The Global Cultural Capital

The Contemporary City

Series Editors Ray Forrest Lingnan University Hong Kong

Richard Ronald University of Amsterdam Amsterdam, The Netherlands In recent decades cities have been variously impacted by neoliberalism, economic crises, climate change, industrialization and post-industrialization and widening inequalities. So what is it like to live in these contemporary cities? What are the key drivers shaping cities and neighborhoods? To what extent are people being bound together or driven apart? How do these factors vary cross-culturally and cross nationally? This book series aims to explore the various aspects of the contemporary urban experience from a ﬁrmly interdisciplinary and international perspective. With editors based in Amsterdam and Hong Kong, the series is drawn on an axis between old and new cities in the West and East.

More information about this series at http://www.springer.com/series/14446 Mari Paz Balibrea The Global Cultural Capital

Addressing the Citizen and Producing the City in Barcelona Mari Paz Balibrea Cultures and Languages Birkbeck, University of London London, United Kingdom

All quotes originally in Spanish and Catalan are provided in translation and were translated by Mari Paz Balibrea Enriquez

The Contemporary City ISBN 978-1-137-53595-5 ISBN 978-1-137-53596-2 (eBook) DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-53596-2

Library of Congress Control Number: 2017935425

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2017 The author(s) has/have asserted their right(s) to be identified as the author(s) of this work in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, express or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.

Cover illustration: Yury Zap / Alamy Stock Photo

Printed on acid-free paper

This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by Springer Nature The registered company is Macmillan Publishers Ltd. The registered company address is: The Campus, 4 Crinan Street, London, N1 9XW, United Kingdom To my parents, in memoriam: Barcelonian lives without cultural capital CONTENTS

1 Introduction: Still Paying Homage to Barcelona 1

Part I In Theory: The Subject of Culture

2 Theorizing Culture in the Creative City 13

Part II Taming the Political Citizen

3 Stories We Live By: ...and the Games Created the City 45

4 Culture Is to the Social Materialization of Democracy as the Critical Subject Is to Democratic Citizenship 53

5 Building Participatory Measures 77

Part III The Olympic Framework

6 Preamble 103

7 Working for the City Image: Municipal Publicity Campaigns Redeﬁning the Preferred Barcelona Subject 107

vii viii CONTENTS

8 Exercising Democratic Citizenship: Sport in the Run-Up to the Olympics 129

9 Rethinking Barcelona’92 as a Cultural Milestone 147

10 Olympic Volunteers: Rise of the Super-Citizen 163

Part IV Back to Work: Governing the Creative City

11 Volunteers Unbound 181

12 New Regimes of Government 191

13 Masterminds of Culture 203

Part V Be Yourself Out There: Inhabiting Barcelona for the Global Market

14 Capital Subjects: Redeﬁning Capitality in Global Films on Barcelona 217

15 Barça in the New Millennium: The Other Barcelona Model 235

Bibliography 273

Index 297 LIST OF FIGURES

Fig. 4.1 “Cambia tu ciudad con los socialistas” (Change your city with the socialists) 1979 Electoral campaign poster (PSOE, José Ramón Sánchez) 70 Fig. 7.1 “Barcelona més que mai” (Barcelona more than ever before) logo (Ajuntament de Barcelona) 109 Fig. 7.2 “Barcelona ’92” logo (COOB’92 S.A., 1988) 110

ix CHAPTER 1

Introduction: Still Paying Homage to Barcelona

Is there anything new remaining to be said about Barcelona? The city’s international prestige is nowadays indisputable. It has become a commonplace in the European Cities Monitor – which lists the top European cities for business expansion according to the opinion of senior executives from leading businesses – to ﬁnd Barcelona at the top of that list (Cushman and Wakeﬁeld 2010) in the quality of life category.1 Equally, its stature as a tourist destination does not even require an argument. Desiring Barcelona comes for the potential visitor as naturally as breathing, its status endlessly validated by armies of preceding tourists left in awe by its charms. In more specialized circles, the ones this book now joins, saturation takes different forms. Barcelona’s transformation in the post-Francoist period is widely considered among architects, urban planners, and local politicians around the world, as a model because of its perceived ability to reconcile economic restructuring with spatial regeneration and the widening of the citizens’ right to the city (McNeill 1999; Kirby 2004; Marshall 2004a; Busquets 2005: 345–445).2 As such, the Barcelona case has been widely studied in academic contexts and emulated across the world by policymakers and other local institutional agents (González 2011). But no less abundant have been the critical accounts of this transformation as the end of progressive urban life and the silencing of democratic voices at the service of global capital. In joining such a crowded scene, this book pays, once again, homage to the exceptional Barcelona case and claims to illuminate previously untold

© The Author(s) 2017 1 M.P. Balibrea, The Global Cultural Capital, The Contemporary City, DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-53596-2_1 2 1 INTRODUCTION: STILL PAYING HOMAGE TO BARCELONA perspectives for its complex understanding. Thanks to previous studies, our work does not need to explore in detail the ideological implications of the so-called “Barcelona model,” but in another sense will go into much more detail than any previous works on the scrutiny of institutional and official political discourses, particularly those concerning culture. It has also become a common-place to include Barcelona among the creative cities and to accept as a given its use of culture for urban regeneration. This book, rather than taking these statements for granted, investigates in much more depth than has been the case so far the genealogy of cultural discourses in Barcelona’s post-Francoist democratic municipalities up to the end of the millennium. Its purpose is to identify, trace and make sense of a transformation in the uses of culture, from being the terrain where democracy materializes, to constituting the central economic asset of the Barcelona brand. Furthermore, such an exploration is informed by a theoretical preoccupation with the relation of subjects to power as mediated by culture. Even more, this book proposes to consider Barcelona as a privileged case study to understand how such relations are articulated. After all, Barcelona’s local institutions were pioneers in becoming aware of the close relationship between culture and the social and economic development of the city, and subsequently in implementing a new paradigm in cultural policy for entrepreneurial creative cities (Rodríguez Morató 2005, 2008). It is within this new paradigm that, for local powers, a new conceptualization, not only of culture but also of the local residents would become indispensable. The analysis of local government documents and their organized events and products shows how they constructed and disseminated ideas of and for the local population, the purpose of which was to influence this population’s concept of itself and of its contribution to the beneficial functioning and prosperity of life in the city. The Barcelona case, therefore, provides in this book the basis for a theorization of citizenship and cultural transformation, by arguing that the economic and political logic of the creative city, with its ties to culture, is a key paradigm for understanding how citizenship is defined in the neoliberal urban context. This is different from the better-known framework of identity used to discuss local citizenship in Barcelona and beyond. In relation to cities, identity has been developed in greatly over the past twenty years around issues of branding (Anholt 2007), that is, of the need and desirability for local institutions to consciously produce a cohesive and attractive corporate identity for their cities that allows them to compete successfully in the global market. From the viewpoint of their INTRODUCTION: STILL PAYING HOMAGE TO BARCELONA 3 focus on identity, these studies take whole cities as their units of analysis, and not only the ways in which citizens are incorporated into the brand. Analogously, the turning of Barcelona into a global tourist brand as a corollary to its exemplary transformation has attracted the attention of a large number of scholars, either to praise or to criticize it (among the most salient are: M. Delgado 2005, 2007; Etxezarreta et al. 1996;Marshall 2004a;McNeill1999; Monclús 2003;Roca1994; Vázquez Montalbán 1987). These studies, coming from human geographers, urban planners, anthropologists, and intellectuals more generally, focus on the redefinition of a place, and particular perspectives have attracted more attention, such as public spaces, in the work of M. Delgado or Degen, or architecture, in the work of Montaner and Muxí. References to how citizenship is affected in this redefinition are frequent, signaling its importance, but not systematic. This book takes a closer, more structured look at the relationship between the municipality and the local citizen. In so doing it revisits the concepts and ideologies of consensus and participation, and pursues their evolution from the pre- to the post-Olympic turning point. Our argument seeks to make sense of the ways in which the Barcelona municipality, through its cultural discourses, established the terms of public participation, how it invoked them, starting by connecting them with ideas of critical citizenship coming from the anti-Francoist grassroots movements, and pursuing the evolution of such ideas toward subsumption and consent. The “cultural capital” of the title necessarily invokes Pierre Bourdieu’s critique of it as a structural social axis of inequality, different amounts of which individuals are invested with according to their class position.3 My work does not deny the relevance of the concept so understood, or that class inequalities continue to manifest themselves through culture in Barcelona, via distinction and otherwise; in fact it considers itself to be fully compatible with it. But my use of cultural capital puts a different emphasis on the coming together in the subject of culture and capital that shifts the focus to a Foucauldian, biopolitical approach to it. What I mean to convey with my play on words is the advent of a qualitatively different role for culture in postindustrial Barcelona, as an economic and social discourse giving reason and meaning to the city through the production of a particular way of life, and therefore needing to involve all citizens in the everyday production of itself as a cultural city. Which explains why cultural policy documents are key to this book. Dominant institutional discourses in postindustrial Barcelona will evolve to have 4 1 INTRODUCTION: STILL PAYING HOMAGE TO BARCELONA culture at the core of the work they do to define and govern local identity –“Barcelonianness”–because the survival of the Barcelona image/brand, of which local people are an indispensable part, is what sustains the city’s economy, and therefore the commodity that needs to be produced and distributed, not only consumed in culture. The notion of capitality certainly invokes Barcelona’s historical status as capital of the Catalonian nation without a state, and in addition the many disputes around its metropolitan centrality with respect to Spain. As capital of the Catalan nation and claimant of a de facto Spanish co-capitality with Madrid, democratic-era Barcelona has been the object of intense disputes over the meaning of its geopolitical and symbolic belonging within Catalonia, Spain, and Europe, a political debate with a large presence in the cultural arena. Studies on collective identity involving Barcelona have traditionally been framed by questions of (anti)nationalism and Catalanism which address the importance of Barcelona as capital, and the historical and political role of culture in its modern formation. But our notion of capitality refers in the main, in the global market of cities that Barcelona enters in the postindustrial moment, to the need to produce the city’s own qualitative advantage, uniqueness and unmatched prominence without which it will not be able to sell and compete. I claim that the manufacturing of such an advantage also endows Barcelona with a form of fully monetarizable capitality, one which residents are supposed to own, and ceaselessly produce and reproduce. In that sense, this book considers how culture, in the hands of local power, contributed to the creation of a preferred citizen of Barcelona, not against the horizon of Catalonia or Spain alone, but of the world as a whole. Along with the transformation of the city’s image, soon to become a brand, which would accompany socio-economic shifts and help differenti- ate Barcelona in the global market of cities, what changed too was the kind of preferred citizen that the new situation generated, the city dweller populating the global brand that Barcelona became.

SPORT AS CULTURE AND IDEOLOGY Underlining the intersections of sport with culture will provide us with valuable insights to our argument on citizens address. In the first instance, its importance stems from the part that sport plays in conceptualizing an improved society and citizens via the promotion of what are perceived as highly esteemed cultural, physical, and moral values to be extended to the SPORT AS CULTURE AND IDEOLOGY 5 entire society. Cozens and Stumpf (1953) (1, quoted by Daniels 1966: 154) argue the anthropological common base shared by sports with widely accepted artistic forms via their connection to play and leisure, a view that can be found in the father of modern Olympism, the Marquis de Coubertin. For structuralist anthropologists, the practice of sport implies basic universal cultural, and even moral, values of socialization, functioning through a system of signs, of symbolic interactions such as victory and defeat, force and weakness (Krawczyk 1980: 13), cooperation and fair play (Lüschen 1967: 137), and the motivation to achieve, be it individual or collective (Lüschen 1967: 133–134, 136). That being said, any discussion of the relation of sport to culture is framed by their place in the particular social circumstances (Lüschen 1967: 130). At the level of policy and disciplinary recognition, the connection of sport to culture via their social relevance is one characteristically made by the welfare state during the period of growth and stability that followed the recovery of Western economies at the end of World War II (Daniels 1966: 153), when both become tools of social policy. The UNESCO-sponsored 1959 Helsinki conference on Sport, Work, Culture defines sport as “an integral part of modern culture ... [which] has important tasks to fulfil in education. Its influence is not limited to sports fields but extends to many realms in the modern, rapidly developing, world” (12, quoted in Daniels 1966: 157). It is not surprising, then, to find sports mentioned as part of collective democratic aspirations, as we will have an opportunity to see for the Catalan case, in fact well before the postwar period, as well as in the late- Francoist one.4 Moreover, sports in the twentieth century, or perhaps more specifically the spectacle of sport, became a major area of popular culture, along with fashion, TV, films, and advertising. For cultural critics, sports, both practicing and watching them, are part of a common shared culture, instantiating forms of expression and value systems capable of incorporating the most disadvantaged citizens in the community. As such, sports are easy vehicles of identity formation and integration, as we will have an opportunity to study with regard to F.C. Barcelona. In addition, such identity often invokes a kind of territorial allegiance (i.e., patriotism) that governments might try to use to their advantage by associating people’s active sporting endorsement as a surrogate for participation on behalf of or in unison with the state (Houlihan 1997: 120– 121) or local government, as was the case with organizing the Olympic Games for Barcelona. Finally, amalgamations of sports and the arts in cultural policy as part of urban strategies are frequent nowadays, thanks 6 1 INTRODUCTION: STILL PAYING HOMAGE TO BARCELONA to sport’s ability to produce urban identity, evidence of participation in communal culture and of turning sport arenas into city tourist landmarks. All of which provides sport with considerable power to forge broadly based support for spatial regeneration, Olympic Barcelona being an unsurpassable example of this. In sum, sport is at a crossroad of cultural, political, social, and urban discourses, and it is within that complexity that its role illuminates thetopicsdiscussedinthisbook.Inthe discourse of grassroots movements as well as political parties of the left in the 1970s, sport played an important role as a trigger of the desired new democratic citizen. Sport joined cultural concerns in the political call to make their significance extend to social matters. Within the framework of what we can call a humanistic agenda, the arts and sport were conceptualized as moving the democratic agenda forward by promoting the fulfillment of every Barcelonian’s human capabilities, not only those of the privileged upper classes. At the beginning of the democratic period, culture and sport were united by their capability to produce active, participatory, healthy, democratic citizens, and civic communities. The practice of sport was a form of popular culture that the local powers used to gather support, and to cement together all the other cultural forms. In addition, crucially for our argument, the local government decisive action on sports helped to de-emphasize the political component of citizenship that had characterized the materialization of democratic citizenship in anti-Francoist struggles of the late dictatorship. Sport made promoting expressions of solidarity that were akin to democratic values compatible with the competitiveness characteristic of neoliberal times; the stimulation of a participation and shared governance conduct with one of passive spectatorship and voluntary service culminating in the Olympic Games. This epitome of competitive sport provides a logic of performance/pleasure that structures neoliberal subjectivity around two basic ideas: self-improvement and the overcoming of barriers (Dardot and Laval 2013:282),and which we will see confirmed in our analysis of F.C. Barcelona as a global brand.

STRUCTURE OF THE WORK Part I provides the theoretical framework for an argument on the centrality of creative cities to frame and condition discourses – particularly cultural ones – on citizenship in the transition from social democracy to neoliberalism. Part II focuses on the period framed by the coming to power of democratic municipalities in 1979 and the celebration of the Olympic STRUCTURE OF THE WORK 7

Games in 1992, covering four terms in municipal government. Departments or Areas of Culture were led in 1979 by PSUC – the Communist Catalan Party – represented by journalists Rafael Pradas and Joan Anton Benach; in 1983 by Maria Aurèlia Capmany; in 1987 by Raimon Martínez Fraile followed by Ferran Mascarell, as coordinator; and in 1991 by Oriol Bohigas, all four appointments being made by the PSC, the Socialist Catalan Party, a branch of the Spanish social-democratic Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party, PSOE. Chapter 4 focuses on Barcelona’surbanactivism from its manifestations in late anti-Francoism, through the transitional, pre- democratic municipalities’ period and culminating in the 1979 first municipal electoral campaigns of the parties that would come to govern in coalition until 1983: PSUC and PSC. Through a focus on the way Barcelonians are addressed in the context of cultural programs, the purpose of this chapter is to establish a starting point for the study of municipal cultural policies under democratic conditions. Chapter 5 follows closely the evolution in the view of culture and the cultural departments of successive local governments resulting from democratic elections, and the consequent changes in the addressing of citizens against the increasingly omnipresent background of the Olympic Games. Analysis of government discourse here centers on Memòries,reports of tasks accomplished by the different municipal departments, from which references to culture in connection with the citizen will be sought. Evidence found in this chapter of the changes in the definition of the desired Barcelona citizen is further explored in Part III, which covers the years of preparation and months of celebration of the Games. Chapter 7 analyzes municipal propaganda campaigns in these Olympic years. Chapter 8 looks at the role played by grassroots sport as conveyor of democratic and cultural rights and its instrumentalization by local government on the way to Barcelona’s nomination as an Olympic city. This chapter is key to making sense of the reasons that explain the speed at which consensus over the Olympic Games and the qualitative political and economic changes they entailed was achieved. Through a discussion of Barcelona’sCulturalOlympiad, Chapter 9 interprets the emergence of the city’s global image as the catalyzer of a qualitative and long-lasting change in the conceptualization of culture by local power. Chapter 10 studies the phenomenon of Olympic volunteers as the advent of neoliberal citizenship. Through the analysis of the literature produced for the training of ’92 Olympic Volunteers as well as historical and conceptual accounts of the role of Olympic volunteers in general, this chapter argues that they encapsulate like no other social model that of a citizen born out of the consensus between government and people, his/her 8 1 INTRODUCTION: STILL PAYING HOMAGE TO BARCELONA agency subsumed at the service of the city. At the time endowed with great social prestige and pride in their role as hosts for the Olympic visitors on account of their competence and dedicated attitude, they would become epitomes of the most desirable Barcelona citizen, paradigms of the right subject to populate the global city image. Chapter 11 documents the spread of the Olympic paradigm beyond the Olympic context, where culture becomes the brand and the volunteer the ideal citizen, and how compliance with this paradigm is encouraged through publicity campaigns and ordinances. Part IV concludes the focus on institutional practices by analyzing new tools of government responding to the consolidation of culture as brand producer. Strategic Plans in Chapter 12 are interpreted in our argument as the consolidation in Barcelona of urban regimes, the coalitions of private and public power and agents, a new form of governing citizens. Direct results of the ’92 Olympic Games, or better even, of the qualitative changes that having the opportunity to organize these brought to all aspects of city government, they are key documents of the shifts in the conceptualization of culture within local governments, culture’s increasing pervasiveness in urban affairs, and how this affects the ways in which government conceives of the local citizen as part of its urban project. Chapter 13 focuses specifically on the ICUB (Barcelona’s Institute for Culture), created in 1995. Clearly a development that puts culture firmly at the center of the economic agenda, this new organism will match the mapping of urban culture as socio-economic activity with a transformed conceptualization of local citizens as components of this culture. I argue here the intimate connection between the visitors’ industry and cultural value as a trait to be encouraged among local residents, given that the tourist expects to experience (i.e., consume) and have at his/her disposal the whole Barcelona way of life. In this way, local people’s lifestyle and everydayness are used as capital resources for the city. This chapter also singles out for analysis the figure of Ferran Mascarell, the most influential thinker and politician to conceptualize and implement the shifts in culture that this book sets out to explore. Through an analysis of Barcelona y la modernidad. La ciudad como proyecto de cultura [Barcelona and Modernity. The City as Cultural Project], I read Mascarell’s ideas as exemplars of the evolution of the social-democratic’sleft discourse on culture and the city. Part V, the final part of the book, having explored how the dominant idea of Barcelona and its citizens against the background of the globalization of the Barcelona brand was established under the initiative and STRUCTURE OF THE WORK 9 leadership of the municipality, takes the resulting hegemonic global image to explore how it works in concrete cultural discourses as an image for global consumption, beyond the direct auspices of the City Council. I single out two instances of mass culture for analysis, film and football, to argue that Barcelona’s specialism, the centrality and global prestige it derives from excelling in producing, is neoliberal subjectivity itself. Chapter 14 chooses two well-known films located in Barcelona that have confirmed and reinforced a global image for the city by enjoying worldwide distribution and good box office revenues, plus no little academic attention, Cédric Klapish’s L’auberge espagnole (2002) and Woody Allen’s Vicky Cristina Barcelona (2008). The book concludes by going back one last time in Chapter 15 to the topic of sport, confirming the importance of sport’s cultural symbolism (Hughson 2004). Barcelona football club (FCB) has been defined as the most important cultural ambassador of Barcelona and Catalonia in the world. From its foundation in 1899 it has been entangled in political disputes over its defense of the Catalan identity against Spanish nationalism, a confrontation that had direct and bloody over tones during the Civil War and subsequent Francoist dictatorship, and which has ever since been actualized in the club’s rivalry with Real Madrid. This phenomenon is very much alive to this day and justifies the relevance of studying FCB all along for its great symbolic importance in shaping Catalan identity throughout the twentieth century. But, important as this discussion is, it nonetheless pertains to both the Catalan and the Spanish areas of influence, and therefore does not go a long way in explaining its definition as global ambassador. This final chapter looks at the club’s transition into a global brand and, at the intersections of this global stardom, with that of Barcelona as a city established some years earlier. In the context of a book devoted to pursuing the emergence of neoliberal subjectivities framed by Barcelona, this last chapter attempts to capture the complexities of its configuration in one of Barcelona’s supple- mentary brands. Once subsidiary to the city giving it its name, the football club has managed to surpass its twin brand in exemplary credentials and symbolic potency. Together, urban and club brands are nowadays the major producers of the visibility and symbolic meanings associated with “Barcelona” for the consumption of millions around the world, thanks to which the citizens of Barcelona have amassed cultural capital of phenomenal proportions. The main purpose of this book is to tease out the ways in which such capital involves, by transforming and feeding from them, the subjects that drive their brands. 10 1 INTRODUCTION: STILL PAYING HOMAGE TO BARCELONA

NOTES 1. Granted this is not a first priority for business, but is still relevant enough to be mentioned and an excellent marker of what defines Barcelona nowadays in the international arena. 2. The “Barcelona model” has received prestigious awards: the Prince of Wales Prize in Urban Design for Harvard’s Department of Architecture in 1990 and the Royal Gold Medal of the Royal Institute of British Architects (RIBA) in 1998. 3. [Cultural capital is] concerned with the ways in which different kinds of cultural knowledge and skill get translated into particular kinds of economic advantage (and vice versa) ... It focuses primarily on the ways in which the connections between particular kinds of cultural training in the home connect with those that are recognized in, and rewarded by, schooling and the education system in ways that reproduce class divisions ...(Bennett and Savage 2004: 10). 4. Another classic definition of sport as a component in each person’s cultural and social development that is the responsibility of the state and its institutions to provide, can be found in the Council of Europe’s Charter for European Sport for All drafted in 1975 (Council of Europe). The Spanish Constitution of 1978, in its article 43.3, subscribes to these principles when it states: “Public authorities will promote health and physical education and sport. Moreover, they will facilitate the proper use of leisure.” PART I

In Theory: The Subject of Culture CHAPTER 2

Theorizing Culture in the Creative City

The role of culture in the transformation of postindustrial cities in the past forty years has been widely studied from the fields of cultural policy and cultural management, urban planning, architecture, human geography, and critical urban studies. It is generally accepted that culture in postmo- dernity has been responsible for a radical turn, the subject of what George Yúdice (2003: 1), following Fredric Jameson (1990), polemically calls an epistemic change,1 according to which culture becomes a resource of capitalist enterprises that consider it a priority to manage, conserve, access, distribute, and invest in assuring its expediency (Yúdice 2003:25–39). In so doing, culture collapses the boundaries between itself and the economic field. Culture becomes the predominant form of commerce, and cultural industries the foundation of a service economy that predominantly sells experiences and entertainments (Rifkin 2004: 138). Culture is for late capitalism one of its last frontiers, a medium allowing it to colonize not only the attributes once reserved to the arts (“creativity, self-fulfillment, a sense of community, spiritual elevation”) but all forms of lived experience (Rifkin 2004: 143, 144). In an era when selling products is secondary to selling experiences, cities become the perfect object to exploit, an optimal container of experience provided that it is properly packaged through a brand, in itself a corporate image that everything produced (and therefore a product) within the city is expected to represent. Long- lasting debates on urban transformation have established beyond discussion the role of culture and the experience industries in the privatization,

© The Author(s) 2017 13 M.P. Balibrea, The Global Cultural Capital, The Contemporary City, DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-53596-2_2 14 2 THEORIZING CULTURE IN THE CREATIVE CITY commodification, and pacification or control of public spaces, gentrification, the spectacularization and aestheticization of cities’ landscapes (Zukin 1995; Nofre i Mateo 2010 for the Barcelona case), city boosting through image production or “imagineering” (Hall and Hubbard 1998: 7; and Benach Rovira 1993 for the Barcelona case),2 the production of cities for consumption, not to mention culture’s growing importance for cities’ economies and for their very physical transformation (Degen 2008: 8, 9, for a summary). In the globalized capitalist world, cities become “city-companies,” infused with a corporate mentality that compels them, in Illas’s words, to fulfill two functions: one of establishing collaborative links with other cities and the other, dialectically contradictory one, of presenting themselves as unique in order to be able to compete in the marketing of cities (Illas 2012: 120). Scholars (Harvey 1989; Borja and Castells 1999) speak of the entrepreneurial turn in cities to explain the change from their traditional managerial role as providers of services to an entrepreneurial one, where the engagement at city level with matters of the economy grow exponentially, increasing their power vis-à-vis the nation-(states) to which they belong. Entrepreneurship, a key concept in our argument, was originally coined by J. A. Schumpeter in the 1930s to refer to the ability of capitalist agents to innovate; that is, to create the conditions or to take advantage of already existing, but not commodified, ones with the intention of producing a surplus value.3 More than any other factor in urban regeneration, it is culture and the culture industries which have provided the terrain for such innovation (Harvey 2012:89– 112; Bianchini 1993;O’Connor 1998; Degen and García 2012; Rodríguez Morató 2005, 2008; Nofre i Mateo 2010; Sánchez Belando et al. 2012 for the Barcelona case), with urban actors more than ever before exploiting – and being exploited by – culture turned into monetarizable capital. Finally, the importance of the relationship of culture to cities is further corroborated in the political field, where social movements, and Barcelona is a good example, organize around demands over consumption and reproduction under capitalist conditions, many of whom take a cultural form (heritage and preservation; access to culture; promotion of popular or autochthonous cultures, etc.). All of the above provides the structural framework to understand the relationship of culture to cities necessary to discuss the Barcelona case in its current form. This book is concerned with defining this relationship of culture to cities for our Catalan case in its historically specific terms, but also with its emergence, where it came from, what existed before it, how it THEORIZING CULTURE IN THE CREATIVE CITY 15 changed in order to become what it is, and when it became hegemonic. And more centrally, it seeks to understand what role this relationship of culture to city demanded from local residents at every point, what part they were asked to play to help secure the city’s success. Our point of departure is 1979, when democratic mayoralties first came to power in Spain after the end of the dictatorship in 1975. A key date in a key period of transition, by which I do not only mean the standard use of Transition in Spanish historiography from dictatorship to democracy – though I also mean that – but also the political/ideological transitions that underpinned Barcelona’s transformation from that point on: an obsolete industrial city led by a socialist local government morphing into the neoliberal cultural city of the turn of the millennium. These are indeed global transformations, and our task is to make sense of them for the particular Barcelona case. A clear opposition between social democracy and neoliberalism has been present in the liberal democratic welfare states of Western Europe and the USA since the beginning of the Cold War, as seen in the classic and greatly influential works in the immediate postwar period of the intellectuals associated with the Mount Pélerin group, principally that of Friedrich Hayek’s The Road to Serfdom (1944) and Karl Popper’s The Open Society and Its Enemies (1945). In that context, they identified state interventionism in economic affairs with communist practices. Foucault lists three of what he calls adversaries and targets of this neoliberal thought, which were to become hegemonic in 1979:4 Keynesian policy, social pacts of war and the growth of federal administration through economic and social programs (2010: 217). While post-Franco Spain, and Barcelona, rapidly made up for lost time in their political integration into Europe and into the economic and social processes of globalization, Spanish neoliberalism deviates from standard neoliberal credos. López speaks of “the strange case of Spanish neoliberalism” (2012: 81), referring to the fact that in Spain forms of welfare and Fordism had been imposed through an authoritarian dictatorial regime, rather than resulting from a social-democratic one, and were not rejected as intrinsic manifestations of the evilness of the state after the death of Franco. In Spain, therefore, “the task [of neoliberalism] could not consist of dismantling a welfare state which only existed in very attenuated versions, nor could it consist of blaming the recipients of non-existent social benefits” (83). What needed urgent dismantling and unmitigated opposition was dictatorship, and this is what social-democratic discourses claimed to do. The subsequent 16 2 THEORIZING CULTURE IN THE CREATIVE CITY transition from a social-democratic to a neoliberal “common sense” (Harvey 2007), was a process of appropriating and neutralizing the former, rather than opposing it, leads authors like Chaves (2011: 272, 273) and Illas (2012:52–53)5 to speak of the interface between social democracy and neoliberalism or of social-democratic neoliberalism and its perpetuation in power, with the latter author even stating that the political fights against Francoism “might have eclipsed the real change that was taking place in Spain, namely the conversion of the social space into a ‘postclass’ consumer society” (Ibid. 39). Indeed, the shift toward economic and social neoliberalism came about through the construction of social consensus and a huge increase in public spending carried out by the social-democratic PSOE, in power since 1982 (see also Petras 1993; Holman 1996;Illas2012:35–44). This is rather counterintuitive, López opines, if we consider that neoliberalism is not “a consensus ideology, but rather a distorted conflict model whose aim is the recuperation of economic benefit at the expense of breaking up the ties between social sectors which had remained relatively in place in the previous historical phase” (83). Consensonomics [consensusnomics], as he labels the concept, allowed for the social depoliticization of citizens, the dismantling of the country’s industry and the restructuring of the Spanish economy through postindustrial sectors such as banks and finance as a whole, real estate and construction companies, as well as communication conglomerates becoming hegemonic.6 Europe became the panacea concept that made the consensus over governmental decisions not only palatable but even desirable as in the embarking on the organization of macro events or on the building of pharaonic infrastructures, because they raised Spain to the modern European standard. López sees in the macro events organized throughout Spain in 1992, including the Barcelona Olympics obviously, the greatest manifestation of the alliance of these newly hegemonic capitalist sectors. It is evident that the Barcelona case expands and finds meaning in this new economic logic (López and Rodríguez 2010: 349). The urban real estate bubble, to mention the most obvious, comes for Barcelona hand in hand with major investments in infrastructures connected to the Olympics, paid through public debt from the different administrations involved, which would in turn produce inevitable land speculation. While it is important to recognize the unique particularities of the Spanish, and by extension, Barcelona’s transition from a social-democratic to a neoliberal rationale, commonalities with other contexts are not to be underestimated. This is the case of “third way” socialism in Western Europe, whose political, economic, and ideological role in power is similar THEORIZING CULTURE IN THE CREATIVE CITY 17 to that of its Spanish representatives Felipe González and Pasqual Maragall for Barcelona. To illustrate this point, and to bring the discussion back to the management of cities and its citizens, Tim Hall and Phil Hubbard offer us a first explanation of the insidious overlap and swing from left to right in urban contexts:

To the left, the entrepreneurial approach promises a way of asserting local co-operation, promoting the identity of place and strengthening municipal pride; for the right, it can be seen to support ideas of neo-liberalism, promotion of enterprise and belief in the virtues of the private sector. (1998:6)

Manchester, which, by the way, took inspiration from the Barcelona model, is a case in point according to Quilley (2000: 609). He makes sense of the municipality’s political evolution from socialist to neoliberal by arguing that there are fundamental continuities between the two ideological positions and rationalities rather than a watershed separating them.7 The radical base made up of grassroots urban movements helped social-democratic municipal governments from the beginning to distance themselves from class-based politics. It also made logical the claiming of transformative power for the local government, which perfectly matched the new context where cities compete and gain in economic power of the neoliberal entrepreneurial moment. In the case of Barcelona, with respect to the image of the local citizen, the voluntarism that had moved the grassroots left movements in late Francoism, their conviction that things could be changed for the better that stirred mobilization and necessitated the personal investment of thousands of people, could conveniently be managed as the coveted quality of the neoliberal entrepreneurial subject. Despite the incessant invocation of dialogue as the democratically validating trademark of all their decisions, the shift in municipal intention was as clear in Barcelona as it is in Quilley’s account for Manchester: from empowering people through consultation practices – a democratic materialization of the transformative power of the collective to discourses of leadership and charisma focused on individuals with executive power – Maragall is the paradigm; from opposition to dictatorship’s repressive modes requiring an embracing of critical citizenship to the appropriation of the critical edge of democracy through consensus. I find Quilley’s interpretation of the evolution in urban politics more convincing than that of those who see a total collapse of social democracy into 18 2 THEORIZING CULTURE IN THE CREATIVE CITY neoliberalism from the outset, as in the positions of Illas and Chaves mentioned above. When it comes to making sense of the politics and ideologies of Barcelona’s democratic period, such collapse implies that grassroots movements of the late-Francoist period were always already of a liberal nature easily subsumable under the market society. We will see that realities were more complicated. Governing Barcelonians required recognition of radically democratic positions prior to attempting their containment. Whether the position of Barcelona’s social-democratic municipality was a cynical one through the entire process is another question, one that probably needs to be tackled on an individual case-by-case basis. López’s coined neologism consensonomics and the previous discussion of how grassroots activism is involved in political conceptualizations of the city point to the central importance of how power manages people when accounting for the transition from social democracy to neoliberalism. Consensus is common in discussions of transitional and democratic Spain in the 1970s and 1980s, to refer to social acquiescence and apathy over political matters. It applies to Barcelona too, but with a different emphasis framed by the Olympics, underlining the enthusiastic approval on the part of the citizenry of how matters were handled by local power. But how was consensus achieved, manufactured, and managed by power? An efficient way to understand how these processes occur is through a careful look at strategies of governmentality. López and Rodríguez (2010: 21) acknowledge that “social governance” is what remains to be fully explained to understand consensus: the “imaginary, ideological, subjective” reasons that allow us to make sense, in the case of Spanish successive crises, of how social peace and stability are maintained for so long in a precarious economic situation. They hypothesize that the growth of the construction sector – and the banking one to support it – along with the creation of an economic climate that favored the spiraling in housing prices and access to cheap credit are key to understand the manufacturing of consensus. Their point is that it created a society of property owners that were quietly acquiescent to the status quo to the extent that it benefited them.8 While this can to a certain extent apply to the logics of consensus in Barcelona too, and generally account as a factor for depoliticization, it is not in itself a satisfactory explanation. The continuity in discourses as political objectives change, as argued by Hall and Hubbard and Quilley, above, has much greater elucidatory power. In particular, participation and the praising and encouragement of citizens’ agency in public affairs is a central concept that traverses the whole democratic THEORIZING CULTURE IN THE CREATIVE CITY 19 period and defines the social-democratic policies of the early 1980s as much as those of the post-Olympic period. As we will have the opportunity to study in detail, what starts as a discourse of people’sempow- erment for the sake of political agency and representation under new democratic conditions will gradually become indiscernible from the promotion of entrepreneurialism, the ideological core of neoliberalism. Moreover, the emphasis on the citizen as beneficiary of municipal action downplayed (deactivated?) the need for political activism in favor of ludic enjoyment for the city’s inhabitants. Its downside, though, was that, as the local government sought to dilute agency from the direct hands of the citizenry, it displaced such agency onto itself, in so doing requiring it to claim full responsibility for transforming the welfare of the city. In light of economic constraints imposed by the Madrid government, and global aswellaslocalcrises,thisgesture of social-democratic welfarism proved unsustainable. To correct it, the promotion of private public partnerships, the trademark of entrepreneurialism, became the way forward for the Barcelona municipality at the economic and ideological level, bringing Barcelona into synchrony with the global hegemony of neoliberalism. To go with it, a discourse of dynamism and entrepreneurship became a favored way by the office of the mayor to address its citizens. But let us go back to the question of governmentality as a theoretical tool before embarking on an interpretation of how it applied to the Barcelona case. It is through its definition that we will arrive at the relevance of culture and neoliberal subjectivity as components of life in the creative city. Foucault created the term to signal the importance of people, since the mid-eighteenth century, as the object of democratic governments.9 “[I]t is the population itself on which government will act” (1991: 100, and see also 93, 94, 97), managing it according to general rational principles connected to evolved concepts of Christian pastoral care (1982: 213–216). Governing actions “structure the field of other possible actions,” they have power “to act upon the possibilities of action of other people” (Ibid.: 222). Unlike sovereignty, which has as its aim the production of the common good and (or as) obedience to the law through discipline, government is about strategizing to produce what is convenient for those governed by seducing them. Therefore, to govern is to provide technologies for the governeds’ understanding of the selves, for their subjectivation, tools that they will be interested in using. It supplies frameworks and structures the purpose of which is to contain 20 2 THEORIZING CULTURE IN THE CREATIVE CITY the potential for action of the subjects governed, to shape and control its limits. Blakeley (2005) has a different, more technical and limited, but compatible take on the government of citizens through the concept of governance, defined as participatory forms of government, that she uses to characterize democratic Barcelona. Blakeley posits that the intense use that the municipality has made of public participation since 1979 amounts to it becoming public policy (150). Citizen participation is in this sense an integral part of a political strategy resulting from the Office of the Mayor coming to the realization that, in order to succeed in a new global market of cities and as a social-democratic government catering for the welfare of its citizens, it would need the complicity and help of both economic elites and voluntary associations (154). Blakeley’s argument rightly points to governance as a double-edged sword: while on the one hand public participation in government is a sign of democratization, on the other it makes the power of such participation vulnerable to state control and limitation. The latter is precisely McDonogh’s point when he states that in post-Francoist democratic Barcelona “Administrative decentralization ... while proposed as solutions to disparities, reinforce inherited structures of silence and control” (1999: 356). And Illas, looking ahead rather than to the past, presses the stimulation of people’s participation’s malign intentions even further when con- tending that the municipality’s insistence on it is in fact a strategy of domination necessary to transform the city in order to make it attractive for global capital: a managerialism masking as Keynesian social democracy that satisfies practical needs but blocks more ambitious and radical political claims (2012:52–53). Finally, putting a theoretically radical spin to it that returns us to Foucault, Lazzarato condemns “[p]articipative management” as “a technology of power, a technology for creating and controlling the ‘subjective processes’” (1996: 134). Our analysis will confirm what is implied by these interpretations: governance limits as it enables, since its ultimate aim is containment. Hegemonic discourses portraying citizen participation in democratic Barcelona gained legitimacy precisely by presenting themselves as continuous and coherent with a history of political struggles for democratic rights in the city, while encouraging the production of docile, non-militant local citizens. Our close analysis of Olympic volunteers for the Barcelona Games will provide us with the epitome of this new, desirable participatory citizen. Volunteerism is a way of producing participation that is not confrontational, that displaces people from the decision- making mechanisms in the realm of politics and the economic while THEORIZING CULTURE IN THE CREATIVE CITY 21 providing them with a sense of agency. Furthermore, governance encourages the unloading of powers and responsibilities previously attached to the welfare state onto the market and the civil society, as we will see happening in Barcelona through the study of culture. With the municipality presenting itself increasingly as a catalyzer and facilitator of cultural production, rather than as the sponsor and responsible party of the first years of democracy, such responsibility moves to urban regimes (Hall and Hubbard 1998: 9), the public private coalitions that define the government of the local in entrepreneurial cities (Illas 2012:54–55). By extension, such laying out of the playing field encourages self-managing behaviors, transferring the heavy burden of responsibility to individuals. Returning to Foucault’s elaboration of the concept of governmentality, he refers to it as not “an institution, ... but ... the activity that consists in governing people’s conduct within the framework of, and using the instruments of, a state” (Foucault 2010: 318), one that is not circumscribed to its direct institutions, but disseminated in the social, manifested in the everyday “through an array of techniques and programs that are usually defined as cultural” in the words of Bratich et al. (2003: 4). Our argument on Barcelona hinges upon this identified role of culture – understood as the network of meanings where identities and values are shaped and played out – as the medium through which governmentality takes shape. Our enquiry on film and football, and how they function to shape what it means to be from and in Barcelona, will corroborate Foucault’s assertion that cultural manifestations of government appear disseminated in the social. But unlike some Foucauldian approaches, we do not de-emphasize the institutional role in governing through culture; quite the contrary. That culture is the terrain where the modern democratic state seeks to intervene in order to influence the production of national subjects and patriotic allegiances is a proposition that we will make adjustments to in order to adapt it to the Barcelona case, rather than completely discard or counter it. Municipal cultural policies, as conscious interventions of power in culture, implemented through a system of institutions and public servants with an assigned budget (Bonet and Négrier 2010: 45), are forms of governing populations, serving the ideological purpose of creating “compliant citizens,” of “formatting,” and then nurturing, “public collective subjectivity” (Lewis and Miller 2003: 2). They are indispensable to understanding how the provision of culture for the citizen is devised, on what ideas of culture and of the citizen that it 22 2 THEORIZING CULTURE IN THE CREATIVE CITY addresses it is based, and how and for what reasons these ideas are transformed through time. In Barcelona’s transition from social-democratic to neoliberal urban politics, what mayor Maragall dubbed “the new urban realism,” the changes in municipal priorities would be solved discursively for the citizen, I argue, within the realm of cultural policies. Culture was a tool of local government that privileged and attempted to shape specific forms of being a Barcelonian by way of tapping into and stereotyping something akin to a local structure of feeling.10 Building thecityforthesocial-democraticmunicipalitywasveryimportantlya business of affecting social cohesion and coexistence, of encouraging and instilling codes and values capable of generating meaning for citizens through cultural management. That being said, the omnipresence of the state as the ultimate incarnation of centralized power and institutionalization needs serious revision too. Cultural policies of the modern state, shaped by the enlightened idea that culture and education are the pillars of economic and social progress, hinge on the provision for the citizen of access to culture (or degrees of access to culture or lack of provision of such access) (Real Instituto Elcano 2004: 3), whereby the citizen is treated by the state as a beneficiary of a culture which is the responsibility of the institutions to hand down to him/her. In all these processes, the city has historically worked as an allied of the state. In the words of Evans (2001: 78):

The conditions that led to the recognition of culture as an aspect of amenity and social welfare provision, and the growth of public participation in national and local cultural activities, can be linked fundamentally to the growth of urban and city populations – in density and industrial conurbations.

But not everyone agrees with Evans that nowadays city and nation-state work together as allies in the production of national identities and cultures. Philippe Urfalino’s work on the French case (1996) and other cultural policy specialists whose work focuses on the Spanish state and the Catalan and Barcelona cases, such as Arturo Rodríguez Morató (2005) or Lluís Bonet and Emmanuel Négrier (2010), argue that the kinds of national cultural policies that materialize and channel the state’s provision of culture described by Evans start to disintegrate from the 1980s, to be replaced by local cultural policies tailored to speciﬁcgeo- graphical areas. These are fueled by city governments which ﬁnd in local THEORIZING CULTURE IN THE CREATIVE CITY 23

– rather than in national – culture the motor of their reinvented postindustrial economies (Rodríguez Morató 2005;alsoM.Delgado2007: 63–89). From this point on, transversality in national cultural policies becomes harder to achieve – and one can even say less desirable – for states whose local and regional economies are more and more dependent upon the tertiary, services, and tourist and leisure sectors, as is the case of Spain. I argue that the change of scale in the design of cultural policies from national to local, from state to city and region, entails a change in kind. As creative cities gain control of cultural policies and economies, they do so too of what we can call the government of citizens, shifting the ground on regional and national parameters of what is involved and what is at stake in such management. For local cultural policies and politicians themselves, rather than cultivating a particular national imaginary, and in addition to providing access to culture to their citizens, it becomes a priority to incorporate their local populations into forms of governance more attuned to the dictates of the creative economy.11 The importance of cultural policy among the instruments for exercising power used by local institutions is routinely noted by scholars studying culture in postindustrial Barcelona in particular, and in creative cities in general, and goes hand in hand with any account of the increasing economic and therefore political importance of culture for the structural survival of postindustrial cities. It inevitably showed in the discourse of city hall cultural leaders. Pep Subiròs defined the city as a cultural artifact, and so did his colleague Ferran Mascarell: “a device of meaning and signification, of promotion and incarnation of certain cultural codes, values and guidelines which facilitate, or fail to, particular ways of conviviality and social cohesion” (1999: 4). To understand the overblown influence of the cultural that Barcelona underwent from 1979, of particular interest is how the transition of the urban economy from industrial to creative, and of urban politics from dictatorial to social-democratic, positions culture as the key medium where the subjective, the economic, and the political converge. Cultural discourses moved the political subject of the pre-democratic period away from a protest based on labor or forms of a radical critique of Capital and toward the fulfillment of all his/her claims in cultural enjoyment of the city. After the Games, on the other hand, the entrepreneurial “discovery” of life itself packaged as culture as a source of economic profit to be exploited for the creative city would be paramount. Addressing the local subject successfully and getting his/her compliance therefore becomes not only, though also, a means of enlisting his/her 24 2 THEORIZING CULTURE IN THE CREATIVE CITY allegiance in ideological matters. Such a relation is supplemented by the turning of the city into a capitalist enterprise whereby citizens are conceived as indispensable producers, and thus workers for the Barcelona brand. While ways of life, cultural values, attitudes, responsibilities, and rights were discursively presented throughout the social-democratic period as immutable givens brought about and restored by democracy, closer attention to the way they played out in particular historical contexts reveals that they entailed an invitation for citizens to exercise them in ways that can be qualified as different, even opposing, but nonetheless always profitable from the municipality’s point of view. More specifically, we witness a case of appropriation and resignification of the most progressive trends in democratic socialism of the late-Francoist and early democratic period, which in turn affects definitions of local citizenship and the way local government addresses its subjects. For Rodríguez Morató (2005), what changes in the way local social-democratic governments in Barcelona deal with culture across their years in power is direct contact with citizenship, arguing that the latter got lost as the municipality came to see its role more and more as a catalyzer and facilitator than as a provider of culture to the local population. If we add to that what we claimed earlier, that such changes, their reasons and consequences, were glossed over at the discursive level, we can easily conclude that the use of cultural discourses became purely rhetorical. However, this would imply an emptiness of signification unable to convey that addressing citizens’ behavior never ceased to have real functionality. Even when the priority in the cultural agenda would switch from managing the turn to democratic citizenship to that of capitalizing a particular city image/brand, the need for the citizen to populate such an image would continue to render dealing directly with citizens within culture important and necessary. We move now to a discussion of the complexities of that relation between power, culture, and the citizen.

THEORIZING THE SUBJECT OF CULTURE IN THE CREATIVE CITY Jeremy Rifkin (2004) includes the commodiﬁcation of all human relations as part of his deﬁnition of the Age of Access, where services, relations, and networks substitute markets and products as the medium and commodity of late capitalism: THEORIZING THE SUBJECT OF CULTURE IN THE CREATIVE CITY 25

The commodification of human relationships ..., [assigning] lifetime values (LTV) to people with the expectation of transforming the totality of their lived experience into commercial fare represents the final stage of capitalist market relations. What happens to the essential nature of human existence when it is sucked into an all-encompassing web of commercial relationships? ... what is left for relationships of a noncommercial nature – relationships based on kinship, neighborliness, shared cultural interests, religious affiliation, ethnic identification, and fraternal and civic involvement? ... what happens to the kinds of traditional reciprocal relationships that are born of affection, love, and devotion? (111, 112)

Rifkin conceives of the human as a consumer besieged by the market. The new frontier of capitalism that he is describing relates to the latter’s ability to gain consumers by way of turning more and more elements of every person’s social and affective relations into services with commercial value. His somewhat anguished rhetorical questions in the quote above regret the loss of a kind of authenticity in human relations that is rendered impossible by the most advanced forms of capitalism. But there is a further turn of the screw in the commodification of human relations that Rifkin does not consider and is key for this book, one provided by the visitor industry. It works by constructing the fantasy for the consumer that there are places in the world where those authentic relations mourned by Rifkin are still possible. In fact, Rifkin’s lament and the possibility of finding a response in travel to conditions of alienation created by capitalism has been at the core of modern forms of travel and tourism since the Romantic period, and Spain, with Andalusia at the forefront, have been on the list of preferred destinations since the early nineteenth century (Balibrea 2004). Be that as it may, what interests us here is not to point to the not so new ability of capitalism and the market to condition and mediate human relations, or even to commercialize the very desire to escape from such constraints into different forms of paradise and authenticity. Instead, our concern is with human relations pertaining to those on the receiving end of a radically commodified experience prepared for the visitor, Rifkin’s besieged consumer. Those endowed with the task of exhibiting and incarnating the kind of authenticity that is expected of them by, say, being part of Mediterranean sociability and thriving public spaces, and in so doing, bringing the brand to life: the local residents. Indeed, what we look to define are the conditions to explain the emergence of an urban resident as producer, rather than consumer, of 26 2 THEORIZING CULTURE IN THE CREATIVE CITY the city. This conceptualization differs from more frequent characteriza- tions that underline the transformation of citizenship in postindustrial cities. Critical representations of “city as spectacle” dominated by the service industry, certainly fitting for Barcelona, tend to produce as a byproduct the idea of its inhabitants’ identity and citizenship as indistinguishable from that of consumers (either passive or politically conscious) or tourists, or both (M. Delgado 2004: 54; Illas 2012: 120; Resina 2008: 201, 211, 215; Yúdice 2003: 160–191). Several scholars writing on Barcelona have dwelled on the importance of Barcelona’s leap to global creative city and its implications for local residents. McNeill coined the term “Barcelona imagined community” (2001), deriving from his own prior study of Barcelona and Maragall’s time in office from 1982–1997 (1999), to account for how the mayor successfully constructed Barcelona politically, in theory and in practice, as a differentiated community capable of punching above its weight or “scale jumping” (2001: 341, 347). McNeill focuses on Maragall’s social-democratic conceptualization (following Manuel Castells), also known as “new urban realism”, where capitalism is embraced and attracted to invest in the city so that the resources it generates can then be put back into social services. Without denying the allegiances he paid to the Spanish state and monarchy, McNeill takes seriously this urban realism’s attempt to transcend the constraints of the local and the nation-state alike in order to place Barcelona as a player in European and global frameworks. The promotion of a new role for cities within the EU and neoliberal globalization entails for McNeill an internationalist conceptualization of citizenship but, despite invoking Benedict Anderson’s concept, he does not dwell on how such an idea of community is meant to be experienced by local residents. Putting less emphasis on the new context and the importance in its shaping of one extraordinary individual, McDonogh’s discussion of the internationalist ambitions of Olympic Barcelona sees them as one more incarnation of the city’s attempts to escape subordination to the central state: “If Barcelona could not escape Spain, it might transcend it” (1999: 356). Both authors recognize on the part of the municipality a political ambition to go beyond the horizon of the Spanish state. Resina (2008: 199–234), on the other hand, completely disagrees with this. His Barcelona’s Vocation of Modernity relates the vocation of the title to a will to mark the city’s identity as capital of the Catalan nation since the nineteenth century. His critique of the post-Francoist democratic period centers on the loss of such a vocation; that is, the decatalanization of THEORIZING THE SUBJECT OF CULTURE IN THE CREATIVE CITY 27

Barcelona, and its citizens, attributed to the actions of the social-democratic city hall. The accent on cosmopolitanism and globalization, far from bypassing the state framework, he opines, is of a non-threatening, depoliticized kind that in fact plays into the hands of a renewed hispanism (2008: 205, 206, 212). Moreover, as Catalan identity fades in Barcelona, Resina rejects the development of an alternative local one, which he qualiﬁes as municipal chauvinism, a mixture of cosmopolitan snobbism and colonized’s shame (2008: 205). Meanwhile, Illas (2012) partially agrees with Resina when interpreting PSC’s post-nationalist urban politics – its short-circuiting of political and historical local identities – as undermining Catalan sovereign aspirations, rather than Catalanism per se (2012: 51). However, his argument subordinates these objectives to the logics of late capitalism, as does M. Delgado (2007). Unlike Resina, the latter takes the local identity that comes with this logics, Barcelonism, very seriously. On the one hand, he traces its continuities, rather than interruptions, with the history of Catalan nationalism (2007:70–74, 79–87) through its construction of a “symbolic centralism” (2007: 80) around Barcelona. As we also argue, he sees Barcelona as an example of the new global leadership given to cities to produce the ideological work traditionally assigned to nations, namely the production of centralized identities (2007: 66–67). Going back to Illas, the epithet created for the Olympic city as “the city of the people” aimed to found a new meaning for local citizenship that stayed away from nationalism,12 and therefore from the thorny antagonism of Spanish – Catalan identities. Instead, by embracing diversity and collaboration, tokens of urban cosmopolitanism, the ultimate objective was the integration of the citizen qua consumer as a way of masking the co-optation of class antagonisms (2012: 52). This is a point made even more forcefully by M. Delgado and Malet (2007), and M. Delgado (2011), who read PSC’s concept of citizenship as a social-democratic ideology, also referred to as citizenism, a radical form of democracy the purpose of which is to make itself compatible with life under capitalist conditions via the latter’s ethical reform and where “the remains of middle- class leftism” (2011:20–21) take shelter. Supported by the medium of public spaces and the need for citizens while in them to espouse civic attitudes of conviviality, for Delgado and Malet citizenship’s ideological point is to achieve social paciﬁcation to the exclusion of non-compliant, undesirable, un-civic individuals and groups. All these studies presuppose a relation and impact of municipal policies, politics, and ideology over the local population, and recognize how the invocation of diversity and citizen 28 2 THEORIZING CULTURE IN THE CREATIVE CITY participation works in favor of the Barcelona brand achieving its desired place in the local market of cities (Illas 2012: 20, 74). Still, their representation of complacent citizenship tends to reinforce ideas of passivity and spectatorship that do not do justice to the importance of the citizen as producer of the creative city. To invoke M. Delgado once again in a paradigmatic statement:

The city dweller himself is urged to become a tourist in his own city, converted into a passive, submissive and compliant spectator of the mise en scène by means of which the administrators of his city seek to generate a symbolic adherence to their projects. (2004: 54)

Without denying that those citizens’ roles are possible, and even encouraged in certain contexts by local governments, my emphasis is on demonstrating that production, not only consumption, and docile action, rather than passive spectatorship, more accurately describe what the local government is seeking from Barcelonians in the periods under discussion. The work of Boltanski and Chiapello (2005), and Dunn (2004) provides us with speciﬁc forms and histories, France in the former, Poland in the latter, to account for this mode of citizenship. By studying management and otherwise disciplinary techniques at the workplace, they demonstrate how a particular kind of personhood, as Dunn puts it, with a distinctive set of values, neoliberal as opposed to communist in her case, is required to survive in and to sustain late capitalism. The French sociol- ogists, on the other hand, historicize how neoliberalism in the 1990s appropriated the “artistic” discourse of the libertarian radical left of the 1960s to reinvent capitalism. The qualities of creativity, autonomy, agency, self-management, ﬂexibility, mobility, cooperation, once greatly oppositional to Fordist and Taylorist disciplinary, hierarchical and regimented working practices, and, more radically, to work under exploitative and alienating capitalist conditions, was incorporated at the core of neoliberal work practices in order “not to enlarge the worker’s margin of resistance to the logic of production, but on the contrary to make him participate in it more fully” (Donzelot 1991: 279). In the words of Lazzarato:

Now, the post-Taylorist mode of production is deﬁned precisely by putting subjectivity to work both in the activation of productive cooperation and in the production of the “cultural” contents of commodities. (1996: 141) THEORIZING THE SUBJECT OF CULTURE IN THE CREATIVE CITY 29

Donzelot argues that “these measures are intended to make work come to be perceived not just as a matter of pure constraint but as good in itself” (1991: 251). In other words, these systems of administration modify social relations, i.e. people’s relation to work, with a view to connecting work to pleasure and the expression in the worker’s mind of his own desire, also noted by Dardot and Laval (2013: 266–269). While focusing on France, the validity of these analyses can be extended to other Western metropolitan contexts that, from the late 1970s, saw the transformation of Keynesian, Fordist welfare states into advanced neoliberal ones. Closer to our urban focus, Zukin’s pioneer study of social and economic transformation in US cities toward the cultural and creative industries identifies the key role of a new kind of local resident, what she calls the cultural mediator (1991: 214). Mediation, according to Zukin, refers to these citizens’ ability to become a critical infrastructure for/in the city economy, by turning urban spaces and experiences from vernacular into “authentic commodities” capable of being consumed by discerning clients. In Zukin’s argument, these mediators are key to processes of gentrification and appropriation of central locations that were once the locus of popular, deprived neighborhoods, as they prepare the latter for cultural consumption by more affluent cohorts of residents and visitors (Ibid.: 215). Cultural mediators constitute a coveted elite of writers, artists, photogra- phers, and professionals capable of articulating a highly intellectualized and self-reflective discourse on the authenticity of a place’s atmosphere, cuisine, etc., that will be determining features in turning this place into a desirable destination for conscious consumption. Adding to this discussion, Cohen (1999) locates the core of what he calls the structure of multicultural capitalism in the urban cultural economy, one “based on the production of cultural diversity and the marketing of the exotic” and which “works by manufacturing particular goods and services associated with the cultural labour of local subjects, which are then packaged for global consumption under the generic brand name of ‘authentic ethnicity’”(19). Cohen, who has the London case in mind, puts a finger on the crucial issues of culture working as a resource in two distinct directions: one, as an asset for the urban economy, and two, as personal capital to be invested in by the local subject, becoming an entrepreneur of himself. The prototype resident of this city is “a new cosmopolitan middle class,” one whose role is not only that of consumers, but also producers of “cultural diversity at a global scale” (19), and therefore whose input and value are indispensable. Close to Zukin’s cultural mediator, Cohen has a sector of 30 2 THEORIZING CULTURE IN THE CREATIVE CITY the urban population in mind, namely the creative elite, the winners of the cultural economy, whom he critically describes as “postmodern entrepreneurs ... do-it-yourself capitalists [who] actively trade off their ethni- cities or sexualities to give an added competitive edge to what is produced for the local/global market” (1999: 20). Finally, and corroborating Chiapello and Boltanski’s findings for the field of cultural production, O’Connor (1998:233–239) argues, through the example of Manchester, how the survival of postindustrial-turned-creative cities depends on the performance of local cultural industries led by Zukin’s “cultural intermediaries,” whose idea of business (its management, goals, knowledge and learning, production, distinction from leisure, relation to customers) is radically opposed, and hostile to traditional business models. And so, from a rebellious response to the form and content of capitalist production, led from the cultural field, emerges the new paradigm of economic development based on knowledge and creativity. Lazzarato’s concept of immaterial labor (1996), and derived from it, in Hardt (1999), that of affective labor, points up the crucial fact that what are most intangible in human relations are nonetheless activities from which capitalism can extract profit, and therefore qualify as labor:

The “raw material” of immaterial labor is subjectivity ... The fact that immaterial labor produces subjectivity and economic value at the same time demonstrates how capitalist production has invaded our lives and has broken down all the oppositions among economy, power, and knowledge. (1996:141)

Hardt and Lazzarato speak of affective labor as part of clearly defined labor relations within industries,13 including cultural ones “focused on the creation and manipulation of affects ... and [requiring] (virtual or actual) human contact and proximity” (Hardt 1999: 95, 98). In other words, they have in mind the people who work in the service industries that Rifkin defines as colonizing more and more of social relations, but rather than focusing on the creative elite, as we saw above in the arguments by Zukin, O’Connor and Cohen, they are interested principally in those on the lower echelons of the payment ladder.14 While recognizing that affective labor is not new, Hardt comes to the same conclusion as Rifkin, though from the side of the worker, or production, rather than that of the consumer, or consumption: “what [is] new, ... [is] the extent to which this affective immaterial labor is now directly productive of capital and the extent to THEORIZING THE SUBJECT OF CULTURE IN THE CREATIVE CITY 31 which it has become generalized through wide sectors of the economy” (1999: 97). While all previous analyses define globalized forms of work production in the cultural economy which are absolutely pertinent for Barcelona’s economy, I want to argue that, for the city brand, not only a sector, but all local residents, are imagined and desired as cultural mediators and are capable of producing cultural labor for the visitor. This is so to the extent that they will be expected to contribute to the perception of all aspects of city life as coherent parts of a fully commodified cultural experience of Barcelona. Citizens will be therefore addressed as people endowed with profitable cultural capital, which we define, following Cohen, as “the accumulated knowledge/power that intervenes to organise the commodification of cultural labour through its means of representation. ... it transforms the topics of identity work into resources that can be traded off or bargained over” (1999: 21, italics in the original). None of the previously discussed categories of work fully captures the reality of life as a whole for the local resident of a cultural city becoming part of the profit-making machinery of the urban brand. In other words, none addresses the question of citizen’s urban identity becoming indistinguishable from brand identity. Mascarell recognizes the question clearly:

The international market of urban images has developed so much that practically everything can be used to create an attractive brand: from local cuisine to architecture; from attributes of the environment to the characteristics of inhabitants themselves. (2008: 164)

This condition of the inhabitants themselves being used to make the city brand attractive implies that the Barcelona cultural subject addressed by local government and required by the cultural industries emerges in a milieu whose deﬁnition cannot be pinned down by talking about work or leisure, and therefore can to a certain extent, but not fully, identify him/her as a worker and/or consumer either. S/he exists in the habitat of the brand. The city as brand, despite its stereotyping and reductive nature, is a fully encompassing, totalizing project. It does not leave any place or aspect of life in which the citizen can hide, where s/he can exist beyond the possibility of life being extracted from him/her as value for capitalist gain. The cultural city turned brand, as the corporate city in Hertbert Muschamp’s account “no longer recognizes the difference between creating and consuming” (quoted in Zukin 2010: 222) and, by extension, does 32 2 THEORIZING CULTURE IN THE CREATIVE CITY not distinguish between its citizens being and consuming in it, or between their being in and their working for it, as the brand’s ambition is to have recourse to the person as a whole. At all times the brand needs its citizens ready to behave and to act for the city. Going about one’s own business or taking pleasure in any form of the everyday is susceptible to being counted as immaterial and affective labor, even helped by the condition of precarious work. What Zukin circumscribes in the following quote, having certain New York neighborhoods in mind, to cultural workers, can be extended for the case of Barcelona to everyone when properly connected to marketed ideas of Mediterranean sociability and thriving public spaces:

Lacking a steady job and looking for their next gig, cultural workers are the “creative types” whom we see eating brunch ... or tending bar ... Their life as ﬂexible workers creates a production of leisure and an image of idleness that stage authenticity, helping to make these neighbourhoods a cultural destination. (Zukin 2010: 237)

The local government and the cultural industry alike actively sought an ideal situation where Barcelonians performing in ways that were profitable for the brand became undistinguishable from being a Barcelonian, a moment when each citizen’s human relations are “entirely dominated by and internal to capital” (Hardt 1999: 96). We will call this condition the biopolitics of urban branding to help us interpret its implications for a definition of the Barcelona resident’s identity in the cultural city. At this point Foucault returns to our argument to help our theorization of the creative city’s preferred local resident as producer of the city we have started to describe. He updates the concept of homo economicus to define it as the paradigmatic subject of neoliberalism, one imbued in the rationality of economic benefit to program all of his actions and to make sense of all of his emotions, so that “all dimensions of human life are cast in terms of a market rationality” (Brown 2005:40),“all associations, including friendships, love and kinship are underwritten by the logic of ownership and the market” (Kagan 2014: 797). Inspired by Schumpeter’s already mentioned definition of entrepreneurship, Foucault’s “entrepreneur of himself, being for himself his own capital, being for himself his own producer, being for himself the source of his earnings” (2010: 226) is the subject whose entire life project is conceived or can be interpreted as investment in himself; that is, as accumulation of human capital with a view to making such capital profitable in a capitalist THEORIZING THE SUBJECT OF CULTURE IN THE CREATIVE CITY 33 market.15 For this subject, neoliberal values such as deregulation, investment, risk-taking entrepreneurship, an ethics based on achieving individual autonomy (Read 2009: 29) permeate not only labor, but also the everyday of values, intimate and social relations commonly perceived as independent from the market (Kagan 2014: 798). Read states that “the logic of the economic is dispersed to all of lived existence, including intimate, romantic, conjugal and kinship relations” (2009:29–30), and finally Dardot and Laval (2013: 275) speak of a subject for whom “[a]ll areas of individual life potentially become indirect ‘resources’ for the enterprise, since they provide opportunities for the individual to improve his personal performance: all areas of existence are the responsibility of self-management.” The entrepreneur subject, totally subsumed under neoliberalism, desires his/her subsumption and living through neoliberal principles. S/he is “the subject of total involvement” (Ibid., 269), equating his life with capitalism itself and the market, and yet believing that everything is done for oneself, and the more alienated for that reason. A new ethics is being tapped, Dardot and Laval argue (Ibid., 264), in the sense that “discourse on the subject has brought together psychological statements and economic statements to the point of fusing them” (Ibid., 285). The key ideological point is “how the psychological subject and the subject of production can identify” (Ibid., 287, italics in the original); that is, how to convince the subject to behave, to conduct himself in a particular way that is going to be productive. It is this kind of absolute subsumption under the rationale of the economic that is demanded from and made desirable for the Barcelona dweller by the logics of the city brand, whose cultural discourse addresses an urban subject expected to produce the city-commodity by producing him/ herself as part of the visitor’s destination community. The life of this Barcelona resident, epitomized by the Olympic volunteer, the first prototype of the Barcelonian being asked to give him/herself entirely without reserve to the enterprise of serving the city, turns into the labor required to produce the desired commodity, a resource in tourist enterprises. To the extent that the Barcelona brand sells a particular way of life; that is, a particular culture, it is this concept-commodity that requires constant feeding and renovation, among other things through the ability of the local population to embody the image. By instilling pride in the city, government will be stimulating residents to work on themselves, to live up to the image, merging the psychological, the cultural, and the economic reasons for it. It is to favor the cultural 34 2 THEORIZING CULTURE IN THE CREATIVE CITY image, to perpetuate and enhance it that the citizen is to improve him/ herself, to offer (produce) him/herself as the object to be consumed by the visitor as part of the city experience. Citizens are charged with incarnating the city, or rather, the city theme, by working on their own behavior, as its staging (representation) is commodified in the marketplace of cities as part of the Barcelona brand/ image. Creative cities host and frame the lives of the workers and consumers of the cultural industries that sustain their economies, the local subjects who populate and bring to life the tourist image and experience that will generate further investment in and consumption of a city provided that quality of life emanates from them. All of this is greatly imbri- cated in and dependent on global economic networks, but still needs to be anchored in citizens’ loyalty to and agency in their locality. It is therefore in the interest of local governments of entrepreneurial cities, as well as the commercial private sector (e.g., the tourist industry) to maximize a kind of local residents’ investment in the city that can be capitalized on as a component of the city’s vibrancy and cultural attractiveness. Local pride and civic self-esteem, imagination, tolerance, innovation, solidarity, participation, creativity, joie de vivre, sensuousness, cosmopolitanism are all individual and collective values, structures of feeling that the cultural city, let’s call it Barcelona, strives to have identified with itself. By incorporating them as part of a politics of experience and agency that is connected to a cultural politics, these values are deployed at one and the same time as intrinsic to the individuals and communities who live them and as instrumental to the city brand which commodifies them.16 Rodríguez Morató provides us with an eloquent – in his case appreciative too – description of the new frontier in the biopolitical use of culture. It is worth quoting his words at length:

