The Impossible Partition of Syria
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Thematic Studies October 2013 The impossible partition of Syria Mustafa Khalifa * The idea of a partition of Syria along sectarian boundaries has been circulating among pro- government circles, reaching the ears of Western commentators, as a way to partially save the Syrian regime, restore peace and protect the Alawite minority from a feared Sunni victory. However the historical, economic, political and, above all, the demographic reality of Syria and those of the neighboring countries indicate that such a solution would lead to a disaster. The ethnic and sectarian composition of the Syrian society and the distribution of the population across the country make the partition of the country impossible. A partition would not only fail to restore peace but it will also be a danger for the stability of neighboring countries. Mustafa Khalifa demonstrates this through a mapping of the ethnic and sectarian composition of the different urban and rural areas of the country. This mapping is inevitably incomplete and based on estimations due to the unavailability of reliable statistics. It provides nevertheless an important contribution to the knowledge about Syria that policy circles need to have when discussing the future of the country. Syrian society is unique in its diversity, with many different ethnic, religious and sectarian constituent groups. In this respect it is equalled in the Arab world only by its neighbour Lebanon, which was created in similar conditions and with which it has an extensive shared history. After the beginning of the Syrian revolution in March 2011, with peaceful protests turning into an armed struggle between Bashar al-Assad’s regime and the different opposition groups, the issue of the composition of Syria’s population was revived locally, regionally and internationally. This discussion was revitalized for many reasons, the most important being: 1. The success of Assad’s regime in almost entirely polarizing the Alawite sect and forcing it into conflict with opposition forces, along with a number of other minorities. To observers, this seems to have led to a semi-divided society in Syria. 2. The deadlock of the armed struggle and apparent impossibility of a decisive military victory by either side. There is a possibility that the conflict may evolve into a longstanding civil * Syrian Novelist and author of The Shell (2007), Mustafa Khalifa spent over 12 years in the prisons of the Syrian regime for his political activities as a member of the leftist opposition to the regime of Hafez al-Assad. 2 war, with great human and material costs. This conviction has become entrenched among many people in Syria, in the region and internationally. 3. Fear among regional and international players that the continuation of the war over an extended period may extend the effects of the war into neighbouring countries and threaten their security. This could lead to a conflagration of the entire region, given the crucial significance of competing strategic interests in the country. Some groups, considering the demographic situation in Syria, have debated the possibility of partitioning Syria into two or more states to protect the main social groups of the country and to end the conflict which, as of late 2013, appears to be irremediable. These groups, which have varying motivations, opinions and commitment to the idea of partition, are: - The Syrian regime: Some people in circles close to Bashar al-Assad have leaked rumours that the partitioning of Syria and the establishment of an Alawite state is an option if the stranglehold upon the regime intensifies. In reality, these leaks are threats directed primarily at two audiences. They are directed first at the Syrian opposition, which is dedicated to maintaining the unity of Syria’s land and people and, secondly, at the neighbouring countries supporting the Syrian opposition since the partitioning of Syria could have consequences for these countries. This is particularly true of Turkey where the existence of significant sectarian and ethnic minorities could constitute ripe grounds for conflict, though the dangers of partition are less than in Syria. When the Syrian regime began leaking the idea of partition, as a threat and as psychological warfare, it was done at a time when they were still hoping that they could be victorious and crush the opposition. It is clear, however, that the regime will resort to this option in the event that it feels it is about to be decisively struck by opposition forces. - Iran: If Iran feels that the fall of its ally, the al-Assad regime, is inevitable, it would prefer to keep a piece of the cake. In this case, it would likely support