The Efficacy of Election Boycotts As an Opposition Tool in Hybrid Regimes

TO RUN OR NOT TO RUN: THE EFFICACY OF ELECTION BOYCOTTS AS AN OPPOSITION TOOL IN HYBRID REGIMES

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Authors Relich, Alexander

Citation Relich, Alexander. (2020). TO RUN OR NOT TO RUN: THE EFFICACY OF ELECTION BOYCOTTS AS AN OPPOSITION TOOL IN HYBRID REGIMES (Bachelor's thesis, University of Arizona, Tucson, USA).

Publisher The University of Arizona.

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TO RUN OR NOT TO RUN:

THE EFFICACY OF ELECTION BOYCOTTS AS AN OPPOSITION TOOL IN HYBRID

REGIMES

ALEXANDER JAMES RELICH

______

A Thesis Submitted to The Honors College

In Partial Fulfillment of the Bachelors degree With Honors in

Political Science

THE UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA

M A Y 2 0 2 0

Approved by:

______

Dr. Jessica Braithwaite Department of Political Science

0 1

Abstract

This paper examines the effectiveness of election boycotting as a strategy for pro-democracy factions that oppose a hybrid authoritarian regime. Part 1 provides context for the current political crisis in the case study country. Part 2 provides analysis of the efficacy of election boycotts and how their usage, coupled with regime tactics, weakens democratic opposition. This evaluation is made via a case study of election boycotts conducted by pro-democratic factions in Venezuela in 2005 and 2018. The case study examines the political situations surrounding each boycott, contextualizing the relative political strength of both regime and non-regime parties, as well as the wider economic and political context of each election. From each scenario, judgments are then made regarding the relative political power of the regime and the pro-democracy factions after there was an election boycott. The analysis shows that after each election boycott by pro-democracy factions, regime strength was increased, relative to oppositional groups that were left in a far weaker position. This finding disputes the widely accepted argument that election boycotts harm the legitimacy of hybrid authoritarian regime types, thus weakening their hold on power. Finally, Part 3 explores possible future paths forward for the future of the Venezuelan state and people.

Introduction

When protests against the rule of Nicholas Maduro began in 2013, the world watched with anticipation, expecting the overthrow of his regime. The successor to the charismatic Hugo

Chavez, who died of cancer in 2013, Maduro lacked much of the latter’s skill in leadership and coupled with declining economic conditions seemed to be leading his regime towards destruction. Yet, the expected overthrow of the socialist regime did not occur.

Since 2014 and the collapse of worldwide oil prices, only one word has seemed appropriate to apply to the South American nation of 33 million people: crisis. Unable to meet its liabilities, the government of Venezuela printed money to avoid insolvency1. Instead, it created a catastrophe of enormous proportions. Inflation this year is expected to hit 10,000,000 percent2.

Already 5 million people have fled, with another million expected to flee before the year is out3.

Clean water is rapidly disappearing4, along with power5. Everyday goods disappeared from the shelves years ago.

Opponents of the regime have been waiting decades for a return to full democracy. Using boycotts, protests, and demonstrations of solidarity, they have tried to force the government to roll back electoral reforms that had given the ruling party a monopoly on power since 2004. But while cracks appeared in the facade of Maduro’s grip on power, all the prognostications of his fall seem to have been overly optimistic. Many years after the first protests took place, the government of Maduro still stands strong, and the opposition remains weak and divided. Pundits

1 “Instability in Venezuela | Global Conflict Tracker.” Council on Foreign Relations, Council on Foreign Relations, 10 Dec. 2019. 2 Council on Foreign Relations, 2019. 3 Council on Foreign Relations, 2019. 4 Kurmanaev, Anatoly, and Isayen Herrera. “Venezuela's Water System Is Collapsing.” The New York Times, The New York Times, 19 Oct. 2019. 5 Council on Foreign Relations, 2019. 2

3 have wondered aloud how this could ever be possible and are confused as to why any portion of the population would continue to support Maduro’s regime.

Yet when we analyze the crisis with the more objective tools of political science, we can see how the regime’s unique origins and careful choices when selecting which levers of power to control have given the heirs of Chavez’s revolution a powerful role in the country that may take many more years to overcome. Years of delegitimizing opposition groups, controlling media, working local politics, and eroding constitutional norms are all things that cannot be solved overnight, and may require decades more before Venezuelan democracy can thrive again. As we will see, the current crisis is inextricably linked to the rule of Hugo Chavez, and the rise of the

Fifth Republic Movement. Chavez’s policies, both in terms of economic redistribution, and political repression, changed the structure of Venezuelan society.

The first section of this paper lays out a history of the rise of the Fifth Republic

Movement and Partido Socialista Unidos Venezuela (PSUV), explaining how the actions taken by Chavez turned Venezuela from a democratic state into a competitive authoritarian state.

Commentary will explain how these actions created a system that would be resistant to changes in power, even under negative economic conditions that would shift the balance of power in a democratic country. The second section will explore the role of the Venezuelan opposition to the

Bolivarian Revolution, and how their failure to adapt to a hybrid regime environment has led to their repeated failures. Special emphasis will be placed on the oppositions’ repeated use of the tactic of election boycotts, and why that tactic has proven ineffective, only strengthening the

PSUV’s grip on power as the country slides further into economic chaos. The final section of the paper will examine the potential future outcomes of the crisis.

Part One: The Road to Ruin, 1990-2013

The End of Democracy: The 1990’s

When the Venezuelan crisis first came to the attention of western media, many were shocked. Afterall, Venezuela had been a bastion of democracy in an increasingly turbulent South

America during the preceding decades.6 The country had enjoyed years of economic prosperity, at one point being considered the 4th richest country in the world.7 Venezuela was also blessed with abundant natural resources, including the largest proven oil reserves of any country on the planet.8 How could it be that this wealthy nation was now a center of human suffering, its streets overrun with the starving and jobless?

Venezuela had been a democratic success story since 1958, when the last military government ended and civilian control was restored.9 The government that was established

(known later as the Puntofijista for the location where the major political parties reached their first compromise) was a triumph in a region overrun with petty despots and civil wars.10 And while its establishment had been no easy feat, the compromises that allowed the establishment of the Puntofijista signaled a coming together of moderates determined to avoid both military control as well as extremists from either right or left.11 For decades, predictable elections shared power between the two major parties, Accion Democratica (“AD”, a Social Democratic party) and the Comité de Organización Política Electoral Independiente (“COPEI”, a Christian

6Margolis, Jason. “Venezuela Was Once the Richest, Most Stable, Democracy in Latin America. What Happened?” Public Radio International, 7 Feb. 2019. 7Desjardins, Jeff. “Venezuela Was Once Twelve Times Richer than China. What Happened?” World Economic Forum, 12 Sept. 2017. 8Desjardins, World Economic Forum, 2017. 9Levine, Daniel H. “The Decline and Fall of Democracy in Venezuela: Ten Theses.” Bulletin of Latin American Research, vol. 21, no. 2, 2002, pp. 248–269., doi:10.1111/1470-9856.00042, 248. 10Levine, Ten Theses, 2019, 248. 11Levine, Ten Theses, 2019, 249. 4

Democratic Party).12 But this bedrock of democracy eventually gave way to a hybrid authoritarian regime, which allowed the nation to spiral out of control economically.

To understand the origins of the 2013 crisis, it is necessary to look back to the early

1990’s. During this time, Venezuela was also plagued by economic problems, though not nearly as severely as the ones it suffers from today.13 Still, as in any democracy, voters were infuriated by the mismanagement of the economy, and demanded reforms to improve their situation.