[For the municipality] It is a matter now of working towards the cultural empowering of the citizenry – by elevating its cultural level, by encouraging its creativity – not only in order to improve the quality of life of the population, but also because it is now understood that in so doing the city’s overall capacity to innovate and to adapt to the society of knowledge is improved. It is at the same time a matter of fomenting the development of civic culture – intercultural dialogue, participation – to the extent that they are efﬁcient ways of achieving social cohesion. The question, in short, is to make culture contribute as much as possible to the economic development of the city ... and to its internationalization as well .... And all of this is to THEORIZING THE SUBJECT OF CULTURE IN THE CREATIVE CITY 35

be accomplished through stimulation of the multiplicity of cultural agents nowadays operating in the city, ranging from cultural industries and companies to associations and business entities in the tertiary sector, creators and specialists, cultural administrations and citizens themselves. (2005: 366–367)

From the perspective of the “city-company” (Illas 2012: 120), citizens themselves, as “culture carriers” and participants in intercultural dialogue that produces social cohesion are but one among the cultural agents in charge of securing the greatest possible economic development for the city. In the urban cultural economy, each citizen’s life becomes a potential component, a provider of creative value and, to that extent, an investment, as on his/her correct behavior the yielding of benefits to the city as well as to him/herself will depend (Minca 2009: 99). Florida (2008: 113) states that economic success for a country depends on its ability to take the maximum advantage of all of its workers’ creative talent. In the culture city, every local citizen becomes such a worker whose creativity can be profited from. In a situation where culture is no longer a subsidiary of the economic and the political at the local level of government, but now contains them, local institutional discourses in creative cities conceive differently of their relation and role vis-à-vis their citizens. The question now for cultural policies is not centered on facilitating and improving life in a way that is meaningful and productive in a particular community or geographical area of influence – in the form of patriotic allegiance, for example – but whose value will be extracted elsewhere. Their remit will now be extended to creating the conditions for this value to be used as a component at the service of the local cultural economies. This qualifies as a biopolitical relation of a different kind: the business of identity formation and production of social cohesion becomes for creative cities directly a matter of economic viability. This is because the deployment itself by local citizens and communities of what can be decoded as an expected, commodifiable, brandable identity that the city can appropriate as part of itself is vital for the local economy. We witness, therefore, through the creative, service and in general visitor industries, a commodification of lived experience and structures of feeling as reified culture. Once the cultural economy becomes hegemonic, the increasing neoliberal biopolitization of the citizen’s cultural address would use all the signs of urban democracy as spectacles of themselves for the enjoyment of the consumer. Now a marketable asset embedded in his/her status as bearer of cultural rights, 36 2 THEORIZING CULTURE IN THE CREATIVE CITY the Barcelona local dweller would be addressed by the local government via cultural policies with an added preoccupation: a steady supply of suitable Barcelonians was to be guaranteed for the production of the desired city brand. In the new context, cultural rights not so much disappeared as they came to obey a different logic. They were now intended to, so to speak, be showed off proudly as much as they were to be lived for one’s own fulfillment. They were still granted, but as much as a skill as a right, with the expectation that the citizen would perform them under the logics of the visual and experiential regime established by the visitor industry, turning citizens into components of what Minca (2009) calls the biopolitics of tourism and I call, for the specific context of the city, the biopolitics of urban branding. This biopolitical shift in the hegemonic conceptualization of the desired relation of local citizens to their city was to become evident in the run-up to the Olympics. After years of dictatorship and mutilated citizenship, municipal culture had inaugurated the democratic period as the realm where the full citizen, qua human being complete in his/her freely expressed everyday life, was located. Culture was at that time a territory of participation and enjoyment explicitly preserved from the demands of the capitalist market. The colonization by the market of this cultural territory witnessed in the post- Olympic period in turn will necessitate that fully accomplished citizen for the new pervasive creative economy incarnated by the brand. Citizen use by the city brand will require a deepening in the biopolitization of the everyday, an internalization on the part of the urban dweller of the need and of the desirability to respond to the city’s request, to the city’s command, for behavior that is in keeping with Barcelona’s global theme, the city’s source of economic viability. As uses of culture changed, so did questions of citizenship, which were approached and targeted differently as time went by: from a way of using culture that mainly served to produce the idea of democracy for people, which in a short span of time neutralized their political and rebellious capabilities, to an idea of culture where people were used and encouraged to produce and perform the fabric of ideas and affects implied in democratic culture for the sake of the city brand. Between these two moments the value of the Barcelona citizen transitioned from beneficiary of cultural value to component of it, from the transitional social-democratic logics of a discourse that aimed to manage people’s participation in the public arena as a way to channel political claims into cultural ones to, thanks to the Olympics, a neoliberal rationale of conduct whereby life itself became, in THEORIZING THE SUBJECT OF CULTURE IN THE CREATIVE CITY 37 its urban totality, a means of homogenizing and optimizing a particular urban brand, and therefore a component of cultural value. The open-minded, tolerant, participatory Barcelona citizen that democracy had allowed to re-emerge and flourish, that spatial interventions in the democratic city had sought to celebrate, was addressed in cultural discourses of the post-Olympic period as being responsible for maintaining and enhancing the inhabitant’s own behavior, his/her own personal and social qualities, for the benefit of the city image. In the new context, citizens’ qualities became attached to well-known buzz words – dialogue, participation, activism – but their original political connections were de-emphasized. The pride that the democratic citizen took in having contributed to transforming the Francoist city could be conveniently rewired for a new logic of local boosterism that characterizes the entrepreneurial city. Moreover, enthusiastic participation could conveniently be instrumentalized as promotion, and its encouragement and consequent empowerment of people’s capacities harnessed to serve the interests of the municipality. The writer Manuel VázquezMontalbánsaw clearly the new role that the democratic characteristics had acquired as the spectacle of the Olympic Games was imminent. In Sabotaje olímpico (translated as An Olympic Death), the protagonist of his detective series, Pepe Carvalho, decides to lock himself in his house during the seventeen days that the Games last in order to avoid being used as an accomplice in the gigantic interpellation of the citizenry that the spectacle requires. While he feels bullied into acquiescing with what is going on, this is his argument as to why he will not be prosecuted for daring to disagree:

Whereas nobody was put in a mental institution for being against the Olympic Games, this was not due to tolerance, but to the exhibiting of such tolerance. He [Carvalho] was surrounded by exhibitionists. (17)

The fragment captures well the new context for the democratic self that the Barcelona citizen, and the city as a whole, is expected to exhibit. What is important is not the ethics of tolerance as a democratic trait that is respectful of criticism and of views other than one’s own, but to be seen as, to be exhibited as, to use Montalbán’s character’s own term, tolerant, to present oneself as such in front of a global audience. Also significant in the allusion to the mental institution of how dominant official discourses in favor of the Games were, is that to be critical of what the Games represented, in themselves and for the city, could only be interpreted as an act of sheer 38 2 THEORIZING CULTURE IN THE CREATIVE CITY folly. The new economic role that creative industries would acquire in Barcelona reinforced this exhibitionist re-jigging of individual and collective urban practices. The model of the Barcelona citizen in cultural policy became the creative entrepreneur to the extent that everyday life itself as a whole in the city became susceptible to being instrumentalized as an asset in place-marketing. All efforts to care for oneself, all social and everyday actions and behaviors, if correctly channeled and performed, were useful to the enterprise qua creative city and it was therefore of utmost importance, on the part of the municipality, to encourage them. Finally, the extent to which such biopolitics can profit from everyday life and structures of feeling, even from consciously recalcitrant subjects, should not be underestimated. I agree on this point with Illas’ critique (2012:13–14) of M. Delgado, whose work on Barcelona represents the real messy and political city, “without epithets, plasmatic and strange, chronically unfriendly” (2004: 64), on the one hand, and the tourist, monumental, organic, sanitized and depopulated one, on the other, as two discrete watertight compartments, with the former being the true one and the latter a “hallucination” (2004: 65) of power. Contrary to this, we can argue that the most “real,” uncommon, subversive in Delgado’s terms, along with the subjects producing such realities, can feasibly be commercialized and assimilated as providing an authentic experience, and turned in this way into a desirable destination, more so in a city that sells itself as cutting edge, progressive and tolerant as does Barcelona. “The blurring of a series of distinctions between citizens and tourists, the real city and its image, and the diversity of the street and the diversity of the market” that Illas refers to (2012: 14), is proof that neither heterogeneity, multiplicity, complexity, messiness, nor even oppositional and resistant politics in urban contexts, can be counted on and theorized as constitutive outsides of the city brand.17

NOTES 1. Several authors, see Lobo (2004) and Osborne (2006), have taken issue with Yúdice’s qualiﬁcation of this new framework for culture as entailing an epistemic change. Their critiques dispute the radical disappearance of culture as a ﬁeld of struggle due to its unescapable instrumentalized subsumption and cooptation by power that Yúdice’s book sets out. For the purposes of our argument, it is not the epistemic nature of the shift we agree with, but its very existence and utter relevance signaled by Yúdice that we aim to NOTES 39

pursue for postindustrial Barcelona. In Yúdice’s words: “[culture-as- resource] is the lynchpin of a new epistemic framework in which ideology and much more of what Foucault called disciplinary society ... are absorbed into an economic or ecological rationality, such that management, conser- vation, access, distribution, and investment in ‘culture’ and the outcomes thereof take priority” (2003: 2). 2. Monica Degen is right in pointing out critically that the experience of the postmodern city tends to be, in both the Humanities and the Social Sciences, “summed up mainly from a visual perspective, often under the concept of the ‘aestheticization of everyday life’ or ‘spectacularization’” (2008: 9). Degen sees in these approaches, and we could add “imagineering,” asimplification of the sensual complexity of experience that her work aims to capture. Even when the visual dimension of the Barcelona brand is paramount, this book also wants to argue that the brand is not only made of images, but also of experiences involving all the senses, and taking place beyond language. As Degen argues, following Lefebvre’s concept of dominated spaces and Foucault’sideaof micropower, power – in our case, the power of the brand – presents itself diluted into a myriad of everyday practices and feelings that succeed in producing conformity through sensual pleasure: seductive spatial arrangements, reduction in variety of people, pleasant odors or the exclusion of everything undesirable (Degen 2008:19,60,63).Itisto this controlled experience that some subjects will not only, or not always, conform to, but also react against and subvert. 3. See Jessop (1998) for a study of the different types of urban entrepreneurship and for a critique of its inappropriate (over)use. 4. For analyses of our contemporary neoliberal times, starting in the late 1970s and in the post-Cold War period, see Foucault (2010); Lemke (2002); Brown (2005); Anderson (1995); and Dardot and Laval (2013). 5. According to Chaves (2011: 273): “Anyone who is happy with the Barcelona brand will manifest a social-democratic neoliberal conception of urban life,” while Illas (2012:52–53) defines Olympic Barcelona’s postpo- litics as the blend of “Keynesian managerialism and neoliberal entrepreneurialism”. 6. What European integration meant for the Spanish economy was its conversion into “a gigantic real estate and consumer market, through the stimulation of financial and stock market activities, of tourism, and through huge investment in transport infrastructures. Banks and construction companies, private monopolies, media conglomerates and real estate agencies would be the new top sectors of Spanish capitalism and would introduce themselves in the new transnational order sustained through very generous doses of public spending” (López 2012: 86). 40 2 THEORIZING CULTURE IN THE CREATIVE CITY

7. The similarities between the British and the Barcelona case are recognized by Ferran Mascarell, who states that “To a certain extent the Barcelona model has been a municipal experience in new labour or new socialism” (2008: 118, and see also 122). 8. “The rapid growth of credit and the evolution of the equity bubble made possible the increase in domestic spending which, once again, was greater than that of other European countries. It is here, rather than on political conspiracy, where one must find the stamp of consensus as a development model. Wealth had seemed to benefit practically everyone, because practically everyone had had access to property of the good at the root of the speculative bubble: namely housing” (López and Rodríguez 2010: 21). 9. Foucault’s argument on governing as action upon the action of others concludes that this is the case “only in so far as they are free” (Foucault 1982: 224). In other words, it is important to point out that governmentality refers to government in conditions of democracy, where citizens enjoy degrees of freedom. 10. The impact on individuals – their consciousness, their behavior – of the global economic transformations that our study covers for Barcelona has been the object of sociological inquiry since the early 1990s (see Taylor et al. 1996: 7). In the UK in particular, the influence of Raymond Williams’ “structures of feeling” inspired approaches coming from anthropology, sociology, and cultural studies which attempted to identify – and dignify – local identity through the study of social practices and relations (Ibid. 32). The structure of feeling’s concept is useful to grasp what is implicated in local identity, the intricate process of negotiating/surviving global economic changes in inextricable relation with affects, experiences, and rhythms shaping lived experience. This work does not try to convey the utter complexity of local structures of feeling through a bottom-up focus on the experiences of different segments of Barcelona’s society. It should already be clear that it works in the opposite, top-down direction. Still, the concept is useful for naming that thing which, no matter in what simplified form, Barcelona’s institutional cultural discourses appropriated, commodified, and managed to great political and economic gains. 11. There are, of course, many differences too between case studies. In the British context, a characteristic to this day of cultural policy in entrepreneurial cities is the preoccupation with quantifying the social impact of the arts and culture in the form of improvement in education, employability, and community engagement (Belfiore 2009). Less obsessed with statistics than their British counterparts, cultural policymakers in post-Francoist Barcelona were engaged in shifting the social use of culture, a more radical move altogether. The point in Barcelona was not to translate a belief deeply engrained in the modern mind – the social value of culture – to the language NOTES 41

of hard data in order to make it more convincing to other sectors of government and therefore worthy of funding. Rather, while taking for granted that benefits were to be had, cultural policies in Barcelona were intent on changing the social use of culture by influencing the citizen that those social benefits produced. 12. “The use of the word ‘gent’ instead of ‘poble’ in all political propaganda had a precise function: to avoid determining which national (Catalan or Spanish) ‘poble’ Maragall’s discourse represented. ‘The city of people’ provided a denationalized imaginary for the city, and both autochthonous Catalans and Spanish immigrants became primarily citizens of Barcelona ... Maragall’s call to diversity detached the citizens of Barcelona from collective and national historical narratives” (Illas 2012: 47, 49). 13. Hardt lists four forms of immaterial labor (1999: 97). In addition to cultural, there are informational, affective, and communicative. As Hardt’s own analysis states implicitly, there is overlap between these different forms. The imbrications of affective into cultural labor is what focuses our argument. Lazzarato’s analysis of immaterial labor, on the other hand, is very much centered on immaterial work for the creative, cultural industries. 14. In addition, Lazzarato sees better than Cohen and Zukin through the glamour of creative, cultural workers’ labor conditions: “Precariousness, hyperexplotation, mobility, and hierarchy are the most obvious characteristics of metropolitan immaterial labor. Behind the label of the independent “self-employed” worker, what we actually find is an intellectual proletarian, but who is recognized as such only by the employers who exploit him or her. It is worth noting that in this kind of working existence it becomes increasingly difficult to distinguish leisure time from work time” (1996: 136). Lazzarato’s point is developed in the work of McRobbie (2014). 15. See Dardot and Laval for an in-depth analysis of the historical and conceptual development of entrepreneurship in relation to neoliberalism (passim, esp. 101–120, 215–299). 16. Illas’s(2012: 117–123) discussion of the Barcelona–Rio Declaration and other “cosmopolitan” documents in the writing and signing of which Barcelona has been involved since 1992 is relevant here. He argues that “[t]hese declarations advertise Barcelona as an open, tolerant, international meeting point in a way that directly benefits the industry based on the organization of congresses, trade fairs, and tourist events in general ... [T]hese documents actively produce the ... cosmopolitanism and multi- culturalism that help Barcelona attract global investments in the form of visitors, conferences, fairs, etc.” (122) 17. A case in point are the “no a la guerra” [no to war] peace demonstrations against the Iraq War in 2003, which were cited, in the context of the forthcoming Fòrum de les Cultures, as examples of the tolerant and 42 2 THEORIZING CULTURE IN THE CREATIVE CITY

enlightened nature of Barcelona citizens, and triggered an ofﬁcial positioning of the municipality under the slogan “B per la pau” [B for peace]. See http://www.bcn.cat/b_pau/catala/welcome.htm. See also Juris and Bonet i Martí for an in-depth account of how Barcelona in the early 2000s became an important hub for anti-globalization movements. PART II

Taming the Political Citizen CHAPTER 3

Stories We Live By: ...and the Games Created the City

There is a dominant discourse that speaks of the major and successful transformations undergone by the city of Barcelona since the advent of the democratic municipality as the work of an exceptional leadership who was able to convince the local population. According to this version of events, these leaders persuaded them out of their pessimistic views of the city and the future, and offered them hope and a new, positive vision for the city. Since the mid-1990s, retrospective accounts on the part of municipal leaders, key players in Barcelona’s cultural and political arena in the 1980s and 1990s, the euphoric (as Illas [2012] calls it) Olympic period, tended to place themselves, and government more abstractly, as the ones who had made a new way of life possible for people as Barcelona evolved successfully toward becoming an Olympic host. Ferran Mascarell (1999: 103), Director of Cultural Programming and Dissemination Services of the municipality since 1985, de facto in charge of Cultural Affairs since 1987 and during the Olympic period, and founder of Barcelona’s Institute of Culture in 1996, has it that leftist parties made people understand their desire for a better city: “progressive candidacies proposed to use culture as a central argument to make citizens understand their desire to change a city of grey architects, ageing infrastructures and under- developed community structures.” Pep Subirós (1999:10),onthe other hand, Personal Advise to the Mayor and Cultural Affairs

© The Author(s) 2017 45 M.P. Balibrea, The Global Cultural Capital, The Contemporary City, DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-53596-2_3 46 3 STORIES WE LIVE BY: ...AND THE GAMES CREATED THE CITY coordinator since 1984, in charge of the Cultural Olympiad as OCSA’s (Cultural Olympiad plc.) chief executive from 1989 to 1991, states that the rehabilitation of industrial buildings reinvented as civic centers, museums, and so on “satisfied up-to-that point ignored needs,” and speaks of early 1980s Barcelona, before the Olympics made their mark, as a “sad and introspective” city (Subirós 1993b: no page). A third key player, Oriol Bohigas, in charge of urban planning during the first democratic local government from 1980 to 1984 and Head of Cultural Affairs from 1991 to 1994, is also a good example of a paternalistic view of the population that leaves all agency to government. Still holding on to an idea of culture as a civilizing influencetobeprovidedtocitizens,Bohigas(1993: 12) is convinced that people, by themselves, are incapable of realizing the importance of culture:

Citizens themselves seem not to worry, voters have already forgotten culture and, therefore, do not include it in their demands to government. It is us politicians who should disseminate the importance of culture and put it inside voters’ heads that this needs to be their next demand. Now voters do not want to give their opinions because they have not tried yet to live in a culturally well-equipped city, and they do not guess all of its certainly unquestionable advantages for a civilized country in the way that we want to make and remake it.

Specifically alluding to the Olympic Games, Mayor Pasqual Maragall speaks of its leading team having returned “a collective excitement and pride to a city which had been defeated and had suffered many years of speculation, lack of investment and negligence” (Subirós 1993b: no page), conveniently situating urban speculation as a problem of the dictatorship and having nothing to do with the inflation- ary dynamic of land practices generated by the Olympic Games themselves. Finally, Josep Miquel Abad, another key socialist figure from the beginning of the first democratic municipalities (moving in 1981 from his PSUC militancy), and managing director of COOB’92, Barcelona’s Organizing Olympic Committee, insists that through the Olympics “Barcelona recovered its morale, and probably this is one of STORIES WE LIVE BY: ...AND THE GAMES CREATED THE CITY 47 its most important legacies. Although intangible, this is of incalculable value” (Samaranch et al. 2002:16). All of these accounts present what came before the Olympic Games as a period of darkness, full of economic crisis, self-pity, and frustration, which clearly enhances the claim that it was that event alone and the leaders who brought it to the city that deserve credit for Barcelona’s success. The first image/poster, created by the advertising company Bassat, Ogilvy and Mather to promote the Barcelona candidacy, under- linesthisidea,withthefive rings rising over the Montjuich mountain and the city as a whole clearly signifying a new dawn for Barcelona. These versions of things infantilize citizens by representing them as passive and lucky beneficiaries of the political elite’s brilliant decisions, as having had needs satisfied that they did not even know they had, as being dependent on government to come and make them see how much better life in the city could be. At best they forget completely and at worst they consciously silence how much of these achievements had started as demands from grassroots movements. Their triumphal accounts appropriate all agencies acting on the city’s recent past, to the detriment of people’s participation and notable activism since the 1960s. Their views disavow the fact that the task at hand for the leadership initiative that took Barcelona to hosting the Olympic Games was not that of convincing a passive, defeatist population to have faith in a better future. Rather, the challenge was to take the initiative away from that population on the grounds of sharing their principles and aims with them, only to transform it into something else altogether through the exercise of power while pretending that no qualitative change had taken place. It has been argued frequently in critical interpretations of the Barcelona model (Balibrea 2001;Capel2005; García 2008;Montaner 2003; Marshall 2004a;McNeill1999;Muxí2011; Andreu Acebal 2011) that in its evolution it managed to kill and coopt what had made it so great in the first place, namely its participatory element, the fact that it had stemmed from the implementation of spatial transformations that had been on the agendas of grassroots urban movements since late Francoism. It is also commonplace to see in the adjudication of the Olympics to the city in 1986 the turning point for the Barcelona model. This turning point and the reasons for its 48 3 STORIES WE LIVE BY: ...AND THE GAMES CREATED THE CITY clamorous success have indeed to do with discarding practices – those concerned with direct democracy and wide consultation governance – inthefaceofhavingtoorganizethemacroevent,andwithappro- priating an initiative that had originally been that of grassroots movements. More radical views, such as that of M. Delgado (2007), vigorously deny that there was ever anything other than the city’s integration into postindustrial global capitalism in the minds of Barcelona’s post-Francoist democratic political leaders and their economic allies. There is no lack of evidence for this either. The Olympic Games, the organization of which had been on the agenda since before Narcís Serra was chosen as the first major of the post-dictatorial democratic period in 1979, provided the perfect alibi for the local governing parties to engage in such integration. Despite their leftist leanings, the PSC and even the PSUC had little appetite for the kind of direct democracy and involvement of grassroots politics in decision- making processes that had seen its golden age during the pre-democratic municipal government of J. M. Socías Humbert (McNeill 1999: 125). The very concept of aspiring to host the Olympics implied a continuity with sustaining the capitalist growth of the city through civic boosterism and property development that bore all the signs of resemblance with Francoist Barcelona Mayor J. M. de Porcioles’ idea for modernizing the city in the 1960s, one that had encountered vociferous resistance on the part of neighborhood associations. McNeill summarizes this continuity thus:

The characteristics of Francoist urban development – the social dominance of ﬁnance capital, the suscitation of celebrated land use cases defeated in the 1970s, the prevalence of zoning changes of dubious legality, and the continued dominance of road-building schemes – still pertained to a certain degree throughout the 1980s and 1990s. (1999: 126–127)1

There was also a continuity of economic interests that explains the reinstatement of these practices, economic interests which were conveniently advanced by allies in key positions of power. The most salient among these was Juan Antonio Samaranch, a prominent Francoist who held positions of political and economic power throughout the dictatorship. He became President of the Diputació STORIES WE LIVE BY: ...AND THE GAMES CREATED THE CITY 49

(Provincial government) in 1973 (Martí and Moreno 1974:43),a highly influential post in the process of Barcelona’s urban transformation into a metropolitan area. He clearly had those interests in mind when he became the IOC’s (International Olympic Committee’s) president in 1980 and, like Porcioles before him, saw in the organization of the Olympic Games an opportunity to favor those interests through the major infrastructural transformation that holding the Games would justify. Before the Games, the macro event project of choice for Porcioles had been hosting the World Exhibition in 1982 (Expo-82), though there had been an attempt by him in 1965 to present Barcelona as a candidate for the 1972 Olympic Games, though this had been frustrated by Madrid’s presentation of a competing and incompatible bid presumably intended precisely to thwart Barcelona’s aspirations (Simón 2013). Barcelona had to wait until Samaranch became part of the IOC in 1966 (Mercé Varela 1974: 41) to reposi- tion itself in the Olympic race. New mentions of it resurface in 1974 (Martí and Moreno 1974: 69). At the time, Samaranch had been a member of IOC’s Executive Committee since 1970 and was clearly making his influence felt. Willy Daume, IOC’s vice-president declared on a trip to Barcelona in 1974, where he came at Samaranch’sinvita- tion, that: “Barcelona could be the most appropriate spot to organize the Olympic Games, because it is a city with a very friendly atmosphere and of ideal dimensions. If a perfect organization on the economic front can be managed, the Games are too, for the city organizing them, great business” (Casanova 1974:39).ByOctober 1974, Samaranch himself had been named vice-president of the IOC, andhewouldmakesurethatBarcelonacontinuedtostayintheminds of the executive members as a good candidate for the Games. There is therefore no doubt that when the Games appeared in the agenda of Mayor Narcís Serra’s first democratic municipality, the cultural/sports macro event concept as trigger of major urban transformation was resurfacing rather than being invented specially for Barcelona. Even more significant than verifying the continuation of these practices under democratic, left-leaning governments is to realize that they were at the core of grassroots denunciations in the late Francoist and pre-democratic periods. So, in a matter of a few years, and channeled through the Olympic Games enterprise, what had constituted major trends in Barcelona’s capitalist urban 50 3 STORIES WE LIVE BY: ...AND THE GAMES CREATED THE CITY development under authoritarian conditions, reinstated themselves under social-democratic ones. The illusion that democracy would bring about a radically new way of living in the city therefore proved false – which is not the same as saying that containing change along these lines was in every local politician and policymaker’s agenda from day one, as M. Delgado proposes. However, while it would be untrue to say that the reasons for the re-signified resurfacing of the Olympic Games went unnoticed and uncriticized, it is accurate to say that the majority of Barcelonians, including many of those who had been part of grassroots protests in the 1970s, accepted quietly and willingly the excitement of organizing the Olympic Games. How could this be? How is it that the citizenry went from being adamantly against such macro events to embracing them wholeheartedly? Here is where an analysis of the changes in the municipal address of citizens finds its place. Such an address made sense in changing ways of the citizens’ relationship with the city and contributed in this way to its transformation. The success with which local governments were able to pull through after the political and economic change of direction demanded by the organization of the Games hasalottodowiththewaysinwhichtheywereabletomaintaina discursive continuity with previous practices that proved convincing to the local population as well as to the soon-to-be global audience. While logics and rationales changed from the point of view of governmentality, discourses remained remarkably consistent. The democratizing and participatory element that had been at the core of the Barcelona model since 1979 remained after 1986, when Barcelona was chosen as Olympic host, very much present in and central to hegemonic local discourses: access to public space and participation are key concepts here. Both would be coopted through their presentation in culture as fulfillment of popular demands for a democratic city. The rationale here from the point of view of government was containment of political activism via contentment through culture, from which the famous consensus and the pursuit of global identity for the city were born. This part of the book analyzes the early moments of this process, namely the initial definitions of the NOTE 51 democratic subject as militant citizenship, and its gradual containment within the realm of culture.

NOTE 1. The same kind of argument can be found in Resina (2008: 215–216). CHAPTER 4

Culture Is to the Social Materialization of Democracy as the Critical Subject Is to Democratic Citizenship

Cultural policies in the Spanish transitional period to democracy were of great symbolic importance (Quaggio 2011). They needed to signify the end of the dictatorial period and the inauguration of a new democratic one. During the dictatorship, cultural production and dissemination had been curtailed through censorship, blacklisting and monopoly of information by the state. The new democratic state continued to play a very important dirigiste role as provider of culture and disseminator of it, but distanced itself from the dictatorial one by eliminating previous “ﬁlters” and by aiming to provide universal access to culture in the form of infrastructures (museums, libraries, archives), heritage protection, and the creation of new institutions (e.g., Orquesta Nacional de España, Centro Dramático Nacional, Ballet Nacional, Compañía de Teatro Clásico) (Quaggio 2011:33–34). From the point of view of government, this is the sea-change in cultural affairs that eliminating the infamous Francoist relic of the Ministry of Information and replacing it with the Ministry of Culture in 1977 aimed to signify (Real Instituto Elcano 2004:4–5; Bonet and Négrier 2010: 45). For the ﬁrst democratically elected transitional government of UCD (Democratic Centre Union), a center-right political party, culture became a stage upon which to project and represent democracy. Pío Cabanillas, Spanish Secretary of Culture from 1977 to 1979, followed closely in his program of action the resolutions of the UNESCO Oslo convention of 1976, which focused on the need for culture to be a medium for the improvement of citizens’

© The Author(s) 2017 53 M.P. Balibrea, The Global Cultural Capital, The Contemporary City, DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-53596-2_4 54 4 CULTURE IS TO THE SOCIAL MATERIALIZATION OF DEMOCRACY ... quality of life, and insisted on the concept of cultural democracy (Quaggio 2011: 14). The European context for this is that of a prolonged post- Second World War period of prosperity and welfare state protection where leisure time increases for citizens as does the influence of mass media. Catching up with these tendencies, Spanish transitional cultural policies of the time acquired the important role of deepening the democratizing process, of being a vehicle for humanizing state policies through actions that could be interpreted as contributing to the disemmination of freedom, pluralism, and progress (Quaggio 2011: 15). Culture at that moment incarnated democracy more than the economic or even political realms, as it took on the role of demonstrating that the state and institutions were making democratic life, democratic everydayness, possible, and with it, that they were providing the means for the full humanity of citizens to emerge. I argue that it is in culture, so understood, that the freedom-seeking impulse of the anti-Francoist movement is channeled by the state, and in culture where it will be coopted and adapted to the needs of reconciliation, peace, and eradication of conflict. But the role of the Spanish democratic “cultural state” would soon be diminished and to a certain extent, undermined, through the combination of two factors.1 On the one hand, from 1982, powers over culture were to be transferred to the newly created Autonomous Regions, and on the other, from 1979, new democratic municipalities included culture in their institutional agendas. It is at the level of these institutional realms that democratic cultural policies would materialize (Bonet and Négrier 2010: 45; Rodríguez Morató 2005: 356, 361 for the Barcelona case). Together, region and municipality, with their greater closeness to citizens, would take over to an important extent from the state in claiming to continue with the task of bringing citizens the benefits of democracy through the dissemination of culture and through becoming the guar- antors of universal participation in it. In addition, cultural affairs at all levels of government would be radically affected by macro-economic factors in the 1980s: the global crisis of the welfare state and the hegemonization of neoliberalism would do away with the figure of the benefactor cultural government and progressively universalize the monetarization of culture (Rodríguez Morató 2005: 356–357). But this shift had not yet taken place when the first democratic local governments in Barcelona, led by communists and social democrats, came to power. As an openly proclaimed leftist municipality, they were no exception in seeing themselves, when it came to cultural affairs, as dealing mostly CULTURE IS TO THE SOCIAL MATERIALIZATION OF DEMOCRACY ... 55 with citizens, rather than in addition with the cultural professional sector, as would be the case later on (Rodríguez Morató 2005: 363), and as being responsible for providing these citizens with democracy through culture. Politicians and intellectuals who would come to shape the transformations in culture and forms of addressing citizens in years to come were very aware of the subjective component of government brought in by culture. Ferran Mascarell understood very well from the beginning that added value of culture for democratic governments, as channeling illusion and affect, and its centrality in giving rights to citizens. By providing culture, municipalities were administering the desires and feelings of democratic entitlement of their populations. Mascarell summarizes well this sense of responsibility on the part of the newly elected municipal politicians working in the area of culture:

Democratic municipalities inherited the transfer of social responsibility accumulated for four decades. A wide array of longings for new things, accumulated by practically two generations of citizens who had not enjoyed the instruments of democratic participation. All in all it clearly highlighted the need for many actions everywhere, well coordinated ones between the new democratic administrations. Only thus would it be possible to rapidly improve the practice of the most elemental cultural rights of the citizenry. (1999: 103)

Pep Subirós, along with Mascarell, was perfectly at tuned to the fact, supported so forcefully by Lefebvre, that spatial urban transformation was more than the business of urban planners, it was about changing the human experience of the city, and in that, a cultural affair. And so, with democratic municipalities, what had changed in the city had been

a device to produce signiﬁcation and meaning, cultural values and patterns which facilitate, or not, particular ways of conviviality and social cohesion. Space is one of the great mechanisms to valorise and stimulate, or not, coming together, dialogue, exchange, tolerance, responsibility, communal sense, identity and collective memory. (1999: 684)

While all of the above puts these kinds of municipal projects firmly within the spectrum of a left-wing agenda, I agree with Quaggio when she states that both central and local governments in this period sought, through their cultural policies, “to contain citizens’ impulses in order to avoid 56 4 CULTURE IS TO THE SOCIAL MATERIALIZATION OF DEMOCRACY ... possible conflicts” (2011: 33). In fact, I interpret her words as meaning that the first state and local democratic governments, from the center- right to the center-left of the political spectrum, used cultural policies and culture in general as containers of the political, by way of making culture and politics discursively indistinguishable. Even if short-lived, this take on culture of the early years in Barcelona’s democratic municipalities played a crucial and long-lasting role in managing political agency and activism in the population from the years of resistance to Francoism to those of democratic consensus. What was at stake in the realm of culture for progressive parties was “to make socialization possible through culture” (Mascarell 1999: 103). Such promotion of new forms of social relations through culture, to be qualified as democratic, were also to bring about consent and contentment with the new status quo. This strategic use of culture is, I think, crucial to understanding the transition in Spain from dictatorship to democracy at the local level, particularly with regard to the governing of people making that transition.

IN THE BEGINNING WAS THE POLITICAL SUBJECT As mentioned in Chapter 3, grassroots movements are fundamental to understanding the shape that anti-Francoism took in Spanish urban contexts, in particular in Bilbao, Madrid, and Barcelona. In the latter case, they were paramount to shaping the meaning of democracy in the city and achieving a greater quality of life through direct political participation in rapidly transforming urban spaces.2 The rise and importance of urban social movements in Barcelona in the 1960s has been well documented (Bordetas Jiménez 2012; Borja 1977; Alabart 1981; Andreu Acebal 2014; Carbonell 1976; FAVB 1982; Huertas and Andreu 1996; Magro Huertas 2011; Recio and Naya 2004). It is the story of how grassroots movements collectively acquired political consciousness while combining in their agendas demands for the correction of the deficiencies in their city with the broader political ones of democracy and of the end of capitalist exploitation. For a generation of Barcelonians, in the hostile context of a dictatorial regime that barely tolerated them, these urban social movements were their political schooling, the space where they learned to speak up, to organize and to occupy the streets. These grassroots associations, which by 1980 had 70,000 members (Abadía Naudí 2007: 182), were from the late 1960s the vehicle for expressing the needs and aspirations of the population and became a collective political negotiator of great influence during the IN THE BEGINNING WAS THE POLITICAL SUBJECT 57 transition years, particularly before the advent of democratically elected municipalities. They are the unequivocal demonstration that wide sectors of the local population were conscious all along of their desires and needs vis-à-vis their city, inasmuch as they were perfectly able to articulate them politically. This point is brought home by the FAVB (Federation of Residents’ Associations of Barcelona) in their taking- stock letter at the time of the first municipal elections in the spring of 1979. While historicizing their own role in the making possible of the transcendental first municipal elections after decades of dictatorship and repression, they state their dual commitment and achievements: on the one hand specific demands for more services, and on the other the fight for broader democratic rights:

Our city, with a rich associative tradition, has seen the recuperation of an associative movement for the new city: the citizen movement, neighbour associations which, from the late 1960s, have played a fundamental role in the lives of citizens, by slowing down the actions of urban capitalism, by demanding improvements in housing, schools, health, green spaces, as well as by provoking a crisis of municipal administration, by ﬁghting for democratic municipalities, for freedoms, for amnesty, for Catalonia’s Autonomy Charter. (FAVB 1979:8)

The political effectiveness and leadership of residents’ associations was recognized by leftist political parties at the time. This illustrates the alliances of the communist and radical left of the time with other social movements, which characterizes the political struggles against late Francoism in all of Spain. Championing an explicit socialist perspective, Por una política municipal democrática (1977) (Towards democratic municipal policies), by Borja, Tarragó and Boix, Catalan communists of the PSUC at the time, represents well how those within party structures took note of and actively sought to connect themselves to new political forms. According to the authors, it is thanks to the associations’ actions that a grassroots democracy (1977: 35) exists at municipal level in Barcelona:

In neighborhoods ... meetings and gatherings take place, vacant premises ... are occupied, “youth Olympiads”, popular, politically-themed celebrations take place, demands for resignation and amnesty are made, etc. They even publicize plans for demonstrations, asking for permission to do them (mostly not granted), which are advertised in the local press and most of the 58 4 CULTURE IS TO THE SOCIAL MATERIALIZATION OF DEMOCRACY ...

time take place. The occupation of the streets, social mobilization, and collective pressure are stronger than an isolated and disconcerted administration. (Ibid.: 84)

For these authors, the agency of the people and, by extension, the urban pre-democratic subject is beyond doubt, as is the idea that collective action in the social is in itself a critical response and resistance to Francoist rules of engagement for the population. Collective participation, whether or not explicitly political, is interpreted as a statement in favor of democracy coming from below:

Popular and citizen movements have reconstituted the foundations of a social fabric organized from below. Neighbor associations in the neighborhoods, the revitalization and acquisition of citizens’ consciousness in cultural, religious and sports entities have turned Barcelona into a city with a well structured social life. Associations and entities have truly become democracy schools. ... Neighbor associations and citizens’ entities have forged the means for the rebirth of our collective life. (Ibid.: 89–90)

Not by chance, both quotes mention the organization for and by local residents of festive cultural and sports events as central territories of political organization and struggle: “Today mass politicization takes place to a great extent through the most immediate social, cultural and political issues, many of which are experienced in the city and neighbourhood” (Ibid.: 87).3 Of note also is the fact that all previous quotes, and many of their references, come from that interregnum between the death of Franco in 1975 and the advent of proper democratic city councils in 1979, when government was exercised from very debilitated municipal institutions. They paradoxically provided, by virtue of their not yet being democratic but already lacking the backing and legitimacy of the dictatorial regime, the best window of opportunity for associations to make advances and to implement their more radical political agendas (Andreu Acebal 2014). This position in Barcelona was occupied by Josep Maria Socías Humbert, mayor from December 1976 to the advent of democratic municipalities in 1979. His time in ofﬁce was characterized by a communicative and socially conscious management style, introducing democratic measures, anticipating and, to an extent, surpassing those of subsequent democratically elected politicians. The example of culture is particularly illustrative for our purposes, from when author Joan de Sagarra was in IN THE BEGINNING WAS THE POLITICAL SUBJECT 59 charge as Cultural Delegate. In the following quote, museums for the imminent democratic future of the city are conceived by the municipality as places for the use of local people (not tourists!), to stimulate and exercise a quite radical version of critical citizenship:

If it is deemed fair and useful to decentralize municipal services and to revitalize neighborhoods, then to establish local walk-in health centres, schools and parks is a priority, but not enough. In fact, those services would tend simply to “reproduce the work force” and in no sense they would question the system, whereas our current situation demands that we doubt, that we question, that we ﬁnd positive ways out of the crisis. For this reason, the current situation demands experimentation at much broader levels. It is necessary to disseminate knowledge to the masses. Museums, – and local museums – can contribute to this rethinking provided, of course, that they are integrated into wider service centres and to the extent that they respond to the spontaneous demand of the local population. (Ajuntament. Libro Blanco 1979: 62)

Here culture (in museum shape), as will be the case with the first democratically elected governments, is part of a package with housing, health, and education in the demand for public services. But it has an added value, that of forming a citizen conceived as a political subject, someone who can be actively democratic thanks to having acquired full consciousness of his/ her power. Culture is here presented as qualitatively different from the other services the democratic city is expected to provide. Primary care facilities, playgrounds and parks, and schools are necessary but not enough to the extent that, according to the author of the quote, they merely reproduce life as keeping the citizen fit to work within the capitalist system. In so doing, they guarantee the repetition of the same, and by implication of the same conditions of exploitation, whereas culture has not reproductive, but the transformative and creative capacity that transitional times demand, insofar as it stimulates a reflective and critical mode in the citizen, the ability to “doubt ... to question ... to find positive ways out of the crisis.” To understand the symbiotic functioning of the cultural realm with the production of a democratic subject as we see it articulated in this quote is key to understand the terms of the transition to democracy in Barcelona. It produces the ideal of an urban citizen as a critical, creative and transformative subject, one that is modeled on the grassroots activist. This Barcelona citizen is the ancestor of the future entrepreneur of 60 4 CULTURE IS TO THE SOCIAL MATERIALIZATION OF DEMOCRACY ... himself, from a time when improving life conditions at a personal and collective level was not indistinguishable from investing in the cultural city, but rather fighting against the imposition of capitalist conditions of exploitation. The quote furthermore purports that the way to produce this kind of a subject is to produce the right kind of culture. Such a conceptualization abolishes the distance separating power (the museum as institution) from people, and abolishes in particular the confrontation between the two, making them appear, instead, as mutual allies through the medium of culture. This is illustrated in the following definition of a new role for and type of museum, the ecomuseum, a concept taken from Georges-Henri Rivière, proposed as the ideal local museum to empower citizens from below:

The ecomuseum is an instrument that a power and a people conceive, produce and exploit together. Power contributes with its experts, facilities and means. People do through the participation of their active forces from all generations, according to their aspirations, their knowledges, their per- ceptive abilities ...(Ibid.: 17–18)

As with the case of the critical subject, the symbiosis of power and the participating people is at one and the same time the predecessor and the antagonist of subsequent cultural conceptualizations in the pre-Olympic period. Genuinely conceived here as able to produce knowledge and power from below, people’s agency is on the verge of being appropriated from above when democratic municipalities finally become a reality. Be that as it may, in the period immediately prior to the celebration of the first municipal elections, it is fair to say that grassroots movements had proved their capacity to constitute themselves as democratic, horizontal, popular power.4 For the democratic left, they incarnated the new, the necessary citizen for the forthcoming democratic city. As such, they were a key, decisive player in the struggle to achieve democracy. Indeed, in addition to providing topics for political focus, associations forged a “new way of being an institution” (Borja et al. 1977: 85)5 that anti- Francoist political parties of the left were interested in seizing. On the one hand, in order to approach those populations that associations engaged so effectively, but on the other, as new and effective democratic ways of intervening in power. Popular participation and popular control of the organization and management of local administration were at the center of associations’ demands for urban democratization,6 as they were considered the main guarantor that a different kind of politics was to be IN THE BEGINNING WAS THE POLITICAL SUBJECT 61 implemented (Ibid.: 227). In anticipation of the upcoming democratic elections, associations had greatly sharpened the focus among the left of what democratic municipal politics should look like. Moreover, their members provided a wealth of experience in the capable exercise of political action, becoming in this way perfect candidates to occupy the newly constituted power. Indeed, many of those local activists who had participated in the struggle against Francoism and in the design of new democratic municipalities, particularly the architects, urban planners, lawyers and economists among them, became after 1979 part of those first democratic municipalities (Borja 2009:39–49). PSUC activists were very aware of the difficulties that such a transition, from autonomous action to being subsumed under the power of municipal institutions, could entail:

we want to insist on the importance that neighborhood associations can have in building our local democracy, as well as on the need for them to adapt to the new situations where they will be required to combine activism with representation, denunciation with constructive solution, opposition with management. (Borja et al. 1977: 38)

Achieving a compromise between both of those roles proved lethal for what had been the associations’ most deﬁning political struggles, as recognized by all those who have studied the topic and by the protagonists themselves. Notwithstanding, the ample evidence of mobilization as well as civic consciousness and activism on the part of the people in the pre-democratic period ﬂies in the face of the socialist municipal elite choosing to tell the story of the city’s successes as having been triggered by their (the elites’) ability to mobilize people and to give them a sense of purpose and pride in their city and in themselves while galvanizing their support for the Olympics. Magro Huertas makes explicit the connection between grassroots struggles and the Barcelona model that the brand would later appropriate:

In Barcelona, some of the characteristics of the city model exported at the time of the 1992 Olympic Games had a popular basis. The struggles and protests of USMs [urban social movements MPB] to obtain democracy, direct participation and a better quality of life helped to make big changes, shaping a characteristic urban model: generation of new public spaces, facilities in the neighbourhoods, areas of new centrality, modernization of the network of infrastructures, participatory urbanism, municipal decentralization to districts and neighbourhoods, and recognition of local interlocutors. (2011: 114) 62 4 CULTURE IS TO THE SOCIAL MATERIALIZATION OF DEMOCRACY ...

There was little recognition of this debt. Incorporating activism to power meant the accomplishment of political objectives for the ﬁrst democratic municipalities, but also the containment of popular agency and the ideal of the critical citizen that it espoused, prior to molding them at the service of the Olympic enterprise. In the run-up to the Olympics, Subirós acknowledges grassroots’, contributions, as does Magro Huertas, however not as having created the means for the city’s prosperity, but as subsidiary coun- terpoints to the City Hall’s extraordinary leadership toward the Games:

Despite the abandonment of activism in the late 1970s, the wealth of a social fabric of associations and the participatory and political tradition of social movements in Barcelona has remained and been renewed enough to create a counterpoint and an almost permanent debate over great and small municipal decisions. (Subirós 1990:6)

After the Games, an even more thorough revision of history was to make critical participation disappear altogether, as we saw in the statements of socialist political leaders in Chapter 3. Instead, references to local residents in the early 1980s allude, in the words of the same politician, to their pessimism and social disintegration. The Games were a reaction against them, “an act of voluntarism, a democratic afﬁrmation ... a revolt” (1993b: 15), on the part of the heroic municipality.

IN THE BEGINNING WAS NON-CAPITALIST PUBLIC SPACE At the municipal level, the use of culture as an index of democracy and locus for the production and universalization of the new citizen was mediated by space in a very important way, particularly the meanings of public space and the place of the citizen in it. No consideration of the conditions under which Barcelona arrived at the threshold of its first democratic municipal elections in 1979 would be complete without devoting some attention to space. As is the case with culture, space was central to the process of democratization of the city to the extent that having power over the uses and definitions of shared, common and accessible urban spaces brought materiality to democratic life. These kinds of places were the indispensable stage for political subjectivities (individual as well as collective) and agencies to come into being. This explains why providing facilities and infrastructures for community use was very high on Barcelona’s municipal agendas in the early 1980s, as it IN THE BEGINNING WAS NON-CAPITALIST PUBLIC SPACE 63 had been in those of grassroots movements before them. It was understood as a way of making the democratic project tangible for everyone. The reclaiming of streets, squares, green spaces, and buildings had been a galvanizing element for grassroots movements from their inception under Francoism. How inextricable democracy is from space and political agency is clear in Magro Huertas’ definition of what characterizes Barcelona’s residents’ associations:

Public space was seen as political space, a place for protesting and achieving civic rights. The USMs [urban social movements MPB] could always take to the streets as a place for protest, for demonstrating their belonging to a place and as a symbol of the right to the city. (Magro Huertas 2011: 113)

The spatial dimension of culture and of the possibility of producing a democratic urban subject had been central too to political parties of the left. The PSUC of the transitional, pre-democratic municipalities period presents common space as the conditio sine qua non of a democratic city:

As opposed to those who present “green” and “nature” as alternatives to a progressively and inevitably uninhabitable city, there is the defense, recuperation and recreation of the city as the place for relationships, exchanges, options which make sense through the medium of common space: gardens, parks, but also the street, the auditorium, the museum, the stadium ... in other words, public space of individual choice or for collective demonstration. To destroy urban public space is to destroy the city. (Borja et al. 1977:234)

In 1977, and for the authors, common space deﬁned in such a way is championed precisely because it is perceived as being alien to capitalism and therefore as impossible to be recuperated as a capitalist investment – which explains why there is a need to defend it from capitalism’s hostility and threat of extermination:

If nowadays free spaces, despite being so necessary, exist only reduced to dimensions which are even lower than the extremely low legal levels, this is because they constitute a non economically proﬁtable lot, and therefore they are contrary to speculative processes and those privatizing the city. (Ibid.: 236)

The history of Barcelona’s urbanism widely supports PSUC’s analysis of capitalist urban interests in the city. Since the implementation of the Cerdà 64 4 CULTURE IS TO THE SOCIAL MATERIALIZATION OF DEMOCRACY ...

Plan in the nineteenth century, Barcelona’s plans for the rationalization of the use of space in the city, and the alleviation of the enormous pressure in the poorest neighborhoods due to lack of affordable housing, had fallen prey to private interests. Their rationale was simple: to maximize profitby turning all possible available land into new blocks of buildings at the expense of planned public spaces and social housing. This could be done by bending the law or by paying to have it changed if necessary (Martí and Moreno: 13–32). These authors explain that during the Francoist dictatorship, in the years of porciolisme (named after mayor J. M. Porcioles), through the medium of the Partial Plan, a legal amendment to the requirements of the all-encompassing Regional General Plan of 1953, all general stipulations about zoning could be conveniently overturned. Land speculation was the norm during Porcioles’ tenure, and it had green and public spaces as its preferred target to the benefit of massive building production handed down to private interests, all done with the municipality’s blessing. During his time in office, intensified through the Barcelona 2000 plan, Barcelona lost 235 hectares of green spaces. The capitalist value of public space was nil for private investors. It was not perceived as being connected to productive activities nor to consumerism, and consequently yielded no profit. It is precisely this, at the time, non-commodifiable nature of public space from Capital’s point of view that puts it on the agenda of the grassroots movements and leftist parties from the late-Francoist period as something to be defended purely on non-monetarizable grounds:

The different types of leisure spaces fulfil important functions: they structure the city, making it identifiable; they separate and isolate non compatible uses from each other, such as housing and industry; they create islands with lower levels of pollution and noise; they allow the practice of indispensable activities such as play, walk and sport; they make up urban “voids” which help with decreasing density and urban congestion; and finally they have cultural, representative and aesthetic value. (Borja et al. 1977: 236)

One could say that the success in urban regeneration and in transitioning toward a creative economy for cities can be measured precisely by their ability to monetarize such “voids,” to generate lucrative capitalist exchange value for public space that is perceived and inhabited as “cultural, representative and aesthetic.” Such emptiness needs to be not only produced by physically, economically and politically allowing for its creation or preservation but, once there, it has to be filled with the right kind of meaning. It is IN THE BEGINNING WAS NON-CAPITALIST PUBLIC SPACE 65 undoubtedly the case that urban regeneration in Barcelona was greatly aided by the abundance of obsolete industrial spaces that the great Barcelona fortunes were happy to get rid of at lucrative prices, to be converted into leisure or cultural public spaces and facilities (Andreu Acebal 2011;Montaner 2011; Etxezarreta 1996). But their future success as emblems of the Barcelona brand was only possible because they came into social significance as part of a political struggle against industrial capitalism and against the particular phase of speculative capitalism incarnated by porciolisme.Thecul- tural, aesthetic and representative value of space needed to be articulated within a counterhegemonic discourse in order for it to be later appropriated for the neoliberal, creative city. The struggle over common, publicly owned, shared, free-of-capitalist-exploitation space will, once achieved, produce its commodification as public space to the point of becoming, not only not incompatible or alien to Capital, but also central to its reproduction in the creative city that Barcelona would become. Once “conquered” for the democratic city, Barcelona’s public spaces, filled with meaning by culture in the form of Mediterranean everyday sociability as well as traditional celebrations (La Mercè, Carnival, Kings’ Day parade, St. Joan, St. Jordi) would become ideological and commodifiable assets. In the process, the political component in cultural, ludic grassroots activism that we now move to describe would be deactivated. For the new democratic municipalities across Spain, the resignification of the street had an important role to play because it provided the experience of democracy and shared ownership of public space among the citizenry. Much emphasis was placed on promoting the street as a place of collective coming together for ludic cultural purposes (fairs, concerts, popular traditional celebrations of different kinds that Francoism had suppressed) (Real Instituto Elcano 2004: 5). For the Barcelona case, these recuperated practices undoubtedly had political significance, as they allowed populations to take pride in their traditions in ways that Francoism had always found suspicious, of Catalan separatism and the chaos of carnivalesque gatherings. Rafael Pradas, a journalist who was to be the first Head of Municipal Cultural Affairs in 1979, described in 1974 the political importance of verbenas, popular celebrations taking place outdoors in the summer time, the day before a holiday:

the verbenas are more than verbenas. They show the reclaiming of the street as a framework for coexistence and social relations, while asserting the political work that neighbour associations – and neighbours themselves, 66 4 CULTURE IS TO THE SOCIAL MATERIALIZATION OF DEMOCRACY ...

without whom there would be no associations – are doing to promote public spaces and a more human and democratic understanding of the city (no page).

Batista (1983: 231) gives credit to Elisa Lumbreras and the already mentioned Joan de Sagarra as Culture Delegates in the immediate pre-democratic period under mayor Socías Humbert as decisive contributors to “the recuperation of streets as ludic spaces.” It is precisely such explicit connection between celebration and political activism as described by Pradas and promoted by Lumbreras and de Sagarra that once the democratic municipalities come about, they will seek to dilute their political component.

MAKING SENSE OF CULTURE IN THE FIRST MUNICIPAL CAMPAIGNS OF APRIL 3, 1979 Given that the level of grassroots associations’ political effectiveness can hardly be overstated, it is not surprising that the content of their specific urban struggles directly translated into political municipal manifestoes of the left campaigning for the first democratic municipal elections of 1979. Evidence of the popular demands and priorities that urban social movements had been developing since the late 1960s can be found scattered across all of the political propaganda of the 1979 first municipal democratic elections produced by the leftist political parties that would win those elections and govern in coalition until 1983: the communists of the PSUC and the socialists of the PSC. Propaganda material from both focusing on culture is addressed to the young, women, the elderly and workers. In other words, it does not attempt to gloss over class, gender, and age differences separating Barcelonians. On the contrary, both parties exhibit unabashed Marxist jargon to express their interpretation of social reality as class struggle (PSUC, “La propuesta ...”; PSC-PSOE, “Els treballadors ...”; PSC-PSOE-PSUC, “Efectos ...”). The selective focus on up-to-then deprived populations underlines the need to deepen democratic achievements at the core of the PSUC and PSC’s agendas, through their addressing of a citizenship who during the dictatorship had lacked many rights and was now to recover them through cultural means in democracy. Culture is in all cases a vehicle for providing an increase in the well-being and human fulfilment of previously deprived and second-class citizens (PSUC, “Alternativa ...”; “La Barcelona ...”; “Prioritat ...”): MAKING SENSE OF CULTURE IN THE FIRST MUNICIPAL CAMPAIGNS ... 67

The communists’ cultural politics aims to actively incorporate to the city’s intellectual and artistic life those who have systematically been margin- alised from it: the workers. We want a culture that is accessible to everyone, that reﬂects everyone’s problems, that allows the free development of our people’s energies. A national and popular culture that is stimulated by the City Council through the creation of Centres for the promotion of collective life and which make citizens the true creators of culture. (PSUC, “Per canviar”)

Or in the more succinct PSC-PSOE version: “The promotion of culture is one the main trends in the socialist city. Culture is a tool of liberation and fulﬁllment of the human being, of her creative ability” (“Los socialistas:” 28). The invocation of creativity, so central to the entrepreneurial brand a few years later, is here still “disinterested.” The political purpose of culture is exclusively connected now to a humanist agenda at the end of which is the person, part and parcel of a community of equals. Its aim is to empower popular movements and to encourage popular control as foundations of a socialist program that democratizes those decision- making processes that affect citizens directly. Culture has a function here to generate this democratic subject, one that is prepared to take into his/her hands and make decisions about changes in the city affecting him/her, one prepared also to be criticaland,insobeing,alsosocially transformative:

Young people today long for real access to culture, in all of its manifestations. For socialists it is a fundamental goal which will allow us to develop a society of free and creative men. We want a global, non compartimentalized culture, one that is updated with scientiﬁc and critical content, one rooted in real society and accessible to all. We will devote a prioritary effort to the improvement and extension of culture’s transmission (education), as well as to the promotion of all cultural activities, while protecting freedom to create and of expression. (Joventut Socialista de Catalunya 5)

Special emphasis is given in many pamphlets to the spatial requirements that cultural demands entail and their implications for the well-being and human dignity of citizens. Promises and claims are frequently made about the parties’ intention to multiply: “places of amusement, leisure and sports which enrich the person and form her culturally” (PSUC. “Carta:” 2; see also “La propuesta ...:” 9; PSC-PSOE, “Els treballadors ...”). All of which is to take place through the nationalization, de-privatization of 68 4 CULTURE IS TO THE SOCIAL MATERIALIZATION OF DEMOCRACY ... services and land in order to make them accessible to all for free: museums, libraries, sports facilities and so on, which, in addition, should exist also in peripheral, working-class neighborhoods. By insisting on the needs of the peripheral zones of Barcelona, PSUC and PSC-PSOE’s propaganda highlights the intersection between intervention in space and democratic empowerment of the citizen, as s/he is to be put in a position to be able to participate in his/her own environment and on his/her own terms. It is for future democratic governments to create and to develop, through their policies and actions, a part of the citizen’s life and subjectivity that was denied in authoritarian times:

The coordination of all cultural activities in neighbourhoods and the safe- guarding of access to all cultural goods previously sequestered by dominant minorities will be the role of the Municipal Commission for Culture. Cultural and civic entities in each neighbourhood will receive funds for their cultural activities. A new network of libraries will make access to free- of-charge culture more convenient. Museums in the city will collaborate in activities with neighbourhoods. (PSC-PSOE “Tornar l’Ajuntament”)

A very good example of this kind of cultural politics qua the provision of cultural rights (Evans 2001: 6) for the empowerment of communities in Barcelona that intersects with the transformation in form and use of urban space are the Casals and Centres Cívics. Polyvalent centres for arts and community activities at the local level, they had been requested repeatedly by residents’ associations, and were created in every neighborhood in Barcelona through the early 1980s, many times via the refurbishment of derelict industrial buildings. They are the perfect materialization and spatialization of the broad and ambitious horizon for culture envisioned by PSC, and specially by PSUC, which defines it as: “A public facility whose aim is to facilitate community life, citizens’ participation, artistic expression and use of leisure time in a pluralistic framework of initiatives and freedom of expression” (PSUC, “Prioritat ...”). As ways of promoting community development through art and culture, casals were closely allied to the arts movement in Europe and the USA (Evans 2001:90–127) and in particular to other European 1960s cultural initiatives such as the Maisons de la Culture sponsored by André Malraux during his tenure as French Minister of Cultural Affairs, and to Britain’s Arts Centres (Mascarell 1999: 103). In addition, even when these explicit connections are rare in the campaign material, the casals inserted themselves firmly into MAKING SENSE OF CULTURE IN THE FIRST MUNICIPAL CAMPAIGNS ... 69 the socialist tradition that, in the Spanish Second Republic in the 1930s, had seen the proliferation of the Casas del Pueblo.7 The tradition of anarchist popular Ateneos, which had been particularly rich in Barcelona in the early twentieth century, is also important to mention, because it was an option for self-management that the residents’ associations preferred (Andreu Acebal 2014: 607) but was in the end discarded in favor of civic centres. These, despite being ultimately dependent on the municipality, were experiments in participative politics. Managed by local authorities, they were a conscious attempt to decentralize municipal power and to take it as close as possible to the life of citizens. They combined their role as a local cultural focus with that of being a platform to unite local associative life and to gather community voices and opinions on matters of relevance to the residents. In its more radical configurations within the PSUC, they were the locus of a bottom-up kind of politics, the catalyzer for the empowerment of citizens (PSUC, “L’alternativa”). In short, in addition to public libraries and the never to materialize local museums (PSC- PSOE, “Tornar ...”; PSUC, “Animar”), casals were conceived as channeling a politics of proximity for a more representative municipal democracy able to provide more services and rights to citizens. All in all, these first municipal elections for socialists and communists were about emphasizing becoming democratic and exercising democratic rights. Socialism in these campaigns is centrally showcased through the cultural agenda insisting on participation in the making and enjoyment of the city. Nothing in the discourses of this period connects culture to the economy and capitalism, not even to position it as qualitatively and ethically in opposition to them.8 Also, nothing makes us think about citizens as being responsible for carrying the image of the city on their shoulders. Participation and agency on their part is sought and promises are given that it will be encouraged and facilitated, but it is all for the benefit of people’s personal and communal growth, not that of the city. Moreover, it is in culture where institutions and events encourage people to participate that a form of direct democracy can be conceptualized and carried out. Municipal cultural policies are charged in this way with fulfilling popular demands, with performing the role of offering citizens the possibility of being treated as discriminating, critical subjects and, as such, of being active in the public space. It is indeed through a conceptualization of political agency that consistently converges in culture for its realization that we find the core of this agency’s eventual undoing. As noted in Chapter 3,the 70 4 CULTURE IS TO THE SOCIAL MATERIALIZATION OF DEMOCRACY ...

“culturization” of political space serves as a strategy of containment, and we do not need to wait until the democratic municipality was in place in order to see such strategy at play. The electoral campaign of 1979 offered an example of resigniﬁcationforustoconsider.“Cambia tu ciudad con los socialistas” (Change your city with the socialists), a PSOE poster mailed across the country during the campaign, as a whole and in blown- up sections (Fig. 4.1),9 is a clear illustration of this process of contention of the political within the cultural. It can be read as an early projection of what a democratically governed city would look like, expressing pedagogical, utopian and patronizing tendencies toward the prospective voters. The poster, by illustrator José Ramón Sánchez, could have been taken from an illustrated book for children. In fact, Sánchez became very popular in television programs of the transitional period such as Un globo, dos globos, tres globos (1974–1979) and Dabadabada or Sabadabada (1981–1984) a

Fig. 4.1 “Cambia tu ciudad con los socialistas” (Change your city with the socialists) 1979 Electoral campaign poster (PSOE, José Ramón Sánchez) MAKING SENSE OF CULTURE IN THE FIRST MUNICIPAL CAMPAIGNS ... 71 little later, where he demonstrated his extraordinary drawing talent by sketching in front of the camera with a permanent marker pen.10 He was also the author of the animation that made up the opening credits of Dabadabada. The fact that he was the PSOE’schoicetoillustratetheir first municipal campaign of the democratic period signals that Sánchez aesthetics of representation for an audience of children was perceived by his political employers as equally suitable to convey a particular view of the new and exciting reality of democracy. The one by PSOE was in fact not the first commission with political implications that Sánchez had received during the Transition. He was also the illustrator for 1978: Una constitución para un pueblo (1978, a Constitution for a people) at the request of the Comisión Interministerial de Referéndum (Interministerial Referendum Commission). This was a pamphlet summarizing the content of the Constitución and the need for Spanish citizens to vote in favor of it, which was distributed free of charge prior to the referendum of 6 December, 1978, that was to ratify the current Spanish Magna Carta.11 Sánchez’s visual approach is the same across all these works, political commissions or not, from the transitional period: we are dealing here with an infantilizing pedagogy, according to which the voters’ grasp of the new realities of the country was being made akin to that of a small child who discovers the world and needs to be gently guided to its correct interpretation. But let us go back to the municipal poster to illustrate this kind of ideological work. From the point of view of the elements composing it, this is a symmetrical and well-balanced image. The dominant colors are green, light brown and red, the colors historically associated with the socialist icono- graphy: the fist and the rose. Urbanized public open space is very important here and occupies the lower half of the poster, where all the people depicted are concentrated. Buildings and nature (sea, mountains, birds) as well as signs of industrialization (cranes, merchant ships, factory chimneys) are pushed to the background. There is even a wall separating the lower from the upper part of the poster. The city is certainly not being signified as a space of work, which is significant of the shift away from Marxism and toward a reformist social-democratic agenda in the socialist party that was taking place in those years. The space occupied by people is punctuated by natural elements tamed by the human hand, civilized nature, and gardens suggesting a benefactor state providing for the controlled enjoyment of all. All signs of work, on the lower left-hand side of the poster, are of those tending gardens, and because they are not in uniform, the suggestion seems to be that the community itself is taking care of the public space 72 4 CULTURE IS TO THE SOCIAL MATERIALIZATION OF DEMOCRACY ... in harmony with the state, rather than them doing a paid job. People are clearly presented in a celebratory, leisure mode. Children and young- looking, fit adults run around freely, as if ready to escape from the poster, this idea being underlined by them being accompanied by white doves; there are unicycles, balloons, footballs, people cycling, reading the paper, painting. The more specific cultural components of the poster concentrate on the lower right-hand side of the poster, with a group of musicians in the foreground and a better attended puppet theater behind them, where we see people with their arms around each other to signify the affectionate bonds that unite the community. The play being performed is Hamlet.In the background a series of buildings have names reinforcing the idea of the cultural qua democratic city paid for by a welfare state. There is an Instituto Giner de los Ríos (state secondary school named after a socialist leader from the 1930s); Biblioteca Pública (Public Library); Museo Municipal (Municipal Museum); Polideportivo Olympia (Olympia Community Sports Facility). The statue’s inscription on the left reads; “El Pueblo a los Artistas” (The People to the Artists), invoking here the memory of the Second Republic and the political commitment of many artists who fought for it during the Spanish Civil War and then either died or had to go into exile when Franco came to power. All in all, we have here a well-orchestrated number of visual signs pointing coherently to the idea of the new democratic city as a public space signified by the collective enjoyment of gardens, leisure, sport, culture, education, and the absence of work and conflict. Last but not least, the most significant element in the poster of the transformation of politics into culture as a strategy of containing, of governing the people is the activity depicted at the very center of the image. Designed as an explicit vanishing point to grab the viewer’s attention in the first place, it depicts a mass of people walking/running into the public space just described and toward the viewer, holding a big, very visible banner that reads “28th Marathon of the Fist and Rose.” These kinds of banners, with the socialist party symbol on it, surrounded and carried by people in the street, would certainly be associated with the political use of the street for demonstrations that had been so common, and at that time still was, in the agitated political climate of late Francoism and the transitional period. But what the poster does with this more immediate mechanism of identification with the political use of public space by people for purposes of advancing democracy is to resignify it. It does not repress it – to silence it would have been a fascist tactic – it rather encourages it, but by putting it in the post-conflict cultural context that I MAKING SENSE OF CULTURE IN THE FIRST MUNICIPAL CAMPAIGNS ... 73 have been describing, and by literally emptying its political content and substituting it with sports, it manages and contains it, it takes it to a controllable, innocuous realm. What this banner is saying is that the socialist party does not want to be involved in leading the masses politically any more through conflict and confrontation, but aspires to be involved in leading them harmoniously through culture and leisure, which they indeed went ahead and did in Barcelona. According to this interpretation, public space has already become an ideology in examples like this one, a fallacy of ebullient but ultimately harmonious sociability intent on diluting any sign of conflict among the public. By encouraging, and financially supporting, the occupying of the streets for leisure, local authorities in the democratic period were sending the message that the reasons for communities to organize and take to the streets during the dictatorship in demonstrations against Franco and his local representatives were obsolete and could now safely be phased out. Mascarell, looking back at the first years of municipal cultural policies, sees festive activities of the early democratic period as “the democratic occupation of urban space’s most expressive metaphor” (2008: 110), explaining that “the recuperation of the street’s festive component” and the creation of cultural centres in each neighborhood became the first goal of the municipalities when they came to power as they “responded to the most well seated claims of neighbor associations” (1999: 108). Also in retrospect, Subirós explained the rationale behind the promotion of public celebrations for the democratic local governments as “moments when the total number of citizens feel as active participants on an equal basis” (Subirós 1999: 14). However, he also points that public celebrations were a way of generating harmony and cohesion in a diverse social fabric (1999: 14), already signalling, through the insistence on harmony and coherence, the importance of neutralizing dissent, the very reason for political activism. Fairly early on in the democratic period, though, anthropologist Llorenç Prats saw clearly that manifestations of popular culture were being co-opted for local governments’ (not only the Barcelona one) agendas, with a pacifying effect:

[there has been an] institutional appropriation of this segment of popular culture [the festa MPB], i.e., the replacement of popular initiative with that of the administration – particularly the municipalities – and other institutions. Undoubtedly, the very popular root of democratic municipalities has been the basis of this appropriation, but nonetheless it runs the risk of transforming the people into a passive subject of these initiatives. Closely 74 4 CULTURE IS TO THE SOCIAL MATERIALIZATION OF DEMOCRACY ...

linked to this phenomenon is the increasing spectacularization of popular culture, particularly the festa, i.e., the separation between actors and spectators. (1983: 219)

By insisting on celebration as the purpose for the collective to come together in public, and by taking away this collective’s agency to favor the spectacle, the understanding of the street as a stage for political struggle and for popular expression was being de-emphasized. While the connection with participation and celebration of the local would never be lost, with legitimate political counterhegemonic claims against the capitalist late- Francoist state and Barcelona city council neutralized, the reclaiming of streets and leisure spaces of encounter would in the Olympic years and beyond become part of the beautified spectacle of life in the city for residents and visitors alike. The climax of the Olympic Games was defined by mayor Pasqual Maragall as a “local annual festivity (festa)ofglobal dimensions,” which made Barcelona “a happy city” (quoted in Benach 1993: 149). Benach himself put his finger on what, in his opinion, defined what was extraordinary and unique in the Games by talking about “the atmosphere,” and interprets citizens’ investment in the macro event as the result of them seeing in it the opportunity for “the coming together of citizens” (Ibid.: 149) again in public space:

What triggered people’s feverish curiosity and what really seduced them was the opportunity to come together in the streets during those unique days in order to celebrate the city together.

