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The Development of Australian on the Western Front 1916-1918: An Imperial model of training, tactics and technology

Lewis Frederickson

A thesis in fulfilment for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

School of Humanities and Social Sciences UNSW

28 August 2015 i

THE UNIVERSITY OF NEW SOUTH Thesis/Dissertation Sheet Surname: Frederickson First Name: Lewis Other Name: Charles Abbreviation for degree as given in the University Calendar: PhD School: Humanities and Social Sciences Faculty: History Title: The development of Australian infantry on the Western Front 1916-1918 Abstract The Anzac myth enshrines a popular history of Australian superiority on the battlefields of the Great War. Australian infantrymen were superior because was a frontier nation whose people possessed independent initiative, resourcefulness, and moral and physical courage. These qualities were transferred straight into the Australian Imperial Force (AIF). This thesis makes a critical examination of the myth. It details how Australian infantry on the Western Front developed into a highly disciplined and professional element of the wider British in the period from 1916-1918. This occurred through standardised training and tactics, hard earned operational experience, and with technically enabled mastery. After , Australia was a relative latecomer to Europe, and arrived in mid-1916. The force experienced comparable losses to the on the , becoming a benefactor of the British learning process. Contrary to the Anzac myth, the five Australian divisions on the Western Front only realised their potential in 1918 when they were amalgamated into a . In this thesis, Chapter 1 provides a historiography of the Australian infantry's experience on the Western Front in comparison to a similar sized formation, the . The Canadians are also used as a comparison in subsequent chapters. Chapter 2 highlights how all British and Dominion infantrymen undertook standardised basic training after 1916. Chapter 3 shows how Australian infantry benefitted from tactical developments in the Sritish Army after the Somme experience. Chapter 4 details how this was consolidated by robust reinforcement, and by a specialist training system of Army Schools. Chapter 5 shows the Australian use of platoon level weapons systems in line with the British Army. Chapter 6 highlights the reality of the qualities of the individual Australian soldier and exposes the Anzac myth. Chapter 7 indicates how Australian leadership provided a top down impetus for the development of Australian infantry. Finally, Chapter 8 presents the apogee of Australian battlefield effectiveness in 1918 with the infantry coming under Monash as a homogenous corps. The conclusion ties these threads together by indicating how Australian development occurred in conjunction with remarkable British activity in the last year of the war. Declaration relating to disposition of project thesis/dissertation I hereby grant to the University of or its agents the right to archive and to make available my thesis or dissertation in whole or in part in the University libraries in all forms of media, now or here after known, subject to the provisions of the Copyright Act 1968. I retain all property rights, such as patent rights. I also retain the right to use in future works (such as articles or books) all or part of this thesis or dissertation. I also authorise University Microfilms to use the 350 word abstract of my thesis in Dissertation Abstracts International (this is applicable to doctoral theses only).

Signature Witness Date The University recognises that there may be exceptional circumstances requiring restrictions on copying or conditions on use. Requests for restriction for a period of up to 2 years must be made in writing. Requests for a longer period of restriction may be considered in exceptional circumstances and require the approval of the Dean of Graduate Research.

For Office Use Only Date of completion of requirements for Award: 11

Originality Statement 'I hereby declare that this submission is my own work and to the best of my knowledge it contains no materials previously published or written by another person, or substantial proportions of material which have been accepted for the award of any other degree or diploma at UNSW or any other educational institution, except where due acknowledgement is made in the thesis. Any contribution made to the research by others, with whom I have worked at UNSW or elsewhere, is explicitly acknowledged in the thesis. I also declare that the intellectual content of this thesis is the product of my own work, except to the extent that assistance from others in the project's design and conception or in style, presentation and linguistic expression is acknowledged.'

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Table of Contents Page Thesis/Dissertation Sheet i

Originality Statement ii

Acknowledgement iv

Glossary v

Introduction 1

Chapter-1 Comparing the Australian and Canadian Experience 15

Chapter-2 Infantry Recruit Training in the AIF 41

Chapter-3 Infantry Tactical Development 1917 73

Chapter-4 Reinforcement Training and the Schools in 100

Chapter-5 Weapons Systems and Specialist Training 124

Chapter-6 Enlisted Men 150

Chapter-7 Leadership and Training: Officers 174

Chapter-8 The of 1918 204

Conclusions 236

Bibliography 244

iv

Acknowledgement I gratefully and sincerely thank Dr. John Connor for his guidance, understanding and patience during the preparation of my thesis at UNSW. John’s quiet mentoring and example had a profoundly positive effect on my views of history and wider experience of heritage. He was foremost in developing in me the persistent and balanced approach intrinsic to research. John has encouraged me to not only grow as an historian, but also as a person and independent thinker. I feel privileged to have conducted my research in such fine . John, for all you have done in assisting me, I thank you. I would also like to thank all of the staff within the Humanities and Social Sciences Department at UNSW for their hard work, expertise and patience. In particular, I am deeply appreciative to the student liaison , Mrs Bernadette McDermott for her unwavering support and administrative guidance during my tenure within the department. Bernadette, thank you for easing the way for all the students you have helped over the years.

I would also like to thank several colleagues from the Royal Australian Air Force for their support and understanding of my desire to undertake this work. Tony Dolin and Jason Lind, we three serve in a technical organisation; though, you have both provided me the encouragement and motivation to complete a thesis on the intangibles of history and human endeavour. I am deeply grateful to both of you for your support. The value that you placed on my work adds to my faith in our roles as airmen and officers. Vale, Richard Archie Long, my hometown mate and personification of the Anzac legend. My very good friend, Morteza Tehrani, fighter pilot and Renaissance man, you have been a constant study companion. Morteza, I thank you for your comradeship and many interesting discussions; “Per Ardua Surgo”, my friend.

Finally, and most importantly, I would like to thank my wife Elizabeth. Her support, encouragement, quiet patience and love are the foundation upon which my life is built. To our beautiful children, Bryce and Olivia, your tender years and transparent enthusiasm for everything life has to offer are a constant inspiration to me. My family, you are a joy!

v

Glossary of Terms and Acronyms

AAMC Medical Corps AASC Australian Army Service Corps ABD Australian Base Depot ACD Australian Convalescent Depot ADBD Australian Divisional Base Depot Adm Admitted ADS Advanced Dressing Station AFA Australian Field AFC AGBD Australian Base Depot AGH Australian General Hospital (1AGH) Heliopolis, physical injuries, diseases, shock. (1AGH) Rouen, France general casualties. (1AGH) Sutton Veny, . (2AGH) Boulogne, France general battle casualties. (3AGH) , France gas patients. AN & MEF Australian Navy & Expeditionary Force AI Accidentally Injured AIBD Australian Infantry Base Depot AIF Australian Imperial Forces ANZAC Australian and Army Corps Anzac In reference to an individual soldier or the mythology of the ANZACs APC Australian Provost Corps APM Australian Provost Marshal Aux Auxiliary AW Accidentally Wounded AWL Absent without leave Bar Second award of same bravery Bde BEF British Expeditionary Force BN CCS Casualty Clearing Station C De G. Croix De Guerre Medal CEF Canadian Expeditionary Force CMG Companion of the order of St Michael and St George CO Commanding Officer Coy Company CSM Company Sergeant DCM Distinguished Conduct Medal DIV DOA Died of Accident DOD Died of Disease DOI Died of Illness DOW Died of Wounds DSO Distinguished Service Order F Amb Field Ambulance FP Field Punishment (No.1 or No.2) vi

GHQ General Head Quarters GOC Commanding GSW Gun Shot Wound HE High Explosive HQ Headquarters KIA Killed in Action LMG Lewis or Light MC MO Medical Officer MIA Mid Mentioned in Despatches MM MSM Meritorious Service Medal OC Officer Commanding OTC Officer Training College POW QM Quarter Master RAP Regimental Aid Post RSM Regimental Sergeant Major RTA Returned to Australia Sect Sig Signals SMLE Short Magazine Lee Enfield SW Shrapnel Wound TRNG Training VC Cross VD Venereal Disease WIA Wounded In Action WOAS While On Active Service The Development of Australian Infantry on the Western Front

INTRODUCTION ‘Australians will stand beside their own to help defend her to our last man and our last ’1 Leader of the Opposition, Andrew Fisher,

Insanity engulfed Europe in July 1914 and its tendrils spread quickly to open warfare. On one side lay the : , Austro-Hungary, Bulgaria and by November, the Ottoman Turks. On the other side, the Allies: Imperial , France and the Empire of . The causes of the war remain hotly debated a century later; the simplistic view a dispute between declining Austro-Hungarian Imperialism and Balkans nationalism.2 This thesis will not chart the course of events of the Great War or seek to understand the conflict. Nevertheless, what is certain is that on the battlefields of Europe between 1914 and 1918 the resources of entire empires were drained. The devastation irrevocably altered the political, social and economic nature of the world, and even today the war remains synonymous with futility and destruction.3 On the Western Front, the battlefields of old Europe stretched a comparatively short 450 miles, from to the Swiss border. Even so, they drew contributions from as far afield as Newfoundland to New Zealand, from Senegal to South and from to . This “Great War”, a “war to end all wars”, directly or indirectly affected all nations of the globe, and Australia instantly provided support to Imperial Britain.4

1 M. Clark, A Short (4th Edn), Ringwood, Australia, 1995, p. 225. 2 An excellent insight into the sheer complexity of the conflict may be read in: Annika Mombauer, The Origins of the First World War: Controversies and Consensus, , 2013. Mombauer highlights that Germany's support of and its declaration of war were important, but Russian support for Serbia and French support for Russia were crucial in bringing about the world war that ensued. The British response to the violation of Belgian neutrality perhaps owed more to politics than altruism. The intrigue seems indefinite; German militarism cast a shadow over it all. In his 2010 work of the same name, The Origins of the First World War, William Mulligan re-examines such issues in even greater detail; he addresses the military, social, economic, political and diplomatic factors influencing the relationship among European powers during the . 3 To appreciate this view, see Dan Todman, The Great War: Myth & Memory, London, 2007. Todman highlights and challenges how the First World War is popularly viewed as the exemplar for the horror of war. He charts the development of a false mythology: heartless generals, safe behind the lines, sending thousands of men “over the top” into a veritable tornado of machinegun and artillery fire. Todman shows the influence of war poets, notably Siegfried Sassoon and Wilfred Owen, who have provided a lasting imagery of the futility of the war. In reality, by 1918, the British Army was highly professional and contributed most significantly to winning the war in the West. 4 Australian involvement points to the Global nature of the war, demonstrating how a complex conflict among European empires came to involve their colonies and dominions; and embraced the Orient, Ottoman , and the .

The Development of Australian Infantry on the Western Front 2 By the end of 1914, a newly formed Australian Imperial Force (AIF) had accepted and deployed more than 20,000 Australian volunteers overseas to train and prepare for combat. The majority of them were sent to Egypt to train; thousands of miles and a hemisphere away.5 In the following four years a further 290,000 would follow. Most of these soldiers would serve as infantrymen, the great majority of them would serve on the Western Front, and by the end of the conflict they had earned a reputation as a highly effective and professional component of the wider British Army. This thesis will examine the substance of this reputation. In particular, it examines the development of Australian infantry on the Western Front from 1916-1918; where, in 1918, for perhaps the only time in the nation’s history, Australian infantry engaged the main enemy in a decisive theatre and defeated him. The experience of the Australian & New Zealand Army Corps (ANZAC) at Gallipoli renders no answer to the later performance of Australian and New Zealand in Europe. By 1918, the homogenous Australian Corps and the Division of the New Zealand Expeditionary Force were among the most highly effective formations on the Western Front. Other than inspiration, the story of Gallipoli has little to do with the professional development of Australian infantry at all. The answer is far simpler. The AIF infantry’s development as a professional fighting force results from its actions on the battlefields of France and Belgium. The preparedness of Australian Infantry came about from the experiences of the entire Imperial force in Europe from 1916-18 where they benefitted from standardised British training and solid preparation for combat on the Western Front. Much has been written about the successes of the Australian and infantry that served on the Western Front. Much more will continue to be written about the AIF as the centenary of its actions is commemorated. To date, this thesis is the first in-depth study of the essential factors that underwrote the Australian victories in France in 1918. These factors were British: a standardised recruit training system for all men who served in the BEF; a commonality among weapons systems, tactics and technical development among all British and Empire infantry; the development of a robust reinforcement and schooling system for men serving in France; and, above all, the shared experience of a learning process that the British Armies in France underwent in their development. This thesis looks to these

5 For views expanding on why Australia should have been involved look to Christopher Pugsley & John Moses (eds.), The and Britain’s Pacific Dominions 1871-1919: Essays on the role of Australia and New Zealand in world politics in the age of imperialism, Victoria, 2000. Despite the length of its title, this work succinctly explains the threat of German militarism in the West at the time. Indeed, German possessions in the Pacific affected the security of Australia, and a German victory on the European continent would have had a direct consequence in the Antipodes. The Development of Australian Infantry on the Western Front 3 factors from the perspective of the Australian infantry soldier during the second half of the war. This thesis contextualises Australian infantry development in the wider framework of the first codified combined arms doctrine in British history. This first in-depth study is important because the processes involved are still in use a century later.6 The Australian infantry’s contribution of a “capability brick” to the BEF during the Great War set a pattern that has underwritten the Australian contribution to conflict since. The thesis looks to the Australian infantry’s training and development in the combined arms process. Notwithstanding, the thesis is not about combined arms warfare; it is about the resultant war- winning formula stemming from its conduct. The thesis is therefore about Australian infantry serving in a British system. The chapters highlight distinct standardised processes that resulted in the absolute battlefield effectiveness of the British infantrymen of 1918. Indeed, the training subject matter for infantrymen in 1918 is not dissimilar what is taught today.7 Because Australian infantry served in the British Army as a national contingent – Australia was a self governing Dominion in the British Empire – the thesis shows that the Australian infantry development was congruent to the experience of the whole. A century on, the duty of the Australian infantry remains unchanged: ‘The role of Infantry is to seek out and close with the enemy, to kill or capture him, to seize and hold ground and to repel attack, by day or night, regardless of season, weather or terrain’.8 The

6 See for example, combined arms processes articulated the Australian Army’s capstone doctrine: Land Warfare Doctrine 1: The Fundamentals of Land Warfare, Canberra, 2002-2004. The modern army talks to orchestrating effects in time and space to achieve objectives. The manoevre Battlefield Operating Systems (BOS) include infantry, armour and aviation elements. The offensive support BOS include the collective and coordinated use of indirect fire weapons [artillery]. Together, they provide the means of prosecuting close combat and concentrating sufficient force to defeat the enemy. BOS effects are enhanced through the orchestration of manoeuvre with the other elements. 7 The rifleman’s course in the modern Army’s School of Infantry inculcates the following skills: a. maintain personal arms and ammunition b. maintain high levels of physical fitness and basic soldiering skills c. conduct aggressive patrolling to seek out and close with the enemy d. operate as part of a combined arms team in a complex environment e. conduct assaults against enemy positions f. repel enemy assaults g. prepare defensive positions and construct field defences h. selected infantryman will maintain and tactically employ the AFV (M113) or PMV (Bushmaster) i. selected infantryman will employ support weapon systems including the 81mm , or the MAG 58 General Service Machine Gun (GSMG) j. selected infantryman will provide precision fire support utilising the 7.62mm SR-98, 7.62mm SR-25 or .50 cal Anti-Material . k. selected infantryman will undergo training in field engineering techniques, breaching, demolitions, surveillance, tracking, specialist communications and Combat First Aid 8 Directorate of Workforce Management – Army (DWM-A), Manual of Army Employment, Corps of Infantry, Canberra, 2015. The Development of Australian Infantry on the Western Front 4 infantry remains the primary combat arm of the Australian Army. Indeed, the Army still defines itself in terms of the past: The ethos of the Army is that of the soldier serving the nation: mentally and physically tough, and with the courage to win. We fight as part of a team, and are inspired by the ANZAC tradition of fairness and loyalty to our mates. We are respected for our professionalism, integrity, esprit de corps and initiative.9 This introduction will highlight the mythology of the Anzac tradition. This introduction will then articulate competing perspectives, source material and a methodology for the study of the Australian infantry’s development on the Western Front. Today, Australia’s entry into the Great War is little debated. In 1914, its participation was a foregone conclusion. Australia had federated only thirteen years earlier, and Great Britain’s declaration of war on Germany on 4 brought an immediate and enthusiastic response. Douglas Newton indicates just how instantaneous the Australian reaction was.10 Even while the British Government was debating whether to participate in the conflict, the Australian Government was prematurely pledging a commitment of combat troops in what would today be viewed as obsequious fawning. Indeed, the Australians offered to transfer control of the Royal Australian Navy – only a year old – to the British Admiralty. More significantly, on 3 August, a full day ahead of the British declaration of war, the Australian cabinet offered an expeditionary force of 20,000 men, to anywhere, for any objective, under British command. Lloyd Robson wrote ‘Australians everywhere anticipated with excitement the glory that war might bring to the young nation’.11 Australian aid to the British Empire was an expectation. Contemporary historians look at this circumstance in the framework of a British global identity. An identity was offered in this ‘British world’; a phenomenon of mass migration from the British Isles. At its core were the “neo-Britains” who found they could transfer into societies with similar values. 12 The Dominions of Australia, and New Zealand were very much a part of this framework in 1914. Individuals enlisting in the AIF were perhaps looking for travel and potential excitement. In a nice turn of phrase, later wrote: One potential soldier was attracted by brilliant , marching, music, drums and glory; one was itching to get a dig at the Germans; one was there because if he had not there he would not have been able to look at any decent girl in the face again; one was

9 http://www.defencejobs.gov.au/army 10 D. Newton, Hell bent: Australia’s Leap into the Great War, Scribe Publications, , 2014. 11 L. Robson, The First AIF: A Study of its Recruitment 1914-1918, , 1982, pp. 24-25. 12 Carl Bridge & Fedorowich, “Mapping the British World”, in The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 2003, 31:2, 1-15, at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03086530310001705576. The Development of Australian Infantry on the Western Front 5 there because he would not be able to look men in the face again; and a final man was there so that he would not have to look at his wife in the face again for quite a while.13 There was some opposition to the war. The socialist elements of the Labor movement disagreed with Australia’s involvement; typical printed reactions including: ‘It is unthinkable to believe because an archduke and his missus were slain by a fanatic the whole of Europe should become a seething battlefield’; and ‘Socialism is the enlightened doctrine of the century. We do not believe in settling differences by slaughtering the people. The days of such antiquated ideas of killing one another to satisfy a king or a party are surely numbered’; and ‘What glory is there in today’s warfare? None, whatever; it is only slaughter and carnage’.14 Such feelings, though, were in the minority. In this British world, whatever their reasons, Australians volunteered for service in the Army in greater numbers than before or since. As the convoys embarked there was little opposition to the war.15 Contemporary Australians can not envisage this response, for in the intervening century, the nation’s demography has irrevocably changed. Nevertheless, a legacy remains, and the myth surrounding Australia’s Great War combatants grows as the 100th anniversary is commemorated. Every , Australians and New Zealanders remember the achievements of their soldiers, sailors and airmen in conflicts stemming back to the Great War. These men are further recognised in the thousands of shrines, memorials and parks maintained in every shire and district of Australasia. Rows of white headstones set in gardens throughout Europe, Africa and Asia show the heavy price paid for Britain’s Imperial protection. The feelings aroused are an almost religious thread that continues to resonate in the Australian psyche. 16 Today, the has evolved to a point whereby popular history views Australia’s ethos partly stemming from the mateship and egalitarian ethos of these soldiers.17 However, as Mark McKenna writes, Australians don’t: see the men who boasted of the number of Turks they killed, or the men, overcome by the fear of death, who could not bring themselves to fight and deserted, or them who came back home to find themselves unemployed and argued against the erection of Melbourne’s in the late 1920s, because they believed the monument glorified war.18

13 M. Clark, History of Australia (abridged), Ringwood, 1999, p. 499. 14 The Labor Call, 6 August 1914, accessed on Trove http://192.102.239.158/ndp/del/page/17865107 15 F.G. Clarke, Australia: A Concise Social and Political History, Sydney, 1992, p. 195. 16 M. Clark, A History of Australia Vol. IV: The Old Dead Tree & The Young Green Tree 1916-1935, Melbourne, 1987, p. 16. 17 H. White, “The military profession in Australia: crossroads and cross-purposes?”; in M. Evans, R. Parkin and A. Ryan (eds.), Future Armies Future Challenges: Land warfare in the Information Age, Sydney, 2004, p. 191. 18 Mark McKenna, “Anzac Day: How did it become Australia’s national day?”; in Lake & Reynolds (eds.), What is Wrong with ANZAC? The Militarisation of Australian History, Sydney, 2010, p. 111. The Development of Australian Infantry on the Western Front 6 Popular history commemorates the qualities of the Australian soldier as being insouciant, irreverent, tough and self-effacing. It is also fashionable to believe they were naturally superior troops who required little or no training. The notion is a persistent myth.19 Volumes have been written in support of the myth and on the skills of Australian troops; the topic has made household names of former rugby international Peter Fitzsimons and journalist Les Carlyon. 20 Academic Robin Gerster has chronicled the role of popular and social history in perpetuating such mythology, his underpinning concept being the indefatigable Anzac legend and the way in which it provided a social and cultural case for Australian identity. He considered the tendency to boast is everywhere evident in AIF literature, from the wartime letters and later historical writings of Monash himself, down to the personal records of the most “humble” Diggers.21 Popular works of the 1980s support this theory. Excellent in style and scholarship as they remain, Bill Gammage’s 1975 work, The Broken Years: Australian Soldiers in the Great War, and Patsy Adam-Smith’s 1978 publication, The Anzacs continue to underwrite the Anzac myth.

Above: 17 . The 4th Australian Infantry Brigade marches through Melbourne prior to embarkation on active service. Such scenes were enacted all over the country at the beginning of the Great War and reflected widespread support for the conflict. (AWM A02745)

19 See Alastair Thompson, ANZAC Memories: Living with the Legend, Oxford, 1985; and Craig Stockings, (ed.), Zombie Myths of Australian Military History: The 10 Myths that will not Die, Sydney, 2010. 20 Peter Fitzsimons, Gallipoli, Melbourne, 2014 & Les Carlyon, Gallipoli, Pan MacMillan, Sydney, 2001. 21 R. Gerster, Big-Noting: The Heroic Theme in Australian War Writing, Melbourne, 1987, p.3. The Development of Australian Infantry on the Western Front 7

Above: The Australian Official Historian, , in a typical pose near in the Somme Sector, observing the advance of Australian troops in 1917. (AWM E00246)

The Anzac tradition, spirit, and ethos – the notion that Australian troops were superior – was founded on the battlefields of Gallipoli, and is a myth that Charles Bean made his life’s work. Bean, initially Australia’s Official Correspondent at Gallipoli, and later the Official Historian, was central to the creation of the Anzac myth. At its core, the mythology was a form of social Darwinism. 22 Bean believed Australian soldiers were superior because Australia was superior. Australia was a dominion society in which it took initiative, resourcefulness, independent judgment and moral and physical courage to survive. These qualities transferred straight into the ranks of the AIF. As early as the Bean had his own agenda in the portrayal of Australian soldiers and their activities.23 Born in Bathurst, Charles Edwin Woodrow Bean received a Public School education in Britain before being accepted at Oxford. When he returned to New South Wales to work as a journalist, he was in every way as the epitome of a young Edwardian gentleman. In his education and family life Charles Bean was imbued with the values of service, honour, patriotism and

22 Connor, J., ‘The Empire’s War Recalled: Recent Writing on the Western Front Experience of Britain, Ireland, Canada, Australia, India, New Zealand, and the West Indies’, in History Compass Vol. 7, No. 4, 2009, p. 1125. 23 Excellent detail on Bean’s outlook and historical concepts are contained in Chapter 2 of A. Thompson, ANZAC Memories: Living with the Legend, Oxford, 1985. The Development of Australian Infantry on the Western Front 8 valour which comprised the ethic of imperial England. He further developed an idealised perception of the Australian character as one based on the enduring, modest and egalitarian colonial bushman, an unwavering theme that he took away with him to war. In 1914 ‘Australians were to derive their national pride from their soldiers’ bravery, strength of character, mateship and loyalty…Australia was above all else her fighting men’.24 More than anyone else, Charles Bean has shaped the national understanding of Australians in the Great War, and it was he who brought the Anzac legend into Australia’s collective memory.25 Bean mentions only briefly that 27% of the volunteers for the 1st Australian Division raised in 1914 were born in Great Britain.26 However, an understanding of Bean’s writing provides the very necessary context to any study of the AIF. Equally, a comparative analysis of similar sized formations in the wider British Army such as the Canadian Expeditionary Force (CEF) provides a very useful parallel. 27 In saying so, this study does not seek to denigrate the accomplishments of Australian soldiers during the Great War. Nor does it seek to play down the mammoth efforts of the Official Historian. This study seeks to provide empirical measure and balance to what was an outstanding military achievement: in two short years, Australian troops became absolutely proficient, not through natural talent, but through hard-work and technical mastery. The processes are worthy of recognition. The study begins thus: the men of the AIF were not the soldiers of Bean’s Anzac legend, and they were far from being natural soldiers. Even at Gallipoli, Bean records that Australian soldiers ran from the fighting; that officers coerced them into battle; that men were appalled by the debauchery of the fighting; and that ‘some resorted to self-inflicted wounds to avoid their obligations’.28 Other troops attempted more elaborate ruses to gain a few days respite. In one case, a young soldier of the 15th Battalion caught chewing cordite by the Regimental Medical Officer, a Luther, was informed succinctly that ‘if he would like to chew a little more, he could rest peacefully on the beaches of Gallipoli forever’.29 Michael Tyquin explores this theme in Madness and the Military: Australia’s experience of the Great

24 F. Farrell, Themes in Australian History: Questions, Issues and Interpretations in an Evolving Historiography, Sydney, 1990, p. 271. 25 R. Gerster, op cit, p. 19. 26 C.E.W. Bean, The Story of Anzac. From the outbreak of war to the end of the first phase of the Gallipoli campaign, , 1915. Volume I of The Official History of Australia in the War of 1914-1918 (1st published 1921, reprinted University of Press, St Lucia, 1981) p. 84. 27 See Tim Cook, At the Sharp End: Canadians Fighting the Great War 1914-16, , 2008 and Andrew Iarocci, Shoestring Soldiers: The 1914-1915, 2008. 28 K. Fewster (ed.), Bean’s Gallipoli: The Diaries of Australia’s Official War Correspondent, Sydney, 2009, p. 203. 29 T. Chataway, The History of the Fifteenth Battalion, , 1948, p. p. 64. The Development of Australian Infantry on the Western Front 9 War, a description of the effects of battle trauma suffered by Australian troops. 30 His revelations fly in the face of the Anzac spirit. The figures published by the Official Medical Historian, Arthur G. Butler, bear this out. In 1924, of the approximately 240,000 returned Australian servicemen, 72,760 were receiving a war related pension. 2,603 of these were classified as ‘War Neurosis’. By 1939, the figures had risen, 77,151 and 3,345 respectively.31 There was a dissonance between such figures and Bean’s theme of Australian superiority. The physical prowess of Australian troops was more likely to be emphasised than the psychological effects of battle. Great War recruiting slogans such as: “Come on. Enlist in the sportsman’s 1000” reinforced the theme. Bean even managed a sporting simile amid the abject slaughter of Fromelles: The crisis called for instant action, and Sergeant Stringer of the 54th rallied a few badly shaken men and boldly assaulted – the Germans tossing stick bombs from the shelter of the trench, while the Australians up on the parapet, flung their missiles like cricketers throwing at a wicket.32 A large number of battalion histories published in the years after the conflict also steered well away from the reality of the Western Front. Some provide little military analysis, other than a chronology of events in the battalion’s history. However, a few accurately depict a technical and social understanding of the war.33 Collectively, the histories provided one method for returning soldiers to maintain contact after the war, and more importantly, for individuals to find meaning in their personal war. The works are valuable in that they are often primary or secondary sources, though they often lack perspective. What is noteworthy is their prolific number; the Great War was such a seminal event in Australian history that thousands of men were compelled to record their experiences.34 Individual recollections are often more graphic. By way of example, Walter Downing’s memoir gained prominence when it was discovered almost a century after the conflict. Downing was a Melbourne law student who served in the 57th Battalion on the Western Front from 1916 to the end of the war. His autobiographical

30 Tyquin, M., Madness and the Military: Australia’s experience of the Great War, Australian Military History Publications, Canberra, 2009. 31 A.G. Butler, The Official History of the Australian army Medical services in the War of 1914-18, Vol. III, AWM, Canberra, 1943, p. 962. 32 Bean, OH, Vol. III, p. 419. 33 See, for example, the individual histories of the 4th Infantry Brigade: T. White, The History of the Thirteenth Battalion AIF, Sydney, 1924; N. Wanliss, The History of the Fourteenth Battalion, Melbourne, 1929; E. Rule, Jacka’s Mob, Sydney, 1933; T. Chataway, The History of the Fifteenth Battalion, Brisbane, 1948; and P. Longmore, The Old Sixteenth, , 1929. 34 Ernest Scott’s figures in Vol XI of the OH indicate that 38.7% of men in Australian society aged 18-44 enlisted in the AIF. The Development of Australian Infantry on the Western Front 10 work, To the Last Ridge, is a gritty narrative that underwrites the ANZAC myth of superiority. It is equally graphic in depicting the soldiers’ battlefield experiences: Germans continued to fire their machine-guns, although transfixed by ; but though they were a crack regiment of Prussians and Bavarian guards, and though they were brave and far outnumbered the Australians, they had no chance in the wild onslaught of maddened men, who forgot no whit, in their fury, of their traditional skill. The [Australians] were bathed in spurting blood. They killed and killed...Bayonets passed with ease through grey-clad bodies. The dozen English we had with us, mere boys without arms till they could find a rifle...were happy so long as they knew where to find the Australians put in charge of them.35 One could be forgiven for thinking that the AIF won the war by itself given such courage. However, any reader of Canadian prose could be forgiven for thinking the same: Sooner or later, this German , who keeps us cowering, will be caught in an advance by our troops. We will fall upon him and him like a hapless trench rat. “…we’re bloody shock troops, that’s what we are.” “Whenever the English troops cave in, up we go.” “The lousy bastards won’t fight unless there’s a row of Canadian bayonets behind ‘em.”36 Robin Gerster is more succinct: From 1915, every mode of Australian prose, whether ‘factual’, ‘fictional’, ‘historical’, or ‘imaginative’ typically functions either overtly or covertly as publicity for the Australian soldier as a twentieth-century embodiment of classical heroic virtue.37 As Gerster’s title suggests, what such histories are remarkable for is their “Big-Noting”. To this end, what “Big-Noting” appears so remarkable for is the narrowness of its theme. The experience of combat, in any guise, is so profoundly life altering that the individuals involved often seek meaning in the experience for the rest of their lives. Ergo, the empirical data behind the AIF’s development is not to be found in the canonical tomes of academia. Equally, it is not to be read in the history of the war as recorded by soldiers after the war. The answer lies in the minutiae of technical and administrative detail recorded during the war itself. This view of the Great War has started to emerge in the last several decades. Modern exponents include historians Gary , Robin Prior and Trevor Wilson. 38 All point towards a “learning process” that the British Army faced on the Western Front, a process that challenges the once accepted orthodoxy of the war. Study of the learning process tends to be more rational in expression. This thesis highlights the Australian infantry’s learning process

