Shu Guang Zhang. Mao's Military Romanticism: China and the , 1950-1953. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1995. xiii + 338 pp. $45.00, cloth, ISBN 978-0-7006-0723-5.

Reviewed by Xiaoyuan Liu

Published on H-Diplo (June, 1997)

Like any complex international event, the his‐ on the Korean War, indicating its "cultural ap‐ tory of the Korean War is a three-dimensional proach" to studying China's intervention (p. 9). puzzle of many sides. Since Allen S. Whiting's clas‐ Chapter Two then sets the historical and intellec‐ sic study, China Crosses the Yalu (1960), a signif‐ tual background for the Chinese strategy in the cant number of scholarly works have considered war by ofering a concise depiction of Mao Ze‐ China's adventurous intervention in the Korean dong's military philosophy, characterized by its War. In the last few years the "forgotten war" has emphasis on the potential of human capabilities. not only been remembered afresh, but has also Chapters Three and Four describe China's defen‐ been rendered a hot topic in the feld by an sive posture before the Korean War and how that emerging new historiography based on new Rus‐ posture changed after Beijing decided to fex its sian and Chinese sources. The book under review military muscle in the Korean Peninsula. Zhang's is a salient example of the new history of the Ko‐ brisk and rich discussion of the shifting military rean War. Its careful examination of the Chinese fortunes of the Chinese People's Volunteers (CPV) People's Republic's military behavior throughout between October 1950 and the summer of 1952, the Korean confict picks up the narrative left by the subject of Chapters Five through Seven, is Jian's China's Road to the Korean War frst-rate military history. Chapters Eight and Nine (1994): thus the new story about "the other side of can be read as informative essays on, respectively, the river," to borrow Edgar Snow's metaphor, is the CCP's political works in the CPV and Beijing's complete. For now, at least. tactics in the negotiations for a cease-fre, both of Intended to ofer a full coverage of China's which serve the book's main theme well. In the military activities in Korea and to interpret these concluding chapter, Zhang highlights the impact activities within a new conceptual framework, the and consequences of the of the Korean War in book is structured efectively. Chapter One estab‐ China and suggests some lessons that should be lishes the study's position in the ongoing debates learned from the confict. H-Net Reviews

Primarily using new Chinese sources to detail Mao's China and After (1986). Yet, to my knowl‐ China's fghting experience, the book flls a major edge, no one before Zhang has identifed Mao's void in the English-language historiography of the revolutionary romanticism as the main thrust be‐ Korean War. It sheds light on certain key issues of hind the PRC's bellicose behavior in the interna‐ the war that have been murky until recently. Was tional scene in the 1950s. According to Zhang, Beijing promoting an all-front strike against the present at the core of the CCP's military strategy United States? We are told that after the Korean were three "images" that justifed the PRC's frst War began, Mao only wanted a defensive bufer war abroad and determined its choice of enemy. zone along the Chinese-Vietnamese border and Two of these are China's self-images of "national recalled the overzealous General Chen Geng, who liberation" and "moral superiority," and the other sought to give the American imperialists a "two- is an "adversarial" image about the United States pronged blow" (p. 69) in Korea and , from (pp. 253-54). Seeking an understanding of the Chi‐ the Chinese military mission in Vietnam. Also, to nese intervention through these elements in Chi‐ what extent could Beijing infuence Kim Il-sung na's "historical" and "human consciousness" (pp. before China's entry into the confict? Not much, 9, 261), Zhang follows the intellectual path pio‐ says Zhang; Beijing's warning about a U.S. landing neered by Akira Iriye. Yet, unlike Iriye's interpre‐ at Inchon was ignored by Kim, and this foreshad‐ tation in Power and Culture that shows a dichoto‐ owed a by-no-means smooth relationship be‐ my between the U.S.-Japanese relationship at the tween the Chinese and North Koreans during the "power and culture" levels, Zhang's work presents war. Zhang also suggests that while CCP leaders a relationship in which Beijing's military culture saw propaganda value in accusing the United led to its power struggle with the United States in States of using bacteriological weapons in Korea, Korea. they were also serious enough about the threat to As described by Zhang, Mao's military roman‐ take concrete preventative measures against such ticism was as much a result of his self-education an event. Finally, in response to the question of in military science, consisting of the Marxist dog‐ whether Beijing's fear of American nuclear power ma on war as class struggle, the Clausewitzian induced the Chinese to make their fnal conces‐ motto on the continuity of war and politics, and sions at Panmunjom, the book notes that in the the wisdom of Chinese military classics, as it was view of the CCP leadership, the chance of Wash‐ a tested system of political-military thought ington's use of tactical nuclear weapons in Korea emerging from the CCP's own revolutionary strug‐ was slim even under the seemingly more aggres‐ gle. Always facing a stronger enemy, either Chiang sive Eisenhower administration. Therefore the Kai-shek or the Japanese, had led Mao during his CPV paid greater attention to preparing a defense career to perfect a "weak army's strategy" (p. 25) against a more likely threat of a US/UN amphibi‐ that sought to use the revolutionary army's supe‐ ous attack. rior "subjective conditions" (high morale, popular The study's intended contribution, however, support, and fexibility and tenacity in a protract‐ lies in Zhang's interpretive framework, as illus‐ ed struggle) to corrode the enemy's "objective" su‐ trated by the book's title. He notes that the con‐ periority in technology and frepower. Mao's ro‐ cept of Mao's "military romanticism" is borrowed mance with the revolutionary fghting machine, from Stuart Schram, an authority on Mao's however, was balanced by his pragmatic prescrip‐ thought and career (p. 11). Students of modern tion for peculiar tactics aimed at maximally re‐ China may also be familiar with Maurice Meis‐ ducing the enemy's military efectiveness with ner's treatment of Mao's subjective, or "volun‐ minimum cost. Such a combination had enabled tarist," revolutionary style in his popular text the CCP to survive its most difcult times and had

