CHAPTER VI1 THE FIRST FIGHTING IN FRANCE AT the time when the I Anzac Corps entered the line in France the Germans still possessed the initiative. It followed that in the mind of every commander and staff officer on the Allied side there was always present the anxiety lest his front should be the next to be attacked. In spite of their deep commitment at Verdun, the Germans were keeping the British Army busy during April and May with sharp assaults upon the Canadians at Ypres and on the British near Loos and at Vimy. Birdwood and the other Anzac commanders were therefore in constant apprehension that their line might at any moment be subject to a similar attack, delivered with the purpose of hindering the Allies from preparing a counter- offensive to that at Verdun. The first duty of this, as of all other, corps was to prepare a scheme of defence in accordance with the principle then recently adopted-that of garrisoning the front line with comparatively few troops, and keeping as many as possible in rear as “ mobile reserves.”’ This would mean the holding of the front line, not continuously, but at “ a series of . defended localities,” situated as far as possible at the heads of the communication trenches. To troops and staff accustomed to the elaborate fortifications of Anzac, however, the defences at Armentikes appeared dangerously defective.’ ‘These instructions were issued by General White on June 7. a For example, the majority of the communication avenues shown on th:. trench;, maps were impassable. Of the five trenches leading to one small sector, Mine and “ Brompton” Avenues :ere both useless, being half-full of mud and water. “VC.” and “Cellar Farm Avenues were both useful trenches (although the former required .Fxtending and ,!he latter had bcen marked down by the enemy ar a good target): York Avenue war impassable. 188 Apr., 19161 THE FIRST FIGHTING 189 It was therefore determined that, to ensure imncdiate security, the front breastwork must at once be strengthened until it was at least seven feet in height and twelve in breadth throughout. The reclaiming of the waterlogged communi. cation trenches must also be hastened, others constructed or lengthened, and the reserve line thickened and completed. It was considered that, until many of these works had been carried out, a German attack could be securely met only by holding the line in the old fashion, with a strong garrison dl along the front. The old garrison was therefore main- tained and new works were at once begun.a The plans for this work were soon to be greatly influenced by the course of operations. The British front was then perhaps more than usually expectant of an attempt by the enemy, and especially of a gas attack. A warning had been issued by the meteorologists' that during the approaching season the wind usually set from the direction of the enemy's trenches; moreover, on April 26th there had come over near Ypres two Polish deserters, who reported that gas cylinders had been installed behind the parapet in their sector, and were to be used almost immediately.' The Anzac divisions had had no experience of gas, except in the test behind the lines, and. like most other troops, dreaded its possible use against them. The result of this nervousness was a series of false alarms. Shortly after dusk on April 26th a violent bombardment was heard, evidently directed against part of the 17th British Division, then north-east of Armentikes. In the course of this, the enemy laid down a heavy barrage of " tear-gas " shells in rear of part of the British line, which (as was afterwards learnt) he unsuccessfully attempted to raid. The sweet aroma of this gas: floating south-westwards behind the -- ' There was, however, this difference from the conditions of Gallipoli-that no part of the resting division (until May 20. the New Zealand Division) was called on to participate. ' Small meteorological sections were distributed throughout the British Expedi- tionary Force. This was one of the expert services not included in the A.I.F. 'A gas-cloud was duly emitted by the Germans on April 30, but inflicted little harm. Not unlike that of hyacinth. 190 THE A.I.F. IN FRANCE [Apr.