The gregariously combative, critical citizen of democracy on the one hand; and on the other the thrilled citizen taking to the streets to take part with others in the global spectacle. Both participating, both engaged with the city. The gradual transformation in discourse of one into the other is what the next chapter pursues.

NOTES 1. Jorge Semprún, Spanish Culture Minister in the PSOE government from 1989 to 1991, points to this Ministry as a democratic invention of the ﬁrst Spanish governments after the dictatorship, one created by imitating the French model: “Democratic Spain set up the Ministry of Culture by taking inspiration from the French model. It is a French jacobin invention, very NOTES 75

important for France, mostly from the time when those ministries incarnated the will of the state, common interest. It is a democratic invention.” It is also signiﬁcant that he distinguishes the Spanish cultural policies at the time from those of its German counterparts: “Germany positioned itself [in the early 1990s, MPB] toward a neoliberal conceptualization of the circulation of cultural goods” (2014: 160–161). 2. For an account of it see Borja et al., esp. 79–94. Writing in 1977, with the Transition in full swing and democratic municipalities not yet a reality, they state that grassroots associations have created “a network of collective life and social organisation” (1977: 83) which “has legitimized a series of social rights which the administration has had no choice but, to a greater or lesser extent, to accept” (Ibid., 81, emphasis in the original). Of their independence from institutions they say: “Organisms are created in the city that are totally autonomous from the State, with representation and mass appeal. This is a phenomenon that cannot be assimilated to the particular authoritarian Spanish system” (Ibid.). 3. See also Borja et al. (1977: 85), and Andreu Acebal (2014: 663–698). 4. “The citizens movement’s own logics leads to the proposal of social transformations as a means to achieve a more egalitarian and communitarian city, to the all-encompassing struggle for the State’s democratization in order for the socialization of the means to manage urban power” (Borja et al. 1977: 94, emphasis in the original). 5. The different angles of their public intervention is so itemized by Borja et al. (1977:84–85):

Associations not only encompass political actions relative to life conditions in the neighbourhoods but, by multiplying their recreational and cultural activities, they become too an important axis of social and collective life development. They also widen the scope of their demands: social (prices), political (amnesty and public liberties) or cultural traditions (education, urban planning, work relations, youth, etc) turn into ways of overcoming the strict traditional framework of neighbourhood concerns. Populations are reached through different means: street exhibitions, newsletters, popular celebrations. Alternative solutions to administrative projects or omissions are devised, as well as plans for speciﬁc areas (education, health) or single-issue ones (concerning a square or block). They establish relations with the Administration, coming together with them in committees with supervision powers. At the same time, neighbour collectives turn into political platforms through a double process: the politicization of their claims and their neighbour leaders, and the presence of political forces that can through them get closer to and directly address the wider population. 76 4 CULTURE IS TO THE SOCIAL MATERIALIZATION OF DEMOCRACY ...

6. For a detailed program of what the PSUC proposed in terms of popular control of the municipal power, see Borja et al. (1977: 109–114). 7. See PSC-PSOE, “Entra” and “Los socialistas” for some of these rare examples. 8. See, for example, how in “Guanyem la ciutat” (Let’s Win The City), a socialist brochure addressed to young people, culture appears connected to leisure and the right of youth to organize and own it in order to avoid being only interpellated by capitalist consumption. The possibility of creating this new type of non-alienated culture depends here upon the building of spaces like the already mentioned casals, esplais (community organized and publicly subsidized play schemes for local children), colònies (community organized and publicly subsidized residential holidays for local children) where it will take place. (p. 10) 9. A Barcelona-speciﬁc PSC-PSOE poster by Horacio Elena, another well- known illustrator of children’s books, of very similar characteristics to the one analyzed here can be found in the brochure “Entra amb nosaltres a l’Ajuntament” (Come In With Us To The City Hall). 10. I want to thank Noemí de Haro for calling my attention to Sánchez’s work during the Spanish transition. 11. See the text here http://respuestahistoria.blogspot.com.es/p/la-constitu cion-de-1978.html. Last access January 27, 2016. CHAPTER 5

Building Participatory Measures

The results of the first democratic municipal elections in Barcelona brought to local power a coalition of Catalan socialists, the PSC (the party with the majority of votes), and communists, the PSUC. During that first term in government until 1983, the area of Culture was to be led by PSUC journalists Rafael Pradas as Regidor (Local Councilor) and Joan Anton Benach Delegat de Cultura (Cultural Delegate) with a special focus on theatre. I agree with Rodríguez Morató (2005: 361) that leaving this area of government to their minority coalition partners is an indication that culture was not seen as being of particular strategic importance by socialists at that point.1 It is, on the other hand, a testimony to how it was in culture that the socialists wanted their most leftist allegiances and their commitment to pre-democratic struggles for democracy to continue to show. The choice of individuals to lead the area of culture paid tribute to the key role that democratic journalists had played in the transitional process to democracy: at the forefront of everyday battles with the Francoist regime and its censors to dignify information and raise the standards of information above the status of regime propaganda. Benach and Pradas, active as independent journalists conspiring against Francoism while writing for El Correo Catalán, TeleeXprés, or Oriflama, founders of the Grup de Periodistes Democràtics (Group of Democratic Journalists), had been among the most active in Barcelona since the 1960s. Their appointment to Barcelona’s first democratic municipality brings an understanding of culture and its transformative democratic capacity as

© The Author(s) 2017 77 M.P. Balibrea, The Global Cultural Capital, The Contemporary City, DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-53596-2_5 78 5 BUILDING PARTICIPATORY MEASURES connected to the everyday and the dissemination of culture to all. They were not intellectuals of renown like their successor, Maria Aurèlia Capmany, was to be, but they had demonstrable “horizontal” knowledge of life in Barcelona, whose social aspects they had been chronicling in denunciatory tones for years, and a proven commitment to democratization in their profession as well as in the city. The two of them, and Capmany after them, would implement the programs that were described in electoral campaigns, and in the struggle of grassroots movements, which had been initiated during the pre-democratic local government of José María Socías Humbert, under the leadership of Elisa Lumbreras, Marta Tatjer, and Joan de Sagarra. Not in vain had PSUC’s electoral slogan been “You know us already,” making explicit their desire for a continuity between their anti-Francoist claims and their intended democratic policies. The corpus of our overview in this chapter of local government documents for the pre-Olympic period is focused on Memòries d’activitats, annual reports of past institutional activities, as they give us, better than anything else at the time, a global sense of the municipality’sunderstanding of its rationale for action. The first of these covers 1981, and the Memòria of this year and the next contain sections on the cultural program and activities generated by the municipality. Indicative of the institutional early conceptualization of culture is that these documents are published by the Personal Services Overall Area. The Council’s view at this point joins culture with the areas of Decentralization and Citizen’s Participation; Education; Youth and Sports; Public Health; Social Services; and, from 1982, Environment, all the sectors concerned with providing services to the citizen. The concept of culture behind them is a familiar one: culture is a service, the responsibility of the provision of which is the local government’s, and the addressee and beneficiary of the service is the citizen. Tellingly, no mention is ever made of Benach and Pradas. Not until 1983 will culture deserve its own separate Memòria, though this year still offers continuity with previous ones in its conceptualizing of culture as a service to citizens. The breadth of areas covered by the government of culture was defined in 1980 and remained stable for the first two terms of the democratic municipality: museums and heritage, theater, plastic arts, popular fairs, folklore and spectacles, libraries, books and publications, and audiovisual media (film and video). For each of them the provision of access to all, what Subirós (1993b:87)calls“cultural stimulation,” is as important as generating new cultural events. The concept, borrowed from cultural policies and BUILDING PARTICIPATORY MEASURES 79 practices in France, Italy, and the Scandinavian countries, is also invoked by Mascarell in 1999 while summarizing twenty years of culture in the Catalan municipalities. For him, it synthesizes an initial municipal impulse which

materialized in the creation of civic centres and ateneus, different spaces for culture and social centres whose explicit mission was to become community instruments to show the collective desire to democratize cultural life. (1999: 103)

The first document published on culture by PSUC’s Secretary of Municipal Policy and Popular Movements in 1980, after having joined the municipal government, makes these same democratic priorities clear: “For us what is really important is to create the conditions to allow an equal and free development of cultural manifestations as diverse as possible” (1980: 148). “From the beginning,” argues Pep Subirós (1993b: 87) in retrospect, “democratic municipal governments were committed to use cultural politics to leverage the reconstruction of the city as a community.” Two principles lie behind this kind of cultural action, this tool of government, for the first democratic municipalities. They represent two distinguishable forms of responsibility in provision toward the citizen: first, to maximize access to the arts, which puts previously marginalized citizens in the position of becoming cultural consumers. This is frequently called as decentralization, referring to the scattering of cultural services and facilities throughout the geography of the city, keeping in mind that deprived working-class neighborhoods occupied the city’s periphery (Secretaria 1980). And second, to facilitate collective and individual expressions of sociability and creativity. In the former role, local government acts as provider of culture for the enrichment of citizen, particularly those who had historically and for structural reasons been denied access to it and the recognition of the value of their own culture; in the latter, the municipality’sculturalpoliciesfinance the public revalorization of what already exists, or the promotion of new local collective or individual practices. These policies imply a modulated consideration of the citizen as a consumer but also as a producer of culture, either as de facto incarnating and sharing of collective practices or as potentially having the ability to learn and to join in artistic practices. References to decentralization are scattered liberally throughout municipal documents of this period. Between 1980 and 1982 its importance even granted it its own area of government: Area of Decentralization and Citizen’s Participation, and its competences often 80 5 BUILDING PARTICIPATORY MEASURES overlapped with those of culture. While it existed, this Area created Borough Councils, forms of local political power for the boroughs, whose function, as far as culture was concerned, was to liaise with the equally new Civic Centres, in the conceptualization, production, and promotion of local cultural activities (traditional celebrations as well as Catalan culture and language, or community sports activities) and in general of all forms of local associative life (Ajuntament, Memòria d’activitats 1982: 73).2 Councils and centres functioned through democratic participatory mechanisms: working parties, information meetings and hearings, the right to make propositions to the general public, public debates prior to the Council’s meetings, and public consultations (Ajuntament de Barcelona 1982: 76). In short, they were a materialization of the citizens’ democratic empowerment through shared governance and bottom-up participation in decision-making. An illustration of the first function of culture and its focus on giving citizens access to high art is provided in the Memòria of 1981, a year which marked the anniversary of Pablo Picasso’s birth. The painter’s work and life were said to have been commemorated through events whose aims were to “[bring] closer to all citizens a wide illustration of the life and works of the great artist and his connections to Barcelona” (Memòria d’activitats 1981: 21). No mention is made of how these cultural activities can be of use as tourist attractions. The same kind of approach appears in reports on government action on Barcelona museums for the Memòria of 1982. New initiatives such as the General Dissemination of Museums, The Museum Outside of the Museum, and the Cultural Bus all emphasize an effort on the part of the municipality to give access to all citizens and to incorporate their cultural interests, including music, the visual, and performing arts, into the enjoyment of the Arts (Ajuntament, Memòria d’activitats 1982:11–57). Another case in point coming from 1983 is the Traditions and Celebrations Service. While referring to the city’s organization of these during Christmas, Carnival, St. George’s, and St. John’s days, their success is measured by the local population’s approval of them through their attendance (Ajuntament de Barcelona, Memòria d’un any de gestió de la Regiduria de Cultura 1983: no page). Any consideration of these festive gatherings contributing to a particular image of the city that is important to cultivate for the sake of pleasing third parties was still out of the question. Examples of the second function of cultural policies also abound, underlining how culture was endowed with the power to unleash creative BUILDING PARTICIPATORY MEASURES 81 qualities in both individuals and collectives. The value produced by this kind of creativity was to materialize democracy in the urban social sphere, rather than to contribute to the competitiveness of any industry in the city, as it would later be the case:

The cultural life of citizens is not limited to contemplation, or the approval of these ﬁrst quality products, but it is at the same time creative and inserts itself in a creation dynamics expressed through street celebrations as well as through spontaneous communal activities in each neighbourhood, even in each street. (Ajuntament, Memòria d’un any de gestió de la Regiduria de Cultura 1983, “Pròleg”: no page)

Stimulating all of these aspects through cultural policies, rather than feeding high culture top down to citizens, directly connects the municipality’s concept of culture with not only an anthropological, but also a progressive understanding of it that is directly linked to the struggles of the late- Francoist period. The concepts of cultural stimulation and revitalization of the city were part of a plan to boost city culture, for which the local citizen and his/her empowerment was the only explicit source and target:

Neighbourhood activities should not consist of products put together in advance, bearing no relation to the neighbourhood’s interests, but ... in many cases and in many neighbourhoods a stimulus is needed so that culture becomes an everyday need. (“Dinamització”, Ajuntament, Memòria d’un any de gestió de la Regiduria de Cultura 1983: no page)

We find a specific example of such way of working with the neighborhoods in the 1981 Spring Season Theater Campaign. A letter from the Cultural Division of the Barcelona municipality to promote theatre in the neighborhoods, “the theatre series: Theatre in the Boroughs 1980”, reveals the importance of working with local theatre groups, of stimulating local residents’ participation, as well as the ambition “in the medium term ...to be able to count on a reasonably stable system of facilities to carry out theatre activities in every Barcelona neighbourhood.”(Ajuntament de Barcelona, Delegació de Serveis, Cultura, 1980)3 An analogous gesture of taking culture to the neighborhoods and responding to their interests and demands, rather than imposing those on them was made with museums, whereby “[d]ecentralization aims to make the municipality’s work more efficient, and at the same time gathers cultural 82 5 BUILDING PARTICIPATORY MEASURES initiatives coming from the different groups in every neighbourhood” (Ajuntament de Barcelona, Delegació de Serveis de Cultura, 1980).4 Moving from impersonal government documents to the leaders of those departments who conceived them, an important testimony of the socialists’ view of culture in the early days of democratic municipalities is provided by Jordi Font. He was Culture Secretary of the PSC 1980–1981, a member of the party’s Executive Committee from 1980 to 1996, and Head of Cultural Promotion for the metropolitan municipality of Hospitalet between 1981 and 1983. Subsequently, as Culture Coordinator for the Barcelona provincial government, the Diputació, from 1984 to 1999, he was involved in the preparation of the cultural side of the city’s Olympic bid. While not directly involved in Barcelona’s municipal affairs, his work for the Diputació partially overlapped with that of the City Council. The theoretical and political ambition of his views, as well as his underlying ideological evolution, is very significant, if not paradigmatic of the socialists’ understanding of culture and of local cultural policies in these years. In a text written in 1982, Font reiterates that the aim of any progressive political culture is “cultural democratization” (“L’esfera i altres reflexions” 1991:43), a topic that he further develops one year later in “Per una política cultural municipal” (1991). Culture is seen here as central to the realization of a socialist society and government, as the space where democracy materializes in the empowerment of the citizen:

Culture, for socialists, is not only the remit of the “Culture Department” at every level of government, it is rather the sphere where all of our political project acquires its meaning. Culture is the space of freedom where relations between peoples occur, and between each one of them and their surroundings. The socialists’ project consists precisely in making ways of life and conviviality possible where freedom does not appear as a mere lapidary statement but as the real and full faculty of every person, where everyone is not so much conditioned by their surroundings but by their own ability to get to know and transform them, where everyone has access to the tools that allow them to determine who they are and how to transform their own life. (Font 1991: 58, emphasis in the original)

For Font, cultural maturity has the same meaning as critical maturity (1991: 58), that is, the ability to be a discerning citizen, one capable of critical response, and of refusal if necessary, of given, pre-packaged ideas:

A person’s cultural maturity demands her emancipation in relation to pre- established models, taking her freedom fully on, tolerating of difference, BUILDING PARTICIPATORY MEASURES 83

accepting of cultural pluralism. Creativity and participation are two characteristics of the citizen that we want, one able to exercise her freedom of expression and creativity, the freedom to participate in collective affairs. Citizens able to broadcast, to be active subjects, rather than objects, television audiences, spectators. Associative initiatives ... should be an important way of channelling efforts in this direction. (Ibid.: 60–61)

It is therefore the role of public institutions, local ones in particular, to make sure that the emergence of such kind of subject is facilitated. To encourage potentialities, critical maturity, and means “to fully increase the ability to be free, the ability to be autonomous towards all kinds of tutelages, including that of the State ... The City Council emerges in this way as a fundamental centre for cultural initiative” (Ibid.: 44). The radical nature of Font’s statements is remarkable. His idea of cultural policies is an all-encompassing project to regenerate life, to produce unalie- nated life in the city, which requires for those policies to counter the “narcotizing” effects “when not openly reactionary content” (Ibid.: 45) of mass culture. But more than that, those policies should eventually create the conditions of their own abolition, since the socialists’ objective for a new subject is someone who is completely autonomous from government and power. In order to accomplish this objective, “new spaces” are to be provided: schools and education, audiovisual media, leisure, and public spaces connected with street use (Ibid.: 46–48). Only by creating these new spaces, as well as by making cultural heritage widely available to people, each individual will have “the whole of knowledge, rational resources allowing him to understand himself and his environment, to transform it and to transform himself” (Ibid.: 60). It is along these lines that creativity and participation (Ibid.: 50–51) are to be promoted, as part of a core endeavor to provide radically democratic individual and collective life. But the duration of these forms of devolved representation and the discourses that framed them was short. The Memòria of 1981 was already reporting problems with them, basically blaming citizens and local associations for their malfunctioning:

[The Council] has not contributed to a better understanding on the part of residents of the borough’s global situation. Consequently, this has created difﬁculties vis-à-vis the ﬁxing of priorities for action programs ... Local groups have not acted as bridges between councils and individual petitions. Petitions have been narrow and lacking in an overall view. (1982: 77) 84 5 BUILDING PARTICIPATORY MEASURES

That the Area of Decentralization and Citizen’s Participation would disappear after 1983 gives these words of 1982 the value of a justification. Handing real power down to the boroughs, cultural or otherwise, had been a claim of the residents’ associations in the pre-democratic period, but was too risky and complicated a practice to maintain once the organization of the Olympic Games had appeared on the horizon. However, instead of being suppressed outright, shared governance was in practice reshaped into forms that facilitated top-down municipal control of associations via economic subsidies and institutionalization (Blakeley 2005: 155–156, 159–162). The municipality steered and the citizens did all the rowing, as Blakeley puts it (Ibid.: 163). Through the “proper” strengthening of ties, the municipality succeeded in involving citizens in service delivery, facilitating consensus and legitimizing municipal policies, as we will see in Chapter 8 through the example of sport. The substitute title for the Area of Decentralization, Area of Citizen Relations, stayed carefully clear of hinting at any particular social or political agenda to define the Area’s role (Ajuntament, Memòria d’activitats 1983–1984), as we will have a chance to consider below. More indicative signs of a move away from local government action that had the local citizen and his/her well-being and quality of life at the center of its policies even precede the disappearance of the Area of Decentralization. By 1982 the post of deputy mayor for the Overall Area of Personal Affairs held by Mercé Sala had been renamed as deputy mayor for the Overall Area of Business and Personal Affairs (Ajuntament, Memòria d’activitats 1982: 8). Though relatively small, these textual changes speak of an inexorable move on the part of the municipality from its most directly democratic policies of its first years, and therefore from their inspiration in the grassroots associations’ positions of the pre-democratic years. It is the specific terms in the process of this inexorable displacement that we are pursuing in cultural official discourses. The concept of participation, already displaced in 1983 from the title and remit of an area of government with direct political functions, will nonetheless remain for much longer in the culture, which becomes the preferred policy area to invoke it. Here too, citizen participation in cultural consumption and production was rapidly transforming itself from a form of empowerment into one of acquiescence, with institutional norms disguised behind a discourse of people and power alliance. Going back to Blakeley’s critical assessment of shared governance in post-Francoist democratic Barcelona, the very insistence on participation, inclusion, and empowerment created the best language to neutralize BUILDING PARTICIPATORY MEASURES 85 dissidence and, while it lasted, became a discursive tool, a technology of government, of immense power. If looked at from this perspective, there is something sinister in Mascarell’s assertion that the highest achievement of the municipalities in the cultural front was to: “[regain] the maximum possible complicity between the City Hall and the respective cultural civil societies, either associative or business-like” (1999: 108). To achieve complicity with civil society, the municipality traded culture for politics. The more access to culture it granted, the more justified it was to boast of its decentralizing and participatory policies, while it was quietly taking away the mechanisms for direct popular participation in decision-making. We saw an early example of the substitution of politics by culture in the “Change your city with the socialists” electoral poster of 1979. We focus now on another example from 1981, concerning a propaganda video addressed to the city’s youth. Video-making was at the time a politically charged terrain because it was affordable and accessible, a new technology not requiring specialist knowledge or equipment to handle. For these reasons it was understood by its practitioners to constitute a form of democratizing access to the production of audiovisual material. As such it was embraced for promotion in the social by the first democratic municipality, which established a collaboration with the radically critical Servei de Vídeo Comunitari (Communitarian Video Service), a pioneer grassroots activist countercultural movement (Vídeo-Nou 2005: 166– 167) whose artistic and pedagogical intervention in the social sought to empower people through control of the means of representation. As expressed by the collective itself in 1977:

The Servei’s aims are to make accessible to cultural and associative groups, at popular prices, the instruction, access to equipment, technical advice and suggestions for distribution that are needed in order to introduce audiovisual language as a stimulating factor in communal cultural life ... The aim was to create the conditions for those interested to be able to produce their own programmes. (“VídeoNou” 168)

Transforming every citizen into a discerning consumer and producer of audiovisual material was, in 1977 when Video-Nou was created, not a countercultural utopia, but a soon-to-be achievable aim through collaboration with the first democratic Barcelona municipality. In the first instance, they shared similar objectives, and their cooperation is one more example of a first moment in the democratic Barcelona municipality 86 5 BUILDING PARTICIPATORY MEASURES where oppositional anti-Francoist movements became part of and indistinguishable from institutional power. This is clear in the municipality’s own description in 1982 (but referring to 1981) of its interest in video, almost indistinguishable from what Vídeo Nou themselves had said in 1977:

To provide the municipality with the means to disseminate in images the new civic content which is being elaborated from the different municipal areas, and to offer groups and citizen associations the basic instruction, advice and equipment so that they get to reach their natural environment with the images of their concerns and experiences. (Ajuntament de Barcelona 1982:44–45)

However, while their work in neighbor community centres put into practice the principles defined in the quote above, their commissioned promotional videos of new municipal services clearly contributed to constructing an idea of citizenship that was moving away from the militancy and counterculture of anti-Francoist times. As a benefactor local state had made political attitudes redundant in democracy, these were to be chan- nelled and made productive through leisure: sport and culture. Such is the plausible interpretation yielded by the video Tot allò que un jove voldria saber sobre Barcelona i que mai no s’hauria imaginat que existia (Everything that a young person should know about Barcelona and would have never imagined that it existed), connected to the area of Youth and Sports of the municipality, a fifteen-minute video recording, with a soundtrack by the Companyia Elèctrica Dharma, an iconic psyche- delic rock band for the Catalan countercultural and anti-Francoist youth of the transitional period. The citizen addressed in this video is not only young but also working class. Unmistakably connecting the images to the benefactor municipal authority, the video opens with the words of Enric Truñó, at the time municipal Head of Youth and Sports Affairs. He is at the gates of the clearly visible secondary school Emperador Carlos in the popular, but not peripheral neighborhood of Sants, against a background of young students who talk among themselves and look curiously at the camera. Truñó looks directly at the camera to address himself to the urban youth of Barcelona in order to inform them of what they can do with their free time, at apparently no cost to them. In an explicit gesture of connection to the political struggles of the pre-democratic period, he mentions that the TURNING POINTS: CRITICAL CITIZENSHIP BECOMES LA GENT [THE PEOPLE] 87 youth centres that are now a reality were a consistent claim of neighborhood associations. The targeted audience is soon epitomized, as Truñó’s image disappears and is replaced by that of a young male who will be our guide in search of youth services throughout the city. Perhaps signaling the producers’ awareness of the audiovisual apparatus’s mode of demonstration, the audience is spared any explanatory voice over, all narrative meaning being left to the visual as it reconstructs the youngster’s itinerary. The Barcelona we see him join and traverse is noisy and polluted, and includes images of the working-class neighborhoods of Trinitat Nova and Sant Martí de Provençals. Through the young man’s eyes the audience is invited to look for green spaces in the city in search of the new sport and leisure on offer: the Ciutadella park (outdoor gyms and cycling) and finally Vallvidriera, a nearby upper-class town in the Collserola hills. An establishing shot of a large modernist house reminds the viewer that the municipality has made a priority of opening historic buildings to public use. In this particular one, the Casa Blava, workshops on jazz, drama, music, cooking, sexual health and drug awareness, as well as skiing and sailing trips are available to the Barcelona youth, all visited by standard juvenile Barcelonians and well attended. Some concluding shots of young people of both sexes convivially chatting outside a tent in the outdoors completes the image of a happy participatory new generation in harmony with its social and ecological environment. Associative and activity tendencies are encouraged to promote culture as leisure, not politics. The spectator is given the message that the new citizen is entitled to educate him/herself and to enjoy his/her free time at the municipality’s expense, and is satisfied as a result. This standardized urban youth, vaguely identifiable still as working class and militant (some long hair and thick, dark beards are there to be seen), is on its way to becoming something else.

TURNING POINTS:CRITICAL CITIZENSHIP BECOMES LA GENT [THE PEOPLE] Not much seemed to have changed in cultural matters when the PSC found itself continuing in power, now on its own, after the municipal elections of 1983. To democratize the city via its cultural policies was still on the PSC’s political agenda if one is to judge by the appointment to the newly created Department of Culture made by the new mayor, Pasqual Maragall. This appointment made government connections even more explicit to principles 88 5 BUILDING PARTICIPATORY MEASURES espoused during the struggle against Francoism, including the idea of culture that came from the years of the Second Republic (1931–1939), and, for the Catalans, having the defense and promotion of Catalan cultural expressions and language at its very core. But it did move away from the grassroots connections that the PSUC leadership and its cultural political principles had imprinted on the area during the socialists’ first term in office. María Aurèlia Capmany, born in 1918, was educated in the values of the enlightened Second Republic, had lived through the Spanish Civil War and the ensuing dictatorship and was a Catalanist, a leftist and a feminist. From the beginning of the democratic transition she had been affiliated to socialist groups,5 becoming a PSC member from November 1976. Capmany was the prototype of the engaged intellectual. She was a rebel, charismatic writer with prestige and a no-nonsense political agenda as a leftist Catalanist. Invested in the consolidation of Catalan as a cultural language, she had not hesitated to participate in different mass media (press, radio, and TV) in addition to her literary work. She had been a consultant until 1980 on theatre matters to the Department of Culture and Education of the provisional Regional autonomous government led by the conservative nationalists of Convergència i Unió, but had basically been ignored for important political positions by her fellow socialists. When Maragall came to municipal power late in 1982 to replace Narcís Serra, who had been called to accept the post of Interior Minister in the state government, Capmany was swiftly incorporated tohisteamasapopularfigure unanimously identified as an incorruptible leftist and Catalanist, as someone who could validate Maragall as being rooted in thesesameprinciples,6 and was ratified as municipal Head of Cultural Affairs after he won the election. According to Pons (2000:361),herprioritieswere theatre, museums, and publications. Many transformations took place under her lead, and particularly important among those was the creation of new cultural facilities, such as the theatre Mercat de les Flors. She also commissioned the preparation of the key Museums’ Plan to Lluís Domènech, approved in April of 1985 (Ajuntament, Memòria d’activitats 1983–1984: 25), which, by identifying the areas where museums were to be developed or restored,7 started to design fundamental spatial and social transformations in thecitythatwouldbegreatlyinfluential in turning Barcelona in due course into a cultural tourist destination (Subirós 1993b:87). More subtle but equally game-changing during Campany’stenurewas the shift in the ways of addressing and conceptualizing local residents. As soon as Maragall entered the picture, the concept of “la gent,” (the people), took center stage. It was the slogan of his first electoral campaign, La ciutat TURNING POINTS: CRITICAL CITIZENSHIP BECOMES LA GENT [THE PEOPLE] 89

és la seva gent (The city is its people), and was going to become the preferred mode of reference to Barcelonians of the Olympic era, one epitomized iconically in the overarching slogan of the period: Fent la ciutat de la gent (Making the city of the people).8 Given the importance that up to that point had been attached to municipal cultural policies in the process of democratizing urban life as well as managing citizens’ feelings and perceptions of them, it is not surprising to see this new concept circulate in cultural discourses from the very beginning of Maragall’s tenure. In that sense, Capmany’s view of the city and its citizens helped reinforce Maragall’s own, and with it, the shift away in cultural policies from a focus on the historically discriminated-against citizen of the periphery was only a matter of time. A good text to explore this question is Caminant junts per la ciutat (Walking together in the city), a book of conversations between Maragall and Capmany.9 Both authors speak at length in this book of the importance of people, and how they are at the center of their political intervention in the city. While Maragall introduces the idea of the city being deﬁned by its people, Capmany puts an emphasis on how her idea of culture connects with the promotion of people’s local identities as central to maintaining the city’s own personality and excellence, and to be taken into account when considering spatial transformations. Culture as a given way of life to be preserved and encouraged, rather than as something to be constructed and in need of being transformed through openly political interventions, is what she stres- ses as a priority (Capmany and Maragall 1983:43).Inheritedideasof creativity associated with life in Barcelona are invoked here and soon associated with Mediterraneanness, a trait that was to become of upmost importance for the city branding. Although at this point it is still only connected to something of value for its own sake and responsible for the democratic, participatory “nature” of Barcelonians, it signals a desire to ﬁnd minimum common denominators to address residents, instead of emphasizing what structural differences had historically separated them by reasons of class, gender, etc. Capmany states:

Barcelona has kept ... this Mediterranean city personality, one which attaches a lot of importance to the agora, the square. The Mediterranean city will, at the earliest opportunity, immediately turn into a community of people. (Ibid.: 44)

Moreover, the idea is still active that it is for municipalities to provide the means to ensure that these cultural manifestations are able to express 90 5 BUILDING PARTICIPATORY MEASURES themselves and flourish, keeping the discourse close to that of cultural policies in the local government’s first term in office. Nonetheless, cultural demands and participation coming from the people are presented as exclusively circumscribed to the realm of culture, excluding the characteristic connection between culture and politics/critique of the first period (Ibid.: 43). But even more significant is the type of citizen that emerges from the reflections of the two leaders, confirming the change we have been noti- cing. The concept of “la gent” and that of (Barcelonian) identity act as equalizers endowed with the power to unify Barcelona as one harmonious whole. Capmany asserts:

Because we are the city, everyone who arrived recently and those of us who have been here for a long time, with our grandparents and great grandparents in our memories. I can already imagine the dialogues that will come after ours ... dialogues between writers, trade unionists, shop owners and musicians, and between Raval, Guineueta, Sarrià, Bellvitge residents. Collective memory will become useful printed word for those who will arrive, if we walk together in Barcelona. (Ibid.: 78)

References to different trades and professions and enumerations of Barcelona’s different boroughs, all united paratactically, provide the illusion of an equal basis for dialogue and exchange, masking the existence of class antagonisms and unequal access to wealth and the city. Maragall (Ibid.: 73) continues his discourse in the same direction, incorporating the socialists’ buzz words of the early democratic municipality: decentralization, participation, justice, solidarity, as necessary means, no longer to empower people, but as means to something else, to fulfill an idea of the city and its culture which in this way becomes paramount. Equality is a condition to allow this idea of city and culture to succeed and to be ready projection outside, no longer just an aim in itself. That such a configuration requires class conflicts to disappear is confirmed by their insubstantial appearance, and subsequent neutralization, in his words:

The tradition of a working class and association movement in Barcelona must be used as a pattern. The best entrepreneurial tradition of Barcelona’s bourgeoisie, which we have inherited ... must help us maintain the necessary impulse ... Barcelona is known around the world for two things: the strength of its popular movement and the capacity for innovation of the middle classes. (Ibid.: 73) TURNING POINTS: CRITICAL CITIZENSHIP BECOMES LA GENT [THE PEOPLE] 91

Maragall proposes here nothing less than the overcoming of class conflict for the sake of the city’s prosperity. Class struggle would thus be transformed into an asset for the city qualified as social participation. The historical conditions of workers and the bourgeoisie are nothing more than compatible identity traits which, in the last instance, can be made to work together for the city. It goes without saying that any sign of the structural nature of their mutual confrontation is lost and silenced by what is nothing other than the emerging logics of city branding.10 In a broader sense, what is being suppressed here is criticism as a form of citizenship, to be substituted by the well-known consensus, a state of affairs requiring a more domesticated, non-confrontational, pacified cooperative citizen. This is the same kind of postpolitical social harmo- nizing that Maragall included in his speech of acceptance of the post of Barcelona’s mayor on September 2, 1982, repeated again in Caminant, where he promises “an Olympic and metropolitan Barcelona ... The Barcelona of today was made with a certain creative brutality. Metropolitan Barcelona will be made with respect” (Ibid.: 23). Respect versus brutality, Maragall expresses no intention of using violence to advance the march of capitalism in the city, his words describing his third-way social-democratic political position: business-friendly but people-caring too. Concepts such as “the people” and the city’scultural identity as the foundation of Barcelonians’ equal belonging work discursively for the liquidation of the combative political subject inherited from late Francoism. They are necessary ideological building blocks for this project to make convincing sense, and Maragall found an ally in Capmany for their promotion.11 Be that as it may, Capmany’s appointment proved to be Janus-faced. Once in post, while some of Capmany’s policies, that is, the aforementioned Museums Plan, were to trigger and open up fundamental transformations for the future of the city, her image of intellectual turned politician signaled the end of an era that had, paradoxically, never been given the opportunity to develop and flourish in Spain or Catalonia due to Francoism: that of the leading intellectual, àlaAndré Malraux, turned the cultural arm of a benefactor postwar welfare state. That Maragall had already appointed Pep Subirós in 1984 as Coordinator and Manager to the Area of Culture without consulting Capmany is no small detail. It indicates to what extent Capmany’s image was instrumentalized by Maragall vis-à-vis the citizenship as part of a process of transformation in the treatment of culture: from right provided for the benefit of citizens, to 92 5 BUILDING PARTICIPATORY MEASURES enterprise for the benefit of the city’s economy. Pons (2000: 372) describes Subirós as “the person trusted by Maragall ... the one called to design, in the near future, the cultural politics of the City Council.” The appointment of Ferran Mascarell one year later as Director of Cultural Programming and Dissemination Services made clear that, at a time when finalizing the city’s Olympic candidacy was so crucial, Maragall was bypassing Capmany’s cultural priorities as the leader of municipal cultural affairs. Both Maragall and Subirós, along with, among others, the first Delegate for Cultural Affairs of the democratic municipality, Joan Anton Benach, made up the team which created the project for the Cultural Olympiad as part of the Barcelona candidacy (Benach 1993: 144). The official municipal report of activities carried out by the Area of Culture in 1984 provides a most significant announcement: the imminent creation of the aforementioned Services, to be led by Mascarell:

This cultural life is not only a luxury, but a necessity of the whole city, a fundamental ﬁeld of conviviality, integration or attraction, as well as a socio- economic agent of socio-economic dynamism of prime magnitude. Every great city deﬁnes itself, to a good extent, by its image and its cultural reality; by its museums, its concerts, its theatres, its exhibitions. The city of Barcelona has, in this respect, a great, but underused, patrimony and the City Council has great projects, but they are hard to carry out within the current organisation of the Area of Culture. The creation of a Directorship for Cultural Programming and Dissemination Services seeks the double objective of taking better advantage of said patrimony and of facilitating the carrying out of the projects. (Ajuntament, Memòria d’un any de gestió de la Regidoria de Cultura. 1984: no page)

The rationale laid out here to justify the creation of this new area of institutionalized cultural interest for local power reveals the emergence of the new, soon to be prevalent, understanding of culture as a key part of the local economy. Such a new conceptualization refocuses attention on the local power’s understanding of culture from the citizen to the city. In so doing, it does away with the previous lack of interest attached to culture, now pejoratively dismissed as parasitical luxury (“cultural life is not only a luxury”), as such lack of interest went hand in hand with cultural policies’ focus on the local dweller and his/her well-being as their raison d’être. The appearance of the image concept signals, as well as the commodiﬁcation of culture, its instrumentalization at the service of TURNING POINTS: CRITICAL CITIZENSHIP BECOMES LA GENT [THE PEOPLE] 93 producing a pre-packaged visuality of the city that is readable and con- sumable by the market. The shift from citizen to city-image as the new center of municipal cultural policies is furthermore a change in the conceptualization of the local citizen. By implication in the quote above, the new protagonist for culture, the object of the new Services’ ofﬁce efforts is someone located outside the city. It is for this subject that urban cultural policies tailored to these new services work. A whole different network of relations connects these policies to this external subject. A political-ethical framework will not explain actions on culture initiated by the municipality’s Services, instead, an economic, capitalist one will. The subject at the center of its policies will no longer be the citizen, but the consumer, and therefore its objective will not be to improve the democratic quality of the city, but rather the economic one. In this new context, the local citizen comes to occupy a very different position. S/he is debunked as the object of the municipality’s concerns and becomes instead an indispensable ally for it, one whose cooperation it is vital to enlist. In the words of a Barcelona council worker:

We have gone through a period where we [in the city council] have worked for the people and now we have to put more emphasis on working with the people. (cited by Blakeley 2005: 159, emphasis in the original)

The rhetoric of mutual cooperation here disguises that the municipality is already operating with the mentality of a corporation whose business is in cities. In such role, the Ajuntament finds itself needing to court its local citizens as a uniquely qualified and irreplaceable candidates for the job of selling Barcelona. Possessing, as in being able to make use of, such workers’ particular abilities to generate profit will make or break the economic future of the city. We therefore witnessed a change in what we called earlier the people and power alliance, which is be coming subsumed under a capitalist logic of relations of production. This has been visible since 1983 when, as we have already mentioned, what was previously know as the Area of Decentralization became the Area of Citizen Relations became the Area of Citizen Relations. The way in which the municipality defines what it understands by citizen relations unmistakably declares that this new Area of government is now operating under a new rationale:

Traditionally, Barcelona is a city with a welcoming and receptive spirit. The City Council should incorporate and project such ways of being of the 94 5 BUILDING PARTICIPATORY MEASURES

citizens and turn it into positive actions of assistance to citizens themselves and of complaisance with those who visit us. The function of urban relations is nothing more, then, than the materialization in public actions of this courtesy of Barcelonians ... The functions of the Area of Citizen Relations are all geared to make sure that urban events give Barcelonians and those who visit us in good will reasons to be proud. (Ajuntament, Memòria d’activitats 1983–1984:7)

To project citizens’ way of being to the outside world, to cater for the visitor. Those two are, in a nutshell, the new vectors defining the municipality’s action on human relations. Local people’s lives do not require, according to this, more investment in decentralization and citizens’ participation to improve. The democratic subject, who used to be a work in progress and whose emergence was the responsibility of government to encourage and facilitate, is now an unquestioned presence. The aims of those early policies have now been achieved and are of such quality that they can from this point on be put at the market’s service, centrally in the form of the tourist and visitor industry, which receives a first mention in this same document (Ibid.: 21, 23). Those qualities need to be visible in order for the city to be able to extract their exchange value, and such need is at the heart of the new municipal contract with citizens. Health reasons were mentioned to explain the fact that Capmany was not reappointed after the municipal elections of 1987 were won once again by Maragall, and her substitute, Raimon Martínez Fraile, was in post for only a few months. When it became clear to him that Pep Subirós and Ferran Mascarell were the ones with the real power and influence over Maragall when it came to cultural affairs, Fraile handed in his resignation. Nofre i Mateo (2010: 142) sees in Subirós and Mascarell’s arrival at the Barcelona Ajuntament the turning point for cultural policies in the city at the key moment when it faces the challenge of organizing the Olympics. The years around the preparation and winning of the candidacy are indeed the key moments of transition in cultural matters for Barcelona, a time when cultural managers and technocrats took over power for good from the amateur intellectuals, whether in militant leftist journalist or in writer form.12 The shift took place in order to confront the preparations for the Olympics and the different approach to a vision for the city that they implied. It was not until after the excitement of the celebrations subsided and after the recognition that the municipality was in a serious financial situation, that a full-blown, open change in cultural policies was to take TURNING POINTS: CRITICAL CITIZENSHIP BECOMES LA GENT [THE PEOPLE] 95 place, under the directorship of Mascarell (Rodríguez Morató 2005: 364). The ten years between the first Subirós appointment and the creation of the ICUB (Institut de Cultura de Barcelona) in 1996 led by Mascarell are nonetheless fundamental from the point of view of managing the expectations and aspirations of the urban population. While government was moving away in that decade from culture as its responsibility to democratizing local life for citizens, it was still in need of mobilizing the achievements of these early cultural policies, as they had proved to be so successful in generating support for the municipality. That interface of increasingly discrepant economic interests with discourses of democratization is what defined the realm of culture in those years and what the logistics of preparing the Olympic Games succeeded in reconciling. Official documents continued to corroborate the changes. In La gestió cultural al servei dels ciutadans de Barcelona i de la capitalitat de la cultura catalana. Memòria Àrea de Cultura 1987–1991, covering the key years when the city prepared for the Olympic Games, the references to culture as an industry and economic asset to exploit is omnipresent (1991:9,56–57, 77–78). This has implications for the way in which the already constituted areas of cultural policy are addressed. References to museums and theatre, for example, previously central to a politics of democratizing access to culture and empowering local citizens, are now interpreted as sources of autochthonous cultural excellence to be exported13:

The city of Barcelona is home to an important art and museum heritage which, without a doubt, plays a key role in the consideration of Barcelona as Catalonia’s capital, as cultural capital and in positioning it internationally as an arts and creative city. (Ibid.: 30)

More insistence on culture as a newly discovered goldmine for the city’s economy comes from Jordi Font, whose work from the early 1980s we quoted earlier as a paradigm of the most radical political positions on culture to have come from the Catalan socialists. Let us recall that back then culture’s raison d’être was to produce the conditions for the generation of a new citizen, to be at his/her service, with commercial interests having no place in the equation. In a 1991 article he revisited the role of culture and cultural policies only to introduce fundamental changes to his earlier perspective: a refusal on the part of the municipality to subsidize culture, and therefore a move away from its responsibility for access to 96 5 BUILDING PARTICIPATORY MEASURES culture,14 coupled with a new understanding of culture as business for the city:

Cultural heritage is positioning itself as a sector with a great future. I am referring mostly to the package formed by architectural and museum heritage and by traditional culture. This reality, along with our natural patrimony constitute a great local capital, full of possibilities if properly exploited. The tourist perspective, for example, ﬁts perfectly. In other words, cultural heritage can be the object of operations which, while making it accessible to citizens in the best possible conditions in order for it to be read and understood as part of one’s own identity, can at the same time become the raw material of more or less ambitious operations of local economic stimulation. (1991: 198, emphases in the original)

Hand in hand with this new cultural frame, references to the local citizens’ role within culture are also refocused. Allusions to the promotion of culture as life-enriching for all have not disappeared, as Font’s words reveal (see also Ajuntament, Memòria Àrea de Cultura 1987–1991: 29), but are positioned differently. Mentions of culture’s ability to generate (implicitly political) critical and discerning citizens have been lost. The cultural stimulation and revitalization concepts of the early years of democracy were reserved to describe processes of engaging the public through culture in order to empower it. Such revitalizing effort is now geared toward a stimulation of the economy, to which the life of citizens is subsumed. The latter’s creativity or identity, acquired through access to culture, matters to the extent that it turns the citizen into a consumer, or a producer. Once again, both roles were present from the beginning of democratic municipalities; what is new is that their promotion now obeys the logics of the market (Font 1991:7, 21–28), as is blatantly expressed in the celebrated reference to the city’s motto of the year 1991 for the design sector: “ideas are for sale” (Ibid.: 78). Subject to the same logic are the increasing references to the identity of the city, in a displacement of personality traits that will necessitate the local citizen working to materialize the desired, coherent image:

Barcelona and its civil society’s historical capacity to make culture and create their own identity signs. This culture distinguishes itself by its open, innovative, plural and democratic character. (Ibid.: 7)15

In the early days of the democratic municipality, plurality, democracy, and openness were actively sought to be producedandsuppliedtocitizens,for NOTES 97 the value they had in themselves, they were altruistic, life-enriching traits with use value. In entrepreneurial fashion, the municipality has now found that they possess exchange value too, and are therefore a potential source of profit for the city. From the beginning of the democratic period, for those in power culture has occupied a key role of transmitting democratic rights to citizens, and as an instrument to govern and lead those citizens in desired political directions. The tendency to use culture as a substitute for politics on the basis of their shared ability to be concerned with what is already common points to the strategic value of culture as a mode or a technology of governance. The introduction, soon afterwards, of culture as an economic asset in Barcelona’s transformation into a creative city catapults culture even more into vital positions of influence in urban governance, but also creates the need to address citizens in a whole new way as components, rather than merely beneficiaries, of culture, as we will continue to explore in the following chapters.

NOTES 1. It is worth noting that Joan Anton Benach was to make a smooth transition and adaptation to changes to come in cultural affairs, from his first post as Culture Delegate of the first democratic municipality to holding positions of responsibility in the City Council throughout the key 1980s. He was part of the team, along with Pep Subirós, Jordi Font, Jordi Serra, and Ferran Mascarell, preparing the cultural side of the Barcelona Olympic candidacy. In 1986 he became chief editor of Barcelona metròpolis mediterrànea, the official journal providing a theoretical backing to transformations in the city, where local architects and urban planners involved in Barcelona’s transformation would mount a theoretical defense of the elements defining the desired city: public spaces, signature architecture, Old City regeneration and Mediterraneanness. Finally, he collaborated with Xavier Rubert de Ventós in the writing of the script for the ceremony of the Olympic torch arrival into Spanish/Catalan territory. 2. The Council’s remit also included local urban projects affecting the built environment, including heritage, and public investment in infrastructures (Ajuntament, Memòria d’activitats 1982:59–76). 3. Ajuntament de Barcelona, Delegació de Serveis, Cultura, (Letter from October 29, 1980). Box: La Campanya Teatral de Primavera 1981. Arxiu Municipal de la Ciutat. 4. While in 1982 we detect a change in mood with the emergence of a new emphasis on the citizen as cultural consumer with no references to social 98 5 BUILDING PARTICIPATORY MEASURES

empowerment, signalling an interest in the increasing possibility of a viable cultural industry for the city, though still circumscribed to the locals: “This increase in number of visitors [to museums] can be due, on the one hand, to increasingly attractive exhibitions to the public, and on the other, to the emergence of a habit among citizens to go to exhibitions as a form of cultural consumerism offered by the city” (Ajuntament, Memoria d’activitats 1982:32). 5. The first one of these being the Group d’Independents pel Socialisme (Group of Independents For Socialism)(GIS) in 1976. For a detailed history of Capmany’s participation in Catalan politics, see Pons (2000: 313–335). 6. See, in Mascarell (1983: 199) how precisely these characteristics are highlighted in her appointment. 7. There were five: Montjuich, Raval, Centre, Montcada, and Ciutadella. Only the last one was not successfully developed. 8. For analyses of the ideology of this concept, mostly interpreting it as a way of bypassing a nationalist address, but also more generally as a postpolitical gesture that serves the interests of late capitalism, see Epps (2001: 192) and Illas (2012:44–56, 74–77). But the earliest and more significant theoretical and artistic intervention against the ideology of the concept was proposed in 1996 in the exhibition and public debates of the same name, La ciutat de la gent, organized by Barcelona’s Fundació Tàpies, curated by Jean François Chevrier and Manuel Borja Villel and featuring photographs by Craigie Horsfield (Borja Villel et al. 1996). 9. This book was the first in a series conceived by Capmany herself at the time of her appointment as Regidora de Cultura in 1983. The idea was to put together two people publicly known for their connection to Barcelona to have a conversation as they walked in the city. The walks were conceived as a kind of stimulation of oral memory and the opportunity to discuss the city’s present, future, and past from the two people’s points of view. The series was to be called Diàlegs a Barcelona (Dialogues in Barcelona) and it ended up having fifty-two volumes. Pons defines the chosen people as broadly having a “Catalanist and progressive cultural vision” (Pons 2000: 371). 10. A corroboration of this postpolitical reading of public participation can be found in Pep Subirós. When making sense in 1999 of key transformations brought about by the first democratic municipalities, he asserts that, thanks to them, “popular classes are not only a working force any more, but citizens with full rights” (1999: 9). This proud statement cleverly does away with class identification in favor of an equality provided by urban identity and social harmony and cohesion in a diverse social fabric. Of course, the justification of the phasing out is that such things as class politics are no longer needed, the classic postpolitical position. El vol de la fletxa (The flight of the arrow), a book providing the municipal leader’s perspective on the making of the Olympic city, edited by Subirós, is not surprisingly also very NOTES 99

strong in its praise for social consensus and the neutralizing and down- playing of dissidence. 11. Finally, the other important area where Maragall and Capmany’s vision for culture and cultural projects in Barcelona are perfectly compatible is capitality, as it fits well both Capmany’s Catalanist ambitions and those of Maragall to build a cultural, political, and economic reputation abroad for the city. When Capmany expresses skepticism with respect to the Olympic Games, Maragall convinces her on the grounds of it being the way to build capitality for the city (Capmany and Maragall 1983: 63). Capmany calls the history of Barcelona’s role as custodian of the city’s and Catalonia’s cultural heritage “municipal vocation” (1986: 79), and praises the role of the bourgeoisie and Catalan politicians as accumulators and cultivators of it. Capmany argues that Barcelona’s cultural and political responsibilities are paramount within Spain, and the defining ones for the Catalan context. Barcelona’s municipality is “not only the preserver of a cultural heritage, but also an active creator of culture and, even more, a decisive advise in Catalan politics” (1986:76–77). 12. Sometimes the same people evolved from one role to an other, as in the already mentioned case of Joan Anton Benach. 13. It is also of interest to compare Barcelona’s City Hall cultural policies with those of the Autonomous Regional government, the Generalitat, in the hands of the Catalan nationalist Convergència i Unió. The matter deserves in-depth analysis, but suffice it here to mention the Generalitat’s Law of Museums of 1990, where we find a clear difference in approach and conceptualization of the museum function. For the autonomous government, it preserves its modern function as a repository of heritage and builder of the national subject, which remains at its center. Its role is to “promote the knowledge, study and dissemination (of the nation’s heritage) among all citizens, so as to facilitate a better understanding of the nation’s outdoors, history and life in general” (Departament de Cultura 1990: 1). Museums “conserve, document and study” cultural goods “for the sake of research, education and intellectual and aesthetic enjoyment, and they are spaces for the cultural, ludic and scientific participation of citizens” (Ibid.: 2). References to its relevance for the services and tourist industries are completely absent. 14. “It is necessary to replace one-off subsidizes for good and to substitute them with a process of dialogue, reflection, and agreement with each social inter- locutor with cultural initiative” (Font 1991: 196). 15. These adjectives are repeated again on p. 45 and will become a well-known motto defining the city. PART III

The Olympic Framework CHAPTER 6

Preamble

Much has been said about the transformative power of the 1992 Olympics with respect to the city’s built environment, the economy of the city, and as the provider of an instant and durable global visibility of the city’s image. This is undisputable, but this book looks at the Games as part of the logic of culture and cultural discourses in the city, and in particular at how the latter had the governing of democratic citizens at stake. In so doing, we can follow very effectively how the Games functioned as a technology of municipal government: they changed the definition of culture for government purposes (see Chapter 9) as well as the rationale of desirable conduct for local citizens (see Chapter 10). The spectacular success on the part of the local government in framing citizens’ participation as part of an all-encompassing, all-benefiting project to reinvent the city, the Olympic Games, as a well-known fact, acquires a new light if we consider it from this perspective: the consensus around the meaning for the city of the Olympic Games, the population’s massive endorsement of and active work for it, is based on a resignification of both urban culture and citizenship from social-democratic to neoliberal. In explaining the “miracle” of people’s support for the Olympic project, Pep Subirós argues that it is not only physical changes that brought about their support, but crucially the intangible emergence of a new climate:

It is not only facades and stones changing. There are attitudes as well, plus a certain spirit. The Olympic impulse makes it possible to take maximum

advantage of economic prosperity, whereas and private initiatives and investments add to public ones in the renewal and modernization of the city, conﬁguring in so doing an entrepreneurial and dynamic atmosphere. (Subirós 1993b: 78)

Subirós is invoking here the emergence of a new sociability inextricably connected to a new, prosperous economy. Producing it discursively for all, however, entailed the adaptation of already existing qualities of citizens’ agency vis-à-vis the institutions. The citizens’ pride and self-esteem originally derived from the socio-political transformation brought about with the help of grassroots movements, needed to be convincingly retooled to deactivate political action and promote the articulation of, not necessarily a passive, but certainly a never radically critical hegemonic consensus. Mayors Narcís Serra and Pasqual Maragall refer speciﬁcally to dialogue which, along with participation, already discussed in Chapter 5, is one of the better-articulated manifestations of such resigniﬁcation. Just before the Games, they argued the legitimacy of having resurrected urban projects much hated during late-Francoism:

It is now fashionable in certain circles to say that some of the major projects we are undertaking in Barcelona now are the ones public institutions in the 1960s and 1970s had pursued: beltways, the Vallvidrera tunnels, Poblenou ... I think, however, that there is a radical difference. In a dictatorial situation with non-democratic municipalities there is no dialogue about what the borough wants, there is no possibility to harmonize general projects with local interests. The best urban planners fail if there is no dialogue with social interlocutors. (Quoted in Subirós 1993b: 81)

Dialogue is invoked here as epitomizing a new context that changes everything, making the same different, not only because it implies negotiation and acceptance of the interests of diverse stakeholders – even though that was not always the case – but because it allows for discursive persuasion based on neutralizing the arguments of oppo- nents. The Olympic Games was the sublime culmination of such dialogue, whereby “a heterogeneous aggregation is transformed, without renouncing debate and criticism, into a cohesive community for a creative and not aggressive project ... [which] goes against nobody, produces no defeats other than sporting ones” (Subirós 1993b: 102–103). To prove his point, Subirós goes on to provide evidence of critics of the Olympic project, only to conclude that they PREAMBLE 105 were few, far between and ultimately easily counterable. In other words, for Subirós, and for many other local residents, the Olympic project was irresistibly, disarmingly, and uncontestably good for the city, and therefore unopposable,1 because it stood true to the ideals of the democratic city and made them advance. The main thematic pillars in the construction of these continuities are studied in the next two chapters. In Chapter 7 we see that municipal campaigns on the beauty and revitalization (Benach Rovira 1993: 488– 490) of the city since 1984 massaged a self-indulgent, aggrandizing, and conveniently depoliticized citizen complacency. In so doing, they triggered a revalorization of the built environment that led to a textbook case of gentrification and the aestheticization of the past. But they could be constructed as well as legitimate heirs to the urban struggles defending the preservation and protection of the city’s architectural heritage against porciolista modernizing developments in the Francoist period. What got lost, however, in this construction, is that those struggles had sought to oppose the lucrative yields derived from demolishing single-family houses of the bourgeoisie or obsolete factories and substituting them with high- rise, multiple-flat buildings (Andreu Acebal 2011), but not many seem to notice those kinds of incoherences. A similar mechanism of continuity/ neutralization is also at work in sporting matters, as we will explore in Chapters 8 and 10. Both cases highlight the role of the – dynamic and entrepreneurial – citizen as producer of the city: in addressing the citizen these discourses emphasized his/her responsibility and accountability to produce a better city, but in pre-Olympic Barcelona such improvements worked in the direction of making Barcelona competitive in the international league of cities, not of making it more socially fair. The ideological sophistication of these discourses is not only that they look backward and tap into the memory of a recent past of activism, but at the same time, that their call to action promotes the new entrepreneurial sociability of neoliberalism. More specifically, socio-political goals of the urban movements which in the 1960s and 1970s could be defined as socialist, communitarian, and even anti-capitalist, by the (entrepreneurial) turning of the object of their struggles into an innovative area of capitalist exploitation, also known as the cultural turn, found themselves resignified as neoliberal aims of the creative city. Likewise, those who continued to endorse them uncritically changed from being resistant to satisfied residents, an attitude epitomized by the volunteer, explored in Chapters 10 and 11. Conversely, the greedy real estate and construction companies that were the city’s 106 6 PREAMBLE enemies of yesteryear could conveniently reinvent themselves as the heroes defending the city’s architectural heritage.2 Lampedusa’s dictum in reverse: For things to change, everything must remain the same. This part of the book dissects the Barcelona Olympic Games as the master discourse making sense of these apparent contradictions.

NOTES 1. Illas (2012: 158, 183) recognizes this too. 2. The paradigmatic case here is that of real estate and construction company Núñez y Navarro, whose motto is “Barcelona, always.” It was the bête noir of urban social movements in late-Francoist Barcelona, but in democracy reinvented and redeemed itself by sponsoring the restoration of emblematic historic buildings such as the Casa Lleó i Morera and the Torre Andreu, cleaning up the company’s record and re-writing its history, as we can read in its ofﬁcial website: “In its more than sixty years of history, the Núñez i Navarro group has often confronted the challenge of restoring buildings, recuperating their registered components and adapting newly built parts to the original style, as in hotel H198 and La Rotonda” (Casa Lleó i Morera). CHAPTER 7

Working for the City Image: Municipal Publicity Campaigns Redeﬁning the Preferred Barcelona Subject

Our analysis of the first democratic period of municipal cultural policies has clearly revealed how the Barcelonian they had in mind was that of the deprived, put-upon citizen of the working-class peripheries. But the envisioned citizen for the pre-Olympic context, as we saw him/her emerge in Chapter 5, was no longer this person; s/he had moved to the city center both (physically and ideologically) and should not longer expect the City Hall to bend over backwards to satisfy his/her demands. The municipality’s priority had shifted from the citizen and his/her well-being to the city and the material conditions necessary to guarantee its successful economic restructuring. But for this endeavor the cooperation of an enthusiastically was still needed, a citizen willing to join the City Council in servicing Barcelona in the correct way, by contributing to the tertiary, tourist, and cultural economies.1 Participation was therefore still very much in demand and active in municipal discourses, but under redefined governance aims. Municipal publicity campaigns are privileged spaces to witness such shifts in detail and the ideological changes that they imply.2 In what follows we will pursue some of their more influential examples for the key pre- Olympic years, from the mid-1980s to the early 1990s. We have analyzed in Chapter 5, through the example of the Tot allò que un jove ...video, how in the first instance the efforts of municipal propaganda were aimed at informing a population identified as young, politically alert, and possibly working-class, of the existence of new cultural services for all at no cost, and to invite this segment of the population to

© The Author(s) 2017 107 M.P. Balibrea, The Global Cultural Capital, The Contemporary City, DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-53596-2_7 108 7 WORKING FOR THE CITY IMAGE: MUNICIPAL PUBLICITY CAMPAIGNS ... take part in them. But the campaign that would define the 1980s’ municipal decade was Barcelona més que mai (Barcelona more than ever before), and it had very different objectives. Launched in 1984 under the leadership of Enric Casas, since 1986 municipal Head of Corporate Communication and Quality, its objective was originally no different from, only more ambitious than that of the videos commissioned from the Servei de Video Comunitari (Community Video Service), namely to call the attention of citizens toward new public services and to provide information on how to use them. Barcelona més que mai aimed at being an overarching slogan covering every municipal action and was a huge success as such. But the campaign was a turning point in ways other than its intensity, efficacy, and visibility. The slogan itself appeals to citizens’ pride and self-esteem through invoking the extraordinary nature of the present. It introduces the idea of the urgency of commitment and action, of the need to concentrate efforts in order to live up to a now that demands more than what is normal, whose temporal logic is that of an extraordinary moment interrupting the monotonous continuity and linearity of time, a moment holding an enormous promise whose achievement is assumed to be the object of everyone’s desire. In short, Barcelona més que mai inaugurates in municipal discourse the temporality of the Olympic Games. The politics of that time differs from and breaks with those of the early days of the democratic municipality. The break with the dictatorship required a temporality of new beginnings, marking a starting point and offering an endlessly wide and open future in the land of democracy. What we witness through the example of the més que mai campaign, with the city having already entered the Olympic candidacy race, is a move to the temporality of the event. It is also relevant to consider the campaign logo, the Miró-style B, as marking a qualitative change. The reference and connection to the Catalan painter Joan Miró, openly accepted by the municipality (Ferrer Viana 2011: 191), comes from the painter’s game-changer star used for the new corporate image of a Catalan savings bank, La Caixa, in 1980. The bank’s new image, created by the US marketing company Landor Associates (Luna García 2008: 150–152), generated a school of followers in the design of corporate images (Sanchís 2001: 192). Its originality derives from its use of high art to produce a commercial brand logo, which allowed, in the La Caixa case, for corporate responsibility and rootedness in place to be associated with the ethos of a savings bank. More specifically, using Miró brought together for La Caixa the values of WORKING FOR THE CITY IMAGE: MUNICIPAL PUBLICITY CAMPAIGNS ... 109 tradition and innovation, the best of the local and global worlds: Miró’s work connected the brand to the Catalan identity by pointing to its Mediterraneanness through the use of warm colors as well as to an international, modern, avant-garde artistic legacy, in this way signalling a people with its own culture and language, but also capable of interacting globally (Ibid.: 67, 75). Moreover, the new brand design alluded to the place where the brand was located, but was sufficiently abstract to allow free interpretation of its meaning (Ibid.: 77); it was seductive and readable for both locals and strangers. The formula was to be picked up almost immediately by a Barcelona municipality as much in need of an image change as the financial corporation had been. Everything in the formula was recyclable. The “Miroesque” B in the Barcelona més que mai campaign is its first manifestation3 (Fig. 7.1). And once the city was chosen to host the Games, another Miró- inspired image was to be created to preside over the five Olympic rings as the Barcelona logo for the Games (Fig. 7.2).

Fig. 7.1 “Barcelona més que mai” (Barcelona more than ever before) logo (Ajuntament de Barcelona) 110 7 WORKING FOR THE CITY IMAGE: MUNICIPAL PUBLICITY CAMPAIGNS ...