2 H-Net Reviews helped it eventually to turn the tables on the in conducting military diplomacy with its North . Beijing assumed that that the strate‐ Korean ally. Above all, the Korean War was the gy would work equally well in Korea. "very frst instance of a limited war in the nuclear Although he does not reject the view held by era," (p. 256) a situation which tended to invali‐ some historians that China's entry into the Korean date the principal assumptions of the Maoist strat‐ War was provoked by the crossing of the 38th par‐ egy. The CPV's "subjective" conditions continued allel by U.S. troops (p. 85), Zhang contends that to work to a certain degree: facing the enemy's su‐ Beijing's decision to intervene in the confict, as perior frepower and assisted only inadequately well as its strategies during the war, had much to by Moscow, the CPV had no choice but to compen‐ do with CCP leaders' confdence in their own mili‐ sate for its own weakness in technology with in‐ tary prowess. As both creators and captives of the tensifed political works among its troops. Thus, Maoist military dogma which was centered on hu‐ this "highly politicized and mobilized army" (p. man factors, CCP leaders and generals chose to ig‐ 214) at times fought with bare fsts or launched a nore the discrepancy between China's military sneak attack during Korea's severe winter with power and that of the United States, willingly con‐ the troops wearing no boots. Yet, as a whole, the fronting their number-one enemy in Korea. The Korean War proved that Maoist military romanti‐ CPV's initial success in Korea, which Zhang sug‐ cism was obsolete as a useful strategic system in gests was due to "sheer good luck," (p. 119) left modern warfare. Unfortunately, according to leaders in Beijing "intoxicated." They consequent‐ Zhang, this lesson was not immediately learned ly made another irrational decision in early De‐ by the CCP leadership. Instead, after the armistice, cember 1950 to push the CPV across the 38th par‐ Beijing celebrated its victory in the Korean con‐ allel. In its forth and ffth ofensives,however,the fict. In the years to come, Mao's military romanti‐ CPV's luck ran out and it was forced to adopt a de‐ cism would continue to have an inebriating efect fensive posture by the spring of 1951. Mao now on small and weak states and to entail "grave had to give up his pursuit of a quick victory, al‐ risks to global security" (p. 261). Zhang identifes though he continued to uphold his military philos‐ the Vietnam War as such a case, and his most re‐ ophy and remained willing to prolong the war in cent example is Saddam Hussein's performance in order to achieve some unrealistic objectives in the the Gulf War. armistice negotiations. Zhang's study is a solid achievement. Howev‐ As is made clear in the book, "military roman‐ er, certain questions may be raised for the pur‐ ticism" explains not only Beijing's intervention, pose of discussion. First, the importance of mili‐ but also the CPV's awkwardness in Korea. CCP tary romanticism vis-a-vis other factors in Bei‐ leaders were repeatedly surprised in the war be‐ jing's decision making needs further clarifcation. cause, according to Zhang, it was unlike anything A fear to lose can prevent one from fghting, but a previously experienced by the CCP's armed forces. confdence in winning does not necessarily The CPV's mobility and numerical advantage prompt one to fght. Zhang argues that Mao's "op‐ tended to disappear in dealing with the U.S./U.N. timistic willingness" was "no less" a factor than a forces' high technology and superior frepower. It security concern in inducing Beijing's decision to also found itself fghting an unfamiliar positional intervene (p. 85). In an array of reasons for Chi‐ warfare for the better part of the war. Fighting in na's action, exactly how important was "military a foreign country, the CPV also had to cope with romanticism?" China's intervention in the Korean new problems of logistics and public relations War was necessarily motivated by more complex with Korean residents, and it had an extra burden reasons than an "I can win" mentality. As China's frst military intervention abroad in its post-treaty

