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Home , 5th Division (Australia), Attack at Fromelles, Battle of Albert (1916), I ANZAC Corps

CHAPTER III

TRENCH-WARFARE : THE BATTLE OF _. 1 HE hattle line in which for three years determined iii great measure the nature and course of the fighting was for the most part that selected by the German The trench line in France General Staff after its failure to effect a break- through in October, 1914. It was a defensive position and sited to control an extensive field of observation and fire. Its chief features should be known to any student of the war in France. They have been well set out as follows :-I

“The German General Staff . selected as the buttress of its new line a series of eminences that lay more or less continuously from the sea to Switzerland. Examples of high ground thus selected are Pass- chendaele Ridge, Messines Ridge, Ridge, Ridge. and there were many others. Their tactical importance was amply evidenced by the sanguinary struggles which eventually centred round most of them. . . . Defences were invariably flung out some thousands of yards in front of the dominating ridges [so that] the typical German position consisted of a considerable width of low-lying ground, trenched, wired, and studded with strong points, behind which rose in tiers ridge after ridge of higher ground, culminating finally in a feature that conferred commalid over all the adjacent terrain for miles.’’

In the Flanders area this command derived not so much from the height of the ridges as from the uniform flatness of the rest of the country. In the sector south-west of Armentitres. with which this chapter is concerned, the British line was in front of the River Lys, and routes of access and egress were therefore determined by existing bridges. The land was rescued from swamp only by a vast reticulation of ditches. The place of trenches, which when dug in the lowlands became water-

See The Story of the Fifth A~istralwuDiwsion, PP. 88-89. by Captain A. D. ‘Ellis.

35 3h THE WESTERN FRONT [I916 logged, was taken by sandbagged parapets aid duckboard tracks. Roads, except the cobbled ones, were soon cut up. The system of l~reast\vorks around the eastern edge of -4rmentikres and thence to the south-west-about nine miles in all-was held on a two-divisional front, first by I Anzac, and later, in mid-July. by II Anzac which disposed the newly- arrived 5th Australian on the right, and the veteran on the left. The conditions of fighting in this area permitted the close approximation of medical posi-

Tkc Sccoird .4rmy Ama, hlay 1916. tions to the firing line. Peasants worked in the fields and children attended school within a few miles of the front line with only occasional mishaps. But in its place and time the fighting here was fierce enough. May-June, 19161 TRENCH-WARFARE 37

Scheme of Clenraitcc. Field ambulance dressing stations’ were formed in front of the Lys in schools or breweries, mostly little damaged though only a few miles behind the line. Evacuation to these and clearance from the regimental aid-posts were straightforward though at times eventful. Regimental bearers, commonly attached to companies, carried wounded f roin the front lines through narrow saps to the aid-posts in sandbagged cupolas or cellars outside the field of machine-gun fire Thence clearance to the horse- or motor-ambulance post was chiefly by wheeled stretcher. Roads were seldom severely shelled except during raids. The general scheme of dressing and rest stations, and of clearance to casualty clearing stations will be made clear by the maps and sketches. Trc,irch-.ieral.ftrrc. In this trench-warfare casualties from the wiping, machine-gunning, and occasional artillery “hates” aver- aged not more than ninety to a hundred per week for the . A sharp rise from time to tinie.shows the shelling of a relief or of a billet; through their excellent system of ground obser- vation the Germans could inflict such losses almost at will.3 The ‘ total Australian battle casualties in May and June were, 499 killed or died of wounds arid 1,579 wounded Raids. In May the serenity of this warfare was broken, never, for the A.I.F.. to return till the end of the war. On RIay 5th the force sustained the first German “raid.” The “raid” was simply a trench-line battle on a small scale, and all the great battles of 1916-17were in tactical method not unlike large-scale raids. Raids were undertaken for various purposes, but chiefly to take prisoners for identification of their units, to inflict casualties and to promote the morale and the “offensive spirit” of the attacking side and lessen those of the enemy. At times they served a tactical or even strategic purpose. But unless it was specially desired to improve the sector of line or to eliminate a strong-post, the enemy trench entered was not retained In 1918 the Australian troops raided for fun. Com- batant preparations for these miniature battles were often very detailed and at this time included elaborate artillery action of the kind known as the “box .” Casualties sustained or inflicted varied from five or six up to a hundred or more.