Economic concerns compounded existing dissatisfaction with the perception of corruption in the democratic government.14

The Venezuelan economy had been weakened by broader trends sweeping the entirety of

Latin America during the late 1980’s and early 1990’s. The end of the Cold War and increasing

U.S. and international support for neoliberal policies initiated a wave of economic reforms across the region, upending the prior statist economic model.15 Economic reforms inevitability push for a change in the political status quo, and Latin America was no exception. In most nations around the region this meant dictatorships being overthrown. But in Venezuela, it was the democratic regime that was shaken to its foundations.16

Since the return of civilian control in 1958, the Venezuelan government had pursued a policy of Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI), in line with the state centered economic model broadly accepted throughout South America beginning in the early 1950’s.17 But as many

12Encarnación, Omar G. “Venezuela's ‘Civil Society Coup.’” World Policy Journal, vol. 19, no. 2, 2002, pp. 38– 48.(39) 13Corrales, Javier. “Venezuela in the 1980s, the 1990s and Beyond.” ReVista: Harvard Review of Latin America, Harvard University, 1999, revista.drclas.harvard.edu/book/venezuela-1980s-1990s-and-beyond. 14Levine, Daniel H., and Brian F. Crisp. “The Character, Crisis, and Possible Future of Democracy.” World Affairs, vol. 161, no. 3, 1999, pp. 123–165. (124). 15Mccoy, Jennifer L., and William C. Smith. “Democratic Disequilibrium in Venezuela.” Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, vol. 37, no. 2, 1995, pp. 113–180.(114). 16McCoy and Smith, Democratic Disequilibrium, 1995, 114. 17McCoy and Smith, Democratic Disequilibrium, 1995, 119. 5

6 nations began to discover, debt financing has severe long-term limitations as a national industrialization policy. International organizations grew increasingly wary of loaning money to nations pursuing ISI over that period.18 Venezuela had also relied on extensive public services funded by oil rents, which proved to be another systematic weakness in their economy.19 These policies allowed the government to own oil, aluminum, and steel production facilities, and employ up to 20% of the country’s workforce.20

Venezuela's subsidized state-owned industrial sectors’ dependence on oil revenue proved to be its undoing. Revenues soared during the 1970’s oil crisis when prices rose dramatically.

This funded a subsequent rise in exorbitantly outsized public expenditures, far beyond the proportionate rise in oil income.21 And once the spending began, it became politically impossible to reduce expenditures when oil prices began to decline.22 Rather than adjust budget priorities,

Venezuelan leaders instead nationalized more industries, including the steel mills and iron ore mines to increase revenues.23 When even that failed to make up budget shortfalls, Venezuela turned to foreign capital to fuel its deficit spending. Eventually the state was left with enormous unfunded liabilities and precious little revenue to pay them. The economic collapse that followed was predictable, though no less severe for it.

Two Party System Breakdown

18McCoy and Smith, Democratic Disequilibrium, 1995, 120. 19Karl, Terry Lynn. “Petroleum and Political Pacts: The Transition to Democracy in Venezuela.” Latin American Research Review, vol. 22, no. 1, 1987, pp. 63–94. (67). 20McCoy and Smith, Democratic Disequilibrium, 1995, 123. 21McCoy and Smith, Democratic Disequilibrium, 1995, 129 22McCoy and Smith, Democratic Disequilibrium, 1995, 129 23McCoy and Smith, Democratic Disequilibrium, 1995, 129 6

Venezuela, at one time the most stable two party system in Latin America, was thus suddenly and unexpectedly facing a profound lack of confidence in its entire political system.

Voters blamed both parties for the failures, resulting in more radical factions for the first time since the end of dictatorial governance in the country in 195924. For decades, the corporatist model had allowed for informal consultations between business, labor, and the government, with oil revenues being used to eliminate the need for tough policy choices.25 But as oil prices fell, this became impossible. As the financial difficulties worsened and the government seemed unable to pass meaningful relief, the perception grew that the Puntofijista lacked leadership and direction.26All of these factors encouraged a reduced role for both organized labor and widespread public participation in the democratic process.27

The decline of Venezuelan democracy was consistent with the typical relationship between economic conditions and political legitimacy.28 Governments draw legitimacy from the perception that they are capable of governing effectively.29 In a democracy, voters will vote to change the ruling party when this perception waivers, but by using democratic means, voters retain the ability to continue to select who governs via popular participation.30 But when voters have voted to change the ruling party and economic conditions remain poor, faith in the type of regime that governs the society begins to erode, leaving the society vulnerable to an authoritarian takeover; this is precisely what happened in Venezuela.31

24Norden, Deborah L. “Democracy and Military Control in Venezuela: From Subordination to Insurrection.” Latin American Research Review, vol. 33, no. 2, 1998, pp. 143–165. (143). 25Karl,Petroleum and Political Pacts, 1987, 67. 26McCoy and Smith, Democratic Disequilibrium, 1995, 115. 27McCoy and Smith, Democratic Disequilibrium, 1995, 118. 28McCoy and Smith, Democratic Disequilibrium, 1995, 116. 29McCoy and Smith, Democratic Disequilibrium, 1995, 116. 30McCoy and Smith, Democratic Disequilibrium, 1995, 116. 31McCoy and Smith, Democratic Disequilibrium, 1995, 116. 7

Yet even as the economy declined and oil revenue dried up, many scholars still would have dismissed the possibility of a populist takeover.32 But while the democratic regime was strong on paper, the economic decline revealed deep fissures that had been plastered over by strong economic performance. In reality, the democratic regime was very much a clientelist, corporatist model.33 As in all clientelist models, political leaders at both the local and national levels were expected to look after their constituents' interests in a very direct way: ensuring jobs, money, and opportunity flowed directly into their hands and pocketbooks. When state revenues fell, the ability to provide these handouts to their followers decreased precipitously, and thus support for the two-party system declined proportionally, as there was no ideological or partisan affiliation underpinning citizen’s party affiliation.

Enter Hugo Chavez

It was during these turbulent times that a young Colonel in the Venezuelan army first stepped onto the national political stage in 1992. His name was Hugo Chavez, and together with a group of disaffected soldiers under his command, launched a coup against the central government.34 Chavez’s men failed in their mission, and he was imprisoned. But the coup in

Venezuela stunned South American leaders at the time, because Venezuela had been a model for civilian control of the military since democratization.35 However, once again the economic situation was revealing vulnerabilities inherent in the old regime’s makeup. Venezuela had long

32Roberts, Kenneth M. “Social Correlates of Party System Demise and Populist Resurgence in Venezuela.” Latin American Politics and Society, vol. 45, no. 03, 2003, pp. 35–57. (37). 33Roberts, Social Correlates, 2003, 38. 34Dietz, Henry A, and David J Myers. “From Thaw to Deluge: Party System Collapse in Venezuela and Peru.” Latin American Politics and Society, vol. 49, no. 2, 2007, pp. 59–86. (77). 35Norden, Democracy and Military Control in Venezuela, 1998, 143. 8

9 allowed lower ranking officers like Hugo Chavez broad autonomy and freedom from oversight.36

In times of stability, this bought their loyalty and gave them a sense of freedom. But when the nation was in turmoil, this same autonomy could give the middle ranks the independence they needed to organize and strike at the government they were supposed to defend.37

Chavez and his “Revolutionary Bolivarian Movement 200” failed in 1992, but a military coup against the government was more likely than onlookers would have assumed at the time.38

Indeed, the Venezuelan government’s policy of engaging the armed forces in “Democracy

Building” projects had given the rank and file of the armed forces a distinctly different understanding of what “democracy” meant when compared to the view of civilian leaders.39 The origins of Chavez’s Misiones, and his use of the military as the frontline labor force for his public works projects, can be traced back to these experiments by the democratic regime which imprinted on the minds of its soldiers that true democracy was inextricably linked to providing the masses with their daily needs.40

With the failure of his attempted coup, Chavez was imprisoned for two years. But the country had not heard the last from him. He formed a new political party, untainted (at least legally) by his extra-legal attempt to seize power: The Fifth Republic Movement (FRM).

Mobilizing the support of the nation’s poor and promising “Socialism for the 21st Century”

Chavez won his first election with 57% of the vote41, in what was regarded as a free and fair election42. It was the beginning of the road to ruin for Venezuela.

36Norden, Democracy and Military Control in Venezuela, 1998, 144. 37Norden, Democracy and Military Control in Venezuela, 1998, 144. 38Norden, Democracy and Military Control in Venezuela, 1998, 152. 39Norden, Democracy and Military Control in Venezuela, 1998, 152. 40Norden, Democracy and Military Control in Venezuela, 1998, 152. 41“Freedom in the World 1999: Venezuela.” Freedom House, The Freedom House Foundation, 30 Sept. 1999. 42Freedom House, 1999. 9

The First Years of Chavez’s Reign: Consolidation

Having secured the presidency, Chavez was determined to keep power in his hands alone.