35 W.H. Downing, To the Last Ridge: The WW1 Experiences of W.H. Downing, Melbourne, 2000. 36 Charles Harrison, Generals Die in Bed, Toronto, 2002, pp. 48/82. 37 Gerster, op cit, p. 5. 38 See: G. Sheffield, Forgotten Victory – The First World War: Myths and Realities, London, 2002; R. Prior & T. Wilson, Command on the Western Front. The Military Career of Sir Henry Rawlinson, Oxford, 1992; Trevor Wilson, The Myriad Faces of War: Britain and the Great War, 1914-1918, Oxford, 1986. The Development of Australian Infantry on the Western Front 11 on the Western Front in the context of the development of small unit training, tactics and technology. Australian troops arrived in Europe as the Somme offensive commenced in 1916. The five month battle proved to be a watershed in tactical development for the British army, and Australians were direct recipients of this knowledge. Gary Sheffield emphasises the British Army’s achievements in developing all-arms warfare during 1916-1918 as underwritten by planning and coordination. In 1918: a Very British Victory Peter Hart argues that by 1918, the British Army was the most effective fighting force in the world.39 Prior and Wilson stress the role of technology in the learning process. Wilson refers to the British Army’s development into a “weapons system” by 1918. When interviewed in 1998 by the ABC’s Four Corners program on the 80th anniversary of the Armistice, Prior indicates that it was the combined nature of the British and Dominion Army’s use of tactics and technology that led to the British Army’s success on the Western Front.40 What underwrote the tactics and technology was standardised training. This thesis will show that training recruits, training in tactics, training in systems – all conducted in the homogeneity of the British pattern – is the manner in which Australian infantry developed during operations on the Western Front. By 1918, the British Army was Trevor Wilson’s weapons system. 41 It was highly professional and technically enabled. This thesis will emphasise the learning process, training processes, tactical and technical development, and involvement in combined arms combat in an Australian infantry context. The early learning process theories may be found in the works of John Terraine, Shelford Bidwell and Dominick Graham and date to the 1970s.42 Indeed, of the 60 divisions comprising the British Army under Haig during 1918, all but ten were British. The achievements of the Canadian and Australian Corps (comprising nine divisions) should be viewed in the context of the entire British effort. Indeed, in terms of the numbers of German divisions engaged, the numbers of prisoners and guns captured the importance of the stakes and the toughness of the enemy, the 1918 battlefields rate as the greatest series of victories in British history. The thesis will indicate that Australian Infantry development on the Western Front occurred in unison with the development of the wider BEF after 1916. Peter Pedersen provides an excellent précis of this development in The

39 Peter Hart, 1918: A Very British Victory, Orion Publishing Group, London, 2008. 40 Interviewed by Chris Masters, in 1918 Remembered, Four Corners Program, ABC, November, 1998. 41 Given the Imperial nature of the British Army weapons system in 1918 – contingents from every part of the Empire were involved – there is even some analogy to Australia’s involvement in coalition operations in the War on Terror a century later. 42 See: J. Terraine, To Win a War: 1918, The Year of Victory, London, 1978; and S. Bidwell & D. Graham, Firepower: British Army Weapons and Theories of War 1904-1945, London, 1982. The Development of Australian Infantry on the Western Front 12 Anzacs.43 Rob Stevenson provides analytical detail on the development of the 1st Australian Division.44 However, Bean’s Official History is perhaps the most comprehensive study of the entire Australian experience. Charles Bean edited the 12-volume series between 1920 and 1942, writing six of the books himself. The series contains nearly four million words and has never been out of print. In particular, Volumes III-VI of the history is exhaustive in detail, and is an outstanding history of the AIF in Europe. Historian Peter Stanley argues that the Official History is one of ‘the great achievements of Australian history. While later studies have elaborated, revised and challenged many aspects of it, it retains its integrity as the single greatest source of interpretation of Australia’s part in the First World War.’45 The AWM’s Research Centre, a further Bean initiative, is a vital resource of primary material underwriting this thesis. The centre contains the diaries and papers of Great War soldiers ranging from general officers to soldiers.46 The material provides primary sources on the views and experiences of Australian infantrymen at all levels. Its contents give context to training and tactical exercises, administration, as well as insight into operational activity in the AIF. The centre additionally contains official records. The two series of immediate relevance to this thesis are Series AWM25 and AWM26.47 Both highlight the training and reinforcement conducted by the AIF in Europe. Series AWM25 contains a wide range of operational material and reports, including copies of messages, general staff circulars and memoranda, procedures, administrative instructions, intelligence summaries, routine and standing orders, and unit histories. Importantly, the series also contains instructions for the dissemination of British doctrinal practices throughout the AIF, and thus provides evidence of the standardised tactical development of British and Dominion forces in the BEF.48 Series AWM26 comprises copies of unit war diaries and précis as well as other operational files. Additionally, the series contains copies of the records of headquarters units of British Empire forces including Britain and Canada. The units represented in the files range in seniority from

43 P. Pedersen, The Anzacs: Gallipoli to the Western Front, Melbourne, 2007. 44 Rob Stevenson, To Win the Battle: The 1st Australian Division in the Great War 1914-1918, Melbourne, 2012. 45 Dr. Peter Stanley, http://www.awm.gov.au/histories/first_world_war/introduction.asp 46 For example, see Monash’s extensive correspondence and papers under file 3DRL/2316 in contrast to Private Verdi Schwinghammer’s (42nd Bn) diary under file 2DRL/0234. Schwinghammer’s diary provides detail of the involvement of 42nd Bn in actions on the Somme, at Tincourt and on the from 1916-1918. The 42nd Bn was a Unit in Monash’s first major Western Front command and Schwinghammer’s diary is an illuminating view of the Australian infantryman’s war. 47 View: http://www.awm.gov.au/research/guides/first.asp 48 among these at the various AIF Training Groups are continual references to the use of British Training Pamphlets SS135, Instructions for the Training of a Division for Offensive Operations (); and its corollary SS143, Instructions for Training a Platoon for Offensive Action (). The Development of Australian Infantry on the Western Front 13 General Headquarters down to individual . British Great War records are wide- ranging and kept at the national Archives at Kew (TNA). The most comprehensive records are detailed under Government Departments that include the War, Foreign, Home and Prime Minister’s Offices. In particular, the War Office (WO) series provides detail on various doctrinal and training developments and their dissemination throughout the British Army during the war. The doctrine promulgated by WO during the Great War is found in the AWM and again gives evidence of the British nature of Australian operations.49 The thesis will show that the CEF’s experience of the Great War closely parallels the AIF’s. Canadian records of the conflict proliferate; though it was not until 1962 that G.W. Nicholson published the first complete academic record for Canada.50 The book shows similarities in how the AIF and CEF viewed themselves and their achievements. Nicholson’s premise is that in their four years away from their homeland Canadian troops earned the reputation of being tough, resourceful fighters, well trained and well commanded. He wrote that ‘there has not been lacking testimony from Allied commanders that in the later part of the war no other formation on the Western Front surpassed the Canadian Corps as a superb fighting machine’.51 This is well worth closer inspection given the very same claims made of Australian troops. Modern Canadian historian Tim Cook even claims in his outstanding two volume series that ‘pound for pound, the Canadian Corps was the most renowned formation on the Western Front’. Given the Canadian experience, there is merit in his suggestion; the comparative analysis with Australian infantry is more than worthwhile. 52 Bill Rawling’s updated Surviving gives excellent detail on how the Canadian Corps navigated the learning process.53 Andrew Iarocci examines the first two years of Canadian development in Europe. 54 The Australian parallels are noteworthy. However, the most notable sources of supporting primary material lie in the Library and Archives Canada in . 55 This collection preserves much of Canada's military documentary heritage, including publications, archival records, sound and audio-visual materials, photographs, artworks, and electronic documents such as websites. Further, the database contains the

49 Paddy Griffith makes extensive use of these records in Battle Tactics…, pp. 260-263. 50 G.W. Nicholson, Canadian Expeditionary Force 1914-1919, Ottawa, 1962. 51 ibid, p. 534. 52Tim Cook, Shock Troops: Canadians Fighting the Great War 1917-18, Ontario, 2008, p. 9; and by the same historian, At the Sharp End: Canadians Fighting the Great War 1914-16, Ontario, 2008. 53 Bill Rawling, Surviving Trench Warfare: Technology and the Canadian Corps, 1914-1918, Second Edition, Toronto, 2014. This entire work critically examines the Canadian infantry’s experience of the Great War throughout the entire conflict, and in conjunction with development in the wider British Army. 54 Andrew Iarocci, Shoestring Soldiers: The 1st Canadian Division 1914-1915, Toronto 2008. 55 See: http://www.collectionscanada.gc.ca/military-peace/index-e.html The Development of Australian Infantry on the Western Front 14 digitised War Diaries of all CEF units. These give a primary perspective of unit activities during the war. By using the BEF as the standard and the CEF as a comparison, this thesis provides a critical and comparative analysis of how Australian infantry developed on the Western Front as an element of the greater Imperial force. Within these guidelines the study will provide an examination, historiography and context to the Australian infantry’s development from 1916- 1918. The opening chapter will accordingly provide an overview of the AIF’s development in comparison to the CEF. Both will be viewed as dominion formations in the context of the wider BEF. The following two chapters explore the development and dissemination of training and tactics in the wider BEF from 1916-18 as viewed through the prism of the AIF. Indeed, the AIF and all dominion troops can be viewed in no other way than as constituent parts of the whole. Chapter four will investigate reinforcement and corps, divisional and brigade training provided to members of the AIF on arrival in France, and on withdrawing from the line. Chapter five provides detail on the Australian infantry’s use of British infantry weapons systems and associated specialist training during the same period. Chapter six views a selection Australian troops who served on the Western Front, and provides a critical analysis of the training that these men undertook before commencing operations. Chapter seven highlights the vital dissemination of training, technical and tactical practices by the commissioned Australian infantrymen. Indeed, the Anzac legend almost ignores officers except as figures of derision. The final chapter shows that the peak of the Australian infantry’s operational effectiveness was reached when the Australian divisions joined into a homogenous Corps. The learning process is continually reinforced throughout the thesis as are the series of lessons learned and disseminated from operations that stemmed from 1916- 1917.

Australian Infantry on the Western Front

CHAPTER 1 Comparing the Australian and Canadian Experience: An Imperially Enabled Context

At length, the shuffling, sorting and list-taking ceases. The men have all presented themselves before the second-in-command... He turns to a knot of officers who represent our regimental staff so far, and they depart and sort out the men. Markers are called out. The regiment is told off into eight squads, the skeleton of a battalion. They are ‘shunned’, dressed, numbered, formed into fours, formed two deep, proved and stood at ease. Then steps forward a young militia captain who is to take charge and march them to Randwick Racecourse... and the 3rd Battalion of Infantry, no longer a name but a living entity, moves off in column of fours, to lunch and glory.1

The Great War of 1914-1918 is often perceived in Britain and the former Dominions as bloody, stupid, ignorant, and unsophisticated in its conduct. Bloody it undoubtedly was. Over 900,000 British and Empire troops were killed2; nearly two million wounded. Almost no family in the – nor the numerous Dominions for that matter – was left untouched. The British Empire fought in Africa, the Middle-east, the Mediterranean, and as far away as German New Guinea. Yet, it was in Europe, in the great crucible of the Western Front that the larger portion of British Empire casualties fell.3 The AIF’s experience on the Western Front from 1916 to 1918 was inherent to the British Army’s experience. Australian infantrymen arrived from the Mediterranean in 1916 went on to serve in almost every major British campaign on the Western Front until early .4 In these two years the British Army underwent a learning process that resulted in a highly effective and disciplined force by the end of the war. The cost was high. By the Armistice tens of thousands of Empire troops were buried or remained unaccounted for in the shattered and landscapes. Here the Commonwealth War Graves Commission still tends the thousands of Empire graves so poignantly described by one Canadian:

1 C.E.W. Bean, The Official History of Australia in the War of 1914-1918: The Story of ANZAC: Vol. I: (hereafter OH), St. Lucia, 1988, p. 83. This passage is all the more significant for Bean given his brother was commissioned into the 3rd Battalion when it was formed. 2 Bean, OH, Vol. VI, p. 1098. The exact number of Empire dead was 908,371. 3 This is, indeed, the case for the AIF; nearly three quarters of the nation’s war dead occurred on the Western Front. The Australian strength in France varied in response to battle casualties and recruiting. However, it never fell below 117,000 men. The battle casualties for three years of trench warfare between 1916 and 1918 amounted to over 181,000 men of whom more than 46,000 died. Another 114,000 were wounded, 16,000 gassed and almost 4,000 taken prisoner. Figure compiled from the Australian Army History Unit at: http://www.army.gov.au/Our-history/History-in-Focus/WWI-The-Western-Front 4 A very good synopsis may be found in: P. Pedersen, The Anzacs: Gallipoli to the Western Front, Melbourne, 2007. The campaigns comprise: The Somme 1916, 1917, Messines 1917, III 1917, The German Offensives 1918, The Battle of 1918, The 100-days offensives 1918. Australian Infantry on the Western Front

16

In Flanders fields the poppies blow Between the crosses, row on row That mark our place; and in the sky The larks, still bravely singing, fly Scarce heard amid the guns below. We are the Dead. Short days ago We lived, felt dawn, saw sunset glow, Loved and were loved, and now we lie In Flanders fields. John McCrae5

When viewed in this context the war was sheer lunacy. Its origins were complex, and the reasons for Britain’s participation were debatable and are still hotly contested.6 What is without question is that almost every Colony and Dominion within the British Empire little contested its involvement when Britain declared war; most provided troops to the wider British Army. Indeed, the Empire’s response highlights that the cultural glue that held together this British world comprised not only sentiment and shared institutional values, but also very real contributions. During the First World War the old Dominions provided 1.3 million troops and India 935,000 to Britain’s 6.1 million; further, Britain would have starved if not for the great Dominion granaries.7 From 12,000 miles away, Australia embarked 330,000 men from a population of less than five million. This approximated 38.7 per cent of the Australian males between the ages of 18-44; a remarkable figure in every respect, and one unlikely ever to be repeated in Australian History.8 From Canada, nearly 460,000 men embarked for the war; and from New Zealand, over 112,000.9 It remains popular in the Australian memory to recall the modern nation was formed as a result of its contributions during the Great War. The figures support the notion. Empire additionally meant the British Army of the Great War was a standardised coalition of national elements underwritten by

5 J. McCrae, “In Flanders Fields”, in Marcus Clapham (ed.), The Wordsworth Book of First World War Poetry, Hertfordshire, 1995. McCrae, a serving Canadian military doctor and artillery officer, wrote the poem in after a colleague was killed by shellfire near Ypres in Belgium. 6 For an appreciation of the complexity of these elements see, for example: Ian Beckett, The Great War: 1914- 1918, London, 2014. The origin, context and aftermath of the conflict is background to this thesis and the Australian involvement in the conflict. Beckett highlights assassination, imperial politics, and disastrous economic and social consequences for both nations and individuals. In some cases revolution, most notably in Tsarist Russia, was the consequence of the war. In a perverse reversal, the half decade to 1920 resulted in marvelous developments in science and technology, particularly in the field of aviation. An understanding of such events is requisite to any insight into the period. 7 Carl Bridge & Kent Fedorowich, “Mapping the British World”, in The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 2003, 31:2, pp. 6-7, at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03086530310001705576. 8 Ernest Scott, Official History, Vol. XI Australia During the War, St. Lucia, 1988, p. 875. 9 Bean, Official History, Vol. VI, p. 1098.

Australian Infantry on the Western Front

17 shared values and culture. This thesis will show that by 1918, standardisation within this institutional construct was elemental to its success. The thesis will show that the development of Australian troops on the Western Front from 1916-18 occurred within this universal whole. This has not always been the prevailing view. The mythology has it that First World War British Army soldiers were led to the slaughter by incompetent officers. The concept of “”10 neatly fitted into the paradigm of disillusioned modernist writers after the war. Their works are the prevailing image even today.11 Indeed, since the 1960s Great War poetry has been studied ad nauseam by countless numbers of secondary students throughout the Commonwealth; the themes of the genre are today perpetually reinforced in popular history. Five decades after the war British General-ship was summarised as: Bravery, perfect discipline, absolute conviction of right and wrong and the existence of God; a whole code of behaviour that is now little more than an object of derision; these were to be pitted against the largest and the most highly trained army in the world.12 On some levels this was true. British officers had been trained to fight small colonial wars, and now had to adapt to a fundamentally different, and technological, circumstance. The First World War was industrial in comparison to all wars that had gone before. The British Army had never endured any conflict like it. The soldiers of 1914 wore cloth caps into battle and their officers carried sabres. For that matter, the German pickelhaube was leather. Four years later steel helmeted men dashed forward using portable section level automatic weapons under the protective mantle of massed artillery and armour. Indeed, with four years practice, the artillery had evolved its methods of indirect fire support to a level of pinpoint accuracy.13 Intense and preliminary bombardments were replaced by the creeping , and by 1918, aerial reconnaissance and flash spotting coupled with geometrical precision enabled a system of battery fire that could clear all ground before it. During the Great War warfare evolved so monumentally towards truly modern concepts of effectiveness that the methods practiced in the last year of the conflict are still trained for today. In 1918 the British

10 The concept – attributed to the German General Ludendorff – was penned by historian in The Donkeys, William Morrow and Company, , 1962. 11 For example, refer to the war poetry of disillusioned officers Wilfred Owen such as: “The Parable of the Old Men & the Young” and “Dulce et Decorum est”; or Siegfried Sassoon’s “Anthem for a Doomed Youth”. These works are all the more poignant given Owen’s untimely death in the last week of the war, and the profound effect of the war on Sassoon’s psyche. Eric Maria Remarque’s All Quiet on the Western Front presents a German perspective on the futility of the conflict. 12 Alan Clark The Donkeys, Prelude: On the Aisne, New York, 1962, p. iii. 13 See Paul Strong and Sanders Marble, Artillery in the Great War, Barnsley, United Kingdom, 2011, pp. 183- 186.

Australian Infantry on the Western Front

18 Expeditionary Force (BEF) was probably at the highest peak of realising effectiveness – then or ever – and during the last 100 days of the war conducted a rolling offensive campaign. Never has standardised training, tactics and technology so fundamentally altered the face of battle in such a short period of time. Despite all that popular history holds true, the second half of the Great War was a period of radical innovation within the British Army. This historiography is the backdrop against which the thesis begins. The development of Australian infantry on the western Front can only be viewed in this context. From 1916-18, the Australian infantry on the Western Front developed into a highly effective fighting force. Australian infantry always operated as a component of the British Army. The Australian infantry’s development was a result of standardised training and tactics, hard earned operational experience, and through technical mastery of the new weapons of war. This chapter will provide context to these salient themes. Firstly, as the war progressed, British and Dominion preparation for the rigours of combat on the Western Front improved dramatically. By 1918 standardised training practices were the norm within the BEF. Secondly, developments in tactics and tactical organisation benefitted the entire British Army as the war progressed. Because the British Army comprised infantrymen from all outposts of the Empire, this operational experience directly influenced Australian practices. The third theme is the incorporation of technology into warfare and this is closely related to the developing use of tactics from 1916 onwards. Mid-1916 was the very timeframe – the – in which Australian troops arrived in Europe. The Canadian Expeditionary Force (CEF) was also a national contingent within the BEF and it fought during the Somme and Flanders , too.14 The CEF was similar in size to the AIF in Europe, and is the obvious formation against which the AIF can be compared. The table of lessons learned after the 1916 Battles of the Somme and highlighted the futility of facing massed infantry against the firepower of modern technology. Developments in both artillery and infantry weapons had resulted in a variety of weapon types, including: high explosive and shrapnel artillery; bolt action, magazine fed ; fused shells with greater ranges; and most significantly, automatic infantry weapons including light and heavy machine guns. Such were the technological advances by 1918 that the soldiers who were winning the war were:

14 The CEF had been in France and the Flanders for over a year before the AIF arrived. See Andrew Iarocci, Shoestring Soldiers: The 1st Canadian Division 1914-1915, Toronto 2008.

Australian Infantry on the Western Front

19 to be found be found at Corps or Army headquarters hunched over trigonometrical and meteorological tables. These were the men who could ensure that the new location devices developed to find enemy guns could pinpoint them before zero hour…15 While this may be so, such knowledge came at the cost of thousands of British and Empire casualties.

Above: 1919. South of the Flander’s fields, in this evocative scene children lay commemorative flowers on the graves of Australian infantrymen killed at Villers Bretonneux in . (AWM E05925) To this end, the tactical war on the Western Front was never unsophisticated, and perhaps represented the first technological “revolution in military affairs” of the early twentieth century. The stereotypical and popular view of fighting in the Great War: a one- dimensional battlefield, static and crude is simply incorrect. Almost from the beginning of the conflict, technical development and innovation came to be marked as the keys to victory in the British Army. These concepts have everything to do with the development of Australian infantry on the Western Front. The AIF was a dominion of the premier super-power of the day, and the processes the Australian Army learned from Britain for military training,

15 R. Prior & T. Wilson, ‘Winning the War’, in P. Dennis & J. Grey (eds.), 1918: Defining Victory, proceeds of the Australian Army History Conference, Canberra, 1998, p. 38.

Australian Infantry on the Western Front

20 doctrinal development and the use of hardware are still practiced a century later. This impression is worthy of immediate explanation. The emphasis in this concept is on the term processes: development, training and implementation of new technology as the method for waging war remains largely unchanged. In fact, once again, in the early 21st century the world is experiencing a revolution in technology, and modern military organisations struggle with the same processes in implementing burgeoning capabilities into their mechanisms.16 This does not mean that the method of implementing modern technology on the Western Front was a ubiquitous process; testing the efficacy of machinegun doctrine cost of thousands of lives. Viewed through this lens, the conflict on the Western Front represented a changing of the old methods of waging war. For Australia, its military was either fortunate or not – depending on one’s view – to be at the coalface as these changes came about. In the period from 1914-1916, the horse, bugle and sabre were passing into history; these replaced by science, technology, industry and process, and enabled through developments in training and tactics during the second half of the war. In the British Army, this occurred from the middle of 1916 onwards. The British Army of the Great War was a complex institution. While all British and Empire troops fought in Europe as the British Expeditionary Force (BEF), in 1914, Britain had two armies. The first, the domestic reserve, was the part time (TF). The second comprised a small regular army which trained for active service overseas. Both elements, totaling about 700,000 troops, were the essential combatants with which Britain entered the war.17 The War Office’s Infantry Training Manual of 1914 was the standardised training continuum for the British Army at the outbreak of conflict, though because British recruits were trained at unit level in 1914, there was a disparity in its application.18 Once in France too, the 1914 manual soon reached a point of obsolescence. Even so, Spencer Jones argues that the BEF of 1914 was one of the best trained, equipped and organised British

16 Again, there is any number of modern analogies. Foremost among these, the West remains embroiled in over a decade of Counter Insurgency (COIN) operations in the Near-east and Afghanistan. The coming decades will undoubtedly result in untold numbers of words being written on the technology associated with the effectiveness of COIN doctrine. These include the use of satellites, unmanned aerial vehicles, Global Positioning Systems, the list is endless. What is interesting though, is that the fire and movement infantry section tactics employed by the British, Canadians and Australians in Afghanistan in 2013 are a near match for those employed by the BEF in France and the Flanders during 1917-18. 17 An overview of the complex model of the British Army is well described by Peter Simkins in Kitchener: the Raising of Britain’s New Armies, 1914-1916, Manchester, 2007. 18 Field service Manual: 1914 Infantry Battalion, His Majesty’s Stationary Office (HMSO), London, 01/10/14.

Australian Infantry on the Western Front

21 Armies that ever went to war.19 Although dwarfed by the massive conscript armies of France and Germany, the full-time professional soldiers of the BEF still performed brilliantly during the 1914 battles of and Ypres. All of this came at a cost. Casualties during 1914 were extraordinarily high and unsustainable. The Territorial Forces deployed to France by the end of March, 1915 and subsequently took place in the major . Back in the United Kingdom Lord Kitchener’s famous series of recruiting banner resulted in literally hundreds of thousands of volunteers for his New Army.

Left: One of the more recognisable Imperial recruiting posters of the Great War (AWM ARTV04085)

Kitchener’s New Army was employed on 1 July in the opening of the Somme offensive.20 Among the Empire troops, the Newfoundland Regiment, proud of its separate status, was slaughtered at Beaumont Hamel on the first day of the Somme. The CEF, having arrived in France during 1915 were in Flanders on 1 July.21 The Australians joined on 19 July. Despite crippling setbacks, the BEF gained invaluable experience on the Somme that would be applied during 1917. If nothing more, the Somme offensives reinforced the

19 See S. Jones, Stemming the Tide: Officers and Leadership in the British Expeditionary Force 1914, Wolverhampton, 2013, pp. 4-9. In referring to the BEF’s preparedness, Jones quotes the British Official Historian, Sir James Edmonds, in Military Operations, France and Belgium, 1914, Vol. II, His Majesty’s Stationary Office, London, 1925, p. 10. 20 provides a moving insight into the raising of the New Armies and the horrors of the Somme in The , first published in 1971, and reissued in 2003. Middlebrook’s research uses official sources, newspapers, autobiographies, and war poems in addition to the recollections of hundreds of participants. On the first day of the battle of the Somme the British suffered nearly 60,000 casualties, two for every yard of their front. It was the blackest day in the history of the British Army, and precipitated momentous changes in the nature of modern warfare. Kitchener's New Army suffered grievously on the first day of the battle. 21 Andrew Iarocci, Shoestring Soldiers: The 1st Canadian division at War 1914-1915, Toronto, 2008, charts the CEF’s experience during the first two years of the conflict.

Australian Infantry on the Western Front

22 imbalance between firepower and massed infantry. In this equation, no amount of spirit could ever prevail against the overwhelming weight of shot. What eventually won through was tactical and technical innovation. It was only soldierly acumen coupled with technological development that came to overcome the physical barriers of shellfire, and enfilading machineguns.

Above: The 500 mile long Western Front of 1917. This is in part the legacy of all nations of the British Empire that emerged from the Great War. Technology – the brass and steel of hardware – may seem to represent the apogee of many Western military forces; however, success in war requires far more than advanced weaponry. German munitions, most notably produced by the Krupps armaments factory, were arguably the most advanced in the early years of the First World War. However, Germany lost the war. The winning solution also lies in the ability of a society to reshape – to

Australian Infantry on the Western Front

23 remold – itself in response to the experience of war that is the real measure of success. Britain perhaps held this monopoly between 1914 and 1918. Australia was a part of this British world; Australian development therefore occurred in concert with the British experience. However, for the BEF, this was still some way off. Ergo, the process of winning the BEF’s infantry war went something like this: 1916 represented payment in battle to gain experience and knowledge. 1917 represented a year of innovation and the consolidation of new training, tactics and technology; this was also costly. 1918 represented the year of victory; after the Allies were almost assured of this fact. The processes involved in achieving victory were far from unsophisticated. New technology and weapons systems were increasingly introduced in the British Army over these three years. This included armoured vehicles, mobile mortars, gas and aircraft. Command and control (C2) systems were commensurately upgraded, resulting in signal communication via cable and, ultimately, wireless technology. By 1918, combined arms warfare was professional practice in the British Army, and was the practical explanation for Allied victory. The development of these methods was integral to the Australian infantryman’s progress on the Western Front. Indeed, Dominion infantry operations in Europe cannot be studied unless viewed in an Imperial context. British doctrine on the Western Front established the process for the Dominions. Australian historian Bruce Faraday clearly articulates this relationship: When the war broke out in 1914... the Dominions each supplied an expeditionary force, transported it to the battle front and then considered it simply to be another part of the British Army for all strategic concerns and most administrative purposes, especially their ability to satisfy their troops’ requirements by indenting for them from the overall British Expeditionary Force ordinance system.22 One example that emphasises this point for BEF infantryman is in the issue of uniforms and equipment. The exhumation in 2008 of several hundred British and Empire soldiers at Pheasant Wood near Fromelles in Northern France highlights this fact. Because British and Australian troops were very much part of the one Empire, there were interchangeable elements to their uniforms.23 Australian and British infantry in the BEF used the innovative 1908 pattern cotton webbing set, designed to distribute the weight of equipment evenly.24 Live rounds, rifles, , bayonets and all sundry related equipment

22 B.D. Faraday, “Half the Battle: The Administration and Higher Organisation of the AIF 1914-1918”, thesis submitted for Degree of Doctor of Philosophy, University of New South Wales, Canberra, 1997. 23 Dr. Louise Loe et al, Remember Me to All: The archaeological recovery and identification of soldiers who fought and died in the Battle of Fromelles, 1916, Oxford Archaeological Monograph No. 23, Oxford, 2014. 24 Remember Me to All, p. 10.

