Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:42 01 October 2016 Hitler’S Brudervolk

Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:42 01 October 2016 Hitler’s Brudervolk

This is the ﬁ rst academic book on Dutch colonial aspirations and initiatives during WWII. Between the summers of 1941 and 1944, some 5,500 Dutch men and women left their occupied homeland to ﬁ nd employment in the so-called German Occupied Eastern Territories: Belarus, the Baltic countries and parts of Ukraine. This was the area designated for colonization by Germanic people. It was also the stage of the “Holocaust by Bullets,” a centrally coordinated policy of exploitation and oppression and a ruthless anti-partisan war. This book seeks to answer why the Dutch decided to go there, how their recruitment, transfer and stay were organized, and how they reacted to this scene of genocidal violence. It is a close-up study of racial monomania, of empire-building on the old continent and of collaboration in Nazi-occupied Europe.

Geraldien von Frijtag Drabbe Künzel is Assistant Professor of History at Utrecht University. Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:42 01 October 2016 Routledge Studies in Modern European History

1 Facing Fascism 8 From Slave Trade to Empire The Conservative Party and the European Colonisation of Black European dictators 1935–1940 Africa 1780s–1880s Nick Crowson Edited by Olivier Pétré-Grenouilleau 2 French Foreign and Defence Policy, 1918–1940 9 The Russian Revolution The Decline and Fall of a Great of 1905 Power Centenary Perspectives Edited by Robert Boyce Edited by Anthony Heywood and Jonathan D. Smele 3 Britain and the Problem of International Disarmament 10 Weimar Cities 1919–1934 The Challenge of Urban Carolyn Kitching Modernity in Germany John Bingham 4 British Foreign Policy 1874–1914 The Role of India 11 The Nazi Party and Sneh Mahajan the German Foreign Ofﬁ ce 5 Racial Theories in Fascist Italy Hans-Adolf Jacobsen Aaron Gilette and Arthur L. Smith, Jr.

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15 Landscapes of the Western Front 23 History, Memory, and Materiality during the Great War Trans-European Identity Ross J. Wilson Unifying Divisions Aline Sierp 16 West Germans and the Nazi Legacy 24 Constructing a German Caroline Sharples Diaspora The “Greater German 17 Alan S. Milward and a Century Empire,” 1871–1914 of European Change Stefan Manz Edited by Fernando Guirao, Frances M. B. Lynch, and 25 Violence, Memory, and History Sigfrido M. Ramírez Pérez Western Perceptions of Kristallnacht 18 War, Agriculture, and Food Edited by Colin McCullough Rural Europe from the and Nathan Wilson 1930s to the 1950s Edited by Paul Brassley, Yves 26 Turkey and the Rescue Segers and Leen Van Molle of European Jews 19 Totalitarian Dictatorship I. Izzet Bahar New Histories Edited by Daniela Baratieri, 27 Antifascism After Hitler Mark Edele and Giuseppe Finaldi East German Youth and Socialist Memory, 1949–1989 20 Nurses and Midwives in Catherine Plum Nazi Germany The “Euthanasia Programs” 28 Fascism and Ideology Edited by Susan Benedict and Italy, Britain, and Norway Linda Shields Salvatore Garau

Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:42 01 October 2016 21 European Border Regions in 29 Hitler’s Brudervolk Comparison The Dutch and the Colonization Overcoming Nationalistic of Occupied Eastern Europe, Aspects or Re-Nationalization? 1939–1945 Edited by Katarzyna Stokłosa Geraldien von Frijtag and Gerhard Besier Drabbe Künzel This page intentionally left blank Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:42 01 October 2016 Hitler’s Brudervolk The Dutch and the Colonization of Occupied Eastern Europe, 1939–1945

Geraldien von Frijtag Drabbe Künzel Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:42 01 October 2016 First published 2015 by Routledge 711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017 and by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2015 Taylor & Francis The right of Geraldien von Frijtag Drabbe Künzel to be identiﬁ ed as author of this work has been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark Notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identiﬁ cation and explanation without intent to infringe. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Hitler’s Brudervolk : the Dutch and the colonization of occupied Eastern Europe, 1939–1945 / edited by Geraldien von Frijtag Drabbe Künzel. — 1st edition. pages cm. — (Routledge studies in modern European history ; 29) Includes bibliographical references and index. 1. World War, 1939–1945—Occupied territories. 2. World War, 1939–1945—Europe, Eastern. 3. Nationaal-Socialistische Beweging der Nederlanden. 4. Farmers—Netherlands. 5. Colonists—Europe, Eastern— History—20th century. 6. Europe, Eastern—Colonization—History— 20th century. I. Frijtag Drabbe Künzel, G. G. von, author editor of compilation. D802.E92H58 2015 940.53'470893931—dc23 2015011518 ISBN: 978-1-138-80315-2 (hbk) ISBN: 978-1-315-75389-8 (ebk)

Typeset in Sabon by Apex CoVantage, LLC Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:42 01 October 2016 To Claudia and Luukje Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:42 01 October 2016 This page intentionally left blank Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:42 01 October 2016 Contents

List of Abbreviations xi Note on Privacy and Place Names xiii Acknowledgments xv

Introduction 1

1 Hunger for Land 12

2 Pure-Blooded Germanics 25

3 Embarking on a Great Adventure 55

4 Towards Absolute Monopoly 86

5 The Beneﬁ ts of Crime 112

6 Fragments of Colonial Dreams 137

7 The Final Act 170

8 Imperium Neerlandicum 185

Selected Bibliography 191 Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:42 01 October 2016 Index 203 This page intentionally left blank Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:42 01 October 2016 Abbreviations

APA Aussenpolitische Amt der NSDAP BBC British Broadcasting Corporation BfS Beauftrager für Sonderfragen CULANO Commissie tot Uitzending van Landarbeiders naar Oost-Europa DVA Verein für das Deutschtum im Ausland EuL Ernährung und Landwirtschaft Heidemij Nederlandse Heidemaatschappij LBGO Landbewirtschaftungsgesellschaft Ostland LBGU Landbewirtschaftungsgesellschaft Ukraine LO Ostdeutsche Landbewirtschaftungsgesellschaft NOB Nederlandse Oost Bouw NOC Nederlandse Oost Compagnie NOHM Nederlandse Oost Handel Maatschappij NOI Nederlands Oost Instituut NOR Nederlandse Oost Rederij NOV Nederlandse Oost Visserij NSB Nationaal-Socialistische Beweging NSDAP Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei OT Organisation Todt

Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:42 01 October 2016 RKF Reichskommissar für die Festigung deutschen Volkstums RuSHA Rasse- und Siedlungshauptamt SLN Stichting Landverhuizing Nederland SS-FAU SS Frontarbeiter Unternehmen SS-WVHA SS-Wirtschafts- und Verwaltungshauptamt VNV Vlaams Nationaal Verbond VOC Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie xii Abbreviations WA Weerbaarheidsafdelingen ZAST Zentralauftragstelle ZHO Zentral-Handelsgesellschaft Ost für landwirtschaftlichen Absatz und Bedarf Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:42 01 October 2016 Note on Privacy and Place Names

For this book hundreds of personal ﬁ les of the Central Archives for Special Criminal Jurisdiction (CABR) in The Hague have been studied. In the interest of privacy, I have exercised discretion in cases concerning suspects who may be still alive. Therefore, in accordance to CABR policy, I have anony- mized the names of individuals who are born in 1915 or after. This concerns twelve men and women. In the text and in the notes they are referred to by their ﬁ rst names and the initials of their surnames. Between 1850 and 1950, names of towns and regions in this part of Eastern Europe were frequently subject to change, largely corresponding with the nationality of rulers. To complicate things, during the war years German and Dutch authorities re-introduced old Germanic indications of places, invented new names for towns and regions and used ‘Germanized’ transliterations, often inconsistently. For purpose of clarity, the names of places and regions in this book are according to present day spellings. An alternative name is added between brackets when archival research would be severely complicated without knowledge of this second name. Diacritics are omitted. Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:42 01 October 2016 This page intentionally left blank Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:42 01 October 2016 Acknowledgments

The research is done, the book is written—the exciting journey that lasted for fi ve years is over. I owe a great debt to all whom I have met along the way and who have supported me, professionally, fi nancially, mentally, or emotionally. The journey began in the summer of 2010, when I was attending a summer workshop on grassroots perspectives on the Holocaust at Yad Vashem’s International Institute for Holocaust Research, Jerusalem. It was my fi rst presentation on the topic and the reactions from the public inspired me to go ahead. Thanks to research fellowships of this institute and the Gerda Henkel Foundation, I was able to fi nd the time to travel, to study, and to write. I am grateful to Eliot Nidam Orvieto, Dan Michman, and David Silberklang for making my three months stay in Jerusalem such a pleasure. Without exception, the staff of the archives that I have been visiting were friendly and helpful. I thank my colleagues Arunas Bubnys, Chris- toph Dieckmann, Joachim Tauber for answering my inquiries and bringing unknown sources to my attention. Karel Berkhoff’s extensive notes on archival material concerning Dutch men in Ukraine have proven to be indispensable for entering the Central State Archive in Kiev. At the National Archives in The Hague, Michel Ketelaars and Sierk Plantinga exerted themselves, not only to help me, but also dozens of students from Utrecht University that I brought to their door. The students, Roland van Blokland in particular, are the next to deserve my gratitude. As their teacher at Utrecht University I have had the privilege to share my fascination with this topic and to work with and learn from them. Their written portraits of individual men and women who volunteered to go to the occupied eastern territories have been Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:42 01 October 2016 of great value to my work. I am also grateful to the entire team of the Department of Political History for their great spirit of collegiality and collaboration. I am most indebted to Ido de Haan and Peter Romijn, whom I both consider to be extraordinarily dedicated mentors, even in times when I did not deserve it. They devoted many hours to reading through drafts of each chapter and commenting on the entire manuscript. Writing a book is a lonely adventure, which nevertheless affects all life around the author. It requires stamina, from the author, but even more from xvi Acknowledgments the people near. Without the unconditional love, endless patience, and joyful distraction my friends and my family offered me, this book would not have been written. My biggest thanks goes to Claudia and Luukje, who endured my preoccupation with grisly things and accepted that they often shared my attention with this stranger in my study, made of ink and paper. Claudia read every word of the manuscript, gave me in the mildest words advice and critique, and always lent a sympathetic ear. It is to her and our daughter that I dedicate this book. Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:42 01 October 2016 Introduction

In September 1942, a year after German troops had invaded the country, a delegation of six men paid a visit to Ukraine. The delegation had been invited by Erich Koch, appointed Reichskommissar of occupied Ukraine and in this capacity the highest German offi cial of the area. Like most of his personnel, Koch resided in the western Ukrainian town of Rivne. Before the war, Rivne had been a lively city, approximately half of its 50,000 inhabitants being Jewish. German police battalions shot most of them in Novem- ber 1941. Just weeks before the delegation arrived, the ghetto of Rivne was liquidated and the remaining 5,000 Jews of Rivne were murdered in the nearby forest of Kostopil. 1 The six men had not come to Rivne to talk about ‘Jewish affairs.’ Koch asked for their presence to discuss the cultivation and colonization of the area under his supervision. In his opinion, the two phenomena were hardly distinguishable: to secure exploitation of the resources of Ukraine, he deemed it necessary to populate the area with people of Germanic origin. What Koch was promoting was the ideal of Germanization, a political program aiming for consolidation of German rule over larger parts of Central and Eastern Europe, by bringing Germanic people in, at the cost of the non-Germanic local population, and by changing the material world of the area into a Germanic “living space”. Grand designs to realize this revolutionary program were being developed in the course of the Second World War. In occupied Poland and, to a lesser extent, in Czech Bohemia and Moravia, German authorities had made a start with the implementation as early as 1939, most evidently in the annexed Polish district of the Warthegau. Here, hundreds Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:42 01 October 2016 of thousands of non-Germanic inhabitants, mainly Jews and Poles, were chased away to make room for people of Germanic descent. The assault on the Soviet Union added more land to the target-area of Germanization. Large-scale migration was postponed until victory over the Soviet Union would be achieved, but already during the war the fi rst batches of Ger- manic ‘pioneers’ arrived in the vast land of what had become the German occupied eastern territories. Among these pioneers were also men of Dutch nationality, in surprisingly large numbers, and the six men visiting Rivne were here to discuss the 2 Introduction Dutch contribution. All six were Dutch citizens, members of the Dutch National-Socialist Movement (Nationaal-Socialistische Beweging, or NSB) and known in the world of fi nance, business, and agriculture. They were affi liated with the Dutch East Company ( Nederlandse Oost Compagnie, or NOC), an organization that had recently been established to coordinate future activities of Dutch men and fi rms in the East. Under the aegis of the NOC, a handful of Dutch fi rms expanded their business to the East. Several Dutch businessmen were appointed in leading positions of expropriated companies through the agency of the NOC. Some 5,500 Dutch volunteers were recruited by the organization for work in the occupied eastern territories. The NOC was responsible for their transport, care, and the payment of their salaries. Various properties were leased by the NOC itself and in both Lithuania and Ukraine an agricultural education center for Dutch recruits was opened. In September 1943 it was estimated that through the NOC the sum of twelve million guilders 2 was invested in Dutch initiatives in the occupied eastern territories. Two years after the war, the NOC still owed the Dutch state some eighteen million guilders. In no other occupied country did the program of Germanization receive so much support as in the Netherlands. Germanization is a well-researched topic. In the 1990s, after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the subsequent opening up of Eastern European archives, several important studies were written, particularly on the genesis of Nazis’ grand designs for Central and Eastern Europe, 3 and on the racist tenets and extreme brutality of Nazi policy in this area. 4 Some authors briefl y mention the Dutch enterprise, but as an initiative steered and controlled by Germans. 5 In the only publication dedicated to the Dutch contribution to the Ger- manization program, it is portrayed as an example of Nazi megalomania, a series of crazy projects doomed to fail, a historical curiosum that began and ended with Nazi rule in Europe. 6 In all works the main characters are Germans; the geographical scope of research is their radius of action in the occupied East. As is convincingly argued by Mark Mazower, 7 Nazi empire-building did not just involve Central and Eastern Europe. The desired Greater Germanic Reich entailed a drastic reordering of the entire map of Europe and involved uniting all people of Germanic descent into an exclusive, European ruling elite. Thus, Germanization of the areas conquered in Central and Eastern Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:42 01 October 2016 Europe was only one, albeit important, ingredient of Nazi empire-building; the other was the establishment of a solid alliance ‘of blood,’ between Germans in and Germanic people outside the Altreich . The engagement of Dutch men in the program of Germanization high- lights the interconnectedness of both sides of Nazi empire-building. The Dutch were given a chance in the occupied eastern territories because of their supposed racial quality: as fellow Germanics they were allowed, even encouraged, to enter the area, to develop various economic initiatives, and to prepare for permanent settlement. Introduction 3 In Belgian Flanders, in Norway and Denmark, even in occupied France, German offi cials looked for Germanic partners, to no avail. Only in the Netherlands were the preconditions for success present. In this small neighboring country, the needed fi nancial means were accessible as the main driving force behind the NOC was also president of the Dutch National Bank. In the story of Dutch involvement in the occupied East the name of this man, Meinoud Rost van Tonningen, cannot be left out, but his personal infl uence and functional power do not explain the magnitude of Dutch collaboration. In the summer of 1941, a year before Rost van Tonningen’s appearance on stage, Dutch senior civil servants had already decided to cooperate and sent some four hundred Dutch farmers to the occupied eastern territories. These offi cials were neither national-socialists nor sympathizing with the racist creeds of Germanization. They had agreed to offer their support for economic reasons: in the short term, they expected to receive additional fodder for the Dutch home front; in the long run, they hoped to acquire the land so much needed for Dutch peasants. Their concern was Dutch agriculture, i.e. the Dutch food supplies and the shortage of land within the Dutch national borders. The issue of lack of land was not new, but had been on the Dutch political agenda for quite some time. With birth rates, particularly in Dutch rural districts, remaining high, mass unemployment amongst Dutch peasants was feared long before the war. In the 1920s and 1930s, there was a growing body of public opinion that the Dutch government should actively engage in population policy in order to halt the rural overpopulation. A gigantic land reclamation project was started to drain a large inland sea (Zuiderzee), but it was feared that this would be barely enough to release Dutch peasantry from population pressure. Land was needed—and was to be found outside the Dutch borders. Years before the delegation left for Ukraine, the fi rst cautious steps on the path of state-sponsored emigration were made. From May 1940 onwards, German authorities, in need of manpower, were soon picking up the signals. In the summer of 1941, a year before the founding of the NOC, agreement was reached on the employment of Dutch farmers in the occupied East. However, the operation was far from smooth and in general German authorities were disappointed about the caliber of most pioneers. They were said to be politically indifferent, picky, and unwilling to perform extra or different work. For their part, Dutch volun- Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:42 01 October 2016 teers were highly dissatisfi ed with their reception in the occupied East. They complained about their long stays in transfer camps and their subordination to German bosses. Early 1942, Alfred Rosenberg, Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories, claimed the employment of Germanic non-Germans in the occupied East. Consequently, his men within the Ostministerium were sent to the Netherlands to discuss the matter again. They successfully approached Rost van Tonningen and like-minded companions. From that moment, the Dutch enterprise politicized. Rost van Tonningen, befriended with Himmler, was 4 Introduction a passionate supporter of the so-called Greater Germanic Reich. Linking up with the recent revaluation of the assumed Germanic roots of the Dutch people, the NOC attempted to gain support for its work in the occupied East and its contribution to the buildup of a new community of men that would exceed national borders and political divisions, but was united by race. At the same time the agenda of the NOC was fi lled with older national issues. The NOC, too, aimed for settler colonialism in order to diminish the population pressure in Dutch rural districts. But the aims of the NOC reached further. Its offi cials wished the occupied eastern territories to offer opportunities to all men of adventurous spirit and to serve as a new market for all sectors of the Dutch economy that needed an extra impulse and/or were hit by the war. Amply supported by the NOC, Dutch peat experts, building-companies, fi shermen, dredgers, carriers, and others tried their luck in Ukraine, Belarus, or one of the Baltic countries. Above all, the occupied eastern territories were designated as a substitution for the lost markets of Dutch maritime colonies. Since May 1940, Dutch overseas trade had dropped. The colonial markets, mainly in the Dutch East Indies, were cut off and colonial trading and cultivation companies in the Netherlands were basically out of business. The Japanese attack and the subsequent surrender of Dutch colonial troops to the Japanese army exacerbated the situation; to some it even seemed that the Dutch East Indies were lost for good. In search of new markets, the occupied eastern territories presented themselves as a suitable and highly promising alternative. New colonial activity also may have been needed to keep up national esteem. In the Netherlands, like in other European nations with colonies, the overseas possessions were an essential part of national identity. In the eyes of Rost van Tonningen, the initiatives in the occupied eastern territories would make up for the loss of the Dutch East Indies and hence restore the nation’s prestige as a colonial power. The name he chose for his new organization was telling: just by association, the NOC recalled the glorious years of the Dutch East India Company ( Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie, or VOC), when Dutch ships controlled the worldwide trade in spices and cash crops, a colony of farmers was created in the Cape of Africa, and Dutch rule was established in Java. Thus, the Dutch support to the Nazi policy of Germanization was not just an instance of Nazi megalomania. Behind the rhetoric of Nazism hid a Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:42 01 October 2016 national agenda, covering long lasting issues of national concern. In order to solve the problem of overpopulation, settlements of Dutch peasants were to be established in continental Eastern Europe; in order to keep up Dutch colonial grandeur, economic investments and colonial trade with this area were to be stimulated. Realizing these aims turned out to be much more diffi cult than expected. The target-area of Dutch (settler) colonialism was not the vast, fertile, and empty land of Nazi propaganda. Heavy military fi ghting had left its marks and by the time the Dutch arrived, the harshness of German rule had Introduction 5 touched most parts of the occupied eastern territories, turning the area into killing fi elds. Albeit military hinterland until late 1943, the German war on partisans, forced labor policy, economic plundering and starvation program, and above all ‘the Holocaust by bullets’ made millions of civilian casualties. In these lands, the Dutch were rarely welcomed with open arms. As they had come to the area in the slipstream of their German brothers, their presence was met with mistrust and hostility by the local population. And like Germans, Dutch men fell victim to partisan attacks. Dreams of Dutch peasants’ settlements and (colonial) trade soon shattered. Moreover, in the climate of brutal violence, Germanic brotherhood did not persist.

This book tells the story of Dutch engagement in the exploitation and colonization of the occupied eastern territories. Whereas most studies on Germanization tend to favor a bird’s eye perspective and concentrate on the plans and policies of German central and local authorities, 8 this book combines macro-, meso-, and micro-level perspectives and puts Dutch organizers and recruits in the spotlight. Integrating different perspectives is particularly effective because of the wealth of sources. The hundreds of postwar judicial fi les of former NOC-offi cials and recruits concerning collaboration trials offer insight in their personal and social background, their motives, expectations, and experiences. The original archives of supervisory bodies like the NOC have been largely saved from the fl ames that destroyed so many offi cial documents in the last phase of the war. These collections also include correspondence with individual recruits and representatives in the area. Rich documentation of the Ostministerium, on the involvement of Dutch and other nationals, is kept in the National Archives in Berlin. In Kiev and Vilnius smaller collections of documents of German local offi cials are at the researcher’s disposal. Although this book is about scaling down and, in a more methodological sense, about the benefi ts of micro-history, it is not a reconstruction of everyone’s everyday life. The dramatis personae are those Dutch civilians who enthusiastically contributed to the exploitation and colonization of the occupied eastern territories. This book shows how support for the German- ization program was born, how national-socialist ideals and national considerations were interwoven and how this support materialized. By seeking the grassroots of the colonization enterprise, it lays bare the dynamics of the Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:42 01 October 2016 relations the Dutch found themselves in: with Germans, yet also with the local—Jewish and non-Jewish—population. The story of Dutch involvement in the exploitation and colonization of parts of Eastern Europe touches upon various topics in historiography. A fi rst main topic is that of collaboration. During the fi rst postwar years, in the Netherlands as well as in other former occupied Western European countries, collaborators were usually met with condemnation and retribution. 9 An inclination to judge and renounce was refl ected in literature. Authors of more recent studies have moved away from this perspective. Their work 6 Introduction presents a wide variety of motives and reasons for collaboration and a large range of forms of cooperation. 10 This study of German-Dutch cooperation looks at the Dutch rationale behind their engagement and seeks to understand how national aspirations and transnational ideals in this instance of collaboration were balanced and translated into policy. The focus is on the distribution of power between the two partners. The study departs from the premise that for a successful cooperation a convergence of interests was more important than political consensus. Second, the book ties in with recent debates on the nature of the Nazi empire. Although Nazi rule in Europe lasted for just a few years, scholars tend to agree that Nazi expansionism, above all towards Eastern and Central Europe, was an instance of imperialism. The question here is what kind of empire was aimed for: how was this particular case of empire-building related to other examples of empire-building? Many authors see connections with more traditional forms of late nineteenth-, early twentieth-century European and German imperialism. 11 They notice similarities in mentalities and practices and some, like Jürgen Zimmerer, argue that in their maritime colonies Germans developed a racist mind-set that paved the way to genocidal violence against Jewish and non-Jewish inhabitants of the occupied East. 12 Others point at parallels with the continental empires that ruled larger parts of Europe until the end of the First World War. Philipp Ther, for instance, draws our attention to the ‘colonial characteristics’ of Prussian rule in Poland before 1918. 13 In their introduction to a volume on imperial borderlands, editors Omar Bartov and Eric D. Weitz state that the expansionist ambitions of the Nazis and their policy in the occupied East should be considered in this tradition of continental empire-building, even though their empire-building absorbed at least ‘some of the characteristics of the nation state by asserting the importance of one ethnic group.’ 14 This close-up study of Nazi empire-building aims to further explore its nature. It is expected that by zooming in on two different target-zones and on two different agents a more differentiated picture of Nazi empire-building will be obtained. Because of the country’s rich tradition of colonial conquest, the Dutch case appears to be particularly interesting.

The fi rst two chapters of this book survey how trends in prewar Dutch history fl owed into the Dutch enterprise in the occupied eastern territories. First I show how the concept of empire had become prominent in this small Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:42 01 October 2016 North Sea country. Although the Dutch had been long renowned for their territorial expansion, the grip of the motherland fi rmed substantially from the late nineteenth century onwards, in particular with regard to the Dutch East Indies. In order to gain full control over the Indonesian archipelago, war was waged against native rulers. In the same period of time, the Dutch East Indies developed into a primary destination for Dutch emigrants. They were the upper class of a racially stratifi ed society that was built upon the legal and social discrimination of ‘natives.’ When war hit Europe in 1939, the Dutch East Indies were still considered the cornerstone of the Dutch nation-state, both in economic and political respects. Introduction 7 E migration to other destinations than the Dutch colonies was still modest in the nineteenth century, but picked up during the interwar years. This was largely a consequence of the ongoing misère of Dutch agriculture. Since the late 1870s, Dutch peasantry had been hit by consecutive crises. In Dutch governmental circles it was commonly believed that overpopulation of Dutch rural areas was the core of the problem. Gradually, the Dutch government started to intervene. To illustrate the increase of governmental engagement in the Netherlands, I discuss various measures taken by the Dutch government in the early twentieth century to release Dutch peasantry: relief programs, land reclamation projects, and state-sponsored emigration. The birth of the idea of a Greater Germanic Reich, targeted at Central and Eastern as well as Western and Northern Europe, is at the heart of chapter 2. During the interwar years, national identity was at stake in both neighboring countries. In Germany, curtailed by Versailles, national borders felt ‘unnatural’ and soon concepts of Volk and a cross-border Germanic identity gained in popularity. In the Netherlands, ethnologists and folklorists of name advocated a revaluation of Germanic ancestry of the Dutch people. After the German invasion of the Netherlands, they joined forces with racial experts of SS and Party and transformed the highly biologized idea of a shared Germanic descent into policy. An effective Dutch incorporation into the Greater Germanic Reich was presented as a restoration of the natural order of things. The supposed racial kinship of Dutch and Germans also paved the way to Dutch involvement in the exploitation and colonization of the occupied eastern territories. In the next two chapters (chapters 3 and 4) I discuss how this involvement was effectively organized. Just a few weeks after the German attack on the Soviet Union, the fi rst batches of Dutch peasants were selected for work in Germany’s occupied eastern territories. The operation was coordinated by Dutch and German experts in agriculture and, although employment in occupied territory was intrinsically political, the political dimension of the operation was played down to the general public. The offi cials presented the transfer of hundreds of Dutch farmers as an economic affair, needed for the acquisition of extra food and farming land. Experiences of the volunteers showed that preparations had been poor, both by German and by Dutch authorities, in the Netherlands as well as locally. From early summer 1942 onwards, the operation was handed to others and within a short Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:42 01 October 2016 period of time it changed into a highly politicized enterprise. What had begun as a quest for arable land and crops now evolved into a wide range of Dutch initiatives in the economic life of the occupied eastern territories. Supervised by Rosenberg’s Ostministerium, the NOC was coordinating the new and considerably enlarged enterprise. Huge investments were made to create a solid umbrella organization, including a head offi ce in The Hague and several offi ces of representatives on the spot. Specialists were sent on fact-fi nding trips and for various branches of economic activities separate daughter companies were founded. By late 1943, the NOC was in charge of several properties in the occupied eastern territories and took care of some 8 Introduction 5,500 volunteers employed in the area. In the NOC’s extensive propaganda campaigns the possibilities seemed unlimited: the occupied eastern territories were virgin land, there to explore and exploit for ‘the greater good,’ ‘a new Europe’—the Greater Germanic Reich. In effect, the recruits had little knowledge of the area they were moving to. As members of the NSB, they generally agreed with the ideological dimension of their mission. They pictured the occupied eastern territories as uncivilized and uncultivated, colonial ground: to these farthest corners of Europe they would bring culture, economic growth, and a new cast of leaders. Arguably, most men thought of themselves as superior to the local population and for some the Dutch East Indian society served as frame of reference. They were soon to fi nd out that the occupied eastern territories did not remotely resemble the Dutch East Indies. In the next three chapters (chapters 5–7), I present a new perspective from within the project of Nazi empire-building. My focus is largely on the Dutch men (and women) and their daily life in this part of occupied Europe. Here I describe the internal cohesion of their communities, their relations with supervisory bodies, in The Hague and locally, and their encounters with others in the area. In chapter 5, I concentrate on Dutch responses to the persecution of Jews. When the fi rst Dutch recruits arrived in the occupied eastern territories, the Holocaust by bullets was at its height. The obvious maltreatment of Jews was new to most of the Dutch civilians. In their occupied homeland, Jews had been submitted to a series of discriminatory laws since late 1940, but publicly displayed acts of violence had been rare. Nevertheless, the majority of Dutch were quick to adapt to the new order. Both recruits and offi cials of the NOC took advantage of the anti-Jewish policy in the area and this chapter illustrates how in this particular case Germanization entwined with the Holocaust. Due to the killing of Jewish artisans, Dutch craftsmen could fi nd employ. Farms, factories, houses, and other goods that used to belong to Jewish owners were vacant and offered to Dutch men. In some places Dutch volunteers directly profi ted of the low cost of Jewish labor. In their lives, the ghetto was a low-wage reservoir, where they could fi nd cheap workers and buy supplies at bottom prices. Although there is no evidence of participation in shootings and other direct anti-Jewish aggression, the Dutch enterprise as a whole gained from Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:42 01 October 2016 the German policy against Jews. Profi teers of the deadlock situation Jews were in, the Dutch represent a still little studied group of agents in the history of the Holocaust, crossing the border between perpetrators and bystanders. Moreover, their rapid acclimatization gives an indication of the extent of anti-Semitism amongst Dutch Nazis. A closer look in NSB newspapers makes clear that what started with pinpricks before the war progressed into a full-blown attack on Jews from May 1940 onwards. Depicting Eastern European Jews as a body of foreign (Bolshevist) oppressors, the Dutch presented and embraced their removal as an act of liberation. In the prospective Introduction 9 Greater Germanic Reich as seen by Dutch adherents, stretching from the North Sea coast to the Caucasus, there was no place for Jews. Jews were doomed to extinction, yet non-Jews of the area were not— even though German plans anticipated a sharp drop in their numbers. In chapters 6 and 7, I discuss the way Dutch civilians related to the non-Jewish local population in the area. Examining NOC-directives and reactions ‘from the fl oor,’ I show how colonial debates resonated in the context of the occupied eastern territories. Among the Dutch, there was agreement on the different make-up of the predominantly Slavic population. The supposed Slavic inferiority was often caught in colonial stereotypes of the lazy, dirty, untrustworthy, and uncivilized ‘other.’ On how to behave towards these ‘others’ opinions differed. Whereas some perceived their own presence as part of a civilizing mission and therefore wished to respect the rights of local people, others reasoned that their Germanic superiority legitimated a more brutal approach. Arguably, the number of the last group swelled as frictions multiplied in the course of the war. With the advance of the Red Army violence in the area escalated. In reaction to the increase of German coercion, popular dissent and partisan activities expanded—and vice versa. In this spiral of violence the position of the Dutch civilians was delicate. Equated with Germans by locals and partisans, the Dutch felt downgraded by their German brothers. The heart of the matter was the lack of clarity on the place of Germany within the future Greater Germanic Reich. In the rhetoric of propaganda all Germanic people were equal, but in the reality of occupied Eastern Europe, an area largely conquered by German military force alone, Germans took the lead. Thus, this book shows that in the heat of war the experiment in Germanic brotherhood failed. By the summer of 1944, apart from those imprisoned by the Red Army or killed by partisans, all Dutch civilians had left the area. After the Allied liberation of the Netherlands they were investigated and tried. In the context of their postwar judicial proceedings the Dutch contribution to the Germanization program became national-socialist history, in all facets alien to Dutch national history. In the fi nal chapter of this book (chapter 8) I recapitulate the major fi ndings of my research. Support for the exploitation and colonization of the German occupied eastern territories also existed in higher circles of the Dutch administration. Dutch senior offi - Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:42 01 October 2016 cials, without ties to the Nazi Movement, joined in for they hoped to solve what they considered the main problem of Dutch agriculture: the shortage of arable land within Dutch national borders. The occupied eastern territories seemed to offer a chance to release redundant peasants. This argument did not lose its strength when the operation was taken over by the NOC, an organization fi rmly rooted in the Dutch National-Socialist Movement, passionately championing the racist fundaments of a Greater Germanic Reich. The NOC, too, worried about Dutch peasantry and thought to solve its problems by transplanting large groups of farmers to the eastern part of 10 Introduction continental Europe. On top of that, as the main Dutch overseas colonial possession was lost to Japan, this area was thought to present new colonial markets and a way to restore Dutch colonial splendor. As a program of community building based on racial exclusivity, carried out with ruthless ferocity, Germanization of the occupied East was without precedence or aftereffects. The Dutch initiatives in the occupied eastern territories, however, built largely upon longer trends in Dutch history. A preview of the fi rst postwar years on the last pages of this book illustrates that only after the war the two main national issues in this operation—concerning the nation’s imperial status and agricultural strength—were brought to an end.

NOTES

1. On the Holocaust in Volhynia, see: Shmuel Spector, The Holocaust of Volhyn- ian Jews, 1941–1944 (Jerusalem: Yad Vashem, 1990). 2 . This sum is to be equated with some 75 million Euros, or 102 million USD, in 2014. 3 . Czes ław Madajczyk (ed.), Vom Generalplan Ost zum Generalsiedlungsplan (München, etc.: Saur, 1994); Mechtild Rössler and Sabine Schleiermacher (eds.), Der “Generalplan Ost”: Hauptlinien der nationalsozialistischen Planungs- und Vernichtungspolitik (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1993). 4 . Dieter Pohl, Von der “Judenpolitik” zum Judenmord: Der Distrikt Lublin des Generalgouverenments, 1939–1944 (Frankfurt/M: Lang, 1993); Dieter Pohl, Nationalsozialistische Judenverfolgung in Ostgalizien 1941–1944: Orga- nisation und Durchführung eines staatlichen Massenverbrechens (München: Oldenbourg, 1996); Christian Gerlach, Kalkulierte Morde: Die deutsche Wirtschafts- und Vernichtungspolitik in Weissrussland 1941 bis 1944 (Hamburg: Hamburger Edition, 1999); Thomas Sandkühler, “Endlösung” in Galizien: Der Judenmord in Ostpolen und die Rettungsinitiativen von Berthold Beitz 1941–1944 (Bonn: Dietz, 1996); Götz Aly and Susanne Heim, Vordenker der Vernichtung: Auschwitz und die deutsche Pläne für eine neue europäische Ordnung (Hamburg: Hoffmann und Campe, 1991). 5 . Mark Mazower, Hitler’s Empire: Nazi Rule in Occupied Europe (London/ New York: Allen Lane, 2008), 218; Hans Umbreit, ‘Auf dem Weg zur Konti- nentalherrschaft’, in: Bernard R. Kroener, Rolf-Dieter Müller and Hans Umbreit (eds.), Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg V/1 (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1998), 247–248; Christoph Dieckmann, Deutsche Besatzungspolitik in Litauen 1941–1944 (Göttingen: Wallstein Verlag, 2011), 779–780. Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:42 01 October 2016 6 . David Barnouw, Oostboeren, zeegermanen en turfstekers: Kolonisatie tijdens de Tweede Wereldoorlog (Amsterdam: Bert Bakker, 2004). 7 . Mazower, Hitler’s Empire . 8 . An important exception is the study of Elizabeth Harvey, Women and the Nazi East: Agents and Witnesses of Germanization (New Haven/London: Yale Uni- versity Press, 2003). 9 . In countries of the Soviet bloc a general reluctance to face the issue of ‘indigenous’ collaboration prevailed. In the public discourse Germany was given sole responsibility for crimes against the population. For an overview, see: Roni Stauber (ed.), Collaboration with the Nazis: Public Discourse after the Holocaust (New York/London: Routledge, 2014). Introduction 11 10 . For a brief impression of recent historiographical developments in the Neth- erlands, see: Ido de Haan and Peter Romijn, ‘Nieuwe geschiedschrijving van de collaboratie’, BMGN 124/3 (2009), 323–328. See also: Josje Damsma and Erik Schumacher, Hier woont een NSB’er: Nationalsocialisten in bezet Amsterdam (Amsterdam: Boom, 2010). 11 . See, amongst others: Shelley Baranowski, Nazi Empire: German Colonialism and Imperialism from Bismarck to Hitler (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011); Donald Bloxham et al., ‘Europe in the World: Systems and Cul- tures of Violence’, in: Donald Bloxham and Robert Gerwarth (eds.), Political Violence in Twentieth-Century Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 11–39; Wendy Lower, Nazi Empire-Building and the Holocaust in Ukraine (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2005); David Furber and Wendy Lower, ‘Colonialism and Genocide in Nazi-Occupied Poland and Ukraine’, in: A. Dirk Moses (ed.), Empire, Colony, Genocide : Conquest, Occupation, and Subaltern Resistance in World History (Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2008), 372–402; Dominik J. Schaller, ‘Kolonialkrieg, Völkermord und Zwangsarbeit in “Deutsch-Südwestafrika”’, in: Dominik J. Schaller, Rupen Boyadjian et al. (eds.), Enteignet, vertrieben, ermordert: Beiträge zur Genozidforschung (Zürich: Chronos, 2004), 147–232. 12 . Jürgen Zimmerer, ‘The Birth of the “Ostland” out of the Spirit of Colonialism: A Postcolonial Perspective on the Nazi Policy of Conquest and Extermina- tion’, in: A. Dirk Moses and Dan Stone (eds.), Colonialism and Genocide (London, etc.: Routledge, 2007), 101–123; Jürgen Zimmerer, Von Windhuk nach Auschwitz: Beiträge zum Verhältnis von Kolonialismus und Holocaust (Münster: LTI, 2007). Also: Benjamin Madley, ‘From Africa to Auschwitz: How German South West Africa Incubated Ideas and Methods Adopted and Developed by the Nazis in Eastern Europe’, European History Quarterly 35 (2005), 429–464. 13 . Philipp Ther, ‘Deutsche Geschichte als imperiale Geschichte: Polen, slawophone Minderheiten und das Kaiserreich als kontinentales Empire’, in: Sebastian Conrad and Jürgen Osterhammel (eds.), Das Kaiserreich transnational: Deutschland in der Welt 1871–1914 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2004), 129–148. 14 . Omer Bartov and Eric D. Weitz, ‘Introduction: Coexistence and Violence in the German, Habsburg, Russian and Ottoman Borderlands,’ in: Omer Bartov and Eric D. Weitz (eds.), Shatterzone of Empires: Coexistence and Violence in the German, Habsburg, Russian and Ottoman Borderlands (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2013), 3. Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:42 01 October 2016 1 Hunger for Land

The Dutch is, like his kinsmen (stamverwanten ) of Germanic descent, and contrary to southern people, hefty and sturdily built. The pur- est expression of this type one still ﬁ nds in our villages on the coast and on the islands in our seas. Yet (. . .) the Dutch is more heavy and coarse rather than muscled. This is true in particular with regard to the inhabitants of the low, watery lands of the provinces of Holland and Zeeland. In our larger cities more blending with foreign blood is visible (. . .) Living close together, less light and air, bad housing, poor food, work that requires little exercise and physical strength, more temptation to indecency—behold the various causes that hold the urban population back. 1

These words were written in 1871 by Robert Jacobus Fruin. Eleven years before, Fruin was installed as the fi rst professor of Dutch national history at Leiden University. The foundation of this chair at the oldest and most renowned of the Dutch universities underscored the value Dutch authorities attached to the study of national history. The young academic discipline was founded to increase awareness of a shared past. It was generally believed that knowledge of the nation’s past could produce a collective identity. Fruin was a formidable chair for more than thirty years. In his writings he repeatedly asserted that the Dutch people, in his eyes a branch of the Germanic tribe (stam), were characterized by their love of freedom, their phlegmatic attitude in life, their sternness, their industriousness, and their commercial instincts: they were a people of reticent, thrifty farmers who successfully cultivated and reclaimed land and were competent tradesmen Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:42 01 October 2016 who sailed the seas to fi nd new markets and established rule over ‘vast territories on the other side of the ocean.’ 2 According to Fruin, the preservation of these overseas acquisitions was of national importance—not only as a source of revenue, but also as a confi rmation of Dutch power on the world stage: without colonies and people overseas, the Netherlands would slide down into a third-class country.3 Clearly, Fruin’s opinions and efforts should be considered in the broader context of increased nationalism in nineteenth-century Europe. National- ism also gave rise to a more aggressive policy outside the continent, where Hunger for Land 13 European powers contended with each other over land, markets, and resources. In their quest for new colonies they continuously tried to oust each other. The main purpose of the international conferences in Berlin in 1884 and 1885 was to regulate the ‘Scramble for Africa’ in an orderly fashion, yet in reality the rivalries persisted. 4 During this wave of ‘new imperialism’ most of the European empires also fi rmed up their grip on their colonies’ population. Buoyed up Social-Darwinist ideas of fi xed racial hierarchies, military expeditions were carried out to submit the local population to the colo- nizer’s authority. In turn, these military triumphs in the colonies reinforced nationalism at home.5 For a long time the commonly held opinion amongst Dutch historians was that both interconnected phenomena—nationalism and new imperialism— simply passed by the Netherlands: the chauvinistic fever that touched so many in Europe did not infect the Dutch crowds and government. At the very most there was some degree of ‘cultural nationalism’—a concept introduced by Jan Bank in 1990, referring to the memorialization of the main purveyors of Dutch seventeenth-century culture.6 Rembrandt, Frans Hals, and the poet Joost van den Vondel, each exponents of the Dutch Golden Age, epitomized this Dutch nationalistic movement. They entered the Dutch public sphere with statues in their honor and having streets named after them. Dutch nationalism certainly found its expression in the glorifi cation of the nation’s cultural heritage, yet the Golden Age was not the only jewel that shone. The overseas Dutch colonies, the Boer colonies in southern Africa, and Germanic Antiquity also became prime sources of nationalistic zeal in the Netherlands. Dutch overseas possessions gained in importance, both for economic and political reasons. In the motherland, Dutch conquests were celebrated more than ever before. At the same time, the Dutch Germanic past was rediscovered. It was believed that Germanic customs, culture, and character (volksaard) were best preserved in Dutch peasantry and, thus, the reassess- ment of Germanic ancestry was often coupled with an idolization of rural life.7 Hence, Dutch nationalism, although a species of its own, encompassed more than the fi eld of art and culture. Dutch people also gave vent to their nationalist feelings by honoring their country’s colonizing power, their supposed Germanic roots, and Dutch country life. At the same time, these sources of nationalist inspiration were experiencing some changes. Marked as matters of national concern, both Dutch agriculture and colonial rule were Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:42 01 October 2016 being placed high on the political agenda. From the nineteenth century onwards, the nation’s prime Dutch colony (the Dutch East Indies) as well as Dutch agriculture were subject to state-led intervention.

THE FARMERS AND THE PEOPLE

‘Farmer is an honorary title and the task of the farmer is of the highest order. Firstly, there’s the task of supplying food for our people. 14 Hunger for Land What is more important, is the mental and spiritual task: providing a healthy offspring, preserving our folk culture ( volkseigen cultuur ) and protecting our moral and ethical values. That is the essence of farmer’s life.’8

Evert Jan Roskam was born in 1892 in Barneveld, a small village in the central part of the Netherlands. Most members of his family were active in agriculture: Roskam’s father ran a small business in food products. At the age of fi fteen Roskam became his father’s youngest employee. Five years later he took over his father’s job. Roskam enjoyed his new position only for two years. In 1924, he was bankrupt and Roskam left Barneveld to move to Amsterdam, where he set up a new company. Unfortunately for Roskam, this company also was liquidated. 9 By then Roskam had found another focal point in life. The young, unsuc- cessful businessman from the rural town of Barneveld became one of the main political agitators of the Dutch National-Socialist Movement. Roskam’s membership dates from 1934, three years after the NSB was founded. Within the Movement Roskam revealed himself as the main advocate of the doctrine of ‘blood and soil’ (Blut und Boden) in the Netherlands. Blown from across the border, this doctrine was rooted in German ruralism, burgeoning at the turn of the century and coming into bloom in the 1920s. The German agronomist Walther Darré was one of its most ardent followers. Already before he joined the German Nazi Party in 1930, Darré had published on German farmers which he considered the ‘new nobility’ of society. In writings and speeches he glorifi ed rural life and the indissoluble bond between a people and the land they lived on and cultivated.10 In the early 1930s Roskam set himself up as the spokesman and leader of the Dutch peasantry within the NSB. In his vision the Dutch were essentially Germanic farmers, with an aversion of modernity yet respectful of their surroundings and community. As opposed to townspeople they were the true keepers of Dutch customs and traditions: in their way of life the Germanic heritage lived on. Farmer became a sobriquet for the ‘real’ Dutch.11 This penchant for farmers and ancient Germanic history was characteristic of Dutch national-socialism, yet it was not the sole province of Roskam and his political associates. Since the end of the nineteenth century, folklorists and alike traveled to the countryside and studied the farmers’ time-honored Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:42 01 October 2016 traditions, purportedly Germanic customs, handed on from father to son. In these days the study of folklore received ample attention. Folk dancing in particular became popular. Some lobbied to get ethnology academic recognition and anchoring.12 The First World War sparked a renewal of public interest in folk culture and history in the Netherlands. The country had successfully kept its position of neutrality and stayed out of the war, yet four years of fi ghting by its neighbors also affected Dutch society. It was deemed necessary to redefi ne national identity, all the more because Belgian authorities made territorial claims to Dutch land. 13 In this climate, the star of some Hunger for Land 15 folklorists and ethnologists rocketed. Folklorist Dirk Jan van der Ven, for example, attracted a larger audience with seminars on folk culture and folk dancing. In his writings he did not mince matters: Dutch peasantry was the true bearer of Dutch, Germanic culture. 14 Conspicuous was also the gain of authority of Jan de Vries, professor of Ancient Germanic Language and Literature in Leiden since 1926. For years De Vries lobbied for revaluation of Germanic Antiquity. Loyalty to tribe and family were virtues of Ger- manic tribal life, De Vries argued: the same ordering principles were still in force in rural communities.15 The glorifi cation of Dutch peasantry is rather surprising, for agriculture in the Netherlands was in a permanent state of emergency since the 1870s. The global agrarian crisis of 1870 had hit the Dutch economy hard and thousands of peasants had left the countryside for the city. 16 Modernization was putting pressure on Dutch farming methods, as machines took over jobs of men. Urbanization caused population pressure to build up. Between 1850 and 1925, the Dutch population had grown from three to over seven million people. Where once were fi elds and cattle, towns and houses emerged. Scarcity of land had become a major concern in this small country surrounded by and drenched in water. Aware of this problem, the Dutch government gradually took on a more active role in the reclamation of land within Dutch national borders. Set up by larger landowners in 1888, the Dutch Heathland Society ( Nederlandse Heidemaatschappij , or Heidemij) aimed for the cultivation of wasteland to create additional land for Dutch peasantry. Members of the board were often also members of government and central administration. During the First World War ties with the government grew even stronger. In order to halt unemployment, the Dutch government came up with a program of relief works that often involved land development projects. The supervision of these works was handed down to the Heidemij. In 1915 the fi rst group of unemployed workers was put to work.17 The Dutch government also engaged in larger hydraulic projects to reclaim land from the water. Not far from the city of Amsterdam, a committee headed by the Dutch king had supervised the drainage of a larger lake (Haarlemmermeer). In the 1920s, a start was made to close off and drain a huge inland sea (Zuiderzee). A dam was built to connect the island of Wieringen to the mainland and in 1926 a very small part of the Zuiderzee was Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:42 01 October 2016 surrounded by dikes and pumped dry. Four years later, the fi rst larger polder of some 5,000 acres of land was created. 18 It was not enough to prevent another crisis. Caused by a new plummet of prices on the global market, massive unemployment struck the Dutch countryside again and thousands of farmers, agricultural and seasonal workers lost their jobs. 19 Following the example set by governments abroad, Dutch authorities initiated major relief programs. Again the Heidemij was the main supervising body. Com- pared to the relief works the Heidemij had undertaken in the First World War, the new projects were gigantic. Thousands of unemployed were forced 16 Hunger for Land to perform hard manual labor: by 1939, some 68,000 men were employed by the Heidemij. They were digging canals, laying out parks, cutting trees, cleaning heathland, etcetera.20 Despite governmental support and popular revaluation of Dutch rural life, farmers and peasants remained vulnerable because of the structural shortage of land and population pressure. The reclamation of land from the sea and the cultivation of wasteland offered some, but seemingly not suffi cient relief. In this context, emigration became en vogue. For quite some time, emigration fi gures in the Netherlands had been remarkable low. Between 1820 and 1920, some fi fty million Europeans left their country: the percentage of Dutch emigrants was negligible.21 The crises in agriculture forced people out of their jobs, but had mainly led to a seasonal exodus of Dutch workers to German farms and factories. Until the 1920s, permanent emigration had been only an option for a few thousands of Dutch citizens per year.22 Traditionally, Dutch governmental support for emigration had been lukewarm. Politicians feared to lose the best men and also understood emigration as social criticism. Gradually, the viewpoints altered and after the First World War Dutch governments began to stimulate emigration. In 1913 the Dutch Society of Emigration (Nederlandse Vereniging Landverhuiz- ing) was established. Ten years later the Centre for Emigration (Emigratie Centrale Holland) was formed. Finally, in 1931, the Centre and Society merged into a foundation (Stichting Landverhuizing Nederland, or SLN) that was completely fi nanced by the government. 23 Whereas the Dutch government had been reluctant to help its nationals to leave the country, the SLN positioned itself as the main advertiser of emigration. Once politicians and administrators had come to realize that an active emigration policy could be expedient to dispose of the surplus (unemployed) population, they became passionate sponsors. 24 In one of his writings Jan Hartland, president of the SLN since 1931, aptly expressed the government’s point of view. A ‘healthy trek’ to foreign country would be a highly effective weapon to combat unemployment, Hartland proclaimed: it would benefi t Dutch society as a whole and Dutch agriculture in particular. Candidates for emigration should be drawn from the rural districts of the Netherlands.25 Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:42 01 October 2016 ‘OUR INDIES’

When war broke out in 1939, emigration virtually stopped, arguably because of protective measures of receiving countries of the New World. 26 Theoretically, additional land could have been found in the Dutch maritime colonies, but they had never been (and would never be) the target of settler colonization. Dutch colonial rule was built up over centuries. In the course of the seventeenth century, the Dutch West India Company, dominating the maritime trade to and from the Americas, established settlements along the Hunger for Land 17 west coast of Africa, at some points along the coast of the two Americas and in the Caribbean. The VOC devoted itself to trade around the Cape of Good Hope and to Asia. Along this route refreshment stations and trading posts were opened. The places that were visited and subsequently claimed were merely by name under Dutch control. Except in the Cape, where Dutch colonists arrived from the 1650s onwards and a larger settler colony came into existence, the early colonization did not result in the arrival of large groups of Dutch citizens to the colonized world. Over the years, the Dutch government lost some of its early colonies. The Portuguese forced the Dutch to a cession of territories in what is nowadays Brazil, and the settlement of New Netherland on the East Coast of North America was handed over to the British. In 1806 the British annexed the Cape colony and in 1872 the last Dutch fort in West Africa, castle Elmina, was sold to the British government. Still, the Dutch ruled over vast stretches of land, in the Caribbean, Latin America and, above all, in Asia—of all the overseas possessions, the Indonesian archipelago was the most enviable and lucrative. Until the late nineteenth century, the Dutch colonies did not really stir the imagination of people in the metropole. News from the colonies was scarce, partly because only a small group of Dutch citizens went to the colonies and, once returned, shared their experiences. The European community in the Dutch East Indies counted just over 25,000 civilians in 1860: more than half of them were civil servants. 27 Activities were confi ned to the island of Java. Economic profi t instead of territorial control was the determinant of Dutch colonial policy. Between 1830 and 1870 the Dutch government implemented the infa- mous cultivation system (cultuurstelsel) in Java, forcing Javanese peasants to devote one fi fth of their land to crops intended for the Dutch export market.28 Although the economic benefi ts for the Dutch state were gigantic, the government was increasingly aware of the stranglehold the Javanese population was being put in. In the last decades of the nineteenth century, the government slowly took its hands off the exploitation of colonial resources. Private enterprises stepped in where the Dutch government had left off and towards the beginning of the twentieth century the exploitation of Indone- sian resources was almost completely in the hands of private cultivation and trading companies. 29 Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:42 01 October 2016 The arrival of entrepreneurs provoked the penetration and development of the entire archipelago, which coincided with the enlargement of military and administrative control over the Dutch East Indies. The First and Second Anglo-Dutch Treaty of Sumatra, signed in respectively 1871 and 1872, could be considered as a starting point. According to the Treaty, the British government desisted from its effort to gain control over the isle of Sumatra. As from that day the Dutch government could make its claim in the area, yet the sultan of Aceh, reigning over this northern province of Sumatra, did not wish to relinquish all his rights. Because of Aceh’s economic and 18 Hunger for Land strategic importance, a military expedition was organized to subjugate the sultan, to no avail. A second Dutch expedition a few months later seemed initially more successful, yet Dutch victory was short-lived and Acehnese troops loyal to the sultan initiated guerrilla warfare. 30 War in Aceh continued in the next few decades and became part of a much wider offi cial Dutch policy of penetration and subjection of the so-called Outer Territories (Buitengewesten) . For centuries Dutch rule had been restricted to Java, but in the late nineteenth century this policy was abandoned as Dutch authorities felt urged to make their claim to this part of the colony now that other imperialist powers—in particular the new players in the fi eld Japan and the United States—had become manifest in the area. The Dutch esteem was at stake and the Dutch government put all its effort into strengthening its position in the entire East Indies, ‘from Sabang to Merauke.’31 The linking of Dutch national esteem to colonial power became most evident in 1894. For years, the island of Lombok had been governed by com- peting Balinese rulers. When Dutch troops tried to end the rivalries in the late summer of 1894, they were attacked by surprise. Hundreds of Dutch soldiers were killed. To revenge the ‘treacherous night attack,’ a punitive expedition was organized. In November that year Dutch artillery crushed Balinese resistance. The war booty, including gold, silver, and jewelry, was sailed home to the Netherlands and put on display in the Dutch National Museum. ‘The treasure of Lombok’ attracted a huge public. ‘Lombok’ triggered nationalist sentiments and heralded a new era of growing interest in and attachment to the Dutch possessions overseas. As imperialist aggression had sparked off nationalism amongst the Dutch public, now nationalism was to fuel imperialist aggression in turn. 32 Joannes van Heutsz, appointed Chief in Command in 1898, became the personifi cation of colonial aggression. With his approval, harsh methods were employed to break Acehnese resistance. The province of Aceh was allegedly subjected to Dutch rule in 1904. On his triumphal march through the Netherlands that year, people waited for hours to see and applaud the ‘pacifi cator of Aceh.’ Huge monu- ments were erected in his honor.33 Now that the Dutch East Indies were ‘closer’ to the motherland, emigration to the archipelago also took off. Between 1860 and 1890 the European community on Java doubled: by 1930, it counted some 250,000 Europeans.34 Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:42 01 October 2016 One signifi cant new group of emigrants was that of engineers. They came to the Dutch East Indies to develop the country’s infrastructure and soil exploitation. As part of the much broader trend in European colonial policy, development (of land and people) had been adapted by the Dutch as a maxim of their own colonial policy. Obviously, the a priori presumption was that the Indonesians were ‘undeveloped,’ lagging behind and inferior.35 This set of beliefs and assumptions was anchored in laws and social life. Late-colonial society in the Indies, as Jacques van Doorn assesses, was a divided, racially stratifi ed society ruled by a small elite group of Europeans.36 Hunger for Land 19 The legal underpinning of discrimination was a law formulated in 1892, stipulating that native Indonesians and ‘foreign Orientals’ residing in the Netherlands Indies were foreigners. In 1910 the legal text was altered and, with the exclusion of Japanese, all were united in the category of ‘Dutch subjects, non-Dutch.’ Different laws applied to them. 37 As the violence deployed in the pacifi cation of the Outer Territories, racial segregation was generally accepted, both in the colony and the motherland. In the end, the native population could only be elevated once they had been submitted to Dutch rule and behaved in an obedient fashion.38 In the early twentieth century, the Dutch East Indies were both in and at the heart of the Dutch nation. Without the archipelago, the Nether- lands would be lost. Yet most Dutch people were confi dent that the colony was solidly attached to the motherland, ‘as the Mont Blanc to the Alps.’ 39 Other Dutch colonies did not stir up nationalist emotions to quite the same extent—with the exception of the former colonies in the Cape of Africa. Offi cial ties between the Netherlands and these colonies were broken in 1806, when the Cape Colony was annexed by the British and the settlements were put under British control. In the 1830s and 1840s larger numbers of these communities migrated into the interior of the Cape. After their ‘trek’ these Boers established two independent republics, Transvaal and Orange Free State. For some decades the British conceded the Boers de facto sovereignty. This changed when diamonds and gold were discovered at places ruled by the Boers. In reaction to the British annexation of Transvaal, the Boers took up arms. After two years of fi ghting, peace was restored, but only for eight years. The Second Boer War evolved into a massive and bitter struggle. In 1902, the republics of Orange Free State and Transvaal as well as the predominantly Boer Cape and Natal colonies were incorporated in the British dominion of the Union of South Africa. Until the last decades of the nineteenth century the Boers had received virtually no attention in the Netherlands. This changed with the British annexation of Transvaal. During the First Boer War, the Dutch South Afri- can Society (Nederlands Zuid-Afrikaanse Vereniging) was founded in the Netherlands, bolstering the bonds between Dutch and Boers. This highly respected and infl uential organization was supported by the cream of Dutch society, by businessmen and academics like Fruin. During the Second Boer War Dutch enthusiasm and engagement revived. Dutch newspapers heaped Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:42 01 October 2016 criticism on the British who, presumably without any other reason than rapacity, attacked the innocent Boers. 40 To a large extent, the misfortunes of the Boers were perceived and verbalized as a family tragedy. When Paul Kruger, president of Transvaal since 1880, had to leave his country two months after the outbreak of the Second Boer War, a Dutch cruiser picked him up and brought him to the Nether- lands. Gatherings of crowds in front of his hotel in The Hague became a usual sight. The aged leader of the Boers was called ‘Uncle Paul’ all around the world, but in the Netherlands the family tie suggested by his nickname 20 Hunger for Land had some real meaning. The Boers were considered direct descendants of the Dutch tribe. For Fruin they were brothers, or sons. His dearest desire was to protect and strengthen this Dutch presence in Africa. ‘What has been lost for good in America, can perhaps be won back in Africa,’ Fruin suggested as he calculated that there were still more men ‘of Dutch blood’ than Englishmen in the Boer Republics.41 In order to strengthen the Dutch foothold at the African continent, emigration to the Boer Republics was also stimulated. 42

Ultimately, these political ambitions were frustrated by the defeat of the Boers and the subsequently incorporation of their settlements. Public interest dwindled for a short time, but revived in the 1930s. Adherents of the Greater Dutch thought (Groot Dietse gedachte) assumed that the Netherlands was comprised of more than the territory enclosed by its national borders in Europe. On a merely linguistic and cultural basis both the Flemish and the Boers in South Africa should be included: on the basis of racial kinship (stamverwantschap), the white communities in maritime colonies, plus both the Flemish and Boers. 43 This thought was in particular advanced by prominent members of the young Dutch Nazi Movement. 44 In the NSB program of 1932, the Move- ment’s leader Anton Mussert argued that unifying the people of the Greater Dutch tribe (Dietse stam) was one of the objectives of the Movement. Explicitly the Boers in South Africa and the Flemish in Belgium were mentioned.45 On several occasions Mussert repeated his plea for a greater Diets empire. Initially, the notion of Diets was rather unspecifi ed and could refer to cultural, linguistic, or biological bonds, but Mussert’s understanding of Diets gradually transformed into a matter of blood and racial kinship. In 1937 for instance, the Dutch leader prided the Diets people for belonging to the ‘Northern race’ (Noordras), ‘the race that up to today rules the world by its creative power, its audacity, its perseverance and its will power.’ 46 The Dutch political nation, Mussert asserted, was merely a construction, ‘like a small sloop, fi rmly attached to the British battleship and rigged up with French sails, made in Paris during the French revolution.’ 47 National borders, in other words, were not the same as natural borders and Mussert aimed for unifi cation of the Dutch with their racial fellowmen, in Belgium and the British South African dominion. 48 With regard to the Dutch East Indies, Mussert vented criticism on the Dutch government that did too little to protect the colony. Mussert feared Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:42 01 October 2016 both internal (Indonesian communist) and external ( Japanese and/or British annexation) threats and proposed an increase of the Dutch military presence in the colony. 49 In addition, he deemed it necessary to start populating some of the Outer Territories. Towards the end of the 1930s New Guinea became central in the settlement plans of Mussert. This large tropical island with its dense tropical forests, over 10,000 miles away from the metropole, was identifi ed as the place for settlement of ‘pure-blooded’ Dutch farmers.50

In Mussert’s ideas about New Guinea two national issues met: Dutch peasantry and Dutch colonial rule. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth Hunger for Land 21 centuries, both had become sources of national esteem, but also matters of national concern. The decades prior to the Second World War witnessed some drastic governmental measures to ensure Dutch imperial status quo and some unusual state-led initiatives to end the crisis in Dutch agriculture. Conquest of land served to secure the nation’s strength. In the East Indies, the Outer Territories were reclaimed by military force; in the motherland, ‘new’ land was created and a governmental ofﬁ ce was founded to set emigration in motion. Notwithstanding the distinct and explicit racial dimension of Mussert’s plans, they drew on familiar sources of Dutch nationalism and grew from well-known and recognized points of national concern. Years later, they would resonate in Dutch plans to take part in the Germanization of the occupied eastern territories.