The first item on his agenda was constitutional reform, aimed at increasing the power of the presidency so that he could deal with the ongoing economic crisis unilaterally.43 Venezuela’s

1961 constitution had implemented a system of limited government with checks and balances.

Chavez viewed this as a threat, and from his opening presidential address promised to reform the laws to give himself more authority to deal with the problems the country was facing44. During the early stages of Chavez’s rule, a number of tactics and policies would develop that would become instrumental to cementing his control over Venezuela’s political life.

The first item on Chavez’s “to-do list” was the passage of a new constitution. Chavez ran an aggressive campaign to get permission for a constitutional rewrite, which was approved by an overwhelming majority in a popular referendum, winning 70% of the vote.45 After the referendum passed, voters then had to select delegates to go to the convention and draft a new constitution. Although three-quarters of those who ran to be a delegate were anti-Chavistas,

Chavez manipulated the rules of the election, ensuring that 90% of the delegates at the convention were pro-Chavez.46 It was a sign of things to come.

The 1999 constitution was a triumph for Chavez and granted him wide latitude. It was the first constitutional change pursued since 1961, when the Puntofijista constitution was approved,

43Garcia-Serra, Mario J. “The ‘Enabling Law’: The Demise of the Separation of Powers in Hugo Chavez's Venezuela.” University of Miami Inter-American Law Review, vol. 32, no. 2, 2001, pp. 265–293. (285). 44 Marcano, Cristina, et al. Hugo Chávez: Venezuelan President and Provocateur. Random House, 2007. (127.)

45Nohlen, Dieter. Elections in the Americas: A Data Handbook: South America. Vol. 2, Oxford University Press, 2005. (555). 46Nohlen, Elections in the Americas, 2005, 568-569. 10

11 and was the herald of an erosion of the rule of law throughout the country. The new constitution empowered the President to appoint and dismiss a wide variety of public officials, to interpret laws, issue regulations, declare states of emergency, and even to suspend the Venezuelan legislature.47 The new constitution also disbanded the Senate, weakening the institutional experience of the legislature compared to the executive branch as a whole.48 The constitution also forbade the impeachment of the president, with removal from office only being possible through a national recall election.49 It was the first of many constitutional iterations that would be amended to enhance the power of the presidency in Venezuela. The rule by decree provisions allowed Chavez to pass 49 “Revolutionary Bolivarian Laws” to restructure the economy and jumpstart his reform package without legislative approval.50

Second, Chavez began a program of widespread propaganda intended to shore up support for his rule. The most outlandish (but arguably successful) was starting his own television show,

“Hello President”.51 Starring Hugo Chavez himself, the live broadcasts sought to portray Chavez as a man of the people, who sang folk songs, took calls from constituents, and berated public servants who failed to meet expectations52. It was arguably one of the most bizarre forms of public address made by a leader in the 21st century, but nevertheless an important pillar in

47Hein, William S, and Jefri Ruchti. “1999 Constitution of Venezuela English Translation.” Constitute Project, 2012. (Article V, Title Two, Chapters I and II). 48Encarnación , Omar G. “Venezuela's ‘Civil Society Coup.’” World Policy Journal, vol. 19, no. 2, 2002, pp. 38–48. (41). 49Hein and Ruchti, 1999 Constitution of Venezuela English Translation, 2012, Article V, Title Two, Chapters I and II. 50Encarnación, Venezuela's Civil Society Coup, 2002, 38. 51Nolan, Rachel. “The Realest Reality Show in the World.” The New York Times, The New York Times, 4 May 2012. 52 Jones, Bart. ¡Hugo!: The Hugo Chávez Story From Mud Hut to Perpetual Revolution. Steerforth Press, 2007. (13). 11

12 propping up his regime53. The show allowed Chavez to reach millions every Sunday and gave him a direct way to contact the people without any dilution of his message.

Third, Chavez immediately began a large program of public works intended to stimulate the economy. Drawing from his military background and the work Venezuela’s army had done during the Puntofijista period, Chavez ordered the army to conduct large scale infrastructure improvement projects across the country. These projects included road repair, swamp drainage, and the provision of food and medical care to underserved communities.54 These army deployments would serve as a blueprint to be used later in Chavez’s masterstroke of public relations, Misiones. These were new government agencies set up to deal with regional problems and serve the poor, thus cementing the lower socioeconomic stratus’s loyalty to the regime55.

Chavez also organized supporters into large cadres called “Bolivarian Circles”, and tasked them with delivering healthcare, career training, and the short term loan program his social reforms promised.56 It also usefully kept his supporters (the majority of who were poor) organized into large formations that could be called on to mobilize for elections, donate labor, or even serve as a mob to protect Chavez and target his enemies.57

Early Opposition: the 2002 Coup Attempt and its Ramifications

Not everyone was happy about the new state of affairs in Venezuela. After the constitutional reforms, many assumed that Chavez would be satisfied with the new powers he had acquired, and would leave well enough alone.58 But as Chavez began to close opposition

53Jone,Hugo!, 2007, 13. 54Gott, Richard. Hugo Chávez and the Bolivarian Revolution. Verso, 2011.(178–179). 55Coker, Trudie. “Dimensions of Democracy in Contemporary Venezuela .” Social Justice, vol. 40, no. 4, ser. 134, 2014, pp. 88–105. 134. (99.) 56Encarnación, Venezuela's Civil Society Coup, 2002, 41. 57Encarnación, Venezuela's Civil Society Coup, 2002, 41. 58Encarnación, Venezuela's Civil Society Coup, 2002, 42. 12

13 media outlets and moved to curtail the independence of the judiciary59, many of Venezuela’s elites became increasingly concerned, and mobilized their resources to take action against

Chavez and the PSUV.60

Chavez had benefited greatly from the collapse of the two-party system in Venezuela, which allowed him a sweeping victory in 1999. His new regime worked hard to overcome the last strongholds of the old political parties, even going so far as to form national labor organizations to stamp out COPEI trade unions.61 But the collapse of the AD/COPEI party system and the norms of governance proved to be a double edged sword. The radicalization of

Venezuelan politics removed the option for the traditional expression of discontent (a routine election to swap one party for another, predictable democratic alternative) that Venezuelans had relied on for 40 years. Chavez’s new, no-holds-barred approach heightened the stakes for elites who increasingly felt directly threatened by his socialist policies. Eventually media and business leaders, coupled with the Catholic Church, began exerting their influence against the government, mobilizing large protests throughout the country beginning in 2001.62

Although Chavez had support amongst the poor, his popularity had never been strong among the wealthy and middle class.63 The wealthy felt especially threatened by Chavez’s policies of expanding state intervention in the economy, which threatened to drive them out of politics via impoverishment. 64 Despite his promises, the economy remained moribund throughout his first term, which fueled discontent with his heavy-handed regime. The

59Urribarri, Raul A. Sanchez. “Courts between Democracy and Hybrid Authoritarianism: Evidence from the Venezuelan Supreme Court.” Law & Social Inquiry, vol. 36, no. 04, 2011, pp. 854–884. (865). 60Encarnación, Venezuela's Civil Society Coup, 2002, 42. 61Garcia-Serra, The Enabling Law, 2001, 288. 62Encarnación, Venezuela's Civil Society Coup, 2002, 42. 63 Salojarvi, Virpi. “Media in the Core of Political Conflict.” University of Helsinki, University of Helsinki, 2016, pp. 1–234. (37). 64 Garcia-Serra, The Enabling Law, 2001, 285. 13

Venezuelan standard of living continued to drop as the economy contracted 10% in 2001, furthering the protests against Chavez’s rule.65 When the President sought to replace the board of the PDVSA (the state oil company) with political allies, business and labor united in opposition of the move, and a general strike was called on April 9th, 2002.

From there, events moved remarkably quickly against Hugo Chavez’s regime. After pro-

Chavez troops opened fire on a peaceful protest, waves of violence swept through the country, killing hundreds.66 This prompted the Army to side against Chavez in favor of Pedro Carmona

(an opposition leader) who ordered Chavez be arrested for the deaths of the protestors.67

Carmona’s forces (who some assert had planned the events long ahead of time, with support from the American Government68) rapidly assumed control of the capitol, Caracas.