2011 March 27 the 7th Field Ambulance opened a laige dressing station at Morbecque. On April 5 it mobed to Fort Ronipu, taking over an hl D S wlth A.D.S’s at Bois Grenier. and Port i Clous. =Thus on April zo the 9th sustained 74 casualties iii a company billet In this first sharp test of morale the regimental medical officer and bearers kept their heads and were commended. The Regimental hfedlcal Officer, Capt A. McKillop, and five bearers were wounded, one bearer was killed. 38 THE WESTERN FRONT [MayJuly, 1916

One or more squads of regimental bearers usually accom- panied the raiders. General medical arrangements dovetailed in with the normal scheme of evacuation and do not call for special description, and space precludes a detailed account of

any one raid. Casualties were chiefly due to the shelling, mainly to the preliiiiinary bombardment, which was often very severe. That preceding the German raid at Bois Grenier on July 3rd is described by the regimental medical officer‘ as the fiercest I ever saw during the war, though I experienced some that continued for hours, even for days on end. When it ceased parapet and parados had been replaced by a line of gaping holes. And yet a few dazed men not only survived but fought with the raiders.

’ Capt R C Winn, R h.1 0. of the 14th Bn . Apr.-July, 19161 TRENCH-WARFARE 39

This feature of intense shelling became familiar, and was an important element both in battlecraft and in medical work.5 At the beginning of June, in fulfilment of a pledge to the French High Command raiding became an element in the British operations in relief of Verdun. In all thirteen were undertaken at this time by units of the I Anzac Corps. To the A.I.F. and its medical service they were of great value both as training for attack and in welding the various units and services into an efficient weapon of war.

TABLE1.-Casualties of A.I.F. on Western Front to 30th June, 1916.

Battle Casualties I Noli-Battle Casualties

Killed in action ..... 418 Died of Disease ...... 51 Died of wounds ...... 178 Accidentally killed .... 24 Died of Gas Poisoning . . 2 Sick ...... 5,437 Wounded in action .... 1,725 Accidentally injured .... 40 Gassed ...... 9 Self inflicted injuries . . 13 Shell Shock ...... 50 Prisoners of war .... 24

It was unhappily far otherwise with the operation of the same kind but on far greater scale, carried out by Australian and English troops at the end 0; this series. Battle of Fromelles The Battle of the had then opened some three weeks before, on July 1st. On the 3rd the I Anzac Corps (Leut.-General Sir ) had been replaced by II Anzac (Lieut.-General Sir ) and, after moving to Bailleul: entrained on July 11th for the south to join the “Reserve” . On the 19th-the day on which the transferred units began to move up to the Somnie battle line-the , which had been left in Flanders, was called on-only three weeks after arrival from

5The purpose and events of these raids in May-July, I 16 are described in detail in Vd. 111 of the Oficial Hsstwy of Australso an tho r%~ of 1914-18. This form of warfare was one of which the Australian troops became the acknowledged masters (Ibtd., Vd. VI). e While there the I Anzac Corps staff, instructed by Second Army, reconnoitred medical positioiis for a British attack on Messines, preparations for which were in progress. 40 THE WESTERN FRONT [July, 1916 -to undertake an action that involved some fifty per cent. of casualties to its infantry engaged.