Fig. 7.2 “Barcelona ’92” logo (COOB’92 S.A., 1988)

While I have found no evidence to support the extent of Luna García’s assertion that the Miró logo for La Caixa singlehandedly triggered the creation of “a completely new image for the city [of Barcelona] based on the creativity of local artists” (2008: 158), it is true that it did not go unnoticed in the Ajuntament that the star logo, with all its already mentioned connotations, perfectly synthesized the mutually beneﬁcial marriage of capital to art, one to become an economic and ideological pillar of Barcelona as a capital of culture. Toni Puig, a communications consultant WORKING FOR THE CITY IMAGE: MUNICIPAL PUBLICITY CAMPAIGNS ... 111 in the Barcelona municipality in the run-up to the Fòrum de les Cultures 2004 macro event acknowledges explicitly the importance that the use of the logo as a marketing strategy in 1986 is considered to have had in inﬂuencing citizens’ attitudes toward their city:

A brilliant decision was made: we started to communicate using the marketing we had invented for the public sphere: “Barcelona, more than ever before”, with its Miró-style B in optimistic, Mediterranean colours, underpinned the strategy to encourage civic morale and enthusiasm. It brought about the change in attitude that we needed: citizens were proud to back Barcelona, their big and all-embracing home under reconstruction, under redesign. It worked. (Quoted in García García de León 2011: 271)

Puig’s words demonstrate that the choice of image for the campaign incorporated a previously absent awareness of marketing strategies to deal with citizens on municipal matters, of these strategies’ complex intertwining with people’s desires and feelings, and of the importance of mastering such complexity in order to exercise influence, for political as much as for economic ends. To that extent, the logo in the més que mai campaign forma- lized a new way in which the city wanted to present itself to its citizens, it subliminally underlined and privileged a series of characteristics that it proposed as the best to be associated with Barcelona, to the detriment of others. These characteristics, which down the line would be associated with a brand mostly aimed at the world and all its potential visitors, had in the first instance local citizens as their targeted audience. And this new image, as we move on to study now, addressed the populace in a fresh way too, proposing new and desirable ways of being a Barcelona citizen. Under the umbrella of Barcelona més que mai, one municipal campaign deserves particular attention, the Campanya per a la millora del paisatge urbà (Campaign for the Improvement of Urban Landscape), better known as Barcelona posa’t guapa (Barcelona make yourself pretty), a slogan created by the publicity agency RCP. It was created in 1985 and made the responsibility of an ad hoc municipal committee led by deputy mayors Jordi Parpal and Joaquim Nadal and with responsibilities across different departments: treasury, urbanism, health, and decentralized neighborhood councils (Ferrer Viana 2001:16–25 and 2011: 192). It provided financial help, in the form of tax breaks and subsidies, to encourage citizens and businesses to invest in cleaning up their apartment buildings’ façades and other kinds of architectural improvements, with a 112 7 WORKING FOR THE CITY IMAGE: MUNICIPAL PUBLICITY CAMPAIGNS ... main, but not exclusive, focus on the exteriors.4 In due course, while the city prepared for the Games, the publicity campaign that accompanied it would also serve to channel a discourse of tolerance toward the many nuisances for citizens produced by major infrastructural construction. The publicity campaign was launched in June 1986 with a most ambitious coverage: radio and TV adverts, banners hanging from street lights, personal mailings, tarpaulin and publicity signs, children’s competitions, information stands, and merchandising.5 The almost immediate adjudication of the Olympic Games in October 1986 gave the initiative a definite boost and sealed its priorities as the new standard Barcelona’s: city image and public–private partnerships (Ajuntament, Memòria d’actuacions 1987: 18).6 Faced with the titanic effort of preparing for the Games, the campaign helped the Council to include other social actors in the task, in this case the transformation of the urban landscape. The Posa’t Guapa campaign started a new form of governance for the City Council; it was “The genesis of a public–private programme of cooperation with great potential” (Ajuntament, Memòria d’actuacions 1987: 8; Ferrer Viana 2011: 191, 194–195) and became a model of shared governance (Ferrer Viana 2011: 195), a case study of how to turn public–private partnerships, the trademark of entrepreneurial cities, into win–win scenarios. Their success is undeniable: in ten years, 25,000 million pesetas were invested; two million and a half square meters of building façades were restored, and 10,000 proposed projects approved and carried out. This included 439 sponsorships and collaborations (Raventós 2001: 31; Ferrer Viana 2011: 194–195) as, thanks to the sponsorship of large businesses in the private sector in exchange for advertising space, the renovation of what in future would be iconic buildings was possible.7 The success of this campaign contributed greatly to the material viability of attaining a desirable and marketable city brand/image. And in that sense, it was a crucial stepping stone to the emergence of modernista heritage, architectural excellence, good taste in designing, and quality public spaces as the defining trends of such an image. How was the citizen addressed in the Posa’t guapa campaign? First and most obvious of all to note is the refocusing on the city image and away from citizens’ personal well-being as ultimate aims of urban policies. If the Tot allò que un jove video intended to encourage more youth from deprived areas to take part in culture and leisure activities whose purpose was to offer enjoyment as self-development and collective growth, Barcelona posa’t guapa sought to enlist the cooperation of the citizen in WORKING FOR THE CITY IMAGE: MUNICIPAL PUBLICITY CAMPAIGNS ... 113 working toward the improvement of the city’s image. The shift in citizen conceptualization we have been pursuing through the analysis of other official cultural discourses is once more corroborated: a reversal in his/her role, from the city/its local government at the service of the citizen, to the citizen at the service of the city’s image. The words of mayor Maragall are clear in establishing this relationship:

We have a unique architectural heritage which must be preserved as a sign of identity and pride for the city ... Throughout history, we Barcelonians have exceedingly demonstrated our creative and accomplishing ability: now that the 92 events have generated new possibilities and have mobilized a great shared enthusiasm, we put it at the service of dignifying our urban space. The Barcelona that will receive the Olympic Games will be a different city. Not only thanks to the new facilities but also because of its progressive recuperation of all those aspects that make up its image. (Ajuntament, Memòria d’actuacions 1987:3)

The use of the first-person plural underlines the people/power alliance of earlier municipal actions, stating that citizens and local power are as one and indistinguishable. Identity appears now as the focus of attention, though not a historically contingent identity whose purpose was to overcome the traces of authoritarianism in the city, as was the case in the immediate post- dictatorial period. What is invoked here as a uniting force is an essence that comes from a past that is not identified in the quote but, given the priorities of the campaign, is closely associated with the bourgeois, Catalanist modernista heritage, and whose value is imperative to make visible. Such an identity is no longer manifested in social struggles against the dictatorship and speculative capitalism, but in the city’s built environment (architectural heritage, objects of everyday life) and in the personalities of the citizens themselves (creative and performing abilities). All of these manifestations had been compatible in the 1960s in the fight against porciolisme’scor- rupted urbanism, intent on destroying the architectural heritage for the sake of favoring real estate businesses. But, at the time, heritage discourses were articulated as defenses of communal ways of living and practices of everyday life. This is clearly conveyed in the municipal book Plans i Projectes per a Barcelona 1981/82 (Plans and Projects for Barcelona):

[Our plan] tries to preserve the historic artistic patrimony of Barcelona understood not as a catalogue of ediﬁces and monuments, but as a conjunct 114 7 WORKING FOR THE CITY IMAGE: MUNICIPAL PUBLICITY CAMPAIGNS ...

of historic centers, unique ambiences resulting from the union of generations which we must transmit not as museum pieces but by using them as living things integrated into the community. (Cited by McDonogh 1999: 353)

At this early point, architectural heritage made sense as, coming from the people and returning to them, it worked as an intensifier of identity that was worth rehabilitating in the process of devolving power and dignity to all in the city. Such a relation has been resignified in the quoted words of Maragall from 1987. According to him, both citizens’ ways of life and heritage architecture were unrecognized treasures or, to put it in the capitalist language at the service of which they will subsequently function, assets of which to be proud and waiting to be exploited by (external) third, external parties.8 There is in his words a call to mobilization within a narrative of discovery. To be uncovered as this narrative culminates is the prize of the Barcelona image, a reward presented as the object of everyone’s desire. The invocation as a heritage of the architectural past makes sense of it for the citizen as a valuable part of him/herself. Heritage reverberates in the individual and passes some of its excellence to him. With its aura of prestige, heritage predisposes the citizen to accept as his own and, as defining, traits attributed to the built environment. When successful, the result is a proud, cooperative citizen, one willing to emulate and to underline the excellence of his/her city as if it were his/her own. Such is the prototype of the perfect citizen for the imminent Barcelona brand. Subsidiary campaigns make this interpellation to cooperate in the beautification of the city even clearer: Barcelona en flor (Barcelona in bloom), Barcelona tindrà bona planta (Barcelona will be good-looking), and Taxi, posa’t guapo (Taxi, make yourself handsome). Moreover, the hegemony of modernista architecture as Barcelona’sdefining heritage helps, in turn, to establish a middle-class, bourgeois, Catalanist standard of prestige emanating from modernisme’s own history. The Barcelona citizen who identifies with modernisme as his/her own is also associating him/herself with the values of the social class which produced it. In that sense, the emergence of modernisme at this moment as a central part of the city brand contributes to generating a hegemonic image of the desired citizen as one embracing and living by middle-class values. Together, all these aspects complete the shift in municipal discourses of the preferred Barcelonian from the peripheral working-class to the centrally located middle-class citizen, which is made evident in the campaign through the stimulation of citizens’ investment in home improvements. Municipal WORKING FOR THE CITY IMAGE: MUNICIPAL PUBLICITY CAMPAIGNS ... 115 discourses here tap into the already existing narrative of democratic shared governance: participation. What is to be shared now is not political decision-making, though, but economic and symbolic capital. The citizen is needed as a small investor, his/her money to work side by side with that of the major private and public investments needed by the city in the context of the Olympic effort:

The common aim is that by 1992, next to the new topography created for the Olympic Games, one can recognize on the urban physiognomy the results that day by day, construction site by construction site, every Barcelonian’s collaboration produce. (Ajuntament, Memòria d’actuacions 1987:6)

Such form of public–private cooperation will produce a domesticated, postpolitical form of citizens’ engagement with the city, as it manages to rewrite the petty bourgeois ideology of home ownership and private property into a form of altruistic collective participation. Ferrer Viana, from the Municipal Institute of Urban Landscape and Quality of Life during the years of the campaign, expresses this subtle imbrication of public and private interests. After deﬁning urban landscape as a common good for collective use, he states more precisely:

The concept of use is important, as is the dynamic of joint public and private responsibility for the landscape. My house is mine (private); when I maintain it and rehabilitate it, I am doing myself a favor, but society also recognises that I am doing something for the collective enjoyment of perception of landscape that belongs to everyone. This can be applied to any other element in the everyday urban landscape. My shutter, repainted the same color as all the others in the building, brings a value of harmony to the eyes of other citizens, with whom my only relation will probably be this common enjoyment of the landscape. (Ferrer Viana 2011: 190)

The Barcelona imagined community evoked by Ferrer Viana in the last sentence is made-to-measure for citizens who are, or aspire to become, home owners. The campaign’s logic conveniently makes their collective pride and public involvement in positive change (toward a disinterested “value of harmony” that brings “common enjoyment”) coincide with the increase in their personal ﬁnancial wealth in real estate. Let us move now to a focus on case studies of municipal publicity advertisements for TV. In order to make the transition in their conceptualization of preferred citizens as clear as possible, we will start with one 116 7 WORKING FOR THE CITY IMAGE: MUNICIPAL PUBLICITY CAMPAIGNS ... of the last appearances of the peripheral “citizen in need”. Si et cau la casa a sobre ... (If your house is falling on you ...) (Ajuntament, Spots publicitaris, no date) was produced by the Patronat Municipal de l’Habitatge (Municipal Authority for Housing) under the slogan Millorant el present (Improving the present), probably in 1985.9 Both publicity spot and slogan, are earlier to the institutional framework that will become the norm, but already function under the umbrella of Barcelona més que mai and the Miró-styled B. Through a permanently still camera at the character’s eye height, we see a man sitting in an armchair reading a newspaper, surrounded by old furniture in a modest living room. This relaxed activity is interrupted by the ceiling falling on him, plus the electrical socket next to him noisily exploding, the sounds of domestic disaster constituting the only soundtrack of the advert. After witnessing these domestic accidents, a voice directly addresses the poor citizen in trouble and the audience:

We have solutions to help you ﬁx the apartment or building where you live. Call us (the phone number of the Housing Authority appears on screen, along with its name, that of the Council and the slogan Improving the Present. An invisible marker draws and underlines the Miró-styled B as the voice over says: Barcelona, més que mai [Barcelona more than ever before]).

The interest of this advertisement for us is that it catches local authorities in the process of changing their way of conceptualizing the desired citizen. We still recognize in the middle-aged man sitting and reading the paper the dignified, socially engaged citizen of humble means who was the object of concern in the democratic municipality’s early days. Moreover, even if it is within a slapstick comedy format, the focus here is on structural, life-threatening damage in housing. Major housing problems of the period are invoked here. The colossal construction boom of the 1960s on the periphery of Barcelona had witnessed the building of working-class neighborhoods for recently arrived immigrants with enormous benefits to construction companies. Many of those buildings were, by the 1980s, showing their structural deficiencies and putting citizens’ lives at risk due to having been made with defective materials (Montaner 2011:49–50; Recio and Naya 2004: 75), a problem that would come to a head in the aluminosis (concrete decay) scandal that exploded in 1990. More generally, Barcelona had a problem with the housing conditions of many of its buildings, particularly those in its historic districts in Ciutat Vella, the old, WORKING FOR THE CITY IMAGE: MUNICIPAL PUBLICITY CAMPAIGNS ... 117 medieval city, where many of its most deprived citizens still lived. The advert is therefore still capable of evoking a late-Francoist, class-discriminating kind of combative and critical citizenship for whom decent housing is a human right to be defended, which in turn allows the local government to still appear as the provider for a vulnerable citizen victimized by the abusive practices of the Francoist period. Clearly separated from the Si et cau la casa a sobre approach is that of Bonica, guapa, ...preciosa (Pretty, beautiful, lovely) (Ajuntament, Spots publicitaris, no date). Already framed by the Posa’t guapa campaign in all senses, this is a more sophisticated product, featuring well-polished advertising strategies. The cinematography offers a radical contrast to Si et cau. A hyperactive, scrutinizing camera moves to the dynamic rhythm of violins interpreting classical music that follow the flattering compliments of the male voice-over. It pans from the bottom up and back, from left to right and back, mostly in medium shot for establishing shots, but also with close-up and high-angle shots. Its objects of exploration are building façades of Barcelona, and the main one among these is the orientalist Bruno Cuadros House, projected by Josep Vilaseca in 1885 and commonly referred to as the House of the Umbrellas, located in the Ramblas. In short, an iconic, modernist building. The already described camera movement provides the viewer with an appreciation of the building’s rich and most emblematic traits: the umbrellas themselves, the dragon with a mane made of the Catalan flag, coats, fans, columns, rails in windows and balconies, shutters, and painted walls. The continuity in camera panning and soundtrack allows for the smooth transition to the shot of a modern, indistinct building’s façade, while the blue-tinted image, suggesting dusk, prevents the viewer from appreciating any detail. The camera swings back in another continuous cut that returns us to a modernist but less distinctive building with which the advert concludes. A voice-over directly addresses the audience at the end of this tour:

If you want your house to be this attractive, call us. The Council will help you to restore it. (A phone number appears on screen as is the slogan Barcelona, posa’t guapa.)

This advert does not present images of people, but rather aims at producing a desirable object for the citizen, a desire which is openly constructed as an aesthetic one. The sense of social aspiration is also strong. Evoked by the camera’s repeated pannings from the bottom up, the narrative here 118 7 WORKING FOR THE CITY IMAGE: MUNICIPAL PUBLICITY CAMPAIGNS ... tempts the viewer/citizen with the possibility, by participating in the campaign, of owning the equivalent to a piece of the modernista heritage, a standard of architectural beauty for the city. The fact that the nouns “house” and “city” are gendered feminine in both Catalan and Spanish helps the analogy with the objectivation and flattering of the female body, common, on the other hand, to the slogan defining the campaign.10 Cinematic codes, including the male voice-over, the objectivation and fragmentation of the body through extreme close-up and the restless, scrutinizing camera movement, seal a heterosexual, phallocentric structure of desire. These cinematic codes seek to prompt the citizen’s agency (to act on the restoration of his/her building) by making him/her occupy the male position as bearer of the look, one that takes possession of the stylized, fragmented female body, here the desirable image and icon of the modernista building, and the subsequent public exhibition of such possession (the restored façade), the conditions for gaining power and pleasure (as an exemplary Barcelonian, a bearer of the city’s most prestigious traits). The resulting product addresses the citizen as the potential client of a reified built environment whose value depends on its ability to awaken this consumer’s scopophilic desire. The gaze of this observer, identified with the camera, partakes indirectly in its possession of the modernista architecture, through which the promise of an enhanced, more desirable citizenship is made.11 While gender dynamics, as I have been trying to demonstrate, are crucially at play in this spot, the absence of any actual image of the citizen being addressed spares us as an audience any class association. Still, a move away from the needs of less economically favored citizens, so central to the early democratic period of municipality, is easily deductible by the needs and desires that the spot is seen as mobilizing. The right to decent housing invoked in Si et cau la casa a sobre is not behind Bonica, guapa, preciosa, which addresses itself to a citizen whose more basic needs must already be covered, and who can therefore be tempted to aspire to a more beautiful house, a sign of upward class mobility in general, and in the particular Barcelona case of the modernista heritage, further associated with the Nationalist bourgeois values of its historical origins. Further confirmation that the preferred citizen of the Posa’t guapa campaign is middle-class and centrally located can be found in the Gràcies a gent tan guapa com aquesta (Thanks to people as beautiful as this) advertisement, broadcast in 1991.12 Against a white background, the viewer sees two transparent glass walls at each side of a revolving door made of the same material. It is being used by people who come in on the WORKING FOR THE CITY IMAGE: MUNICIPAL PUBLICITY CAMPAIGNS ... 119 left and go out on the right to leave the frame, always facing the camera. The viewer sees in succession: a middle-aged woman carrying a small dog; a young girl; an embracing and kissing middle-aged couple; a middle-aged man; a young woman holding and kissing a baby in a baby carrier; an old lady; a middle-aged man with a girl aged under ten. For each one of them, a Barcelona address, with street name and number, appears on screen. As they come in through the revolving door, some of them look at the camera and act as if posing for it, while others rearrange their clothing. All of them are dressed up and many act as if they are very conscious of it. As they parade in front of the camera, a male voice says: “Thanks to people as beautiful as this, Barcelona is changing. Three thousand houses have already been restored in Barcelona.” At this point, a young male in a dirty suit and in disarray appears on screen from the left and disappears through the revolving door. The voice addresses him: “And you, what are you waiting for? Give us a call, we will take care of everything.” At which point the young man, his suit dry-cleaned and ironed, reappears, enters the door like the others toward the camera and leaves to the right as we hear: “Barcelona, make yourself beautiful.” All those appearing in the advert share a middle-class aesthetic; they all dress smartly and clearly feel happy and secure in themselves as a result. All the men wear a jacket, and all evoke well-accepted identity positions: heterosexual couples, father and daughter, mother and baby, single young and senior people, pet owner. Even the discordant young man at the end, being addressed reproachfully by the voice of local power, is dressed in a suit, even if it is only dirty and unkempt. As buildings and people become one, the implication is that it only takes a bit of effort and some self-respect to “make oneself beautiful,” not money or property ownership, and that all problems with housing are cosmetic ones. One is what one owns and will be valued by one’s aestheticly pleasant appearance. A desirable identity is fulfilled here through good-looking property, which in addition offers the bonus of city ownership. The working-class, modest aesthetics of Si et cau la casa a sobre, or that in Tot el que un jove have completely disappeared, and with them the insinuation that their problems are structural and the responsibility of government to solve. The refocus on a different segment of the urban population to define the Barcelona citizen through its built environment is further explored and made visible in two adverts from the late 1980s, Rehabilitació d’Edificis i Vivendes al Casc Antic (Buildings and Houses Rehabilitation in the Old City) (1988)13 and Rehabilitació d’EdificisiVivendesaLaRibera(Buildings and Houses 120 7 WORKING FOR THE CITY IMAGE: MUNICIPAL PUBLICITY CAMPAIGNS ...

Rehabilitation in La Ribera) (1989) (Ajuntament, Spots publicitaris,nodate). Bonica ...,andGràcies ..., through an association with the beautification of the city, or in particular with the modernista heritage, tapped into social aspirations of class mobility to propose the Council’spathtoanenhanced, compliant Barcelona citizenry. These other cases seek to entice Barcelonians toward possession of a different sort of recently uncovered city cultural value, namely its Mediterranean sociability.14 Class mobility of a different sort is required to acquire this form of cultural capital, a spatial mobility that consists of the middle classes colonizing the most deprived neighborhoods in a city, also known as gentrification. The adverts are very timely, as it was in June 1988 that PROCIVESA (Promoción Ciutat Vella S.A. [Old City Promotions Inc.]), a private–public enterprise for the rehabilitation of buildings in the Old City15 was created. Its interventions in the neighborhood encountered resistance on the part of some residents, who demonstrated against them, claiming that it would amount to the expulsion of 6,000 of its inhabitants due to the increase in prices (Barcenoal 92 1989: 43; López Sánchez 1986;Von Heeren 2002), plus providing no immediate solution to the chronic problems encountered by long-term residents: crime, drugs, appalling sanitation, unemployment.16 Though these kinds of attitudes or those citizens who might have been in danger of expulsion are not what these adverts want to focus on, their very absence from the screen, is an important part of the conveyed message. The production of meaning of these two municipal adverts depends on the viewer understanding the historic status of the Old City as a frontier crossed by the Barcelona bourgeois subject at his/her peril: a deeply deprived space of transgression (prostitution, drug taking, non-normative sexuality, but also revolution) for the more daring, mostly male among them, but never of homes and home-making.17 It is this deeply ingrained representation that the municipal adverts seek to counter while making room for a new urban lifestyle and resignified space. The latter is accomplished through the invocation of Mediterranean sociability, Barcelona’s own authenticity discourse, one more local materialization of the global practice in postindustrial cities of turning cultural values into capital. Philo and Kearns (1993: 3) offer an explanation of its workings and what kind of potential customer it targets:

Central to the activities subsumed under the heading of selling places is often a conscious and deliberate manipulation of culture in an effort to enhance the appeal and interest of places, especially to the relatively well-off and well-educated workforces of high-technology industry, but also to WORKING FOR THE CITY IMAGE: MUNICIPAL PUBLICITY CAMPAIGNS ... 121

“up-market” tourists and to the organisers of conferences and other money- spinning exercises. In part this manipulation of culture depends upon promoting traditions, life-styles and arts that are supposed to be locally rooted, and in this respect the selling of places has what the humanistic geographers might call an “authentic” quality spawned by the cultural life of the places themselves .... (emphases in the original)

Pointing in the same direction, Zukin (2010: 220) defines authenticity as a “changing technology of power that erodes one landscape of meaning and feeling and replaces it with another.” La Ribera and Casc Antic had been the objects of grassroots movements’ claims for more investment to improve their residents’ lives, later to be picked up by the first democratic municipalities as part of their focus on providing for the most deprived citizens. Si et cau la casa a sobre can be seen as still pertaining to such logics, as the municipality is addressing itself here to residents of moderate means already living and established in the area. But as Zukin studies for the case of New York (2010: 227–228), improvements in Casc Antic were capitalized by private developers in collusion with the municipality (PROCIVESA) as the stepping stone to a new commodification of the space for the well-off, now repackaged as a fashionable “landscape of meaning and feeling” of Mediterranean sociability: public space, thriving street life, exuberant food, warm, sunny weather, life by the sea, moderately risky, exciting public spaces. Zukin’s words are perfectly applicable to our case:

Authenticity is nearly always used as a lever of cultural power for a group to claim space and take it away from others without direct confrontation, with the help of the state and elected ofﬁcials and the persuasion of the media and consumer culture. (2010: 246)

While Degen makes it speciﬁc to our case study:

For newcomers the attraction of El Raval lies in its particular place gestures and sensuous rhythms inscribed in its living landscape, such as its individual old shops and social interactions that are nowadays considered as non-existent in the rest of the city. Both for newcomers and tourists the sensescapes of the area become part of the package of experience they consume when choosing to settle or wander around the Old City of Barcelona. (2008:184) 122 7 WORKING FOR THE CITY IMAGE: MUNICIPAL PUBLICITY CAMPAIGNS ...

Authenticity works as a technology of power to facilitate gentriﬁcation, that is, to attract more well-off citizens and visitors to, in principle, a less attractive area. The targeted groups are the relatively young, cosmopolitan, single or child less liberal and cultural professionals, the creative classes (Florida 2005; Zukin 1995), the “cultural mediators” (Zukin 1991: 216) discussed in Chapter 2. These are the most likely subjects to appreciate difference from and to dismiss the comfort of the bourgeois norm, the most prepared to capitalize on difference and turn it into proﬁt, the most equipped to prepare the socio-economy of an area to transform itself so as to attract mass consumption. Reid and Smith argue that the rhetoric of urban regeneration making sense of these groups’ intervention in the city is often informed by tropes of the hero in the American West, or frontier narratives. These celebrate the exceptionally adventurous individuals who dare to penetrate a dangerous territory, while hiding the damaging social implications of such a penetration for the existing dwellers:

The imagery [of the frontier] operates to rationalize the violations incurred in the reinvestment over the previous experience of abandonment and decline ... [It] functions to facilitate and to legitimate the gentriﬁcation and restructuring of their neighborhoods by projecting an image of consensus that these changes are superior and progressive, whilst excluding the voices and destroying the communities of the residents of neighborhoods being gentriﬁed. (1993: 194–195)18

A version of his kind of new citizen is the one attempting to interpellate the viewer in our two adverts.19 They are characterized as cosmopolitan and as professionals working in the creative industries: a photographer and a writer/journalist respectively. As future entrepreneurs and the viewers’ cultural mediators, they can see the potential of the place, value what it is, and how it can change so as to render it proﬁtable.20 Both adverts share the same cinematography. We start from establishing shots, with a camera looking out into the street, located on the limits of an apartment, a window in the case of Casc Antic, a balcony in that of La Ribera. The camera turns, to the left in the case of Casc Antic and the right in that of La Ribera, in order to take the viewers inside the houses, where we are introduced to their residents. In the Casc Antic case, this is a good-looking and well-dressed middle-age woman speaking Spanish with a slight French accent. She is identiﬁed on the screen as Françoise and is a WORKING FOR THE CITY IMAGE: MUNICIPAL PUBLICITY CAMPAIGNS ... 123 journalist. The viewer looks at her directly through a middle shot. She speaks in Spanish directly to the camera in Spanish, which approaches her as she talks and stops in a close-up shot as she concludes:

I live on my own, and in this neighborhood you can never feel lonely, there is an absolutely incredible life, you go down the street and see the ladies going to the market, dancers, actors from the Theatre Institute, it’s absolutely incredible. Problems, of course there are problems, there are too many poorly kept and derelict buildings.

In the La Ribera advert, on the other hand, as the camera turns to the apartment, we can see a dog and some plants in the balcony. Inside, the residents are a young couple, also apparently middle-class. Only the man speaks, as the woman looks at him and listens silently. The viewer sees them through a middle shot against the background of walls covered by shelves full of books in moderate disorder. A text appears on the screen to inform the viewer that he is a photographer and that his name is Sergi Gomis, so we can presume, rightly, as it turns out, that he is a Barcelonian. Sergi speaks to the camera in Catalan:

After living outside of Barcelona for four years we looked for an apartment for a long time. When we saw this place, we were hooked, we saw it one morning, and by the same evening we had already secured it, and were living here. The problem with living in this neighborhood is that you see people having a hard time, people with serious problems with tap water, [lack of] natural light, etc. But we are very very happy with the way people relate to each other here, with the atmosphere in shops. One ﬁnds here that people know how to live differently, people have something special.

In both cases, after the statements, there is a blackout and white underlined words appear on the screen stating: “Rehabilitation of Casc Antic (or La Ribera) buildings and apartments. Old Town, Live Barcelona,”21 as a deep male voice speaks: “Not all things can get done at the same time, but will get done very soon.” The citizens offering their testimonies in these adverts establish a different relationship with their Council from the one we witnessed in the previous ads. The Olympic Games and the major infrastructural construction undertaken during the years prior to it, peaking certainly in the period covered by this particular campaign, give us the general 124 7 WORKING FOR THE CITY IMAGE: MUNICIPAL PUBLICITY CAMPAIGNS ... frame. The municipality directly acknowledged the inconveniences that the local population had to endure during the years when the works were carried out through the Barcelona guanyarà (Barcelona will win) campaign, apologizing to citizens and appeasing them through the promise of a worthy, higher good awaiting the city after the Olympics. While not directly connected to them, the Rehabilitation campaign took advantage of this context to justify the municipality’s shortcomings. And more so after the campaign and public demonstrations of protest on the part of the Raval residents in the spring of 1987 (McDonogh 1999: 343), before PROCIVESA’s creation. For the first time, we see here a municipality on the defensive, allowing conforming citizens to speak in order to express their solidarity and understanding of the municipality’s constraints given the exceptional Olympic circumstances. The characters in these two ads are aware of structural problems in their respective neighborhood (tap water, insalubrious conditions, lack of light, derelict buildings) but are tolerant of them. These sympathetic, consensual citizens are not the ones, as they agree, suffering from these social problems, those presumably of the ones protesting in the streets of El Raval in June 1987 and several times after, but their attitude is offered as exemplary. The contrast between the benevolent, supportive tone in the new citizens’ words and the restrainedly irritated, defensive one of the voice-over seems to redirect the aim of the adverts from the potential cultural mediator in search of the next urban frontier, to that other citizen who is daring to complain. Unlike the newcomers, complainers do not appreciate the value of the Old City’s sociability. They refuse to see that this is now a tremendous asset for the city, even if produced at the expense of the long-time dweller, and it is a priority that s/he learns to appreciate it. Having one’s building fixed, being able to pay the rent, finding a job or tackling crime surely comes second to the privilege of being involved in the thriving authentic atmosphere of La Ribera. In proposing this, these adverts materialize and reinforce a regenerating planning project for these areas that acts “as agent of the dominant political discourse and vision, rather than as [facilitator] of a pluralistic urban model that includes neighborhood concerns” (McDonogh 1999: 367). They correspondingly imagine a citizen who can fit such a vision and in this way make clear that the spatial transformations taking place in the neighborhood, the new activities that are being promoted, not only do not have the long-standing resident in mind, but are by omission working to expel him or her.22 NOTES 125

From our analysis of key municipal campaigns in the pre-Olympic period, a desirable Barcelona citizen emerges, but also the evidence of how other kinds of citizens’ needs are being obscured and bypassed.

NOTES 1. To put it in the words of Benach Rovira, who produced one of the first critical accounts of the municipality’s propaganda work to create a positive reception of Barcelona’s transformation: “Social cohesion and citizens’ trust in a common project have been aims at the service of which no advertising effort has been spared ... Changing citizens’ perceptions of their own city and, above all, changing their expectations, seems to contain, therefore, one of the keys to revitalisation” (1993: 503–504). 2. Though there are certainly other cultural objects worth exploring. Museum exhibitions, for example, are another privileged space of citizen address coming from the municipality. Exhibitions like Barcelona, la ciutat i el 92 (1988 and 1990), curated by Josep Acebillo and Pep Subirós and massively attended by the general public, also worked to project the idea and image of a desirable and appealing citizen with whom residents can identify. 3. The Miroesque B was to be the city’s visual signature until 2000, coinciding with another landmark, the adoption of the concept of marca, brand, to define the city to citizens. After the Games, the Miroesque logo continued in the Ara, Barcelona i tu (Now, Barcelona and you) and Barcelona i tu, cada dia millor (Barcelona and you, better every day) campaigns. Variations started to appear: instead of only a B, the city is signified through its airport identification abbreviation: BCN. The design is similar to that of the original B, but with the “Mediterranean” colors now redistributed between the three letters, a red B, a yellow C and a blue N, which is also the color of the underline. The Forum de les Cultures 2004 campaign, Barcelona mira endavant (Barcelona looks ahead) used the same three letters but in deep blue, moving progressively away from the original Miroesque identity and closer to the blue B of the city-brand starting in 2000. 4. In addition to façades, an other seven areas were in the first instance covered by the improvement programmes: advertising signs, buildings’ sanitary conditions, soundproofing of businesses with a high volume of public gathering or affected by their noise, landscaping of private green spaces visible to other neighbors or passersby, including the elimination of signage blocking their view, restoration of party walls, and adapting awnings and canopies. Later the improvement programs increased to twenty five and included the concealment of aerials and air conditioning, lifts and solar panels, and green vehicles and taxis (Ferrer Viana 2011: 192). 126 7 WORKING FOR THE CITY IMAGE: MUNICIPAL PUBLICITY CAMPAIGNS ...

5. More details of the campaign can be found in Ajuntament, Memòria d’actuacions 1987:18–27. 6. Signiﬁcant of the spirit of the initiative, and of the worldview of social democracy in power, are the words attributed to Parpal, one of the two leaders of the campaign: “private initiative will build the leftist city” (Barcenoal 92 1989: 37). Parpal was a champion of public–private partnerships, particularly those specializing in urban regeneration, as the other posts he held while working for the municipality reveal: Delegate Minister for Olympic Games and Urban Promotion plus President of VOSA (Olympic Village Anonymous Society). 7. For example, Moët & Chandon sponsored the restoration of La Mercè Church, and Acieroid that of the Ametller house (Ferrer Viana 2011: 194). 8. A Barcelona Catàleg del Patrimoni Històric-Artístic (Catalogue of Artistic and Historic Heritage) was published in July 1986 by the same team of architects who worked for the Posa’t Guapa campaign (Ferrer Viana 2011: 192). 9. I have been unable to determine the exact date of this advert. It is kept as part of a video recording along with other examples of the publicity campaigns of the Barcelona municipality in the pre-Olympic period. A copy of it is held by the General Library of the Barcelona City Council under the label of Spots Publicitaris Ajuntament (Municipal Publicity Adverts). 10. Another advert from 1988 makes that connection absolutely explicit. Tractament de Bellesa (Beauty Treatment) features the face of a young woman in close up in the process of putting on make up as the male voice- over details improvements in green spaces, rehabilitated façades, and plants on balconies. Accessible here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=womeNA- 3B3Y, last access March 28, 2017. In addition, a series of posters by Enric Satué that was part of the Posa’tGuapacampaign literally composes female faces out of architectural features. 11. I take the basic psychoanalytic feminist ideas in this brief analysis from Mulvey’s classic article Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema. 12. Accessible here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=J7x1hDnLpjE, last access March 28, 2017. 13. See Benach Rovira (1993: 495–505) for another critical analysis of municipal campaigns related to Ciutat Vella, in her case A Ciutat Vella surt el sol (The sun rises in Ciutat Vella). 14. On the importance of the Mediterranean for the construction of the Barcelona brand, see Balibrea (2004) and Illas (2012:81–132). I will come back to the topic of Mediterraneanness in Chapter 9, when discussing the Olympic Games. NOTES 127

15. To clarify my use of terms, Ciutat Vella or Casc Antic, the Old Town, are names coined in the democratic period to define the entire medieval part of the city, which existed before the nineteenth-century urban expansion of Cerdà’s Eixample. El Raval is the west part of it limited by the end of the medieval town to the west and the Ramblas to the east. The Barrio Chino, Chinese quarter, is the common term used from the nineteenth century to identify the southern part of El Raval, the one closer to the sea and port. Finally, La Ribera is located in the north-east part of the Old Town, framed by the Vía Laietana and the Ciutadella parc. 16. Of particular relevance were the campaign and public demonstrations of protest on the part of the Raval neighbors in the spring of 1987 (McDonogh 1999: 343). For an overview of social problems and grassroots resistances in El Raval to municipal changes in the borough during the democratic period, see McDonogh (1999: 357–367) and Degen (2008: 125–129, 139–143, 179–190). For a thorough critique of the urban planning and architectural intervention in Ciutat Vella, especially in La Ribera, see von Heeren (2002). Also Pöppinghaus (2002). 17. The imaginary of the Barrio Chino of Barcelona, as it used to be known, is well studied and profusely represented in literature and film. See McDonogh (1987: passim) and (1999:349–351); Degen (2008:93–102); Resina (2008: 93–118); Huertas and Fabre (2000) for accounts of El Raval’s history. 18. The promotion of the 22@ district from 2000, aiming to reinvent the historic industrial and working-class neighborhood of Poblenou for the creative industries as the economic sector for the future, would generate advertising of the same “frontier” kind targeted at young entrepreneurs in the creative sector. See, for example, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v= F2VFniCw9tE, last access March 28, 2017. 19. Different Ciutat Vella campaigns addressed different segments of the population, as has been studied by Benach Rovira (1993: 497). The already mentioned A Ciutat Vella surt el sol targeted the long-term resident, while Millorem Ciutat Vella (We are improving/Let’s improve the Old City) and A Ciutat Vella, primer la gent (In the Old City, people go first) were meant to appease their increasing protests. Finally, Vine a Ciutat Vella (Come to the Old City) targeted potential new buyers in the area. Without disagreeing with her interpretation, in my analysis of these two adverts in the Ciutat Vella. Barcelona viva (Old City. Live Barcelona), I argue that they are more sophisticated in that they are addressing both long-time dwellers and newcomers with clearly different discourses. 20. But such sociability was ironically being transformed as the neighborhood gentrified (McDonogh 1999: 357–359). 128 7 WORKING FOR THE CITY IMAGE: MUNICIPAL PUBLICITY CAMPAIGNS ...

21. There is also an indication of the time-frame for the campaign. From October 1988 to October 1990 in the case of Casc Antic, from October 1989 to October 1991 in that of La Ribera. 22. In the words of Degen: “The imposition and control of new practices are often disguised under the headings of leisure or culture. The spatial practices implemented by regeneration bodies aim to submit areas to a new deﬁnition of public life by manipulating the sensuous geography and thereby attract- ing or deﬂecting different social groups” (2008: 130). CHAPTER 8

Exercising Democratic Citizenship: Sport in the Run-Up to the Olympics

The discursive changes in the argument on citizen conceptualization, participation, and power decentralization that so far we have been pursuing in government documents, in the words of local leaders and in municipal publicity campaigns, they all work nowhere more smoothly than in matters of sport. Public space, popular participation, and an anthropological, humanist understanding of culture come artfully together in the realm of sport to realize a discursively seamless ideological shift. It is through the invocation of sport as a component of personal well-being, as a citizen’s right to be provided for by the welfare state; it is under the argument that the government is fulﬁlling its promises of providing more and improved facilities for the universal practice of sport in the city; it is through demonstrations of public participation and the occupation of public space that the large-scale practice of sport provide; it is connecting the celebration of the Olympic Games to a tradition of organizing popular Olympiads as part of festive-political occupation of public space since the late-Francoist period, it is mobilizing all these narratives that the municipality would be able to make sense for locals and the IOC alike of its vision of Barcelona as a natural-born Olympic city. Still, sport has received little attention so far in discussions of how consensus was manufactured in 1980s Barcelona, regardless of how obvious its centrality to the Olympic Games, the event nobody fails to signal as the apotheosis of consensus. My intention in this chapter is to explore the importance of sport to understand the evolution and smooth transition from the combative urban grassroots political agenda of

© The Author(s) 2017 129 M.P. Balibrea, The Global Cultural Capital, The Contemporary City, DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-53596-2_8 130 8 EXERCISING DEMOCRATIC CITIZENSHIP: SPORT IN THE RUN-UP ... the right of the city to the peaceful unanimous celebration of the Olympic spectacle. Indeed, sport, analogously to culture, has featured in a prominent place on the Barcelona grassroots political agendas since the 1960s. Both were linked to the desire for full spatial and symbolic access to the city, and explicitly connected with an understanding of the practice of sports as a sign of democratic and popular activity that originated in the first third of the twentieth century but had been suppressed during the dictatorship. Throughout the twentieth century, and particularly since the advent of the modern Olympics, sport had become a point of contention between centralist and Catalan nationalist interests. From the turn of the twentieth century, and thanks to the backing given to sport by the Catalan bourgeoisie, these disputes involved the two modern cultural strands pertaining to sports: the quest for its universal practice, which overlapped humanist discourses of democratic access to well-being for all; and its progressive turning into a mass spectacle with phenomenal ideological and economic power, which in turn generated the need for the stimulation of a different, and to an important extent opposite, kind of sports practice: the creation of elite athletes. In matters of sport, democratic aspirations, bourgeois, pro-business ambitions for Barcelona’s capitality plus nationalist sentiments, all come together to produce a coherent quest for modern regeneration in Catalonia that centralist powers wanted to thwart in one way or an other (Pujadas i Martí and Santacana 1995, vol 1: 140–142). Olympism was a central part of the whole thing. The first project to promote Barcelona as an Olympic city had 1924 and the VIII Olympic Games as its objective, but was in the end defeated by Paris (Ibid.: 144), brought with it a desire to promote the necessary institutions to make it possible, namely the Catalan National Olympic Committee that was to supersede the frustratingly inefficient and uninterested Spanish one. More radical advances in matters of sport, those having to do with universal access to it, had taken place with the advent of the Second Republic in 1931, even though the regional institution Mancomunitat de Catalunya had done a lot since its creation in 1913 to popularize the practice of sport among Catalans (Ibid.: 149–160). From the beginning of the century, and led by collectives ideologically close to republicanism and the working classes, or “leftist catalanism,” sport had been associated to the development of popular culture. It was for these collectives part and parcel of a “culture whereby physical education was included in the general development of the person and promot[ed] EXERCISING DEMOCRATIC CITIZENSHIP: SPORT IN THE RUN-UP ... 131 the notion of sport democratization” (Ibid.: 160).1 It would not be until the advent of the Second Republic, though, that they would form “a homogeneous sport core with common sociability characteristics and aims” (Ibid.: 162). An effort was made then to do away with the practice of sport as a discriminatory activity, witnessing what Abadía Naudí and Pujadas i Martí (2005: 52) call a new sociability for sport. Demanding the practice of sport became a vehicle to encapsulate a democratic, Catalanist and modern way of being the implications of which went far beyond the realm of sport to have an impact on the political, social, and cultural life of Catalonia, one materialized in the “proliferation of dozens of local sports institutions linked to cultural, political, union, popular or simply sport- loving groups.”2 Its power was coined in the expression “sport and citizenship” (Pujadas i Martí and Santacana 1995 vol. 2: 59; Santacana and Pujadas i Martí 1992: 38, 42–43). This new sociability certainly implied the projection too of a new kind of ideal citizen, one impersonat- ing the values of Catalanist republicanism (Santacana and Pujadas i Martí 1992: 34, 36), and already during the Second Republic, of antifascism. With its connections to left-leaning trade unions, grassroots associations, Catalanism and democratization, which had culminated in the organization of the frustrated Popular Olympiad of July 1936 as a response to the fascist Berlin Games of the same year (Pi Sunyer 1995:39–40; Pujadas i Martí and Santacana 1995 vol 2: 66–69), “sport and citizenship” had become “ sport and anti-fascism” (Pujadas i Martí and Santacana 1995 vol. 2: 62–66), or the kind of modern sociability and citizenship that Francoism had sought to suppress from the practice and spectacle of sport. To a certain extent, sports facilities during the Franco period reinforced its perception as a classist affair: before gyms became ubiquitous in post- Franco, democratic Barcelona, private tennis and polo clubs were few, highly selective, prohibitively expensive and strategically situated in the well-off neighborhoods of the city. In Barcelona, from the early 1970s, the FAVB (Federation of Residents’ Associations of Barcelona) saw this as a shameful inequality and vigorously campaigned for the building in all popular and working-class neighborhoods of publicly owned, free-of- charge sports facilities, in free-from-speculation, publicly owned land. These were to be intimately connected to schools and popular local celebrations in an attempt to stimulate the practice of sport and the promotion of a healthy population as a citizen’s right that the local government had the duty to provide. In matters of sport, as in matters of health, housing, and education, neighborhood and other grassroots 132 8 EXERCISING DEMOCRATIC CITIZENSHIP: SPORT IN THE RUN-UP ... associations (musical, Catholic groups) were asking Barcelona’s local government to act as an instrument of the welfare state, without these demands taking away from these groups their role as catalyzers and promoters themselves of the spread of sports practice, as they had been during the Second Republic. The call for the massification of sport had spatial implications that also contributed to imbricate it in the struggles of urban social movements. Calls for the creation of local sports facilities were frequently tied to struggles over permission to use obsolete space, always in danger of becoming the object of speculative greed. For example, the local association of El Clot-Camp de l’Arpa neighborhood fought successfully in 1976 against the Pla Comarcal (Regional Plan) re-adjudicating obsolete land previously occupied by industry (companies RENFE and Fibracolor) for the purpose of building apartments for private development. Their successful claim was on the grounds that the land was needed for the construction of a nursery, a school, and sports facilities (Associació de Veïns Clot-Camp de l’Arpa 1976: 3). The connection of massive sport practice and the struggle against capitalist exploitation of and speculation with urban land is made very clear in the document published by FAVB at the time of the first municipal elections.

It is necessary to get sports facilities by de-privatizing sporting areas, even municipal ones, by rezoning empty areas for the construction of new facilities for the practice of sports. It will be extremely important to coordinate actions involving cultural, school and sports facilities. (FAVB 1979: 10)3

Another clear example of this consideration of sport as a democratic right can be found in the communists’ program of the pre-democratic period. For them, the practice of sport should be separated and free from capitalist social relations and ways of being. Sport must be a “democratic expression of a free and disinterested hobby” (Borja et al. 1977: 228). Consequently, they advocate “the practice of a ‘free’ sport, with no competitive ambition whatsoever, where play, amusement, physical exercise and social relations are the most important elements” (Ibid.: 231). Radical connections are made of this kind of sporting practice with culture and the production of a democratic subject:

Integrating physical education within the frame of cultural education should entail the development of a pedagogy of physical and intellectual education that contributes to the production of responsible citizens. (Ibid.: 229) EXERCISING DEMOCRATIC CITIZENSHIP: SPORT IN THE RUN-UP ... 133

This openly political understanding of sport is aware of the ideological implications in practicing it. Its proponents aim to avoid elitism and nationalism, precisely what had characterized the practice of sport during the dictatorship (Ibid.: 232). In this way, a clear opposition of elite and professionally competitive sport versus its massive popular practice is delineated. Popular Olympiads are cited as an example of the latter, in opposition to the ofﬁcial ones with their concerns for a better, more competitive, medal-winning sporting elite:

Sports’ real problem is not the lack of sporting success or the number of Olympic medals won, but the fact that the great majority of people do not practice it. The current Popular Olympiads movement, organized outside of ofﬁcial sport, asserts the will to a collective and massive practice of sport, and demonstrates how far ofﬁcial policies are from these needs. (Ibid.: 227)

Along the same lines is what the Congrés de Cultura Catalana had to say about sport.4 In a part of its resolutions that reveal structuralist and psychoanalytic inﬂuences framed by Marxism, their authors offer a critique of sport in modern society and, by extension, under Francoism. According to the Congrés, Francoism’s dealing with sport had exploited certain ideological trends that favored the consolidation in the average practicing citizen of “an acknowledgement of authority and ... the careless and subordinated abandonment of himself to discipline” (Congrés de Cultura Catalana 1978: 269); in spectators, a “passive, brutalized distraction ... [to be given] idols with which to identify, making spectators believe in their national superiority” (Ibid.: 270–271); and in the talented citizen, the promotion of him/herself as an “isolated individuality” (Ibid.: 270–271). Sport in the new democratic context, by contrast, was to be the radical opposite, a transforming practice for the new subject in the new society, very similar in its liberating capabilities to what cultural practice is conceived as being able to provide under new democratic conditions, as we saw in Chapter 4:

We believe that a new concept of culture can exist, within a different, freer and more democratic society ... where constituted powers cannot manip- ulate nor direct it towards aims that do not beneﬁt the collective ... We 134 8 EXERCISING DEMOCRATIC CITIZENSHIP: SPORT IN THE RUN-UP ...

should move towards a new concept of sport that understands it as an activity that seeks the physical wellbeing and psychological balance of the population, as an educating tool and as leisure, freely practiced ... as a pleasant activity ... a liberating and fulﬁlling expression of the human being in leisure that destroys the classic existential antagonism between body and soul. (Ibid.: 268, 294)

Also reminiscent of how culture was conceptualized in this period, is the idea that the administration of leisure is to be autonomous, part of a “self-managed, liberating and creative planning” (Ibid.: 293), free from capitalist alienation and therefore “running away from the obligation of consuming fetishes, commodities and stereotyped ways of life to which capitalist society pushes us” (Ibid.: 294). The very inclusion of sport in the Resolutions of the Congrés and the politically radical terms in which its social relevance is theorized clearly proves what an important part of cultural and political democratic struggles sport is. When conveniently transformed by democratic principles, sport and the benefits it brings about are “a right of every citizen which the collectivity should not renounce” (Ibid.: 269).5 Facilitating the practice of sport according to the Congrés was seen as part of the democratic government’sresponsi- bility to guarantee the production of a fully human, that is, democratic citizen. Sport contributes to making a better human being of the citizen and provides instruments for “a free, creative and critical education” (Ibid.: 294), the characteristics we saw earlier associated with the power of culture in a democratic society in socialist and communist discourses. The fact that the first democratic municipality grouped them together as the Culture and Sports Area speaks of the same joined conceptualization of the practice of sport as transformative at both the individual and the collective level, in ways that are separate, distinct, and in opposition to the rules of a capitalist economy of values. Despite the harsh separation that the Congrés and PSUC writers drew between sporting practices during the dictatorship and what was to be desirable and expected in the new democratic period, it is vital to mention the ways in which this period would also continue practices and social conceptualizations of sports that came from the years of dictatorship. We have already mentioned in Chapters 3 and 6, and they are well known, the continuities that the pursuit of the Olympic Games revealed with respect to urban growth models and regarding the very protagonists involved on EXERCISING DEMOCRATIC CITIZENSHIP: SPORT IN THE RUN-UP ... 135 each side of Franco’s death. But there is more to continuities than Porcioles-style urban boosterism and Samaranch’s unscathed transit from Francoist to democrat provide, particularly in order to explain the seamless transfer of allegiances on the part of the citizenry. It would indeed be reductionist to claim that sports had only been a rich people’s practice during Francoism. Like the rest of the fascist movement, Francoism had seen from the very beginning the importance of sport as a form of mass culture (Pujadas i Martí 2005:74),as involving disciplinary practices able to produce satisfied and conform- ingcitizens,andasaspectacletoentertainandpacifythem.Its promotion had been entrusted to the Falangista party from 1941 (Congrés de Cultura Catalana 1978: 269), which instituted physical education as part of the school curriculum, but all the way had to fight the reticence of the Catholic church while defending the appropriate- ness of its practices, particularly when it came to girls and women (Ofer 2009: 106). As Ofer argues, Fascist ideologies were “anchored ... in the more open and progressive perceptions of the human body” (Ibid.: 126). Or to put it another way, Fascism had a modern concept of the healthy body and what it took to keep it that way that the most reactionary forms of Catholicism could not accept, particularly when it came to the female body. It was not until the mid-1950s that mass sports made a comeback for the Francoist regime. Coinciding with geopolitical changes for the regime in the early 1950s, the state’s conception of sport changed from an emphasis on the connection of sport with militarism and indoctrination to a different one with well- being and leisure, more attuned to its social significance in other European countries (Pujadas i Martí and Santacana 1995 vol 2: 169, 173). José Antonio Elola Olaso, appropriately a Falangist with experience in the Frente de Juventudes, the Spanish Fascist party’syouth front, where a lot of sport training took place, and the National Head [Delegado] of Sports from 1956, definedin1959thesocial function of sport in terms that are at some points indistinguishable from the democratic claims of the future anti-Francoist movements:

[Sport] is a whole educational tool, not only in the physical, but also in the intellectual and moral realm ... Sport is preventive health, a source of health. (Quoted in Pujadas i Martí 2005: 75; and Pujadas and Santacana 1995 vol 2: 173) 136 8 EXERCISING DEMOCRATIC CITIZENSHIP: SPORT IN THE RUN-UP ...

The Law of Physical Education of 1961 sought “to promote the dissemination through propagandistic means of sporting practices, the building of facilities that would bring sports close to citizens and in this way that would increase the competitive level, the training of physical education teachers and the extension in number of associations” (Pujadas i Martí 2005: 75).6 It is true that this politics was never able to overcome a chronic deficiency in number and quality of sports facilities. It is also true that, for that reason, it presented unequal results across Spain, with particular success stories like Sabadell, a city near Barcelona labeled by the regime as a “pilot city of Spanish sport” next to cases of failure like that of Barcelona, where real estate interests took precedence over ideological ones in matters of the mass promotion of sport through the building of facilities (Ibid. 1995 vol 2: 182–183). However, it seems clear that a discourse of universal practice of sport, as physical education or as spectacle, was very familiar to Barcelona’s populations by the 1970s and certainly part of a dominant discourse (Ibid. 1995:200–210). This is particularly well illustrated by the massive success of the 1966 publicity campaign of the Sports’ National Office, headed by Juan Antonio Samaranch under the slogan “we count on you” (Ibid. 1995 vol 2: 203). In other words, what the Barcelona population might make of sport in the 1960s might well have been part of a shared memory that belonged to a modernizing, democratizing tradition coming from the early twentieth century and the Second Republic, but their ideas were also framed in response to a discourse owned and propagated by the policies of late-Francoist, technocratic political figures like the already mentioned Elola Olasa or his successor in post, Samaranch. The social meanings and ideologies implied in the massive practice and spectacle of sport are therefore complex and ambiguous in late Francoism. They were conforming practices to the extent that they were supported and embraced by at least some influential Francoist sectors. But at the same time, the regime’s tolerance and encouragement of sport created an area of possibility where other symbolic meanings could exist surreptitiously. Despite the regime’s rigid vertical structure of its institutional organization (Congrés de Cultura Catalana 1978:269)7 and the ideological manipulation it imposed on its practice, sport opened a window through which Catalanist and democratic aspirations could be channeled within a Francoist framework.

We must recognize that in Catalonia, given the existence of sporting and leisure organisations of long tradition, some activities have been maintained. EXERCISING DEMOCRATIC CITIZENSHIP: SPORT IN THE RUN-UP ... 137

While these could not be spread among the people, they were indeed practiced by some groups who continued their trajectory, avoiding manipulation and centralist control and trying to have an impact on the new generations. (Ibid.: 271)

Moreover, cities near Barcelona like Terrasa and the already mentioned Sabadell, for example, had potent competitive handball, hockey and swimming teams whose players were recruited locally thanks to a tradition of cultivating grassroots sport. On the other hand, as Pujadas i Martí (2005: 79) states in relation to Sabadell: “It is obvious that these successes were amply taken advantage of by the mass media and the authorities themselves, who viewed in Sabadell’s case an authentic mirror of Spanish sporting successes.” Whether those elite sportsmen and women from Sabadell teams and their fans truly felt the ideological interpellation of the regime or rather tolerated it as imposed manipulation and had more of an allegiance to Catalanist and democratic ideals is unclear. Either way, they were engaging in elite competition and nation-affirming as modes and values of sporting exercise, the kinds of sports practice and spectatorship that, as we have seen, that the PSUC and Congrés documents detested. In places like Barcelona, where the social implantation of sport had been much more unsuccessful than in Terrasa or Sabadell, say, sport could be socially much more easily constructed as a democratic claim. Still, the regime had also emphasized the benefits for everyone of engaging in sport, creating among the population expectations that it could not ultimately match by building the actual facilities that could make the massive practice of sport possible (Pujadas i Martí and Santacana 1995 vol 2: 206– 208; Boix and Espada 1991). One could therefore argue that the democratic struggles around access to the universal practice of sport of the late- Francoist period are not fully positions against the regime, but in fact demands for the full implementation of what by the mid-1960s were positions widely, and too enthusiastically for its own sake, embraced by the regime, bar its most fundamentalist Catholic factions. All in all, the politically ambiguous, in some aspects contradictory character of the social meaning of sport during late-Francoism is of great importance in understanding its smooth transition into the democratic period, and the important role it played in creating social consensus. Despite its humanist rhetoric, the Olympics changed all the priorities in the practice of sport embraced by the PSUC and Congrés, and substituted them with the reimposition of the abhorred principles of competitiveness, 138 8 EXERCISING DEMOCRATIC CITIZENSHIP: SPORT IN THE RUN-UP ... participation as passive spectatorship instead of universal practice and a hero cult, de-emphasizing the role of the collective in favour of praise of the individual, and of the commodificiation of sport (Comisión 1992:84).In other words, when looking at sport as a vehicle for subject formation, the Olympics undid the democratic subject and replaced it with the neoliberal one. And yet, the truth is that some of those conceptualizations and practices of sport (competitiveness, spectatorship, local patriotism) had been with the population all along, and associated too with anti-Francoist practices. Such ambiguity helps to explain that, even though sport yielded the same kinds of political and economic benefits to democratic municipal power as it had done during the dictatorship: a population seduced into accepting sport as a medium for urban transformation, capitalist investment, and for producing local patriotism, it could still be discursively constructed as being associated with anti-Francoist, democratizing, Catalanist practices. Abadía Naudí and Pujadas i Martí (2005: 52) deem the transitional period for the social practice of sport as: “The key stage for the modernization, mass access and democratization of sport in the city in the twentieth century”. When the democratic municipalities of the PSC- PSUC coalition came to power, their sports policies moved in the same direction, as we have seen with the case for culture. First, universal free access and the promotion of its use. Second, public ownership of facilities that could make the first aim possible. In so doing, they were responding to a popular clamor (Ajuntament, Memòria d’activitats 1981: 109). “We find ourselves before a disproportionate increase, on the part of most of the population, in the desire to practice a sport” (Ibid.: 102). Since private ownership of sports facilities had produced “inequality and discrimination in citizens’ access to the practice of sport,” there was a need to promote, instead, “sport centres in the more peripheral and increasingly over- crowded boroughs” (Abadía Naudí 2007: 430), subsidized with substantial public investment. With the help of regional (Generalitat) and provincial (Diputació) administrations, a great deal was done in this direction. The city hall created, for the first time, a sports policy, it purpose-built facilities, or fixed already existing ones, in this way becoming one of the biggest promoters of sport in the city (Ibid.: 367, 397). The importance of considering sport as part of culture is also underlined in the way that all administrations dealt with them as part of a unit. The Diputació created in July 1981 an informative commission for Culture and Sport overseen by the Sports and Culture Activities Service (Ibid.: 409). In a key moment for the construction of consensus around EXERCISING DEMOCRATIC CITIZENSHIP: SPORT IN THE RUN-UP ... 139 the Barcelona candidacy, 1981–1982, both the Diputació and the Generalitat consolidated themselves as promoters of sport for all and invested valuable resources to play a key role in extending universal access to sport through contact with sports associations, the refurbishing of sports facilities and sports equipment for all in the communities, or by training P.E. teachers (Ibid.: 408–424). The generosity of all public administrations saw them work closely with sports grassroots associations. Sport was immediately connected too to the occupation of public spaces for festive activities, fulfilling in this way, but also containing, the political right to the city that the residents’ associations had fought for: go-kart races for children, the First Youth Football Tournament of Barcelona Neighborhoods; the First Tournament of Street Football, and the more popular, accessible to all and ludic in character races of La Mercé, Jean Bouin and Ciutat de Barcelona, the Bicycle Celebration (Abadía Naudí 2007: 407, 433), are examples of events with wide participation by the population that began to be organized by the municipality during its first term in office. All of this active intervention by the government in matters of sport speaks loudly and clearly of a desire on their part to democratize the city and to return rights to citizens that had been withheld and fought for during the dictatorship. But a picture of democratic municipal sports policies, in this early period, would not be complete or fully understood without mentioning the Olympic Games. We have already discussed in Chapter 3 that there was a long history of Barcelona putting itself forward throughout the twentieth century to stage the Games, and under widely different political auspices. We can now assert that at least from July 16, 1980, when Juan Antonio Samaranch was chosen as president of the IOC, the Barcelona municipality was actively working, once again, on its Olympic candidacy.8 Public media presentation of the project took place during the “Night of Sport” on January 30, 1981, a gala organized by the sports daily El Mundo Deportivo where the best Spanish sportsmen and women are chosen. With Samaranch and mayor Narcís Serra in attendance, they both took the opportunity to express their commitment to take up the challenge (García 1981). Subsequently, state support for this was sought and publicly obtained, in the first instance through the figure of the king. During the Armed Forces Day celebrations on May 30, 1981, hosted by Barcelona and with King Juan Carlos in attendance, mayor Serra made a public announcement regarding the city’s Olympic intentions (“El Alcalde”). On June 30, 1981 the municipality agreed unanimously to put forward a candidacy (Abadía Naudí 2007: 401). The full support of the 140 8 EXERCISING DEMOCRATIC CITIZENSHIP: SPORT IN THE RUN-UP ... state came soon after the social democrats of the PSOE achieved state power in October 1982, in the form of the Spanish Olympic Committee backing the Barcelona candidacy over the ones of Granada and Jaca (Ibid.: 405). In short, the institutional pursuit of the Olympic candidacy occupied the practical totality of the democratic municipality’s first term in office, and therefore it cannot be separated from the sports policies it put in place during the same period. Having the candidacy backed by the different Spanish central authorities was an indispensable first step leading the diplomatic efforts of Serra and Samaranch, followed by that of convincing the IOC, but no less important was to carry the population along in support for the event.9 From 1982, one of the two main objectives of the city hall in sports matters, along with the promotion of sports for all, was already openly “to turn Barcelona into the best framework for great sports events to take place, creating in this way wealth, interest and spectacle” (quoted by Abadía Naudí 2007: 282). By stating this as a main objective, Barcelona’s democratic municipality was taking up the baton from a long tradition in the city’s history, not only with respect to the organization of the Olympic Games, but also of macro events more generally, as the preferred form of boosting the city’s economy and transformation. As we know, its immediate predecessor was no other than Francoist mayor Porcioles, whose advances along these lines had always hit a the wall of frontal opposition on the part of grassroots associations. It was therefore of utmost importance to handle popular support for the event very carefully. Abadía Naudí’s(2007: 397) description of the important advances in matters of sports policy during the 1981–1982 period (regularization and balance in the spread of sports facilities throughout the geography of the city; dissemination and promotion of sporting events favoring the access of all to sport; creation of the Municipal Sports Council) needs to be interpreted with the candidacy’s preparation in mind, a candidacy that needed to be sold, not only to representatives of the IOC in fierce competition with other cities, but also to a highly politicized local population. From 1981, to start preparing the city for a future Olympic candidacy entailed, on the part of the Barcelona municipality, “to accentuate the municipality’s role around other sporting manifestations in the city” (Ibid.: 367), through the organization of sports events, the building of new facilities (ninety-three were built between 1976 and 1982 [Abadía Naudí and Pujadas i Martí 2005: 55]) and the rehabilitation of old ones such as the Picornell swimming pools or the Montjuïc Olympic stadium. From very early on the candidacy was presented to residents as being in complete EXERCISING DEMOCRATIC CITIZENSHIP: SPORT IN THE RUN-UP ... 141 harmony with the democratizing efforts of sports policies, the latter an indispensable condition for Barcelona to become a credible Olympic candidate, “a prior and fundamental requisite in order for our city to become the 1992 Olympic Games host” (Ajuntament, Memòria d’activitats 1982: 102). Such communion is illustrated in the words of Enric Truñó, the municipality’s Head of the Sports Area from 1981 to 1995, when in 1981 he stated the ways in which the Olympics would continue, potentiate, and enhance the work that the democratic municipalities were doing in order to materialize and implement the demands of grassroots movements:

The Olympics must be used to take a leap forward both in terms of urban design and infrastructure as well as in sports facilities in schools and the different boroughs, because it is crucial to extend among young people and the entire population the practice of sports understood as a competitive and leisure activity, as this will contribute to humanize our city. (Abadía Naudí 2007: 402)

Moreover, the popular, festive, participatory, and eminently not competitive nature of the sporting events mentioned earlier was connected in municipal discourses with the promotion of the democratic ethos of sports for all. But as mass events, they could also double as preparation for a city gearing up to becoming a host to the spectacle and business of sport. By incorporating the same democratic component to sport that the grassroots associations, neighborhood and strictly sports ones, had historically demanded, the municipality could effectively contain the oppositional character that sport – and in particular macro events such as the Olympic Games – had acquired during the dictatorship. The more the city hall was investing in the promotion of sports for all in the city, the more it was also doing to promote the city’s candidacy for the Olympics. Indeed, Muxí (2011: 76) sees in the active position taken on the sports front by mayor Serra a cynical and calculated maneuver to promote the universal practice of sport among the citizenry with a view to facilitating their massive support for hosting the Games for which he was putting in a bid. Be that as it may, Serra’sandthen Maragall’s government actions gave undeniable substance to what would permanently become the official line about the Games: that preparations to host them had been made first and foremost at the service of the city (Abad in Samaranch et al. 2002:15–16). The number and variety of municipal actions on sport from the moment when the candidacy became “the 142 8 EXERCISING DEMOCRATIC CITIZENSHIP: SPORT IN THE RUN-UP ... project” to pursue by the city hall (and well supported by the actions of the other administrations: Diputació, Generalitat, and the central state), “contributed greatly to the consolidation of a process of mass access to the practice of sports” (Abadía Naudí 2007: 408). And this consolidation of a new sociability of sport in a favorable context was in turn key to building popular support and credibility vis-à-vis the Olympic Games candidacy. The importance of such a context can hardly be overestimated. While other Olympic candidate cities might have had to do a lot of convincing of their local populations regarding the desirability of allocat- ing vast amounts of the municipal budget in preparation for the Olympic event, in Barcelona’s case the local authorities were able to articulate a pro-Olympic discourse that flowed in harmony with the popular demands for a more sporting city. Such discourse could embrace and capitalize on the longed-for and enthusiastically exercised democratic sociability of sport evident among the Barcelona population and its multiple grassroots associations, and was able to use it as a platform to convince this population that the Games was just one more opportunity for the citizenry to put into practice and to expand such sociability. Sports activities constituted an increasing part of the neighborhood associations activities during the early 1980s, as the municipality and the rest of administrations concentrated efforts to promote the Barcelona Olympic candidacy (Abadía Naudí 2007: 439). More and more of their work was done in collaboration with the municipality, which is indicative of how much the full spectrum of the grassroots movements’ agenda for the social implantation of sport was embraced (and co-opted) by the institutions (Ibid.). While the conditions of possibility of a new sociability of sport were unmistakably political, and as such they had shared grassroots political agendas, it is also the case that, once these conditions were achieved, the practice of sport lost its politically progressive edge. The example of sports policies offers a paradigmatic example of how the consensual citizen emerges: a satisfied and thankful resident who sees multiple evidences of a government at the service of the people, who consequently is made to feel as being in full agreement with such government.SuchacitizenisliabletoaccepttheCityCouncil’ssportsprojects as having his/her best interest in mind, and therefore as being his/her ownproject,atwhoseserviceitisworthbeing.Theefforttogetthe Olympic Games, to the extent that they were understood as extensions of the democratizing effort, could in this way claim to involve the entire city as a single subject. EXERCISING DEMOCRATIC CITIZENSHIP: SPORT IN THE RUN-UP ... 143

But there was more in governmental action to achieve non-controversial communion with and support from the local population than accepting and carrying out grassroots demands. There were also shifts as well in modes of citizen address derived from the introduction of other practices of sport. In no way contradictory, but rather continuing with the recent tradition of supporting the massive practice of sport in public spaces, Barcelona started assiduously to host international competitive events to promote its potential as Olympic material. The most well-known is the FIFA World Cup of 1982, celebrated in Spain, which served Barcelona well as a preparation for the kind of macro event that the Olympic Games was going to be. The inau- gural ceremony took place in the Catalan capital and was used as a platform to announce the Olympic candidacy, and as proof that the city was ready to organize such events successfully. But there were less prominent examples, from the racing cars’ Monjuïc 24 Hours to championships in different sports modalities, from sailing to table tennis to hockey.10 It is hand in hand with these other ways of collective participation in sport, through spectatorship, and culminating in the Olympic Games, that a different idea of the resident, of his/her relation to the city and of his/her role in it. From the perspective of sport, the centrality of the Olympic Games shifts the axis from massive participation into massive spectatorship of the event. But paradoxically, from the point of view of the citizen’s relation to the city, it moves the citizen from being merely a beneﬁciary of the actions of government in the city to a role as an active producer of the city. As we will explore in Chapter 10, the Games propitiate a government discourse that instills in the citizen the desire to perform citizenship for others, to act in public with a global audience in mind, to produce an image of the city for the visitor. The city hall’s organization in October 1981 of an Olympism Day triggered the following comment from Vicenç Esquiroz, journalist and founder of the Club Natació Montjuïc, an emblematic swimming sports facility:

Although the’92 Games are still ten years away, it is necessary to make aware of them, not only athletes and those practicing basic sports such as athletics, swimming and gymnastics, but every citizen. This is in order to create the necessary climate vis-à-vis this manifestation of world sports: the XXV Olympics. (1982: 14–15)

What emerges in this quote is the concept of the citizen’sfunctionand responsibility to provide the right atmosphere for the celebration of a macro event, or rather the need to produce the possibility of citizens providing such 144 8 EXERCISING DEMOCRATIC CITIZENSHIP: SPORT IN THE RUN-UP ... an atmosphere. The athletes’ participation is secondary to such effort. A bit later, in the summer of 1982, Narcís Serra would praise Barcelonians for having demonstrated their “extraordinary civic ability” (quoted in Bañeres 1983: 243) during the inauguration ceremony of the FIFA World Cup, a sign that Barcelonians were making progress in the municipality’sdesired direction. Esquiroz and Serra’s ways of addressing the citizen de-emphasize the earlier connection of sport as culture (i.e., realization and exercise of democratic citizenship) and displaces the massive component in sport from its practice as a right of the citizen to its hosting as a citizen responsibility. In his/her new role, the Barcelona citizen mediates the event for the global audience, produces the city, not for him/herself, but for such an audience. The meaning of this revamped citizenship is no longer expressed through the democratic use of public space, but through the citizen taking responsibility for the image of the city in public spaces. In patriotic fashion, organizing the Olympic Games was presented to the Barcelona citizen as a tall order demanding that s/he rises to the challenge. An impeccable performance in front of the global audience is his/her duty, a responsibility affecting each and every Barcelonian. Simultaneously, deriving pleasure and pride from this whole process becomes an imperative. In this way, the logic of competitiveness engulfs the Barcelonian subject who, along with the athletes, is winning, as stated in the municipal campaign, “Barcelona will win.” This triumph is of a different kind from the triumph over the dictatorship of the 1970s with which the first democratic mayors came to power because it is a triumph that depends on the world market to signify. It means that the city and its citizens have become what they are by virtue of succeeding in going outside themselves, by putting the transformation of the city at the service of the market. According to this logic, the city, and every subject in it, as long as s/he identifies as a Barcelonian, becomes an enterprise whose justification will depend on its validation by a world audience.11 We explore the full development of this new logic in the next two chapters.

