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Devonport Site Visit – Summary Presentation 13Th March 2019

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Devonport Site Visit – Summary Presentation 13Th March 2019 Devonport site visit – summary presentation 13th March 2019 Marine Land Aviation Nuclear www.babcockinternational.com Disclaimer This document has been prepared by Babcock International Group PLC (the “Company”) solely for use at a presentation in connection with the Company's analyst and investor site visit on 13 March 2019. For the purposes of this notice, the presentation that follows (the “Presentation”) shall mean and include the slides that follow, the oral presentation of the slides by the Company, hard copies of this document and any materials distributed at, or in connection with, that presentation. The Presentation does not constitute or form part of and should not be construed as, an offer to sell or issue, or the solicitation of an offer to buy or acquire, securities of the Company in any jurisdiction or an inducement to enter into investment activity. No part of this Presentation, nor the fact of its distribution, should form the basis of, or be relied on in connection with, any contract or commitment or investment decision whatsoever. Statements in this Presentation, including those regarding the possible or assumed future or other performance of the Company or its industry or other trend projections, as well as statements about Babcock’s or management’s beliefs or expectations, may constitute forward-looking statements. By their nature, forward-looking statements involve known and unknown risks, uncertainties and other factors, many of which are beyond Babcock’s control. These risks, uncertainties and factors may cause actual results, performance or developments to differ materially from those expressed or implied by such forward-looking statements. Accordingly, no assurance is given that such forward-looking statements will prove to have been correct. Forward looking statements in the Presentation regarding past trends or activities should not be taken as a representation that such trends or activities will continue in the future. They speak only as at the date of this Presentation and the Company undertakes no obligation to update these forward-looking statements. The information and opinions contained in this Presentation do not purport to be comprehensive, are provided as at the date of the Presentation and are subject to change without notice. The Company is not under any obligation to update or keep current the information contained herein. 2 Marine Land Aviation Nuclear www.babcockinternational.com Marine: how we operate UK Naval International Naval Technology Engineering Submarines Surface ships Submarines Surface ships Energy and Marine consultancy Equipment Training Equipment Training Equipment Systems › All UK submarine refits and life-extension › 100% Canadian submarine refits › Owned intellectual property in complex › 75% surface ship refits › Australian ship and submarine support energy, marine and defence systems › Submarine and ship fleet time support › Weapons technology to South Korea, Spain › Through-life support of complex assets › Design, build, assembly and support of QEC › US-UK submarine missile tube programme › Platform integrator of OEM technology › Future class support and systems upgrades › New Zealand and Oman dockyards › Design and use of support technology All supported by: Advanced technology Technical expertise Unique infrastructure 3 Marine Land Aviation Nuclear www.babcockinternational.com Marine: how we do it Advanced technology Technical expertise Unique infrastructure › Design, integrate and support technology › Long heritage of innovative engineering › Owned and managed unique infrastructure (both ours and OEMs’) knowledge and applied technology › UK and International infrastructure › Upgrade platforms & predict critical support › Deliver critical programmes for complex › Supports naval and commercial marine › Deliver savings and advance the definition assets in highly regulated environments programmes of availability 4 Marine Land Aviation Nuclear www.babcockinternational.com Marine: where we operate Canada UK Rosyth Spain South Korea Clyde Bahrain Oman Australia New Zealand Bristol Devonport 5 Marine Land Aviation Nuclear www.babcockinternational.com Technology focused business › Owned intellectual property – complex systems / equipment design and development – ecoSMRT, weapons handling and launch systems (WHLS) › Through-life support of complex equipment – Weapons and C4ISR › Design, engineering and management services – platform integrator of OEM technology › Use of innovative support technologies – enabling digital asset management (iSupport) 6 Marine Land Aviation Nuclear www.babcockinternational.com Unique combination of technical expertise and infrastructure Vanguard Class refit