TO RUN OR NOT TO RUN: THE EFFICACY OF ELECTION BOYCOTTS AS AN OPPOSITION TOOL IN HYBRID REGIMES Item Type Electronic Thesis; text Authors Relich, Alexander Citation Relich, Alexander. (2020). TO RUN OR NOT TO RUN: THE EFFICACY OF ELECTION BOYCOTTS AS AN OPPOSITION TOOL IN HYBRID REGIMES (Bachelor's thesis, University of Arizona, Tucson, USA). Publisher The University of Arizona. Rights Copyright © is held by the author. Digital access to this material is made possible by the University Libraries, University of Arizona. Further transmission, reproduction or presentation (such as public display or performance) of protected items is prohibited except with permission of the author. Download date 27/09/2021 17:52:40 Item License http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/ Link to Item http://hdl.handle.net/10150/651392 0 TO RUN OR NOT TO RUN: THE EFFICACY OF ELECTION BOYCOTTS AS AN OPPOSITION TOOL IN HYBRID REGIMES By ALEXANDER JAMES RELICH ____________________ A Thesis Submitted to The Honors College In Partial Fulfillment of the Bachelors degree With Honors in Political Science THE UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA M A Y 2 0 2 0 Approved by: ____________________________ Dr. Jessica Braithwaite Department of Political Science 0 1 Abstract This paper examines the effectiveness of election boycotting as a strategy for pro-democracy factions that oppose a hybrid authoritarian regime. Part 1 provides context for the current political crisis in the case study country. Part 2 provides analysis of the efficacy of election boycotts and how their usage, coupled with regime tactics, weakens democratic opposition. This evaluation is made via a case study of election boycotts conducted by pro-democratic factions in Venezuela in 2005 and 2018. The case study examines the political situations surrounding each boycott, contextualizing the relative political strength of both regime and non-regime parties, as well as the wider economic and political context of each election. From each scenario, judgments are then made regarding the relative political power of the regime and the pro-democracy factions after there was an election boycott. The analysis shows that after each election boycott by pro-democracy factions, regime strength was increased, relative to oppositional groups that were left in a far weaker position. This finding disputes the widely accepted argument that election boycotts harm the legitimacy of hybrid authoritarian regime types, thus weakening their hold on power. Finally, Part 3 explores possible future paths forward for the future of the Venezuelan state and people. 1 2 Introduction When protests against the rule of Nicholas Maduro began in 2013, the world watched with anticipation, expecting the overthrow of his regime. The successor to the charismatic Hugo Chavez, who died of cancer in 2013, Maduro lacked much of the latter’s skill in leadership and coupled with declining economic conditions seemed to be leading his regime towards destruction. Yet, the expected overthrow of the socialist regime did not occur. Since 2014 and the collapse of worldwide oil prices, only one word has seemed appropriate to apply to the South American nation of 33 million people: crisis. Unable to meet its liabilities, the government of Venezuela printed money to avoid insolvency1. Instead, it created a catastrophe of enormous proportions. Inflation this year is expected to hit 10,000,000 percent2. Already 5 million people have fled, with another million expected to flee before the year is out3. Clean water is rapidly disappearing4, along with power5. Everyday goods disappeared from the shelves years ago. Opponents of the regime have been waiting decades for a return to full democracy. Using boycotts, protests, and demonstrations of solidarity, they have tried to force the government to roll back electoral reforms that had given the ruling party a monopoly on power since 2004. But while cracks appeared in the facade of Maduro’s grip on power, all the prognostications of his fall seem to have been overly optimistic. Many years after the first protests took place, the government of Maduro still stands strong, and the opposition remains weak and divided. Pundits 1 “Instability in Venezuela | Global Conflict Tracker.” Council on Foreign Relations, Council on Foreign Relations, 10 Dec. 2019. 2 Council on Foreign Relations, 2019. 3 Council on Foreign Relations, 2019. 4 Kurmanaev, Anatoly, and Isayen Herrera. “Venezuela's Water System Is Collapsing.” The New York Times, The New York Times, 19 Oct. 2019. 5 Council on Foreign Relations, 2019. 