Australian Infantry on the Western Front

24 was centrally issued and common to Britain and Australia; ergo, the pattern was British.25 Further, although Australian uniforms were most often made of Australian wool, though this was not always the case; some were made in British textile factories. Nevertheless, there were some distinctive elements: the Australian tunic had four pockets like the British pattern, though these were pointed.26 The Australian tunic also had a fabric belt integral to its design. Australian “” insignia were distinctive, as was the soft slouch hat, though on operations all Empire troops, and later the Americans, wore the flat Brodie steel helmet. Nevertheless, in all, the similarities between the British and Australian and equipment patterns were striking and necessary in an Imperial Army. At an operational level – formations and higher – British historian Ian Malcolm Brown also substantiates the symbiotic relationship.27 He indicates that the BEF developed extensively after 1916 as a result of concerted efforts that focussed on efficient planning and administrative services; processes that resulted in the doctrinal, operational and tactical successes of late 1917 and during the course of 1918. Canadian historian Bill Rawling is equally convincing in his portrayal of how the Canadian Expeditionary Force (CEF) fitted into this pattern of effective BEF innovation.28 Despite the Canadian context, Rawling stresses the BEF’s changing tactical methodology after 1916; his work providing a blueprint for how a Corps sized formation in the British Army developed professionally during the Great War. The art of war had become more than the popular image of an assault by massed manpower. In 1918, the BEF had progressed to the sum of its combined constituent arms, each enabling the others. And at the tip of this spear was the infantry. The reality was that a Corps sized formation such as the Australian Imperial Force (AIF) greatly contributed to the British Army’s success in the final year of the war, but equally, so did the contributions of the similarly sized CEF, and every other Corps of infantry in the British Army. The beginning of this learning process for the Australians came in mid-1916, for the Canadians 1915, but for the British it pre-dated the war. At the beginning of the 20th Century the British Army began transforming from a colonial policing force, an Army trained to fight in the outposts of the Empire, to a doctrinally modern force.29 Here again, the complexity of politics among the European

25 Remember Me to All, p. 14. 26 ibid, p. 11. 27 I.M. Brown, British Logistics on the Western Front 1914-1919, London, 1998. 28 W. Rawling, Surviving Trench Warfare. 29 Timothy Bowman and Mark Connolly, The Edwardian Army: Recruiting, Training and Deploying the British Army 1902-1914, Oxford, 2012, pp. 64-66.

Australian Infantry on the Western Front

25 powers influenced military doctrine; in particular, the Moroccan crisis of 1905 precipitated tension among Germany, France and Britain.30 The doctrinal and technological innovation that resulted because of such influences was profound. For the British Army, this meant a focus on the potential for war in Europe. 100-years earlier, at the time of the Battle of Waterloo, standard practice was to form infantry up in defensive “blocks”. This pattern remained in place for nearly a century afterwards. After 1900, while the assault still comprised frontal attacks by units of infantrymen assembled in lines or waves, sub-units were permitted to manoeuvre on the battlefield using rapid fire and movement. A British belief in the offensive spirit was paramount in these tactics, and based on the conviction that moral ascendency could overcome fire-swept ground in the attack.31 The Infantry Training Manual of 1914 articulated a decade’s worth of such developments, stressing that infantry should advance as quickly as possible, to ‘close with the enemy, cost what it may’.32 The manual importantly stressed individual soldier skills and marksmanship as components of the assault, embodied in the “firing line”, but the mass of infantrymen was still archaically measured as “bayonets in the field”. Technological advances, particularly the development of the machine gun, were relegated to a supporting role in the process of attack. ‘When the firing line comes under effective fire its further advance will be assisted by the covering fire of… machine guns, and every advantage of this covering fire must be taken by all attacking troops to gain ground and close with the enemy’.33 Such doctrine failed to take into account the awesome lethality and cyclic rates of new quick firing weapons. Machine-guns would literally rain a “curtain of fire”, through which it was impossible to advance, let alone overcome. This martial spirit resulted in the British military hierarchy accepting new weapons into its inventories during the first decade of the 20th century, though not taking into account weapon capabilities when integrating the systems into doctrine. The consequences of such thinking would be profoundly disastrous. As early as 1907, British trials indicated that two

30 was located in a highly strategic position in overlooking the Straits of . Germany had little interest in Morocco though felt threatened by the loose alignment between France and Britain. deliberately provoked a crisis in 1905, and again in 1911, by challenging French influence in Morocco. Germany hoped to humiliate France and force Britain to break off its association with the French. Both attempts simply strengthened the relationship between France and Britain. Britain recognised the German threat, and the events in Morocco precipitated a naval arms race, and the British Army began to focus on the possibility of operations in Europe. In Origins of the First World War, Cambridge, 2010, William Mulligan argues that the war resulted partly as an outcome of these international politics in the early twentieth century. See pp.93-100. Military planning in this context represented an immutable force. 31 Tim Travers, The Killing Ground: The British Army, the Western Front and the Emergence of Modern Warfare, London, 1987, chapter 1. 32 Infantry Training…, Chapter 10. Infantry in the Attack, Section 121, para.5, p. 133. 33 ibid, Section 123, para. 5, p. 139.

Australian Infantry on the Western Front

26 machine guns would destroy a battalion in the open in only a minute if the troops did not seek cover.34 Indeed, the capabilities of automatic fire were quite well understood in the pre-war Army.35 Despite this knowledge, in 1914 and 1915, machine-guns and artillery would cut infantry offensives down like wheat before the scythe. There are no mitigating circumstances for such obtuse thinking; what is evident in 1915 is that the British Army was not ready to conduct warfare mechanically and on an industrialised scale. There were not enough artillery pieces or shells, or even trained men to fire them. There were not enough men or infantry support weapons to overcome prepared fortifications; and anyway, combined-arms cooperation, indirect fire and integrated operations had not yet been thought of, let alone tactically developed. As late as mid-1916, after Australian infantry had entered the line on the Western Front, the Australians were still being instructed in out-of-date methods. In particular, one lecture delivered to the “New Chums” of the AIF on 7 stands out: The next big decisive battle is going to be one almighty hand to hand fight. Whole Battalions, and Divisions will go forward, and the side that gets the best of it is going to win this war. About 80% of the infantry will go forward armed with the rifle and bayonet. No doubt the crust will be broken with trench mortar and bomb, but the offensive is going to be pushed home with rifle and bayonet. Everybody who goes forward must know how to use the rifle and bayonet. He must know how to kill with it in the same manner he knows how to play football. They must also practice bayonet control, as it is very difficult to control a man once he has killed. We have one overwhelming advantage in this war, and that is individuality, which is your British Birthright, the fighting spirit which is in every one of you here.36 In all of this data is an Army in denial; Britain entered the Great War with detailed data on how massed infantry would perform against machinegun fire, while at the same time rejecting the facts associated with this information. Developments in training and tactics would have to come with the awful first-hand experience of new technology. In this process the Dominion Armies would be required to learn in parallel with their British counterparts. It would not be until the beginning of 1917 that changes would begin to take effect.

34 Dominic Graham, in Tim Travers & Chris Archer (eds.), Men at War: Politics, Technology and Innovation in the Twentieth Century, , 2011, p. 74. 35 Bowman and Connolly, The Edwardian Army, pp. 90-93. 36 AWM 25 49/2, Bayonets and Bayonet Training, “Lecture by Major Campbell on Bayonet Fighting”, 7 July 1916.

Australian Infantry on the Western Front

27

Above: Bayonets and Bayonet Training. Members of the 28th Battalion at bayonet drill, France, 1917. Throughout the war, Empire infantry continued to be trained in the ascendancy of the bayonet in the face of machine guns and quick firing artillery. (AWM E00684)

1917 marked the fourth calendar year of the Australia’s involvement in the Great War. During 1915, Australian troops faced fire for the first time on Gallipoli. Over 8-months the operation cost Australia 26,111 casualties, including 8,141 deaths.37 However, at the outset of the war Australian infantry were totally unprepared for the tasks that they would face. The greater portion of recruits had little or no previous military experience, and they had little use for the enforced discipline that a modern army required. Initial employment training was elementary. Over a period of about one month a recruit conducted drill, rifle practice and physical training before proceeding overseas. During the war the majority of Australian troops would embark overseas untrained in unit tactics and more advanced military procedures. Consolidation on the sands of Egypt during early 1915 proved to be poor preparation for the Gallipoli campaign, from which all British and Dominion forces had withdrawn by early 1916. Gallipoli was entirely inadequate preparation for the rigours of warfare on the Western Front.

37 See: http://www.awm.gov.au/encyclopedia/gallipoli/

Australian Infantry on the Western Front

28

Above: Recruits of the AIF’s first contingent at drill Broadmeadows in 1914. Early in the war training standards were typically disparate, and varied not only among the Empire’s nations but from Unit to Unit. The men pictured here have not been issued uniforms. (AWM H18373) st In , the 1 Australian Division arrived at Armentières – the “Nursery” – for its first exposure to operations in Europe. Recruiting and the withdrawal from Gallipoli enabled the AIF to double in size.38 Accordingly, the AIF was organised into I ANZAC Corps comprising the 1st and 2nd Divisions, and the ; and II ANZAC Corps comprising the 4th and 5th Divisions. The raised in Australia embarked directly for training in England. Both ANZAC Corps served in various BEF Armies during the next two years, and it was only in 1918 that they would combine to form the Australian Corps under Monash. This lack of constant homogeneity differed from the CEF which had retained its national identity first as a Division, then a Corps, since early 1915.39 Throughout 1916, the four divisions of the AIF would join the BEF in increasingly complex and costly campaigns against the central enemy on the main battlefields of the First World War. There can be no doubt that the German military on the Western Front was central to the war strategy of Britain and the especial focus of the BEF. German bunkers, artillery and barbed wire defences would soon introduce the Australians to a new scale of mechanised warfare for which they were not prepared. Indeed, in 1916 on the Somme, placenames including Pozières and further north Fromelles, became enduring bywords for horror in the Australian military lexicon. By the end of the year, after about six-month’s active service in Europe some 40,000 Australians had been killed or wounded on the Western Front.40 British casualties during 1916, 20,000 killed on 1 July 1916 alone, the first day of the Battle of the Somme, were proportionally extreme. Such figures were not to say that British commanding generals were indifferent or even inured to the suffering of their troops. Simply, the tactics and training employed by the BEF was not developed to match the technology emerging in the conflict. In these circumstances lay a

38 Bean, Official History, Vol. III provides a detailed view of the “Doubling of the AIF”. 39 Iarocci, Shoestring Soldiers…, pp. 269-270. 40 Figures compiled from Bean, Official History, Vol. III.

Australian Infantry on the Western Front

29 “learning process”; the means by which British and Dominion troops gained experience and further applied this knowledge in the course of battle on the Western Front. The learning process would result in a radical transformation of the British Army’s training methodology from late 1916 onwards. Commensurate introduction of new and sophisticated technology, and flexible small unit tactics, were also key indicators to the changing nature of 20th century warfare. In this, the BEF would be in the forefront of thinking; a vastly different approach to a belief in the ascendancy of the “offensive spirit”. The learning process never followed a neat parabolic curve during the course of the war. The reality was a sine-wave, high points marked by proportionate troughs as new methods were implemented and tested. While tactics, technology and training may have provided answers, the reality was an ebb and flow of test and adjustment, forward and backward progress, and success and failure over time. As a component of the wider BEF, the Dominions were equally subjected to the vicissitude of battle. In many respects, though, the Australian experience was in lag by virtue of the AIF’s shorter length of service in Europe. After all, British had already been in Europe two years when the AIF arrived. The Canadians had been in France for one. Further, although Australian officers and non-commissioned officers were instructed at British schools in France prior to commencing operations on the Western Front41, no training or eagerness could make up for first-hand experience. At Pozières in particular, during the six weeks spanning July-, the AIF suffered casualties comparable to its earlier eight months operations at Gallipoli. Australian academic Robin Prior indicates that at this period in the AIF’s history British commanders were all too aware of the rigours of the Western Front. Despite their Gallipoli service, Australian troops ‘simply did not know what they were getting into’.42 The Official History adds weight to this sentiment. Bean points out that on the Somme in 1916 Australian loss rates were almost exactly the same as those in the forty-one British divisions engaged in similar fighting over the same period.43 The proportional comparison between the British and Australians is interesting. The casualty rates contrast with the widely held view that the Australian soldier was superior to his British contemporary; at least this is the popularly held Australian belief. What is most significant, though, is that the statistics are a gauge. The conduct of operations on the Somme

41 OH, Vol. III., pp. 87-8. 42 Professor Robin Prior, interviewed by the ABC’s Chris Masters, in “1918 Remembered”, Four Corners Program, November 1998. 43 OH, Vol. III, p. 862.

Australian Infantry on the Western Front

30 fundamentally highlight how, when and why the learning process influenced the implementation of new training, tactics and technology in the British Army’s methods. The changes and ultimate success occurred predominantly after the Somme campaign, and after the AIF arrived in Europe. This may be one indicator for why Australians believe so strongly in the invincibility of Australian soldiers; because the successes started to occur after they arrived. Yet, the numbers also indicate that Australian infantry were in a minority: the AIF contribution was comparable to the four divisions of the Canadian Expeditionary Force (CEF), but was less than one-tenth of the BEF’s total force of infantry. Popular history often fails to consider the “tail”: the overwhelming collection of combat support, logistic and administrative support personnel. In this respect, the Australians were almost entirely reliant on the British. In fact, at any period in the Great War the majority of the AIF comprised infantry, and the Australian Government paid the British for providing logistical support to the AIF in the field.44 The analysis is simple. For all intents and operational purposes, Australians were a component of the BEF, as were the Canadians and other Dominion forces. Ergo, Australian troops operated under the same operational paradigms, and experienced the same the refinements to strategy, new technology and unit tactics as did the wider BEF in early 1917. It was the implementation of standardised training, tactics and technology that marked the development of Australian infantrymen. Both the Australian and Canadian Corps underwent the experiential learning process of operations on the Western Front. Both operated as part of a British Expeditionary Force (BEF) throughout the war, though they would remain semi-independent national contingents that benefitted from a generally unchanging divisional composition. This was not true of the wider BEF. It is the very homogeneity of the Australian (after 1918) and Canadian Corps that enables both to be viewed as a microcosm of the development of the wider BEF. Table 1.1 lists the major Canadian operations conducted on the Western Front during the Great War. Table 1.2 lists the major Australian operations conducted on the Western Front after its arrival in 1916.45 The similarities are striking; this is particularly so during the 12 month period after that the CEF spent in Europe while the AIF was fighting on Gallipoli. This chapter will show that the experience that the Canadians and British Army gained before

44 P. Dennis (et al), The Oxford Companion to Australian Military History, Melbourne, 1995, p.358. 45 The two tables show a similar Australian and Canadian involvement in the major BEF actions on the Western Front after 1916. Both represent 4 & 5 Dominion divisions in the overall British 60 divisions. A comparison of the timeline indicates the Australian arrival in France to be about a year in lag of the Canadians. Australian casualties are higher than the Canadians during their time in Europe; this is indicative of a slight lag in the learning process.

Australian Infantry on the Western Front

31 the Australians arrived in France actually placed them ahead of the AIF in the learning process. This would remain the case until 1918 when the Australians were finally melded into a homogenous Corps. In 1914, in both Australia and Canada, few distinguished between Dominion and British national aims; when war broke out there was no hesitation: both self-governing colonies went to war in a mood of moral certainty of the Imperial cause. Again, like Australia, the CEF learned hard lessons in its baptism of fire. The AIF sailed from on 22 numbering 20,000 men, while the CEF arrived in England on 14 October 1914, having mobilised over the same period as Australia. The process of mobilisation was very similar in both countries. Canada responded to a War Office communiqué requesting a force ‘to be composed of officers and men who are willing to volunteer for overseas service under the British Crown’.46 The preliminary strength of the contingent was set at 25,000; most of these men comprised an infantry division, and many of them had trained in the pre- war militia.47 A British Permanent officer, General Edwin Alderson, was placed in command of the force. The initial training of the CEF in 1914 was every bit as haphazard as it was in Australia 10,000 miles away. Nicholson expounds on the CEF’s camp at Valcartier prior to embarkation: Having arrived with no unit organization, the men had to be medically examined, inoculated and attested, and issued with clothing and equipment the last a protracted affair dependent upon deliveries from the manufacturers. All these processes played havoc with training programmes, which were further disrupted by repeated changes in the composition, location and command of the units to which the troops were assigned. All arms engaged in elementary squad drill and rifle exercises.48 Tim Cook writes that it started raining in England on 23 October, the day after the CEF arrived. It continued to do so for the next three months while the troops were encamped and training on the Salisbury Plain in Wiltshire. Indeed, ‘the torrential downpours created small lakes, and more than 60,000 boots trekking through them soon churned the ground into a sea of mud’.49 Conditions and facilities were so bad that the AIF was diverted enroute to the training camps in Egypt. When the entered the war shortly afterwards, Australian history was irrevocably altered. The CEF continued in the rain and squalor for three more months before embarking for the continent in , gaining operational

46 G. W. L. Nicholson, Official History of the in the First World War: The Canadian Expeditionary Force 1914-1919, Ottawa, 1961, p. 18. 47 Iarocci, Shoestring Soldiers, pp. 23, 25-27. 48 ibid, p. 24. 49 Tim Cook, At the Sharp End, p. 74.

Australian Infantry on the Western Front

32 exposure at Armentières and a flanking role at Neuve Chapelle in March, and entering the line in the Flanders during April.50

Table 1.1: Major Canadian Actions Western Front: 1915-18 (source: Bean/Nicholson)

Operation or Battle Date Casualties Campaign

Gravenstafel 22 – 23 April 1915 St Julien 24 Apr – 4 May 1915 Second Ypres Frezenberg 8 – 13 May 1915 Total deployed: Bellewaerde Ridge 24 – 25 May 1915 458,218 15 – 27 May 1915 Second nd 2 Givenchy 15 – 16 Killed: Third Artois Loos 25 Sep – 8 Oct 1915 No Campaign St Eloi Craters 27 Mar - 16 Apr 1916 Officers 2,887 Other Ranks 53,752 No Campaign Mount Sorrel 2 June - 13 56,639 Flers- 15 – 22 Sep 1916 Ridge 26 – 29 Sep 1916 Wounded: Somme 1916 1 – 18 Officers 6.347 Regina Trench 1 Oct – 11 Nov 1916 Other Ranks 143,385 Ridge 9 – 14 149,732 Arleux 28 – 29 April 1917 Total casualties: Lens Hill 70 15 – 25 Third Ypres Passchendaele 26 Oct – 10 Nov 1917 Officers 9,234 Amiens 8 – 11 August 1918 Other Ranks 197,137 Battle of the Scarpe 26 – 30 August 1918 206,371 Hundred Days Somme Drocourt-Quéant 2 - 3

2nd Somme Canal du Nord 27 Sep – 1 Oct 1918 Hindenburg Line 8 – 9 October 1918 Valenciennes 1 – 2 Nov 1918 Capture of Mons 9 – 11 Nov 1918

50 Nicholson, OH, Chapters 3-4.

Australian Infantry on the Western Front

33 Table 1.2: Major Australian Actions Western Front: 1916-18 (source: Bean)

Operation or Total Casualties Battle Date Campaign Includes Gallipoli

Fromelles 19 July 1916 Somme 1916 Pozières 23 July to 3 Sep 1916 Hindenburg Line 17 1st 11 April 1917 Battle of Arras Lagnicourt 15 April 1917 Total deploy 2nd Bullecourt 3 – 17 Flanders Messines 7 – 14 331,814 Offensive Action at Nieuport 10 – 11 Killed: Lens Hill 70 15 – 25 August 1917 Menin Road 20 – 25 Officers 2,862 Polygon Wood 26 Sep to 3 Oct 1917 Other Ranks 56,468 Third Ypres *59,330 Broodeseinde 4

Poelcappelle 9 October 1917 Wounded: Passchendaele 12 Oct – 10 Nov 1917 St Quentin 21 – 23 Officers 6,304 Other Ranks 145,867 Bapaume 24 – 25 March 1918 152,171 Rosières 26 – 27 March 1918 1st Somme 1918 Arras/Avre/ 28 Mar – 5 Apr 1918 Total casualties: Dernacourt 5-6 April 1918 nd Officers 12,096 2 Villers-Bretonnuex 24-25 April 1918 Other Ranks 202,335 /Saily Laurette st 214,431 1 operation by collective 10 Australian Corps *Gallipoli Killed: Hamel 4 8 – 11 August 1918 8,141 Advance towards Peronne 8 – 20 August 1918

Hundred Days 22 – 28 August 1918 Offensive Mont St Quentin 31 Aug – 3 Sep 1918 Hindenburg Line Peronne 1 September 1918 Advances on Epehy, Bellicourt, Navroy, 12 Sep – 1 Oct 1918 Canal du Nord and Bony Montbrehain 5 October 1918

Australian Infantry on the Western Front

34 25 April is a day of commemoration across Australia and New Zealand as the former Dominions remember the day of the landing on Gallipoli in 1915. On 22 April 1915 the Canadian experience of the Great War also changed forever as the CEF closed in battle with the Germans during 2nd Ypres. Although intelligence had indicated its impending use, gas was used by the Germans for the first time, and the CEF witnessed its immediate effects on French troops: Half suffocated, and with eyes streaming and nose and throat burning, their morale broken by this unexpected terror, many abandoned their positions and fled, leaving behind large numbers of dead.51 Fighting from the Allied flank, the CEF’s fought desperately to close the gap throughout 23 April. At midnight (GMT) on 24 April 1915 the AIF was embarking from Island on the eve of the Gallipoli campaign. Simultaneously, the CEF’s 1st Division was hit with the full force of the Great War’s second gas attack. Currie writes that ‘most of the Canadians survived the gas, even if many were knocked unconscious or rendered insensible, or were to suffer from damaged lungs for the remainder of their chemically shortened lives’.52 As the AIF clung to its gains on the cliffs of Gallipoli throughout 25 April, the 1st Division of the CEF desperately held the line at Ypres until systematically relieved by British reinforcements. Here, the difference between conditions on Gallipoli and the Western Front are most noteworthy. Bill Rawling calls the fighting at Second Ypres as the worst battle of the war for the Canadians; the Canadian line held at inordinate cost to the CEF: 6,000 men wounded, killed or missing53. Cook noted the War Office wrote with some understatement that ‘The Canadians have had many casualties, but their gallantry and determination undoubtedly saved the situation’.54 On 25 April 1915 Australian dead numbered approximately 700.55 Following Second Ypres, in May and June the 1st Canadian Division continued to operate in the northern Somme sector. It took part in the Battles of Festubert and Givenchy. When the arrived in , both divisions formed the Canadian Army Corps. Alderson remained in command. After significant action at Loos (September to ), and St Eloi and Mount Sorrel (March to June 1916), the Canadian Corps was joined by a third division and given over to the command of another British Army regular and the future Canadian Governor General: Lieutenant General Sir Julian Byng. Byng was a cavalryman with extensive experience. He had served in Egypt and

51 Nicholson, OH, p. 62. Bill Rawling further indicates that Nicholson provides a common Anglo-Saxon of the actual events here. The French actually withdrew in good order out of the gas cloud to set up defensive positions in a safer locale. 52 Cook, At the Sharp End, p. 148. 53 Bill Rawling, Surviving Trench Warfare, p. 35. 54 Cook, At the Sharp End, p. 165. 55 Bean, OH, Vol. I.

Australian Infantry on the Western Front

35

Above: Richard Jack: The 22-25 April 1915. Beaverbrook Collection of War Art, Ottawa (CWM 19710261-0161)

France as a divisional commander and as the Cavalry Corps Commander. At Gallipoli he led the and returned to the Western Front in to command the XVII Corps. Byng was firm – even hard – he was a “trainer” though his manner and dress were casual; moreover, he was a soldier’s soldier and he gave the Canadians Corps pride, and the troops worshiped him.56 A century later Tim Cook writes: The Canadian Corps became (and remains) the primary national symbol of Canada’s contribution to the war effort. While [British] corps were hollow shells that had divisions passing through them, the Canadian Corps’ [divisions] remained permanent… The Corps was not a permanent national army – in that it fought as part of the BEF – but [by] 1917 the men of this formation saw themselves as part of an identifiable entity, and one that earned an enviable reputation over the previous two years.57 During the second half of 1916 the Somme experience was the catalyst that forced sweeping doctrinal and tactical changes throughout the entire Imperial Army. Both Australian and Canadian infantry served in large numbers during the battle. On the Somme the Canadian Corps relieved the Australians at Pozières on 30 August 1916. They participated in the Battles of Courcellette and Thiepval Ridge in September, and in October Corps fought in the

56 ibid, pp. 344-5. 57 T. Cook, The Madman and the Butcher: The Sensational Wars of and General , Ontario, 2010, p. 195.

Australian Infantry on the Western Front

36 Battle for the Ancre Heights, most notably in operations capturing the Regina Trench.58 The Somme cost the CEF over 23,000 casualties; the fighting during the 18-months leading up to the battle another 37,000. 15,000 of these men had been killed.59 With Australian casualties at Gallipoli and on the Western Front at around 61,000, the similarity in the experience of the two national contingents to this point in the war is striking. As the winter of 1916-17 commenced the entire BEF underwent an educational and doctrinal metamorphosis. A series of highly influential tactical training documents from the period including the “Notes from the Front” series would underscore the professional development of the British Army from 1917 onwards. Whether or not the new doctrine comprised British, French, Canadian or Australian innovation is academic; the reality is that in the originality of these thoughts lay the seeds for victory on the Western Front. What precipitated the implementation of the doctrine in the BEF occurred in when British Officer Sir Arthur Solly-Flood was seconded to the French . Here, he observed first-hand innovations in “Fire and Movement” tactics as practiced by French sections and platoons. Subsequently, Flood’s work as a training officer resulted in the seminal SS143 Instructions for the Training of Platoons for Offensive Action, the most important tactical manual for the British Army during the entire war.60 The commander of the CEF, Sir Julian Byng, sent a Canadian officer, Arthur Currie, to the same conference on a similar quest. Currie’s report, Notes on French Attacks, North-East of Verdun in October and December, 1916, was submitted to Byng in January 1917 in isolation to Solly-Flood. However, his findings almost mirrored the processes to be laid out in SS143 the following month.61 The final constituent in the mix comprised the training of new drafts of recruits and their subsequent reinforcement on the continent. During 1916 the War Office directed recruit training schools to be established across England teaching a standardised syllabus of training.62 Further Army and Corps schools would be established in France and the Flanders to provide reinforcement and specialist training. The catalyst was the Battle of the Somme. The Somme experience was instrumental in the development of infantry in the BEF. By the end of 1916 training practices and doctrinal

58 The Canadian Corps now comprised four divisions, though not all of them participated in this operation. 59 Figures compiled from Bill Rawling, Surviving Trench Warfare, Appendix B. 60 SS143 Instructions for the Training of Platoons for Offensive Action, HMSO, London 17 February 1917 61 LAC, MG 30 E100, Currie Papers, file 159 ‘Notes on French Attacks, North-East of Verdun in October and December, 1916.’, 23 Jan 1917, Ottawa. 62 Army Council Instruction 1968, British War Office, dated 15 . Directive 1968 was sourced in AWM25 943/7 Part III, Training Australian Imperial force United Kingdom 1917, as an Attachment to GS 2/1 General Outline: Standard System of organisation of Training, No. 4 (D) Group, Codford, dated 1 Feb 17.

Australian Infantry on the Western Front

37 implementation were to be standardised across the BEF. The key word was standardised. With regulated training, the flow on effect was to raise the operational effectiveness across the BEF and its constituent national contingents. More so, the notion of “effectiveness” could be articulated. Even today, the theory defining operational effectiveness remains enshrined in British and Commonwealth Army doctrine.63 In particular, at a philosophical level, contemporary British doctrine speaks to Fighting Power, which highlights the army’s ability to cohesively operate and engage in combat.64 The modern British Army derives its effectiveness from harmonising all components of fighting power (conceptual, moral and physical) to build on solid foundations as consistently as possible. Fighting power is also typified by an economy of effort in its application. Fighting power incorporates quantifiable factors including training, tactics, the use of technology, and a supporting logistical infrastructure. However, these factors do not represent an exhaustive list. Other factors are unquantifiable: what, for instance, influences morale, resilience, and the intangibles of leadership? Before the Great War, British officers spoke of the “offensive spirit”. During the war, rapid developments in training, tactics and technology complemented the spirit. Thereafter, standardisation in the implementation of these factors dates to the post-Somme efforts of officers including Solly-Flood and Currie who first codified modern platoon tactics. The standardised development of the BEF began to surge after the Somme, though this did not occur uniformly. Standardisation in the application of training, tactics and new methods equates to operational effectiveness, and ergo success. Corps homogeneity within the CEF created a national identity and this probably increased efficiency among the Canadians that was realised earlier than the rest of the BEF in France. Notwithstanding, a sense of identity was also prevalent among the British Guards and Highland regiments. It was evident among the many New Army battalions that had been drawn from within the same parish, which subsequently trained together for the following year. There was an absolute burgeoning identity in the AIF after Gallipoli. However, the thesis will show that identity alone does not equate to effectiveness. Corps level Australian effectiveness was not truly achieved until after the formation of the Australian Corps in 1918. At a divisional level, Rob

63 The contemporary British Doctrine Publication Operations is the capstone philosophical doctrine pertaining to the notion of operational effectiveness. The document is available at: http://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/33695/ADPOperationsDec10.pdf The Australian version of this document is Australian Defence Department, Land Warfare Doctrine 1, The Fundamentals of Land Warfare, Land Warfare and Development Centre, Tobruk Barracks, , 2002. 64 ibid, Chapter 2, Fighting Power.

Australian Infantry on the Western Front

38 Stevenson points to the effectiveness achieved in the 1st Australian Division in France.65 The 1st Division benefitted from homogeneity among its excellent commanders, efficient staff, and not the least from hard earned experience gained on operations. Homogeneity in the 1st Division meant officers who enforced standardised practice, trained hard and who sought out innovative practice. These practices were not applied uniformly among the other Australian divisions, and the AIF did not realise its full potential until the last year of the war. Homogeneity is a partial explanation for why a formation such as the Canadian Corps, and later the Australians, reached such standards of effectiveness. Even so, the Dominion contingents remained standardised “capability bricks” in the BEF, and their homogeneity simply added to the wider BEF’s operational effectiveness. It is a measure of the BEF’s success, that it smoothly amalgamated and standardised all of its subordinate elements. The logic applied across all elements of the force. By the end of the war, effectiveness was the hallmark of all British infantry. The characteristic was intrinsic to all New Army or Territorial battalions; all regular, highland or Guards regiments; all colonial and dominion formations. Each contributed to the whole. Their effectiveness was achieved by the reinforcement of technical competence. This was furthered by a training continuum applied right across the strata of the entire Army: from recruit level to the specialist schools overseas. At unit and formation level it was buttressed by the tactics and training laid out in published training pamphlets.66 Training was standardised after the Somme, and the disparity among formations in the BEF reduced significantly. There were momentous lessons in this campaign. While recollections of the Somme focus on the catastrophic, they ignore the lessons learned. In concentrating on the early failures, what is often overlooked is that by 1918 the British Army was a highly professional, modern and capable force. It was led by thoroughly competent commanders from every outpost of the Empire. Moreover, this army played the leading role in defeating the German forces in the crucial ‘One Hundred Days’ campaign leading to the Armistice.67 By the end of the war, it was the entirety of the British Army that was particularly noteworthy. Infantry, artillery, machine-guns, , aircraft, and wireless telegraphy all functioned as parts of a

65 Rob Stevenson, To Win the Battle: The 1st Australian Division in the Great War 1914-1918, Melbourne, 2012. 66 The bibliography lists the many training pamphlets referred to throughout the thesis. 67 ‘Hundred Days’ refers to the period from 8 August 1918 to the end of the war. See: Bean, The Official History of Australia in the War of 1914-18 Vol. VI, The AIF in France, Brisbane, 1988; Tim Cook, At the Sharp End: Canadians Fighting the Great War 1914-16 & Shock Troops: Canadians Fighting the Great War 1917-18, Ontario, 2008; G. Sheffield, Forgotten Victory – The First World War: Myths and Realities, London, 2002.