NOTES

1 . Robert Fruin, ‘Het karakter van het Nederlandsche Volk’, in: P.J. Blok, P.L. Muller and S. Muller (eds.), Robert Fruins verspreide geschriften I (Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1900), 1–21. 2 . Ibidem, 8–9 and 13–15. More on Fruin: Herman Paul and Henk te Velde (eds.), Het vaderlandse verleden: Robert Fruin en de Nederlandse geschiedenis (Amster- dam: Bert Bakker, 2010). 3 . Quoted in: J.A.A. van Doorn, Indische lessen: Nederland en de koloniale ervaring (Amsterdam: Bert Bakker, 1995), 21. 4 . Etienne François and Hagen Schulze, ‘Das emotionale Fundament der Nationen’, in: Monika Flacke (ed.), Mythen der Nationen: Ein Europäisches Panorama (Berlin/München: Koehler & Amelang, 1998), 17–32. 5 . A striking example is the immense popularity of Lord Kitchener in Great Britain. Kitchener had been in command of the highly successful military campaign in Sudan, presenting him the epithet Lord of Khartoum. His star rose again during the Second Boer War, when he was Chief of Staff of the British troops. Appointed Secretary of State for War, Kitchener even acquired political power in 1914. John M. MacKenzie, ‘Heroic Myths of Empire’, in: John M. MacKenzie (ed.), Popular Imperialism and the Military: 1850–1950 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1992), 109–138; Patrick Wagner, ‘Empire’s Hero Is Coming Home: Lord Kitchener of Khartoum: Symbolfi gur einer autoritären Option für das Grossbritannien der “edwardianischen Krise”’, Werkstattgeschichte 43 (2006), 23–44. 6 . Jan Bank, Het roemrijk vaderland: Cultureel nationalisme in Nederland in de Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:42 01 October 2016 negentiende eeuw (Den Haag: SDU, 1990). 7 . Henk te Velde, Gemeenschapszin en plichtsbesef: Nationalisme en liberalisme in Nederland, 1870–1918 (Den Haag: SDU, 1992); Barbara Henkes, Uit liefde voor het volk: Volkskundigen op zoek naar de Nederlandse identiteit 1918–1948 (Amsterdam: Athenaeum-Polak & Van Gennep, 2005), 35–38 and 102. 8 . Evert Jan Roskam, De wereldbeschouwing van den Nederlandschen boer (Utrecht: Nenasu, 1939), 3. 9 . A.A. de Jonge, ‘Roskam, Evert Jan (1892–1974)’, in: Biografi sch Woordenboek van Nederland. Available online via http://resources.huygens.knaw.nl/bwn 1880-2000/lemmata/bwn4/roskam. Last visited 14 November 2014. 10 . Anna Bramwell, Blood and Soil: Walter Darré & Hitler’s “Green” Party (Buckinghamshire: Kensal Press, 1985), 54–73. 22 Hunger for Land 11 . Evert Jan Roskam, De Nationaal Socialistische Beweging in Nederland in verband met ons christelijk karakter en onze Germaansche volksaard (Utrecht: Nenasu, 1934); Roskam, De Wereldbeschouwing van den Nederlandschen boer, 61–96. 12 . Rob van Ginkel, Op zoek naar eigenheid: Denkbeelden en discussies over cultuur en identiteit in Nederland (Den Haag: SDU, 1999), 13–16 and 23–27. 13 . Henkes, Uit liefde voor het volk, 14 and 22. 14 . Ibidem, 35–38, 102; Jan Bank and Maarten van Buuren, 1900: Hoogtij van burgerlijke cultuur (Den Haag: SDU, 2000), 77–78. 15 . Jan de Vries, De Germaansche Oudheid (Haarlem: Tjeenk Willink, 1930), 50; Henkes, Uit liefde voor het volk, 24–25. For a more general analysis of the revaluation of Dutch farmers’ lives in the 1920s and 1930s see also: Wichert ten Have, De Nederlandse Unie: Aanpassing, vernieuwing en confrontatie in bezettingstijd 1940–1944 (Amsterdam: Prometheus, 1999), 33–47. 16 . Henk te Velde, ‘Van grondwet tot grondwet: Oefenen met parlement, partij en schaalvergroting 1848–1917’, in: Remieg Aerts, Herman de Liagre Böhl, Piet de Rooy and Henk te Velde, Land van kleine gebaren: Een politieke geschiedenis van Nederland 1780–1990 (Nijmegen: SUN, 1999), 127–128; Hans Knippenberg and Ben de Pater, De eenwording van Nederland: Schaalvergroting en integratie sinds 1800 (Nijmegen: SUN, 1988), 106. 17 . Gedenkboek der Nederlandsche Heidemaatschappij 1888–1913 (Den Haag: s.n., 1913), 17; K.J.W. Peeneman, ‘Kalm temidden van de strijd: Verhoudingen tussen Heidemij en overheid’, Heidemij Tijdschrift 4/99, 171–186. For further information on Heidemij, see: Aart Camijn, KNHM 110 jaar: Tussen bedrijf en samenleving (Rotterdam: Centrum voor Bedrijfskunde Erasmus Universiteit, 1998); Huibert Han Vleeschenbeek, ‘Honderd jaar Heidemij, een overzicht’, Heidemij Tijdschrift 4/99 (1988), 9–26. 18 . On the Zuiderzee project: Willem van der Ham, Verover mij dat land: Lely en de Zuiderzeewerken (Amsterdam: Boom, 2007); Johannes van Mastenbroek, De Dijk (Zwolle: Waanders, 2007); Eva Vriend, Het nieuwe land: Het verhaal van een polder die perfect moest zijn (Amsterdam: Balans, 2012); Dirk Jan Wolffram, Zeventig jaar ingenieurskunst: Dienst der Zuiderzeewerken 1919–1989 (Lelystad: Uitgeverij De Twaalfde Provincie, 1997); Auke van der Woud, Het lege land: De ruimtelijke orde van Nederland, 1798–1848 (Amsterdam: Olympus/Uitgeverij Contact, 2010), 280–301. 19 . J.H. de Ru, Landbouw en Maatschappij: Een analyse van een boerenbeweging in de crisisjaren (Deventer: Van Loghum Slaterus, 1980), passim; Hein A.M. Klemann, Nederland 1938–1948: Economie en samenleving in jaren van oorlog en bezetting (Amsterdam: Boom, 2002), 191–196; Piet de Rooy, ‘Een zoekende tijd: De ongemakkelijke democratie 1913–1949’, in: Aerts et al., Land van kleine gebaren, 214. 20 . Vleeschenbeek, ‘Honderd jaar Heidemij’, 19–20; Peeneman, ‘Kalm temidden van de strijd’, 175–181. On relief works and care for the unemployed in the Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:42 01 October 2016 interwar years see: Piet de Rooy, Werklozenzorg en werkloosheidsbestrijding 1917–1940: Landelijk en Amsterdams beleid (Amsterdam: Van Gennep, 1978). 21 . Timothy J. Hatton and Jeffrey G. Williamson, ‘International Migration 1850–1939: An Economic Survey’, in: Timothy J. Hatton and Jeffrey G. Williamson (eds.), Migration and the International Labour Market 1850–1939 (London: Rout- ledge, 1994), 3–4; Te Velde, ‘Van grondwet tot grondwet’, 128. 22 . Hans Krabbendam, Vrijheid in het verschiet: Nederlandse emigratie naar Amerika 1840–1940 (Hilversum: Uitgeverij Verloren, 2006), 24. 23 . Marijke van Faassen, ‘Min of meer misbaar: Naoorlogse emigratie vanuit Ned- erland: Achtergronden en organisatie, particuliere motieven en overheidsprikkels, 1946–1967’, in: Saskia Poldervaart, Hanneke Willemse and Jan Willem Hunger for Land 23 Schilt (eds.), Van hot naar her: Nederlandse migratie vroeger, nu en morgen (Amsterdam: Stichting Beheer IISG, 2001), 54–55; Krabbendam, Vrijheid in het verschiet, 42, 57–58 and 63–64. 24 . J.H. Elich, Aan de ene kant, aan de andere kant: De emigratie van Neder- landers naar Australië 1946–1986 (Delft: Eburon, 1987), 91–93. 25 . Jan Hartland, Emigratie en kolonisatie in dezen tijden (Amsterdam: s.n., 1935), 16–17. 26 . In the United States, for instance, the Emergency Quota Act (1921) and the Immigration Act (1924) put a limit to the number of annual arrivals. In neighboring Canada the national government also introduced immigration regulations. Duncan M. McDougall, ‘Immigration into Canada, 1851–1920’, The Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science 27/2 (1961), 166; Ninette Kelley and Michael Trebilcock, The Making of a Mosaic: A History of Canadian Immigration Policy (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1998), 111 and 135–137; Marvin McInnis, ‘Immigration and Emigration: Canada in the Late 19th Century’, in: Hatton and Williamson, Migration and the Inter- national Labour Market, 135–151; Marc R. Rosenblum, ‘Immigration and US National Interests: Historical Cases and Contemporary Debate’, in: Terri E. Givens, Gary P. Freeman and David Leal (eds.), Immigration Policy and Secu- rity: US, European and Commonwealth Perspectives (New York: Routledge, 2009), 16–17. 27 . Cees Fasseur, Indischgasten (Amsterdam: Bert Bakker, 1997), 16. 28 . Ibidem, 14–15; Remco Raben, ‘A New Dutch Imperial History? Perambu- lations in a Prospective Field’, Bijdragen en Mededelingen betreffende de Geschiedenis der Nederlanden/The Low Countries Historical Review 128/1 (2013), 9–10. 29 . Paul van der Velde, ‘The Royal Dutch Geographical Society and the Dutch East Indies, 1873–1914: From Colonial Lobby to Colonial Hobby’, in: Morag Bell, Robin Butlin and Michael Hefferman (eds.), Geography and Imperial- ism 1820–1940 (Manchester/New York: Manchester University Press, 1995), 81–82. 30 . Paul van ’t Veer, De Atjeh-oorlog (Amsterdam: De Arbeiderspers, 1969). 31 . Cees Fasseur, ‘Een koloniale paradox: Nederlandse expansie in de Indone- sische archipel in het midden van de negentiende eeuw, 1830–1870’, Tijdschrift voor Geschiedenis 92 (1979), 162–186. More in general: Maarten Kuiten- brower, The Netherlands and the Rise of Modem Imperialism (New York/ Oxford: Berg, 1991). 32 . Bank and Van Buuren, 1900, 92; Elsbeth Locher Scholten, Ethiek in fragmenten: Vijf studies over koloniaal denken en doen van Nederlanders in de Indonesische archipel 1877–1942 (Utrecht: HES Publishers, 1981), 195; Te Velde, ‘Van grondwet tot grondwet’, 148–149. Also: Jurrien van Goor, ‘De Lombok-expeditie en het Nederlandse nationalisme’, in: Jurrien van Goor (ed.), Imperialisme in de marge: De afronding van Nederlands-Indië (Utrecht: Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:42 01 October 2016 HES, 1986), 19–70. 33 . H.W. van den Doel, ‘Military Rule in the Netherlands Indies’, in: Robert Cribb (ed.), The Late Colonial State in Indonesia: Political and Economic Foundations of the Netherlands Indies 1880–1942 (Leiden: KILTV, 1994), 60–66. 34 . Bank en Van Buuren, 1900, 91–92. 35 . Henk Schulte Noordholt, ‘Onafhankelijkheid of moderniteit? Een geïllus- treerde hypothese’, in: Remco Raben and Marieke Bloembergen (eds.), Het koloniale beschavingsoffensief: Wegen naar het nieuwe Indië (Leiden: KILTV, 2009), 106; Jacques van Doorn, De laatste eeuw van Indië (Amsterdam: Bert Bakker, 1994); Locher Scholten, Ethiek in fragmenten, 196. 24 Hunger for Land 36 . Jacques van Doorn, A Divided Society: Segmentation and Mediation in Late- Colonial Indonesia (Rotterdam: Faculty of Social Sciences, Erasmus Univer- sity Rotterdam, 1983), 8–12. 37 . Cees Fasseur, ‘Cornerstone and Stumbling Block: Racial Classifi cation and the Late Colonial State in Indonesia’, in: Cribb, The Late Colonial State in Indonesia, 35–38. 38 . Locher Scholten, Ethiek in fragmenten, 196–197; Marieke Bloembergen and Remco Raben, ‘Wegen naar het nieuwe Indië, 1890–1950’, in: Raben and Bloembergen, Het koloniale beschavingsoffensief, 7–24. 39 . Fasseur, Indischgasten, 254. 40 . Vincent Kuitenbrouwer, War of Words: Dutch Pro-Boer Propaganda and the South African War (1899–1902) (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2012), 43. 41 . Willem Ottenspeer, ‘Boeren en academici: De Leidse universiteit en het enthou- siasme voor de Zuidafrikaanse Boeren rond de eeuwwisseling’, De negentiende eeuw 15 (1992), 205–206. Quoted by Martin Bossenbroek, Holland op zijn breedst: Indië en Zuid-Afrika in de Nederlandse cultuur omstreeks 1900 (Amsterdam: Prometheus, 1996), 73. 42 . Kuitenbrouwer, War of Words, 21–23, 39–40 and 46–56. 43 . Bart J.H. de Graaff, De mythe van de stamverwantschap: Nederland en de Afrikaners, 1902–1930 (Amsterdam: Suid-Afrikaanse Instituut, 1993), 218. 44. Robin te Slaa and Edwin Klijn, De NSB: Ontstaan en opkomst van de Nationaal- Socialistische Beweging, 1931–1935 (Amsterdam: Boom, 2009), 700–701. 45 . Anton Mussert, Programma der Nationaal-Socialistische Beweging in Neder- land (Utrecht: Hoofdkwartier Nationaal-Socialistische Beweging, 1932), 18. 46 . Anton Mussert, De bronnen van het Nederlandsche nationaal-socialisme (Utrecht: Nenasu, 1937), 17. 47 . Ibidem. 48 . Ibidem, 18. 49 . Jennifer L. Foray, ‘An Old Empire in a New Order: The Global Designs of the Dutch Nazi Party 1931–1942’, European History Quarterly 43/1 (2013), 34. 50 . T e Slaa and Klijn, De NSB, 747–748. Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:42 01 October 2016 2 Pure-Blooded Germanics

‘A FUNNY SAILORMEN’S DIALECT’

The idea of some kind of unifi cation of Germanic people went back to the early nineteenth century, when particularly in Germany small yet infl uential pressure groups began to manifest themselves. In his protest against Napo- leonic dominance over Germany, philosopher Johann Gottlieb Fichte suggested the unifi cation of ‘Germanic people’ (Germanen), to be identifi ed by their use of a variant of ‘a Germanic mother tongue’ (eine germanische Muttersprache) .1 Ernst Moritz Arndt, writer of several patriotic songs and one of Fichte’s devotees, brought the term Teutschland into use, an imaginative nation that would unite people of one and the same Ger- manic language group. The river Rhine, from source to estuary, constituted one of the arteries of this nation. 2 In the 1850s and 1860s Arndt’s former pupil Wilhelm Heinrich Riehl delved more deeply into the subject of people and their natural habitat, concluding that a shared perception of their natural surrounding was another binding factor. Hiking through the Dutch- German borderlands, Riehl was struck by the similarities in language, customs, and environmental planning. 3 Historian Julius Langbehn was full of praise for the Dutch people, according to him a culturally superior people of farmers that had put a stamp on numerous German cities. Prussia was in need of ‘Hollandization’ (Verholländerung), Langbehn argued and he added that the Dutch fear of Prussian annexation could be counteracted by giving the Dutch control over Prussia. 4 Heinrich von Treitschke, in the years of the German unifi cation a histo- Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:42 01 October 2016 rian of fame who made no attempt to disguise his support for a united Ger- many under Prussian leadership, was overall more interested in Germany’s eastern borders. Aside from his overtly anti-Semitism, Von Treitschke was also famous for his hatred of Poles. Exemplary for his political point of view is Das deutsche Ordensland Preussen, an essay written in 1862 in order to legitimize Prussian rule over land that once was Polish. In the line of his—highly disputable—argument the Prussian king was a lineal descendant of Teutonic Knights who conquered larger parts of Eastern Europe in medieval times. Coupled with his fi rm belief that Poles were incapable of 26 Pure-Blooded Germanics good government, German rule in the eastern borderlands was both rightful and needed.5 With regards to the regions west of the German confederation, Treitschke ventilated his most belligerent opinions during the Franco-Prussian War (1870/1871).6 Being a staunch German, Treitschke published in the fi rst year of the war his pamphlet ‘What We Require from France?’ (Was fordern wir von Frankreich?), which voiced the feelings of many German citizens: ‘give up the old booty, give up Alsace and Lorraine’ (Heraus mit dem alten Raube, heraus met Elzas und Lothringen!). 7 According to Treitschke, both provinces (and some adjacent territory) were ‘by history and nature’ German, populated by large groups of German-speaking people: their annexation denoted the tailpiece of two hundred years of Prussian efforts to regain lost ground.8 As stipulated by Treitschke in this pamphlet, the sovereignty of the Netherlands was ‘acceptable’ (zu dulden),9 yet in one of his posthumously published lectures he labeled the Netherlands as an outpost of the Reich and wished for a ‘return to the old fatherland’ (dass [. . .] Holland noch einmal zum alten Vaterlande zurückkehrt). 10 The Dutch, like the majority of the Swiss and the Austrian populations, were a branch of the same tree: their language was merely ‘a funny dialect’ (ein komisches Matrosendialekt) of the Germanic mother tongue. 11 The wars the Prussian Minister President Otto von Bismarck provoked in the 1860s and 1870s fi rmed without any doubt the ties between the Prus- sian kingdom and other northern German states, fi nding its consolidation after the French defeat, when the Prussian king William was proclaimed emperor of a unifi ed German Reich. However, within the borders of the new nation-state some considered this unifi cation as incomplete. Bismarck’s ‘lesser German solution’ (kleindeutsche Lösung) did not include over ten million ‘ethnic’ Germans living outside the borders of the new nation, in Austria-Hungary and areas further afi eld.12 Moreover, they were concerned with the nation’s territorial base in Europe and the world: given Germany’s political, economic, and militarily growth in strength, the country deserved more space.13 These viewpoints were endorsed by renowned scholars like Friedrich Ratzel. Educated in zoology in the 1860s, Ratzel was most interested in the relationship between people and places, resulting in various academic appointments and publications in the fi eld of ethnography and (political) Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:42 01 October 2016 geography from 1875 until his sudden death in 1904. In his work Ratzel combined his three disciplines, resulting in a distinct biologist view on man- kind, nations, and state systems. He introduced the notion of ‘living space’ (Lebensraum) in 1901, to describe the territory all living organisms needed. For a healthy condition a healthy stock was essential—leading in turn to the need of suffi cient space. Working under the principle of states and nations as living organisms, Ratzel applied the same simple rules to these entities: only those nations would survive with suffi cient (i.e. ever-increasing) space and population. For Germany expansion was therefore vital. Within Europe, Pure-Blooded Germanics 27 where land mass was scarce, Ratzel imagined only larger, politically unifi ed states to survive. Additional space was to be sought (and fought) outside Europe, in regions on the world map that were still not colonized by other European powers.14 Not surprisingly, Ratzel was a fervent supporter of Germany’s participation in the frenzied quest for colonies at the close of the nineteenth century.15 All the same, his ideas were quickly embraced by those advocating a larger continental German Empire. For many of his German contem- poraries expansion overseas and on the European continent were equally desirable. The Pan German League (Alldeutscher Verband) became their conduit. The close intertwining of continental and maritime expansionism was at the heart of this small, yet highly infl uential pressure group and personifi ed by its founding father, the colonial adventurer Carl Peters. The Society for German Colonization (Gesellschaft für Deutsche Kolonisa- tion) Peters established in 1884 was responsible for successfully concluding profi table treaties with several African chiefs in South-East Africa. At that time, Peters’ work in Africa still lacked governmental support, yet after his return Peters effi caciously pressed Bismarck into backing his further missions to acquire German colonies in this part of Africa. In the heyday of the “Scramble for Africa” Peters’ aggressive, expansionist policy generated some major tensions between Germany and the United Kingdom. Much to the annoyance of Peters, the governments of both states settled their rising confl icts in an agreement signed in July 1890, whereby Germany gained the control over Helgenland, a minuscule yet strategically important island in the North Sea, and Zanzibar and the nearby coast strip on the African mainland were handed over to the British crown. Out of discontent Peters founded the General German League, which soon was renamed Pan Ger- man League.16 The League’s general objective was to protect German interests, in Ger- many and abroad, but most of its actions were concentrated on Germany’s borderlands.17 The condition in the eastern provinces of Prussia, where the Polish population by far outnumbered the small group of German citizens, was initially the greatest worry of Pan Germanists. Although in the days of Bismarck an assertive policy had already been pursued against Polish inhabitants, 18 Pan Germanists wished to proceed from this point and actively roll back Polish infl uence in the area. Their tactics were rewarded. Bernard von Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:42 01 October 2016 Bülow, who took offi ce as chancellor of the German Reich in 1900, served them hand and foot. By various measures expressions of Polish culture were banned or destroyed. In its place, German Kultur was brought in: larger building and infrastructure projects were initiated to ‘open up’ the area. In 1908 Von Bülow signed the Reich Association Law, prohibiting the use of the Polish language in public places and private clubs and associations.19 Settler colonialism featured also largely in German policy towards its eastern provinces. The Royal Prussian Colonization Committee, founded in 1886, received larger funds ‘for the strengthening of the German element 28 Pure-Blooded Germanics in the provinces of West Prussia and Posen against attempted Poloniza- tion.’ Land and farms were bought up and as a rule resold or leased out to German farmers. At the same time a settlement program was commenced to establish a German ‘dam’ against the Polish ‘fl ood.’20 From 1886 onwards, a few thousands German farmers moved to the East each year, resulting in some 130,000 by 1905. In 1908, the Expropriation Law was issued, enabling the Committee to expropriate Polish landowners and allocate their former land to German settlers.21 By that time, the policy of the German government towards its Polish citizens had moved beyond compulsory assimilation. Affected by the advent of Social-Darwinism, the differences between Germans and Poles were increasingly understood in racial and biological terms. As opposed to linguistic or cultural differences, biological classifi cations were immutable. Thus, the Polish foe grew into the archetypical other (or one of the archetypical others) that could not assimilate and would therefore always constitute a threat to the German Empire.22 In this line of thought nationalist organizations like the Pan German League took a more radical stance from the turn of the century onwards, promoting the expulsion of Polish and other ethnic minorities from the Reich. 23 Gradually, the League’s scope widened, from the condition in border- regions under German control, to the question of Germany’s borders per se. Inspired by Ratzel’s idea of ‘organic frontiers,’ the rightfulness of the existing political state lines was brought to public debate. Around the turn of the century, a claim was made for the creation of additional ‘living space’ further eastwards, in Russian territory. Anti-Slavic feelings grew and in writings the Russians in particular were portrayed as foreign Asians, alien to Western European civilization.24 In the buildup to the First World War the League’s power was at its height. Some members of the government, the emperor, his confi dants and most higher military offi cers were clearly charmed by Pan Germanist ideals. Protecting German interests remained the League’s main objective, but over the past decades the organization had steered a more aggressive course. In the early 1910s some spokesmen of the League openly pled for taking up arms in order to bring together the Germans/Germanic people across the continent and to establish one single large Germanic nation-state that would provide suffi cient ‘space’ for its inhabitants. Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:42 01 October 2016 Friedrich von Bernhardi, a former general of the Prussian army, proph- esized war in 1913. Deutschland und der nächste Krieg, the work he published that year, became a national bestseller. 25 According to Bernhardi, war was both a necessity and a duty, for ‘the Germany of today, considered geographically, is but a mutilated torso of the old German Empire’ (Das heuti- gen Deutschland ist geographisch genommen nur ein verstümmelter Torso des alten Kaiserreichs) .26 The war Bernhardi wished for should be directed against the ‘Slavonic waves’ that were dashing Germany’s eastern frontier and Germany’s western neighboring states. Germany needed to restore Pure-Blooded Germanics 29 its natural borders, including the banks of the Rhine, from source to mouth. Furthermore, the Dutch people, inhabitants of the region around the Rhine’s lower reaches, may have established their own nation-state and developed their own ‘folkdom’ (Volkstum), but in language and customs they were Germanic.27 The general’s perspective on Germany’s future, including a war of conquest in Western European countries, was shared by other members of the League. A year before Bernhardi had launched his book, the League’s chairman Heinrich Class had published his vision under the pseudonym of Daniel Frymann. In Wenn ich der Kaiser wär’ Class suggested a series of measures to strengthen Germany’s position in the world. Suppression of supposedly internal enemies—Jews, socialists, Poles, and others—should be coupled with a program of massive armament, needed to conquer Europe and annex German-speaking areas such as the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg.28 These remarks indicate that by the early 1910s Pan Germanists and Ger- mans of a similar mind were actually factoring in the possibility of war. Worse still, they assumed that a greater German nation could only be accomplished by force of arms. In their eyes Germany’s future depended on a war of conquest. Building upon Ratzel’s ideas they assumed that Germany needed to expand its territory and its population—a homogenous population composed of Germans and their kinsmen abroad. Within Germany’s ruling elite these assumptions fell on fertile ground and one could argue that for Pan Germanists and the like the outbreak of the war in the summer of 1914 came as a gift from the gods. In reaction to the assassination of the Austrian-Hungarian crown prince Archduke Franz Ferdinand on June 28th, Germany declared war on Russia and France. When its troops entered Belgian territory the next day, thereby violating Bel- gian neutrality, Britain declared war on Germany. For the next four years, Europe was the stage for bloodshed and destruction. ‘We grasp the sword, forced to self-defense, with clean hands and a clean conscience,’ the German emperor William II proclaimed in his speech to the Reichstag on the day that German troops crossed the border and invaded Belgium.29 Perhaps this was the general feeling in Germany during the tense summer of 1914, but within weeks war aims were formulated that could hardly be reconciled with the notion of defense only. 30 Exemplary is the Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:42 01 October 2016 often quoted September-memorandum Theodor von Bethmann Hollweg, chancellor of the German Empire, wrote in September 1914 to the attention of his emperor. At the time Bethmann was composing his piece, Germany was in a winning mood. The fi rst battles were fought and some major military victories already achieved. On the eastern front the Russian advance had been halted at Tannenberg. On the western front German troops had broken through enemy lines and were close to Paris. In his writing, the chancellor suggested to annex Luxembourg and specifi c parts of other West- ern European countries: in France the iron-rich basin of Briey, the coastal 30 Pure-Blooded Germanics strip from Dunkirk to Boulogne, the western slopes of the Vosges, and the city of Belfort; in Belgium Liege, Verviers, and Antwerp. What was left of France and Belgium would be brought to complete economic dependency on Germany. Agreements should be concluded between Germany and various other European countries to reinforce Germany’s economic supremacy in Europe. The ties with the Netherlands should be tightened, yet Bethmann Hollweg warned against the use of coercion: ‘it must not alter the Dutch way of life, nor change Dutch military obligations.’ The Netherlands would be at the mercy of Germany, but the appearance of the country’s independence must be kept up.31 During the war, German aims were constantly the subject of discussion. Politicians, like Bethmann Hollweg, changed their opinion, or adapted their views dependent on how Germany’s military chances appeared. In general goals became ever more unrealistic.32 Of decisive infl uence was the appointment of fi eld Marshall Paul von Hindenburg to general chief of staff in August 1916. Together with Erich Ludendorff, his quartermaster general, Hindenburg enjoyed almost unlimited power, also in non-military affairs. Both men were fervent adherents of the annexationist line in German policy and particularly interested in German expansion eastwards. 33 Effectively using modern forms of propaganda—like fi lm—Ludendorff and Hindenburg succeeded in obtaining massive support for their annexationist policy. 34 When in March 1917 the Brest-Litovsk Treaty was signed, people in Germany were euphoric. The Russian Bolshevist delegation accepted the loss of all territories in German hands and some adjacent strips of land, providing Germany excess to both the Black and the Baltic Sea. Six states were created in the new border zone: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, the Belarussian National Republic, the Ukrainian National Republic, and the Kingdom of Poland. On paper, their statehood was guaranteed; in practice, it was debated and in the eyes of many these new states were at the most vassal states of the German Empire. 35 Although Germany’s focus was fi xed on the occupied eastern territories in the last years of the war, the future of the occupied western zones remained on the agenda, too.36 The French nation was viewed as a nation in decay. French birth rates had been low over the last decades, justifying a cut in the nation’s size.37 According to German opinion, Belgium was a strange political invention of France and Britain. It was not a nation in the true Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:42 01 October 2016 sense, ‘organically’ grown and populated by one people (Volk), with one shared past, culture and language. German plans with regard to Belgium were varied, yet the most popular version involved some drastic changes of its borders. On the one hand, the Belgian nation should lay claim to some of the ceded French territories, in particular the area that once had belonged to Flanders around Lille and Arras. On the other hand, it was to expect the loss of its Wallonian provinces. Redubbed as ‘Nord-Westmark,’ the new Flemish state would thus encompass the residential areas of Germanic-speaking people in France and Belgium. This line of thought was at the base of German Pure-Blooded Germanics 31 occupation policy in Belgium and actually led to the offi cial partition of occupied Belgium in March 1917.38

DISPUTED BORDERS

In Compiègne, German aspirations were shattered. With the ‘Treaty of Peace between the Allied and Associated Powers and Germany’ signed some months later, Germany agreed to the conditions of armistice in Novem- ber 1918. On June 28th, 1919, exactly fi ve years after the assassination of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria-Hungary that marked the beginning of the hostilities, German statesmen accepted guilt for this war and responsibility for all consequential damages. They committed themselves to paying the costs of reparation and compensation. They swallowed the decimation of Germany’s army and weaponry. Furthermore, they agreed to the immediate cession of Alsace and Lorraine (to France) and most of the East Prussian provinces Posen and West Prussia (to the reinstated Republic of Poland). The future of other regions in Germany’s borderlands depended on plebiscites. These votes plus the aggression of neighboring countries resulted ultimately in another round of territorial losses in the 1920s—including the region of Eupen-Malmédy (to Belgium), Northern Schleswig (to Denmark), the Klaipédia region (to Lithuania), and Upper Silesia (to Poland and Czecho- slovakia). The future of Saarland was still undecided although France was in charge of all mines located in the area. The banks of the Rhine (Germany’s Rhineland) were until further notice to be occupied by a combined force of American, Belgian, British, and French troops. The eastern Prussian city of Danzig (Gdansk) would remain under the authority of the League of Nations. Together with these territories, people were lost. After the war the number of German-speaking people outside Germany’s borders had grown to a startling eleven million. Most of them lived in the newly created states in Eastern and Central Europe. In some of these countries German rule had left deep scarfs, resulting in spontaneous or state-orchestrated violence against Germans. In Czechoslovakia for instance, Germans were forced to use the new offi cial language, Czech, and some of the German landowners lost their estates. In Poland the national government took anti-German confi scations Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:42 01 October 2016 a step further. As a consequence, hundreds of thousands of Germans fl ed the country. By 1926 more than 575,000 Germans had left Poland. In Alsace- Lorraine the expulsion of Germans involved over 200,000 Germans. The German nation Pan Germanists had been dreaming of seemed further away than ever.39 To many Germans the Armistice of November 1918 came as a complete surprise. Soldiers at the eastern front were unaware of the terrible situation of German troops at the western front. War propaganda at home had been highly effective to the extent that the majority of the German civil population 32 Pure-Blooded Germanics kept quiet and endured wartime deprivations—as long as there was the prospect of a glorious victory in the not too distant future. As soldiers were holding ground, something must have gone astray somewhere else. Public indignation was enormous when the news of the Treaty of Ver- sailles reached the German home country. Almost immediately larger groups of people gathered in the streets of Germany’s cities to fi ercely protest against the terms of the Treaty—which, in their eyes, were iniquitous. Germany was punished with undue severity. Disappointment, shame, and anger over the Treaty created a ferocious hatred of all held responsible for this ‘shameful peace’ (Schandfrieden). Resentful citizens were bolstered by an array of right-wing, nationalist movements. Some of these movements remained in the shimmer zone of extra-parliamentary, often violent, action. Others grew into infl uential political parties, like Hitler’s National Social- ist German Worker’s Party (Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei, or NSDAP). A different, perhaps more sophisticated way of rejecting the Treaty was embodied by scholars who tried to prove the Treaty wrong by scientifi c argumentation. Some authoritative historians, for example, investigated the question of culpability (die Schuldfrage) . According to paragraph 231 of the Treaty, Germany was to be held responsible for the war, yet according to these historians this assumption was disputable. Their research suggested that France and Russia were to be considered as the real warmongers in July 1914. Because of the political implications of their work, Berlin followed their steps attentively. Quite often these scholars enjoyed fi nancial support of the German Foreign Offi ce; some were even fully employed by the German government. Under auspices of the Foreign Offi ce, historians gathered and published a series of documents to support the thesis that Germany did not want war in July 1914 and therefore could not be held responsible for the outbreak of that war. 40 Another Foreign Offi ce initiative was the establishment in May 1919 of the German Protection League (Deutscher Schutzbund für das Grenz- und Auslandsdeutschtum). Financially backed by the Ministry, the League’s main work was located in the former German regions that were awaiting plebiscites. Together with the much older and partially privately funded Society for Germandom abroad ( Verein für das Deutschtum im Ausland, or DVA) the League tried to mobilize as many German inhabitants as possible Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:42 01 October 2016 to vote for a return to the Reich. Within Germany these organizations easily found their audience. The DVA, for example, counted more than two million members in the interwar years.41 A more general aim of both organizations was a growing popular awareness of ‘Germanic descent’ abroad. This descent was no longer understood as a simple matter of language and Germandom was almost completely comprehended in biological terms. The concepts of ‘Volk’ and ‘race’ had made their entry into the vocabulary of the Schutzbund’s spokesmen and, inspired by international scholars like Madison Grant, the idea of a superior Pure-Blooded Germanics 33 Nordic race gained political foothold. According to Grant and many other racial experts of the day, Europe was racially divided into groups, each located in a specifi c part of Europe. The Nordic race lived in the northern and western part of Europe—in areas around the Baltic Sea, the North Sea, and the Atlantic Ocean. Members of this race were not only recognizable by their physical appearance (tall, dolichocephalic, blond, blue-eyed), but also by their specifi c mental aptitudes, and social behavior and structures. As opposed to the Mediterranean and Alpine people, they were generally more vigorous and rational, more balanced and community minded.42 In Germany, interest for ‘the other Germanics’ (Restgermanen) and ‘kindred people’ (Stammverwandte) grew in the 1920s and 1930s. Both Research of the East (Ostforschung) and Research of the West (Westforschung) developed into academic programs. Historians, ethnologists, demographers, geographers, archeologists, and others attached their name to these programs. Scholars received assignments to study manifestations of ‘German- ess’ in past and present times, mostly in Germany’s neighboring countries. Ostforscher concentrated merely on what had become the Second Polish Republic. Besides the disciplinary and methodological variations, their studies aimed to demonstrate that German presence in the area was indisputable. This, in other words, was German territory.43 The geographical counterpart of Ostforschung was Westforschung, the study of Germany’s western borderlands. In this area, too, Germany had been forced to cede portions of its territory, to France and Belgium. These losses were an important impetus for the German government to fund research on German history in the lost areas. Although Westforschung would not be as politically instrumental as Ostforschung, it did add to the general belief that these territories, too, belonged to the historical and therefore legitimate living sphere of Germanic people. Moreover, Westforschung intended to lay bare the similarities between Germans in Germany and their ‘racially kindred’ western neighbors, i.e. the Dutch and Flemish. German ethnologists, often affi liated to universities relatively close to Germany’s western border, studied the customs and history of these neighboring people. In Bonn, at the Institute for Historical Geography and Ethnology of the Rhine-lands (Institut für geschichtliche Landeskunde der Rheinlande), for example, the cultural heritage of the Dutch was studied by renowned German medieval- ists, Germanists, and archeologists.44 Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:42 01 October 2016 From 1931 onwards Westforschung in Bonn and at other German universities received full fi nancial support of the German government. Inves- tigations in western countries intensifi ed. It was also in these years that international networks of German scholars and their foreign colleagues came into existence. In the Netherlands, for instance, Jan de Vries was growing close to German scholars in ethnology and Germanic studies. Like his peers from Germany, the Dutch professor at Leiden University exerted himself for a public reappraisal of the Germanic ancestral heritage. The Dutch ‘national character’ (volksaard) was developed within ancient Germanic 34 Pure-Blooded Germanics communities, De Vries asserted: it was closely related, almost identical, to that of other Germanic descendants such as the Flemish and the Germans.45 Although De Vries was—at least still at that time—a man of science, his appeal for a revaluation of Germanic civilization was in Germany politically highly instrumental. Germanic Antiquity offered a model of identifi cation that exceeded the state’s territory, for the heirs of this civilization were to be found within and across the border. In the course of the 1930s racist tenets were creeping into De Vries’ scholarship. The Celts and the Germanics were in his opinion different and incompatible ‘races’ and, although questioning the superiority of one race over another, De Vries deemed ‘blending of races’ highly undesirable.46 It would take De Vries until the Second World War before he realized (and fully subscribed to) the political implications of his statements, but some of his German colleagues used the Dutch professor’s good name for their own cause, especially after his appointment as chairman of the International Association for European Ethnology and Folklore in 1935. 47 After the assumption of power in 1933, the Nazi regime continued to foster research on Germanic life in Germany’s neighboring countries in the west, yet political activism in the Netherlands was mostly organized outside of the academic world. Wolfgang Ispert was one of the main agitators. Born in 1898 Ispert had spent most of his youth in the industrial town of Wuppertal-Elberfeld, some twelve miles eastwards of the Rhine and not far from the border with the Netherlands. Marked by his experience at the front during the First World War and highly unsatisfi ed with the postwar German order, Ispert had joined the militant wing of the German Free Corps in the early 1920s. As a young student in medicine he took part of the Kapp putsch, but soon after became a member of the still small NSDAP. In 1924 Ispert founded a Group for Borderland Work and Study (Ar- beitskreis für Grenzlandarbeit), which consisted mainly of members of the Nazi Party who sought a closer association with Germanic people across the border. According to Ispert, a new orientation in German foreign policy was needed. Instead of hegemony overseas, supremacy on the continent should be sought. The ‘reconquered’ area adjacent to Germany’s western border (die Rückgewinnung unserer niederländisch-fl ämischen Stammesbrüdern) would constitute the ‘Western front’ of this imaginative Greater Germanic Reich. 48 Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:42 01 October 2016 Not long after Hitler’s rise to power Ispert’s group was incorporated within the NSDAP-organization: initially as an independent section (Abteilung Grenzland), then as Section West (Abteilung West) under the supervision of Alfred Rosenberg’s Offi ce for Foreign Political Affairs (Aus- senpolitische Amt). In the capacity as head of this section Ispert was seeking contact with Dutch and Flemish Nazis, laid out networks of like-minded men on both sides of the border and contributed considerably to the work of German intelligence services in these neighboring countries.49 Pure-Blooded Germanics 35 Other powerhouses in Nazi Germany also showed interest in Germany’s western neighbors. Rudolf Hess, Deputy Führer since 1933, disposed of a separate agency to study Western European Germanic people. Increas- ingly powerful was the SS agency Ahnenerbe. Its employee Hans Ernst Schneider would grow into Ispert’s equivalent and interlocutor of various Dutch ethnologists and folklorists. Schneider did not come from a western German border region like Ispert. His place of birth was in eastern Prussia. His studies—in Germanic studies, literature, philosophy, and art history—had brought him to Berlin and Vienna. Schneider had joined the NSDAP after Hitler’s take-over and rapidly developed into one of the Party’s experts in folklore and ethnology. His knowledge of folk dance as the expression of ancient social rituals secured him a position within the SS Race and Settlement Main Offi ce ( Rasse- und Siedlungshauptamt, or RuSHA)—fi rst, in April 1937, as head of the department of art, next as employee within the Department of Races (Rassen Amt) . Finally, in Septem- ber 1938, Schneider was delegated to Ahnenerbe. Established in 1935 to encourage research on Germanic history and culture, Ahnenerbe had been expanding its radar quickly. It became Schneider’s major task to ‘loosen up’ the Dutch eastern border. To this end Schneider tried to increase awareness among the Dutch of their Germanic roots and to establish close relations with Dutch colleagues in the fi eld of ethnology and folklore studies. Schneider traveled often to the Netherlands to talk with political friends and colleagues.50

BRINGING IN, PUSHING OUT

In his year in the prison of Landsberg, Hitler was allowed to occasionally receive a guest. One of them was Karl Haushofer, a former general of the First World War and since 1919 lecturer in political geography at Munich University. Already in the early 1920s, Haushofer established his name as the founding father of geopolitics. Placing his work in the service of the restoration of Germany’s greatness, Haushofer questioned the viability of existing European nation-states. In his opinion, only larger empires and conglomerates of associated countries would survive. Germany should therefore expand, in order to provide enough soil and resources for its pop- Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:42 01 October 2016 ulation. To this purpose Germanic people abroad should be absorbed into a greater Reich. Clearly, Haushofer was largely indebted to Ratzel. To Hitler he did not hand his own book, but one of Ratzel’s. The need to unite Germanic peoples and to create suffi cient ‘living space’ were also the mantras of Mein Kampf and served as guiding principles in Hitler’s foreign policy since 1933. Early 1938, the Nazi regime realized the Austrian annexation, incorporating Europe’s second largest German population into Germany’s new borders. In the autumn of that year, the Czech 36 Pure-Blooded Germanics Sudeten region was seized, followed by the Lithuanian Klaipédia region in early 1939. These too were areas with larger German minorities: bringing them ‘back in the German Empire’ (heim ins Reich) was Hitler’s major concern. Before the First World War, Czechoslovakia and Poland had been inhabited by substantial numbers of Germans. An estimated 1.2 million Ger- mans had lived in the Polish Republic, while Czechoslovakia counted some 3.5 million Germans. 51 These numbers rapidly decreased after 1919 and particularly in the Polish provinces the number of Germans became just a small minority. Unsurprisingly, both countries were on Hitler’s list of conquests. After the seizure of Prague in March 1939, fi rst Czechoslovakia was split into a formally independent Slovakia and a Czech ‘protectorate.’ Then six months later Poland was divided into a Russian and German sphere of infl uence, in accordance to the secret protocol of the German-Russian non- aggression pact signed August 23rd. The German fl ag was hoisted in the western parts of Poland (the former East-Prussian provinces of Posen and West-Prussia) and in Upper Silesia. The three regions were annexed and became new German provinces: Upper-Silesia, Warthegau, and Danzig-West Prussia; what remained of Germany’s occupied Poland became the German ‘general-government.’ Czechia was rich in natural resources and there were plenty of industrial zones in both the occupied part of Poland and Czechia—yet most important was the extra ground that was obtained for the German ‘race.’ The annexed Polish provinces and Czechia were designated for Germanic settlement. These areas were to become German or, like Himmler worded it: ‘Our mission is not to Germanize the East in the old sense—bringing the German language and laws to those living there, but rather to ensure that in the East only men of truly Germanic blood dwell.’52 Partly in collaboration with Himmler, Darré, Minister of Food and Agri- culture since 1933, progressively engaged in plans of farmers’ settlements outside Germany’s borders. The fi rst of these plans, dating from February 1937, involved ‘new spaces outside the present borders’ (Neuräumen aus- serhalb der augenblicklichen Reichsgrenzen) .53 Over the course of the next years, planners of the Ministry and Ostforscher developed various relocation schemes. By the spring of 1939 plans with regard to Polish territory had been drafted. At the heart of the plans was the establishment of a ‘wall Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:42 01 October 2016 of blood’ (Blutwall), consisting of an unbroken chain of German farms, and various smaller interconnected ‘bridges of blood’ (Blutbrücke) in the western Polish provinces. The thinking was that as a matter of course, the smaller, isolated puddles of Polish life in between would naturally run dry—a process that could take years, decades, or perhaps even centuries. Approximately 220,000 German farmers were needed to make it work.54 In 1939, however, Darré was not the powerful man he had been in 1933. With Hitler’s backing, Himmler was put in charge of population policies. At a conference of SS-generals, the Reichsführer declared in public that he Pure-Blooded Germanics 37 ‘really intended to get, rob and steal German blood from all over the world’ (Ich habe wirklich die Abischt, germanisches Blut in der ganzen Welt zu holen, zu rauben und zu stehlen, wo ich kann) .55 His fi rst operation, early in 1939, involved the transfer of Germans from Italy to the Reich. 56 The unscrupulous approach suggested by Himmler in his speech seemed indeed in order, as volunteers for the Germanization of land eastwards were scarce. In the newly created German protectorate of Bohemia and Mora- via the local German population, a miniscule three percent of the total population, was hardly inclined to perform the master role Himmler and others had in mind. In Germany proper the recruitment of German farmers advanced with great diffi culty and everywhere recruiters met passive resistance. Making a German Czechia was much harder to realize than expected. 57 On Polish ground circumstances seemed slightly more favorable, at least in the annexed Polish provinces. Here the local German community was much larger than in Czechia, adding up to almost one million people, approximately ten percent of the total population. 58 Already in the early autumn of 1939 talks had commenced with the Latvian and Estonian government on the subject of the Baltic Germans. Germany eagerly agreed on the absorption of some 60,000 Baltic Germans in the Reich. Three weeks after the attack on Poland, in addition to the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, German and Rus- sian offi cials concluded a treaty on mutual population exchanges. ‘Ethnic Germans’ (Volksdeutsche) living in the Soviet Union would ‘return home,’ too. This transfer would involve another 130,000 ethnic Germans, from Volhynia, Galicia, and the Narew-Bialystok region. Hitler appointed Him- mler Reichscommissioner (Reichskommissar für die Festigung deutschen Volkstums, or RKF) in October 1939 for the coordination of this task. Largely thanks to the ambitious nature and anti-Polish disposition of Gauleiter Arthur Greiser, the Warthegau was soon transforming in a stage of mass migration and ethnic cleansing. In a year’s time, hundreds of thousands of Poles were expelled, while their Jewish fellow-countrymen were either killed or squeezed in ghettos.59 In spite of Greiser’s energy, the overall success of Nazi population policy in former Poland was limited. New plans developed under supervision of Himmler were requiring considerable larger numbers of settlers. The notorious General Plan East, for example, was urging for the emigration of some 100,000 German farmers’ families, Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:42 01 October 2016 each counting eight members. Another two million Germans (peasants and non-peasants alike) would be needed in a later stage. In 1940, not more than 22,500 German peasants had shown willingness to leave the Altreich. Baltic Germans were welcomed as lost sons, but their arrival also caused some panic. Several agencies had been set up to expropriate and administer Polish farmsteads: Darré, for instance, ordered the establishment of the East-German Society of Agrarian Exploitation ( Ostdeutsche Landbe- wirtschaftungsgesellschaft, or LO) to administer the larger estates. Yet the process of confi scation was time-consuming and the allocation of farms to 38 Pure-Blooded Germanics settlers proceeded slowly. Furthermore, German authorities soon realized that by far not all ethnic Germans were racially and professionally qualifi ed to be part of the Germanization program. While transit camps were congesting, the former Polish agriculture was still in need of personnel and managers.60 Other paths to people the annexed Polish territories were now being explored. Propaganda campaigns were set up to stimulate remigration of German emigrants in overseas areas, yet the success was limited. 61 What seemed more promising was the recruitment of racially kindred people on the continent. Although a multitude of considerations induced Hitler to order the attack on Western and Northern Europe, one of the outcomes was that precious Germanic blood of racially kindred people came within the reach of German authorities. The idea to target land of the Soviet Union as settlement area had been developed just a few months before. Initially, the idea prevailed to create a chain of vassal states in the western part of the Soviet Union that would protect the enlarged Reich from Russian and Bolshevist attacks. 62 The impending launch of Operation Barbarossa in June 1941 gave way to different plans, comprising ruthless exploitation and colonization of the area. In this transformation Himmler had an active part. Over the next months, he ordered Konrad Meyer to develop several designs for an ever growing stretch of land in Eastern Europe. In the fourth versions of General Plan East, presented by Meyer in July 1942, it was calculated that the indigenous (Slavic) population should be reduced by some thirty million. Some fi ve million Germanic men should take their place. As the war had already put a strain on the population of the Altreich, these Germanics were to be recruited amongst ethnic Germans and racially kindred Germanics outside the borders of the Altreich. 63 This formal inclusion of foreign Germanic men in the Nazi schemes was initiated by Himmler, but with regard to the future of the occupied eastern territories other authorities also had their say. German offi cials in economic and agricultural affairs made their presence felt, most of all Herbert Backe, since 1933 State Secretary of Food and Agriculture. Early in 1941, Backe was put in charge of food policy in preparation for Operation Barbarossa. After the German attack on the Soviet Union, Backe managed the exploitation of the conquered areas. His newly assigned position of State Secretary Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:42 01 October 2016 within the newly formatted Reichskommissariat Ukraine underscored his authority.64 Appointed Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories in July 1941, Alfred Rosenberg was formally in charge of the two German governments installed in the occupied eastern Territories: the Reichskommissariat of Ukraine and the Reichskommissariat Ostland, covering the Baltic States and Belarus. Establishing rule through settlement was also his creed, yet Rosenberg was inclined to give the indigenous population, in particular of the Baltics, some rationale. Moreover, Rosenberg was strongly opposed to interference of other Nazi celebrities in ‘his’ playground.65 Pure-Blooded Germanics 39 Preliminary talks began in Berlin in November 1941. In the buildings of the German Foreign Offi ce offi cials of Rosenberg’s Ostministerium, members of the Wehrmacht staff and economic experts gathered and discussed the general topic of ‘foreign contribution’ (Beteiligung des Auslandes) . Aware of the shortage of manpower in Germany proper and convinced of the undesirability of putting indigenous (Slavic) people in charge, they all agreed on bringing ‘foreigners’ in—amongst the nations mentioned were Belgians. Gottlob Berger, Himmler’s close associate and chief of staff for the Waffen-SS, approved of these plans. 66 Over the course of the next months, several more top-level meetings were scheduled. At these occasions the group of foreign volunteers was further defi ned. Apparently, Poles, Serbs, and Czechs were excluded as they were judged both racially inferior and politically untrustworthy. In January 1942 Georg Leibrandt, within Rosenberg’s Ostministerium head of the political section, assured Himmler that these nationalities were no longer under consideration as candidates for the East.67 Primarily, volunteers should be selected from the Germanic peoples of the occupied western and northern countries: Denmark, Norway, Belgium and the Netherlands. They were preferred, as one of Leibrandt’s colleagues asserted, ‘for racial-political reasons.’68 The exact nature of this prospective Germanic contribution remained, however, ambiguous. In the summer of 1941 Hitler pictured a mass immigration of two to three million Germanic people to the occupied East. They would come from Germany proper, but also from Western Europe, Scan- dinavia, and even from America.69 When this mass immigration would start, was unclear. In most of the future plans and grand designs it was taken into account that the realization would take at least decades. Planners like Meyer emphasized that the colonization should wait until the war’s end. In March 1942, Berger explicitly discouraged the immediate transfer of larger numbers of Germanic farmers to the area. 70 Two months earlier, Rosenberg already had argued that ‘in the next fi ve years no one was going to settle.’71 In the same period of time Himmler proclaimed that it was still unclear when the contribution from nationals other than Germans could commence. 72 Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:42 01 October 2016 GERMANIC ALLIES

In the early spring of 1940 Hitler decreed the invasion of Denmark and Norway. The main reasons for doing this were economic and military in nature. Germany bordered on Denmark to the north. Via Scandinavia British troops could invade the Reich. In particular the vast Norwegian coastline seemed vulnerable. Conversely, this coastline offered ice-free harbors to the German fl eet and gave way to the Atlantic. Moreover, the occupation of Norway would also secure the crucial Swedish deliveries (from the country’s northern regions) of iron ore to Germany.73 40 Pure-Blooded Germanics In the scheme of things, Denmark was more or less a stepping-stone on the way to Norway. It turned out to be an easy passage. The Danish army was hopelessly outmoded and posed no threat to the German military force. The German ultimatum to bomb the city of Copenhagen as well as the promise to respect Danish sovereignty and political independence were enough to convince the Danish government to accept the imposed Ger- man ‘protection.’ And so it was that within six hours after the fi rst German troops entered Danish territory, the Danish-German war was over. The conquest of Norway was quite a different story. The country’s geographical constellation complicated German warfare. Norwegian troops under siege simply withdrew into desolate parts of the country. The fi ght against British droppings on Norway’s extensive shore was tantalizing. After sixty-two days of intense fi ghting, the Norwegian army capitulated. The Norwegian king fl ed the country and his government was put under strict German supervision by a front man of the Nazi Party, Joseph Ter- boven. As Reich Commissioner (Reichskommissar) of occupied Norway, Terboven was installed to protect German interests and to ‘win’ the Norwe- gian population for the sake of the Greater Germanic Reich. 74 Although the two Scandinavian countries were invaded and conquered principally for strategical and economic causes, the racial quality of the native population was immediately recognized and affected the German political course towards both Danes and Norwegians. These descendants of the illustrious Vikings were considered people of superior racial material. In their remoteness, unaffected by the modern world, they had kept their racial purity. In their communities Nordic mythology had originated. This was, in the words of the racial scientist Hans Günther, who was highly praised in SS-circles, the real home of the Nordic race (Urheimat); Danes and above all Norwegians were the racial summit.75 Both Himmler and Darré were enticed by Günther’s so-called Nordic thought (Nordischer Gedanke). 76 Darré in particular admired the communal life of the Norwegian peasantry and the hereditariness of their farms, safeguarding the bond of people (tribe) to soil, which was much appreciated by Darré. Himmler for his part championed the idea of transforming the SS into a transnational order of Nordic men. In the late 1930s he opened his SS regiment Germania to all people of Germanic descent, including civilians from parts of Europe that were not yet occupied.77 Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:42 01 October 2016 Thus, some sort of entry in the ‘the greater Germanic area’ (der Ger- manische Grossraum) was to be expected in the recently occupied northern countries. The Danish reaction to German plans to involve Danes in the exploitation of the occupied East was negative: initially the chances for collaboration looked better in Norway. 78 It was Norway that in particular became the playground of Nazi racial policy. The various SS organizations that took up residence in Norway made serious efforts to advance ‘racial awareness’ amongst the Norwegians. Their work commenced in January 1941. In their propaganda they constantly marketed the idea that Pure-Blooded Germanics 41 Norwegians ‘naturally’ belonged to a much larger community of racially kindred people: they should help defending their needed ‘living space’, i.e. the Greater Germanic Reich; they should also be willing to throw themselves into the breach for Germany, which was fi ghting a war for the survival of the Germanic/Nordic race. The recruitment campaigns for the Waffen- SS were all about racial solidarity. SS offi cials simply assumed that these protagonists of the Nordic race were happy to join the Waffen-SS and to fi ght side by side with Germans and other Germanic people for a common cause.79 Simultaneously, initiated by Himmler on his visit to Oslo in January 1941, the fi rst tentative talks between German and Norwegian offi cials took place on the subject of a possible Norwegian participation in the Germanization of occupied Poland. For this matter Himmler approached Olav Willy Fer- mann, a fabulously wealthy Norwegian entrepreneur, who had made most of his fortune in a German-Norwegian business. Fermann was also one of the most distinguished members of the Norwegian Fascist Party (Nas- jonal Samling), which he had joined in 1933. During his protracted stays in Germany in the 1930s Fermann made Himmler’s acquaintance. On his tour in Norway, Himmler informed Fermann about his plan to involve Norwe- gian farmers in the colonization of the occupied East. Fermann was assigned to investigate the feasibility of this plan and to take the required preparatory steps. Most of the following months were spent in Germany. Shortly after the German attack on the Soviet Union, in June 1941, Fermann joined the Reichsführer on a trip through occupied Eastern Europe. They visited Lublin, where Konrad Meyer was met, went to the Baltic area, and went again to Kiev. It was in these late summer days that mass shootings of Jews by German special forces took place in and around Kiev. Supposedly, Fermann got wind of the killings. Soon after he decided to cease his cooperation with the German colonization project. 80 Others succeeded Fermann, but the recruitment of Norwegian farmers barely got started. In 1941 a few dozen Norwegian men enjoyed some preliminary agricultural education in Germany, in preparation for a prospective settlement in occupied Polish territory. Actually, just a handful stayed briefl y in the Lublin district. The results of initiatives fostered in 1942 were equally disappointing. As part of the international Germanic Land Service (Germanische Landdienst) some three hundred youngsters from Norway’s Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:42 01 October 2016 rural areas traveled to the Warthegau to be trained as settlers. Prior to their settlement the men of this group were obliged to acquire some basic military training, provided by the Waffen-SS. By the time their instruction fi nished, the colonization of the Nazi East seemed an unattainable ideal. German troops were withdrawn from the area that was designated for colonization.81 By order of the Norwegian Nazi leader Vidkun Quisling, the ‘Ostweg Soci- ety’ was established in Oslo to encourage Norwegians to volunteer for work in the Nazi East. This was an initiative, not solely targeted at farmers. By November 1943, some six hundred candidates had put forward their names. 42 Pure-Blooded Germanics Their transfer to the occupied eastern territories was postponed as their safety in the area could no longer be guaranteed. 82 A bio-political project initiated by the SS in Norway that indeed did succeed was that of the Lebensborn organization. Even before a military victory was secured in the late spring of 1940, Himmler gave air to his wish to offer care to the Norwegian women who were (or had been) involved with German soldiers. Under the fl ag of the Lebensborn organization several maternity homes, clinics, and birth houses opened their doors to these women and their children in the course of the war. More than 8,000 children were born in these places. In this way Himmler’s aim to preserve valu- able Nordic blood was at least successful.83

In the early morning of May 10th, 1940, German troops crossed the border that separated Germany from its smaller neighbors to the west. The invasion was part of Fall Gelb, the codename for the military operation that was targeted at France and the United Kingdom. The control over Belgium, Luxem- bourg, and the Netherlands was necessary to facilitate the military advance southwards and to create a springboard across the Channel. As in the run- up to the First World War, the governments of the three small countries committed themselves to a policy of neutrality. The German remilitariza- tion of the Rhineland in 1936 had brought German soldiers back to their borders, but in his speech from January 30th, 1937, Hitler had sent the reassuring message to his audience that the Belgian and Dutch neutrality would be respected.84 Less than four years later, the Western European countries were attacked. Before night fell, all of Luxembourg was conquered by the Wehrmacht. In great hurry the grand duchess and her ministers fl ed the country. In the Neth- erlands, German paratroopers were dropped behind the Dutch defense lines. The queen and most of her ministers sailed to England on May 13th, leaving the country to the military commander to rule. The large-scale attack by air on Rotterdam caused massive destruction and led to the Dutch decision to surrender, only fi ve days after hostilities commenced. At that moment the fi ghting in Belgium still continued, yet also in this country, even with British troops coming to the aid, German supremacy was undeniable. Thirteen days after the Dutch defeat, the Belgian army was defeated and capitulated. Now that the three countries adjacent to the northern part of France Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:42 01 October 2016 were under German control, the German advance continued swiftly, simply circumventing the Maginot-line that had been built to protect France from its eastern archenemy. Again, Germany’s military was overpowering and on June 22nd the armistice was signed meeting German conditions. Unlike the Netherlands and Belgium only a certain part of France would become occupied German territory: the Atlantic coastal strip and roughly the northern half of the country. To the south of this demarcation line French sovereignty and authority were secured. Pure-Blooded Germanics 43 After the military defeat of Germany’s western neighbors, Hitler’s political ambitions with regard to the conquered area and its population became clear. The Führer now openly expressed his desire to ‘save’ the larger racially kindred populations of Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. In one way or another they would be incorporated into the Greater Germanic Reich. With this end in mind, a political expert as head of government was preferred. In the early summer of 1940 Gustav Simon was selected for the job in Luxembourg. A man with excellent credentials, his main assignment was ‘to win the hearts of the Luxembourgian people for Germandom’ (Die Her- zen der Luxemburger für das Deutschtum gewinnen) .85 In effect, loyalty and racial purity were rewarded and Luxembourgian citizens ‘of German descent’ (Deutschstämmig) who had made themselves useful for Germany could apply for German citizenship. At the same time, Simon suppressed all expressions of French culture. Speaking French in public, according to Simon the language of ‘a nigger nation’ (einer verniggerten Nation), was prohibited. More drastic bio-political measures followed later. In the course of 1942 Simon aired his wish to push allegedly Francophile citizens over the border, yet was halted by Himmler who preferred to postpone major migration projects until war was over. Thus, expulsions of Francophile citizens from Luxembourg were only random occurrences. A more substantial group of forced migrants consisted of racially qualifi ed (i.e.: Germanic) Luxembourgians who were accused of being ‘anti-German.’ They were sent to Germany or further to the east to be re-educated. Some 4,187 Luxem- bourgians arrived in the Sudeten region, predominantly family members of deserted soldiers of the Wehrmacht or Waffen-SS. The recruitment of soldiers had been on a voluntary basis until the summer of 1942, resulting in the largest percentage of volunteers from Western Europe. In July of that year, conscription was introduced in Luxembourg.86 Whereas Luxembourg was de facto annexed by Nazi Germany, Belgium was to remain occupied military territory. The highest authority rested in the hands of a Wehrmacht commander, although the appointment of a Reich Commissioner like in Norway was never off the agenda. As opposed to Nor- way, however, the Belgian head of state (Leopold III) was still in Belgium. It would be a delicate matter to put a German civilian head of government above the king. Moreover, a military authority seemed needed in the light of Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:42 01 October 2016 the strategical importance of the Belgian coastline for a planned attack on the United Kingdom. Hitler decided to suspend the appointment of a civilian as head of government. To a large extent, the military predominance in Belgium blocked the way for racist purists like Himmler. 87 Unlike Norway, the country would not become a center stage of the SS. This is not to say that Belgium stayed unaffected by racial or geopolitical measures. For many infl uential Nazi politicians, Belgium constituted a political monstrosity of French design. The 44 Pure-Blooded Germanics national borders did not follow historical geographical lines and ignored the ethnic, cultural, and linguistic differences of Flemish and Walloons. As soon as German control over the country was established, some major adjust- ments of the borders were opted for. The country lost the region of Eupen- Malmédy. Handed over to Belgium in the aftermath of Versailles, this region was formally annexed by the German Reich in 1940.88 At the same time, the French departments Nord and Pas-de-Calais were added to Belgium. For this last adaptation the German authorities found their legitimation fi rst and foremost in history. According to them, the region was Dutch (or Flemish) ‘by origin.’ It had been part of the Low Countries until 1678, when Louis XIV established rule over the region. However, the people, their culture and customs, had remained intrinsically Dutch—and thus Ger- manic. More in general, in geopolitical terms, France simply did not deserve the land mass it possessed. Like in the First World War, the French nation was considered a nation in decline and decay, due to its drop in birthrates. Thus, a cut in French territory seemed only fair. In addition to the two departments joined with Belgium, France lost its border-regions Alsace and Lorraine to Germany. A broad strip of land in north-eastern France was closed off and designated as an area for Germanic settlement. The German Ministry of Food and Agriculture sent its LO-offi cials from Poland to this area to administer the 8,900 appropriated French farms. As in former Polish territory they were faced with a lack of zest among German farmers to move outside the Altreich. LO relied heavily on forced laborers, mostly prisoners of war, to work the land. In the long run, the evicted French inhabitants were allowed to return.89 Although German redivision of land did not gain much support in France, it was applauded by some Flemish citizens. Since the separation of Belgium from the Netherlands in 1830, the young nation was marked by the internal division of (French-speaking) Walloons and (Dutch-speaking) Flem- ish. As French became the dominant language in government, economy, and the academic world, parts of the Flemish population felt neglected and unrepresented in the nation’s higher circles. They found shelter in Flemish- nationalistic movements. The German occupation of 1914–1918 was seized by these nationalistic movements as an opportunity to create a new, Flemish- controlled nation-state. Already in that time the wish was uttered to ‘recon- quer’ what was called French Flanders (roughly the two French departments Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:42 01 October 2016 of Nord and Pas-de-Calais). During the interwar years, Flemish nationalists united in the Flemish National League ( Vlaams Nationaal Verbond, or VNV) repeated this wish. Infl uenced by Nazi ideology, the VNV propagated the annexation of French Flanders in order to create additional ‘living space’ for the Flemish people.90 When German troops invaded France and Belgium again in 1940 and this time succeeded in reaching and conquering Paris, the VNV did not hesi- tate to openly side with Germany. The news of the annexation of French Flanders was received as the joyful rectifi cation of history and the end of Pure-Blooded Germanics 45 French domination over the area. However, the German military regime in Belgium was careful not to raise expectations of a further Flemish colonization of the area. Above all, the German military sought to maintain order in this country that would serve as the main stepping-stone to conquer England. Unbalancing the already fragile relation between the Flemish and Walloons by favoring the fi rst was not in Germany’s military interest. 91 Not surprisingly, Himmler’s representatives in Belgium had fewer reservations. They tapped the VNV to spread their message of a racially homogenous Germanic Reich and to recruit men for the Waffen-SS. Overall, the recruitment of Flemish volunteers was fruitful: approximately 10,000 Flemish men took up arms for the Waffen-SS.92 Finding Ger- manic men (and their families) to populate and cultivate the land that was conquered in the East was less successful. The economic engagement of Belgians in the occupied East was put on the agenda only after the German attack of the Soviet Union. For Flemish volunteers, one of Rosenberg’s special deputies suggested in May 1942 the establishment of an exclusive zone of settlement in the occupied eastern territories. The offi cial was convinced that a concentration of Belgian economic activities would strengthen the ‘Germanic infl uence’ in the area. He recommended the region of Baranov- ichi in Belarus. 93 There was some propaganda for Flemish participation in the exploitation and colonization. 94 Five months later, the same deputy had to conclude that, despite his initial optimism, not a single Belgian volunteer had been recruited. There had been some talks, for instance with Belgian specialists in canalization and with Belgian engineers who had been employed in Ukraine before the First World War. The idea to establish a society to coordinate selection and employment was given some thought, yet it did not materialize.95 It is plau- sible that the enterprise did not take off due to a lack of support from both the German occupying forces in Belgium and Belgian national-socialists. The German military authorities in Belgium were foremost concerned with military security in the country and feared all kinds of activities, like recruitment campaigns for the Nazi East, which would possibly cause disturbances in Belgium. The Flemish national-socialists for their part were aware of the need to fi nd additional ‘living space,’ yet their eyes were on northern France and Wallonia. Through an aggressive Flemish settlement policy in these adjacent regions, they aimed to solve the problem of population density in Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:42 01 October 2016 Flanders. Eastern Europe was not of major interest to them.96

THE DUTCH SURPLUS

The German prospects for recruitment seemed better in the occupied Neth- erlands. In many respects the organizational arrangements in Norway were taken as an example for the Low Countries. Similar to Norway, the Dutch head of state and her ministers had fl ed the country, leaving a beheaded, 46 Pure-Blooded Germanics yet well-organized, Dutch administration at the occupier’s disposal. On May 25th Hitler decreed the installation of a Reich Commissioner, like he had done for Norway, who would be responsible for the nazifi cation of the indigenous (Germanic) population in the neighboring state. Identical to the Reich Commissioner of Norway, this offi cial should lead the Dutch ‘by soft hand’ into the Greater Germanic Reich. Through propaganda and education the Dutch should be convinced of both the historical inevitability and the benefi ts of this absorption.97 Hitler chose the Austrian Nazi Arthur Seyss-Inquart for the position of Reich Commissioner. Internationally, Seyss-Inquart had built up a reputation as one of the key players in the downfall of Austria’s chancellor Kurt von Schusnigg. Inaugurated Schusnigg’s Minister of Interior on February 16th, 1938, Seyss-Inquart became his successor on March 11th. With his explicit consent, German troops crossed the border one day later. A lawyer by education, Seyss-Inquart laid the legal foundations of the Austrian Anschluss . Despite this feat, his political career in Vienna had come to a halt, largely because of the appointment of Joseph Bürckel as Reich Commissioner of Austria, six weeks after the union of Germany and Austria had become formalized. The assault on Poland offered Seyss-Inquart new opportunities. On October 5th, 1939, he became the new Higher SS and Police Com- mander (Höherer SS- und Polizeiführer) in Cracow. Within a month he was selected as Hans Frank’s deputy in the General Government.98 Ideologically, Seyss-Inquart was close to Himmler and his utopia of a Greater Germanic Reich. In his mind, Europe was ‘the homeland of people of Nordic descent’ (Heimat der Völker nordisch bestimmter Herkunft); Eastern Europe was merely a desolated steppe, inhabited by ‘unbridled masses.’99 Both Himmler and Seyss-Inquart thought highly of the racial qualities exhibited by the Dutch.100 Rarely did Seyss-Inquart oppose the intrusion of the SS in Dutch society. Ahnenerbe was one of the agencies that benefi ted. Quickly after the German military victory, Himmler stationed Schneider in the Netherlands. It took Schneider just a few weeks to found De Volkse Werkgemeenschap, a society of Dutch ethnologists and others whose aim it was to increase ‘Germanic awareness’ amongst the Dutch public. The time of ‘bourgeois nationalism’ was over, they openly declared: this was the dawn of an era of Germanic brotherhood. 101 Jan de Vries became one of Schneider’s protégés.102 After the capitulation Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:42 01 October 2016 of the Dutch army, the professor in Germanic Studies was quick to openly sympathize with the new rulers.103 In his writings published over the course of the occupation, De Vries stressed the importance of the common roots of the Dutch and the Germans. More and more he came to understand these roots in biological terms: the cultural, linguistic, and behavioral similarities were all expressions of the same racial identity.104 Convinced of the historical task of the Germanic people in Europe, De Vries favored the emigration to occupied Eastern Europe of Dutch farmers who had neither land nor farm within the Dutch national borders.105 For Pure-Blooded Germanics 47 legitimation De Vries looked back. During the Migration Period in the early Common Era, he asserted, Germanic tribes had lived in Eastern Europe, but they had been pushed westwards by Slavs and others. Thus, the Nazi project of eastern colonization was simply an act of reclamation. In other writings De Vries concentrated on the long tradition of Dutch colonization of the East, going back to the sixteenth century when Dutch Mennonites had moved to the hinterland of Danzig.106 De Vries visited the annexed Pol- ish regions to witness with his own eyes the Dutch colonial heritage in the area. When plans were discussed with regard to a new Germanic Institute in the Netherlands, his name was mentioned as the head of a research project on Germanic colonization in continental Europe.107 Although De Vries would not join the SS until 1943, his passion for everything Germanic and his linking of former to present-day Germanic migration to Eastern Europe brought him into the SS-fold. In higher circles of the SS the swift military conquest of the Netherlands elicited hope for a Dutch contribution to the colonization project in the Nazi East. To one of his trustees Himmler spoke of the Dutch as ‘by blood exceptionally highly qualifi ed men’ (blutsmässig unerhört wertvolle Kräfte), well suited for the job of peopling the East. By moving eastwards they were in tune with history, i.e. the ‘treks’ of Dutch farmers to this part of the European continent centuries ago. Moreover, Himmler expected them to be keen to leave their densely populated country. According to the Reichsführer, there were simply too many people in the occupied Netherlands, putting serious strains on Dutch peasantry in particular.108 Barely six days after the attack on the Soviet Union was launched, a gathering was organized in the center of Amsterdam. Hundreds of Dutch came together to listen to Seyss-Inquart. In his long speech the Reich Com- missioner not only urged his audience to take up arms against the Bolshevist threat, but also made an appeal to his fellow-Germanics to help colonize the conquered land. ‘Look eastwards,’ he insisted: ‘800 years ago, your ancestors were drawn in that direction, again and again, and added substantially to the European culture and mentality.’109 The day had dawned to make a new contribution. Shortly after, Seyss-Inquart was received by Himmler in his Ukrainian headquarters. Together they traveled to Cracow to discuss the contribution of Dutch farmers with German general governor in Poland Hans Frank. 110 Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:42 01 October 2016 Arguably, as a result of these talks, a former Ostforscher was requested to study the potential Dutch input in the colonization project. Before the war Hermann Roloff had been engaged in bio-political planning with regard to Germany’s eastern provinces. In order to make these eastern borderlands more ‘German,’ Roloff suggested moving German farmers from western to eastern regions. 111 After the conquest of Polish land, Roloff, like most of the prewar Ostforscher, adapted his focus to the new situation and published on the subject of mapping people and space in Germany’s newly acquired eastern territories. 112 48 Pure-Blooded Germanics In 1940 a new assignment awaited Roloff. Within the German administration of the occupied Netherlands he was appointed head of planning. As opposed to the occupied East, planning in the Netherlands hardly seemed in need of German intervention. In many ways the prestigious Dutch land reclamation project of the Zuiderzee simply had been the supreme example of rational and effi cient planning. Roloff considered the Dutch population extraordinarily healthy: thanks to their ‘racial and biological strength’ (rassische und biologische Volkskraft) birthrates were high and mortality levels were low. The Dutch, in other words, were excellent fellow Germanic tribesmen. The increase in their population was partially absorbed by newly acquired or cultivated land within the national borders. The Zuiderzee project would offer land and a home for ‘a new, Germanic peasantry’ (ein neues, Germanisches Bauerntum). In his euphoria Roloff even suggested modeling the occupied East after this Dutch project. Yet the project would not be suffi cient to end the dangers of overpopulation and shortage of land in Dutch rural areas. Roloff estimated that at least 100,000 farmers should leave the country to restore the balance in Dutch agriculture. They were excellent candidates for the colonization of the occupied East.113

When Roloff made his calculations public in 1942, Dutch and German offi - cials had reached agreement on the employment of Dutch farmers in the occupied East. As early as July 1941, a special Commission for the Employ- ment of Farmers in Eastern Europe ( Commissie tot Uitzending van Land- bouwers naar Oost-Europa, or CULANO) was established to coordinate the enterprise. Already in the late autumn of 1941 the fi rst groups of farmers had left the country.114 To a certain extent this early ‘success’ can be ascribed to German efforts. From the fi rst days of the occupation Himmler and his men of the SS were committed to involving the Dutch population in their empire-building in Europe. A vicious, all-encompassing policy of nazifi cation would increase awareness amongst the Dutch of their Germanic roots. It was one of Seyss- Inquart’s main assignments to bring the lost Dutch sheep back to the Ger- manic fl ock. Unlike in Norway, land was scarce in the Netherlands. Most of the rural areas were thought to be burdened with an excess of people. Without intervention this would not change quickly as birthrates in the countryside were generally high. Roloff had calculated that tens of thou- Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:42 01 October 2016 sands of Dutch should leave the countryside to provide those who were staying behind suffi cient ‘living space.’ Thus, the assumption was also that the Dutch would want to go. Au fond, the analysis of Roloff was not new. The critical situation of Dutch agriculture had been a worry to Dutch governments for decades. Since the outbreak of the war and the Allied blockade in the late 1930s, the national food provisions constituted an additional concern. Price control and rationing of staple food had been introduced before May 1940, yet the occupation seemed to ask for more drastic measures to secure Dutch food Pure-Blooded Germanics 49 supply. The German request for a Dutch contribution to the exploitation of agricultural resources in the occupied East, in return for a share of the harvest, did not fall on deaf ears.