Carmona proved to be not as committed to restoring Venezuela’s democracy as he claimed. Instead of working with the broad coalition of labor and business groups that had backed his rise, he instead turned to some of Venezuela’s most conservative factions.69 A repeal of the 1999 constitution (which had found widespread popular support among the Venezuelan people, passing with almost 70% in favor during the referendum) was summarily abolished, as was the National Assembly, the Supreme Court, and the 49 Revolutionary Laws passed during the first Rule By Decree Period.70 However, all this change was too much, too quickly. The military factions resented the elimination of the National Assembly and the sidelining of trade union support and began withdrawing their support from Carmona’s interim government. With

65Encarnación, Venezuela's Civil Society Coup, 2002, 42. 66Encarnación, Venezuela's Civil Society Coup, 2002, 43. 67Encarnación, Venezuela's Civil Society Coup, 2002, 43. 68 Encarnación, Venezuela's Civil Society Coup, 2002, 43. 69Encarnación, Venezuela's Civil Society Coup, 2002, 44. 70Encarnación, Venezuela's Civil Society Coup, 2002, 43. 14

15 the collapse of army support, the Carmona government was disbanded after ruling the country for just 48 hours.71

The 2002 coup would turn out to be a watershed moment in Venezuelan politics. It would prove to be the last time the military would rise up against the Venezuelan government and marked the beginning of serious efforts by Chavez and his PSUV successors to integrate the armed forces into their political program for Venezuela. Chavez would later take decisive steps to ensure that the Army, from the rank and file on through to the general staff, would support his regime no matter what.

The 2002 coup also irreversibly tarnished the reputation of Venezuela's business community, its conservative interests, the church, and many of the leaders of the old Puntofijista order. As we shall see later in this paper, the PSUV has skillfully used the 2002 coup to delegitimize all right wing opposition towards the Bolivarian movement. This proved to be a decisive factor when examining the success of the Chavistas in their ability to cling to power even under terrible economic conditions. Their sole ideological opponents ruined their reputations so thoroughly and lost so much legitimacy by striking outside the established legal order, that their chances of being considered a legitimate political alternative was permanently damaged.

Indeed, opposition groups traditionally do best when they stay within the bounds of democratic norms when resisting autocratic behavior.72 This is because the transition from a democratic regime into a competitive authoritarian regime is a slow process73, which gives regime opponents time to respond to the weakening of the democratic process if they act

71Encarnación, Venezuela's Civil Society Coup, 2002, 44. 72Gamboa, Laura. “Opposition at the Margins: Strategies against the Erosion of Democracy in Colombia and Venezuela.” Comparative Politics, vol. 49, no. 4, July 2017, pp. 457–477. (457). 73Gamboa, Opposition at the Margins, 2017, 460. 15

16 effectively.74 The strongest chances of Venezuelans to resist the erosion of their democracy was first via the legislature75, and failing that to turn to the courts, other parties, and civil society actors to exert pressure within the existing constitutional framework (even if that framework is eroding or becoming corrupted by autocrats)76. Chavez skillfully neutralized each one of these potential opponents in turn, but the task was made exponentially easier by the actions of the 2002 coup plotters.

Conquering the Courts

The Venezuelan judiciary had a well-established reputation as being a fair and impartial arbiter of the nation’s most pressing legal and political questions. But impartiality could stand in the way of forming a “popular democracy”77, and so Chavez set out to dismantle the court’s independence and bind the judiciary firmly to the PSUV movement. Because courts had challenged the legality of many of his early measures, especially the laws he had passed under the first Rule By Decree Period, Chavez had to undermine the independence of the courts to enact his vision.

Chavez’s approach to dealing with the Venezuelan court system mirrored the approaches taken by other competitive authoritarian regimes. In outright dictatorships, courts are simply abolished or replaced by other political tribunals. The hallmark of courts in competitive authoritarian states is that the existing infrastructure of the court system (including its reputation for impartiality and integrity) is quietly hijacked behind the scenes.78 This saves the autocrat a large legitimacy cost, and enables the courts to continue to fulfill their traditional role as a means

74Gamboa, Opposition at the Margins, 2017, 461 75Gamboa, Opposition at the Margins, 2017, 457. 76Gamboa, Opposition at the Margins, 2017, 457 77Kutiyski, Yordan K., and André Krouwel. “Narrowing the Gap: Explaining the Increasing Competitiveness of the Venezuelan Opposition.” Latin American Politics and Society, vol. 56, no. 4, 2014, pp. 71–97. (72). 78Urribarri, Courts Between Democracy and Hybrid Authoritarian Systems, 2011, 854. 16

17 of social control over the population.79 Court systems may even be encouraged to grow in power, provided their decisions further the aims of ruling elites.80 And beyond controlling courts that deal with day to day matters that can be used to repress the population, control of the high and supreme courts are paramount to ensuring the success of a hybrid regime.81 Higher courts are often equipped with the powers of judicial review and an expansive role in determining the constitutionality of laws. This makes them a high priority target for anyone determined to subvert the existing constitutional order.82

Just as he had benefited from Puntofijista precedent involving the military in public works projects, Chavez was also the beneficiary of a movement to increase the power of the courts that started nearly a decade before his rule began.83 The Venezuelan judiciary had been notably corrupt and inactive in political affairs from the 1960’s through the 1980’s, but as the traditional political order of the country began to break down in the 1990’s the courts were increasingly forced to take an assertive role in running the affairs of state.84 Reforms to strengthen the judiciary, especially by increasing the professionalism of judges were enforced, and the new judicial system increasingly filled the vacuum of power left in the struggling nation.85 However, while the court’s power increased, the perception that it was corrupt did not fade, which weakened the court’s ability to institutionalize its newfound power and prestige.86

As Chavez took control in 1999, he embarked on a two-pronged approach to subduing the court: enhance its formal powers while co-opting its members into explicitly supporting his

79Urribarri, Courts Between Democracy and Hybrid Authoritarian Systems, 2011, 854. 80Urribarri, Courts Between Democracy and Hybrid Authoritarian Systems, 2011, 855. 81Urribarri, Courts Between Democracy and Hybrid Authoritarian Systems, 2011, 855. 82Urribarri, Courts Between Democracy and Hybrid Authoritarian Systems, 2011, 855. 83Urribarri, Courts Between Democracy and Hybrid Authoritarian Systems, 2011, 863. 84Urribarri, Courts Between Democracy and Hybrid Authoritarian Systems, 2011, 863. 85Urribarri, Courts Between Democracy and Hybrid Authoritarian Systems, 2011, 863. 86Urribarri, Courts Between Democracy and Hybrid Authoritarian Systems, 2011, 864. 17

18 movement.87 First was to continue the reformation of the court system. The sub-chambers of the

Supreme Court were revised and centralized so that only the main chamber would have decisions of any political consequence.88 Chavez’s new constitution also granted even more sweeping review powers to the judiciary, allowing for the Supreme Tribunal (as the court was now called) to review and invalidate any law or lower court decision on constitutional grounds.89 This gave the regime a potent weapon to police the judicial system. Rather than having to staff the entire third branch of government with loyalists, Chavez could concentrate power into one narrow board that could invalidate all others. Thus, the appearance of judicial debate and dissent was preserved, while true power was kept in the hands of the Chavistas.

Election Boycott of 2005- Last Stand of the Opposition

Despite his increasingly autocratic tendencies, Chavez allowed a national election in

2005 for the National Assembly of Venezuela, at the time the sole federal legislature. In this way, Chavez helped to legitimize his continued rule over the country, by showing that his

“popular democracy” had won over the hearts and minds of the Venezuelan public. Rule of the people, not merely of force, was Chavez’s stated objective.

This tactic has become a hallmark of competitive authoritarian regimes. Holding elections allows a leader to demonstrate popular support, and maintain a veneer of democratic legitimacy in an otherwise authoritarian state.90 Rulers often come to rely on these elections as currency in international affairs, staving off criticism by showing broad support for their policies or party. 91

87Urribarri, Courts Between Democracy and Hybrid Authoritarian Systems, 2011, 865. 88Urribarri, Courts Between Democracy and Hybrid Authoritarian Systems, 2011, 865. 89Hein and Ruchti, 1999 Constitution of Venezuela English Translation, 2012, Article 336. 90Ekman, Joakim. “Political Participation and Regime Stability: A Framework for Analyzing Hybrid Regimes.” International Political Science Review, vol. 30, no. 1, 2009, pp. 7–31. (9). 91Ekman, Political Participation and Regime Stability, 2009, 10-11. 18

Chavez had used a similar tactic dealing with a recall effort in 2004. In an election that was generally acknowledged to be free and fair, Chavez defeated the recall vote handily, and used it to claim an electoral mandate for his regime moving forward.92 Chavez’s opponents were obviously disheartened, and as the 2005 National Assembly vote neared, the opposition adopted a new strategy of boycotting the election to reduce Chavez’s legitimacy.