Australian Infantry on the Western Front

39

Left: Major General Sir Arthur Solly- Flood, the officer responsible for codifying British Army platoon level tactics during the Great War. (Western Front Association)

single unit. As a result of meticulous planning, each component was integrated with, and provided maximum support for, every other component. By 1918, it was not that the British had developed a war-winning weapon. What they had produced was a weapons system: the melding of the various elements in the military arm into a mutually supporting whole.68 The chapter has shown that the experiences of the Australian infantry on the Western Front occurred in concert with the entire British Army. The Canadian experience was very similar to that of the Australians, though it commenced one year earlier while the Australians were on Gallipoli. The chapter introduced the concept of a “learning process” in the BEF which will be more thoroughly explored in subsequent chapters. Under the learning process the British Army reached a peak of operational effectiveness. Indeed, in four years, the BEF and its Dominion forces would change completely in character developing, in the most difficult of environments, against the toughest of opponents.69 Although they suffered many terrible setbacks during the first years of the conflict, it is fair to state that all British Army

68 Trevor Wilson, The Myriad Faces of War: Britain and the Great War, 1914-1918, Oxford, 1986, p. 7. 69 G. Sheffield, ‘The Indispensible Factor: The Performance of British Troops In 1918’ in P. Dennis & J. Grey (eds.), 1918: Defining Victory, Proceeds of the Australian Army History Conference, Canberra, 1998, p. 75.

Australian Infantry on the Western Front

40 and Dominion forces had much to learn about fighting a technical, high-intensity war for which they were totally unprepared. The next chapter will view the cornerstone of this development for the Australians through a standardised pattern of recruit training.

Australian Infantry on the Western Front

CHAPTER 2 An Imperial Pattern: The Catalyst of the Somme Infantry Recruit Training in the AIF 1916-18 This chapter will focus on the detail of the Imperial pattern of recruit training introduced in 1916. Within months of the AIF’s arrival in France, a War Office Directive – No. 1968 of 15 October 1916 – directed that all troops enlisting in the Army undertake a 14- week standardised course of basic recruit training. This directive included all Dominion troops training in their own camps in the UK, and by early 1917 the British syllabus was incorporated as the core curriculum for training in the AIF’s UK Depots.1 During the Great War there was commonality in equipment, tactics and procedures among all British Empire infantry formations on the Western Front. This chapter will show that recruit training was the foundation of BEF infantry battlefield effectiveness, and that the AIF recruit training process in England was entirely British. Indeed, by 1918 there was a linear British schooling continuum stemming from recruit training into operational units on the Western Front. Standardisation was the key to success. Standardisation underwrote the BEF’s level of battlefield effectiveness during the second half of the Great War. This chapter will show how important the recruit training process was to Australian commanders. It will detail the significant physical and administrative resources allocated to the establishment of Australian recruit training schools on the Salisbury Plain between 1916 and 1918. The chapter emphasises that individual basic training in Wiltshire was elemental to the development of Australian infantry on the Western Front. The first contingents of the AIF arrived on the Western Front in early 1916. Within months there would be nearly 100,000 Australian troops in Europe, and the year would prove a defining point in Australian military history. Despite their numbers, the four divisions of Australian infantry were dwarfed by the sheer mass of men who were engaged in the conflict around them. Bean indicates that when the Australians arrived, the Allied forces totalled some 160 divisions who were opposed by 120 German divisions.2 Statistically, Australian infantry therefore comprised only 1.6% of the Allied infantry; their numbers within the BEF were slightly higher: 7% of a total 60 British divisions. However, even the composite corps to

1 Army Council Instruction 1968, British War Office, dated 15 Oct 16. Directive 1968 was sourced in AWM25 943/7 Part III, Training Australian Imperial Force in the United Kingdom 1917, as an Attachment to GS 2/1 General Outline: Standard System of Organisation of Training, No. 4 (D) Group AIF, Codford, dated 01 Feb 17. 2 Bean, OH, Vol. III, p. 79. Australian Infantry on the Western Front 42 which the Australian divisions were assigned, I & II ANZAC, seemed small in comparison to the wider BEF. At the beginning of 1916 the BEF comprised four Armies; a fifth would be raised later in the year. Each Army was allocated between two and four corps of infantry. A corps had between two and four infantry divisions. Supporting arms including artillery, signals, engineers and later armour were also allocated to a Corps; although they received direction from their parent units and higher command, the support from these elements was apportioned as required in support of the infantry on a cascading level down to unit level. After inspecting the Australian troops on 27 March, Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig, the Commander-in-Chief of the BEF, recorded his views of them as: ‘Splendid, fine physique, very hard and determined looking…’.3 Even so, the Australian infantry were introduced to a quiet area of the Western Front on 7 April near the village of Armentières; a sector nicknamed the “Nursery” by the British Army. Even though the Australians had recent service in the Middle-East, Haig undoubtedly knew that the Gallipoli campaign represented no level of preparation for the rigours of combat on the Western Front. Rob Stevenson indicates that Gallipoli was something of a “false start”, giving the 1st Australian Division superficial experience that was not related to the types of operations it would later face in France.4 Further, training across the entire Empire Army during the first year of the war was conducted at unit level and there was no method of standardisation. Celebrated Great and infantry officer, Siegfried Sassoon, was scathing of the tactical training conducted early in the war: ‘blank- skirmishing in a land of field day make-believe’, represented his dismissal of the poor standards achieved during exercises.5 The training of reinforcements who joined Australian units while they were on Gallipoli was of an even lower standard. Typical of many formations was Colonel ’s 4th Infantry Brigade, the 13th-16th Infantry Battalions, which received a great many reinforcements during June and . The unfortunate travails of the 4th Infantry Brigade during its assault on the Sari Bair Range during the Gallipoli August offensives of 1915 is central to the background of this thesis. They highlight the poor preparation of Australian infantrymen during the first half of the Great War. Tom Chataway’s History of the 15th Battalion writes of the quality of the men who arrived as reinforcements in June 1915. Most of them had conducted no tactical training in

3 Haig Diary 27 , in Sheffield & Bourne (eds.), Douglas Haig: War Diaries and Letters 1914-1918, London, 2005. 4 Stevenson, To Win the Battle: The 1st Australian Division in the Great War, 1914-1918, Melbourne, 1013, p. 94. 5 Sassoon, Memoirs of an Infantry Officer, Simon Publications, London, first published 1930. Australian Infantry on the Western Front 43 the field. On enlistment, many men embarked and found themselves with their front line battalions at Gallipoli only three months later. Some were so poorly trained that even after entering the line at Gallipoli they loaded their Lee-Enfield rifles one round at a time, rather than filling the magazine.6 They were keen and initially fit; though training them was a responsibility that had to be borne by leaders in each battalion who were battle weary and short in numbers. Nearly thirty years later Chataway wrote that during these weeks: the Battalion was practically a new one and, what was especially important, one which had not performed a single large scale operation in practice or in fact…Another serious factor was that many of the new men did not even know their Platoon officers by name…7 The details of the assault on Sari Bair need not be covered in detail here, save to say that it was for a time central the attempted ANZAC break-out offensives of . While the battle is often referred to in academic history, it is generally overlooked in popular Australian history. It was not a battle that yielded seven Victoria Crosses like Lone Pine, nor was it afforded the “noble tragedy” status of the Light Horse Regiment’s charge at the Nek or the New Zealand Infantry Brigade’s attack on Chunuk Bair. However, Bean recorded that the 4th Australian Infantry Brigade’s assault on the Sari Bair Range on 8 August 1915 ‘became one of those “black days” for the AIF which most deeply affect the spirit of soldiers’.8 The battle was typical of Australian operations early in the war: poorly planned, confused, and a dismal failure. After a tortured night march out of Anzac Cove over 6-7 August 1915, the sat under shellfire for most of the next day. ‘What deeds of heroism performed before the light of day will never now be known’, wrote Tom Chataway of his unit’s silent and nerve-wracking assault with the bayonet over 500 yards. ‘Men would suddenly come into contact with a party of Turks appearing out of the darkness, then to struggle, curse, kill and continue with the advance’.9 At dawn on 8 August, Monash’s 4th Brigade was slaughtered as it assaulted the Sari Bair Range in the face of emplaced machine guns.10 Peter Pedersen describes the distasteful affair in a chapter aptly entitled “I Thought I could Command Men”;

6 P. Pedersen, Monash as a Military Commander, Melbourne, 1985, p. 92. Reiterated at a conference at the AWM on 5-6 August 2010: Gallipoli, The August Offensives, A Ridge Too Far. 7 Chataway, The History of the 15th Battalion, Brisbane, 1948, p. 67. 8 C.E.W. Bean, The Official History of Australia in the War of 1914-18 (hereafter OH) Vol. II, The Story of Anzac, St Lucia, QLD, 1988, p. 663. 9 Chataway, 15th Battalion..., p. 74. 10 The worst casualties were suffered in the 15th Battalion. The History of the 15th Battalion Nominal Roll indicates 550 men from the battalion killed on Gallipoli: a staggering 167 of these troops were killed during the Black Day of 8 August 1915. Australian Infantry on the Western Front 44 a referral to several unsubstantiated accounts that Monash actually broke down and used these words during the worst of the combat on 8 August 1915.11 8 August 1915 is a date coincidental to “der Schartz Tag”: the Black Day of the on 8 August 1918.12 What is not coincidental is that part of the Allied spearhead of 8 August 1918 comprised an entire Australian Corps under the command of Lieutenant General Sir John Monash. The Australians, alongside the Canadians, performed brilliantly on 8 August 1918. This event, just three years from the fiasco at Sari Bair – only two years since the Australians had arrived in France, marked the culmination of the learning process and the beginning of the campaign that would end the war on the Western Front. This thesis will show that Monash’s development as an officer was integral to the development of the AIF in France. Both the Australian infantrymen and their commander progressed to overcome the inordinate difficulties associated with waging war on the Western Front.

Above: A cinematic still from a recreation of British troops on the Western Front released during 1916. Such images profoundly influenced the popular memory of the Great War; troops “going over the top” with rifle and bayonet, struggling through barbed wire to grapple with the enemy in his trenches. On 1 July 1916, the AIF was present in Europe but not involved in the opening day of the Battle of the Somme. In the worst day in its history, the British Army suffered 60,000 casualties in 24 hours, 20,000 of whom were killed.13 Australian troops would not have long

11 Pedersen, Monash as a Military Commander, Melbourne, 1985, pp. 90-126. 12 8 August 1918 is generally referred to as the opening day of the 100-days campaign which led to Germany’s defeat. 13 See Martin Middlebrooke’s defining The First Day on the Somme, London, 1971. Australian Infantry on the Western Front 45 to wait before joining in. On 19-20 July 1916, the Australian was involved in a joint operation with the British 61st Division at Fromelles north of the Somme sector. Termed a “demonstration”, the AIF’s first major action on the Western Front was intended to divert German attention from the Somme battlefields approximately 50 miles to the south.14 The 5th and 61st Divisions were tasked with assaulting well defended German positions over open ground, and with inadequate and uncoordinated artillery cover. The results were never going to be pleasant. The operation was a disaster, and in what Ross McMullin calls the worst 24 hours in Australia's entire history15, the 5th Division suffered 5,533 casualties.16 Fromelles was a blueprint for the BEF’s uncoordinated tactics during the first half of the Great War, and was the perfect showpiece for what not to do in an infantry assault on the Western Front.17 The British Corps Commander, Sir , blamed the Australians entirely: The artillery preparations were adequate. There were sufficient guns and sufficient ammunition. The wire was properly cut, and the assaulting battalions had a clear run into the enemy’s trenches. The Australian infantry attacked in the most gallant manner and gained the enemy’s position, but they were not sufficiently trained to consolidate the ground gained. They were eventually compelled to withdraw and lost heavily doing so.18 Lost heavily is an understatement: 1,700 men were killed. In his autobiography, To the Last Ridge, veteran Hugh Downing wrote ‘…the sandbags were splashed with red, and red were the firesteps, the duckboards, the bays. And the stench of stagnant pools of the blood of heroes is in our nostrils even now’.19 Bean does not directly state that Haking lied in his summation, though he is damning: ‘The reasons for this failure seem to have been loose thinking and somewhat reckless decision on the part of the higher staff …it is difficult to conceive that the operation, as planned, was ever likely to succeed’.20 After the battle, the indomitable 15th Australian Infantry Brigade’s commander, Harold “Pompey” Elliott, broke down when he witnessed his men struggling back into their own trenches.21 Whatever the circumstance for individuals, the 5th Division was “gutted” at Fromelles and rendered operationally ineffective for months afterwards22. As tragic as it was, Fromelles graphically reinforced that Australians were unprepared for the rigours of combat on the Western Front;

14 Bean, OH, Vol. III, pp. 331-333. 15 Ross McMullin,, “Disaster at Fromelles”, Wartime Magazine, Issue 36, Canberra, 2006. 16 Bean, OH, Vol. III, p. 442. 17 Ross McMullin,, “Disaster at Fromelles”, Wartime Magazine, Issue 36, Canberra, 2006. 18 Bean, OH Vol. III, p. 444. 19 Downing, To the Last Ridge: The WW1 Experiences of W.H. Downing, Sydney, 2000, p. 35. 20 Bean, OH Vol. III, p. 444. 21 Ross McMullin, Pompey Elliot, Melbourne, 2002, p. 224. 22 Christopher Wray, Sir James Whiteside McCay: A Turbulent Life, Melbourne, 2002, p. 204. Australian Infantry on the Western Front 46 the BEF was not yet as coordinated and technologically progressive in the use of weapons systems as it would be a year later.23 John Harris even indicates that one of Haig’s weaknesses at this stage of his career was his limited knowledge and understanding of artillery.24 The crucible of the coming Somme Campaign would give the learning process the required impetus. Between 23 July and the end of August the 1st, 2nd and 4th Australian Divisions were sent to the centre of the Somme front at Pozières.25 By the time each of the divisions had rotated through the nightmare of the battlefield, the AIF had been awarded six Victoria Crosses and suffered 23,000 casualties26. This figure was comparable to the eight months campaign on Gallipoli during the previous year. Australian infantry would achieve their objectives at Pozières, but such was the ferocity of the battle, one British veteran stated that it was the only time in France he witnessed Australian troops running from their obligations on the Western Front.27 Australian historian Lloyd Robson has indicated that the casualty rates in the AIF on the Somme in 1916 were so extreme, so distressing to the Australian civilian population – nothing like it could have been envisaged – that newspaper accounts were deliberately misleading.28 Normal reinforcement cycles and recruitment could not provide replacements if such losses continued.29 The concept of critical mass – proportionality – addressed in Chapter-1 is indicative of these loss rates. Dan Todman explains: It is the case that the Australian Expeditionary Force [sic] suffered heavier deaths per thousand soldiers than its Imperial Allies – largely because the Australians relied on British logistics and artillery units, so that most of their soldiers served in combatant rather than support roles.30 This did not mean that British deaths in frontline battalions were substantially less. In fact, at Pozières the Australian rates of loss were proportionately the same as those in the forty-one British divisions engaged on the Somme.31 On the battlefields of Europe, the Australian official correspondent was well aware of the effects of battle on men. He profoundly believed that the shelling at Pozières set the benchmark for intensity for the war and directly impacted the psyche of soldiers:

23 Developments in artillery in the period from mid-1916 to mid-1917 are a salient example. In this year period their development was exponential. See: Strong & Marble, Artillery in the Great War, pp. 124-125. 24 Harris, Douglas Haig & the First World War, p. 221. 25 The 3rd Division, raised in Australia, was sent directly to England for training. 26 Bean, OH, Vol. III, pp. 862-863. 27 1918 Remembered, Four Corners Program narrated by Chris Masters, ABC, 1998. 28 L. Robson, The First AIF: A Study of its Recruitment 1914-1918, Melbourne, 1982, pp. 82-83. 29 ibid, p. 83. 30 Todman, The Great War: Myth & Memory, London, 2007, p. 66. 31 Bean, OH, Vol. III, p. 862. Australian Infantry on the Western Front 47 The Pozières bombardment had ripped from their souls the protective coverings of convention, and, although the great majority after a short rest set their teeth and quietly gave themselves up to fate and a renewal of such terrors, a proportion could never without compulsion face them again... The punishment which until now had been supreme in the AIF – to be returned to Australia in disgrace – had no longer sufficient force…32 Such views differ to the legendary status of Australian Great war soldiers. Indeed, the “natural” Australian soldier was mythological, but has permeated the national psyche and military ethos for nearly a century.33 The reality is thus: in 1916 Australian infantrymen were not yet professional soldiers. Some of them had served at Gallipoli, most of them had not; they were volunteers to a man – bakers, students, labourers, clerks, teachers, pastoralists, tradesmen – men from every field of endeavour in Australian society. The AIF was a formation within the British Expeditionary Force (BEF), and it was the British Army that established the processes for the AIF’s professional development during the following two years. The Somme offensives provided the impetus for this development. In 1916, Haig was well aware that the Somme campaign would be one of attrition. In Firepower, Dominick Graham indicates that Haig reduced – not rationalised – such complexities; ‘the provision of adequate means with which to fight a series of dour battles, and, above all, the master principle of war that victory could only be obtained by offensive action’.34 During the first months of 1916 Haig knew implicitly the parlous state of France’s Verdun battlefield in the southern sectors of the Western Front. He knew the BEF was needed to relieve pressure there. Grim, abrupt, single-minded, Martin Middlebrook writes that Haig may have had many faults, but disloyalty to his allies was not one of them. Indeed, Haig hoped to realise a series of sledgehammer blows by the BEF on the Somme that would see the war concluded by the end of 1916.35 Politics also played a role in his rationale. Haig did not want his forces to play a secondary role to the French, and he considered the arrangement to conduct an Anglo-French offensive north and south of the Somme River to be an equal

32 Bean, OH, Vol. III, p. 870. 33 By way of example, the late John Laffin, prodigiously published work on the outstanding soldierly qualities of Australians for decades. Typical of his prose is: Anzacs at War: The Story of Australian and New Zealand Battles, Abelard-Schuman, London, 1965 which mawkishly praises Australasian troops while playing down the skills of the British and opposition. The mass market frenzy occurring as the centenary of the Great War commences continues in a similar vein, though academics are starting to rebut the more blatant claims: ‘They are great soldiers these Australians with their keen, clear-cut, falcon faces ... There is a reckless dare-devilry combined with a spice of cunning which gives them a place of their own in the Imperial ranks’, quoted and refuted by Elizabeth Greenhalgh in Craig Stockings (ed.), Zombie Myths of the Australian Military, p. 70. 34 Bidwell & Graham, Firepower: British Army Weapons and Theories of War 1904-1945, London, 1982, p. 70. 35 M. Middlebrook, The First Day on the Somme, p.70. Australian Infantry on the Western Front 48 venture in breaking the German Army on the Western Front.36 By the beginning of 1916, the French commander-in-chief had agreed to this notional plan, and a joint operation was scheduled for mid-year. By the end of March, though, Haig knew that the French would not be prepared. He was candid in his assessment of the situation: [T]he French spoke freely and said ‘They had lost severely in men, and it was now time for the British to play their part’, or some such words… Lord K. [Kitchener]…thinks the French are aiming at a development of their dominions in the Eastern Mediterranean, and will not now fight actively to beat the German in France. Consequently it is possible that the war will not end this year… I said that I never had any intention of attacking with all available troops except in an emergency to save the French… Meantime, I am strengthening the long line which I have recently taken over, and training the troops. I have not got an Army in France really, but a collection of divisions untrained for the field.37 This diary entry is insightful. The Somme offensive might not result in a “knock-out blow” to the enemy, only in a wearing down of German forces.38 It also appears that Haig was intuitively aware that the war would be drawn-out, and that he knew the quality of technology and the soldiers under his command were perhaps not yet equal to the task.39 He constantly sought solutions to this dilemma, and one was offered by modern technology. Technology was a “force multiplier” in the Great War, and Haig was keen to employ it. As early as 1916, he recognised that technology including the use of gas, guns, tanks and aircraft when combined with the infantry was a potential war-winner.40 Hard training and modern tactics would underwrite this “learning process”, doctrine would codify it. It was not always a neat upwards curve. The massive setbacks have resulted in popular history reviling Haig as an ignorant technophobe.41 This is unfair. John Harris indicates that ‘with regard to the most modern military technology Haig was no Luddite’. Even as a junior officer he recognised that technology may save his skin and he had a healthy interest in it.42 As commander of the BEF he controlled a large and highly complex organisation. The reality is that under his leadership, in evolving an effective weapons system, capable of actually winning the war, the

36 Harris, Douglas Haig, pp. 204-208. 37 Haig diary entry 29 , in G. Sheffield & J. Bourne (eds.), Douglas Haig: War Diaries and Letters 1914-1918, London, 2005, p. 183. 38 Harris, Douglas Haig, pp. 211-213. 39 ibid, p. 212. 40 P. Griffith, Battle Tactics of the Western Front: the British Army’s Art of Attack 1916-1918, London, 1994, p. 110. 41 See for example several quotes from Episode-1 of the Blackadder Goes Forth television series (1989) describing Haig’s generalship: Blackadder: Are we all going to get killed? Yes. Clearly, Field Marshal Haig is about to make another gargantuan effort to move his drinks cabinet another six inches closer to Berlin. Blackadder: Would Haig’s brilliant plan involve us climbing out of our trenches and walking slowly towards the enemy, Sir? It’s the same plan we used last time and the seventeen times before that. 42 Harris, Douglas Haig, p. 23. Australian Infantry on the Western Front 49 BEF emerges as an innovative and highly effective force.43 It was in these circumstances that the AIF arrived on Western Front. The Canadian Expeditionary Force (CEF), the other large Dominion element of the BEF, had been there a year. Indeed, Chapter 1 describes how the CEF had experienced its own “Pozières like epiphany” on the Western Front at Ypres while the AIF was still on Gallipoli. In the middle of 1915, a Canadian officer recorded the manifestation thus: A change of face is noticeable in most, if not all the men…Young men have become old men, aged years in weeks. Talkative men have become quiet…The camp visitor would scarcely recognize in these quiet men the roisterers of other days. No more is “Tipperary” heard - never in this land.44 The 1st Division of the CEF had departed the Canadian training base at Valcartier in October 1914, embarking from Quebec for further training in Salisbury. It deployed to the Western Front during the following year. Their standard of training was elementary, the most they would undertake before active service would be basic exercises in weapons handling and drill.45 Training in the field was conducted on a divisional basis and remained simplistic. As late as February 1916, the 1st Canadian Division listed its training fundamentals as: 1. Infantry Drill & Tactics.46 i. Drill Rifle Exercises Squad and Company Drill (Officers-Company in Battalion Drill) Extended Order Drill Communicating Drill: with special reference to acquiring a good word of command and inculcating self-reliance ii. Tactics a. Trench Warfare Trench discipline How to defend a section of the trench line System of Patrols, Listening Posts, Reconnaissance Attack from trench to trench Consolidating and capturing a position Making and meeting counter-attacks Orders and arrangements to meet gas and fire projectors Orders for assault on German trenches b. Open Warfare

43 G. Sheffield, Forgotten Victory: The First World War Myths and Realities, London, 2002, p. 146. 44 Macleans, 15 June 1915, p32; quoted in Terry Copp, Canada’s National Army, Canada’s National Interest 1918, Ottawa, 2008. 45 G. W. L. Nicholson, Official History Of The Canadian Army In The First World War: The Canadian Expeditionary Force 1914-1919, Ottawa, 1961, p. 24. 46 LAC RG9 III Canadian Corps, General Staff Folder 108, File 29,1st Canadian Divisional training School Syllabus of Instruction 25 Feb – 10 Mar 1916, Ottawa.

Australian Infantry on the Western Front 50 Principles of Attack and Defence – use of ground and taking cover Protection – Advance, Flank and Rearguards – Outposts – Patrols Inter-communication and field messages March discipline Night operations Orders (officers only) Attack and defence of localities River crossings Simple schemes on ground In this regimen lies no mention of platoon tactics, fire and movement or the use of section support weapons; all of which would be fundamental to the infanteer’s skill-set by the end of the war. Further, the system of giving orders – passing down tactical plans and objectives – was provided only to officers. What if the officer were killed or wounded? Later in the war, one of the great characteristics of the BEF was the ability for men to cross train: if any one man was killed or wounded then there were others to fulfill his duties. The method of giving orders and taking command if the leader was incapacitated was intrinsic to this process. This was not well developed in the British Army – consequently nor was it in either the CEF or AIF – until after the Somme. The Canadian Corps fought in the battles of 1916 leading up to the Somme campaign of July. A joined the CEF in September and in this

Above: A “ Pozières like epiphany” for the Canadians: a realisation of the complexities of modern warfare. This image of the landscape around the Second Battle Ypres was taken between 22-25 April 1915. This was around the same time the AIF was landing on Gallipoli. (CNA PA-002165) Australian Infantry on the Western Front 51

homogenous entity lay the genesis for one of the most innovative and effective fighting Units of the Great War. The four divisions of the Canadian Corps served in the British 4th Army during the latter half of 1916 and figured prominently in operations around the Somme between September and November. Almost 25,000 Canadians were killed, wounded or reported missing in during this period.47 This figure is similar to the losses of the AIF during July and August on the same battlefields.48 The similarity of these figures is indicative of the parallel experiences of two comparable forces serving concurrently in an Imperial Army. One memorable characteristic of both the AIF and CEF during the first years of the war was their poor standard of discipline. Popular Australian history fondly refers to this trait among the troops as “larrikinism”; alcohol abuse and miscreant behaviour appear to be a feature of both forces. Among the Canadians, Nicholson writes that beer sales in the CEF camps on the Salisbury plain were actually increased in order to curb unruly ‘troops going to the neighbouring villages where they "get bad liquor, become quarrelsome and then create disturbances"’.49 Tim Cook is more succinct; in both England and on the continent, ‘in addition to day-to-day tensions between the soldiers and their local hosts, more serious crimes were committed – of assault, theft, rape and murder’.50 As the thesis has already highlighted, Australian behaviour in the fleshpots of Cairo was no better. In his celebrated autobiography A Fortunate Life, Great War veteran Albert Facey clearly describes his experience of Australian intemperance: [During a train journey] to Cairo there were drunk soldiers vomiting all over the seats and out of the windows; some were fighting or trying to fight, and the language they shouted at each other was terrible. We finally arrived at the station just out of Cairo and disembarked. A lot of troops had to be carried off as they were so drunk they couldn’t walk.51 There was little to appeal in the filth and squalor of Egypt’s appalling hygienic standards that most Australians could not comprehend.52 The pyramids of Cheops were embellished with carved Australian names and graffiti, and in Cairo the soldiers were tired of the constant harassment of the street vendors, hawkers, bars and prostitutes all keen to make a profit from foreign servicemen. One soldier wrote home that Egypt was a nation of ‘sin, sand,

47 Figures compiled from Bill Rawling, Surviving Trench Warfare, Appendix B. 48 Figures compiled from Bean, OH, Vol III. 49 Nicholson, p. 38. 50 Tim Cook, At the Sharp End: Canadians Fighting in the Great War: 1914-16, Ontario, 2008, p. 390. 51 Albert Facey, A Fortunate Life, Ringwood, 1987, p. 242. 52 , John Monash: A Biography, Melbourne, 1982, p. 209. Australian Infantry on the Western Front 52 sun, shit and syphilis’.53 Instances of absence without leave and drunkenness increased. Contempt for the mercenary practices of Egyptian vendors began to be manifested in violence. The rates of venereal disease soared54, and the men were scathing in their criticism of the natives, and especially the prostitutes, because of these ‘injustices’. It was at this time that the slang and derisory term ‘Gyppo’ entered the Australian vernacular, a term still used to describe an unscrupulous and sneaky character. The men of the CEF and AIF were civilians who had come straight from their respective societies, and who were ingrained with the egalitarian ethos of both Dominions. Their training was generic, and they questioned the enforced discipline placed upon them. A side note on this point; that many Canadian and Australasian soldiers were actually born in the United Kingdom might equally indicate that the differences between Colonial and Briton were perhaps not as pronounced as believed. Even so, specialist training and advanced tactics were almost non-existent for the men of the CEF and AIF during the first months of the war. Add alcohol to the boredom of routine, and the results in both England and Egypt were predictable. A month after they arrived in France, Haig now recorded his doubts about Australian skills: They are undoubtedly a fine body of men, but their officers and leaders as a whole have a good deal to learn...A portion of their front was shelled last Thursday night and a small party of Germans entered their trenches. I understand the severity and accuracy of the enemy’s artillery fire was a revelation to them!55 Historian Robin Prior concurs with Haig, and indicates that the AIF probably didn’t know what it was about to be involved in.56 Early in the war both Australian and Canadians recruits received only the most rudimentary basic training. This was telling. Training, technology and doctrine were the path forward; their manifestation was realised in combined arms operations. In 1916 the concept of combined operations was embryonic, though straight forward. The concept remains unchanged nearly a century later: a basic idea that different combat arms and weapons systems must be used in concert to maximise the survival and combat effectiveness of the others. Indeed, the strengths of one system compensate for the weaknesses of others.57 Notwithstanding, the complexities were significant, but could be

