Norway's Political Test in Faryab, Afghanistan: How to Lead?

NORWEGIAN PEACEBUILDING CENTRE No. 10 July 2010 Noref Policy Brief Norway’s political test in Faryab, Afghanistan: how to lead? Ståle Ulriksen Executive Summary Norway’s five-year experience as the lead nation of the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) Meymaneh in Faryab province, north-west Afghanistan, has been marked by an increased level of violence. This violence is often attributed to the greater strength of the Taliban insurgency. But a close analysis suggests that it has other causes. They include traditional local feuds, struggles between different power structures, and competition over drug trafficking. The nature of politics in this part of Afghanistan – where institu- tions are weak, parallel power systems coexist, warlords exercise personalised control, ethnicised divisions are growing, Ståle Ulriksen and older men dominate – underpins these conflicts. The district of Ghormach Ståle Ulriksen is head of the Department of in nearby Badghis province, for which Security and Conflict Management at the Nor- Norway took responsibility in January wegian Institute of Foreign Affairs (NUPI). He 2009, illustrates the problem: here, a series of military operations in an area of served as NUPI’s Deputy Director from 2000 to extreme poverty and intense ethnic rivalry 2006. He studies war and military operations, seems to have caused more problems European military cooperation and integration, than it has solved. and Norwegian security and military develop- ments. Among his latest publications are Webs This complex pattern of conflicts in and of war – “The international community and around Faryab presents Norway with an the handling of regional conflict formations in acute test, which at present PRT Mey- West Africa and Central Africa”, Comparative maneh is not equipped to handle owing to Social Research, forthcoming, 2010; “Deploy- weak political direction and military and ments for Development? Nordic Peacekeeping civilian efforts that are not coordinated. If Efforts in Africa”, International Peacekeeping, this analysis is correct, Norway should 2007; “European Military Forces: Integrating refine its political approach in north-west by Default?”, in Janne Haaland Matlary and Afghanistan. This could involve rethinking Øyvind Østerud, eds, Denationalisation of De- the separation of civilian and military ef- fence: Convergence and Diversity, Aldershot, forts; deploying special operations forces; Ashgate, 2007.lating in Southern Sudan?”, and acquiring deeper intelligence on the Norwegian Peacebuilding Centre (Noref), 2010. region’s political dynamics. Noref Policy Brief No. 10 July 2010 Background1 implication is that the current plans of the International In September 2005, Norway succeeded the United Security Assistance Force (Isaf) – involving enhanced Kingdom as the “lead nation” in Provincial Recon- military pressure and the attempted strengthening of struction Team (PRT) Meymaneh in Faryab province Afghan security forces in and around Faryab – are in north-western Afghanistan. A few statistics convey unlikely to succeed. Rather, this increased activity is some of the main trends of the almost five years that likely to prove counterproductive by activating latent have followed, and indicate the nature of the predica- conflicts and creating new ones. ment that Norway as the lead nation now faces. At the time of the handover, the PRT had around 100 The Faryab context troops; by early 2010 this number had increased to 450 Faryab is one of nine provinces in the area of respon- (Norwegian and Latvian). In 2005, the Afghan Nation- sibility of Isaf’s Regional Command (RC) North. RC al Army (ANA) proper had no presence in Faryab; by North has its headquarters in Mazar-i-Sharif in Balkh 2009 it had a full kandak (battalion) that was mentored province. It is commanded by Germany, which con- by almost fifty Norwegian officers. In 2010, around tributes most of the 6,000 troops in the region. The 700 United States troops are expected to arrive to men- Afghan army’s 209 Corps covers the same region. tor an expanded police force. In 2005, Faryab was con- The corps has only one brigade, but two more are be- sidered a “safe” province; in 2009, Norwegian troops ing formed. One of these will cover Faryab, Jowzjan were probably involved in close to 100 attacks and and Sari Pul from its headquarter in Meymaneh. The firefights.2 Violent incidents have continued in 2010. 