The Battle of Fromelles has been called “a; important raid” (British Official), an “attack on a sector of the line (German Official), and an “ ” (Official Chronology). The Australian Official Historian properly names it a Battle. The plan was ihe out- come of ail ambitious scheme of the British XI Corps The military to assist the Soinme offensive by repeating a previous plan unsuccessful attack threatening the important Aubers Ridge that dominated the western approach to . Forestalled by the Battle of .Albert the local general staff was loth to give up its scheme, which then became a “feint” to divert atten- tion from the Somme. The objective finally proposed was a small German facing the First and Second Armies, known as the “ Sugar-loaf,’’ formed through a slight rise which had been developed as a machine-gun fortress This strong point together with some 1,000 yards of the German reserve line, presumed to run parallel with the front, were to be captured and held. On July 15th General Haig gave a tentative and general approval ; thereafter the project moved con- lusedly to its dthitenirtit. The Sugar-loaf was faced on the north by the right of the newly arrived 5th Australian Division and on the west by the left of the 61st. a Territorial division, also newly sent to France. and forming the left of the First Army just as the 5th Division formed the right of the Second. For the attack, the 5th Division was to concentrate all its three brigades on the front of its right brigade, the 15th, and the 61st Division similarly concentrated itself upon its oun left. The XI Corps would direct the attack. After several delays the well advertised opera- tion was fixed for 5.45 p.m. on July 19th Across No-Mail’s Land ran a muddy stream, the Laies, usually three to four feet deep. The attack was made late in the aitertiooii. and darkness fell soon after, about 8.30 p.m The artillery preparatioii had left the Germail machine-gun posts on thr hugar-loai for the most part intact. As a coiisequeiicr the 61st Lhvisloii and failed III thetr assault on this strong-post. The centre and left brigades (14th and 8th) of the Cowme of the 5th Division crossed No-Man’s Land, seized two hnes Battle of German trench, and moved on 300 yards to what was noted iii their maps as the third trench-their objective. sotne 600 yards from the tront line This however proved to be 110 more than a ditch filled with water. The night was spent in desperate attempts to consolidate the positions occupted ; but the morn- ing found each Brigade partly surrounded by the enemy and com- pelled to fight its way back to, and across No-Man’s Land, with appall- Ing loss. Casualties occurred chiefly in No-Man’s Land, but also in the ap- proach trenches-which were heavily shelled during the assembly- and large numbers of men were killed or wounded in the confused fight- ing which tmk place in and beyond the German lines. July., 19161 TRENCH-WARFARE 41

Responsibility for the medical arrangements in rear of the 5th Division lay with the D.M.S. of Second Army, who detailed No. 2 Australian C.C.S. for “sitting cases” : stretcher cases were to go to a British unit at Ba~lleul.~Fifty motor ambulances of No. 14 Motor Ambulance Convoy were allotted Medical to the D.D.M.S. II Anzac Corps lor evacua- tion to C.C.S., and twenty-one were lent to the 5th Division, whose motor-transport had not yet arrived. -4 special rest station was formed at Port i Clous Farm for slight casualties. The 5th Division’s sector of the front of attack had pre- viously been held by the 15th Brigade with two in

Sclterne of Cleararlcc frorir Froinelles Sector, Jtcly 1916.

line Regimental aid-posts had been at “Pinney’s ,4venue” (58th Bn.) and at Cellar Farm Avenue (57th). These normally cleared through advanced dressing stations at Rouge de Bout - .- 7 The use of No I Aust. C C.S , situated at Estaires, only five miles from the front line, for this duty was precluded by the arrangements for road traffic. 42 THE WESTERN FRONT [July, 1916 and Croix Blanche to the main dressing station at Fort Rompu, staffed by the 8th Field Ambulance. For the battle the latter station was retained to serve the left sector, and a new main dressing station was opened in a factory at Bac St. Maur to serve the right. The latter was elaborately equipped with wards to be staffed by two units (14th and 15th Field Ambulances) which would work independently. Ample supplies of stretchers, splints, dressings, blankets and medical comforts were pro- vided. Like the plans of the battle itself the arrangements made by the A.D.M.S. (Colonel C. H. W. Hardy) for clearing his front were unusual. No single field ambulance was charged with the sole duty of controlling clearance from the front; instead, dif- ferent sectors of it were allotted for each unit and “definite routes were arranged and set apart.” The two existing regi- mental aid-posts at “Pinney’s Avenue” and “Cellar Farm” were retained, together with those in use by the reserve battalions at “Rifle Villa” and “Eaton Hall.” All were well stocked with extra dressings and comforts, issued officially or procured through individual initiative.8 “,Liaison” between the ambulance “bearer” officers and the regimental medical officers appears to have been defective. Most of the latter had however recon- noitred the front line, as also had those of the reserve battalions. Though new to the conditions on the Western Front some medical officers and a considerable proportion of their N.C.O’s had been trained and tried out at Gallipoli, and there was among them a general apprehension of very heavy casualties-an appre- hension which does not appear to have been felt by the British commander concerned-Lieut.-General Haking? The chief medical features of Fromelles were, first, a mili- tary failure with exceptionally heavy casualties, sustained in a brief time, and on a very small front; General course of events . second, the fact that the distance of the ad- vanced and main dressing stations from the front line was much less than usual. These features, and the