NOTES

1 . Quoted in: Thomas Müller, Imaginierter Westen: Das Konzept des “deutschen Westraums” im völkischen Diskurs zwischen Politischer Romantik und Natio- nalsozialismus (Bielefeld: Transcript Verlag, 2009), 68–69. 2 . Ibidem, 69–71. 3 . Ibidem, 92–99. 4 . Von einem Deutschen [August Julius Langbehn], Rembrandt als Erzieher (Leipzig: Hirschfeld, 1890), 141–146. 5 . Michael Burleigh, ‘The Knights, Nationalists and the Historians’, in: Michael Burleigh, Ethics and Extermination: Refl ections on Nazi Genocide (Cam- bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 14–17. 6 . Heinrich von Treitschke, Was fordern wir von Frankreich? (Berlin: Georg Reimer, 1870). Available online via http://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=wu.890 92561190;view=1up;seq=9. Last visited 5 September 2013. 7 . Ibidem, 4. 8 . Ibidem, 7. 9 . Ibidem, 7–8. 10 . Heinrich von Treitschke, Politik: Vorlesungen gehalten an der Universät zu Berlin I (Leipzig: S. Hirzel, 1899), 128. Available online via http://archive.org/ details/politik01trei. Last visited 5 September 2013. 11 . Ibidem, 227. 12 . George Mosse, Culture of Western Europe: The Nineteenth and Twentieth Century (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1974), 64–65. 13 . Shelley Baranowski, Nazi Empire: German Colonialism and Imperialism from Bismarck to Hitler (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 41. 14 . Mark Bassin, ‘Imperialism and the Nation State in Friedrich Ratzel’s Political Geography’, Progress in Human Geography 11 (1987), 473–495. 15 . Ibidem, 481–482. 16 . On Carl Peters see: Arne Perras, Carl Peters and German Imperialism 1856–1918: A Political Biography (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2004). 17 . Müller, Imaginierte Westen, 126–152. 18 . Mark Mazower, Hitler’ s Empire: Nazi Rule in Occupied Europe (London/ New York: Allen Lane, 2008), 15–23; Philip T. Rutherford, Prelude to the Final Solution: The Nazi Program for Deporting Ethnic Poles (Lawrence: Uni- versity Press of Kansas, 2007), 13–35. 19 . Volker R. Berghahn, ‘German and Poles, 1871–1945’, Yearbook of European Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:42 01 October 2016 Studies 13 (1999), 27–28; Richard Evans, The Coming of the Third Reich (London: Allen Lane, 2003), 45–46. 20 . Robert Lewis Koehl, ‘Colonialism inside Germany: 1886–1918’, Journal of Modern History 24/3 (1953), 256. 21 . Baranowski, Nazi Empire, 23. 22 . Kristin Kopp, ‘Constructing Racial Difference in Colonial Poland’, in: Eric Ames, Marcia Klotz and Lora Wildenthal (eds.), Germany’s Colonial Pasts (Lincoln/London: University of Nebraska Press, 2005), 77. 23 . Baranowski, Nazi Empire, 42–44; Berghahn, ‘German and Poles’, 28. 24 . Troy Paddock, ‘Creating an Oriental Feindbild’, Central European History 39/2 (2006), 221–232. 50 Pure-Blooded Germanics 25 . Friedrich von Bernhardi, Deutschland und der nächste Krieg (Berlin/Stuttgart: J.G. Cotta, 1913). Available online in English via www.gutenberg.org/fi les/ 11352/11352.txt. Last visited 6 September 2013. 26 . Ibidem, 16–17 and 82. 27 . Ibidem, 82. 28 . Evans, The Coming of the Third Reich, 47–48; Daniel Frymann (pseudonym of Heinrich Class), Wenn ich der Kaiser wär’: Politische Wahrheiten und Notwendigkeiten (Leipzig: Dieterich’schen Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1912), 128–136 . Its fourth edition (1914) translated in English, available online via www.h-net.org/~german/gtext/kaiserreich/class.html. Last visited 6 September 2013. 29 . The emperor’s speech on 4 August, in a special session of the Reichstag, available online via www.gutenberg.org/fi les/16331/16331-h/16331-h.htm#SPEECH_ FROM_THE_THRONE. Last visited 6 September 2013. 30 . Fritz Fischer, Griff nach der Weltmacht: Die Kriegszielpolitik des kaiserlichen Deutschland 1914–1918 (Düsseldorf: Droste, 1961), 101–104. 31 . Theodor Bethmann Hollweg, Denkschrift September 9, 1914. Reprinted in Wolfdieter Bihl, Deutsche Quellen zur Geschichte des Ersten Weltkrieges (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1991), 61–62. Available online via http://germanhistorydocs.ghi-dc.org/sub_document.cfm?document_ id=980. Last visited 8 September 2013. 32 . Baranowski, Nazi Empire, 78–82. 33 . Vejas Gabriel Liulevicius, War Land on the Eastern Front: Culture, National Identity and German Occupation in World War I (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 12–47 and 54–81. 34 . Klaus W. Wippermann, ‘Die deutschen Wochenschauen im Ersten Weltkrieg’, Publizistik 16/3 (1971), 271. 35 . Baranowski, Nazi Empire, 102–103; Fischer, Griff nach der Weltmacht, 779–803. 36 . See for more detail: Hans W. Gatzke, Germany’s Drive to the West: A Study of Germany’s Western War Aims during the First World War (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1950). 37 . Müller, Imaginierter Westen, 149–151 and 159. 38 . Ibidem, 157 and 166–167. 39 . Mazower, Hitler’s Empire, 33–37. 40 . Bernd Faulenbach, ‘Zäsuren deutscher Geschichte? Der Einschnitt von 1918 und 1945’, Tel Aviver Jahrbuch für deutsche Geschichte XXV (1996), 21; Wolfgang Jäger, Historische Forschung und politische Kultur in Deutschland: Die Debate 1914–1980 über den Ausbruch des Ersten Weltkrieges (Göttin- gen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1984), 46–87. 41 . Elisabeth Harvey, Women and the Nazi East: Agents and Witnesses of Ger- manization (New Haven/London: Yale University Press, 2003), 26; Mazower, Hitler’s Empire, 40–41. Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:42 01 October 2016 42 . Steffen Werther, SS-Vision und Grenzland-Realität: Vom Umgang dänischer und “volksdeutscher” Nationalsozialisten in Sønderjylland mit der “grossgermanischen” Ideologie der SS (Oslo: Acta Universitatis Stockholmiensis, 2012), 46–50. 43 . For more detail on Ostforschung and its instrumentalization by the Nazi regime see: Michael Burleigh, Germany Turns Eastwards: A Study of Ost- forschung in the Third Reich (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988). 44 . Willi Oberkrome, Volksgeschichte: Methodische Innovation und völkische Ideologisierung in der deutschen Geschichtswissenschaft 1918–1945 (Göttin- gen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1993), 61ff. Pure-Blooded Germanics 51 45 . Jan de Vries, De Germaansche Oudheid (Haarlem: Tjeenk Willink, 1930), 50; Barbara Henkes, Uit liefde voor het volk: Volkskundigen op zoek naar de Nederlandse identiteit 1918–1948 (Amsterdam: Athenaeum-Polak & Van Gennep, 2005), 24–25. 46 . Henkes, Uit liefde voor het volk, 150–152. 47 . Barbara Henkes and Björn Rzoska, ‘Volkskunde und “Volkstumspolitik” der SS in den Niederlanden: Hans Ernst Schneider und seine “grossgermanischen” Ambitionen für den niederländischen Raum’, in: Burkhard Dietz, Helmut Gabel and Ulrich Tiedau (eds.), Griff nach dem Westen: Die “Westforschung” der völkisch-nationalen Wissenschaften zum nordwesteuropäischen Raum, 1919–1960 (Münster: Waxmann, 2003), 295–296; Ton Dekker, De Neder- landse Volkskunde: De verwetenschappelijking van een emotionele belangstelling (Amsterdam: Aksant, 2002), 203. 48 . Müller, Imaginierter Westen, 296–301. 49 . Ibidem, 304–315; Netherlands Institute for War, Holocaust and Genocide Studies Amsterdam (NIOD), KBI, fi le 7801; NIOD, 061, fi le 170. 50 . Henkes and Rzoska, ‘Volkskunde’, 305–321; Joachim Lerchenmueller, ‘Hans Ernst Schneider/Hans Schwertes Niederlande-Arbeit in den 1930er bis 1950er Jahren’, in: Dietz et al., Griff nach dem Westen, 1111–1140. 51 . Mazower, Hitler’s Empire, 33; Edward D. Wynot, ‘The Polish Germans, 1919–1939: National Minority in a Multinational State’, The Polish Review 17/1 (1972), 23–64. 52 . Quoted in Mazower, Hitler’s Empire, 181. 53 . Ibidem, 78–86. 54 . Ibidem, 84–87. 55 . Speech Heinrich Himmler to the audience of SS-generals in Münich (8.12.1938), printed in Bradley F. Smith and Agnes F. Peterson (eds.), Heinrich Himmler: Geheimreden 1933 bis 1945 und andere Ansprachen (Frankfurt a. M: Pro- pyläen Verlag, 1974), 38. 56 . Only some 50,000 of the estimated 200,000 Germans voluntarily left South Tyrol. See: Markus Leniger, Nationalsozialistische “Volkstumsarbeit” und Umsiedlungspolitik 1933–1945: Von der Minderheitenbetreuung zur Siedle- rauslese ( Berlin: Frank & Timme, 2006), 88ff. 57 . Mazower, Hitler’s Empire, 184–189; Uwe Mai, “Rasse und Raum”: Agrar- politik, Sozial- und Raumplanung im NS-Staat (Paderborn, etc.: Ferdinand Schöningh, 2002), 87–93. 58 . Harvey, Women and the Nazi East, 81–82; Rutherford, Prelude to the Final Solution, 8. 59 . Catherine Esptein, Model Nazi: Arthur Greiser and the Occupation of West- ern Poland (Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 174–180; Timothy Snyder, Bloodlands: Europe between Hitler and Stalin (New York: Basic Books, 2010), 132–133. 60 . Epstein, Model Nazi, 162–163; Hans Umbreit, ‘Auf dem Weg zur Koninental- Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:42 01 October 2016 herrschaft’, in: Bernard R. Kroener, Rolf-Dieter Müller and Hans Umbreit (eds.), Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg V/1 (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags- Anstalt, 1998), 147–148; Mai,“Rasse und Raum”, 122 and 294; Rolf-Dieter Müller, Hitlers Ostkrieg und die deutsche Siedlungspolitik: Die Zusammenarbeit von Wehrmacht, Wirtschaft und SS (Frankfurt/Main: Fischer, 1991), 130–138. 61 . Mai, “Rasse und Raum”, 308–309. 62 . Ibidem, 301. 63 . Ibidem, 310–315. 64 . Gesine Gerhard, ‘Food and Genocide: Nazi Agrarian Politics in the Occupied Ter- ritories of the Soviet Union’, Contemporary European History 18/2009, 53–56. 52 Pure-Blooded Germanics 65 . Mai, “Rasse und Raum”, 304–305; Wendy Lower, Nazi Empire-Building and the Holocaust in Ukraine (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2005), 173–174. 66 . Note HA III Sektor Wirtschaft to Alfred Rosenberg, 20 November 1941, and report, concerning meeting with Gottlob Berger, 17 March 1942, Bundesar- chiv Berlin (BA), R6, fi le 443. 67 . Letter Georg Leibrandt to Heinrich Himmler, 9 January 1942, BA, R6, fi le 443. 68 . Letter Otto Bräutigam to Albert Speer, 31 July 1942, BA, R6, fi le 443; note Walter Malletke, concerning the mobilization of European labor force and industrial capacities for the occupied eastern territories, 7 December 1942, NIOD, 265, fi le 28. 69 . Mazower, Hitler’s Empire, 149. 70 . Report, concerning meeting with Gottlob Berger, 17 March 1942, BA, R6, fi le 443. In Ukraine near Zhytomyr ethnic Germans were indeed concentrated in the settlement of Hegewald. Together with regiments of the Waffen-SS, who also served as their guards, their colony served as a detached military post. Lower, Nazi Empire-Building, 163–179. 71 . Letter of Hanns Albin Rauter to Heinrich Himmler, 6 January 1942, in: Nanno in ’t Veld, De SS en Nederland: Documenten uit SS-archieven 1935–1945 (Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1976), 624. 72 . Koos Bosma, ‘Verbindungen zwischen Ost- und Westkolonisation’, in: Mechtild Rössler and Sabine Schleiermacher (eds.), Der “Generalplan Ost”: Hauptlinien der nationalsozialistischen Planungs- und Vernichtungspolitik (Berlin: Akad- emie Verlag, 1993), 201. 73 . Umbreit, ‘Auf dem Weg zur Koninentalherrschaft’, 46–54. 74 . Ibidem. 75 . Werther, SS-Vision und Grenzland-Realität, 46–53. 76 . On the development of the Nordic thought in both Germany and Norway, see: Nicola Karcher, ‘Schirmorganisation der Nordischen Bewegung: Der Nor- dische Ring und seine Repräsentanten in Norwegen’, NORDEUROPAforum 19/1 (2009), 7–35. Also: Hans-Jürgen Lutzhöft, Der Nordische Gedanke in Deutschland 1920–1940 (Stuttgart: Ernst Klett Verlag, 1971). 77 . Terje Emberland, ‘Å stjele norsk bondeblod: Heinrich Himmler, Walther Darré, SS og den norske bonde’, Fortid 2 (2009), 19–26. 78 . In April 1942 a delegation of Danish offi cials, led by the Danish minister Gunnar Larsen, visited the occupied eastern territories to explore the possibilities for Danish business. In his travel report their travel companion, Rosenberg’s special representative Freiherr H. von Harder, informed his superior of the Danes’ ‘dismissive attitude’ (ablehnende Haltung) towards any kind of participation in the occupied East. Politically, he argued, the Danes were not yet ready. Note Hermann von Harder to Alfred Rosenberg, 27 April 1942, and travel report Hermann von Harder, 1 May 1942, BA, R6, fi le 443. Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:42 01 October 2016 79 . Terje Emberland, ‘Pure-Blooded Vikings and Peasants: Norwegians in the Racial Ideology of the SS’, in: Anton Weiss-Wendt and Rory Yeomans (eds.), Racial Science in Hitler’s New Europe 1938–1945 (Lincoln/London: Nebraska University Press, 2013), 112–117. More exhaustive in: Terje Emberland and Matthew Kott, Himmlers Norge: Nordmenn i det storgermanske prosjekt (Oslo: Aschehoug, 2012). 80 . Emberland and Kott, Himmlers Norge, 312–339. 81 . Emberland, ‘Pure-Blooded Vikings and Peasants’, 109–110. 82 . Note Walter Malletke to Alfred Rosenberg, 15 November 1943, BA, R6, fi le 449. Pure-Blooded Germanics 53 83 . Emberland, ‘Pure-Blooded Vikings and Peasants’, 117–118. 84 . Paul Dostert, Luxembourg zwischen Selbstbehauptung und nationaler Selbst- aufgabe: Die deutsche Besatzungspolitik und die Volksdeutsche Bewegung 1940–1945 (Luxembourg: s.n., 1985), 27. 85 . Ibidem, 72. 86 . Ibidem, 170–182 and 209–212. 87 . Luc Vandeweyer, ‘Etnische zuivering als politiek project in België’, Bijdragen tot de Eigentijdse geschiedenis 5 (1998), 68. 88 . See also: Johannes Koll, ‘Preussischer Westen, belgischer Osten: Eupen, Malmédy und St. Vith zwischen Reichsgründung und Zweiten Weltkrieg’, Comparativ: Leipziger Beiträge zur Universalgeschichte und vergleichenden Gesellschaftsforschung 15/2 (2005), 101–125. 89 . Müller, Imaginierter Westen, 300 and 325–326; Umbreit, ‘Auf dem Weg zur Koninentalherrschaft’, 129–130; Mai, “Rasse und Raum”, 296. 90 . Vandeweyer, ‘Etnische zuivering’, 50–59. 91 . Ibidem, 66–68. 92 . Kristof Carrein, ‘De Vlaamse Oostfronters: Sociaal profi el en wervingsverloop, november 1941—augustus 1944’, Bijdragen tot de Eigentijdse geschiedenis 6 (1998), 107–111. 93 . Letter Rittmeister Freiherr Hermann von Harder to Alfred Meyer, 5 May 1942, BA, R6, fi le 443. 94 . La Revue des Marchés, 3 May 1942 and 9 August 1942; De SS Man, 19 Sep- tember 1942. I thank Frank Seberechts for this tip. 95 . Note Hermann von Harder, 22 October 1942, BA, R6, fi le 443. 96 . Vandeweyer, ‘Etnische zuivering’, 66–68. 97 . As opposed to Norway, however, the Dutch Nazis were not put in charge of an indigenous (national-socialist) government. Instead, the heads of the Dutch Departments were summoned to act as a provisional government. This considerably weakened the position of Mussert and his movement, although in due time many of these civil servants were replaced by members of the Dutch Nazi Movement and from December 1942 onwards Mussert received some sort of recognition as Hitler declared him Leader of the Dutch Volk. 98 . See: Gerhard Botz, Die Eingliederung Österreichs in das Deutsche Reich: Planun- gen und Verwirklichung des politisch-administrativen Anschlusses 1938–1944 (Vienna: Europa Verlag, 1972). 99 . Speech Arthur Seyss-Inquart, 10 February 1944, in: Reden aus Anlass der Amtseinführung des Präsidenten der deutschen Akademie Reichsminister Dr. Seyss-Inquart in der Grossen Aula der Ludwig-Maximilians-Uni München (München: Selbstverlag Deutsche Akademie, 1944), 40–42. 100 . Letter of Heinrich Himmler to Arthur Seyss-Inquart, 7 January 1941, in: In ’t Veld, De SS en Nederland, 532. 101 . Lerchenmüller, ‘Hans Ernst Schneider’, 1125–1126. 102 . Barbara Henkes, ‘Voor Volk en Vaderland: over de omgang met wetenschap en Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:42 01 October 2016 politiek in de volkskunde,’ in: Frank van Vree, Barbara Henkes and Martijn Eickhoff (eds.), Volkseigen: ras, cultuur en wetenschap in Nederland 1900–1950 (Zutphen: Walburg Pers, 2000), 62–94, 83; Dekker, De Nederlandse Volks- kunde, 203. 103 . Jan de Vries, Naar een betere toekomst (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 1940), 5–6. 104 . Jan de Vries, ‘De Germaanse achtergrond van onze Kultuur,’ in: Jan de Vries, Het Herwonnen Verleden: Opstellen en voordrachten (Den Haag: De Schouw, 1944), 7–23. 105 . Lou de Jong, Het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden in de Tweede Wereldoorlog VI (Den Haag: SDU, 1975), 437–445. 54 Pure-Blooded Germanics 106 . Jan de Vries, ‘Naar Oostland willen wij rijden’, in: De Vries, Het Herwonnen Verleden, 35–50. 107 . Dekker, De Nederlandse Volkskunde, 211 and 246–247. 108. Letter Heinrich Himmler to Richard Hildebrandt, 7 January 1941, in: In ’t Veld, De SS en Nederland, 531. 109 . Het Vaderland, 28 June 1941. 110 . Bosma, ‘Verbindungen’, 201; Peter Witte et al. (eds.), Der Dienstkalender Heinrich Himmlers 1941/1942 (Hamburg: Christians, 1999), 220. 111 . Mai, “Rasse und Raum”, 90. 112. Hermann Roloff, ‘Die Mitarbeit der Wissenschaft bei der Ordnung und Gestaltung des deutschen Ostraumes’, Raumforschung und Raumordnung 3 (1939), 535–542. 113 . Roloff, ‘Planung in den Niederlanden’, Raumforschung und Raumordnung 6 (1942), 162–192; Bosma, ‘Verbindungen’, 198–203. 114 . Note of Friedrich Graf Grote, 10 December 1941, NIOD, 265, fi le 31; minutes of the fi rst meeting of CULANO, 22 July 1941, NIOD, 120a, fi le 1.

Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:42 01 October 2016 3 Embarking on a Great Adventure

‘TO SECURE THE DUTCH FOOD SUPPLY’

Within the Netherlands, the news of the German invasion of the territories under Soviet rule traveled fast. In the early morning of Sunday, June 22nd, 1941, the fi rst day of the hostilities, Jacobus Joseph van Aken, mayor of the provincial town of Zevenbergen, observed that everywhere in his municipal- ity people had gathered to discuss the latest rumors.1 Later that day German and Dutch broadcasting stations confi rmed the buzz. The next morning the German assault was front-page news. On German orders the offi cial Dutch press opened with Hitler’s address to the German people, justifying the German attack on the Soviet Union as a sheer act of defense against the ‘Bolshevist threat.’ 2 In Volk en Vaderland Mussert heaved a sigh of relief: ‘Finally, Europe purifi es the East.’ 3 Wehrmacht troops were sent by Hitler not only to protect Germany, but the entire European civilization, he stated. Another Dutch national-socialist journal defi ned the German act of violence as a necessary step against ‘disgraceful Bolshevism.’4 A very different view on the recent events was offered by the numerous clandestine papers in the Netherlands and the illegal radio broadcasting that was being coordinated in London. Although prohibited in July 1940, listening to the news provided by the BBC and the Dutch government in exile was a fi xed daily routine for many. On the eve of June 22 this audience could hear the British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, branding Hitler a ‘monster of wickedness, insatiable in his lust for blood and plunder.’ A strong opponent of communism, Churchill equated the Nazi regime with Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:42 01 October 2016 ‘the worst features of communism,’ yet at the same time declared that ‘any man or state who fi ghts against Nazism will have our aid.’ 5 In her broad- casted speech the next Friday, Queen Wilhelmina also openly condemned Bolshevism, but added that the Russian government deserved full support in its battle against the German aggressor.6 In most of the Dutch clandestine publications this two-sided message of ideological rejection and military alliance was repeated. The exception was, of course, the Dutch communist press, for instance De Waarheid, which incited the population of occupied territories and Germany to jointly resist Nazi rule. 7 56 Embarking on a Great Adventure All newspapers had their readers and all viewpoints their adherents. Recent historiography on the years of German occupation presents unanim- ity on the fact that Dutch public opinion was divided into a myriad of views and attitudes toward the new rulers, their policies and beliefs. However, in particular in the fi rst months after the German assault on the Netherlands, compliance prevailed across the different circles of population and government. As opposed to Belgian citizens, who still bore in mind vivid memories of the violent German occupation during the First World War, the Dutch had no recent experience with foreign occupation. Fear might have reigned with some, above all Jewish fugitives from Nazi-Germany, yet as the battle was short and Wehrmacht soldiers overall exercised restraint, the terror of occupation appeared less than was expected. The routine of daily life was resumed, albeit some rebelled against the new rule forced upon them. Orga- nized Dutch resistance was almost non-existent. Only over the course of the war, as the German fortunes at the military front worsened and German demands towards the people in the Netherlands increased, did the political stances polarize. 8 This compliance was largely due to a convergence of interests. 9 Seyss- Inquart’s key assignment was to gently guide the Dutch into the Greater Germanic Reich and to provide the German Reich optimal benefi t of the Dutch economy. To this end, drastic interventions in Dutch internal affairs should be avoided. Keeping things the same was also what most of the Dutch authorities in offi ce opted for. In negotiations with their German counter- parts these offi cials tried to exert their infl uence and moderate German demands. Thus, like their German interlocutors, they generally condemned acts of resistance and attached great value to the maintenance of public order. According to the majority of Dutch offi cials, disturbances of the public order would lead to a hardening in German policy, a weakening of their bargaining position, or even their replacement by Dutch Nazis. Pragmatism and political calculation predominated in Dutch ruling circles during this initial phase of occupation. In economic affairs German policy was directed at a merging of the Dutch and German economy. Clearly, the partners in this desired amalgam would be uneven and German authorities would set the course. Although numerous Dutch businessmen were not in favor of a joint venture of this kind, they were soon to understand the benefi ts of the occupation. The Netherlands Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:42 01 October 2016 experienced an industrial boom in 1940 and 1941, largely due to German orders. Overall Dutch economy was rapidly recovering from the cut in overseas trade. Adaptation and common interests were the keywords for Dutch businessmen and Dutch offi cials in economic affairs.10 During the fi ghts of early May 1940, Dutch farmers in some parts of the Netherlands suffered from inundations ordered by Dutch command- ers. Overall, however, Dutch land was hardly damaged by military operations. Experts in the fi eld of agriculture were nonetheless aware of the challenges the occupation constituted. The import of wheat from overseas, Embarking on a Great Adventure 57 for example, now completely adjourned. How could it be guaranteed that the Dutch would have enough to eat if war would linger on? Hans Max Hirschfeld was the highest responsible Dutch offi cial for agricultural affairs. Hirschfeld had joined the civil service in 1931 when he was appointed general director of Trade and Industry. In 1940 he was promoted to general secretary of the Department of Trade, Industry and Shipping; a few months later he assumed the same position at the Department of Agriculture and Fisheries. Hirschfeld had witnessed the rise of Nazism in Germany, yet to him politics and business were two separate things. More than anything, Germany was a highly appreciated and indispensable business and trading partner. To a large extent Hirschfeld did not change his point of view after the German attack.11 During the years of occupation, Hirschfeld delegated much of his tasks and authority in agricultural affairs to two of his men: Stephanus Louwe Louwes, general director of Food Supply, and Geert Ruiter, general director of Agriculture. Louwes, who was ten years senior to his superior, was a man of great merits. Appointed government commissioner for arable and cattle farming in 1935, Louwes operated as one of the driving forces behind the government’s policy in defusing the ongoing agrarian crisis. Louwes also took a lead in the prewar organization of food supply. By October 1939 a fi rst-class system of rationing was introduced in the Netherlands.12 Although his position as general director of food supply forced him to intimately work together with German offi cials, Louwes’ hostility towards Nazism was an open secret. It did not undermine his position; even most Germans valued Louwes for his expertise. 13 Contrary to Louwes, his colleague Geert Ruiter sympathized with national- socialism. In the early 1930s Ruiter, who was a reasonably prosperous cattle breeder, was the face of the farmers’ protest organization of Agriculture and Society (Landbouw en Maatschappij) in the northern part of the Neth- erlands. When Landbouw en Maatschappij drew closer to the Nazi Move- ment, Ruiter followed suit and became a member. A month before the attack on the Soviet Union he also joined the SS. Ruiter was not reputed as a political fanatic. Friend and foe valued him, too, as a highly knowledgeable man who stood up for the interests of Dutch farmers. In his postwar statement Hirschfeld, for instance, positioned Ruiter in sharp contrast to ‘real’ Nazis like Roskam.14 Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:42 01 October 2016 His appointment as general director of Agriculture was by German order.15 Friedrich Franz Graf Grote arrived in The Hague in 1940 to assume his position as head of the section Food Supply and Agriculture ( Ernährung und Landwirtschaft, or EuL) within the German administration. Until his departure to the eastern front early in 1942, Grote was Hirschfeld’s German partner. A scion of a noble family and landlord of the large Varchentin estate in the northern German region of Mecklenburg, Grote had joined the NSDAP in 1931. Eight years later Grote was appointed Farmers’ Leader (Landesbauernführer) of Mecklenburg. In the Netherlands, his assignment 58 Embarking on a Great Adventure was to coordinate and supervise Dutch agriculture. Politically, Grote stood close to Darré and Backe. As far as Dutch agriculture was concerned, his heart was with (tenant) smallholders: he believed that through unifi cation and organization they would gain in strength. In the early summer of 1941, Grote requested that his Dutch political equal Ruiter be appointed general director of Agriculture. Despite Hirschfeld’s protest, Ruiter assumed offi ce in July that year. 16 As Ruiter did not wish to leave his farm unmanned, his presence in The Hague was only part-time, from Tuesdays until Fridays.17 At the time of Ruiter’s appointment, the fi rst talks on the subject of Dutch involvement in what would be euphemistically called ‘the opening up’ of the occupied East had just begun. Grote initiated these talks, but his orders directly came from Backe. As soon as Hitler had decided to attack the Soviet Union, the exploitation of Soviet resources was put on Backe’s agenda. In his annual report sent to Hitler and others in January 1941, Backe had drawn an extremely pessimistic picture of the food situation in the next year. Largely due to the British sea blockade, Germany would not be able to continue the war without a drastic decrease of rations. It was expected that this would seriously affect the general mood and might even lead to revolts. Backe suggested acquiring resources abroad, with force: the fi elds of the western and southern regions of the Soviet Union guaranteed suffi cient food for both German civilians and soldiers. 18 On Hitler’s order, Backe developed plans on the prospected agricultural exploitation of the Soviet Union. According to Backe, agriculture in the ‘surplus areas’ (mainly Ukraine) should be improved and expanded. The fertile soil in these areas should yield enough food ‘to feed Europe.’ This would be at the expense of people living in the so-called ‘defi cit areas’ of the Soviet Union (i.e. Belarus and the northern parts of Russia proper). In order to feed the German army and the people back home, it was taken into account that starvation would hit the population in the defi cit areas: it was estimated that some thirty million people would die. 19 In a folder produced for future German managers of Russian farms, Backe warned against feelings of pity: ‘The Russian has already endured poverty, hunger, and frugality for centuries. His stomach is elastic, therefore no false sympathy.’ 20 Probably around the time of Seyss-Inquart’s speech in Amsterdam in which he incited the Dutch ‘to look eastwards,’ Backe approached the Reich Commissioner and asked him to see to the recruitment of Dutch farmers, Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:42 01 October 2016 needed for the exploitation of the occupied Soviet territories.21 Early in July 1941 Grote discussed the matter with Hirschfeld and others at the Dutch Department for Food and Agriculture. On Monday, July 7th, he convened a meeting with Hirschfeld and Louwes. Ruiter did not attend the meeting, as he had not been formally appointed yet. In his stead Cees Staf, president of the Heidemij, was invited. Director of a larger semi-governmental organization responsible for the cultivation of barren land and for the management of relief work for the unemployed, Staf was viewed highly. In October 1939, when the Dutch army prepared Embarking on a Great Adventure 59 for a war of defense, the Dutch government came to Staf to coordinate the planned evacuation of cattle and agricultural products from the territories designated for inundation. After the capitulation of the Dutch armed forces the next year, Staf was the government’s deputy in talks concerning duped farm holders. Staf was a conservative Christian and no member of the Dutch Nazi Movement.22 Like Hirschfeld and Louwes, Staf answered Grote’s appeal and came to The Hague to listen to his plea to send Dutch agricultural workers eastwards. In return for collaboration, the Dutch state would receive a share of the harvest. Arguably, this barter tempted Louwes and Hirschfeld: they were both concerned with the issue of food supply in the Netherlands. Appar- ently, none of the three was held back by conscientious objections to tilling the land that was not Dutch and that had been taken by military force. It is likely that their view on Bolshevism soothed their conscious. Arguably, in line with the view of most Dutch people since June 1941, they considered Bolshevists their military allies, but also their ideological enemies whose aggression in its borderlands (largely overlapping with the German occupied eastern territories) was illegitimate. A talented and experienced coor- dinator of larger projects, Staf seemed to be the right man to coordinate the new enterprise. According to his postwar statement, Staf initially declined a director’s post: only after Grote had threatened him that non-cooperation would seriously harm the Dutch food situation, did he give in.23 Be that as it may, Staf’s ‘fi ght’ must have been brief. Just a few days after their meeting, Hirschfeld informed the professional organizations of Dutch farmers about the recent plans. Through their spokesman—a brother of Louwes—the unions agreed to support the initiative, on three conditions: fi rst, the recruits should go voluntarily; second, the unions should be able to inform their members truthfully; and third, the initiative should not be publicized.24 Staf’s fi rst concern was to fi nd partners: although he knew his way inside the higher circles of Dutch administration, he needed agricultural specialists in the fi eld. Regional consultants in agrarian affairs, installed by the Dutch government in the late nineteenth century, were his choice. Shortly after the meeting with Grote several consultants were approached. Some declined,25 but G.J. Lienesch, agricultural engineer and consultant in the province of North Holland, accepted the post as a member of Staf’s organization in for- Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:42 01 October 2016 mation.26 The third man who joined Staf was SLN-director Hartland. The appointment of this protagonist of emigration as a remedy against unemployment and overpopulation is telling.27 The initiative to send Dutch farmers eastwards served the short-term goal of acquisition of additional crops and fodder, yet from the very fi rst moment it was expected that, perhaps at a later stage, Dutch farmers could also acquire the land they tilled in the area. Arguably, Staf and his two companions did not agree to the overtly racialist dimension of Germanization, yet their ultimate objective was colonization. 60 Embarking on a Great Adventure Within two weeks after the meeting with Grote, Staf informed Hirschfeld of the formation of a commission of coordination.28 A couple of days later, his letter was spread amongst employees of the Heidemij. With reference to ‘the worrisome prospects’ of Dutch food supply, Staf asserted, Dutch authorities decided to help to cultivate the land conquered in the East: a share of the harvest would be their reward. Staf made an appeal to all within the Heidemij, qualifi ed for a managerial position in arable farming. 29 Mean- while, Hartland asked Hirschfeld to spread the news amongst his subor- dinates at the Department in The Hague and in the country. He pressed Hirschfeld to emphasize that the main aim would be the securing of food supply in Europe and the cultivation of ground ‘in areas that so far have not generated the surpluses that were to be expected given the fertility of the soil.’30 Hartland repeated Grote’s words that the Dutch would receive a share in the profi ts as a reward for their support. To an audience of leading men in Dutch agriculture more details about the initiative were provided. Hartland, Staf, and Lienesch presented themselves and their newly established Commission for the Employment of Farmers in Eastern Europe (CULANO). In Ukraine, a piece of land of some 1.2 million acres in area was promised, they stated. 31 It was estimated that some 3,000 Dutch men could fi nd work here: as managers in charge of confi scated kolkhozes; as exploiters, supervisors, and assistant-supervisors of one or more farms; as tractor-drivers and mechanics. ‘For now,’ Hartland maintained, colonization and permanent emigration to the area were not discussed, but the chance of permanent settlement ‘in a later stage’ was considered ‘highly probable.’ The chairmen were requested to promote the initiative to the rank and fi le of their unions. Their campaigns should be coordinated with the district employment offi ces in the Netherlands. Still in July 1941, Hartland notifi ed these offi ces of the foundation of CULANO. As agreed with German authorities, recruitment of Dutch farmers was about to start. The organization would be put in the hands of the district employment offi ces. CULANO could profi t of the experiences of the civil servants working at these offi ces. Many had been involved for years in fi nding work for the unemployed and fi nding workers for Dutch enterprises. They would receive tips for candidates from local representatives of farmers’ professional organizations and directives from CULANO. All recruits should be made clear that employment in the occupied East was in no way Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:42 01 October 2016 related to the German military operation. The uniforms they would have to wear were merely meant to guarantee the protection of German troops and to provide them some authority in the presence of locals. 32 In a follow- up meeting Hartland reiterated that the planned enterprise concerned ‘the peaceful cultivation of a certain area’ and not immediate or permanent settlement, although this might be possible ‘after some time.’ Recruits would commit themselves for a year; during that year their wives and children would have to stay in the Netherlands due to a lack of housing and other facilities. Their transfer to the area had to wait ‘until later.’33 Embarking on a Great Adventure 61 While Hartland organized the recruitment in the Netherlands, Staf and Lienesch visited the headquarters of LO in Berlin. Like in occupied and annexed Poland and the northern parts of France, LO supervised the appropriation and exploitation of rural estates in the occupied Soviet territories. In September 1941, Backe stipulated the establishment in both Reichskom- missariat Ostland and Reichskommissariat Ukraine of a Society of Agrarian Exploitation. Their immediate task was the confi scation of harvest for the benefi t of German troops. In the long run, they were to secure (and eventually improve) the production of grain and seeds in the occupied eastern territories. On Backe’s recommendation the ties between the German local administration and the two newly established societies ( Landbewirtschaf- tungsgesellschaft Ostland, or LBGO, and Landbewirtschaftungsgesellschaft Ukraine, or LBGU) would be strengthened by ‘personal union’: senior civil servants of a Reichskommissariat, for instance, should be also appointed in leading positions within the LBGO or LBGU. 34 A complimentary organization (Zentral-Handelsgesellschaft Ost für landwirtschaftlichen Absatz und Bedarf, or ZHO) was established to coordinate the food processing industry in the conquered area. The production of meat and dairy products, for instance, was supervised by this organization. 35 Shortly after the German attack on the Soviet Union, LO was put in charge of the employment of Dutch farmers.36 Staf and Lienesch left for Berlin to talk to offi cials of LO as some tuning seemed advisable. In the German capital they learned that preparations for the employment of Dutch farmers had hardly progressed. The offer of larger sections of Ukraine, suggested by Grote, seemed premature to the authorities of LO: Ukraine was still a so-called military operating area and therefore unsuitable. To shorten the lines of communication, LO promised to open up an offi ce in The Hague.37 The information received in Berlin was disappointing, yet it did not bring the initiative to a halt. Apparently, once the operation had been set in motion it was operating under its own momentum. Not very long after their visit to Berlin, Backe in turn visited The Hague. At the opening ceremony of an exhibition on the Dutch ‘production drive in Europe,’ an initiative of the Dutch national-socialist Agrarian Front to push the Dutch agricultural economy into the direction of autarchy, Backe summed up the problems and challenges of Dutch agriculture. 38 One of his men visited Staf to discuss the recruitment of Dutch farmers. 39 Early in October, LO opened its offi ce in Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:42 01 October 2016 The Hague. It was housed in an apartment near the North Sea coast, within walking distance from the offi ce of the Dutch Agrarian Front. In order to monitor the operation, Grote posted one of his own employees from EuL in the LO-offi ce.40 The fi rst applications reached CULANO by the end of July. Within weeks, hundreds of candidates were registering. 41 Slowly, the contours of the organization became clear. Some fi ve to ten men responded to Staf’s letter and applied for a supervising position in the occupied East. 42 Each of them had been employed by the Heidemij, and some knew Staf personally. 62 Embarking on a Great Adventure Jan Remko Dertien, a farmer’s son from Groningen, had worked for the Heidemij since 1927. His last position was that of an assistant-supervisor of a larger cultivation project.43 Another applicant, Jelle Scharringa, had been a Heidemij-supervisor since 1925. 44 They resigned, arguably after Staf’s reassurance that work in the East would be considered a great asset when they would come back and wished to resume their job for the Heidemij. Scharringa became CULANO’s representative in the East; Dertien a supervisor of a few dozens of recruits. 45 Most of the lower candidates were recruited by the Agrarian Front. In the fi rst week of August, Staf was told that already 363 volunteers had presented themselves.46 They were investigated by local authorities of the NSB and only after their approval were they sent on to a district employment offi ce. By the end of August, 295 names were passed by the Agrarian Front to the offi ces; another hundred would follow in the fi rst half of September. 47 CULANO was also reached through different channels,48 but in most cases the procedure was the same: the candidate was referred to the district employment offi ce closest to his place of residence. Once his application letter was received, he was invited to come and talk to an employment offi - cer and subsequently, to the offi cer’s interregional supervisor. They wrote separate reports about the candidate. Having read the reports, Hartland added his advice and sent the fi les off to LO. More often than not, Hartland, accompanied by men of LO, interviewed the candidate a third time, in person, in particular when the candidate had applied for a higher position in the occupied East.49 Two additional documents were still needed: fi rst, a positive medical screening report, and second, as the Dutch registry offi ces did not provide statements about ‘Aryan descent,’ a certifi cate of moral conduct.50 On departure, all recruits were dressed by CULANO. They were given the use of a uniform and accessories: an overcoat, a jacket, a waistcoat, shorts and trousers, socks and underwear, a hat and a cap, boots and shoes, gloves and a tie, braces and a belt.51 The uniform was tailor made, manufac- tured by a Dutch tailor in The Hague. 52 All recruits received two blankets, a pallet, a pillow case, and some soap and cutlery. To store their belongings each obtained a large wooden chest, marked with their personal number. 53 All in all, the fi rst steps on the way to Dutch participation in the exploitation of occupied territories in Eastern Europe appeared to have been com- Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:42 01 October 2016 pleted smoothly. On paper, the selection procedure seemed professional and rational. Applicants were screened by civil servants from employment offi ces. In the late 1930s, some of them had also been involved in the selection of farmers for the reclaimed land in the Wieringermeer. From 1938 onwards, Dutch employment offi ces had also been recruiting (unemployed) farmers for work abroad, mainly in Germany. 54 For CULANO both experiences could be combined. These civil servants classifi ed candidates according to their skills as candidates for a position as supervisor, as assistant-supervisor, or as a mechanic for tractors and other agricultural Embarking on a Great Adventure 63 tools. The defi nitive decision was often taken by Hartland himself, who also interviewed applicants for higher positions. A medical check-up fi nalized the selection process. Financially, the operation was advantageous, for it was entirely at the expense of German authorities. LO paid for the care and for the transport of recruits—to and from screenings, interviews, and, of course, to and from the East. Likewise, LO was responsible for their wages. Although Hirschfeld granted CULANO a fi xed credit to cover the travel and material costs of Lienesch, Staf, and Hartland, the expenses for the Dutch authorities were low. There were no salaries or offi ce space to be rented. Hartland, Lienesch, and Staf had kept their regular jobs (and incomes) and CULANO was housed inside the building of Hartland’s emigration offi ce.55

‘WE HAVE BEEN DECEIVED’

In reality, there were some major hitches. First of all, the number of recruits fell seriously short of the desired number. Because of the strict selection criteria a certain divergence in numbers between candidates and recruits was anticipated, yet in this case the total of people that eventually did leave the Netherlands to fi nd employ in the East was a meager ten percent. This failure rate of ninety percent from initial applicants was mainly caused by the extraordinarily large number of accepted recruits who did not go: they backed out, did not show up for their interview(s) or they asked for a post- ponement.56 For instance, of the 777 candidates who applied before Decem- ber 12th, 1941, 166 backed out, 55 were put on hold, and 107 did not show up: in total, only 142 left the Netherlands. 57 Two months later the scores were hardly any better: of the 1,127 candidates, 104 were rejected, 225 pulled out, 74 successfully asked for suspension, and 92 did not show up. 58 As being volunteers was an essential precondition of the operation, there was little that CULANO and LO could do about it. Consequently, German authorities lowered the target. In September 1941, Hartland was told that, instead of the initial needed 5,000, ‘for the moment’ fi ve hundred Dutch men would be suffi cient.59 Yet even this number would be unattainable. In total, some 350 to 400 volunteers selected by CULANO would leave the Netherlands to fi nd work in the occupied East. Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:42 01 October 2016 Two groups departed just before the winter, in November 1941; two other groups in March 1942. Although primary sources give little information on selection procedures, it can be concluded that geographically, the four groups differed in composition. The fi rst group, departing November 22nd, counted six coordinators representing CULANO on site, some fi fty supervisors and fi fty assistants. A large number came from one single Dutch province: Groningen. Of the group that left the Netherlands on December 2nd, only fi ve were recruited in Groningen. The majority of this group used to live in the province of Drenthe. The third transport, scheduled March 20th, 64 Embarking on a Great Adventure only counted one farmer from Drenthe and one from Groningen. All others were candidates from the southern and western parts of the Netherlands. The fi nal transport of some hundred people, leaving March 27th, consisted mainly of recruits from rural districts of the eastern province of Overijssel and the coastal province in the north-western part of the country. 60 More worrisome than the low numbers of recruits was the political course the enterprise was taking. Initially, both Grote and his Dutch partners did not wish the enterprise to be overtly national-socialist in nature. Grote aimed to build a new Dutch peasantry at home around the nucleus of national-socialists: their departure was therefore not desirable.61 Dutch authorities wished to consider the employment of Dutch nationals in occupied territory as a strictly economical affair, without any political intentions or implications. This last stance proved hard to maintain. Most of the recruits were members of the Dutch Nazi Movement. Dertien, for example, joined the NSB in December 1940, Scharringa a few months later. 62 Peter Kok, like Schar- ringa and Dertien an employee of Heidemij recruited by Staf and included in the CULANO-leadership on the spot, entered the NSB shortly after May 1940. 63 The fourth member of the CULANO-leadership, Remt Buringh, a farmer from Groningen, was also member of the Movement. 64 Among ‘ordinary’ recruits, national-socialists were present in large numbers too. One of them was a local farmers’ leader of the NSB in his hometown and had joined the NSB in the early 1930s. 65 Many others were also old members. 66 Ironically, the overrepresentation of NSB-members was largely the result of a policy initiated by Grote himself. From the onset of the occupation, he had been aspiring for the nazifi cation of Dutch agriculture and had been aiming at the establishment of one single organization for all farmers. Hence, it is hardly a surprise that the existing professional organizations for farmers were highly suspicious of Grote. Their support to an initiative that bore Grote’s name was bound to be limited. In a letter dated July 26th, the chairman of the catholic union made clear that recruitment did not meet the union’s standards with regards to religion and ethics.67 Other unions, unwilling to work together with Agrarian Front, simply did not take any action in helping fi nd candidates. 68 In the late summer of 1941, when the nazifi cation policy was speeded up and one single professional organization, the Landstand, was established to absorb all other professional organizations, there were strong protests. One by one, the older professional organi- Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:42 01 October 2016 zations dissolved themselves. Thus, the only recruiting agencies left were of national-socialist make-up.69 To Staf’s astonishment, Roskam joined him and Grote in the border town of Oldenzaal on November 22nd, where the fi rst trainload of recruits was about to set off.70 In a local hotel, a room was festively decorated to celebrate their departure. Staf held his speech, emphasizing the economic importance of this mission. The tone of the other two speakers—Grote and Roskam—was very different. Grote talked of ‘solidarity between Germanic peoples’ and the need to expand their living space; Roskam fulminated Embarking on a Great Adventure 65 against prewar Dutch agrarian policy and stressed the long history of Dutch farmers migrating eastwards. At the end of the evening, farmers brought the Nazi salute.71 The next morning, hundreds of people gathered at the station to wave the recruits farewell. Staf did not show up, according to his postwar statement, out of anger for the overtly political course the operation had taken.72 His observation had been accurate. Against his will, the employment of Dutch farmers in the occupied zones of the former Soviet Union also received full press coverage. In the nazifi ed Dutch press the economic importance of the operation was underlined, yet other, more political aspects also received attention. The national-socialist Nationale Dagblad described the departure as ‘a historical farewell,’ a follow-up of the eighteenth-century ‘trek’ of Mennonites eastwards.73 The Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant also referred to the allegedly historical ties of the Dutch people to this part of Europe.74 Het Volk called the recruits pioneers, who would restore Ukraine as the granary of Europe. 75 In Deutsche Zeitung, a German newspaper published in the Netherlands, it was mentioned that until the spring of 1942 some 400 Dutch would permanently settle in the occupied East as colonists.76 Like Staf, Hirschfeld was highly concerned about the politicization of the entire operation. 77 What troubled him even more was the alarming news from recruits who had left the country. The fi rst two groups of volunteers halted in Lodz (Litzmannstadt), in annexed Poland, to receive some basic instructions and injections against typhus. In Lodz, they were housed in the barracks of a former transit camp for ethnic German settlers. The terrain was guarded, but Dutch men could freely walk in and out. The fi rst letters home were still positive and cheerful. A volunteer from the south of the Netherlands informed the NSB-leader in his hometown of the ‘wonderful reception’ in Lodz. 78 In a personal letter to Staf, sent December 16th, Dertien praised housing and food, yet he noticed that the stay of three weeks in this transit camp was turning many into grumblers: ‘We yearn to leave for Russia, [to be] in the open fi eld, where we belong.’79 One of the German LO-offi cials visited the Dutch recruits in Lodz early December. A few days later he informed CULANO about what he had witnessed. The care, provided by local German offi ces, was excellent. His concern was the bad observation of curfew. According to the camp commander, the Dutch were keen to visit brothels and returned late. Scharringa, being in Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:42 01 October 2016 command of both Dutch groups in Lodz, was said to set a bad example as he was often amongst the latecomers. The offi cial advised to place the Dutch as soon as possible in their jobs, as with time, boredom and undisciplined behavior were bound to increase. December 17th they would be ready to leave.80 A day later, a report was sent to CULANO about top-level meetings in Berlin. During these talks it was decided that the Dutch would be employed near Minsk, in German White Ruthenia instead of Ukraine. According to the new plans, they would not be put in charge of larger farms or former 66 Embarking on a Great Adventure kolkhozes: the time was not yet there for Dutch farmers to independently manage larger rural estates. Instead, they would be subordinated to German supervisors. The entire operation would be supervised by the newly established LBGO in Riga. A department of this offi ce would open in White Ruthenia. Although the recruits were ready for departure, it was decreed that they should wait, at least until after Christmas. Sending them off mid- December would mean that they would arrive during the Christmas festivities, when most German organizations were operating half speed and temperatures were far below zero. This, in other words, was not the best time to come. 81 Eventually, the men left Lodz and went to Riga, but, contrary to their expectations, the time in waiting rooms continued. As was predicted, the long stays in transit led to grumbling, undisciplined behavior, and tiffs and wrangles amongst the Dutch men. In a long letter to Staf, Scharringa summed up his grievances. Apart from the seemingly endless delays, the leader of the Dutch recruits was most concerned about the new design of the operation. To his former superior he complained that apparently nothing of the original plans had remained. Instead of colonization in a close order formation, the Dutch recruits would be dispersed. Scattered across White Ruthenia and the Baltic States, they would have to carry out the orders of German superiors. The Germans, Scharringa concluded, had broken their promise to provide Dutch peasantry their own ‘living space.’ Another nui- sance to Scharringa was the caliber of his men. The majority of recruits, recommended by organizations of the NSB, were not at all qualifi ed for managerial positions. They were mostly smallholders, Scharringa wrote, notorious for their pig-headedness. ‘A worse sort of people (. . .) is hard to fi nd,’ he bitterly stated.82 For their part, the recruits were not altogether happy with Scharringa either.83 In January, a disillusioned farmer criticized Scharringa and his close collaborators like Dertien. Their attitude towards ‘ordinary’ recruits was condescending and not comradely.84 Some weeks later CULANO received a letter of complaint written by two farmers from the eastern part of the country. Again Scharringa was labeled as arrogant, and incapable of doing the job. 85 Most disturbing were the statements of fi ve released farmers, who had left Riga after Scharringa had threatened to shoot them if they would not accept the ‘new’ work under the less favorable conditions.86 Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:42 01 October 2016 Letters of complaint and stories of misbehaving or malfunctioning recruits mounted. Some had left Lodz without permission, to spend Christ- mas at home; others were said to be unable to work as they suffered from homesickness. By the end of January, some twenty to thirty men had left Lodz and returned to the Netherlands. 87 Others were sent to Riga. Here they were joined by two new batches of recruits who came directly from the Netherlands. According to Scharringa, they were well taken care off in Riga, but most recruits strongly disagreed. Like in Lodz, they had to fi ght boredom: there were days that lessons in Russian were the only thing on Embarking on a Great Adventure 67 their agenda. As food portions were small, the stealing of food became a common occurrence.88 A considerable number yielded to the temptation of the black market. This was not the adventure they had been dreaming of. ‘We [the Dutch recruits—GvF] have been deceived from day one,’ a recruit wrote bitterly.89 Finally, in late February 1942, a smaller group of recruits were placed in their positions. For some, the time in transit had been over four months. The fi rst group, under the command of Dertien, left Riga on February 27th and were brought to Kaunas by train, where they were divided across various confi scated rural estates in the area. On one of the estates the head of the German administration lived: a Dutch recruit was put in charge of his cav- alcade. According to Dertien, the Dutch farmers of his group were generally satisfi ed with their work.90 The next fi ve groups, four in March and one in May 1942, went to German White Ruthenia. March 12th, some hundred Dutch farmers were directed to Vileyka, a smaller town near Minsk where the LBGO had indeed opened an offi ce. Two days later a second group was sent on a train to Minsk. Once arrived they quickly found out that they were not expected and fi nally, after days of hanging around at the station, the LBGO came to their rescue. In smaller groups the men were put to work, mainly at confi scated kolkhozes near Minsk. Another group of thirty men left some days later for Hlybokaye (Głębokie) in what used to be Polish territory before the Russian occupation in 1939. A last group of 159 volunteers left Riga May 22th. Of this group, 115 were assigned a job in agriculture: they all went to the LBGO-offi ce in Vileyka that brought them to farms in need of agricultural managers and assistant managers. The other forty-four men accepted employment in the construction industry. Most of them were entrusted with the supervision of building teams; some were appointed as guards for captured Jews or prisoners of war.91 To many, life in the occupied East did not meet expectations. With the prospect of supervising a larger rural estate or a collection of farms, these men had signed their contract and had left their homeland. After weeks and weeks in transit camps, some were in jobs they had not applied for. Of those who did fi nd work in agriculture, several were unhappy in their new position. They did not belong to the staff of attendants, but were subordinated to German—and sometimes even indigenous—supervisors.92 An extra Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:42 01 October 2016 annoyance was the standard delay in payments of wages, largely produced by the disorderly character of the entire operation on site. With German representatives in The Hague it was agreed that LO would take care of insurances and salaries. The monthly wage, plus family allowance, was to be paid out to the family of the recruit, most of the times his wife, yet in reality families back home often had to wait for months before salaries were cashed.93 The number of volunteers that went or were sent back before their contract ended was high. For some the return was a voluntary choice: they suffered from diseases, homesickness, or fear of partisans. Others were 68 Embarking on a Great Adventure thrown out by German offi cials because their behavior had supposedly been poor.94 These and similar messages worried the offi cials of CULANO and cooled down their initial enthusiasm. In the summer of 1941 they had complied to Grote’s demands because they, too, saw chances for Dutch agriculture. From the spring of 1942 onwards, a more critical attitude towards the operation was adopted. In his response to Scharringa, written in February 1942, Staf expressed his regrets about the ‘different direction’ of the activities.95 In a letter to Ruiter, Hirschfeld uttered his concern about the ‘newest developments.’ As the weeks in waiting seemed to turn respectable citizens into a bunch of indecent and lawless men, Hirschfeld doubted out loud whether he and other Dutch offi cials should give their assistance at all. 96

‘WIRTSCHAFTSSOLDATEN’

All in all, the fi rst experiences had been disappointing, for most of the recruits and the Dutch authorities who had been supporting the enterprise, but also for German offi cials like Grote. Early 1942, all parties involved were evaluating the directions the entire operation should take. Hirschfeld made it his policy to make no attempt to take the initiative—a time-honored strat- egy among Dutch administrators once a convergence of interests had turned into a divergence of interests.97 Faced with reluctant Dutch professional organizations, Grote considered new incentives. Grote thought of reward- ing farmers who volunteered for work in the occupied East with a preferen- tial treatment in case they would return and would be interested in a farm on new land reclaimed from the Zuiderzee. Ultimately, Hirschfeld’s protest made Grote change his mind, but his concern about fi nding enough recruits remained. As the only partner willing to cooperate, Grote drew ever closer to the NSB. He even considered the inclusion of a Landstand-representative in the CULANO-board.98 There was not enough time for Grote to take measures in this direction. In early 1942 he assumed his military duty and left for the eastern front. Less than three months later, he had fallen in battle. 99 In the Netherlands, his work was taken over by his former assistant, C.J.G. von der Wense, a farmer’s son who had made a career in Germany’s civil service. Von der Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:42 01 October 2016 Wense was more interested in keeping good relations with Dutch offi cials than in the employment of Dutch farmers in conquered eastern land. 100 Within higher circles of the NSB, Von der Wense was disliked. Branded a ‘little German civil servant,’ Von der Wense was accused of being friends with the ‘biggest cad of prewar years’ Louwes and ‘his friend, the half-Jew’ Hirschfeld. 101 Grote’s successor did little to stimulate Dutch economic involvement in the occupied East, but other German authorities now manifested themselves. Most prominent was Alfred Rosenberg’s Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Embarking on a Great Adventure 69 Territories and its new initiatives. Since its creation in July 1941, this Minis- try had rapidly evolved into a colossal institute, with offi ces in Berlin and in situ. In its prime years, the Ostministerium counted some 21,000 employees working in the occupied eastern territories. Most of them were distinguishable by the brown color of their uniforms, identical to the Nazi Party wear. A substantial group consisted of agricultural supervisors (Landwirtschafts- führer and Kreislandwirtschaftsführer), some 6,400 in total.102 With regard to the future planning of the area, Hitler had already given Himmler his mandate in June 1941. The large designs, developed by Himmler’s men in the following months, would be more or less indicative for the German policy towards the people and land of the occupied eastern territories. All plans involved a radical change in the ethnical composition of the population. Ultimately, the area would come under permanent German rule, effected by a network of predominantly agrarian communities of German(-ic) settlers. With time, Rosenberg’s engagement in the matter also grew stronger. In top-level meetings in the late autumn of 1941, the Reichsminister would propose various outlines of the future order of space and people in the conquered (and still to conquer) areas of the East. In one of his speeches he had mentioned the creation of ‘military colonies’ (Militärkolonien) involving fi fteen to twenty million German settlers. Confronted with the low numbers of Germans who were actually volunteering for the annexed Polish regions, Rosenberg advocated the immersion of ‘irreproachable’ men from Denmark, the Netherlands, and Scandinavia. Together with their German fellowmen, they would turn the occupied eastern territories in the granary of entire Europe.103 Although the prioritization (of specifi c regions in the East) and the pace (of the settlement policy) would remain topics of debate, by the end of 1941 it had become clear that Rosenberg was claiming authority in the involvement of ‘foreign’ manpower and capital in the exploitation of the occupied eastern territories. In January 1942, Göring, Plenipotentiary for the implementation of the Four Year Plan, gave Rosenberg his approval. Shortly afterwards, Rosenberg secured himself the support of Himmler. A massive settler colonization of Germanic people would have to wait until after the war, yet the fi rst preparatory steps towards this goal were set. A limited number of inhabitants from Germanic countries would be allowed Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:42 01 October 2016 into the area. Together with smaller groups of Germans and resettled ethnic Germans, they would be the pioneers of the project of Germanization of the occupied eastern territories.104 It is in this period of time that his colossal institute spread its tentacles over Western Europe, foremost over the Netherlands. Rosenberg’s employees in the occupied eastern territories had witnessed that, overall, the employment of the Dutch did not constitute an unqualifi ed success. Possibly prompted by the negative messages, Rosenberg decided to address himself to the employment of Dutch civilians in the East. Now that Backe’s 70 Embarking on a Great Adventure involvement had dwindled and Grote had been drafted for military service, Rosenberg and his senior offi cials presented themselves. They too expected that Dutch farmers would be interested in work in the conquered parts of the Soviet Union because of the scarcity of land and prospects for (younger) farmers in the Netherlands. Yet they also had their eye on other sectors of Dutch industry and trade that had been brought to a halt due to the war. Their focus was in particular on all colonial activities connected to the Dutch East Indies—i.e., trade fi rms, merchant banks, tropical cultivation. It was believed that the archipelago, under Japanese attack since December 8th, 1941, would soon be lost. As a result of this loss of colonial power, the Ostministerium expected an increased eagerness among the Dutch to participate in the colonization of the occupied East.105 For a future partner, Rosenberg turned to the NSB. A meeting between him and Mussert in early January 1942 could be marked as the starting point of the Ostministerium’s work in the Netherlands. The Dutch Nazi leader requested a larger area for future Dutch colonists, preferably with access to the sea. Rosenberg refused to commit himself to any promise, asserting that it was still too early for ‘a larger colonial settlement’ (eine grössere Siedlung). Nevertheless, the meeting opened the way to collaboration between the Dutch Nazi Movement and the Ostministerium. Fully supporting this joint work, Seyss-Inquart assigned his general commissioner Fritz Schmidt the job to coordinate all preparatory activities concerning the recruitment and employment in the East. Within the organization of the Reichskommissariat, Schmidt was Seyss-Inquart’s most political man. To Seyss-Inquart, transplanting Germanic people to this region was, in all facets, an eminently political affair.106 In the fi rst talks with representatives of the Ostministerium, an inventory was taken of the progress that had been made to date and the problems encountered. The participants shared stories of lawless Dutch bands in Lodz and Riga and fl aws in selection, care, and payments. They discerned two main causes: fi rst, a lack of coordination in The Hague; second, a lack of interest on the spot. CULANO in its current form was discarded as a tooth- less organization, missing the right political zest and the needed fi nancial means to turn the operation into a success.107 It was also noticed that besides CULANO a larger number of fi rms, persons, and institutions were recruiting people for work in the occupied eastern Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:42 01 October 2016 territories. Speer’s man in the Netherlands, Richard Fiebig, for instance, being concerned about the transfer of material and machines that had become redundant in the Netherlands, had ordered to transport cranes from the wharfs of Rotterdam to the East.108 Hans Hennig, a German magnate in building works, was involved in the recruitment of Dutch construction workers for Ukraine. 109 In the spring of 1942, the Ostministerium itself approached an agricultural expert to fi nd Dutch gardeners specialized in fruit and vegetables for work in the Baltic area.110 Heinrich Sellmer, Seyss-Inquart’s deputy in the Dutch province of Drenthe, tempted a Dutch specialist in peat excavations to accept Embarking on a Great Adventure 71 work in the East. Aware of the importance of peat as a natural fuel, Sellmer wished to stimulate the turf industry of Lithuania. Drenthe, particularly the eastern part adjacent to the German border, knew a long and rich history of peat digging. Sellmer’s aim was to send expertise from this quarter of the Netherlands to the occupied eastern territories. In April 1942 Jan Habing, a thirty-year-old citizen from Emmen, knowledgeable in the fi eld of turf production, left for Lithuania to explore the possibilities. Habing recruited a few men to work with him in the Lithuanian moors.111 An important recruiter was August Borggreven, district leader of the NSB in the east of the Netherlands. Ambitious by nature, and backed by Mussert, Borggreven acquired substantial powers in the fi rst war years. In 1941 he was appointed Mussert’s deputy in the province of Gelderland and his deputy ‘with special duties’ (in bijzondere dienst) . 112 In December of that year, Borggreven was asked by a befriended Dutch architect to help him fi nd men who would be interested in work in Kharkiv. They would be working for Seyss-Inquart’s general commissioner of economic affairs, Hans Fischböck, who was the expected general commissioner of Kharkiv after the conquest of the city and surroundings. 113 The initiative was coordinated by a German offi ce in The Hague (Zentralauftragstelle, or ZAST). It did not take Borggeven long to collect a group of candidates. Headed by the architect, the team left for Kharkiv, but returned within a few weeks. The work had been successful, yet a much larger recruitment drive of Dutch craftsmen and construction workers was desired. What had started with the temporary employment of one single Dutch construction fi rm, by June 1942 had turned into the establishment of the Labor Service Holland (Werkdienst Holland) led by the head of ZAST, Erwin Nimtz. Again, recruitment was put in Borggreven’s hands. The majority of the hundreds of volunteers applied for craft and construction work. The closeness of the military front made Kharkiv less suitable. Nimtz and his column of Dutch workers were stationed in Rivne, the center of German administration in Ukraine. In the course of 1942, some eight hundred men joined the Labor Service Holland. 114 Confronted with this jumble, Rosenberg’s fi rst concern was to bring all these activities and enterprises together in one unit. In the future, economic activities of Dutch men and fi rms in the East should be coordinated from one central point, supervised by the Ostministerium. To make this work the Reichsminister approached one of his most valued employees and also Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:42 01 October 2016 one of his oldest collaborators, Walter Malletke. The friendship between Rosenberg and Malletke dated from early 1933, when within the NSDAP the Offi ce of Foreign Affairs (Aussenpolitische Amt der NSDAP, or APA) was established. Headed by Rosenberg, APA was one of the offi ces that set out the lines of the Party’s foreign policy. Spearheads of the APA-program were the creation of ‘living space’ in Eastern Europe and the strengthening of bonds with supposedly racially kindred people in Europe, above all in Scandinavia. Malletke, educated in economics, was appointed head of Rosenberg’s department of politico-economic affairs. 72 Embarking on a Great Adventure Since the outbreak of the war, the APA had rapidly lost ground to other organizations of Party and state. Its special taskforce (Einsatzstab Rosenberg), however, received almost unlimited power in the acquisition of works of art, precious manuscripts, and artefacts in the occupied countries. Malletke was part of this looting unit in the Netherlands. Supported by a small staff, Malletke was also trustee of banks from so-called ‘hostile’ countries and administrator of expropriated Jewish fi rms. It is estimated that Malletke had been involved in the administration of at least ninety-one companies and banking institutions in the Netherlands.115 In the course of 1941 Malletke was asked by Rosenberg to assume a position within the newly created Ostministerium. In December he was transferred to Berlin. Within the Ostministerium Malletke was appointed Rosenberg’s ‘special deputy’ (Sonderbeauftragter, also Beauftragter für Sonderfragen, or BfS) in politico-economic affairs. In hierarchy, his team was equal to the principal divisions (Hauptabteilungen) within the Ostmi- nisterium. However, there was one important difference: whereas all other divisions were subordinated to Rosenberg’s powerful state secretary, Alfred Meyer, Malletke and his colleagues came directly under Rosenberg.116 His general task description mentioned the encouragement and coordination of ‘foreign’ economic activities in the occupied eastern territories. This brought him back to the country he had left just a few months before. Together with Denmark, Norway, and Flanders, the Netherlands became the target area for Malletke and his personnel. To them it was evident that economic activities of foreigners in the occupied East were held to racial and political restrictions. Only people (and companies) from Germanic countries qualifi ed. After all, the permanent exploitation of conquered land in the East was a bio-political affair, requiring the engagement of all people of Germanic descent.117 With a small staff of dedicated men with a similar ideological and racist mindset, Malletke began his work almost immediately. The fi rst round of talks led him to believe that recruitment of volunteers would not succeed without the NSB. There were several options: Borggreven, who had just returned from his visit to the Berlin headquarters of the Ostministerium, 118 could be put on the board of CULANO, Malletke thought. The other option was to establish a completely new organization headed by one of Mussert’s men. Either way, it was evident that the search for Dutch men and capital should Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:42 01 October 2016 remain in Dutch hands in order to secure a contribution by the Dutch people.119 In the following weeks, Malletke and his staff continued their talks. At meetings in Schmidt’s offi ce various experts were heard. Some informed them that at least 2,000 Dutch farmers could leave immediately; others mentioned the number of 7,000. It was also suggested to bring 150,000 head of Dutch cattle to the occupied East.120 At fi rst, Malletke’s men held high hopes for Borggreven. Yet as they came to realize that his connections to the world of Dutch fi nances and business were poor, other options were Embarking on a Great Adventure 73 explored. This became even more urgent upon the Japanese victory over allied forces in the Dutch East Indies in March 1942. This news made Malletke believe that the Dutch contribution to the exploitation of the occupied eastern territories could be considerably augmented. The funds and business that were released by the loss of the colony could and should be directed at the occupied East. A partner was needed with expertise or connections in these fi elds and as a larger operation would require huge investments, this partner should also have access to fi nancial means. Malletke found this partner in Meinoud Rost van Tonningen, son of a general in the Dutch colonial army who had been raised in the Dutch East Indies. Having completed his law studies in 1921, his work for the League of Nations had brought Rost van Tonningen to Vienna. Won over by national-socialism, Rost van Tonningen resigned in 1936 and returned to the Netherlands to dedicate himself to the political cause. A year later, he was appointed NSB-deputy in the Dutch parliament. Since May 1940, Rost van Tonningen was loaded with honorary jobs and titles. A month after his appointment as president of the Dutch National Bank in March 1941, Rost van Tonningen was also allotted general secretary ‘for special economic affairs.’ In the summer of 1941 he was engaged in various attempts to make the Dutch economy ready for absorption in a greater European economic sphere (Grossraumwirtschaft) . With some of his friends he tried to force a reorientation of Dutch economy towards the European continent. Although his power was restricted by Hirschfeld, Rost van Tonningen was an important and dedicated ally of German authorities in the Netherlands.121 He was also one of the early protagonists of the Greater Germanic thought in this country. Rost van Tonningen believed that the space in the East (Ostraum) was historically Germanic. As the cultivation of this area required help from all Germanic peoples, he was strongly in favor of Dutch efforts to stimulate recruitment and employment. With regard to layout and organization, Rost van Tonningen had very specifi c ideas, which he ventilated for the fi rst time in August 1941, arguably to Backe. To his mind, there was no distinction between employment and colonization, because permanent use of this Ostraum required permanent settlement of Germanic people in the area. With regards to the Dutch, he advised building upon centuries of traditions and methods of Dutch colonization. In his view, support should be organized, initially state-led, from the motherland to colonists in Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:42 01 October 2016 the periphery; the colonists should be settled close together, in circumstances that resembled community life in the Netherlands.122 In a letter sent two months later to Fischböck, Rost van Tonningen elabo- rated on his plans. Again he stressed the importance of colonization ‘in closed formation.’ In order to gain Dutch popular support, larger propaganda campaigns were needed. The message that should be brought across was that work in the occupied East would be not only highly profi table for the Dutch, but also an opportunity to be part of a much richer history of Dutch colonization, abroad and in Europe. To turn the operation into 74 Embarking on a Great Adventure a success, Rost van Tonningen suggested putting one single organization (Monopolgesellschaft) in charge, after the example of the Dutch East Indies Company or the Hanseatic League. Obviously, this organization should have large fi nancial reserves at its disposal.123 Early 1942, Rost van Tonningen mobilized his forces to attract the attention of the authorities involved. He warned against Borggreven: in his opinion a private one-man enterprise, without contacts inside the world of Dutch (big) business and fi nance, would not be qualifi ed to lead this huge operation. What was needed was an organization of experienced, politically reliable Dutch businessmen to supervise. For this company he had already thought of a suitable name: the Long Distance Society (Maatschappij van Verre) . The name was inspired by the Long Distance Company (Compagnie van Verre), established in 1594 by nine dauntless merchants from Amsterdam, who had prepared the way for the Dutch East Indies Company to rule international trade for decades. In a similar manner, the prospective Long Dis- tance Society should enable the Dutch to take advantage of the richness of the occupied eastern territories. The Dutch state, the National Bank, and the cities of Rotterdam and Amsterdam should guarantee full fi nancial coverage and turn the Society into a cash-rich organization. The Society, he believed, should be accommodated by a Dutch banking institution that had lost its fi eld of operation. Of the three larger commercial banks responsible for investments in the Dutch East Indies, Rost van Tonningen preferred the Dutch-Indies Trade Bank (Nederlandsch-Indische Handelsbank), not the least because it was led by Jan Robertson, since March 1941 Rost van Tonningen’s assistant at the Dutch National Bank. Robertson and Rost van Tonningen were personal and political friends.124 They met Malletke in March 1942 to discuss the anticipated Dutch contribution in the occupied East. During these talks, Rost van Tonningen was full of self-confi dence. He told his German partner that the operational aspects could be left in Dutch hands. Financial backing was going to be provided by the Dutch National Bank. There was, in other words, no reason to worry or wait. On the contrary: because of the loss of the Dutch East Indies, Dutch colonial trade was in an acute need of new markets.125 Although Malletke was probably impressed by Rost van Tonningen’s offer,126 he could not immediately give him the green light. It was still unclear how a Dutch presence in the occupied eastern territories would be Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:42 01 October 2016 appreciated by other—local—German offi cials.127 At the time of the talks, only a part of the CULANO-farmers were employed. Others still passed time in transfer camps. Their discontent and their misbehavior were generally known by German authorities. While Malletke discussed matters in The Hague, he ordered his deputy, Hermann von Harder und von Harmhove, to travel through the occupied eastern territories to cautiously sound out local German offi cials on the employment of Dutch men in the area. Malletke had known Von Harder, a 45-year-old merchant form Hamburg, for years. Both Embarking on a Great Adventure 75 men had worked for Rosenberg before the war. In talks with local German offi cials Von Harder was now to fi nd out in which economic sectors foreign manpower and equipment were needed. At the same time, he was to initiate ‘the Germanic trek’ (Germanenzug) to the area. The journey would fi rst go to Reichskommissariat Ostland, i.e. the area covering the three Baltic States and German White Ruthenia.128 Between February 27th and March 13th, Von Harder visited Hinrich Lohse, Reich Commissioner of Ostland, his fi ve general commissioners, twelve district commissioners, and several senior offi cials. All appeared to be aware of the signifi cance, in political and economic respect, of employment of workers from Germanic countries in the Ostland: ‘a political and biological task of prime importance’ (eine politische und biologische Aufgabe erster Ordnung), in the words of Adrian von Renteln, head of the German administration in Lithuania. Von Renteln considered the employment an inte- grative component of the future settlers’ program. In order to clear Lithuania of Polish infl uences, Rudolf Pense, the head of economic affairs in the same general commissariat, favored the idea of replacing Polish landlords by Dutch and Danes. In Estonia, the German administration welcomed ‘an incoming wave of Germanic blood’ (eine germanische Blutzustrom) .129 The one negative sound came from Martin Matthiessen, Lohse’s specialist in agriculture and head of the LBGO. He believed that people from Germanic countries were hardly any better than Latvians, Estonians, and Lithuanians. The only reason Matthiessen could think of to bring them in was as substi- tutes for Poles. It became clear to Von Harder that Matthiessen particularly disliked the Dutch. Von Harder could think of two reasons. First: before his transfer to Riga, Matthiessen had been the Landesbauerführer in Münster, near the Dutch border. In this capacity, he had some bad experiences with Dutch workers. Second: being responsible for the employment of the Dutch farmers of the CULANO-operation, Matthiessen was kept abreast of the behavior of Dutch volunteers, in Lodz and Riga. Overall, the news reinforced his views on the Dutch.130 Nevertheless, Matthiessen committed himself to support the Ostministerium’s effort to engage foreign, Germanic people in the exploitation of the occupied east and, shortly afterwards, his superior confi rmed the intended collaboration. 131 Malletke asked Rosenberg to have some of his men stationed in the area. They should be accommodated in two small local offi ces—one in the Ostland, and one in Ukraine.132 Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:42 01 October 2016 In fact, negotiations with offi cials in Ukraine had not yet taken place. By the end of 1941 Erich Koch, Reich Commissioner of Ukraine, was informed about Rosenberg’s view on the engagement of Germanic people and business in the exploitation of the occupied eastern territories. 133 It is highly likely that Koch rejected this idea. In general the Reich Commissioner was averse to interferences by third parties in the region under his rule. In the spring of 1942 the Ostministerium expected that much persuasion was needed to convince Koch and his closest colleagues.134 76 Embarking on a Great Adventure Malletke did not leave his plans to Koch’s discretion. For now, he restricted the involvement of Dutch manpower and business to Ostland. Encouraged by the overall positive reaction of the authorities in the Baltic States and Belarus, Malletke also accelerated his work in the Netherlands. In May consecutive talks with all parties involved resulted in the unanimous decision to put Rost van Tonningen in charge of the operationalization. 135 Malletke urged Rost van Tonningen to make haste as, like he stated, summers in the occupied eastern territories were short. If the Ostministerium wished to use Dutch manpower for bringing in the harvest, then speed was required.136 By the end of the month Rost van Tonningen presented his ideas to Seyss-Inquart, Fischböck, and Schmidt. He was expecting that willingness to develop economic activities in the occupied Eastern territories would be widespread in the Netherlands. In order to coordinate these activities and to guarantee a contribution of Dutch individuals and organizations, a national umbrella organization was needed. This company, Rost van Tonningen emphasized, would hold a monopoly as far as the involvement of Dutch business and manpower in the area was concerned. In return for services, the company would be granted a piece of land (a concession). The organization, fi nancially supported by the Dutch state, the Dutch National Bank, the cities of Amsterdam and Rotterdam, ‘and some larger trading and banking companies,’ would be called the Dutch Trading Company of Eastern Europe (Nederlandse Handelscompagnie voor Oost-Europa) .137 All participants of the meeting agreed to Rost van Tonningen’s suggestions even though some aspects of the prospective operation were far from clear. Which fi rms, for instance, were ‘these larger trading and banking companies’ mentioned by Rost van Tonningen? And which piece of land qualifi ed to be leased to the Dutch? Various regions had been brought to table— a harbor city (Liepāja [Libau], for instance) and some villages near the Baltic Sea; a strip of land in the northern part of the Caucasus, bordering the Black and Caspian Sea—yet by the time of their meeting a decision had not yet been taken. 138 The Ostministerium insisted Rost van Tonningen to proceed with the operationalization even without clarity on these points. 139 In the next two weeks events happened in rapid succession. On June 4th, Rost van Tonningen was summoned to Rosenberg’s presence. The meeting was scheduled for June 8th, leaving Rost van Tonningen four days to pre- Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:42 01 October 2016 pare. Given that an exploratory trip was planned after the visit to Berlin, the offi cial founding of the Company was suddenly extremely urgent. A nota- ry’s offi ce was visited to apply for a patent on the execution of all economic activities in the occupied eastern territories and to draw up a memorandum of association. In a similarly hasty fashion, a press release, announcing the formation of the Company (but leaving out all unresolved questions), was produced.140 The organization was presented to the public on June 9th, under a slightly different name: the Dutch East Company (NOC). A few weeks later Embarking on a Great Adventure 77 its statutes were published in the Government Gazette. The starting capital was fi xed on 2.5 million guilders, divided in 2,500 shares of 1,000 guilders. Of these 2,500 shares, 500 were allocated—in equal amounts—to the Dutch state, the Dutch National Bank, and the cities of Amsterdam and Rotterdam. Rost van Tonningen, in his capacity as president of the Dutch National Bank, would stand surety for any costs or debts incurred by the young organization.141 Whereas Rost van Tonningen claimed the chair of president of the NOC, Daniël Krantz was appointed general director. Krantz, a highly respected and successful banker, was asked by his friend Robertson for the position. Although not a member of the NSB at the time of his appointment, Krantz was known as an early adherent. The acceptance of Robertson’s offer was also his political ‘coming-out’ and Krantz was prepared to put up with the consequences: earning a smaller salary, losing old friends, and even breaking up with his wife and his children who were bitterly opposed to national-socialism.142 Besides a president, a director, and a board of shareholders, the statutes also mentioned a board of commissioners and a supervisory board. For these positions Rost van Tonningen searched in his circle of business and political friends. The supervisory board was made of three men: Robertson, Rost van Tonningen’s confi dant P. Hoekstra, and F.B.J. Gips, a tradesman in wood. Gips occupied a dual position as he was also one of the seven commissioners of the NOC board. Rost van Tonningen presided this board. Two of the commissioners had made their fortune in colonial trade.143 On his travel to Berlin the newly appointed president was accompanied by Gips, Hoekstra, and Robertson. Roskam’s choice, Willem Gerhardt, secretary of the Landstand, joined the group.144 In the early morning of June 8th, the delegation was warmly welcomed by personnel of the Ostministerium. They were brought to the offi ce of Rosenberg, housed in the impressive building of the former Russian embassy on Unter den Linden. Rosenberg’s confi dants Malletke and Von Harder had their desks on the ground fl oor. In their rooms with beautiful views on the prestigious avenue, the talks commenced. Rost van Tonningen carefully enquired about the matter of concessions. He expressed his fear that, as long as this matter remained unsolved, the Dutch Nazi Movement would try to obstruct the operation. Malletke did not yield to Rost van Tonningen’s Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:42 01 October 2016 hardly veiled request. A ‘migration of peoples from the West to the East’ had to wait until the war was decided, he stated. In an effort to take the sting out of the conversation, Rosenberg’s Sonderbeauftragter reassured his Dutch audience that the Ostministerium considered all employed in the East as utterly needed and highly appreciated ‘economic soldiers of the war’ (Wirtschaftssoldaten des Weltkrieges) .145 After the talks with Malletke, the delegation was received by Rosenberg. The meeting was brief, ending exactly thirty-fi ve minutes later. In the evening, a diner was organized to their tribute. That same night, escorted by 78 Embarking on a Great Adventure Von Harder, the Dutch offi cials said farewell to their hosts and departed the capital by train, heading for East Prussia. The train took them to Sovetsk (Tilsit). Exhausted, they continued their journey by car. Riga would be their next stop. Here they would have their fi rst talks with German offi cials of the Reichskommissariat Ostland.146

The trip of Rost van Tonningen and his retinue would herald a new era in the history of Dutch involvement in the occupied eastern territories. In the summer and early autumn of 1942, the possibilities for various Dutch economic branches in the area were explored. Captains of shipping companies, dredgers, specialists in fi sheries, tropical cultivations like tobacco, tea, and rubber, and of course authorities in agriculture and dairy farming traveled eastwards where they were received by representatives of German rule in the area. In turn, these representatives asked the NOC for assistance in other economic sectors that suffered from a shortage of skilled manpower. They invited, amongst others, Dutch citizens knowledgeable in the fi eld of peat excavation, bricks and tiles production, fl ax processing, lemonade and sugar manufacturing, and experienced distillers. What had started in the summer of 1941 with the recruitment of a few hundreds of Dutch farmers had turned into a gigantic project to transfer larger segments of Dutch economic activity to this part of continental Europe. To all involved it was evident that this involvement was part of the much larger program of Germanization. Temporary work was considered to be the fi rst step to permanent presence in the area. Arguably, this had already been recognized by men like Staf and Hartland. They thought that migration of Dutch farmers could release the pressure on Dutch agriculture at home. Because of this convergence of interests they complied with German policy. Yet, even so, it would be hard to maintain that these men also agreed to the ideological and racist dimension of Germanization for it is a matter of record that when the operation openly politicized, they withdrew their support. And, as opposed to Staf’s and Hartland’s intention to fl y under the public radar, the operation of the NOC was coupled with extensive political campaigns from the very beginning. Both the politicization and the scaling up of Dutch employment in the occupied East began with the drastic political events in the second half of 1941. Contrary to German military hopes and ambitions, victory over the Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:42 01 October 2016 Soviet Union had proven hard to achieve and by the end of 1941 it had dawned on Hitler and his closest collaborators that war could linger on— for months, and perhaps even for years. The idea gained in strength that, in order to keep up the German military strength, all available sources—also those in occupied countries—should be put to use. Since the war had begun, Dutch trade had suffered severely. The Japanese assault in December 1941 and the following loss of the Dutch East Indies increased the urgency to fi nd new markets. By participating in the colonization of the occupied East, the Dutch nation would fi nd a new colonial mission. Embarking on a Great Adventure 79 As far as the new efforts were concerned, two men in particular claimed a leading role: Rosenberg and Rost van Tonningen. The rise of these two men in the matter of Dutch involvement in the East was the result of their individual struggles for power. Competences within Nazi rule, both in Germany and the Netherlands, were often overlapping and disputed. In 1941, authorities in the matter of population policy were attributed to Himmler. By successfully claiming a monopoly over the involvement of (Germanic) foreigners, Rosenberg recovered some of the lost ground. Despite his impressive collection of titles and jobs, Rost van Tonningen’s hunger for esteem and power was still not satiated. In this specifi c, ideologically prestigious matter he was unrivalled. His high position in economic and fi nancial affairs, coupled with his passionate love for a Greater Germanic Reich, seemed to guarantee that the operation under his command would be a success.