-June, 1916 Anzac line, perplexed the drivets in the horse-lines and men in billets around Erquinghem and Bac St. Maur, but it inflicted no harm and caused no deep apprehension. The next night, however, shortly before ten o’clock, a warning of gas was received by the 2nd Division from the 17th. In the front line gas-gongs and horns were sounded,and an officer of the 1st Battalion (1st Division), apparently misunderstanding the orders for such a case, fired a “G.A.S.” signal-rocket. The 5th Field Artillery Brigade at once opened on the enemy’s parapet in accordance with its standing orders, the theory then being that the bursting shells would help to dissipate the cloud. Meanwhile the divisional staffs had telephoned to brigades and battalions, each of which reported that there was no gas in their area. The artillery was therefore stopped after having fired for an hour. The alarm had been a false one, but it had one interesting effect. The infantry of the 2nd Division for the first time saw a “ barrage ” placed by its own artillery upon the enemy parapet. Along the whole line . the troops were delighted with the spectacle, and from that night was dated the siire reliance of this division’s infantry upon their own gunners. Even the artillery staff, which had been somewhat anxious concerning the probable performance of their almost untrained howitzer batteries, was reassured by the night’s work. “At least we didn’t hit our own trenches -1 suppose that’s something,” commented Brigadier-General George Johnston, the commander of the 2nd Division’s artillery. On several other nights, gas alarms originating far up the line passed down the front, and were repeated by sounding gongs and bleating strombus horns ; but as a matter of fact gas in cloud form, emitted from cylinders, was never used directly against an Australian division. Seven weeks after these events 5 officers and 40 men, detached from the 25th Battalion, were in the line near Messines, when the Germans made one of their last attempts to inflict casualties by this method. On that occasion the gas cloud was met quite coolly by all troops on the spot, and there is no record of any Apr.-June, 19161 THE FIRST FIGHTING 191 casualties from gas among the Australian detachment.' But when, after the gas had passed over the trenches directly subject to the attack, it was carried southwards by the wind along the valley of the Lys and through the area behind the Anzac front, ten miles away, it was still strong enough to cause the horses in the artillery waggon-lines to cough, and many of the men to vomit. Most troops wore their helmets for an hour, but there were no serious casualties among them.8 Green clover and some of the vegetable crops were afterwards found to be " nipped." There were standing orders for the warning of the civil in- habitants : at Fleurbaix the brigade staff was to inform the Maire, in whose house the briga- dier was billeted. At Sailly- The C.R.E. will warn M. Becu, the proprietor of his billet, who will warn the Vicar, who will have the bell of the girls' school in the Estaires road rung. At Bac St. Maur- A cyclist from the pioneer battalion will call the doorkeeper at M. Sablon's factory, who will at once start the steam siren. In Nouveau Monde and Estaires the church bells were to be rung. Whether these precautions were duly carried out is not recorded; according to one authority two young children died in the Anzac area. On several later occasions 'Two of the Australians, however, were killed by the bombardment. This attack occurred on the night of June 16. The gas used included chlorine, but wltb a large proportion of phosgene, and caused some 400 casualties among the British troops, of which probably about a tenth were deaths. The gas was sent out in two clouds-the first smoke, probatly with little gas: the second, after an interval, strong gas. The object of thls procedure was to cause the men to lay aside their helmets after the first cloud, imagining that the attack was past ' Men were usually most careful never to be without their gas-helmets, since the absence of a helmet might at any time mean certain death. One cyclist, however, who had forgotten to carry his, rode off in haste to find it, and the heavy breathing induced by the exertion caused him to consume so much gas that he suffered more seriously than others. 192 THE A.I.F. IN FRANCE [Apr.-June, 1916 cloud-gas was discharged by British special-service troops from the Anzac 1ines.O This ended the very limited experience of the Anzac troops in that dreaded, but least dangerous, branch of gas-warfare. Fighting first came to Australian troops in France, not in the form of gas attack, but in those sharp and sudden minor actions, involving only a company or two at a time, which sooner or later befell most units holding even a quiet line in France. The chief basis which the high command on either side possessed for estimating the probable intention of the enemy was an accurate knowledge of the disposition of his troops -in technical language, his “order of battle.” If it was po2sible to discover where the enemy’s divisions were, and whether they were increasing in number opposite certain parts of the front and decreasing elsewhere, his plans could be forejudged with fair accuracy.