Based off the aforementioned theories of competitive authoritarian regimes and how they operate, this boycott should have been a devastating blow to the regime. However, this was not the case, and indeed the boycott only strengthened Chavez’ grip on power.93 Opposition groups had expected to receive as much as a third of the seats in the National Assembly94; hardly a majority, yet nevertheless a sizeable opposition bloc. Opposition parties maintained that they should be competitive in more areas of the country, and petitioned the Organization of American

States to investigate the election procedures.95 When the OAS certified that the voting procedures appeared fair, the five opposition parties withdrew from the election, out of a belief that Chavez had somehow bought off the OAS.96

The result was a landslide victory for Chavez. The Fifth Republic Movement won 60% of the vote and claimed 116 seats. 97 This was an increase in the FRM’s number of seats. The opposition received far less than the third of the chamber that had been predicted, with only 26%

92Kutiyski and Krouwel, Narrowing the Gap, 2014, 72. 93Congressional Research Service, and Mark P Sullivan. “Venezuela: Political Conditions and U.S. Policy .” Venezuela: Political Conditions and U.S. Policy , Congressional Research Service, 2009. 94Reel, Monte. “Chavez Allies Are Poised To Solidify Their Majority.” The Washington Post, WP Company, 5 Dec. 2005. 95Reel, Chavez Allies Are Poised To Solidify Their Majority, 2005. 96CRS and Sullivan, 2009, 8. 97CRS and Sullivan, 2009,7-8. 19

20 of the seats being held by non FRM delegates (many of whom would go on to join the FRM coalition).98

The consequences of the boycott were the opposite of the opposition parties’ intentions.

The opposition received less seats, and by petitioning for outside verification of the vote, actually enhanced the legitimacy of the election process rather than detracting from it. The prestige and legitimacy of the opposition also declined precipitously, as they now stood accused of dropping out of a fair, lawful process simply because they were not favored in the likely result.99

This boycott had far reaching implications. The opposition’s choice to opt out of the process, rather than strengthening their movement, instead obliterated it. The organization of opposition movements collapsed, and they ceased to be a politically coherent alternative to the

Fifth Republic Movement. Venezuela has thus served as an interesting counterpart to the prevailing literature on hybrid regimes, which stress the importance of boycotts as a means of undermining the legitimacy of the hybrid system.100 As we will see, later boycotts (such as the

2017 election to the Constitutional Assembly) also failed to conform to the trend in literature, with opposition groups growing weaker and the party in power only growing stronger.101

From 2005 until 2013, there was no real opposition to the Fifth Republic Movement, or as it was later named the United Socialist Venezuelan’s Party (PVSU). Chavista candidates dominated Venezuela’s politics both locally and nationally, and the country slid closer and closer to resembling a one-party state. 102 Without any real check on his power, Chavez was able to increase the frequency of his Rule By Decree Periods, expand his control of the economic and

98CRS and Sullivan, 2009, 8. 99CRS and Sullivan, 2009, 8. 100Ekman, Political Participation and Regime Stability, 2009, 28. 101Rapoza, Kenneth. “It's A 'Miracle': Venezuela's Socialist Party Dominates Weekend Election.” Forbes, Forbes Magazine, 18 Oct. 2017. 102Ekman, Political Participation and Regime Stability, 2009, 27-28. 20

21 political life of the nation, and distribute oil revenues ever more liberally in an attempt to raise

Venezuelan’s quality of life and assure their loyalty. It was that last, short-sighted measure that began his country’s path towards economic collapse.

2013-2019: The Turning Point

2013 was a turning point in Venezuela's history for two key reasons. The first reason was the death of Hugo Chavez on March 5th, 2013. Chavez had created a massive social movement in Venezuela and had guided the country as its president for more than a decade. His death from cancer shocked the country. The Vice President, Nicholas Maduro, a longtime PSUV member and close aide to the late president, assumed office and committed publicly to furthering

Chavez’s legacy. Maduro narrowly won the special election for the presidency, confirming his status as Chavez’s successor.103

But 2013 was not just a year of leadership changes, it was also a year of economic changes. The Venezuelan economy began to decline again in 2013. Once again, the culprit was exorbitant government spending floated on rising oil prices.104 Chavez’s government had fallen prey to the same trap of easy credit to which the Puntofijista regime had succumbed.

As the price of oil fell, the central government began a policy of printing money to inflate away its debts.105 Chavez’s 1999 constitution rewrite had compromised the independence of the central bank, and the new president, Maduro, would take full advantage.106 The Venezuelan government began printing money at breakneck speed, hoping that inflation would ease the pressure of the public sector debt that now could not be met with oil revenue. But it was too

103Salojarvi, Media in the Core of Political Conflict, 2016, 36. 104Labrador, Roccio Cara. “Venezuela: The Rise and Fall of a Petrostate.” Council on Foreign Relations, Council on Foreign Relations, 24 Jan. 2019. 105Labrador, Venezuela, 2019. 106Salojarvi, Media in the Core of Political Conflict, 2016, 33. 21

22 little, too late. Inflationary debt relief has had mixed results as various governments have implemented it. Some have seen moderate success (Britain, Hungary) while others have seen catastrophic inflation that resulted in a barter economy (Uganda, Germany). Venezuela unfortunately now belongs to the latter category.

As conditions worsened, the printing of money continued. The current inflation rate is now over ten million percent and shows no signs of slowing.107 The oil output of PDVSA had fallen precipitously as company resources have increasingly been diverted outside oil related activities.108 The economic collapse produced a massive refugee crisis as millions of

Venezuelans have fled into neighboring countries to escape famine and destitution.109

As the situation continued to deteriorate, opposition groups began gaining strength. In

2015 the Democratic Unity Roundtable (Mesa de la Unidad Democrática, MUD) won a supermajority in the National Assembly, ending more than a decade and a half of PSUV rule.

But before the MUD could exercise its new powers to reign in Maduro, a new body was formed, the Constituent Assembly, created by Maduro to supersede the old legislature while it worked to draft a new constitution.110 Conveniently, while the Constituent Assembly was debating a new constitution, the President would be granted discretionary power to rule the country during the crisis.111

The MUD protested Maduro’s creation of the new legislative body and boycotted the election for the Constituent Assembly. The PSUV thus dominated the new super-legislature, and

107Council on Foreign Relations, 2019. 108Cañizález, Andrés. “The Collapse of the Venezuelan Oil Industry.” Global Americans, 19 June 2018. 109Sanchez, Valentina. “Venezuela Hyperinflation Hits 10 Million Percent. 'Shock Therapy' May Be Only Chance to Undo the Economic Damage.” CNBC, CNBC, 5 Aug. 2019. 110Cawthorne, Andrew, and Isaac Burrutia. “Venezuela Opposition Boycotts Meeting on Maduro Assembly, Clashes Rage.” Reuters, Thomson Reuters, 8 May 2017. 111Cawthorne and Burrutia, Venezuela Opposition Boycotts Meeting on Maduro Assembly, Clashes Rage, 2017. 22

23 quickly sidelined what power the MUD had acquired at the National Assembly. It seems that opposition groups had learned little since the failure of the 2005 boycott.