BThuq,one R.M.O. (Capt. K. H. Grieve of the 56th Bn ) records that “strong acissors, were bought with regimental funds and issued to each hearer, and were found of great service. 0“The Battalion officers all realised it would be a very bloody business. Gallipoli ones said it would be much worse than the Gernian Officers’ Tren:h: (Major E. F. Lind, 15th Fld. Amb.) See also Vol. I, p. 293 “Steele’s. August 7.” 19th-20th July, 19161 TRENCH-WARFARE 43 comparative absence of intense shelling in the back areas, determined the nature of the medical problem and in great measure also the results achieved. While they promoted a rapid evacuation by wheeled transport from the dressing stations they also made inevitable a period of congestion in the zone of hand-carry. The medical interest of the battle centres therefore in the collecting of casualties from the field of battle and their clearance in the zone served by the regimental and ambulance bearers. Partly through the excess of casualties on the Australian right, but chiefly through the existence there of more direct routes of clearance and special means of escape from the sphere of fighting,1° the streams of wounded passed chiefly along the right hand routes of clearance.” The first casualties, from the German shelling, reached the field ambulances in the M.D.S. at Bac St. Maur at 12.30 p.m. on the 19th. Early reports received by the A.D.M.S. from the advanced dressing station were very favourable; but at about midnight the reported ntmbers of casualties exceeds the capacity of the medical staff and stretcher bearers. Our old line very full of wounded. . . . Very Urgent. Action was taken in response to this call by both the Army Corps and the 5th Division staffs Assistance was obtained from the New Zealand Division on the left, whose A.D.M.S. (Colonel Begg) sent substantial help in officers and bearers to the 14th Field Ambulance at Rouge de Bout, and from the 8th Field Ambulance at Fort Rompu. The 184th Brigade of the 61st Division lent a hand. At 4.35 a.m. a message was received by the A.D.M.S. from the II Anzac Corps Commander (General Godley) congratulating “all ranks on your splendid work”; at 3.45 a.m. the D.A.D.M.S. II Anzac reported that “all was going most satisfactorily, and that there were then no further bearers or medical officers wanted.” This complaisance, born of the muddle that dogged this dread- ful affair, was rudely shaken when, at 7.12 a.m., an urgent wire

~~ 10As at Lone Pine, “saps” were dug into No-Man’s Land during the night of the battle. These were a factor in the rescue of the wounded, though not a great one. II As in all military treatises, the terms “right” and “left” are of course used with reference to the front, and not to the rearward direction of the stream of casualties. 43 THE WESTERN FRONT [ IQth-Zoth July, 1916

was received at Divisional Headquarters from the 15th Brigade that “there is still a large number of men wounded during the action awaiting to be dealt with.” The experienced Officer Com- manding the 14th Field Ambulance, Lieut.-Colonel A. H. I’ebbutt. had on his own initiative made a personal reconnais- sance of the front line and now reported that whereas the wounded who had reached the dressing stations were being evacuated satisfactorily, the front line and the battlefield itself, through shortage of regimental bearers and their exhaustion, had certainly not been “cleared.’’ This was confirmed by reports from the 15th Brigade, and it soon became evident that a serious medical tragedy was impending on the military one. From that hour onwards it was recognised that the collecting of wounded from the zone of fighting to the regimental aid-posts and thence to the advanced dressing stations was a problem demanding the utmost efforts of the whole medical service and combatant troops alike. We may now pick up the actual course of “medical” events in this tragic affair. No-Man‘s Land on this front varied in depth from 4~ yards at the Sugar-loaf to some 100 in front of the From zero hour at 5.45 p.m. on- the wounded wards men were being wounded and now lay scattered thickly over the whole of the area covered in the attack, in particular around the “sallyports” and on the right, in the sphere of the 15th Brigade’s advance across No-Man’s Land. The problem of collecting and clearance of battle casualties is essentially a matter of numbers; and with the figures now available we can envisage more clearly than could the actors at Fromelles the nature of their problem.