NOTES 1. But it was not the anti-bourgeois practice that it was in other European countries (Pujadas i Martí and Santacana 1995 vol 1: 160). 2. See also Pujadas i Martí and Santacana 1995 vol 2: 47–70. NOTES 145

3. For the connection of claims for the massive practice of sport with demands for public use of land to be taken away from business and capitalist speculation, see Associació de Veïns Badal, Brasil i Bordeta. 4. The Congrés de Cultura Catalana, active during the first years of Transition, from 1975 to 1977, was a hugely supported civic initiative which organized a series of cultural and political events to defend Catalan culture and rights, and to help guarantee their development in the new democracy. Most notable are the three influential volumes they published, analyzing the structural reasons for Catalonia’s contemporary situation and stating their programmatic aspirations for a democratic Catalan society (Fundació). I am grateful to Louise Johnson for pointing out to me the relevance of the CCC to matters of sport, and in general the connection of sport to Catalanism and democracy from the early twentieth century. 5. It is relevant to note that the Futbol Club Barcelona took part in the Congrés and contributed to the elaboration of its resolutions, in this way connecting itself at this point in time with the most progressive of sport conceptualizations (Santacana i Torres 2005: 247). We will return to this point in Chapter 15. 6. See also Boix and Espada (1991) for a detailed account of how Samaranch was key to this, partially failed, will to promote the massive practice of sports in Spain. In fact, Samaranch’s professional institutional life inside the regime’s power structures was to a great extent devoted to this cause. 7. The Head of Sports was endowed with absolute power in matters of sport. He presided over all regional sports organizations (Federaciones), which was notorious in the case of football and resented by the clubs, F. C. Barcelona in particular (Santacana i Torres 2005: passim; Pujadas i Marti and Santacana 1995 vol 2: 210). 8. Samaranch himself dated the beginning of the conversations on the possibility of putting Barcelona forward as a candidate city with the first democratic Barcelona mayor of the post-Francoist period, Narcís Serra, in 1979, when he saw clearly that he would become the next president of the IOC (Samaranch et al. 2002: 7). 9. Maragall’s dismissal, years later, of the relevance of convincing the local population in the candidacy period over that of seducing IOC members because “Candidacy means gaining votes and votes could not be gained in Barcelona, but abroad” (Samaranch et al. 2002: 10) is inaccurate. It is clear that the municipality made a conscious effort to secure the support of Barcelona residents, and that it used such support as an asset to enhance the city’s candidacy before the IOC. Abad (Ibid.: 15–16) quotes the cases of Montreal and Mexico City as having played at a disadvantage when competing against Barcelona for this reason. 10. See Abadía Naudí (2007: 407) for a full list of events. 146 8 EXERCISING DEMOCRATIC CITIZENSHIP: SPORT IN THE RUN-UP ...

11. Other municipal discursive initiatives, which I will not analyze in depth here, contributed toward reinforcing the identiﬁcation between citizen, city, and Olympic Games, actively producing ideas of how the desirable and good Barcelonian was expected to look: invested, proud, grateful, and willing to be the face of the Olympic city as synonymous with a democratic city. Key publicity campaigns were “Everyone’s objective” and “Barcelona will win,” but the same kinds of ideas can be found in the video Barcelona ’92: A City’s Love Story with Olympism by Leopoldo Pomés, creator of the image campaign during the candidacy period, or in the exhibition Barcelona, the City and 92, curated by Josep Acebillo and Pep Subirós, shown twice in the city, ﬁrst from October 8, 1988 to January 8, 1989, and again from November 21, 1990 to January 13, 1991. CHAPTER 9

Rethinking Barcelona’92 as a Cultural Milestone

The Olympics crystallized for the first time, and with lasting effects, the efforts to produce a global image of Barcelona, what after the Games was called the brand, at whose service both culture and citizens must be. Obviously, the municipality had already produced an image for the visitor and the tourist (Balibrea 2004), but the Olympics allowed this image to take a qualitative leap and become omnipresent; the raison d’être for the whole city. This is what, years later, allowed the municipality to say confidently and proudly: “Barcelona is more than a city, it is abrand” (Ajuntament, 2003a:13and2003b:189–199). It is how the concepts of culture and citizen are refigured in this first, but durable, synthesis of the brand that this chapter and the next explore.

CULTURE BECOMES IDENTITY,IDENTITY BECOMES THE BRAND Communist and socialist accounts of culture and its social role in the pre- democratic early days of the democratic municipalities had stayed well clear of deﬁnitions and applications of culture that had Catalan identity at its core. The latter was indeed mentioned and incorporated as an indispensable part of struggles to reinstate an autochthonous, popular culture and common language that Francoism had suppressed, but not given centrality. This had a necessary consequence in citizen address, whereby Catalan allegiances featured as part of a list of essential rights to be devolved, but did not occupied an ontologically different place from other

© The Author(s) 2017 147 M.P. Balibrea, The Global Cultural Capital, The Contemporary City, DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-53596-2_9 148 9 RETHINKING BARCELONA’92 AS A CULTURAL MILESTONE matters of social disadvantage. As is well known, this was a time of endless and never fully resolved confrontations between the municipal powers and the autonomous government (Generalitat), which, in the hands of the conservative nationalists of Convergència i Unió (CiU), had the reinstatement and strengthening of Catalan identity and culture very much at its core. In matters of culture, a recurrent criticism was the administrations’ respective patronages, creating a culture that was highly dependent on public subsidies and which favored only those cultural producers who were ideologically close, or prepared to comply with power. An initiative in 1984 from Generalitat’s Head of Culture, Joan Rigol, to arrive at an Agreement on Culture across governments and ideologies that had a stake in Catalonia failed miserably, epitomizing how impossible in the pre- Olympic period it had been to reach any kind of ideological consensus around cultural matters. The inability of the respective administrations to cooperate over cultural matters, despite – and aggravated by – the overlap in power and responsibilities over cultural matters, to carry out projects centrally, the most expensive ones requiring investment in the building or regeneration of cultural facilities and infrastructures (museums, auditor- iums, libraries), seriously damaged in the short- and medium-term Barcelona’s aspirations to capitality. The advent of the Olympic project would only partially solve the problems, though in the long run allowed for all the planned cultural infrastructures to be built, even if some were not ready by 1992. The socialists had all along criticized the identitarian basis of the nationalists’ politics, and its provincial, pernicious effects for the understanding and promotion of culture (Mascarell 1999: 104). However, in truth, the advent of the Olympic Games, and more broadly of the service economy as post-industrial Barcelona’s “destiny,” made it indispensable for the municipality to manufacture its own form of identity or local patriotism. This is largely for two mutually dependent reasons: to gather local popular support; and to create a coherent image for the visitor/ spectator. We have seen the early manifestations of this process in the municipal Memòries from the mid-1980s, in the exchanges between Maragall and Capmany, and in Serra’s invocations at the end of the’82 FIFA World Cup, among others. But if this is the case, an irony emerges: socialists’ efforts to move Barcelona toward a further and more efﬁcient integration into global capitalist exchanges, by mobilizing identity in order to accomplish its goal, were making use of the very political methods they had always criticized in rival nationalist positions. CULTURE BECOMES IDENTITY, IDENTITY BECOMES THE BRAND 149

Much has been said and written about the political disputes and struggles between CiU and PSC over the identitarian ownership of the Barcelona Games. Once Barcelona had been given the opportunity to be put on the global map, how was that map to be drawn, and what kinds of geopolitical and cultural realities was the appearance of Barcelona on it supposed to make globally visible? Would the excellence Barcelona was set to radiate contribute to educating an ignorant global spectatorship about the wonders of Catalonia? Or would an impressive Barcelona instead cause this worldwide audience to change its mind about the backward, pre-modern and authoritarian Spain of Cármenes and bull- fighters? Were those two outcomes compatible, or were they mutually undermining? While discrepancies along these lines were fiercely defended and debated by the different factions, there was no dispute between the rival administrations when it came to valuing the advantages of hosting the macro event, or to signaling that the whole point of hosting it was to put Barcelona on the global map of economic and symbolic market transactions. Granted, nationalists had a critique of how socialists were doing things, but their criticism fits into the category of what Subirós (1993b:76–82), as head of the Barcelona Cultural Olympiad, OCSA, speaking of neighborhood associations, calls partial critiques, those which never questioned the validity of the whole enterprise in the first place. In other words, none of the administrations rejected the event as what it could ideally be: a phenomenal opportunity to boost the local economy, whether we understand local as regional or as municipal here. Putting it even more clearly, neither of the two administrations opposed the Games as the global capitalist enterprise it is. Resina, one of the most vocal critics of the socialists’ time in municipal power, rightly pointed out the many ways in which the whole Olympic enterprise was insidiously implicated in processes of banaliza- tion, spectacularization, and postpoliticization of city life and identity (2008: 199–234). For Resina, more polemically, the ultimate aim of the entire hosting of the Games was to complete a process of Catalan identity dissolution, to Hispanize Barcelona and Catalonia, and to produce a vision of them as being forever subordinated to the Spanish state. The opinions expressed by municipal representatives, such as Subirós, Maragall himself, and their supporters, certainly confirms his view. Right after the conclusion of the Games, they saw in the way that things had developed the emergence of a new Spanish identity. Subirós (1993b: 92) speaks of an “explosion of an understood will, of an immense desire for 150 9 RETHINKING BARCELONA’92 AS A CULTURAL MILESTONE reconciliation”, while Maragall is said to have “called for the re-foundation of Spain after the Olympic experience” (Espada 1992), which according to Espada means:

Maragall’s will that Spain be a state of two capitals, not only in fact, but by right too. [Thanks to the Games] Barcelona has increased its power. Before the world, as the well-travelled Juan Antonio Samaranch said, it has offered an image of the end of the siesta. Before the rest of Spain it has conﬁrmed its forefront role without offending solidarity or understanding.

Finally, Jaume Guillamet, Head of the municipality’s Media ofﬁce at the time, insisted on the idea of a renewed and redeemed Spanish identity facilitated by Barcelona’s example: “Well-meaning patriotism, conviviality of ﬂags and languages, urbaneness, happiness and universalism. The new face of democratic Spain” (1993: 163). Still, the view from outside tended to insist on how the Games had succeeded in creating for the global audience an image of distinctiveness and difference for Catalonia with respect to Spain. Moragas (2002: 132) argues that the international media covering the Barcelona Games focused strongly on the Catalan difference within the Spanish context, along with the city’s urban transformation and its quality. Nick Pitt (1992), The Sunday Times correspondent, corroborates this view:

None have been more enthusiastic in using the Games to promote their own national identity than the hosts, once one had worked out who they were. ... those claiming the privilege are the City of Barcelona, the nation of Catalonia and the kingdom of Spain, the last of which, despite putting up much of the money to stage the Games, has come a poor third in self- promotion ... Certainly, Catalonia and Barcelona can jointly claim credit for the miracle of organisation and effort that has brought the city fast- forward into the late 20th century.

Another journalist, New York Times correspondent George Vecsey (1992: 4), stated that “the world became aware that the Catalans are a separate people inside Spain, and this was the ultimate message of these Games: People are asserting their independence.” On the academic side, McNeill (1999: 79), focused more on the strictly political battles between parties, saw Pasqual Maragall as the unmistakable winner of political control after the Games, but without denying the strength with which the nationalist CULTURE BECOMES IDENTITY, IDENTITY BECOMES THE BRAND 151 presence was felt and the strengthening of the view of Barcelona at the forefront of Catalan, not Spanish development. Finally Pi Sunyer (1995: 44–49) and Hargreaves conclude that the “battle for Barcelona” fought at the symbolic level of ﬂags, anthems, folklore, and language was won by Catalanism:

Globalisation and Españolisation processes were ﬁltered through the national culture and sense of national identity, their meaning refracted through the prism of nationalism, and their impact monitored by individuals, organizations and political parties, who made every effort to turn the Games to the cultural, economic and political advantage of Catalonia ... In overall terms, by the end of the Games, Catalan identity had been more enhanced than Spanish identity. (Hargreaves 2000: 160, 162)

Political disputes over cultural symbols between PSC and CiU on the occasion of the Barcelona Games implicitly or explicitly relied on a local population invested in them and therefore responding in one way or the other to their interpellation. The differing views of the two main parties in dispute were shared by their respective constituencies and party sympathi- zers scattered across all layers of society. Both parties were in government, and therefore both had considerable power to disseminate their views, to stimulate certain forms of social agitation, and, more generally, to exercise influence over the population as a whole through different institutional apparatuses and their allies. In the process of exercising such influence, and as part of the discourses created for that very purpose, the definition of an ideal local subject was certainly important: a militant Catalan nationalist/ independentist for CiU, and a cosmopolitan urbanite Catalanist-but-still- Spanish in the case of PSC. Barcelona citizens were actively enacting, rejecting and decoding a multiplicity of identity signals of Catalanness and Spanishness that circulated in abundance around the time of Games. In turn, those signals, more or less distorted/resignified depending on the media that transmitted them, were picked up by a global spectatorship. And according to all the interpretations outlined, the Barcelona Games managed in the transmission to assert the distinctiveness of the host city and its citizens – independently of how the recipients decided to define what made up such disparateness – and to present it as a desirable commodity. Whether such a difference should be labelled as Catalan/re-defined Spanish/Mediterranean identity (Moragas 2002: 125) was of secondary importance for the global audience. This is not because such an audience 152 9 RETHINKING BARCELONA’92 AS A CULTURAL MILESTONE necessarily ignored the particularities of the political differences between local parties, but rather because such disputes were eventually solved in the production of the Barcelona image to be projected globally, a synthesis made possible by the priorities of Capital. The brand incorporated the logics of identity, essential to nationalism and newly suitable for socialists too in their attempt to galvanize the entire local population behind the Olympic project. While the content of this image has been analyzed effectively in the works of Moragas (1992b, 1993, 2002, 2005) and of Illas (2012:82–103), I want to study here how much the focus on image- making marks a qualitative change in the conceptualization of culture for the municipality.

THE CULTURAL TURN The Barcelona Olympic Games was the first to introduce the concept of a Cultural Olympiad to last for four years, the period between the two Summer Olympics and culminating in the celebration of the Barcelona Games (García and Miah 2007: 10; Moragas 2008: 6; Subirós 1992). According to García and Miah, the development of culture as an aside of the Games has worked historically as “an opportunity for host cities to embed their distinct local identity within the national and international arena” (2007: 10). Beatriz García argues that the cultural and artistic aspects of the Olympic Games “play a critical role in defining the Games’ symbolic dimensions ... cultural discourse is fundamental to understanding how the city was experienced during the Olympic fortnight and the kinds of images that it projected to the rest of the world” (2011: 287). Culture in the Olympic context is defined by spectacle, tourist attraction and city promotion, and the Barcelona case was no different: “The initiative to present a four-year festival responded to this aim [to improve the city cultural services and international projection] and intended the involvement of relevant sponsors and public bodies to have a long-lasting impact on both national and international audiences” (García 2008: 372). This is corroborated by Pep Subirós himself (1992: 3) when he mentions the promotion of Modernisme and Antoni Gaudí’s architecture and design or “creative sophistication” (Ibid.: 4) as ways of creating a Barcelona identity for the global audience, and when he states the importance of the four-year program for the propaganda effort vis-à-vis the local population (Ibid.: 4; 1999: 15). Maragall himself defined the role of the Cultural Olympiad for Barcelona in its inauguration in 1987 as “astimulus THE CULTURAL TURN 153 from the Olympic ideals of peace, dialogue and fraternity for artistic and creative activity, and also for the construction of universal dialogue and exchange platforms” (Moragas 2002: 134), clearly marking a path beyond the definition of culture as the realm of the arts and into using it to define a distinct and local identity that can be integrated globally. At the urban regeneration level, the Olympics’ cultural program also helped to guarantee the funding for the building of cultural facilities (Subirós 1999: 16), such as Barcelona’s Centre for Contemporary Culture (CCCB); the Museum of Contemporary Art (MACBA); the Auditorium; the National Theatre; the National Museum of Art of Catalonia (MNAC); and the Aragon Crown Archive. They would become paramount for putting Barcelona on the map of cultural cities after the Games had made it a desirable tourist destination. While all these cultural elements are clearly fundamental for the host, paradoxically, as García and Miah state (2007: 11), the chronic problem of Cultural Olympiads is the lack of media attention they can attract in an environment where the value is measured by the ability to have events broadcast nationally and internationally, so that

journalists are focused entirely on covering the sport, and rely on pre- recorded inserts to provide some local background rather than engage with the real-time cultural atmosphere of the Games.

The Cultural Olympiad organized for the Barcelona Games was no exception, with many labeling it directly as a failure (Moragas 2008; García 2000:3–7). Organization and financing for it was separated from that of the Games themselves in the already mentioned OCSA, which crucially prevented it from benefiting from the financial boost awarded to other things Olympic. Isolated in this way, culture became the target of political disputes between the local and autonomous governments already mentioned. Subirós reckoned that “the approach was not serious, neither were resources proportionate to ambitions and programmatic speeches ...” (1993b: 86). But the failure of the Cultural Olympiad is not so much one to be measured by the conflict it generated between people and administrations, by the number of visitors and media interest attracted by the specific events, or by the number and coherence of the exhibitions organized in the four years it spanned. What failed was the model, one which Barcelona’s innovation in extending it for four years did not alter, the model of separating culture out from the rest of the Olympic spectacle and 154 9 RETHINKING BARCELONA’92 AS A CULTURAL MILESTONE to restrict its influence to the traditional arts. Rather than considering culture and sport as two distinct and separate aspects of the Olympiad, one could consider how they converge. This is precisely the approach taken by Moragas (1992b, 2008; see also Klausen, quoted by García [2008: 362]), who associates the importance of culture in the Olympics with it being the medium for the production of value that will be broadcast at a globaly level. The “promotion and selection of values constitutes the main cultural and political responsibility currently in the organisation of Olympic Games,” to the point that “the Olympic Games constitute ... a cultural phenomenon ... the recipients ... beyond those taken into account by the Cultural Olympiad are all those, locally and globally, who receive, directly or indirectly, the Games’ communication products” (1992:4–5), or also “The cultural project must be understood ... as all expressions of value production updated through the mass media not only dedicated to public opinion in the host city but also to international public opinion” (Moragas quoted in García 2008: 367). For Moragas, key to the endeavor of organizing the Games is the conscious process of semanticizing values and attaching them to the host’s identity in a promotional package that can be offered to and decoded by a global audience. Or as García (2008: 362) puts it, what is required is: “to summarize the political and cultural personality of the host country in a way that is both representative in the eyes of the local community and easy to understand by foreigners.” In so doing, the host’s culture becomes a product the function of which is to enter into an act of communication with a global audience whose understanding and approval of one’s presentation is paramount and therefore radically conditioning of the product. One can therefore argue that, once Barcelona becames an Olympic host, an important process started that gave culture a new and fundamental role: that of conveying an image for an external recipient, mostly composed of a global audience that will experience Barcelona through the filter of mass media, largely, though not exclusively, television. Moragas (2008: 15) goes as far as to say that the most important cultural implications of the Olympics are “the great effort of a collective to present its identity before the public world opinion, in other words, to choose the cultural expressions that identify it as a collective.” If this is true, then while OCSA’s Cultural Olympiad can be said to have failed, culture as the packaging of local cultural values for a global audience certainly did not, rather the opposite: it was at the center of the host’s immediate and lasting organizational success. Moreover, we need to take these cultural formulations into account for our discussion of THE CULTURAL TURN 155 the role of culture in the formation and transformation of a particular dominant idea of the Barcelona citizen. Becoming an Olympic city brings with it this new cultural priority. Attending to it displaces the socialists’ previous focus on using culture as a reckoner of the degree of the city’s democratization, as a service provided by the local government to its citizens, and as a process whose consistent and widespread practice contributes to producing better citizens in a better society. Instead, a very consciously mediated commodity is to be produced. One that does not necessarily contradict much of the content put forward by culture-as- democracy, but fundamentally changes its function: from that of being a benefit to all, to a very different one of being a sign of identity for the interpretation of others. The first democratic cultural agendas were focused on creating cultural events and facilities that the local citizens could use to enrich themselves in order to become better people and part of a better society. Such citizens will be in the new context taken as a given and turned into an asset for the commercial Barcelona brand. The militant community of late-Francoist and transitional Barcelonians finds its postpolitical mirror image in the masses endlessly cheering the Olympic Games. The connection is captured in the following observation, made the day before the city chosen to host the 1992 Olympic Games was announced:

Ever since the famous demonstration where one million Catalans demanded the right to Catalan political autonomy, a similar level of citizens’ unity had not been achieved. (González Casanova 1986)

In the municipal proclamation of July 22, 1992, two days before the Olympic torch arrived in Catalan territory, Maragall exhorted citizens to behave in a cultured way, presenting to the world “our uniqueness as a human community,” one which he carefully connected to the values of democracy, both recent and remote:

We want to proudly show in front of the ﬂame and in front of the world the way we are, after ﬁfteen years of democracy and autonomy, and after practically two and a half centuries of non-acknowledgement, or of ignor- ance of our [Catalan] Constitutions and Charters.

The Olympic Games produced the commercialization and standardization of these cultural and political qualities to be understood as “creative, innovative ... truly cosmopolitan” (Moragas 2008: 7), but paradoxically 156 9 RETHINKING BARCELONA’92 AS A CULTURAL MILESTONE also “with little concessions made to the commodiﬁcation of art.” To the extent that the local population itself carried and incarnated those values, they would themselves be commercialized (Moragas quoted by García 2008: 363). Moragas (2008: 15) is right when he states that the cultural legacy of the Games was “the city image projected on [a] global scale and the participation of the local community in the international debate on culture.” Indeed, the Games would change culture permanently for the city. The resulting cultural construction would become the kernel of the Barcelona tourist image and brand to be dominant after the Games, the one that would make Barcelona intelligible and desirable for a global spectator/visitor. Given that so much was at stake, it is not surprising that the COOB’92, where the economic and political control of the Games was concentrated, wanted from the very beginning, when the torch arrived in Catalonia in 1988 (Moragas 2008: 7), to take control of these cultural aspects:

The nationally and internationally acclaimed cultural Olympic image of Barcelona seems to have been more the effect of COOB’s Image and Communications Division than of the CO’s [Cultural Olympiad’s] four- year festivities. (García 2000:4)

The difficulties that characterized OCSA and the COOB’92’s relations during the pre-Olympic period are illuminated as yet another important symptom of the shift in cultural policy for Barcelona. The COOB’92 reserved for itself the management of the city’s image through the Olympic symbols, probably considering that it was too important to risk leaving it in the hands of cultural professionals and artists with no government briefing. The culture-as-product they were handling was a highly specific and sophisticated object in the hands of those actively working for the Organizing Committee of the Games, aimed at a foreign audience:

When preparing the Games, several actors in the host city, coordinated by the Organising Committee, start preparation of the information for international dissemination. This is a great task of semanticising values, deﬁning one’s own culture and identity that will later be treated in international media. This process implies the deﬁnition of socio-cultural basic references in order to identify the host; the choosing of the key geopolitical references to interpret their socio-political reality (Catalonia, Spain, Europe, identity, autonomy, self-determination, etc.), the design of symbols (logo and THE CULTURAL TURN 157

mascot), the selection of a cultural model for the opening and closing ceremonies and the torch’s route, preparing the basic information strategies for international media, editing one’s own media (books, brochures, guides, videos). (Moragas 1992b:5)

Equally symptomatic of this new role of culture, where creating an attractive global image was paramount (Moragas 2002: 125), is how it bypassed all the political disputes between socialists and nationalists. “Mediterraneanness” was the overall, consciously chosen symbol of consensus presiding over the Games (Moragas 1993:3;Illas2012: 82–103), as it defused the national disputes without denying the legitimacy of any of the claims under debate. Nothing in the following description of Barcelona’s identity was disturbed by the CiU-PSC dispute:

Barcelona was interpreted at the same time as young and old, as historic and modern, as a city of the north and of the south, as eastern and western, as a city that lives in its streets but which, however, is tidy and able to organise macro-events. (Moragas 2002: 125–126)

The global image of Barcelona was consensual for the most important iconic moments of the Games, also those with the biggest audience, for instance, ceremonies, “the Games’ main cultural and symbolic asset” (Ibid.: 127–128). They were “made to be ground-breaking at the artistic level but consensual at the political one in order to achieve the double effect of spectacularity and citizens’ support” (Ibid.: 126). The same applies to the host city’s logo, by Josep Maria Trias, inspired by Miró’s La Caixa star and Mediterranean colors, like that of the “Barcelona more than ever before” campaign (see Chapter 7), that is, by an idea of local identity connected to the prestige of the avant-garde and at the same time to local geographical conditions. In conclusion, projecting Barcelona’s image (and that of its citizens) globally would have never been successful without mapping out a homo- genizable and exportable concept of urban space and citizenship. The millions poured into improving existing and generating new city infrastructures as a result of the opportunity to host the Games was a determining factor in moving the city toward a viable post-industrial, tertiary economy, one ﬁtting a European, Western trend. As a result of the Games, Barcelona was to be seen as a comparably and fully recognizable 158 9 RETHINKING BARCELONA’92 AS A CULTURAL MILESTONE modern, postindustrial, heritage-rich, European, cosmopolitan, Mediterranean city. In this context, differences were to be subsumed under similarity: entering the global market of cities with a good chance of success entailed ﬁnding a qualitative difference to allow the brand to stand out from its competitors. There was no incompatibility between its qualifying adjectives, as Hargreaves states:

The organisers [of the Barcelona Games] positively embraced these inﬂu- ences [those of internationalism, Europeanisation, Americanisation and global culture] because there were advantages to be gained by doing so. And they were no impediment to Catalan nationalism: they did not cut across it, divert attention from it or cancel it out. They stimulated it, not in the sense that nationalism manifested itself in opposition to them, but rather in the sense that the character of the Games offered the nationalists opportunities to exploit the Games to their advantage. (2000: 129)

And vice versa, I would add. The particulars of Catalan nationalism offered all non-autochthonous, globalizing interests invested in the Games opportunities to exploit such nationalism to their commercial advantage. Let us return one last time to Resina’s argument to conclude our discussion of culture and the Barcelona Games. He uses the example of the national liberation movement Terra Lliure, and the violent coercion on the part of the state that it suffered before 1992 in order to neutralize it (2008: 219–222; Illas 2012: 104–106, 183) as a measure of the anti- Catalanist sentiment surrounding 1992. While this episode was the most militant face of the escalating “political battles for Barcelona” that conditioned the Olympic candidacy and preparation periods, Terra Lliure was not representative of majoritarian nationalist positions, and certainly not of those espoused by CiU. However much the infamous episode of the Operación Garzón (named after the judge who authorized legal action to be taken against Terra Lliure) deserves to be criticized, and it does, it is inaccurate to present it as the standard of how opposed to Catalan identity the Games were, and of how far local and state authorities were willing to go to suppress it. It was not Terra Lliure’s independentist Catalanism that was threatening the local, state, and global financial and political partners involved in the celebration of the Games. It was rather the fact that they were or had been an active armed group, and that they supported radically anti-capitalist views. That this was the lowest common denominator of intolerable opposition to the Games is supported by looking at who else THE CULTURAL TURN 159 was prosecuted with a similar use of coercion and censorship, an element not covered by Resina’s study. They included obviously the much stronger and more dangerous armed Basque separatist group ETA – with an infrastructure capable at the time of striking anywhere in Spain – and terrorism more broadly, as the Olympic Games of the Cold War era had been marred by such attacks (“Samaranch ...” 1992: 34). But at the local level, those targeted were local minority and radical groups whose critical position went to the heart of what made the Games a city regenerator accelerator, of what was wrong with it from the socio-economic point of view, and of who were the losers in the operation. The most notable was the militant group Barcenoal 92. In times of quasi-universal consensus, they bridged the critical left-wing positions common to grassroots movements of late Francoism with the critiques of the Barcelona model that would become increasingly pervasive in post-Olympic Barcelona, particularly when the Forum 2004 operation appeared on the horizon. At the time, nonetheless, they were a minority and, with respect to No’92, their anarchist ethos and aesthetics made them appear outlandish when compared with normative positions on the city’s transformation (Subirós 1993b: 81). In hind-sight, however, their positions reveal themselves to us as lucid denunciations we take for granted today of the economic and ideological repositioning of the city along neoliberal lines that the Games facilitated: an increase in prices, inequality, poverty, gentrification, privatization, and big corporate business. In addition, they rejected the Games’ megalomania and underlined a philosophy of encouraging cut-throat competition (Barcenoal 92 1989:1,8,20–26; López Sánchez 1991: 92–94), all of them critiques which would become much more main- stream in the post-Olympic period. Not only their insights into the new situation, but also their connection to the past was key to their resistant position: going back to the beginning of the twentieth century and the plans to construct a Great Barcelona while keeping the rebel working classes under control (López Sánchez 1991: 91). They denounced the end of an attitude of listening to and incorporating the voices of neighborhood associations, in this way making visible the invisible in the municipal propaganda: housing expropriations, gentrification processes which expelled long-term residents from their communities. Furthermore, they pointed out the companies getting the most economically profitable contracts from Olympic enterprises and who owned them. Particular mention here deserves their critical pointing of the Vila Olímpica development links with La Ribera Plan, one of the most contested by grassroots movements 160 9 RETHINKING BARCELONA’92 AS A CULTURAL MILESTONE during the Francoist period. No ’92 named those who, while occupying positions of responsibility in pre-Olympic Barcelona were benefiting economically from it. These kinds of critiques also attracted the use of state violence and coercion, interpreted by those suffering from these as evidence of an increase in the militarization of society and of how it criminalized those who disobeyed, by presenting as apparently unquestionable their criteria separating the good from the bad citizens (Barcenol 92 1989:8–19; López Sánchez 1991:98–99). Their protest against state violence was expressed in their manipulation of the Barcelona’92 logo to become Carcelona’92, using the Coca-Cola design, broken into two pieces. All of these dissident voices, including those coming from Terra Lliure, speak of a – very marginal – type of citizen who resisted the seduction and interpellation of dominant government voices selling the excellences of the brand. While this kind of recalcitrant citizen could have had Catalonia’s independence as part of its political agenda, this was certainly not the only, or the most unacceptable of their political convictions from the point of view of the state. Resina’sanalysisoftheGamesasadeceitfulanddisastrouscombina- tion of Hispanicization and banal spectacularization of Barcelona/ Catalonia at the hands of the socialists turns Catalan nationalism conveniently into a utopian opposition to Capital that puts all the blame on the socialists for having bowed down to its demands. What is never clear in his argument is how the Catalan – conservative and pro-business – nationalists of CiU, had they been in charge of an event whose celebration they never opposed, would have used culture to produce a global corporate image of the city that was fundamentally different from what it ended up being, that is, that was not a banal, spectacularized and postpolitical take on Catalan “common values” (Resina 2008:248).How can nationalism, in the context of organizing a global spectacle such as that of the Olympic Games, escape the logics of Capital in turning the defense of a singular and distinct identity into something that is not indistinguishable from producing a place’s qualitative advantage in the market is never tackled by Resina. Our analysis has argued that the centrality of identity for producing consensus and to generate a global coherent image of Barcelona in effect meant the dispelling of the noisy political disputes between administrations and the signing of a so-called pax olimpica (Subirós 1993b:30–101). Both the PSC and CiU worked for the image, their respective cultural imaginaries put at the service of a greater good, that of positioning Barcelona in the world market of cities. THE CULTURAL TURN 161

That their political interests differedastohowbesttotakeadvantageof such position for Catalonia or for Spain is secondary here. That the resulting image was oversimpliﬁed, depoliticized, and trivial is indisputable, as undeniable it should be that both nationalists and socialists had a part in producing it. CHAPTER 10

Olympic Volunteers: Rise of the Super-Citizen

BECOMING THE HOST For the international media covering the Barcelona Games, topics of paramount interest were citizens’ participation, the atmosphere in the city, and how journalists were treated by locals, particularly the Olympic volunteers (Moragas 2002: 132). In their new cultural function, Barcelonians were necessary to incarnate that culture as well as to sell it; as culture-carriers they were indispensable in making it understandable and desirable for others. References to the local population’s attitudes during the Games as part of the city’s image-making insist on their distinctive trends: their demonstration of a particular local sociability (Pi Sunyer 1995:48–49); their Catalan sentiments and/or militancy (Hargreaves 2000:96–112); and their enthusiastic cheering in sports events (Pi Sunyer: 47). Municipal enthusiasts of the Games were nothing short of euphoric in their description of the population behavior and how it enhanced Barcelona’s global image. Joan Anton Benach endowed the Games with the extraordinary ability to generate a kind of super-citizen: active and participatory while peaceable, consensual and celebratory of the status quo, one coming together with others to make up a pseudo-sacred community displaying well-bred attitudes, and in so doing announcing the possibility of a better future:

It was not, then, the “great atmosphere” that was being created or that was sought after, it was rather an atmosphere of an unknown quality, being

produced every day and where everyone could identify as a protagonist and co-participant in a promethean idea of urbaneness crystallizing in dates that had been scheduled eleven years before. (Benach 1993: 149)

Benach speaks of the exemplary nature of people’sinvestmentinthe Barcelona candidacy and then the hosting of the Games as a form of “active civic behavior” (1993: 148) which turned the Barcelona Games into the “great people’s spectacle” thanks to “totally unique synergy currents” and a “mysterious coming together of complicities” between Games and citizens (Ibid.: 148). Enric Truñó describes “civic behavior” as orderly, rule-respecting behavior that is observed by an audience:

The whole city was a party, urbaneness was the rule, trafﬁc and transport signals were respected, ﬂags were on balconies as a token of welcome ... The Spanish media bent over backwards to show this civil engagement and the foreign media signalled that citizens were the protagonists. (2002: 84)

Andreu Clapés, assistant director of the Barcelona Olympic Volunteer Programme, of which more below, expressed the idea of everyone being fully engaged citizens like the volunteers were, and how the foreign press picked up on it:

One must underline that not only the participation of volunteers impacted all citizens around the world, but the participation of all of society, who with courage and enthusiasm ventured out into the streets to celebrate this party. (2002: 145–146)

Another member of the municipal organization, Jaume Guillamet, was equally ecstatic about local residents’ conduct, attaching great importance to it as part of the overall success:

Barcelona practised a great exercise of discipline and urbaneness, an exceptional attempt at everything that the city could give ... Citizens did not limit themselves to being spectators or ﬁlm extras. Every Barcelonian made an effort to be nice to disoriented or lost strangers. (1993: 161)

For Guillamet, of particular value was the local residents’ ability to behave in a recognisable way for foreigners, to be cosmopolitans by way of being consumers of global products: BECOMING THE HOST 165

Volunteers’ identifying shirts and audiences’ caps both became display areas for pins from other Games, cities, countries, Olympic committees, companies, television, radio, newspapers, sports. Like mutually-awarded honours, they were evidence of wit, sociability and cosmopolitanism. (1993:160)

The ability of Barcelonians to present themselves thus before a global audience produced the most coveted result, that of Barcelona being perceived as an “educated, upbeat, free, united and human” city (Gianni Miura quoted in translation from Italian by Subirós [1993b: 96]). Indeed, there is evidence that this was, in fact, greatly valued by visitors. For example, George Vecsey from the New York Times praised the Barcelona Games because the Barcelonians made the experience authentic and unique:

These Games reminded us that the Olympic movement is more than the sometimes callow youths who actually win the medals. At their best, the Games are a celebration of the people who stage them – every trilingual ofﬁcial, every cheerful volunteer, every police ofﬁcer who sticks a mirror under your car, looking for bombs, and then sends you on your way with a solid “Vale, vale”.(1992:4)1

From the point of view of these government ofﬁcials, the Games for the local citizen were intended to be the culmination of a process of democratization that came from the past and had prepared them for greatness, a validation of their local identity, an occasion of such transcendence as to take excellent citizenship to a whole new level. People’s enthusiastic response to the Games was interpreted by municipal leaders as the Games’ enduring moral legacy. Samaranch expressed it unmistakably when he said: “I always say this. People became much more positive, much more optimistic, much more entrepreneurial” (Samaranch et al. 2002: 16). And so did Enric Truñó:

Probably the Olympic project’s best legacy, beyond the city’s physical transformation, was a change of mentality in citizens themselves. Aware of the creative and logistic ability and of the rigor they demonstrated, a new conﬁdence was born in one’s own strengths and a positive attitude was generated to face the great challenges of the future. (2002: 85)

What they perceive as the long-lasting new attitude for the entire population generated by the Games is a competitive, relentlessly 166 10 OLYMPIC VOLUNTEERS: RISE OF THE SUPER-CITIZEN optimistic subject. The Barcenoal 92 group, from the opposite side of the ideological spectrum, recognized the same ideal of citizenship emerging: “a new social type: the yuppie as a model of conduct for the good citizen” (1989: 7), but envisaged a less rosy, more sinister future for it. Despite their radical differences, all these analyses point in the attitudes generated by the Olympic Games to the advent of a neoliberal ethic (Dardot and Laval 2013: 264) as the new standard for the exemplary Barcelona resident. While all citizens of Barcelona were interpellated by municipal discourses to encourage their collaboration with the Games, a selected cohort, the Olympic volunteers, were closely watched, intensely disciplined, and heavily ideologized to behave in a certain way during the duration of the event. They were trained to become exemplary hosts among already extraordinary local citizens. Identitarian questions of the sort discussed around the “battles for Barcelona” in the previous chapter had nothing to do with their training, and yet this group of people was crucial, in more ways than one, to the success of the Games, and made an indispensable contribution to the city’s image during the Olympic celebration. They were present and visible for a global spectatorship of between 700 and 1000 million (Moragas 2002:125)atevery Olympic sporting event and, in a myriad of ways and occasions, were the vanguard in the city’s encounter with visitors, greeting and managing the general public as well as assisting the “Olympic family,” throughout the duration of the Games. Pi Sunyer (1995: 49) speaks of volunteers as “the social interface between guests and the host society.” A growing corpus of literature has devoted itself to describing the increasingly important role that volunteers play in the conduct of the Olympic Games.2 Much of it is written from the unquestioned acceptance of these events, confident that they will continue to take place, and ultimately motivated by the willingness to improve the performance of the Games within their already existing parameters. Unlike these accounts, what interests us in the analysis of volunteers that follows are the ways in which they were coached by institutional powers to become perfect citizens, and what the elements in that definition reveal of how a local power on the verge of achieving global influence conceived of its urban subjects. The figure of the Olympic volunteer signifies for the argument of this book a culmination of the process of transformation in the conceptualization of the democratic urban subject we have been studying, from beneficiary to producer of culture and of the city, and from critical of to consensual with power. BECOMING THE HOST 167

In our reading of it, the volunteer is the subject of peaceful consensus par excellence, though there is no seeming passivity in his/her acceptance of the status quo. The campaign that toured the country by bus in 1986 recruiting Olympic volunteers did so under the slogan that encapsulates the best-known Olympic value spelled out in Pierre de Coubertin’ Olympic Charter: participating is what counts (Clapés 1995: 4). Indeed, the volunteer is the epitome of the participatory and engaged citizen, and doubly exemplary because his/her commitment is altruistic, disinterested, disentangled from the unequal, messy demands of paid working relations. Madrid speaks of volunteering as “the expression of a concern for others, caring to give a hand and to do something to improve the world ... to take responsibility in public affairs, those which affect the collective” (1999: 77). These qualities could have made a militant subject of the Olympic volunteer, if it weren’t that the latter abhorred social conflict and was devoid of dissent, civil disobedience or criticism. To that extent, the volunteer is the political subject of anti-Francoism and the early democratic municipal period without the edge of antagonism against power that fighting the dictatorship had required. The continuities and discontinu- ities with late-Francoist grassroots activism in the democratic municipal discourse and policies we have been pursuing converge in this figure to produce the local government’s perfect prototype of the Barcelona citizen. The Olympic volunteer is the distilled, purest form of tamed subjectivity under democratic local hegemony, the greatest evidence of its success in producing a democratic subject in full agreement with, and indistinguishable from, power: a subject willing to invest his/her skills and efforts at the service of the hegemonic view of the city. Volunteering proposes a way of life, a path of improvement for the individual that inextricably encompasses personal, emotional growth through collective action. This is clearly noticeable in the testimonies given by Barcelona Olympic volunteers. Albert Estany de la Torre explains the gains in lived experience and affects connected to solidarity and group work from acting as an Olympic volunteer:

The opportunity to do something useful and meaningful for our city made us into people with the highest collaborative spirit on earth ... It has been one of the best experiences in our lives ... The fact of ﬁnding us in the same group and sharing the same idea, that of supporting the Barcelona 92 Olympics, made us feel very united, as if we were a big family. 168 10 OLYMPIC VOLUNTEERS: RISE OF THE SUPER-CITIZEN

Comradership and good will among us was the dominant attitude ... In a few, very few days, we made many friends ... We are looking forward to going back to accomplish our mission as volunteers. (“La festa”:5)

Jordi Solsona i Pla describes the power of the collective, the empowerment derived from losing one’s individuality in an action that can only be accomplished as part of a group:

I have been lucky to be one of four hundred carriers of the big ﬂag distributed through Barcelona’s ten boroughs ... Perhaps the most important was the will to participate and the enthusiasm to be part of this event. It was not a matter of monopolizing attention on anybody’s part to carry a piece of the ﬂag, no one aspired to do it singlehandedly. Instead, it was a good excuse to convene the entire neighbourhood, the children who carried Cobi on their backs, cyclists or athletes, parents who were more enthusiastic than their children and, above all, the festive atmosphere of the parade. It should be added that people at home waving at us from their windows and balconies increased the cheerfulness of the procession. At the end of the event I had the satisfying feeling that, rather than four hundred of us in the Moll de la Fusta, there were more than a hundred thousand. (“La festa”:5)3

Of importance is the fact that Olympic volunteering in Barcelona was mostly taken up by young middle-class citizens: 80% of volunteers were aged under 30 (with 75% being between 16 and 24 [Clapés 1992: 23]), and the occupation of the great majority was being a student (Montilla Castillo 1997: 14; Clapés 1992: 23). This is in keeping with other well- documented sources concluding that the practice of volunteering is predominantly for the middle classes, who can afford to work without pay (Montilla Castillo 1997: 6). In our case, the fact that the majority of the volunteer body was made up of students is also important to note for two more reasons: ﬁrst, it can be said to have served as a model of citizenship for new generations. Clapés explained how changing the image of local youth was central to the aims of the volunteers’ project:

In a society that is often considered materialist, and where the image of young people is associated with apathy and drugs, it was necessary to subtly present a new image of Spanish youth: dynamic, with initiative, altruistic, capable of doing things for nothing, generous and optimistic. (1995:5) BECOMING THE HOST 169

Second, under the increasingly pervasive logic of neoliberal sociability, volunteering can be seen as providing the soft skills of identity work that we will see being common to the neoliberal subject, the entrepreneur of himself. Indeed, the influence of the volunteer as the perfect Barcelona citizen extended well beyond the duration of the Games to become an overall prototype of desired citizenship for the post-Olympic city, as we will argue in Chapter 11. It was this emerging subject that materialized for the Barcelona citizen the transformation of democratic sociability into a globally recognizable neoliberal one. In the wider context of volunteering, the Barcelona Olympic phenomenon is consistent with an international trend started in the 1990s and not unrelated to the diminishing in other forms of social participation, such as militancy in political parties or trade unions (Madrid 1999: 78, 82). Moreover, Madrid (Ibid.:80)pointsoutthatitisonlyinthe 1990s that what used to be an undefined but common form of social exchange of favors became legally typified as volunteering. Along the same lines, Clapés insists that volunteering in Barcelona channeled a long-standing collective practice, that of grassroots associations of all sorts. According to him, it did not have the institutional acknowledg- ment that from the moment of the Games they enjoyed, a way of putting things that signals his desire to label every grassroots collective as part of the volunteer movement:

It is obvious that in Catalonia volunteering had a long tradition of really valuable collaboration and social work. The majority of those doing it, though, did not consider they were volunteering. Their work did not have the recognition that it now enjoys. (2002: 154)

Finally, the same author argues in a different publication (1995: 5) that the Barcelona Games put volunteering in general on the map for the Spanish population, which the creation of the Institut Català del Voluntariat (INCAVOL) Catalan Institute of Volunteering, created and supported by the autonomous government in 1991 and in place until 2004, seems to corroborate for the Catalan case. This institution deﬁnes the volunteer as

someone who provides services voluntarily and for free, without an economic compensation and within an autonomous not-for-proﬁt organisation. (Quoted in Montilla Castillo 1997:5–6) 170 10 OLYMPIC VOLUNTEERS: RISE OF THE SUPER-CITIZEN

Non-monetarization of work is central to volunteering, as is the performance of such work within the parameters of a socially valuable service, a category that the Games attributed to themselves:

The volunteer is a person who makes an individual, altruistic commitment to collaborate, to the best of his/her abilities in the organisation of the Olympic Games, carrying out the tasks assigned to him/her without receiving payment or rewards of any other nature. (COOB’92 vol I: 381)

However, the Olympic Games, or the International Olympic Committee, hardly qualify as a not-for-profit organization, which makes Olympic volunteering a misnomer. While the volunteer is true to the principles of the task at hand, organizing the Games is a hugely complex commercial enterprise with business partners set to yield immense profit from it, not least the IOC, who raked in US $940 million in TV rights and sponsorships in 1992 (Pi Sunyer 1995: 52; Boix and Espada 1991: 254–257; Brunet 2002: 248), with NBC alone making US $40 million and sponsors US $170 million (Witteman 1992). It is ironic that the massive enthusiasm to give time and skills for free to the Olympic movement coincided in Barcelona with the commercial attitude of the IOC. It was under the presidency of Samaranch in 1985 that the TOP (The Olympic Partners) program came into being (Boix and Espada 1991: 250–257). Up to that time, the IOC’s main source of income was TV rights. The “invention” of the TOP program, by which a selected group of commercial brands paid the IOC for the exclusive use in their advertising of the Olympic rings, turned the IOC into a formidably wealthy organization. So, on the occasions when Juan Antonio Samaranch donned the volunteer t-shirt to demonstrate his commitment to the collective, as he did in the case of Barcelona, the message he sent out was disingenuous. While volunteers gave their work and invested their values outside of a market logic, Samaranch, the IOC, and its partners stood to gain huge economic profits from the Games, including those extracted from the volunteer workforce. Also of relevance to qualify the meaningfulness of Olympic volunteering as a socially significant practice is its radical subsumption under institutional rules whose function is to control volunteers both ideologically and materially, reducing their function to one of acting as mouthpieces for the established power (Madrid 1999:82).Barcenoal 92 denounced the ways in which responding to the local government’scall implied a neutralization of political critical edges, and a convenient BECOMING THE HOST 171 reduction of action to what was manageable and either beneficial or innocuous for power (1989: 26). In the wider context of social movements, the necessary depoliticization of volunteer groups makes Yúdice, referring to 1990s Latin America, speak of the NGOization of those which had appeared in the 1980s, “to the point that activism has given way to bureaucratic administration” (2003: 77), and Negri and Hardt speak more brutally of their reduction to “mendicant orders of Empire” (2000: 36). Blakeley comes to a similar, if more general, conclusion regarding the dangers for activists of getting too close to institutions, when assessing the nature and political value of shared governance in democratic Barcelona:

Mobilising citizens around a local government project, deﬁned and promoted from above, necessitates deﬁning participation in order to safeguard the project’s viability. As a result, the democratic potential of this kind of participation is limited: rather than empowering citizens who take part, participation can become a means of controlling citizens. (2005:163)

Historians of the Olympic Volunteer movement in the twentieth century, such as Montilla Castillo (1997) and Moreno et al. (1999), agree that its boom among the local civilian population in the host city took place in the 1980s and 1990s. More specifically, Panagiotopoulou, following Moragas, has divided the participation of volunteers since the beginning of the twentieth century into four great periods (2010: 2), the fourth inaugurated by the Barcelona Games. His criterion is that a greater rationalization of volunteers’ roles under the management of national organizing committees began in 1992, in contrast with prior, more amateur, ways of dealing with them. The development responded to the increasing dimension of the Games as a global spectacle. In this new context, volunteers carry out indispensable work without which the Games could not take place, as recognized by the organizers in Barcelona: “without volunteers there are no Games” (Corachán 1992). They are important, as always, for ideological reasons: as proud believers in the beneficial nature of the Games for all and their contribution to enhancing the local identity, their altruism incarnates the lofty Olympic values and helps to promote the event as being rooted in the interests and passions of the local population. Volunteers can “infect” other local and global populations with their enthusiasm.4 But now to their essential role are added economic reasons: they provide a wealth of qualified skills at no cost to the organization. 172 10 OLYMPIC VOLUNTEERS: RISE OF THE SUPER-CITIZEN

Montilla Castillo (1997: 16) estimates that the Barcelona Olympics volunteers were responsible for carrying out two-thirds of the total work that the Games required. Non-remuneration placed the organizers in a legally vulnerable position, however, regarding how to guarantee that volunteers would indeed perform their indispensable tasks, which explains the importance of other kinds of symbolic incentives (corporate identity gift; participation diplomas and medals; commemorative books; the provision of social recognition and respect) plus legal protection (Volunteers’ Ombudsman; Volunteers’ Attention Ofﬁce), as retention strategies (Clapés 1995). What the volunteer did not receive in money, she/he got in moral praise, by being presented systematically as a morally superior citizen. Investment in ethics and values was high to achieve volunteers’ loyalty and commitment. All these rewards help to explain how volunteers accepted what otherwise were strenuous working conditions. In the ofﬁcial press of the time, those volunteers who gave up were dismissed for not having the moral resilience that it took, and given the shameful name of ‘deserters’5:

Only about 300 people have abandoned the adventure. Reasons vary: some due to exhaustion, others because they were tired of eating a hamburger every day and yet another handful because they did not see a reason to continue once they had been given the uniform and accreditation. For COOB leaders, deserters are only 1% (in other Games they reached 8%) of a total collective that is putting its heart and soul into serving its city. (Corachán 1992)

The Volunteer campaign was launched during the candidacy period for the first time in the history of Olympics (Clapés 1995:3).Atotal of 60 thousand people registered their interest and this was a determining factor in securing the adjudication of the Games (COOB’92, vol II: 109). Volunteers had been recruited for the Games in both Los Angeles and Seoul, but in these cases recruitment happened once the organizers had determined for what purposes they needed the volunteers. In the Barcelona case, the opposite happened: first recruitment, then a definition of how many and for what purposes. By November 1986, one month after the adjudication of the Games to the city, 102 thousand people across the country had indicated their desire to be volunteers, according to Benach (1993: 147) “one of the most honorable examples of civic behavior, generosity and efficacy in Olympic history.” In the end, 34,5486 were selected and employed. These enormous figures are a BECOMING THE HOST 173 testimony to how successful the organizers of the Games were in making them a collective enterprise, so well encapsulated by the slogan: “Everyone’s objective.” Much of importance was attached to the preparation and training of volunteers, the Motivation Programme, all in the hands of the COOB’92, which had a budget of a thousand million pesetas, provided by the auto- mobile manufacturer Seat.7 A large quantity of literature was created for the volunteers as well as for the production of a favorable social image for them, from reports to manuals of conduct, to magazines and periodicals (Barcelona ’92; Voluntaris ’92 [the volunteers’ official publication]; Barcelona Olympic News; Barcelona Olímpica; Olimpia) and radio programs (Voluntaris Olímpics) to open channels of communication among the volunteers and to create a collective consciousness, identity and pride among them (COOB’92, vol II: 111–112). Investments were made in their training, particularly in language training, with one thousand scholarships being provided for volunteers to go for four weeks ‘study to the UK and France’ andanothertwothousandtofollow language courses in Catalonia (Clapés 1992: 23). But, the project still relied heavily on volunteers’ existing work skills in all areas: sport, protocol, medi- cine, IT, journalism, driving, military and civil service, hospitality (COOB’92, vol II: 122) – a total of four hundred different tasks (Montilla Castillo 1997: 8). However, the most important element of the training was related to the promotion of a particular way of performing local citizenship, of being a Barcelonian for millions of visitors from across the world. A striking example of how this kind of work was carried out is provided by the Handbook of the Olympic Volunteer (Manual de Formació del Voluntari Olímpic). A brochure for the internal use of volunteers in training, we hear through it the disembodied voice of the government addressing the citizen directly through the second-person singular and instructing him/her on what to do and how to behave, making the work of subjectification unmissable. The discourse merges ideas of solidarity, companionship, mutual cooperation, and empowerment, while connecting with ideas of participation and solidarity reminiscent of the anti-Francoist past:

The volunteer is solidarian with others; she/he believes that it is worth doing positive things to improve the solidarity and understanding spirit among all people, with a universalist sense. (Comitè 1989: 26)

Commitment and agency as citizens’ attributes are duly mobilized, but this transformative action/power on the part of citizens is now put at the 174 10 OLYMPIC VOLUNTEERS: RISE OF THE SUPER-CITIZEN service of the city, in this way making qualitative – though apparently only cosmetic – changes to principles of active and assertive citizenship that came from the late-Francoist period. Maragall is quoted in the Voluntaris’92 periodical as saying:

We are fully convinced that in the Voluntaris’92 programme there is a value standing out above all others: a vocation to participate. For this reason we want Games that we can share. The Games of solidarity. Games that are everyone’s aim ... This will be your ﬁrst mission as volunteers: to prepare yourselves rigorously so that people look at us in admiration. (Voluntaris, Issue 1, p. 3)

Toward the end of the quote we read the shift from the old discourse of solidarity to that of spectacle. At an individual and collective level, the volunteers are given to understand that they are the city, the image of the city for a global visitor and a global audience, and because of that, their conduct needs to rise to the challenge. Volunteers are responsible for embodying the city in desirable ways that will yield a reward for themselves, their city and their pais, an ambiguous term that might refer to either Catalunya or Spain (Comitè 1989: 3). By acknowledging that the citizen is at the center of at the spectacle and should therefore be always aware of being looked at, a new corporate public relations jargon emerges. The entire process of the recruitment and training of volunteers, from its start in 1986 to the celebration of the Games, was conceptualized as a series of media events (Clapés 1995: 4, 7), giving us an idea of how important it was, not only to do what was necessary to train volunteers, but to be seen to be doing it in a particular way in order to generate the desired response from those receiving the information. This newly found characteristic of becoming a citizen, or rather, a “local” for the visitor, one attuned to the mediation that audiovisual and print media outlets will impress in one’s behavior, will not be ephemeral:

You have to always be aware of what you say, of why and how you do things, of your external appearance ... Be scrupulously punctual ... Be the best reﬂection possible of the image that we all want to give. Be aware that many eyes will be ﬁxed on you, on your behavior. This should not make you uncomfortable, do your work naturally, as any good volunteer would. (Comitè 1989: 18, 19) BECOMING THE HOST 175

Both registers, personal and professional, are continuously blurred in the Manual, indicating to what extent the entire subject is being interpellated for a task that cannot separate and distinguish work from entertainment, and which will lead to personal as well as professional growth, as it was clear in the two testimonial quotes above. The aim of the volunteers’ role is to be “the friendly face of the city. Volunteers have to exude love for and knowledge of their city. They must be the perfect hosts greeting visitors” (Clapés 2002: 160) and, in order for that to be possible “the spirit of openness and kindness” (Ibid.: 158) was to be inculcated:

We ask you from this moment to be open and willing to collaborate in the different tasks of the events taking place in your city. These tasks can be a lot of fun, and a positive attitude on your part will make the experience much more gratifying ... To be a volunteer means to LEARN by mixing WORK with FUN. (Comitè 1989: 4, 8, emphasis in the original)

The blurring of the personal and professional allows for metaphors where the COOB as the volunteer’s employer becomes the city itself at whose service the citizen is. The power and authority of the proprietor and the servitude of the tourist guide become one in the volunteer, both empowering and disempowering him/her at the same time:

The city is your home and the people that you will assist are your guests. A good host always treats guests with all sorts of attentions and courtesy ... You can transmit to visitors the desire to get to know the city and the excitement of living in it. (Comitè 1989: 15)

From the point of view of constructing an ideal urban subject on the part of the local administration, voluntaris olímpics were key because they made a seamless transition from the participatory qua militant to the participatory qua collaborative citizen. A new form of citizen participation was found in them, a particularly beneficial one for the institutions as it separated social engagement from social conflict or dissent, channeling the social virtues of citizen participation to the benefit of hegemonic powers. While volunteer discourses continue to emphasize solidarity and collectivity as preferred non-commodifiable values of the Barcelona citizen’s identity, and still to construct the city and its spaces as the non-mercantile goal of collective action, they are now charged with the new responsibility of producing the city. Qualities of solidarity, group cohesion, and organization, well known to activism, in hegemonic discourse are qualities expected to serve and 176 10 OLYMPIC VOLUNTEERS: RISE OF THE SUPER-CITIZEN benefit the city’s image. A key slogan of the Olympic Games and its legacy, “Friends forever,” relies on the production of affect to yield profit, but it is through the rhetorical keeping of non-monetarizable values whose production by the volunteer is, by definition, not remunerated, that their monetarization can happen; that is, that surplus value in the form of more viewers/visitors/consumers can be extracted from their work. Voluntaris are in this sense a technology of government that expresses a preference for citizens who are “civically active ... responsible for themselves and for others in their ‘community’” (King 2003: 297). In the Barcelona context, the successful implementation of this technology marks the shift from progressive to neoliberal thinking. King spells out the difference very clearly between both when speaking of the 1990s US context:

Responsibility is not to be demonstrated by the paying of taxes to support social welfare programs, or by the expression of dissent and the making of political demands on behalf of one’s community, but through participation in practices of volunteerism and philanthropy. [Such practices] offer large groups of people the feeling that they can and do make a difference in shaping the organization, direction, aspirations, and ideals of the nation state in which they live. (Ibid.: 297, and see also 311)

Although King’s linking volunteering to the undermining of the welfare state is not so clear at this point for the Barcelona context,8 certainly her point about the proper way of expressing social responsibility is. Volunteering is presented as a fulﬁllment, a collective expression of democracy, but without any expression of dissent or signiﬁcant critique of the status quo. It keeps the ethics of democracy but devoid of any critical edge and, as a form of governing, it works by capitalizing on the rhetoric of democracy and participation, by invoking and coopting a history of mobilization and organization of the civil society inherited, in the case of Barcelona, from the pre-democratic period, in order to put it at the service of a qualitatively different government project. Clearly such mechanism has a long history in the creation and use on the part of the state of patriotic allegiances. What is new here is its adaptation to the context of urban identity and the fact that such allegiance will become in itself the commodity that the upcoming creative city will need to produce in order to stay true and to improve its brand’s global status. In that sense too, the emergence and fashionable status of volunteering mark a shift from a progressive to a neoliberal urban model. NOTES 177

NOTES 1. Another example can be found in Graham-Yooll (1992). 2. For a history of volunteers in the modern Olympic movement, see A.B. Moreno et al. 1999. 3. For more examples, see Clapés (2002: 157–163). 4. This included, in the case of Barcelona, reaching out to the rest of Spain. The campaign to recruit volunteers covered the entire state, and their role was considered important in propagating affection for the Games across Spain: “These volunteers were the great transmitters of Barcelona’s project around the state, creating bonds of affection among all volunteers and, in turn, between the families of these volunteers. We succeeded in making them too own the project” (Clapés 2002: 150). 5. But see Montilla Castillo (1997: 12) for a more balanced account of the number of people leaving the volunteer program before the Games, and of their reasons for doing it. 6. COOB’92, vol II: 101. Figures vary slightly according to the source. Corachán (1992) speaks of 36,500 signed volunteers. 7. For details of the training program in its full extension, see COOB’92, vols II and III; Clapés (1995 and 1992) and Montilla Castillo (1997). 8. In King’s own words: “well-intentioned, charitable consumer-citizens must share the burden of governing and the fulﬁllment of their needs with the state, the market, and the nonproﬁt sector” (2003: 305). PART IV

Back to Work: Governing the Creative City CHAPTER 11

Volunteers Unbound

The kind of collective behavior that Olympic volunteering generated was seen by the organizers and local government as a morally superior form of citizenship to be fostered, a model to follow (Blakeley 2005: 156–157). Moreno et al. (1999: 10) state that “Barcelona is one of the few if not the only case in which the Games led to the formation of volunteer associations after the holding of the Games.” Indeed, the power found in training a volunteer to produce a better, more socially conscious citizen, and tighter communities triggered an attempt, ultimately ﬂawed, to perpetuate their existence at the service of the city (COOB’92, vol II: 111):

We believe that it is worth continuing to promote those attitudes developed by volunteers during the Olympics by looking for other “Games” which can serve as excuses to continue living those values for the sake of the city. (Voluntaris Olímpics: no page)

This was carried out through the municipal creation of the Oficina de Dinamització dels Voluntaris Olímpics (ODV)(Office for the Promotion of Olympic Volunteers) which for a while managed the transfer of volunteers to serve in other organizations (Clapés 2002:155).The success in training volunteers helped the government to reinforce its post-Olympic revisionist account of democratic Barcelona’s recent history (see Chapter 3). The figure of the volunteer offered government the possibility of presenting itself as having taken the lead in organizing civil societyinawaythatwasbeneficiary to local power and, considering the

© The Author(s) 2017 181 M.P. Balibrea, The Global Cultural Capital, The Contemporary City, DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-53596-2_11 182 11 VOLUNTEERS UNBOUND economic turn that the city was making from the Games on, to the service economy to which it would give its full backing. To the extent that the volunteer’s devoted citizenship was of the government’smak- ing, it contributed to a tale of the local elite providing for society, waking it up from its lethargy, and, in this case, even paternalistically teaching it how to engage socially. Its ideological effect minimized the importance of all sorts of urban-grassroots-originated activity that existed independently of government in favor of a kind of safe social commitment that was guaranteed to be docile:

Thanks to the good will of the three institutions involved (State, Autonomous and Local Government, MPB) one of the social objectives we set has certainly come to fruition: namely to awaken the sensitivity of Spanish society vis-à-vis the volunteering phenomena. Nowadays this concept is not only integrated in society, but is also seen positively and as one more expression of an organized civil society that, in this way, is articulated as a reliable form of urban life, one revealing the values of all those who embrace this kind of philosophy and praxis. (Clapés 2002: 156)

While the municipality’s experiment of continuing the volunteering impulse through the aforementioned ODV soon failed, the experience inaugurates for the Barcelona Ajuntament what would become a long- lasting interest in intervening in the organization of civic movements, in having an impact on “the articulation of civic society” (Voluntaris Olímpics: no page). This interest coincides with the municipality’s involvement in promoting values such as dialogue, solidarity, friendship, peace, mutual respect, environmentalism, and global dialogue between peoples and cultures as firm staples of the city’s image. As studied by Illas (2012: 117–123), this line of work starts with Barcelona participating in and signing the Barcelona-Rio Declaration in time for the celebration of the Games, to which the signing of other “cosmopolitan” documents would follow. Illas argues that these types of gestures contributed to the creation of a coherent global image for the city, and we have demonstrated how the terms used to define it took advantage of a recent history of democratic activism. The promotion of volunteering worked equally coherently in the same direction. The ODV, and from 1995 Barcelona’s Council of Associations, both municipal institutions, endowed themselves with the capacity to capitalize on the social strengths of its civil society which they presented as being derived from the Olympic spirit that local power was VOLUNTEERS UNBOUND 183 able to generate (Voluntaris Olímpics: no page). All the aforementioned values, conveniently cultivated through the signing of declarations, the hosting of appropriate events, and the encouragement of volunteers, would be central to the economic promotion and physical transformation of the city, the (failed) epitome of it being the Fòrum de les Cultures 2004. Indeed, the altruistic nature of all these initiatives hides the fact that the municipality will deliberately use the widespread perception of a set of qualities attributable to Barcelona citizens as selling points for the city. Immediately after the Olympic Games, as the city adapted itself to its new global status, this renewed interest in influencing the propagation of a particular citizen’s behavior will condense around discourses of civisme, urbaneness. In embracing such discourses the municipality sought the consent of citizens and the neutralization of their critiques by incorporating them in innocuous ways. In the emergent context, volunteering acquired meaning as a technology to generate the correct attitude, a predisposition, a channeling of participatory energies that went along, rather than engaged critically, with the status quo. M. Delgado refers to these centrally promoted attitudes as “citizenism,” pointing critically at how the other side of the civic coin is the stigmatization of those who do not comply, the incívicos (uncivil ones) (M. Delgado 2011:25–27). The consensus and assent of citizens so articulated by the local government is a residue of its immensely successful discourse during the Olympic years. However, the municipal ability to create social acquiescence diminished as the negative consequences of the Olympic adventure made themselves felt: social costs, institutional debt, underused facilities (García Almirall 2011; Mur Petit 2008; Pascual et al. 2012). The discourse promoting the transformation of the local economy to the creative industries, taking center stage in the newly labelled as 22@ district from 2000, presented many shortcomings. For example, the city failing to be chosen as European Cultural Capital 2001 but, above all, the social fiasco of the city hosting the Fòrum Universal de les Cultures in 2004 indicated a turning point in the relations of the City Hall with its citizens. The critical militancy against, or at best indifference toward, the Fòrum, ended the honeymoon period of the mayoralty with its citizens.1 And yet, despite failures and dissidences, the cooperation of the citizen, as the natural specimen in the tourist city’s habitat, was more necessary than ever. As the local consensus deteriorated, its global counterpart went from strength to strength, capitalizing on the Olympic formula of cultural excellence made up of heritage and architectural modernity plus Mediterranean 184 11 VOLUNTEERS UNBOUND sociability (Moragas 1993). The following municipal slogan from 1991 captures the qualitative advantages that the city-turned-brand offers to the tourist. The presentation of these in paratactic continuity expresses well the tourist experience as a list of things to cover and tick, all equal in importance, and each isolated and independent of the rest:

Barcelona. Mediterranean. Olympic. Catalan. International. Gaudí. Avant- garde. Meetings. Romanesque. Picasso. Fashion. Rambles. Cosmopolitan. Bi- millennial. Design. The Sagrada Família. Pau Casals. Beaches. Dalí. Liceo. Flotats. Miró. Cathedral. Bohigas. Costa Brava. Night. Gothic. Cultural. Industrial. Books. Boﬁll. Concerts. Open. Theatre. Exhibitions. Tàpies. Sports. Harbour. Festivals. Fountains. Montjuïc. Montserrat Caballé. Fairs. Tibidabo. Museums. Art Deco. Güell Park. Football. Everything, in Barcelona.2

Pere Duran, CEO of Turisme de Barcelona (Barcelona’s Tourist Office), is less sophisticated than Moragas and less detailed than the publicity spot, but equally efficient when defining what marks Barcelona’s qualitative advantage over other cities: the combination of urban life with the sun and beach attractions:

As a great urban tourist destination in Europe, Barcelona is the only one offering ﬁrst-class quality sun and beach in addition to a great city. This is one more attractive element to add to what the city offers to holidaymakers. (Duran 2002: 283)

