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The Rise and Decline of the Iranian Hardliners: Why Ahmadinejad's

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The Rise and Decline of the Iranian Hardliners: Why Ahmadinejad's http://dx.doi.org/10.18778/8220-219-9.04 Giorgia Perletta The Rise and Decline of the Iranian Hardliners: Why Ahmadinejad’s Group Shifted from Power to Opposition This paper analyses the political parabola of the Iranian hardliners behind the leadership of Mahmood Ahmadinejad with a historical approach. It will investigate the rise in power of Ahmadinejad’s circle by identifying his elec- toral campaign, as well as his political narrative and relations with the other political factions. Moreover, the paper will analyse economic reforms and trace the guidelines of Ahmadinejad’s foreign policy to provide a comprehensive insight into his political agenda. The paper aims to identify the path of hard- liners from being the peak of the political power to the subsequent margi- nalization that led them to stand as the opposition. It will therefore examine the roots behind this shift and the legacy left by the hardliners’ political expe- rience in the factional competition. The hardliners entered the Iranian political scene between 2003 and 2005. Domestic politics was experiencing an ongoing clash between conservatives and reformists, a heterogeneous front that had been able to intercept the de- mand for more openings from students’ circles and the urban middle-class. The reformist president, Mohammad Khatami (1997–2005), was in his last term and the Dovvom-e Khordad (as the reformist front is generally referred to in Iran)1 was exhausted by the constant marginalization and repression of its members by unelected institutions2. In Iran, these constitutional bodies, such as the Guardian Council, the Expediency Council, and the judiciary3, have always epitomised the most conservative expression of the system. They are linked to the office of the Supreme Leader, whose authority derives from the principle of Velayat-e faqih. Reformists had tried to change not only the social aspects, providing more openings to individual liberties, civil society, minorities, wo- men and young people; they had also resumed the debate on political Islam ini- tiated in the nineties by religious intellectuals4. However, the ambitious project 1 Dovvom-e khordad (the second day of the Iranian month Khordad) named the reformist front by recalling the day in which Mohammad Khatami won the presidential elections in 1997. 2 G. Abdo, From Revolution to Revelations: Khatami’s Iran Struggles for Reform, “Middle East Report” 1999, Issue 211. 3 To have a general understanding of the functioning of Iranian institutions see: M. Kamrava, H. Houchang, Suspended equilibrium in Iran’s political system, “The Muslim World” 2004, Vol. 94, Issue 4, p. 496. 4 F. Jahanbakhsh, The emergence and development of religious intellectualism in Iran, “Histor- ical reflections/Réflexions historiques” 2004, Vol. 30, No. 3, pp. 469–489. A suggested reading is: 36 Giorgia Perletta to implement gradual social reforms and soften pressures on dress-code and gen- der segregation did not find a real implementation. Also, regional circumstances influenced the setback of the reformist front, already weakened from within. President Khatami presented himself as the advocate of the “dialogue among civilizations” (goftogu-ye tamaddonha), which implied a relationship of dialogue with other countries, hence the rejection of a confrontational approach. The growing regional instability following 9/11 has negatively af- fected Iranian relations with foreign powers and the reformists’ attempt to es- tablish a positive engagement with the West. For instance, the United States under the presidency of George W. Bush located their troops along the Iranian borders. In 2001, the Enduring freedom operation led the American troops to step in in Afghanistan to eradicate the Taliban presence and the main leaders of Al Qaida, while after two years the Iraqi freedom operation saw the US in- vasion of Iraq5. The Islamic republic was therefore surrounded by troops from a hostile country, which perhaps was even committed to provoke a regime change in Iran through a domino effect. Moreover, in 2002, president Bush also declared Iran a part of the “Axis of evil6”, along with North Korea and Iraq, that is those rogue states accused of financing international terrorism. It is now evident how regional instability and US threats played in favour of reformist opponents. Border insecurity, a lack of trust towards Washington and a jus- tified sense of siege, activated a progressive securitization of Iranian foreign policy that favoured conservative factions competing with reformists. In this internal and geopolitical context, the hardliners came to power. The Islamic republic of Iran was entering a new phase that, eventually, would have transformed internal factional relations and reshaped political alliances. The first sign of this change was given by local elections in 2003. Due to a low turnout and the defeat of the reformist movement, a new group emerged as the winner of the capital’s council. 