NOTES

1 . War years diary Jacobus Joseph van Aken. Available online via www.histo rischdagboek.nl/jjvanaken/biografi e-jacobus-joseph-van-aken. Last visited 19 November 2013. 2 . De Telegraaf, 23 June 1941. 3 . Volk en Vaderland, 23 June 1941. 4 . De Zwarte Soldaat, 27 June 1941. 5 . Speech Winston Churchill, 22 June 1941. Available online via www.winston churchill.org/learn/speeches/speeches-of-winston-churchill/809-the-fourth- climacteric. Last visited 19 November 2013. 6 . Speech H.M. Queen Wilhelmina, 27 June 1941, printed in Slaet op den Trom- mele, 27 July 1941. 7 . De Waarheid, 26 June 1941. 8 . Chris van der Heijden, Grijs verleden: Nederland en de Tweede Wereldoorlog (Amsterdam: Contact, 2001), 271–293. 9 . Peter Romijn, Burgemeesters in oorlogstijd: Besturen onder Duitse bezetting (Amsterdam: Balans, 2006), 160–320. 10 . Hein Klemann and Sergei Kudryashov, Occupied Economies: An Economic History of Nazi-Occupied Europe, 1939–1945 (London/New York: Berg, 2012), 85–89. 11 . On Hirschfeld see: Meindert Fennema and John Rijnsburger, Dr. Hans Max Hirschfeld: Man van het grote geld (Amsterdam: Bert Bakker, 2007). Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:42 01 October 2016 12 . G.M.T. Trienekens, Tussen ons volk en de honger: De voedselvoorziening, 1940–1945 (Utrecht: Matrijs, 1985), 10–41. 13 . Ibidem, 69–71. 14 . SS Registration Card (undated); letters Stephanus Louwe Louwes to J.H. Cornelis, 25 November 1946, and Hans Max Hirschfeld to J.H. Cornelis, 6 December 1946, National Archives The Hague, Central Archives for Special Criminal Jurisdiction (NA/CABR), 2.09.09, fi le 48001. 15 . Trienekens, Tussen ons volk en de honger, 71. 16 . Ibidem, 50–52. 17 . Police report on Geert Ruiter, 18 October 1945, NA/CABR, 2.09.09, fi le 48001. 80 Embarking on a Great Adventure 18 . Alex J. Kay, ‘ “The Purpose of the Russian Campaign Is the Decimation of the Slavic Population by Thirty Million”: The Radicalization of German Food Policy in Early 1941’, in: Alex J. Kay, Jeff Rutherford and David Stahel (eds.), Nazi Policy on the Eastern Front, 1941: Total War, Genocide, and Radicaliza- tion (Rochester: University of Rochester Press, 2012), 101–113. 19 . Ibidem. 20 . Quoted in ibidem, 111. 21 . Report Friedrich Graf Grote, 10 December 1941, BA, R6, fi le 440. 22 . For more information see: www.parlement.com/id/vg09ll98m9zu/c_kees_staf. Last visited 29 March 2014. 23 . Report Cees Staf (undated), NA/CABR, 2.09.09, fi le 108554. 24 . H.M.L. Geurts, Herman Derk Louwes, (1893–1960): Burgemeester van de Nederlandse landbouw (Groningen/Wageningen: Nederlands Agronomisch Historisch Instituut, 2002), 195–197. 25 . Letter consultant West Overijssel to general director of agriculture, 10 July 1941, National Archives The Hague (NA), 2.11.07.01, fi le 12. 26 . Letter Hans Max Hirschfeld to G.J. Lienesch, 19 July 1941, NIOD, 120a, fi le 3. 27 . Jan Hartland, Emigratie en kolonisatie in dezen tijden (Amsterdam: s.n., 1935), 16–17; letter Hans Max Hirschfeld to Jan Hartland, 19 July 1941, NIOD, 120a, fi le 3. 28 . Letter Cees Staf to Hans Max Hirschfeld, 19 July 1941, NIOD, 120a, fi le 3. 29 . Circular Cees Staf, 21 July 1941, Gelders Archief Arnhem (GA), 0915, fi le 375. 30 . Letter Jan Hartland to Hans Max Hirschfeld, 19 July 1941, NIOD, 120a, fi le 3. 31 . Minutes of meeting of CULANO, 22 July 1941, NIOD, 120a, fi le 1. 32 . Letter Director Central Employment Offi ce to the directors of the District Employment Offi ces, 26 July 1941, NIOD, 120a, fi le 12. 33 . Report of meeting of directors Central Employment Offi ce, directors of the District Employment Offi ces and others, 29 July 1941, NIOD, 120a, fi le 13. 34 . Directions Herbert Backe, for the exploitation of agriculture in the newly occupied Eastern Territories, 12 September 1941, and letter Herbert Backe to Reichskommissar Ukraine and Reichskommissar Ostland, 17 September 1941, BA, R92, fi le 964. Although his directions were issued in September, the offi cial founding did not take place until December that year. Notarial deed concerning the establishment of the Landbewirtschaftungsgesellschaft Ostland, 10 December 1941, BA, R92, fi le 964. 35 . Notarial deed concerning the establishment of the Zentral-Handelsgesellschaft Ost für landwirtschaftlichen Absatz und Bedarf, 17 July 1941; directions Herbert Backe, 18 August 1941 and 25 September 1941, BA, R92, fi le 964. 36 . Letter Reichart to Reichsministerium Ernährung und Landwirtschaft, 26 June 1941, BA, R2, fi le 19521. 37 . Letter Geert Ruiter to Hans Max Hirschfeld, 25 September 1941, NA, 2.11.07.01, fi le 12. 38 . Herbert Backe, De taak van de Nederlandschen landbouw in de Europeesche Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:42 01 October 2016 economische ruimte (s.l.: s.n., 1941); notes concerning Day of Production Drive in Europe, 18 August 1941, NIOD, 120, fi le 205. 39 . Letter Cees Staf to CULANO-Head Offi ce, 12 August 1941, NIOD, 120a, fi le 4. 40 . Letter Giebel to A. Zell, 28 January 1942, BA, R6, fi le 440. 41 . Letter CULANO-Head Offi ce to Folkert Posthuma, 18 September 1941, NIOD, 120a, fi le 11. 42 . Letter P.L. Kok tot Cees Staf, 30 September 1941; letter Cees Staf to Jan Hartland, 3 October 1941, GA, 0915, fi le 375. 43 . NA/CABR, 2.09.09, fi le 108088. Embarking on a Great Adventure 81 44 . Of fi cial statement Jelle Scharringa, 20 May 1946, NA/CABR, 2.09.09, fi le 107544. 45 . See for instance: letter Cees Staf to G.L. Zaadnoordijk, 2 August 1941, GA, 0915, fi le 375. 46 . Various applications and notes on applications, NIOD, 120a, fi le 15. 47 . Letters Willem Gerhardt to Jan Hartland, 2 September 1941, 8 September 1941, and 12 September 1941, NIOD, 120a, fi le 15. 48 . Various correspondence between CULANO and LO, NIOD, 120a, fi le 14. 49 . Minutes of a meeting of CULANO, 22 July 1941, NIOD, 120a, fi le 1. 50 . Letter Cees Staf to CULANO-Head Offi ce, 12 August 1942, NIOD, 120a, fi le 4. It should be noted that occasionally the Agrarian Front did produce statements about Aryan descent; see letter to director Central Employment Offi ce, 20 September 1941 and 29 September 1941, NIOD, 120a, fi le 53. 51 . Letter CULANO to directors of District Employment Offi ces, 18 November 1941, NIOD, 120a, fi le 12. 52 . Various correspondence between CULANO and tailor J.P.C. Nicolai, NIOD, 120a, fi le 61. 53 . Letter CULANO to directors of District Employment Offi ces, 18 November 1941, NIOD, 120a, fi le 12. 54 . Liesbeth van de Grift, ‘On New Land a New Society: Internal Colonisa- tion in the Netherlands, 1918–1940’, Contemporary European History 22 (2013), 609–626; Piet de Rooy, Werklozenzorg en werkloosheidsbestrijding 1917–1940: Landelijk en Amsterdams beleid (Amsterdam: Van Gennep, 1978), 201–202. 55 . The sum of the credit was 25,000 guilders (approximately 10,000 Euros or 12,000 US dollars in 2014). Letter Hans Max Hirschfeld to Jan Hartland, 19 July 1941, and letter Jan Hartland to Hans Max Hirschfeld, 25 September 1941, NIOD, 120a, fi le 3. 56 . List District Employment Offi ce Emmen, 18 November 1941, NIOD, 120a, fi le 30; list District Employment Offi ce Eindhoven, 16 December 1941, NIOD, 120a, fi le 31; list District Employment Offi ce Deventer, 19 November 1941 and 16 January 1942, NIOD, 120a, fi le 28; list District Employment Offi ce Bergen op Zoom, 18 December 1941, NIOD, 120a, fi le 26. 57 . State of affairs recruitment Eastern Europe, 10 December 1941, NIOD, 120a, fi le 4. 58 . Letter Jan Hartland to Cees Staf, 12 February 1942, NIOD, 120a, fi le 4. 59 . Letter Jan Hartland to director Rijksinkoopbureau, 30 September 1941, NIOD, 120a, fi le 9. 60 . Various transport lists, NIOD, 120a, fi le 62. 61 . Report Friedrich Graf Grote, 10 December 1941, BA, R6, fi le 440. 62 . Statement Jelle Scharringa, 8 and 9 October 1946, NA/CABR, 2.09.09, fi le 107544; statement Jan Remko Dertien, 20 May 1946, NA/CABR, 2.09.09, fi le 108088. Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:42 01 October 2016 63 . Statement P.L. Kok, 14 June 1945, NA/CABR, 2.09.09, fi le 110960. 64 . Statement Remt Lambert Buringh, 29 May 1945, NA/CABR, 2.09.09, fi le 40752. 65 . Statement Jerenome Kossen, 9 May 1945, NA/CABR, 2.09.09, fi le 105319. 66 . Statement Klaas Stigter, 16 September 1946, NA/CABR, 2.09.09, fi le 109780; statement Klaas Kostelijk, 17 May 1945, NA/CABR, 2.09.09, fi le 14600; statement Markus Roos, 27 June 1945, NA/CABR, 2.09.09, fi le 105799; statement Jan van Gilst, 1 May 1945, NA/CABR, 2.09.09, fi le 109701. 67 . Letter G.J. Heymeyer to Jan Hartland, 26 July 1941, NIOD, 120a, fi le 11. 68 . Report Friederich Graf Grote, 10 December 1941, BA, R6, fi le 440. 82 Embarking on a Great Adventure 69 . Note for Hans Max Hirschfeld, 25 September 1941, NA, 2.11.07.01, fi le 12. 70 . Letter Cees Staf to Hans Max Hirschfeld, 14 January 1942, NIOD, 120a, fi le 3. 71 . Dagblad van het Oosten, 22 November 1941. 72 . Statement Cees Staf (undated), GA, 0915, fi le 382. 73 . Nationaal Dagblad, 22 November 1941. 74 . Nieuw Rotterdamsche Courant, 23 November 1941. 75 . Het Volk, 22 November 1941. 76 . Deutsche Zeitung, 23 November 1941. 77 . Note of Hans Max Hirschfeld to Geert Ruiter, 27 February 1942, NA, 2.11.07.01, fi le 12. 78 . Letter Gerrit Jan van Bavel, 23 November 1941, NA/CABR, 2.09.09, fi le 32209. 79 . Letter Jan Remko Dertien to Cees Staf, 16 December 1941, GA, 0915, fi le 375. 80 . Report Reinhold, 8 December 1941, NIOD, 120a, fi le 58. 81 . Report Reinhold, 9 December 1941, NIOD, 120a, fi le 58. 82 . Letter Jelle Scharringa to Cees Staf, 15 February 1942, NIOD, 120a, fi le 65. 83 . Con fi dential report J.S. Korteweg, 10 November 1942, NIOD, 176, fi le 940. 84 . District Employment Offi ce Deventer to LO Aussenstelle The Hague, 23 Janu- ary 1942, NIOD, 120a, fi le 28. 85 . District Employment Offi ce Zwolle to CULANO-Head Offi ce, 5 March 1942, NIOD, 120a, fi le 52. 86 . Letter LO Aussenstelle The Hague to CULANO, 5 March 1942, NIOD, 120a, fi le 14. 87 . Letter Giebel to A. Zell, 28 January 1942, BA, R6, fi le 440. 88 . Statement Hendrik van S., 15 July 1946, NA/CABR, 2.09.09, fi le 109853; statement Gijsbert van den Berg, 24 February 1947, NA/CABR, 2.09.09, fi le 57173; statement Hendrik Koster, 26 August 1946, NA/CABR, 2.09.09, fi le 105471; statement Klaas Stiger, 16 September 1946, NA/CABR, 2.09.09, fi le 109780; statement Hendrik V., 26 June 1946, NA/CABR, 2.09.09, fi le 37917; statements H. Gort and R. Veldman, 5 March 1942, NIOD, 120a, fi le 52; letter Johan Wouter van IJzeren to his wife, 18 May 1942, NA/CABR, 2.09.09, fi le 70297. 89 . Letter Reinder van Veen to unknown, 28 May 1942, NIOD, 176, fi le 606. 90 . Letter Jan Remko Dertien to Cees Staf, 28 March 1942, NIOD, 120a, fi le 65. 91 . Letter G. Hekkert to Cees Staf, 24 March 1942, and letter W. van ’t Hoff to Cees Staf, 3 February 1942, and letter W. Stork to Giebel, 22 May 1942, NIOD, 120a, fi le 65; letter Johan Wouter van IJzeren to his wife, 18 May 1942, NA/CABR, 2.09.09, fi le 70297; statement Hendrik van S., 15 July 1946, NA/CABR, 2.09.09, fi le 109853. 92 . Letter Johan Wouter van Ijzeren to his wife, 18 May 1942, NA/CABR, 2.09.09, fi le 70297; statement Hendrik van S., 15 July 1946, NA/CABR, 2.09.09, fi le 109853. Statement Markus Roos, 23 December 1946, NA/CABR, 2.09.09, fi le 105799; letter J. van de Wijngaard to District Employment Offi ce Heerlen, 18 August 1942, NIOD, 120a, fi le 65; letter Reinder van Veen to unknown, Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:42 01 October 2016 28 May 1942, NIOD, 176, fi le 606; statement Klaas Kostelijk, 6 November 1945, NA/CABR, 2.09.09, fi le 14600; statement Hendrik V., 26 June 1946, NA/CABR, 2.09.09, fi le 37917. 93 . Letters CULANO to LO Aussenstelle The Hague, 11 December 1941, 24 December 1941, 29 December 1941, and 2 January 1942, NIOD, 120a, fi le 14; letter Jan Hartland to Willem Gerhardt, 26 September 1941, NIOD, 120a, fi le 15. 94 . List of departed and released recruits, 13 May 1942, NIOD, 120a, fi le 65. 95 . Letter Cees Staf to Jelle Scharringa, 25 February 1942, NA/CABR, 2.09.09, fi le 107544. 96 . Letter Hans Max Hirschfeld to Geert Ruiter, 27 February 1942, NA, 2.11.07.01, fi le 12. Embarking on a Great Adventure 83 97 . Letter Hans Max Hirschfeld to Cees Staf, 15 May 1942, GA, 0915, fi le 375. 98 . Report for Hans Max Hirschfeld, 18 February 1942, letter Landstand to Geert Ruiter, 6 March 1942, letter Smits to Geert Ruiter, 29 January 1942, and letter Friedrich Graf Grote to Hans Max Hirschfeld, 2 January 1942, NA, 2.11.07.01, fi le 12; report Friedrich Graf Grote, 10 December 1941, BA, R6, fi le 440. 99 . David Barnouw (ed.), Correspondentie van Mr. M.M. Rost van Tonningen II (Zutphen: Walburg pers, 1993), 141. 100 . Lou de Jong, Het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden in de Tweede Wereldoorlog VI (Den Haag: SDU, 1975), 483 and Lou de Jong, Het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden in de Tweede Wereldoorlog VII (Den Haag: SDU, 1976), 135; Trienekens, Tussen ons volk en de honger, 50–51. 101 . Letter Meinoud Rost van Tonningen to Heinrich Himmler, 22 September 1942, Yad Vashem Archives Jerusalem (YVA), JM 4576. 102. Andreas Zellhuber, “Unsere Verwaltung treibt einer Katastrophe zu . . .”: Das Reichsministerium für die besetzen Ostgebiete und die deutsche Besatzung- sherrschaft in der Sowjetunion 1941–1945 (München: Verlag Ernst Vögel, 2006), 169–170. 103 . Ibidem, 247–248. 104. Letter Hermann Göring to Alfred Rosenberg, 3 January 1942, and report Walter Malletke, concerning the talk with Gottlob Berger, 17 March 1942, BA, R6, fi le 443. Arguably, the approval from Hitler reached Rosenberg 21 January 1942, see: E. Fraenkel-Verkade (ed.), Correspondentie van Mr. M.M. Rost van Tonningen I (Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1967), 850. 105 . Report Walter Malletke, 20 March 1942, BA, R6, fi le 443. 106 . Report Alfred Rosenberg, 5 January 1942, and report Alfred Meyer, 27 Janu- ary 1942, BA, R6, fi le 440. 107 . Letter Giebel to A. Zell, 28 January 1942; reports A. Zell, 12 February 1942 and 27 February 1942; report Walter Malletke, 28 February 1942, BA, R6, fi le 440. 108. Report Hermann von Harder, 30 June 1942, BA, R6, fi le 441; report Hermann von Harder, 11 November 1942, BA, R6, fi le 443. 109 . Letter Bedrijfsgroep Bouwindustrie ‘werken buiten Nederland’ to Deputy in Building Industry, 11 November 1942, NIOD, 176, fi le 209. 110 . Report Reinder van der Veen, of the 13th journey to the occupied East, 15 January 1944, NIOD, 176, fi le 607. 111 . Report Jan Habing, on the Dutch employment in the turf industry from 14 April 1942 until 1 March 1943 (undated), statement Jan Tip, 16 September 1947, NA/CABR, 2.09.09, fi le 30597. 112 . Joost Johannes Gerardus Boot, Burgemeester in bezettingstijd (Apeldoorn: Sem- per Agendo, 1967) passim; various undated statements, NA/CABR, 2.09.09, fi le 59380. 113 . Report Walter Malletke, 5 June 1942, BA, R6, fi le 441. It is not clear why Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:42 01 October 2016 Fischböck’s appointment as general commissioner of Kharkiv was blocked. Fraenkel-Verkade, Correspondentie I , 207. 114 . Report Willem Hendrik van Eek, 26 October 1943, NIOD, 176, fi le 362; statement Jan van Wallinga, 12 September 1942, NA/CABR, 2.09.09, fi le 107315; report, concerning activities of Werkdienst Holland (undated), BA, R6, fi le 459. 115. Fraenkel-Verkade, Correspondentie I, 794; various documents NA/CABR, 2.09.09, fi le 174. 116 . Hermann Gustav Fritz Freiherr von Harder und von Harmhove, Lebenser- innerungen, 839, Swiss Federal Institute for Technology Zürich/Archiv für Zeitgeschichte (AfZ), NL von Harder von Harmhove. 84 Embarking on a Great Adventure 117 . Zellhuber, “Unsere Verwaltung treibt einer Katastrophe zu . . .”, 127–128; report Walter Malletke, 7 December 1942, NIOD, 265, fi le 28; travel report Walter Malletke, 31 March 1942, BA, R6, fi le 440. 118 . Report on the visit of August Borggreven, 20 January 1942, BA, R6, fi le 440. 119 . Report Walter Malletke, 27 February 1942, report A. Zell, 12 February 1942, letter Walter Malletke to Alfred Rosenberg/Alfred Meyer, 21 February 1942, BA, R6, fi le 440. 120 . Report on a meeting concerning the employment in the East, 3 March 1942, report on a meeting between Alfred Meyer, Fritz Schmidt, August Borggreven and Anton Mussert, 19 September 1942, reports Walter Malletke, 27 Febru- ary 1942 and 2 March 1942, BA, R6, fi le 440. 121 . On Meinoud Rost van Tonningen see: David Barnouw, Rost van Tonningen: Fout tot het bittere einde (Zutphen: Walburg, 1994); Fraenkel-Verkade, Cor- respondentie I, 3–257. 122 . Report Meinoud Rost van Tonningen, ‘Die Niederländer im Ostraum’ (undated), in: Fraenkel-Verkade, Correspondentie I, 677. 123 . Letter Meinoud Rost van Tonningen to Hans Fischböck, 10 October 1941, in: Fraenkel-Verkade, Correspondentie I, 711. 124 . Reports Meinoud Rost van Tonningen, 13 February 1942 and 4 March 1942, in: Fraenkel-Verkade, Correspondentie I, 773 and 787. On Jan Robertson, see various documents in his postwar fi le, NA/CABR, 2.09.09, fi le 51. On his position at the National Bank, see: J. de Vries, Geschiedenis van de Neder- landsche Bank V (Haarlem: Enschede, 1994), 52–55. I thank Tom Christian de Visser. 125. Report Walter Malletke, 23 March 1942, BA, R6, fi le 440. 126 . See for instance his report from 16 April, in which he mentioned the willingness in the Netherlands to attack the problems and to come to practical solu- tions. Report Walter Malletke, 16 April 1942, BA, R6, fi le 440. 127 . Reports Walter Malletke, 27 February 1942, 4 March 1942, and 6 March 42, BA, R6, fi le 440. 128 . Travel report Hermann von Harder, 17 March 1942, BA, R6, fi le 443. 129 . Ibidem. 130. Ibidem. 131 . Minutes K.W. Coste, 20 March 1942, BA, R6, fi le 443. 132 . Letter Walter Malletke to Alfred Meyer, 27 April 1942, BA, R6, fi le 443. 133 . Letter Alfred Rosenberg to Erich Koch, 29 November 1941, BA, R6, fi le 443. 134 . Minutes K.W. Coste, 20 March 1942, BA, R6, fi le 443. 135 . Report K.W. Coste, 12 May 1942, and travel report K.W. Coste, 13 May 1942, BA, R6, fi le 440. 136 . Letter Walter Malletke to Meinoud Rost van Tonningen, 13 May 1942, in: Barnouw, Correspondentie II, 21. 137 . Report Meinoud Rost van Tonningen, 23 May 1942, in: Barnouw, Correspon- dentie II, 23. Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:42 01 October 2016 138 . Ibidem. Fischböck supported the idea of a Dutch concession near the Baltic Sea; see: report Walter Malletke, 13 May 1942, BA, R6, fi le 440. 139 . Report K.W. Coste, 4 June 1942, BA, R6, fi le 441. 140 . Report Walter Malletke, 6 June 1942, BA, R6, fi le 441. 141 . Statuten der Naamlooze Vennootschap Nederlandsche Oost Compagnie N.V. gevestigd te ’s-Gravenhage, 6 June 1942, NIOD, 176, fi le 18. 142 . Various statements and memoranda of oral pleading of Daniël Krantz, 29 April 1949 and 25 February 1950, NA/CABR, 2.09.09, fi le 156 III. I thank Steven Bergwerff. 143 . Frits Kock van Leeuwen and Pieter van Leeuwen Boomkamp. Embarking on a Great Adventure 85 144 . Statement Willem Gerhardt, April 1945, NA/CABR, 2.09.09, fi le 89544; Het orkest Europa (undated), NA/CABR, 2.09.09, fi le 52722. 145 . Von Harder, Lebenserinnerungen, 839, 861 and 907, AfZ, NL von Harder von Harmhove; report Walter Malletke, 8 June 1942, BA, R6, fi le 441. 146 . Travel report Willem Gerhardt (undated), NIOD, 176, fi le 597. Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:42 01 October 2016 4 Towards Absolute Monopoly

FIRST STEPS

The night train that the NOC-delegation took that second Monday of June 1942 was delayed and it was already afternoon when its passengers fi nally made out the contours of the city of Sovetsk. At the station, they had to wait for a few hours before they could continue their travel in convoy to Riga. Although Riga was only 150 miles eastwards, it took the delegation almost half a day. Some of their cars were involved in a crash shortly after departure. The passengers were only scratched and bruised, but the vehicles were severely damaged and needed to be replaced. Exhausted, they reached Riga in the evening of June 9th.1 In the Latvian capital, they were received by the general commissioner of Latvia. For the next two weeks, they traversed the Ostland, covering more than 1,500 miles. Harder fi lled their agendas. Back to back meetings were planned with local German offi cials of the LBGO and the Reichskommis- sariat. The delegation visited the offi ces of German authorities in Latvia and the neighboring Baltic states of Lithuania and Estonia. The trip ended more or less in Minsk, with a meeting with Wilhelm Kube, general commissioner of White Ruthenia. At home, the trip received extensive press coverage. Pictures of Rost van Tonningen’s arrival in Berlin, surrounded by high-ranked offi cials of the Ostministerium, were front-page news. Shortly after his return, an offi cial interview with Rost van Tonningen was printed in most national newspapers. Het Volk, a socialist daily that had been put under Rost van Ton- Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:42 01 October 2016 ningen’s political custody in July 1940, opened in bold headlines about the ‘huge possibilities for our pioneers.’2 With Dutch helping hands, the harbors of the Baltic States could be brought into development, turning the Baltic Sea into the busiest sea in Europe for shipping traffi c. Once the harbors would come into operation, a rosy future awaited Dutch shipping companies. Dutch involvement in the region’s fi shing industry could as much as triple the returns. Gardening and peat digging in the Baltic States, two specialties of the Dutch par excellence, would be improved and expanded too. Towards Absolute Monopoly 87 To a large extent, Rost van Tonningen was simply summing up what had been discussed with German authorities in the Ostland. During these talks the transfer of Dutch farmers to the area had also been brought up. Although there was a need for manpower, German offi cials unanimously urged for a strict selection. Clearly, the behavior of some farmers sent by CULANO had had a deterring effect.3 Nevertheless, in particular in the surroundings of Vilnius known as the German administrative zone Wilna-Land , the shortage of manpower was acute and the County Commissioner (Gebietskommis- sar) Horst Wulff requested a substantial number of Dutch farmers. In his scheme, Dutch farmers would substitute their Polish colleagues. 4 In the company of Wulff, Gerhardt inspected the country and several larger rural estates that might be of interest to the NOC. One of the estates was Waka T, a farmstead less than twenty miles to the south of Vilnius. Built in 1870 by a Polish count, the property had remained in his family’s hands until the late 1930s, when fate hounded the count’s heirs. In 1939 the last descendant in line lost his life in a plane crash. Shortly after, his widow and their two children were forced to fl ee the country in order to escape the Red Army, leaving the estate unmanned. During the German–Soviet battles of June 1941, the buildings were hit by shellfi re. Soldiers of the Wehrmacht were housed in Waka T until the confi scation by the LBGO. 5 Despite the damage, Gerhardt liked the estate. Judging by the size of the buildings, the livestock, and the arable land, Waka T met the requirements for a NOC-complex, fusing model farm and educational center. 6 In August 1942, Gerhardt traveled eastwards again, this time together with another protégé of Roskam. After their visit to Berlin, the couple continued the journey to Riga, where they met the Dutch farmer Marinus Ekko Vorenkamp, candidate for the post of supervisor in Waka T. Vorenkamp had worked in Germany for many years. From March 1940 until January 1942, he had been in charge of a large estate in the Warthegau. In 1942 Vorenkamp applied for a new position in the occupied eastern territories. He arrived in the Ostland in August.7 After a last round of talks in Riga, Vilnius, and The Hague, a lease contract for Waka T was signed between German local authorities and representatives of the NOC. A similar contract was drafted with regards to a rural estate in Lentvaris, some fi fteen miles to the east of Waka T, close to the city of Trakai. These contracts constituted an absolute novelty, for in the Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:42 01 October 2016 occupied eastern territories confi scated property usually remained in Ger- man public hands. According to Harder, who had been deeply involved in the negotiations, not one single piece of land or building had been leased to non-Germans before. 8 In the Dutch press Waka T was referred to as the ‘fi rst area of Dutch settlement.’9 Vorenkamp and a small staff of assistants moved into the estate in the fi rst week of October. 10 A year after the fi rst NOC-journey, hundreds of Dutch men were employed in the Baltic States and White Ruthenia. In Minsk, a Dutch construction fi rm was employing a few dozen Dutch workers. Some 125 Dutch 88 Towards Absolute Monopoly farmers were in White Ruthenia, predominantly near Vileyka. 11 In Lithu- ania, Wulff’s Wilna Land was full of Dutch presence. The NOC ran the larger estate Waka T, which was slowly converted into a model farm and agricultural education center for Dutch farmers. Some thirty to forty Dutch farmers held a more or less permanent position at the estate, while another hundred farmers enjoyed schooling at Waka T before they were put to work in Lithuanian agricultural branches, as supervisors or managers of one or more smallholdings.12 About fi ve miles to the east, the NOC took over operations in the peat moors at Biała Waka (for unknown reasons the Dutch referred to it more often by its Lithuanian name, Baltoji Voke). 13 To the German authorities, peat was of crucial importance. 14 With its numerous moors and wetlands the production of peat in Lithuania would be intensifi ed. Aware of the expertise in this fi eld of work in the Netherlands, German authorities looked at Dutch specialists in peat digging to bring to the Lithuanian moors and intensify production of this natural fuel. 15 Jan Habing had been approached by German authorities early in 1942. After the founding of the NOC he offered his services to Rost van Tonningen. The president asked him to sug- gest a Lithuanian moor that would be best for the NOC to exploit. Habing recommended Baltoji Voke, bordering a large moor of approximately 7,413 acres. At that time, only a small piece was cultivated, but the prospects for the future were good. 16 More properties were conveyed, generally on a basis of lease. In Lat- via, for instance, agreement was reached on the lease of some assembled buildings on the grounds of a Latvian school for advanced agriculture, near the small village of Malpils. Here, a Dutch center specializing in growing vegetables and gardening arose. On the grounds, Latvian girls attended a school.17 The lease was the work of Reinder van Veen, a Dutch agricultural engineer who had already been asked by the Ostministerium in the spring of 1942 to select Dutch farmers in fruit and vegetable products. After the NOC was founded, Van Veen accepted Krantz’ offer to become the organization’s chief in vegetable and fruit gardening. As such, he was responsible for the wellbeing of individual Dutch gardeners and their families. These gardeners, in contrast to farmers, could travel with their families to the occupied East sometimes. In the summer of 1943, Malpils counted eleven Dutch gardeners. The vegetable supply to the city of Kaunas was largely in the hands of a Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:42 01 October 2016 Dutch inspector. In a later stage, plans were developed to establish a Dutch breeding station near Vilnius, but arguably because of the change in military prospects this initiative was postponed.18 Many plans, like the plan to start up the production of wooden shoes in Riga, did not materialize,19 but some others actually did. A larger lemonade manufacturer from the Netherlands signed a contract to exploit the locally well-known Saltinis factories in Vilnius, which had remained unmanned since the expropriation of the rightful owners.20 Dutch men were put in charge of sawmills, one in Riga and one in Rudiskis. 21 A garage owner from Towards Absolute Monopoly 89 Rotterdam was allowed to open up a workplace to repair cars and trucks; a laundryman from Amsterdam started a launderette in Kaunas. In the popular hotel Metropol in the same city, one could hear waiters speaking Dutch. In particular in the last days of the Ostland, Kaunas became a center of Dutch activities. Evacuated from all around, hundreds of Dutch volunteers arrived in the city the Germans considered the Lithuanian capital. Because of the number of Dutch people in the city, a communal house seemed desirable. A house in the center was bought by the NOC. Early in 1944, Dutch building teams were employed to carry out renovations.22 The options for Dutch fi shing industry in Latvia and Estonia were also investigated. It was concluded that Lake Peipus on the Estonian-Russian border was preferable. The NOC was granted exclusive rights to fi sh the lake from its eastern shore. A daughter company was erected ( Nederlandse Oost Visserij, or NOV) to coordinate the employment of fi shermen. In May that year fi fty-three Dutch fi shermen were housed near Gdov on the eastern shore of this gigantic body of water. Some of their boats and equipment were transported all the way from the Netherlands to this place close to the eastern front.23 Right from the onset, the NOC was keen on playing a role in shipping and docking in the harbors of the Baltic Sea. Already in June 1942, Rost van Tonningen discussed the transfer of harbor cranes to Latvia with a Dutch stevedore.24 In time, the focus shifted from Liepāja to Riga and surroundings. Inquiries were made in the harbor cities of Amsterdam and Rotterdam. Whilst the mayor of Rotterdam demonstrated willingness, his colleague in Amsterdam was reluctant for any kind of collaboration. 25 At the same time, the possibilities for a role in shipping across the Baltic Sea were investigated. A magnate of the Rotterdam harbor accepted the directorship of the Dutch East Shipping Company ( Nederlandsche Oost Rederij, or NOR), a second daughter company of the NOC. To buy and rent the needed ships, fi nancial means were put at the NOR’s disposal. Although the NOC would remain unable to put a stamp on the harbors of the Baltic States, its ships would sail, providing a sea line between the harbor of Delfzijl in the Netherlands and various harbors of the Baltic Sea. 26 From the summer of 1943 onwards, Riga also became peopled with hundreds of Dutch construction workers who were under the supervision of a third daughter company of the NOC, the Dutch East Building Company Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:42 01 October 2016 ( Nederlandse Oostbouw, or NOB). This company was merely a supplier of manpower for the SS Frontier Workers Enterprise (SS Frontarbeiter Unterne- hmen, or SS-FAU), a colossal organization led by the SS Main Economic and Administrative Department (SS-Wirtschafts- und Verwaltungshauptamt, or SS-WVHA) and one of the many German organizations responsible for building strategic and defense works just behind the eastern front. As early as 1941 candidates were recruited by individual Dutch building companies for this organization. In order to organize their efforts in a more structured manner, the SS-WVHA charged the fi rm Furnier Beton with the supervision 90 Towards Absolute Monopoly of the employment of Dutch volunteers for the SS-FAU. In October 1942, a contract was signed. The number of this contract—SS-FAU 168—was also the label by which the Dutch involvement became known.27 Initially, despite numerous talks with the NOC, the operation remained in the hands of Furnier Beton. With some fi fty Dutch building companies an agreement was achieved for recruitment and employment of personnel in SS-FAU 168. Furnier Beton remained responsible for the entire operation. In a few months, some 2,000 Dutch construction workers were sent off to the East. Soon news of sloppy selections, unsupervised transports, delays in payment, and lack of essential human care reached the authorities in Berlin and The Hague. Taking advantage of the general discontent amongst the partners involved, the NOC presented itself as the obvious alternative. In March 1943, the SS-WVHA annulled the contract with Furnier Beton. A new contract was signed with the NOB (SS-FAU 175) and in May that year, the fi rst contin- gents of SS Frontier Workers selected by the NOB arrived in Riga. Of the fi rst 374 men, 43 stayed behind in the Latvian capital to be trained as Wachmann (guard). All others were transported into Russia, to Novgorod and even further north and eastwards. Here, close to Saint Petersburg and just behind the frontline, they carried out building works. A second group of some fi ve hundred men left the Netherlands a few weeks later. 28 As the rate of enlistment of volunteers remained disappointingly low, the SS-WVHA decided to abandon the principle of volunteering and in the early summer of 1943 started to force Dutch men to accept work for the organization. By November 1943, the NOB/NOC supervised the employment of 4,280 Dutch SS Frontier Work- ers (3,050 volunteers and 1,230 forced laborers). The majority of this group (3,380 men) were put to work near Riga. 29

‘FROM BELARUS TO THE SEA OF AZOV’

The occupied Baltic countries were the region of the fi rst initiatives of the NOC, but this part of the occupied eastern territories was not considered the most desirable area for economic activities. Shortly after his fi rst trip, Rost van Tonningen stated quite emphatically that the Baltic States were merely the fringes: beyond them was the ‘enormous, partly still virgin land, from Belarus via Ukraine to the Sea of Azov.’ This area was at the heart of Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:42 01 October 2016 Dutch colonization plans. According to Rost van Tonningen this land had been the subject of Germanic cultivation until the eighteenth century. ‘We, the Dutch, shall continue along the same lines as our ancestors in the sixteenth and seventeenth century, when 67 percent of the sea trade through the Danish straits traveled under Dutch fl ag, when settlements of Dutch craftsmen penetrated to the outskirts of Moscow and those of Dutch farmers to the Sea of Azov.’ 30 Not surprisingly, the NOC directed their attention to Ukraine. Fischböck suggested involving his man in Rivne, Nimtz, in fi nding a way to Reich Towards Absolute Monopoly 91 Commissioner Koch. Up to that day, Koch had shown to be unfavorably disposed to any foreign involvement. But according to Fischböck, Nimtz and Koch were on friendly terms. Nimtz’ building workers of Werkdienst Holland were responsible for much of the renovations and extensions of Koch’s city residence in Rivne. In his perky style, Koch instructed Nimtz to summon Rost van Tonningen to come over. Cautious not to forfeit the privileges granted by the Ostministerium, Rost van Tonningen decided not to comply. Instead, he waited for an offi cial invitation which included the Ostministerium.31 He did not have to wait for long. In the course of the summer, Koch dras- tically changed his stance. In early August, the president of the new company traveled another time to Berlin to talk with representatives of the Ostmi- nisterium and with Koch about the implementation of what was called ‘the immediate program’ (Sofortprogramm) . The minutes of this meeting make clear that this program included both Ostland and Ukraine. The Ostminis- terium recommended the NOC to set up study groups for Ukraine, which could investigate for instance the profi tability of cash crops like tobacco, cotton, and rubber, and the options for inland shipping.32 Koch appeared eager to welcome Dutch persons and fi rms in ‘his’ Ukraine. He also agreed to Rost van Tonningen’s request for a larger collective farm that would operate like Waka T as a Dutch agricultural center in Ukraine. Nimtz was pushed forward as the middleman between the Reichskommissariat and the NOC.33 A few weeks later, Rost van Tonningen traveled to Ukraine. This time, he was accompanied by men from the top echelons of party and society. Among them were the kingpins of Dutch agriculture, Roskam and Ruiter. Mussert’s personal adviser, Bob van Maasdijk, and Rost van Tonningen’s nephew, Frits Kock van Leeuwen, were also part of the delegation. Van Maasdijk had made his fortune in the world of fi nances and insurances, Kock van Leeuwen in colonial trade. Both men were members of the NOC board. A last member of the team was Pieter van Leeuwen Boomkamp, a magnate from colonial trade. Van Leeuwen Boomkamp was chief of the Van Leeuwen Boomkamp family imperium, owning larger plantations of rubber, palm oil, tobacco, and coffee in the Dutch East Indies and controlling the export and import of these goods.34 Their journey began in Berlin and was continued by airplane to Rivne, where they were welcomed by Koch himself. 35 In a friendly, unperturbed Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:42 01 October 2016 atmosphere talks were held with the Reichskommissar and his staff. Helmut Körner, head of food and agriculture within Koch’s administration, informed his audience about the options and restrictions for the Dutch in the exploitation of Ukrainian agriculture. For independent settlement in the area it was still too early. Possibly, in a strip of land between Kursk and Kharkiv, land and property could be leased to Dutch private enterprises, in order to develop cash crops like tobacco, but Körner remained reticent on this matter. Van Leeuwen Boomkamp and Kock van Leeuwen were invited to explore the possibilities on site. 36 92 Towards Absolute Monopoly As far as common agricultural production was concerned, the plans were already more elaborate. Körner spoke to Roskam at great length and in a report to Rost van Tonningen he verbalized the agreements he and Roskam had reached. Like their German fellows, Dutch farmers would receive additional training. For this purpose, an educational center was needed. Körner suggested a larger building in the western canton (Kreis) of what was called the General District of Zhytomyr (General Bezirk Shitomir) . In the Soviet years, this building had served as a boarding school where girls were trained to be specialists in animal care.37 The school was located near Rohachiv and Baranivka, the capital of the canton, some fi fty miles to the west of Zhyto- myr and some seventy-fi ve miles to the east of Rivne. The closest town of substantial size was the city of Novohrad-Volynskyi which the Germans usually referred to by its Polish name, Zwiahel. Although there was neither furniture nor equipment, Körner praised the school for its solid construction, central location, and proximity to the educational center for German farmers in the adjacent Iarun region. Aware of the Dutch ambition to combine a school with a model farm, Körner added that there were plenty of larger farmsteads in the vicinity of Baranivka that could serve this purpose. Most of these farms were at that moment still supervised by Germans, but in due time Dutch men could replace them. After a four-week course they would be ready, either to bear responsibility for six to ten kolkhozes (Stützpunktleiter), or several middle-sized state- owned farmsteads (Oberleiter), or for one single farmstead (Betriebsleiter) . Other positions, like that of assistant, accountant, trading or technical specialist, would also be open to Dutch volunteers. Ultimately they would all come under a German Canton Farmer (Kreislandwirt) or County Farmer (Gebietslandwirt) .38 The next day the delegation toured through town on bicycles and horses. They visited the barracks of Werkdienst Holland and met the group of about four hundred Dutch workers—bricklayers, plasterers, carpenters, and painters. The delegation was struck by their orderly appearance and impressive work. These men were changing the city for good: where once were ‘Bolshe- vists’ in shabby houses, now decent residences for Germans were emerging. Roadwork was carried out, fl owers and patches of grass were planted, park benches were placed—‘in short,’ Van Maasdijk wrote in his report of the trip, ‘western culture had made its entrance.’39 Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:42 01 October 2016 From there, the men went to Kiev, where they met a second unit of Werk- dienst Holland. The trip was continued to Dnepropetrovsk and Nikolayev. On their way between these two cities, they halted in Khortytsia. In this small provincial village they met with the offspring of Mennonite colonists, who had come to this area in the eighteenth century. Roskam, Rost van Tonningen, and the other men were thrilled by the sight of these ‘ancestors.’ In and around the village the delegation spotted blond, blue-eyed boys and girls. From the Black Sea shipyards of Nikolayev the journey went north by plane, to Belarus, only interrupted by a short stop in Zhytomyr to fi ll the Towards Absolute Monopoly 93 plane’s fuel supplies. Back in the air, they saw the Pripet marshes, notorious for the partisans hidden in these impenetrable wetlands covering some 38,000 square miles in the south of Belarus and the north-western part of Ukraine. A warm reception waited the Dutch men in Minsk, where Kube served a feast on their behalf. In his welcoming speech he referred to ‘the unique civilizing task in the East, reserved for all Germanic peoples.’40 Their program allowed them to do some sightseeing in and around Minsk for the next couple of days.

Back in the Netherlands, it was time to take stock. The negotiations with German authorities had not resulted in the handing over of so-called concessions in Ukraine. Nor had the NOC, nor any other Dutch organization, been granted a piece of land to create a Dutch enclave. Defi nite promises were only made with regard to the lease of an educational center for Dutch farmers. Nonetheless, the prospects looked good for both Dutch exploitation and colonization, for both Dutch agriculture and industry. Rost van Tonningen and his fellow travelers were encouraged to send new delegations of specialists, in various fi elds of economic life, on fact-fi nding missions. In the next six months, the NOC organized some twenty trips to look into the options for all sorts of economic activities. For instance, whether the Dutch could be of use in the cultivation of cotton, rubber, and tobacco was studied, as well as their prospective role in peat excavations in Ukraine. A commission investigated the opportunities in ship docking in the Black Sea area, whilst yet another examined the contribution Dutch dredgers could make to improve Ukrainian waterways. Several individual entrepreneurs explored their chances on new markets in the area.41 Likewise, German experts on economic affairs in Ukraine started to fi nd their way to the headquarters of the NOC in The Hague. As optimal exploitation of Ukrainian resources demanded more manpower and machines than the Altreich could possibly provide, there was a warm interest for Dutch know-how, gear, and personnel. Already before their visit to Ukraine (and Belarus), the Ostministerium made an overview of the estimated number of people needed for agricultural professions in the occupied eastern territories.42 A few weeks later, Körner sent a detailed list of ‘immediate requests’ for the cause of food and agricultural production in Ukraine. In total, some 2,000 professionals from the Netherlands were wanted in Ukraine: accoun- Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:42 01 October 2016 tants; technicians specialized in farming machines; vegetable gardeners and experts in the cultivation, buying, and selling of seeds; and butchers and personnel for vegetable auctions, for managing positions on farms and collective farms, for work in sugar factories and in distilleries. 43 At the same time, it urged the NOC to speed up the recruitment of personnel for administrative support services in agriculture, like typists and accountants, needed for the administration of larger state-farms and the German local administration.44 In addition, the Ostministerium requested millers, bakers, and experts in building mills. 45 Early 1943 the NOC was also asked to look for an 94 Towards Absolute Monopoly agricultural engineer who would be willing to work at the research institute for cotton in Kherson. The candidate should be young and preferably schooled in tropical cultivation. Experience in Dutch East Indies was highly recommended. Eventually two agricultural engineers would go. 46 Not far from Kherson, gardeners were needed in the canton of Welyka Olexandri- wka, in the German general district of Nikolayev. According to the head of the German administration there, this canton was targeted by Himmler for prospective Germanic settlement (Siedlungsgebiet) . The canton counted already a substantial number of Germans and ethnic Germans. The Dutch gardeners would feel at home here.47 Dredgers were wanted, foremost by the Organisation Todt (OT) in charge of the infrastructure in Ukraine, as well as hydraulic engineers (again, if at all possible, with ‘colonial’ experience).48 Negotiations started on the exploitation of existing and the building of new enterprises. For wood production, the management of sawmills, and the manufacturing of wooden casks and wooden shoes, German authorities approached the NOC.49 In the autumn of 1942 talks commenced between the NOC and ZHO, which was responsible for food processing. The ZHO was mainly interested in supervisors that could take over the management of existing enterprises and in private companies that were willing to expand their fi eld of action to the occupied eastern territories. With the NOC it was discussed how Dutch volunteers and fi rms could be engaged in the production of eggs and fowl, jam, preserved goods, cheese and conserves, sugar and liquor. 50 Dairy specialists were also needed, amongst other Dutch managers, for ten milk factories in Melitopol.51 Whether Dutch carcass destructor plants could expand their work and how supervisors for soap, glue, and shoe polish factories could be found were other topics of discussion.52 Around the same time, the Ost- faser Gesellschaft, within the Four Year Plan organization responsible for the textile, paper, and fl ax production in the occupied East, asked the NOC to assist in fi nding qualifi ed people in the Netherlands to run some textile factories and to establish a strawboard plant in Ukraine.53 Others turned to the NOC for craftsmen. In Bialystok, a German supervisor of a clothing factory expressed his need for a mechanic for the reparation of his sewing machines, an electrician, and a professional in nee- dlework.54 Körner himself demanded three to four Dutch furniture makers who would be stationed in his department in Rivne. 55 For the severely Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:42 01 October 2016 damaged city of Kiev, Dutch companies specializing in central heating systems were approached.56 The NOC also received countless telex messages from Nimtz. Construction workers were needed, as well as various kinds of craftsmen: painters, plasterers, and carpenters, but also shoemakers, tailors, tanners, soap boilers, glass blowers, hair dressers, saddle makers, watch makers, potters, upholsterers, and musicians for the German casino in Rivne. 57 Thus, Werkdienst Holland not only provided men for building units, but also supervised the settlement of Dutch craftsmen and their small businesses in the occupied East. The latter needed to be prepared to Towards Absolute Monopoly 95 actually move to the area, where they would live with their families in small houses or fl ats. 58

CONSOLIDATION

Uttering these aims and wishes was one thing, realizing them another. In June 1942, the NOC was not much more than a collection of names of men more or less well known in the world of Dutch business and politics. Rost van Tonningen’s fi rst and major concern was the establishment of a solid offi ce in The Hague, with auxiliary branches in Berlin and on the spot. As the coordination of Dutch economic activities in the occupied eastern territories was the ultimate goal, this organization would employ all kinds of specialists, in various aspects of economic life. In less than two years, supported by excessive public funds, a signifi cant organization was indeed built up. Headed by a board of commissioners (of nine members), a supervisory board (of four members, plus a secretary), a presidium (of nineteen members), a director and a secretariat (fi ve members), some 260 Dutch civilians were employed by the NOC. The Ostminis- terium safeguarded its supervision by posting one of Malletke’s men in The Hague, H. Freiherr von Puttkammer. This offi cial held offi ce in the same building as the NOC and attended all top-level meetings.59 Early October 1940, the NOC took over the paper work of the LO in The Hague. 60 In that same month the administration in Riga, concerning the volunteers of CULANO still employed in the Ostland, was also passed to the NOC.61 Most of the 260 employees were located in The Hague, where the NOC had moved into two larger buildings in the center of the city, connected by a common enclosed garden. In the two buildings one could fi nd the offi ces for personnel, fi nancial and juridical affairs, as well as an information desk, the organization’s archive, a travel and visa desk, translators, typists and accountants, and a team responsible for purchases. There were special departments for gardening, cash crop cultivation, and industry. The largest department was concerned with the social care for recruits, providing work for over fi fty employees. Seven subsidiary companies were established: for construction works (NOB); for fi sheries (NOV), for shipping overseas (NOR), and for domestic shipping (Nederlansche Oost Binnenvaart); for Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:42 01 October 2016 dredging (Nederlandsche Oost Bagger); for the production of bricks and tiles (Nederlandsche Oost Baksteen); for Dutch trade (Nederlandsche Oost Handel Maatschappij). Abroad, some twenty-two employees represented the NOC: seven of them were accommodated in Berlin, two in Latvia, four in Ukraine, eight in Lithuania, and one in White Ruthenia. Four more or less permanent posts were opened: in Kaunas, in Riga, in Rivne, and in Vilnius. The NOC’s main representative was Oswald Fabius. From his fi rst marriage, Fabius inherited a coffee trading business. Politically indifferent, he saw new markets when 96 Towards Absolute Monopoly German troops arrived in the Netherlands. In fact, Fabius became one of the main suppliers of liquor and coffee to the Wehrmacht. Already in the second half of 1940, he sold three hundred tons of coffee and 70,000 liters of Dutch gin, mainly to divisions of the German army. His services came at a signifi cant price, making Fabius a wealthy man. In October 1942, he accepted the position of the NOC’s chief representative in the East, a well-paid job. Fabius moved to Riga where he held offi ce until February 1944. 62 Why the NOC-directorate selected him for this position, is unclear. Fabius had joined the NSB only in August 1941 and lacked connections to the inner circles of the Movement. Perhaps his trading skills worked to his advantage. Johan Lingmont also overtly collaborated with German partners, even before he joined the NSB (like Fabius no sooner than 1941). After his academic study, Lingmont became director of an engineering factory in Amster- dam. At the age of 41, he applied successfully for a job within the NOC. It brought him fi rst to Ukraine, then to Lithuania. Most of his time was spent in Vilnius, where he held offi ce until June 1944. 63 In the German administrative capital in Lithuania, Kaunas, another engineer occupied a third NOC- post. Marius Dijt even joined the NSB later than both of his colleagues, yet he was valued by the Movement’s leaders for his views on agriculture and economics.64 The last NOC representative was Willem Hendrik van Eek, the Benjamin of the NOC-representatives. Van Eek was thirty-three years old on the day of his employment. After his studies in agricultural engineering, he found work as an inspector at the Heidemij. In December 1942 he left for Ukraine. According to his postwar statement, he had been the last man leaving Ukraine in early 1944. He was then transferred to Lviv in the German General Government and coordinated the employment of a small group of Dutch farmers. As opposed to the others, Van Eek was an early follower of national-socialism. Within a month after the offi cial foundation of the NSB in 1932, he had become a member.65 Whereas the representatives were the NOC’s eyes and ears on the spot and were responsible for the maintenance of good relations with local Ger- man offi cials, the head offi ce in The Hague coordinated the Dutch involvement of fi rms and people. In order to establish a monopoly for all Dutch economic engagements in the occupied East, the NOC sought to encapsu- late prevailing private initiatives. Borggreven was ruthlessly sidelined, as was the director of Furnier Beton, but as a rule the NOC strived for control, Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:42 01 October 2016 not necessarily a take-over. To companies performing work in the area, it offered services, like wages administration and recruitment, transport and social care. Despite these services, the general reaction of the Dutch world of industry and trade was lukewarm. The largest Dutch sugar beet refi nery of the Netherlands, for instance, had no desire to transfer three of its plants to Ukraine, even though conditions were favorable. On no account did the company wish to be associated with the NOC. 66 This reaction appeared to have been common among leading men of Dutch business. Rost van Towards Absolute Monopoly 97 Tonningen held high hopes for colonial trading companies, yet they generally refused to cooperate after the announcement by Seyss-Inquart in the summer of 1942 to put these companies under German administration. Most of the company directors refused to talk to the NOC for they feared to lose control over their business.67 Father and son Van Leeuwen Boom- kamp and Kock van Leeuwen, three men publicly known as supporters of the NSB, were more or less the only colonial tradesmen who were willing to collaborate. 68 It was above all the prospect held to them by the Ger- man trustee of Van Leeuwen Boomkamp’s company, concerning the lease of some 50,000 acres in Ukraine to cultivate tobacco. 69 In Rivne, where Ger- man authorities were met, they found out that the trustee had presented a very rosy picture. Körner’s only offer was to take a look, at a strip of land allocated for tobacco plantations, parallel to the railway tracks between Kursk and Kharkiv. Some 12,000 acres were still available for exploitation. A few days later, Van Leeuwen Boomkamp and Kock van Leeuwen indeed did visit the area, but what they witnessed was waste land, devastated by the war. There was neither proper housing, nor equipment, nor draft horses. The local market reminded one of a pasar in the Dutch East Indies, but the people were not familiar with plantation labor. In a report written by Van Leeuwen Boomkamp’s son upon his return to the Netherlands, he expressed hesitance in forcing the locals living in the designated area to work. ‘What we have seen was much more beautiful than we expected,’ he concluded, but he added that the land was not at all desolate, ‘which would make pioneering work, as we had in mind, impossible.’70 Nevertheless, both trading companies still wanted to go ahead. In a letter to Rost van Tonningen they proposed the establishment of a syndicate, charged with the cultivation of tobacco in northern Ukraine. They were even willing to invest larger sums, on three conditions: fi rst, the NOC would stand surety; second, they would be the fi rst candidates to buy ground when the opportunity presented itself; third, they would have a fi rst pick when the tea- area in the Caucasus would be accessible for German and allied business.71 Apparently, these were demands that could not be met. Besides, because of the advancing front, the strip of land between Kursk and Kharkiv had also become too dangerous. A piece of land in the southern part of Ukraine was suggested as an alternative. Again a delegation of specialists in tobacco made the journey, this time to Zaporozhe, only to fi nd out that most land Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:42 01 October 2016 had already been given to German planters. What was left were little shreds of ground, each no more than 2,400 acres, adding only up to an estimated 12,000 acres. The enthusiasm of both directors cooled down considerably. Kock van Leeuwen clashed with his uncle, resulting in his withdrawal from the board of commissioners in the summer of 1943. Rost van Tonningen tried to keep Van Leeuwen Boomkamp’s interest, but even his offer of a larger credit could not win him over. In August 1943, Van Leeuwen Boomkamp wrote to his president that the risks were too high—not only for his own company, but also for the NOC. 72 98 Towards Absolute Monopoly With the two colonial trading companies leaving, the ambition to make the occupied eastern territories a substitute for the lost colonies overseas and to direct Dutch colonial trade to this part of the European continent seemed to be doomed. More in general it appeared that gaining Dutch fi rms for investments in the occupied East was hard. The NOC tried to tempt trades- and businessmen with credits. The owner of a launderette, for instance, received a loan and so did two clothing manufacturers who took over textile businesses in Kiev. The effect was small. In the second half of 1943, at the heyday of the NOC and before the Red Army had entered the occupied eastern territories, NOC’s endeavors to stimulate business involvement (Firmen-einsatz) had resulted in only a handful of companies.73

Whereas the achievements were modest with regard to the involvement of Dutch fi rms, the NOC was more successful in the recruitment and employment of Dutch people (Personen-einsatz) . Through the actions of the NOC, in Zhytomyr three Dutch supervisors took over a factory in casks in March 1943, and in Kostopil (near Rivne) a Dutch sixty-year-old man managed three saw mills. The largest mill, completely shut off from the outside world by fences and observation posts, included a blacksmith and a stable for a string of horses. Some three hundred locals were put to work here.74 Dutch men knowledgeable in the fi eld were put in charge of peat excavations. The majority worked in moors that were leased by the NOC itself. After the moors of Baltoji Voke, a few other moors were offered to the NOC: near Kiev and near Palemonas in Lithuania.75 With some fi fty Dutch civilians appointed—as supervisors, for administrative positions or as specialists like architectural draughtsman—Baltoji Voke was by far the largest moor in Dutch hands. To the moors near Kiev some twenty recruits were sent.76 On individual contracts others were serving as technical assistant and supervisors in the different moors exploited by either the Lithuanian Peat Trust or the German Center for the Supply of Energy.77 Many volunteers could be found in comparable lower-end supervising jobs. Some fi ve to ten Dutch volunteers were employed as inspectors by Geo Gretzer and Wiesenbrock, a private German company specializing in the production of tobacco near Nikolayev. Their main task was to watch over the work of Ukrainians. A handful of Dutch vegetable gardeners were also in the area. They were under contract of the SS Gartenbau and often in Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:42 01 October 2016 command of locals, too. In the city itself, approximately thirty Dutch volunteers worked in the yards of the Hermann Göring Werke, again mostly in supervisory positions. A much larger second group dockworkers was stationed in Kiev, where they performed work for another German organization (Ukrainische Schiffs- und Maschinebau Anstalten) . For the improvement of shipping on the Dnepr, the Dutch East Dredging signed an agreement with the Organisation Todt to supply people and equipment from the Neth- erlands. Until the evacuation of the area in October 1943, Dutch suction dredgers were operative on the Dnepr. A few dozens of skilled Dutch men were leading Russian and Ukrainian crews. 78 Towards Absolute Monopoly 99 Like the recruits of CULANO, the NOC-volunteers who applied for a job in agriculture expected a senior position. In their minds, they would run a (larger) farm in the vast plains in the East—an image that was strengthened time and again in the Nazi propaganda campaigns. Almost without exception, they were fi rst brought to one of the two education centers. In both Rohachiv and Waka T, recruited farmers were attending courses that would prepare them for their future jobs. From the summer of 1943 onwards, farmers were receiving additional teaching prior to departure. For this purpose, the NOC had opened the ‘Ostland farmers’ school’ in the Netherlands. During an introductory course of four weeks the recruits attended classes in national-socialist ideology, German, Russian, and the use of guns.79 In the Dutch center near Rohachiv, Arnout de Waard occupied the same position as Vorenkamp in Waka T. De Waard, known in his village as an outstanding farmer, had joined the NSB long before the war. At the time of his recruitment, he was the Movement’s leader for the whole of the province of Zuid-Holland.80 Accompanied by some thirty-fi ve others, he left for Bara- nivka in the autumn of 1942. Amongst this fi rst group were also his son and his daughter. Together with the daughter of Roskam, his daughter would be head of the household and kitchen.81 From October 1942 until April 1944 Waka T saw some hundred recruits. Many received job offers by one of the German authorities in the vicinity— the LBGO or one of the German commissioners of counties and cantons in the general district of Lithuania. Farmers who had successfully ended the course in Waka T were often appointed inspectors of Lithuanian farms. By April 1943, some forty-six Dutch farmers were charged with the supervision of Lithuanian farmsteads.82 In the Dutch center near Rohachiv/Baranivka, the number of recruits was almost three times as high. In the twenty-one months of its existence, more than three hundred Dutch volunteers stayed in the former boarding school. Almost all were employed after their four weeks training. The Dutch farmers were mainly put in charge of farms in the districts of Kiev, Dnepro- petrovsk, and Zhytomyr.83 Starting in the late spring of 1943, Dutch pupils were also placed at one of the two larger estates the NOC took a lease on, both in the vicinity of Kiev: one in Skvyra (some 6,000 acres) and one Usin (more than 13,000 acres). Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:42 01 October 2016 Many—but not all—Dutch candidates for supervisory positions in the Ukrainian food industry were contracted by the ZHO. By the summer of 1943, thirty-three Dutch volunteers were employed, six as managers of milk factories and seven as specialist in agriculture. Four Dutch women worked at the offi ces of the ZHO.84 The organization also employed gardeners, but many Dutch volunteers of this profession found a position in the occupied East via the NOC’s expert in gardening. In the summer of 1943, his recruiting efforts came to a pause as he himself, together with one his fi rst recruits, assumed control over two larger gardening estates in the north-eastern part of Estonia.85 100 Towards Absolute Monopoly Although quite a few Dutch volunteers occupied a manager’s position, the majority did not. Quantitatively, the men in the construction branch almost outnumbered all the others put together, and they were mostly in executive jobs. This is in particular true for the SS Frontier Workers. Of the three to four thousand Frontier Workers employed in the occupied eastern territories, just a few had the chance to acquire a supervising position. The majority were grouped in building teams and performed physically hard labor, often under bad conditions. 86 For many recruits of Werkdienst Holland the same was true. Early 1942, before the NOC had been established, the fi rst two to three hundred recruits of this service had been employed in Ukraine. Under the administration of the NOC, recruitment continued. In the last quarter of 1942, for example, 184 volunteers traveled to Rivne where they found shelter in the Werk- dienst’s main camp (Stammlager) . In 1943, groups similar in size arrived in Rivne. The majority stayed here and helped build the German quarter of the town, but smaller units were sent through to Kiev, Zhytomyr, or Dnepro- petrovsk. From the start, the ambitions were bigger. Werkdienst Holland would also enable Dutch (and for that matter: Germanic) craftsmen to start their own business or workshop in the occupied East. These recruits were expected to become settlers. Together with Dutch employment offi ces, publicity campaigns were set up to attract Dutch artisans.87 According to an overview composed by a German offi cial in May 1943, Werkdienst Hol- land coordinated the employment of several construction teams, yet also of individual cobblers, tailors, watch menders, hairdressers—and even a horse and a dog trainer. 88 In early May 1943, Dutch newspapers reported on the fi rst group of Dutch artisans that had been allowed to dissolve their contracts with Werk- dienst Holland and to establish their own businesses in Rivne. 89 Their number was still small—eleven—but their admission as self-employed persons was generally perceived as a fi rst step towards more entrepreneurial freedom for Dutch craftsmen and small commerce in Ukraine. In actual fact, some had already opened their own business. This explains why barbers, watchmakers, and even a photographer were amongst the selected candidates and also why Dutch shops could be spotted in Rivne. 90 Lingmont met several of them, housed in small stores and workshops in the Volhynian capital.91 Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:42 01 October 2016 In the late spring of 1943, Erich Koch announced the unexpected news of the liquidation of Werkdienst Holland. Although his motives are not entirely clear, rumors of mismanagement and irregularities within the organization must have worried the Reichskommissar. Nimtz had reported on the lawless behavior of some of the Dutch employees, but Nimtz’ luxurious lifestyle was also a source of concern. Secretly, the Reichskommissar had ordered one of his collaborators to start investigations. In his briefi ngs to Koch Werkdienst Holland had been portrayed as a costly and ineffi cient enterprise that was led by corrupt men and that was using highly qualifi ed Dutch men for jobs Towards Absolute Monopoly 101 that could mostly be done by Ukrainians. Koch decided to break down the organization. Dutch employees were given a choice: they could either work in building teams led by Germans, or they could attend a six-month course that would prepare them for opening their own businesses and workshops as artisans. Ostwerk, the organization responsible for their education, was founded in the early summer of 1943. They would become the new caste of smallholders and artisans of the occupied eastern territories.92

WIVES AND LOVERS

Male recruits were by far the majority, but the Nazi East was not void of Dutch women. According to NOC’s administration, at least eighty women had left for the occupied eastern territories. Some of them were accompany- ing their husbands. Dutch vegetable growers, for example, often traveled together with their wives and children. Reinder van Veen favored transplanting families. In his scheme of things, families, ‘preferably blessed with many children,’ were crucial for the planned Germanization of Eastern Europe. Early in August 1942, the fi rst gardener’s wife arrived in Tallinn (Estonia). A year later, six of the gardeners had brought their wives and children into the area. As a rule Dutch gardeners were put in charge of expropriated farms where families used to live. Most of them were accommodated in the Baltic countries, in particular in Lithuania.93 This group of women generally did not perform work other than that of housewives, but a substantial number of Dutch women did fi nd employment in the occupied East, or were themselves recruited in the Netherlands for their own qualities. A maternity nurse from The Hague was employed by the NOC to provide medical care to Dutch farmers in and around Baranivka and Rohachiv.94 Others became typists, secretaries or accountants and were working in German offi ces, in offi ces of NOC’s representatives, or at Dutch enterprises. The garage owner from Rotterdam, who took over larger car repair workshops in Kaunas and Vilnius, had asked his nineteen-year-old cleaner to join him and his mechanics in going to Lithua- nia. 95 Not far away, Lingmont’s wife was head of the NOC-offi ce in Vilnius, often assuming the authority of her husband.96 The wife of a poultry inspector from Arnhem, who himself was appointed supervisor of some larger Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:42 01 October 2016 kolkhozes in southern Ukraine, became head of the offi ce for the LBGU in Nikolayev.97 Dijt’s successor at the NOC’s offi ce in Kaunas took on a young Dutch woman whose husband was in charge of a larger vegetable farm near Kaunas.98 Mastering Russian, Lithuanian, German, and Dutch, she was extremely suited for the job. In the Lithuanian and Ukrainian peat moors leased by the NOC, Dutch female personnel were managing the offi ces and within the organization of the Werkdienst Holland Dutch female personnel also found employment. At least eight of the fi fty employees working for the organization were Dutch 102 Towards Absolute Monopoly women.99 A shorthand secretary from The Hague had applied for a job for the Werkdienst Holland as early as April 1942.100 The entire household of the two Dutch educational centers was in the hands of Dutch women; for quite some time Roskam’s daughter was head of the kitchen and household personnel of the educational center near Rohachiv. In Rivne and in other Ukrainian towns Dutch young women were working, too. A wife of a recruit of Werkdienst Holland came to Rivne to work in the Werkdienst’s kitchen. Much to her dismay, she was sent to the German casino to work as a waitress.101 More Dutch girls and young women worked outside the offi ces and premises of Dutch organizations. In Rivne, there were Dutch female hairdressers and tailors.102 Even after the offi cial announcement that visas would no longer be granted, in March 1944 Dutch women were still arriving in the East.103 Most of these women sympathized with national-socialist ideology, although some, like a fi fty-two-year-old landlady in charge of the household in Rohachiv for three months, lacked political zeal. 104 Others, like the elderly Dutch woman employed by the LBGU in Rivne, were more politically opinionated. 105 One of the youngest employees in the ZHO-offi ce in Kiev and Melitopol was brought up in a national-socialist tradition. After a short stay in Germany, she had joined the NSB. Back in the Netherlands, she soon became notorious for her political fervor. In postwar police records this young teacher was accused of having affairs with German soldiers, betraying her anti-German neighbor, and intimidating the colleagues at her school. 106 Elisabeth W., bookkeeper by profession, already sympathized with national-socialism in the 1930s, but her political beliefs fi rmed during the early war years, when she was in Germany for work. In her long letters to her lover she expressed her viewpoints on Jews and fellow countrymen with different political beliefs.107 Some of the women employed in the East had been familiar with the work of the NOC for quite some time. Lingmont’s wife and one of the chiefs of household in Waka T and had worked at the NOC head offi ce in The Hague before they decided to apply for work in the occupied eastern territories. In general, female employees often switched offi ces. After the evacuation of Ukraine, many would fi nd a new position in Lithuania. In December 1943 it was registered that some 118 Dutch citizens were working in this Baltic country. Of them, eighteen were women. 108 This number was exceptionally Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:42 01 October 2016 high. Especially during the last phase of German occupation, female volunteers were hard to fi nd. It took weeks before a suitable (female) candidate was appointed to run the kitchen of Waka T, for example. 109 Most female recruits were young and unmarried. For them, life in the occupied East might have felt freeing. Hundreds of miles away from home, parental and other sorts of social control were absent. In the East, Elisabeth W. could enjoy her love for an older divorced man, without having to face social disapproval. In the late spring of 1944, when Russian troops were approaching, she made clear to her lover that under no circumstances did Towards Absolute Monopoly 103 she wish to return to the Netherlands.110 Jantje S., in an open marriage with a man almost twice her age, described life in Lithuania as much more free: ‘It is just a relief to not live in the suffocating atmosphere of a Dutch village.’111 Many worked peacefully alongside their male colleagues, but some women caused trouble. Nimtz, for instance, complained about some women recruited by the head offi ce in The Hague. Their behavior was far from becoming. He urged for meticulous screening for all female candidates. A document holding curriculum vitae and a photograph should be sent to Rivne before appointment. Without Nimtz’ explicit approval no girl or woman was to be sent to Ukraine anymore.112 Apparently, this did not prevent other ‘indecent’ Dutch women from fi nding employment in the occupied East. 113 Before departure to Lithuania, Jantje S. and her husband had been investigated by the NOC. Reports on both partners were negative. Sly and weak were words used to defi ne her husband; Jantje herself was reported as having low moral standards and as ‘an impudent, pushy witch’.114 Nevertheless, the NOC had taken both on. At various workplaces amorous relations developed. Both Nimtz and his right hand man married a female employee. In Lithuania, a married vegetable grower fell in love with the daughter of one of his Dutch colleagues. Although the grower’s wife insisted on the removal of that girl from Ost- land, Krantz did not wish to mingle in this private matter. When a married NOB-administrator got romantically involved with his Dutch secretary, Krantz dismissed the woman as this specifi c affair could harm the prestige of the NOB.115