Indeed, it is clear that it had been the Olympic Games that had earned the city the international stamp of quality and therefore the qualitative advantage it needed to excel in the global market of cities. The instant global visibility they had provided for the very carefully prepared Barcelona image proved durable. The economic boost to the city3 according to all indica- tors – investment, jobs, income, tourism – was phenomenal (Brunet 2002: 260). In particular, with respect to tourism, Barcelona was the European city undergoing the most dramatic boost to this industry in the ten years after the Games (Duran 2002: 276). Barcelona’s Tourist Office was created as a consortium in 1993, bringing the municipal and industry- sector interests together to promote the city (Duran 2002: 279). Central areas earmarked for growth were culture and sport, with conferences and cruises soon becoming related areas of exponential development. We will come back to the intersection of sport and tourism for the city in our VOLUNTEERS UNBOUND 185 chapter on F. C. Barcelona. With respect to culture, Pere Duran stated that the celebration in 1993 of the Miró Year shifted Barcelona’s tourism toward culture for good (2002: 278). To attribute such importance to a single event is an exaggeration, and we have been arguing all along how culture had been positioned as the key to the city’seconomyforalong time. The statement is nonetheless significant of how effective and attractive the cultural tourism formula became just after the Games. Barcelona’s success as a tourist destination in the decade after them and beyond is also attested by hotel occupation: an average of 80% from 1998 to 2002, taking into account that there had been an 85% increment in hotel beds in the decade to 2001 (Duran 2002:281).Inthe same period, the number of tourists increased by 95%, and hotel over- night stays by 115% (Ibid.: 283). The number of visitors almost trebled between 1990 and 2004 (Turisme de Barcelona 2004). The Games turned around the statistics of reasons for visits to the city. In the balance of tourism versus business, from 1997 holidays motivated 60% of the visits, compared to 30% for 1990 (Duran 2002: 284). In 2002 the tourist sector represented 14% of the city’s GDP (Ibid.: 292) and Barcelona led the number of international visits to Spain (Ibid.: 293). In short, the Games transformed “Manchesterian Barcelona into the Mediterranean Copacabana” (Ibid.: 284). While it would not be until 2000 that the Office of the mayor officially adopted the marketing concept of “corporate brand” as the best way to define Barcelona, city image was from the beginning of the post-Olympic period the supreme value to keep and cherish (Casas 2003:7–8). “Barcelona is more than a city, it is a brand” (Ajuntament 2003a: 13, and 2003b:198–199), will become the new municipal mantra, disputing the central stage to the concept of capitality so important to political disputes over the place of Barcelona vis-à-vis Catalonia and Spain. Before the Games, at the center of Pasqual Maragall’s political vision for Barcelona had been precisely the bypassing of these national (Catalan) and state (Spanish) bipolarities via a new European map in which Barcelona was to be conceived as the capital of a Mediterranean macro region of European cities (Maragall 1987;McNeill1999:55–81 and 2001). But Maragall’s geopolitical configuration of a new place in the sun for his city makes sense against the horizon opened up by the, at the time, recent integration of Spain into the European Union. Such a framework was decentered when the Olympic Gamespropelledthecityontotheglobal, not only European, radar. Despite all their financial and social implications, disputes over 186 11 VOLUNTEERS UNBOUND

Barcelona’s capitality had been eminently political, whereas the new and long-lasting hegemony of Barcelona as a global city would demand a different logic to survive and excel, not that of politics, but of capitalism. For the exercise of local power, that was the fundamental difference between seeking Barcelona’s “capitality” and working to promote its image brand. The shift was not yet fully recognized by Oriol Bohigas, municipal Head of Culture from 1991 to 1994, immediately after the Olympic Games:

After the Olympic Games’ success, a politics of capitality ... is an important aim for the current municipal government team. And culture is one of the fundamental factors of this politics. If Barcelona does not manage to consolidate itself as a great cultural centre ... it will have no credibility in other ﬁelds where it might want to make a mark. (Bohigas 1993:23–24)

Whatever it is that Bohigas has in mind when he advocates the consolidation of Barcelona as a great cultural center – a modern idea of cultural capital where museums, concert halls, art, literature, and architecture play a central role as markers of political and economic power – he is clearly still looking for an area beyond culture in which the city is to make its mark. What subsequent years of post-Olympic socialist government were to show, however, is that culture became Barcelona’s ultimate horizon, and it was through that medium and at the service of an economic, not political, logic, that culture would continue to feed Barcelona’s global image and place it in the market of cities. In other words, post-Olympic Barcelona would come to see the success and consolidation of its image at a global level, and in that sense made the mark desired by Bohigas. This, however, would not come through any significant increase in Barcelona’s political weight in the Spanish or European realm during the remaining years of the PSC in the City Hall, or in its “capitality,” to use Bohigas’ term.4 International prestige, popularity, and visibility would rather come through its consolidation in the market of tourist cities and in the economic area of services, for whom culture would be of paramount importance.5 And this was a culture, not only understood as cultural industries and the tertiary sector, but also as the means to produce life that is meaningful and adequate for the reproduction of the city, and for whose management government continued to play an important role. This latter additional component of culture is the extra element what the Games had so effectively produced. Their success solidified and gave permanent currency to the rationale of desirable conduct for local citizens in municipal discourses, VOLUNTEERS UNBOUND 187 shifting it toward the needs of a new paradigm: that of the creative city. In the Barcelona that the Olympics foreshadowed, the ideal local citizen would be the one fully ready to produce and reproduce the city brand via producing him/ herself under the terms of the advertised, globally visible and readable community. The entire life of this branded citizen could be fully exchangeable as a resource for the urban capitalist enterprise in the creative and tourist industries, fully investable as cultural capital. Immediately after the Games, municipal discourses reflected how paramount it was to keep the city image. Having proven so successful, it made sense to perfect and perpetuate it. With work on the physical transformation of the city considered now to be “complete,” its consumption through culture became for the municipality the commodity to be constantly actualized and exploited. In the candidate dossier prepared by the municipality to participate (unsuccessfully it turned out) in the competition to become European Capital of Culture of 1995, entitled “The Time of Imagination,” Maragall states:

After a stage characterized by urbanistic renovation, and another characterized by the creation of great infrastructures that have made the city more habitable and accessible, now ... is the time to enjoy the city and to develop its quality of life: the hour of urbanitat [urbaneness], we ourselves say, of which culture is a fundamental element. (Quoted in translation in McDonogh 1999: 372)

In the new context, the enjoyment and urbaneness – well-being and quality of life, creativity, tolerance, civic spirit – that Maragall refers to stop being aims in themselves. They are no longer targeted to residents only, they are subordinated to the economic development of the city. It takes work and discipline to be perceived by visitors as living in the “correct” way. This is the new biopolitical role of the citizen in culture, as his/her entire way of life, sociability itself, is refunctionalized and put at the city economy’s service. The management of culture as an economic resource for the municipality becomes in this way enmeshed in and indistinguishable from the production of improved lives for residents. Having been about the production of life as the production of democracy in the early democratic period, culture has in the post-Olympic period this function fused with and been subordinated to the production of life as the production of an economic asset. Servicing the city image as the means of economic survival for the city catapults culture to the center stage of municipal policy in ways different from what it had been in the early days of the 188 11 VOLUNTEERS UNBOUND democratic Ajuntaments. As the provision of culture is increasingly delegated to private hands – a process started in the mid-1980s with the promotion of public-private enterprises – it is widely accepted that the role of municipal authorities in this area is increasingly reduced to that of a referee, a facilitator, an intermediary that allegedly guarantees fair play. But on the other hand, and this is the main point that I am making here, totheextentthattheimagereigns, culture’s realm of influence expands to become indistinguishable from image production, nothing pertaining to the city is alien to it. The brand image is a final product for the service of whose perfection everything else exists and is subordinated, including its citizens. Culture is therefore still fully the responsibility of the municipal authorities. Culture in the post-Olympic city is the field where the Barcelonian qua democratic subject is expected to perform endlessly as him/herself for the sake of the brand. Citizens will be valued by official and hegemonic discourses to the extent that they are prepared to comply. Articulated through the scenario of a hegemonic neoliberal ethos, the nature of democracy and democratic life for the citizen is refunctionalized to become an expectation of personhood that insists on personal responsibility and willingness to behave in specific ways. As we will see in this part of the book, in work in the cultural/service industries as in leisure, the ideal enterprising Barcelonian with the global image is self-directed, self-motivated and self- monitoring (Dunn 2004:22). Before the Games, local citizens were invited via a range of publicity campaigns to contribute to changing the city, as we saw in Chapter 7 through our analysis of the “Barcelona more than ever” campaign. After the Games, with Enric Casas still as municipal Head of Corporate Communication and Quality, the new campaign was “Now, Barcelona and you.” There is in this slogan a new direct and explicit interpellation of the citizen. He/She is paired with the city in a coordinate clause that endows giving each equal importance: “And the ‘and’ conjugates, unites everyone, every male and female citizen, with the Barcelona that is being made, that we are all making together” (Ajuntament 2003a: 109). The words evoke romance and an exclusive relation between the parts, an invitation to enjoy and seize the moment that fits well with Maragall’s description of the post-Olympic moment in “The Time of Imagination” quoted above. But the slogan has a strong disciplinary implication to it too, imposing an imperative quality to the pair city-citizen, a reminder to the local resident that he/she is, willy-nilly, coupled with the city and therefore responsible for it. Enjoyment of Barcelona’s quality of life VOLUNTEERS UNBOUND 189 through disciplined behavior is spelled out as the axis of the “Now, Barcelona and you” campaign:

It is now the time for every Barcelonian not only to feel the city as his own, but to use it through a socially committed and civic behaviour. The main axes of communication will be, therefore, urbaneness and quality of life. (Ajuntament 2003a: 118–119)

To make the citizen responsible is the core disciplinary aim of the campaign:

In the development of the campaign the attempt will be made to establish an order and guidelines for behaviour that guarantee conviviality and the city’s maintenance ... Now that the Barcelona of Barcelonians was made, it was necessary to make every citizen responsible for trying to maintain an adequate civic conduct in harmony with it. It was necessary to guard the already made city by settling habits and conduct able to guarantee conviviality and the city’s maintenance. (Ajuntament 2003a: 14, 112–113)

Disciplining the citizen is a necessary condition of what is presented as indisputably everyone’s aim: “to guard the already made city.” The citizen is asked to be at the service of this completed city, subordinated, devoted to it through an exemplary behavior. The ofﬁcial municipal announcement informing citizens of the “Now, Barcelona and you” campaign itemizes the traits that make up a good Barcelona citizen:

Now is the time for Barcelona to continue to advance in its own interpretation of an urban quality of life. We Barcelonians are well known around the world as hospitable, generous, tidy, hard-working, imaginative and entrepreneurial. Urbaneness and culture should be more and more present in Barcelona’s everyday [life] and in that of its citizens ... we have everything: people, urbanism, history, willingness. Now we have to enjoy our city. Now, Barcelona and you. (Ajuntament 2003a: 120, 123)

Key in this quote for our argument is, of course, how it posits citizens’ traits in relation to a particular global image that is a priority to maintain. The qualities of the good Barcelonian provide a mixture of well-known commonplace features attributed to Catalan people, accentuated by neoliberal entrepreneurialism. The invocation of a foreign opinion to validate one’s own identity speaks volumes here of the new economy of performativity that the brand imposes. The correct way of “enjoying our city” is always 190 11 VOLUNTEERS UNBOUND already conditioned by someone else’s view, by someone else seeing the Barcelona citizen enjoying him/herself. Such kinds of watched-over enjoyment lie at the center of an understanding of culture whose constant presence and never-ending reproduction is adamantly needed by/for the brand: an everyday civisme and quality of life reinforcing the idea of Barcelonians’ lives being easily identifiable by customers with the commodity called Barcelona. Barcelona citizens are to be empowered, self-activating and self-regulating but to “constantly observe and improve themselves in accordance with norms set by” (Dunn 2004: 113) the brand. Even though urbaneness (civisme) would not become a city ordinance, and therefore susceptible to being enforced, until 2005, it was present since 2000 in the municipal “Civic Campaign: Let Us Do It The Right Way” (Campanya Cívica Fem-Ho Bé) (Direcció de Marketing 2000), at the time the concept of the brand is officially adopted to define the city. Civisme should therefore be seen as belonging to the same logic of the brand in the creative-neoliberal paradigm, one that, when it comes to citizen behavior and participation in the public sphere, prioritizes the preservation of the dominant image and the elimination of all behavior deemed as damaging to it. The next two chapters conclude our focus on municipal discourses by analyzing the emergence of two new governing tools matching the shifts highlighted up to now: the Strategic Plans; and Barcelona’s Institute of Culture (ICUB). Furthermore, they foreground the pivotal role of Ferran Mascarell in the overall cultural transformations that this book analyzes.

NOTES 1. On the evolution of grassroots social movements in Barcelona in the post- Francoist democratic period, and including the post-Olympic period, see the work of Bonet i Martí (2012). 2. It appeared in the magazine Vivir en Barcelona. Cited in Benach Rovira (1993: 491). 3. See Brunet (2002) for a detailed account of the economic impact of the Games. 4. That being said, it remains to be studied in depth how Barcelona’s international standing in turn conditioned the escalating tensions between Catalonia and the Spanish state, erupting with the disputes over Catalonia’s Charter (Estatut)of 2006 and continuing with the rise of the independentist movement. 5. Rodríguez Morató conﬁrms it when he states: “With its broadened agenda of aims and its innovative management and planning mechanisms, Barcelona’s cultural administration, endorsed by cultural markers in uninterrupted progression, has emerged as an international reference” (2008:62). CHAPTER 12

New Regimes of Government

Strategic Plans were conceptualized initially during the pre-Olympic periodtoextendintimeandinkindthephenomenalimpulseofthe Olympic event. The first plan came about in 1990 and the social-democratic municipality was to produce four of these before handing power over to conservative nationalist Convergència i Unió in 2011.1 At the time of writing, it was in its fifth edition, Barcelona Metropolitan Strategic Plan – Vision 2020, produced in 2010, but our chapter will focus on the first three plans produced in the 1990s. Barcelona was one of the first cities to conceive and implement detailed Plans.2 They incarnated governance in its most entrepreneurial form: a pragmatic response to an exceptional situation that impelled the municipality to enlist the support of economic forces and to take advantage of the enthusiastic local population’s consent to municipal initiatives. Correspondingly inspired by a business mentality, a preference for medium = to long- term vision and “big thinking” on the future direction of the city, the successive Plans aimed to gather strength from local representatives of the different social, economic, and political spheres (business, university, unions). The Office of the Mayor invited them to participate in discussions and then to agree on a common process of development for the city in the ensuing five or ten years, in the first instance one able to keep up the momentum created by the Olympic Games. The writing up of those agreements constituted the Pla Estratègic document – an action plan, as it is called in the II Pla (1994: 56) for the future of the city that the

© The Author(s) 2017 191 M.P. Balibrea, The Global Cultural Capital, The Contemporary City, DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-53596-2_12 192 12 NEW REGIMES OF GOVERNMENT municipality would use, in a non-normative way, as guidlines to define its political, social, and economic decisions. The exercise was instantly popular amongst city governments elsewhere, with the pioneer Pla Estratègic Econòmic i Social Barcelona 2000 awarded a prize for excellence in planning, highlighting the city’s number of public–private partnerships and its international scope as well as praising it for setting a precedent in the formulation of overall strategic planning for cities (Truñó 2002: 82). And it was no less popular in Barcelona, where it became the default way, in different policy sectors, to present the municipality’s lines of action in the medium to long term. The first Pla Estratègic Barcelona 2000 working party was constituted in November 1988 and approved in 1990. According to Subirós (1993b: 80), it responded to a unique logic of participation and shared governance (one hundred and fifty entities were invited to participate), which in his view spoke of the by then well-established municipality’s democratic and progressive way of going about exercising power. To this Subirós added the Ajuntament’s legitimate willingness to capitalize for the long term on the major urban transformations made possible by the Olympic event. A more critical account of the Plans’ significance requires us to consider them not only for their content, but also as form, because they constitute a new object, a new instrument of government. Once the ’92 Olympic Games and their phenomenal capacity for generating social consensus and government action had disappeared into the distance, the Pla, in its very form, can be understood as attempting to take the Games’ place as a structure to produce, not only content (i.e., lines of economic action and government intervention) but also forms of relating to and interacting with power. They depart from the Memòries studied in Part II of this book, not only because they are projections into the future, rather than accounts of past endeavors. Memòries were derivative documents meant for internal use, Plans are exhibitionist documents that enjoy being seen, showing off their “transparency.” As Fairclough argues in relation to British New Labour’s1998Green Paper: A New Contract for Welfare,thePlans Estratègics can be considered as new genres of governmental discourse, social practices of government whose intention is to produce new forms of conceptualizing social life (2000:14) and world vision. The first Pla Estratègic Econòmic i Social Barcelona 2000 clearly worked in this direction. As Subirós notes in our previous reference, participation and collaboration between citizens and institutions as the best and most democratic way forward for the city is underlined from the beginning. Maragall states that: “the city’s collective effort to succeed in designing its main future directions ... has made it possible to stimulate and channel NEW REGIMES OF GOVERNMENT 193 the participatory vitality of its citizens” (IPla1990: 13). This statement is questionable on two grounds. First, as it claims to have accounted for the opinions and inputs of all in the city, when the long list of participants in different capacities is overwhelmingly represented by business associations, companies, and individuals (IPla1990:95–110). Those who are considered participatory citizens include, therefore, not everyone, but those whose participation and vitality contributed to the formulation of the Pla. Casellas argues that from the beginning the idea was to offer a business- friendly image that could attract the private sector by smoothing the Ajuntament’s image as a left-wing government:

Barcelona’s ﬁrst Strategic, Economic and Social Plan ... can be interpreted as an attempt on the part of the local administration to include, in the process of creating a consensus as to the city’s future, a broad-based economic and social spectrum traditionally removed from left-wing parties. The attempt to gain the trust of the business sector may explain why, initially, the trade unions were not invited to form part of the strategic plan commission, though this was later rectiﬁed. (2011: 63)

Indeed, Truñó (2002: 80) confirms that only those economic and social stakeholders who could claim an influence were invited to the table. We have here, therefore, a classic gesture of metonymical appropriation of people’s voices on the part of government. Maragall’s statement is further questionable in its definition of dialogue and participation, in its careful pointing of the Pla as the right way, the “basic instrument of city building” (I Pla 1990: 13) to stimulate and channel dialogue and participation. This is made explicit in the following:

The Plan’s participatory nature is its guarantee for success. As [with] every vital city, Barcelona’s concerns can be reﬂected in a positive way within the appropriate frame of debate and reﬂection such as the one enabling the making of the Plan. (Ibid.: 13)

Collective debate and reflection, the exchange of ideas, participation, these are all part of a conceptualization of municipal politics clearly connected with the first democratic local governments in Barcelona, as Subirós pointed out. Maragall is making an effort here to provide a discursive continuity with patterns of governance that make the social-democratic ethos visible. The same kind of strategy founds continuity in later Plans. In 194 12 NEW REGIMES OF GOVERNMENT the III Pla, new PSC mayor Joan Clos boasted about how ingrained participatory practices, as reflected in the Plans, are in Barcelona, in a gesture that invokes old times but in fact qualifies a very different exercise from the one defined in the first years of democratic municipalities: “Barcelona has endowed itself with a qualified and active participatory structure. Few cities, I believe, can see how numerous groups of citizens get together to talk about their future with no more ties than the achieved complicity of having worked together for ten years” (III Pla 1999: 9). And the members of this III Pla executive committee even speak about a “a truly strategic urban/citizen way of thinking” (Ibid.: 15) as leading to the production of the document. What openly removes this governmental rhetoric from late-1970s, and early-1980s, municipal practices is the new, “right” framework provided by the Pla, which allows for the “positive” incorporation of Barcelona’s “concerns” (note the avoidance of the term criticism). The Pla becomes within this safe frame the accepted horizon for debate and for the expression of concern, a horizon that includes a guarantee that conversation will lead to cooperation and consensus. It is, in this sense, a government strategy of social containment that, borrowing from Fairclough, produces a new idea of public engagement as the purpose and result of particular ways of social interaction. The type of interaction stimulated by the Plans does away with “old” categories of class, or any other kind of social antagonism, and with politics more generally. The use in the document of a highly rationalized, academic, technocratic style, one structured around the formulation of one main objective and three strategic ways to achieve it, on which hundreds of numbered bullet points converge, in turn subordinated to subheadings such as “specific objectives,”“sub- objectives,” and “proposals,” increases the effect that we are looking at a document where particular political and economic interests, and the silencing of others, have no place. The addition of photographs and charts give it certified academic objectivity. The Pla has people discussing and participating for the benefit of their city in a post political arena, not unlike the way that the ’92 Olympic Games invited popular participation for the sake of the city but on condition that people subsumed their will to that of the collective enterprise. The Plans spell out from the beginning and the way in which and (the limits under which) participation is to happen in order to become visible and influential. Within its rhetoric, citizens have participated in the putting together of the collective, consensual document that each Pla is meant to NEW REGIMES OF GOVERNMENT 195 be, but its conceptualizing of citizens is circumscribed to those who perform successfully within the Plans’ terms. And these are, by no means, all the citizens that there are with initiative and opinions. Casellas puts her finger on what those who are not invited to sit around the table are missing, and on how they are disempowered:

Citizen participation loses the ability to act and inﬂuence, not only because it does not have efﬁcient mechanisms of participation but also because its contributions are not understood, since it does not form part of the mechanisms that generate visions and strategies of development. (2011:65)

The Plans gave crucial governing powers to the private sector, masking as part of the civil society and the city in general, in this way in the long run increasing non-democratic, technocratic government. Those who are more critic of this new form of government see in it a way of deactivating the executive power of grassroots movements and direct democracy, to the benefit of the private sector and its economic and ideological interests (Andreu Acebal 2011: 55).3 Or, more moderately, while holding on to the idea that Plans have the potential of transformative power, others also recognize the risk of them becoming a grand rhetorical exercise for the sake of legitimating power (Borja 2005: 17). All things considered, what seems undisputable is that the Plans constituted one more structural move away from increasing regular citizens’ ability to intervene in power, and conversely, a move toward the sharing of power with non-elected representatives of private interests. Certainly Plans had no juridical capacity to adjudicate or deprive anybody of citizenship, but as technologies of government they placed a particular frame and set of limits on the possibility of citizens influencing government by circumscribing valid participation in favour of making a profit for the city. However, we need to go further in our analysis of citizen participation, because the ideological importance of the Plans’ rhetoric of participation is not only that of metonymically masking the reduction of citizen power. Encouraging “positive” participation in the social and making it visible was a central strategy of the Plans. Participatory processes of governance were woven in discursively as part of the Barcelona brand, one element of its competitive advantage. The III Pla states openly how:

In Europe, the future of every city depends, to a great extent, on its capacity to generate the marks of its own identity and a certain competitive advantage 196 12 NEW REGIMES OF GOVERNMENT

with regard to the other cities. The values of participation and the consensus culture are values that belong to the identity of Barcelona .... In the international ﬁeld these practices of participation in the management of the city enjoy great credibility and are one of the main elements of know- how in Barcelona. (1999: 134)

Participation and consensus production as cultural forms and values make a key appearance in this quote as being directly connected to sellable points for the city brand. They are proof of how culture, in its humanistic deﬁnition favored during the ﬁrst years of the democratic period, was capitalized as an asset in the government’s conceptualization of city marketing. In the next section, I look further at how the Plans and other government documents used culture as the chosen logic to articulate desirable attitudes and behaviors for local dwellers to exhibit in order to attract global investment.

WEAVING CULTURE INTO THE PLANS In their laying out of a desirable direction of development for the city, the Plans redefined the role of local government in culture and spelled out the all- encompassing role of culture in urban affairs. Taken together, these combined actions enshrined the foundations of the creative economy. With reference to roles, they defined a move away from the local government’s direct involvement in the production of culture, as a sign of neoliberalization which proclaimed the excellence of “governing at a distance” through collaboration and partnership with other social stakeholders. In the words of the Memorandum of the Constitution of Barcelona’s Institute of Culture (Memòria de la Constitució de l’Institut de Cultura de Barcelona),theroleoftheInstitute,a key organization materializing the new hegemonic role for culture in the city, is defined as a catalyzing one (1995:19,20):“The City Hall should adopt an eminently relational function ... one of encouraging social interrelation, of producing and disseminating information, of sharing responsibility with and mediating between different agents.” At its most interventionist, the municipality energizes and corrects markets when they do not produce the desired fair-play balance (1995: 20). But to have the whole picture of how Plans textualize the new all-encompassing role of culture in urban affairs we need now to refer back to our discussion in Chapter 11. We argued there that the reshuffling of culture as the city’s vital means of subsistence necessitated to address citizens as neoliberal subjects: self-governing and fully allied to the WEAVING CULTURE INTO THE PLANS 197 interests of the all-powerful city image, part of the urban cultural capital. It is this latter dimension of citizens as cultural capital that Rodríguez Morató (2005, 2008) and Sánchez Belando et al. (2012) do not take into account when they argue that the first two Plans of 1990 and 1994 did not yet show signs of the new role of culture as being central to the city’s creative economy, and where culture was instead presented as being separated from exploiting the economic potentialities of the city (Rodríguez Morató 2008: 48). My argument, on the other hand, is that we find from the beginning signs of these kinds of instrumentalization of culture in its very use as a form of people management, because from the beginning this has been a necessary component to achieve a desirable future for the city. The ways in which citizens’ desirable behavior are defined in these documents lay the foundations for the full-blown realization of the cultural creative city. Nofre i Mateo’s conceptualization of Barcelona’s cultural plans and policies as ideological interventions in the social points us in the right direction for analysis. His critical position accuses the local government of having used the cultural paradigm for urban transformation as a form of social control and social sanitation (2010: passim). Nofre i Mateo denounces Plans Estratègics for their ideological attempt to create social behavior through spatial cohesion and, taking the already mentioned criticisms of Andreu Acebal and Casellas as mechanisms to exclude non-compliant voices, particularly those in the urban peripheries (Ibid.: 148–149). It is this concernwithpeopleandthesocialhavingtofit with the projected future for Barcelona so perceptively uncovered by Nofre i Mateo in the Plans, that in my view gives culture its raison d’être and its ideological meaning in these early documents. The IPla’s broadest overarching aim was to “consolidate Barcelona as a European entrepreneurial metropolis, with influence over its macro region; with a modern quality of life; socially balanced and strongly rooted in Mediterranean culture” (1990: 19). The ideas of entrepreneurship, internationalization of impact, prosperity, and Mediterraneanness delineated in 1990 an image that the Games would make global. Still, nothing in this main aim refers explicitly to the economic realm, though the word “influence” seems to be hinting at one of the economic kind, and this is confirmed in the in-depth explanation of terms that the document allows (1990: 50). The sentence is, however, specific from the outset when it comes to the cultural realm: references to quality of life, social balance, and Mediterranean culture. Here the social-democratic agenda surfaces, the preoccupation with people’swell-beingasamatterfor government: their connection to their cultural roots, and equality of rights (all confirmed in more detailed explanations in 1990: 51). These 198 12 NEW REGIMES OF GOVERNMENT had been at the core of the political and cultural agenda of leftist parties in power during the democratic municipal governments. But they are framed in a very different way and place here, and it is their relation to this frame that qualitatively changes their meaning: the frame of entrepreneurship, the attitude central to neoliberal sociability and subjectivity, used here as an adjective – entrepreneurial – qualifying the city in a trope that anthropomorphizes Barcelona. As used in this first Pla Estratègic, the invocation of entrepreneurship brings to the forefront the idea of economic profit as the rationale for all action in individuals and, by extension, in whole cities. The II Pla defines the term further, calling specific attention to the importance of its incarnation not only in activities, but also in individuals – significantly referred to as agents, not citizens – making up “a dynamic city, thanks to its own economic activity as much as to the behavior of its agents” (1994: 20). And five years later the III Pla takes it as a given that entrepreneurship in citizens is a sine qua non condition of success: “It goes without saying that the entrepreneurial nature of the citizens is an indispensable condition in ensuring the dynamism necessary to con- tinually open up to new economic activities” (1999: 20). Indeed, neoliberal entrepreneurship entails an “economisation of the social,” the total merging into each other of social and economic matters (Simons 2006: 524) and the implementation of a new ordering of conduct and subjectivities (Dardot and Laval 2013:157).Therealm of culture (personal and collective values, rights, creative expressions) isforthisreasonacrucialbattleground for the advent of neoliberalism. Its importance is recognized in the IPladocument, which significantly defines cultural acquisition on the part of citizens as having both use and exchange value, “culture is an activity for citizens that is fundamental for their social and human promotion and also in order for the city to be creative and attractive in the cultural realm” (1990:87).The II Plan is characteristically bolder in its prescription of the need to make those two aspects compatible: “Cities ... have to also be a place of consensus between a commercial logic based on immediate capital profitability and an ancestral logic bearing in mind the signs of social and cultural identity of citizens” (1994: 24). It is a source of pride, therefore, that “Barcelona emerges as an international city, one open to the logics of commerce (i.e., to those processes pertaining to a market economy) and at the same time endowed with a rich cultural heritage” (Ibid.: 31). Among the three strategies defined by the IPla,oneis“to WEAVING CULTURE INTO THE PLANS 199 facilitate people’s advancement, increasing the opportunities for education, culture and quality of life” (Ibid.: 20). But this is proposed as a necessary plan of action in order to achieve the aim of generating in Barcelona’scitizens“a greater ability to handle the changes that the city will undergo in the near future” (Ibid.: 20). It is this subordination to an ultimately economic aim, to a practical function that only makes sense within the logic of capitalist competition, that renders the language of culture, quality of life, access to education, and so forth, different from what it used to be. That these objectives are losing their value as markers of social justice is further attested by their falling behind on this very front. The II Pla, which under the slogan “Barcelona, quality city,” assesses the accomplishments after the draft- ing of the IPlaand is more focused on Barcelona’s integration into the global economy, acknowledges under the category of “social balance” that there have been no advances in the remedying of wealth inequality, housing costs, marginality, or access to education (1994: 22) and, even more, that the city’s involvement in global economic dynamics is creating new forms of social inequality (Ibid.: 25, 37). But this is never considered as a major problem, since the II Pla openly recognizes its interest in focusing on people as human resources for the economy (Ibid.: 38). Another example of the subordination of culture to the economy is provided by definitions and functionality attached to the need to promote Barcelona as a Mediterranean city. Mediterranean culture appears attached to the following elements: “creativity, art, design, ways of life, gastronomy, artistic and historical heritage, leisure, vegetation, neighborhoods, walks, outdoors, sea, mountains” (IPla1990: 51). This is said to be the basis, a kind of raw material one might venture, in need of being shaped and prepared through “making technologies cultural, by stimulating top creative sectors in the city, by facilitating spaces, tools and infrastructures which allow participation in public urban debates as well as the spontaneous creation of new cultural and civic activities” (Ibid.: 51). The ultimate objective of this effort, including the stimulus to citizen participation and to spontaneous grassroots cultural and civic activity, while looking at the rhetorical level very similar to social-democratic statements of the first democratic period, is now to prepare the city for competition in Europe and beyond: “[Mediterranean culture] contributes to Barcelona a remarkable differential element in its ability to grow and progress in tune with its tradition and significance within 200 12 NEW REGIMES OF GOVERNMENT

Catalonia’shistory” (Ibid.: 51). Social balance is therefore desirable to the extent that it is good for business as it contributes “to guarantee the Plan’s viability from the human perspective” (Ibid.: 54). In short, to maximize qualitative advantage is the ultimate entrepreneurial rationale, subordinating everything to it, including the city’s traditions and history and, very centrally to our analysis, its inhabitants’ ways of life. What we witness here, in short, is a process of immaterialization of work, to use Lazzarato’s term, that has yet to fully transpire, but which is recognizable enough to allow us to see how culture is being geared up to serve the needs for services, functions, and relations that the creative economy will need. When looked at from this perspective, the fact that culture does not yet appear, as Rodríguez Morató argues, so connected to the areas marked for economic development in the first and second Plans Estratègics is not the same as saying that culture is not already being put at the service of the new, but not yet fully in place, economic model for the city. The insistence on what looks like a social-democratic social agenda is in fact laying the foundations for its future recuperation as a source of capitalist profit. Because it is not only that Barcelona will aspire to become a creative city by way of promoting a number of cultural industries, but that the city itself (or a particular image of it) as a whole will become a cultural product in the marketing of cities. And the success of this cultural product will depend greatly on the ability of its dwellers to provide, as human resources, the quality of life, Mediterraneanness, the tolerant and civic attitudes at the core of the IPlacentral aim. The local population’s sociability, their desires, their everyday and banal interactions, become in this way the target of the entrepreneurial city as practices to be ultimately monetarized. An entrepreneurial attitude, let us not forget, consists in being alert “to previously unnoticed changes in circumstances which may make it possible to get far more in exchange for whatever they have to offer than was hitherto possible” (Kirzner, Competition and Entrepreneurship, quoted in Dardot and Laval 2013: 111). For the Barcelona government and allied businesses qua entrepreneurial agents, this “whatever they have to offer” is a particular image of the city and its connected idea of quality of life (another way of referring to its culture), that the ’92 Olympic Games catapulted on to the global stage. It will therefore be in their interest to promote and influence the proliferation of certain behaviors and the discouragement of others as part of maintaining and developing the business encouraged by the city image. The call in the II Pla Estratègic to involve young people with social NOTES 201 issues through volunteering is a case in point (1994: 47). By proposing it as part of a strategy for the city to generate a positive response to the new demands of social integration, the municipality is signaling what we already explored in Chapter 10, namely its preference for a particular, non-confrontational form of activism to deal with social inequalities, which fits well with Barcelona’s global image as an ethical city. Practices of promotion and influence such as this one are implicated in producing and reproducing life that complies with the demands of a market in search of enjoying the way of life that the Barcelona dweller is perceived as embodying. In short, even when culture does not appear as central to the economic objectives as drawn by the first Pla, the form of its presence reveals the neoliberal nature of the creative city in the making, and is proof that the reproduction of life packaged as culture will be at the heart of the entrepreneurial imperative to profit from the city.

NOTES 1. From 2003 the Plans turn metropolitan, that is, they incorporate all municipalities surrounding the city of Barcelona and constituting Greater Barcelona, its metropolitan area of inﬂuence. 2. There was one precedent in San Francisco in 1984, but it was the Barcelona model, once again, that captured the imagination of other municipalities across the world. See Pla Estratègic Metropolità de Barcelona 2006:29–30. Monclús (2003: 408), on the other hand, writing about urban planning, argues that strategic planning is a global trend visible since the 1970s which, in turn, is a cyclic return to a focus on the productive dimension of cities and their international projection occurring in the early twentieth century. 3. Evidence of critical awareness that Plans are signs of Barcelona’s immersion in an un-democratizing process of neoliberalization is fairly recent, but see an exceptional critique at the time of their ﬁrst conceptualization provided by Barcenoal 92 (1989: 14). CHAPTER 13

Masterminds of Culture

The clearest evidence of the local government’s embracing the transformations in cultural matters that we have analyzed as emerging in the first two Plans Estratègics is the creation of the Institut de Cultura de Barcelona (ICUB) (Barcelona’s Institute of Culture), in 1995, an institution conceptualized, instigated, and initially directed by Ferran Mascarell. The Director of Cultural Programmes and Dissemination for the mayoralty from 1985 to 1987; Coordinator of Culture for the municipality from 1987 to 1991; Director of ICUB from its inception until 1999; municipal Head of Culture from 1999 to 2006; and intermittently Regional Minister for Culture from 2006 to 2016, first under a Socialist (2006), then a Catalan Nationalist conservative government (2010–2016), Mascarell accumulated in thirty years of a political and policy-making career, more decisive posts in the area of cultural politics than anybody else in Barcelona. Followed at some distance by Pep Subirós, he is the mastermind and, without a doubt, the most influential thinker and politician to conceptualize and implement the shifts in culture that this book focuses on. The ICUB was created at a time when Barcelona’s municipality was devoting all its efforts to maintaining the momentum gained by staging the Olympics and to overcoming the economic crisis caused by its organization, both of which it expected to manage successfully through the reinventing of the city for the creative industries. Mascarell was the person capable of making the argument for culture to be put at the center of that effort. The Institute appeared as the city was preparing its, eventually

© The Author(s) 2017 203 M.P. Balibrea, The Global Cultural Capital, The Contemporary City, DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-53596-2_13 204 13 MASTERMINDS OF CULTURE failed, candidacy to European Cultural Capital for 2001. In the Memorandum of the ICUB’s constitution already mentioned in Chapter 12, culture is not only presented as the thing that has historically made all that is distinctive and worthwhile about Barcelona but, more crucially for our argument, the case is made forcefully for the need to monetarize local people’s creativity. For a city suffering from continuous constraints and prevented from realizing its aspirations to political capitality, culture, it is argued, is the only way of expressing excellence: “Barcelona has always confronted its challenges from its citizens’ creative will” (Institut 1995: 7). This is not only a reference to celebrity artists and architects but to life as a whole, as lived by the population in its entirety, because Barcelona breathes and inspires culture:

A place with an atmosphere that stimulates the senses and activates memory. Culture in Barcelona is the effervescence of everyday life, the color of its streets ... the rhythm of its playful activities, the character of private and public cultural initiatives, the will to project itself outside ... the activism behind ideas bred by culture. (Ibid.: 7)

Culture’s “penetration” into everyone’s way of life is presented as an exceptional Barcelona trait:

The citizens who live and work in Barcelona aspire to a cultural way of life, i.e., toaframeworkwheretheycanmakeexplicittheircreativeaptitudes,or creatively enjoy those of others ... Culture has achieved a high level of penetration in Barcelona’s social fabric. (Ibid.: 8, 9, see also 13–15)

Barcelona’s way of being is not exactly an essence in this discourse, as its origins are historized: “[Barcelona’s] vital nature, has always been democratic, compromising, cosmopolitan and innovator. Barcelona’s culture was made from its being a city open to inventiveness, conviviality, creativity and freedom” (Ibid.: 8). However, understood as a rooted and stable identity, culture is nonetheless sufﬁciently ingrained to be relied upon permanently as raw material:

Creativity, understood as the essence of culture, as the outcome of imagination, with the ability to elaborate new ideas, new worldviews, and to facilitate social progress. Creativity has been ever-present in Barcelona, an imaginative response from its individuals. (Ibid.: 21) MASTERMINDS OF CULTURE 205

References to creativity are not to a privileged few in this quote, though these are elsewhere in the document labeled as “intellectual capital” (Ibid.: 29) but to something in the very nature, the “civic culture” (Ibid.: 21–23) of the city, and therefore attributable (and subject to exploitation) to each and every local dweller: “Culture exists because there is a social fabric making it its own, ﬁlling it with content, identifying it. Culture creates collective links promoting expressive, communication and social phenomena, which contribute to a greater social cohesion” (Ibid.: 21). There is in all these quotes full consciousness of how the work done on the cultural front during the early years of democratic municipalities is an essential part of the new cultural project. Way of life in open spaces, cosmopolitanism, citizen participation and solidarity, and private–public partnerships, they are all available to be, in the entrepreneurial way, monetarized. Invocations of culture that so remind one of the democratic discourses of the early democratic period should not mislead the reader, though. When this discourse emphatically insists that “culture is the space of values ... dialogue ... knowledge and information ... creativity ... research and the promotion of innovation ... participation” (Ibid.: 27) it is doing so with the entrepreneurial rationale in mind. It aims to turn all these deﬁnitions of culture, including those that point to ethical and political commitments, into highly desirable commodities, it is searching for their untapped exchange value:

Increasingly, cultural capitals will be those that manage to permanently ferti- lize the activism of ideas, values and ways of living, those that engender creative culture and know-how to keep the added value of creativity alive ... (Ibid.: 41)

This discourse is equally aware of how much it needs the cooperation of citizens to succeed. The generation of consent is openly acknowledged, fully in line with the urbaneness discourse that we have seen proliferated in normative form in the post-Olympic period:

The necessary reforms and transformations for the revitalization and consolidation of the city on the map many times require the creation of a broad citizen consensus to be carried out. At the same time, the generation of urban pride helps in maintaining the facilities and city activities, as well as it increasing citizen participation. (Ibid.: 33) 206 13 MASTERMINDS OF CULTURE

If creativity is, as we read everywhere in the Plans Estratègics, the key to succeed when competing in the late capitalist world, it is in culture, the Memòria argues, where it originates. For this reason, and considering how culture is constructed as being at the center of the city’s identity, it should be considered the axis of such Plans for the future. Indeed, all of those cultural attributes are to be mobilized, packaged to appear as assets that will make the city competitive in the global market. Even more, they are, in fact, unique, and therefore the ones that can give Barcelona that coveted advantage:

The city needs to assert all of its assets, and to exploit the soft ones – creativity – rather than the hard ones – facilities. One of Barcelona’s attributes is creativity. What it needs to do, then, is to keep cultural creation alive in the international arena. Otherwise, the city’s leadership could be diminished. (Ibid.: 26)

The establishment of the ICUB marked the hegemonization of culture as the key field to capitalize on for the economic viability of the city. After it, the III Pla Estratègic of 1999, with the organization of the Universal Fòrum for Cultures on the horizon for 2004, had culture take the center stage that Rodríguez Morató saw was missing in the previous two Plans. This was the first Pla that generated its own independent document on culture. In the Cultural Sector Plan, as it was called, statements about the leadership of creative industries and the definition of culture as the engine to move the “city of knowledge” forward (Pla Estratègic del Sector Cultural 1999:2,5) are made openly. Sánchez Belando et al. (2012: 43) provide us with the technical definition of these culture-centered Plans:

Plans stemmed from the idea of promoting the ability to create local cultural value through the strengthening of ties among all actors intervening in the realm of culture (public–private–third sector), and that of all phases in the cultural production chain (creation–production–distribution), and also through the promotion of interdisciplinary collaboration.

The subject involved in this cultural networking activity is not the citizen, but the creator. Unlike the cultural ambition of the early democratic period, where the emphasis on turning consumers into producers of culture was part of a discourse of access for all to culture and empowerment, in the city of knowledge creators (of innovative talent) are necessarily entrepreneurs, MASTERMINDS OF CULTURE 207 those who can turn an idea into a commodity, who can turn use into exchange value (Pla Estratègic del Sector Cultural 1999: 38). All immaterial cultural manifestations are implicated in capitalist exchanges, as Barcelona is a city which “puts the street at culture’s service” (Ibid.: 39), and not vice versa. The Pla Estratègic Metropolità. Etapa 2006–2010 makes the argument on creativity explicitely extensive to other liberal professions beyond the Arts:

By creative we are not exclusively referring to artists or advertising agents, but rather to all those individuals for whom creativity is a key part of their profession, such as scientists, musicians, architects, designers, lawyers, writers, etc. In other words, those people who are capable of generating new ideas and breaking away from convention. That is, in order to be a step ahead of the competition. (Ibid.: 77)

Chiappelo and Boltanski’sargument(2005) about the need for new capitalism to change human relations in the workplace to overcome its crisis and doing so by appropriating what they call the “artistic critique”, comes to mind frequently when reading these documents. The types of human working relations the new economy needs insist on horizontality and cooperation, both originally belonging to a progressive, even radical, critique of working conditions:

The same is now occurring in the computer age. Early on it was thought that the installation of computers was enough to increase the productivity of a company, without making parallel changes in its vertical organizational systems. What is truly important is knowing how to combine computers, the Internet, ﬁbre optics, etc., and this calls for new ways of doing business with less emphasis on the command and control functions and more on connectivity and horizontal cooperation. There is a clear trend towards replacing the vertical value chains with ﬂatter, more horizontal value chains. (Pla Estratègic Metropolità. Etapa 2006–2010 2006: 76)

The horizontality implied in social justice has been substituted here by a different kind of logic to argue in its favor, but it is still in the interest of this discourse to keep older rationales alive, as if their respective aims were compatible. The same mechanism is at play when the ideal of social cohesion (Pla Estratègic del Sector Cultural 1999: 2, 5) is underlined, with culture still being defined as “a transversal programme for participation, conviviality and citizenship” (Pla Estratègic Metropolità 2006:39),justasitwasintheearlydemo- cratic period. The priority now, however, lies with the economization of 208 13 MASTERMINDS OF CULTURE culture. Nous Accents 2006, a review of the achievements of the 1999 Strategic Plan of the Cultural Sector, while recognizing tremendous advances in matters of tourism (Institut 2006: 22), also acknowledges a patchy record in matters of social cohesion (Ibid.: 10–11). To solve the problem, we are told, social policies are to generate more creativity, as “one must take into account that the kind of multidimensional – social, cultural ... creativity characterizing contemporary society is the basis for common growth” (Pla Estratègic Metropolità 2006: 37). In other words, social cohesion can only be achieved through a further subsumption of its political priorities under a neoliberal economic logic. The Memòria of the ICUB’s constitution and the ICUB itself are key turning points in the municipality’s conceptualization of culture, ways of life and people’s attitudes as partaking of Barcelona’s competitive advantage. Nobody understood this function of culture better than Ferran Mascarell, who was to follow Bohigas as Head of Culture in 1995 (Rodríguez Morató 2008). He was the architect and intellectual mind behind the biopolitical turn in culture that this book centrally describes. Mascarell himself reckoned the importance of 1994 as a time of “deep transformation in objectives for municipal cultural action” which was willing to “move forward in the exercise of their cultural responsibilities” (1999:108).Hisbook,Barcelona y la modernidad. La ciudad como proyecto de cultura (Barcelona and Modernity. The City as Cultural Project), offers his overall view on the city after thirty years of dealing with culture in the Barcelona municipality. Published in 2008, the essay combines theoretico-philosophical as well as experience-based reflections on the city as a concept and on the case of Barcelona. The argument bears noticeable similarities to the preceding and non-authored Memorandum. For our purposes, Barcelona y la modernidad is interesting for being an overview of the entire period covered by our study from the standpoint of one of its key architects in the cultural realm. As such, the book epitomizes the displacement of hegemonic social-democratic discourses on urban politics to the neoliberal frame. A transformation that is nonetheless denied by presenting both realities as a continuum without fissures, exactly the trope that our study has been engaged in dismantling. This is therefore a very suitable text to conclude our analysis of municipal government discourses. Barcelona y la modernidad supports the argument on culture that we find in the bureaucratic Memorandum and Plans with the validation that an intellectual, historically-informed account from a prestigious source can provide. Our intention is to deconstruct Mascarell’s theses in order to uncover their ideological underpinnings, while highlighting one MASTERMINDS OF CULTURE 209 last time that it is in culture that the biopolitical work of addressing and recuperating the citizen for the benefit of the city brand takes place. Far from reductionist, Mascarell’s view of culture acknowledges the persistence of its anthropological value, and the need and responsibility of government to cultivate and maintain cultural rights and values. In so doing, he establishes a continuity with the social-democratic discourse on culture that came from the years of anti-Francoist grassroots activism, but, crucially, subsuming it as well under the logics of the creative city. We have analyzed in Chapter 3 the ways in which the discourse of social-democratic local government leaders reconstructed the process of preparing the city for the successful Games as a narrative where admirable visionary leaders conducted the cheering and obedient masses to a safe harbor. We interpreted this discourse as intending to take leadership and initiative away from the grassroots political movement that had initiated many of the proposals finally taken to fruition, even if skewed, during the Olympic period. What we witness in Mascarell and in the shift to the creative city is a move of return to agency through an anthropological understanding of culture. It is clear when analyzing the Memòria de Constitució… that the focus is back on the – on any – citizen, both individual and collective, for initiative, the kind that can be capitalized as profit for the creative city. Mascarell puts forward two basic arguments in this book: the theoretical one defines the city as culture; and the other, having Barcelona as a case study, maintains that the city’s centuries-long modern project was finally being completed in the democratic period under social-democratic leadership,1 but that its triumphant march has been halted since 2004, the fateful year of the Fòrum Universal de les Cultures (2008: 76). As we have already mentioned, Mascarell’s idea of culture is fully anthropological and encompasses everything that makes us human:

Where cultural interpretations only ﬁnd deﬁciencies, there is a primeval, earth- bound, aura-less common culture that sustains the identity, creativity, desire for progress and will to community for the majority of individuals. (Ibid.: 53)

The city in turn is seen as the materialization of all this human potential bound in culture: “cultural matters manifest themselves fully in the city: the place par excellence of the symbolic, of freedom, creativity, progress and community” (Ibid.: 42). What is enticing about Mascarell’s generous definitions of culture and the city is their doing away with the qualifying of culture as good and bad, elitist and mass, high and low. Unburdened by 210 13 MASTERMINDS OF CULTURE the stigma attached to these qualifying words, agency and the creativity necessary to produce culture, including the production of the city, are conferred on everyone, not only to a few select, privileged ones. This is undoubtedly a liberating and democratizing gesture. But there is a downside to it: it does away with all those realms of the social that allow one to account for what generates inequality and injustice: ideology, politics, the economy. Mascarell’s anthropological approach to culture glosses over all of them and creates a rosy lowest common denominator, a point of departure where everyone is equal. This is fundamental to his intellectual edifice and to his explanation of the case of Barcelona. From his perspective, Barcelona, capital of a nation without a state, has historically managed to progress and excel thanks to its people’s will and resilience, in the absence of proper supportive institutions. The post-Francoist democratic period is, according to this account, the culmination, the last instance of such pattern of urban intervention: a cultural manifestation that involves everyone acting in unison: “The totality of Barcelona was involved in its transformative project, an idea of the city, a cultural project. It based its force in the participation of many of those who lived in it” (Ibid.: 79). The intricacies of political battles disappear in Mascarell’s account, subsumed under his culturalizing, degree-zero of politics view: “Politics was understood as a common cultural field on which to build democracy and a new urbaneness” (Ibid.: 88), and more specifically “Culture was synonymous with creativity, freedom, Catalanness, civility, progress, diversity, social justice, commitment, innovation and modernity” (Ibid.: 108–109). What emerges from his account is an agent of change, one that has surfaced at different points in our argument already in the voices of other socialist municipal leaders: the people, a pre-postpolitical view of them that comes directly from that ancestral definition of culture at the beginning of Mascarell’s book, and which is frequently exchanged with the city itself in perfect symbiosis as the subject of Mascarell’s words:

In little less than two decades the city projected and won its most recent effort of modernity. It achieved it thanks to its radical stand for urban democracy in a shared cultural project. It was the experience of common people. It took shape through a global city discourse. The city acted as its own subject of culture. (Ibid.: 92)

La gente, the people, always act together and in the same direction in order to beneﬁt the city (Ibid.: 89) because they share a culture – a new MASTERMINDS OF CULTURE 211 incarnation of identity – among themselves, and with professionals and politicians:

The city of the 1980s and 1990s showed that a city can transform itself by the force of its cultural capital, from the common culture shared by those living in it, from the professional sub-groups, from the democratic political culture. (Ibid.: 90, and see also 121)

Of course, all of this symbiosis of politicians, technocrats, and people sharing the same project is a celebration of consensus and the Barcelona model on the part of someone who represents those who took an active part in orchestrating it. But what is significant from the vantage point of the mid-2000s, when the book is published, is the insistence on recognizing the common culture, the one shared by all residents, as cultural capital. Two things I believe are being selected as profitable: creativity as the substratum of human life; and the ability to channel it collectively in a desired direction. According to our analysis of the Plans and in the Memorandum documents, citizen participation is indispensable for the city to survive, and Mascarell’s strategy was to invoke its past incarnations, in their most recent postpolitical version, to underpin the need for its return. To say that: “For two decades the participatory process was fed with the presence of citizens where decisions regarding the functioning of the city were being made” (Ibid.: 108, and other examples in 120–126, 139) is a gross inaccuracy that our study has tried to unpick. However, its mention is not rhetorical, as Mascarell is sincere when he calls for the comeback of citizen participation, as this was invaluable in putting Barcelona on the global map through the Olympic Games, and has continued to be expected ever since to confirm the image:

All citizens together sent to the world a message of open identity, creativity, transforming ability, democratic community and organisational quality that impregnated local and international symbolic views for a long time. (Ibid.: 111)

To note here is how seamlessly Mascarell, when citing the list of Barcelona’s citizens’ qualities moves from values to technical skills. Submerged in post- 2004 ennui after the Forum’s failure, Mascarell mourns consensus and longs for its return. His hope is that “Creativity and a communal sense continue to be indisputable attributes of the city” (Ibid.: 116), and therefore can be 212 13 MASTERMINDS OF CULTURE put at its service once again. In all his references to aesthetic and moral values as constitutive of being a Barcelonian, Mascarell is instilling a biopolitical quality to culture, as a way of subsuming life itself and putting it at the service of the city’s needs. It is in this sense that we can say that with Mascarell the Barcelona citizen as the neoliberal subject is theorized. But contrary to other accounts of neoliberalism whereby the subordination of life to market rationality requires “moral value neutrality,” as Brown (2005: 40) defines it when referring to the US case, Mascarell’s market rationalization of cultural value paradoxically aims to make capitalist profit out of the production of the human as a moral subject. Rather than letting go of a rhetoric of moral value, cultural rights, and celebration of community, it cultivates it as an asset to be capitalized in the marketing and branding of the city. And it is in so doing that his social-democratic credentials subtly become neoliberal. For Mascarell, his project is to be distinguished from what he attacks as dominant postmodernism and late capitalism: “Barcelona demonstrated that it could oppose those old dogmatic free market economies ... Barcelona is able to ... lead again the world’s urban movement against the undesired consequences of the market’sdeterminism” (2008: 135). In our view, however, the resistance and critique he advocates are not such, but new forms of subsumption under the rules of (cultural) capital camouflaged in a social-democratic rhetoric. Why, if that were not the case, would Mascarell be so significantly silent about the critical movements that opposed the Fòrum? Why is it that dissent has no part in the civic democratic culture so pervasively invoked in his book? The Memorandum and Barcelona y la modernidad are twin foundational texts for understanding the neoliberal cultural turn that social- democratic Barcelona becoming a creative city entails. In them, a long process of transformation with respect to the role of citizens in a democratic postindustrial city crystallizes in all of its seductive and insidious ambiguity. Through mild invocations of local pride, flattering reassur- ances about “the way we are” and “what we can do together”,and allusions to the abundance of individual agency and creativity, life is in demand as cultural capital to be tapped into. This all-involving discourse targets what is more personal, more quotidian, more visible, more intimate, more trivial, more extraordinary, more inescapable of individual and collective life itself in the social, with the ambition of channeling it all to the service of the image/brand. This is the defining gesture of the creative, cultural city. It aims to mirror and shape, to then subsume, local life in its entirely. NOTE 213

NOTE 1. Mascarell’s thesis is the same as that of Joan Ramon Resina’sinBarcelona’s vocation of modernity, though they arrive at diametrically opposed conclu- sions: Resina sees the destruction, rather than the culmination of Barcelona’s modern “vocation,” which he equates with a Catalan nationalist project, under PSC’s municipal government. PART V

Be Yourself Out There: Inhabiting Barcelona for the Global Market

This last part of the book moves beyond the discourses of government and its strategies and demands on the citizen to behave as a neoliberal subject. It continues to be concerned with the production of neoliberal subjectivity in the creative city, but from the point of view of the brand’s performance. In what follows and through a focus on ﬁlm and sport we observe how the Barcelona global cultural image conditions, in concrete cultural examples, conﬁgurations of subjectivity. The purpose of these incursions is to see the Barcelona brand performing “out there,” by mobilizing neoliberal fanta- sies of subject construction and transformation. CHAPTER 14

Capital Subjects: Redeﬁning Capitality in Global Films on Barcelona

This chapter explores the construction of a global Barcelona gaze; that is, of a look at the city constructed as a result of the global irradiations of the brand, a gaze that in turn helps to perpetuate the city brand’s world purchase. We consider here how the brand is perceived globally as favoring, as producing, as encouraging, and as enriching particular modes of living, and therefore a specific kind of person able to take advantage of and enjoy the experience. All of which is offered as a promise to the potential visitor, on the understanding that such kinds of results could not have been produced in the places where they come from, as a result endowing Barcelona with the means to produce a particular kind of life experience that is unviable for subjects elsewhere, and defining in this way the city’s qualitative advantage. I tackle the issue through the analysis of two well-known films set in Barcelona that have confirmed and reinforced a global image for the city by enjoying worldwide distribution and good box office revenues, plus no small amount of academic attention. It is worth mentioning that the use of film to disseminate Barcelona’s brand image has attracted substantial critical attention (Osácar Marzal 2016; Rodríguez Campo et al. 2011; Aertsen 2011; Deleyto and López 2012). Our study focuses on Cédric Klapish’s L’auberge espagnole (translated into English in different parts of the world as Pot Luck or The Spanish Apartment)(2002), and Woody Allen’s Vicky, Cristina, Barcelona (2008). L’auberge had a follow-up in 2005, Les puppees russes (Russian Dolls). In the case of Vicky,itis

© The Author(s) 2017 217 M.P. Balibrea, The Global Cultural Capital, The Contemporary City, DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-53596-2_14 218 14 CAPITAL SUBJECTS: REDEFINING CAPITALITY IN GLOBAL FILMS important to draw attention to the fact that the film was part of a conscious effort made by the Barcelona Ajuntament to promote the city as a tourist destination, and that it invested one million euros in it, to target in particular the US market. The film generated profits of 7.5 million euros (Rodríguez Campo et al. 2011: 139; Aertsen 2011). Both films were made by foreign directors whose work had not previously been located in Barcelona, and they produce a kind of visitors’ view of the city and its inhabitants that is, in itself, paradigmatic of the kind of attention the city brand is seeking, an image for global consumption through the medium of cinema. Much of the scholarly work generated by the films, either critically or approvingly, accepts contemporary Barcelona’s geopolitical role and global economic place as derived from the service and visitor industries. They therefore see these films as reinforcing the city brand and image createdinordertoperformsucharoleandtomaintainsuchaplace.Itis accepted that the films work by using Barcelona’s landscape as a postcard background full of familiar icons (from modernist architecture to Mediterraneanness to cosmopolitanism) in order to engage characters in narratives of self-searching and successful transformation. While certainly agreeing with these interpretations, I find them ultimately insuffi- cient to account for the ways in which the films are implicated in reinforcing Barcelona’s global image and place in the world market of cities. It is clearly true that these film narratives reinforce the brand by portraying exclusively those urban spaces that are part of a hegemonic, global idea of the city, to the absence of all other anodyne ones. It is also the case that they construct a fantasy about life and social relations in Barcelona that predictably hides all existing antagonisms and the exploitative socio-economic conditions that could spoil the visitors’ experience. But what I am interested in exploring is the way in which these films “sell” Barcelona as a destination to visit by presenting it as a most efficient producer and enhancer of neoliberal subjectivity. When considered from this perspective, Barcelona, the visitors and the city-break destination is to be conceived, against the grain, as a place of labor for the visitor, not as a place of leisure. As McCaffrey and Pratt put it with respect to L’auberge,thevisitor’s stay in Barcelona has exchange value (2011:437–438). The unfailingly leisurely, warm and chic Barcelona atmosphere of these films, which foreign characters inhabit for a period, is the necessary breeding ground for their effective identity work. What makes – some – characters happy in the end, what gives value to their CAPITAL SUBJECTS: REDEFINING CAPITALITY IN GLOBAL FILMS ON BARCELONA 219

Barcelona experience is presented under the guise of having become emotionally fulfilled individuals, but can be otherwise defined as having extracted from their encounters in the city the necessary tools to succeed individually in a neoliberal world. These kinds of work are presented by the films as only being possible in Barcelona, and not in the global capitals, Paris and New York, respectively, that the protagonists come from. Which endows Barcelona with a sort of capitality and centrality that in turn justifies and reinforces the geopolitical role and economic place at the service of which the Barcelona brand was created. The concept of identity work connects directly with our ongoing discussion on neoliberal subjectivity and homo economicus. As we discussed in Chapter 2, in life lived under neoliberal conditions of sociability, market perspectives and values present themselves for the individual in the shape of “interests, desires, and aspirations” (Read 2009: 29) of an utmost personal and intimate nature, but at the same time as being indispensable in order to prepare oneself for employability and beyond, for a successful life. Anything and everything happening to the individual affects one’s human capital and contributes, or not, to a “coherent biographical narrative” (Giddens quoted in Snee 2014: 844) and therefore to one’s chances of success, and for that reason can conceivably be rationally managed as an investment. All efforts to structure and rationalize life as a permanent investment in oneself can be labeled as identity work. In turn, as neoliberal rationales become increasingly prevalent, the market, in entrepreneurial fashion, has intervened to help in shaping identity work’s endless potential manifestations when they are likely to become more lucrative. The Anglo- Saxon concept of the gap year, or overseas year, whereby young people between stages of education take time off to travel and gain world experience, is a case in point. A little less conditioned by class, though still greatly the territory of the at least moderately affluent, is the European Erasmus exchange program, whose participants, in addition to studying, are exposed to a life-enriching experience by visiting another country. When read as identity-work facilitators – and I am not saying, mind you, that this is all they are – their value is to provide cultural capital that will at some point be validated by the market in the form of “soft skills, greater maturity, enhanced self-awareness and increased independence” (Heath quoted in Snee 2014: 845). Our two films present characters who visit Barcelona as temporary residents, for a summer in the case of Vicky, and for a year in that of L’auberge, as the protagonist undertakes an Erasmus year in Barcelona. 220 14 CAPITAL SUBJECTS: REDEFINING CAPITALITY IN GLOBAL FILMS

None of them is in the city to properly take a job, though they are not city- break tourists either. More or less formally, study and research are what brings them to the city. However, neither film focuses on that aspect, but instead on the social relations the characters establish while in Barcelona, and how that affects them personally. My argument is that in Vicky and in L’auberge the adventures of the protagonists, their life-changing experiences are framed by the neoliberal logic of identity work. Barcelona, thanks to the greatly commodified and stereotyped life conditions that it is perceived and presented as having readily available, emerges as the destination of choice, not for inconsequential fun under the sun, but as a fundamental stepping stone on the subject’s way to readying him/herself for the risks and opportunities of neoliberal life. Both films deploy narratives of transformation, or re-subjectification on the part of the protagonists derived from their encounter with the visited place and its inhabitants.1 In that sense, both films reproduce tired modern myths of the South from the perspective of the metropolitan gaze,2 but with the exotic encounter resignified for a neoliberal paradigm. As metropolitan encounters with the Other in the South, the two films still invoke several centuries-long stereotypes of Spanishness, as noted by Sánchez and Ezra (2005) with respect to L’auberge. This is despite pro- testations that Vicky consciously intended to separate itself from such clichés and their more recent associations with the Francoist dictatorship (Aertsen 2011). In L’auberge, since the actual contact with the locals is kept to a minimum, more diffuse ideas of the South coming from Romanticism and especially from France prevail: Spain as the opposite of modernity’s instrumental reason, as the place where non-alienated contact with the senses and non-regimented use of time is still possible, and therefore where a metropolitan subject can go in search of what the experience of modernity has lost. These visions take more concrete forms in Vicky, which can be read as a combined updating of the Carmen and Don Juan myths, courtesy, of course, of the characters played by Javier Bardem (Juan Antonio) and Penélope Cruz (María Elena) and including most importantly the ways in which the representation of the Other creates at one and the same time fear and desire in the metropolitan gaze (Colmeiro 2002; Gabilondo 2008). In Vicky, the Spanish imaginary framework is permanently on, from the already mentioned character stereotypes to the soundtrack music. The more diagetically relevant melodies, corresponding to a romantic atmosphere, inevitably involving Juan Antonio, are provided by Spanish guitar music, either instantly recognizable tunes such as MOVE OVER, CAPITALS OF THE WORLD 221

“Asturias” and “Granada” by Isaac Albéniz, Paco de Lucía’s “Entre dos Aguas”, or equally evocative of Spain, “Gorrión” and “Entre las olas” by Juan Serrano. In L’auberge, markers of Spanishness include the Osborne bull on the T-shirt that his friends give to the protagonist when he leaves Barcelona, and the flamenco lessons taken by his friend and flatmate Isabelle (Cécile de France). They are also evoked through music, though diffused in wider concepts of latinidad, as in the opening and closing credits, with the soundtrack incorporating paso doble, rumba, and salsa rhythms. All in all, in these films Barcelona is very much still the background for the tourist economy, “the theme park of the femme fatale and the latin lover” (Gabilondo 2008:54). Both films present characters who will know how to take advantage of what the Barcelona destination has to offer and contrast them with others who will not. The narratives, guided in both cases by a male narrator – the retrospective reliable one of the protagonist himself in the case of L’auberge, and a disembodied, ironic extra-diegetical one, typical of Allen’s films, in Vicky – invite the viewer to see the former as successful and deserving of praise, and the latter as inspiring pity or derision. The happy ending, and ideological closure, consists of the winners moving out of Barcelona, back to the cities they came from and on toward a bright professional as well as personal future that they are now better prepared to confront. The losers, on the other hand, are seen as continuing with what we are invited to imagine as unfulfilled, monotonous lives that will make them unhappy. Or put differently, in happy-ending ideological fashion, everyone gets what they deserve, and a new order is restored.