53 Bill Gammage, The Broken Years: Australian Soldiers in the Great War, Ringwood, 1975p. 36. 54 Patsy Adam-Smith, The Anzacs, Melbourne, 1985, pp. 71-75. 55 Haig diary 9 in Sheffield & Bourne, Douglas Haig…, p. 186. 56 Robin Prior interviewed in 1918 Remembered, Four Corners Program narrated by Chris Masters, ABC, 1998. 57 Even today, the ability to combine fire, protection and movement by different arms has been the key to success in close combat and represents an important measure of an army’s professional effectiveness. In close Australian Infantry on the Western Front 53 reduced to mathematical fundamentals. In the constituent equation of the machine-gun, , gas and massed artillery versus manpower alone, no soldier, irrespective of nationality, could hope to prevail. Haig knew that training was a partial methodology for breaking the deadlock of such circumstances. In 1918 he would record an absolute ‘need for the training of battalion commanders, who in their turn must train their company and platoon commanders. This is really a platoon commander’s war...’58, but this was not yet standard practice. In early 1916 during Australian preparations for embarkation to the Western Front, training and administration for the thousands of Australian recruits in Egypt proved difficult for the AIF to manage. This was compounded by the AIF Headquarters’ scheduled move from Egypt to the United Kingdom in April 1916.59 The flow-on effect among the rank and file was manifested in poor operational readiness, and in the undisciplined conduct of off-duty soldiers. So serious had this issue become, that the GOC of the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force, General Sir , wrote to the Chief of the Imperial General Staff in London during February highlighting the ‘extreme indiscipline and inordinate vanity of the Australians’.60 Geoff Barr, in his study on Policing the AIF, indicates that on arriving back in Egypt after Gallipoli, many morose and battle weary troops had taken solace in alcohol, and that policing an army that had yet to get its fighting spirit back was exceedingly difficult. At this time, self-discipline in the AIF was at its lowest point.61 The term self-discipline presented a very real dissonance for Australian infantrymen at the beginning of 1916. This thesis will prove that the men of Sir Archibald Murray’s description – the low self esteem of Geoff Barr’s Australians – were in every sense of the word different to the highly professional troops serving in the same army at the end of 1918. This thesis will show that the factors that brought about this remarkable change lay in the foundation skills imparted during standardised Imperial training. With training came confidence, with confidence came self- discipline and pride; with all of the foregoing, the resultant need for enforced discipline could be relaxed. In a twist, the end of a regimen of modern, standardised training actually gave greater independence for the individual soldier.

combat, no single arm or weapons system can succeed alone: infantry must be teamed with tanks and both must be linked to artillery. A précis of the 20th century development of Australian combined arms processes can be read in Lieutenant General (ret’d) , ‘General Monash’s Orchestra – Reaffirming Combined Arms Warfare’ in Michael Evans and Alan Ryan (eds), From Brietenfeld to Baghdad – Perspectives on Combined Arms Warfare, Land Warfare Studies Centre, Working Paper No. 122, July 2003. 58 Haig diary entry 23 Jul 18, in Sheffield & Bourne, Douglas Haig…, p. 436. 59 Dennis (et al), Companion to Australian Military History..., p. 16; & Bean, Vol III, p. 33. 60 Bean, OH, Vol III, p. 57. 61 G. Barr, Military Discipline: Policing the 1st Australian Imperial Force 1914-1920, Canberra, 2008, pp. 73-6. Australian Infantry on the Western Front 54 Like the Canadians during their early days on the Salisbury Plain, Australian troops were under-trained and poorly employed. Their leadership was inexperienced, and the approach that the newly appointed commander of the Australian 5th Division62 Major General McCay proved a salient example of the case in point. McCay’s response to the difficulties encountered during a badly organised 60km desert march was to rebuke, not reflect: When troops are ordered to make marches it is for some definite purpose, and it is always necessary that troops reach their destinations as formed bodies...The did not answer this test on any of the 3 days of its march...A soldier’s duty is to do what he is told in the time and manner appointed, and to persevere to the limits of his .63 McCay’s dour personality shaped this response, of course. Nevertheless, in these words lay a failure in the fundamentals of his command responsibilities. Simply, unrealistic expectations placed on poory led and trained Australians invariably led to low results. This pattern would be repeated later on the Western Front. Not unexpectedly, McCay created much resentment among his troops with his approach, and he would go on to figure prominently in the Fromelles debacle. However, he had made an academic point: it was clear that the AIF, much expanded and not yet efficient, would require a great deal of training to become battle-ready. Standardised recruit training imposed by the War Office would lay the foundation stone for later battlefield effectiveness. Even before the Somme, the BEF recognised the essential requirement for regulating the core skills of its infantry. The British experience from 1914 to late-1916, including 1st and 2nd Ypres, Neuve Chapelle, Loos, and the Somme offensives, had reinforced the parabolic nature of the learning process.64 Dan Todman highlights the effects of the massive expansion of the BEF in 1915, and points to the some of the early successes of the foregoing list of battles, but also the dramatic failures that were the end result for most of them.65 1915 was also marked by the inordinate difficulties associated with coordinating technology and large numbers of new troops. These were not processes to which British generals were accustomed.66 Colonial officers would have had even less experience. When Haig assumed command on 19 , he well knew the size of the organisation he commanded: In addition to planning operations, disseminating military doctrine and organising training, [Haig’s] HQ kept the vast army fed, clothed and supplied with weapons,

62 5th Australian Infantry Division: 8th/14th/15th Infantry Brigades. 63 Wray, Sir James Whiteside McCay, p. 165. 64 See for example Dominick Graham, Fire-Power: British Army Weapons and Theories of War 1904-1945, London, 1982. 65 Todman, Great War: Myth and Memory, pp. 78-79. 66 ibid, p. 80. Australian Infantry on the Western Front 55 ammunition, fresh manpower, horse, mules, fodder, motor vehicles, fuel, petrol, barbed wire, bandages and everything else it needed. It ran a postal service, organised hospitals and medical services and managed a transport network in rear areas that included canals as well as railways and motor transport.67 Training was to all such matters. Andrew Iarocci indicates how difficult it was to train the large number of infantry replacements for the Canadian divisions involved in II Ypres during 1915.68 Kitchener’s New Army, raised during 1915 and decimated on the Somme, had been trained at independent unit level. “On the job” training was inefficient, impractical and difficult to standardise. Setting down a syllabus of training for large numbers of recruits was a massive undertaking, and the basic training process was an entirely British initiative. Subsequently, Army Council Instruction 1968 issued by the British War Office, dated 15 October 16, decreed all recruits for the British Army were to undertake a 14-week standardised syllabus of ab initio training. The Australians followed the directive verbatim. The CEF did, too; the Canadians were absolutely on board with a proposal for standardisation. By the middle of 1915, the CEF had almost entirely left the Salisbury Plain and was training at Shorncliffe in the Southeast of England. Its training centres would remain there for the duration. Cook writes that ‘Shorncliffe was a rustic, idyllic location in which to prepare for war’.69 By the end of the Somme campaign there were 135,000 Canadian troops in and around Shorncliffe training to reinforce the four divisions of the CEF in France, about 108,000 men.70 Canada also benefitted from the forward thinking training specialists, and the commander of Canada’s Overseas Ministry in London, Major General Sir Richard Turner wrote to the Canadian High Commissioner in London, Sir George Perley stressing its importance.71 By early 1917, the Canadian High Commission directed the CEF adopt the War Office Training Syllabus in its entirety, and ‘demanded every recruit arriving in the United Kingdom have a certificate attesting to his progress’.72 In the AIF’s case, the Australian Government insisted that the force would retain its distinct national identity. While sustainment and combat support for Australian infantry were realised from Imperial sources, the responsibility for administration and training remained an AIF responsibility. These were dual functions that ran in parallel. As early as May 1915, the Australian Government had provided for the establishment of an AIF presence in London to

67 Harris, Douglas Haig, p. 190. 68 Andrew Iarocci, Shoestring Soldiers: The 1st Canadian Division 1914-1915, Toronto, 2008, pp. 185-187. 69 Tim Cook, Shock Troops, p. 46. 70 Nicholson, OH, p. 224. 71 LAC RG9 III Canadian Corps, General Staff Folder 90, file 10, correspondence Turner to Persey dated 16 & 20 December 1916. 72 Rawling, Surviving Trench Warfare p. 96. Australian Infantry on the Western Front 56 administer Australian troops wounded and re-embarking for active service.73 Command of this establishment fell to Major General Sir , KCMG, VD. Newton Moore, a former West Australian Premier and experienced militia officer, was the incumbent West Australian Agent-General in London. His diplomatic credentials were impeccable. Meanwhile, the Administrative functionality of the AIF was still in Egypt from where the bulk of the troops had embarked for Gallipoli. As Australian divisions were entering the front on the Somme battlefields, the AIF Administrative HQ commenced relocating to the United Kingdom. Newton Moore’s command underwent a period of commensurate rapid expansion to establish a training infrastructure on the Salisbury Plain in England.74 The Salisbury region in Wiltshire had long had a British Army presence, and the establishment of AIF Training and Command depots in the region was especially significant. The Canadians had trained in the region 18-months earlier. Training Depots, divided into Groups, were designed to receive recruits from Australia to undertake basic training. Command Depots were designed to train men who had been wounded and were likely to be deemed fit to return to the front. A period of great politicisation surrounding who would be selected to command the AIF Administrative HQ in the UK resulted in several appointments during the year following the AIF’s arrival in Europe.75 Indeed, the dilemma went on well into 1917, and the Official History goes into great detail on the plotting among the contenders seeking this prized command.76 Meanwhile, Newton Moore’s skills resulted in him retaining command of the expanding AIF Depot system throughout the UK. Bean considered him ideal for the duty: Newton Moore...did not, at first acquaintance, leave an impression of ability. Yet, under a bluff exterior he had...a wide experience of men and the ability to handle them; and these qualities, together with the politician’s sense of what men were feeling, a kindly humour, marked determination... [highlighting] the principle that no troops should be sent to France until passed as sufficiently trained according to the standards laid down by the War Office.77 Moore was equal to the task, and he developed a robust administrative and training regimen during mid-1916, overseeing a major redevelopment during the following year.78 The Salisbury Plain remained the chief training centre for Australian forces for the duration of the war, and HQ AIF Depots was located at Bhurtpore Barracks, Tidworth. Further centres were

73 John Connor, Anzac and Empire: George Foster Pearce and the Foundations of Australian Defence, Melbourne, 2011, p. 84. 74 Bean, OH, Vol. III, pp. 145-167. 75 Connor, Anzac and Empire, pp. 84-86. 76 ibid, pp. 172-174. 77 Bean, OH, Vol. III, p. 175. 78 AWM 15, Australian Imperial Force depots in the United Kingdom - Headquarters (Salisbury Plain) Central Registry, Tidworth files, AWM Canberra. Australian Infantry on the Western Front 57 established in the surrounding area at Codford, Fovant, Grantham, Hurdcott, Lark Hill, Parkhouse, Perham Downs, Rollestone, Sutton Veny and Wareham. The Ordnance Survey Chart overleaf displays the relative proximity of the major Australian training effort on the Salisbury Plain during the Great War. Tables 2.1 and 2.2 display the disposition of assets and administrative preparation conducted in preparation for Australian recruit training.79 The Recruit Training Depots, divided into Groups, corresponded to the five divisions of the AIF in the field. Each Group was commanded by a , the equivalent of a battalion commander. Each group provided training and instruction to prepare an Australian soldier with the basic skills to serve as an infantryman in a front line battalion.80 The Command Depots were similarly commanded by a lieutenant colonel, and returning wounded men were allocated according to their medical status and probable duration of convalescence. Owing to their experience, graduated training was conducted for convalescent soldiers allocated to Command Depots, and this expedited their return to operations.

Left: His Majesty, King with General Sir Newton Moore, at the review of Australian troops on the Salisbury Plains in England. (AWM C04394)

79 AWM4-1/66/2, Formation Headquarters Report on AIF Depots in the UK July 1916 – April 1917, AWM, Canberra. 80 AWM4-1/66/2, Formation Headquarters Report on AIF Depots in the UK July 1916 – April 1917, AWM, Canberra. Australian Infantry on the Western Front

Above: Cutaway depictions of the main Australian Training bases on the Salisbury Plain during the Great War: Tidworth and Perham Downs in the east, Bulford in the South and Lark Hill in the SW. Stonehenge is immediately to the south of Lark Hill (Ordnance Survey).

Australian Infantry on the Western Front

Table 2.1 Disposition of AIF Recruit Training Depots Salisbury 1916-1917.

AIF Training Group Parent Division Location

No. 1 (A) Group 1st Lark Hill: distance from Tidworth 10 miles Accommodation 6300 1st/2nd/3rd Training Battalions

No. 2 (B) Group 2nd Rollestone: distance from Tidworth 12 miles Accommodation 6100 5th/6th/7th Training Battalions

No. 3 (E) Group 3rd Lark Hill: distance from Tidworth 10 miles Accommodation 5250 9th/10th/11th Training Battalions

No. 4 (D) Group 4th Codford: distance from Tidworth 23 miles Accommodation 6000 4th/12th/13th Training Battalions

No. 5 (C) Group 5th Hurdcott & Fovant: distance from Tidworth 21 Accommodation 11000 & 24 miles Hurdcott: 8th/14th/15th Training Battalions Fovant: Training Battalion

Table 2.2 Disposition of AIF Command Depots Salisbury 1916-1917.

Command Depot Location

No. 1 Command Depot Perham Downs: distance from Tidworth 3 miles

No. 2 Command Depot Weymouth: distance from Tidworth 65 miles

No. 3 Command Depot Fovant: distance from Tidworth 24 miles

No. 4 Command Depot Wareham: distance from Tidworth 50 miles

Australian Infantry on the Western Front 60

Above: The Australian Training Camp at Codford on the Salisbury Plain. (AWM C01288)

Each Training Group comprised three Training Battalions, representing the three brigades of the parent division, and the manpower establishment for each was filled by recruits arriving from Australia and the . For example, the 4th Australian Infantry Division comprising the 4th, 12th and 13th Infantry Brigades, had a commensurate No. 4 (D) Group at Codford comprising the 4th, 12th and 13th Training Battalions (TB).81 Each Training Battalion fed its parent operational brigade. Instructors for the Australian Training Battalions were levied from experienced men among parent operational units. The process worked sufficiently well to provide soundly trained men – albeit not always in sufficient numbers – to units at the front until the end of the war. By way of example, No. 4 (D) Group and later the 3rd Training Brigade indicates a rotation of experienced men from the Western Front into Training billets from 1917 onwards.82 Considerable effort was made at AIF HQ to panel Australian Officers and Instructors allocated to the Training Battalions on instructional technique courses conducted by the Imperial Schools of Instruction located at various British Army establishments throughout the UK. The AIF had its own special instructors’ school for musketry located at Bhurtpore Barracks, Tidworth.83

81 In conjunction to AWM15, see AWM4, Australian Imperial Force Unit War Diaries. Each Training battalion has a Unit record detailing its activities until it was superseded in . 82 AWM4-23, Unit History for No. 4 (D) Group AIF Depots in the United Kingdom 83 AWM4-1/66/2, Formation Headquarters Report... Australian Infantry on the Western Front 61

Above: The Australian Rising Sun made with white stones at the entrance to an AIF Depot on the Salisbury Plain. (AWM C04426)

To place this mammoth effort into context, the first recruits transported directly from Australia arrived in England on 8 Jun 1916. To April 1917, 99,000 troops had disembarked in England from Egypt or Australia, and 72,000 of these men had subsequently completed training and reinforcement before embarkation to the Western Front.84 This did not include Major General John Monash’s 17,000 men of the 3rd Division, which had been raised in Australia and embarked as a formation for independent training in England. Only after the HQ AIF Training Depot system came into being after mid-1916 was the 3rd Division’s training incorporated into the fold as No. 3 (E) Group at Lark Hill. Monash’s efforts are an interesting side-note in these early training endeavours, and are indicative of the costly lessons that he had learned at Gallipoli in 1915.85 When Monash took command of the 3rd Division in mid-1916, he immediately enforced appropriate training, and provided his men with the resources that they needed. To ensure that his troops would be prepared for the combat in France, he dug a trench system on the Salisbury Plains and, using live ordinance,

84 loc cit. 85 Pedersen, Monash as a Military Commander, p. 144. Pedersen indicates in France Monash studied every document on tactics that he received, becoming thoroughly conversant with the successful techniques practiced in his own army and with the German and French doctrine as well. He seized on the innovations of others, and on the latest methods employed in the BEF, both of which stood him in good stead as a commander. Australian Infantry on the Western Front 62 rotated the division through the network to acclimatise it to frontline conditions.86 Private Verdi Schwinghammer of the 42nd Battalion recorded that the training under Monash’s regimen at Lark Hill Camp was ‘very severe and strenuous. We were up at daylight every morning and continued drilling until dark’.87 Arriving in France Schwinghammer then conducted reinforcement training at Harfleur ‘practicing battle and trench warfare and going through rifle and gas drills’.88 In this regimen, Monash had the benefit of working with his men from first principles. He also had the ingenuity of his and on which to levy.89 Above all, he had the latest British frontline standards delivered from France. The AIF’s Training Group system was rationalised in November 1917, and reorganised to more closely align with the British Army system which used brigades instead of groups. AIF HQ adopted three Training Brigades to fulfil the obligations of the former Groups.90 Under the new system, the 1st Training Brigade supplied the 1st Infantry Division and Pioneers; the 2nd Training Brigade supplied the 2nd & 3rd Infantry Divisions; and the 3rd Training Brigade supplied the 4th & 5th Infantry Divisions. The training brigade system remained in place on the Salisbury Plains until the end of the Great War.91 Table 2.3 overleaf depicts the Training Formations from November 1917 onwards. Left: The elaborate trench training system dug by Australian troops on the Salisbury Plain during 1916. Troops of Monash’s 3rd Division pioneered the use of such training to prepare them for the rigours of combat on the Western Front. (AWM C01253)

86 M. Molkentin, “Trench Warfare 101: Training at the Bustard Trenches”, Wartime Magazine, Issue 33, 2006. 87 AWM 2DRL/234 diary Private Verdi Schwinghammer, 42nd Battalion, , 3rd Division, AIF, p. 9. 88 ibid, p. 10. 89 AWM25 943/11 “Training Papers Lark Hill”: James “Bull” Canaan, Commander of Monash’s 11Bde and Schwinghammer’s 42Bn, correspondence with in France requesting a copy of the British Trench Orders in use in 2Div. Canaan was CO of the 15th Bn at Gallipoli during the assault on Sari Bair. 90 AWM25 943/11, Training United Kingdom, Special Order by Major General The Honourable J.W. McCay GOC AIF Depots in the United Kingdom, Tidworth 28 October, 1917. 91 See AWM4, Australian Imperial Force Unit War Diaries. AWM4 23/79/2, 1st Training Brigade, November 1917; AWM4 23/80/1, 2nd Training Brigade, November 1917; AWM4 23/81/1, 3rd Training Brigade, November 1917. Australian Infantry on the Western Front 63

Above: 3rd Division troops training trenches on the Salisbury Plain.

(AWM H00447)

Table 2.3 AIF Training Brigades Salisbury November 1917.

Training Parent Composition & Reinforcement Cycle Brigade Division

No. 1 Training 1st • 1st/2nd/3rd TBs reinforced 1st/2nd/3rd Infantry Brigades Brigade • Pioneer TB reinforced 1st/2nd/3rd/4th/5th Pioneer Companies

No. 2 Training 2nd/3rd • 5th/6th/7th TBs reinforced 5th/6th/7th Infantry Brigades (2nd Division) Brigade • 9th/10th/11th TBs reinforced 9th/10th/11th Infantry Brigades (3rd Division)

No. 3 Training 4th/5th • 12th/13th TBs reinforced 4th/12th/13th Infantry Brigades (4th Division) Brigade • 14th/15th TBs reinforced 8th/14th/15th Infantry Brigades (5th Division)

An overview of the recruit training curriculum highlights several phases in the training process. The course comprised two weeks of Preliminary Training; eight weeks of Intermediate Training; and four weeks of Platoon and Technical Training.92 The three phases were graduated; emphasis on the nature of operations for the infantryman on the Western Front was emphasised throughout training, and modern concepts of active service were

92 Refinements to the original syllabus were introduced during the first half of 1917, and are indicated in AWM25 943/7 Part III, Training Australian Imperial Force in the United Kingdom 1917. Army Council Instruction No. 1968 is complete on this file. Australian Infantry on the Western Front 64 introduced through lectures in field work, bombing and anti-gas measures. At the beginning of the course, during Preliminary Training, recruits were vaccinated and inoculated, and arrangements were made for individual dental or specialist medical treatment as required. Preliminary training was a rigorous introduction to the military for a civilian, and comprised 128 hours of practical and theoretical instruction. The training was martial, though judicious. It introduced the trainee to a lifestyle that quickly enabled him to undertake instruction during the following weeks without undue strain.93 Physical training was not to last more than 30 minutes, and lectures were to be conducted in between. Tables 2.4, 2.5 and 2.6 detail the instruction laid down in the 14-weeks training per directive No. 1968. In addition to primary subjects, a list of static lectures was covered during Preliminary Training that would be recognisable in any syllabus of recruit indoctrination today:

Static lectures provided to British and Empire Army recruits Musketry. Discipline and saluting. Crimes and punishment. Interior economy, pay, messing duties. Conduct on Active Service. Trench warfare (including bombing). Protection. Foreign uniforms & Regimental History. Hygiene and sanitation. Anti-gas measures. First Aid/field dressings. Visual training.

93 Covering Directive, Army Council Instruction 1968, British War Office, dated 15 Oct 16 sourced in AWM25 943/7 Part III, Training Australian Imperial Force in the United Kingdom 1917. Australian Infantry on the Western Front 65

Table 2.4 Army Instruction 1968, Preliminary Recruit Training, dated 15 Oct 16.

Preliminary Training Hours Allocated Primary Subjects (Weeks 1 & 2)

Light Physical Training 6

Marching without Arms 36

Squad Drill without Arms 6

Care of Arms 18

Care of Equipment and Kit 18

Anti-Gas Instruction 18

Demonstration in Fitting Marching Order 18

Lectures and Inspections 18

Table 2.5 Army Instruction 1968, Intermediate Recruit Training, dated 15 Oct 16.

Intermediate Training (Weeks 3 - 10) Hours Allocated

Physical Training & Marching 48

Bayonet Training 36

Fitting Marching Order (weeks 4/5) 6

Squad/Platoon Drill & Marching with Arms/Marching Order 79 Company Drill in Marching Order (week 9) 9

Company Route Marching (week 10) 12

Musketry (graduated use range & qualification Parts I/II) 114

Lectures and Inspection of Equipment and Kit (weeks 3-6) 12

Anti-Gas Instruction 8

Night work and sentry duty (weeks 3-9) 12

Bombing (weeks 7-10) 12 Entrenching/Sandbagging/Fieldwork (weeks 8-10) 27 Australian Infantry on the Western Front 66

Table 2.6 Army Instruction 1968, Platoon & Technical Training, dated 15 Oct 16.

Platoon & Technical Training (Weeks 11 - 14) Hours Allocated

Physical Training 21

Bayonet Training 24

Squad Drill 18

Musketry (including qualification Parts III & IV) 39

Anti-gas Instruction 4

Bombing 21

Night Work 3

Field Work (including entrenching/wiring/cooking) 144

Route Marching 66

The recruit training syllabus was well devised. The first stage of training was individual, during which the soldier was taught discipline and how to handle his personal weapon and equipment. The following stages were collective, during which troops learned how to work as part of a bigger tactical team. After the two weeks indoctrination, eight weeks Intermediate Training subsequently introduced the recruit to graduated lessons in the basic practical disciplines required of a modern infantry soldier. Significantly, the fitting of marching order (boots, webbed equipment and personal equipment) was conducted early during Intermediate Training, and then reinforced through regulated section, platoon and company drill sessions. These activities culminated in extended route marching. Further, the recruit was required to actually qualify in live firing practices with rifle, a standard that had not been universally established during the first two years of the conflict.94 The final month of the course, Platoon and Technical Training, shows a shift from basic instruction to the practical application of earlier lessons in the course. Table 2.6 highlights the increased weighting provided to field work, route marching and more extensive qualifications on the rifle covered by the Platoon and Technical Training component of the curriculum.

94 Chapter-5 will cover British Empire musketry standards that applied before and during the Great War. Australian Infantry on the Western Front 67 This type of training was, and remains, fundamental to every soldier’s basic skills. Developing a familiarity with the noise and physical extremes of battle, particularly the practice of live-firing, had the potential to partially negate the immediate shocking affects of combat. What is clear in the promulgation of the new British syllabus is that senior officers in the British Army placed great emphasis on a regimen of standardised initial training. Indeed, the myth of Australian superiority falters in the light of a syllabus requisite to every recruit from every outpost of the empire. When one remembers that many Australian troops were either born in the United Kingdom or were first generation Australians, and that most of them were city dwellers, Bean’s theory on the natural soldier is easily contestable: The training of the men was never the main difficulty in the Australian Imperial Force. The bush still sets the standard of personal efficiency even in the Australian cities. The bushman is the hero of the Australia boy; the arts of bush life are his ambition; the most cherished holidays are those spent with country relatives or camping out. He learns something of half the arts of a soldier by the time he is ten years old...95

Left: Australian Infantry in England undergoing respirator training in the use of the small box respirator before proceeding to France. The small box respirator was one of the most effective general purpose gas masks of the Great War. (AWM C01320)

95 Bean, OH Vol. I, p. 46. Australian Infantry on the Western Front 68 British Army recruit training was adopted in its entirety by the AIF for the duration of the Great War. However, during 1917, casualty rates and the need for reinforcements sometimes meant that the course was shortened, and troops embarked for France at the end of Intermediate Training. This was not a desired circumstance, but such practices required occasional amendments to the curriculum. These were promulgated throughout the BEF, and also in the AIF training establishments. A War Office directive issued as Notes in Conjunction with Army Council Instruction No. 1968 in 1917, indicated that ‘when trained men are not available, men in less advanced categories can be sent overseas, but no man will be sent until he has reached a standard equivalent of up to 9 weeks of training’. Notwithstanding, Haig decreed every deploying soldier was to have qualified on Parts I & II of the musketry course, and except in very urgent cases, men were not to proceed overseas until they had completed the 11th week of training. 96 As tactics developed during 1917, and combined arms operations came to predominate in the open warfare of 1918, the practice of sending partially trained men to the Western Front declined. As the war continued and newer and more complicated weapons and tactical schemes were introduced in combat, training became commensurately longer and more involved. Nevertheless, Army Council Instruction No. 1968 marks a defining point in the evolution of modern military training techniques in the British Empire. Indeed, the significance of a standardised pattern of recruit training among troops in the British Army from the latter half of 1916 onwards cannot be overestimated. By applying a common training system, ostensibly any man from any British or Dominion formation was capable of soldiering in any unit into which he was placed. Officers and NCOs theoretically knew the capabilities and technical mastery of the recruits and replacements marching into their battalions, and this basic knowledge enhanced the cohesion and operational effectiveness of all units in the BEF. With a standardised training system, the BEF began to move away from the New Army that had arrived in France during 1915 and 1916 ‘amid conditions of gigantic administrative muddle, equipment shortages and universal unpreparedness’97. Commensurately, the AIF was able to negate any possibility of a man arriving at the front unable to load or operate his rifle effectively. The rationale was simple. In taking a recruit through a systematic, standardised pattern of training, a soldier could be conditioned, prepared and reinforced for the severity of

96 AWM25 943/7 Part III, Training Australian Imperial Force in the United Kingdom 1917, issued February 1917. 97 Griffith, Battle Tactics of the Western Front, p. 52. Australian Infantry on the Western Front 69 active service on the Western Front. The process was one of providing the individual soldier with technical mastery over the systems and skills at his disposal. Such training underwrote the concept of effectiveness detailed in Chapter 1. The principle proved effective on both sides during the Great War. The reinforcement of training and tactical procedures until they were inherent built individual resilience. Further, the ability to react instinctively in combat when exhaustion and fear were pervasive now moved training concepts into the intangible realm of psychology. Understanding the fundamentals of soldiering was empowering for the men involved, this engendered self-confidence. In turn this led to improved morale and capability. Add to this improved technology and tactical developments and the results lead to success in battle. These concepts have little to do with nationality. Indeed, as Griffith points out, training was not an Australian innovation. ‘It was an outlook which simply came naturally to all intelligent soldiers, of whatever nationality, who fully understood the inward workings of their chosen profession’.98

Above: A bayonet assault course in a training camp on the Salisbury Plain. Such training aids conditioned troops for the severity of active service on the Western Front. (AWM C00448)

98 ibid, p. 100. Australian Infantry on the Western Front 70 If ab initio training was a mammoth effort for the AIF and CEF, then recruit training in the British Army surely presented greater challenges to the War Office. Forming, equipping and deploying the more than 30 divisions of the New Army, and increasing the strength of BEF from six to sixty divisions (including Dominion formations) in less than two years was a major achievement. Raising, training and sustaining such a large and powerful force while concurrently engaged in major operations in France and elsewhere makes this accomplishment all the more significant. The training of hundreds of thousands of recruits to a standardised level was not resolved until well into 1917. Dominion divisional formations probably only stood out in this process in one major respect: they were relatively homogenous in that they generally remained under one parent corps for the duration. The policy of recruiting units by state in Australia, and even from particular state districts, remained a cohesive feature of the AIF during the war.99 The manner in which the AIF doubled in size after the Gallipoli had been generally achieved by dividing an existing unit100 in two, and then by filling the complement of both old and new battalions with reinforcements. This balanced the experience and skill sets of both units. However, the question of whether AIF battalions actually maintained any such advantage or superiority after their first experiences of the Somme is academic, for the AIF formations involved had been practically destroyed. Certainly, Australian troops probably had some sense of pride in their achievements after these battles. They undoubtedly had strong attachments to the colour patches of their battalions; now forged under fire, and such feelings surely transferred into a level of esprit d’corps. Again the point is academic – the Canadians similarly used unit colour patches, the other Dominions and British regiments had their own distinctive badges, the Guards and Scots regiments had even more distinctive accoutrements. The facts are straight forward: without experience, tactical development or technological innovation, the argument that martial spirit and cohesion would win through alone was specious. The foundation of effectiveness was practical. Indeed, under shellfire and against machine guns, soldiers with good morale died just as quickly as those with poor morale. While British ab initio training became standard practice in the AIF after the middle of 1917, the reinforcement of tactical expertise often remained disparate. The No. 4 (D) Group Brigade Major, Captain P. Currie MC, believed the best method to overcome

99 P. Dennis (et al), op cit, p. 69. See also L.L. Robson, The 1st AIF: A study of its recruitment 1914-18, Melbourne, 1982. 100 When the AIF doubled in size after Gallipoli in early 1916, all of the original units had seen service on Gallipoli. It was from this experienced cadre that new battalions were formed. See Bean, op cit, Vol. III, St. Lucia, 1988, p. 32. Australian Infantry on the Western Front 71 inconsistency was to use experience, to adhere to published training pamphlets, to educate. This must commence at the ab initio level. This method additionally reinforced standardisation among instructional staff. Currie’s solution focussed on platoon training and was issued to No. 4 (D) Group Training Battalion staff on 27 August 1917101: 1. To develop the leadership capacity of all ranks up to platoon leader: The recruit of today being the Section Leader of tomorrow. 2. To revive the use of the rifle and bayonet by emphasising the fact that the soldier is a rifleman first and a specialist afterwards. 3. To demonstrate the flexibility of the platoon, its organisation, the use of various sections, their equipment and possibilities. 4. To develop the offensive spirit in the soldier by use of the bayonet. 5. To demonstrate and explain SS143: Instructions for the Training of Platoons for Offensive Action. 6. It is necessary that every man should know the principles of platoon fighting, and the functions of the various sections. The rationalisation of the Australian Training Depots in the UK shortly after this time also addressed inconsistencies in delivery among many of the Training Battalions. Reports on training activities from this period indicate a requirement for emphasis on platoon training, and of the need for reinforcement officers to participate and supervise their men closely.102 Newton Moore was replaced by Major General James Whiteside McCay during the first quarter of 1917 just as the AIF training system was beginning to stabilise.103 McCay, a former Federal politician, lawyer and citizen soldier was highly intelligent and capable. His connections to the High Commission in London were a conduit directly back to Pearce. He was also a schemer who had failed in command. As Christopher Wray argues, ‘for all his qualities, [McCay] seems to have lacked the ability to plan and oversee precise, detailed and well-coordinated plans for battle…’.104 This did not mean that McCay did not have his uses; he simply had no talent for operational command. McCay had commanded a brigade at Gallipoli which had been badly cut up during the Battle of Krithia. Coming on top of this, his failure as commander of the 5th Division at Fromelles simply required him to be posted to non-operational duties. McCay probably knew this, and Pearce was certainly well aware of the ‘importance of the training depots for the battlefield performance of the AIF’.105 It was a delicate circumstance. McCay was no coward; he had been wounded twice.