PAWNS ON THE FRONTLINE

Compared to the three to four hundred farmers that had been recruited by CULANO, the NOC was without a doubt the more successful recruiter. Exact numbers are hard to provide as various reports mention various numbers, but a viable estimation is that the NOC recruited between six to seven thousand men. It must be reiterated that some 5,250 were volunteers; a further 1,500 were forced labor.116 Pertaining to industrial law, the relations between employee and the NOC could differ. A small group were directly Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:42 01 October 2016 employed by the NOC, others were under contract with one of the German organizations in the East. For some of these organizations, the NOC provided all the care: recruitment, selection, education, transport, insurance, payment of child allowance, and advances. After the war, interrogated by policemen and judges about their motives, many indicated that economic, not ideological, considerations had inspired them to join the NSB and to apply for a job in the occupied East. In general, employment in the occupied East was indeed fi nancially attractive. Wages were fi xed and generally higher than in the Netherlands. Every month 104 Towards Absolute Monopoly salaries were transferred to bank accounts back home. If the recruit was a father, a fi xed sum was also paid for childcare. The recruits themselves received some pocket money to spend freely. In Lithuania, as in the rest of the occupied eastern territories, nothing was charged for bed and board. 117 It appears, however, that for hardly any of the recruits, work in the occupied East was needed to come out of poverty. Although some had been switching jobs regularly, the majority were in a job at the moment they applied for a position in the occupied East. Among the recruits were successful farmers, like the manager of the NOC’s education center in Ukraine,118 and successful retailers, like the man who gave up his vegetables store to start a new life as farmer in Ukraine, 119 and successful entrepreneurs, like the man who liquidated his fl ourishing painting business. 120 Evart van Dieren, an engineer in the harbors of Rotterdam who had made a small fortune in wartime thanks to German orders, choose to switch jobs and was now supervising the employment of Dutch fi shers in the occupied East. 121 Willem Hendrik van Eek, a higher civil servant in the Netherlands, resigned to become the NOC’s representative in Ukraine. 122 Johan Lingmont put down his work as a factory’s director to do the same in Vilnius.123 A large majority of the recruits were members of the NSB and quite a few had joined the NSB long before the war, in a period of time that membership did not yet open the door to material advantages and lucrative jobs.124 On the contrary: in the 1930s various economic branches were closed for members of the movement. Under threat of dismissal, civil servants who sympathized with the national-socialist ideology were forced to give up their membership. Unlike German Nazis, of whom there were millions in the 1930s, the NSB had been a disliked minority before the war. Joining the NSB often meant opting for social isolation and a secluded milieu of like- minded ‘comrades.’ The gains, in other words, were fairly small. 125 Like the NSDAP, the NSB required dedication and commitment. Mem- bers were expected to actively engage, to disseminate the national-socialist message, and to show up at meetings and public gatherings. Many of the recruits marched the streets with the WA, some joined the Waffen-SS or the regular SS. Since late 1941, Dutch farmers, vegetable and fruit growers, and fi shers were encouraged to join the national-socialist Landstand. They received the Agrarian News (Agrarisch Nieuwsblad), which was supervised by the organization. In the fi nal phase of the war, a number of them volun- Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:42 01 October 2016 teered for a position within the newly established, national-socialist police auxiliaries, the Landwacht . In a period of political and social polarization, this organization offered badly trained men almost unlimited power. Many radicalized and soon the Landwacht was notorious for its brutality.126

In sum, among the recruits and personnel of the NOC there were many truly political believers, who agreed with the main tenets of the Movement’s political program and ideological aims. According to the NOC, only skilled men and idealists should go. Hence, before departure, all recruits were screened, physically and professionally, but also politically.127 Towards Absolute Monopoly 105 Although the actual work of the NOC may seem to have been restricted to recruitment and employment on temporary contracts, colonial aspirations were never off the agenda. In extensive propaganda material published by the NOC, this was constantly being stressed. In the ongoing battle ‘against the enemies,’ the Dutch people should come to the aid of their German brothers. They would help to establish a new, national- socialist order in Europe, ruled by supposedly racially superior men of Germanic descent. Identifi ed as the historical and legitimate ‘living space’ of these Germanic men, the occupied eastern territories should be secured for the future. ‘So, let’s go eastwards,’ one of the organizers stated, ‘where the black earth is waiting for professional, vital, Germanic farmers.’128 Volunteers for this ‘pioneering task’ were instructed accordingly. In Waka T and the center near Rohachiv, Dutch farmers were taught a national- socialist worldview and received lessons in the history of the Germanic peoples and questions of race and people’s hygiene. 129 Recruits of later sift- ings were held to attend a two-week course in the Netherlands prior to their departure. Here, they learned how to use weapons and how to behave towards the ‘natives’ of the occupied eastern territories. 130 These political lessons were resonating in their letters and their songs. Many wrote that they were proud to contribute to the establishment of a new Europe.131 The lyrics of one of their songs made clear that this new European order, ‘Germanje,’ was an exclusive racial order of Germanic men like themselves. ‘In Russian barren fi eld we stand guard,’ they sang, ‘to make Germanje big, strong and free.’132 Despite the supposedly historical ties to the area, the overwhelming majority of volunteers and participants on fact-fi nding missions had not been to this part of Eastern Europe before. Of the organization’s agents in the region, for instance, only Oswald Fabius might have been in Latvia, for he had married a Latvian woman in 1930. Rost van Tonningen’s prewar career had often taken him abroad. For quite some years he had lived in Vienna. Yet with this part of Europe he was unfamiliar. Most men probably pictured the area as rich, unexplored, and empty, like it was presented in campaigns time and time again. Instead, they would fi nd themselves in an area that was riddled with genocidal violence. Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:42 01 October 2016

NOTES

1 . Travel report Wilhelm Gerhardt (undated), NIOD, 176, fi le 597. 2 . Het Volk, 27 June 1942. 3 . Meinoud Rost van Tonningen, Bericht über die bisherige und zukünft- ige geplante Aufbau-arbeit der Nederlandsche Oost Compagnie n.v. in den besetzten Ostgebieten (’s-Gravenhage: s.n., 1943). 4 . Report Hermann von Harder, 18 June 1942, BA, R6, fi le 441; letter Reinder van Veen to Horst Wulff, 17 September 1942, NIOD, 176, fi le 607. 5 . Travel report Jacob van den Berg, 19 December 1942, NIOD, 176, fi le 619. 106 Towards Absolute Monopoly 6 . Travel report Wilhelm Gerhardt (undated), NIOD, 176, fi le 597. 7 . Letter Martinus Ekko Vorenkamp to Elisabeth Jouanne, 3 August 1942, NA/ CABR, 2.09.09, fi le 38971. 8 . Von Harder, Lebenserinnerungen, 852, AfZ, NL von Harder von Harmhove. 9 . Het Volk, 27 June 1942 . 10 . Rost van Tonningen, Bericht, passim . 11 . Quarterly reports concerning activities of the NOC 1942, 1943, and 1944, NIOD, 176, fi le 15. 12 . Letter Martinus Ekko Vorenkamp to NOC-Department of Agriculture, 8 December 1942, NIOD, 176, fi le 622; report Horst Wulff, 13 July 1942, NIOD, 176, fi le 632. 13 . On 27 March 1943, a contract was signed that made the NOC trustee; on 8 May 1943, the offi cial transfer took place; on 30 November 1943, a new contract was signed that made the NOC the offi cial leaseholder of Baltoji Voke. Report J.W.J. Tummers, 10 May 1944, NIOD, 176, fi le 728. 14 . Letter K.W. Coste to Daniël Krantz, 27 July 1942, NIOD, 176, fi le 707. 15 . On the person of Jan Habing, see various documents in his postwar fi les, NA/ CABR, 2.09.09, fi les 30597 and 87586. 16 . Letter Jan Habing to NOC-Directorate, 8 August 1942, NIOD, 176, fi le 707. 17 . Letter Reinder van Veen to Daniël Krantz, 17 November 1942, NIOD, 176, fi le 607; 11th travel report Reinder van Veen, 2 October 1942, NIOD, 176, fi le 607. 18 . Letter Marius Dijt to NOC-Directorate, 11 August 1942, NIOD, 176, fi le 123; list of wishes Reinder van Veen, 4 July 1942, NIOD, 176, fi le 607; letters Reinder van Veen to Daniël Krantz, 4 August 1942, 9 August 1942 and 30 May 1943, and to Horst Wulff, 17 September 1942, NIOD, 176, fi le 607; overview Reinder van Veen (undated), NIOD, 176, fi le 607; 9th travel report Reinder van Veen, 5 July 1943, NIOD, 176, fi le 610; letter Reinder van Veen to Willem Goedhuys, 24 July 1943, NIOD, 176, fi le 612. 19 . Letter J.J.W. Bogaart to NOC, 22 February 1943, NIOD, 176, fi le 697. 20 . Agreement on the take-over purchase, 11 August 1943, NIOD, 176, fi le 702; report J. Postma/NOC-Department of Finance, 10 June 1943, NIOD, 176, fi le 702; letter Johan Lingmont to NOC-Department Industry and Traffi c, 18 June 1943, NIOD, 176, fi le 702; report for NOI, 14 March 1944, NIOD, 176, fi le 702. 21 . Report Johan Lingmont, 5 June 1943, NIOD, 176, fi le 744; list of fi rms that are or will be shortly involved, 12 July 1943, NIOD, 176, fi le 752. 22 . Contract of sale, concerning Kestucciostrasse 37 Kaunas, 9 March 1944, NIOD, 176, fi le 1032; letter J.W.A. van de Graaff to NOC-Directorate, 20 April 1944, NIOD, 176, fi le 123. 23 . Quarterly reports concerning activities of the NOC 1943, NIOD, 176, fi le 15; report, concerning a meeting with Oswald Fabius, 14 January 1943, NIOD, 176, fi le 805. Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:42 01 October 2016 24 . Report Meinoud Rost van Tonningen, 23 June 1942, NIOD, 176, fi le 903. 25 . Reports Pieter Schelte Heerema, 30 June 1942 and 27 August 1942, NIOD, 176, fi le 892. 26 . Letter Meinoud Rost van Tonningen to K. Kaufmann, 9 March 1943, NIOD, 176, fi le 897; letter F.B.J. Gips to W.N.A. Kröller, 24 August 1943, NIOD, 176, fi le 898; report, 9 February 1942, NIOD, 176, fi le 898. See also: letter Meinoud Rost van Tonningen to Arthur Seyss-Inquart, 29 August 1942, in: David Barnouw (ed.), Correspondentie van Mr. M.M. Rost van Tonningen II (Zutphen: Walburg pers, 1993), 78. 27 . Report P. and B.J. Hoekstra, 15 November 1943, NIOD, 176, fi le 856. 28 . General report H. Bebing, 6 July 1943, NIOD, 176, fi le 855. Towards Absolute Monopoly 107 29 . Report Pieter Schelte Heerema, 1 June 1943, NIOD, 176, fi le 76; report T. van der Zee, 10 October 1942, NIOD, 176, fi le 66; report P. Hoekstra, 10 October 1942, NIOD, 176, fi le 66; report Daniël Krantz, 6 October 1942, NIOD, 176, fi le 663; report P. and B.J. Hoekstra, 15 November 1943, NIOD, 176, fi le 856. Also in: B.A. Sijes, De Arbeidsinzet: De gedwongen inzet van Nederlanders in Duitsland, 1940–1945 (Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1966), 477–478. 30 . Het Volk, 27 June 1942. 31 . Report Evart van Dieren, 9 December 1943, NIOD, 176, fi le 81; report, concerning the activities of Werkdienst Holland (undated), BA, R6, fi le 459; report Walter Malletke, 8 June 1942, BA, R6, fi le 441. 32 . Report Walter Malletke, 19 July 1942, and report K.W. Coste, 7 August 1942, in: Barnouw, Correspondentie II, 59 and 61. 33 . Report Hermann von Harder, 6 August 1942, BA, R6, fi le 442. 34 . N. Japikse, Persoonlijkheden in het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden in woord en beeld: Nederlanders en hun werk (s.l.: s.n., 1938). Available online via www. iisg.nl/ondernemers/pdf/pers-0909–01.pdf. Last visited 11 April 2014. 35 . Bob van Maasdijk published his report in September 1942 in the national- socialist weekly De Waag. The reconstruction of the second trip is largely based on this report. Bob van Maasdijk, ‘Nederlandsche mogelijkheden in het oosten’, De Waag, 16 and 25 September 1942. 36 . Letter Helmut Körner to Meinoud Rost van Tonningen, 2 September 1942, NIOD, 176, fi le 742; letter Johan Lingmont to NOC-Department Industry and Traffi c, 4 October 1943, NIOD, 176, fi le 639. 37 . Willem Hendrik van Eek, ‘Steunpunten in Europa’s strijd’, De Waag, 5 March 1943. 38 . Letter Helmut Körner to Meinoud Rost van Tonningen, 2 September 1942, NIOD, 176, fi le 1011. 39 . Van Maasdijk, ‘Nederlandsche mogelijkheden in het oosten’, De Waag, 16 September 1942. 40 . Ibidem. 41 . Ibidem. 42 . Letters K.W. Coste to Daniël Krantz, 13 and 29 July 1942, NIOD, 176, fi le 745. 43 . Appendix letter Helmut Körner to Meinoud Rost van Tonningen, 2 Septem- ber 1942, NIOD, 176, fi le 742. 44 . Letter Geert Ruiter to Meinoud Rost van Tonningen, 23 October 1942; reports Daniël Krantz, 28 and 30 October 1942, NIOD, 176, fi le 940. 45 . Reports Hermann von Harder, 21 July and 3 August 1943, NIOD, 176, fi le 745. 46 . Letter K.W. Coste to NOC-Directorate, 7 January 1943, NIOD, 176, fi le 745; police records J.W.A. van der Graaff, 22 June 1946, NIOD, 176, fi le 1067; police records Jan Pieter Haisma, 28 January 1946, NA/CABR, 2.09.09, fi le 46885. Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:42 01 October 2016 47 . Letter Gebietskommissar Alexanderstadt to Willem Hendrik van Eek, 24 August 1943, NIOD, 176, fi le 126. 48 . Letter OT to NOC-Directorate, 16 November 1942, NIOD, 176, fi le 45; letter SS-WVHA to NOC, 1 December 1942, NIOD, 176, fi le 746; letter Pleni- potentiary Construction Works to NOC, 19 November 1942, NIOD, 176, fi le 746. 49 . Letter RKU to Ostministerium, 21 December 1942, NIOD, 176, fi le 692; letter NOC-Directorate to Johan Lingmont, 3 March 1943, NIOD, 176, fi le 691; letter Willem Hendrik van Eek to NOC-Directorate, 28 December 1943, NIOD, 176, fi le 691; letter Werkdienst Holland to NOC-Directorate, 5 January 1943, NIOD, 176, fi le 748. 108 Towards Absolute Monopoly 50 . See various documents, NIOD, 176, fi le 696–704; J.J.W. Bogaert, list of vacancies (undated), NIOD, 176, fi le 971. 51 . Reports Daniël Krantz, 12 May and 30 September 1943, NIOD, 176, fi le 696. 52 . Report, 2 March 1944, NIOD, 176, fi le 684; reference Betriebsabwick- lungsstelle General District White Ruthenia (undated), NIOD, 176, fi le 684; report W. Dekker, 23 July 1943, NIOD, 176, fi le 684. 53 . Letter Germanic SS in the Netherlands to N.C. Huisman, 1 April 1943, NIOD, 176, fi le 738; minutes of meeting Daniël Krantz and N.C. Huisman, 26 January 1944, NIOD, 176, fi le 738; report, 30 November 1942, NIOD, 176, fi le 679. 54 . Letter Deutsche Bekleidungsindustrie-Aufbau to H. von Puttkammer/NOC (undated), NIOD, 176, fi le 745. 55 . Letter Werkdienst Holland to NOC, 9 November 1942, NIOD, 176, fi le 748. 56. Report, 13 July 1942, NIOD, 176, fi le 688; letter C.J. Harloff to Jan Robertson, 13 July 1942, NIOD, 176, fi le 688; report P.A.G. Volkers, 14 July 1943, NIOD, 176, fi le 688. 57 . List of needed professionals (undated), NIOD, 176, fi le 745. 58 . Report Erwin Nimtz to Meinoud Rost van Tonningen, 12 December 1942, NIOD, 176, fi le 745; letter Werkdienst Holland to NOC, 1 December 1942, NIOD, 176, fi le 745. 59 . Note C. Greef, concerning H. von Puttkammer, 28 October 1942, NIOD, 176, fi le 940. 60 . Report Daniël Krantz, 7 October 1942, NIOD, 176, fi le 940. 61 . Report J.M. van Hinterdam, 16 October 1942, NIOD, 176, fi le 665. 62 . Con fi dential report of Oswald S. Fabius, 22 April 1946, NA/CABR, 2.09.09, fi le 17761; report A. Braun (undated), NA/CABR, 2.09.09, fi le 17761; report A. de Man, 14 April 1946, NA/CABR, 2.09.09, fi le 17761. 63 . Verdict, 20 October 1949, NA/CABR, 2.09.09, fi le 24858; statements Johan Lingmont, 10 August and 1 September 1948, and of Daniël Krantz, 12 Octo- ber 1948, NA/CABR, 2.09.09, fi le 24858. 64 . Letter J.W. Zwart to G.E.M. Janssen, 10 November 1943, NA/CABR, 2.09.09, fi le 41788. 65 . Statement Willem Hendrik van Eek, 12 January 1946, and verdict, 24 Octo- ber 1947, NA/CABR, 2.09.09, fi le 97489 8811. 66 . Pressed by German authorities, this sugar company (CSM) ultimately would accept to participate in the refi ning of sugar beets in Ukraine. A Ukrainian Sugar Company was established in 1943. The advance of the Red Army prevented the implementation of the plans. Keetie E. Sluyterman, Driekwart eeuw CSM: Cashfl ow, strategie en mensen (Diemen: CSM, 1995), 96–102. 67 . Letters Rost van Tonningen to Walter Malletke, 28 June 1942, and to Arthur Seyss-Inquart, 14 July 1942; report F.B.J. Gips, 29 June 1942, in: Barnouw, Correspondentie II, 31, 34 and 54. 68 . Frits Kock van Leeuwen, Toespraak F.W.A. Kock van Leeuwen November 11 Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:42 01 October 2016 1941 (Amsterdam: s.n., 1941), 4. 69 . Letter NOC to Van Leeuwen Boomkamp Company, 20 July 1943, and letter Meinoud Rost van Tonningen to NOC, 16 August 1943, NIOD, 176, fi le 195; various postwar statements Jan Jacob and Pieter van Leeuwen Boomkamp, NA/CABR, 2.09.09, fi le 105479. 70 . Report Jan Jacob van Leeuwen Boomkamp of his journey from 23 August until 15 September 1942 (undated), NIOD, 176, fi le 540. 71 . Letter Jan Jacob van Leeuwen Boomkamp and Frits Kock van Leeuwen to Meinoud Rost van Tonningen, 6 October 1942, NIOD, 176, fi le 744. 72 . Report G.J. Bakker, 17 June 1943, NIOD, 176, fi le 605; letter Frits Kock van Leeuwen to Meinoud Rost van Tonningen, 15 March 1943, NIOD, 176, Towards Absolute Monopoly 109 fi le 605; letter Meinoud Rost van Tonningen to Van Leeuwen Boomkamp Company-Directorate, 20 July 1943, NIOD, 176, fi le 605; letter Meinoud Rost van Tonningen to NOC-Directorate, 16 August 1943, NIOD, 176, fi le 605; letter Pieter van Leeuwen Boomkamp to Meinoud Rost van Tonningen, 26 Augustus 1943, NIOD, 176, fi le 605. 73 . Contract NOC and BEGEKA Company, concerning a loan, 20 April 1943, NIOD, 176, fi le 679; list of fi rms that are or will be shortly employed (undated), NIOD, 176, fi le 744; report B. and P.J. Hoekstra, 15 November 1943, NIOD, 176, fi le 856. 74 . Letter Willem Hendrik van Eek to NOC-Directorate, 28 December 1943, NIOD, 176, fi le 691. 75 . Contract for trusteeship (undated), NIOD, 176, fi le 708. 76 . List of recruits (undated), NIOD, 176, fi le 665. 77 . Letter Jan Habing to Wirtschaftsdienst Berlin, 7 November 1942, NIOD, 176, fi le 709. 78 . Letter Pieter Schelte Heerema to Meinoud Rost van Tonningen, 17 Febru- ary 1943, NIOD, 176, fi le 816; letter Meinoud Rost van Tonningen to Pieter Schelte Heerema, 20 February 1943, NIOD, 176, fi le 816; report Pieter Schelte Heerema, 12 April 1943, NIOD, 176, fi le 816; report Pieter Schelte Heerema, 25 February 1943, NIOD, 176, fi le 821; report OT, 27 May 1943, NIOD, 176, fi le 819. 79 . Report, concerning the activities of the NOC in the second quarter of 1943, NIOD, 176, fi le 15. 80 . Statement B. Smaal, 11 September 1946, and inventory list, 1 December 1945, NA/CABR, 2.09.09, fi le 33076; Het Nationale Dagblad, 2 March 1942. 81 . Het Nationale Dagblad, 2 March 1942. 82 . Police report Commander of the Security Police and the SD Lithuania, 31 March 1943, Lithuanian Central State Archive (LCVA), R-1399–1–61, fi le 46; list of recruits (undated), NIOD, 176, fi le 665; letters Marius Dijt to Daniël Krantz, 5 February and 3 March 1944, NIOD, 176, fi le 123. 83 . List of recruits (undated), NIOD, 176, fi le 665. 84 . Report J.J.W. Bogaert, 14 July 1943, NIOD, 176, fi le 971. 85 . Letter H. Nell to Oswald Fabius, 23 July 1943; report Friedrich Wilhelm Jenetzky to Hermann von Harder, 30 May 1944, NIOD, 176, fi le 607. 86 . Report Pieter Schelte Heerema, 1 June 1943, NIOD, 176, fi le 76; reports T. van der Zee, 10 October 1942, and P. Hoekstra, 10 October 1942, NIOD, 176, fi le 66; report Daniël Krantz, 6 October 1942, NIOD, 176, fi le 663; report B. and P.J. Hoekstra, 15 November 1943, NIOD, 176, fi le 856; Sijes, De Arbeidsinzet, 477–478. 87 . Volk en Vaderland, 14 and 28 August 1942, 4 and 11 September 1942. 88 . Report S.U. Kotzulla, 20 May 1943, Central State Archives of Supreme Bodies of Power and Government of Ukraine (TSDAVO), fond 3206, opis 3, delo 23. 89 . Haarlemsche Courant, 5 May 1943. Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:42 01 October 2016 90 . Report Walter Malletke, 22 April 1943, BA, R6, fi le 459; report Hermann von Harder, 13 May 1943, BA, R6, fi le 459; statement Willem Hendrik van Eek (undated), NA/CABR, 2.09.09, fi le 97489 8811; transcript interview radio reporter A.E.M. Kortebein (undated), NA/CABR, 2.09.09, fi le 105479. 91 . Report Johan Lingmont, concerning Werkdienst Holland, 26 February 1943, NA/CABR, 2.09.09, fi le 24858. 92 . Nieuwe Venlosche Courant, 19 May 1943; Drentsch Dagblad, 20 May 1943; De Telegraaf, 18 May 1943; Utrechtse Courant, 19 May 1943; report Hermann von Harder, 18 May 1943, NIOD, 176, fi le 81; stipulation Erich Koch, 4 June 1943, NIOD, 176, fi le 81; letter Ostministerium to RKU, 21 July 1943, NIOD, 176, fi le 122; report S.U. Kotzulla, 20 May 1943, TSDAVO, 110 Towards Absolute Monopoly fond 3207, opis 3, delo 23; report, concerning a telephone call with Erwin Nimtz, 12 May 1943, BA, R6, fi le 459; report Erwin Nimtz, 21 May 1943, BA, R6, fi le 459; resolution Erich Koch, 1 June 1943, BA, R6, fi le 459. 93 . Police records Nicoloaas Bakker, 29 June 1945, NA/CABR, 2.09.09, fi le 109278; letter Reinder van Veen to Willem Goedhuys, 24 July 1943, NIOD, 176, fi le 612; letter Reinder van Veen to Daniël Krantz, 4 August 1942, NIOD, 176, fi le 607. 94 . Police records Cornelia van Dorp, 31 January 1946, NA/CABR, 2.09.09, fi le 109526. 95 . Police records Maria H., 24 February 1947, NA/CABR, 2.09.09, fi le 110354. 96 . Letter Johan Lingmont to Daniël Krantz, 23 March 1944, and Sonja Lingmont-van Dorp to Daniël Krantz, 25 March 1944, NA/CABR, 2.09.09, fi le 94374. 97 . Police records Gerardus Johannes Lelieman, 10 August 1945, NA/CABR, 2.09.09, fi le 27079; note public prosecutor concerning Philipina Lelieman- Splinter, 7 July 1947, NA/CABR, 2.09.09, fi le 108391. 98 . Letter J.W.A. van de Graaff to NOC-Directorate, 31 March 1944, NIOD, 176, fi le 123. 99 . Letter S.U. Kotzulla (RKU) to Erwin Nimtz, 30 July 1943, TSDAVO, Fond 3206, opis 3, delo 22; note S.U. Kotzulla, concerning the inspection of Werk- dienst Holland, 20 May 1943, TSDAVO, fond 3206, opis 3, delo 23. 100. Letter Henriette van Haarlem to J.W.A. van de Graaff, 4 August 1944, NA/ CABR, 2.09.09, fi le 109475; police records Henriette van Haarlem, 5 Novem- ber 1945 and 9 October 1946, NA/CABR, 2.09.09, fi le 109475. 101 . Bitterly disappointed, she returned to the Netherlands within a few weeks. Report C.W. Palm, 23 October 1942, NIOD, 176, fi le 333. 102 . Letters Lüdecke to Erwin Nimtz, 6 October 1942 and 6 January 1943, and letter Erwin Nimtz to Lüdecke, 30 December 1942, and letter Egon Kalbheim to Lüdecke, 23 March 1943, NIOD, 93, fi le 91. 103 . Letter Daniël Krantz to NOC-Offi ces in Berlin, Riga, Kaunas, and Vilnius, 8 March 1944, NIOD, 176, fi le 126. 104 . Police records R. van Muijen-Winkler, 20 December 1945, NA/CABR, 2.09.09, fi le 109439. 105 . Police records M.E.H. Silvergieter-Hoogstadt, 25 June 1946 and 2 July 1946, NA/CABR, 2.09.09, fi le 109603. 106 . List, concerning transport from The Hague to Melitopol, 17 August 1943, NIOD, 176, fi le 318; letter T. van der Zee to NOC-Offi ce Rovno, 26 Novem- ber 1943, NIOD, 176, fi le 972; police records Sonja T., 21 March 1946 and 22 May 1946, NA/CABR, 2.09.09, fi le 55217. 107 . Police reports Elisabeth Anna W., 8 August 1946, and letters Elisabeth Anna W. to Anton Carel Kluizenaar, 7 August 1941, 16 November 1941, and 15 December 1941, NA/CABR, 2.09.09, fi le 105363. I thank Jocelyn Kruse- meijer for this tip. Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:42 01 October 2016 108 . Letter of application Sonja Lingmont-van Dorp, 1 February 1943, NA/CABR, 2.09.09, fi le 107430; letter K. Buys-Spaan to H. Sartorius, 14 February 1944, NIOD, 176, fi le 125; police records Anna Meta W., 23 October 1945 and 5 January 1946, NA/CABR, 2.09.09, fi le 31664; letter Marius Dijt to Daniël Krantz, 8 February 1944, and Daniël Krantz to Marius Dijt, 3 December 1943, NIOD, 176, fi le 123. 109 . Letter Marius Dijt to Daniël Krantz, 8 February 1944, and Daniël Krantz to Marius Dijt, 11 February 1944, NIOD, 176, fi le 123. 110 . Letters Elisabeth Anna W. to Anton Carel Kluizenaar, 26 April 1944 and 7 May 1944, NA/CABR, 2.09.09, fi le 105363. 111. Letter Jantje S. to unknown, 23 December 1943, NA/CABR 2.09.09, fi le 8674. Towards Absolute Monopoly 111 112 . Telegram Erwin Nimtz to ZASt, 9 October 1942, NIOD, 93, fi le 91. 113 . Telegram Egon Kalbheim to ZASt, 13 April 43, NIOD, 93, fi le 91. 114 . Report of Credit reform The Hague, 3 November 1943 and 18 November 1943; report NOC-Intelligence, J.H. Verhoeve, 22 November 1943, NA/ CABR, 2.09.09, fi le 28674. 115 . Letter Marius Dijt to NOC-Directorate, 2 September 1943, and reply, 8 Sep- tember 1942, NIOD, 176, fi le 123; letter Daniël Krantz to NOB-Directorate, 20 March 1944, NIOD, 176, fi le 125. 116 . Report of activities NOC, 1943 and 1944, NIOD, 176, fi le 15; lists of recruits (various dates), NIOD, 176, fi le 84. 117 . For salaries, allowances, and scales of salaries, see: NIOD, 176, fi les 435–442. 118 . Police records Marinus Vorenkamp, various dates, NA/CABR, 2.09.09, fi le 33076. 119 . Police records Sippe Schuiling, various dates, NA/CABR, 2.09.09, fi le 26181. 120 . Police records Jan Lieve van der Velde, various dates, NA/CABR, 2.09.09, fi le 36341. 121 . Police record Evart van Dieren, 1 August 1946, NA/CABR, 2.09.09, fi le 71325. 122 . Police records Willem Hendrik van Eek, various dates, NA/CABR, 2.09.09, fi le 97489 8811. 123 . Police records Johan Lingmont, various dates, NA/CABR, 2.09.09, fi le 24858. 124 . See the notes on personal cards within the NOC-Administration, NIOD, 176, fi le 435–442. 125 . Josje Damsma and Erik Schumacher, Hier woont een NSB’er: Nationalsocialis- ten in bezet Amsterdam (Amsterdam: Boom, 2010), 22. 126 . Nanno in ’t Veld, De SS en Nederland: Documenten uit SS-archieven 1935–1945 (Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1976), 385–402. 127. Letters Heinrich Sellmer to Arthur Seyss-Inquart, 6 July 1942, and Meinoud Rost van Tonningen to Heinrich Sellmer, 10 July 1942, in: Barnouw, Corres- pondentie II, 46–47 and 52. 128 . Jacob van den Berg, ‘Oekraine, land, volk en mogelijkheden’, Nieuw Neder- land. Maandblad voor economie, staatskunde en economie 10/3 (November 1943), 321–364. 129 . Report Horst Wulff, concerning the educational center at Waka T, 13 July 1943, NIOD, 176, fi le 632. 130. Propaganda pamphlet NOC ‘En de boer hij ploegde voort!’ (undated [1943]), NIOD, 176, fi le 583; Oostlandpraatjes no. 5, NIOD, 176, fi le 590. 131 . Letter Paul Borsje to a friend, 26 April 1943, NA/CABR, 2.09.09, fi le 34472; letter Arnout de Waard to NOC, April 1943, NIOD, 176, fi le 84. 132 . Song ‘Legioen der soldaten’ (undated), entered in his diary by H.Q. Verhaaren, NA/CABR, 2.09.09, fi le 55527. Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:42 01 October 2016 5 The Benefi ts of Crime

KILLING FIELDS

Prior to the war, Jews comprised ten to twenty percent of the total population in the area. Roughly 350,000 Jews lived in Belarus and over 250,000 in the Baltic States; in Ukraine, this number was almost threefold. Fleeing from persecution in Western Europe, the fi rst Jews had arrived here in the early-modern era. Employed by the nobility for tax farming and leasing, the early Jewish settlers, in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, were often exposed to the hostility of the non-Jewish local population. On a more positive note, though, they enjoyed the protection of their mighty employers.1 In 1795, after the three Polish partitions, the eastern provinces of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth had come under Tsarist rule. These provinces were part of the so-called ‘Pale of Settlement,’ the area within the Russian empire designated for Jewish settlement. Numerous discriminatory laws were issued by Catherine the Great and her successors. Although some Tsars (in particular Alexander II) made attempts to improve the fate of Jews, Russian rule generally meant a deterioration of their legal, economic, and social position. Around the turn of the century, anti-Semitism had reached a climax in all of the Pale of Settlement. Jews were easy targets, being different from their gentile neighbors by their religion, their culture, and in general also by their profession. Most Jews were involved in commerce and trade. They were merchants, ran small shops, or peddled through the countryside selling and buying their goods. 2 In spite of legal discrimination and social intolerance, the Jewish popu- Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:42 01 October 2016 lation in the Pale had been growing over the course of the nineteenth century. In Lithuania, for example, their number had almost tripled. 3 Vilnius and Kaunas matured as the epicenters of Lithuanian Jewry. Writers, musicians, teachers, and scientists had made their home in the cities: synagogues, schools, libraries, museums, medical facilities, and publishing houses had been established. Social activities were organized in an array of political and ideological movements. The renaissance of Jewish life in both cities, temporarily brought to a halt by the First World War, was resumed after 1918. Both Vilnius, annexed by Poland in 1922, and Kaunas, designated the The Benefi ts of Crime 113 Lithuanian capital by the absence of Vilnius, were vibrant centers of Jewish cultural life.4 In agreement with the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, Soviet troops invaded the eastern regions of Poland, including western Ukraine and Vilnius and surroundings, in September 1939. The Vilnius area was granted to Lithu- ania in exchange for the acceptance of Soviet military bases on Lithuanian ground. Within a year, however, the whole of Lithuania was annexed by the Soviet regime as well as other former Polish eastern provinces. Bolshevism was introduced and deeply affected Jewish life: Hebrew was banned, several political and religious institutions, newspapers, and centers of education were shut down, businesses were nationalized, private property was confi s- cated, and thousands of ‘suspects’ were imprisoned and deported to special settlements in remote Kazakhstan or Siberia.5 However, by the end of the 1930s, Jews were still a considerable and often quite distinct minority. Vil- nius counted some 60,000 Jews, roughly thirty percent of the entire urban population; in Kaunas Jews made up a fourth of the population. Tens of thousands of Jewish refugees from the western part of Poland that had been invaded by the German Wehrmacht came to these cities to look for shelter. 6 Even in places where Bolshevik rule had been introduced as early as 1919, Jews still constituted large minorities at the onset of Operation Barbarossa. Minsk counted about 53,700 Jews in 1939, comprising forty-one percent of the entire city’s population. One in four inhabitants of Kiev and Dneprop- etrovsk were Jewish. In many middle-sized and smaller towns the picture was identical. Berdychiv in northern Ukraine was home to one of the largest and oldest Jewish communities. Before the Russian revolution the town had evolved into a prime center of Hasidism, the mystic movement that had spread through Eastern Europe in the course of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. In the 1890s, eighty percent of the town’s population was Jewish. The town counted some eighty synagogues and other houses of worship. Soviet rule dissolved much of Jewish communal life, but at the beginning of the Second World War Berdychiv still bore a clear Jewish stamp. 7 Although most of the larger cities accommodated signifi cant numbers of Jews, many were living in smaller market towns and villages scattered across the area. In the early 1920s the number of Jews living in these ‘shtetls’ was roughly 1.3 million. 8 In some places Jews came close to outnumbering gentiles. Distinct from them by their clothing, customs, and religion, Jews in Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:42 01 October 2016 the shtetls used Yiddish as their lingua franca. Everywhere in the countryside these predominantly Jewish settlements were to be found. Life in a shtetl is thoroughly researched by Yehuda Bauer. Illustrative is his detailed study of Kurzeniec, a village some fi ve miles to the north of the Belarussian town of Vileyka. Kurzeniec was in the early twentieth century home to 1,500 Jews, comprising some sixty percent of the entire population. The majority belonged to families that had lived in Kurzeniec for genera- tions. Family and social ties were close and helped to overcome ideological differences. Like in most shtetls, Jewish adult men worked as artisans and 114 The Benefi ts of Crime small traders although they quite often also kept some cattle. Poverty was considerable. The community at large was Hasidic and observant: Kurze- niec had four synagogues. 9 In the Kiev province, Skvyra was also renowned for its Hasidic teachers. By the end of the nineteenth century, Skvyra had seven synagogues for its 9,000 Jewish inhabitants. This number dropped sharply after Soviet rule was established, but Jews were still a large minority when war broke out. In the former Polish provinces of western Ukraine and Belarus, towns with large Jewish communities were also common. In Baranovichi, some hundred miles to the southwest of Minsk, the majority of the population was Jewish. About half of the inhabitants of Hlybokaye, a small city to the north of Minsk and Vileyka, was Jewish. Its 11,000 members mostly lived in the center of the town, where their workshops and businesses could also be found. There were ten houses of worship in Hlybokaye, as well as several homes of Jewish social, cultural, and political organizations. In the Volhyn- ian capital of Rivne almost half of the inhabitants were Jewish. Nearby, in the small town of Kostopil, the Jewish community counted 4,000 members. As Kostopil was close to the forest, many of its inhabitants made a living in the wood industry. In the village were timber yards, wood factories, and furniture workshops. Some of these enterprises were owned by Jews.10

Every single one of these Jewish communities, whether big or small, fell into German hands within weeks after the onset of Operation Barbarossa. In Lithuania, the majority of Jews were murdered in the fi rst fi ve months after the German troops invaded the country. In some places, the news of the German attack triggered local gentiles to attack Jews in their vicinity, sometimes even before German troops were in sight. As a rule these attacks culminated in wild orgies of violence and looting. ‘Spontaneous’ anti-Jewish violence was sanctioned and encouraged by German offi cers once they had arrived. In Kaunas, Jews were entirely abandoned to their fate when Lithua- nian thugs committed their crimes. Hundreds of Jews were publicly clubbed to death. In the fi rst seven weeks after the German invasion, some 12,000 Jews and communists were killed, mostly by Lithuanians. 11 Simultaneously, Jews of Lithuania were being submitted to all sorts of discriminatory regulations. Jews were forced to wear special identity badges, they were submitted to a strict curfew, and in some streets, generally in the Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:42 01 October 2016 city’s center, they were not allowed altogether. It was prohibited for Jews to use pavements and to visit parks and other public places. Jews owning a house or business were expropriated and Jewish communities were forced to pay ‘contributions.’ In Vilnius but also elsewhere, adult men were fair game for kidnappers, organized mainly to deprive the Jewish community of its strongest members. The victims of the Vilnius kidnappings were shot in pits near Ponary, a suburb close to the western border of the city. The fear elicited by these often nightly kidnappings unleashed a rush for working permits. It was generally believed that being needed at the workplace could offer some protection against anti-Jewish aggression.12 The Benefi ts of Crime 115 During the next months, the persecution of Jews in Lithuania was assuming a more organized and structured form. In the slipstream of the German army, special German police units were moving into the area and began to organize and coordinate the eradication of Jewish life. The actual rounding up and execution of Jews was often the work of Lithuanian auxiliaries. Not surprisingly, many of the actors in the pogroms of June found their way to these Lithuanian police and paramilitary groups.13 In several places in Lithuania, the killings slowed down in November 1941. The remaining Jews were concentrated and packed off to ghettos, closed off from their non-Jewish neighbors. Raids were a common occurrence in the ghettos, but at least some ghettos were also needed as reservoirs for cheap labor. Their preservation, in Vilnius for instance until the autumn of 1943, was largely motivated by economic considerations. Most of the ghettos in the rural district to the south-eastern part of Lithuania were liquidated earlier.14 In other parts of the German occupied eastern territories, the ingredients of anti-Jewish policy were roughly the same.15 Short periods of brutal and violent incidents, often organized by locals, was followed by a more organized and structured policy of looting, ghettoization, forced labor, and mass shootings. The pace of anti-Jewish measures varied from town to town. The smaller Jewish communities in Baranivka and Novohrad-Volynskyi, both in the German Zhytomyr district and in the area where the NOC would establish its educational center late 1942, were eradicated shortly after German troops had entered the area. In Berdychiv Jewish life was destroyed after the erection of a ghetto, in early September 1941, when in total 12,000 to 13,000 Jews were killed as a result of two ‘actions’ (Aktionen) of the Ger- man police. Only a few hundred Jews were kept alive. 16 In Skvyra, as in more towns of the Kiev district, most of the Jews were murdered just before the winter of 1941–1942. 17 In many ghettos the population fl uctuated, partly as a result of the arrival of new groups of Jews from out of town. In Hlybokaye, for instance, a ghetto was established October 1941 to accommodate the city’s Jewish population. In the summer of 1942, hundreds of Jews from surrounding shtetls were brought to Hlybokaye. In August 1943 the inhabitants were taken out and shot. As the Germans expected many Jews to be still hiding in the ghetto, fi re was set to the wooden buildings. 18 In the small town of Lida Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:42 01 October 2016 the ghetto, established in December 1941, was almost empty in May 1942, after 5,670 inmates were taken out of town and shot or (young children) blown up by hand grenades. Some 1,500 Jewish artisans were kept alive and populated a part of the old ghetto. Soon new groups of Jews were arriving and in September that year, the number of inmates was close to 4,000.19 In Baranovichi there was no ghetto until late November 1941. Vari- ous massacres were organized, reducing the Jewish population in the city to some seven hundred. October 1943 they were taken to a camp outside the city where most of them were killed, together with Jews from other places.20 116 The Benefi ts of Crime One of the largest ghettos in the occupied eastern territories was located in Minsk. Established in July 1941, the ghetto housed over 80,000 people, most of whom had been living in the city before the war. A few months later a second ghetto was created to accommodate tens of thousands of Jews deported from Germany proper, Austria, and Bohemia-Moravia. At its height, the Jewish population in Minsk counted over 100,000 souls. Most of them were killed in the ongoing police ‘actions’ and by August 1942, fewer than 9,000 Jews were left. The ghetto was fi nally liquidated in October 1943.21 In Vileyka and Kurzeniec, not far from Minsk, the murder of Jews had also begun in the summer of 1941. As the fi rst town was chosen by German authorities as their regional head offi ces, Jews in Vileyka had little chance to survive. Three days after the arrival of a special police unit, the fi rst batch of Jews were shot. The victims were only men. A second mass execution a few days later included women and children. The remaining Jews in Vileyka were expelled from the city. Soon it became clear that German rule could not do without the (cheap) labor performed by Jews. Autumn 1941, Jews from the nearby town of Kurzeniec were brought to Vileyka. They were housed in a labor camp in the city. Other Jews from Kurzeniec were put to work at a larger farm confi scated by the LBGO. Apart from incidental murders, the Jewish community of Kurzeniec as a whole survived the fi rst year of the German occupation. Yet in September and October 1942 all but twenty-seven were killed.22 Far to the west of these Belarussian places, in Volhynia, most of the Jews were shot within months after the German attack. According to a German police report, some 15,000 Jewish inhabitants of Rivne had been killed in two actions that took place on November 6th and 7th.23 Those who were spared this fate, an estimated 7,000, were put on trains in July 1942 and brought to Kostopil. They were all shot in the nearby forest. At that time, not much was left of the prewar Jewish community of Kostopil itself. More than half of its population had been murdered in the late summer and early autumn of 1941. A ghetto, housing the remaining Jewish citizens, was kept intact for the next year. In August 1942, it was emptied and liquidated. Every single captured Jew of Kostopil was thus murdered.24 Within three years, more than eighty percent of the Jewish population in the area was dead. Hundreds of thousands of Jews had been chased, molested, robbed, and murdered. Only a small fraction of the prewar popu- Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:42 01 October 2016 lation had survived, by fl eeing behind the eastern front, into Soviet-ruled territory, or by hiding. Both escape routes demanded mental and physical strength, and often also access to money and goods as well as sheer luck. Moreover, for their survival those in hiding had to depend on gentiles, who often thought in anti-Jewish stereotypes, did not have the means to feed extra mouths, and were perhaps numbed by the brutality all around them. Violence had been epidemic since the onset of the war. Ultra-nationalists in both Ukraine and Lithuania, for instance, unleashed their aggression, attacking Poles and other ethnic minorities. In most parts of the occupied The Benefi ts of Crime 117 eastern territories, German rule was quickly developing into a policy of radical and ruthless suppression. Locals were being forced to work, often abroad, and suffered from hunger as the German occupant was appropri- ating their food supplies. Everyone was in danger of becoming a victim of German anti-guerilla warfare. It is estimated that in Belarus alone, some 400,000 non-Jewish Belarussians died largely due to German policy. 25 The millions of Russian soldiers caught by the German army in 1941 were even worse off. They were shot, starved to death, or died from diseases that were rampant amongst the underfed, neglected, and incarcerated men. 26

THE JEWISH THREAT

When the fi rst Dutch volunteers entered the area early 1942, the waves of killings had ebbed. Russian POWs and Jews who had survived the Ger- man onslaught were put to work as forced laborers. They were cramped in labor camps and ghettos. 27 Jewish communities had vanished, but the landscape still bore clear evidence of the former Jewish life. Ruins of synagogues, yeshivot, and other Jewish educational or cultural institutions could be spotted everywhere.28 There were large stores spread across the occupied eastern territories, holding the robbed belongings of Jews—their furniture, valuables, and even the clothes they had worn when at the execution site. The houses Jews had lived in and the stores they had owned were sealed (and often sold) after their removal. 29 Although Dutch recruits and offi cials were entirely unfamiliar with this kind of overt and eliminative aggression towards Jews, they were no strang- ers to anti-Semitism. Most of them were members of the NSB and subscribed to the worldview of this movement. In order to understand their reactions to the Eastern European scene of mass crime and genocidal violence, it is worthwhile to take a closer look at the relations between Jews and gentiles within the Netherlands, the offi cial policy of the NSB towards Jews, and the engagement of recruits and offi cials in anti-Jewish policy in the Netherlands. Compared to the large Jewish communities in Eastern Europe, where millions of pious and traditional Jews lived together in towns and shtetls, sometimes greatly outnumbering the non-Jewish population, the prewar Jewish population in the Netherlands was fairly small and geographically Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:42 01 October 2016 concentrated. In 1930, the country counted 111,917 Jewish citizens. Of them, 65,523 lived in Amsterdam, constituting 8.65 percent of the city’s population.30 Jewish settlement in the city went back centuries. With the Inquisition at its height in the late fi fteenth century, Sephardic Jews from the Iberian Peninsula had been taking shelter in the city’s fl ourishing harbor; some of them had managed to acquire great wealth in overseas trade. Over the next centuries, fl eeing from the repeated outbursts of anti-Jewish violence, larger groups of Jews from Eastern Europe and Germany had arrived in the city. 118 The Benefi ts of Crime At the close of the eighteenth century, the Jewish community in Amsterdam counted more than 20,000 members, constituting over ten percent of the overall population. In less than twenty years, their number rose to over 30,000.31 By that time, Jewish inhabitants of the Netherlands were granted full civil rights, and although Jews suffered from social discrimination, their legal position was secured. Yet their equality in the law came at a price: Jews were expected to ‘acculturate,’ i.e. to integrate into the dominant non-Jewish culture. Within a few decades, most of the Dutch Jews did. They had learned to speak Dutch (instead of Yiddish), visited Dutch public schools, and were engaged in the governance and administration of their country.32 Assimilation and integration were the keywords for the majority of Dutch Jews in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Only a smaller number of observant and traditional emigrants from Eastern Europe, the so-called ‘Eastern Jews’ (Oostjoden), resisted absorption into the dominant Dutch culture and succeeded in holding on to their religious and cultural customs. Most of them were transients from Eastern Europe, who aimed to escape poverty and pogroms by transatlantic emigration. Their stay in the Netherlands was usually short. A few hundred families, arriving in the Netherlands after the First World War, decided to stay. They created their own communal life, spoke Yiddish, and often chose to live close together. In Amsterdam and in the coastal town of Scheveningen, for example, separate communities of Hasidic Eastern-European Jews came into existence. They were watched with some suspicion by protagonists of assimilation, but their arrival did not give rise to any countermeasures. As opposed to Berlin, Munich, and Vienna, there had been little to no physical aggression towards Jews in the Netherlands in the interwar years.33 This absence of (physical) aggression is often held as a proof of the mild character of Dutch anti-Semitism before the war, but it should be noted that this supposed mildness was already fading years before German troops invaded the country.34 Affected by advocates of the völkisch thought like Evert-Jan Roskam, impressed by the recent achievements of the Nazi regime, and, possibly, frightened by the infl ux of Jewish refugees from Nazi- Germany, Dutch anti-Semitism within the NSB was gaining in strength from the mid-1930s onwards. Individual Jews were increasingly named, blamed, and shamed. Jews in general were being portrayed as foreign occupiers and Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:42 01 October 2016 suppressors.35 In late 1938, in reaction to the November pogrom, Mussert suggested the removal of Jews from Europe. The Dutch colony of Surinam and bordering French Guyana on the South American continent would suit well as a new Jewish homeland.36 After the German attack in May 1940, anti-Semitism proliferated in the Netherlands. Having lifted the ban on uniforms, German authorities gave way to paramilitary groups of the NSB (Weerbaarheidsafdelingen, or WA). In particular in the larger cities of the Netherlands, Jews were their game. 37 At the same time, Nazi propaganda accelerated. Jews were incessantly The Benefi ts of Crime 119 branded as ‘the other,’ the antagonists of ‘the Nordic man’: a race without modesty; unwelcome guests; poison for the national body; a plague to the Dutch people; parasites, living on the wounds of other people. 38 For some editors, the exposure of Jews in Dutch culture, business, and society had become a sacred mission.39 Like in German Nazi war rhetoric, Jews were represented not only as the enemy from within, but also as the enemy from outside. In the British and American governments ‘international Jewry’ was spotted. The battle against the Soviet Union was perceived of as a life-and-death struggle; a struggle against ‘Judeo-Bolshevism,’ ‘nihilistic Asians,’ ‘the forces from the east, stupid and ignorant masses.’ 40 The choice was simple: either the new, national-socialist order, or chaos; either Christian values, or ‘international Judeo-Bolshevism, destruction of religious life, the church, Volk, family and European civilization.’ 41 Pictures of Russian prisoners of war were being selected to show to the public, confi rming the stereotypes of ‘Asian hordes’ and ‘Judeo-Bolshevists.’42 On these waves of intimidation and aggression, the German authorities in the Netherlands glided smoothly to a stricter and more overtly anti-Jewish policy. In the summer of 1940 suave words had been spoken: as long as Dutch civil servants would cooperate and obey German orders, everything would carry on in the same way; there would be no such thing as a ‘Jew- ish question’ in the Netherlands. In reality, over the course of two years, the German authorities tightened the screws on Dutch Jews. The visit of Adolf Eichmann to the Netherlands in April 1942 marked the transition to mass deportation and murder. Branded with a yellow badge, Jews were increasingly segregated from non-Jews. The fi rst written summons ‘for work under police-supervision in Germany’ were sent off on July 5th, 1942. Ten days later, the fi rst train to the extermination camp of Auschwitz-Birkenau departed from the Netherlands.43 Not surprisingly, German anti-Jewish regulations were generally applauded in Dutch Nazi papers.44 The introduction of the yellow badge in May 1942, for instance, was warmly welcomed and passionately defended.45 According to one editor, the emblem was required to watch the less obvious, ‘acculturated’ Dutch Jews. 46 For a political party that in April 1941 was still promoting the transfer of the entire Jewish population of Europe to South America, the deportation of Jews from the Netherlands taking off in the Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:42 01 October 2016 summer of 1942 came as a good, perhaps even more realistic, alternative.47 Once deported to labor camps in the East, the Jews, used to a luxurious life of parasites, would fi nally learn to use their hands, a reporter commented.48

PROFIT AND CONSENT

As members of the NSB, most recruits and offi cials of the NOC had been exposed to the uncompromising anti-Jewish agitation of the Movement for 120 The Benefi ts of Crime years. Their vocabulary reveals that they also had been absorbing it. In their writings Jew and Jewish were often used as synonyms of everything wicked and evil. Badly behaving recruits were categorized as ‘cads and Jews’;49 an untrustworthy recruit was labeled ‘a Jew in a Christian guise.’50 Probably most of them also approved of the anti-Jewish regulations that were introduced by the German authorities in the Netherlands. A farmer in charge of a larger rural estate near Lida reacted enthusiastically to the news of the introduction of the yellow badge in the Netherlands: ‘that will make them [Jews—GvF] meek,’ he explained. 51 For an NOC-offi cial the introduction of the star was not enough. Early May 1942, two months before the deportations would start, he wrote that expulsion of all Jews from the Netherlands would be the only solution: ‘Leaving them [the Jews—GvF] here (. . .) is as equally unhygienic as relentlessly poking a nail into a car- buncle.’ 52 A ‘clinical’ removal of the Jews—‘thorough, fast, hygienic and painless’—was needed.53 Some of the Dutch men involved in the employment in the East displayed their anti-Jewish sympathies in a more active way. A fi sher from Amster- dam who would go to Lake Peipus relentlessly tried to bar Jews from the city’s fi sh market. Already in May 1940, he had been involved in fi ghts with Jewish colleagues. One Sunday, he and his fellows of his WA-unit came to the (Jewish) market, molested stallholders and buyers, and destroyed their merchandise.54 Another recruit had worked as an informer for the German security police in his hometown before his departure to Ukraine. He was responsible for the arrest of two allied pilots, but his main task was to fi nd furniture and valuables that had belonged to Jews but had ‘disappeared’ after their forced departure. 55 After his return from Baltoji Voke, a peat worker joined the Landwacht and became a notorious men hunter. One of his victims had been a Jewish man in hiding. 56 Another former recruit was implicated in the search and arrest of a nine-year-old Jewish girl. Both the girl and her caregiver were sent to Bergen-Belsen. The girl survived, the farmer did not.57 A remarkable large number of recruits tried to take advantage of the expropriation of Jews in the Netherlands. One of the farmers bought and moved into a house near the center of the provincial town of Amersfoort. The house was owned by a Jewish family that had been deported early 1943.58 At the age of twenty-nine, a plasterer who had been working in Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:42 01 October 2016 Rivne from November 1942 until January 1944 bought two villas in his hometown. Both houses had belonged to Jewish landlords. 59 A metal- worker, who alternated his work as a Wehrmacht guard in the Netherlands with building work in the occupied East, took possession of a house of deported Jews in the southern city of Tilburg. 60 A Frisian farmer’s son who had worked in Ukraine from February 1943 until April 1944 gave his father the assignment to invest his money in houses. On his son’s explicit orders the father had bought two houses of deported Jewish families in the nearby town of Leeuwarden.61 In a postwar police investigation it was concluded The Benefi ts of Crime 121 that another recruit, a peasant from Drenthe in dire straits before the Ger- man occupation, had accumulated a fortune during the war years: for small prices, he had acquired nine houses formerly owned by Jews.62 Not only individual recruits, but also the NOC-organization as such, benefi tted from the organized robbery. In the spring of 1943, one of its warehouses in The Hague was fi lled with the entire contents of twenty-fi ve houses of Jewish families. Dozens of bedframes, cots, mattresses, chairs, tables, lamps, paintings, and mirrors were piled up. Some pianos were kept in store, too. Heaps of clothes, children’s toys, and home appliances were formed. Ordinary cutlery and silver tableware were sorted out, as were crys- tal glasses, china services, and other objects of value. 63 Within the NOC it became common practice that whoever needed something for his work for the organization, could visit the store and make his pick.64 It is questionable, however, that everything that was selected was used only for professional purposes. Puttkammer, representative of the Ost- ministerium in The Hague, for instance, was a regular visitor of the warehouse. From May 10th to July 7th, 1943, he came six times, choosing some thirty objects, amongst others: a dressing table, chairs, bedroom furniture, carpets, silver tableware and a china service, pillows, ashtrays, and a chan- delier. The selected goods were sent off to Berlin. Arguably, to make his life in Berlin more comfortable, Puttkammer picked some more things in March and June 1944: hair brushes, coat hangers, a dining table with four match- ing chairs, a sideboard, and some smaller side tables. For someone who spent most of his time in The Hague, these acquisitions could hardly be of service to him for his work in the Netherlands.65

EARLY ENCOUNTERS

Although it can be assumed that most recruits and offi cials generally disliked Jews, their accurate knowledge of the fate of Eastern European Jews was limited. They had read about the crimes committed by retreating Soviet rulers, for instance in Lviv and Tarnopol. In these reports Jews were considered the culprits. Citing extensively a Dutch doctor who took part in the assault on the Soviet Union, Volk en Vaderland described the Jews in the eastern borderlands as ‘scum,’ responsible for all kinds of ‘bestial’ murders and Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:42 01 October 2016 other crimes. 66 These wrongs were often recalled to legitimize harsh reprisals and brutal assaults on Jews. In their letters home, Dutch volunteers of the Waffen-SS were telling about their involvement in hunts and killings of Jews. Some of these testimonies were published in national-socialist papers.67 Months before the attack on the Soviet Union, images of ghettos in Cra- cow, Warsaw, Lodz, and Lviv were already being printed in Dutch newspapers. Leaving the immense suffering and starvation in these sealed places unmentioned, reporters emphasized the ‘normality’ of ghettos in European history and the recent and acute need for ghettos in occupied Poland. 68 122 The Benefi ts of Crime Ghettos, a reporter of Het Nationaal Dagblad proclaimed, were ‘the only way to allow for a tenable food supply policy and to fi ght the spreading of contagious diseases.’ Statistics concerning the city of Lodz were said to support the point he was making. Since the establishment of the ghetto, there had been no cases of typhus anymore. Evidently, the ghetto population was not included in this calculation. 69 A reverse line of causal effects was more often adhered to. The impoverished and unhealthy state the Jews were in, their ‘fi lthy ghettos’ as it was often called, were frequently adduced to justify the restrictions infl icted upon them. 70 In Agrarisch Nieuwsblad a Dutch soldier commented on the things and people he encountered on his way from Berlin to the eastern front. Behind Katowice, he stated, Eastern Europe began. Here, there were no neat and clean farmsteads but poor and uncivilized people, ‘and Jews, everywhere Jews (. . .) a short visit to any ghetto in Poland would cure even the most persistent “Jew-friend” (jodenvriend) in the Netherlands.’71 It was precisely in Poland where recruits for work in the occupied eastern territories got a fi rst glimpse of the anti-Jewish policy of the German rulers. In the closing months of 1941, farmers selected by CULANO were brought to a transfer camp in Lodz. Their departure to places further east was delayed several times and during their stay in Lodz they had plenty of time for sightseeing. In the city, the ghetto of Lodz could not be missed. It was large and cleaved by two main roads that were forbidden for Jews: they had to cross by footbridges to go from one part of the ghetto to another. From these two streets ghetto life could be observed. For Dutch farmers it was a short ride by trolley from their barracks to the ghetto.72 After Lodz most of the recruits were brought to Riga. Here, again, weeks were passed in waiting. The only daily task seemed to have been a two-hour lesson in the Russian language, 73 leaving recruits ample time to explore the city. By the time the fi rst Dutch men arrived in Riga, most of the Latvian Jews in the city’s ghetto had been murdered.74 Jews expelled from Germany had come in their stead. Compared to the Lodz ghetto, the Riga ghetto was small, counting some 15,000 inmates. Remnants of Jewish life in the city, however, were numerous. In Riga, the ghetto was not located in or around streets where many Jews used to live. Instead, a predominantly non-Jewish neighborhood at the outskirts of the city had been turned into a ghetto. Former Jewish houses, some three hundred in total, in the city center were Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:42 01 October 2016 vacated and used for different purposes.75 Except for a smaller group of recruits headed by Dertien, all selected for work in agriculture went to Minsk. From there, they were being spread across German White Ruthenia. In pairs and sometimes in groups of four, they were accommodated on expropriated farms. Some were put to work in the vicinity of the LBGO-branch in Vileyka, while others were stationed near Hlybokaye, some eighty miles to the north. A father and his son went further west, to Baranovichi, where they were put in charge of the maintenance of tractors, tools, and instruments needed for farming.76 The Benefi ts of Crime 123 Not one of these farmers could have failed to notice the recent outbursts of violence against Jews in the area. Most towns in their vicinity had ghettos, overcrowded with marked, maltreated, and exploited Jews. In Hlybokaye, for instance, some 20,000 Jews had been cramped in the city’s ghetto, constituting more than half of the city’s population. In Vileyka, Jewish forced laborers from the neighboring town of Kurzeniec were accommodated in two larger buildings in the city. In Kurzeniec itself, Jews lived in a ghetto. In Baranovichi about 12,000 Jews were held prison in a sealed part of town.77 These fi rst batches of Dutch volunteers soon got used to this new reality. Again, they not only witnessed, but they also took profi t. Some took over Jewish possessions. In Riga, Dutch farmers of CULANO were accommodated in vacated fl ats of Jewish landlords. 78 The father and his son stationed near Baranovichi ‘found’ two adjacent synagogues that would serve as their garage and workplace. 79 Their colleague in Hlybokaye, who managed a larger farm of some 3,700 acres, wrote to Staf about the terrible state of his farm on the day of his arrival. In nearby ghettos he had acquired the missing furniture and amenities: chairs, beds, stoves and other items. 80 Early recruited Dutch vegetable growers also gained from the expropriation of Jews. They were offered well-equipped farms that had belonged to Jews. 81 Others made use of Jewish manpower. Of the fi rst CULANO-recruits, a few became involved in supervising forced laborers, sometimes Jews. Well aware of the coercion exerted on these Jews, they had accepted the job. 82 Two Dutch gardeners were employed to supervise the work at the city’s vegetable gardens in and near Kaunas. For their assignment they could utilize Jewish forced laborers from the city’s ghetto. Whereas one man claimed (after the war) to have done what he could for his Jewish workers, the other Dutch gardener was questioned about his supposedly brutal behavior towards his personnel. 83 In Lithuanian moors Jewish forced labor was a common sight. Early 1942 peat expert Habing was making his fi rst visit to Lithuania. Several moors were inspected; all were making use of Jewish workers. In Baltoji Voke, some eighteen miles from Vilnius, Jews had been employed even before the city’s ghetto was established. Xavier Piatka had just turned twenty-two when German troops invaded his hometown of Vilnius. Soon, Xavier became aware that Jewish men who had been picked up from the street, allegedly for work elsewhere, never returned. Piatka fl ed the city Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:42 01 October 2016 and found employment in Baltoji Voke.84 Michael Turner decided to do the same. His wife, dressed like a Polish farmer’s wife and without wearing the yellow badge, regularly paid him a visit in the moors. 85 Together with his wife, Gabriel Rabinowitz also had left Vilnius. The couple stayed in Baltoji Voke for several months.86 After the establishment of the ghetto they were joined by others. Tatiana Piotrowski and her husband fl ed the ghetto and arrived in Baltoji Voke early 1942.87 Dressed as Polish farmer’s wives, their hair covered underneath a headscarf, Gitta Goldberg and her aunt also left Vilnius to fi nd work in the moors. 88 In the fi rst months provisions had been 124 The Benefi ts of Crime poor. There was, for instance, no proper housing and some sixty Jews were moved to the nearby village Czarny Bor (Juodsiliai) to fi nd shelter in a cow- shed. Cooking facilities were inadequate and in the winter months snow was melted to use for drinking, cooking, bathing, and washing. Every day, some six miles had to be walked, to and from the marsh. 89 Still, most Jews preferred this life to that in the ghetto. Out of sight of German and Lithu- anian police forces, chances for survival just seemed better in Baltoji Voke. At the time of Habing’s visit, wooden barracks were being built near the moor. Some three hundred Jews would move into this small labor camp— mostly families. A small number of them were over sixty-fi ve; thirty-two children were aged fi fteen or younger. 90 Arguably, the presence of children and elderly people was the result of the introduction of new German working permits, the so-called ‘yellow certifi cate’ (gelbe Schein). This permit not only offered protection to the worker himself, but also to three family members of his choice. It is likely that at least some of these privileged members were also brought to the moor, even though they were too old or too young to work. 91 By May 1942, the labor camp was sealed. Jewish policemen from the ghetto were appointed to keep order inside the barracks; Lithuanian policemen guarded the camp. 92 Although the barracks constituted a slight improvement, living conditions remained bad. Wading through layers of mud, peat had to be dug out by hands or with a simple spade. Whereas most men were digging peat, women took care of the piling up and drying of the sods. To speed things up, they had to turn the sods around and expose them from both sides to wind and sun. Kneeling on wet ground, the heavy sods had to be lifted time and again. When the wetlands were frozen and peat could not be harvested, a part of the group of Jewish workers were brought back to the ghetto. Others were sent to the nearby woods around Sorok Tartar (Keturiasdesimt Toto- riu) as lumberjacks. The work and their daily walk to and from the forest in cold weather took a heavy toll; frozen limbs were common among those who had stayed during the winter months in Baltoji Voke.93 The proximity of the pits of Ponary made life for all diffi cult. The small suburban town Gitta Goldberg remembered as a lovely destination on hot summer days before the war, was barely two miles away. From August 1941 onwards, tens of thousands of their fellow Jewish citizens were murdered here. In the moors of Baltoji Voke the volleys of machine guns were heard.94 Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:42 01 October 2016