facility Large-scale docking facilities Frigate support centre Owned Ship-lift Astute Class jetty Managed 7 Marine Land Aviation Nuclear www.babcockinternational.com Solving complex problems for our customers Enhance Deliver critical Upgrade critical Reduce Upgrade legacy platform and and highly and complex through life platforms and system complex national support costs systems availability programmes infrastructure (at lower cost) 8 Marine Land Aviation Nuclear www.babcockinternational.com What we do at Devonport 9 Marine Land Aviation Nuclear www.babcockinternational.com Devonport: introduction › Largest naval dockyard in Europe › Dockyard owned by Babcock (Naval Base operated by Babcock) › UK centre of excellence for deep maintenance of Royal Navy complex platforms › Provide critical marine and nuclear engineering services, integral to our customers’ operations › Strategic support partner to the UK Ministry of Defence (MOD) › Involvement in a range of complex naval programmes › Strong track record of delivery › Mainly operate long term, incentive-based contracts that are structured to deliver both performance and cost benefits to our customers › Employ around 5,500 people at Devonport and its satellite sites – 257 of these are graduates, 335 apprentices and around 3,600 are in an engineering role › The site has served the Royal Navy for over 300 years and will continue to for decades to come 10 Marine Land Aviation Nuclear www.babcockinternational.com Devonport: longevity across programmes › Vanguard Class › Dreadnought Class › Trafalgar Class › Astute Class › Astute replacement › Albion Class (LPD) In service › T23 Class Decommission › T26 Class 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 11 Marine Land Aviation Nuclear www.babcockinternational.com Devonport: strong track record Over the last ten years we’ve delivered: Warship refit programmes › 17 x Type 23 Frigates › 4 x Landing Platform Dock Submarine refit programmes › 3 x Vanguard Class Submarine - Long Overhaul Periods (Refuel) › 6 x Trafalgar Class Revalidation and Assistance Maintenance Periods (RAMPs) › On track to deliver c.£1bn savings over the life of the Terms of Business Agreement (ToBA) 2010-2025 across all sites 12 Marine Land Aviation Nuclear www.babcockinternational.com Devonport: strategic support partner to MOD › Integral to key UK programmes › Continuous At Sea Deterrent › Frigate and anti-submarine warfare deployment › Amphibious assault capability › Key contracts › MSDF - TOBA › Vanguard Class refit and refuel › T23 life-extension › Amphibious support › Weapons support contracts 13 Marine Land Aviation Nuclear www.babcockinternational.com Devonport: integrated with our customers › Babcock own and operate the Royal Dockyard and nuclear license site Waterfront Wharf's (MOD) › Babcock operate the Naval Base › Completely intertwined with MOD, Devonport Royal Royal Naval and Royal Marines Dockyard site operations and planning HMS Drake (MOD) › Unique infrastructure and expertise, not replicated anywhere HMS Defiance (MOD) RM base (MOD) 14 Marine Land Aviation Nuclear www.babcockinternational.com Devonport: integral to customer operations › Centre of excellence for: › Anti submarine warfare surface fleet (ASW) Waterfront Wharf's › All submarine deep maintenance (MOD) work › Amphibious assets › Weapons support Devonport Royal Dockyard › Base port for: › Albion Class (LPD) HMS Drake (MOD) › T23 ASW frigate fleet › Future T26 fleet › Trafalgar Class SSN fleet HMS Defiance (MOD) › The forefront of our intelligent support technology RM base (MOD) 15 Marine Land Aviation Nuclear www.babcockinternational.com Devonport Royal Dockyard and Naval Base Innovations hub on site with a number New Engineering and Business of ground-breaking technological hub completed in 2018 projects in progress STEM programme and apprenticeship schemes Ongoing investment Currently working on five streams of in infrastructure Type 23 frigates across the site New Type 26 frigates will be base-ported at Devonport Only site with the ability Successful refit programmes to refuel and defuel on Amphibious Assault Ships Dispatching specialist teams around nuclear submarines the globe to support our customer 16 Marine Land Aviation Nuclear www.babcockinternational.com iFrigateTM Connected Platform Innovation Vision Data acquisition Data distribution On Board Analytics Data release control Shore side analysis Sensor technology to Sensor bearer On-Board analytics suite The maintainer remains Data analysis shore side capture material state infrastructure to to enable the maintainer in control of on-board to enable forward data distribute sensor data to observe & orient data data, providing a shore- deployed support to be and allow aggregation, and derive information side link when additional provided and to optimise exploiting hard wired to enable risk based support
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