MOVE OVER,CAPITALS OF THE WORLD Xavier (Romain Duris), the young Parisian student of Economics in L’auberge, is advised to go on the Erasmus program to Spain for his last year of university studies in order to enhance his chances of getting a job on his return. The film begins in Paris. The city is introduced visually through a bird’s eye view of the river Seine, a point of view that will recur in the first part of the film, as the viewer hears the protagonist’s voice telling his story. Not only the river but also images of major roads with no people in sight, or only de-humanizingly small ones, convey the sense of his alienation with respect to life in a city where things move but in a controlled, immutable way that is indifferent to people’s desires and preferences. From the soundtrack point of view, Paris emerges to the 222 14 CAPITAL SUBJECTS: REDEFINING CAPITALITY IN GLOBAL FILMS tune of Marc-Antoine Charpentier’s Te Deum in D Major, an immediately recognizable European theme, as it is the European Broadcasting Union soundtrack and that of the Eurovision song contest (00:02:20–00:02:52; 00:03:13–00:03:18).3 In this way, Paris is associated not only with France but also with Europe, a view of it as highly bureaucratic, hyper- rationalist, and alienating, and because of that considerably intimidating, boring, and unattractive for a young person. The European connection will be confirmed soon at the level of the plot. Charpentier’stheme accompanies the viewer and Xavier in the background as he experiences this kind of working environment while walking through the indistinct office space of the Economy, Finances, and Industry Ministry. The camera in fast motion conveys the sense that it is saving viewers’ time from the tiresome monotony of Xavier having to walk past endless bland cubicles and corridors in order to get to his interview with a ministerial bureaucrat of some influence.4 Upon greeting Xavier, the latter will show him the “impressive” view of the river from his office, though this is ostentatiously, and metaphorically, obstructed by a window panel designed as a grid. Xavier’s time with the bureaucrat lays out the future that awaits him if he does the right things: an affluent life surrounded by expensive objects and lavish consumption if he specializes in the Spanish economic market, as this will allow him, having the right insider recommendations, to fill a small gap in the huge machinery of the Ministry. Spending a year in Spain, Barcelona, it turns out, is supposed to do the preparatory work to enhance his CV. We will not see the space of bureaucratic state and EU-controlled capitalism again until the end of the film when, after having spent his year in Barcelona and passed the necessary exams, Xavier goes back to meet his destiny only to change his mind about it (01:49:13–01:51:05). The scene underlines to the point of caricature the dehumanizing rationality of bureaucratic administration: a cubicle is a tiny workspace like a thousand others around the building, only distinguished by a serial number on the door; order is arbitrary and tyrannical: folder color-coding is to be maintained because “the European Commission insists” on it; human relations are reduced to banal conversations beside the coffee machine; enthusiasm and good spirits are fake; clothing is formal and bland; retirement is mentioned as a token of a life spent endlessly repeating the tedious sameness. Needless to say, Xavier runs away from it all to embrace in the last minute of the film a life that is still to be written as opposed to having been laid down for him in advance, a lifestyle that returns him to what the audience know are his true self and desires, to be a writer. MOVE OVER, CAPITALS OF THE WORLD 223

The same kind of representation of financial capital as producing subjects that are economically wealthy but socially anodyne, predictable, and boring to be around recurs in Vicky, locates it in another global capital, New York. It is incarnated by Doug (Chris Messina), a Wall Street broker and Vicky’s (Rebecca Hall) fiancé, who is described by the narrator (Christopher Evan Welch) as “decent and successful”, someone who “understood the beauty of commitment”, and in the words of his own girlfriend, made from a “cookie-cutter mold” (00:13:13). A New York exterior location is visible briefly only once in the film (00:31:37– 00:33:38). It portrays Doug in a suit, having just stepped out of an office, against the background of Manhattan harbor, with skyscrapers and docked sailing boats on a sunny day. He calls Vicky in Barcelona, where it is already nighttime and she is in bed, to break the news of his plans to fly to Barcelona so that the couple can get married there right away. The diegetic point of the scene is to show Vicky faking interest and love for her fiancée, when what she has in her head is Juan Antonio, with whom, during a trip to Oviedo, she had a one-night affair. Mise-en-scène works to make Doug appear eager but unexciting. Despite the sunny and leisurely background, the image lacks color and is instead tinted a kind of austere beige. Camerawork reminds the viewer of a newsclip, with a steady camera focusing straight at him via a medium shot from a single angle, and slowly coming closer to his face. Any viewer can think of more desirable images of Manhattan, and more predictable ones. Our disap- pointment as viewers matches Vicky’s underwhelmed reaction to “the news.” The cinematic imaginary of New York and Paris, portrayed as exciting, romantic, life-stimulating cities, is huge and very likely to be present in every viewer’s mental archive. Moreover, Doug being a Wall Street broker, we could hardly imagine a less oppositional place to neoliberal life. But the point here, and in L’auberge, is not to pit Barcelona against New York, or Paris, in permanent terms. Barcelona is always understood in its branded role of city-break holiday enclave: a temporary stop along the way. It is the visual mechanism of invoking a ludic landscape that puts the major cities at a disadvantage with respect to Barcelona, where it is perpetually sunny, strikingly aestheticized, and overflowing with sexual opportunity. What does Barcelona have that these great cities lack? The answer is that it is a breeding ground for the creative subject, the right place for the global first-world subject to come and work on him/herself, to acquire experiences and knowledge that can be invested in his/her professional future, which will be in creative work. 224 14 CAPITAL SUBJECTS: REDEFINING CAPITALITY IN GLOBAL FILMS

WINNERS AND LOSERS OF THE BARCELONA EXPERIENCE L’auberge’s closure and dominant reading invites viewers to embrace a protagonist who has valiantly chosen to liberate himself from any structural constraints by renouncing a secure job with the Ministry and embracing his vocation as a writer. However, Xavier’s story can be re-thought as a tale of transformation of the “oppressed” subject of bureaucracy and excessive state and European Union intervention into the neoliberal entrepreneur qua the creative worker. As Dunn (2004: 22) argues, “Persons who are ‘entrepreneurs of themselves’ flexibly alter their bundles of skills and manage their careers, but they also become the bearers of risk, thus shifting the burden of risk from the state to the individual.” This French national is willingly prepared to give up all the labor rights that presumably go with a job with the EU/French administration for the exciting precariousness of freelance writing, celebrating independence, hedonism, self-reliance, and risk-taking entrepreneurship. Barcelona in the film serves the purpose of making the re-subjectivation of the protagonist along these lines possible, his retraining to a form of creative productivity whose real conditions of exploitation go unacknowledged by presenting Xavier’s new life as being independent of the market and disentangled from any labor structure. Xavier’s Erasmus year in Barcelona becomes a way for the protagonist to work on and reinvent himself as a new type of person/worker: the creative worker. His liberation is from Fordist-type working practices, those incarnated by the work awaiting him in Paris. But the new conditions of work imply the subsumption of once resistant-to-Capital artistic practices, to use Chiapello and Boltanski’s terminology once more, albeit in an unrecognized way.5 Everything that happens to him in Barcelona can be interpreted as, in the end, having been successfully monetarized, invested in human capital on the part of the protagonist, principally his affects and aesthetic sense: the people he meets in the flat that he shares, the training as a lover through the “lessons” of his lesbian Belgian friend Isabelle and his affair with married woman Anne-Sophie (Judith Godrèche). In the scene leading to the one I have described, with Xavier returning to the rest of his life in Paris, he meets Martine (Audrey Tautou), his former Paris girlfriend, for the last time and then takes a walk through Montmartre, in the middle of which he encounters a group of Erasmus students. The area, where Xavier’s voiceover states “the parisiennes never go,” a quarter whose attraction is based on its commodified and long-gone artistic and bohemian aura, puts him in WINNERS AND LOSERS OF THE BARCELONA EXPERIENCE 225 contact with the tourist experience, where he feels both “tipique,” the same as everyone else, and utterly alienated. The camera shows us Xavier in close-up surrounded, suffocated by, tourist-like people. After his brief encounter with the Erasmus students, he turns away and walks down a street that in a seamless cut turns into his walking, now wearing a suit and tie, toward the Ministry building to accept his new job. The location of the Montmartre scene prior to the Ministry one links the tourist as well as the Erasmus experiences abroad as equally connected to life and subjectivly subsumed under the tyranny of state-dominated Capital’s regimented reason. Xavier, however, refuses to be “tipique” or, to put it in the language of Cristina in Allen’s film, refuses to fit a cookie-cutter mold. The concluding images of him turned into a human plane accelerating on the airport runway and about to take off into a huge blue sky insists on the idea of a blank, but bright and unspoiled, unframed future awaiting Xavier, who is able to escape the insidious logic of Capital. Such victory has been made possible for him by Barcelona, the place providing him with an authentic, bespoke experience of life-changing, enlightening proportions. But what the film spares us is the news that the discourse of authenticity is another turn of the screw in the search for new commodifiable frontiers in the service industry, ignoring that the freedom it cele- brates is “not to enlarge the worker’s margin of resistance to the logic of production, but on the contrary to make him participate in it more fully” (Donzelot 1991: 279). This is the kind of subject that the Barcelona brand can help to enhance and give a competitive edge to, even better, according to these films, than the global capitals themselves, endowing Barcelona as a result with a capitality status. Xavier in L’auberge and, as we will now see, Cristina in Vicky, aspire to become such types of subjects. It is bureaucratic capitalism that they reject. But what they choose instead is not a life of freedom from the constraints of the market and instrumental reason, but rather the new model of capitalist subjectivity, the creative subject. The successful, creative neoliberal subject in Vicky is played by Cristina (Scarlett Johansson). With university friend Vicky they go to Barcelona to spend two summer months. During their stay, while Vicky expects to advance her work on her MA on Catalan Identity, Cristina’s objectives are much looser. She is not part of any structured course of studies, and in the previous six months she has been making a film. Both characters are hence bound in some way by an interest in the creative industries, the perfect fit for the cultural capital that Barcelona brands itself, but Cristina’s situation matches better the conditions and expectations of how time is 226 14 CAPITAL SUBJECTS: REDEFINING CAPITALITY IN GLOBAL FILMS spent on a gap year. The audience finds out through the voice-over that she fits the stereotype of the artist, permanently unsatisfied, always searching for an identity. Though never openly recognized, it is clear to the viewer that Vicky envies Cristina’s worldview and ways of interacting with it. Moreover, this film’s narrative could not be further from an interest in things Catalan, which are in no conscious way worked on in the film. Vicky mistakes her object of intellectual interest since, for a film that treats spaces as mere two-dimensional, highly manicured and clichéd areas chosen for aesthetic effect, any attempt at an in-depth exploration of its complexities cannot possibly be welcome, an early sign of Vickys being out of sync with what the Barcelona brand has to offer. Much more appropriate to the film’s bi-dimensional shallow approach is Cristina’s penchant for photography. From the beginning, and via the opinions of the omniscient voice-over, the audience is instructed to approve of Cristina’s attitude and to disap- prove of Vicky’s sanctimonious one, based on their disparate ideas of love.

Vicky had no tolerance for pain and no lust for combat, she was grounded and realistic. Her requirements in a man were seriousness and stability. ... Cristina ... expected something very different from love. She had reluc- tantly accepted suffering as an inevitable component of deep passion and was resigned to putting her feelings at risk. (0:02:00–0:02:40)

The split screen with a closeup of both women’s faces that accompanies these words, diegetically unnecessary as the two friends are supposed to be sitting next to each other in a taxi, visually underlines their opposing worldviews on love matters and foreshadows a plot of parallel, contrast- and-compare personal developments. Vicky is engaged to marry and Cristina has just broken up “with yet another boyfriend” (0:01:48). We are about to witness how the two friends react to the same love stimulus in Barcelona: the most stereotypical incarnations of Latino passion as enacted by Juan Antonio and María Elena. It is my argument that love functions in this film as a cipher for life, and by extension, in neoliberal identity work logic, of human capital acquisition. Attitudes toward love and desire mask in the film an interest in subject behavior when confronted by the new, the risky and the unknown. While this is a basic structural trope of narrative, its particular resolution in the film belies a neoliberal paradigm. Despite the scrupulously symmetrical presentation of both characters’ views in the taxi scene, we see the narrative leaning toward a preference for Cristina. WINNERS AND LOSERS OF THE BARCELONA EXPERIENCE 227

In the introductory scene, she is given the last word too. While viewers are told what she does not want in love, we are left not knowing what she does want. She is a subject of desire, looking for what she lacks. She is open, while Vicky is closed. Crucially too, she sees risk as a necessary component of life, and abhors security and stability; all qualities which, when attached to her, increase in appeal. Let us not forget that risk, the glamorous side of precariousness, is a central trait of preferred neoliberal subjectivity, at pains to present security and stability as being alienatingly boring, repressive, and the realm of cowards. This is in fact how we are made to see Vicky’s preferences. Though displaced to the world of love expectations, we have in a nutshell the representation of a world where love/life/job security and stability have not only disappeared, to be substituted by precarious/ freelance/risky love/life/work, but the latter are made to look like a gain for the subject/worker. Incidentally, a similar message is to be derived from cheering Xavier’s life choices after his Erasmus year in Barcelona. The qualities of commitment and stability, long-time employment and marriage in L’auberge, but only marriage in Vicky, are presented as de-humanizing, things to put up with only for those who do not have the courage to run away from them to live in touch with their senses and desires. The plot that ensues only confirms these predispositions, and where the film’s dominant reading wants us to place our sympathies as an audience. Cristina, adapting well, even thriving on risk, will manage to work on herself in productive ways. Vicky will not. When both friends meet Juan Antonio (00:08:08–00:11:42), a successful and talented painter, the scene plays overtly on Don Juan stereotypes. Juan Antonio offers Vicky and Cristina an open and rosy sexual fantasy, so perfect and so aware of its constructed perfection – the luxury, the adventure, the beauty – as to only be possible for a carefully designed product. Significantly, his sober, neutral, detached tone is “seductive” and “devil- ishly snob-machista” as Perriam claims (2013: 188), but also, I would argue, businesslike, a demeanor and opaqueness (Fuller 2009: 25) that Javier Bardem maintains throughout his performance in this film.6 He speaks of his proposition, though not a contract where everything is to be negotiated beforehand, as his “best offer,” and discusses and defends its qualities at length, particularly when prompted by Vicky’s challenging comments, and argues that it deserves consideration, rather than outright refusal. The conversation is edited on a shot/reverse shot pattern that keeps the women as a group and Juan Antonio always framed in isolation from them, intensifying the sense that a formal distance is kept. The 228 14 CAPITAL SUBJECTS: REDEFINING CAPITALITY IN GLOBAL FILMS women react very differently to his words. Vicky is scandalized; Cristina flattered and seduced. Although the latter’s reaction is interpreted by Vicky as a hopelessly romantic one, it is rather the case that Cristina understands there is something to be gained if she takes the risk. She can see Juan Antonio from the beginning as a service provider whose job is to please her and to enrich her Barcelona experience, and will consequently invest in his offer. But Vicky will mistake the terms of Juan Antonio’s offered agreement as being “for real,” first a real sham then a real romance. Throughout the film, Juan Antonio never forces and never imposes, he is constantly asking the American friends what they want, acting throughout more as an analyst than a potential lover. And although he pokes fun at Vicky for being overanalytical, he is the one who is always presented as being a step ahead in his understanding of women’s desires and what makes them tick better than they do. In other words, Juan Antonio knows his business and his place. This could certainly be said of all serial seducers and Don Juans, but this is not a tale of female victimization at the hands of a male sexual predator. I agree with Fuller (2009: 27) that the focus of the film is on what women want, and it turns out it is not a Spanish bull. Juan Antonio never intends to pose any danger to the visitors’ life trajectory, but rather to be the perfect access provider. He is allowed to seduce because he serves a function, he has cultural capital and offers it to the Americans. He is able to appreciate art and to make love, an aestheticized and sexualized subjectivity that can be a resource of entrepreneurship. In his relation with Cristina, he facilitates her identity work by putting her in contact with authenticity, the most coveted commodity in travel services. She moves into his house to enjoy full access to his creative process, paintings and expert lovemaking; he takes Cristina to places, which she will unfailingly photograph (00:35:38–00:36:11), and “encourages her photographic work”; and he provides her with exclusive access to environments and local people (poets, artists, musicians) that would otherwise be hidden for the majority of visitors. Cristina is inspired to write poetry when Juan Antonio calls her (00:31:26–00:31:33), while Vicky stalls, wasting time, perpetually hesitant, tempted by the wrong options. Even when María Elena, Juan Antonio’s estranged but omnipresent ex-wife, turns up to live with them, after a hint of jealously on the part of Cristina, the arrangement turns out to be even more beneficial for her. María Elena, said to be the quintessence of beauty and artistic genius, has even more than Juan Antonio to offer to the aspiring young artist. In keeping with the Carmen stereotype, María Elena’s destructive traits are her WINNERS AND LOSERS OF THE BARCELONA EXPERIENCE 229 undoing and arguably that of Juan Antonio too, but this is no obstacle to her functioning as another quality access provider for Cristina. Moreover, María Elena’s arrival introduces new frontiers of exploration for Cristina, artisti- cally, but also sexually, all of which are presented as enriching the American because she is uninhibited and willing to take risks. María Elena’sartistic authority will validate Cristina’s talent, encouraging and improving her photographic work,7 even by becoming Cristina’s photographic subject, aptly so since María Elena makes up such a great part of the Barcelona landscape and experience for Cristina.8 In a paradigmatic scene that summarizes the transfer of power between the women, we see Cristina going from an isolated, humiliating position of creative inferiority toward the Spanish couple, and María Elena specially – with separate shots framing and separating them – to, in a matter of seconds, a transfer, or better relinquishing, of María Elena’s power and authority that will put Cristina back in control of the gaze and artistic power for good. In the end, a solid vocation and body of photographic work emerges from her being part of their relationship, when Cristina sees herself as a photographer (01:13:05– 01:13:52). Right after Cristina is said to have acquired her life and professional skills, conveniently coinciding with the end of the summer and the period she had planned to stay in Barcelona, she feels restless and announces she is leaving the “bohemian but nonetheless committed emotional radical- ism” (Perriam 2013: 189) of their arrangement, to the pain and disappoint- ment of her two local friends. When María Elena threatens to become violent towards Cristina and reproaches her all too clearly for having only had her own interests in mind, it is Juan Antonio – a tamed Don Juan – who introduces an understanding, pacifying, compromising tone, letting Cristina get away scot-free and making all the gains. Nowhere in the film is Cristina’s disingenuous attitude as clear, and yet the narrator justifies it as a relentlessness Cristina cannot help and, even more, the narrative rewards it through a validation of her mode of subjectivity as the preferred one. During her time with the Spanish couple, Cristina has improved her career as a photographer by sustaining the disguised predator attitude of someone who extracts raw material for her own processing and profit. She has literally sucked knowledge out of Juan Antonio and María Elena, their immaterial labor and creative work, sexual as well as artistic, handling them in a way that at all times benefits her. The couple, involved in centuries-long Spanish stereotypes of tormented love, live and breathe beauty and passion to the point of their destruction. Cristina will get involved with them only to a certain extent, passion for her turning out to be a calculated enterprise one 230 14 CAPITAL SUBJECTS: REDEFINING CAPITALITY IN GLOBAL FILMS enters in pursuit of personal gain and growth. Bardem and Cruz, for all their fierce exchanges and verbal abuse of each other, particularly on the part of María Elena, and aggressive attitudes, play docile, rather than recalcitrant native subjects in their encounter with the beauty and seduction of the neoliberal subject. By comparison, Vicky is incapable of being in touch with her own desires and to respond to them in “constructive” ways. She does not only fail, but deserves to fail for repressing her desires. Replicating the politics of modern Romantic encounters of metropolitan subjects with the exotic Other, Vicky desires and fears Juan Antonio in equal measure. She expects more than is offered in her relationship with him, constantly making a fool of herself. She belongs in a different narrative, one where she and Juan Antonio “really” fall in love with each other and Vicky stays in Barcelona as a result. The reason that this is never a possibility is not so much the fault of this Don Juan’s chronic sexual promiscuity so much as a product of the conditions themselves of the Barcelona experience. In the world of life abroad, experience qua CV enhancer, Vicky developing deep and enduring feelings for Bardem’s character is an aberration that the film constructs as Vicky’s embarrassing sexual repression. Unable to deal with risk in a way that allows her to make a gain; that is, to deal with risk as investment, Vicky will leave Barcelona diminished, settling in a cowardly fashion for stability (marriage) without passion. As observers, we are encouraged to sneer at her going back to the safe haven of her boyfriend, but by subscribing to such an interpretation we overlook another way of approaching Vicky’s “problem,” and the reasons why she exhibits the wrong attitude throughout, namely that she lacks the fundamental entrepreneurial qualities of self-reliance and risk- taking. The only point in the film when she deliberately plans to cheat on her boyfriend and takes the risk of meeting Juan Antonio at his house for an intimate encounter obeys the same out-of-place romantic logic Vicky has displayed since he first crossed her path in the narrative. She is still fantasizing with the idea of putting an end, through involvement with him, to an inauthentic life with Doug, surrounded by material goods and wealth but no substance (01:03:55–01:05:00). But this is at odds with the film’s dominant logis. The closure to this film was always going to entail the American women leaving Barcelona, as this is in keeping with the global idea of Barcelona as a city-break cultural destination for visitors in transit. The important selling point is not to propose the “Barcelona way of life” as a permanent option, but to convince the global viewer that there is something to take away for the visitor on a temporary residence, something precious WINNERS AND LOSERS OF THE BARCELONA EXPERIENCE 231 and unique to incorporate as soft skills to her subjectivity. The fact, then, that everything backfires terribly with María Elena showing up unexpectedly and shooting Vicky in the hand is truly providential in avoiding such an undesirable outcome as Juan Antonio showing signs that he has fallen in love with Vicky and wants a permanent relationship (01:23:40–01:27:11). Moreover, if the bohemian, artistic, transgressive-of-social-norms way of life espoused by María Elena and Juan Antonio always shows Cristina its more productive and transferable skills, unlucky Vicky is relentlessly hit with its most destructive and undesirable elements. Consequently, the fiasco is portrayed as Vicky’s, rather than as María Elena’s fault. And rightly so: according to the neoliberal credo, anything bad befalling the subject is, in the final analysis, his/her own fault, the result of an inadequate disposition. A similar kind of disappointing, pitiful personality for the viewer to compare to the exalted neoliberal creative subject is put forward in L’auberge as well. Here the role is played by Anne-Sophie, married to obnoxious Jean Michel (Xavier de Guillebon), and living permanently in Barcelona. Anne-Sophie looks older than Xavier and his friends, partly as a result of her status, hairstyle, and behavior. She arrives in Barcelona on the same plane as Xavier, to join her husband who is a neurologist, and they all meet on arrival at the airport. She has no recognized profession or personal interests, does not speak any Spanish, let alone Catalan, and is afraid to go out in the city on her own, so Xavier is asked to escort her. It is through their outings that the viewer gets to see the iconic Barcelona landmarks as their own relationship grows. This provides a direct connection between the city and individual transformation, signaling the power of being in Barcelona. Their ensuing sexual involvement is important for both, to liberate themselves from past sexual repressions and inhibitions: Xavier applies to Anne-Sophie these seduction techniques taught by his lesbian friend and flatmate Isabelle, marking the beginning of his moving away from the reserved, always-playing-by-the-rules person he used to be. Anne- Sophie, on the receiving end of these techniques, gratefully enjoys them, at the expense of cheating on her husband, another transgression. The difference between them, as between Cristina and Vicky, is that Anne-Sophie will not take the eye-opening experience with Xavier as a springboard to greater personal transformation, which in her case points at separating from Jean Michel. She chooses stability over risk for reasons the viewer is not privy to and do not matter much plot-wise as she is really not the main subject qua visitor that the narrative promotes. As Amago (2007: 12) has argued, the Barcelona of L’auberge is multicultural and multilingual, and a locus for the 232 14 CAPITAL SUBJECTS: REDEFINING CAPITALITY IN GLOBAL FILMS formation of a globalized transnational, even postnational identity; at least, it wants to be seen as such. This is the opposite of how Anne-Sophie is portrayed. During one of their urban hikes through El Raval, the marginal turned chic and fashionable Old City, Anne-Sophie complaints about the stink and dirt of the streets, lamenting that in places Barcelona seems a third-world city. Much more enlightened, politically correct Xavier embar- rasses Anne-Sophie making her see how racist her comments are, and how Paris has its own third-world areas as much as Barcelona has. But as Sánchez and Ezra point out more critically (2005: 140), while presenting a liberal view of mobility as the answer to intercultural understanding, the film glosses over the unequal mobility conditions that different collectives face in Europe. When considering this, Xavier’s comments about accepting the dirty sides of first-world cities lacks substance, more so with El Raval as background, an acceptance that is easy to make in theory but that never really comes back to bite, to affect his, after all, privileged life. In turn, Anne-Sophie’s comment is more genuine and at least acknowledging, when she apologizes, of its own shortcomings. Read against the grain, it points to a complex reality of inequality in Barcelona’s urban fabric with which the politically correct neoliberal Xavier, and the film’s dominant reading of the city as depthless background, want nothing to do. To conclude, these films implicate Barcelona in economies of affect and desire that are deeply connected with global capitalist discourses. Through the use of over-coded narratives, genre conventions and cinematographic devices, these films surreptitiously associate Barcelona with processes of subject transformation and adequacy to a neoliberal sociability. Behind their light-comedy tone, their veredict on noncomplying subjects is ruth- less. All in all, they make of Barcelona a necessary and desirable place for the production of the quality and thoroughly commodified life experience necessary to become a successful neoliberal subject. And more insidiously, these films’ narratives would want us spectators to believe that there is no other good way of being in, when not being from, Barcelona.

NOTES 1. In L’auberge, the lyrics, in Spanish, of the original soundtrack, composed by Loik and Mathieu Dury aka Kouz-1, and sung by Ardag, reinforce the logics of this narrative. During the opening credits (00:01:10–00:02:08), the song “L’auberge espagnole” combines sexual proposals with a voluntarist narrative using the second person singular, you, to interpellate and incite the NOTES 233

audience to find the courage in their hearts to change their lives and future. The soundtrack for the closing credits (1:52:33–1:56:40), on the other hand, through the song “Cambia la vida” (Life changes) speaks of a life changed for the best as a result of having had the right attitude in life. 2. Romney (quoted in Perriam 2013: 188) speaks of Vicky as a “revamp of the age-old Americans-in-Europe story.” 3. McCaffrey and Pratt, in their article on this film present it as being centrally about the anxieties of being a French male abroad, and as such reinforce French stereotypes. “Whilst manifestly extolling the virtues of European integration and the socio-cultural values associated with the university Erasmus exchange program, [L’auberge] simultaneously reinforce[s] con- ventional representations of French national identity in the form of repub- lican universalism, symbolic masculine heteronormativity and French exceptionalism” (2011: 433). While I find this to be an overall correct argument, I argue here that there is also room to extend Xavier’s rejection of Paris beyond France and as epitomizing a particular concept of Europe. 4. Through the same camera work and to the same interpretive effect the film portrays Xavier’s miserable time trying to navigate the Kafkaesque maze of French university bureaucracy in order to sign up to the Erasmus program (00:05:30–00:07:30). 5. Significant of the way in which this new creative capitalism rejects what was radical and political of the 68 movements from where it got its ideas is the representation of Xavier’s mother, derogatorily defined as an annoying, vegetarian hippy (00:05:00–00:05:20). Xavier’s attitude toward her throughout the film is at best condescending, and at worst abusive. 6. In a compatible reading to mine, Perriam (2013: 188) reads this scene and Juan Antonio’s proposition as coming out of Allen’s characteristic ideological ambivalence with respect to sexual politics and, more generally, sees Bardem and Cruz’s performances as self-aware of their own iconicity as actors and stereotyping in the characters they play (2013: 192). 7. “María Elena went out photographing with Cristina. She had a superb eye and knew a lot about the art of photography and taught Cristina much about the aesthetics and subtleties of picture taking. She advised her to get rid of her digital camera and use an old one for more interesting results” (01:02:30–01:03:50). 8. Fuller argues that María Elena incarnates in places the very spirit of Barcelona in the film (2009: 27), a point corroborated by Perriam, for whom Cruz becomes increasingly monumental (Perriam 2013: 186). Putting more ideological pressure on that identification of body to landscape, I would say that it allows for the visitor to both admire and extract value from them. CHAPTER 15

Barça in the New Millennium: The Other Barcelona Model

Our object of study in this chapter is the transition from a local to a global brand of F(ootball) C(lub) B(arcelona), known to its fans as Barça. It covers the period when the club’s local signs of identity in the new global context were being redefined, in a move rewarded by the market, the global as much as the local one, with unparalleled success. Barcelona in this chapter will be a central reference, not to the city but to the football club. However, both club and city are not only compatible but mutually reinforcing signifiers of an ever more powerful global brand. As in the field of urban transformation, in matters of football-playing style, often referred to as a philosophy, Barcelona in the twenty-first century was to become a model, a much greater one in fact than the city, as Barça is repeatedly acclaimed as being the best football team on the planet (Balagué 2012:27).1 As a global commercial brand, Barça offers anyone around the world the possibility of identification qua pleasure that partially overlaps with, and by doing so intensifies, that of the city itself. As the prestige of the club skyrocketed in the mid- to late 2000s and its board of directors fine-tuned it to make the club a leader in the cultural industry of global football, its headquarters in the city of Barcelona became an increasingly desirable tourist destination. City and club feed on each other’s achievements and prestige in a phenomenally successful commercial enterprise. On the one hand, the city brand provides the club with a form of branded and thoroughly commodified prestigious locale for territorialization, to compensate for the deterritorialization that the demands of providing for a global

© The Author(s) 2017 235 M.P. Balibrea, The Global Cultural Capital, The Contemporary City, DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-53596-2_15 236 15 BARÇA IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM: THE OTHER BARCELONA MODEL fandom unavoidably provoke. While Watson (2008: 274) is right that nowadays the proliferation of sites for FC Barcelona (FCB) fans around the world triggers a degree of deterritorialization,2 the city of Barcelona continues to be a privileged symbolic and material site of reterritorialization. This is so for locals, but very much too for those living farther afield. As of 2015, the club had 153,000 members (Cordero 2015) around the world, most of whom either visit or, it is not too risky to imagine, desire to visit, the club’s headquarters in Barcelona. Through the football club, the city of Barcelona brand was catapulted into becoming a world presence that multi- plies its separately acquired seductive possibilities in the global market. In 2015 the club was generating 1.2% of the city’s gross domestic product (GDP). The club’s stadium, Nou Camp or Camp Nou, now turned into a carefully planned theme park, is the third most popular tourist attraction in the city, after the Sagrada Família temple and the Aquarium (Nafría 2013, quoting official figures). Barça’s Museum receives more visits than any other in Catalonia, with well over a million visitors per year (figures from the club quoted in Xifra 2008: 196; more recent, confirming ones in Cordero 2015). On the other hand, the club’s relentless sporting successes in the domestic and international arenas since the early 2000s have gained it an uncontroversial global leadership. Holding such an undisputed place has worked, in turn, as a most effective device to create allegiances, in the form of Barça supporters everywhere, but beyond that, through an intensifica- tion of local pride, and subjective and collective identification with the city of Barcelona and with Catalonia. This is the main object of our study in this chapter. We conclude here our pursuit of the transformations in the conceptualization of the subject of Barcelona, by exploring the impact of Barça’s colossal sporting success in the local fandom’s “national sense of the self” (Watson 2008: 273), but also in that of the global fandom. Such an argument will allow us to produce a fuller picture of the ways in which a neoliberal paradigm of subjectivity perme- ates the global image and reality of the Barcelona brand. As far as this concerns the city, while the hegemonic construction of the idea of local citizenship we have been analyzing thus far has been widely contested in the post-Olympic period, showing allegiance to Barça has proved for many the formula to achieve the unexamined embracing of those same formsofsubjectivitythattriggeredcontestationwhenperceivedtobe attached to processes of city branding. It is our contention here that the club’s accomplishments at one and the same time launch from, and project back to, Barcelona and Catalonia a BARÇA IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM: THE OTHER BARCELONA MODEL 237 model of behavior that modifies, validates, and empowers local subject positions vis-à-vis a global audience. This feeding back process, we assert, has had consequences that go far beyond the strictly sporting arena. We are especially interested in looking at the role played in the aforementioned process by some of the club’s players, coaches, and executives, and how they came to be perceived as the kinds of ethical models of subjective and collective behavior that simultaneously and without contradiction confirm national stereotypes and are the most coveted ones in a contemporary world where all human relations are considered to be at their best when framed by competition. In a process analogous to the one we have analyzed in relation to the Barcelona citizen, our argument will be that the political, the critical, and the resistant, are the media through which, by mastering their discourses and adapting them to its goals, the FCB neoliberal project achieved supremacy. The club that emerged from the ashes of sporting and economic crisis in 2003 with the start of the presidency of the Elefant Blau (Blue Elephant) collective led by Joan Laporta initiated a process of increased, and open, politicization of the club as defender, ostentatiously so in the case of its new president, of Catalonia’s independence. It was also the start of a relentless economic recuperation that culminated in the unprecedented sporting success and global prestige for the club that the hiring of coach Pep Guardiola in 2008 was to bring (Escorcia 2005b). His period in post, 2008–2012, during which Barça and its team of ziga zaga players allegedly became the greatest in the world (Hunter 2012), coincided with the toughest years of the global economic crisis, a time when the efficacy and morality of the principles of free market and financial engineering as the pillars of capitalist growth were being radically questioned. Our argument is that the club’s business model, and the outstanding technical and professional prowess exhibited on the sporting front, broadcast on a global level, will work ideologically as an antidote to the toxic, predatory, and criminal tendencies in neoliberalism that the crisis was uncovering, becoming instead the epitome of “good” neoliberal behavior. Guardiola’s intelligence and work ethic in particular, but also those of his La Masia – the club’s youth football academy – players, working in conjunction with the outstanding transformation of the club into a leading corporate empire, provided a most convincing package to advertise the excellence of a whole neoliberal worldview. In this sense, and even more thoroughly and efficiently, the club does the same kind of ideological work as we argued was the case with the Olympic Games. In 238 15 BARÇA IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM: THE OTHER BARCELONA MODEL both cases, the practice of sport and its spectacle provided a logic of performance/pleasure that structured neoliberal subjectivity: self- improvement, and the overcoming of limits (Dardot and Laval 2013: 282) and relentless competition as the reasons for and guarantee of social and personal success. Moreover, the club attains in this way what had been eluding the city’s hegemonic powers, institutional and private alike, since the panacea of the Olympic Games had faded on the horizon of history, namely consensus around its unmatched greatness. The minor point I am making here is that such consensus spills over to the city brand, which borrows from the club’s glamour and can pride itself on being the club’s cradle and on sharing/giving it its name. The major point is that such consensus over the club, though not singlehandedly, has nonetheless had a lasting, even transforming, effect on the make-up of the local subject. To fully consider this point, we need to step back from our focus on the city and widen it to include Catalonia and Barça’s well-known connection to Catalan nationalism. An analysis of the transformations of this connection in the post-dictatorial period will lead us to a discussion of Barça’s global brand’s contribution to the spread of Catalan nationalist and independentist sentiments. But such discussion will equally take us to a perhaps less predictable conclusion: that the reinforcement, via Barça’s philosophy of playing, of what is presented as quintessentially Catalan, is at the same time boosting neoliberal subjectivity. By identifying with the irresistible object of desire that Barça’s dazzling successes propose as manifestations of the Catalan self, I will be arguing that the interpellated fan is at the same time assenting to the premise that neoliberal subjectivity is its latest and most faithful incarnation. We start in what follows by looking for the origins of this current configuration.

THE POLITICS OF MÉS QUE UN CLUB (MORE THAN A CLUB) We have discussed (see Chapter 8) how during the first third of the twentieth century and up to the Spanish Civil War sport was in Catalonia part of a modernizing and democratizing effort. Led by leftist Catalanist forces and involving prominent cultural representatives, this effort went hand in hand with a nationalist sentiment. Theirs were the principles of “sport and citizenship” (Pujadas i Martí and Santacana 1995 vol. 2: 59), the very ones that Francoism had sought to silence. During the Second Republic, “sport and citizenship” had acquired in addition its antifascist connotations, which would only intensify during the THE POLITICS OF MÉS QUE UN CLUB (MORE THAN A CLUB) 239 dictatorship years. FCB had taken part in building this new sociability of sport, and suffered the consequences of such commitment, most brutally in the person of its president Josep Sunyol, executed by Franco’s forces in 1936 at the beginning of the Civil War, and during the dictatorship by seeing all the club’s Catalan signs erased or Castilianized.3 Whereas a definition of the club during the years of dictatorship as anti-Francoist would be an exaggeration,4 Barça’s symbolic capital during the dictatorship was enormous among anti-Francoists, turning the club for millions of socis (members) and culés (sympathisers), in Catalonia mostly, but also in the rest of Spain, into what Manuel Vázquez Montalbán (1988: 92) famously described as the “unarmed symbolic army of Catalanness.” An army that is deployed on the pitch and off against the dictatorial and centralist forces of the regime.5 This is the meaning and legitimacy behind the motto Més que un club, coined in 1968 by Narcís de Carreras (Miravitllas 2013: 159). The slogan pinned down for good that deeply-felt extra dimension beyond the sporting event which had made FCB during the Catalan and Spanish twentieth century a quasi-political institution, one endowed with an ethical and social mandate reinforcing, and sometimes even substituting for, more direct channels of social and political expression.6 The FCB of the late-Francoist and transitional periods aligned itself with democratization discourses (“Los deportistas”: 8), having embraced its unmistakably Catalan and Catalanist roots, particularly during the presidencies of the aforementioned Carreras (1968–1969) and Agustí Montal Costa (1969–1977). The political gestures were many (Santacana i Torres 2005:239–245): official contact with Josep Tarradellas, the President of the Catalan autonomous government, while still in exile from the dictatorship, along with his invitation as a guest of honor to Camp Nou when he returned after Franco’s death, in October 1977; the club’s adherence to the Catalan Culture Congress and participation in the writing of its resolutions via the lawyer Josep Lluís Vilaseca, from the club’s board of directors7; the club promoting the broadcasting of football matches in Catalan; its contribution to the campaign demanding the restitution for Catalonia of its status as an autonomous community, the Autonomy Charter; and its access to the demonstration of September 11, 1977, celebrating Catalan National Day. In addition, the club distinguished itself in these transitional years by its demands for democratization in the governing and management of sport. All in all, the Barça of these years incarnateswhatMontalcalled“our idiosyncrasy as a club and 240 15 BARÇA IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM: THE OTHER BARCELONA MODEL its civic projection” resulting in “our responsibility as a Catalan institution” (Santacana i Torres 2005:310). The symbolic horizon invoked by Més que un club was a non-controversial one until the arrival to the presidency of Josep Lluís Núñez in 1978, lasting until 2000 but extended until 2003 via his close ally – and prominent militant of the right-wing, anti-Catalanist PP (Popular Party) – Joan Gaspart. The principal antagonism faced by Núñez throughout his years as president, coming from part of the fan base and Catalan media,8 was based on the accusation that under him the club was abandoning the ethical and political principles encapsulated in the club’s slogan. Núñez’s time in office infuriated legions of culés on account of his dismissal of the club’s symbolic dimension compounded by, and for many the very cause of, persistent sporting failures. To Catalan nationalists, Núñez was always going to be perceived as an enemy of democratic Catalanism. Such an attitude was not only attributable to his alleged depoliticization and de- Catalanization of the club, which, as such, was applauded in right-wing españolista and socialist circles alike (Watson 2008: 208). It was due too to his infamous past of alliances with Francoism and porciolisme, which tainted his investment in the club with the obscure origins of a fortune made at the expense of speculating with and destroying the architectural heritage of the city through his real estate business, Núñez y Navarro, the bête noir of the anti-Francoist grassroots movements in 1960s Barcelona. Not to mention the fact that he was an immigrant from the Basque Country and, as such, a not particularly well received parvenu among the autochthonous Catalan bourgeoisie. Jordi Pujol, at the time not President of Catalonia’s autonomous government, but the leader of the conservative Catalan nationalist Convergència Democràtica de Catalunya, famously warned in 1978, prior to the club’s presidential elections won by Núñez, that “If Barça falls in not-enough Catalan hands, we will react” (quoted in Santos Fernández 2008: 12). And react they did for the more than twenty years of Núñez’s tenure. Francesc de Carreras, the son of Narcís, the president who coined the slogan in 1968, is paradigmatic of this critique of Núñez’s tenure:

What one could call the historic error is to treat Barça – a Catalan social entity – as if it were only a mercantile or industrial company and, more speciﬁcally, as if it were a company in the real estate sector in 1960s Barcelona. Núñez’s nouveau riche mentality, his general lack of education about the history of our nation and of the institutional signiﬁcance of the THE POLITICS OF MÉS QUE UN CLUB (MORE THAN A CLUB) 241

club, his blind support to a genius player who will solve all problems – a leader – and not to the steady and continuous work of a team, results in Núñez’s management being characterized by its economic success, its sporting failure on the football front and its deafening ridicule on the social and institutional front. Economic success simply because tickets are more expensive, sporting failure despite the club’s expense in signing new players being the highest in the world. Social and institutional ridicule because Barça nowadays does not connect with the seriousness, work ethic, steady effort and civic image of today’s Catalonia. (1983: 246)

First thing to note about this quote is that de Carreras makes a connection between the style of playing and Catalan identity that is central to our argument. For him, “constant work and continuity,” as opposed to relying on individual, the leaders, is not only a preferred strategy for playing, but more fundamentally the sporting distillation of a national essence. The words of de Carreras epitomize an equation that was frequent in Nationalist circles from the transitional period, as Watson has studied thoroughly through a focus on the newspaper Avui’s coverage of the club. Watson argues convincingly that behavioral trends such as seny (the quality of being reasonable), irony, continuity, mesura (restraint or mod- eration), pactisme (the ability to negotiate and reach agreement), historically attached in Nationalist discourses to the Catalan identity, were transposed consistently to Barça’s style of playing in the 1970s, a trend we see confirmed in de Carreras here and one that was to continue into present day discourse, as we will analyze below. Moreover, for de Carreras, the club, in order to stay true to its principles, was to resist pure commodificationinanincreasinglyinter- nationalized cultural industry of sport. Only what de Carreras interprets as an approach revealing the uncomfortable historical alliance between Capital and dictatorship making Núñez unfit for purpose should in fact be to the latter’s credit in the club’sofficial history. Indeed, the real estate businessman understood, as Barça’s president, that professional football was about to become a global and fabulously financed enterprise. In a process that paralleled in time and space that undergone by the Olympic city, whose candidacy the club had rushed to put its support behind (Abadía Naudí 2007), Núñez saw the importance of positioning Barça within an emerging market that would give it a global reach. Indeed, fueled with the money from TV and advertising networks, the internationalization of the game was a fact in the mid- 242 15 BARÇA IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM: THE OTHER BARCELONA MODEL

1990s, driven by the possibilities of generating a global spectatorship that new broadcasting technologies were opening up (Giulianotti 2002: 27). FCB increased its fan base by 30,000 during Núñez’speriod,from 77,000 to 106,000 (Abadia Naudí 2007: 248). Bañeres (1983:245) details how FCB was involved from the early 1980s in transforming the sport into a global spectacle. Enabled through aggressive investment in players and coaches,9 this was a process that would rechannel the meaning of football playing and competition, from targeting a local and national audience, to focusing increasingly on a more international one. This process developed throughout Núñez’s presidency,10 with signiﬁ- cant precedents, such as the hiring in 1973 of Johan Cruyff, followed in 1982 by that of Diego Armando Maradona. It yielded its best rewards through the mastery of Johan Cruyff in 1988, hired for a second time as coach of the ﬁrst team. Cruyff’s Barça, known as the dream team,11 would go on to win four consecutive La Liga titles between 1991 and 1994 plus the UEFA Champions League in 1992, while establishing as the house stamp the so-called philosophy of playing that Guardiola would almost twenty years later make globally admired. That being the case, and as Watson’s analysis shows, one needs to conclude that Núñez’s presidency kick-started the internationalization of the club as a business enterprise, in this way initiating a process that future boards of directors would, not only not oppose, but in fact work on perfecting and culminating brilliantly. Going back to de Carreras article, even though he claimed not to be opposed to Barça becoming a rich club, his demands for it to stay true to the ethical mandate of being Més que un club in the late twentieth century make it in fact incompatible:

The big challenge for Barça today is precisely this: to make true the historic role that the people of Catalonia have assigned to it, to move from a simple football team into a representative of the nation. The Real Societat and the Athletic Bilbao have managed to give the image of the Basque nation .... Barça, in addition to being an economic power, must be a crucial institution in the sporting and cultural development of Catalonia as a whole. In short, the saying that it is more than a club must become true. And, in order for that to become a reality, leaders must own the aims of building an egalitarian and democratic Catalonia for everyone ... We have been able to build a mythic Barça. It is now necessary that this myth helps transform Catalan society and contributes to promote and cultivate sport all over Catalonia. In order for that to be possible, it is necessary for Barça to be popular and national. (1983: 246) THE POLITICS OF MÉS QUE UN CLUB (MORE THAN A CLUB) 243

De Carreras wants a club that predicates by example. His reference to a national and popular Barça was still the century-long demand by the Catalanist left to put the club at the service of a nation-building project, actualized once again in the first years of democracy when his words are written.12 His was an inward-looking project willing to tolerate market forces and business logic only insofar as they can maximize and remain subordinated to being Més que un club, clearly not what Núñez had attempted. By mentioning the examples of Real Sociedad and Athletic de Bilbao one can infer that de Carreras has in mind a club whose professional teams are made of exclusively of those born in Catalonia and raised through the ranks of Barça’s youth academy system while he envisioning the club’s fandom and potential audience as made solely Catalan (and Catalanist) supporters. Engagement with globalization and internationalization as intrinsic mechanisms of capitalism are not compatible with this model. In his comparative work on the intersection of nationalism and globalization in the Athletic de Bilbao and F. C. Barcelona football teams, Nili (2009) argues that Bilbao, in order to preserve its Basque identity, has rejected globalization, whereas F. C. Barcelona, without renouncing its nationalist roots, has made them compatible by fully and extremely successfully embracing globalization. For Nili, what has differentiated both responses to the demands of club commodification in an increasingly globalized market is a different kind of nationalism: ethnic in the case of Bilbao, civic in that of Barcelona. The difference in approach between the two clubs is corroborated by Ferran Soriano (2012:37–41), a member of FCB’s board of directors under Joan Laporta in charge of financial strategy, in a book that we later analyze in detail, Goal: The ball does not go in by chance. He likens the unashamed position against globalized capital of the Basque club to that of comic characters Asterix and Obelix fighting the Romans, and posits it as radically opposed to that of a club such as Barça, aspiring to lead and to be a global brand. While the difference in approach between the clubs is crystal clear from our vantage point, and despite purported differences in kind between their respective nationalisms, if de Carreras’s ideas in the text analyzed above wear to have become dominant, it is doubtful that the attitudes toward globalization of the two clubs would have presented itself as radically distinct as it became. In the post-dictatorial context, de Carreras and Núñez represent the two opposing sides, nationalism versus globalization, that cannot find a its synthesis.13 Once the club’s political function stopped being 244 15 BARÇA IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM: THE OTHER BARCELONA MODEL overdetermined by the dictatorship, and as it very rapidly found itself at the globalization crossroads, its two “missions” entered into direct conflict: the pursuit of a place in a globalizing cultural market of sports versus a nation-building political and ethical endeavor. By the time of the 2003 elections, the question of how the club was to confront the challenge of mastering the new reality of football as a global spectacle and of making supporters proud in the symbolic and sporting terrains was still being disputed. Dávila et al. describe the bleak situation:

In 2003, the club was immersed in a deep crisis. Since Joan Gaspart became president in 2000, the team had not won a single title and had burned through four coaches. Revenues were ﬂat in a rapidly growing market and large payments to bring world-class players had deepened the economic crisis without solving the club’s competitive performance. Fans were frustrated. The stadium grew increasingly empty with each passing game. Catalan society was disenchanted. (2007:2)

The ceaseless controversy that had accompanied Núñez’s tenure became outright discredit under Gaspart, and was the springboard off which the collective led by lawyer Joan Laporta, The Blue Elephant, launched and built its legitimacy (Santos Fernández 2008: 39).14 Created in 1997 with Johan Cruyff’s support, the team ran for election on a platform demanding transparency, democracy, a return to Catalanism and better sporting results (Ibid.: 65–66), and finally won a landslide victory against Gaspart in 2003.15 During the eight years of their stay in office, the Elephant team turned a demoralized and bankrupt club into a “corporate empire” (Ball 2007, quoted in Nili 2009: 264) fueled by unprecedented sporting success, while claiming to have remained true all along to the bonus in the Barça motto: more than ever, Barça was more than a club. In this way, they succeeded in squaring the circle, in finding a synthesis to the up-to- that-moment incompatibility between being a winning, world-leading team and remaining true to the club’s historic civic values. Conflict disappeared when the political and ethical essences that de Carreras saw as being outside of, and therefore as incompatible with, a capitalist pursuit of markets and profits, became instead the added value that made them possible. The Laporta team had found the key to unraveling the nation- versus-business conundrum, and it was nothing but neoliberalism. Even more, it was only through the core incorporation of those civic and political values that Barça had become more than a club, and through RELOADING MÉS QUE UN CLUB 245 their transformation into assets, rather than hindrances, to a fully neoliberal, profit-driven enterprise, that this success can be grasped in all its complexity:

The emotional side of football and the aspects of identity that link FCB with Catalonia are essential. This adds complexity to the challenge but brings lots of value. How many of the world’s marketing directors would not want their brands to be packed with so many values and emotional links as football clubs have with their fans? (Soriano 2012: 43)

This quote comes from Soriano’s already mentioned Goal, a book devoted, as its subtitle, Management ideas from the world of football, indicates, to explaining Barça’s phenomenal business and sporting success, and how to take it beyond the sports industry. Soriano was a key member of Laporta’s board of directors, his Deputy President for Economic Affairs. Along with Marc Ingla, Deputy President for Marketing and Media, they were the experts on global marketing strategies and had been partners at the telecommunication projects’ consultancy ﬁrm, Diamond. Together with Sandro Rosell, former director of Nike for Spain and South America, and the President himself, they became the most visible faces of this new Barça.

RELOADING MÉS QUE UN CLUB Silk and Andrews (2001: 180) argue that sports is used by transnational corporations in their advertising campaigns “as a means of contributing toward the constitution and experiencing of national cultures,” given that tapping into the practice of locally popular sports allows them to play a role in reimagining those localities. The authors coined the concept of “cultural Toyotism,” alluding to the corporate practice of adapting production to the particular demand of speciﬁc markets, to explain this articulation of the local with the global. As FCB became a global brand, the question of the club’s local identity remained at the center with great symbolism. Silk and Andrews, quoting Dirlik, argue that

the recognition of the local in marketing strategy, however, does not mean any serious recognition of the autonomy of the local, but is intended to recognize the features of the local so as to incorporate localities into the imperatives of the global. (Ibid.: 187) 246 15 BARÇA IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM: THE OTHER BARCELONA MODEL

What the authors have in mind in their article is a description of the strategies used by already existing transnational corporations to better tackle a global market made up of localities. Our point of departure, however, is the opposite one to theirs. What we are accounting for is precisely the process of recognition/generation of the global–local connection they describe, but on the part of FCB’s management; that is, on the part of a brand/company previously known as local, rather than on the part of already global corporations. Global corporations are as much in need of tapping into local sensibilities and imaginaries in order to do business with them and to conquer new markets, as local brands are in need of entering markets beyond their locality if they want to become global. FCB’s Laporta board of directors was as aware as transnational corporations that sport (but mostly football in this case) is a global commodity, a “globally present cultural” form (Ibid.: 191), but one that changes in “accent” from locality to locality. If for global corporations the question is how to tap into these different accents, for the FCB management the matter was in the first instance to tap into what is transcultural and transnational in football. This was achieved through a process by which the historically strong local identity of the club, summarized in the slogan, was resignified so as to respond to the imperatives of global production and consumption, as Watson (2008: 238–257) and Nili (2009) have established. And so, the “more than a club” FCB message, a bonus that for local fans, in the final analysis, had to underpin all sporting successes, was assimilated to the logics of brand creation, as a way of identifying and distinguishing Barça from other competitors. Watson (2008: 246) argues that it was the danger of losing the global market, rather than any faithful attitude to Catalanism, that moved the Laporta management team to identify the club’s “key brand benefit” (KBB: note the use of business jargon), the one to secure client fidelity, as based on club identity rather than on individual players. Players come and go but the club remains. Ferran Soriano (2012: 53) identifies a similar objective through an equivalent marketing concept:

We had to wake up and discover our competitive advantage; in other words, that which made us different from our competitors, that we could leverage on to outperform them, and the ways in which we were better than they were.

In the very early days, its seems that any sense that a reworking of the slogan might be in order to make it palatable for a potential global fandom RELOADING MÉS QUE UN CLUB 247 was lacking. The strategy instead was to explain in a straightforward way the predicaments of Catalonia as a nation to the world:

Barça is easy to explain from the outside because it is simple – says Soriano – we have a country that has historically suffered from institutional and symbolic lacks due to political circumstances. And Barça became a way of expressing that which we are ... So that Barça is a tool for Catalans to project themselves in the world and explain that we are here and are a nation. (Watson 2008: 241)

However, the assumption that Catalonia’s historical specificity as incarnated by the club would attract global clients via their identification and sympathy with it proved ill-advised. According to Watson (2008: 245), Barça’s zeal to project its national history globally in the belief that it could be integrated easily into a business strategy backfired badly. It was instead seem as an attempt to impose on others the club’s own local reality, and as evidence that it dismissed that of the markets it wanted to conquer, namely China. Criticisms of arrogance, of having a colonialist attitude and of being insensitive to local particularities, meant that intercultural communication had failed and the local content of the KBB, of what gave the club its competitive advantage, had to be abandoned. Without mentioning what a bumpy road it had been to reach this conclusion, Soriano’s account confirms the club’s realization that a change of course had been necessary:

Historically, FCB’s main asset had always been the strength it has received from its people: the members and fans. Barcelona is more than a club in Catalonia, and more than a club throughout Spain, where in some places it has been viewed as the alternative team, or even the “progressionist” team .... It was a matter of updating these ideas ...and broadcasting this around the world, filling it with sufficient content to make it meaningful to people outside Catalonia and Spain. ...The review of FCB’s competitive advantages in comparison with its rivals led us to opt for a rapid growth strategy based on building a winning team, financed by an aggressive commercial strategy and standing out from the competition through our brand, which was being great and being different, while respecting the essence of Barcelona’s 100-year history. (2012: 54–55)

Being great and being different, this is not to say much: it is every commercial brand’s aspiration. The complexity in this process of branding 248 15 BARÇA IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM: THE OTHER BARCELONA MODEL was that it needed to preserve its meaning as the traditional locus of identiﬁcation for local fans, while at the same time become recognizable enough to be translatable across the globe:

It is a lot more difﬁcult to promote the concept of “more than a club” to a FCB football fan who is neither a Catalan nor Spanish and has absolutely no idea about the history of the club, Catalonia, or Spain. What does “more than a club” mean to a Chinese child? (Ibid.: 66)

The conundrum was clear: Més que un club had to grow from being a monovocal to a multivocal concept (Silk and Andrews 2001: 195). To accomplish such a transformation, the local motto was elevated to become a global aspiration, one invoking a convenient-for-business kind of universalism and apparently non-monetarizable values shareable by all. Watson speaks of a process of distillation of “the traditional ‘essences’ of Catalanism and ‘Barcelonisme’ into one that would resonate across global markets as qualities with a universal appeal that avoided disjuncture” and could “draw afﬁliations with particular lifestyles and values rather than distinct national territories” (2008: 247). Soriano (2012: 68) credits the club’s communications manager, Jordi Badia, with having designed the terms of the resigniﬁcation “to communicate our idea of social commitment in an obvious and far-reaching way for the 21st century.” In the end, the two chosen keywords were Solidarity and Humanitarianism. For the global audience, they entailed the convenient deactivation of the political militancy implied in the 1968 slogan whose reception in China had proven toxic. The choice was clearly a postpolitical one for the global brand, whereas the humanitarian and charitable gesture substituted for the political force of the original. According to Watson (2008: 248), the words started appearing in Laporta’s discourse in 2004, substituting discussion of Catalanist roots, and were conveniently accompanied by humanitarian visits and regular charitable donations. Watson (2008: 249) and Josep Maria Canyelles, corporate adviser on global social and ethical responsibility from the consulting think tank Responsabilidad Social, identify this move as a recognizable business technique. It is an opportunity for market penetration through corporate philanthropy, social responsibility, and strategic giving:

The fact that these values are intrinsic to the club and that the latter guarantees the integrity of the former reinforces the institution’s reputation RELOADING MÉS QUE UN CLUB 249

and constitutes a security cushion before any incident. This is a basic reason why many big companies with a central part of their market value in their corporate reputation have policies in place to manage their Social Responsibility. They know that the conﬁdence of their clients and stakeholders depends on it. (Canyelles 2009:5)

Success was instant, and portrayed in the club’s webpage as Barça being the only club in the world that had opted for solidarity (Watson 2008: 248), with the choice having made possible “the projection of FCB to a world level [and an enormous increase in] the respect and prestige of the club” (Ibid.: 252).16 Canyelles attaches great importance to the reputational aspect in Barça’s process of global expansion:

These actions have granted it international recognition and prestige as a socially committed club and are the basis upon which the strategy of international expansion is set up, by attempting to be aware of all challenges, not only ﬁnancial, but also reputational ones. (2009:9)

The culmination of this strategy was the master stroke signing of the agreement with Unicef in 2006, announced in the summer and engineered by Marc Ingla, Deputy President for Marketing and Media. FCB had always refused to accept the sponsorship of any commercial brand to wear on their main team’s shirts. The agreement with Unicef at one and the same time broke with that tradition and reinforced it, as the deal with the not-for- proﬁt institution/brand required the club, not to receive from, but to donate money to, the sponsor,17 a demonstration of the club’s commitment to human children’s rights, rather than to the lucrative business of professional football. In addition to continuing to make its local fans proud of the club’s ethical values, the strategy made them globally understood. The ofﬁcial webpage at the time read:

This caring and humanitarian Barça needs to be globalised. It is a strategic decision that is in keeping with the club’s history and the way that football is continuing to develop on a worldwide basis. That is why the club has decided to contribute 0.7 per cent of its ordinary income ... in order to set up international cooperation programs for development, supports the UN Millennium Development Goals and has made a commitment to UNICEF’s humanitarian aid programs through the donation of one and a half million euros for the next ﬁve years and now wears the UNICEF 250 15 BARÇA IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM: THE OTHER BARCELONA MODEL

logo on its shirts – an agreement that has made Barça unique. (Quoted in Nili 2009: 264)

Barça’s fan base and revenues grew spectacularly between 2006 and 2010, when the deal lasted (Soriano 2012: 69). That the strategy did not turn the club into an altruistic enterprise became apparent with a closer look into its business plan, as Nili (2009: 264–265) points out critically, and Dávila et al. (2007:26–29) demonstrate by itemizing the new sources of income devised by the Laporta board of directors: tax benefits thanks to the donation of 0.7% of the club revenues to social initiatives and the channeling of all social programs through the creation of a Foundation; persistence and expansion of other commercial sponsorships, principally that of Nike for sports equipment, but including Akasvayu, Audi, Damm, Telefónica, Televisió de Catalunya, Betandwin, Acer, Toshiba, and RACC, diversified through new concepts and categories such as “official club airline” or “official technology provider,” and maintained in the Barça shirts for sports other than football; the selling of television and other media outlets’ broadcasting rights (Calatayud and Orta 2006); a proliferation of merchandising, including internet betting, and video and console games; rises in the prices of membership and tickets18; increasing the number of members19; real estate sales; the management of image rights for Barça players; and stadium hire.20 Not to mention the fact that the sponsorship had set a precedent in fans’ minds, which made more acceptable the wearing on the main team’s shirt of a commercial brand. The move to commerce was made irreversibly in 2011, when the agreement with the Qatar Foundation, a country brand with dubious human rights credentials, was signed (Santos Fernàndez 2008: 68; Miravitllas 2013: 224–228). Still, the Unicef move was crucial to construct a global brand on the foundations of a coherent tradition, in this way reinforcing its values as authentic, socially responsible, sincere and distinct: Soriano’s “being great and being different” made specific. The Unicef sponsorship repositioned FCB as an active cultural partner, which it had clearly been all along for local supporters, for a global spectatorship and potential fandom. It turned a claim that the club’s ethical commitment was meaningful only to the local section of the fandom, and increasingly in the minority, into a globally translatable aspiration (Conn 2006). In this way, its symbolic value escalated from national to worldwide appeal, as did its corporate reputation. The Unicef deal impacted the value system of fans local and TOWARDS A MODIFIED BARÇA DNA 251 global with corporate ethics. It tapped into the ethical, lifestyle marketing strategy that corporations had been adopting since the 1980s (Rifkin 2004: 177) for commercial gain. To the extent that FCB fans, and in particular its members, felt they were participants in the corporate ethical behavior of their club, and therefore proud to be part of its uniquely moral stand, they were becoming, by delegation, ethically active and morally and socially responsible.

TOWARDS A MODIFIED BARÇA DNA Along with its integration into corporate social behavior, the ethical imperative behind the club’s motto underwent further discursive transformation in its implications for ways of playing understood to identify and single out the club from its competitors. The idea of “universal” values, referring to those that are transferable, not essentially exclusive to a particular team or place, are certainly invoked regularly when speaking of FCB. Nonetheless, the club and its representatives are praised in those invocations for being endowed with an exceptional ability to produce them. FCB’s successful trajectory in the global arena depended on it having created a distinguishable, local and territorialized style of playing. There were two elements to this resigniﬁcation: technical ability and moral quality. While the two are conceptually distinct, they became ideologically undistinguishable in discourse. Soriano explains how spectacular football was one of the ﬁrst components to be included as a necessary part of the new globalized Barça:

When fans all around the world were asked what the FCB brand suggested to them, many of them mentioned spectacular football. They talked about Ronaldinho, Maradona, Cruyff, and Kubala. They talked about well-played football, technical talent, and goals. (2012: 68)

His description remains fully within the realm of professional competence, conveniently devoid of the nationalist ideology that FCB’s executives had learned to suppress when facing a global audience. Still, further qualiﬁcation by him of the team’s way of playing includes it being fair play and made up of stars and team (Ibid.). As we will examine below, such concepts subtly connect with moral values reminiscent, at least to local fans, of attributed Catalan traits. But let us 252 15 BARÇA IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM: THE OTHER BARCELONA MODEL focus before on how this moral high ground is discursively attached to the club:

Even in reference to civic values, we should not limit their inﬂuence to the institutional area, but from the pitch we need to ﬁnd a coherence in style, in expressions, in gestures. Within the normal practice of a sport where physical strength is very important, Barça has not come across as an specially violent team, but the opposite, it has played the card of technical superiority. There would not be a deepening of civic values if players played foul, whereas fair play and elegant forms are causes for pride to fans and followers of the sport more generally. (Canyelles 2009:5)

Technical prowess is connected by Canyelles to values that make FCB players appear to be morally superior. Coach Guardiola himself is the ﬁrst proponent of such moral superiority:

I like to win, I like to train, but above all, I want to teach people to compete representing universal values: values based on respect and education. Giving everything while competing with dignity is a victory, whatever the score line suggests. (Balagué 2012: 341)

And so it is also perceived internationally. Hunter speaks of “football which is uplifting to the spirit ... [and has a] capacity to inspire and to thrill” (2012:8–9). The Scottish journalist claims he has faith in the importance of teaching Barça’s way of playing to young people for ethical as well as sporting reasons:

The first touch, the technique, the obsession with maintaining possession, the flowing passing movements, half-touch football – I want all this to influence the young boys and girls who first play and then coach football, so that it becomes the norm for people to want to play like that (notwithstanding our inherent need to compete aggressively) and the dummies and thugs become outcasts. (Hunter 2012:9)

For Hunter Barça’s elegant and intelligent way of playing has digniﬁed and validated the game, by making the playing style of “thugs” and “dummies” irrelevant. Aggressive competition, thanks to Barça players, is made unnecessary on the way to prevailing over the rival. Being beaten this way inspires admiration, rather than frustration, envy or rage. When summarizing reactions to Barça’s winning of the UEFA Champions TOWARDS A MODIFIED BARÇA DNA 253

League in Wembley in May 2011 against Manchester United, Hunter highlights comments such as that of ManU’s coach, Alex Ferguson: “Nobody’s given us a hiding like that, but Barça deserve it. In my time as manager, it’s the best team we have played. They play the right way and they enjoy their football. They do mesmerize you with their passing” (2012: 14); or former Barça coach, Terry Venables, “Barça didn’t just beat them, they showed United what’s possible” (Ibid.: 15).21 There is a spiritual excess that is attached to this playing:

Every single player gives it everything they’ve got but some of them have a certain quality that transcends sport. It goes beyond simply winning or losing. It’s about those players who remain constant, who are not affected by the pressure or stress. It’s the symbiosis of their football sense and their human spirit which means that they are always ‘present’. There are very few sportsmen who have that quality. It’s sport in its purest form. (Manel Estiarte quoted in Hunter 2012: 51)

Conversely, rivals who play differently, and worse, who try to neutralize this way of playing by, say, letting the grass on the pitch grow longer, are qualiﬁed as morally worse, unfair players, as in the following comment prior to a match when FCB was visiting archrival Real Madrid’s stadium:

Skinhead playing surface, ball ﬂying at the speed of a hockey puck – advantage to the quick, technical ball players. Grass like the fringes on a 1970s country and western suede jacket, slower moving ball, happy days for the hasslers, the hackers and the horrible, defensive football which so many employ to try and shackle Messi, Iniesta and Xavi. (Hunter 2012: 33)

Our earlier quote from de Carreras criticizing Núñez’s performance in office defined the desirable traits of FCB – qua Catalan – players as marked by “constant work, seriousness, work ethic, sustained effort” (1983: 246), in this way staying true to a particular incarnation of the Catalan tradition. For many local fans, part of being “more than a Club” was also a matter of being able to connect discursively some forms of playing and behaving on the pitch with the club’s Catalan adscription. In a period of astounding sporting and financial accomplishments, moral quality and technical ability fueled each other to the point of conceptual fusion, without the Catalan 254 15 BARÇA IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM: THE OTHER BARCELONA MODEL link, at the local level at least, being lost. Watson’s analysis asserts this much when he defines the club’s identity in 2006:

Laporta’snewBarça had won two successive Spanish League titles, and now, the biggest prize in world football, the Champions League, and had done so playing a complimentary brand of football that embodied the collective work ethic ... As Laporta frequently explains his philosophy is that ‘I do not want to have the best players in the world, I want the best team in the world’.This is the embodiment of the collective spirit ... that formed a cornerstone of Conservative Catalanism’s ideal types ...(2008: 236)

It is my argument that what makes possible this seamless articulation of national and global values when it comes to playing style is the extent to which this “philosophy” spells out what can be decoded as an identitarian/local and as a neoliberal/global ethos at one and the same time. While in de Carreras’ text from 1983 such style belonged to a social-democratic logic aspiring to use football in a “popular” nation-building project, in order to build “a democratic and egalitarian Catalonia for all” (1983: 246), such aspirations have now been reshaped to fit the ideal of the entrepreneur, the preferred model of neoliberal subjectivity. In Catalanist terms the marriage is incarnated in the old-time figure of the hardworking Catalan, ready to compete in, and reign over, a global market, but dwarfed by subordination to the Spanish state. This model of subjectivity hinges the global with the local in a seductive and versatile fantasy of success through meritocracy. The strategy of manufacturing global values through all mottos, while enticing legions of new fans around the world, also had the effect of addressing the local fan, the one sensitive to the historically rooted position of the club as an “unarmed symbolic army of Catalanness” in a new cosmopolitan way. The resultant validating “moral boost” that the local fan got from partaking of its club’s ethical behavior, rather than diluting the original political element in the 1968 motto, had the virtue of fueling it. And given that (what was effectively presented to fans as) admirable corporate behavior came hand in hand with sporting success achieved through what was identified as a morally superior way of playing, for those heavily emotionally invested in the club – the local fans who grew up with the club and could understand it as part of a local legacy – its spectacular successes allowed for an explosion of affects, the possibility of an identification made solely of juissance with no lack, no unfulfilled NATIONALIST NEOLIBERALISM: CATALAN IDENTITY AS CORPORATE ASSET 255 desire.22 Moreover, the successes of this FCB provided fans with the experience of interacting in the world (of football), and of conquering it. Global recognition of success proved that it could be achieved without the intermediation and conditioning of the Spanish state, or symbolically via the humiliation of its sporting historical proxy, Real Madrid, defeated numerous times in recent years. The strength of these feelings generated on the occasion of football games and their ability to spill over beyond the sporting terrain cannot be underestimated. Passion for Barça accompanied and amplified the irresistible ascent of the independentist Catalan movement since the mid-2000s and is credited with having changed the mood of the nation. Violán (2014:81–102) endows the club’s successes with the ability to prompt a newly found self-confidence in Catalan society. Significantly, he labels those who take part in it, Generación 2–6 (6–2 Generation), an allusion to FCB’s win over Real Madrid at the latter’s home stadium in May 2009. All in all, the new FCB of total football and world game supremacy found itself occupying a new and significant, if not formal, place in political and social processes affecting Catalonia, with all its historical, civic, and political purchase not only intact, but renewed and perfectly adapted to the demands of the twenty- first century. While it is beyond the ambition of this chapter to analyze this process of re-politicization in depth, our purpose is to prove how the subtext to all this renewed Barça’s politicization responds to the logics, not only of Catalan nationalism/independentism, but also of neoliberalism at the same time.