14 of the 15 seats were assigned to members of the Alliance of Builders of Islamic Iran (Eʾtelaf-e Abagaran-e Iran-e Eslami), a group formed by technocrats, non-clerics, war veterans and members of the Revolutionary Guards. The leader of the group was Mahmood Ahmadine- jad, a generally unknown figure who in 2003 was eventually appointed mayor of Tehran. Before, Ahmadinejad served as governor of Ardabil between 1993 and 1997, but his presence in the revolutionary momentum and its aftermath is questioned. Coming from the poor neighbourhoods of the capital, he will A. Soroush, Reason, freedom, and democracy in Islam: Essential writings of Abdolkarim Soroush, New York 2002. 5 A. Ehteshami, Iran’s international posture after the fall of Baghdad, “The Middle East Jour- nal” 2004, Vol. 58, No. 2, pp. 179–194. 6 D. Heradstveit, M.G. Bonham, What the axis of evil metaphor did to Iran, “The Middle East Journal” 2007, Vol. 61, No. 3, pp. 421–440. The Rise and Decline of the Iranian Hardliners... 37 always refer to his background and modest lifestyle to present himself as close to ordinary people and disadvantaged classes7. During his administration, Ahmadinejad carried forward theatrical proposals and projects, like the idea of burying war martyrs in city parks. His rhetoric involved constantly prai- sing the war efforts, martyrs and war veterans, to underline the mobilization of people and commitment to the revolutionary-oriented ideology of resist- ance8. Tehran became a place to celebrate and remember the effort of thesacred defence9. At the same time, he was insisting on the righteousness of Islamic values. Within this rhetorical framework, he provided important donations to local mosques to finance public celebrations and religious activities. The pro- gressive militarization and Islamization of space and political discourse had the objective of making alliances. The emerging faction led by Ahmadinejad could not count on consolidated support from other factions, nor from other cen- tres of power. Thus, already during his administration of Tehran, Ahmadinejad tried to strengthen the alliance with conservative clerics and military figures. In 2004, the elections for the renewal of the parliament (majles) assigned another important victory to the Alliance of Builders, who conquered all the 30 seats of the capital. The groups linked to the conservatives obtained the majority in the majles imposing a heavy defeat for the reformists who accused the system of electoral fraud10. But the real surprise occurred the following year, when in 2005 the still unknown mayor of Tehran was elect- ed president of the Iranian republic. Ahmadinejad was not the first choice of the conservatives, who were instead supporting Ali Larijani and Mohammad Qalibaf, while reformists were divided behind two candidates, Mostafa Mo’in and Mohsen Mehr’alizadeh11. Pragmatists supported Mehdi Karrubi and the former president, Hashemi Rafsanjani (1989–1997). The low turnout brought the two most voted candidates to the ballot, which occurred for the first time in the history of the Islamic republic. On one side, Hashemi Rafsanjani, per- ceived by the people as among the most corrupt politicians in the system12, and on the other, the unknown mayor of Tehran. Surprisingly, the latter won the ballot, representing a new personality among well-known and criticised 7 K. Naji, Ahmadinejad: The secret history of Iran’s radical leader, Berkeley 2007, p. 11. 8 B. Rahimi, Contentious Legacies of the Ayatollah, [in:] A Critical Introduction to Khomeini, ed. by A. Moghaddam, New York 2014, p. 293. 9 K. Naji, op. cit., p. 50. 10 3,600 out of about 8,200 reformist candidates were disqualified by the Guardian Council. Turnout was also very low (51%). Seventh Parliamentary Election, Iran Data Portal, http://irandat- aportal.syr.edu/2004-parliamentary-election, retrieved 20.11.2018. 11 A. Gheissari, K. Sanandaji, New conservative politics and electoral behavior in Iran, [in:] Con- temporary Iran: Economy, Society, Politics, ed. by A. Gheissari, Oxford 2009, p. 276. 12 S. Namazi, The Iranian Presidential Elections: Who voted, why, how & does it matter?, “Middle East Program, Woodrow Wilson Center” 2005, p. 5. 38 Giorgia Perletta politicians, and in June 2005 was elected president13. He presented himself as an outsider to the system (gheyr-e khodi), far from political circles which were perceived as imbued with corruption and detached from people’s needs. He claimed to represent the poor, the urban subaltern and the rural population as they were dissatisfied with the current political system. Ahmadinejad
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