the founding of an Alawite state, considering this situation to be the lesser of two evils. In this case, it will do its utmost to ensure that this state has geographical access to Iraq, achieving its goal of establishing what has been referred to as the Shi’ite crescent extending from Iran to Lebanon. From the Iranian perspective, the partitioning of Syria is a legitimate alternative to some worse scenario. But Iran’s strategic ambition is much greater. It wants to be able to exercise power over all of Syria, and also to be able to have control over Lebanon, Jordan, and Palestine through Syria. It will, therefore, accept only temporarily a limiting of its influence to a small geographical area controlled by an Alawite state, and after that, will seek to change the balance of power which has compelled it and Assad’s regime to accept this state of affairs. The region will therefore not be peaceful and settled even after any possible partitioning of Syria and the establishment of an Alawite state. - The Western states that are active and influential internationally, and at the level of the Syrian crisis. In decision making circles in these states, and in some connected research centres and think tanks, the option of partitioning Syria into two states has been discussed in the belief that that this solution could guarantee the end of the conflict between Assad’s regime and the opposition forces. Some important questions emerge here and must be addressed: Is the partitioning of Syria realizable in reality? If the answer is yes, is it the best way to avoid the dangers that have led to this idea being proposed? In other words, would this solution reduce the human and material costs that might be expected with a widespread civil war? Would this solution bring stability to the region and prevent a conflagration? The answer to these questions requires, to 3 begin with, a study of the demographic situation in Syria, its main ethnic, religious and sectarian groups and their distribution in the country. GROWTH 1943 1953 % SUNNIS 1 971 053 68,91% 2 578 810 70,54% 31% 14 SHI’ITES 12 742 0,45% 887 0,41% 17% 398 ALAWITES 325 311 11,37% 445 10,90% 22% 36 ISMAILIS 28 527 1,00% 745 1,01% 29% 113 DRUZE 87 184 3,05% 318 3,10% 30% 3 IDIYEY 2 788 0,10% 082 0,08% 11% TOTAL MUSLIMS 2 427 605 84,87% 3 145 287 86,03% 30% JEWS 29 770 1,04% 31 647 0,87% 6% 478 CHRISTIANS 403 036 14,09% 970 13,10% 19% TOTAL POPULATION 2 860 411 Different estimations have been made on the demographic composition of Syria. They usually correspond to these figures however they can vary depending on the aims of the sources. For example, some give the figure of 7% for the number of Alawites, while other studies raise this figure to 15%, so it is therefore best to rely on sources that appear to be more neutral. According to records of civil statistics, on 1st January 2011, the number of residents of Syria was 24 million, distributed over the 14 governorates in the table. These residents comprise a mixture of many ethnicities, religions and religious sects, as described below. Divisions in Syrian society Generally, we can speak of the composition of Syrian society along three dimensions: the ethnic, religious and sectarian. The ethnic groups Arabs constitute the major ethnic group in Syria, making up between 80 and 85% of the population. They are the majority in all districts except for the Hasakah governorate. Kurds are the second largest ethnic group in Syria, making up around 10% of the Syrian population and distributed among four regions. Most of the Kurdish population is concentrated in the northeast, bordering on Iraq and Turkey. The second area, in which smaller Kurdish communities are also found, is central Syria. The third area is in the regions of Kobani (Ayn al-Arab) and Afrin, and despite the fact that most maps show these Kurdish regions as though they were connected, there is actually a large Arab and Turkmen bloc that separates them (Jarabulus, Manbij, Al–Bab, Azaz). 4 The fourth area is in the capital, Damascus, mainly in the neighbourhood of Rukn Addin. Kurds in Damascus are entirely Arabised and do not speak Kurdish very well. The major locales in which Kurds are found are: the city of Hasakah and the villages surrounding it, Qamishli, Amouda, Darbasha, Malikiyah, the city of Aleppo, Ayn al-Arab and most of the villages around it, Afrin, and nearly all the villages around it, as well as minorities in Damascus, Homs, Idlib, and Ar-Raqqah. The only area in which the Kurds constitute a majority is the Hasakah governorate, where they make up 60% of the population. The Map in the Annex 2 shows the distribution of Kurds in Syria. Different groups of Kurds have held different positions in relation to the uprising against Assad’s regime.