SECURITY in the INDO-PACIFIC COMMONS Toward a Regional Strategy
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SECURITY IN THE INDO-PACIFIC COMMONS Toward a Regional Strategy Michael Auslin Resident Scholar in Foreign and Defense Policy Studies American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research December 2010 Contents Acknowledgements . iv Executive Summary . 1 Setting the Strategic Tableau . 5 The Indo-Pacific’s Post-1945 Odyssey . 6 America Turns to the Indo-Pacific . 7 Defining the Indo-Pacific and Its Commons . 7 Defining a Strategy for Security . 8 Security Trends in the Indo-Pacific Commons . 11 The Changing Military Balance of Power: The Chinese Catalyst . 11 The Regional Response . 17 Forging a Regional Strategy for the Twenty-first Century . 19 U.S. Capabilities: Enhancing Forward Presence and Power Projection . 19 The “Concentric Triangle” Strategy: A New Approach to Friends and Allies . 22 Shaping a Liberal Indo-Pacific Region . 26 Notes . 29 About the Author . 31 iii Acknowledgements his report is the result of an eighteen-month Colleagues both at AEI and elsewhere also read Tresearch project conducted at the American drafts of this report, participated in many of the Enterprise Institute (AEI). The project included three events of this project, and helped arrange meetings major public conferences, two research trips to U.S. and provide research materials. They include LCDR military installations, and over a dozen closed-door Jeff Baker, USN; CDR John Barrett, USN; Rich Berry; meetings with senior U.S. government and military Dan Blumenthal; LCDR John Bradford, USN; CAPT officials, security analysts, and scholars, along with lit- Bud Cole, USN (ret.); COL Charles Corcoran, USAF; erally hundreds of conversations with knowledgeable Thomas Donnelly; CAPT Henry Hendrix, USN; LTC individuals in Washington and around the world. Leo Kosinski, USAF; COL David Krumm, USAF; I particularly would like to thank the Japan Foun- Adam Lowther; LCDR Chris McConnaughay, USN; dation’s Center for Global Partnership, which funded LTC Harvey Newton, USAF; Danielle Pletka; Ron the majority of this project. In addition, the Center for O’Rourke; Sak Sakoda; Gary J. Schmitt; GEN John Defense Studies at AEI sponsored several of the Shaud, USAF (ret.); Jim Thomas; Jan van Tol; and closed-door meetings. I am grateful to the Honorable several members of the U.S. government who wish Donald C. Winter, former secretary of the Navy; ADM to remain anonymous. Finally, I am indebted to my Gary Roughead, chief of naval operations, USN; ADM past and current research assistants, Jennifer Gregg Timothy Keating, USN (ret.); ADM Jonathan Greenert, and Leslie Forgach, and my intern, Chihiro Ikegami. vice chief of naval operations, USN; RADM Wendi Car- None of the opinions in this report should be penter, USN; RADM Jeffrey Lemmons, USN; RADM interpreted as representing the views of any of the David Titley, USN; RDML Robert Thomas, USN; and U.S. government officials or military officers listed RDML Mark Montgomery, USN, who participated in above. The views expressed here are solely my own, meetings and conferences connected with this project. as are any errors of fact or interpretation. iv Executive Summary nsuring security in the Indo-Pacific region will • Encourage the evolution of liberal-democratic Ebe the primary foreign policy challenge for the norms that will help spread freedom and United States and liberal nations over the next gener- lead to cooperative behavior in service of ation. Doing so successfully will provide the greatest the above economic and political opportunities for the next quarter century. Conversely, a failure to maintain The overriding goal of this strategy is to create a stability, support liberal regimes, create cooperative security environment that enhances stability and regional relations, and uphold norms and standards of prosperity and does not require the use of U.S. or international behavior will lead to a region, and world, allied military power. of greater uncertainty, insecurity, and instability. The interests of the United States and its allies Due to its economic strength, military power, and partners lie in protecting the Indo-Pacific com- and political dynamism, the Indo-Pacific will be the mons from any disruption that would cause politi- world’s most important region in coming decades, cal tension or conflict, adversely affect global and its significance will be felt throughout the globe. economic activity, or hinder the access of any nation Since the end of World War II, it has transformed to the rest of the region and globe for political or itself into the world’s economic powerhouse, yet has military reasons. However, as a result of China’s also witnessed a struggle between tides of liberalism, military buildup in particular, the United States and authoritarianism, and even totalitarianism. It remains its allies can no longer be assured of maintaining riven by distrust, territorial disputes, ethnic ten- regional superiority of forces either numerically sions, and painful historical memories. or, eventually, qualitatively. The comprehensive The