20,500 square kilometres of Faryab province are divid- Norwegian troops have suffered serious losses, ed into fifteen districts; estimates of the population including four killed and nine wounded in are unusually wide in range, from 1 million action during May and June.3 to 2 million (Norwegian authorities tend to use the lower figure, Afghan local This increase in violence is normally authorities the higher). Faryab is one Increased Isaf attributed to the increased strength of the most ethnically diverse of all pressure is likely to of the Taliban insurgency. This Afghanistan’s provinces. The major- activate latent conflicts policy brief, however, argues that ity of the people are Turkic-speaking and create new ones. a large part of the violence seems Uzbeks and Turkmen, but there are to be rooted in other factors: a mix- also substantial Arab, Hazara, Pashtun ture of traditional local feuds, strug- and Tajik groups. gles between old and new power structures, and competition over the control of In 2009, there was fighting in almost all dis- drug-trafficking. If this argument is correct, the tricts, with the four districts in the Andkhoy area appearing the sole prominent exception. Faryab’s three 1 This is the second of two policy briefs by Ståle Ulriksen on the southernmost districts – Ghormach, Qaisar and Almar challenges facing Norway in Afghanistan. The first is “Nor- – have been problematic since 2007. (Four Norwe- way’s strategic challenges in Afghanistan: how to make a differ- gian soldiers were killed in Almar on 27 June 2010.) ence?”, Noref, April 2010, http://www.peacebuilding.no/eng/ Throughout 2009 there was heavy fighting too in cen- Publications/Noref-Policy-Briefs/Norway-s-strategic-challeng- tral Faryab, notably in Pashtun Kot and Shirin Tagab es-in-Afghanistan-how-to-make-a-difference, accessed 1 July – a situation that has continued in 2010. The eastern 2010. Both are based on research financed by the Norwegian part of the province, Bilchiragh in particular, also grew Ministry of Defence. more unstable in 2009. 2 The number is an estimate. See the articles on www.mil.no; Åge Winge, “30-50 skarpe oppdrag siden nyttår”, in Addressa, In this part of Afghanistan, power is basically no. 11, September 2009, http://www.adressa.no/nyheter/uten- distributed and implemented through three systems: riks/article1381802.ece , accessed 16 March 2010; and “Nor- dmenn i kamp hver tredje dag i Afghanistan”, NRK News, 22 1. The governor, the security chief and the district gov- December 2009, http://www.nrk.no/nyheter/verden/1.6919407 , ernors are appointed by the president. Policy is im- accessed 16 March 2010. plemented in cooperation with the representations 3 “Four Norwegian soldiers killed in Afghanistan”, BBC News, of the line ministries in each province. The Afghan 27 June 2010, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/10430341.stm , accessed 1 July 2010. - 2 - Norway’s political test in Faryab, Afghanistan: how to lead? national army operates independently of the prov- There are strong tensions between the different sys- inces. Northern Afghanistan is the responsibility tems. But many actors will work within all of them of 209 Corps. The relationship between the ANA simultaneously at local, provincial, regional and na- and the Afghan National Police (ANP) is problem- tional level. Most disputes and conflicts in Faryab are atic. The police have been accused of corruption, local, and the issue at stake in the majority of cases is illegal taxation and involvement in drug-traffick- control over water, land and grazing rights. If the par- ing (a situation discussed in more detail below). ties to such disputes are bonded to the warlord system, conflicts may easily escalate. 2. Afghan politics are highly personalised. Institu- tions are weak, political parties and group- It should also be noted that all these power ings are loose constellations, and alli- structures are dominated by old men. The ances and allegiances may change presence of a large number of young men quickly. Alongside the formal with scant hope of a career in the ex- structures, an almost feudal sys- The presence of isting formal or informal systems of tem of power functions. Control many young men power is a liability. They represent is exercised through direct or in- with scant hope of a a huge recruitment pool for rebel direct personal bonds to the war- career is a liability. groups and criminal bands, but they lord in charge. In Faryab, Jowzjan may also resort to violence on their and Sari Pul the Uzbek warlord own in order to carve out a position for Abdul Rashid Dostum sits on top themselves. of a pyramid that includes a number of provincial- and district-level warlords; in Faryab itself, Fatullah Khan of Qaisar is the senior The ethnic-political contest warlord after Dostum and the latter’s closest ally. For two centuries, Meymaneh was the leading tribal Dostum, the strongman of Junbesh-e-Melli-ye Af- chiefdom of a group of four such Uzbek khanates in ghanistan (commonly referred to as Junbesh), has the area presently covered by Faryab, Jowzjan and Sar- over the last two decades crushed a series of Uz- i-Pul. These principalities were conquered by Afghan bek and Turkmen rebellions in Faryab. Indeed, the kings in a series of bloody wars in the late 19th cen- competition for control in northern Afghanistan tury. Meymaneh was the last khanate to fall. Afghan between Dostum’s Uzbek-dominated Junbesh and occupation was violent and oppressive; thousands of the Tajik-dominated Jamiat-i Islami (or Jamiat) Pashtun settlers moved into the area to consolidate seems to be resurfacing; this poses a major chal- Kabul’s gains, and local farmers and herders lost their lenge to Isaf.

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