101 AWM25 943/7 Part 3, N0. 4 (D) Group, Codford, General Outline: Standard System of Organisation of Training, addendum dated 27 August 1917. 102 AWM25 943/7 Parts 3-4. 103 Bean, Vol IV, p. 24; and contemporary detail in J. Connor, Anzac and Empire..., pp. 84-86. 104 Wray, Sir James Whiteside McCay, p.210 105 J. Connor, Anzac and Empire, p. 84. Australian Infantry on the Western Front 72 McCay was convalescing in England in early 1917. In addition to his political contacts, he had the very administrative skills required for garrison training. Therefore, McCay actively petitioned the Australian government to gain command of the AIF depots in the UK. Pearce and McCay came from different sides of the political spectrum, though Pearce knew that he could still utilise the other’s skills. He ratified MCay’s appointment as the new AIF depot commander in England and wrote to Birdwood on 2 February 1917 to give this direction.106 Newton Moore had by all accounts completed extraordinary work in the few months of his command. Nevertheless, McCay was to remain in charge of training AIF recruits in the UK until the end of the war. His selection coincided with the creation of a British Training Directorate following a tactical revolution and flurry of training pamphlets flowing from the Somme experience. Haig’s headquarters ‘put considerable effort into tactical indoctrination and training’, but the disparity of dissemination of tactical developments among Australian recruits well into 1917 is as telling for McCay as was his performance at Fromelles.107 The Australian implementation of the latest tactical doctrine in its training methods was often in lag. It would take all of 1917 to harmonise recruit training among AIF Depots, and by Third Ypres this was reaping rewards on the battlefield. In , the AIF produced Notes for Officers Supervising Platoon Tactical Exercises in AIF Depots in the United Kingdom.108 This pamphlet, 12 pages long, outlined the conduct of a platoon training for operations, and referred to British Divisional level publications to provide an operational overview of doctrine, and British Platoon level publications to provide tactical level direction. The documents comprise SS135 Instructions for the Training of Divisions for Offensive Operations, and SS143 Instructions for the Training of Platoons for Offensive Action. In its aims, the Australian Notes for Officers shows the absolute focus that the AIF was giving to small unit infantry tactics by the beginning of 1918: 1. To give reinforcement officers practice in the handling and working of a platoon... 2. To show non-commissioned officers the working of an organised platoon, and to give them confidence in handling sections... 3. To show reinforcement privates to be a useful member of a platoon so...he will instinctively do the right thing. The application of such pamphlets in the development of Australian infantry will be discussed in the next chapter.

106 ibid, p. 212. 107 J.P. Harris, Douglas Haig, p. 194. 108 The pamphlet is reproduced entirely in AWM25 943/7 Part 6. Australian Infantry on the Western Front

CHAPTER 3 British Infantry Tactical Development 1917 An Imperial Model for the AIF Bleak winter weather at the beginning of 1917 on the Western Front was a depressing omen for the New Year. During 1917 Tsar Nicholas would abdicate. Late in the year Russia would withdraw from the conflict. In an attempt to starve Britain out of the conflict, Germany announced its policy of unrestricted submarine warfare in February, and America would reverse its foreign policy and declare war against the Central powers in April.1 In 1917, French general Nivelle’s offensives along the Aisne River south of the Somme would result in thousands of casualties for little gain.2 As a result, in late May and June after two and a half years war, mutiny swept through the French Army’s ranks. In Britain at the beginning of 1917, Welshman David Lloyd George was a new Prime Minister for a new year, and in Australia another Welshman, William Morris Hughes, had been recently re-elected as Prime Minister. Lloyd George would come to openly criticise Haig during 1917; he would be just as damning about the battles of attrition occurring in France. 3 1917 commenced with the experiences of the Somme and Verdun being codified into new training pamphlets. The New Year also brought the promise of further British offensives. For the BEF these would occur initially at Arras, and later, further north in the Flanders near the .

Left: C.E.W. Bean, Official War Correspondent, knee deep in mud in Gird trench, near in France during the winter of 1916-17. Conditions such as these were typical of the winter that year. (AWM EO0572)

1 D. Stevenson, 1914-1918: The History of the First World war, London, 2004, pp. 246-248. 2 For the planning and overview of Nivelle’s coordination with Haig, see J.P. Harris, Douglas Haig & the First World War, Cambridge, 2008, pp. 281-282 3 Harris, Douglas Haig, pp. 278-279. Australian Infantry on the Western Front 74

Left: Australians at Montauban, in France, in December 1916, cleaning off the winter mud from their boots and clothes. 1916-17 was the worst winter in France for decades. Such was the static nature of operations on the Western Front that fighting around Montauban was to be the last operational activity conducted by Australian infantry during the war nearly two years later. (AWM EE00016)

Despite these depressing events, 1917 was a watershed year in the development of the British and its constituent Dominion Armies. Haig was pleased with the prospects for 1917, and with the size of his force: 56 infantry divisions backed by 1,157 pieces of heavy artillery.4 He was less pleased with Nivelle’s attitude at a Franco-British conference on 15 January in which the Frenchman insisted on maximum support from the British in the opening of the Aisne offensives.5 Nivelle was adamant that the BEF should extend its line further south in direct support of the French northern flank; the British should also conduct an offensive in the Arras sector in support of Nivelle’s main thrust.6 Haig resisted, and the War Cabinet overruled him. Nivelle expected the British offensive to occur no later than 1 April 1917, and Lloyd George ordered Haig to comply.7 Irrespective of the strategic situation, the British experience of the learning process during 1917 resulted in the introduction of new technology, the codification of basic training and the development of specialised tactics throughout the year. This process was difficult and costly. However, with standardisation among the BEF’s infantry divisions, and a developing all-arms approach to battle, came the promise of victory over the German Army on the Western Front and an end to the war. The professional development of Australian infantry was intrinsic to this experience, though the AIF was not involved in any meaningful way in the development of new tactics

4 Harris, Douglas Haig, p. 281. 5 See Haig’s diary entries for 16 January 1917 in Sheffield & Bourne (eds.), Douglas Haig: War Diaries and Letters 1914-1918, London, 2005. 6 Harris, Douglas Haig, p. 283. 7 See Haig’s diary entries for 16 January 1917; and Harris, Douglas Haig, p. 284.

Australian Infantry on the Western Front 75 and doctrine in the first half of 1917. The chapter will examine the development of small unit infantry tactics in the aftermath of the Somme. 8 To this end, the development occurred among all Empire infantry units and was essentially British. The chapter does not focus on the concurrent progress of the supporting arms, including the artillery and armour, other than in the context of their involvement with the infantry in combined arms operations. By viewing small infantry formations, the focus clearly highlights the method by which new tactical doctrine was developed and codified in the BEF during early 1917. This argues the work was primarily a Canadian and British innovation, and initially it was erratically disseminated. The disparity of application of new tactical doctrine among the Australian divisions is evident when they are compared to the homogenous Canadian Corps. At the beginning of 1917, training recruits to a competent standard was a new and vital process, but actually making infantrymen tactically effective on operations was equally important. For recruits, the process commenced with a standardised delivery of core skill sets via a 14-week basic training course. The syllabus for the course was adopted by all Dominion troops training in their own camps in the UK9, and the process of training and reinforcement for individual troops did not end there. The thesis has so far detailed how the codified basic training regimen in the BEF from late 1916 onwards provided the foundation of a soldier’s skills in the path to achieving battlefield effectiveness. Codification occurred among all national contingents within the BEF. In this regimen lies evidence that senior officers in the British Army were not simply accepting of extreme casualty rates or of the tactical circumstances of the war. In fact, in addition to standardised training practices, equal efforts were directed at analysing the fluidity of tactics required at the front. The process began at unit level. An appreciation of the evolving firepower and composition of these units is essential to understanding how tactics were refined in the BEF after the Somme experience. In mid-1916, the British and Dominion infantry division comprised 18,000 men and was commanded by a major general. Its main firepower was 18,000 rifles and 26-machine guns. It comprised three infantry brigades, each with four battalions of a thousand men.10 At the beginning of the war, the battalion comprised of a HQ, eight rifle companies and a machine-gun section of two medium machine-guns. There were no grenades, mortars or automatic weapons below this level. A company comprised 120 soldiers, and was split into

8 By this stage in the conflict the platoon was central to infantry operations. It remains so a century later. 9 AWM25 943/7 part III, Training Australian Imperial Force in the United Kingdom 1917: British War Office Army Council Instruction 1968 of 15 Oct 16 10 Rob Stevenson outlines the 1st Australian Division’s composition in: To win the Battle: The 1st Australian Division in the Great War, 1914-1918, Melbourne, 2013, p. 29. Australian Infantry on the Western Front 76 two half companies each commanded by an officer. A half company comprised two sections of about 30 men under the control of a sergeant.11 However, before the end of 1914 the British adopted a more versatile structure of four companies, leaving the battalion the same size with each company comprising six officers and 227 soldiers. 12 There were few differences among the CEF’s, AIF’s and BEF’s battalion structure. They relied on mass rifle fire. Table 3.1 depicts the Battalion structure of 1915-1916. The battalion was the primary infantry unit of the BEF, and the innovation that occurred in its basic subordinate fighting element, the platoon, revolutionised the nature of infantry operations during the Great War. A battalion comprised 1026 men, of whom 30 were commissioned officers;13 31 including the Chaplain. The commanding officer, a lieutenant- colonel, had a major as his executive officer, and a captain as adjutant. The adjutant was responsible for administration and the myriad of paperwork that was central to the unit’s activity. A captain Quartermaster was responsible for logistics; and a doctor was the Medical Officer. The senior non-commissioned officer in battalion HQ was the Regimental Sergeant- Major primarily responsible for the good order and discipline of the enlisted men. The HQ additionally included a number of specialists within its cadre including Clerks, Cooks, Drivers, Signallers, Pioneers, Shoemakers and Armourers. There were four companies in a battalion, each commanded by a Major. Company HQ included the Company Sergeant-Major (CSM), a Quartermaster, batmen and drivers. The fighting elements of a company were 4- platoons. Doctrine issued in early 1917 revolutionised the way that all Empire formations conducted platoon operations. Within this construct, while the platoon remained under the centralised command of the battalion, it was free to conduct autonomous operations under the decentralised control of its leader. A platoon was commanded by a lieutenant, with a Sergeant second in charge. The platoon was divided into 4-sections of 12 men. A section was commanded by a or Lance-Corporal, and was the basic fighting element of the platoon. Figure 3-1 depicts the structure of a British Army, CEF and AIF Battalion.

11 The eight company model is described in Ian Kuring, Redcoats to Cams: A History of Australian Infantry 1788–2001, Canberra, ACT, 2004, p. 47. 12 A précis of how this occurred in practice is detailed well in Tom Chataway, The History of the Fifteenth Battalion, Brisbane, 1948, pp. i-iii. The 15th Battalion underwent this process during in 1914. 13 Then as now, commissioned officers held command appointments within the battalion at platoon, company and HQ levels. Non-commissioned officers held leadership appointments at the tactical levels. See the BEF Army rank structure depicted in the opening glossary. Australian Infantry on the Western Front 77

Table 3-1. War Establishment of Infantry Battalion, London 1915-16. (His Majesty's Stationery Office)

War Establishment British Infantry Battalion 1916

Headquarters Machine Gun Section Lieutenant Colonel 1 Subaltern 1 Major 1 Sergeants 2 Adjutant 1 Corporal 1 Quarter-Master 1 Privates 24 Sergeant-Major 1 Drivers 6 Quarter-Master Sergeant 1 Batman 1 Orderly Room Clerks 2 ______Sergeant Cook 1 35 Transport Sergeant 1 Company x 4 Sergeant Shoemaker 1 Drivers Transport 10 Major 1 Drivers Spare Animals 2 Captain 1 Batmen 5 Subalterns 4 Company Sergeant Major 1

Pioneers Company Quartermaster 1 Pioneer Sergeant 1 Sergeants 8 Pioneers 10 10 Privates 192 Signallers 1st Line Drivers 3 Sergeant 1 Batmen 6 Corporal 1 ______Private 15 227 Stretcher Bearers 16 Orderlies for Medical Officer 2 _____ Total 1026 74 Attached Medical Officer 1 Medical Drivers/Water Duty 5 Armorer 1 Interpreter 1 Chaplain (AIF/CEF only) 1

_____ 9

Australian Infantry on the Western Front 78

Battalion HQ

A Company B COY C COY D COY

1 Platoon (Pl) 2 Platoon 3 MG Section 4

Figure 3-1. 1915-1916 construct of Infantry Battalion.

In 1915 the battalion’s massed rifle power had been augmented by four Vickers medium machine-guns. In combat, these were generally moved into a Brigade machine-gun group of 16 guns. During 1916, the Vickers gun teams were formally removed from the battalion and formed into machine-gun battalions and divisional machine-gun brigades. In the battalion, the heavy tripod mounted Vickers gun was replaced by a more portable weapon, the two man operated Lewis light machine-gun. Weighing 28lbs, with a drum magazine of 47-rounds on top, the was itself no light weight – and it was complicated. 14 However, when operated as a component of the platoon, the increase in infantry effectiveness was profound. This and the following chapter will show how the Lewis gun came to predominate in the firepower of an Imperial platoon during the Great War. In 1916, each battalion initially received four Lewis guns, and these were grouped into a HQ machine-gun section. By the end of 1916 numbers increased to 16, and by 1918 there was establishment for up to 36 Lewis Guns per battalion. Indeed, when casualties denuded Australian units during the last months of the war, some battalions increased the number of Lewis guns even further. The Lewis gun fundamentally increased the firepower of a battalion, and the tactical employment of the weapon would revolutionise the infantry’s war.

14 SS448, Method of Instruction in the Lewis Gun, His Majesty’s Stationary Office, (HMSO) London, 1917. Australian Infantry on the Western Front 79

Left: Depiction of an Australian Lewis Gunner taking aim, Western Front. The change in tactical use of the Lewis gun during 1917 was a defining doctrinal event for the British army during the Great War. Artist: George Benson (AWM ART19991)

By the middle of 1917 – the AIF’s first full year in Europe – the platoon had become central to the conduct of operations. Paddy Griffith, Bill Rawling, Dan Todman and Gary Sheffield all demonstrate the evolution of tactical doctrine in the BEF during this time.15 Haig was central to its implementation. As Harris argues: Whatever his other faults, Haig was very open to technological innovation… the British Army on the Western Front was highly experimental and innovative and the British pushed the available military technology to its limits in the wars final year.16 Indeed, Haig knew the soldiers under his command; their strengths and their weaknesses. This was particularly so with Dominion troops. Before the German offensives of 1918, when victory was not yet assured, he was privately clear in his views about whom he favoured from among the Dominions: Thursday, 28 : I spent some time with the Canadians today. They are really fine disciplined soldiers now and so smart and clean. I am sorry to say that the Australians are not so nearly smart and efficient. I put this down to Birdwood who, instead of facing the problem, has gone in for the easier way of saying everything is perfect and making himself as popular as possible. We have had to separate the Australians into convalescent camps of their own, because they were giving so much trouble when along with our men…17

15 Paddy Griffith, Battle Tactics of the Western Front: The British Army’s Art of Attack 1916-1917, London, 1994; Bill Rawling, Surviving Trench Warfare: Technology and the Canadian Corps, 1914-1918, Toronto, 1992; Gary Sheffield and Dan Todman (ed), Command and Control on the Western Front: The British Army’s Experience 1914-1919, London, 2004. 16 Harris, Douglas Haig, p. 2. 17 Sheffield & Bourne (eds.), Douglas Haig: War Diaries and Letters 1914-1918, London, 2005, p. 385. Australian Infantry on the Western Front 80 In February 1918, such thoughts are telling. The British had been on the Western Front for three and a half years, the Canadians three. The AIF had been on major operations there for 18 months. The Canadians had established a national homogeneity as a Corps of troops; the Australians were not yet a Corps. The CEF had Currie, Monash’s higher level command skill-sets over a common Australian contingent was yet to come. Haig says the Canadians were more efficient; this was probably true. Battlefield efficiency – effectiveness – is the result of hard training and the implementation of quality tactics. The relative experience and length of service on the Western Front is evidence of differing standards among formations and units in the BEF. In early 1918, the AIF experience on the battlefields of France and Flanders was only just beginning to match that of the CEF. The homogeneity of the Canadian Corps infantry was also a telling factor. This was a matter of standardisation. Standardisation in a force as massive as the BEF still remained a core issue in the last year of the war. The catalyst of the Somme in 1916 had given impetus to a change in Haig’s approach towards tactics. In February 1918 Haig’s staff had worked on the conundrum of implementing new and standardised tactics and technology for more than a year. Although he continued to favour the concept of a series of hammer blows to break through the German lines, he knew that combined arms, finesse and fluidity in the tactical application of the troops – down to the lowest level – were the keys to success. Artillery was central to the process and the developing use of counter battery fire and the creeping barrage in the latter stages of the Somme campaign were a portent of things to come.18 The answer lay in the tactical exploitation of the automatic, and direct and indirect, firepower now afforded to the infantry platoon. With new methods of artillery and armour in support, these tactics would lead to breaking the deadlock of the Western Front. At Haig’s level the goal of the British Army was how to overcome a modern entrenched army, increasingly armed with new and highly effective weaponry. The first efforts to address these circumstances resulted in the reorganisation of the British Army’s divisional construct in 1915, and the publication of training pamphlet SS135, Instructions for the Training of Divisions for Offensive Action, issued by the War Office in December 1916.19 This comprehensive 68-page document intended to standardise the application of divisional training and firepower in the BEF, thereby reducing losses and generating impetus in the

18 See Shelford Bidwell & Dominic Graham, Fire-Power: British Army Weapons and Theories of War 1904- 1945, 1982; and Paul Strong and Sanders Marble, Artillery in the Great War, Barnsley, United Kingdom, 2011, pp. 123-125. 19 SS135 Instructions for the Training of Divisions for Offensive Action, His Majesty’s Stationary Office, (HMSO) London, 1916. Australian Infantry on the Western Front 81 ongoing offensives to break the stalemate of the front. SS135 revolutionised operations in the British Army at the formation level. Within SS135 the concept of massed lines of infantry in the assault was abandoned. In its place came the expedited fluid attack of the small unit supported by a creeping artillery barrage.20 SS135 additionally reinforced the importance of the platoon as a self-sufficient all-arms unit: The ultimate unit in the assault is the PLATOON. The platoon must be organised and trained as a self-contained unit capable of producing the required proportions of riflemen, rifle-bombers, bombers, carriers and runners trained to work in combination. One or two Lewis guns may also be added on occasion. On the resourcefulness and self-sufficiency of the platoon in dealing scientifically with every obstacle which it may meet, on its internal organisation into small parties trained to their particular tasks under their own leaders, and on the skill of the platoon leader and the hold which he has over his command, the success of the assault will largely depend. 21 The new focus on the platoon appears to have taken place at the tactical level across the BEF at the same time, though Dominic Graham argues British Major Generals and Arthur Solly-Flood were the officers who initially codified the practice. 22 In November 1916, the acting Commander of Third Army School, Brigadier Arthur Solly-Flood and a group of other British officers joined the French Fourth Army training school at Chalôns-sur-Marne to observe the lessons learned from recent operations. Among their number was Major General Arthur Currie, commander of the 1st Canadian Division. Solly- Flood codified the essence of the French tactical initiatives in doctrine, and then disseminated it throughout the BEF. Currie wrote of the experience: The division selected for attack were trained especially for the work they had to do; the training was carried out on ground as similar to the area over which they had to attack as it was possible to find. All the training consisted of platoon and company training. All ranks studied most carefully the best manner of reaching the objective, how special points of resistance were to be dealt with, and how the objective was to be consolidated. Troops that had to pass through the troops taking their first objective were specially practiced in this movement. Especial attention was given to the best way of tactically employing the latest weapons, namely, rifle grenades, automatic rifles, bombs, 37mm guns, etc… They were “storm” troopers on a large scale and their morale and esprit-de-corps were consequently very high.23 Shortly afterwards, on 7 February 1917 the War Office issued training pamphlet SS143 – Instructions for the Training of Platoons for Offensive Action. 24 This was a seminal

20 P. Griffith, Battle Tactics of the Western Front, p. 77. 21 SS135, p. 17. 22 Dominic Graham, Fire-Power: British Army Weapons and Theories of War 1904-1945, London, 1982, pp. 126-7. 23 LAC RG9 III Canadian Corps General Staff Folder 109, File 10, Currie: “Notes on French Attacks, North- East of Verdun in October and November 1916”, Ottawa. 24 SS143 – Instructions for the Training of Platoons for Offensive Action, HMSO, London, 1917. Australian Infantry on the Western Front 82 publication. In the document lay changes to the way British infantry would conduct small unit operations for the rest of the war. As Dominic Graham points out, SS143 was created in response to the modern battlefield environment, and its dissemination was a top-down process throughout the BEF. 25 This approach ensured standardised practice among all elements of the infantry, and superseded the obsolete practice of attacking in lined up waves. In particular, a new theory stemming from the lessons of the Somme proposed that platoons advance in file and sections as “worms”, not waves. Experience indicated this to be a far more effective method of attaining objectives. 26 Sections in the advance would provide covering fire to fellow sections as they moved ahead. Section specialists in the platoon now included riflemen, light-machine gunners and grenadiers. Section level control of such weapon systems contrasted starkly with earlier arrangements and was indicative of the fluid nature of tactical operations. The modern battlefield environment required independent application of firepower, and SS143 encouraged initiative and autonomous action. Accordingly, by 1917, although a platoon fell under centralised company command, its leader executed decentralised and independent control in the training for and conduct of operations. SS143 was in essence a storm-trooper’s handbook; every section in the platoon playing a part in a newly devised all-arms form of attack.27 These assault tactics would now be applied among infantry in the whole BEF.28 The manual signified a clean break from the old infantry tactics. The first reference to SS143 in an AIF training establishment in the UK is a copy of the document contained in AWM25 943/7 Part 3, N0. 4 (D) Group, Codford, dating mid-1917. The extracts detailed here are taken verbatim from this Australian source, and verified against War Office Original. The Australian document is the same as the British document. It forms the core of the British and Empire method of infantry operations during 1917-1918. The defining extract reads:

25 Dominic Graham, Fire-Power, Chapter 7. 26 ibid, p. 126. 27 Griffith, Battle tactics of the Western Front, p. 194. 28 For Australian application see: R. Stephenson, ‘The 1st Australian Division in 1917: A Snapshot’, in P. Dennis & J. Grey (eds.), 1917: Tactics, Training & Technology, proceeds of the Australian Army History Conference, Canberra, 2007, p. 33. For Canadian application see: Tim Cook, Shock Troops: Canadians Fighting the Great War 1917-18, Ontario, 2008, p. 28; and W. Rawling, Surviving Trench Warfare: Technology and the Canadian Corps 1914-1918, Toronto, 1992. Australian Infantry on the Western Front 83

SS143: Instructions for the Training of Platoons for Offensive Action 1917 Organisation of a Platoon The platoon is the smallest unit in the field which comprises all the weapons with which an infantry soldier is armed. It has a minimum strength, exclusive of its headquarters, of 28-other ranks (OR), and a maximum of 44-OR. If the strength falls below the minimum the platoon ceases to be workable, and the necessary members will be obtained by the temporary amalgamation of companies, platoons or sections under battalion arrangements. Taking an average strength in the sections of 36-OR, a suitable organisation would be:

Section Composition Totals Headquarters 1 Platoon Leader (Officer) & 4 OR 4 Bombing 1 NCO & 8 OR (includes 2 bayonet men & 2 throwers) 9 Lewis Gun 1 NCO & 8 OR (includes No.s 1 and 2) 9 Riflemen 1 NCO & 8 OR (picked shots, scouts, bayonet fighters) 9 Rifle Bombers 1 NCO & 8 OR 9 (includes 4 bomb firers) 9

Every NCO and man should carry a rifle and fix his bayonet for the assault, except No.s 1 and 2 of the Lewis Gun and Rifle Bombers if using a cup attachment. Ammunition and Bombs, etc., and How Carried a. Every man carries 120 rounds Small Arms Ammunition (SAA), and at least 2 bombs. b. The Lewis Gun Section carries 30 drums of ammunition. c. In Bombing Sections each thrower carries 5 bombs, and the remainder 10 or more each. d. Every man in a Rifle Bomb Section can carry at least six rifle bombs. e. Flares must be distributed throughout the sections. Characteristics and Uses of the Various Weapons a. The rifle and bayonet, being the most efficient offensive weapons of the soldier, are for the assault, for repelling attack or for obtaining superiority of fire. Every NCO and man must be proficient in their use. b. The bomb is the second weapon of every NCO and man, and is used either for dislodging the enemy from behind cover or killing him below the ground. c. The rifle bomb is the “” of the infantry and used to dislodge the enemy from behind cover and to obtain superiority of fire by driving him underground. d. The Lewis Gun is the weapon of opportunity. Its chief uses are to kill the enemy above ground and obtain superiority of fire. Its mobility and the small target its team presents render it suitable for working round the enemy’s flank or for guarding one’s own flank.

Australian Infantry on the Western Front 84

Tactics of the Platoon in the Attack The Platoon commander controls and directs sections and sends back information to the Company Commander. The tactics to be employed [by a platoon] in the attack may be summarised as follows: a. Push on to the objective at all costs and get it with the bayonet. b. If held up, obtain superiority of fire and envelope one or both flanks. c. If reinforcing a platoon that is held up help obtain superiority of fire and envelope a flank. d. Co-operate with platoons on either flank. Tactics of Sections in the Attack Section Commanders control and lead their sections, keeping in touch with the Platoon Commander. a. The section of rifle men should, without halting, gain a position on a flank, from which to attack both with fire and with the bayonet. b. The section of bombers should, without halting, gain a position on a flank and attack under cover of the rifle bombers. c. The section of rifle bombers should open a hurricane bombardment on the point of resistance from the nearest cover available. d. The section of Lewis Gunners should, in the first instance, open traversing fire on the point of resistance from the nearest cover available. At a later stage it may be desirable to work around a flank. Training To obtain uniformity of ideas and tactics it is necessary for a training method to be laid down on broad lines. Platoon tactical exercises comprising attacks in trench and open types of warfare should be practiced near billets as often as possible. Sections must also continually exercise in their particular weapons. Platoon Sergeants and Section Commanders can be usefully trained by this means… This enhances their powers of initiative. The training requirements to be attained are: a. The offensive spirit. All ranks must be taught that their aim and object is to come to close quarters with the enemy as quickly as possible, so as to use the bayonet. Bayonet fighting produces lust for blood; this must become as second nature. b. Initiative. The matter of control by even company leaders on the battlefield is now so difficult that the smaller formations, ie. Platoon and section commanders, must be trained to take the necessary action on their own initiative, without waiting for orders. c. Confidence in weapons. This necessitates a high standard of skill at arms. Cooperation of weapons groups on the battlefield is an essential corollary to confidence. d. Discipline is necessary at all times, particularly on the battlefield; and morale must be heightened by every means. e. Esprit de Corps. True soldierly spirit must be built up in sections. Each section should consider itself the best in the platoon, and the platoon the best in the battalion.