;?i5 at Lone Pine these officers remained for the most part in their aid-posts, sending their bearers forward in charge of the N.C.O’s.l2 Collecting of wounded in and R .M.O ’s beyond No-Man’s Land was at first under- taken entirely by the regimental bearers. Retiring troops

~~

13 The R &I0. 60th Battalion (Capt F. W D. Collier) records his own experi- ence--“I was at first ordered to go over with the last wave but that was changed and I was to stay back and clear up till the new position was captured, and then go over. But 1 had orders that my sixteen regimental bearers were to go over with the last nave. and collect wounded at once I think now that this was a great nustake but it was iiiy first battle Nine out of my sixteen bearers were knocked out sppn after they jumped o%ei and 1 never saw any niorc of them after that iiight. rgth-20th Jul!, rgrh] TRENCH-\\’ARFXRE 45 assisted those who could walk, and with this help and that of the regimental bearers of reserve battallons, and later of infantry fatigue parties, and of ambulance bearers. large numbers of wounded reached the front line and thence the aid-posts, or were “dumped” in the nearest trench or dugout. The aid-posts at Pinney’s Avenue and Cellar Farm Avenue were behind the support trenches and some 300 yards from the front line. The K.A.P’s at Rifle Villa At the and Eaton Hall became waggoii loading regimental aid-poets posts. In Pinney’s five and at Cellar Farm three medical officers worked together. At IO p.m. a “forward post” was established in Pinney’s, close to the front line; another was organised in Nine Avenue be- yond Cellar Farm by the R.h.1 0. 31st Battalion (Captain E.

Collccriuri arid L. /r.nroirrt. of Botflc oj Frolrrrlles. 19-20 Jltljl 1916.

Russell), ]Jut on this officer’s being wounded the post was abandoned. Finally at 9 a.m. 011 tlie 20th when tlie last troops of the 14th Brigade withdrew across No-Man’s Land, not only all the regimental aid-posts but the whole of the front line and 46 THE WESTERN FRONT [Igth-20th July, 1916 approach trenches were thickly thronged with wounded. There- after, no further collecting from the scene of the fighting could be done by normal means.13 The work in the aid-posts was very heavy. “We worked all that afternoon (19th) that night and all next day without ceasing [writes Captain Collier]. We could not show a light and when we came to a wounded man we would ask him where he was hit and feel for his wound with hands covered with dried blood and mud. There was no time and no water to wash hands, and of course the wounded had their first dressing at the regimental aid-post.”

Through the night the burthen of appeal by regimental medical officers and brigade staff was for additional help in the clearance from aid to ambulance post. Field ambulances When in the early hours of the 20th the nature of the catastrophe became known, helpers, medical and other, were freely available. Aid-posts, trenches, and dugouts were searched and by IO a.tn. the front line was “pactically” clear. The work at the advanced dressing stations was largely in supplement-it would seem even in duplication-of that of the reeimental aid-posts. Of five advanced Y Advanced dressing stations that were formed, all save those at Croix Blanche and Rouge de Bout faded out at an early hour and their personnel mov& forward to the more advanced posts. Eaton Hall and Rife Villa became the most important field ambulance positions in front of the main dressing btations, siiice hue inechanical transport was