FULL ENGAGEMENT

Thus, these early Dutch groups not only saw the discrimination and ill treatment of Jews, but also took advantage, by taking over their goods and making use of their manpower. The larger groups that followed would not act very differently. However, the parameters of their presence in the East had altered. Most of them were recruited by the NOC, a highly political The Benefi ts of Crime 125 organization with ambitions much larger than those of CULANO and a clear anti-Jewish agenda. As opposed to CULANO, the NOC was overtly anti-Semitic. Their initiatives in the area were perceived as just, as part of a legitimate war of ‘recon- quest’ and liberation, for these grounds in Eastern Europe were believed to be ‘originally’ Germanic. In this line of thought, the crooked thief and unlawful ruler was soon detected and personifi ed. In a poem, published in spring 1943, an offi cial of the NOC was writing of the heroic ‘trek eastwards’ of Dutch farmers to end the years of plundering and looting by ‘the Jewish henchman.’ 95 A specialist in agricultural affairs, often traveling to the East for the NOC, explained to his readers that for ages ‘the Jew and the Jesuit’ had formed a tandem and exploited the poor farmers of Ukraine: ‘Like it was, it still is. The Jews have been the parasites of Ukraine, like they have been all around the world. (. . .) The further we go back in the history of the Ukrainian people, the more we see the devastating effect of Jewish activities (. . .), particularly during the last episode of Judeo-bolshevism.’ 96 In at least one account it was mentioned that most Jews had disappeared from the area. According to the author, they had fl ed or they were killed by locals who had been ‘intoxicated by a sudden feeling of liberation.’97 Unlike CULANO, too, the NOC had benefi ted from anti-Jewish policy in the Netherlands by laying a claim on belongings of expropriated Dutch Jews. Some of the Jewish inventory of the NOC warehouses in The Hague was sent off to the occupied East, primarily to decorate the offi ces of Dutch representatives in the region. In his notes concerning 1943, a NOC- administrator also referred to ‘Jewish furniture’ stored in a warehouse in the ice-free harbor of Ventspils (Windau). Although the warehouses in the city’s port were also used by German local authorities to deposit the confi scated belongings of Jews, 98 possibly the goods mentioned here were shipped from the Netherlands. 99 When Johan Lingmont arrived in Lithuania spring 1943, there was no NOC-offi ce in Vilnius. From necessity, he received guests initially in his bedroom in Hotel Metropol in Kaunas.100 By June that year the redecoration of his offi ce in Vilnius was fi nished. Most of the furniture came from the warehouse in The Hague and thus had belonged to Dutch Jews.101 It is highly likely that senior personnel of Werkdienst Holland also benefi tted from the anti-Jewish looting. On Fischöck’s order at least one trans- Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:42 01 October 2016 port of goods from the occupied Netherlands to Ukraine was organized. The transport was known as the ‘Home in the Netherlands’ action (Heim in Holland Aktion) and included furniture, luxury goods, paintings—and, surprisingly, also twenty-three horses. Van Dieren, who visited Rivne in 1943 and interviewed various Dutch recruits, was told that the horses were taken from the Dutch royal stables; the rest of the trainload consisted of confi scated goods from either the royal palace in The Hague or houses of well-to-do Jews.102 Nimtz, leader of the Werkdienst, was not authorized to dispose of the animals and the furniture, but many pieces were sold with his 126 The Benefi ts of Crime approval. Nimtz himself bought two horses; his wife a table with chairs, a painting, table-linen, and carpets.103 Albeit their numbers decreased at a terrifying pace, Jews and traces of their social life were still present when the NOC took over the initiative in the summer of 1942 and was sending its recruits and employees to the occupied eastern territories. The rare testimonies of their encounters with Jews bring to light their acceptance of a reality in which Jews were incarcerated, maltreated, and exploited. On his way to Ukraine, Lingmont had spotted ‘eastern Jews’ in Lviv. Sitting in a car that was bringing him to Rivne, he saw the fence of their ghetto. In more cities he met larger fences separat- ing Jews from the world outside. On the streets Lingmont spotted Jewish forced laborers dressed in rags. He was revolted by their physical appearance and annoyed by their slow pace across the road which forced him to slow down.104 Gerhardt, Roskam’s expert in agricultural affairs and Rost van Tonnin- gen’s travel companion in the East in June 1942, also noticed Jews.105 On his visit to three Dutch vegetable growers near Kaunas and Vilnius, Gerhardt witnessed forced laborers at work, both Jews and Russian POWs. In the peat moors he saw them too; the pictures he had taken of Jewish forced laborers were used to decorate his long travel report. Gerhardt observed that at most of the visited farms forced laborers were used. At Waka T, some twenty-four Jews were working. A couple of women had been employed as housekeepers and cooks,106 and some of the men worked on the land, but among the group of Jews were also tailors, carpenters, smiths, and a few children. They were members of the families of Jewish forced laborers at the farm. 107 In Vilnius and Kaunas, Gerhardt had been received by German offi cials. At that time, both cities still had larger ghettos. After the fi rst wave of murder that had lasted until the end of the year, the surviving remnants of the Jewish community of Kaunas were used as forced laborers. In the days of Gerhardt’s visit, the Kaunas ghetto still covered a few blocks in town. It was liquidated and set on fi re in July 1944, just before the German retreat from the area and the Red Army’s arrival. In Vilnius, some 15,000 to 20,000 people were living in the city’s ghetto at the time of Gerhardt’s stay. Between January 1942 and the late spring of 1943, raids and killings abated, giving inmates time to more or less adapt Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:42 01 October 2016 to their new communal life. During daytime, most were forced to work.108 Within the ghetto itself there were a few dozen workshops. According to a report from June 1943, some 3,000 inmates were employed at these places. 109 Jews also found work in the city, but outside the ghetto. In December 1942 it was estimated that some 150 private enterprises and non-German organizations in Vilnius made use of Jewish laborers. Of the German employers, the Wehrmacht undoubtedly had the largest share. Car workplaces and garages, but above all the confi scated fur factories in the city, were exploited by the Wehrmacht.110 Gerhardt did not visit these factories, but another The Benefi ts of Crime 127 Dutch delegation had and reported in a Dutch daily about the Jews from the ghetto working here.111 One time or another, Dutch NOC-recruits working in Lithuania visited Vilnius or Kaunas. The offi ces of the NOC’s regional representatives were here. The agricultural educational center of Waka T and the peat moor of Baltoji Voke were close to Vilnius. Dutch farmers and peat workers came to Vilnius to buy utensils, or to spend their days off. It would have been hard to fail to notice the ghetto, units of forced laborers, and the numerous destroyed or damaged synagogues and other houses of study in the city. Lingmont’s offi ce, for instance, was not much more than one mile away from the ghetto’s northern fence. Supervising Dutch industrial activities in Lithuania, Lingmont was also a regular visitor of Baltoji Voke. On these trips to this moor, he passed Ponary.112 Like in the days before the NOC, the Dutch were not only witnesses. In various ways, they also took advantage of German anti-Jewish policy. Again, Jewish forced labor was used by the Dutch: in Waka T, but also in a garage in Kaunas that was exploited by a garage holder from Rotterdam. 113 Still in 1943, in the peat excavations near Kaisadorys, Jews were badly needed as Lithuanians selected by the local employment offi ces rarely showed up. 114 They were accommodated in three barracks near the moor and guarded by Ukrainians. Doris Mirman was only fi fteen when she, together with her younger brother and parents, arrived in Kaisadorys in the spring of 1943. Like in Baltoji Voke, life in Kaisadorys was tough. Many were suffering from malnutrition, diseases (typhus was rampant in the camp), and other mistreatments. Although the moor was in German hands, a Dutch peat expert was appointed as supervisor. He was shot by drunken Ukrainian guards in August 1943.115 A larger group of Jewish forced laborers worked for the NOC in Bal- toji Voke. In the late summer of 1942, Habing had told the NOC-board that one could not do without (cheap) Jewish workers. He urged for the employment of at least eight hundred Jews.116 That number would never be reached. Spring 1943, when the NOC was given trusteeship over the moor, some 125 Jewish families were in the barracks. Presumably, they had stayed here during the winter. A few months later, Habing could dispose of 260 adults and 20 children. By then, a lease contract was signed, putting the NOC offi cially in charge of the production of peat and the Jewish Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:42 01 October 2016 workers. To his superiors in The Hague, Habing repeatedly reported on the living conditions of ‘his’ Jewish workers, their rickety barracks, their lack of proper shoes and clothing, and their poor cooking facilities. 117 Although a Jewish dentist and doctor were working in the camp, medical care was also insuffi cient, according to Habing. He was fearing low production with sick, underfed, or otherwise neglected workers.118 In the summer of 1943, a small group of Jewish workers had stolen some weapons of the Lithuanian guards and escaped from the camp. Some Dutch workers at the moors joined in the hunt that was organized, but none of the 128 The Benefi ts of Crime fugitives were caught. Having received information about the escape, Ger- man police offi cer Martin Weiss came to the labor camp. Weiss was known by the Jewish population of the Vilnius ghetto. Not only did he command the ghetto, Weiss was also amongst the executioners in Ponary. On June 30th, he had come to take revenge for the recent escape. Weiss selected sixty-seven people, seven of whom were children. They were taken to Ponary and shot. One of the victims was Gitta Goldberg’s brother-in-law. 119 At the time of the execution, the Jewish workers’ population in Baltoji Voke was probably at its peak, counting some 400 to 450 people. Two weeks after the reprisal, the labor camp was closed. In early June, Him- mler had been ordering to liquidate all Jewish labor camps in the Ostland. Now that partisan activities were growing in the Ostland’s rural districts, camps outside the larger cities were dangerous and thus had to be closed down.120 Shortly after, the evacuation of Baltoji Voke took place. Twenty- two Jews managed to escape, but all others, 358 by Habing’s calculation, were brought to the Vilnius ghetto.121 Most of them would suffer the same fate as the thousands of others in the ghetto: they were shot at Ponary, sent to concentration camps in Estonia, or remained in one of the two smaller labor camps on the outskirts of Vilnius until the city’s liberation by Russian soldiers in July 1944. In his report to the NOC headquarters in The Hague Habing grumbled that a drop in production now had become inevitable.122 As the NOC was envisioning a much broader involvement of Dutch nationals than CULANO, it also saw chances for Dutch entrepreneurs: they could make use of cheap Jewish labor and could also step in where Jewish directors and owners had left. Of much prestige was the contract signed by an Amsterdam fi rm in August 1943, concerning the trusteeship over the lemonade factories of Saltinis, seven in Vilnius and two elsewhere in Lithu- ania. Together with Lingmont, the Dutch director had visited the factories early 1943. In talks with German authorities it was explained that the Dutch fi rm was to take over the work of the former Jewish owner who had been pushed aside in 1941.123 Possibly, more Jewish enterprises were taken over or supervised by Dutch managers and entrepreneurs. In Baranovichi, a Dutch supervisor was put in charge of two inoperative chemical factories, producing glue, soap, and lubricant; in Berdychiv, a factory of tiles was taken over by the NOC; in Skvyra, central Ukraine, a larger rural estate was leased; and in the nearby Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:42 01 October 2016 town of Bila Tserkva it was discussed how to exploit the closed down factory of preserved goods with Dutch help.124 In Ukraine, Dutch millers were brought in to re-start the production of fl our.125 Near Rivne, near Vilnius, and near Riga Dutch volunteers were put to work as supervisors of unmanned (herrenlose) sawmills. In autumn 1942, a plan to take over the largest textile factory in Kiev was seriously discussed. Before the German occupation, the factory had employed some 5,000 men, all Jews. Eventually, this plan was blocked, but some smaller inoperative factories were confi scated by Dutch entrepreneurs in close collaboration with the NOC.126 The Benefi ts of Crime 129 For Dutch artisans and small traders the eradication of Jewish life in this part of Europe also appeared to open up an entirely new market. In most of the German occupied eastern territories, Jews had been prevalent in (small) commerce and craftsmanship. Although small groups of Jewish craftsmen had been kept alive for German interests, most of them had fallen victim to the haphazard murders by German police units. In early September 1942, Wilhelm Kube, as general commissioner the highest authority of German White Ruthenia, requested Rost van Tonningen to recruit not only farming specialists, but also skilled workers: woodcrafters and carpenters; mechanics, electricians, plumbers, bricklayers, and painters; and tailors and cobblers. Kube was frank and open: Dutch craftsmen were needed to replace their vanished Jewish colleagues.127

SHADES OF COMPLICITY

Most of these entrepreneurial initiatives failed, arguably due to a lack of time. In the autumn of 1943, the front was already creeping onto eastern parts of occupied Ukraine. A year later, the area was almost completely conquered by Soviet soldiers. Nevertheless, the plans reveal the ambitious character of the NOC and the intended large-scale exploitation of Jewish suffering. Dutch men could step into the gap that was created by the murder of the Jews; they would appropriate Jewish property and dispose of Jewish forced labor. Recruits of both CULANO and the NOC must have been well aware of the mass crime committed against Jews. They saw the traces that the Ger- man killing machine had left behind. They watched how the few who had survived were robbed of everything and were squeezed together in ghettos and labor camps. They bore witness to the fact that those men, women, and children were maltreated and often forced to perform slave labor. In some places, like in Baltoji Voke, mass shootings were too close by to be unnoticed. Yet the Dutch recruits, as well as the Dutch offi cials coordinating their employment on the spot, were not just witnesses of mass crime and their position cannot be covered by one of the common labels in Holocaust historiography. They were neither perpetrators nor bystanders, but they belonged Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:42 01 October 2016 to a category in between. They were put in charge of former Jewish companies, they visited ghettos to obtain desired furniture, they made use of cheap Jewish labor. They, in short, took benefi t of the brutal anti-Jewish policy of German authorities in this region and by doing so, they consolidated this policy. Clearly, Jews had had a greater part in the life of earlier recruits than those arriving later. Yet even in the last phase of German rule over the Baltic countries, parts of Ukraine and Belarus, a Dutch farmer in Skvyra asked the NOC-headquarters in The Hague to send ‘Jewish furniture’ for his new 130 The Benefi ts of Crime accommodation and the NOC-representative in Kaunas exerted himself to acquire a former Jewish house that would, in redecorated style, serve as a home for the Dutch in the region.128 It is highly likely that their complicity in anti-Jewish policy stemmed from their anti-Semitic orientation. Before and after the NOC entered the stage, Dutch men had shown their willingness to comply with German anti- Jewish policy and, what is more, to make use of the terrible position Jews were in. Years before the fi rst volunteers would leave for the Nazi East, Dutch national-socialist media had started spreading the gospel of hatred. Being exposed to anti-Jewish propaganda for quite some time, recruits generally welcomed German measures against Jews in their home country. Some engaged in anti-Jewish (verbal or physical) aggression; others fi nancially benefi tted from German policy. When the NOC took over in the summer of 1942 and the mission acquired a more racist dimension, most of them agreed. As Jews and Bolshevists amalgamated in their worldview, they pictured themselves as the liberators of the area from this double-headed oppressor. Paradoxically, while their number was diminishing by the day, fear for Jews amplifi ed. Vengeful, escaped, and hiding Jews, it was believed, were fi nding their way to partisans and were plotting attacks behind the military front, targeted at all Germanics in the area. In Baltoji Voke and Waka T rumors spread about a roaming group of at least 2,000 partisan-Jews. 129 In the peat moor, a Dutch worker had been captured by Jewish ‘bandits.’ In a report sent off to the Dutch headquarters in August 1943, Habing noted that these and similar events frightened his men. 130 When in February 1944 a group of twenty Dutch painters arrived at their place of destination, Bialystok, they were being directed towards the former ghetto for accommodation. The sight of this desolate place, every room an unordered mess with dashed pieces of furniture, down of pillows covering the fl oor, and bedbugs crawling on matrasses and bedding, caused some distress. What worried the Dutch painters most, however, were the rumors of escaped Jews, hiding in tunnels underneath the ghetto. A German guard was said to have been killed by one of them. Terrifi ed, the painters decided to leave the area and spend the night elsewhere. 131 Dutch recruits and NOC- personnel in the area had stopped seeing Jews in terms of economic profi t. In the last phase of the German occupied eastern territories, when Jews were Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:42 01 October 2016 no longer visible, no longer prisoners and forced laborers, Jews were the source of panic and fear.

NOTES

1 . Dov Levin, The Litvaks: A Short History of the Jews in Lithuania (Jerusalem: Yad Vashem, 2000), 43–46. 2 . Ibidem, 74–75. 3 . Ibidem, 77. The Benefi ts of Crime 131 4 . Christoph Dieckmann, Deutsche Besatzungspolitik in Litauen 1941–1944 (Göttingen: Wallstein Verlag, 2011), 115–146. 5 . Timothy Snyder, Bloodlands: Europe between Hitler and Stalin (New York: Basic Books, 2010), 142–143. 6 . Timothy Snyder, The Reconstruction of Nations: Poland, Ukraine, Lithuania, Belarus 1569–1999 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003), 306; Yitzhak Arad, Ghetto in Flames: The Struggle and Destruction of the Jews in Vilna in the Holocaust (Jerusalem: Yad Vashem, 1980), 27–28; Levin, Litvaks, 190. 7 . Wendy Lower, Nazi Empire-Building and the Holocaust in Ukraine (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2005), 15. See also entry Berdychiv in: Shmuel Spector, The Encyclopedia of Jewish Life before and during the Holocaust (Jerusalem: Yad Vashem, 2001). 8 . Yehuda Bauer, Death of the Shtetl (New Haven & London: Yale UP, 2010). 9 . Yehuda Bauer, ‘Kurzeniec: A Jewish Shtetl in the Holocaust’, Yalkut Moreshet. Holocaust Documentation and Research 1 (winter 2003), 132–134. 10. On the various towns, see entries in: Spector, The Encyclopedia of Jewish Life . Partially digitally available via www.jewishgen.org/yizkor/pinkas_poland/ pol5_00168.html. Last visited 16 May 2014. For Ukrainian towns, see also the entries on the site of History of Jewish Communities in Ukraine project, www.jewua.org. Last visited 13 June 2014. 11 . Yitzhak Arad, ‘The “Final Solution” in Lithuania in the Light of German Documentation’, Yad Vashem Studies 11 (1976), 234–272. Of a more recent date: Dieckmann, Deutsche Besatzungspolitik, 115–146. 12 . Arad, Ghetto in Flames, 54–99. 13 . Ibidem, passim. Often German special police units worked closely together with other German groups in the vicinity. On the complicity of Wehrmacht units, see for instance: Waitman Wade Beorn, Marching into Darkness: The Wehrmacht and the Holocaust in Belarus (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univer- sity Press, 2014). 14 . In September 1941 some 47,000 Jews moved into two small enclosed quarters of the city. Arad, Ghetto in Flames, 101–110. On ghettos see: Dan Michman, The Emergence of Jewish Ghettos during the Holocaust (Cambridge: Cam- bridge University Press, 2011). 15 . For an overview, see: Yitzhak Arad, The Holocaust in the Soviet Union (Jeru- salem: Yad Vashem, 2009). 16 . Ibidem, 170–171. 17 . Ibidem, 171. Also entries on www.jewua.org. Last visited 13 June 2014. 18 . Arad, The Holocaust in the Soviet Union, 326 and 498. Also on: www.jewish gen.org/yizkor/Hlybokaye/hly189.html. Last visited 11 June 2014. 19 . Shmuel Spector, ‘Lida’, in: Shmuel Spector (ed.), Lost Jewish Worlds: The Communities of Grodno, Lida, Olkieniki, Vishay (Jerusalem: Yad Vashem, 1996), 212–217. 20 . Arad, The Holocaust in the Soviet Union, 324–325. Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:42 01 October 2016 21 . On the ghetto see: Barbara Epstein, The Minsk Ghetto 1941–1943: Jewish Resis- tance and Soviet Internationalism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2009). 22 . Bauer, ‘Kurzeniec’, 139–149. 23 . Ereignismeldung UdSSR 143, 8 December 1941, YVA, Tr.3, fi le 1479. 24 . On the Holocaust in Volhynia, see: Spector, The Holocaust of Volhynian Jews, 1941–1944 (Jerusalem: Yad Vashem, 1990). 25 . Beorn, Marching into Darkness, 29. 26 . Ibidem , 58–59. 27 . The ghetto of Vilnius, for instance, counted in early 1942 some 15,000 to 20,000 people. The majority were employed in workshops inside the ghetto or in German and Lithuanian businesses nearby. Arad, Ghetto in Flames, 273–351. 132 The Benefi ts of Crime 28 . In Vilnius, most synagogues were completely demolished and plundered. Rosenberg’s special taskforce in looting complained about this unorganized theft of valuables that were now lost for the German Reich. Tätigkeitsbericht der Gruppe Kruk, 19 July 1943, YVA, M.45, fi le JM 17209. 29 . In Vilnius alone, 429 houses formerly owned by Jews were confi scated. An estimated 323 Jewish enterprises in the city that had not been nationalized by the Soviet regime were also expropriated. Letter Stadtsverwaltung Wilna to Gebietskommissar Stadt Wilna, 25 September 1942, and Verzeichnis der nichtnationalisierten ehem. Jüdischen Unternehmungen und Werkstätten, 27 October 1941, YVA, M.45, fi le JM 17197. 30 . J.C.H. Blom and J.J. Cahen, ‘Joodse Nederlanders, Nederlandse joden en joden in Nederland’, in: J.C.H. Blom, R.G. Fuks-Mansfeld and I. Schöffer (eds.), Geschiedenis van de Joden in Nederland (Amsterdam: Balans, 1995), 250–257. 31 . D.M. Schwetschinski, ‘Tussen middeleeuwen en Gouden Eeuw, 1516–1621’, in: Blom et al., Geschiedenis van de Joden in Nederland, 88–91; J.I. Israel, ‘De Republiek der Verenigde Nederlanden tot omstreeks 1790—Demografi e en economische activiteit’, in: Blom et al., Geschiedenis van de Joden in Neder- land, 97–126; R.G. Fuks-Mansfeld, ‘Verlichting en emancipatie omstreeks 1750–1814’, in: Blom et al., Geschiedenis van de Joden in Nederland, 183 and 197. 32 . Blom and Cahen, ‘Joodse Nederlanders’, 277–284; Leo Fuks, ‘Oost-joden in Nederland tussen beide oorlogen’, Studia Rosenthaliana 11/2 (July 1977), 200–201. 33 . Fuks, ‘Oostjoden’, 202–203; J. Michman, H. Beem and D. Michman, Pinkas: Geschiedenis van de joodse gemeenschap in Nederland (Amsterdam/Antwer- pen: 1999), 378–379 and 382. 34 . Blom and Cahen, ‘Joodse Nederlanders’, 284. 35 . Robin te Slaa and Edwin Klijn, De NSB: Ontstaan en opkomst van de Nationaal-Socialistische Beweging, 1931–1935 (Amsterdam: Boom, 2009), 384–389. On the Dutch refugee policy see: Dan Michmann, ‘Die Jüdische Emigration und die niederländische Reaktion zwischen 1933 und 1940’, in: Kathinka Dittrich and Hans Würzner (eds.) Die Niederlande und das deutsche Exil 1933–1940 (Königstein: Athenäum, 1982), 73–83, and Bob Moore, Ref- ugees from Nazi Germany in the Netherlands 1933–1940 (Dordrecht, etc.: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1986). 36 . Volk en Vaderland, 18 November 1938; De Waag, 9 December 1938, 13 Jan- uary 1939, 31 March 1939, 6 April 1939, and 14 July 1939. 37 . Friso Roest and Jos Scheren, Oorlog in de stad: Amsterdam 1939–1941 (Amsterdam: Van Gennep 1998), 205–284. 38 . Volk en Vaderland, 12 July 1940, 1 September 1940, 20 September 1940, and 10 October 1940; De Zwarte Soldaat, 17 July 1941, 10 April 1942, and 3 July 1942. Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:42 01 October 2016 39 . Fotonieuws, June 1941; V olk en Vaderland, 3 October 1941, 9 January 1942, 10 April 1942, and 9 October 1942. 40 . De Waag, 22 June 1941. 41 . Volk en Vaderland, 18 July 1941. 42 . Fotonieuws, 15 October 1941; Arnhemsche Courant, 20 August 1941. 43 . For an overview of the persecution in the occupied Netherlands, see: Bob Moore, Victims and Survivors: The Nazi Persecution of the Jews in the Neth- erlands 1940–1945 (London: Arnold, 1997). 44 . Volk en Vaderland, 4 April 1941 and 19 September 1941; De Zwarte Sol- daat, 15 April 1941, 16 May 1941, and 28 November 1941; De Waag, 8 June 1941. The Benefi ts of Crime 133 45 . Ton Dekker, De Nederlandse Volkskunde: De verwetenschappelijking van een emotionele belangstelling (Amsterdam: Aksant, 2002), 206; Volk en Vader- land, 8 May 1942. 46 . De Zwarte Soldaat, 3 July 1942. 47 . Storm SS, 21 August 1942; Volk en Vaderland, 4 April 1941. 48 . De Zwarte Soldaat, 21 August 1942. 49 . Letter J.K. de Boer to Jan Barendregt, 10 July 1943, NIOD, 176, fi le 600. 50 . Letter Willem Hendrik van Eek to NOC-Directorate, 24 July 1943, NIOD, 176, fi le 971. 51 . Letter Jan Vos to friends, 15 June 1942, NA/CABR, 2.09.09, fi le 205. 52 . Letter Evart van Dieren to Dutch SS-staff, 4 May 1942, NA/CABR, 2.09.09, fi le 71325. 53 . Ibidem. 54 . Police record Willem Hendrik Botter, 5 March 1946, NA/CABR, 2.09.09, fi le 21852. 55 . Police records Jan Vos, 25 September 1945 and 5 October 1945; records of judicial proceedings, 25 April 1949 and 31 May 1949, NA/CABR, 2.09.09, fi le 205. 56. Police record Hendrikus Habing, 12 October 1945, NA/CABR, 2.09.09, fi le 2139. 57 . Letter Douwe de Jong to wife and children, 16 January 1943; offi cial complaint Jan Lute Middendorp, 5 May 1945; record of judicial proceeding, 9 February 1947; verdict, 23 December 1947, NA/CABR, 2.09.09, fi le 76090. 58 . Verdict, 19 September 1947, NA/CABR, 2.09.09, fi le 55428. 59 . Police record Petrus van Diepen, 2 October 1945; verdict, 7 May 1947, NA/ CABR, 2.09.09, fi le 14993. 60 . Assessment report Bureau Roerende Goederen van Vijanden en Landverraders Tilburg, 15 November 1945; verdict, 6 February 1946, NA/CABR, 2.09.09, fi le 31876. 61 . Police record Siebe H., 13 June 1947; verdict, 28 October 1947, NA/CABR, 2.09.09, fi le 76011. 62 . Police records Henk Spoelder, 3 July 1945, and Jan Habing, 12 February 1946, NA/CABR, 2.09.09, fi le 75665. 63 . Reports on the inspection of the warehouse III, 14 April 1943 and 19 May 1943, NIOD, 176, fi le 558; list of remnants of Jewish furniture, 4 January 1944, NIOD, 176, fi le 558. 64 . Letter NOC-Warehouses to NOC-Commission of Coordination, 19 August 1943, NIOD, 176, fi le 558. 65 . Letter A. Eygelaar to NOC, 8 July 1942, NIOD, 176, fi le 1049; mailing list for H. von Puttkammer, Berlin (undated), NIOD, 176, fi le 1049; list of goods handed to H. von Puttkammer (undated), NIOD, 176, fi le 1049. 66 . Volk en Vaderland, 22 August 1941. Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:42 01 October 2016 67 . Ibidem. On the behavior of Dutch Waffen-SS soldiers in the occupied East, see: Evert Jan van Roekel, Jongens van Nederland: Nederlandse vrijwilligers in de Waffen-SS (Houten: Spectrum, 2011). 68 . Het Volk, 17 November 1941; De Residentiebode, 6 February 1942; Het Nationale Dagblad, 13 February 1941, 31 March 1941, and 5 December 1941; Storm SS, 24 October 1941; Rotterdamsch Nieuwsblad, 20 October 1941; Nieuwsblad van het Noorden, 11 October 1941; Leeuwarder Nieuws- blad, 20 October 1941. 69 . Het Nationale Dagblad, 31 March 1941. 70 . Ibidem, 13 February 1941; Fotonieuws, 15 October 1941. 71 . Agragrisch Nieuwsblad, 26 August 1941. 134 The Benefi ts of Crime 72 . Ibidem, 20 December 1941. On the ghetto, see Isaiah Trunk’s study from 1962, which has recently been translated in English: Isaiah Trunk, Lodz Ghetto: A History (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2006). 73 . Letter Johan Wouter IJzeren to his wife, 18 May 1942, NA/CABR, 2.09.09, fi le 70297. 74 . On the Riga ghetto, see Andrej Angrick and Peter Klein, The “Final Solution” in Riga: Exploitation and Annihilation 1941–1944 (New York: Berghahn Books, 2012). 75 . Letters Stadtverwaltung Riga to Gebietskommissar Riga Stadt, 8 September 1941, 11 September 1941 and 21 October 1941, and to Generalkommissar Ostland, 14 October 1941, BA, R91, fi le 367. 76 . Letter W. van ’t Hoff to Cees Staf, 3 May 1942, GA, 0915, fi le 375; Letter G. Hekkert to Cees Staf, 24 March 1942, GA, 0915, fi le 375; letter Jan Remko Dertien to Cees Staf, 28 March 1942, GA, 0915, fi le 375. 77 . Arad, The Holocaust in the Soviet Union, 151; Bauer, ‘Kurzeniec’, 139–143. 78 . Police record Hendrik van S., 15 July 1946, NA/CABR, 2.09.09, fi le 109853. 79 . Het Nationale Dagblad, 24 July 1942. 80 . Letter W. van ’t Hoff to Cees Staf, 3 May 1942, NIOD, 120a, fi le 65. 81 . Report Willem Gerhardt, concerning the Dutch task with regard to the Baltic agriculture, 15 July 1942, NIOD, 176, fi le 597. 82 . Ibidem; police record Markus Roos, 23 December 1946, NA/CABR, 2.09.09, fi le 105799; letter Johan Wouter van IJzeren to his wife, 18 May 1942, NA/ CABR, 2.09.09, fi le 70297; police record Hendrik van S., 15 July 1946, NA/CABR, 2.09.09, fi le 109853; letter Johan van de Wijngaard to District Employment Offi ce Heerlen, 18 August 1942, and letter B. Stork to Giebel/ LO The Hague, 21 May 1942, NIOD, 120a, fi le 65; report (undated), NIOD, 176, fi le 333. 83 . Letter Reinder van Veen to Daniël Krantz, 30 June 1944, and report Reinder van Veen, concerning the beating of Lithuanians by Dutch men, 28 Decem- ber 1942, NIOD, 176, fi le 607; police record Frans Overkleeft, 16 November 1945, NA/CABR, 2.09.09, fi le 105448. 84 . T estimony Xavier Piatka, YVA, O.93, fi le 11160. 85 . Testimony Michael Turner, YVA, O.93, fi le 34318; testimony Luba Turner, YVA, O.93, fi le 34319. 86 . Testimony Gabriel Robbins, YVA, O.93, fi le 10326. 87 . Testimony Tatiana Piotrowski, YVA, O.93, fi le 29367. 88 . Testimony Gitta Goldberg, YVA, O.93, fi le 20041. 89 . Irina Guzenberg, ‘The 1942 General Population Census in Lithuania: The Labor Camps of Vilnius Ghetto’, in: Žydų muziejus (ed.), Vilniaus getas: kalinių sąrašai (Vilnius: Valstybinis Vilniaus Gaono žydų, 1998), 51. 90 . Žyd ų muziejus, Vilniaus getas, 125–131. 91 . Arad, Ghetto in Flames, 144–146. 92. Police record Johannes Lingmont, 3 February 1949; police record Jan Habing, Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:42 01 October 2016 2 March 1949; police record Berend Klein, 2 and 3 March 1949; police record Andries Harms, 12 March 1949, NA/CABR, 2.09.09, fi le 24858; Guzenberg, ‘The 1942 General Population Census’, 51; Arad, Ghetto in Flames, 335. 93 . Quoted by Guzenberg, ‘The 1942 General Population Census’, 51–52. 94 . Testimony Gabriel Robbins, YVA, O.93, fi le 10326. 95 . Willem Hendrik van Eek, ‘Boeren trekken naar het oosten’, De Waag, 5 March 1943. 96 . Jacob van den Berg, ‘Oekraine, land, volk en mogelijkheden’, Nieuw Neder- land: Maandblad voor economie, staatskunde en economie 10/3 (November 1943), 332–333. The Benefi ts of Crime 135 97 . Willem Hendrik van Eek, ‘Steunpunten in Europa’s strijd’, De Waag, 5 March 1943. 98 . Telegram Treuhandstelle to Generalkommissar Talinn, 13 April 1942, BA, R90, fi le 450. 99 . List of remnants of Jewish furniture in Windau, 31 December 1943, NIOD, 176, fi le 558. 100 . Report Johan Lingmont, 14 July 1943, NA/CABR, 2.09.09, fi le 24858. 101 . Letter Johan Lingmont to Daniël Krantz, 3 July 1943, and police record Johan Lingmont, 1 September 1948, NA/CABR, 2.09.09, fi le 24858. 102 . Police record Evart van Dieren, 16 December 1946, NIOD, 248, fi le 344; report Evart van Dieren, 9 December 1943, NIOD, 176, fi le 81. 103 . Letters S.U. Kotzulla to Erwin Nimtz, 7 and 10 September 1943, TSDAVO, fond 3206, opis 3, delo 21. 104. Diary entry Johan Lingmont, 16 February 1942, NIOD 244, fi le 2180. 105 . Report Willem Gerhardt, concerning the Dutch task with regard to the Baltic agriculture, 15 July 1942, NIOD, 176, fi le 597. 106 . Report Jacob van den Berg, 25 November 1942, NIOD, 176, fi le 619; report J.W.J. Tummers, 25 March 1944, NIOD, 176, fi le 618. 107 . Žyd ų muziejus (ed.), Vilniaus getas, 69–171. 108 . Arad, Ghetto in Flames, 273–351. 109 . List of workshops, June 1943, YVA, M.45, fi le JM 17192. 110 . Letters manager Kaillis to Gebietskommissar Stadt Vilnius, 17 November 1941 and 20 July 1942, YVA, M.45, fi le JM 17191; letter fur factory Udra to Gebietskommissar Stadt Vilnius, 15 December 1941, YVA, M.45, fi le JM 17191; letter chairman ghetto and chief of Jewish police to Gebietskom- missar Stadt Vilnius, 5 December 1942, YVA, M.45, fi le JM 17192. 111 . Het Nationaal Dagblad, 12 November 1942. 112. Fahrbefehle Johan Lingmont (undated), NA/CABR, 2.09.09, fi le 94374. 113 . Report Johan Lingmont, 23 March 1943, NIOD, 176, fi le 148; daily report Johan Lingmont, 8 May 1943, NA/CABR, 2.09.09, fi le 24858. 114 . Letter management Turfi ndustrie-Trust Kaisadorys to Staatlichen Turfi ndustrie- Trust, 16 June 1942, YVA, M.45, fi le JM 17185. 115 . Testimonies Sonja Milner and Doris Mirman, YVA, O.93, fi les 7295 and 2670; report Johan Lingmont, 15 August 1943, NA/CABR, 2.09.09, fi le 24858; police record Jan Habing, 6 June 1947, NA/CABR, 2.09.09, fi le 109431; report Jan Habing, 14 August 1943, NIOD, 176, fi le 719. See also Alex Faitelson, The Escape from the IX Fort (Kaunas: s.n., 1998), 121. 116 . Letter Jan Habing to NOC-Head Offi ce, 8 August 1942, NIOD, 176, fi le 707. 117 . Report Jan Habing, 24 March 1943, NIOD, 176, fi le 707; agenda Johan Ling- mont, 20 May 1943, NA/CABR, 2.09.09, fi le 24858; police record Berend Klein, 3 March 1949, NA/CABR, 2.09.09, fi le 24858. 118. Report Johan Lingmont, concerning his meeting with Jan Habing (undated), NIOD, 176, fi le 148; letter Jan Habing to NOC-Head Offi ce, 8 August 1942, Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:42 01 October 2016 NIOD, 176, fi le 707; report Jan Habing, 24 March 1943, NIOD, 176, fi le 707. 119 . Police report Commander of the Security Police and the SD Lithuania, June 1943, LCVA, R 1399–1–26, fi le 160; testimony Gitta Goldberg, YVA, O.93, 20041; police record Abram Wolpianski, 13 July 1948, Landgericht Würz- burg, Ks 15/49, 3 February 1950, vol. 1, 6. Also: Arad, Ghetto in Flames, 368–371; Guzenberg, ‘The 1942 General Population Census’, 52; David Barnouw, Oostboeren, zeegermanen en turfstekers: Kolonisatie tijdens de Tweede Wereldoorlog (Amsterdam: Bert Bakker, 2004), 104. On Martin Weiss, see: Helmut Langerbein, Hitler’s Death Squads: The Logic of Mass Murder (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2003), 66–69. 136 The Benefi ts of Crime 120 . Arad, Ghetto in Flames, 367ff. 121 . Guzenberg, ‘The 1942 General Population Census’, 52; report of activities of the NOC over the third quarter of 1943, NIOD, 176, fi le 15. 122 . Report Jan Habing, 14 August 1943, NIOD, 176, fi le 719. 123 . Agreement on the take-over purchase, 11 August 1943, NIOD, 176, fi le 702; report J. Postma/NOC-Department of Finance, 10 June 1943, NIOD, 176, fi le 702; letter Johan Lingmont to NOC-Department Industry and Traffi c, 18 June 1943, NIOD, 176, fi le 702; letter Sonja Lingmont-van Dorp to NOI, 14 March 1944, NIOD, 176, fi le 702. 124 . Letter W. Bekker to Beschaffungsgesellschaft Ost, 29 June 1943, NIOD, 176, fi le 684; report W. Bekker, 22 July 1943, NIOD, 176, fi le 684; creden- tial Betriebsabwicklungsstelle für Generalbezirk Wiess Ruthenien (undated), NIOD, 176, fi le 684; trusteeship contracts, 11 December 1942, NIOD, 176, fi le 848; various documents, NIOD, 176, fi le 704. 125 . Various documents, NIOD, 176, fi le 697. 126 . Report W.T.M. de Lestrieux Hendrichs, 10 September 1942, NIOD, 176, fi le 136; travel report J.W. Bödeker, 13 November 1942, NIOD, 176, fi le 136. 127 . Letter Wilhelm Kube to Meinoud Rost van Tonningen, 9 September 1942, in: David Barnouw (ed.), Correspondentie van Mr. M.M. Rost van Tonningen II (Zutphen: Walburg pers, 1993), 80. 128 . Letter Klaas van Prooye to Jan Barendregt, 26 March 1943, NIOD, 176, fi le 659; letter J.W.A. van de Graaff to NOC-Directorate, 20 April 1944, NIOD, 176, fi le 123; travel report S.H. Kijlstra, concerning his travel to Lithuania from 9 March to 21 March 1944 (undated), NIOD, 176, fi le 1041; contract of sale, concerning Kestuciostrasse 37 Kaunas, 9 March 1944, NIOD, 176, fi le 1032. 129 . Letter P.A.G. Volckers to NOC-Head Offi ce, 25 August 1943, NIOD, 176, fi le 628. 130 . Report Jan Habing, 14 August 1943, NIOD, 176, fi le 719. 131 . Report fi rm Hoogland, 24 February 1944, NIOD, 176, fi le 122. Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:42 01 October 2016 6 Fragments of Colonial Dreams

THE IMPERIAL SPECTRUM

In the everyday life of Dutch recruits and NOC-representatives, Jews were not the only and often not the most prominent and visible antagonists. In their ghettos, labor camps, and working units, Jews were constrained to an existence largely isolated from the outer world. Moreover, on the long term their existence in the imagined Greater Germanic Empire was undesired. This was different with regards to other ethnic groups in the area. Although in propaganda and letters home the area was pictured as empty land, all involved were (or soon became) aware of the presence of a German occupying force and a large, predominantly Slavic and Baltic population. How imperial rule should look like in this particular context was a question that was often discussed within the NOC’s higher circles. In the early summer of 1942, Rost van Tonningen had agreed to make a contribution on four conditions: the NOC would be the single partner in the matter of Dutch employment in the occupied eastern territories; the employment of Dutch workers would be on a voluntary basis; Dutch and Germans would be treated equally; and, fi nally, the employment of Dutch volunteers would be under Dutch supervision. The cooperation, in other words, would be between equal partners. At the same time, Rost van Tonningen demanded some autonomy. His ultimate goal was the acquisition of land to establish exclusive zones of Dutch settlement. As for now, he could settle with the idea of Dutch working in closed formations and the control over Dutch economic activities in the occupied East. Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:42 01 October 2016 Central to the question of imperial rule was the question of how to relate to the (non-Jewish) local population living in the area. Already in June 1942, on the NOC’s fi rst fact-fi nding mission to the occupied East, Rost van Tonningen unfolded his ideas about the prospective interethnic relations. In a top-level meeting with German senior offi cials, the Dutch president of the recently founded organization pointed at the dangers of displaying too much courtesy towards native rulers. According to Rost van Tonnin- gen, the German occupation had triggered chauvinism amongst the local (in this particular case the Latvian and Estonian) elites, for they conceived 138 Fragments of Colonial Dreams the dethronement of Soviet rule as the precursor of national liberation. Yet nationalism was hard to reconcile with the greater good of Germanization for Rost van Tonningen. He argued that Latvians and Estonians did not consider themselves as Germanic and did not feel part of a greater Germanic unity. Moreover, to his mind, they could not be considered Germanic for they lacked the racial and cultural prerequisites. Instead of according them political power, the indigenous population should be submitted to German- ization ‘with brutal means’ (mit brutalen Mitteln). To strengthen his argument, Rost van Tonningen referred to the Dutch East Indies. Decades of colonial experience had taught the Dutch that local elites and national aspirations should be brushed aside in order to achieve a position of absolute hegemony.1 Almost immediately Rost van Tonningen’s words were criticized. Seyss- Inquart, for instance, accused Rost van Tonningen of acting presumptuously and speaking with more authority than was granted to him.2 In a letter to Georg Leibrandt, Rosenberg’s chief of political affairs, a German senior civil servant reproached Rost van Tonningen with a lack of political and historical knowledge of the area. Putting the people of the Reichskommissariat Ost- land on a par with the ‘Malayans’ of Dutch East Indies was fundamentally wrong. As opposed to Dutch East Indies, the Baltic countries had been the subject of German immigration for over seven hundred years. This region was in every way dissimilar to a colony and as opposed to colonies, the people and places in the Baltic were strongly affected by German culture.3 Rosenberg, however, tended to agree with Rost van Tonningen’s viewpoints and Von Harder valued Rost van Tonningen’s analysis, too. Accord- ing to him, Rost van Tonningen had proven to be ‘an excellent psychological observer’ (ein ausgezeichneter psychologischer Beobachter) and a ‘European- German’ (Europäisch-deutscher) thinker. Yet Von Harder stressed the importance of distinguishing short-term and long-term goals of German policy in the occupied East. As for now, collaboration with the indigenous elite was needed for an optimal exploitation of the area’s resources; their national agendas should be more or less respected. After the war, they would be stripped of political power as a ruthless policy of Germanization would be carried out. 4 To a certain extent, the variety of reactions to Rost van Tonningen’s words refl ected the ambivalence and lack of clarity in the German plans for Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:42 01 October 2016 the future of the occupied East and, more to the point, for the future of its non-Germanic inhabitants and the place of fellow Germanics in the Ger- manization program. In the summer of 1941, Hitler had been mentioning a mass immigration to the occupied eastern territories of some two to three million Germanic people, Germans and Germanics alike.5 The long-term plans developed by Himmler’s men in the course of 1941 implicated the formation of an upper class of Germanic settlers and a sharp reduction of the indigenous population. Rosenberg also presented his vision of a network of settlements, populated by millions of German and Germanic settlers, who Fragments of Colonial Dreams 139 would control the conquered local people and their land. How these Ger- manic peoples would relate to each other and when these measures and programs were to start, remained unclear. With these matters still largely being in abeyance, German local authorities defi ned their positions towards the local population. At all levels of German administration, opinions and attitudes varied widely. In occupied Ukraine, for instance, Erich Koch was famous for his profound contempt of Ukrainians. In his eyes, they were as worthless and replaceable as the ‘nig- gers’ of America. Any political say for Ukrainians was refuted: they merely were there to serve their German masters. 6 Other Germans embraced points of view diametrically opposed to the stance of Koch. In the Baltic States in particular, not in the least because Baltics in general were racially more valued than Ukrainians, German senior offi cials were more tempted to grant political power to ‘native’—Lithuanian, Estonian, and Latvian—authorities. Within the German parameters and under German supervision, local Bal- tic elites were allowed to develop a shadow administration which soon appeared highly effective in the consolidation of German rule and the implementation of German policy. The divergence of opinions and attitudes was refl ected within the NOC- organization, and, again, on the local level of volunteers and representatives. Whereas Rost van Tonningen represented a viewpoint of ruthless domination, others were more accommodating. They put emphasis on their mission as liberators, of perhaps ignorant, but innocent, people and their land. Their source of inspiration was the Boers in South Africa, allegedly living peacefully alongside natives. 7 One of the NOC’s experts on Eastern Europe, who visited Ukraine in August and September 1943, reported that years of Bolshevist rule had ‘proletarized’ the Ukrainian population. ‘Internally,’ though, the Ukrainians were still a highly civilized people. He made a plea to respect and acknowledge their rights. 8 NOC’s propaganda and research section (Nederlands Oost Instituut, or NOI) was guiding in the offi cial line of the NOC towards the local population and its land. From early 1943 onwards, the institute produced extensive written propaganda material. In addition, through short radio talks and fi lms, the Dutch audience was informed about the area and the ‘pioneering’ work of the Dutch settlers. For volunteers stationed in the occupied eastern territories, a journal was produced, called The Pioneer (De Pionier) . It had Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:42 01 October 2016 information on the geography, people, and history of the various regions in which the Dutch were present. Over and over again it was stressed that the NOC would bring prosper- ity and introduce ‘culture’ to the area, yet it was highly questionable as to what extent the local population would benefi t. More than acculturation or integration, the NOI advertised separation and marginalization of indigenous Slavic people.9 They might benefi t from the Germanic presence in their vicinity, yet they would never be their equals. The indigenous population was seen as inferior, racially, morally, and culturally. What they needed 140 Fragments of Colonial Dreams were the ‘strong hands and strong hearts’ of Germanic men. 10 The picture presented was that of an immutable, racially segregated, colonial society. Like Rost van Tonningen in his speech, propagandists of the NOC often made reference to the rich history and long tradition of Dutch colonial rule. It was assumed that Dutch men were particularly qualifi ed to take part in this new colonization project because of their ‘colonial experience.’ In fact, a handful of NOC-advisers, members of the board, and volunteers had been in Dutch colonies overseas. Willem Gerhardt, for example, had spent a few years of his life in Bogor (Buitenzorg), on the island of Java.11 In this highly segregated colonial society Gerhardt was part of the white ruling elite. Like many of his peers, he dreaded ‘yellow domination’ and years after his return Gerhardt still warned against the advance of the ‘Asian race.’12 Others, like father and son Van Leeuwen Boomkamp and Kock van Leeuwen, were economically closely tied to the archipelago. In the late thir- ties, the latter acquired a fortune as president of three companies, all specialized in production and trade of tropical goods in the Dutch East Indies.13 An employee at the peat moors of Baltoji Voke was born and raised in Palembang (South Sumatra) before he came to the Netherlands in 1936 to study mechanical engineering. 14 Several experts in water management who had worked in the Dutch East Indies applied for positions in the occupied East in 1942.15 They were told to wait until the conquest of the territory was consolidated. Others could start immediately. A former land surveyor in the Dutch East Indies, for instance, was appointed as supervisor of a farm in Belarus.16 Another volunteer had years of experience as a planter in tobacco in the Dutch East Indies. Early in 1943 he was put in charge of several tobacco plantations near Nikolayev and Kherson.17 Although some asserted that men like ‘the kind of the former Indian planter’18 were needed and pamphlets also repeatedly mentioned that the newly conquered areas in Eastern Europe would substitute the Dutch East Indies as a market for trade and a place for tropical agriculture, the archipelago was not taken as a blueprint for the occupied East. As opposed to the Dutch East Indies, this area on the European continent would be the destination of larger groups of emigrants. Hence, publicity campaigns preferred to pay attention to the historical treks of Dutch peasants to and in South Africa and, above all, to the eastern part of Europe. Germanic people, strong, skilled, and energetic, should go eastwards, ‘descendants of those Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:42 01 October 2016 Dutch men, who went as pioneers to the east and south and held up the good name of our descent,’ one protagonist of colonization stated.19 What the NOC aimed for and propagated was a settler colonialism. ‘To colonize is to transplant people,’ the NOI’s director Willem Goedhuys agreed with Himmler, and colonization of this specifi c part of Europe was needed to prevent a ‘numerical Slavic superiority’ on the continent. Firmly rooted, racially homogenous settlements of Dutch men would become centers of power and islands of Germanic civilization. 20 It was the NOC’s task to recruit and transfer Dutch volunteers to the area: racially fi t, politically Fragments of Colonial Dreams 141 trustworthy, and capable candidates who would live in largely secluded communities of settlers, amidst a native population that would undoubtedly accept Dutch presence as they would understand that the Dutch would bring progress to the area.

SCARCITY IN THE LAND OF BOUNTY

For all volunteers, the road to the occupied eastern territories went fi rst to Berlin. In the German capital, trains were changed. For destinations in the Reichskommissariat Ostland the trip continued through East Prussia to Kaliningrad (Königsberg) and often fi nished at the Lithuanian border in Chernyshevskoyeo (Eydtkau), where local trains, carts, motorized cars, and trucks were waiting to bring the Dutch to their place of destination. Initially, volunteers for Ukraine followed larger stretches of the same track, only to take a different connection in Kaliningrad. By the end of 1942, however, the itinerary was directed southwards, crossing the General Government and crossing the border east from Lviv. The fi rst Ukrainian city the Dutch called at was Rivne.21 Depending on the stopovers, the journey took on average some four to seven days. During that time, passengers had a chance to get a fi rst glance of ‘the East.’ Following his appointment as special representative of the NOC, engineer Johan Lingmont had left the Netherlands in February 1943. Passing through Berlin, the train brought him to prewar Poland and halted at the station of Lviv. From there, the journey continued by truck to the occupied eastern territories. Slowly the landscape changed, from small fi elds surrounded by fi r woods to rolling hills as far as the eye could see. It reminded Lingmont of the southern part of the Netherlands, but so much ‘larger and wider.’22 Ten months later Jantje S. said farewell to her friends and traveled with her husband into Lithuania. Due to allied bombing of Germany’s cities and railways and lack of logistic means, their trip was much more strenuous. The couple had to spend nights in provisory dormitories in Osnabrück, Hamburg, and Kaliningrad. From the Lithuanian border, carts brought them and their luggage close to Waka T, yet the last four miles they went on feet, as Jantje recalled, ‘through the jungle.’23 After days in overcrowded trains, these last miles were tough, but Jantje was awed by the endless hills Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:42 01 October 2016 and large estates: ‘this is all so very different to Holland, everything being so big, creating such a feeling of freedom.’24 Her observations were far from unique. Supervising some ten kolkhozes and over 25,000 acres of arable land, a farmer told his friend that he felt alive now that he had all the room he needed. 25 Coupled with images of ‘the immense vastness’26 was the presumed fertility of the soil. In NOC-propaganda, but also in private letters, the area was pictured as rich: ‘extensive, lush fi elds, just waiting.’ 27 A Dutch supervisor in Lithuania indeed needed superlatives to praise the soil conditions of his 142 Fragments of Colonial Dreams farm,28 yet it was Ukraine in particular that fi red the imagination: the mystic black earth of Ukraine could produce larger, better, and more crops than anywhere else in Europe. In a letter home, a farmer reported enthusiastically about the incredible fertility of the land under his command. 29 For other economic sectors, prospects were great and expectations were high, too. The entire area was in dire need of ‘capable Dutch hands,’ it read in NOC’s propaganda, and ‘the Germanic sword’ was needed to bring all industrial sectors into cultivation.30 A few soon got a taste of what was surely to come. Arrived in Rivne, Lingmont enjoyed his dinner in Ulmenhof, a prestigious German restaurant redecorated by Dutch teams of Werkdienst Holland. Superb food, liqueur, coffee, and the fi nest chocolate were served.31 Others were equally awed by the choice of luxury goods for sale in cities of the occupied East. Tobacco and vodka found ready Dutch buyers, and so did nylons and lingerie. 32 Before long the buzz spread back to The Hague. As a consequence, reporters and specialists of the NOC often expected a festive welcome in the occupied eastern territories, with copious meals and drinking-bouts. On their visit to Waka T, two high-ranked offi cials of the NOC demanded butter, fresh- caught trout, eggs, ham, bacon, and vodka.33

These splurges stood in stark contrast to everyday life in the occupied eastern territories and the fi rst impression of most of the recruits. They were mainly shocked by the immense poverty of the area. A new world began by crossing the border of prewar Poland: a world of dirt, cold and other hardships, a journalist noted.34 Several larger cities had been bombed by the German air force or deliberately demolished by retreating Russian troops. In rural areas, Dutch volunteers were witnesses to great poverty and neglect. In their letters home they wrote about the living conditions of the rural population: their scruffy huts made of wood or clay and straw, their fi lthy rags, and their few bony chickens and cows. In most of these villages, tele- phones, electricity, tab water, and central heating had not yet made its entry. ‘Backward,’ ‘primitive,’ and ‘lagging decades behind Western civilization’ were common qualifi cations used to describe rural life.35 ‘(Judeo-)Bolshevism’ was blamed for these dreadful conditions. At the offi cial opening ceremony of Waka T, Rost van Tonningen spoke of the ‘the East, impoverished by Bolshevism’ (durch den Bolschewismus verelendeten Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:42 01 October 2016 Ostraum) .36 ‘Let them all come here,’ Jantje S.’s husband remarked cynically in a letter to a friend, inviting his political opponents, ‘then they would see the blessings of Bolshevism.’37 According to his wife, Poles and Lithuanian slaughtering each other was the result of Bolshevism. 38 The Dutch had no idea of the harm ‘Bolshevism and Jewry’ had done, a peasant in Ukraine wrote to his wife.39 Obviously, the poverty also affected Dutch volunteers. The fi rst handful of Dutch peat experts to arrive in the occupied eastern territories was accommodated in barracks together with Lithuanians. Food supplies were poor, warm meals rare, and housing was bad. Within a few days all had lice Fragments of Colonial Dreams 143 and bugs. 40 The individual and collective farms the Germans expropriated in Belarus and Ukraine were often in a desolate state. Workers were gone and gear was damaged or stolen. The fi elds were full of weeds, the cattle was underfed and otherwise maltreated. Dutch peasants were generally shocked by the sight of such neglect. To their loved ones in the Netherlands, Dutch peasants complained about dirty buildings and the lack of basic household effects and equipment. 41 At their two education centers, near Vilnius and Baranivka/Rohachiv, living conditions were far from luxurious, especially during that startup period. In Ukraine, most of the furniture had disappeared from the premises. Electricity had been cut off and there were not enough beds. Food was just outright distasteful and unhealthy, causing diarrhea and gastroenteritis amongst the volunteers. Waka T. was damaged by the war and much of the supplies and gears stored at the estate had been stolen by the retreating Red Army. When the Dutch arrived, they found only one tractor. The fi rst group shared the amenities with Polish workers. Sanitary facilities were poor and a room in the attic was used as public toilet. It would take until April next year before the estate received electricity. With the installation of a water pump in September that year, the peasants at Waka T fi nally had drinking water.42 In Ukraine, Werkdienst Holland and above all its main camp soon acquired a bad reputation. The NOC encapsulated this organization in the autumn of 1942. Some six months before, Nimtz had been appointed supervisor of the employment of Dutch workers in Ukraine. German companies and authorities made their wishes known to Nimtz who forwarded the requests to The Hague. Many requests concerned building workers, for Koch’s castle, Nimtz’ villa, or other German objects of prestige in what was to become the German capital in Ukraine, Rivne.43 A handful of Dutch building workers accepted a position as guards, mostly of the German prison in Rivne. At the same time, recruitment was targeted at Dutch people who would like to settle in Ukraine and to open up a small business or workshop, in Rivne and elsewhere. Most of these candidates were also accommodated in the barracks. Particularly bothersome were the delays and mistakes in payments. It did not take long before disillusioned, angered recruits returned to the Netherlands.44 When the NOC took on the supervision of Werkdienst Holland, in the Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:42 01 October 2016 early autumn of 1942, it was determined to put a swift end to all the mistakes. A new procedure of selection and recruitment was introduced and new agreements with German offi cials were made to guarantee timely and correct salary payments. 45 It did not succeed. New series of letters of complaints were written, this time addressed to the NOC head offi ce. Men were protesting against the small portions of food, the poor hygiene in the barracks, and the work they had to perform. ‘I was told I could let my family come over and start my own business here—instead, we recruits live in barracks, lack proper clothing and food,’ one man complained. 46 Another volunteer criticized the overcrowded barracks in Rivne, where thieves had a 144 Fragments of Colonial Dreams clear fi eld as locks were missing. Toilets and basins, located in the open air outside the barracks, were dirty and cold and as a consequence, a substantial number of volunteers suffered from chronic diarrhea. Personal hygiene was poor as the workers were short of decent footwear and clothing, and their camp lacked showers and laundry facilities. Most workers never changed their underwear, an eyewitness commented. 47 Another volunteer confi rmed his story and told the NOC that hygiene in Rivne was so bad that every newcomer fell ill immediately. Large swarms of fl eas were hopping everywhere in and around the camp. Although the barracks were equipped with some sanitary facilities by the end of November, other matters did not improve. On the contrary: food supplies grew smaller (and more distasteful) and proper clothes for the winter months were not distributed. On top of that, German authorities had suddenly decided to withhold taxes and health insurance costs of the wages. More cutbacks followed in the next months, ruining the already poor atmosphere. 48 Alarmed by the news, the NOC head offi ce sent several inspectors to Rivne. Their reports were just as discomforting. ‘Never in my life have I seen so much dirty mess as in the barracks of Werkdienst Holland,’ one of them concluded.49 Approached by a group of Dutch workers, Van Eek inspected the place and advised the NOC to intervene as quickly as possible on behalf of the neglected Dutch men.50 A group of three inspectors visiting Rivne early in January of 1943 were also shocked by the sight of the men and their accommodation. A snowstorm blew on the day of their visit, but the hundreds of Dutch volunteers in the barracks had nothing to protect themselves against the cold: no stove, fi rewood, proper blankets, or warm clothes.51 For thousands of workers assigned to units of the SS Frontier Workers Enterprise, conditions were often even worse. Until early 1943, individual Dutch builders were responsible for recruitment. Lists of candidates were suggested to Furnier Beton, a company that was in touch with the authorities of the SS. The NOB had taken over recruitment and care for this organization after news of all the faults reached the Netherlands. Campaigns were started in the late spring of 1943 and in May that year the fi rst NOB- volunteers left for the occupied eastern territories. By the end of the year, over 4,000 Dutch SS Frontier Workers were recruited.52 The selection and transfer of SS Frontier Workers had been pursued in great haste and problems in housing and care soon announced themselves. Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:42 01 October 2016 Recruits were being put on trains without the right documents and basic provisions. Once arriving in Berlin, Dutch supervisors were told to leave and return to the Netherlands, leaving the men behind in camps of the SS. Without proper clothing and shoes, the fi rst batches were sent to building works just behind the front line, near Pskov in northern Russia. In a swampy, mosquitos-infested area they were sleeping in tents. Except for a small stream, there were no sanitary facilities in this place.53 By August 1943, most of the Dutch volunteers employed by the SS Fron- tier Workers Enterprise 175 were divided into four to fi ve camps, in northern Fragments of Colonial Dreams 145 Russia and Latvia. In spite of good intentions, the NOB did not succeed in making much improvement. Footwear and clothing remained a main concern. Dutch supervisors on the spot observed that their recruits, ‘Dutch- Germanics’ on paper, were being treated even worse than the nearby Jewish forced laborers.54 Offi cials sent by the NOB to investigate the situation met larger groups of Dutch workers, barefooted and in rags, ‘degenerated, demoralized, impoverished.’55 Family members came to the offi ce in The Hague to complain about the lack of social care, but also about the delays in payments of salary.56 Finally, in December 1943, Rost van Tonningen confronted a higher offi cial of the SS in the Netherlands about the dreadful living conditions of Dutch SS Frontier workers. A reassuring message was sent from the Berlin headquarters, but in actuality little improved. 57

THE LONELINESS OF A PIONEER

In particular amongst the craftsmen employed by Werkdienst Holland, the Dutch peasants, vegetable growers, and peat workers, the ideal of settler colonialism was cherished. Jan Habing, who advised the NOC on the choice of a moor in Lithuania, imagined the valley in Baltoji Voke as the perfect spot for Dutch settlement. The scenery here was stunning—a valley with a river meandering through fi elds of rye, surrounded by dense forests. Habing was dreaming of a formation of brick houses, where Dutch families would live and eat their homegrown vegetables. For this, he selected men he knew and who lived close to his Dutch hometown. He discussed his plans with Reinder van Veen, NOC’s expert of gardening, who immediately encouraged him to prepare the soil for growing vegetables.58 In the eyes of many, a crucial prerequisite for a successful settler’s community would be the transfer of wives and children. A permanent settlement required families, not just working men. Already before the NOC started its work, the idea of moving close relatives of recruits to the area had been part of the plan. CULANO, for instance, had announced publicly that family members would join their beloved ones ‘on a date to be specifi ed later.’59 Farmers leaving the Netherlands late 1941 reckoned that their wives and possibly their children would come once their position in the occupied East was safe and stable. Soon they realized that this would take more time than Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:42 01 October 2016 expected. One of the men of Staf’s group of trustees wrote to his superior about his doubts in this respect. The living conditions in the occupied East were so dangerous that he was not expecting to bring his wife or children to the area in the near future. 60 Family migration was also on the long-list of the NOC, but the transfer of smaller groups of men was the fi rst step: large- scale migration would come later.61 In a total of fi ve to six thousand volunteers, the few dozen Dutch women present in the East could hardly make a difference. By far the majority of recruits were male. They lived with fellow countrymen on farms, in barracks, 146 Fragments of Colonial Dreams or in other accommodations. Most of the farmers in a supervising position were clustered in groups of two to fi ve men. In January 1943, a Frisian farmer informed his wife that he had left the Ukrainian education center. After some fi fteen miles in a sleigh, he and fourteen other recruits reached the railway station and went to Kiev. From there, the men traveled in cou- ples to rural estates in the vicinity. Accompanied by one other Dutch volunteer, the farmer himself was stationed in Bila Tserkva. 62 Near Smilavichy in Belarus, four farmers and one mechanic found employment. During the day, all were at different places performing their work; at night, they gathered together at the largest estate.63 Not far away, two other Dutch farmers ran a larger expropriated farm. 64 In the rayon of Novohrad-Volynskyi, a Dutch farmer appointed Stützpunktleiter shared responsibility for ten kolkhozes with his Dutch assistant. 65 Although these farmers lived close together, most farmers did not. Whereas the NOC had been promoting Dutch employment in closed formations and at least some of the recruits had left the Netherlands believ- ing that they would indeed be working alongside fellow countrymen and under a Dutch supervisor, most Dutch farmers lived on their own. Scattered across the area, they had their share of loneliness. A farmer on a larger farm wrote a friend that he was excited to go on leave ‘after months in the desolate wilds.’66 A colleague of his in Skvyra used similar words in a letter to his wife: a half year ‘in the jungle’ made him yearn for home.67 Another volunteer who had been in the occupied East since November 1941 repeatedly complained to his comrades that no one wrote to him. They should understand that it was not easy ‘in this wasteland.’68 A vegetable grower heading the NOC-enterprise in Malpils also mentioned the loneliness at the estate. Malpils itself was a hamlet of just a few farmsteads. It took one hour by horse to reach the station closest by. From there, the daily train to Riga consumed another four hours. 69 Instead of the company of relatives and comrades, there was a vast, impenetrable ‘wilderness.’

FRIENDS AND FOES

Some might have taken comfort in the thought that they were pioneers, vanguards in the process of colonization, yet for many, the occupied East Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:42 01 October 2016 was not the imagined colonial land. Their reveries of some sort of Dutch autonomous communities were largely frustrated by the German occupation policy that was ever more moving into the direction of instant exploitation to obtain the resources needed for a lingering war. Plunder was hard to reconcile with long-term plans of cultivation and colonization. The growing primacy of immediate economic gains in German policy also affected Dutch relations to the local, non-Jewish population. The NOC as well as its recruits generally considered the peoples of the occupied eastern territories as different, everything but Dutch. Head of NOI Goedhuys Fragments of Colonial Dreams 147 needed a series of comparisons to aptly describe the Ukrainians: ‘lazy like the Scythes, hardened like the Huns, skilled with arms like the Goths, tanned like the Indians, cruel like the Samaritans, lions they are, just as smart as the Turks and incredibly mean as the Tartars.’ In appearance, talents, character, and behavior they had nothing in common with Germanic people.70 Maintaining distance towards the locals was repeated in all advertising. ‘In a way, we are going to build up our culture, our western culture, and that is only possible with men, aware of their responsibility towards the inferior natives,’ Goedhuys thought.71 ‘A volunteer should be secure,’ a NOC- reporter noted, ‘that his position is above the natives.’ 72 In a series of articles a member of the NOC-board warned Dutch volunteers, who were ‘leading men of German blood,’ against ‘blending’ with different blood. 73 These ideas seeped through to the lower level of men in the fi eld. Van Eek, NOC-representative in Ukraine, stipulated that Dutch Stützpunktleiter were ‘representing the Germanic race in the East’ and should therefore be a model of righteousness and discipline. 74 In Gdov, the Dutch supervisor of the NOC’s fi shing enterprise wrote similar words to his volunteers: they were expected to behave decently, and ‘as sons of a civilized and cultivated people’ their behavior should be an example to others. 75 Everywhere, in their lodgings and at their work places, Dutch volunteers met these ‘others.’ The domestic staff in Waka T counted several Polish workers. In the center in Ukraine, the daughter of Roskam supervised some fi ve to ten Ukrainian women helping in the kitchen and household. In the main camp of Werkdienst Holland, in Rivne, Ukrainian cleaning ladies were employed. On farms, Dutch supervisors and managers made use of the services of local maids and cooks. In many places Russian POWs were working for Dutch recruits, too. 76 Dutch Stützpunktleiter, each responsible for the exploitation of a larger area, which had some eight to ten collective farms (mostly kolkhozes) and various hamlets, depended on the cooperation of local managers and chiefs of the farms and hamlets.77 On arrival in Gdov near Lake Peipus, Dutch fi shermen employed local girls to cook and clean. Shortly after, Russian workers arrived to carry out building work for the fi shermen. Most of them were Russian farmers living nearby. Their work was not completely voluntary as they were ordered to do so by German authorities. They did not receive money for their work. Instead, a Dutch supervisor handed out a small amount of tobacco to those Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:42 01 October 2016 ‘who deserved it.’ When in July 1943 a smokehouse was built, he sent in a request for another twenty-fi ve local girls. Eventually they would come, barefoot and without proper clothing. While they had to stand on unheated concrete fl oors, ‘in puddles and dirt,’ the Dutch supervisor asked for twenty- fi ve pairs of wooden shoes.78 Although some recruits deemed the Ukrainians unworthy of the rich soil they lived upon, 79 others accepted their presence, yet underscored the importance of disengagement. ‘When you treat them [locals—GvF] too friendly and well, they will be within a few days outspoken or even cheeky,’ a peasant 148 Fragments of Colonial Dreams working in Belarus wrote. 80 Receiving good treatment, he added, was a luxury they were not used to and (therefore) could not handle well. Their laziness was often a result of a too friendly treatment, a colleague agreed. 81 Many, in particular men in supervisory positions, commented on this supposed laziness of the indigenous population. 82 The NOC-representative in the predominantly Polish city of Vilnius characterized the Poles as slow and untrustworthy: ‘they talk and boast enormously, but [when it comes to] making progress—forget it!’83 Elisabeth W. was of a similar opinion: Lithuanian men looked like ‘monsters,’ Lithuanian women were fi lthy, unreliable, ugly— and lazy.84 In a letter to The Hague, one of the leaders of the fi rst cohorts of Dutch peasants was completely astonished with the slow working pace of the locals, being ‘lazy, as I have never experienced before.’85 Obviously, this assumed lethargy of the local population should be seen in the light of developments in German occupational policy. Lootings organized by German authorities robbed the local population of their means of existence. Germany’s hunt for manpower put great strain on the relations between occupiers and occupied. The large-scale raids and deportations to Germany not only diminished the number of fi t men available for work within the occupied territories; they also sobered up the local population. Against this background of unrestrained German terror and, simultaneously, military advance of the Red Army, local people were increasingly less inclined to cooperate. 86 Unable to break the circle, German authorities resorted to violence. German troops and their local auxiliaries descending upon hamlets became a common sight.