3 H-Net Reviews century era, Beijing's act of war in Korea needs to A related question concerns the book's thesis be understood in a larger historical and political of a "people's war against the U.S./U.N. high tech‐ context. China's search for restoration of its "cen‐ nology war" (p. 214). The thesis would perfectly trality" in Asia had continued for a century, and suit the Vietnam War, but its application to the Korea's geo-strategic and political importance to Chinese-American confict in Korea seems to indi‐ China had remained the same since the Qing Dy‐ cate a rare oversight on Zhang's part. The prob‐ nasty. It is interesting to note that the CCP's view lem is the defnition of "people's war." In the set‐ of Korea in the 1950s was not diferent from that ting of twentieth-century Asia, such a war indeed of Kuomintang during World War II. Neither involved the practitioner's military weakness ver‐ wanted Korea to be controlled by a big, hostile sus its enemy's military superiority. But there is a power; for the KMT the Soviet Union, and for the more important social-political dimension. The CCP the United States. While the KMT's wartime CCP has opted for the "fsh and ocean" metaphor anti-Sovietism in Korea received no sympathy in describing the relationship between its armed from the United States, the CCP's anti-American‐ force and Chinese society. Ironically, in the Kore‐ ism was encouraged and assisted by Moscow. an War the CCP leadership itself took the fsh out Zhang does mention historical, political, and geo- of the ocean once it despatched Chinese troops to strategic considerations in Beijing's policy mak‐ Korea as "volunteers." The low-tech quality of the ing, but his discussion of these factors pales be‐ CPV troops was not "the essence of China's peo‐ side the book's omnipresent theme of military ro‐ ple's war" (p. 215) as Zhang contends; actually, in manticism. Korea the CPV lacked the sine qua non for a peo‐ There is also the meaning of "military roman‐ ple's war: a favorable social environment that can ticism." There are two well-known sayings in Chi‐ empower the "people's army" but strangle the nese military classics--"an army pufed up with "people's enemy." A people's war in Korea could pride is bound to lose" (jiaobingbibai) and "an only be fought by the Koreans themselves. Despite army burning with indignation is bound to win" Mao's rhetoric, the CPV, as a foreign army in Ko‐ (aibingbi_sheng). Since both are about the "subjec‐ rea, was fghting a conventional war. In a few tive" quality of an army, they are relevant to mili‐ places Zhang mentions that the CPV headquarters tary romanticism. Yet obviously they illustrate instructed its troops to carry out guerilla warfare two very diferent conditions. As Zhang correctly behind the enemy lines. This would be an inter‐ points out, the Maoist strategy begins with a fun‐ esting topic for Zhang to explore further, as the damental self-consciousness of weakness. The result might just show the CPV's inability to do so. strategy's optimism mainly refects a philosophi‐ As Zhang indicates, the CPV did not have an easy cal attitude about the eventual result of a war and relationship even with the Korean population un‐ should not be confused with unrealistic and over‐ der Kim Il-sung's control. It can argued, therefore, confdent decisions on strategy. In Zhang's discus‐ that Beijing's assumption that the CPV would be sion of Beijing's decisions at diferent junctures of able to fght in Korea as the Eighth Route Army or the war, the distinction between "jiao bing" and the PLA had fought in China was a far more seri‐ "ai bing" tends to blur. The analysis of Beijing's ous misconception than its equation of the U.S. strategies may go a step further by separating Army with the Kuomintang or the Japanese those decisions based on the premise of the origi‐ armies. In other words, according to the "people's nal Maoist strategy from those that indicated Bei‐ war" logic, the real challenge to the CPV and jing's own violation of the fundamentals of that Maoist military romanticism in the Korean War strategy. was the land and people of Korea, not America's high technology.