NATIONALIST NEOLIBERALISM:CATALAN IDENTITY AS CORPORATE ASSET In his analysis of a current discourse linking economic liberalism and the project of an independent state for Catalonia, Illas (2010: 392) argues that such narrative hinges around the need to value again and to return to “the work and savings methodical ethics that is inseparable from the very material characteristics of Catalan capitalism.” According to him, by weaving together traditional and conservative ideas of what distinguishes Catalan behavior along with the foundations of liberal capitalism, this narrative makes the concept of a global Catalan subject emerge. The more this creature searches for its roots, the more it prepares itself for the demands and challenges of today’s world. Possessing ancestral Catalan 256 15 BARÇA IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM: THE OTHER BARCELONA MODEL traits is for the authors studied by Illas, Xavier Sala i Martin and Xavier Roig, the equivalent of the Protestant ethic for Max Weber, a breeding ground for the flourishing of the spirit of capitalist entrepreneurship. This is neither here nor there in Illas’ argument, but for our own it is important to mention at this point that the authors have relevant connections with FCB. Roig, a businessman, was Laporta’s Director of the 2003 electoral campaign taking him to the club’s presidency. Sala i Martin, on the other hand, a well-known Professor of Economics at Columbia University, consultant to the World Bank and IMF, and an economic libertarian, was FCB’s Treasurer during Laporta’s tenure between 2004 and 2010. Going back to Illas’ argument, he analyzes these authors as purporting that the entrepreneurial nature of the Catalan, akin to that of other communities around the world, has historically been corrupted and thwarted by Catalonia’s subordination to the Spanish state. To the extent that entrepreneurialism is at the core of economic and social prosperity for this neoliberal worldview, to allow for the true spirit of Catalanness to re- emerge is a conditio sine qua non, but one that cannot be accomplished unless Catalonia becomes independent from Spain and is thus set free to compete directly in the world stage (Illas 2010: 393). Illas aptly summarizes this view as “Catalonia needs a state if it wants to freely compete in the global market, or even better, if it wants to participate in interstate competition over corporate capital” (2010: 398). This is exactly what the club that the Laporta team, with contributions from Sala i Martin and Roig, went on to build in the sports and business realms: competition on equal terms in the international arena that pre- vailed,23 while claiming fidelity to the traditional values of the club and a defense of Catalanness. The significant political implication of this is that Barça’s overwhelming triumphs can be experienced as illustrations of what the right personal and collective attitude could accomplish for both business and nation.24 The Laporta team’s implementation of a relentlessly commercial approach to the running of the club’s finances in the global market of football fit the workings of a global capitalism that had learned to bypass nation–state barriers to yield profits. As the efficacy of such a route to success became apparent, to attribute it to a particular personal and collective way of being and behaving, that of the Catalan people incarnated in the club’s most charismatic workers, became increasingly plausible and helped greatly to reinforce the idea that not only the club, but the Catalan nation as a whole had what it took to sink its dependency on the Spanish nation-state into oblivion. NATIONALIST NEOLIBERALISM: CATALAN IDENTITY AS CORPORATE ASSET 257

We see the recognition of the club’s contribution to Catalonia at play in the following quote from economist, Catalan conservative nationalist, and a CiU Member of the European Parliament, Ramon Tremosa. Written right after the club won the Champions League in 2006, the article is signiﬁcantly entitled “Gràcies, Barça” (Thank you, Barça):

Today Barça is Catalonia’s most important brand abroad, the main global asset of an exporting Catalonia ... Barça positions Catalonia in the world and its success gives visibility to a country without its own colour on the map: BBC International news presenters, for example, refer to Barça quite naturally as the team of the Catalans; or this very week, British weekly Time devotes a piece to Barça entitled Homage to Catalonia. For how much longer will you, Barça, be a safe haven for this nation? (2006)

As a leading Catalan brand, the football club is an example for all businesses to follow as well as a facilitator abroad, breaking and preparing the ground, generating a good disposition toward those identifying as Catalan:

For many small businesses, Catalonia’s image as an innovative, rigorous and serious nation, where jobs are well done and of quality, where there is an effort and hard-work culture, one of tolerance and dialogue, creativity and Mediteraneanness, as well as other positive values for which we are identiﬁed everywhere, are an excellent form of introducing themselves ... Barça’s case, not only in terms of its sporting successes, but mostly because of good management and social excellence, has in the past and should continue to reinforce that asset on which all companies and organizations can feed. (Canyelles 2009: 20)

The image of Catalanness that Canyelles invokes is fully compatible with that of Barcelona projected by the Olympic Games, and undoubtedly aided by the city’s global image, but it transcends the city in its political and economic ambition. Barça can become the key local/global business partner for Catalonia because of the ideological connection that in these discourses ties sport, politics, and economics with Catalan neoliberal nationalism/independentism. It is our purpose now to demonstrate how this resignified invocation of Catalan traits in Barça that subsumed them under a neoliberal rationality of subjectification and collective identification, turned selected FCB representatives into heroic models to follow. Many players could be examined for this purpose, perhaps in particular, though not only, Messi, Xavi, and 258 15 BARÇA IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM: THE OTHER BARCELONA MODEL

Iniesta, and the club’s youth academy by extension. Due to space constraints, we will devote our analysis to coach Pep Guardiola, undoubtedly the most exemplary and politically inﬂuential of the club’s staff.

“VERTEBRATOR” GUARDIOLA Appointed as coach of the main team in the summer of 2008,25 Guardiola was to put in place during the ﬁrst year of his tenure a phenomenally successful coaching style that led the team to an unprecedented record of victories, obtaining in the 2008–2009 season the triplete (hat trick) – Spanish King’s Cup; Premier League, La Liga; and the UEFA Champions League – and in addition the Spanish and European Super Cups and the FIFA Club World Cup, all of which catapulted the club to the top of the global football rankings. Guardiola was chosen FIFA World Coach of the year in 2012. The International Federation of Football History and Statistics named the team that he led the best in football history (Canyelles 2009:1), crediting it for having changed the world of football (Balagué 2012: 27):

Guardiola, the 37-year-old rookie, inherited a disaffected group of superstar egos and talents and got it right immediately. He won their trust, demanded their utmost every day and inspired them to better what they thought was their upper limit. It is a managerial achievement of gargantuan proportions. (Hunter 2012: 122)

While Guardiola’s achievements were certainly meritorious on the sporting front, I would reserve the gargantuan qualiﬁcation chosen by Hunter for what the coach achieved beyond that strictly professional front. For local fans well acquainted with the club’s history, its unprecedented successes, along with its architect, became symbolic compensations of great importance. In Catalonia, Guardiola turned into nothing less than an idol, the object of a “mass delirium”, according to Guillem Balagué, Pep Guardiola’s biographer (2012: xxi, 289). Within the Spanish liberal tradition, Guardiola’s social construction as leader replicated philosopher José Ortega y Gasset’s classic argument about natural born elites. He argues that they deserve to lead on account of their moral and intellectual qualities, their unassuming effort towards endless improvement, their unwavering sense of discipline and service to a greater cause (2005: 118–119). To allow these minorities to lead over the masses – that the masses recognize the need to be led by the best – is for “VERTEBRATOR” GUARDIOLA 259

Ortega indispensable in order for a society to prosper. For the Spanish case, Ortega sees the role of this desired elite as leading a project capable of bringing together, directing and enthusing all Spaniards. The lack of such a project, he argues, is the reason for Spanish decadence, including the struggles of peripheral nationalisms. He uses an organicist metaphor to express the problem, and to point to its solution, when he speaks of an invertebrate Spain, a country lacking a structuring project (2002). Analogously, but without pushing the analogy further than this, I argue that the social hegemonic meaning and stature given to Guardiola vis-à-vis Catalonia during his years as FCB’s main coach can be illuminated through the same metaphor. Guardiola was deﬁned by success, sporting but also economic, social, and moral. Like Ortega y Gasset’s members of the elite, he was presented as having won because he deserved to win, because winning was a reﬂection of his being a person of a higher quality. During his time at Barça, Guardiola, a well-known supporter of Catalonia’s independence, found legions of Catalan fans and the media well disposed to follow his advice and example way beyond the realm of football, in matters of a political, moral, and economic nature. His attributed heroic trends were related to his ability to articulate Catalonia in positive ways, to show it the way to excellence: it is in that sense that I call him a “vertebrator”. Balagué (2012: 289) expresses puzzlement at the collective madness that took fans to idolize him, a pathological veneration that the individual himself, according to his biographer, always rejected:

How do you go from the humility of the Barcelona team, their constant prioritizing of the principles they based everything on (work ethic, respect, collective effort) to the fanaticism of some of their followers, and even the cottage industry created around the ﬁgure of Guardiola?

The fanaticism of some (many!) fans could be explained because the club’s style of playing was, once again, constructed as being directly connected to a particular way of being Catalan and, to that extent, capable of showing those who identiﬁed with them, a valuable and globally acknowledged way to succeed as Catalans. Balagué makes the connection between economic entrepreneurialism and work ethic as Catalan traits, with reference to Guardiola, early on in his biography of the coach:

That work ethic, instilled in him by his parents, is very much part of the Catalan character: saving the soul through industry, effort, honest labour 260 15 BARÇA IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM: THE OTHER BARCELONA MODEL

and giving your all to the job. In a suitably symbolic place (the Catalan Parliament), and on being awarded the Nation’s Gold Medal, the country’s highest accolade for a Catalan citizen, in recognition for his representation of Catalan sporting values, he said in his acceptance speech: “If we get up early, very early, and think about it, believe me, we are an unstoppable country.” (2012: 12)

The quote reveals how pervasive the concept is that there is a clear connection between a particular way of being Catalan – which in turn coincides with the ethics of the entrepreneur of himself – and well-deserved success, one that materialize in Pep Guardiola. The biographer himself supports it when he elevates Guardiola’s family customs to national values. But the Catalan autonomous institutions, which awarded Guardiola a medal for incarnating and spreading what they considered to be Catalan sporting values,26 support it too, as does the coach himself, when he augurs Catalonia all types of successes provided that its citizens observe a particular bedtime discipline. However, it is not only the perception that Guardiola’s tested recipe for success could be patented as Catalan that made his years as FCB coach unique, bordering for fans on the mythical. The most truly remarkable aspect of Guardiola’s performance within this frame of mind was how he countered the less good traits in the Catalan way of being to make the best ones shine. This is fundamental to understanding his ascendancy as a role model of work ethics in the context of the profound Spanish (and therefore Catalan) economic crisis of 2008, with jobs been lost by the million and, in Catalonia, with a political dynamics of increasing confrontation with the state government. For embattled Catalan fans, and possibly beyond, Guardiola became a fantasy incarnation of economic, symbolic, and political victory for the Catalans, one crucially born out of redeﬁning what those very Catalans understood to be their identity. When describing Guardiola’s relation to Cruyff, Balagué quotes the latter as distrusting the Catalan “conservative and pessimistic mentality” (2012: 339) and is said to have had doubts originally about Guardiola as FCB’s ﬁrst team coach because “‘As a Catalan, would he be able to make decisions?’ The Dutchman considers Catalonia a nation that is often lacking in initiative” (2012: 141). The fact that Cruyff’s fears proved to be unfounded is not presented in the biography as proof that they were wrong, but rather as an example of how Guardiola was able to counter the negative trends, indeed acknowledged as Catalan, with the already mentioned positive ones, which FROM COACH TO CEO: YOUR INVESTMENT IS IN GOOD HANDS 261 are equally attachable to Catalan identity. Moreover, while giving an account of the bitter confrontations between Guardiola’s Barça and José Mourinho’s Real Madrid in the 2010–2011 season, the Catalan coach is thus described by Balagué as motivating his team for a game that they would end up winning:

The stereotypical Catalan attitude, the idea that ‘if something can go wrong, it will’, throwing in the towel, generally being pessimistic, could have taken over. He [Guardiola] wanted to transmit to his team and the fans the idea of ‘¡Sí, podemos!’–‘Yes, we can!’ The mood changed. (2012: 265)

The logic of Balagué’s argument on Guardiola never abandons its natio- nalistic nature, but instead endows the coach with the power of being a turning point for Catalanness, as well as for the club’s sporting success. According to this discourse, Catalans recovered their winning spirit with Guardiola’s Barça. Going back to Balagué’s assertion that Guardiola always rejected the pedestal he was made to stand on, the fact is that his sporting performance throughout his four years as FCB’s coach was placed within ideological discourses of far-reaching economic and political meaning. It is such positioning that, regardless of whether he might have willingly played along with those discourses or not, produced, among other reactions, what Balagué calls mass delirium. Guardiola and, by extension, the club’s symbolic power was strong enough to inspire, and to be made to endorse, political and economic worldviews. We have so far shown how the club’s victories and the role played in them by the coach were discursively connected to nationalist tropes of behavior, in this way connecting with a tradition that is as long as the club’s history. Let us now move to the ways in which these were woven with ideas of entrepreneurship to produce a desirable neoliberal subjectivity.

FROM COACH TO CEO: YOUR INVESTMENT ISINGOOD HANDS We quoted Balagué above speaking of a “cottage industry” having been created around Guardiola. Apart from the media attention he managed to grab, this is a reference to the proliferation, during his time as FCB’s coach, of arguments, in article and book form, on his qualities as a leader and of the importance of transposing those from sports to other realms. Guardiola was appropriated as a model to describe new styles of political 262 15 BARÇA IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM: THE OTHER BARCELONA MODEL leadership. Bordignon, in his analysis of the Italian Secretary of the Democratic Party and Italian Prime Minister since February 2014, Matteo Renzi, likens the politician’s post-ideological, anti-political style to Guardiola, greatly admired by Renzi, and argues that his career parallels that of the coach as “another young, winning innovator, committed to the offensive game, and ready to abandon his ‘secure position’ in the world’s strongest football club” (2014: 15). Meanwhile, in a book we will return to later, Liderazgo Guardiola (Guardiola-style leadership), Cubeiro and Gallardo do not hesitate to compare him to Barack Obama.27 But it has been in the world of business where the Guardiola of the “six cups” has made his mark as a model of corporate leadership. A series of books and other texts from the world of management and self-help published since 2009 have found in the coach a model, insisting on his philosophy, his methods and his discourse as being fully adaptable to the world of economics. Among the books, in addition to the already mentioned Liderazgo Guardiola (2010) there is Miguel Ángel Violán’s Pep Guardiola: The Philosophy that Changed the Game (2014).28 Already mentioned, Canyelles offers another example. His list of Guardiola’s qualities is long and impressive, as befits a role model: leadership, profes- sionalism, integrity, work culture and ethics, effort, resilience, modesty, respect for the opponent, lack of belligerence, serenity, education (2009: 11). Golobart (2009: 59) adds some more qualities: sacrifice, solidarity, justice, a good balance between reflection and emotion. The perfect leader even refuses a salary rise! In a similar business oriented text, “Aprender del coach Guardiola” (To learn from coach Guardiola), Cubeiro (2010: 70) insists on his qualities to succeed are: mission, vision, values, attractive talent, motivational, obsessed with winning – but not at any price, risk- taking. Cubeiro and Gallardo present the leader as one who is brave (2010: 39), has a philosophy; that is, a sense of mission, vision, and values which, along with talent and commitment (Ibid.: 70), guarantees his success (Ibid.: 59). Coming from the world of advertising, Banc Sabadell’s highly praised publicity campaign starting in 2011, El banco de las mejores empresas. Y el tuyo. (The bank for the best companies. And for you), used Guardiola as its image to advertise the Expansión account, directed at freelance individual clients and small business. The billboard and street campaign was presided over by a close-up of Guardiola’s talking face. Under it, different slogans were made of quotes from the coach, presumably offered in the context of his job, printed in white characters, and rephrased or responded to underneath, in blue characters, to apply to FROM COACH TO CEO: YOUR INVESTMENT IS IN GOOD HANDS 263 the bank. Coach and bank, the logics/principles/worldview of football and of banking enter in this way into a harmonious dialogue where the latter echoes and adapts the assertions, and benefits from the authority of the former. All of the phrases have as a subtext leadership quality, along the lines of the attributes we have seen attached to Guardiola so far, and which are now offered to the reader for identification with him/herself and the bank itself. The aim here is to make the potential client feel simultaneously that s/he is Guardiola and that s/he is in the hands of Guardiola. In other words, s/he is as good and success-destined and deserving as Guardiola, and two, Banc Sabadell is as good as Guardiola to guarantee the success of those who depend on its leadership.29 A business leader deals in people, and the measure of his/her competence is the extent to which s/he is able to extract surplus value from those under his/her supervision:

What Pep has done is in fact the great challenge for companies in our postindustrial society: to manage people by moving them from a logics based on the present to another centered on the generation of value. Put differently, to have the best assets in the world (players/workers) does not imply that they are available to create value for the team/company. The necessary magic touch to make people bring all their talent into play is the most coveted skill nowadays ... Guardiola’s leadership has succeeded in making a group of high standing, globally recognized and fabulously paid professionals behave truly as a team, having prioritized the values of respect, work and involvement.(Canyelles 2009: 2, 11)

In an extension of Boltanski and Chiappelo’s(2005) argument, several times invoked in this book, on the ways in which neoliberal capitalism learns to tap into the previously antagonistic, non-monetarizable values of creativity and demands for flexibility, we see in Canyelles’ words the call for a further extension of the biopoliticization and monetarization of workers’ lives. Up for subsumption here is collective force, organization and struggle. The importance of the collective, of team work, the tamed version of the political collective in neoliberal jargon, redresses the nucleus of individualism on which (neo)liberalism is based. However, it makes sure that it is put at the service of a well-defined, non-threatening idea of success, by which all individual competences work for the higher goal: capital gain, even when the rhetoric of implementation shines with moral lofty stances of putting the group ahead the individual. This is Barça’s 264 15 BARÇA IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM: THE OTHER BARCELONA MODEL playing style par excellence, and it admirably solves the contradiction in neoliberal capitalism of continuously promoting the need for team work while at the same time pitching worker against worker in cut-throat competition. No such conflict afflicts Barça players, who are endlessly praised for their team work, but so are genius individualities, Messi more than anybody, but Xavi, Iniesta, Piqué, or Busquets abundantly too. Xavi can be used as a paradigmatic example, when he declares that “it is clear in my mind that I would be nothing without my fellow players” (quoted in Cubeiro and Gallardo 2010: 139). There is no confrontation between individual and collective in this club:

Messi has humility – youcanseeitwhenheplays.Heacceptsthatthe core group is the life and soul of the club. Meanwhile, his team-mates are happy to recognize him as the best player in the world. There is no jealousy – that’sverydifﬁcult to achieve. (Manel Estiarte, as quoted in Hunter 2012:49)

It is very important that this is perceived as an uncontroversial image, accepted by all, fans and others, as deﬁning the club. Cubeiro and Gallardo quote tennis player Rafa Nadal, a well-known supporter of rival Real Madrid, praising Barça’s supremacy precisely on the basis of its unassuming values of humility:

I am sympathetic to Barça ... I like the unity their players transpire on the pitch and out ... Messi ... appears as a normal person, one involved in the group, humble ... They have managed to stand as one. Pep Guardiola has been able to transfer those values to them, and they are the key to success. (2010:77–78)

But it is equally a requirement to maintain competition as the ultimate reason to exist. Collective growth and values are put at the service of producing always higher, better yields. At the start of the 2009–2010 La Liga season, right after having produced the best ever results for the club the previous year, Guardiola insisted: “we will have to keep on correcting things because, even if one keeps winning, one has always to improve” (quoted in Cubeiro and Gallardo 2010: 253). A commonplace in the years of sweeping success for FCB players has been how to maintain their “hunger” to win (Hunter 2012: 53). The ability to succeed in keeping players’ appetite for more trophies has been praised as a great quality of the FROM COACH TO CEO: YOUR INVESTMENT IS IN GOOD HANDS 265 coach. What is not mentioned so often is that all that effort, when it bears fruit, produces huge amounts of money in the annual balance sheet of the club, the well-oiled capitalist enterprise created by the Laporta board. Undoubtedly, there is more than money involved in motivating players. Pride, passion, eagerness, humility are indispensable to prevent an “emotional absenteeism” (Cubeiro and Gallardo 2010: 316) of potential fatal consequences on the sporting, and irremediably, economic fronts. But failing to qualify for the next round in the UEFA Champions League is not only a big blow to morale, it causes the club and its workers to lose millions in TV and advertising contracts. A humble demeanor keeps alive an attitude of endless competition with oneself and others in the quest for the kind of permanent improvement that produces ﬁnancial gains,30 which are, in the end, always the reason for this work-ethical attitude. Rather than ethics, it is therefore more accurate to speak of “emotional intelligence,” the ability to put values at the service of generating proﬁt for the company (Cubeiro and Gallardo 2010: 374), as the one moving these workers. Be that as it may, the rhetoric on Guardiola in the kind of literature that we are analyzing, consistently avoids, as a rule, mentioning the phenomenal amounts of money his successes make possible for others, and himself, to earn, and instead remains coherent to a discourse of moral excellence and exceptionality:

Pep Guardiola, the man of vision. Unchanged by power. Still ﬁghting for the idea that playing beautiful football cannot only win you great prizes, but deﬁne your club, your cultural identity and your position in the world. (Hunter 2012: 141)

It is for some neoliberals in work ethics such as his that the answer lies to the Spanish problem of unemployment. He incarnates “emerging values of work” (Canyelles 2009: 16), and a way to deal with the perceived problem of workers’ attitudes:

The values Guardiola has worked with in depth are valid not only in the sports realm but necessary ones for society as a whole, for companies and organisations of any kind. A work and effort culture has lost presence in our country. A sense of discipline (or self-discipline) has become obsolete; as far as motivation is concerned ... “if they want me to yield proﬁt, they need to motivate me”. And so any organization employing qualiﬁed personnel can become a hen house full of roosters who do not understand that lack of 266 15 BARÇA IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM: THE OTHER BARCELONA MODEL

humility is like a woodworm gnawing at the basis for team work, and therefore also for creativity and synergies. (Ibid.)

Looking at 2009, as the economic crisis was hitting hard and Spaniards were losing their jobs, Canyelles argues that the Spanish labor problem is that workers’ excessive individualism turns “any organization into a hen house full of roosters” and that their lack of commitment to the common cause of a neoliberal economy can have lethal consequences. The implication here is that, by working with Guardiola’s qualities, or under someone with his qualities, by having the right attitude, anybody can be as successful as he has managed to be. Conversely, those who fail have only themselves to blame for not trying hard enough, a central mantra of neoliberalism. “Anything in life can be achieved through hard work,” according to Brazilian Barça player at the time, Dani Alves (quoted in Cubeiro and Gallardo 2010: 256). That and focusing on the positive, another classical voluntarist argument of liberalism to place full responsibility for success (and failure) on subjective attitude. The opposite attitude is a moral defect, victimism (Ibid.: 350–351), precisely what Guardiola taught his team, and Catalans more generally, to overcome. That very idea of deserving failure is recuperated by previously mentioned Xavier Sala i Martin, signiﬁcantly using Guardiola and his team of players to draw out desirable economic examples and models. Speaking in 2009 in an interview about the way the economic crisis was affecting Spain, he too blames the attitude of Spanish workers as a dragging factor, and offers the example of Barça players to counter it. In her introduction to the piece, interviewer Peláez explains that, for Sala i Martin:

In order to turn Spain into an innovative country, the ﬁrst step is to put the basis for an educational system that helps to develop an entrepreneurial and hard-working mentality. “The problem in Spain is that here everyone wants to appear on Big Brother and become rich and famous in four months, that is very hurtful” deplores the economist. “In order to earn, one needs to work. Barça players are good because they work. Why is Iniesta so good? Because since he was a little boy he has worked for hours and hours.” (Peláez 2009:27)

Sala i Martin’s neoliberal, economically libertarian ideology shines through these words. Spain’s economic problem is one of having a lazy potential workforce, and therefore the solution can only be to push FROM COACH TO CEO: YOUR INVESTMENT IS IN GOOD HANDS 267 through with reforms that, one, make workers work more: “in-depth labour market reforms are also necessary in order to induce people to work more”; and two, to stop all state attempts at tampering with the workings of the market and to impose instead a strict meritocracy for which football is seen as an excellent example: “excessive egalitarianism must be eliminated and instead to pay more to those who are more valuable in order to favour competitiveness” (Peláez 2009: 28). Sala i Martin’s request for an educational system that develops a hardworking and entrepreneurial mentality in young people finds a response within the very FCB realm he so admires. La Masia, FCB’s boarding youth academy, holds a foundational place in the imaginary of the club’s successes as the breeding ground, the grassroots of its trademark football style. Given the extra weight that such “football philosophy” carries, it is a focus of admiration for millions of kids and a most coveted, and highly selective, route to life success. The aspiration to be chosen as one of its members gives meaning to young lives and those of their families in Catalonia and beyond. La Masia aspires to be much more than a football academy, even an elite one: “a footballing university campus where players and coaches mix” (Balagué 2012: 33). Being trained in La Masia is perceived as giving kids and future professional players something different. According to Guardiola, a graduate of it, this is a reference not only to the already mentioned technical ability, but also to human qualities. The players who go through La Masia are taught to behave with “civility and humility” (Ibid.: 340). It is this “unique” package of technical skills and a set of values that makes La Masia stand out.31 It is the educational ground where the values of hard work, self-esteem, commitment to excellence, responsibility, and loyalty that we have analyzed as being connected to the first team are inculcated. An entire worldview sustains its fantasy status as a social object of desire, one that conforms perfectly to the neoliberal paradigm and has the disciplinary and ideological power of a desirable model for the entire society. La Masia reproduces the role of an ideal liberal state that strives to preserve, not democracy, but rather something deemed better, merit, the basis for the most admired category: fair play. In this perfect meritocracy, children are only accepted into La Masia on the basis of their potential, which guarantees free competition and equal opportunity to all at the entry point. The different degrees of success and failure undergone down the line by those chosen ones, continuously broadcast by media narratives of young players being promoted to the main team, or sold to other clubs, or 268 15 BARÇA IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM: THE OTHER BARCELONA MODEL being injured, or being more or less able to cope with pressure, reinforces a worldview whereby inequality of outcome is the sole result of personal circumstances, and rightly and acceptably so. Which conveniently leaves out, or accepts as inevitable collateral damage, the many times when things go wrong, are contradictory, fail, exclude, or present some sort of shortcoming.32 Therefore, for La Masia’s prototype subject, Sala i Martin’s desired worker, winning becomes an obsession, a desire never fully fulfilled that propels him or her endlessly ever further. That such attitudes are validated by successful professional players further naturalizes them as the only possible positive world outlook. In La Masia, as in any commercial company, everything is conducive to the production of the best human resources possible in order to attain the desired outcome: to come out on top in the market. Not unlike the ways in which the Barcelona brand recycles the city’s history of Francoist resistance and public engagement as local cultural trends of quality embodied in its people, the club’s connections with that same resistance, and to Spanish reactionary and authoritarian centralism more generally as well as Catalan national and sovereign aspirations, serve as tokens of unique moral superiority, materializing in fans, players and forms of club governance. The resulting ethical attitudes and cultural values associated with the Barça global brand produce, at one and the same time, a desirable neoliberal subject of global appeal and a newly militant local subject that millions endorse. For them, the club’s successes provide a powerful communal experience of fulfillment and juissance of a fantasy that is as defiantly national as it is quietly neoliberal. Barça’s transition from local to global proves that becoming a worldwide commercial enterprise is not a one-way route to the dissolution of past politics for its followers. It offers in this way a different model of subjetification under neoliberal conditions to the docile citizenship that we saw the creative city demanding. The global FCB has certainly articulated its local culture qua watered-down values as a commodity to be sold to a planetary fandom, but the ensuing success in so doing contributed to reignite the contestatory power in the culture where it originated. The question is whether such contestation does something other than further enhancing the model of neoliberal subjectivity. Either way, the seduction of the Barcelona brand, in city and football club form, demonstrates a power to interpellate life that, this book has argued, conceals a will to exploit. More than ever before… NOTES 269

NOTES 1. Ramon Besa, a sports journalist, defines such a philosophy, often referred to as the club’s footballing DNA, as: “possession, combining, defending by attacking and always looking for a way to the opposition’s goal; finding the best talent without physical restrictions as the key element of the selection of players. Add to that the commitment to technical quality and ensuring that the kids [in Barça’s youth academy, La Masía] develop an understanding of the game. It is a philosophy based on technique and talent: nothing more, nothing less” (cited in Balagué 2012: 36). See a more detailed description of it in the appendix on La Masía in Balagué (Ibid.: 337–341). 2. For a discussion of deterritorialization and reterritorialization of the globalized club, see Watson (2008: 234–257). I agree with him when he concludes that a balance between the two, rather than the winding down of territoriality in a context of globalization, describes the situation most accurately. Still, Watson’s argument for reterritorialization is based on the maintenance and reinforcement of local, Catalan identity in the new context, to which I will refer later, not to the role of the city of Barcelona. 3. See Burns Marañón (1999) and Shobe (2008) for good accounts in English of the club’s history and its connections with and symbolic central importance to Catalan identity. 4. See Miravitlles (2013: 153–169) for a critical account of the club during the years of dictatorship, providing evidence of less than resistant positions on the part of its directives. The book is very critical of Santacana’s El Barça i el franquisme. Crònica d’uns anys decisius per a Catalunya (1968–1978) precisely for silencing everything that did not fit the image of FCB as democratic and Catalanist. 5. It should also be mentioned here, in order to understand the symbolic dimension of FCB as an institution attached to democratic values, that the club is owned by its members, who choose the president in democratic elections every four years. In Spain, after 1992, only Barça, Real Madrid, Athletic Osasuna, and Athletic Bilbao have been allowed to keep this ownership structure. See Dávila et al. (2007: 3) for more details on the rights of the Barcelona socis. 6. See it in the words of the club’s president Montal in Santacana i Torres (2005: 309–314) and in FCB (April–May 1977). 7. More on the club and the Congrés in FCB (February 1977). 8. Watson (2008) has studied in depth Catalan daily Avui’s construction of Barça as a Catalan club and Núñez’s period as one when Catalan signs of identity were perceived as being dangerously lost. 9. “With an expansive economic management, without stopping before any investment need, Barça kept professionalizing all of its sections until it 270 15 BARÇA IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM: THE OTHER BARCELONA MODEL

became a leading power in all the sports that it participated in” (Bañeres 1983: 245). 10. One example to illustrate the volume of business that media contracts generated. In 1999 a contract was signed by the club with Vía Digital, owned by phone company Telefónica, with a value of 62,000 million pesetas for five years in exchange for exclusive TV rights (Santos Fernàndez 2008:63). 11. English used in the original. 12. Which is ironic in hindsight, given that de Carreras would later become a very vocal critic of Catalan nationalist positions in initiatives such as Foro Babel. In 2005 he co-founded Ciudadanos in Catalonia, a new political right-wing, neoliberal anti-Catalan nationalism party. 13. In the case of Núñez, the extent of his de-Catalanizing the club, however, should be questioned in hindsight, as it was under Núñez’s presidency that La Masia was created in 1979. La Masia would become the foundation of Barça’s branded style of playing and fuel for identity discussions of Catalan and Barcelona excellence. It became controversial for the first time along these lines in 1998, when the Catalan autonomous government’s President Jordi Pujol expressed unease at the disproportionate number of Dutch players in the first team, brought by Dutch coach Louis Van Gaal, at the expense of autochthonous players from La Masia, and recurred during the time that he worked for Barça (Fernàndez 2008:49–50, 58, 60). 14. For a detailed account of the fight against Núñez involving Laporta that began in 1996 and concluded with the latter’s election as President in 2003, see Santos Fernàndez, passim. 15. In a statement to Catalan daily Avui on June 13, 2003, during the electoral campaign, Laporta stated that “what fundamentally moves me, beyond returning Barça to the world front line is to bring back the club’s Catalanism” (quoted in Watson 2008: 216) 16. Laporta’s words in an address to a Barça members’ assembly. 17. From 2006, the club paid Unicef 1.5 million euros for five years. Wearing the logo on its shirt prevented the club from earning around 22 million euros with a commercial sponsor (Cubeiro and Gallardo 2010: 58). For a fuller picture of all aspects of Barça’s social responsibility efforts and acquisition of global prestige beyond the Unicef deal, see Canyelles (2009:8–9, 12–14). 18. Prior to its appointment, the Laporta candidacy had criticized this move ferociously for trampling on the club’s democratic principles. 19. A money-collecting exercise since 2005, as acknowledged by the board of directors themselves, it was nonetheless sold locally as a democratizing gesture on account of the club’s ownership structure. In the words of board member Antoni Rovira: “We have opened the club to everyone to NOTES 271

make it more inter-class, more democratic, more heterogeneous, more participatory” (quoted in Watson: 227). 20. In addition, see Vivanco 2005d for details of how Barça, prior to the Unicef deal, was very close to, but failed to obtain, a tempting sponsorship from the Chinese government to advertise the Beijing 2008 Olympic Games on the club’s shirt, which also included using Barça to promote football in Asia. The deal was supposed to pay a record 19 million euros annually for five years, plus a further seven depending on titles won (Vivanco 2005b, 2005c). This is a clear sign of how aggressively the Laporta board was from the outset seeking the globalization of the club’sbrand.Itiswithinthis logic, and not outside it, that the “humanitarian” Unicef deal is to be understood, as Ferran Soriano himself acknowledges in Escorcia and Calatayud (2005:2). 21. Many more quotes from expert voices are quoted, stating that Barça is “on a different level”; “the most intelligent team of all time”; “a unique phenomenon”;of“technical perfection” (Hunter: 216–17). 22. See E. Delgado (2014: 195–250) for a discussion of the political importance of football victories, in her case study of the Spanish national team’s winning of the FIFA 2010 World Cup in South Africa, to provide a communal experience of fulfillment and juissance of the nation’s fantasy. 23. To gain a sense of the intensity and depth of business agreements the club began to sign in Asia from 2003, principally for media projects, see Watson (2008: 242–243). 24. Significantly, Laporta refused to join the PP’s government strategy to use the main Spanish football clubs to promote Spain’s brand, Marca España, abroad (Méndez 2011). 25. The previous season, Guardiola had been the coach in the lower league, segunda división,ofBarça B, a team also belonging to the club and a traditional middle stage of progression toward the first team for players coming from the youth academy. Once he became coach of the main team, Guardiola was instrumental in promoting some of these players, one of the keys to his sporting success. 26. The exact words that the Catalan Generalitat devoted to Guardiola explain that he was given the award “for his projection of a cultured Catalonia, civil and open” (Balagué 2012: 288). 27. “Like Obama, Guardiola did not have previous experience in post. Like Obama, he is a great communicator (direct, coherent, reliable). Like Obama, he puts his heart into what he does. Like Obama, he is humble, an idealist and pragmatic (the effort culture). Like Obama he is cautious and an innovator. Like Obama, he is elegant” (Cubeiro and Gallardo 2010: 97). 28. There is other literature on Guardiola which does not fall under the alluded paradigms. Concentrating on game strategies is Matía Manna, Paradigma 272 15 BARÇA IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM: THE OTHER BARCELONA MODEL

Guardiola (Guardiola Paradigm) (2012). Gathering together his multiple statements and press conferences given to the public as those of a prophet (a god?) is Pep Guardiola, Paraula de Pep (Word of Guardiola) (2010); and another biography is offered by Jaume Collell in Pep Guardiola. De Santpedor al banquillo del Barça (Pep Guardiola. From Santpedor to Barça’s bench) (2009). 29. Ex.1: Pep Guardiola: “I am tested everyday. And I must provide answers.” Banc Sabadell: “The day before yesterday. Yesterday. Today. Tomorrow. The day after tomorrow”; Ex. 2: PG: “I have been learning and trying to do better from day one.” BS: “As far as we are concerned, since 130 years ago.”; Ex. 3: PG: “Growth requires dedication, suffering and effort.” BS: “Whenever you are ready.”; Ex. 4: PG: “Every job’s engine is passion.” BS: “In fact, it is the engine for everything.”; Ex. 5: PG: “Perfection does not exist, but one must look for it.” In this exceptional case, there was no “response” from the bank, arguably it becomes one with the coach’s voice in this statement. 30. In the Laporta era, all gains made from having won a tournament were shared among players. These incentives earned each player 1.5 million euros in the six-cup season, 2008–2009 on top of their ﬁxed salary (Cubeiro and Gallardo 2010: 305). 31. “Few clubs could be found with a politics of promoting its home-grown players according to humanist values and with such a powerful economic investment. La Masia is a model of conviviality and tolerance, from where players considered among the best in the world have come out and they all very apparently share values of humility and modesty as part of can Barça’s style” (Canyelles 2009: 2). 32. Contradictions in the hegemonic narrative are discreetly downplayed, as in the case of Oleguer Presas. A rare case of an openly political player, this right-back defender played for the ﬁrst team between 2001 and 2006. A hard-core culé, Presas continued in the Laporta era to insist on a reading of Barça’s surplus value as a commitment to freedom from Spanish reactionary centralism and from capitalist encroachment and servitude. His loyalty to a political symbolic reading of the club’s victories was received with patronizing condescension (see Lowe 2006); his refusal to comply with sponsors’ requirements, such as that of driving an Audi car to the Nou Camp, as the eccentricity of an eco-warrior; and with nothing less than open hostility his daring to decline Spanish selection’s coach Luis Aragonés’ invitation to join the team on account of Oleguer’s independentist beliefs, or to criticize Spanish judiciary system’s dealings with Basque terrorist organization ETA (Lowe 2007). BIBLIOGRAPHY

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A Barça, 235–272, see FCB Abad, Josep Miquel, see under Barcelona ’92 Barcelona ’92; PSC; PSUC; and anti-Olympic movements, 160 Abadía Naudí, Sixte, 131, 138–142, candidacy period, 145n9, 146n11, 240, 242 172 Ajuntament de Barcelona, see under as commercialising cultural Municipality values, 8, 24, 36 Allen, Woody, see under Vicky, and discoursive continuities with Cristina, Barcelona grassroots claims for sport, 167 Andreu Acebal, Marc, 47, 56, 58, 65, as generating an idea of 69, 105, 195, 197 citizenship, 86 Animació cultural, see under as global spectacle, Governance; Participation; PSUC 160, 171 Àrea de Descentralització i and its moral legacy, 165 Participació Ciutadana, see and the Operación Garzón, Participation 158 Àrea de Relacions Ciutadanes, see and previous Barcelona Olympic Participation candidacies, 142 Associació de Veïns i Veïnes de and recruiting and training of Barcelona, see under FAVB; volunteers, 173 (see also under Grassroots associations Brand; Consensus; CiU; Cultural policies; Culture; Gentriﬁcation; Identity; B Municipality; Olympic Games; Balagué, Guillem, 235, 252, 259–261, Publicity campaigns; Sport; 267, 269n1, 271n26 Volunteer) Pep Guardiola. Another Way of Barcelona posa’t guapa, see Publicity Winning, 258, 260 campaigns

Barcelona model producing a global Barcelona definition of, 2 gaze, 217 distinguished from Barcelona as selling a way of life, 33 brand, 33–34 Brown, Wendy, 32, 39n4, 212 as applied to FCB, 9–10 Barcelona-Rio declaration, 41n16, 182 Barcenoal, 92 C and anti-Olympic Canyelles, Josep Maria, 248, 249, 252, movements, 125n6, 159, 257, 258, 262, 263, 265 166, 170 Capital and critique of the Olympic Games’s Barcelona as, 4 connections to and definition of cultural capital, 3 capitalism, 104–105 and definitions of capitality in global and critique of state violence (see also films, 217–233 under Barcelona ’92) economic and political logics in the Benach, Joan Anton, 7, 77, 78, 92, definition of capitality, 186 97n1, 99n12 and the global Barcelona gaze, 217 See also under PSC; PSUC as the logics of Barcelona Blakeley, Georgina, 20, 84, 93, 171, 181 ’92, 245–251 Bohigas, Oriol, 7, 46, 184, 186, 208 Capmany, Maria Aurèlia See also under PSC Caminant junts per la ciutat, 89 Boltanski, Luc, 28, 30, 207, 224, 263 and Museums, 91 The New Spirit of Capitalism and Pasqual Maragall, 17 (see under Boltanski, Luc; and PSC, 7 Chiapello, Eve) the people, 88 Borja, Jordi, 14, 56, 57, 58, 60, 61, and use of the concept of la gent 63, 64, 75n2, 76n6, 132, 195 [the people], 88, 90 See also under PSUC Carreras, Francesc de, see under FCB Brand Carreras, Narcís de, see under FCB Barcelona as, 2, 8, 24, 28, 33, 34, Casa dels paraïgues 39n2, 39n5, 113, 126n14, Bruno Cuadros house (see under 155, 195, 217, 223, 224, 235, Publicity campaigns) 251, 268 Casas, Enric, 108, 188 and biopolitics of urban and Barcelona as brand (see also branding, 32, 36 Publicity campaigns) and city branding, 89, 91 Casellas, Antonia, 193, 195, 197 as city image, 24 Castells, Manuel, 14, 26 and civisme, 190 Chiapello, Eve, 28, 30, 207, 224, 263 distinguished from Barcelona Citizen model, 33–34 and agency, 8 and global perceptions of as beneficiary of the city, 19, 22, 36, Barcelona’s, 268 78, 143, 166 INDEX 299

and ciudadanismo, 270n12 persistence of Barcelona’s global as consumer of the city, 25–26 prestige, 1, 184–185, 235–237 as creator, 67, 96, 206 and governance, 84, 192 as cultural capital, 31 and Olympic Games, 103, 237 as cultural mediator, 29, 122, 124 and public participation, 3, 129 as culture-carrier, 163 and public spaces, 157 and democratic citizenship, 6, 24, as a sellable point for the city 129–146 brand, 196 global image of Barcelona’s, 147, and sport (see also under Europe) 157, 217, 218 COOB92 (Barcelona Olympic and municipal address of, 50 Organising Committee), 46, 156, as mutilated during the 170, 173, 181 dictatorship, 36 Coubertin, Pierre de, 167 as newly constituted through the See also under Olympic Games Olympic Games, 61 Creative city as Olympic host, 45, 50 Barcelona as, 26, 65, 212 and pride, 104, 108 and the biopolitical turn in as producer of the city, 32, 105, 143 culture, 208 (see also under Subject) and citizen’s agency, 18 City council, see under Municipality as city for consumption, 34 City hall, see under Municipality as container of packaged CiU (Convergència I Unió) and experience, 23–24 Barcelona ’92 deﬁnition of, 187 and battles for Barcelona, 158 and the entrepreneurial turn, and idea of culture, 36, 46, 88, 89 14, 105 Ciudadanismo, see under civisme; inhabited by the creative class, 122 Delgado, Manuel and Mediterranean sociability, 32 Civisme, see 22@; Brand; Fòrum and neoliberalism, 2, 19, 23, 26, 32, Universal de les Cultures 2004 38, 65, 97, 105, 176, 187, 197, Clapés, Andreu, 164, 167, 168, 169, 200–201, 209, 212, 268 172, 173, 174, 175, 177n4, the post industrial city turning 181, 182 into, 212 See also under Volunteer role of culture in, 13, 97, 197 COE (Spanish Olympic Cruyff, Johan, see under FCB Committee), 140 Cubeiro, Juan Carlos, 262, 264, 265, Congrés de Cultura Catalana, 266, 270n17, 272n30 133–137 Liderazgo Guardiola, 262 and sport, 133, Cultural capital, see Capital 134, 136 Cultural Olympiad Consensus and Barcelona ’92, 97, 149, 153 and citizens’ empowerment, 37, 84 and Olympic Games, 7, 46, crisis of, 235–236 152, 154 300 INDEX

Cultural Olympiad (cont.) as producer of the postpolitical and Subirós, Pep, 45, 46, 78, 149, citizen, 115, 211 152, 153 (see also under PSC and CiU’s opposed Culture) understandings of, 151, 160 Cultural policies redeﬁned by Barcelona ’92, 107 as beyond the “cultural state”, 54 role of the citizen in, 16–24 local vs. national/state policies, 2 as servicing the city image, 187 as part of the “cultural state, 54 as site for the materialization of as providing access, 23 democracy, 53–76;as role in the management of technology of government, 85; citizens, 30, 156 (see also under in the run-up to the Governance; Governmentality; Olympics, 77–99, 107–128, Participation) 147–161 Cultural studies and subjectivity, 24–42, 53–76, distinguished from cultural 191–213 (see also under policy, 40n10 Cultural studies; Cultural interpretation of national culture policies) in, 21–22 Culture as capital, 14, 31, 33 D and citizenship, 24 Dardot, Pierre, 6, 29, 33, as converging of the economic and 39n4, 41n15, 166, 198, the political, 23, 35 200, 238 and creative cities, 13–42, 97, 197 The New Way of the World: On as immaterial labor, 30–31 Neoliberal Society indistinguishable from (see under Dardot, Pierre; economics, 31, 56, 113, Laval, Christian) 135, 160 Degen, Monica, 3, 14, 39n2, as life itself as source of economic 121, 127n16, 127n17, proﬁt, 38 128n22 as the local residents’ structures of and Marisol García. La metaciudad: feeling, 34 Barcelona. Transformación de as the management of una metropolis, 14 citizens, 22–24, 30–38 Sensing Cities. Regenerating Public as monetarizable capital, 4, 14 Life in Barcelona and as part of the welfare state, 72, 91 Manchester, 3, 39n2, 121, in post-Olympic 127n16, 127n17, Barcelona, 191–212 128n22 as preserved from the demands of Delgado, Manuel, 3, 23, 26–28, 38, the market, 36, 90 48, 50, 183, 271n223, 14, as producer of the critical 39n2, 121, 127n16, citizen, 17, 59, 62 128n22 INDEX 301

El espacio público como ideología, 27, Europe, 4, 15–17, 68, 156, 184, 195, 183, 281 199, 222, 232 Elogi del vianant. Del “model and European integration as Barcelona” a la Barcelona real, 3 facilitator of consensus in La ciudad mentirosa. Fraude y democratic Spain, 18 mentira del modelo European Capital of Culture, 187 Barcelona, 3, 23, 27, 48, 50 Barcelona’s candidacy to, 204 Dialogue, 17, 34, 35, 37, 55, 90, Etxezarreta, Miren, 3, 65 99n14, 104, 153, 182, 193, 194, 205, 257, 263 see under Consensus; Governance; F Participation FAVB (Federació d’Associacions de Dinamització cultural, see under Veïns i Veïnes de Barcelona), see Governance; Participation; PSUC Grassroots movements Diputació de Barcelona, 48–49, 82, FCB (Futbol Club Barcelona) 138–139, 142 (Barcelona Football Club) Donzelot, Jacques, 28, 29, 225 and Barcelona, 243 Dunn, Elizabeth, 28, 188, as Barcelona model, 237–239, 190, 224 242–243, 245–246, 249–251, Privatizing Poland. Baby Food, 253, 255, 259, 260–261, 267 Big Business and the business model under Laporta, 237 Remaking of Labor Carreras, Francesc de, 240, (see under Dunn, Elizabeth) 241–244, 253, 254 Duran, Pere, 184, 185 Carreras, Narcís de, 239, 240, 241–244, 253, 254 and Catalan independentism, 257 E and Catalan independentism being Electoral campaigns indistinguishable from and 1979 PSC-PSOE’s, 7, 66–69, neoliberalism, 255 75n2, 75n3, 75n4, 75n5, and catalanism as opposed to 76n6 globalisation, 248 and 1979 PSUC’s, 7, 66–76 as corporate empire, 237, 244 and Cambia tu ciudad con los and corporate ethics, 250 socialistas, 70 Cruyff, Johan, 242, 244, 251 Elefant blau, see under FCB and de-territorialisation, 235, 236 Elola Olaso, José Antonio and democratic values, 269n5 and Falange’s Frente de economic ﬁgures, 241–242 Juventudes, 135 Elefant blau, 237 and Samaranch, Juan Antonio, 135 example of meritocracy, 254, 267 Entrepreneurship, 14, 19, 32, 33, 197, Gaspart, Joan, 240, 244 198, 200, 224, 228, 256 as a global brand, 9, 235, 245, 250 deﬁnition of, 14, 32 and good capitalism, 261–268 302 INDEX

FCB (Futbol Club Barcelona) and biopolitics, 3, 32, 34–36, 38, (Barcelona Football Club) (cont.) 187, 208, 209, 212 Guardiola, Pep, 237 and governmentality, 18, 19, 21, and history of, 247–249 40n9, 50 ideological work compared to that and homo economicus, 32, 219 of the Olympic Games, 237 and neoliberalism, 15, 19, 32 (see Ingla, Marc, 245 also under Subject) as irresistible object of desire, 238 Laporta, Joan, 237, 243, 244, 245, 246, 248, 250, 254, 256 G and neoliberal values, 9, 33, Gallardo, Leonor, see under Cubeiro, 245–271 Juan Carlos and Gallardo, Leonor Núñez, Josep Lluís, 240, 241, 242, García, Beatriz, 14, 47, 108, 110, 139, 243, 253 152–154, 156, 183 offering models of behaviour to a Gaspart, Joan, see under FCB general audience, 251 Gentrification Ortega y Gasset’s idea of nation and 22@, 183 vertebration applied to and authenticity, 29, 121 Guardiola, 258, 259 and Casc Antic, 119–125, 126n13, playing style (philosophy), 126n15, 127n16, 127n17, 235, 254 127n19, 128n21 and resignification of més que un and El Raval, 119–125, 126n13, club, 238–245, 248 126n15, 127n16, 127n17, Roig, Xavier, 256 127n19, 128n21 Sala i Martin, Xavier, 256, 266 and frontier narratives, 122 6:2 Generation, 255 and La Ribera, 119–125, 126n13, Soriano, Ferran, 243, 245, 246, 126n15, 127n16, 127n17, 247, 248, 250, 251 127n19, 128n21, 159 and territorialisation, 235, 236, 251 and Núñez y Navarro, 106n2, 240 Youth academy, see La Masia (see also under Publicity Ferrer Viana, Ferran, 108, 111, campaigns; Zukin, Sharon 112, 115, 125n4, 126n7, Global films 126n8 on Barcelona, 217–233 Font, Jordi, 82, 83, 96, 97n1, definition of, 218 99n14, see under Culture; González, Felipe, 1, 17, 155 Citizen; Diputació de Barcelona; See also under PSOE PSC Governance, 6, 18, 20, 21, 23, 48, 80, Fòrum Universal de les Cultures 2004 84, 97, 107, 112, 115, 171, 191, and the Barcelona brand, 183, 209 192, 193, 195, 268 and the end of consensus, 238 (see definition of, 20 also Creative city; Culture) and participation, 6, 80 Foucault, Michel Governmentality INDEX 303

dealing with citizens’ conduct, 6 I deﬁnition of, 21 ICUB, 95, 204, 206(Barcelona’s and Foucault, 21 (see also under Institute for Culture) Governance; Foucault, Michel) and Ferran Mascarell, 8, 190, Grassroots associations, 56, 57–66, 203, 208 75n2, 78, 84, 85, 88, 104, 121, and new regimes of 127n16, 129–131, 137, government, 191–201 139–143, 159, 167, 169, 182, Identity 190n1, 195, 199, 209, Barcelona’s local, 2 240, 267 and ideological implications of appropriation of their agency by citizens’ pride, 105, 108 municipal leaders, 17, 24, 48, indistinguishable from brand, 31 73, 193 (see also under Sport; Ingla, Marc, see under FCB Governance) Institut Català del Voluntariat role in late francoism, 17, 47, 57, (INCAVOL)(Volunteering 104, 159 Catalan Institute), 169 role in democratic period, 66 IOC (International Olympic Guardiola, Pep Committee) appearance in Banc de Sabadell’s and information on ﬁnances, 170 advertisement, 262, 263, and relation to 272n29 Olympic volunteers and market constructed as national logics, 49 leader, 261–262 relevance in Barcelona of the TOP constructed as neoliberal (The Olympic Partners] paradigm, 267 programme, 170 incarnating a work ethic, 237, 259, and Samaranch, Juan Antonio, 49, 265 (see also under FCB) 170 (see also under Barcelona Guillamet, Jaume, 150, 164 ’92; Olympic Games)

K H Klapish, Cédric, see under L’auberge Hardt, Michael, 30, 32, 41n13, 171 espagnole and affective labor, 30, 32, 41n13 Harvey, David, 14, 16 Homo economicus, see under Citizen; L Foucault, Michel; Subject La Masia, 237, 267, Hunter, Graham, 237, 252, 253, 258, 268, 269n1, 270n13, 272n31 264, 265, 271n21 as neoliberal microcosm, Barça. The Making of the Greatest 237–238 (see also under Team in the World FCB) 304 INDEX

Laporta, Joan, see under FCB propietarios en la onda larga del L’auberge espagnole capitalismo hispano [1959- and Barcelona presented as 2010], 16, 18, 40 (fn8) preferable to Paris as a global Lumbreras, Elisa, 66, 78 capital, 218–219 and the EU, 222 and gap year, 235 and identity work, 218–219 M ideological closure in the happy Macro events, see under Barcelona ’92 ending of, 221 Fòrum Universal de les Cultures and narratives of personal 2004, 41n17, 111, 125n3, 159, success, 238 183, 206, 209, 211, 212 and presenting Barcelona as Olympic Games, 48, 49, 50, 74, producer and enhancer of 140, 143 neoliberal subjectivity, 218 Maragall, Pasqual as producing a visitor’s view of and Capmany, Maria Aurèlia, 88, Barcelona, 150 (see also under 89, 90, 91, 92, 94, 99n11, 148 Capital) and the idea of “la gent”, 87, 88, 90 representation of Paris in: as and the new urban realism 22, 26 reproducing myths of the south (see also under Barcelona ’92; from a metropolitan Consensus; CiU; Municipality; perspective, 220 PSC) stereotyping reinforced through Martínez Fraile, Raimon, 94 soundtrack, 220–221 Mascarell, Ferran title translated into English as Pot Barcelona y la modernidad. La Luck and The Spanish ciudad como proyecto de Apartment, 217 cultura, 8, 203–213 La ciutat de la gent, see Publicity and cultural capital, 95, 203–213 campaigns deﬁnition of culture according Laval, Christian, 6, 29, 33, 39n4, to, 95, 203–213 41n15, 166, 198, 200, 238 and denial of social-democracy’s Laval, Christian and Pierre Dartot, see urban politics having moved to Dardot, Pierre; Laval, Christian the neoliberal frame, 208 Lazzarato, Mauricio, 20, 28, 30, and ICUB, 8, 95, 190, 203, 208 41n14, 200 and PSC, 7, 8, 23, 40n7, 45, 55, 56, and immaterial labor, 30 68, 73, 79, 85, 92, 94, 95, López, Isidro, 15–16, 97n1, 98n6, 148, 190, 18, 39n6, 40n8, 120, 203–213 159–160, 217 and rationalization of cultural and Emmanuel Rodríguez. Fin de value, 8, 55 ciclo: Financiarización, and the return of participation, 55, territorio y sociedad de 203–213 INDEX 305

use of the concept of la gent (the and influence of the La Caixa people), 203–204 logo, 108, 110, 157 (see also under Memòria de modernista heritage, 112, 113, constitució de l’Institut de 118, 120 Cultura de Barcelona) as promoted through McDonogh, Gary W., 20, 26, OCSA, 152–153 (see also under 114, 124, 127n16, 127n17, Publicity campaigns) 127n20, 187 Montaner, Josep Maria, 3, 47, 65, 116 McNeill, Donald Moragas, Miquel de, 150–154, and the Barcelona imagined 156–157, 163, 166, 171, 184 community, 26, 115 Municipality and the relation between porciolisme Barcelona compared to and Barcelona ’92, 150 Manchester, 17, 185 Mediterranean sociability and cultural policies, 7, 21, 69, 73, and culture in Barcelona ’92, 32, 89, 93, 107 120, 183 as facilitator of culture, 21, 24 as defining Barcelona’s cultural as responsible for producing turn, 13–25 culture, 31 (see also under as the defining trait of the Barcelona Memòries; Publicity campaigns; brand, 25, 32, 89 Strategic Plans) Memòria de constitució de l’Institut de Museums Cultura de Barcelona, 191–201, Museums’ Plan (Pla de Museus), 88, 209 91 and Barcelona’s capitality, 204 as part of the creative city, 95 and the biopolitical turn in as sites to form criticial citizens, 45, culture, 208 58, 59, 67, 68, 69, 80, 81, and civic culture, 205 91, 95 and the creative city, 209 and urban regeneration, 153 and culture as competitive Muxí, Zaida, 3, 47, 141 advantage, 208 and entrepreneurial rationale, 205 N and Mascarell, Ferran, 208 Neoliberalism ’ and monetarisation of people s in economic terms, 16 creativity, 204 (see also under history of, 15–16 ICUB) as the “new common sense,” 16 Memòries in social terms, 15, 16, 18 as different from strategic plans, 192 relation to social democracy in and municipal discourses on Spain, 6, 16, 18 (see also under – culture, 7, 77 99, 192 Foucault, Michel; Homo Minca, Claudio, 35, 36 economicus; Subject) Miró, Joan, 108, 109, 110, Núñez, Josep Lluís, see under FCB 157, 185 Núñez y Navarro, 106n2, 240 306 INDEX

O Plans Estratègics, see under Strategic OCSA (Olimpiada Cultural S. A.), see Plans Cultural Olympiad Porcioles, Josep Maria de, see Oficina de Dinamització dels Porciolisme Voluntaris Olímpics (ODV) Porciolisme (Office for the Promotion of definition of, 113 Olympic Volunteers), 181 Núñez, Josep Lluís, 240 Olympic Games its practices indistinguishable from and Barcelona candidacies to, 47, Barcelona ’92, 113 92, 140, 164 and previous Barcelona Olympic as encouraging a neoliberal candidacies, 142 subjectivity, 218–219 and urban boosterism, 135 (see also vs. Popular Olympiads, 129 under Grassroots movements) and urban regeneration, 126n6 Postindustrial city and use of volunteers, 173 (see also Barcelona as, 3, 23, under Barcelona ’92; 39n1, 212 Volunteer) role of culture in, 13–24, 191–213 Ortega y Gasset, José, see under FCB (see also under Creative city) Pradas, Rafael, 7, 65, 66, 77, 78 See also under PSUC PROCIVESA (Promoción Ciutat P Vella S.A.), 120, 121, 124, see Pacte Cultural (Agreement on under Publicity campaigns Culture), 148 PSC (Partit dels Socialistes de and PSC vs. CiU visions of Catalunya) culture, 149 and battles for Barcelona, 158, 166 Participation and idea of culture, 166 (see also and Àrea de Descentralització i under Barcelona ’92; Benach, Participació Ciutadana, 79, 84 Joan Anton; Bohigas, Oriol; and Àrea de Relacions Cultural policies; Culture; Ciutadanes, 84 ICUB; Maragall, Pasqual; as political, 53–76 Mascarell, Ferran; Municipality; as postpolitical, 91, 115, 211 Publicity campaigns; Social role of culture in, 53–76, 77–99 democracy; Sport; Strategic as a sellable point for the city Plans; Subirós, Pep) brand, 196 PSOE (Partido Socialista Obrero as technologies of government, 195 Español), 7, 16, 66–71, 74n1, (see also under Grassroots 76n7, 76n9, 140, see under movements; Governance; González, Felipe Volunteer) PSUC (Partit Socialista Unificat de Pi Sunyer, Oriol, 131, 151, 163, Catalunya) 166, 170 during late-francoism, 104, 137 INDEX 307

during first democratic Cívica Fem-HoBé, 190; municipalities, 6, 7, 46, 48, 57, Campanya per a la millora del 61, 63, 66, 79, 134 (see also paisatgeurbà, 111; Ciutat under Benach, Joan Anton; Vella, Barcelona viva, 127n19; Borja, Jordi; Grassroots Conversaciones sobre el future; movements; Pradas, Rafael; El banco de las mejores empresas Public space) Y el tuyo, 262; and the Public private partnerships, 188, emergence of the modernista 192, 206 heritage, 112–113, 118–120; and neoliberal economy, 112 Friends forever(Amics per and neoliberal politics, 192 sempre), 176; and frontier (see also under Barcelona ’92; narratives, 122; and Governance; Participation; gentrification, 120; Gràcies a Strategic Plans) gent tan guapa com Public space aquesta, 118; and housing as beyond capitalism, 25, 27, 62–66, conditions, 116; La ciutat de la 113 gent, 98n8; and logos, 108; and as part of the Barcelona brand, 14, Mediterranean 25, 32, 61, 65, 97n1, 112, 121, sociability, 120–121; Millorant 139, 144 el present, 116; and posters, 47; and casals, 68 and publicity and centres civics, 68 advertisements, 107–128; and and festa major, 74 public private and the street, 38, 56, 58, 63–66, partnerships, 112; and the 72–74, 75 (fn 5), 81, 83, 121, redefinition of the Barcelona 123–124, 157, 164, citizen, 3, 107–128; 204, 207 Rehabilitació d’Edificisi and verbenas, 65 (see also under Vivendes al Casc Antic, 119; Brand; Grassroots movements; Rehabilitació d’Edificis i PSC; PSUC; Sport) Vivendes a La Ribera, 119; Si et Publicity campaigns cau la casa a sobre, 116–119, Ara, Barcelona itu, 125n3 121; and slogans, 111, 116, and authenticity, 120–121, 124 117; Taxi, posa’t guapo, 114; Barcelona 92; Barcelona, la ciutat i Tot allò que un jove voldria el 92, 125n2; Barcelona en saber sobre Barcelona I que mai flor, 114; Barcelona no s’hauria imaginat que guanyarà, 124; Barcelona existia, 86, 107, posa’t guapa, 111–112, 112, 119 (see also under 117–118, 126n8, 126n10; Gentrification) Barcelona tindrà bona Pujadas, i Martí Xavier, see under planta, 114; Bonica, guapa, Santacana, Carles; Pujadas, i Martí preciosa, 117; Campanya Xavier 308 INDEX

R and Pujadas, i Martí Xavier. Història Regiduria de Cultura, see under il.lustrada de l’esport a Cultural policies; Municipality Catalunya Resina, Joan Ramon, 26, 27, 127n17, Schumpeter, Joseph, 14, 32 149, 158, 159, 160 on entrepreneurship, 32 Barcelona’s Vocation of Serra, Narcís, 48, 49, 88, 104, 141, Modernity, 26, 213n1 144, 145n8 Rifkin, Jeremy, 13, 24, 25, 30, 251 and Samaranch, Juan Antonio, 49, “The Age of Access,” 24 139, 140, 141 (see also under Rodríguez, Emmanuel, see under Barcelona ’92; Municipality; López, Isidro PSC; PSOE; Sport) Rodríguez Morató, Arturo, 2, 14, Servei de Vídeo Comunitari, 85, 108 22–24, 34, 54, 56, 77, 95, 197, See also under animació cultural; 200, 206, 208 Citizen; Culture; Dinamització Roig, Xavier, see under FCB cultural; Participation; PSUC; Rosell, Sandrom, see under FCB Publicity campaigns; Subject Social democracy cultural policies of, 208 S morphing into neoliberalism, 15, Sagarra, Joan de, 58, 66, 78 203–213 Sala i Martin, Xavier, see under FCB and PSC, 160, 194 Samaranch, Juan Antonio, 47, 48, and PSOE, 16 135–136, 139–141, 145n6, Socías Humbert, Josep Maria, 48, 58, 145n8–145n9, 150, 159, 165, 170 66, 78 Campaign We count on you Soriano, Ferran, see under FCB (Contamos contigo), 136 Goal: The ball does not go in by and the Sports’ National Ofﬁce chance, 243, 245, 246, 247, (Delegación Nacional de 248, 250, 251 Deporte), 136 Sport during Francoism, 135–136, 159 ambiguos nature of sport discourses (see also under Barcelona ’92; under Francoism, 136–137 Olympic Games and anti-fascism, 131 Sánchez, José Ramón) as building consensus, 238 Cambia tu ciudad con los and Catalanism, 130, 131, 145n4, socialistas, 70 244, 246 Una constitución para un pueblo, 71 and competition, 137, 140, 237, Santacana, Carles, 130–131, 135–137, 238, 252, 256 145n5, 145n7, 238–239 and cultural values, 154 El Barça i el franquisme. Crònica and democratic citizenship, 6, 129 d'uns anys decisius per a and identity, 5, 173, 241, 243, 265 Catalunya (1968- as ideology, 4–6 1978), 269n4 invoked against francoism, 88 INDEX 309

invoked by francoism, 91–92 Barcelona: Olimpíada Cultural and neoliberal subjectivity, 6, 9, Barcelona ’92, 62 236, 254, 261 El vol de la ﬂetxa, 46, 62, 78, 79, 88, as part of cultural policies, 4–6, 98n10, 104, 105, 149, 159, 87, 131 160, 165, 192, 193 and participation in public Subject, 2, 3, 8, 9, 17, 19–21, 23, spaces, 129–146 24, 29, 31–34, 38, 39n2, 51, as popular and mass culture, 4, 53, 56, 58–60, 63, 69, 73, 83, 6, 135 91, 93, 94, 96, 99n13, 107, 120, practice of, to produce a new, anti- 122, 132, 133, 138, 142, 144, 11, capitalist subject, 105 166, 167, 169, 175, 188, 196, in the Second Republic, 130, 131, 206, 210, 212, 216, 217, 220, 132, 136 223–232, 236–238, 255, 268 and sociability of, 142, 239 as constituted through affective as spectacle, 5, 136 labor, 30, 32 “sport and citizenship,” 131, 238 as constituted through immaterial and sports facilities (see also under labor, 30 (see also under FCB; Grassroots movements; Citizen) Samaranch, Juan Antonio) critical, 53–76 Strategic Plans docile, 20, 230 as different from Memòries, 148, 192 as entrepreneur, 29, 32, 33 and the entrepreneurial subject, 17 as homo economicus, 32, 219 rhetoric of participation, 195 and neoliberalism, 6, 9, 19, 32, 169, as new forms of governing, 195 196, 212, 216, 218, 219, 225, origin of, 191 227, 230, 232, 238, 254, 261, and the subordination of culture to 268 the economic, 191–201 (see also under Culture; Cultural policies; ICUB; Mascarell, T Ferran; Public private Tatjer, Marta, 78 partnerships; Subject) Terra Lliure movement, 158, 160 Structures of feeling Theatre, 81, 92, 123, 153, 184 approached through a bottom-up as sites to form critical citizens, 81, focus, 40n10 92 (see also under Animació as appropriated in governing cultural; Dinamització strategies, 22, cultural; Museums; PSUC) 34–35, 38 Tourism and local identity, 40n10 as biopolitics, 36 Subirós, Pep, 23, 55, 62, 97n1, Barcelona as tourist destination, 1, 98n10, 73, 79, 88, 91, 92, 94, 88, 153, 183–185, 218, 235 95, 103, 105, 125n2, 145n11, Economic ﬁgures for 159, 160, 192, 193, 203 Barcelona, 184–185 310 INDEX

Tourism (cont.) ideological closure in the happy as part of the creative city, 26, 28, ending of, 221 38, 187 presenting Barcelona as a breeding role of culture in, 36 ground for the creative Transition subject, 223 from dictatorship to democracy in presenting Barcelona as producer Spain, 15, 56 and enhancer of neoliberal effects on culture of, 36–37 subjectivity, 218 from social democracy to as producing a visitor’s view of neoliberalism in Spain and Barcelona, 150 Barcelona, 6, 18 as propaganda of a tourist Truñó, Enric, 86, 87, 141, 164, 165, destination, 218 192, 193 representation of New York in, 223 See also under Barcelona ’92; PSC; as reproducing myths of the south Servei de Video Comunitari from a metropolitan 22@ perspective, 220 and civisme, 183 and risk as a neoliberal trait, 227 and Fòrum Universal de les Cultures and Spanish characters as service 200, 183 (see also under Brand; providers, 228 Creative city; Gentriﬁcation; and Spanish stereotypes, 229 Publicity campaigns) stereotyping reinforced through soundtrack See also under Capital; Subject U Volunteer USM (Urban Social Movements), see after the Olympic Games in Grassroots movements Barcelona, 181–190 as contributing to create Barcelona’s global image, 163–177 V as epitome of neoliberal subjectivity, 7 Vázquez Montalbán, Manuel, 3, 37, history of volunteering, 166–172 239 interpellation in the Manual del Barcelonas, 3 voluntari olímpic, 173–177 Sabotaje olímpico, 37 as modellic Barcelona citizen, 7–8, Vicky, Cristina, Barcelona 20, 33, 163–177 and Barcelona presented as as morally superior citizen, 163–177 preferable to New York as a and the Olympic Games, 163–177 global capital, 219 and paid work, 167, 169–170, 176 economic ﬁgures for, 217–218 as postpolitical participation, 20, and gap year, 226 105, 163–177 as global capital and identity Motivation programme [Programa work, 219, 220, 226, 228 motivacional], 173 INDEX 311

relation to the militant subject, 155, and post-Fordist practices, 29 167–168, 175–176 as pleasure, 29, 32 as the subject of docile See also under Creative city; Culture; consensus, 166–177, 181–190 Subject as undermining the welfare state, 176 Voluntaris ’92 (publication), 173, Y 174 Yúdice, George culture as resource, 38n1 epistemic change of culture as W resource, critique of, 13, Watson, Lee, 236, 240, 241, 242, 38n1 246, 247, 248, 249, 254, 269n2 Work and the “artistic” critique of it, 28 Z as indistinguishable from Zukin, Sharon, 14, 30–32, 41n14, leisure, 41n14 120–122 as indistinguishable from life, 31 and authenticity, 120 and Fordist and Taylorist and cultural mediators, 29, 122, 124 practices, 28 Landscapes of Power, 29, 31, 122