Some recruits were shocked by the use of force and violence towards locals. Visiting Lithuania’s peat moors, a Dutch man condemned the performance of a German supervisor, who without any obvious reason was shooting at defenseless female forced laborers.87 A manager of a kolkhoz informed the NOC about the behavior of his superior, a German Stützpunktleiter, who beat his local workers badly, drank excessively, and, slave to his urges, got mixed up in sexual affairs ‘with all kinds of women and girls.’ 88 After the war, a former Dutch Stützpunktleiter could still remember the German reprisals and the dozens of Ukrainians hung on lantern poles in the streets of Nikolayev.89 Yet drunkenness and aggressive behavior were not restricted to Germans. There are numerous incidents involving Dutch men misbehaving in a com- Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:42 01 October 2016 parable way. Drunken Dutch men were frequently spotted in the streets and fi elds of the occupied eastern territories. The Dutch supervisor of the NOC-vegetable farm in Malpils, for instance, was often sharing drinks with his Latvian workers. 90 Dutch fi shermen were notorious for their alcohol consumption. Already in the train towards Lake Peipus, several bottles of vodka had been consumed. At their stopover, two fi shermen were lost and later found in a hotel room, together with seven local women. In Gdov they had soon acquired a reputation as heavy drinkers. In October 1943 one of them was put in custody because of public drunkenness.91 Fragments of Colonial Dreams 149 On his journey to Rivne in February 1943, Lingmont observed the excessive consumption of spirits by members of Werkdienst Holland, too. More supervision was needed, by a man of character, or ‘all these men will per- ish.’92 A few months later, he sent a comparable message to The Hague, this time concerning Dutch farmers in Lithuania. Christmas festivities in Vilnius had been pleasant, except for the handful of Dutch peasants who had been drinking for days and days. Again his advice was to improve supervision, ‘or otherwise our Dutch young farmers will succumb, if not by women, surely by vodka and moonshine.’93 In Waka T, two drunken Dutch volunteers were said to have been urinating from a window on the fi rst fl oor.94 Not far from Vilnius German police arrested a Dutch farmer who had shot a woman when he was drunk. 95 The NOC head offi ce also received mails concerning drinking bouts at the Dutch center near Rohachiv. On one occasion, for nights in a row farmers and staff were said to have been drunk. 96 One of the suspects would become a successful Stützpunktleiter, in charge of several kolkhozes near Skvyra. His household became notorious for drinking binges and orgies. A visitor reported to the NOC about his night in Skvyra, when he was introduced to four Ukrainian girls who appeared to be the Dutch Stützpunktle- iter’s personal (sex-)slaves. 97 Alcohol and (local) women often came in pairs, yet in a few rare cases encounters between Dutch men and local women were of a friendlier, or even romantic, nature. According to his postwar statements, the draughtsman of Baltoji Voke was terribly spoiled by nuns from a nearby convent. Two of his colleagues were romantically involved with Polish girls. 98 In her postwar testimonies Holocaust survivor Sara Ginaite-Rubinson men- tions her love affair with a Dutch vegetable grower working near Kaunas.99 A farmer who went missing in Ukraine was spotted in Kaunas accompanied by his Ukrainian mistress. 100 A higher manager of the leased rural estate near Lentvaris was fi red after rumors of his affair with a Polish maid. 101 One of the recruits in Waka T even married a local girl, without the required offi - cial permission of the German authorities. He was given notice and returned to Amsterdam with his young Polish bride.102 A few Dutch recruits were also using violence against their local workers. A vegetable grower in Lithuania, for example, was investigated by German authorities after complaints of his aggressive behavior towards his person- Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:42 01 October 2016 nel.103 Having watched German supervisors hitting their (Belarussian) personnel, a farmer from the early CULANO-batch feared that it would not take long before he would resort to violence, too: because of their laziness he was gripped ‘every now and then’ by the desire to deal a blow on their backs. 104 For some, this fear had already become reality. ‘Every day,’ a farmer confi ded to his wife, he needed a piece of wood to get people to work. Some- times he had hit so hard that his victim could not walk for days. ‘This is how life goes here,’ he continued. Once a week there were drinks at the residence of his German superior, which gave him the heart to carry on. 105 150 Fragments of Colonial Dreams Some gruesome stories buzzed around, concerning the Dutch Stützpunkt- leiter in Skvyra. Economically, his approach appeared successful and he managed to improve agriculture in the region under his supervision. 106 Yet his behavior towards his workers was said to be tyrannical. ‘A true poten- tate,’ a Dutch eyewitness reported: ‘a man with an attitude like a czar,’ another added. 107 Locals and POWs put to work in his region were in danger of being shot if they performed poorly. One day in early autumn 1943, a raid was organized in a nearby village. That morning, only a handful of villagers had shown up for work. To motivate the others, it was said that seven villagers were publicly shot.108

Besides work, company, and entertainment, the Dutch also needed local people for trade. Before their departure, recruits had been told to pack clothes and some basic items. Candidates of Werkdienst Holland and NOB had to bring their toolkit, too. Some products were shipped from The Hague, but for the larger part, for products for their personal care and their work, the Dutch were dependent on local sales- and tradesmen. Because of the overall scarcity, many things were not available legally and had to be bought on the black market. In all of the occupied eastern territories, trade by barter revived and Dutch recruits joined in without much hesitation.109 Several were drawn in deeper than was strictly necessary to obtain what was needed. From the moment the fi rst volunteers arrived in the occupied East, alarming messages reached The Hague, concerning Dutch volunteers entangled in black marketeering. Of the farmers to arrive in Riga early 1942, some had traded their valuables for food and luxury goods.110 A Dutch building unit, taken on to embellish Waka T late in the autumn of 1942, soon discovered that building material was scarce in Lithuania and could therefore be sold for exorbitant prices on the black market. Large cans of paint, nails, tools, and various pieces of furniture shipped in from the Netherlands had disappeared from the stock rooms. Years later a visitor noticed that, for miles around Waka T, houses were painted in the same color as the estate.111 In other places, too, Dutch volunteers became involved in the illegal buying (or stealing) and selling of goods. During the winter of 1943/1944, when the lake was frozen and most fi shermen had left Gdov, the few who had stayed behind stole cans of oil from the Wehrmacht.112 A farmer in Ukraine was sent back after it appeared that he had been trading illegally. 113 Another Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:42 01 October 2016 farmer stationed in Lithuania had robbed two newcomers and pressed them into selling other items. He, too, was fi red and put on a train back to the Netherlands. 114 A man in charge of a dairy factory in Ukraine was accused of violating rationing regulations and shared his fate. 115 Even some NOC- employees were implicated. Rumor spread that one of them had arrived in Ukraine with a suitcase full of ladies’ stockings and women’s wear, clearly to be sold on the black market. 116 The summit of these illegal practices was Rivne, where hundreds of disillusioned Dutch volunteers of Werkdienst Holland spent their days in packed Fragments of Colonial Dreams 151 barracks, without proper clothing and care. Theft and barter were rampant here. Some volunteers even sold their boots and uniforms to obtain other desirables. Several men suspected of black marketeering were being arrested by the German police and put in jail, but this did not scare others. Because of their complicity in black marketeering, Dutch men in Rivne were nick- named by their German colleagues and Ukrainian locals ‘white Jews.’117

GERMANIC BROTHERHOOD

For the NOC, these developments were unfavorable. In the eyes of the Dutch organizers, the volunteers represented the Germanic race in the East, supposedly superior in physique, character, and moral. To be taken seriously by their German partners, the behavior of Dutch men in the area should be irreproachable. What they were witnessing, however, were sloppily dressed drunks, hagglers, swindlers, and thieves. The NOC head offi ce, convinced that a tighter grip on its local representatives would force improvement, sent off hundreds of directives which almost immediately created tensions, mostly between NOC director Krantz and the NOC’s representatives in the fi eld. According to them, Krantz’ directives often demonstrated how little he understood of the situation and living conditions in the East. When Krantz demanded Van Eek to see to it that Dutch recruits should not eat copious meals in public, the Ukraine representative sneered back that neither public places nor copious meals were to be found in Ukraine anymore.118 His colleague in Kaunas tendered his resignation after he was overruled by a NOC-reporter who had come to the area with special mandates granted by Krantz.119 Of all representatives, Lingmont was most dismissive of Krantz’ med- dling. Their correspondence was full of mutual recriminations. According to Krantz, his representative in Vilnius was a quarrel monger, impudent, and prodigal. Lingmont thought of his director as both ignorant and presump- tuous.120 By the late spring of 1944 relations between the two sank below freezing point. Lingmont delivered one fi nal blow, accusing Krantz openly of ‘woman-like cattiness’ and divide and rule tactics ‘so characteristic of Jews.’121 From this point, there was no turning back. Two weeks later Ling- mont handed in his resignation.122 Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:42 01 October 2016 Clearly, Krantz lacked the capacity to handle his representatives tactfully and many of his instructions were indeed often patronizing and demanding. Possibly, he was invigorated by pressure from above. Rost van Tonningen, founding father and main fi nancier of the NOC, meticulously watched every step of his old business friend. German authorities were holding Krantz responsible for the successes and failures of the entire enterprise. In June 1942, they had approved of the establishment of the NOC in order to end all existing predicaments—in recruitment and care—and to prevent new problems. They had believed that adequate coordination and sharp supervision 152 Fragments of Colonial Dreams were demanded to turn the employment of Dutch volunteers in the occupied East into a success and to secure Dutch participation in the colonization of the area in the long run. Rosenberg had put one of his most trusted employees—Malletke—in charge. Another employee—Puttkammer—was stationed in The Hague to keep an eye on the ins and outs of the NOC. Initially, collaboration between Malletke’s staff and the NOC had been smooth and the Ostministerium clearly appreciated the time (and money) the NOC invested in the project, but disquieting messages sent by authorities in the occupied East soon reached the Ostministerium. In late autumn of 1942, Nimtz, for example, complained bitterly about the caliber of most men recruited for Werkdienst Holland. According to his sources, patients suffering from syphilis, tuberculosis, and chronic infections had been accepted by the NOC. Furthermore, moral sense was bitterly low and Dutch men were engaged in stealing, in black marketeering, and in public disturbances. 123 Their appearance was shabby as they were often wearing dirty, incomplete, and different kinds of uniforms. Etiquette, like saluting German superiors in public, was not being observed. In short, they were undisciplined and ‘not soldier-like’ (unsoldatisch) .124 These qualifi cations were repeated by other German authorities in the fi eld. In his early letters to Rost van Tonningen, Gebietskommissar Wulff had been downright complimentary. The NOC had chosen the district he ruled as one of the centers for Dutch settler’s colonization and Wulff was welcoming Dutch volunteers with open arms. Yet before long it was dawn- ing to him that the employment of Dutch farmers in this area was anything but a success. In the fi rst six months forty-six Dutch volunteers had been employed in agriculture, mainly as supervisors and administrators of several farms. By April 1943, only twelve were still in their job. According to a German police report, just one of them met German expectations and performed well. 125 Still, the tone of Wulff’s messages to The Hague stayed positive, but gradually, his appreciation for Dutch initiatives was diminishing. Late spring 1944 Rost van Tonningen was told that Dutch farmers sent to Lithuania were easy to get on with, but were lacking professional knowledge. ‘A crisis of confi dence,’ Wulff’s colleague concluded early in May of 1944. 126 He and Wulff were most upset by the news of various close relations between Dutch and Poles. Wulff’s initial plan to reduce ‘the Polish element’ in Lithuanian agriculture by Dutch substitution was largely under- Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:42 01 October 2016 mined by Dutch volunteers themselves. 127 Dutch vegetable growers also became the subject of German criticism. Two men, still praised for their work in Lithuania, were verbally attacked for their later work in Estonia. In May 1944 a letter was sent to Von Harder, complaining about their neglect: they were poorly equipped and lazy; they had been selling seeds and bulbs on the black market and, on top of it, they had left the country without permission. The proverbial Dutch diligence was completely absent with these men, the author continued: they were everything but ‘colonial-pioneers.’128 Fragments of Colonial Dreams 153 In due course, German central authorities received increasingly worrying messages about Dutch men in the occupied eastern territories. In the summer of 1943, Koch’s expert for agriculture Helmut Körner sent a letter directly to Rosenberg. Although he praised the qualities of the fi rst batches of Dutch farmers sent to Ukraine, he was less satisfi ed with the latest groups. Many had resigned within a few months after their arrival in the occupied East; some had shown only interest in fi nancial gains; others had been too old or too young: most were ideologically indifferent; and all, Körner concluded, were lacking military discipline.129 Forced into the defensive, the NOC sent a string of reporters and inspectors to different parts of the region to size up the situation and to gather fi rsthand information. Their observations were congruent with the fi ndings of German authorities. They, too, were struck by the unlawful and undisciplined behavior of Dutch volunteers. 130 Some exerted themselves in their search for explanations. In their reports it was stated that Dutch people were not used to thinking in (racial and social) hierarchies. In other words: the Dutch men felt uneasy saluting superiors and treating ‘natives’ as lesser human beings. 131 The majority of the NOC-reporters suggested that the attitude of Ger- man offi cials towards Dutch volunteers was the main cause of the bad behavior of Dutch volunteers. Germans on the spot were said to be cool, sometimes openly hostile towards their Germanic Dutch brothers. Habing suspected his German partners in peat exploitation to be totally unwilling to work together with Dutch colleagues. A specialist in agricultural affairs had met several German offi cials in Ukraine, who all seemed to be reluctant to discuss the matter of Dutch employment. Others visiting the area on behalf of the NOC were having similar sobering experiences. Apparently, not every German offi cial was interested in collaboration with the Dutch.132 In talks with these and other NOC-reporters, but also in direct correspondence with the NOC-head offi ce, Dutch recruits themselves were in similar words complaining about the way German local offi cials were treating them. It was held against the head offi ce in The Hague that little was done to make things better, but the local German authorities were considered the main malefactors. They were forcing them into subordinate positions, were putting them on desolate and dangerous posts, and were demanding strict obedience of their rules. Employees of Werkdienst Holland, for instance, Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:42 01 October 2016 were holding the German management responsible for their dreadful situation. The Germans had provided Dutch accommodation in rickety barracks, unilaterally changed their wages, and failed to provide suffi cient food, clothes, and footwear.133 On a higher level, negotiations continued, but they, too, turned into series of mutual accusations. Nimtz and his men blamed the NOC for poor examinations; the general reply of Dutch offi cials was that Nimtz and his men did not manage the Werkdienst properly. The insuffi cient care, the irregular payments and cutbacks in salaries, supposedly all Nimtz’ responsibility, had caused discontent, which in turn had led to bad behavior. 134 154 Fragments of Colonial Dreams Dutch misconduct was triggered by Germans, treating the Dutch like ‘a slightly better sort of natives,’ one NOC-reporter noted bitterly, and many subscribed to this causal line of thought.135 The high number of—voluntary and involuntary—resignations amongst volunteers was another manifesta- tion of the general disappointment amongst volunteers, allegedly brought about by the insensitive behavior of German offi cials in the area. Before their departure, volunteers had been made to believe that they were the best pick. They were told to be proud to be the sons of a nation celebrated for its colonial wins, who would intuitively know how to cultivate and exploit the resources of a foreign country, and how to rule foreign people. Their supposed racial superiority would qualify them even more. In their understanding of the Nazi laws of races, they were Germanics and on a par with Germans. In consequence, most recruits expected to be on equal footing with Germans in the occupied East. Their point of view was worded in the NOC’s propaganda and shared by leading Dutch men in the exploitation and colonization of the occupied East. In the prospective Greater Germanic Reich of the NOC, Dutch and Germans were both part of the ruling elite of Germanic people. Moreover, in the project of cultivation and colonization of the occupied eastern territories they would be equal partners with sovereign authority, at least towards their own nationals. In the summer of 1942, Rost van Tonningen had announced his four conditions for cooperation. Of these four conditions, only one was met. Early initiatives like Borggreven’s were soon to be extinguished completely and by early 1943, the NOC indeed reached the much sought for monopoly in recruitment and care. Yet the principle of voluntary employment was abandoned when the NOC agreed to select SS Frontier Workers amongst prisoners in German detention camps in the Netherlands. Furthermore, although the NOC managed to exercise authority in places under lease, by far the majority of volunteers were subjected to direct German supervision—like they had been in the days of CULANO. And like in those days before the founding of the NOC, there was a general sense of inequality and of coming second, after Germans.136 With time, mutual allegations and complaints were only increasing. They were clear manifestations of more fundamental incompatibilities of Dutch and German plans. The grand designs of cultivation and colonization for Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:42 01 October 2016 the area had been supported by both partners in the team, but the issues of Dutch sovereignty and Germany’s place as primus inter pares in the prospective Greater Germanic Reich had remained unsolved. In the actual collaboration these issues would be the cause of misunderstandings and dis- agreements. The radicalization of German occupation policy was adding to the tensions. In due time, in acute need of resources and manpower, Ger- man authorities were giving more and more priority to instant exploitation. At the same time they were less and less inclined to respect Dutch claims. Whereas the NOC by and large stuck to the initial plan of cultivation and Fragments of Colonial Dreams 155 colonization of the occupied eastern territories, German activities in the area were increasingly motivated by the short-term goal of economic gains. According to most German local offi cials the Dutch simply had to comply with German occupation policy.

UNDER ATTACK

In June 1942, opportunities in the occupied East had seemed to be without limits. In interviews and writings, the occupied East was pictured as vast, fertile, yet virgin territory, largely untouched by civilization, fi rmly in the grip of the German army. ‘Natives’ would be grateful to be freed from the ‘Judeo-Bolshevist’ yoke and would happily cooperate. If not, they would be forced to bow to their new masters. This was the time of the Wehrmacht’s launch of the offensive on Stalin- grad. A general sense of optimism was prevailing in German higher military circles, and consequently also in The Hague, amongst those Dutch men involved in plans to participate in the cultivation and colonization of the occupied eastern territories. In the fi rst fl ush of military victory, they had been organizing exploratory missions, recruiting the fi rst Dutch ‘pioneers’ and signing contracts which would secure a part in the exploitation of the region’s resources.137 By December 1942, larger sums of money had been invested in the project, yet the NOC stood still in its infancy when the Battle of Stalingrad was decided in February 1943 and Soviet troops were taking over the military initiative in the East. In the following months, slowly, but surely, the Red Army pushed westwards. Before the end of the year, parts of the former Reichskommissariat Ukraine were already in Russian hands. Inevitably, the steady advance of the Red Army left little time to turn plans into successes and the NOC’s last quarterly reports, written in March and June 1944, read like a long list of aborted plans and failed projects. In Ukraine, hardly anything had taken off. The successful projects were few and easily identifi ed: aside from the establishment of an educational center for Dutch peasants, the lease of two larger rural estates near Kiev and a turf moor, a handful of artisan businesses, a few exploiters of factories, and some supervisors of saw mills and dairy factories, not much had been realized. Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:42 01 October 2016 Projects that had been started had to be abandoned in the closing months of 1943. The larger, prestigious NOC-estates near Kiev, for instance, were evacuated only seven months after the lease contract had been signed and the fi rst Dutch peasants had arrived. The four Dutch directors of dairy factories in Melitopol had also left their posts, as well as the supervisors of factories and businesses in Ukraine. Werkdienst Holland was liquidated, most SS Frontier Workers stationed in Ukraine were sent to Germany to work, and the Dutch dredgers had left their boats on the Dnepr. Dutch fi shermen near Lake Peipus were evacuated in late 1943. The only successes the NOC 156 Fragments of Colonial Dreams could still count these days were located in the Baltic countries: the potato harvest in Waka T had been excellent, the production of lemonade in the former factories of Saltinis had been multiplied, and the car mechanics from Rotterdam had made the Wehrmacht into their main client. 138 Not least, Germany’s military defeats on the eastern front translated themselves into low numbers of applications for the East. From October 1943 onwards, hardly any Dutch citizen still wished to go. Just as off-putting was the news of Dutch casualties at and just behind the front: Dutch soldiers of the Waffen-SS, but also recruits of the NOC. At the end of the year 1943, some eighty-nine Dutch civilians stationed in the occupied eastern territories had been killed. Three months later the death toll had risen to 103. 139 Gradually, the occupied eastern territories had become a synonym for hardships and fi ascos—and also for mortal danger. Nearly all of the deceased civilians had been murdered by partisans. From the day they had set foot in the occupied eastern territories, Dutch volunteers were told about partisans. In White Ruthenia, armed resistance had been signifi cant since the early days of German occupation. Inhabitants of this part of the occupied East were less inclined to regard the German soldiers as liberators (from Soviet domination). Already in the fi rst months of German rule, Germany’s brutal occupation policy, aiming for mass starvation and the elimination of a large percentage of the Belarussian population, had driven many into the arms of Soviet and other partisan groups. With its vast swamps and dense forests the countryside was well suited for guerilla warfare.140 After the cold winter months, partisan activities revived in the spring of 1942. The Wehrmacht Intelligence Service noticed that the number of raids quadrupled between April 1 and June 30. Despite the execution of thousands of partisans, by late September their activities were judged ‘unbearable.’141 White Ruthenia, and in particular the area around Vileyka where the German LBGO had its regional offi ce, was also the destination for most of the early CULANO-volunteers. They had arrived in this region from March 1942 onwards and inevitably became infected by the widespread fear for partisans. In numerous letters home partisans were the main topic. ‘We have just been here for a few days,’ one farmer wrote May 1942, ‘and all we hear is partisans and again partisans.’142 Their fear was not ungrounded. As partisans did not discriminate and Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:42 01 October 2016 the Dutch were often equated with Germans, they too became targets. A peasant on a farm near Lida boasted to his friends back home about a partisan attack on Dutch farmers that had been beaten off: fi ve ‘bandits’ had been killed.143 Yet his colleague stationed not far from him dreaded ‘the large forest nearby which was full of partisans.’ He told his friends about a recent assault on two Dutch volunteers.144 ‘Partisans are getting more and more bold, constituting almost a second front behind the military front,’ one farmer wrote in July 1942. ‘A couple of times,’ he added, they had made an attempt on his life. One day, his assistant, his arms tied up, had to watch Fragments of Colonial Dreams 157 how partisans robbed the farm. Everything of value—clothes, weapons, supplies, horses, and pigs—was stolen. No lives were lost, but the threat became more real every day. In the next two months another three assaults on his farm took place. Finally, during his Christmas leave, a larger group of partisans attacked his farm again. The buildings were set on fi re and this time his assistant was murdered. Not surprisingly, the farmer had no desire to come back.145 By spring 1943, more than twenty Dutch peasants stationed in Belarus had been killed. Within a few months that number doubled. At that time, parts of White Ruthenia were largely in partisan hands. Other areas were wiped out by German police battalions, leaving no means of existence.146 Alarmed by the rise in casualties and the dangers the Dutch were put in, Rost van Tonningen addressed Himmler. According to him, the German protection of Dutch volunteers was utterly poor. They were sent to isolated places in partisan-infested areas, without guards, without being trained in the use of weapons—and often even without proper guns. Rost van Tonnin- gen did not doubt their bravery, yet without protection they were a defenseless prey for partisans. He suggested sending Dutch or German SS-men as guards, to improve the volunteers’ military equipment and to expand their military training.147 Of these suggestions only the last one did not fall entirely to deaf ears. During the preparatory training that was provided to farmers from the summer of 1943 onwards, candidates were receiving some basic teaching in the use of weapons. By that time, partisan activity was spreading across the entire occupied eastern territories. In forested areas of Lithuania, for example, ‘bandits’ (Banden-Unwesen) were on the rise.148 Not far from Baltoji Voke, Lithu- anian parachutists, dropped by the Red Army, established contact with representatives of the Jewish resistance in the Vilnius ghetto. Fear for Jewish escapees was growing since the liquidation of the ghetto. It was generally believed that larger groups of Jewish outlaws were living in the nearby forests, waiting to take revenge on Germans and all who had chosen their side. Fear-driven Dutch farmers at Waka T were convinced that Jews were responsible for recent train explosions and murders in the vicinity. 149 In the course of 1943, the Rudniki Forest, just a couple of miles from Baltoji Voke, indeed had become the hide out for various resistance groups. They roamed the area, attacking and robbing villagers. The nearby town of Trakai was attacked and both Waka T and the Dutch accommodations Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:42 01 October 2016 near the peat moors were raided more than once: the partisans took food supplies, horses, weapons and clothes. A Polish boy, two guards, and a Dutch peat worker were kidnapped. Still in late July 1944, when Lithuania was evacuated and Russian soldiers marched into the country, rumor had it that this Dutch man was still alive and performing forced labor for Jewish partisans.150 Responsible for the turf production in Baltoji Voke and the wellbeing of its Dutch personnel, Lingmont (and his wife) cried out for help.151 The Ostministerium, however, was not inclined to solve the issue. 152 Wulff did 158 Fragments of Colonial Dreams come to Lingmont’s aid and requested Rost van Tonningen to send Dutch guards. Unauthorized to employ armed men himself, Rost van Tonningen presented the request to Höherer SS- und Polizeiführer of the Netherlands, Hanns Albin Rauter, who in turn referred to his colleague in Lithuania. The evacuation of the area frustrated further actions.153 Elsewhere in Lithuania, Dutch workers were well aware of the increasing partisan threat. Early in 1944, on his way to chop some wood, a Dutch peat worker was killed, together with his German and Russian companions. His uniform, watch, wallet, and boots were stolen.154 Jantje S. told her Dutch friends back home that partisans were gaining in boldness and she added that not long ago she and her husband had been shot at themselves.155 The ‘wild east’ appeared ever less attractive, she had to admit. Lingmont’s wife, Sonja, addressed the issue in a letter to Krantz. Vilnius was not a safe haven for Dutch volunteers anymore, she told her director. She and all other Dutch citizens were encircled by partisans, ‘Lithuanians, Poles, Byelorussians, Bol- shevists and last but not least Jews.’156 Closer to the front, SS Frontier Workers were particularly easy targets for partisans. During an attack in January 1944, six were shot, at least three of them at point blank range. In the cold for hours, a worker wounded by partisans’ bullets suffered severely from frostbite. The barracks of the Dutch Frontier Workers near the Estonian concentration camp in Vaivara were more than once attacked by partisans. Dozens of men were kidnapped or killed.157 In the last phase of German occupation, partisans overran all of Ukraine. At the close of 1942, German authorities of Kiev already noticed that partisans were growing stronger. In western Ukraine, above all Volhynia, partisans were also more numerous and powerful. A Dutch prisoners’ guard in Rivne was killed in the course of his duty. A farmer was killed in June 1943, when fi fteen men came to his farm—a few days later German police arrested a man wearing his uniform. That same summer partisans had plotted an attack on two trucks carrying Dutch passengers near Rivne. All escaped, but one smashed his leg badly. A month after this incident, a Dutch Stützpunktleiter nearby was ambushed by fi fty partisans. In Sep- tember a much respected expert in agricultural affairs was attacked on his trip through Ukraine. A peasant exploiting a farm near Berdychiv and a colleague near Kiev were also murdered. 158 Clearly, the extra lessons in the Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:42 01 October 2016 use of weapons and additional distribution of guns had not stopped the partisans. 159 In this same period of time partisans also chose to attack the prestigious educational center near Rohachiv. What happened that late evening in June is not entirely clear. According to the head of the school, one of the farmers who had stood guard rushed into the premises around eleven at night to tell the others that some fi fty heavily armed ‘bandits’ were on their way. As the highest authority present, the head of the school ordered to put down the weapons and to see what the partisans wanted. The talks were friendly and after handing over their weapons and munition, the partisans left again. Fragments of Colonial Dreams 159 No one was killed.160 The story of one of the Dutch guards was slightly different. According to him, his superior had allowed the partisans to take everything that suited their taste. They not only took weapons and munition, but also clothes, footwear, rings, watches, vodka, and food. Having packed their carriages, the partisans shook the farmers’ hands and gave three bottles of the vodka as a kind gesture.161 The next day, all thirty-two Dutch men in the school packed their stuff. Sixteen went from Baranivka to Rivne to fi nd a new job, the rest resigned and returned home. Not before long, the school was set on fi re by partisans and burned down to the ground. An empty building in a township some fi ve miles from Rivne was designated as the new school for Dutch peasants, but it was hardly put to use.162

These Dutch men were by no means unique in their reaction to the increasing violence. The mounting activities of partisans constituted an important reason to leave the area for more Dutch volunteers. Those who stayed in the occupied East took measures to protect themselves. They decided to sleep in groups, in fenced and guarded places, or in the open fi eld, far away from the premises that were usually the partisans’ target.163 The raid and subsequent closure of the school not only underscored the debacle of Dutch ambitions in Ukraine, but also marked a profound crisis in Dutch-German relations. To volunteers and men like Rost van Tonningen, the incident at the school illustrated the extraordinary dangers Dutch men were exposed to. The buildings of the school had been guarded by Dutch farmers alone—most of them did not know how to shoot. They had used old-fashioned carbines, which made the fi ght with heavily armed partisans uneven from the very start. Rost van Tonningen found their behavior rep- rehensible, but all the same he could understand and felt compassion. What the incident demonstrated most of all was the urgency of training volunteers in the use of weapons, of improving their armaments, and of offering them military protection by professional guards. For their part, the German authorities were merely stunned by the indul- gence of Dutch volunteers, and repulsed by their passive (kamp fl os) attitude.164 Highly indignant about the incident, Koch wrote to both Rosenberg and Himmler’s second man, Gottlob Berger. In his letters he openly condemned the behavior of the Dutch men involved and showed that his Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:42 01 October 2016 patience for Dutch volunteers in general had worn thin. 165 ‘I would rather have no Dutch men at all, than have to tolerate their continuous dealing and trading, their undisciplined behavior and their displays of laziness,’ Koch stated. 166 His suggestion was to bring them to court and have them tried for cowardice and treacherous behavior. Rosenberg pleaded differently. A stricter selection, also on ideological grounds, coupled with a broader education (including military training) should prevent similar incidents and create men better suited for the job, he argued.167 Rost van Tonningen, who had been urging for military training of Dutch volunteers for quite some time, welcomed Rosenberg’s suggestions, but Koch’s 160 Fragments of Colonial Dreams blunt criticism bothered him. He did not share Koch’s assessment that others would have operated differently in the same situation. Without proper military equipment and training no one should even consider resisting, Rost van Tonningen replied. Furthermore, he worried about the way (and by whom) this military training would be provided. Behind his back, Rosen- berg’s representative in the Netherlands Puttkammer had opened talks with both Rauter and a commander of a German prisoners’ camp in the Neth- erlands. Puttkammer considered this camp as perhaps the best location for Dutch candidates to be militarily trained and otherwise prepared for their future work. To practice in the dealing with ‘natives,’ a few inhabitants of the occupied eastern territories should be brought to the Netherlands. Rost van Tonningen was charmed by the idea, but disagreed with the organizational construction. The NOC should be in charge, not a single camp commander outside the organization of the NOC. He suggested a vacated labor camp in the southern part of the Netherlands where new recruits could be instructed by a Dutch commander of the Waffen-SS. The administration of the camp would be entirely in the hands of the NOC. In late July of 1944, Rauter agreed to this proposal. Six men were employed by the NOC to run the household of the camp.168 At the time that this new camp started operation, most of the occupied eastern territories were lost to Soviet troops. They had entered Ukraine in the closing months of 1943 and would not be challenged again. On the contrary, the invasion of Ukraine featured the beginning of the conquest of all areas that in June 1941 were governed by Soviet rule. By July 1944, the largest part of the German occupied eastern territories was indeed back in Russian hands. The numerous letters of complaints sent during the war and the postwar judicial statements of former volunteers suggested that for many recruits employment in the occupied East was more or less a deception. Actual life in the occupied East had seldom resembled the image they cherished of colonial life: a life of abundance and undeniable supremacy. In the reality of the occupied East, many suffered from shortages and hardships. Despite the apparently unlimited access to spirits and cigarettes, the standard of living was generally lower in the East than in the Netherlands. Furthermore, their authority was far from undisputed and locals were generally less apt to offer full cooperation than expected. In time, more people joined the partisans Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:42 01 October 2016 and directly opposed German/Dutch orders and rule. In the eyes of the Dutch, the German policy was weakening Dutch supremacy. Partners on paper and according to racial laws of Nazism, Ger- man offi cials did not show proneness to granting power and control to the NOC and to individual Dutch volunteers. Instead of self-government and cooperation on the principle of equality, the entire Dutch enterprise as well as individual volunteers were often subordinate to German supervision and superiority. In the end, the Dutch presence in the occupied eastern territories was a German favor. Ultimately, the Ostministerium, but also local German Fragments of Colonial Dreams 161 offi cials, could unilaterally decide to change policy—or to leave out their Dutch partner. This became evident in the aftermath of the incident at the Dutch school in Ukraine, when German-Dutch relations seriously cooled down. Without consulting Dutch authorities, Koch ordered his police force in Rivne to fi nd a suitable way to punish the thirty-two men present in the school at the time of the raid. Sixteen men had already left Ukraine and were back home. At least one of them was arrested by the German security police in the Neth- erlands and interrogated by the German prosecutor in The Hague. 169 The men still present in Ukraine were arrested and put in custody in Rivne. They were given the choice: either to remain in detention ‘until further notice,’ or to attend a course of four to eight weeks provided by the SS. All men opted for the training. In October 1943 they were brought to the German enclave Hegewald, inside the Zhytomyr district. Contrary to the agreement, the sixteen were not released after their training ended. It was said that Himmler himself had wished to absorb the men into his Waffen-SS, ‘so they could prove not to be cowards.’ Those who refused were sent back to the prison in Rivne; others stayed in Hegewald, until the evacuation of the colony in November 1943. 170 Rost van Tonningen and others protested, but it did not help. German authorities had stopped listening to their Dutch partners.

NOTES

1 . Con fi dential message Hermann von Harder, 27 June 1942, BA, R6, fi le 441. 2 . Report Hermann von Harder, 30 June 1942, BA, R6, fi le 441. 3 . Letter Hans Schindowski to Georg Leibrandt, 23 July 1942, BA, R6, fi le 441. 4 . Report Hermann von Harder, concerning a talk with Gustav Schlotterer, 30 June 1942, and confi dential notice Hermann von Harder, 2 July 1942, BA, R6, fi le 441. 5 . Mark Mazower, Hitler’s Empire: Nazi Rule in Occupied Europe (London/ New York: Allen Lane, 2008), 149. 6 . Ibidem, 456 and 464. 7 . Roskam and Ruiter were protagonists of this line of thought; see: Het Vader- land, 7 July 1941; Geert Jan Ruiter, ‘Landbouwpolitiek in het nieuwe Europa’, Nieuw Nederland. Maandblad voor economie, staatskunde en economie 10/3 (November 1943), 380. 8 . Report M. Wladimirow, ‘Observations during My Trip through Ukraine Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:42 01 October 2016 August/September 1943’ (undated), NIOD, 176, fi le 140. 9 . Oostlandpraatjes no. 2, NIOD, 176, fi le 590. 10 . Ibidem. 11 . Statement Willem Gerhardt, April 1945, NA/CABR, 2.09.09, fi le 89544. 12 . Ibidem. On the colonial hardliners, see: Tessel Pollmann, ‘ “Men is fascist of men is het niet”: De Indische NSB als imperiale droom en melkkoe’, in: Remco Raben and Marieke Bloembergen (eds.), Het koloniale beschavingsoffensief: Wegen naar het nieuwe Indië (Leiden: KITLV, 2009), 171–173. 13 . Letter G.M. Greup to O.G. Veenstra, 9 November 1936, NA/CABR, 2.09.09, fi le 41591. 14 . Police records, 8 May 1947, NA/CABR, 2.09.09, fi le 106131. 162 Fragments of Colonial Dreams 15 . Letter Brusse to NOC, 19 December 1942, NIOD, 176, fi le 746. 16 . Letter M.A. de Lange to G.W. von Meyenfeldt, 15 December 1945, NA/ CABR, 2.09.09, fi le 105319. 17 . Contract Arie Slot and Werkdienst Holland, 8 September 1942; police report Arie Slot, 4 April 1946, NA/CABR, 2.09.09, fi le 1330; notice polizeiliche Mel- debehörde, 26 August 1943; letter M. Kutterink to public attorney Special Court Alkmaar, 17 April 1946, NA/CABR, 2.09.09, fi le 105126. 18 . Letter A. Perk to comrades (undated), NA/CABR, 2.09.09, fi le 40752. 19 . Jacob van den Berg, ‘Oekraine, land, volk en mogelijkheden’, Nieuw Neder- land 10/3 (November 1943), 363. 20 . Willem Goedhuys, ‘Oost Europa’, 8 August 1944, NIOD, 176, fi le 1064; report Willem Goedhuys, concerning history and future of Ukraine (undated), NIOD, 176, fi le 595. 21 . Telegram ZASt to Egon Kalbheim, 7 January 1943, and Reichskommissariat Ukraine to ZASt, 6 January 1943, NIOD, 91, fi le 93. 22 . Diary entry Johan Lingmont, 13 February 1943, NIOD, 244, fi le 2180. 23 . Letter Jantje S. to unnamed friends, 23 December 1943, NA/CABR, 2.09.09, fi le 28674. 24 . Ibidem. 25 . Letter Jan van Gilst to Matthijsen, 25 April 1943, NA/CABR, 2.09.09, fi le 109701. 26 . Het Nationale Dagblad, 24 July 1942. 27 . Pamphlet NOI (undated), NIOD, 176, fi le 583. 28 . Letter Jan Remko Dertien to Cees Staf, 28 March 1942, GA, 0915, fi le 375. 29 . Letter Johannes Gerritsen to Hendrik Johan Witteveen, 23 July 1943, NA/ CABR, 2.09.09, fi le 108340. 30 . See pamphlet NOI (undated), NIOD, 176, fi le 583; report Willem Goedhuys, concerning history and future of Ukraine (undated), NIOD, 176, fi le 595. 31 . Diary entry Johan Lingmont, 16 February 1942, NIOD, 244, fi le 2180. 32 . Letter Elisabeth Anna W. to Anton Carel Kluizenaar, 7 May 1944, NA/CABR, 2.09.09, fi le 105363. 33 . Report Jan Barendrecht, concerning his visit to Waka T from November 9 until November 23 1943 (undated), NIOD, 176, fi le 144. 34 . Het Algemeen Handelsblad, 2 December 1941. 35 . Het Nationale Dagblad, 24 July 1942; Letter Remt Lambert Buringh to unknown, 30 August 1943, NA/CABR, 2.09.09, fi le 40752; letters Jan Remko Dertien to Cees Staf, 28 March 1942, and G. Hekkert to Cees Staf, 24 March 1942, and W. van ’t Hoff to Cees Staf, 3 May 1942, GA, 0915, fi le 375; letter Gerrit Jan van Bavel to NSB-Breda, 7 May 1942, NA/CABR, 2.09.09, fi le 32209; letter Jan van Gilst to Matthijsen, 25 April 1943, NA/CABR, 2.09.09, fi le 109701. 36 . Kauener Zeitung, 13 September 1943, NIOD, 176, fi le 635. 37 . Letter Nicolaas Ritske Schreinhout to unknown, 14 September 1943, NA/ Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:42 01 October 2016 CABR, 2.09.09, fi le 47884. 38 . Letter Jantje S. to Fie and Hannie, 28 June 1944, NA/CABR, 2.09.09, fi le 28674. 39 . Letter Adriaan Pieter de P. to Corrie, 22 May 1943, NA/CABR, 2.09.09, fi le 67588. 40 . Report Jan Habing, 15 June 1942, NIOD, 176, fi le 707; report Jan Habing, concerning the Dutch employment in the turf industry in Lithuania from 15 April 1942 until 1 November 1943, December 1943, NIOD, 176, fi le 719. 41 . Letter Remt Lambert Buringh to unknown, 30 August 1943, NA/CABR, 2.09.09, fi le 40752; letters Jan Remko Dertien to Cees Staf, 28 March 1942, and G. Hekkert to Cees Staf, 24 March 1942, and W. van ’t Hoff to Cees Staf, Fragments of Colonial Dreams 163 3 May 1942, GA, 0915, fi le 375; letter Gerrit Jan van Bavel to NSB-Breda, 7 May 1942, NA/CABR, 2.09.09, fi le 32209; letter Jan van Gilst to Matthi- jsen, 25 April 1943, NA/CABR, 2.09.09, fi le 109701. 42 . Note Hendrikus Quirinus Verhaaren (undated), NA/CABR, 2.09.09, fi le 55527; report Jacob van den Berg, 19 December 1942, NIOD, 176, fi le 619; report on activities, from 1 October 1942 until 31 December 1942 (undated), and from 14 January 1943 until 1 May 1943 (undated), NIOD, 176, fi le 632; report T. Volker, 3 July 1943, NIOD, 176, fi le 638; letters Daniël Krantz to J. Rottier, 6 March 1944, and J. Rottier to Daniël Krantz, 22 March 1944, NIOD, 176, fi le 637. 43 . Notes Werkdienst Holland, concerning outstanding bills, 30 June 1943 and 31 July 1943, TSDAVO, fond 3206, opis 3, delo 22. 44 . Report Willem Hendrik van Eek, concerning the regretful abuses of craftsmen of the former Werkdienst Holland in Rowno, 26 October 1943, NIOD, 176, fi le 362. 45 . Report, concerning the activities of department of social affairs after the take- over of Werkdienst Holland (undated), NIOD, 176, fi le 81. 46 . Letter of complaint by J. Vocht, 9 November 1942, NIOD, 176, fi le 363. 47 . Report Buitink, concerning Werkdienst Holland in Rowno, 30 November 1942, NIOD, 176, fi le 363. 48 . Letter H. Zootjes, 4 February 1944, NIOD, 176, fi le 16. 49 . Report of a meeting in Rivne, 10 December 1942, NIOD, 176, fi le 81. 50 . Short report of tour of duty Willem Hendrik van Eek, 16 February 1943, NIOD, 176, fi le 138. 51 . Report T. van der Zee, concerning his experiences in Rowno and Kiev, 21 January 1943, NIOD, 265, fi le 138; observations by P.A.G. Volckers, concerning his visit to Rowno from 21 January until 2 February 1943, 5 February 1943, NIOD, 176, fi le 136. 52 . For more on Dutch men in service of the SS Frontier Workers Enterprise, see: Henk Sintniklaas, De SS-frontarbeiders van kamp Amersfoort (Kampen: Voorhoeve, 1999); E. Fraenkel-Verkade, ‘Nederlandse SS-frontarbeiders’, in: A.H. Paape (ed.), Studies over Nederland in Oorlogstijd (Den Haag: Marinus Nijhoff, 1972), 117–169. 53 . Reports B.J. Hoekstra, 5 December 1943 and 14 November 1943, NIOD, 176, fi le 855; report B.J. Hoekstra, 14 December 1943, NIOD, 176, fi le 857. 54 . Reports no. 20, 11 September 1943, and no. 24, 11 October 1943, NIOD, 176, fi le 855. 55 . Inspection reports, 24 November 1943 and 5 December 1943, NIOD, 176, fi le 855. 56 . Report B. and P.J. Hoekstra, 15 November 1943, NIOD, 176, fi le 856. 57 . Letter W. Kammler to Meinoud Rost van Tonningen, 28 December 1943, NIOD, 176, fi le 1068; police records Pieter Hoekstra, 21 May 1945, NIOD, 176, fi le 1053. Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:42 01 October 2016 58 . Eventually, in 1944, a vegetable garden of a considerable size would be laid out in Baltoji Voke. The profi ts, however, would remain low as the vegetables and greenhouses were easy targets for the increasing number of partisans in the nearby forests. Police records, Berend Klein, 3 March 1949, and Pieter Oortwijn and Marten Kemper, 12 March 1949, and Willem Koops, 14 April 1949, and Harm Koops, 29 March 1949, NA/CABR, 2.09.09, fi les 265, 24858, 75881, 108856, and 109431; letter Reinder van Veen to Daniël Krantz, 9 August 1942, and to Horst Wulff, 17 September 1942, NIOD, 176, fi le 607; letter Johan Lingmont to NOC-Department of Industry and Traffi c, 4 October 1943, NIOD, 176, fi le 639; letter Jan Habing to NOC-Head Offi ce, 8 August 1942, NIOD, 176, fi le 707. 164 Fragments of Colonial Dreams 59 . Nieuw Rotterdamsche Courant, 23 November 1941; report of a meeting between National Employment Offi ce, Regional Employment Offi ces, and others, 29 July 1941, NIOD 120a/13; Employment contract (undated), NIOD, 120a, fi le 59. 60 . Letter G. Hekkert to Cees Staf, 24 March 1942, GA, 0915, fi le 375. 61 . Van den Berg, ‘Oekraine, land, volk en mogelijkheden’, 356–357. 62 . Letter Douwe de Jong to his wife and children, 16 January 1943, NA/CABR, 2.09.09, fi le 76090. 63 . Letter Gerrit Jan van Bavel to De Ruyter, 31 March 1942, NA/CABR, 2.09.09, fi le 32209. 64 . Letter Marinus Hage to Hartog, 26 July 1942, NA/CABR, 2.09.09, fi le 89943. 65 . Letter Jan van Gilst to Matthijsen, 25 April 1943, NA CABR, 2.09.09, fi le 109701. 66 . Ibidem. 67 . Letter Adriaan Pieter Rijper to Corrie, 15 December 1943, NA/CABR, 2.09.09, fi le 67588. 68 . Letter Gerrit Jan van Bavel to De Ruyter, 21 May 1942, NA/CABR, 2.09.09, fi le 32209. 69 . Letter Paulus Borsje to Rook, 1 May 1943, NA/CABR, 2.09.09, fi le 34472. 70 . Report Willem Goedhuys, concerning history and future of Ukraine (undated), NIOD, 176, fi le 595. 71 . Oostlandpraatjes, no. 2, NIOD, arch 176, 590. Uitzending 2. 72 . Travel report S. Kijlstra from March 9 until March 21 1944 (undated), NIOD, 176, fi le 1041. 73 . Report Bob van Maasdijk, concerning Dutch possibilities in the East (undated), NIOD, 176, fi le 132. 74 . Directives Willem Hendrik van Eek, 31 January 1943, NA/CABR, 2.09.09, fi le 40752. 75 . Announcement no. 2 by N. Roskam, 1 June 1943, NIOD, 176, fi le 797. 76 . Letter Jan Remko Dertien to Cees Staf, 28 March 1942, NIOD, 120a, fi le 65; letter Remt Lambert Buringh to unknown, 30 August 1943, NA/ CABR, 2.09.09, fi le 40752; report of Willem Frederik Gerhardt, concerning the Dutch mission with regard to Baltic agriculture, 15 July 1942, NIOD, 176, fi le 597; report Bob van Maasdijk, concerning Dutch possibilities in the East (undated), NIOD, 176, fi le 132; reports of Jan Barendregt (undated), NIOD, 176, fi les 84 and 598. 77 . Report A. Perk, 10 August 1943, and directives Willem Hendrik van Eek, 31 January 1943, NA/CABR, 2.09.09, fi le 40752. 78 . Weekly reports N. Roskam, 11 April 1943 and 19 April 1943, NIOD, 176, fi le 797; letters N. Roskam to Wirtschaftskommandantur Gdov, 15 July 1943, and to Arbeitsamt Gdov, 20 July 1943), NIOD, 176, fi le 797; report N. Ros- kam, 25 July 1943, NIOD, 176, fi le 797. 79 . Letter J.K. de Boer to Jan Barendregt, 10 July 1943, NIOD, 176, fi le 600. Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:42 01 October 2016 80 . Letter W. van ’t Hoff aan Cees Staf, 3 May 1942, GA, 0915, fi le 375. 81 . Letter Marinus Hage to comrade Hartog, 26 July 1942, NA/CABR, 2.09.09, fi le 89943. 82 . Report Markus Roos, 28 September 1943, NIOD, 176, fi le 598. 83 . Entry in the diary of Johannes Lingmont, 15 February 1943, NIOD, 244, fi le 1063. 84 . Letter Elisabeth Anna W. to Anton Carel Kluizenaar, 26 April 1944, NA/ CABR, 2.09.09, fi le 105363. 85 . Letter G. Hekkert to Cees Staf, 24 March 1942, GA, 0915, fi le 375. 86 . In Belarus the relations were even more strenuous as cooperation had been low from the start, partly due to the repressive German policy in this country. Fragments of Colonial Dreams 165 87 . Report C. Holm, The Dutch in Lithuania (undated), NIOD, 176, fi le 707. 88 . Report Markus Roos, 11 October 1943, NIOD, 176, fi le 598. 89 . Note Gerardus Johannes Lelieman, 10 May 1943, NA/CABR, 2.09.09, fi le 27079. 90 . Report Reinder van Veen, 5 July 1943, NIOD, 176, fi le 607. 91 . Report L. Viemelink, 21 May 1943, NIOD, 176, fi le 798; report N. Roskam, 18 September 1943, and letter N. Roskam to NOV, 7 October 1943, NIOD, 176, fi le 797. 92 . Report Johan Lingmont, concerning the Werkdienst Holland, 26 February 1943, NA/CABR, 2.09.09, fi le 24858. 93 . Letter Johan Lingmont to Daniël Krantz, 28 December 1943, NIOD, 176, fi le 84. 94 . Report S.J. Woldring, 16 December 1943, NIOD, 176, fi le 629; report Marius Dijt, 19 November 1943, and letter M. Dijt to NOC-Directorate, 20 Novem- ber 1943, NIOD, 176, fi le 123. 95 . Letter D.J. Feitsma to NOC-Directorate, 30 June 1944, NIOD, 176, fi le 123. 96 . Letter Jacob van den Berg to Daniël Krantz, 20 March 1943, NIOD, 176, fi le 598. 97 . Report J. Middelkoop, 24 September 1943, NIOD, 176, fi le 600. 98 . Letter Johan Lingmont to NOC, 6 June 1944, NIOD, 176, fi le 710. 99 . Sara Ginaite - Rubinson, Resistance and Survival: The Jewish Community in Kaunas, 1941–1944 (Oakville: Mosaic Press, 2005), 76–82. 100 . Notes on identity card NOC-Database (undated), NA/CABR, 2.09.09, fi le 39046. 101 . Police protocol Jadwiga Palewiz, 24 April 1944, and Bettie Zelek, 25 April 1944, NIOD, 176, fi le 16; report S.H. Kijlstra, 15 March 1944, NIOD, 176, fi le 637; letter Horst Wulff to Meinoud Rost van Tonningen, 20 April 1944, in: David Barnouw (ed.), Correspondentie van Mr. M.M. Rost van Tonningen II (Zutphen: Walburg pers, 1993), 431–434. 102 . Letter J.W.A. van de Graaff to NOC-Directorate, 11 May 1944, NIOD, 176, fi le 123; letter Johan Lingmont to NOC-Head Offi ce, 20 March 1944, NA/ CABR, 2.09.09, fi le 94374. 103 . Overview Reinder van der Veen, concerning the employed during the second half year of 1942 (undated); report Reinder van der Veen, concerning hitting of Lithuanians by Dutch men, 28 December 1942, NIOD, 176, fi le 607. 104 . Letter W. van ’t Hoff to Cees Staf, 3 May 1942, GA, 0915, fi le 375. 105 . Letter Adriaan P. de P. to Corrie, 22 May 1943, NA/CABR, 2.09.09, fi le 67588. 106 . Travel report S. Woldring, 15 August 1943, and letter W. Pen to Daniël Krantz, 30 September 1943, NIOD, 176, fi le 600. 107 . Report J. Middelkoop, 24 September 1943, and letter W. Pen to Daniël Krantz, 30 September 1943, NIOD, 176, fi le 600. 108 . Travel reports Jan Barendregt (undated), NIOD, 176, fi les 84 and 598; police statement J. Koolen, 24 November 1944, NA/CABR, 2.09.09, fi le 31216. Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:42 01 October 2016 109 . See, for instance: letter Marinus Hage to Hartog, 26 July 1942, NA/CABR, 2.09.09, fi le 89943; letter Elisabeth Anna W. to Anton Carel Kluizenaar, 7 May 1944, NA/CABR, 2.09.09, fi le 105363; letter Hendrikus Quirinus Ver- haaren to Kaat, 16 August 1943, NA/CABR, 2.09.09, fi le 55527. 110 . Letter Reinder van Veen to unknown, 28 May 1942, NIOD, 176, fi le 606. 111 . Report Y.L. Vennik concerning his travel to Lithuania from 9 September until 1 October 1943 (undated), NIOD, 176, fi le 569; report P.A. Schelven, 11 October 1943, NIOD, 176, fi le 624. 112 . Letter E.J.A. Duffels to NOV, 18 November 1943, NIOD, 176, fi le 797. 113 . Note on member card NOC, 21 February 1944, NA/CABR, 2.09.09, fi le 44119. 166 Fragments of Colonial Dreams 114 . Letter J.W.A. van de Graaff to NOC-Directorate, 26 May 1944, NIOD, 176, fi le 123. 115 . Letter W. Bekker to NOC-Directorate, 25 October 1943, NIOD, 176, fi le 122. 116 . Ibidem. 117. Report Erwin Nimtz, 22 November 942, NIOD 93, fi le 91; Report T. van der Zee, concerning Werkdienst Holland, 21 January 1943, NIOD, 176, fi le 138; report Graf, 10 December 1942, NIOD, 176, fi le 363; letter Willem Hendrik van Eek to NOC-Department of Employment, 6 January 1944, NIOD, 176, fi le 972. 118 . Letter Daniël Krantz to Willem Hendrik van Eek, 20 September 1943, and response, 29 September 1943, NIOD, 176, fi le 126. 119 . Letter Marius Dijt to Daniël Krantz, 8 December 1943, NIOD, 176, fi le 123. 120 . Letter Johan Lingmont to Daniël Krantz, 17 October 1943, NIOD, 176, fi le 709; letter Daniël Krantz to Johan Lingmont, 15 September 1943, and response, 18 September 1943, NA/CABR, 2.09.09, fi le 94374; letter Johan Lingmont to Daniël Krantz, 23 March 1944, and to Meinoud Rost van Tonningen, 7 April 1944, NA/CABR, 2.09.09, fi le 24858. 121 . Letter Johan Lingmont to Daniël Krantz, 23 March 1944, NA/CABR, 2.09.09, fi le 24858. 122 . Letter Johan Lingmont to Meinoud Rost van Tonningen, 7 April 1944, NA/ CABR, 2.09.09, fi le 24858. 123 . Report Hermann von Puttkammer, concerning the meeting in the offi ce of Werkdienst Holland, 16 December 1942, BA, R6, fi le 459; report, concerning the fi nancial settlement with Werkdienst Holland, 6 March 1943, NIOD, 176, fi le 81; short overview of the employment of Dutch craftsmen in Ukraine, 14 December 1943, NIOD, 176, fi le 81; report for internal use, in preparation for the meeting with the gentlemen of the NOC, 10 December 1942, NIOD, 176, fi le 363; Report T. van der Zee, 21 January 1943, NIOD, 176, fi le 138. 124 . Report Hermann von Puttkammer, concerning the meeting in the offi ce of Werkdienst Holland, 16 December 1942, BA, R6, fi le 459. 125 . Police report Commander of the Security Police and the SD Lithuania, 31 March 1943, LCVA, R-1399–1–61, fi le 46. 126 . Letters Horst Wulff to Meinoud Rost van Tonningen, 19 November 1943 and 20 April 1944, and responses, 10 December 1943 and 6 May 1944, and letter R. Pense to Meinoud Rost van Tonningen, 6 May 1944, in: Barnouw, Cor- respondentie II, 341, 348, 431, 444 and 445. 127 . Ibidem. 128. Letter Friedrich Wilhelm Jenetzky to Hermann von Harder, 30 May 1944, NIOD, 176, fi le 607. 129 . Letter Helmut Körner to Alfred Rosenberg, 30 June 1943, NIOD 120, fi le 279. 130 . Report T. van der Zee, concerning his experiences in Rowno and Kiev, 21 January 1943, NIOD, 176, fi le 138; observations by P.A.G. Volckers, concerning his visit to Rowno from 21 January until 2 February 1943, 5 February Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:42 01 October 2016 1943, NIOD, 176, fi le 136. 131 . Report T. van der Zee, concerning his experiences in Rowno and Kiev, 21 January 1943, NIOD, 176, fi le 138; report B. van den Tempel, concerning his travel to Ukraine from 14 June until 10 July 1943 (undated), NIOD, 176, fi le 362. 132 . Travel report, concerning talks in the Netherlands with Generalkommissar Fritz Schmidt, 2 April 1942, NIOD, 265, fi le 32; report Jan Habing, 14 August 1943, NIOD, 176, fi le 719; report S. Woldring, 15 August 1943, NIOD, 176, fi le 600; travel report Y. Vennik (undated), NIOD, 176, fi le 569; Bericht über die Niederländer, die aus dem Werkdienst Holland stammen und z. Zt. in Rowno tätig sind, 9 December 1943, NIOD, 176, fi le 81; report Fragments of Colonial Dreams 167 Willem Hendrik van Eek, 26 October 1943, NIOD, 176, fi le 362; report Mei- noud Rost van Tonningen, 15 March 1943, and letter Rost van Tonningen to Erwin Nimtz, 23 June 1942, in: Barnouw, Correspondentie II, 30 and 184. 133 . Letter of Jelle Scharringa to Meinoud Rost van Tonningen, 24 November 1942, in: Barnouw, Correspondentie II, 123; letter of Johan Wouter van IJzeren to Nederlandse Landstand, 7 August 1942, and to his wife, 18 May 1942, NA/ CABR, 2.09.09, fi le 70297; report of Clara Palm, 23 October 1942, NIOD, 176/ 333; letter of Jacob Gerrit Liestert to Jan Barendregt, June 20, 1943, NIOD, 176/598. 134. Report Hermann von Puttkammer, concerning the meeting in the offi ce of Werkdienst Holland, 16 December 1942, BA, R6, fi le 459; report, concerning the fi nancial settlement with Werkdienst Holland, 6 March 1943, and short overview of the employment of Dutch craftsmen in Ukraine, 14 December 1943, NIOD, 176, fi le 81; report for internal use, in preparation for the meeting with the gentlemen of the NOC, 10 December 1942, NIOD, 176, fi le 363. 135 . Report of M. Silvergieter-Hoogstadt (undated), NIOD, 176, fi le 84. 136 . Report Meinoud Rost van Tonningen, 1 September 1943, NIOD, 176, fi le 32; report Meinoud Rost van Tonningen, 15 March 1943, and letters Meinoud Rost van Tonningen to Hermann Freiherr von Harder, 28 September 1942, and to Walter Malletke, 31 March 1943, in: Barnouw, Correspondentie II, 87, 184 and 194. 137 . First report of activities of the NOC (undated), NIOD, 176, fi le 15. 138 . Report of activities of the NOC in the fi rst quarter of 1944, NIOD, 176, fi le 15. 139. Reports of activities of the NOC in the fourth quarter of 1943 and the fi rst quarter of 1944. NIOD, 176, fi le 15. 140 . Waitman Wade Beorn, Marching into Darkness: The Wehrmacht and the Holocaust in Belarus (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2014), 35–36 and 91–118. 141 . Report Abwehrstelle Ostland, for the period from 1 April until 30 June 1942 (undated) and from 1 July until 30 September 1942 (undated), BA, R90, fi le 751. 142 . Letter Reinder van Veen to unknown, 28 May 1942, NIOD, 176, fi le 606. 143 . Letter Jan Vos to friends, 15 June 1942, NA/CABR, 2.09.09, fi le 205. 144 . Letters Gerrit Jan van Bavel to De Ruyter, 31 March 1942 and 21 May 1942, NA/CABR, 2.09.09, fi le 32209. 145 . Letter Marinus Hage to comrade Hartog, 26 July 1942, 20 September 1942, and 21 January 1943, NA/CABR, 2.09.09, fi le 89943. 146 . Order of the Higher SS and Police Leader White Ruthenia, 1 August 1943, BA, R90, fi le 752; letter Kreislandwirt Vileyka to Generalkommissar in Minsk, 12 June 1943, and letter Kreislandwirt Vowchyn to Gebietslandwirt Vileyka, 25 July 1943, BA, R93, fi le 7a. 147 . Report Meinoud Rost van Tonningen, 24 October 1942, and letter Meinoud Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:42 01 October 2016 Rost van Tonningen to Heinrich Himmler, 27 March 1943, in: Barnouw, Cor- respondentie II, 97–99 and 173–174. 148 . Report Abwehrstelle Ostland, for the period from April 1 until June 30 1942 (undated), BA, R90, fi le 751. 149 . Letter T. Volker to NOC-Head Offi ce, 25 August 1943, NIOD, 176, fi le 628. 150 . Yitzhak Arad, Ghetto in Flames: The Struggle and Destruction of the Jews in Vilna in the Holocaust (Jerusalem: Yad Vashem, 1980), 243–250; report of activities of the NOC in the fi rst quarter of 1944, NIOD, 176, fi le 15; statement Dekker to NOC-Department Insurance, 25 July 1944, NIOD, 176, fi le 481; letter J. Rottier to Daniël Krantz, 31 March 1944, NIOD, 176, fi le 599; letter Marinus Ekko Vorenkamp to Daniël Krantz, 4 April 1944, NIOD, 176, 168 Fragments of Colonial Dreams fi le 630; report Willem Hendrik H., 21 September 1943, NIOD, 176, fi le 719; letter Sophia Lingmont-Van Dorp to Daniël Krantz, 29 February 1944, NA/ CABR, 2.09.09, fi le 24858; reports Jan Lukszo, 17 March 1944, B. Hoeks- tra, 15 March 1944 and 27 March 1944, and Johan Lingmont, 30 March 1944, and letter Johan Lingmont to Daniël Krantz, 4 April 1944, NA/CABR, 2.09.09, fi le 94374. 151 . Letters Johan Lingmont to Daniël Krantz, 29 February 1944, and to Mei- noud Rost van Tonningen, 22 April 1944, NIOD, 176, fi le 93; letter Sonja Lingmont-van Dorp to Daniël Krantz, 14 March 1944, NA/CABR, 2.09.09, fi le 94374. 152 . Report Wolf/Ostministerium, 6 April 1944 and 12 April 1944, NIOD, 176, fi le 710. 153 . Letter Meinoud Rost van Tonningen to Horst Wulff, 3 April 1944, in: Bar- nouw, Correspondentie II, 417. 154 . Letter D.J. Feitsma to NOC-Head Offi ce, 23 June 1944, NIOD, 176, fi le 123. 155 . Letter Jantje S. to family Somers, 27 April 1944, NA/CABR, 2.09.09, fi le 28674. 156 . Letter Sonja Lingmont-van Dorp to Daniël Krantz, 14 March 1944, NA/ CABR, 2.09.09, fi le 94374. 157 . Letter G. Maar to NOC-Department Insurance, 17 February 1944, NIOD, 176, fi le 494; report NOC-Department Insurance, 24 January 1944, NIOD, 176, fi le 536; letter NOC-Department of Information to NOC-Riga, 21 March 1944, NIOD, 176, fi le 125. 158 . Note NOC-Department of Insurance, 24 February 1944, NIOD, 176, fi le 487; report W. Bekker, 3 November 1943, NIOD, 176, fi le 444; report, concerning the murder of F.D. Lindeboom (undated), NIOD, 176, fi le 480; letter Erwin Nimtz to Lüdecke, 10 March 1943, NIOD 93, fi le 92; letter Willem Hendrik van Eek to NOC, 5 June 1943, NIOD, 176, fi le 971; letter Willem Hendrik van Eek to NOC, 30 October 1943, NIOD, 176, fi le 972. 159 . Letter Higher SS and Police Leader for Ukraine to Gottlob Berger, 12 March 1943, BA, R6, fi le 446. 160 . Report Jacob Gerrit Liestert, concerning the partisan attack on the school in Rohachiv, 17 June 1943, NIOD, 176, fi le 598. 161 . Note of a talk between J.R. Swart and Daniël Krantz, concerning the partisan attack in Rogatchew (undated), NIOD, 176, fi le 665. 162 . V erslag van J. Ridder, 20–08–1943, NOID, arch 176, fi le 84; report W. Bekker, 22 September 1943, BA, R6, fi le 460. 163 . Report Jan Barendregt, 20 August 1943, NIOD, 176, fi le 598. 164 . Letter Helmut Körner to Alfred Rosenberg, 30 June 1943; report Hahn, 29 June 1943, NIOD, 176, fi le 1050. 165 . Letter Helmut Körner to Alfred Rosenberg, 30 June 1943, NIOD, 176, fi le 1050; letter Erich Koch to Alfred Rosenberg, 28 August 1943, NIOD, 176, fi le 599. Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:42 01 October 2016 166. Letter Gottlob Berger to Heinrich Himmler, 3 September 1943, in: Nanno in ’t Veld, De SS en Nederland: Documenten uit SS-archieven 1935–1945 (Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1976), 1199–1200. 167 . Report Hermann von Harder, 16 August 1943, BA, R6, fi le 446. 168 . Letters Meinoud Rost van Tonningen to Walter Malletke, 16 September 1943, to Alfred Rosenberg, 21 September 1943, and to Hanns Albin Rauter, 27 October 1943 and 28 October 1943, and report Meinoud Rost van Ton- ningen, concerning his visit to Camp Ommen, 13 October 1943, in: Barnouw, Correspondentie II, 285, 286, 310, 326, and 328; list of personnel, 1 Sep- tember 1944, and short report concerning the NOC (undated), NIOD, 176, fi le 1067. Fragments of Colonial Dreams 169 169 . Evidence is not clear whether he has been tried. Letter Tjipke Stoel to secretary of the special courts in Groningen-district, 8 October 1947, NA/CABR, 2.09.09, fi le 40800. 170 . Letters W. Bekker to NOC-Directorate, 3 November 1943, Willem Hendrik van Eek to W. Bekker, 6 November 1943, and Daniël Krantz to Meinoud Rost van Tonningen, 18 February 1944, NIOD, 176, fi le 665; police records Izaak Beerens, 12 October 1945, NA/CABR, 2.09.09, fi le 51446. Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:42 01 October 2016 7 The Final Act

RETREAT

A month before the evacuation of Hegewald, the fi rst groups of Dutch pioneers fl ed their workplace to avoid being captured by advancing Soviet troops. A Dutch businessman in charge of fi ve expropriated brickyards near Poltava, on the eastern side of the Dnepr, returned in early October to the Netherlands.1 Some eighty former employees of Werkdienst Holland who had been absorbed into the new organization Ostwerk were still on the eastern bank of the river and it was feared that they had not been able to cross the river in time. 2 Around the same date the NOB closed its offi ce in Kiev and most of the SS Frontier Workers in Ukraine were transferred to Germany.3 Employed in April of 1943 at the large suction dredges, around thirty Dutch men had spent the summer trying to improve navigation on the stretch between Kiev and Dnepropetrovsk. In early September they received the order to stop their work and sail their huge machines to Nikolayev as Kiev and surroundings had become too close to the front. Their journey was largely frustrated by German military authorities, who confi scated all but one tugboat. In the fi rst half of October the thirty men came back home. Not much later they heard that retreating German troops had blown up the dredges and other equipment left on the Dnepr.4 The rural estates in Usin and Skvyra in the Kiev district were among the next to be evacuated. The three Dutch supervisors of Usin were on leave in the Netherlands when Russian troops crossed the Dnepr. They returned and, ordered by offi cials of the LBGU, they organized the ‘trek’ of their Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:42 01 October 2016 livestock westwards. Pigs were put on trains, and sheep were united with other sheep from surrounding farms and shepherded into the direction of Vinnitsa. Together with German colleagues, a Dutch farmer guided a herd of cattle westwards. Two weeks later he returned again to Usin only to leave the next day, this time with his two Dutch companions and some cows and horses. At that moment, the Red Army was less than six miles away. Due to bad weather and military transports going the opposite direction, this second trek was much more of an ordeal. After days in heavy rainfall and on dirt roads, Vinnitsa was reached on November 15th. The cattle was handed The Final Act 171 over and the three men were ready to leave, yet trains were overcrowded and it still would take days before they could go.5 In Skvyra, the evacuation commenced early in November 1943. Like in Usin, much of the cattle at this Dutch farm had come here with German troops retreating from the area on the other side of the Dnepr. In October 1943, the stables in Skvyra counted some three hundred stallions. Unlike most Dutch civilians in the area, the farmer in charge of this estate decided to ignore German military orders and to stay as long as possible in Skvyra. This soon turned out to be an unwise decision. After a day in the fi eld, he found his house completely looted by partisans. Telephone poles and wires had been cut, making communication with the outside world impossible. He now decided to leave the place. 6 These fi rst evacuations in eastern Ukraine preceded the collective withdrawal of Dutch volunteers from what was considered the heart of the new Germanic east. After the departure of the NOC’s representative Van Eek on January 13th, 1944, all Dutch activities in Ukraine were suspended. 7 Their evacuation went far from smoothly. Means of transport was scarce and the number of people on the move was large: the Dutch volunteers joined a huge stream of ethnic Germans, Ukrainian nationalists, Germans and their foreign helpers, all trying to escape the advancing Red Army. Charged with the evacuation of livestock, Dutch farmers sometimes had to slow their pace and, in consequence, could hardly stay ahead of the front. In a Russian airborne attack two Dutch peasants begged retreating motorized German troops to take them on, but they were refused. It was feared that they did not make it to safer grounds. Another farmer, who had left his Ukrainian farm early in November 1943, was still wandering around with a large herd by the end of the year.8 Van Eek took inventory in October 1944: there was no sign of fi ve farmers. He assumed that they were killed or caught by Russian troops.9 Throughout their escape, baggage and other valuables often got lost. A farmer driving cattle to the west lost track of his belongings when a Ger- man panzer division traversing scattered his herd, scaring the animals in different directions. 10 During the evacuation of Rivne, the entire administration of Dutch peasants and gardeners employed in occupied Ukraine was lost, as well as the books kept by the administrators of Werkdienst Holland. 11 Much of the equipment shipped from the brick factories in Pol- tava never reached Rivne.12 Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:42 01 October 2016 The fi rst goal of most employees in Ukraine was to cross the former Ukrainian-Polish border and to reach Lviv in the south-eastern part of the German General Government. From there, they hoped to continue their journey through safer military hinterland. The last train station in Ukraine was Rivne. Whereas a trip by rail to Lviv used to take not more than a day, people now had to wait for days before their journey could even begin. Many were looking for alternative routes. Dutch workers, transferred from Werkdienst Holland to Ostwerk a few months before, made an attempt to escape by trucks and on carriages, but they were halted just outside the city’s 172 The Final Act borders. German units confi scated their vehicles, forcing the men to return to Rivne and stand in line for their chance to leave. 13 As the Ostministerum wished to regard the advance of the Red Army as a temporary setback and clung to the idea of a massive migration of Ger- manic people to the area, Von Harder decreed that a certain number of Dutch volunteers coming from Ukraine should not be released and should not be allowed to go back to the Netherlands. He was fearing negative publicity engendered by the return of volunteers and announced that at least some volunteers should be relocated to areas in the East that were still under German rule. 14 Hence, in anticipation of a successful second German attack and re-occupation of Ukraine, a few dozen Dutch farmers, gardeners, and former employees of Werkdienst Holland were put to work in the General Government and in Lithuania. Early in October 1943 a ‘pioneers group’ (Vorkommando) of fi ve had left Ukraine and were brought to Rozdol, a small town in Galicia some thirty miles to the south of Lviv, where Nimtz was living in yet another castle. The fi ve men would be the nucleus of a new annex of Ostwerk. In agreement with Von Harder, another fi fty employees of Ostwerk arrived in Lviv a month later. Most of them were granted leave and they were allowed to continue their journey to the Netherlands. Ten men remained in Lviv to work for Ostwerk in Galicia. 15 Others were sent to Bialystok. After the evacuation of Novohrad- Volynskyi, Bialystok was named as the next headquarters of the organization, yet the approach of the Red Army frustrated this plan. Again, many were released and only a small group stayed in the area, just in Kaunas. In May 1944, after the offi cial liquidation of Ostwerk, they were divided over building units supervised by German authorities. Some were helping to renovate the communal home (Holland Haus) in Kaunas; others were put to work in the vicinity.16 Several farmers fl eeing from Ukraine also stayed in the area. Some seventy men were sent from Lviv to Vilnius and arrived at Waka T in January. Not before long, the newcomers, who complained about the meager food, lack of vodka, and poor national-socialist spirit at the estate, were placed at different farms. Van Eek had hoped for the German authorities in Lithuania to employ all of them, but only twelve men were. A larger group left for Lviv to work for a German company in charge of expropriated farmsteads (Liegenschaftsverwaltung) . When Russian troops were also approaching Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:42 01 October 2016 Galicia, they were told to leave their farms and drive their cattle to Cracow. 17 The work was largely coordinated by a man they knew, Van Eek, who had opened a new offi ce in Tarnow, near Lviv. Some months before, the LBGU had moved to the same town.18 The relocated men (and a few women) would not be staying long in their new residences. The Polish armed resistance initiated fi ghts with Ger- man troops in Lviv, resulting in a full German withdrawal. By that time, Minsk and most of German White Ruthenia had also been overrun by the Red Army. 19 Early in August 1944, both Kaunas and Vilnius were liberated. The Final Act 173 A month later, soldiers of the Red Army marched into the Estonian capital of Tallinn. With the seizure of Riga, in October 1944, the German occupied eastern territories had ceased to exist. These last days in the Ostland had been chaotic, and for some even trau- matic. A farmer, stationed near Ašmiany in Belarus, had to rush when Rus- sian soldiers approached his farm. He managed to escape, via Vilnius to Kaliningrad.20 In Vilnius and surroundings, where dozens of Dutch volunteers were still employed, people started to prepare to leave in the last days of June. A special deputy from the NOC-head offi ce traveled to the Lithu- anian city to coordinate the evacuation. Lingmont’s offi ce became the epi- center of activities. While Lingmont’s wife was putting valuables in boxes, others were burning offi cial documents and correspondence.21 On the fi rst Sunday of July all were summoned to prepare for departure. The last souvenirs were bought, suitcases were packed, and more people gathered in Lingmont’s offi ce. The next morning they woke up by the sound of busy traffi c. Soldiers and civilians, in cars, trucks, or with horses, trying to escape the city. Headed by Vorenkamp, farmers and other personnel from Waka T on panje wagons and horses were spotted. The people in the offi ce started to load their luggage onto carriages, too. Almost every one had been forced to leave things behind as there were not enough places for all belongings.22 In a long line with thousands of others, the Dutch group slowly drove to the city’s station. On their way and at the station they were bombed by Russian airplanes. The next morning they boarded for Chernyshevskoye on the western border of the Reichskommissariat Ostland. Most of the Dutch volunteers were directed by German policemen to Virbalis, some fi ve miles to the east, where they were to stay until means of transport would be available to transport them further westwards. Their accommodation in fenced barracks together with non-Germanics elicited protest. Some did not deign to sleep in the same place as ‘Russians.’23 Within a few days they were put on another train that was bringing them to East Prussia. Nearly all were put into accommodation on the premises of a German higher agricultural school in a suburb of Kaliningrad. Here, they were joined by Dutch refugees who had chosen a different route to escape. Lingmont, for instance, had traveled by car to Kaliningrad.24 Others, like the car mechanics who used to work at a garage in Kaunas, entered East Prus- sia near Nesterov, more to the east. 25 All were gathered in the East Prussian Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:42 01 October 2016 capital, where the same NOC’s special deputy divided them into groups, corresponding with the day of their scheduled departure from East Prussia.26 Unlike German civilians, the Dutch were exempt from military service and were free to leave, women and men, yet some fi fty farmers made clear that they wished to be employed again in what was left (or would be regained) of Germany’s occupied East.27 Van Eek was also confi dent of Germany’s victory and re-occupation of the area. For that reason, he urged that at least some of the volunteers who had been in Ukraine would remain under LBGU’s contract.28 The Ostministerium appreciated Van Eek’s optimism 174 The Final Act and the recruits’ willingness. 29 In anticipation of a second German occupation of the area, Dutch recruits were relocated in the Altreich’s (eastern) borderlands. Von Harder was convinced that particularly in Lithuania Dutch hands would be soon needed again and in his plan the group of volunteers constituted ‘the new stock’ (Aufbaustamm) of Dutch men in Lithuania.30 Developments on the battlefi eld proved him wrong. The Red Army was conquering more and more ground, forcing volunteers gathered in Kalin- ingrad out. They were all repatriated.31 A special deputy charged with the evacuation of Dutch men from Riga had to conclude that Riga could not be reached anymore.32 Dutch men in the Latvian capital had to prepare for evacuation on their own. In the last days of September, Dutch vegetable growers in Malpils were summoned to leave. In a tearing hurry the crops were gathered. Some 23,000 kilos of vegetables were brought to a nearby offi ce of the LBGO. The next day the entire inventory of Malpils—tractors, wagons and other equipment—was handed in, as well as the pieces of cattle. Under attack of Russian fi re, the men drove off to Riga. From there, a train took them to Liepāja where they met other Dutch volunteers.33 Not all Dutch men under the care of the NOC had left Riga in time and in the late autumn a larger group of SS Frontier Workers was still present in and around the city. Earlier that year, when a collective special leave was granted to SS Frontier Workers, many decided not to return to their work in the East. Still, the number of Dutch workers in Latvia remained considerable. During the summer, a special representative of the NOB traveled several times to Berlin and Liepāja to discuss their dismissal and return, but the SS authorities of the SS were not inclined to let them go. A few hundred men managed to escape and reach the Netherlands. Others were put on trains to Berlin and worked in the warzone near the German capital. During the deputy’s last visit to Liepāja, German offi cials had agreed to the departure of a group of another 250 men. Some eight hundred Dutch workers were less fortunate. They were still in Latvia when Russian troops arrived. 34 Little is known about their fate. Two years after the war the Dutch Red Cross still made enquiries with regard to some two hundred cases of missing Dutch SS Frontier Workers. Research showed that of this group only a small fraction was successfully repatriated: fi ve of them died after their return, arguably of deprivations suffered prior to their repatriation. With regard to the others it could only be concluded that they were in Russian captivity. Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:42 01 October 2016 Of some sixty men no traces were found. Another eighty were killed during fi ghts in Latvia or died afterwards, in Russian POW camps—in Rumania, Buchenwald, near Moscow, or even in Siberia.35