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To treat China's war in Korea as what it was, "chose to act aggressively" (p. 9) in Korea, what the PLA's frst conventional military mission led the CCP to choose these images over others, abroad, can only assist Zhang's purpose of show‐ such as China's "centrality" in Asia, China as a ing the inadequacy of the Maoist strategy. This ap‐ state of "poverty and blankness," and the "cryptic" proach would allow the author to take a more de‐ Russians? Is the "culture" in the book a "commu‐ tached stance from CCP leaders' own perceptions nist," "nationalist," or "Chinese" culture? Zhang's wrapped in ideology and to examine the transi‐ discussion of the culture of the Chinese peasantry tion of the Chinese state in the early 1950s. After also needs elaboration. To attribute the success of all, the CPV operation was the PRC's own frst "po‐ the CCP's political work with the CPV troops main‐ lice action" in Asia. How indicative was the action ly to peasant soldiers' illiteracy (p. 259) seems to of Beijing's self-image and its prescription for Chi‐ imply that the Communists' revolution in China na's international environment? What were the had been largely a Machiavellian feat. The argu‐ political implications of the CPV operation to the ment based on peasants' illiteracy also cannot ex‐ Chinese-Soviet and the Chinese-Korean relation‐ plain why during the Korean War the PLA ships? The CCP leadership's own statement about launched its frst massive campaign of literate ed‐ its "internationalism" (pp. 248-49) certainly does ucation within its units. not reveal the nucleus of Beijing's intention in A bilateral (or multilateral) and comparative these regards. These questions may not be central approach is always efective for international to Zhang's investigation, but a fuller explanation studies. It may even be requisite for the cultural of the international political context may help the mode of international studies. After using such an reader to have a better grasp of Beijing's policy approach to good efect in his frst book Deter‐ making. For instance, Zhang disagrees with Chen rence and Strategic Culture (1992), however, Jian's "China's changing war aims thesis" (pp. 304, Zhang, surprisingly, chooses to focus only on the n4) and contends that Mao consistently pursued Chinese side in this study. Other actors of the Ko‐ the restoration of the 38th parallel. This seems to rean War are not given adequate attention. As a imply that politically Beijing was better prepared study of international conficts, the book does not than Washington for the limited nature of the explain why the United States was a "perceived," confict. Yet did Beijing alone decide its war aims? but not a real, enemy of the PRC; why Beijing's de‐ How important were Kim and Stalin in Beijing's cision to cross the 38th parallel was irrational; policy making? and why Beijing should alone assume responsibil‐ Zhang's exploration of the cultural dimension ity for prolonging the war after the talks for of the Korean War is a much needed addition to armistice began. When absorbing Zhang's argu‐ the literature, yet in this area the reader is also ment that the CCP's military culture, or "images," left seeking more. A clear defnition of Chinese dictated Beijing's policies, the reader may also culture by the 1950s would beneft the reader. The want to know to what extent Beijing's perceptions three "images" that Zhang fnds in the CCP policy distorted the "reality" about its opponents. Except making have quite diferent historical ramifca‐ for a brief summary of the American side in the tions. The "national liberation" image could be conclusion, the book does not treat the reader to a shared by all twentieth-century Chinese national‐ cultural engagement between the two sides in‐ ists, the "adversarial" image was mainly held by volved in the war. Therefore, when Zhang quotes the CCP after World War II (the KMT had a similar Jonathan Pollack on policy making as a process image of the Soviet Union), and the "moral superi‐ "rarely so rational or unambiguous," (p. 9) it is un‐ ority" image was a legacy of China's Confucian clear whether "rationality" in the book is used in past. If these cultural ingredients led Beijing to an intra-cultural or an inter-cultural sense. There