Australian Infantry on the Western Front 85 SS143 is a veritable treasure trove of revolutionary thinking. What is evident is that the best minds of the BEF had evaluated the experience of the Somme and benefitted from it. Byng of the Canadian Corps was certainly a stand-out example of this. In Surviving Trench Warfare Bill Rawling indicates the upwards trend in combat effectiveness in the Canadian Corps between the Somme and the attack on Vimy Ridge in April 1917.29 The Operations Orders for all Canadian brigades assaulting the Vimy Ridge during the Battle of Arras state that special attention was to be called to the adherence to principles outlined in SS143.30 This was just over a month after the pamphlet’s original promulgation. The BEF was a massive force, a parent organisation for five Armies: for the CEF to achieve this standard of efficiency in April 1917 put them without doubt at the leading edge of tactical innovation during the Great War. Currie’s 1st Division led the way! At the beginning of 1917, the Australians could make no such claims. They had been in France only six months. Of the five divisions, the 3rd had only been on operations in France for two months and the 5th was coming back on line after the debacle at Fromelles the previous July. The 1st, 2nd and 4th Divisions had been heavily involved in operations on the Somme, suffered grievously like all other BEF units, and had utilised extant tactical doctrine. In short, the AIF had not been involved in the seeking out or development of new doctrine in the aftermath of the Somme. In this respect, the Australian development was disparate, and was not equal to the Canadian development. In 1916 and 1917 there was no individual like Byng or Currie in I or II Anzac Corps with the necessary drive, authority or insight into tactical developments who could facilitate the dissemination of standardised doctrine among the Australian divisions. While there were men capable of doing so, Monash foremost among them, their time would not come until 1918 after they had gained further experience and when the five Australian divisions wereunited as a Corps. There was another factor to consider, too. Quite often there was a disparity in the dissemination of doctrine. This was indeed the case among the Australian divisions. In some cases the doctrine was not included in the Australian training syllabi for months. 31 The conclusion is clear: it was the Canadian Corps’ experience as a homogenous formation on the

29 Bill Rawling, Surviving Trench Warfare, Chapter 4. 30 For example, see: LAC, RG9 III C3 Vol. 4026, Folder 10, File 2, Operations Order for the 1st Canadian Infantry Brigade, 21 Mar 1917, Ottawa. 31 For example, the document had been in circulation for six months before it was referred to in No. 4 (D) Group’s training regimen at Codford. In fact, it depended on what British Army a Corps was allocated to as how quickly tactical doctrine was disseminated to the lower ranks. No. 4 (D) Group was the training organisation reinforcing the 4th Australian Infantry Division, a formation generally remembered as one of the elites of the AIF. However, the reality is that the 4th Division did not realise its “elite potential” until it was combined into the Australian Corps in 1918. Australian Infantry on the Western Front 86 Western Front from its inception which provided a greater Dominion contribution to the development of tactics and doctrine in 1916-17. The AIF simply implemented what was already in place. The tactical developments from late 1916 to the third quarter of 1917 are central to this view. General Sir , GOC of the Fifth British Army to which I Anzac Corps (including the 1st, 2nd & 4th Australian Divisions) was attached for parts of 1916 and 1917 wrote to his divisional commanders in December 1916 expressing some concern over Australian standards. Indeed, Gough‘s remarks are forthright about what he viewed as the “entire neglect of sound principles” among all divisions in his Corps: I will point out to you the sort of things I unearthed at my inspections. In some units not a single platoon was organised. Sections were broken up, section commanders did not know who were in the sections or that they were expected to command them, platoons did not have its bombers organised as a section under its own commander…Again, company commanders did not train or even exercise Lewis gun detachments, or in some cases even see them….I may mention that a pamphlet [SS135] on the training of a division for offensive action will shortly be issued…32 On 14 February 1917, Haig’s Chief of Staff, Lieutenant-General Sir , issued a memorandum entitled “General Principles for the Formation” to every Army HQ in the BEF. His correspondence pointed to another shortly to be issued pamphlet subordinate to SS135. The new pamphlet would be the direction to the BEF that new tactics were to be applied. 33 Kiggell he stated “the platoon is to be regarded as the unit…”: The weapons now under the hand of a platoon commander should be arranged according to their various peculiararities (sic). That is to say the rifle and bayonet and bomb, being the most effective offensive weapons, should be placed as far forward as possible, closely supported by the which may be regarded as the “howitzer” of the platoon, and the Lewis gun, which is the weapon of opportunity.34 However, the application of the new tactics proved to be haphazard and was not uniformly applied throughout the BEF for almost the entirety of 1917. Byng made the developments immediately the central theme of his Corps’ directives: The largest unit that, under modern conditions can be directly controlled and manoeuvred under fire by one man is the Platoon. The Platoon Commander is therefore in most cases, the only man who can personally influence the local situation. In fact, it is not too much to say that this is the Platoon Commander’s war. Realising this, it

32 AWM25, 947/76, Précis of remarks made by the Army Commander at the Conference held on 27 December 1916, HQ. Such matters are indicative of standards not yet achieved in the development of Australian infantry. 33 This document is found in both AWM25 947/17 Part 2, & LAC RG 9 III C1, Folder 109, File 9, Canadian Corps HQ General Staff, both dated General Headquarters 14 Feb 1917. Subsequently issued as SS143, Instructions for the Training of a Platoon for Offensive Action, HMSO, 1917. 34 General Principles…, Paras 1-2. Australian Infantry on the Western Front 87 becomes the duty of the Company Commander to see that each Platoon is trained by its leader to act either with independence or as a component of the Company.35 Application among Australian divisions was more disparate and depended on what Corps and Army the formation was allocated to. Though this was a BEF wide problem, for the Australians, the disparity was particularly prevalent in I ANZAC Corps – comprising 1st, 2nd and 4th Divisions – allocated to the British 5th Army under General Gough. The disparity was less so in II ANZAC Corps – 3rd, 5th and the NZ Division – allocated to the British under General Plumer. Robbins has written that: Gough was very impetuous and difficult to get on with… like a cat on hot bricks… By early 1917 Gough had gained the reputation of a commander who terrorises those under him to the extent that they are afraid to express their opinions… Unlike good officers, like Allenby and Plumer, Gough does not seem to have learned from the experiences of 1915-1916… By March 1917, junior officers felt that heavy losses and complete failure were typical of Gough… By mid-1917 there was little confidence in Gough… By late- 1917 no division wanted to go to [Gough’s] 5th Army, and most units hailed a relief a transfer to Plumer’s 2nd Army.36 Evidence of these discrepancies can be found within the minutiae of divisional administrative correspondence associated with both I & II ANZAC soon after SS143 was promulgated. For example, on 6 March 1917, Lieutenant Colonel , Chief of Staff to HQ 1st Australian Division indicated the tactical changes in SS143 were to take effect immediately while the division was training out of the line. 37 Blamey and his divisional commander, Major-General Harold Walker, were very much in tune with the BEF’s latest tactical initiatives. The directive for infantry training in the 1st Division is particularly insightful: 1. All infantry will complete the reorganisation on the lines laid down in the pamphlet recently issued without delay. 2. The new organisation involves the training of specialists, who must be brought to a higher degree of efficiency. The rifle grenade, hand grenade and Lewis Gun have now become platoon infantry weapons and it should be the aim to train every man to handle all of these effectively. 3. Close order drill and bayonet fighting will form part of the programme; drills are to be kept short and sharp… Route marching with the objective of conditioning the men and hardening the feet is necessary. 4. Co-operation of riflemen, rifle grenadiers, bombers and Lewis Gun teams is to be practiced in action against enemy strong points… in accordance with the formations laid down for attack by GHQ of which copies will be circulated [ie.SS143]. The exercises will be carried out by platoons in the first place, then by companies and so work up to battalion exercises.

35 LAC RG 9 III C1 Vol 3864, Folder 99, File 3 Canadian Corps Directive G530. S109/1 Battalion Organization (Army and Corps Scheme) dated 13 May 1917. 36 Simon Robbins, British Generalship on the Western Front: Defeat into Victory, London, 2005, pp. 32-33. 37 AWM4 1/42/26, War Diary for the 1st Australian Division, General Staff Memorandum No. 7, dated 6 March 1917. Australian Infantry on the Western Front 88 5. Commanding officers will devote as much time as they have at their disposal to the training of officers. 6. The Divisional commander is aware that it will involve constant work and thought on the part of officers to enable the training to be carried out with success.

The 3rd and the 5th Division were likewise implementing practices in accordance with HQ direction. Monash, the commander of the 3rd Division had learned the hard lessons of inexperience at Gallipoli well. His capacity for planning down to the finest detail – the need for order, specifics, method and economy – coupled with his insistence on attending to the well-being of his troops would stand him in good stead. He additionally made sure that only the best officers and senior soldiers, those with battle experience, trained his men for battle. When the 3rd Division deployed to the front in late 1916, and again throughout 1917, the quality of its work and high efficiency were recognised largely as the result of Monash’s efforts. The 5th Australian Division under Major-General Hobbs applied the BEF directive immediately in its “Training Memorandum No. 79” dated 31 March 1917: ‘The Instructions for the Training of a Platoon for Offensive Action, 1917 (a pamphlet issued by the GHQ) is to be taken as the official manual and will be closely followed’.38 In contrast, concurrent direction for training out of line for the 2nd Australian Division under Major-General Nevill Smyth VC makes absolutely no mention of the new tactics. Route marching in rear areas appeared to be more important: The importance of good march discipline, as well as the power to make marches of 15- 20 miles without undue fatigue and with sufficient remaining energy to fight at the end, has yet to be realised by all ranks. March discipline is essential in all arms and services and should be made habit, not only on special marches but on all marches.39 While physical fitness was important, this is an astonishing directive given during what was essentially a revolution in military affairs occurring in the British Army. Non- standardised application of tactical doctrine was even more prevalent in the 4th Division under Major-General William Holmes. By mid-1917, the 4th Division’s non-conformity was even prevalent within its AIF training formations in the UK. These training establishments were staffed by officers and NCOs supposedly current in the application of contemporary tactics at the front. If these experienced soldiers were not conducting modern practices in France, then they certainly could not have been relied upon to teach them at the training schools. In June 1917 No. 4 (D) Group (4th Division), issued a memorandum to its Training Battalions (4th, 12th and 13th TBs) indicating the poor state of preparedness among soldiers in

38 AWM25 947/72, 5th Australian Division Training Memos and Syllabus: France – up to Jly 1918. 39 AWM25 947/17 Part 2, 2nd Australian Division Memorandum Training Directives, 28 March 1917. Australian Infantry on the Western Front 89 their knowledge of practices detailed in SS143. The memo noted that trainees had only a ’very hazy idea of the organisation of a platoon, and the particular functions of each section’; and that… ‘Careful instruction in lectures, and training men in their field work as platoons, should put this matter right’. Further, there was not ‘sufficient emphasis on the fact that the rifle is the chief weapon… The standard of efficiency must be raised’; and ‘every opportunity is to be taken to illustrate and practice the use of the rifle grenade’. 40 Nevertheless, as late as August 1917, the No. 4 (D) Group War Diary made record of a meeting in which the tactics detailed in SS143 were still poorly understood among experienced officers arriving from Europe: A want at present is some means for improving officers sent from France for a tour of duty as instructors... The training of the organised platoon was discussed...Naturally, the basis is SS143... But still the instructors have their own version which may be right or wrong... TBs [Training Battalions] have been asked to submit notes on how they instruct in this subject irrespective of the standard schemes over in France.41 The published battalion histories for the four battalions of the 4th Brigade, 4th Australian Infantry Division each bears this inconsistency out. The narratives all refer to the Lewis Gun during the first half of 1917 as a company controlled weapon system utilised at the Company Commander’s discretion.42 This was clearly an error in theory and practice among the 4th Division’s frontline units. Further, different tactics, techniques and procedures undoubtedly had the potential for grave consequences when units from different formations were in joint operations at the front. Variances in training standardisation and tactics implementation depended on the experience of commanders and leaders at divisional level and below; these men were influenced by their Corps and Army commanders. This was not an isolated Australians matter. However, it greatly defined Australian operations because it was a BEF wide problem. Qualified, experienced and effective battle-hardened officers and non-commissioned officers were required to efficiently implement best tactical practice. Concurrently, they were attempting to train and indoctrinate inexperienced men newly posted-in as replacements. The frontline soldiers needed the support of competent and pragmatic logisticians, who in turn

40 AWM25 943/7 Part 4, Memoranda to TBs, HQ N0. 4 (D) Group, Codford, dated 18 Jun 17. 41 AWM4 33/23/1 Part 1, No. 4 Group War Diary, 21 August 1917. 42 See several of the individual histories of the 4th Infantry Brigade. For example: T. White, The History of the Thirteenth Battalion AIF, Sydney, 1924: pp. 87-88 at Stormy Trench February 1917; E. Rule, Jacka’s Mob, Sydney, 1933: p. 93 while holding the line in July 1917 “B Company’s Lewis Gunners”; T. Chataway, The History of the Fifteenth Battalion, Brisbane, 1948: p. 175 reference to the company machine gun section in the aftermath of Bullecourt; The histories of the 13 & 15 BNs and Rule’s narrative were compiled by battalion veterans, and provide relatively precise detail of the Battalion hierarchy and operations during 1917. Australian Infantry on the Western Front 90 were complemented by the cogent and precise prose of professional staff officers. These skill-sets were sorely lacking throughout much of the BEF until well into the second half of the Great War. Inexperience among commanders, staff and frontline troops plagued the British Army during the period 1915-17. Robbins points out: As a result, poor or unrealistic planning and ineffective control of operations meant that too often the troops went into battle without the adequate preparation, fire support, logistic support and effective coordination which was necessary to perform successfully in modern battle against a well-trained and resolute enemy.43 All of this meant that in early 1917 the BEF – with the exception of the Canadians – struggled to conduct operations and concurrently disseminate standardised best tactical practice. To be sure, by 1917 matters had begun to improve, but problems remained, partly because new, inexperienced commanders came out to the front and committed the same mistakes, and because the ‘high authorities never seem to learn lessons which are obvious to those who have to carry out their plans’.44 Both I and II ANZAC Corps suffered this dilemma. In the trenches, soldiers had to learn their functions while under fire in the most difficult of circumstances – and without the voice of experience guiding them from above or supporting them from behind. There had never been a war like this, and many personnel were learning as circumstances unfolded. The only consistency seemed to be in the day to day routine of trench warfare; manning the parapets, consolidating fortifications, and preparing and training for the next operation, and maintaining an offensive stance through trench-raiding. Even so, by the second half of the war there was an ever-growing level of tactical acumen across the entire BEF. Paddy Griffith indicates ‘this was greatly helped by the sustained level of training and doctrinal analysis’ which included pamphlets issued ‘after attacks, carefully studied and then incorporated into revised training guidelines’.45 Such progress should be viewed as a testament to the leadership of the BEF from 1917 to 1918. Under these circumstances, it is not surprising that Australian methods and practices were shaped by the shortcomings and personalities of their commanders. Gough was the Army commander to which I Anzac Corps was allocated. Robbins has highlighted this officer’s poor reputation; he points equally to his personality as his technical skills.46 Gough was prescriptive – even inflexible – and his supervision of staff work was poor. He had been in command during the massive Australian commitment at Pozières in 1916. Later, his poor supervision of staff work, and in particular the communications between the 62nd and 4th

43 Robbins, British Generalship on the Western Front, p. 21. 44 ibid, p. 25. 45 Griffith, Battle Tactics on the Western Front, p. 196. 46 Robbins, British Generalship on the Western Front, p. 31-33. Australian Infantry on the Western Front 91 Australian Divisions in I ANZAC, led to massive losses in both units at Bullecourt in April 1917. Prior and Wilson argue that of the British Army commanders: Gough need not detain us. His grasp of the tactical situation facing his army seemed always limited, his dithering [and] his performance at the Somme should have seen him sink into a well-deserved obscurity. In a perverse reversal of fortune during 1917, the opposite was to happen.47 Bullecourt is a shocking low point on the sine wave of the learning process. Australian infantry had a central role in the battle. A detailed account is outside of the scope of this thesis; however, a thrust towards Bullecourt by the British Fifth Army was intended to weaken the German flank during the opening days of the Battle of Arras.48 Even so, Gough’s Army played an adjunct role to the main offensives by the British First and Third Armies. The operation was rushed. The intelligence was clear: German barbed wire was up to 20-feet thick. British shellfire was not substantial enough to break it. There weren’t enough guns. Gough’s I ANZAC Corps was warned that artillery and tanks would move in support of the offensive, though neither Amy nor Corps staff informed the engineers responsible that road maintenance was required for the preliminary movement. 49 Indeed, there never would be enough artillery support for the operation. Strong and Marble argue that during Arras too often the British would attack an objective their gunners could not see, the infantry would advance… and never be seen again, cut off by German barrages and torn up by German counter attacks (this was exactly what happened to the Australians at Bullecourt). 50 The technically unreliable , being introduced for the first time in sufficient numbers to support an infantry offensive, was not coordinated with the infantry’s movements. Their subsequent mechanical and operational failure was complete. This embedded in the Australian infantryman’s psyche a mistrust of the behemoth so deep that it lasted well into 1918. Indeed, poor staff work at Army, Corps and Divisional levels was the salient feature of the two Battles of Bullecourt in April 1917. Gough was nonplussed. He allocated the British 62nd Division and the 4th Australian Division to the assault. Communication between the two divisions was poor, and every tank failed to meet its objectives during the battle. Given the subsequent failure, it is interesting to note that the 4th Australian infantry division represented the AIF’s own “galaxy of stars”. Among its number , first Australian VC recipient of the war, and now the 14th

47 Robin Prior and Trevor Wilson, The Somme, New Haven and London, 2005, p. 305. 48 Arras, it will be remembered, was a campaign conducted in support of Nivelle’s French offensive further to the south. 49 Bean, OH, The AIF in France, Vol. IV, St. Lucia, 1992, p. 255. 50 Strong & Marble, Artillery in the Great War, Barnsley, 2013, p. 128. Australian Infantry on the Western Front 92 Batallion’s intelligence officer; Major VC, who rose from private to lieutenant colonel during the four years of the Great War; and his former comrade, Major Percy Black DSO DCM, now a Company Commander in the 16th Battalion. Despite the prowess of these middle-ranking officers, the thesis has already noted that the dissemination of the BEF’s latest tactics was particularly poor in the 4th Division well into 1917. How could men like Jacka, Murray and Black not be versed in contemporary tactical standards? There is no short answer to the cause of the disparity, though a failure in Gough’s command responsibility in the rigorous dissemination of tactics was a likely influence. In any event, Bullecourt proved that individual bravery stood absolutely no chance in overcoming the strength of the German defences. On the first day of the battle, Jacka would become embittered that his warnings of impending failure were ignored, Murray disillusioned by the slaughter, and Black left hanging on the uncut German wire after being shot down by a maxim gun. The Canadian Corps action at Vimy Ridge during the same offensive provides a notable contrast to the Australian performance and will be subsequently explored. On 8 April, even the thrusting Gough was unsure in his cable to GHQ: 5th Army cannot carry out their attack owing to the fact that they have not been able to cut the wire. General Gough hopes to be able to attack Thursday April 12. Everything possible will be done by 5th Army to assist the 3rd Army’s attack by means of bombardment.51 On 9 April the First and Third British Armies launched their offensives, and Gough threw caution to the wind. The 4th Australian and British 62nd Divisions launched uncoordinated attacks ostensibly in support of each other the next day. Writing for the returnedsoldiers’ paper Reveille in 1932, former 14th Battalion (4th Division) Sergeant William Groves vividly recalled the tactics employed in the Australian Division: The lines [of men] are in perfect order, for another 200 yards they remain unbroken. In moments between the advances one is able to see the whole formation, each line or wave stretching illimitably to right and left. It is a glorious sight in the chastened background of the spreading white mantle of snow.52 In a scene reminiscent of British troops walking towards the German trenches on the Somme ten months earlier, the 4th Division lost over 3,000 men, of whom nearly 1,200 were captured. 53 Another 14th Battalion man, Edgar Rule, a soon-to-be commissioned Gallipoli veteran, wrote of Birdwood’s address to the men of the 4th Division after Bullecourt: I heard him apologise to our boys for the disaster that had over taken them…He appeared to be struggling with the desire to take us into his confidence, and parts of

51 Bean, OH, Vol. IV, p.268. 52 William Groves, “Bullecourt”, Reveille, Melbourne, 29 January 1932. 53 OH, Vol. IV, p. 342. Australian Infantry on the Western Front 93 his conversation were impressed on my memory. “Boys, I can assure you that no one regrets this disaster that has befallen your brigade more than I;” and again, “I can assure you than none of your own officers had anything to do with the arrangements for this stunt;” and lastly, “We did our utmost to have the stunt put off until more suitable arrangements could be made.” Not a word did he utter in condemnation of those in higher authority, but it was plain to me that he shrank from being contaminated by the bloody fiasco.54 This is an extraordinary first hand revelation. Birdwood was a Corps Commander. He was outranked by only Gough himself in the Fifth Army. If Birdwood and Gough were not responsible for what happened to the 4th Australian Division at Bullecourt then who was? The answer is complex. It is not enough to say that new small unit infantry tactics had not been implemented throughout the division’s battalions. In an environment such as the Western Front small unit tactics would not prevail if unsupported by the combined cooperation of the other combatant arms. The result at Bullecourt came about because of poor staff work – particularly with regard to coordinating the various arms involved, a lack of standardised tactical training, and a moral failure among leaders who pressed ahead into a battle doomed to failure. Haig knew well Gough’s weaknesses: poor planning, predilection towards aggressive recklessness and a poor attention to detail. Within months, Haig’s diary records as much.55 Tim Travers suggests that such notions were prevalent and central to the thinking of a few BEF generals, and are based on a belief that the offensive spirit will overcome embedded modern defences in an infantry attack.56 It is well that such methods did not occur throughout the entire BEF. A month before Arras, Major General Arthur Currie wrote to Canadian Corps HQ espousing the strengths of SS143: The great advantage of the new platoon organisation is its elasticity, and therefore I do not consider that any definite rule should be laid down as to the position of the various sections of the platoon in the attack. In my opinion the position of these sections…depends on the objectives laid down, the nature of the ground over which the platoon has to act, and the kind of opposition that it is expected it will meet.57 Indeed, Byng had been preparing for Vimy Ridge for months. He trained his divisions intensively using the newly developed tactics, and the 1st Division even had a full sized practice course laid out labelling every known German trench and machine gun post.

54 E.J. Rule, Jacka’s Mob, first published 1933, Melbourne (2000), p. 81. 55 See Kiggell’s comments to Haig, Haig’s Diaries, 10 September 1917, Haig’s assessment of Fifth Army staff work, 18 September 1917; in Sheffield & Bourne (eds.), Douglas Haig: War Diaries and Letters 1914-1918, London, 2005. 56 Tim Travers, The Killing Ground: The British Army, the Western Front and the Emergence of Modern Warfare, London, 1987, Chapter 1. 57 LAC RG 9 III C1, Folder 109, File 9, 1st Canadian Division memorandum to Canadian Corps dated 5 March 1917. Australian Infantry on the Western Front 94 Preparations were absolutely thorough, and commanders ensured that all ranks knew their objectives and the plan of attack.58 Byng was hard on the Corps, but his men adored him and they even began to call themselves “Byng’s Boys”. Canadian and British Artillery pounded the Vimy Ridge, and using a creeping barrage technique the infantry followed close behind. The infantry stormed the German defences using the fluidity of new platoon tactics and took the heights in four days. Tim Cook writes the battle is the most famous and costly in Canadian history: 10,500 men in the short period of fighting.59 Victory at Vimy Ridge also signifies the Canadian memory of the Great War, as triumph in defeat at Gallipoli does for Australia, and was the one bright moment in the failure that was Arras. The British Corps in the offensive had started well but euphemistically “bogged-down”. The French Army to the south had failed so catastrophically that it would mutiny the next month! Nevertheless, Vimy Ridge was a tactical turning point in the First World War. After Arras Byng wrote to his commanding general highlighting the Canadians’ continued training of the tactics that had proved so successful: The training being carried out [in the Corps] is entirely platoon and company training. Reinforcements are being brought in and allotted to their platoons, which are then being trained as complete units. Special attention is being given to the training of men in grenades, rifle grenades and machine gun work…60 The Canadian Corps’ by now routine application of such methods signified the new standard for the training continuum and application of new doctrine in the BEF. As Arras wound down and the French ground to a halt along the Aisne, Haig now turned to Plumer’s Second Army to relieve the pressure on the Ypres Salient north of the Somme. Plumer’s plan was to attack the Messines Ridge southeast of Ypres, thereby removing the Ypres salient entirely and giving the British control of all high ground in the region. Strong and Marble indicate ‘the Battle of Messines was designed to mirror the operational success of the storming of Vimy Ridge, an attack that was limited to seizing a particular geographic objective rather than trying to break through’. 61 Plumer was the antithesis of Gough. He was meticulous, conservative and favoured the limited objective. Plumer had deployed in early 1915, and spent almost the entirety of his war in the Flanders. In the planning for Messines 21 mines were dug under the German front lines and packed with hundreds of tonnes of explosives. They were particularly concentrated around the spot-

58 Tim Cook, Shock Troops: Canadians Fighting the Great War 1917-18, Ontario, 2008, p. 81. 59 ibid, pp. 143-144. 60 LAC RG 9 III C1, Folder 109, File 1, Canadian Corps G. 439 134/7, memorandum to dated 10 May 1917. 61 Strong & Marble, Artillery in the Great War, Barnsley, 2013, p. 133. Australian Infantry on the Western Front 95 height on . On 21 May 1917, Second Army commenced its preliminary bombardment of the German lines with nearly 2500 guns, and they did not let up until 7 June. Particular emphasis was placed on counter-battery work – the destruction of German defensive artillery, and this was meticulously coordinated with the observation aircraft of the . 62 When the artillery bombardment ceased on 7 June, the Germans manned their trenches and positions believing an infantry assault would shortly commence. Plumer ordered the mines detonated, and the resulting explosions destroyed the entire German front line killing as many as 10,000 men. The blasts were heard as far as London 165 miles away. A little over two months later, the Australian photographer Frank Hurley, wrote of the resultant devastation in his diary: What an awful scene of desolation! Everything has been swept away: only stumps of trees stick up here & there & the whole field has the appearance of having been recently ploughed… It’s the most awful & appalling sight I have ever seen. The exaggerated machinations of hell are here typified. Everywhere the ground is littered with bits of guns, bayonets, shells & men. Way down in one of these mine craters was an awful sight. There lay three hideous, almost skeleton decomposed fragments of of German gunners. Oh the frightfulness of it all… Looking across this vast extent of desolation & horror, it appeared as though some mighty cataclysm had swept it off & blighted the vegetation, then peppered it with millions of lightning stabs. It might be the end of the world where two irresistible forces are slowly wearing each other away.63 The Battle of Messines was a stunning success for the BEF. Using a strategy aimed to secure only the ridgeline, the British objectives were all attained within 12 hours. Messines, small in scale compared to Arras, was nearly flawless in its execution. However, it was prior planning and preparation that paved the way for success. Plumer had a huge contour relief map made of the battleground before the assault and rotated every attacking Unit through the model prior to the battle. He had the troops thoroughly study the land and understand their objectives before they even stepped onto the battlefield. For six weeks prior the 20 brigades of the 2nd Army practiced and rehearsed again and again their part in the assault down to the platoon level.64

62 ibid, p. 134. 63 State Library of New South Wales, Sydney MLMSS 389 / Box 5 / Item 1Diary of Capt. F. Hurley, Official War Photographer, 23 August 1917. 64 Griffith, Battle Tactics of the Western Front, pp. 86-99. Australian Infantry on the Western Front 96

Left and right: One of the huge mines and resultant crater at Hill 60 on the Messines Ridge. The 1st Australian Tunnelling Company were responsible for firing the massive explosive charge in a mine under Hill 60, 4500 yards south east of Ypres, which completely destroyed the German front line at the northern end of Messines Ridge on 7 June 1917. (AWM E00580)

The Australian contribution was II ANZAC Corps comprising the 3rd, 5th and New Zealand Divisions. The battle would also herald a rise in fortunes for the 4th Australian Division, belatedly transferred to Second Army as a reserve. The 4th Division undertook the same training as all the other divisions in the assault, and Edgar Rule of the 14th Battalion recorded his observations of the battlefield model precisely: It covered about an acre of ground and was fenced in. It showed the smallest details: barbed wire, little villages, trenches, trees. Valleys had been evacuated and the earth thrown onto places where the map showed elevation. Rivers were represented by blue earth, and it gave an excellent idea of the objects and obstacles to be met going over. Previous to the attack all officers and troops participating were sent here to view the work. No doubt it was the attention shown to little details such as this that made the Messines battle such as success.65 After Bullecourt, such processes must have been absolutely welcomed in the 4th Division. The 4th Australian Division’s experience during the spring and summer of 1917 provides is an illustrative comparison of old and new tactics. It highlights the difficulty of instilling the new British doctrine among the sixty divisions of the BEF. Maintaining standardisation across a force of five Armies would always prove to be difficult in 1917. Indeed, the 4th Division’s parent Fifth Army was not a pace setter in the process. There is no coincidence in the fact that the fortunes of the division rose when it was transferred to the Second Army after Bullecourt.

65 Rule, Jacka’s Mob, p. 86. Australian Infantry on the Western Front 97

Above: A view of the large contour map near Petit Pont, Belgium, which was specially made to th give the troops a knowledge of the Messines battlefield. These men comprise elements of the 13 th Brigade and 14 Battalions AIF. (AWM E00632)

Above: A view of New Zealand infantry training in preparation for the Battle of Messines. These men are moving forward in rehearsal over ground similar to the battlefield using section and platoon structures as stipulated in SS143. Every division participating in the Battle of Messines, including the 3rd, 4th and 5th Australian Divisions practiced such methods. (Photograph H29 Auckland War Memorial Museum Otago)

Australian Infantry on the Western Front 98

Left: Captain Albert Jacka VC (front holding map), 14th Battalion, comparing his maps with the prepared model of the Messines area. This contour map of the battlefield was constructed near Petit Pont, and stands where erected from which it could be studied to advantage, in order that troops taking part would fully understand their course of action in the great undertaking.

(AWM E00631)

One British officer recorded that a posting from Plumer’s Second Army to Gough’s Fifth Army revealed striking dissimilarities: ‘[a]fter the wonderful organisation and devotion to detail which one found in 2nd Army, the 5th Army struck one as very haphazard in its methods...’. 66 However, under Plumer, the Australian Divisions began to absorb and effectively apply the doctrinal changes that had taken effect throughout the year. It is also no coincidence that the process of allocating both I and II Anzac to the one Army command sowed the seeds for the later formation of the Australian Corps. Their combination led to an exponential increase in the Australian infantry’s battlefield effectiveness. Institutionalisation was the key to operational effectiveness on the Western Front. Such concepts were particularly well employed by generals such as Plumer, Currie, Byng, and later Monash. Drawing on the lessons of the battlefield, and systematically reinforcing tactical doctrine down to the lowest levels of their various commands, such men influenced the outcome of the war. To be sure, the tactics compiled by the British Army from 1916 onwards were being disseminated throughout the entire BEF, but it was initially among the homogenous Corps such as the CEF that the doctrine was so effectively applied. In SS143 and 135 lies the development of an inherent flexibility of thought. That an organisation as large as the BEF adapted and fundamentally changed its small unit tactics after the rigours of its early experiences is nothing short of amazing. It completely refutes the accepted “lions led by donkeys” myth which has clouded the conduct of small unit operations on the Western Front for 100 years. What was really occurring was a revolution in military affairs. While the human cost of the 1914-1915 experience is undeniable, the true pattern of the war really emerges in 1917 and 1918. In the last year of the conflict, in terms of tactical

66 Bond and Robbins (eds), Staff Officer: The Diaries of Walter Guinness 1914-1918, London, 1987, p.61.

Australian Infantry on the Western Front 99 ability and technical mastery, the BEF was likely the most competent army in the world. While Australian infantrymen greatly benefitted from such thinking, they had little to do with its inception. The codification of infantry tactics was articulated by British and Canadian staff officers, published by the War Office, and came about as the result of two and a half year’s collective experience on the Western Front. In an Australian context, the following pages will highlight the honing of these basic principles by exploring the pattern of reinforcement training that the Australian infantry received in the various Army schools in France.