Indo-Pacific’s unique geography makes the buildup of Chinese military power should be recog- balance of regional security most vulnerable in its nized as a tool for the broader geopolitical expan- “commons”: the open seas, air lanes, and cyber net- sion of Chinese influence, providing the means works that link the region together and to the world. necessary to achieve regional acceptance of Chinese Given the importance of the Indo-Pacific commons aims, however those may be defined in the future. to the continued prosperity and stability of the At the same time, security in the Indo-Pacific region, the policy objectives of the United States and region must not be reduced to hedging against its Indo-Pacific allies and partners should be to: China’s rise or limited to attempting to shape Chinese behavior, but rather must be focused on • Ensure access to the Indo-Pacific com- the Indo-Pacific commons as a whole. Therefore, mons for all nations America’s strategy should have three parts: an enhanced, superior, forward-based U.S. presence in • Deter or contain conflict in the commons the region; an innovative new approach to allies and partners; and a political goal of helping create a • Maintain credible military capabilities that more liberal Indo-Pacific region. can deter or defeat the most likely threats Our regional strategy must be based on U.S. to regional stability forces maintaining their forward presence with 1 SECURITY IN THE INDO-PACIFIC COMMONS superior power projection capabilities in the Indo- Japan, South Korea, India, and Australia; the inner tri- Pacific region, responding to disruptions, and miti- angle connects Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and gating uncertainty. To do so, a forward-based military Vietnam. The outer triangle should serve as the force structure in the Pacific must focus on the anchor for security cooperation in the Indo-Pacific, as power projection capabilities and weapons systems well as for U.S. policy in the region. The inner triangle most appropriate for defeating potential adversaries’ will play a unique role in enhancing littoral security key strengths, and it must be postured to increase and focusing on the “inner commons” of the lower U.S. forward presence in the Indo-Pacific in both South China Sea. peacetime and times of conflict. This includes The final leg of this strategy must focus on the over- ensuring control of the undersea realm through an all political environment in the Indo-Pacific. This new increased U.S. attack submarine force, increasing strategy for security in the Indo-Pacific commons is the number of forward-deployed BMD surface com- not designed explicitly to promote democracy, liberal- batants, enhancing U.S. Air Force forward presence ism, or a freedom agenda. It aims to be a prudent strat- in the region, and maintaining and increasing com- egy for ensuring stability and the interests of nations prehensive cyber and intelligence, surveillance, and that contribute to regional prosperity, including the reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities. United States. For this reason, it must be as realistic Military capability, however, is only one part of a about the type of regional environment that will pro- strategy for security in the Indo-Pacific commons. mote stability as it is about the means to be used to The United States should also pursue a new political counter disruptive influences. However, it is clear that strategy that explicitly links together both its close liberally inclined nations are more likely to work partners and strategically important nations that together to provide public goods, uphold regional increasingly share common concerns. Conceptually, security, and cooperate in resolving regional issues. this new strategic arrangement can be thought of as a Encouraging a more liberal Indo-Pacific region is set of “concentric triangles.” The outer triangle links therefore a political goal as well as a strategy. 2 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY FIGURE 1 THE INDO-PACIFIC REGION 3 Setting the Strategic Tableau nsuring security in the Indo-Pacific region will its “commons”: the open seas, air lanes, and cyber Ebe the primary foreign policy challenge for the networks that link the region together and to the United States and liberal democratic nations over world. Today, new threats to the liberal interna- the coming generation. Doing so successfully will tional order and to the Indo-Pacific commons are provide the greatest economic and political oppor- raising questions about future security in the tunities for the next quarter century. Conversely, a region. Any change in the stability of the Indo- failure to maintain stability, support liberal regimes, Pacific commons will have a negative effect on create cooperative regional relations, and uphold political relations and economic activity, and could norms and standards of international behavior will well lead to conflict between major Indo-Pacific lead to a region, and world, of greater uncertainty, powers that depend on free and open seas, air- insecurity, and instability. ways, and cyber connections.