’JEarlj on the zoth there occuried an episode of great interest. A man of the 29th Bn searching for a wounded officer in NeMan’s Land was challenged by a Bavarian officer, who insisted that the action must be regularised if it was to be permitted. A combatant deer of the 29th (Major A. W. Murdoch) then made a rough Red Cross flag and, passing over NwMan’s Land, asked if a mutual cessation of hostilities could be arranged. The Bavarian officer telephoned for instructions, and in the meantime the men of both sides took advantage of the curious situation. The firing ceased and the wounded were brought in on our side while the Germans repaired their parapets. Major Murdoch returned safely, but as his action was not confirmed by the Australian Divisional Commander (who con- sidered himself hound by standing instructions from the Higher Command), the informal truce ceased. During the whole of the next week, however, parties or individuals went out by night and brought in men marked down during the day. The last was carried to Captain H. Rayson’s aid-post nine dass after wounding. He had crawled to a shell-hole and though he could not reach the water had kept him. self alive by continuously soaking and sucking a strip of 111s tunic. 19th-mt July, 19161 TRENCH-WARFARE 47 available. It is noted however that the work at the “advanced dressing stations” was “very heavy.” Clearance thence to the main dressing station was smooth and without incident. The front lines were not fully relieved till the 21st. At both of the main dressing stations treatment and evacu- ation to casualty clearing station were carried out with a smooth- ness and celerity probably not exceeded in the Main dressing etations history of the Australian Medical Service in this war. The rate of clearance indeed reached as high as two cases per minute. Ample provision had been made and it was effectively exploited; the dressing of wounds- in particular splinting-brought high commendation from the Second Army authorities1‘ At Bac St. Maur and Fort Rompu recordings of woundings by sites were kept as well as of the number of walking, sitting, and lying-down cases. The casualties sustained in the operation are shown in the following table. They are a measure at once of the extraordinary medical problem and of the cost to the A.1 F. of this “feint”- really a subsidiary attack, wholly futile and unnecessary, made by inexperienced troops against unduly distant positions with insufficient preparation, particularly by the artillery, which itself was insufficient for the enterprise. They represent a casualty list of 50 per cent. of the troops engaged. Normally in the A.I.F. the proportion of wounded and died of wounds to killed in action was approximately as four to one. In the 15th Brigade at Fromelles it was less than one and a half to one. This increased proportion is due to men being shot to death as they lay wounded in No-Man’s Land, or dying there through lack of assistance. The small number of medical casualties, one officer and four other ranks wounded, is due to the conipara- tively slight shelling of the ambulance bearer routes in rear. Regimental bearers working in the front area lost very heavily, more so, possibly, than iii any other engagement of the A.I.F. - 14 This operation is, indeed, selected by the British Official Historian as illustrating a smooth and successful evacuation Brrtish Oficral Medical History, Grseral, Vol. III, pfi. 7-10 48 THE WESTERN FRONT [ 19th-zxst July, 1916

TABLEII.-Casualties sustained by the 5th Division at Fromelles between noon on 19th July and 8 p.m. of zIst July:--. Killed Died of 'risoners Woundec in action wounds of war In action Total

~~ 8th Inf. Bde .... 4i7 51 I66 I ,086 14th ,I .... '438 283 9& 15th ,, .... 726 5 904 Other units .... 60 -9 I6 208 Totals ...... IJOt 216 470 3,146 5,533'5

Wounded passed through main dressing stations :-

Percentage of wounds according to site Upper limb ...... 31'79 per cent Lower limb .. .. . 31-00 II Head and nrd .. 16-67 ,, Thorax ...... 7'93 .. Abdomen . ... . 4'27 91 Back ...... 2'22 ,, "Shell Shoci'' . .. 6.12 ,, Total . .. 100'00 ,, On this sector and on the whole Second Army front the tumult and shouting died down as quickly as it arose. The 5th Division, badly shaken, went back from the SI Corps to II Anzac and remained in this sector till the autumn. Shortly after Fromelles Colonel R. E. Roth16 was replaced as D.D.hS.S., II Anzac Corps, by Colonel C. hlackie Begg, N .Z.M .C. i

16 The 61st British Division during the same eriod lost 1,547 of whom approxi- mately 934 were admitted to field ambulances anf the remainder were killed or died of wounds, or were taken prisoner. This officer was invalided to He died in 1924. 17Coniparisons and contrast of great medical interest may be made between the Battle of Fromelles and certain operations of the Gallipoli and Palestine Campaigns. Thus the Landing at Anzac, and the Amman raid illustrate clearance In a retreat, and the attack on Krithia, the collection and clearance of casualties reaching fifty per cent in a few hours. In the Awstralza)r Ofiicial History Fromelles is compared with the raid at Lone Pine. and the medical prohlems were also ver) similar See i-01 I, pp. 136.45, 153-7 293-5, 691-5