5 H-Net Reviews are cases in history, such as Japan's attack on was strong enough to persuade Mao to send a Pearl Harbor or Hanoi's refusal to bend to a message to Stalin on October 2, 1950 outlining the "breaking point" under U.S strategic bombing, in reasons why China would not be able to inter‐ which the application of "irrationality" would vene. Issues like this have to wait for clarifcation only lead us to the refuge of cultural ignorance. based on multiarchival research. Zhang's book Zhang's tilt to "irrationality" in his interpretation presents the Chinese perspective, but sometimes of Beijing's policy making therefore tends to com‐ verifcation from non-Chinese sources may be promise his goal in explicating the CCP's military needed. culture. These issues aside, Shu Guang Zhang's new Finally, a note on the source materials of the book further proves his reputation as one of the book. In the book Zhang shows how a careful and vanguard scholars in the study of the Chinese diligent mining of Chinese sources can yield divi‐ Communist Party's international behavior, and dends, though there is no strike at a mother lode. readers can expect to hear more from him. The Zhang could also have been more discriminating book is most valuable as it stands, and would ben‐ about using information from Chinese "literary eft both specialists and general readers. Its great‐ histories," such as works by Ye Yumeng. Readers est strength is its detailed and comprehensive of this list familiar with archival research may coverage of China's military activities which al‐ feel less than fully satisfed with what the Chinese lows readers to draw their own conclusions. Ro‐ materials can ofer. To know how a decision was manticization of war is certainly dangerous, made, we want to see the entire chain of docu‐ whether undertaken by a strong or weak state, ments in the policy making process. Today this is and for whatever reason. Yet wars have been still "objectively" impossible in the study of Chi‐ fought for complex reasons, and "subjective" and nese policy making. Scholars have to use whatev‐ "objective" conditions have shaped wars' courses er information the government in Beijing is will‐ and outcomes in no uniform pattern. America's ing to publish. The published documents are usu‐ superior technology in the Gulf War did not pro‐ ally fnal decisions or terse instructions that may duce a clear victory for U.S. foreign policy, while help illustrate the current party line on history. the subjectively motivated Islamic soldiers of Reminiscences and scholarly writings in China Chechnya seem to have succeeded in eradicating still tend to follow the prevailing standard of "po‐ the infuence of the stronger Russia from their litical correctness" in China. As for the Korean land. War, one such example is the question of whether Copyright (c) 1997 by H-NET, all rights re‐ or not was among the initial opponent served. This review may be copied for non-proft to Mao's intention to send troops to Korea. In Chi‐ educational use if proper credit is given the au‐ nese publications Zhou, the beloved premier, has thor and the list. For other permission, contact h- been portrayed as Mao's constant supporter, [email protected] while and Gao Geng have been singled out as Mao's opponents because they are dis‐ graced ofcials in the ofcial CCP history. Yet ac‐ cording to new documents from the Russian Pres‐ idential Archives (translated and discussed by Alexandre Y. Mansourov in the Winter 1995/1996 issue of the Cold War International History Project Bulletin) not only did Zhou join Lin in cau‐ tioning Mao, but the initial opposition in the party

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Citation: Xiaoyuan Liu. Review of Zhang, Shu Guang. Mao's Military Romanticism: China and the Korean War, 1950-1953. H-Diplo, H-Net Reviews. June, 1997.

URL: https://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=1027

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