When Maduro called for early presidential elections as well, more protests from the

MUD followed. Once again citing concerns of fairness in election procedures, the MUD and their allies boycotted the 2018 presidential election, ensuring a victory for Maduro.112 What should have been a hotly-contested election turned into a comfortable extension of Maduro’s rule.113 Those candidates that did run faced an enormously corrupt process, filled with accusations of voter intimidation and the imprisonment of potential rivals.114

When Maduro received a second term by a comfortable margin, the National Assembly declared that he had violated the Constitution. Juan Guaido, a member of the MUD and President of the National Assembly, declared himself President of Venezuela in January of 2019.115

Guaido called for the military to oust Maduro, but thus far the military has stood by their

President.116

PART 2: THE ROLE OF OPPOSITION GROUPS IN VENEZUELA

Having examined the origins of the Venezuelan crisis and the rise of the PSUV, we will now turn our attention towards examining why, despite the ongoing economic and humanitarian crises, the opposition groups in the country have been ineffective at opposing the Maduro

112Neuman, William, and Nicholas Casey. “Venezuela Election Won by Maduro Amid Widespread Disillusionment.” The New York Times, The New York Times, 21 May 2018. 113Faiola, Anthony. “Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro Wins Reelection amid Charges of Irregularities.” The Washington Post, WP Company, 21 May 2018. 114Sen, Ashish Kumar. “Venezuela's Sham Election.” Atlantic Council, The Atlantic Council, 9 Apr. 2019. 115Reeves, Philip. “In Venezuela, Juan Guaidó's Campaign Faces New Difficulties.” NPR, NPR, 25 Sept. 2019. 116Press, Associated. “Venezuela's Guaido Takes to Streets in Military Uprising.” POLITICO, 30 Apr. 2019. 23

24 government and the PSUV. There are five key reasons listed below, explaining why the pro- democracy movement in Venezuela has failed:

1. Lack of Differentiation- Center left coalitions are too similar in messaging to the

socialist PSUV.

2. The opposition has found no way to overcome political organization restrictions,

and have failed to adapt to increasingly heavy-handed measures by the regime in

general: Since the widespread censorship of the media, the opposition has been unable to

overcome the systemic barriers to participating in a truly competitive manner. By

continuing to pursue democracy solely via the ballot box, the opposition has hamstrung

itself as Venezuela morphs from a hybrid regime into an autocracy.

3. Ineffective, Top-Heavy Organizations with Little Grassroots Support: Few

opposition groups have grown up organically, many are business funded or started by

other prominent figures rather than organizing at the grassroots level. Unlike the PSUV

many cannot mobilize mass support, rendering their electoral position untenable even in

the face of PSUV failures and scandals.

4. Legacy of the 2002 Coup on Venezuelan’s View of Opposition: The attempted

coup delegitimized democratic opposition groups as being power hungry and tools for

elites who opposed the people. Grassroots support has been lacking ever since.

5. Boycotting “Illegitimate” Elections at Critical Junctures has Weakened

Opposition Movements: In both 2005 and 2017, opposition groups have boycotted

elections to prove a point that the elections were corrupt. However, by boycotting the

election, the opposition has forfeited the chance to have any voice or impact made by the

government, even if it was token representation.

Each one of these reasons will be discussed in more depth.

Lack of Differentiation

Differentiation is crucial to success as a political party. Voters need to be able to identify a candidate’s positions and strengths, and research demonstrates that the easiest way to do so is via a party label.117 However, many of the parties that compete against the PSUV are left wing parties. The impact of the 2002 coup on right wing opposition groups has already been discussed at length earlier in this paper, but it is worth reiterating once again that the coup attempt and subsequent popular backlash effectively removed rightwing actors from the political playing field. The result has benefited the PSUV in a crucial way.

Because conservative competition has been eliminated, true ideological alternatives have been unavailable for popular consideration. Without a meaningful, radically different alternative,

Venezuelans lack the ability to choose a substantively different direction for their country. The result of the removal of right wing opposition means the remainder of the groups opposing the

PSUV are left wing groups. This creates difficulties for opposition groups looking to compete in the remaining aspects of democratic life, as well as with opposition groups’ messaging efforts.

The primary concern of opposition groups is a return to democratic governance, and a weakening of the institutional power of the PSUV. Additionally, opposition groups now want economic

117Lowry, William R, and Charles R Shipan. “Party Differentiation in Congress.” Legislative Studies Quarterly, vol. 27, no. 1, Feb. 2002, pp. 33–60. (39).

26 reforms to alleviate the suffering of Venezuelans. Because these movements have not clearly differentiated their positions from the PSUV, they have failed to attract support.

Opposition groups’ messages fall into three broad categories. The first is the demand for the ouster of Maduro and the PSUV, a message that will resonate well with their core supporters but is not inherently persuasive to PSUV voters.118 Second is the demand for “democracy” which the PSUV easily coopts with their overuse of the term “participatory democracy”.119

Finally, opposition groups promise economic reforms to alleviate the economic blight upon the country, which the PSUV has also done.120 The oppositions’ economic platform is primarily based on democratic socialism, which means these groups advocate for much the same style of redistributionist policies implemented by the PSUV only with “accountability to the people”.121

The lack of differentiation in messaging goes to the heart of the problem faced by opposition leaders: when your message is nearly identical to that of your adversary, voters have difficulty in determining the difference between the policies of both groups. And after decades in a controlled media environment, voters are less willing to entertain concepts falling outside this left-leaning consensus- years of propaganda have shifted the electorate far to the left.

Ineffective, Top-Heavy Organizations With Little Grassroots Support:

The long history of corruption that plagued the Puntofijista system has given most

Venezuelans the impression that most political parties are corrupt.122 As a result, the experience

118“Diputada Tamara Adrián Desde AN: ‘En Venezuela Régimen Usurpador Viola Los Derechos Humanos, Leyes y Políticas Públicas.’” Unidad Venezuela, 2019, unidadvenezuela.org/. 119Democratic Unity Roundtable,unidadvenezuela.org, 2019. 120Oficina de La Presidente de la República. “Plan De La Patria 2019-2025: El Futuro Es Hoy.” Plan De La Patria 2019-2025: El Futuro Es Hoy, 2019. 121Democratic Unity Roundtable,unidadvenezuela.org, 2019. 122Salojarvi, Media in the Core of Political Conflict, 2016, 39. 26

27 of being a “grassroots” activist without formal connections to party activity is highly prized and looked on with greater favor by the Venezuelan people.123 However, most opposition groups in

Venezuela, especially those that can trace their roots back to leaders from the democratic period, lack this credibility. This undermines them because in the traditional clientelist system of

Venezuelan politics, a party’s connections to the people are essential to its success. 124

Opposition groups are often tarred by their association with non-grassroots efforts, which the public conflates with funding from the wealthy who want to bring back capitalist oppression.125 The PSUV had been very successful in cementing its dominance amongst grassroots activist by relying on community media and small independent outlets126, rather than the larger corporate media outlets (many of whom were staunchly anti-Chavista before media laws took effect).127 The Venezuelan people are thus given the impression that the PSUV, at this point undisputed hegemon of Venezuelan political life with vast institutional support and funding, is still the barrio underdog of its early years, ever on the brink of being taken down by the country’s corrupt capitalist elite.

Boycotts are an Ineffective Tactic for Confronting a Hybrid Authoritarian Regime.

Much of the prior scholarship on competitive authoritarian regimes has highlighted the importance of a democratic veneer to preserving these types of regimes’ international

123Salojarvi, Media in the Core of Political Conflict, 2016, 39. 124Mainwaring, Scott, and Timothy R. Scully. Christian Democracy in Latin America: Electoral Competition and Regime Conflicts. Stanford University Press, 2003. (283). 125Salojarvi, Media in the Core of Political Conflict, 2016, 161. 126Salojarvi, Media in the Core of Political Conflict, 2016, 161. 127Birkhahn-Rommelfanger, Daniel, et al. “Is Chávez a Sinner or a Saint?” Foreign Policy, no. 153, 2006, pp. 4–11. (4).

28 credibility.128 By avoiding obvious repression, presidents with aspirations of hegemonic control can maintain power without sacrificing prestige.129 The conventional academic wisdom on election boycotting has always been that it deals damage to competitive authoritarian regimes by attacking this legitimacy.130 In turn this precipitates regime change.131

Yet the example of Venezuela flies in the face of this literature. First, Venezuela undercuts the belief that boycotts can slow the erosion of a democratic government into a competitive authoritarian state. Venezuela still had some characteristics of being democratic in

2005, the year opposition groups boycotted the National Assembly elections. The result was a decisive Chavista victory which furthered the authoritarian tendencies of the regime.