2 3 have wondered aloud how this could ever be possible and are confused as to why any portion of the population would continue to support Maduro’s regime. Yet when we analyze the crisis with the more objective tools of political science, we can see how the regime’s unique origins and careful choices when selecting which levers of power to control have given the heirs of Chavez’s revolution a powerful role in the country that may take many more years to overcome. Years of delegitimizing opposition groups, controlling media, working local politics, and eroding constitutional norms are all things that cannot be solved overnight, and may require decades more before Venezuelan democracy can thrive again. As we will see, the current crisis is inextricably linked to the rule of Hugo Chavez, and the rise of the Fifth Republic Movement. Chavez’s policies, both in terms of economic redistribution, and political repression, changed the structure of Venezuelan society. The first section of this paper lays out a history of the rise of the Fifth Republic Movement and Partido Socialista Unidos Venezuela (PSUV), explaining how the actions taken by Chavez turned Venezuela from a democratic state into a competitive authoritarian state. Commentary will explain how these actions created a system that would be resistant to changes in power, even under negative economic conditions that would shift the balance of power in a democratic country. The second section will explore the role of the Venezuelan opposition to the Bolivarian Revolution, and how their failure to adapt to a hybrid regime environment has led to their repeated failures. Special emphasis will be placed on the oppositions’ repeated use of the tactic of election boycotts, and why that tactic has proven ineffective, only strengthening the PSUV’s grip on power as the country slides further into economic chaos. The final section of the paper will examine the potential future outcomes of the crisis. 3 4 Part One: The Road to Ruin, 1990-2013 The End of Democracy: The 1990’s When the Venezuelan crisis first came to the attention of western media, many were shocked. Afterall, Venezuela had been a bastion of democracy in an increasingly turbulent South America during the preceding decades.6 The country had enjoyed years of economic prosperity, at one point being considered the 4th richest country in the world.7 Venezuela was also blessed with abundant natural resources, including the largest proven oil reserves of any country on the planet.8 How could it be that this wealthy nation was now a center of human suffering, its streets overrun with the starving and jobless? Venezuela had been a democratic success story since 1958, when the last military government ended and civilian control was restored.9 The government that was established (known later as the Puntofijista for the location where the major political parties reached their first compromise) was a triumph in a region overrun with petty despots and civil wars.10 And while its establishment had been no easy feat, the compromises that allowed the establishment of the Puntofijista signaled a coming together of moderates determined to avoid both military control as well as extremists from either right or left.11 For decades, predictable elections shared power between the two major parties, Accion Democratica (“AD”, a Social Democratic party) and the Comité de Organización Política Electoral Independiente (“COPEI”, a Christian 6Margolis, Jason. “Venezuela Was Once the Richest, Most Stable, Democracy in Latin America. What Happened?” Public Radio International, 7 Feb. 2019. 7Desjardins, Jeff. “Venezuela Was Once Twelve Times Richer than China. What Happened?” World Economic Forum, 12 Sept. 2017. 8Desjardins, World Economic Forum, 2017. 9Levine, Daniel H. “The Decline and Fall of Democracy in Venezuela: Ten Theses.” Bulletin of Latin American Research, vol. 21, no. 2, 2002, pp. 248–269., doi:10.1111/1470-9856.00042, 248. 10Levine, Ten Theses, 2019, 248. 11Levine, Ten Theses, 2019, 249. 4 5 Democratic Party).12 But this bedrock of democracy eventually gave way to a hybrid authoritarian regime, which allowed the nation to spiral out of control economically. To understand the origins of the 2013 crisis, it is necessary to look back to the early 1990’s. During this time, Venezuela was also plagued by economic problems, though not nearly as severely as the ones it suffers from today.13 Still, as in any democracy, voters were infuriated by the mismanagement of the economy, and demanded reforms to improve their situation. Economic concerns compounded existing dissatisfaction with the perception of corruption in the democratic government.14 The Venezuelan economy had been weakened by broader trends sweeping the entirety of Latin America during the late 1980’s and early 1990’s. The end of the Cold War and increasing U.S. and international support for neoliberal policies initiated a wave of economic reforms across the region, upending the prior statist economic model.15 Economic reforms inevitability push for a change in the political status quo, and Latin America was no exception. In most nations around the region this meant dictatorships being overthrown. But in Venezuela, it was the democratic regime that was shaken to its foundations.16 Since the return of civilian control in 1958, the Venezuelan government had pursued a policy of Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI), in line with the state centered economic model broadly accepted throughout South America beginning in the early 1950’s.17 But as many 12Encarnación, Omar G.