CHAOS AND DECLINE

Although men like Von Harder, Van Eek, Rost van Tonningen, and Krantz still treasured the dream of settler’s colonization of the occupied East, 36 by the autumn of 1944 reality had turned grim: the German occupied eastern The Final Act 175 territories were lost and arguably for a long time. In October 1944, the ten- ancy for the premises of the NOC’s offi ce in Vilnius was canceled. 37 Except for some farmers, predestined to establish a new core of Dutch settlers, all Dutch volunteers were released in the closing months of 1944. These volunteers returned to a different, highly polarized and politicized homeland. D-Day and the subsequent advance of Allied troops through France had brought the end of German rule also closer to the Netherlands. Encouraged by Allied military victories, obedience to German regulations was declining. In this last phase of the war the Dutch resistance came to bloom. Confronted with enemies from within and without, the German authorities in the Netherlands relied increasingly upon violence. In this fi nal stage of German rule, Dutch collaborators were playing a more prominent role in the German struggle against ‘bandits’ and ‘terror- ists.’ From March 1944 onwards, Landwacht, a new organization of armed and uniformed Dutch volunteers, was patrolling the streets to maintain (German) law and order. Small groups of men in black uniforms intimidated the public with their arbitrary searches of passers-by and assistance in raids and chases. Unemployed and possibly hardened by their ‘eastern’ experience, former recruits of the NOC engaged in the work of the Landwacht. A group of peat workers who had returned from Baltoji Voke were among the new auxiliaries. Several men established a reputation as men hunters; others became notorious for denunciation or other treacherous activities.38 Initially, the repatriation of its recruits resulted in extra work for the NOC organization. Special deputies had to be appointed and sent to the occupied East to coordinate the retreat of Dutch volunteers and to close the businesses of the NOC in the region. Furthermore, claims in cases of loss and theft had to be handled. Luggage was easily lost during the hasty departure and in overcrowded trains. The NOC’s special deputy for the evacuation in Lithu- ania, for instance, reported to Krantz that several of his belongings had gone missing during his retreat. As Russian troops were approaching, German soldiers had set the wagon with his stuff on fi re to avoid that anything of worth would fall in Russian hands. 39 It was a minor bill in the light of the enormous fi nancial investments the NOC had made in the occupied East—investments, which vanished with the arrival of Soviet troops. Like before, salaries had to be paid, as well as allowances (after dismissal) and claims (in case of loss, accidents, invalidity, or death). With time, the Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:42 01 October 2016 exact number of recruits that had been lost track off grew. In the turbulent last phase of German hegemony in the eastern territories, it was often unclear whether someone had gone into hiding after leaving his work without permission, was killed, or was caught by partisans or Soviet soldiers. Clarity on this matter was important to decide what had to be paid. In case of the kidnapped peat worker from Baltoji Voke, for example, the NOC felt compelled to pay his wife a full salary as his death could not be confi rmed. 40 Over the past years, the NOC had been merely coordinating the payments to Dutch recruits. To put it differently: the NOC had been taking care of timely payments of salaries by giving recruits an advance. In autumn of 176 The Final Act 1944, when the majority of recruits had been released, it was time to collect the money still due and to make up the balance. Letters and invoices were sent to the main debtors: both Reichskommissars, the LBGU and LBGO, the administrator of Werkdienst Holland, and the SS-WVHA. Negotia- tions often carried on for long and many debtors had not been paid by the time the war ended. Ten weeks before liberation Rost van Tonningen asked his accountant to screen the NOC-books. His overall conclusion was that fi nancial administration and balances fell short in most respects. 41 His counting work was carried out in a time of complete organizational disintegration. What began with the dismantling of the regional offi ces in the occupied eastern territories was enhanced by the bombardments on the Berlin offi ce and fi nalized in the departure of Krantz. The approach of Allied troops through France and Belgium had culminated into a complete collapse of structures within the NOC-organization. Some ten weeks after the Allied landing on the coast of Normandy, Paris was liberated. Victorious troops went northwards to Belgium and took Antwerp and Brussels. In the Nether- lands, rumors of advancing Allied forces brought hope to Dutch hearts, yet also inspired both Dutch and German Nazis with dread. On September 4th, 1944, the fi rst day of a new workweek, the NOC- head offi ce was buzzing with rumors. Agitated employees were telling each other what they had heard: Allied soldiers in the south of the Netherlands would probably be in The Hague by the next evening. In a frenzy, people started to pack papers and equipment. At the fi nance department, all payments were done and the last bills were sent. 42 Some superiors tried to contact Krantz for directives, but were told by his secretary that the director could not be disturbed. Finally, Krantz gathered his senior employees and instructed them to close down the NOC head offi ce. Each member of the team was to be granted leave by September 5th and two months of salary. The entire administration was to be packed and shipped to Germany. As Krantz was expecting that there would not be suffi cient time to wrap up all archives, he ordered the burning of documents that provided information on the NOC’s personnel. After Krantz’ farewell, the offi ce became the scene of panic and greed. ‘Everyone ran, screamed or yelled,’ a head of one of the departments remembered. 43 Drawer after drawer was emptied and as there was a lack of boxes, documents and maps were piled up in the hallway. Some papers were Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:42 01 October 2016 thrown onto one of the small bonfi res that were lit in and around the premises.44 As Krantz had agreed to the selling of cigarettes and liquor supplies, employees were stumbling over each other to secure some of these treasures. ‘In everything comparable to a good old Jewish market,’ one eyewitness reported,45 but the situation was to get worse. Typewriters, carpets, paintings, and different sorts of furniture were stolen. By the end of the day, the offi ce was a ravaged, looted, and desolate place.46 That same evening, Krantz arrived in Deventer, a provincial city in the east of Holland, not far from the German border. He expected to meet Rost The Final Act 177 van Tonningen, who had taken up residence in this town, but the president had just made the trip in the opposite direction to size up the situation in The Hague. When they fi nally met—in Deventer—and discussed the future of their enterprise, rumors of an Allied invasion were scotched. Allied troops had managed to cross the Dutch southern border, but were halted in Arnhem, leaving the northern provinces, including The Hague, still under German rule. Both Krantz and Rost van Tonningen deemed it wise to move the NOC-offi ce to Germany proper. Films of the entire NOC-archive were put in a safe in Rost van Tonningen’s residence. In the course of November of 1944, Krantz, accompanied by a small staff of administrative personnel, left the Nether- lands. Their journey ended more than fi ve hundred miles to the east of The Hague, near Frankfurt an der Oder. Here Krantz had at his disposal various rooms in a larger castle near Cybinka (Balkow) to set up a new offi ce for the NOC. The main part of the archive was stored in this castle.47 Despite Krantz’ efforts to centralize the NOC again, the organization had suffered badly from fragmentation of power. The representative in Berlin, for example, asserted himself more than ever, even though he was frequently bombed out of his offi ce. Before his departure from the Netherlands, Krantz assigned three of his most trusted employees with all current affairs. This troika in The Hague, soon notorious for corrupt practices and luxurious lifestyle, remained in offi ce until May 1945 and constituted an authority of its own. Others, like Rost van Tonningen himself, but also his fi nancial expert and the newly appointed chair of the Supervisory Board, made their presence felt. Although relations had been troubled before, Krantz’ leadership was now openly criticized.48 By March 1945, the organization was fully disintegrated. As the Red Army made its way to Berlin, the Dutch representative of the NOC in the German capital packed his trunks and closed his offi ce. Krantz also left the offi ce in Balkow. On his orders the three largest chests containing the most important books of the NOC’s administration were put on a train to Lübeck where they were handed to the Swedish consul. On Krantz’ request one of his employees in Balkow traveled to The Hague in order to safeguard the books that were kept here. On the day of his arrival, only four men were still present in the building that used to be the heart of a lively organization, providing work to a few hundreds of employees.49 Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:42 01 October 2016

AFTERMATH

While Krantz was fl eeing to Lübeck, a second Allied offensive was initiated to liberate the northern provinces of the Netherlands. Rost van Tonningen now took up arms against the Allied forces. He was arrested by Canadian soldiers early May 1945. In detention, he tried to commit suicide twice. His last attempt, on June 6th, succeeded. His death prevented him from being tried, from public humiliation, and from an undoubtedly severe sentence.50 178 The Final Act In the months succeeding the unconditional surrender of German troops, the organization of the NOC was marked as an instrument of collaboration and on governmental order a group of three administrators was entrusted with its liquidation. Their task was complicated, for the administration of the NOC was far from adequate. Parts of the archives were burnt or missing and possessions of the company were stored in warehouses all over the country. Much of the furniture of the head offi ce seemed to have been stolen and keys of safes could not be found. In October 1945 a message was published in national newspapers, asking creditors and debtors of the NOC to make themselves known. It took long time before their claims could be veri- fi ed.51 In June 1947, the Dutch Minister of Finance received an estimation of the state’s investments in the NOC. In total, the NOC still owed the Dutch state some eighteen million Dutch guilders.52 While the fi nancial situation was being sorted out, the suspects were investigated. Their arrest and detention were part of a national hunt for collaborators, real and imagined, which would ultimately involve hundreds of thousands of Dutch citizens. Between 120,000 to 150,000 of the accused were arrested. Conventional prisons were not equipped to accommodate such large numbers and most of the detainees—men, women and children— were confi ned in provisory places of detention: sheds, school buildings, military barracks, and even former German prisoner camps. Particularly during the fi rst weeks, conditions in these places were deplorable. Sanitary facilities were often insuffi cient and as most detention camps were short of basic furniture, prisoners usually spent their time in and on their ‘bed,’ which, in most cases, consisted of some straw on a concrete fl oor. Badly supervised by superiors and intoxicated by a sudden sense of power, their (Dutch) guards added to the prisoners’ misery. They were starved, teased, humiliated, and beaten.53 Gerhardt, who had accompanied Rost van Tonningen on the fi rst fact-fi nding mission of the NOC in June 1942, suffered from tuberculosis and severe depression after his nine months in custody.54 Already in 1943 the Dutch government in exile had decided that citizens accused of collaboration should be tried under the provisions of special criminal jurisdiction. Special tribunals and courts were established immediately after the German capitulation, but their administration of justice fully congested due to the enormous infl ux of cases. To their relief the Minister of Justice soon ordered to drop all charges in lighter cases of collaboration. Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:42 01 October 2016 In consequence, approximately 90,000 cases were not brought to court. Eventually, the tribunals assessed some 50,000 cases, the special courts some 16,000 cases.55 Among the investigated Dutch suspects were offi cials of the NOC as well as hundreds of recruits. They were accused of collaboration with the occupying German forces, treason, and membership of the NSB or one of its organizations. In most of the cases against the former recruits their willingness to work in the Nazi East constituted only one part of the charge. Often those on trial were also accused of membership of the NSB, WA, or The Final Act 179 Landwacht. Specifi c attention was paid to the question as to whether the suspect had worn a uniform and/or carried a weapon. In general, application for work in the occupied eastern territories was seen as a proof of a pro-German political orientation. Working in the occupied eastern territories was seen as aiding the enemy, ‘against the interests of our own people.’56 In a case of a farmer who had applied twice, the tribunal found him also guilty of theft for he had taken crops from the Russian people. 57 In most charges work in the occupied East was included as a gravi- tating act. Thus, Jantje’s lover was sentenced to three years imprisonment because of his membership of the NSB, his denunciation of three teenagers who had cut a telephone line that was used by the Wehrmacht—plus his performance of work to the benefi t of Germany, in the Netherlands and in Lithuania.58 More severe cases of collaboration were not brought before a tribunal, but before a special court. This was not an ironclad rule. A farmer with a long record of treacherous activities, for instance, was sentenced by a tribunal to seven years imprisonment.59 A colleague was convicted by a special court, although his crime had not been much more than ‘deliberately and voluntarily accepting work to the benefi t of the enemy in time of war.’ 60 In general, employment in the occupied East was only a minor charge in special court cases. In one case, for instance, a special court sentenced a farmer to fi fteen years imprisonment. He had been employed in the occupied eastern territories, yet his trial concentrated on his treacherous deeds in the Netherlands. An informer of the German and Dutch police, he had brought the lives of others in danger. In raids and searches he often displayed his extraordinary fi erceness and aggression. 61 Another former recruit who had joined the Landwacht was sentenced to four years imprisonment because he had acted as a ‘genuine servant of Germans’ (moffenknecht) . In some verdicts employment in the occupied eastern territories was not even mentioned as it was overshadowed by a long list of crimes committed in the Netherlands afterwards. 62 It is noticeable that behavior in the occupied East as such was not investigated. The use of forced laborers, the appropriation of companies and houses, and other violations of the rights and autonomy of the local population remained by and large out of the scope of the Dutch judges. This had practical reasons: by late 1945, the locus delicti was behind the iron Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:42 01 October 2016 curtain.63 The charges against De Waard’s former assistant who in Skvyra had supposedly terrorized the local population, for instance, were not investigated.64 A complaint was lodged against Vorenkamp, head of Waka T near Vilnius, who presumably assisted German guards in catching Jews, but the Dutch prosecutor decided to abandon further research. 65 In the cases of the NOC’s former peat expert Jan Habing and Vilnius representative Johannes Lingmont, the Dutch justice had come across Jewish forced laborers in Baltoji Voke, but once it was determined that these laborers were not Dutch Jews, investigations were aborted. 66 180 The Final Act Both Jan Habing and Johan Lingmont were brought to trial. Habing was convicted to three years and six months of prison for his work as peat expert in German interests.67 Lingmont, who had fl ed to Germany, was brought to justice in 1948. His activities in favor of German economy before and after his time in Lithuania were the principal constituent of the verdict.68 His former colleague in Ukraine, Van Eek, stood on trial in 1947. He was punished for his forthright pro-German attitude and his contribution to the NOC in Ukraine with four years of imprisonment. 69 Like recruits and NOC-representatives, top level offi cials were also investigated after the war. In May 1948, the court case of Evert Jan Roskam was handled. His support of the NOC was one of the ingredients of his conviction, but his membership of the Germanic SS and his work as Peasants Leader in general were considered a bigger crime. Roskam was sentenced to three years and six months imprisonment.70 Gerhardt, for some time his assistant, had been brought to court a year before. His contribution to the NOC as agricultural propagandist was only one of the charges. Like in Roskam’s case, Gerhardt’s membership of the Germanic SS was the center- piece and in June 1947, he was found guilty of treason and giving assistance to the enemy. Because of his weak health, the tribunal deemed his time passed in custody as a suffi cient punishment.71 As the majority of members of the NOC-board came from the world of fi nance and commerce, they were often implicated in economic collaboration. De Kock van Leeuwen, Rost van Tonningen’s nephew and temporary member of the NOC’s board, for instance, was also chief executive of a trading company in colonial products and president of the Chamber of Commerce in Amsterdam. Arrested in May 1945, his case was heard in December 1946— and again in June and August 1947. Guilty of NSB membership, offering support and assistance to the enemy, and openly displaying consent with the enemy, De Kock van Leeuwen was condemned to two years and three months in prison.72 His work for the NOC was barely mentioned. A much more serious punishment waited Robertson, Rost van Tonningen’s right hand man at the Dutch National Bank and also member of the board. The main accusation against him did not concern his work for his former superior or the NOC. In August of 1944 Robertson had taken part in a Landwacht search in Amsterdam. During this event he shot a captured man suspected of distributing communist leafl ets. Robertson was charged with Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:42 01 October 2016 murder, denunciation, and ‘endangering the lives of fellow countrymen.’ For over fi ve years, he was interned in various camps for political prisoners. After several appeals the punishment was fi nally established in October 1950: Robertson was sentenced to fourteen years imprisonment. 73

In only one postwar case was the organization and work of the NOC the main charge. Late in April 1949, the special court of The Hague handled what soon became known as the ‘NOC-trial.’ Before the judges stood Daniël Krantz, the former director, and four others. A prominent member of the ‘treacherous’ NSB, Krantz had been head of the NOC, according to the The Final Act 181 prosecutor ‘an organization inspired by and in favor of the enemy.’ As such, he was thought to be responsible for recruitment and employment, for the NOC itself and for its many subsidiary companies.74 In the course of the fi rst day of the trial the charges against him and the others were dealt with in more detail. The fi nancial mismanagement, the rivalries between Krantz and others, the cooperation with the Ostministerium— all these aspects were briefl y mentioned. The main theme that day was the NOC’s involvement (and therefore Krantz’ engagement) in the SS Frontier Workers Enterprise. By early 1949, prosecutor, judges, and the Dutch public at large had probably heard of the hundreds of Dutch men, virtually prisoners of the SS, who had been forced to build German defense works on the eastern front and of whom nothing had been heard since the Red Army had overrun their positions. 75 On May 13th, 1949, the court came to its verdict. Krantz was sentenced to seven years of imprisonment. The court had found him guilty of having joined a treacherous organization, the NSB, and, in his capacity of NOC- director, of having supported ‘the exploitation and exploration’ of occupied territories, ‘against the interests of the Dutch state and the Dutch Allies in their battle against Germany.’ 76

NOTES

1 . Letter Daniël Krantz to Meinoud Rost van Tonningen, 9 October 1943, NIOD, 176, fi le 16. 2 . Reports Hermann von Harder, 1 October 1943, and Won/Ostministerium, 2 October 1943, BA, R6, fi le 460. 3 . Letter Kuypers to NOC-Head Offi ce, 5 October 1943, NIOD, 176, fi le 124. 4 . Report A.A. Hofman, concerning dredging on the Dnepr, 21 October 1943, NIOD, 176, fi le 822; contributions of Nederlandse Oost Bagger to the quarterly report of the NOC, 11 January 1943, and report Nederlandse Oost Bag- ger, 5 May 1944, NIOD, 176, fi le 844. 5 . Letter Daniël Krantz to Geert Ruiter, 9 December 1943, and report Doewe Noordhof, on the events from 15 October 1943 onwards (undated), NIOD, 176, fi le 660. 6 . Report Klaas van Prooye, 6 December 1943, NIOD, 176, fi le 659; report Jan Barendregt, concerning his journey through Ukraine (undated), NIOD, 176, fi le 600. Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:42 01 October 2016 7 . Police record Willem Hendrik van Eek, 12 December 1946, NA/CABR, 2.09.09, fi le 97489 8811. 8 . Letter A. Duyker to LBGU Rowno, 22 December 1943, NIOD, 176, fi le 536; report Duivelaar, 23 October 1943, NIOD, 176, fi le 444. 9 . Letter Willem Hendrik van Eek to NOC, 17 October 1944, NIOD, 176, fi le 646. 10 . Letter H. Wassing to LBGU, 30 November 1943, NIOD, 176, fi le 492; letter LBGU to Jan van Iperen, 10 August 1944, NIOD, 176, fi le 457. 11 . Report Willem Hendrik van Eek, concerning his journey to Berlin, Lemberg, Tarnow, and Krakau, 12 April 1944, NIOD, 176, fi le 121; report, 22 April 1944, BA, R6, fi le 461. 12 . Report, concerning activities of the NOC in the last quarter of 1943, 31 March 1944, NIOD, 176, fi le 15. 182 The Final Act 13 . Report Hermann von Harder, 15 November 1943, BA, R6, fi le 460. 14 . Reports Won/Ostministerium, 16 November 1943, and Hermann von Harder, 15 November 1943, BA, R6, fi le 460. 15 . Letter Gustav Adolf Hoppe to Mengert, 18 October 1943, BA, R6, fi le 446; report Hermann von Harder, 15 November 1943, BA, R6, fi le 460; report, concerning the employment of Dutch artisans by Werkdienst Holland/ Ostwerk, 18 October 1943, NIOD, 176, fi le 444. 16 . Reports Hermann von Harder, 16 March 1944 and 5 July 1944, BA, R6, fi le 461; letter liquidator Ostwerk to Gustav Adolf Hoppe, 4 May 1944, BA, R6, fi le 461; report Ostministerium/Beauftragte für Sonderfragen, 28 March 1944, NIOD, 176, fi le 665; reports, concerning the activities of the NOC in the last quarter of 1943, 31 March 1944, and the fi rst quarter of 1944, 30 June 1944, NIOD, 176, fi le 15; letter Jan van Iperen to W. Bekker, 26 Feb- ruary 1944, and letter J.W.A. van der Graaff to NOC-Directorate, 20 April 1944, NIOD, 176, fi le 123. 17 . Letter Marius Dijt to Daniël Krantz, 8 February 1944, and response, 11 Feb- ruary 1944, NIOD, 176, fi le 123; report, concerning the activities of the NOC in the fi rst quarter of 1944, 31 March 1944, NIOD, 176, fi le 15; report Ost- ministerium/Beauftragte für Sonderfragen, 29 March 1944, NIOD, 176, fi le 665; report Willem Hendrik van Eek, 12 April 1944, NIOD, 176, fi le 121. 18 . Agreement between LBGU, NOC, and the German administration of Galicia district, 3 April 1944, and letter LBGU to Willem Hendrik van Eek, 5 April 1944, and report Willem Hendrik van Eek, 12 April 1944, NIOD, 176, fi le 121; letter Daniël Krantz to C.L. Klink, 30 August 1944, NIOD, 176, fi le 457. 19 . Report Willem Hendrik van Eek, 12 April 1944, NIOD, 176, fi le 121; letter Daniël Krantz to C.L. Klink, 30 August 1944, NIOD, 176, fi le 457. 20 . Police records of Jan Riemersma, 17 July 1947, NA/CABR, 2.09.09, fi le 47732. 21 . Report A.C. Kluizenaar, concerning my stay and experiences in Vilnius, 22 July 1944, NIOD, 176, fi le 1044. 22 . Polonaises, notes by Cornelis Paape, 12 December 1946, private archives of Casper Paape; report J.W.A. van der Graaff (undated), NIOD, 176, fi le 1044; letter W. Bekker to NOC-Directorate, 4 August 1944, NIOD, 176, fi le 122. 23 . Report J.W.A van der Graaff (undated), NIOD, 176, fi le 1044; report Nico- laas Ritske Schreinhout, 25 August 1944, NA/CABR, 2.09.09, fi le 47884. 24 . Letter Johan Lingmont to NOC, concerning his expenditures for his fl ight from Vilnius, 20 July 1944, NIOD, 176, fi le 1037. 25 . Letter J.W. Beer to W. Bekker/NOC Berlin, 18 July 1944, NIOD, 176, fi le 457. 26 . Letters P.A.G. Volckers to Daniël Krantz, 14 July 1944, 17 July 1944, and 18 July 1944, NIOD, 176, fi le 457. 27 . Letter W. Bekker to NOC-Directorate, 20 July 1944, NIOD, 176, fi le 122; various statements of employed Dutch farmers, NIOD, 176, fi le 457. 28 . Report Willem Hendrik van Eek, 12 April 1944, NIOD, 176, fi le 121; letter Daniël Krantz to C.L. Klink, 30 August 1944, NIOD, 176, fi le 457. Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:42 01 October 2016 29 . Letter Walter Malletke to Meinoud Rost van Tonningen, 12 July 1944, in: David Barnouw (ed.), Correspondentie van Mr. M.M. Rost van Tonningen II (Zutphen: Walburg pers, 1993), 487; reports Hermann von Harder, concerning employment of Dutch farmers in the Reich, 18 August 1944, and concerning his trip to the offi ces of Generalkommissar Litauen in East Prussia, 11 August 1944, BA, R6, fi le 446. 30 . Report Beauftragte für Sonderfragen/Ostministerium, 22 August 1944, NIOD, 265, fi le 30. 31 . Letters P.A.G. Volkers to Daniël Krantz, 14 July 1944, 17 July 1944, and 18 July 1944, NIOD, 176, fi le 457. The Final Act 183 32 . Letter W. Bekker to NOC-Directorate, 4 August 1944, NIOD, 176, fi le 122. 33 . Report Adriaan W., concerning the evacuation of vegetable farm in Malpils, 5 October 1944, NIOD, 176, fi le 614. 34 . Police records Pieter Hoekstra, 21 May 1945, NIOD, 176, fi le 1053. 35 . Various documents, NIOD, 176, fi le 888. 36 . Letter Meinoud Rost van Tonningen to Arthur Seyss-Inquart, 27 December 1944, in: Barnouw, Correspondentie II, 530. 37 . Letter J. Rietveld to Daniël Krantz, 29 August 1944, NIOD, 176, fi le 1037. 38 . Preparatory report for Daniël Krantz, concerning his meeting with Meinoud Rost van Tonningen (undated), NIOD, 176, fi le 663; various police records, NA/CABR, 2.09.09/265, fi les 75881, 108856 and 109431. 39 . Letter P.A.G. Volkers to NOC-Directorate, 12 December 1944, NIOD, 176, fi le 16. 40 . Internal notifi cation P.H. Oldemans, concerning H. Dekker, 25 July 1944, NIOD, 176, fi le 481. 41 . Report J.W.J. Tummers, 19 February 1945, NIOD, 176, fi le 40. 42 . Report P.H. Oldemans, concerning the events in September 1944, 16 Febru- ary 1945, and short report A.A. de Jong, concerning 4 and 5 September 1944, 15 February 1945, and report P.W. Bazuin, 14 February 1945, and report C. de Stoppelaar, 16 February 1945, NIOD, 176, fi le 39. 43 . Report P.H. Oldemans, concerning the events in September 1944, 16 February 1945, NIOD, 176, fi le 39. 44 . Ibidem; short report A.A. de Jong, concerning 4 and 5 September 1944, 15 February 1945, and report P.W. Bazuin, 14 February 1945, and report C. de Stoppelaar, 16 February 1945, NIOD, 176, fi le 39. 45 . Short report A.A. de Jong, concerning 4 and 5 September 1944, 15 February 1945, NIOD, 176, fi le 39. 46 . Report P.H. Oldemans, concerning the events in September 1944, 16 Febru- ary 1945, and short report A.A. de Jong, concerning 4 and 5 September 1944, 15 February 1945, and report P.W. Bazuin, 14 February 1945, and report C. de Stoppelaar, 16 February 1945, NIOD, 176, fi le 39. 47 . Police records Uylen, 25 September 1945, and P.W. Bazuin, 20 August 1945, NIOD, 176, fi le 1053. 48 . Letter Frederic Louis Rambonnet to Meinoud Rost van Tonningen, 21 Febru- ary 1945, and letters Rost van Tonningen to Daniël Krantz, 27 February 1945 and 9 March 1945, and to Rambonnet, 12 March 1945, in: Barnouw, Cor- respondentie II, 563, 566, 585, and 588. 49 . Letter Daniël Krantz to Meinoud Rost van Tonningen, 27 March 1945, in: Barnouw, Correspondentie II, 598; police records Uylen, 25 September 1945, NIOD, 176, fi le 1053. 50 . David Barnouw, Rost van Tonningen: Fout tot het bittere einde (Zutphen: Walburg, 1994), 130–135. 51 . Message W.H. Scheurleer, 3 October 1945, NIOD, 176, fi le 1052; various Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:42 01 October 2016 documents, NIOD, 176, fi les 1042–1056. 52 . Letter W.H. Scheurleer to Minister of Finance, 6 June 1947, NIOD, 176, fi le 1055. 53 . Peter Romijn, Snel, streng en rechtvaardig: Politiek beleid inzake de bestraffi ng en reclassering van ‘foute’ Nederlanders 1945–1955 (Amsterdam: Olympus, 2002), 163ff. Also: Henk Eefting, De Bijzondere Rechtspleging 1944–1952: Rampzalige gevolgen voor politieke delinquenten en collaborateurs (Soester- berg: Aspekt, 2007). 54 . Memorandum of oral pleading J. van Duijvendijk (undated), NA/CABR, 2.09.09, fi le 52722. 184 The Final Act 55 . Sjoerd Faber, Gretha Donker et al. (eds.), Bijzonder Gewoon: Het Centraal Archief Bijzondere Rechtspleging, 1944–2010, en de ‘lichte gevallen’ (Zwolle: Waanders, 2010), 8 and 37. 56 . Verdict tribunal Alkmaar, 10 July 1946, NA/CABR, 2.09.09, fi le 14600. 57 . Verdict tribunal Groningen, 29 August 1947, NA/CABR, 2.09.09, fi le 40752. 58 . Verdict tribunal Leeuwarden, 14 October 1948, NA/CABR, 2.09.09, fi le 47884. 59 . Verdict tribunal Groningen, 26 November 1947, NA/CABR 2.09.09, fi le 40800. 60 . Verdict special court The Hague, 21 January 1946, NA/CABR 2.09.09, fi le 67730. 61 . Verdict special court Leeuwarden, 14 June 1949, NA/CABR 2.09.09, fi le 205. 62 . Verdict special court Leeuwarden, 23 December 1947, NA/CABR, 2.09.09, fi le 76090. 63 . Verdict tribunal Utrecht, 12 October 1948, NA/CABR, 2.09.09, fi le 57347. 64 . Verdict tribunal Breda, 31 October 1946, NA/CABR, 2.09.09, fi le 31216. 65 . Police records Cornelis Adolf Geertsema, 7 February 1946, and Martinus Ekko Vorenkamp, 8 February 1946, NA/CABR, 2.09.09, fi le 38971. 66 . NA/CABR, 2.09.09, fi les 30597 and 24858. 67 . Verdict tribunal Assen, 24 December 1947, NA/CABR, 2.09.09, fi le 30597. 68 . Verdict cantonal court Amsterdam, 20 October 1949, NA/CABR, 2.09.09, fi le 24858. 69 . Verdict tribunal Utrecht, 24 October 1947, NA/CABR, 2.09.09, fi le 56653. 70 . Nieuwsblad van het Noorden, 1 May 1948 and 10 May 1948; verdict tribunal Arnhem, 10 May 1948, NA/CABR, 2.09.09, fi le 4967. 71 . V erdict tribunal Rotterdam, 26 June 1947, NA/CABR, 2.09.09, fi le 52722. 72 . Police records Frits de Kock van Leeuwen, 11 December 1945, and verdicts tribunal Haarlem, 3 December 1946, 3 June 1947, and 7 August 1947, NA/ CABR 2.09.09, fi le 41591. 73 . NA/CABR, 2.09.09, fi le 51. 74 . Proceedings of special court The Hague, 25 April 1949, NA/CABR, 2.09.09, fi le 156 III. 75 . Ibidem. 76 . Verdict special court The Hague, 13 May 1949, NIOD, 176, fi le 1071. Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:42 01 October 2016 8 Imperium Neerlandicum

In the life of the former NOC-director, the court’s sentence was the fi nal blow in a series of many. Before June 1942, Krantz had been a respected man in the world of fi nances, appreciated for his knowledge of banking. Father of fi ve healthy children, he enjoyed a rich social and family life. By committing himself to the NOC, Krantz gave up his position as bank manager and a sound salary. Because of his political beliefs and very real collaboration, many of his friends and business partners distanced themselves. His social isolation became complete with the separation of his wife, largely due to their different political views. 1 If in the life of this one man this court case was of great magnitude, for the Dutch public at large it was not. Coverage of the trial was limited and the public tribune remained empty. It seemed that, almost four years after the end of the war, the retribution of collaboration in general had lost much of its urgency. Labeled as a singular Nazi curiosity, there was no reason to pay much attention to the phenomenon of the NOC. Other issues moved under public scrutiny. One of these issues was emigration. Already during the war, the Dutch government in exile had put the matter on the agenda. Special committees were appointed to give advice on the question whether it was needed to encourage emigration, in particular in relation to the overpopulation of rural areas. Their reports were equivo- cal in their advice: emigration, especially of landless peasants, should be actively stimulated by the Dutch government.2 Thus, as opposed to prewar policy, the fi rst postwar Dutch governments vigorously promoted departure. A national survey organized in 1948, showing that one out of three Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:42 01 October 2016 interviewees wished to leave the country, gave the last push. In his new year’s speech the prime minister openly made an appeal to the courage of ‘a part of our people’ to build a future elsewhere.3 At the time of Krantz’ conviction, the exodus had just begun. Some 50,000 to 60,000 Dutch citizens were leaving their country that year. Fear of unemployment was one of the main drivers for these candidates; another was the structural problem of scarcity of land. Accordingly, the Dutch Departments of Social Affairs and of Agriculture were both leading in the organization of mass departure. This close collaboration materialized in the teamwork of 186 Imperium Neerlandicum Cees Staf, general director of agriculture within the Department of Agricul- ture from 1945 until 1951, and Jan Hartland, in his dual function of head of emigration and senior civil servant within the Department of Social Affairs.4 1949 was also the year the Dutch bade farewell to its most prestigious colony, the Dutch East Indies. Making use of the opportunities offered by the Japanese occupation, Indonesian nationalists had grown in strength during the war years. Immediately after the unconditional surrender of Japanese troops in August 1945, Sukarno proclaimed independence for the Republic of Indonesia. The authorities in the Netherlands contested this claim at once and although some were not unfavorable to the idea of some sort of Indonesian self-determination, a transference of all power to Indo- nesian republicans was for most politicians not negotiable. It would take the Dutch government four years to fi nally accept Indonesian sovereignty. 5 Between 1945 and 1949 a colonial war was fought. Dutch soldiers were sent to Java in the summer of 1947 and, again, in the winter of 1948–1949. Both ‘actions’ did not lead to the desired result of rolling back Republican rule. In the month of Krantz’ trial, one of the last troops of Dutch soldiers was evacuated from Madura, an island to the north of Java. In December that year, the young queen Juliana affi rmed the handing over of sovereign power to the Republic of United States of Indonesia. Although parts of New Guinea (and Surinam and the Netherlands Antilles on the other side of the world) remained under Dutch rule, the Dutch state had lost its largest and richest overseas colony. The era of empire was over. Considered in a wider timeframe, the Dutch participation in the exploitation and colonization of the Nazi East is hardly an abruption or anom- aly, but rather a transitional phase in the history of Dutch imperialism and population policy. The questions of how to release Dutch agriculture of population pressure and how to preserve Dutch colonial status had been both directive in the discussions that led to Dutch initiatives in the occupied eastern territories. In the summer of 1941, in search of extra manpower to maximize the cultivation of the fi elds of the newly conquered areas in East- ern Europe, German offi cials had turned to Dutch experts on the subjects of agriculture, emigration, cultivation of barren land, and relief works for the unemployed. Hartland and Staf, the two leading players in the policy of mass departure after the war, were also the main actors in the fi rst experiment of state-led emigration during the war. Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:42 01 October 2016 Before the war, Staf had already been concerned with the issues of land reclamation and unemployment. As the head of the Dutch Emigration Service in the 1930s, Hartland for his part had been arguing that emigration was an effective weapon against unemployment and overpopulation. Both senior offi cials were familiar to the structural crisis in Dutch agriculture caused by the shortage of land within the Dutch national borders. During the war, they were willing to cooperate and to recruit Dutch volunteers for employment elsewhere to bring this crisis to an end. When they gave their support in the summer of 1941, they assumed that employment on a temporary contract Imperium Neerlandicum 187 would in due time lead to permanent emigration of Dutch peasants to the Nazi East. Building on longer trends in Dutch history, taking part in the cultivation of the Nazi East was also a Dutch quest for ‘living space.’ Even after Rost van Tonningen and Rosenberg claimed the enterprise in June 1942, old trails were being followed. From the start it was clear that Rost van Tonningen and his close collaborators like Krantz had ambitions that went far beyond the sheer relocation of Dutch peasants. The occupied eastern territories would also provide jobs for Dutch workers, and markets for Dutch investors and entrepreneurs. Moreover, it would soften the recent blow of the loss of the Dutch East Indies and restore the imperial status of the Dutch nation. In extensive propaganda campaigns the NOC emphasized the nation’s long colonial tradition. Not only the dominance of overseas trade in the days of the VOC was being brought to mind, but also the pioneers of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries who left their safe homes and moved to virgin territory, in the ‘wilds’ of the Cape of Africa or on the ‘steppes’ of East- ern Europe. The point to be made was that the initiatives of the NOC fi tted in a longer continuum of Dutch conquest and rule of foreign land and people. Thus, the transfer of people and activities to the occupied eastern territories constituted a next chapter in the history of Dutch expansion and colonial rule. For a nation whose identity had been (and still was) largely based on its overseas conquests, the acquisition of new possessions was deemed essential. It was generally believed—before, during, and after the war—that without imperial power the Netherlands would shrink to the size of an insignifi cant third class country.

At the same time, particularly after the take-over by the NOC, the enterprise had a distinct national-socialist character. The politicization of the enterprise became all encompassing in the early summer of 1942, when Rosenberg’s Ostministerium spread its tentacles to the Netherlands and the minister himself charged Rost van Tonningen with the coordination of all Dutch endeavors to explore and exploit the occupied East. Both men were passionate advocates of the Greater Germanic Reich. They aspired the formation of a larger continental empire, established by association and conquest. However, their imagined continental empire would not be based on multi-ethnicity, but on racial exclusivity. Bringing together people of Germanic descent was their central aim. For Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:42 01 October 2016 the existence of this united people larger parts of Eastern Europe needed to be claimed, fi rst by military conquest, then by population policy. Accordingly, the building of a new Reich involved people and land in both Western and Eastern Europe. The program of Germanization was not a goal per se, but part of a larger project of Nazi empire-building, aiming for integration of fellow Germanic people. This story of Dutch participation in the cultivation of the occupied East exemplifi es the coherence of both sides of Nazi empire-building. Collaboration was a fi rst step on the way to integration and, as is shown, the Dutch did join in. Already before the war the idea of a common German 188 Imperium Neerlandicum descent had found support among Dutch national-socialists. The Greater Germanic Reich offered an alternative identity based on race, transcending national political borders. Although Germanization of areas in the East would be a combined effort of all Germanic people, relations between Germans and Dutch in situ would quickly grow troublesome. Obviously, political consent was not a guarantee for successful collaboration. Recruits had left the Netherlands in the presup- position that it was only a matter of time before Dutch presence in this area would be consolidated: they pictured themselves as pioneers, the fi rst in a massive transfer of people from west to east. They were thought to be experts in colonial rule for they were the sons of a nation of conquerors: as if by intuition they would know how to deal with natives and how to exploit the richness of the area to the benefi t of themselves and their motherland. Although the Greater Germanic Reich was a continental empire, the main frame of reference for most Dutch participants was the Dutch colony overseas. In actuality, the position of the Dutch in the occupied eastern territories differed diametrically from what was known, expected, and hoped for. More- over, the area was not the reward of Dutch military conquest. This was terrain seized by German tanks and guns. The Dutch were far from absolute sover- eigns in the area and without German permission not much could be done. The NOC and its recruits were to operate within borders and according to rules set by German authorities. The Dutch had offered their support because they were expecting that racial brotherhood implied Dutch autonomy. In the eyes of most German partners this was an erroneous assumption: participating in the occupied eastern territories required adaptation and, to an increasing extent, subjection to German directives and rules. An increasing divergence of interests worsened the relations. As war lin- gered on and victory over the Red Army was ever further away, the focus of German policy in the area shifted more and more to semi-organized pillaging. Plans for long-term cultivation were being replaced by instant exploitation. For the Dutch, this development was undesirable. Behind the well-known national-socialist rhetoric of racial solidarity and empire-building, they had been following their own national agenda: the acquisition of land and commercial rights would strengthen Dutch economy, restore Dutch colonial grandeur, and make Dutch peasantry viable and healthy again. The realization of these national ambitions seemed unattainable in a context of bound- Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:42 01 October 2016 less violence and plunder. Because of different assumptions on the division of power between the two partners, this project of collaboration was perhaps doomed to fail. Ulti- mately, national interests of both partners obstructed a policy aiming for transnational unity. The unexpected diffi cult living conditions in the occupied East added to the friction. The occupied eastern territories were not the empty, yet rich land of Nazi propaganda. Millions of people, Baltic, Slavic, and Jewish, were populating the area. They soon became the victim of Nazi racist ideology. Although opinions within the Nazi regime varied and distinctions were sometimes made with regard to the various peoples Imperium Neerlandicum 189 and regions of the occupied East, the basic assumption was that German domination in the area was justifi ed by the laws of race. As the German people were descendants of a superior race—of Aryans/Germanics—they had the right, arguably even the obligation, to subdue and govern others. Except ethnic Germans—and to a certain extent also Baltic people—the entire population of the occupied eastern territories was considered inferior. In the context of war and occupation, these ideas evolved into a state-engineered and state-sanctioned policy of extreme brutality and genocide. Although collaboration, in particular during the initial phase of German occupation, was pandemic here, many locals came to resent their new rulers. As German policy grew more compulsive, resistance increased. Sup- ported by their political allies abroad and making use of the geographical and climatological circumstances of the area, armed underground movements expanded rapidly. By early 1943, larger parts of the occupied eastern territories were the terrain of guerilla warfare. In these circumstances panic struck among the new rulers and internal tensions grew. Ironically, whereas the Dutch criticized their German partners for unequal treatment, partisans— and, for that matter, the Soviet soldiers reconquering the area from late 1943 onwards—did not discriminate between Dutch and Germans.

Despite the troubled relations, the Dutch had added to the consolidation of German rule in the area. Their very presence in the area was based on the removal, exclusion, and suppression of others. Racism was undoubtedly prevalent in the Dutch colonial army and society, and racist violence was certainly not absent in the Dutch colonies of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Yet the scale and the pace of the killings and other mass crimes in the German occupied eastern territories were unparalleled. It is noticeable that most of the Dutch organizers, reporters, local representatives, and recruits accepted this brutal reality without too much mental stress or moral objections. Arguably, they agreed with the main tenets of Nazi ideology, but a homegrown anti-Semitism and a collective colonial heritage also paved the way to the approval of racial discrimination. Stereotypes of the lazy, dirty, untrustworthy, and generally backward ‘colonial other’ were resonating in their letters and reports. At the time the Dutch volunteers were entering the stage, the majority of the millions of Jews living there had been killed. Although they were not the main culprits of this mass crime, the Dutch con- Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:42 01 October 2016 stituted a group that beneﬁ tted and, by doing so, supported and consolidated anti-Jewish policy. Germanic brotherhood was perhaps hard to ﬁ nd in the occupied East, but the Dutch were certainly the Germans’ brothers in crime.

NOTES

1 . Memorandum of oral pleading, 22 May 1950, and statements J.E. van der Pot (undated) and P. Bakker, 4 January 1945, NA/CABR, 2.09.09, ﬁ le 156 III. 2. Marijke van Faassen, Polder en emigratie: Het Nederlandse emigratiebeleid in internationaal perspectief 1945–1967 (Den Haag: Huygens ING, 2014), 50–51. 190 Imperium Neerlandicum 3 . Quoted in: ibidem, 45. 4 . Ibidem, 5, 55–58, and 80–90. 5 . Hans Blom, ‘De Tweede Wereldoorlog en de Nederlandse samenleving: Continuï- teit en verandering’, in: Hans Blom, Crisis, bezetting en herstel: Tien studies over Nederland 1930–1950 (’s-Gravenhage: Nijgh & Van Ditmar Universitair, 1989), 164–183, in particular 177–178; James Kennedy, Nieuw Babylon in aanbouw: Nederland in de jaren zestig (Amsterdam/Meppel: Boom, 1995), 50–54 and 69–73; Friso Wielenga, Nederland in de twintigste eeuw (Amsterdam: Boom, 2009), 222–234. Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:42 01 October 2016 Selected Bibliography

ARCHIVES (AND ABBREVIATIONS USED IN THE NOTES)

Bundesarchiv Berlin (BA) Central State Archive of Higher Organs of Government and Adminis- tration Kiev (TSDAVO) Provincial Archive Gelderland Arnhem (GA) Lithuanian Central State Archive Vilnius (LCVA) National Archives The Hague (NA) National Archives The Hague/Central Archives for Special Criminal Jurisdiction (NA/CABR) Netherlands Institute for War, Holocaust and Genocide Studies Amster- dam (NIOD) Private Collection Casper Paape Rijswijk Swiss Federal Institute for Technology Zürich/Archiv für Zeitgeschichte (AfZ) Yad Vashem Archives Jerusalem (YVA)

NEWSPAPERS

Agrarisch Nieuwsblad Algemeen Handelsblad Arnhemsche Courant Dagblad van het Oosten Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:42 01 October 2016 De Residentiebode De SS Man De Telegraaf De Waag De Waarheid De Zwarte Soldaat Deutsche Zeitung Drentsch Dagblad Fotonieuws 192 Selected Bibliography Het Nationale Dagblad Het Vaderland Het Volk Kauener Zeitung La Revue des Marchés Leeuwarder Nieuwsblad Nationaal Dagblad Nieuwsblad van het Noorden Nieuw Rotterdamsche Courant Nieuwe Venlosche Courant Rotterdamsch Nieuwsblad Slaet op den Trommele Storm SS Utrechtse Courant Volk en Vaderland

WEBSITES

http://archive.org/details/politik01trei http://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=wu.89092561190;view=1up;seq=9 http://www.gutenberg.org/fi les/11352/11352.txt http://www.gutenberg.org/fi les/16331/16331-h/16331-h.htm#SPEECH_FROM_ THE_THRONE http://germanhistorydocs.ghi-dc.org/sub_document.cfm?document_id=980 https://www.h-net.org/~german/gtext/kaiserreich/class.html http://www.historischdagboek.nl/jjvanaken/biografi e-jacobus-joseph-van-aken http://www.iisg.nl/ondernemers/pdf/pers-0909-01.pdf http://www.jewishgen.org/yizkor/pinkas_poland/pol5_00168.html http://www.jewua.org http://www.jewishgen.org/yizkor/Hlybokaye/hly189.html http://www.parlement.com/id/vg09ll98m9zu/c_kees_staf http://resources.huygens.knaw.nl/bwn1880-2000/lemmata/bwn4/roskam http://www.wereldoorlog1418.nl/nederlandse-gedenktekens/#08 https://www.winstonchurchill.org/learn/speeches/speeches-of-winston-churchill/ 809-the-fourth-climacteric

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Agrarian Front (Agrarisch Front) 61, Belgium: and the Greater Dutch thought 62, 64 (Groot Dietse gedachte) 20; and Agrarisch Nieuwsblad 104, 122 German occupation WWII 42, agriculture: and emigration policy 3, 7, 43, 44; and Germanization of the 16, 18, 185–6; and shortage of occupied eastern territories 39, land 3, 7, 15–16 45; and liberation 176; and WWI Agriculture and Society ( Landbouw 29–31, 33 en Maatschappij) 57 Berdychiv 113, 115, 128, 158 Ahnenerbe 35, 46 Bergen Belsen 120 Aken, Jacobus Joseph van 55 Berger, Gottlob 39, 159 Alexander II, Tsar 112 Berlin: and anti-Semitism 118; and Amersfoort 120 archives 5; and Berlin Wall Amsterdam 14–15, 47, 58, 74–7, 89, 2; and contact NOC and 96, 117–20, 149, 180 Ostministerium 61–5, 77, 80, Arndt, Ernst Moritz 25 87, 90–5, 121, 145, 176–7; and Ašmiany 173 CULANO 69, 72–6; and German Foreign Ofﬁ ce 32; and Hans Backe, Herbert 38, 58, 61, 69, 73 Ernst Schneider 35; and interna- Baltoji Voke: and Dutch exploitation of tional conference of 1884 13 the moor 98; and Dutch settle- Bernhardi, Friedrich von 28 ment 145; and Dutch volunteers Bethmann Hollweg, Theodor von 29, 120, 140, 149, 157, 175; and 30 Jewish forced labor 123, 124, Bialystok 37, 94, 130, 172 127–30, 179; and NOC take- Bila Tserkva 128, 146 over 88; and partisans 157 Bismarck, Otto von 26 Bank, Jan 13 Boers 19–20, 139 Baranivka 92, 99–101, 115, 143, 159 Bogor 140 Baranovichi 45, 114–15, 122–3, 128 Borggreven, August 71–2, 74, 96, 154

Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:42 01 October 2016 Barneveld 14 Bülow, Bernard von 27 Bartov, Omar 6 Bürckel, Joseph 46 Bauer, Yehuda 113 Belarus: and anti-Jewish policy 112–16; Catherine the Great 112 and Belgians 45; and develop- Centre for Emigration ( Emigratie ments before WWII 30; and Centrale Holland) 16 Dutch farmers 76, 140, 143–6, Chernyshevskoyeo 141 148–9, 170; and German occu- Churchill, Winston 55 pation 3–4, 38, 58, 117, 156; Class, Heinrich 29 and NOC 79, 92–3, 129; and Commission for the Employment of partisans 93, 157 Farmers in Eastern Europe 204 Index ( Commissie tot Uitzending van 77, 78, 86, 95, 151–60, 188; and Landbouwers naar Oost-Europa , supervision ‘on the spot’ 143–5; CULANO): and colonization and tobacco cultivation 91, 60, 74, 145, 149, 156; and its 97–8 dissolution 70; and establishment Dutch East India Company (Verenigde 48; and national-socialism 64, Oostindische Compagnie , VOC) 65, 68; and NOC 95, 103, 125, 4, 17 128–9, 154; and problems in the Dutch East Indies: and the colonization occupied eastern territories 72, of the occupied eastern territories 74, 87; and recruitment 61–3, 8, 140; and decolonization 186; 68, 99; and transit camps 65–6, and Dutch colonial policy 6, 122–3 16–18; and Dutch nationalism Cracow 46, 47, 121, 172 13, 18–20; and the Japanese Cybinka 177 attack 78; and the occupation of Czarny Bor 124 the Netherlands 4 Czechoslovakia 1, 31, 35, 37 Dutch Heathland Society ( Heidemij) : and CULANO 58; and recruiting Darré, Walther 14, 36, 37, 40, 58 60–2, 64, 96; and relief works D-Day 175 15, 16 Denmark 3, 31, 39–40, 69, 72 Dutch National Bank 3, 73, 74, 76, 77, De Pionier 139 180 Dertien, Jan Remko 62, 64–7, 122 Dutch National-Socialist Movement Deutsche Zeitung in den Niederlanden ( Nationaal-Socialistische 65 Beweging , NSB): and Alfred Deventer 176–7 Rosenberg 70–2; and anti- De Volksche Werkgemeenschap 46 Jewish policy 8, 117, 118, 119; De Waarheid 55 and colonial expansion 20; and Dieren, Evart van 104, 125 CULANO 62, 68; and Evert-Jan Dijt, Marius 96, 101 Roskam 14; and NOC person- Dnepr 98, 155, 170 nel 73, 77, 96, 99; and postwar Dnepropetrovsk 92, 99–100, 113, 170 trials 178–81; and recruits 8, 64, Doorn, Jacques van 18 66, 99, 102, 103, 117 Drenthe 63–4, 70–1, 121 Dutch Society for Emigration Dutch East Company ( Nederlandse ( Nederlandse Verening Oost Compagnie , NOC): and Landverhuizing ) 16 anti-Jewish policy 8, 115, 119–30; Dutch West India Company 16 and colonialism 4, 78, 140, 145, 146, 187; and founding 3, 76; East-German Society of Agrarian and evacuation and dissolution Exploitation ( Ostdeutsche 173–8; and Germanization 2–9; Landbewirtschaftungsgesellschaft , and its daughter companies 89, LO): and CULANO 61–3, 65, 95, 98, 139; and its economic 67; and occupied France 44; and activities 87–101; and its organi- occupied Poland 37; and the take- Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:42 01 October 2016 zation 77, 95–6, 151, 176, 177; over by the NOC 95 and local population 9, 137, Eek, Willem Hendrik van: and General 139, 146–50; and Meinoud Rost Government 171–4; and postwar van Tonningen 3, 86, 87; and trial 180; and Ukraine 96, 104, partisans 156–9; and peat exca- 144, 147, 151 vations 88, 98; and political aims Estonia: and developments before 4, 19, 145, 187; and postwar WWII 30, 37; and Dutch SS trials and handlings 5, 178–81, Frontier Workers 158; and fi sh- 185; and propaganda 8, 78, 141, ing industry 89; and gardening 142; and recruitment 100–5; and 99, 101, 152; and Germanization relations with German authorities 75; and Jews 128; and liberation Index 205 178; and Meinoud Rost van Göring, Heinrich 69 Tonningen 137–9; and visit of Grant, Madison 32, 33 NOC delegation 86 Greater Germanic Reich: and Europe ethnic Germans 37–8, 69, 94, 171, 2, 7, 34; and Jews 9; and 189 Luxemburg 43; and Meinoud Rost van Tonningen 4, 79, 187; Fabius, Oswald 95, 96, 105 and the Netherlands 7, 8, 9, Fall Gelb 42 46, 56; and the NOC 154; and Fermann, Olav Willy 41 Norway 40, 42 Fichte, Johann Gottlieb 25 Greater Dutch thought ( Groot Dietse Fiebig, Richard 70 gedachte ) 20 Fischböck, Hans 71, 73, 90, 91 Greiser, Arthur 37 Flemish National League ( Vlaams Groningen 62–4 Nationaal Verbond , VNV) 44, Grote, Friedrich Franz 57–61, 64, 68, 45 70 Flemish people: and the Belgian state Günther, Hans 40 before WWII 20, 30, 33, 34; and Germanization 44, 45 Habing, Jan: early work in Lithuanian Foundation for Emigration from peat industry 71, 88, 123, 145; the Netherlands ( Stichting and German partners 153; and Landverhuizing Nederland , SLN) Jewish forced labor 124, 127, 16, 59 128, 130; and postwar trial 179, France: and D-day 175, 176; and 180 German colonization 61; and Hals, Frans 13 German occupation 42, 44; Harder und von Harmhove, Hermann and WWI 26, 29–33 von: and Dutch partners 78, 86, Frank, Hans 46, 47 87, 138, 152; and evacuation Fruin, Robert Jacobus 12, 19, 20 172, 174; and negotiations with Furnier Beton 89, 90, 96, 104 German local offi cials 75; and Ostministerium 74, 77 Galicia 37, 172 Hartland, Jan 16, 59–63, 78, 186 Gdansk 31, 36, 47 Haushofer, Karl 35 Gdov 147, 148, 150 Heim in Holland Aktion 125 General Government 36, 46, 96, 171, Hennig, Hans 70 172 Hermann Göring Werke 98 General Plan East 37, 38 Hess, Rudolph 35 Geo Gretzer and Wiesenbrock 98 Het Volk 65, 86 Gerhardt, Wilhelm 77, 87, 126, 140, Heutsz, Joannes van 18 178, 180 Hindenburg, Paul von 30 German Protection League ( Deutscher Hirschfeld, Hans Max 57–60, 63, 65, Schutzbund für die Gren- und 68, 70 Auslandsdeutschtum ) 32 Hoekstra, P. 77 Germanic Land Service ( Germanische Hotel Metropol Kaunas 89, 125 Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:42 01 October 2016 Landdienst) 41 Hlybokaye 67, 114, 115, 122, 123 Germanization: and Dutch support ‘Holocaust by bullets’ 5, 8, 114–17 4, 9, 10, 21, 59, 78, 138; and Himmler, Heinrich: and anti-Jewish Eastern Europe 1; and Germanic policy 128; and Dutch volunteers support 37, 38, 41, 69, 188; 159, 161; and Germanization and racism 3, 8; and settlers 36–9, 69; and involvement colonialism 10, 187 Germanic people 40, 79, 94, Ginaite-Rubinson, Sara 149 138, 140; and Meinoud Rost van Gips, F.B.J. 77 Tonningen 3, 157; and Norway Goedhuys, Willem 140, 146, 147 41, 42; and Western Europe 43, Goldberg, Gitta 123, 124, 128 45–8 206 Index Ispert, Wolfgang 34, 35 Kiev 92; and liquidation 100, 101, 155, 176; and Rivne 91, Kaisadorys 127 125; and settlers colonialism Kaliningrad 141, 173 100, 145; and social care and Katowice 122 misbehavior 143–4, 147, 149, Kaunas: and Dutch communal house 150, 152, 153; and women 130, 172; and Dutch volunteers 101, 102 67, 88, 101, 127, 172, 173; and Lake Peipus 89, 89, 120, 147, 148, 155 ghetto 126; and Jewish forced Landbewirtschaftungsgesellschaft labor 123, 126, 127, 149; and Ostland (LBGO): and founding Jewish life 112, 113, 114; and 61; and head offi ce in Riga 66, liberation 172; and NOC offi ce 75; and local offi ce in Vileyka 90, 95, 125, 151 67, 116, 122, 156; and Malpils Kharkiv 71, 91, 97 174; and NOC 80, 176; and Kherson 94, 140 Waka T 87, 99 Khortytsia 92 Landbewirtschaftungsgesellschaft Kiev: and Dutch dairy production 100, Ukraine (LBGU): and Dutch 102; and Dutch industrial busi- farmers 170, 173; and founding ness 94, 98, 128, 170; and Dutch 61; and head offi ce in Rivne 102; volunteers in agriculture 98, 99, and local offi ce in Nikolayev 146, 155, 158, 170; and Jews 101; and NOC 176; and offi ce in 113–15, 128; and Labor Service Tarnow 172 Holland 92, 100; and NOC 92; Landstand 64, 68, 77, 104 and visit Norwegian delegation Landwacht 104, 120, 175, 179, 180 41 Langbehn, Julius 25 Koch, Erich: and dissatisfaction with Latvia: and Baltic Germans 37; and Dutch volunteers 159–61; and developments before WWII 30; Germanization 2; and involve- and Dutch building units 145, ment of non-Germans in Ukraine 174; and Dutch fi shermen 89, 75, 76, 91; and Labor Service 148; and Dutch guards 90; and Holland 100, 101, 143; and Dutch vegetable growers 88, NOC 91, 153; and Ukraine 148; and evacuation 174; and 1; and Ukrainians 139 Jews 122; and NOC offi ce 95, Kock van Leeuwen, Fritz 91, 97, 140, 105; and perceptions of Latvian 180 people 75, 137–9; and visit of Kok, Peter 64 a NOC delegation 80 Körner, Helmut 91, 93, 94, 97, 153 Lebensborn 42 Kostopil 1, 114, 116 Leeuwarden 120 Krantz, Daniël: and appointment 77; Leeuwen Boomkamp, Pieter van 91, and the last days of the NOC 97, 140 174–7; and postwar trial 180, Leopold III 43 181, 185, 186, 187; and supervi- Leibrandt, Georg 39, 138 sion on local representatives 88, Lentvaris 87, 149 Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:42 01 October 2016 103, 151, 158 Lida 115, 120, 156 Kruger, Paul 19 Liegenschaftsverwaltung 172 Kube, Wilhelm 86, 93, 129 Lienesch, G.J. 59, 60, 61, 63 Kurzeniec 113, 114, 116, 123 Liepaja 76, 89, 174 Kursk 91, 97 Lingmont, Johan: and appointment 96; and Jews 126, 127, 128; and Labor Service Holland ( Werkdienst impressions of ‘the East’ 141; and Holland) : and aims and recruit- relation with Krantz 151; and ment 94, 100; and anti-Jewish postwar trial 179, 180; and Rivne policy 125; and evacuation 100, 142, 149; and Vilnius 101, 170–2; and founding 71; and 102, 125, 127, 157, 158, 173; Index 207 Lithuania: and developments before National-Socialist German Worker’s WWII 30, 31, 36; and Dutch Pary ( Nationalsozialistische daily life 103, 104, 139, 141, Deutsche Arbeiterpartei , or 142, 148; and Dutch farmers 88, NSDAP) 32, 34, 35, 57, 71, 104 89, 99, 149; and Dutch indus- Nationale Dagblad 65 trial activities 101, 128; and Nesterov 173 Dutch vegetable growers 101, Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant 65 103, 149; and evacuations Nikolayev 92, 94, 98, 101, 140, 148, from Ukraine 102, 127, 172; 170 and German administration 75; Nimtz, Erwin: and Werkdienst Holland and Jews 112–16, 123, 124; 71, 143; and NOC 90, 91, 94, and misbehavior of Dutch vol- 172; and complaints about unteers 150, 152; and partisans Dutch volunteers 100, 103, 157, 158; and NOC 2, 127; and 143, 152, 153; and rumors of NOC offi ces 95, 96, 125; and corruption 100, 125, 126 peat industry 71, 88, 98, 145, Norway 3, 39–43, 45, 46, 48, 72 148; and postwar trials 179, Novohrad-Volynskyi 92, 115, 146, 172 180; and visit of NOC delegation 86 Oostbouw (NOB): and founding 89, Lodz 65, 66, 70, 75, 121, 122 90, 95; and personnel 103; and Lohse, Hinrich 75 recruitment 144, 150; and health Louis XIV 44 and social care 145; and Louwes, Stephanus Louwe 57–9, evacuation 170, 174 68 Operation Barbarossa 38, 113, 114 Lübeck 177 Organisation Todt (OT) 94 Lublin 41 Ostfaser Gesellschaft 94 Ludendorff, Erich 30 Ostforschung 33 Luxemburg 29, 42, 43 Ostministerium : and August Lviv 96, 121, 126, 141, 171, 172 Borggreven 72; and Erich Koch 75, 91; and evacuation 173; and Maasdijk, Bob van 91, 92 exploitation and colonization of Malletke, Walther: and appointment the occupied eastern territories 71, 72, 152; and involvement 68, 69; and involvement of for- of Germanic volunteers 75–7, eign volunteers 39, 72, 75; and 95; and Meinoud Rost van Meinoud Rost van Tonningen Tonningen 73, 74 73, 76, 77, 86, 187; and the Malpils 88, 146, 148, 174 Netherlands 3, 69, 70, 71; and Matthiesen, Martin 75 NOC 93, 95, 152, 157, 160; and Mazower, Mark 2 NSB 70; and organization and Melitopol 94, 102, 155 personnel 69, 71, 72, 121; and Meyer, Alfred 72 participation of Dutch volunteers Meyer, Konrad 38, 39, 41 5, 7, 69, 72, 88; and in postwar Minsk: and CULANO 65, 122; and trials in the Netherlands 181 Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:42 01 October 2016 Dutch construction units 87; and Jews 113, 114, 116; and Palembang 140 liberation 172; and visit of NOC Palemonas 98 delegation 86, 93 Pale of Settlement 112 Molotov-Ribbentrop pact 113 Pan Germanism 27, 28, 29, 31 Munich 35, 118 partisans: and attacks on Dutch volun- Mussert, Anton: and colonial aspi- teers 9, 157–9, 171, 175, 189; rations before WWII 20, 21; and Dutch fear of partisans 67, and Jews 118; and Operation 156, 158; and German policy Barbarossa 55; and settler’s 5, 156, 160; and Jews 130; and colonization 70–2, 91 Pripet Marshes 93 208 Index peat industry: and Baltoji Voké 88, 120, and Dutch industrial activity 88, 142; and Dutch peat experts 89, 128; and Jews 122, 123; and 70, 71, 78, 86, 98, 148, 159; LBGO head offi ce 66, 75; and and Dutch settlements 145; and liberation 173, 174; and NOC German fuel policy 88; and delegation visit 78, 86, 87; and Jewish forced labor 123, 124, NOC offi ce 95, 96 126, 127, 130; and partisans Rivne: and Dutch guards of the prison 157, 158, 175; and Ukraine 93, 143, 158; and Dutch imprison- 101 ment 161; and Dutch industrial Pense, Rudolph 75 activity 94, 98; and Dutch vol- Peters, Carl 27 unteers 120, 141, 150, 151, 159; Piatka, Xavier 123 and Dutch women 102, 103; Piotrowski, Tatiana 123 and evacuation 171, 172; and Poland: and Arthur Seyss-Inquart German authorities 90, 91, 143, 46; and CULANO-volunteers 161; and Jews 1, 114, 116, 126, 65; and developments before 128; and Labor Service Holland WWII 30, 31, 36, 112, 113; and 71, 100, 143, 144, 147, 149; and Dutch images 141, 142; and NOC delegation visit 1, 92, 97; Germanization 1, 36, 37, 41, 44, and NOC offi ce 95; and parti- 61; and ghettos 121, 122; and sans 158; and Ulmenhof 142; Hans Frank 47 and visit Evart van Dieren 125 Poltava 170, 171 Robertson, Jan 74, 77, 180 Ponary 114, 124, 127, 128 Rohachiv: and Dutch educational cen- Pripet Marshes 93 ter 92, 99, 101; and instructions Pskov 144 at the center 105; and living conditions at the center 143, Quisling, Vidkun 41 149; and partisan attack on the center 158 Rabinowitz, Gabriel 123 Roloff, Hermann 47, 48 Ratzel, Friedrich 26, 27, 28, 29, Rosenberg, Alfred: and administration 35 of occupied eastern territories recruits: and anti-Jewish Policy 8, 119–24, 38, 72; and employment of 127–30; and CULANO 59, Germanic non-Germans in the 62; and daily life 8, 65–8, occupied eastern territories 3, 141–6; and evacuation 155, 39, 45, 68, 69, 75; and Meinoud 170–5; and German authorities Rost van Tonningen 76, 77, 79, 8, 9, 151–4; and local population 138, 153; and the Netherlands 9, 146–51; and NOC 2, 5, 95, 69–71, 152, 187; and NOC 7, 98; and partisans 156–9; and 159, 160; and Offi ce of Foreign political orientation 8, 64–5, Political Affairs 34 103–5; and postwar trials 178, Roskam, Evert-Jan: and anti-Semitism 179; and propaganda 63–5, 118; and Dutch peasantry 98–100; and women 101–3 14; and Geert Ruiter 57; and Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:42 01 October 2016 Reichscommissioner for the Germanization 6, 77, 87; and Strengthening of German his daughter 99, 102, 147; and Nationhood ( Reichskommissar postwar trial 180; and visit to für die Festigung deutschen Ukraine 91, 92; and Wilhelm Volkstums, RKF) 37 Gerhardt 126 Rembrandt 13 Rost van Tonningen, Meinoud: and Renteln, Adrian von 75 after the war 180; and Alfred Riehl, Wilhelm Heinrich 25 Rosenberg 76, 77, 79, 138, 153; Riga: and CULANO-volunteers 66, 67, and collaboration with German 70, 122, 123, 150; and Dutch authorities 73–4, 76–9, 86, 91, construction workers 89, 90; 92, 145, 152, 154, 157–61, Index 209 187; and Germanization 3, 77, SS Main Economic and Administrative 90, 92; and liberation 177; and Department ( SS-Wirtschafts- NOC organization 74, 77, 89, und Verwaltungshauptamt , 95, 97, 151, 176–7; and political SS-WVHA) 89, 90, 176 aims 4, 73, 87, 137–42, 174; and SS Race and Settlement Main Offi ce thoughts on interethnic relations ( Rasse- und Siedlungshauptamt , 137–8; and visit 78, 86 RuSHA) 35 Rotterdam: and Evart van Dieren 104; Staf, Cees 58–68, 78, 123, 148, 186 and German bombardment 42; Stichting Landverhuizing Nederland and NOC 70, 74, 76, 77; and (SLN) 16 volunteers from Rotterdam 89, Sukarno 186 101, 127, 156 Rozdol 172 Tallinn 101, 173 Rudiskis 88 Tarnopol 121 Rudniki Forest 157 Tarnow 172 Ruiter, Geert 57, 58, 68, 91 Terboven, Joseph 40 The Hague: and CULANO 70; and Scharringa, Jelle 62, 64–6, 68 Department of Agriculture and Scheveningen 118 Fisheries 58, 59, 60; and Dutch Schmidt, Fritz 70, 72, 76 volunteers 62, 101, 102, 161; Schneider, Hans Ernst 35, 46 and German authorities 57, Sellmer, Heinrich 70, 71 61, 67, 71, 74, 152; and NOC Seyss-Inquart, Arthur: and appoint- head offi ce 7, 8, 87, 90, 93, 95, ment as Reich Commissioner 46; 96, 102, 103, 121, 125, 127–9, and Germanization 47, 58, 70, 142–5, 148, 149, 152, 152, 155; 71; and German policy in the and Paul Kruger 19; and liberation Netherlands 97; and Meinoud 176, 177; and postwar trials 180 Rost van Tonningen 76, 138 Ther, Philipp 6 Skvyra: and Dutch farmers 128, 129, Tilburg 120 146, 149, 150; and evacuation Trakai 87 170, 171; and Jews 114, 115; Treitschke, Heinrich von 25, 26 and NOC-lease of rural estate Turner, Michael 123 99; and in postwar trials 179 Smilavichy 146 Ukraine: and Alfred Rosenberg 38, 75; Society for Germandom abroad (Verein and Belgian economic activities für das Deutschtum im Ausland , 45; and CULANO 60, 61, 65; DVA) 32 and Dutch construction work- Society of German Colonizaton 27 ers 70; and Dutch industrial Sorok Tartar 124 activities 96, 97; and Dutch Sovetsk 78, 86 national-socialist propaganda Soviet Union: and Dutch presence 65, 65, 90, 125; and Dutch vol- 70; and German assault 41, 47, unteers 4, 100–4, 120, 172; 55, 57, 58, 61; and Germany’s and Dutch women 102, 103; Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:42 01 October 2016 eastern front 78, 119, 121; and and Erich Koch 75, 13; and Germanization policy 1, 7, 37, 38 evacuation 155, 170, 171; and Speer, Albert 70 Germanization plans 1, 58; and SS Frontier Workers Enterprise Heim in Holland Aktion 125; ( SS-Frontarbeiter Unternehmen , Herbert Backe 38, 61; and Jews SS-FAU); and Dutch volunteers 112–16, 126, 128, 129; and 100; and evacuation 155, 170, Labor Service Holland 71, 100; 174; and forced labor 154; and and living conditions 141–3, living conditions 144, 145; and 147, 149, 150; and liberation organization 89, 90; and parti- 129, 155, 160; and NOC 2, sans 158; and postwar trials 181 91, 93–6, 151, 153, 159, 161; 210 Index and NOC delegation visits 1, 3, Waka T: and daily life 91, 99, 102, 105, 91–3, 139; and postwar trials in 141–3, 147, 149, 150, 156; and the Netherlands 180 evacuation 172, 173; and Jews Ukrainische Schiffs- und Maschinebau 126, 127, 130; and NOC lease Anstalten 98 87, 88; and partisans 157; and Usin 99, 170, 171 postwar trials 179 Warsaw 121 Vaivara 158 Warthegau 1, 36, 37, 41, Veen, Reinder van 88, 101, 145 87 Ven, Dirk Jan van der 15 Weerbaarheidsafdelingen (WA) 118, Ventspils 125 120 Vienna 35, 46, 73, 105, Weiss, Martin 128 118 Weitz, Eric D. 6 Vileyka: and Dutch farmers 67, 88, Welyka Olexandriwka 122, 156; and Jews 113, 114, 94 116, 123 Wense, C.J.G. von der 68 Vilnius: and Dutch recruits 87, 88, 127, Westforschung 33 143, 172, 179; and evacuation Wilhelmina, Queen of the Netherlands 173, 175; and ghetto 115, 123, 55 126, 128, 158; and Jews 112–14; William II, Emperor 26, 29 and liberation 172; and NOC women and the occupied eastern 87; and NOC offi ce 95, 96, 101, territories 101–3, 145 104, 125, 148, 149, 151; and Wulff, Horst 87, 88, 152, partisans 158; and Saltinis 157 factories 88, 128; Vinnitsa 170 Zaporozhe 97 Volhynia 37 Zentralauftragstelle (Zast) 71 Vondel, Joost van den 13 Zentral-Handelsgesellschaft Ost für Vorenkamp, Marinus Ekko 87, 99, landwirtschaftlichen Absatz und 173, 179 Bedarf (ZHO) 61, 94, 99, 102 Vries, Jan de 15, 33, 34, 46, 47 Zevenbergen 55 Zhytomyr 92, 98, 99, 100, 115, Waard, Arnout de 99, 197 161 Waffen-SS 39, 41, 43, 45, 104, 121, Zimmerer, Jürgen 6 156, 160–1 Zuiderzee 3, 15, 48, 68 Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:42 01 October 2016