Once again, in 2017 and 2018, boycotts were used, this time by the MUD. The MUD boycotted the election to the Constituent Assembly in 2017, and thus Chavistas received an overwhelming supermajority.132 When the most popular candidates of the MUD were barred from running for president in the 2018 election, the MUD response was to boycott once again, rather than fielding any candidate. Once again, Maduro and the PSUV have been the only beneficiaries of the boycotts. Thus, the evidence from Venezuela shows that election boycotts are not a universally effective measure for democratic opposition groups to use when confronting competitive authoritarian regimes.

128Menocal, Alina Rocha, et al. “Hybrid Regimes and the Challenges of Deepening and Sustaining Democracy in Developing Countries.” South African Journal of International Affairs, vol. 15, no. 1, 2008, pp. 29–40. (33). 129Gamboa, Opposition at the Margins, 2017, 459. 130Smith, Ian O. “Election Boycotts and Hybrid Regime Survival.” Comparative Political Studies, vol. 47, no. 5, 2013, pp. 743–765.(761). 131Smith, Election Boycotts and Hybrid Regime Survival, 2013, 761-762. 132McCoy, Jennifer L. “Analysis | Venezuela's Controversial New Constituent Assembly, Explained.” The Washington Post, WP Company, 14 Feb. 2018. 28

Similarly, while the western world has initiated sanctions,133 these economic measures have only hurt ordinary Venezuelans, and will not make regime change any more likely because of the nature of the Venezuelan government.134 Indeed, these sanctions have only enhanced the credibility of Maduro’s claims that Venezuela’s economic troubles are the result of foreign interference by the United States, arguably shoring up his domestic support rather than diminishing it.135

Legacy of the 2002 Coup on Venezuelan’s View of Opposition

The coup of 2002 came close to successfully removing Chavez from power.136 Yet the coup also became an invaluable tool for Chavez and his successors to delegitimize any opposition from the right. Rhetoric against coup plotters, right wing agitators, and foreign backed agents is a hallmark of the PSVU regime, and has only increased as economic conditions in the country have worsened, including accusing capitalism for causing the COVID-19 pandemic.137

As party and state have become increasingly intertwined under PSVU rule, collective memories of the violent 2002 coup attempt have made any opposition to the ruling party opposition to the

Venezuelan state itself, and by extension opposition to the Venezuelan people for which that government claims to stand.

133United States, Congress, Congressional Research Service. “Venezuela: Overview of U.S. Sanctions.” Venezuela: Overview of U.S. Sanctions, Congressional Research Service, 2019. 134Escribà-Folch, Abel, and Joseph Wright. “Dealing with Tyranny: International Sanctions and the Survival of Authoritarian Rulers.” International Studies Quarterly, vol. 54, no. 2, 2010, pp. 335–359. (354-355). 135Rapoza, Kenneth. “Maduro Blames Trump For Venezuela's Great Depression.” Forbes, Forbes Magazine, 15 Feb. 2019. 136 Ed Vulliamy, “Venezuela Coup Linked to Bush Team,” The Guardian (London, U.K.), Apr. 21, 2002. 137 Mario Obiediente and Iraida Vargas, “Crisis civilizatoria capitalista, pandemia y ataques contra Venezuela,” Ciudada CCS (Caracas, Venezuela), Apr. 30, 2020. 29

This was clear when opposition leader Juan Guaido called for a coup to oppose Maduro in 2019. Guaido called for a mass civil uprising as protests continued to rock the Maduro regime, and then called on national guard commanders to abandon their posts and join him in a military

Golpe.

The civilian populace was unmoved by this outburst from Guaido, and the military remained committed to the PSUV. The military’s loyalty can in part be linked to the provisioning of important posts to army generals and the disbursements of payments-in-kind to the armed forces.138 Yet why there was no upsurge in civilian activism officially is a mystery; I would contend the legacy of the 2002 coup is apparent here.

Furthermore, the lack of change since the 2019 Guaido coup attempt has been striking. If anything, as of the time of writing, Guaido is less relevant than ever, head of state in name only.

Maduro’s reign seems secure despite gross economic mismanagement. Guaido took a risk calling for military assistance in the transition for power, and it seems to have backfired terribly. He is now isolated politically, and in many ways sacrificed his legitimacy and credibility with the

Venezuelan people in his pursuit of power.

Boycotting “Illegitimate” Elections at Critical Junctures Has Weakened Opposition

Movements

There has been extensive debate in political science as to whether opposition groups participation in elections strengthens or undermines a competitive authoritarian regime. As previously discussed, there is an argument that participation strengthens the regime, that it grants

138 Staff, “Maduro Rewards Loyal Soldiers with Toilet Paper, Opposition Says,” The World Tribune (Washington D.C., USA), Jul. 26, 2017. 30

31 a democratic veneer to an authoritarian system, guaranteeing international legitimacy and providing a smokescreen for illegal state actions. Participation may grant stronger institutional support than a lack thereof, and a veneer of democratic action may convince some residents that the regime they live under has more support than it actually does among the citizenry.139

When looking at the example of Venezuela, however, we see that this has not been the case. The Venezuelan opposition chose not to participate in crucial elections in 2005 and 2017, boycotting the electoral process entirely. These election boycotts had the state purpose of undermining the regime by exposing its undemocratic nature.140

In the 2005 elections, the Venezuelan opposition gave up its last chance to arrest democratic backsliding in Venezuela. However, the democratic opposition was wary of the

Chavez government interfering in the electoral process, and consequently did not participate in the elections, instead opting for a total boycott of the election. While those participating in the boycott claimed this destroyed the legitimacy of the PSUV landslide that followed, inside

Venezuela it seems that the 2005 boycott fatally undermined voter confidence in democratic groups. For more than a decade, no substantial democratic bloc would emerge from Venezuela, and no serious opposition to the regime would manifest. The 2005 boycott indisputably contributed to the collapse of organized democratic factions as bickering and recriminations over the 2005 debacle drove many existing parties apart. This was furthered by the Chavista narrative that opposition had boycotted out of fear of losing or lack of public support.141

139 Ekman, Political Participation and Regime Stability, 2009, 9. 140 Philip Reeves, “Venezuela Holds Presidential Election but Main Opposition is Boycotting it,” National Public Radio (Washington D.C., USA), May. 19, 2018. 141 Mathew Frankel, “Threaten but Participate: Why Election Boycotts are a Bad Idea,” Brookings Institute, (2010): 10. 31

The 2017 election was a similar story. As economic conditions in the country worsened, opposition to the PSUV grew, merging in a pro-democracy coalition known as Democratic Unity

Roundtable (Mesa de la Unidad Democratica, MUD). While this group had significant public support and managed to win the majority of seats in the national assembly,142 the PSUV soon called for the creation of a constitutional assembly to provide constitutional changes needed to deal with the country’s ongoing economic failures. Rather than compete in elections for the

Constitutional Assembly, the Democratic Unity Roundtable withdrew from the elections. The inevitable result was that the PSUV won nearly every seat in the new chamber, which provided a firm legal foundation that President Maduro has used to sanction his emergency powers. Out of belief that they will not have a majority, democratic forces in Venezuela have repeatedly failed to obtain any power that might advance their goals.

PART 3: THE FUTURE? WHAT’S NEXT FOR VENEZUELA

There are many paths that may unfold in the future for Venezuela, and the future is difficult to predict. However, based on what we know of the unfolding political situation, we can make educated predictions about likely outcomes in the Venezuela Crisis.

The Likelihood of Civil War in Venezuela

Many pundits have dramatized the likelihood of civil war in Venezuela, especially after

Guaido’s call for armed action.143 And there is scholarly work that supports that Venezuela may indeed spiral from civil strife into civil war. Typically, when political processes have broken

142 https://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/07/world/americas/venezuela-elections.html 143 Rob Picheta, Meg Wagner, Veronica Rocha and Joshua Berlinger, “Venezuela’s Uprising,” CNN (Caracas, Venezuela), May. 1, 2019. 32

33 down and opposing parties cannot resolve their differences, armed conflict results, especially when the incentive structure conditions both parties to believe their aims are best achieved by force.144 The risk of conflict is further amplified when dealing with a multiparty authoritarian hybrid state.145

Under a perfunctory examination, all these conflict inducing criteria would seem to apply to Venezuela. The country’s economic situation had been exceedingly dire since the collapse of oil prices in 2014, with provision of medical care and necessities coming to a standstill. This type of economic collapse typically lowers the threshold for conflict,146 while single resource export economies are already more vulnerable to conflict in the first place.147 Furthermore, we have seen widespread civil unrest. The distribution of weapons to civilian supporters by the PSUV can also be seen as lowering the conflict threshold, adding weapons to an already volatile situation.

However, while there have been many factors that increase the likelihood of civil war in

Venezuela, there has been no outbreak of war in the country. Why is this? There are several important factors that have proven important for confounding the outbreak of civil war. One of the most important is the loyalty of the military to the Maduro regimes and the PSUV. Maduro has benefited immensely from Chavez’s program to ideologically indoctrinate the armed forces.

Coupled with shrewd disbursements of key positions to military leaders, and extensive efforts to insulate troops from the commodity shortages plaguing the civilian population, Maduro has

144 Kristian Skrede Gleditsch and Andrea Ruggeri, “Political Opportunity Structures, Democracy, and Civil War,” Peace Research 47, no. 3 (2010): 299. 145 Hanne Fjelde, “Generals, Dictators, and Kings: Authoritarian Regimes and Civil Conflict, 1973—2004,” Conflict Management and Peace Studies 27, no. 3 (2010): 195. 146 Paul Collier, “The Market for Civil War,” Foreign Policy, (2009): 1. 147Macartan Humphreys, “Economics and Violent Conflict,” Unicef/Harvard University, (2003): 4. 33

34 managed to keep the military on his side. As long as the military remains a reliable regime backer, the PSUV will stay in power.

An Internal Golpe?

Another possibility is Maduro’s removal by forces within via PSUV rivals or the army internally, without widespread bloodshed. In many Latin American countries, armies have quietly removed heads of state once their leadership is presumed to be no longer in the national interest. In this way, the military may see itself as a type of guardian (and definer) of what lies in the national best interest.148 The recent example of Evo Morales of Bolivia likely weighs heavily in Nicholas Maduro’s mind. Morales, like Chavez, was an immensely popular socialist, whose party won a dominant position after appealing to overlooked indigenous communities.149 In power for more than a decade, Morales fundamentally shifted Bolivia’s politics to the left, as well as towards increasing authoritarianism. Seeking a third term and revisions to the constitution, Morales pushed too hard, eventually causing his ouster.150

This is far from an uncommon occurrence in Latin America. Yet is this type of scenario possible in Venezuela? Could the military act unilaterally to remove Maduro quietly, empowering one of his party rivals to take over the machinery of government? The answer once again is likely no, for two reasons.

148 Wndy Hunter, “State and Soldier in Latin America: Redefining the Military’s Role in Argentina, Brazil, and Chile,” United States Institute for Peace, (1996): 2. 149Gabriel Hetland, “Many wanted Morales out. But what happened in Bolivia was a military coup,” The Guardian, (2019): 2. 150 Matthew Bristow and Eric Martin, “Bolivian President Evo Morales Resigns After Army Tells Him to Go,” Bloomberg Business Weekly, (2019): 3. 34

The first is that the military has been largely subsumed into the PSUV architecture for governing Venezuela. This has been accomplished by installing generals into key sectors of the economy, including the state oil company PDVSA.151 Additionally, the state has used the military in extensive repression operations against the civilian population. It is highly unlikely that a military strongman could step in and be viewed by the population with any sense of legitimacy.

The second, and perhaps more mundane reason is that there are few alternatives to govern Venezuela that the military might select to replace Maduro. Chavez’s fear of being overthrown led to purges of the upper echelons of Venezuela’s civil and military leadership.152

As a consequence, Maduro has no rivals of any competence in the PSUV leadership. With a conscious culling of the ambitious, the PSUV has disabled its ability to select a new leader and

“throw Maduro under the bus” in an attempt to preserve its legitimacy and control. While a new leader might put a fresh coat of paint on the rusting PSUV, such a leader emerging is unlikely.

American Intervention?

The possibility of an American regime change operation has also been discussed since the economic collapse of 2014. Proponents have argued the United States has a vested interest in solving the Venezuelan’s problems, with justifications ranging from granting humanitarian mercy, restoring regional stability, and even containing the spread of socialism in South

151Alexandra Ulmer, Deisy Buitrago, “Maduro taps major general to lead Venezuela's deteriorating oil industry,” Reuters, (2019): 2. 152 Eduardo Silva, Challenging Neoliberalism in Latin America (London: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 225. 35

America.153 These calls were revived when the Trump administration branded Nicholas Maduro and several prominent members of his regime as narcotraffickers.154

There is little doubt that if committed, the United States would certainly prevail in any conventional conflict with Venezuela. The Venezuelan military is poorly equipped and not especially well trained.155 America could certainly apply hard power pressure to affect a removal of Maduro from office.

However, such armed intervention is also unlikely to occur. First, the United States is too distracted by other pressing problems. As of the time of writing, the COVID-19 outbreak is at the forefront of national policy now, reducing all foreign questions to secondary importance. When looking at the wider scope of American foreign policy, the Trump administration’s long term priority seems to be the containment of China,156 along with an end to the regime change wars in the middle east (now entering their third decade).157 American troops, spread thinly across the globe to counter myriad existing threats, are unlikely to be marshalled to attack a country that presently poses no threat.

This is especially true because of the development of American energy independence.

Although the current economic depression may jeopardize some American oil companies,

153 Doug Bandow, “America Shouldn’t Invade Venezuela,” Cato Institute, (2019): 5. 154 Ryan Lucas, “U.S. Charges Nicolás Maduro And Other Venezuelan Officials With Narcotrafficking,” NPR, (2020): 1. 155 Bandow, Cato, 7. 156 National Security Strategy of the United States, 2017, 25. 157 National Security Strategy of the United States, 2017, 49. 36

37 fracking technology has ensured the United States has a supply of oil,158 negating the need to target oil rich nations to ensure that crude flows to American markets uninterrupted.

The final consideration that would discourage an invasion of Venezuela would be the fiscal cost. A war in Venezuela would inevitably be a drawn out conflict.159While the United

States could annihilate the Venezuelan armed forces, a protracted guerilla campaign would likely result, especially given the vast number of PSUV supporters who have been armed recently.160

Like many of the prominent Ba’athists in Iraq, PSUV leaders might form their own militias and continue the fight against Americans, resulting in a lengthy counter insurgency campaign.161

Similar endeavors in Iraq and Afghanistan have cost the U.S. over 2.5 trillion dollars, and remain unresolved.162 Given the incredible expense of these operations, and the current American debt burden of over 24 trillion dollars, it seems unlikely that a regime change war is a palatable option for U.S. policy makers. Especially as the American government will spend more to ward off an economic depression in the coming months, fiscal concerns will dissuade even the most ardent

Washington hawks from starting yet another conflict.

The Likely Outcome

Given the facts, ceteris paribus the Maduro regime survives. It will survive until the regime reaches a point that it cannot continue to provide for the military forces that keep it intact,

158 Mason Hamilton, “Despite the U.S. Becoming a Net Petroleum Exporter, Most Regions Are Still Net Importers,” U.S. Energy Information Administration, Department of Energy, 2/6/2020, https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=42735. 159 Bandow, Cato, 7. 160 Associated Press, “Venezuela’s Maduro to Provide guns to 400,000 Loyalists Amid Peaking Tensions,” Fox News, (2017): 1. https://www.foxnews.com/world/venezuelas-maduro-to-provide-guns-to-400000-loyalists-amid- peaking-tension 161 Bandow, Cato, 8. 162 Amy Belasco, Congressional Budget Office, The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror Operations Since 9/11, 2017, 15.

38 either in kind or with foreign currency. While a global economic depression, collapse of oil prices, and western sanctions may all help this process, they by no means ensure it. The disheartening reality is that for all the damage the Partido Socialista Unidos de Venezuela has done to their own country, they have systematically destroyed the ideological diversity of their nation’s political life. Their opposition has squandered opportunity after opportunity to take a stand against their encroaching authoritarianism, and they have successfully bought off the military that could have been the last hope to depose them internally. While Maduro’s continued rule may seem baffling to casual observers, this paper has demonstrated that his grip on

Venezuela, dependent on tenuous circumstances as it may be, remains terrifyingly strong.

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