Australian Infantry on the Western Front

CHAPTER 4 Reinforcement Training and the Schools in France The Australian Infantry’s Adoption of an Imperial Pattern This chapter will focus on the reinforcement process that newly trained and returning Australian soldiers undertook after their arrival on the continent, and on the British Army schooling system in France which trained troops in operating modern weapon systems. Contrary to popular belief, these schools and their associated processes and training pamphlets provided a robust and valuable education to Empire soldiers in preparing them for the rigours of combat. The training methodology occurred BEF wide, and the development of Australian infantry can only be viewed in this context. The schooling system will be viewed contextually; there was a disparate dissemination of doctrinal and training standards among the different British Armies to which Australian infantry were allocated in 1917. An overview of the 1917 campaigns in which Australian infantry were involved will provide further context. These campaigns show how Army commanders had a very real influence on the application of the latest tactics and doctrine among their formations on the Western Front. Despite discrepancies, the overarching theme remains that the education methodology employed by the BEF comprised specificity in training and habituation, and was a concept as old as the armies of Alexander the Great. Indeed, Alexander lived by the words of his famous tutor, Aristotle: ‘We are what we repeatedly do. Excellence is not an act but a habit’.1 Instinctive habit was the dictum employed in training by the BEF during the Great War. 1917 marked several important training milestones in the development of Australian infantry on the Western Front. Firstly, a standardised syllabus for training recruits had been adopted among all British and Empire elements. Secondly, the promulgation of the training pamphlet SS143 – Instructions for the Training of Platoons for Offensive Action in February represented a tactical revolution in military affairs for the Great War Imperial infantryman. The skills imparted by both recruit and tactical training were then consistently reinforced and upgraded once the infantryman had arrived in France. Until 1917, machine-guns, barbed wire and artillery had mown infantry offensives down like wheat before the scythe. Combined arms cooperation, the creeping barrage, and indirect fire support were still developing.2 The use of section based weapons systems and commensurate tactics were gaining doctrinal

1 Will Durant, The Story of Philosophy: The Lives and Opinions of the World’s Greatest Philosophers, Pocket Paperbooks, New York, 2006, p. 98. 2 See the lessons learned for British Artillery from the Somme campaign in Paul Strong and Sanders Marble, Artillery in the Great War, Barnsley, United Kingdom, 2011, pp. 123-128. Australian Infantry on the Western Front 101 traction, though there would be some disparity in their implementation throughout the massive five Army structure of the BEF. In 1917 the cult of the bayonet and the offensive spirit still prevailed.3 It would take experience gained from the learning process to realise modern ‘mechanical warfare’ in 1918 – the application of tanks, aircraft, machine guns and artillery. The combined arms process would occur in concert with and in support of the infantry to gain ascendancy and win on the battlefields of the Western Front. The British Army’s method of reinforcing competencies among men when they arrived in France, and in the technical schooling system set up on the continent during the second half of the war, overcame many of the difficulties associated with training so many troops in the field. During the Great War British reinforcement training emphasised the reiteration and evaluation of core and common skills learned by Australian recruits on the Salisbury Plain, and on educating the individual in the practices of the operational environment in which he would shortly serve. Reinforcement training was often conducted by stern non-commissioned disciplinarians in order to “harden” the men for the rigours of trench warfare. While this was not always well appreciated, the training very much prepared the infantryman for the rigours of the tactical field environment. The BEF continuously maintained a series of training camps and base reinforcement depots to prepare officers and soldiers of all ranks for the rigours of operations and combat. Early in the war, Britain established base depots at the channel ports in France and other places on the lines of communication leading to the Western Front. These ports were logistics hubs where munitions and goods arrived in bulk and were broken down for despatch by rail for receipt among the various BEF Armies, Corps and lower formations. Hundreds of thousands of tons of equipment, food, stores – everything the BEF required to be maintained in the field – passed through these ports from Britain during the course of each week of the war. Equally important, base depots were the centres for collecting and forwarding reinforcements to their line battalions and units. With such an emphasis on manpower, the training camps and base depots comprised thousands of military and support personnel. They became communities unto themselves and aside from accommodation and training facilities for the reinforcements passing through, bases and depots were centres for considerable industry. They comprised hospitals, workshops, entertainment areas, storage, postal and administrative facilities, shops, restaurants and brothels, these to name but a few of the many varied requirements of thousands of troops away from home.

3 For informative views of such archaic methods of war see Tim Travers, ‘The Army and the Challenge of War 1914–18’, in David Chandler and Ian Beckett (eds), The Oxford Illustrated History of the British Army, Oxford, 1994, passim; and by the same historian, The Killing Ground: The British Army, the Western Front and the Emergence of Modern Warfare, Routledge, London, 1987. Australian Infantry on the Western Front 102 When the AIF arrived in Europe in 1916, reinforcement training centres for Australians were incorporated into four major BEF Base Training Centres, or depots4, already established in western France to cope with the massive influx of men and material: specialised in Infantry and Artillery reinforcement training. Rouen specialised in Infantry, Cavalry and Engineer reinforcement training. specialised in Infantry reinforcement training. Étaples specialised in Infantry reinforcement training, and housed small Artillery and Engineer schools for the ANZAC Corps. The BEF also established many more training centres around France throughout the war. The reinforcement training Australian infantry received at these centres was central to the development of Australian infantry on the Western Front.

Above: Australian troops arriving at ANZAC Camp Etaples. Artist Iso Rae (AWM Art 19601) Of the camps, it is Étaples south of Boulogne in France, which remains the most notorious and well-remembered of all British Great War training centres. Even before they arrived, reinforcements were well aware of the brutal methods employed by Étaples’ instructional staff who presented lessons in gas warfare, bayonet drill, and physical training. Conditions were such that the only major mutiny that occurred in the British Army during the Great War took place at Étaples in September 1917; though Gary Sheffield rightly points out that the event occurred in response to the behaviour of instructors and military police, and in

4 AWM25 947/8, Training – France: General Methods of Training Reinforcements. Australian Infantry on the Western Front 103 no way even approximated the mutinies that occurred in the French Army only a few months earlier. What is significant about the Étaples mutiny is that it highlights greater similarities among British and Dominion troops of the era than popular history generally gives credit to. Indeed, like the Australians, and perhaps because of the use of , ‘the British Army remained a citizen force of civilians, largely working men, in uniform’.5 Like the Australians, Britons enlisted for the purpose of defeating the Germans, and once that duty was complete, they no longer saw themselves compelled by blinkered military discipline. In any event, the area around Étaples was a concentration of Imperial reinforcement camps and hospitals during the war. It was remote from attack, except from aircraft, and accessible by railway from both the Flanders and Somme battlefields. In 1917, Étaples was representative of one of the numerous and mammoth logistics, training and reinforcement footprints that the British Army had established in France. 100,000 troops were camped among the sand dunes and the hospitals near the town. The camp included eleven general, one stationary, four Red Cross hospitals and a convalescent depot, and could accommodate 22,000 wounded or sick. In , 10 months after the Armistice, three hospitals and a convalescent depot still remained.6 Preparations undertaken at Étaples and the other Base Training Centres for moving forward to the trenches were well remembered. Norman Harvey of the 9th Battalion AIF wrote in his battalion history that after recruit training in the United Kingdom, when Australians of the 1st Division arrived in France: they went by way of Bolougne…then on to the great British base camp at Étaples… Here they stayed for two weeks to have the finishing touches put on their training at the “Bull-ring”, a training camp a couple of miles to the north of the camp. Many considered the training at the Bull-ring unduly severe, though others took no exception to it. From Étaples reinforcements were sent to join their units.7 The objectives of such Base Training Camps for all Empire soldiers were the same, and Australian records indicate they were directed threefold: 1. To test the efficiency of all drafts, and to give further training to those which do not pass a reasonable standard. 2. To give a final polish to all drafts, in view of the latest lessons learnt at the front.

5 G. Sheffield, Forgotten Victory: The First World War Myths and Realities, London, 2002, pp. 156-157. 6Commonwealth War Graves Commission web site accessed 22 January 2014: http://www.cwgc.org/find-a-cemetery/cemetery/56500/ETAPLES%20MILITARY%20CEMETERY 7 N. Harvey, From ANZAC to the Hindenburg Line: The History of the 9th Battalion AIF, Brisbane, 1940, p. 158. Australian Infantry on the Western Front 104 3. To continue the training of all those who may remain at the Base Depots for any length of time. 8 The timing of this directive, issued at the end of 1916, only months after the AIF’s arrival and the BEF’s recent involvement in the Somme campaign, indicate attempts to address ‘developments in tactics and highlight the necessity for efficient instruction’ within the base training camps in France.9

Left: Australian infantry undergoing reinforcement training at Etaples during the Great War. (AWM P02897.003)

Another soldier of the 9th Battalion, and later recipient of the Military Medal, Gerry Evans recorded in some detail the positive effects of such reinforcement: The camp at Étaples was very good and we received more training there in a couple of weeks than in six months in Australia. We were trained by English Sergeant . One said, `they say you cannot drill the Australian but I like training them'. I must hand it to him because he could drill them and there was no doubt he had the command. We would do an hour's physical training and it was willing, a one hour lecture which was on the rifle, , mortar or Lewis machine gun, then back on the hard training. The bayonet course consisted of frames with bags of straw hung to the frames and you ran your hardest and the command was `in, out, on guard' - then you raced through between the bags to the end of the course. You were taught the most vital parts of the body and when on the course you had to bayonet a particular vital part. Then there was the obstacle course. You were lined up and told it was a course and off you went. You had to jump a trench, run to a wall and scramble over it without any toe hold, then on to an 8 ft. drop, and if you jibbed you got pushed over by the ones behind. Sometimes it was rifle drill and fixing bayonets, sometimes it was instruction on the gas helmet and then through the gas . 10

8 AWM25 947/8, Training – France 1917: General Methods of Training Reinforcements, & Notes on the Training of Reinforcements at the Base Training Camps, undated. 9 AWM25 947/8, Training – France: I ANZAC GHQ Memo to 1st – 4th Australian Divisions. 10 Gerald Vance Evans, “Recollections of the 1914-18 War”, in Edward G. Lengel (ed.), World War 1 Memories: An Annotated Bibliography of Personal Accounts, Melbourne, 2004, p.5. Australian Infantry on the Western Front 105 On arriving at a training centre, soldiers immediately drew new weapons and gas masks from the depot armoury. Lost or deficient equipment was replaced and medical and document inspections were carried out. All drafts were tested in musketry, bombing and bayonet fighting, and passed through a gas chamber; these events were considered the fundamentals of training. During peak periods, the training centres could surge to pass over 2000 men through these elemental processes steps between five and nine days.11 When men had passed this training they were considered ready to join their battalions, but continued to exercise small unit tactical procedures until required for operations. This process, it must be remembered, was an extension of what the soldier – he had already passed his basic training in England – had previously undertaken as a recruit. It was also a prelude to training in his battalion and parent division behind the lines on the Western Front. Soldiers that did not realise the standard in these fundamentals, or whose discipline was considered unsatisfactory were detained for further remedial training until they did so.12 For the infantrymen of every unit in the British Army the process of training was laid down in the pamphlet System of Testing and Training Reinforcements carried out by Base Training Schools BEF.13 The training was regulated and standardised across the BEF. Table 4.1 indicates the assessed standards required among all replacement troops. Table 4.2 details the further training undertaken on the completion of the basic reinforcement evaluation.14 There is a direct nexus between training, reinforcement and battlefield effectiveness in these syllabi and what comes before and after in the making of a soldier. This was Haig’s work, and in it was an avowal of an intelligent approach to the war. Haig was undergoing the learning process in conjunction with the BEF, and he took every opportunity to apply lessons learned and incorporate new technology into the circumstance as it was developed. This was entirely necessary. Haig was well aware that the tactics and technology of waging war on the Western Front changed rapidly as new equipment and techniques came on line. This not only occurred in the development of infantry tactics, but also in the use of aircraft, artillery, tanks and military communications. Haig directed this emergence, and it was his responsibility to mould the various capabilities into a combined war-winning weapons system. Training was at the core of this expansion.

11 AWM25 839/13, Training of Reinforcements in France, 1917: GHQ Memo to Australian Divisions. 12 AWM25 947/8, Training – France: General Methods of Training Reinforcements, 1916. I ANZAC GHQ Memo to 1st – 4th Australian Divisions. 13 Later Laid down in SS 152, Instructions for the Training of the British Armies in France, HMSO, June 1917, Chap. 2, Part III. 14 AWM25 947/8, Training – France: General Methods of Training Reinforcements in accordance with System of Testing and Training Reinforcements carried out by Base Training Schools BEF, HMSO, London 1917. Australian Infantry on the Western Front 106

Table 4.1 Soldier Reinforcement Test Syllabus Training Centres: France.

Subjects Standard Tested

1. Loading and Unloading 2. Charging Magazines 3. Cease Fire and what to do 4. Adjusting sights Musketry 5. Recognition of aiming marks by simple methods 6. Rapidity of aim (target exposed for four seconds) 7. Rapid fire (at least ten rounds per minute) 8. Care of arms and ammunition

1. Grenade throwing with dummies Grenade Instruction 2. Grenade tactics, and attack practice 3. Live grenade throwing

1. Preliminary Bayonet Fighting 2. Control Course 3. Final assault course

1. Lecture 2. Drill in Gas helmets Anti-Gas 3. Demonstration: i. Each draft passes through an atmosphere of gas in gas helmets, and an atmosphere of shell gas without helmets.

Table 4.2 Soldier Reinforcement Additional Training: France.

Subjects Standard Tested

1. Constructing trenches, breastworks, etc. 2. Wiring, revetting, drainage 3. Trench routine Trench Warfare 4. Relief of trenches i. Each draft put through a 12-hour relief of trenches by night or day.

Steady Drill 1. With Arms 2. Without Arms

1. Signals and how to carry them out 2. Judging distance 3. Use of cover Skirmishing 4. Fire control orders 5. Re-telling off 6. Digging with an entrenching tool

1. Discipline Lectures 2. Preservation of health by the Medical Officer 3. Care of feet by the Medical Officer Australian Infantry on the Western Front 107 As a constituent element of the British Army, the infantry of the AIF were required to conduct this training. Ergo, their development was in line with the wider development of the BEF. By the middle of 1917, the process for training British Armies in France was codified in SS152, Instructions for the Training of the British Armies in France, which was amended and updated in January of the following year.15 Within this construct, Army Commanders were responsible for the standardised and effective training of all elements of their considerable commands. Formation – that is corps, brigade and divisional – commanders were responsible for the standardised efficiency of the battalions under their jurisdiction, and Commanding Officers were responsible for the training of all personnel in their units. Indeed, as the doctrine espoused ‘sections, platoons and companies must be properly organised under their own leaders; and these leaders must be practiced in handling their own commands, and must train them and train with them on all occasions’.16 The opening paragraph of SS152 laid down the hierarchy of this doctrine succinctly: The general policy of training in the British Armies in France may be briefly stated to be as follows: i) Commanders of formations are responsible for the efficiency of the units under their command. ii) Commanding officers are responsible for the training of all officers, NCOs and men in their units. iii) Various special instructors are trained at schools in order to assist Commanding Officers in the training of their units. iv) Reinforcements, with certain exceptions, are trained at Training Camps.17 Such guidelines established the structure, syllabus and responsibilities for Corps schools, staff training and unit collective training. They set a framework that governed training within the BEF for the rest of the war. These were Haig’s initiatives. Training and the promulgation of training standards became the norm in the British Army from mid-1917 onwards. Examples of the SS series of training pamphlets are variously held as folios in both AWM4 and AWM25 which pertain primarily to the operational and administrative activity of the AIF. This includes training. The documents are additionally held in hard copy in the Library & Archives Canada (LAC) in Ottawa in the RG9 series of operational files pertaining to the CEF. The SS series of pamphlets are equally prolific among the miscellany of administrative documents pertaining

15 SS152, Instructions for the Training of the British Armies in France, HMSO, June 1917, revised January 1918. 16 SS135, Instructions for the Training of Divisions for Offensive Action, HMSO December 1916, revised June 1917, para. 6. 17 SS152, Instructions for the Training of the British Armies in France, Chap. 1, P. 4, Para. 1. Australian Infantry on the Western Front 108 to Units in the AIF, particularly with reference to them as standard practice after about the middle of 1917. Uniform promulgation of the documents remained problematic throughout the BEF until this point, and AIF Divisions suffered from this disparity in training and application. This is not a point of direct criticism; such “teething” difficulties are to be expected in the expansion of the BEF from six to 60 divisions in less than two years. It is of far greater significance for the infantrymen of the BEF that the innovations associated with the learning process were ultimately so successful. Haig’s staff may take the credit for the dissemination and publication of cutting edge training and tactical doctrine. On Valentine’s Day 1917, Haig’s Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Sir Launcelot Kiggell issued the “General Principles of the Formation” in which the initiatives for the new training standards were enshrined. 18 The memo articulated changes in the layout of units, the introduction and command of new weapons systems, and the new manner for carrying out an assault. In the fortnight prior to Kiggell’s memorandum Haig had also established a training directorate within his G Staff branch under the command of Brigadier, later Major General, Arthur Solly-Flood, the author of the soon to be released seminal SS143, Instructions for the Training of Platoons for Offensive Action and its sister pamphlet SS144, Normal Formation for the Attack..19 Solly-Flood was the man more than any other who codified the new methods for waging war in the BEF during 1917.20 Along with the GHQ position, General Staff Officers training were allocated to all Corps and Armies in the BEF for the specific purpose of supervision of training. Solly-Flood grasped his responsibilities with both hands, and when he penned the overarching guidance in SS152 less than four months later he wrote: The training of each division must be carried out under the personal guidance of the Divisional commander, assisted, controlled and supervised by the Corps and the Army. Every commander should inspire his unit with his personal energy and fighting spirit…No opportunity should be missed of inculcating mutual confidence, cohesion, and the spirit of combination... [The] men must acquire the habit of looking to their leaders for direction. This can only be acquired by constant attention and training.21 In conjunction with this document, the BEF GHQ training branch also determined new training and standardisation requirements for the five Armies on the Western Front. A system of schools were established in each Army, and embedded at the GHQ, Army, Corps and Divisional levels. Men were additionally allocated to serve as instructors in the United

18 AWM25 947/17 Pt2“General principles of the Formation” issued to 1st - 5th Armies, and this copy stamped as held by the 1st Australian Infantry Brigade and disseminated 02 March 1917. 19 G Staff pertaining to Operations and Intelligence, A Staff Administration, Q Staff Quartermaster’s Logistics. See Peter J Palmer, ‘Sir Arthur Solly-Flood and Tactical Training in the BEF,’ The Western Front Association, http://www.westernfrontassociation.com accessed 25 January 2014. 20 Robbins, British Generalship on the Western Front, Chapter 9, passim. 21 SS152, Instructions for the Training of the British Armies in France, June 1917 Chap. 2, Part I, Sect. 1, p. 8. Australian Infantry on the Western Front 109 Kingdom. The source of cadre staffs of instructors – experienced and effective – was logical. They were leavened from front line battalions as experts in their trade. The men were provided training in instructional technique training and in turn became educators themselves. For example, the November 1917 history for the 1st Australian Training Brigade at Sutton Veny on the Salisbury Plain has extensive detail on the lists of infantry NCO and junior officer instructors allocated from parent battalions to undertake courses in instructional technique.22 Instructors were posted for about six months to England, an Army or ancillary school before returning to their parent units.23 These establishments provided comprehensive training for almost every conceivable need for a large army in the field. The responsibilities associated with command at every level were manifest in all publications: Commanders should train the troops they lead into action. This is a principle which must never be departed from… the object of which is to coordinate policy and system and so arrive at uniformity of doctrine… No form of training which can be carried out by Officers Commanding units is to be relegated to schools.24 Training must commence with platoons and companies working independently, and progress gradually until brigades and even the whole division have carried out the operation as a complete unit… Commanders must ensure that each battalion is thoroughly trained before attempting to carry out practice with larger formations.25 The platoon commander should be the proudest man in the army. He is the commander of the unit in the attack. He is the only commander who can know intimately the character and capabilities of each man under him. He can establish an esprit de platoon which will hard to equal in any other formation.26 In these words lies explicit proof that in 1917 a revolution in training was occurring across all levels of command within the BEF. This was evolving at platoon level in the form of SS143 and from the top downwards in the forms of SS152 and SS135.27 All of the documents reflected a process of centralised command and decentralised control for British infantry, and all were directed for promulgation by Haig’s HQ. Indeed, Solly-Flood’s foresight resulted in a training system that standardised the operational practices of all infantry in the BEF. His initiatives would underwrite battlefield effectiveness in the British Army, and his organisation of this training is significant to the developmental history of every British and Empire infantry unit on the Western Front. The BEF schooling system was vital to realising the development of Australian Infantry on the Western Front.

22 See AWM4 23/79/2 – 1st Training Brigade Unit History, November 1917 is indicative of this process. 23 SS152, Instructions for the Training of the British Armies in France, January 1918 Chap. 2, Sect. 5, p. 19. 24 SS152, Instructions for the Training of the British Armies in France, Chap. 1, June 1917 Chap. 1, Part II, p. 4. 25 SS135, Instructions for the Training of Divisions for Offensive Action, HMSO, 1916, p. 5. 26 SS143, Instructions for the Training of Platoons for Offensive Action, HMSO, 1917, Part III, Para. 2. 27 Sheffield and Todman (eds.), Command & Control on the Wester Front: The British Army Experience 1914- 1918, Stroud, United Kingdom, 2007, pp. 180-181. Australian Infantry on the Western Front 110 At the Army School level, the GHQ schools trained staff officers, company commanders of the , and officers and NCOs in the tactical handling of machine-gun and Lewis guns. GHQ schools also gave instructional courses to produce musketry instructors, and specific training in anti-aircraft machine-gunnery (this from ground to air). Army level schools trained Infantry Officers and Sergeants as Company Commanders and Company Sergeant-Majors (CSMs), and had Commanding Officer (CO), scouting, observation and sniping schools for the training of COs and instructors in these disciplines. Army level schools finally had artillery, heavy and medium trench mortar, and signalling schools. These schools primarily produced instructors for their various disciplines, but also trained men as replacements for the front. Corps level schools held an Infantry school for the training of platoon commanders and sergeants. This school also had a bombing, and Lewis gun school affiliated to it. A signals school and anti-gas school were maintained at Corps level to liaise with parent Corps HQs in their respective Armies.28 By 1918 the Corps level schools additionally undertook the infantry reinforcement training previously conducted separately at the Base Training Camps for men returning to their battalions or newly arrived in France. The huge centres at Le Havre, Rouen, Calais and Étaples still processed the thousands of soldiers destined for the front, they still comprised massive supply dumps, respite centres and general hospitals, but the specifics of infantry training were now carried out by parent formations. In this rationalisation was a marked common-sense method for trained and experienced infantrymen to educate newly arrived and inexperienced infantrymen. They were labelled Corps Reinforcement Camps; where trained infantry reinforcements awaited despatch to their units, and where infantrymen not taken into action were sent. SS152 even went as far as to direct that no training of infantry reinforcements was to be undertaken at the Base Camps. They were to be sent without delay to Corps reinforcement Camps. Infantry reinforcements were to comprise: i) Men from graduated battalions. ii) Men who have received 14-weeks training. iii) Returned casualties from England. iv) Casualties returning from hospitals and convalescent depots in France.29 The training continuum comprised a top-down process in which higher level schools produced instructors who trained soldiers at formation and unit level. This was intended to

28 SS152, Instructions for the Training of the British Armies in France, January 1918 Chap. 1, Sects. 2-3, p. 5-8. 29 SS152, Instructions for the Training of the British Armies in France, January 1918 Chap. 2, Sect. 5, p. 20. i) Graduated battalions comprised formed bodies of men who had trained together. ii) 14-weeks training was the ab initio training undertaken in England. Australian Infantry on the Western Front 111 make units self-sufficient in generating their required skill sets and capability. Schools at the Army, Corps and Brigade level were permanent institutions to which instructors were posted for the purpose of training instructors in specialist skills. At Divisional level and lower, classes of instruction were provided to groups of soldiers in order to hone tactical battlefield skills. Divisions, brigades, battalions and platoons trained as discrete and combined elements in preparation for battle. The instructional technique applied at all levels in the hierarchy is largely unchanged a century later: that being explanation, demonstration and practice.30 Further, from formation to Army levels, each element maintained a cadre of instructional staff who did not go into battle. Indeed, the BEF considered instructional cadre staff essential for the common good; guidance stated that units should withhold men before operations to serve as a nucleus that could train reinforcements if so required: ‘It is a “Golden Rule” that all Commanders, down to and including Company Commanders, must keep some portion of their command (nominally 25 per cent) in hand as a reserve’.31 These school systems made it possible to rapidly spread knowledge of the latest methods developed by experience while simultaneously counteracting poor standards. However, once again, the implementation of the schooling system was disparate, and it was either highly effective in the immediate in some Armies and subordinate Corps, or ineffectually implemented in others. The homogeneity of the Canadian Corps again led the way even before SS152 was published. The 2nd Canadian Division’s relay of Byng’s direction in general correspondence of mid-1917 (post Vimy Ridge) is salient: The GOC wishes to impress on all commanding officers the necessity of making the utmost possible use of the period in Reserve in order to bring their units back to the same state of training and discipline as they were in before April 9th. The following are the general lines on which the GOC wishes commanding officers to work: i) Platoons must first be organised in accordance with SS143. ii) Discipline must be improved. A very high standard of smartness and cleanliness of turnout must be insisted on all occasions. iii) The training must be progressive. a. The first week will be devoted to section and platoon training: including Handling of arms, Bayonet fighting, physical drill, marching, saluting and box respirator drill. b. The second week will be devoted to the tactical training of sections and platoons in the attack both in trench and open warfare, including schemes to

30 SS152, Instructions for the Training of the British Armies in France, Chap. 2, Part IV, p. 19, para. 1. The contemporary ADF parlance is BDM: Brief/Demonstrate/Monitor, and Brief/Monitor/Debrief. The essence of these processes is much the same as explanation/demonstration/ practice. 31 SS135, Instructions for the Training of Divisions for Offensive Action, HMSO, 1916, p. 20. Australian Infantry on the Western Front 112 bring out the principles of cooperation of the various weapons with which the platoon is armed. c. The third week will be devoted to the tactical training of the company in attack.32 To this end, in the summer of 1917 when any Canadian infantry unit was out of the line, it was training; the morning generally spent on military work and the afternoon spent engaged in team sports.33 Bill Rawling records memories of the period through the eyes of Canadian 7th Battalion veteran William West: We took training and the new recruits took musketry at the range. We trained for probably two weeks and then we went into the line for a certain number of days… Then we were taken out of the line and we were on support work which brought up the ammunition and supply to the front line. Then we trained for Hill 70.34 Hill 70 was a localised battle around the Flanders village of Lens in August 1917. The battle was similar in concept to the diversion intended by the Battle of Fromelles during the Somme campaign a year earlier, though far better executed by the homogenous Canadian Corps. Hill 70’s intent was to relieve pressure on the concurrent Third Ypres campaign. The responsibility for training among some AIF divisions around this time was quite different to the Canadian standards. The 2nd Australian Division provides a notable comparison. In correspondence dated as late as May 1917, Major General N. Smyth VC, GOC 2nd Australian Infantry Division is clearly behind the curve of the learning process: The following are my views on the points raised: (b) Training of reinforcements… At present there appears to be considerable duplication of efforts in respect to the training of reinforcements. - They are first trained in Australia. - Then in England. - Then in Étaples. - And now some are trained in Partially Trained Reinforcements Camp [sic]; necessitating the detachment of officers and NCOs from their battalions for instructional purposes. - I was also assured, whilst at Salisbury Plain earlier in the month, that there is ample room to complete the training of all reinforcements there. Other points which suggest themselves are: - The quality of the material now composing units – especially the inexperience of leaders; and

32 LAC RG 9 III C1, Folder 109, File 1, 2nd Canadian Division G. 33/664, memorandum to all subordinate formations in the division and copied to Corps GHQ, “Training While in Reserve”, dated 26 May 1917. 33 Rawling, Surviving Trench Warfare, p. 135. 34 loc cit. Australian Infantry on the Western Front 113 - The consequent necessity of a periodic withdrawal from the line and allotment of a definite training period, so that progressive training may be carried out.35 This response is absurd; it highlights a stark disparity between the Canadian and Australian 2nd Divisions at the same time in the same theatre of war. Smyth’s sentiments also contain fundamental errors in fact and intent. The standard to which recruits were trained in Australia was rudimentary at best. Recruits were trained in England to a graduation level; and then reinforced at a Base Camp after deploying to the continent. By this time the soldier was no longer a recruit. Further, in accordance with SS 152 & 135 it was a Divisional responsibility to consolidate the training of a man when he arrived at his unit; this was later the responsibility of Corps level Reinforcement Camps. Indeed, in June 1917, it was a mathematical certainty that no soldier arriving at his unit in France had been in the AIF for less than six months; this comprising a nominal ten week sea voyage, and the remainder in training and reinforcing the skill sets required to serve as a line infantryman in his battalion. Soldiers, even though inexperienced, were simply not allowed forward until trained. There is, of course, context to this comparison. It will be recalled that achieving battlefield effectiveness very much depended on what British Army a Corps or Division was serving in. At the end of May 1917, the 2nd Australian Division was allocated to Birdwood’s I ANZAC Corps in Gough’s Fifth Army. Gough was not known for the attention to detail required to standardise training practices; Birdwood was better, though his forte was not in training. Birdwood was also Gough’s subordinate. Therefore, at a lower level still, divisional commanders were influenced by commanders and held great sway in the training of their commands. Very often, their methods differed, though one maxim remained: ‘the value of a formation, no matter what its size, depend[ed] on the character and personality of its commander, whether he be a colonel or a lieutenant’.36 Standardisation was the other determining factor. One British officer, Captain Stair Gillon of the 29th Division, recorded the ‘necessity for an even, uniform, and all-pervading standard’ in training and operations in France.37 Like the 1st and 2nd Australian Divisions, and the NZ&A Division, the British 29th Division had Gallipoli experience, and in 1917 it was also serving on the Western Front. Standardisation, therefore, was the theme. Another comparison of 2nd Australian Division practices, this time with the processes of the GOC 1st Australian Division, Major General

35 AWM25 947/6/495 Memorandum on Training 2nd Australian Division to I ANZAC HQ dated 12th May 1917. 36 Colonel Walter Nicholson, Behind the Lines, London, 1939, p. 48. 37 Stair Gillon, The Story of the 29th Division: A Record of gallant Deeds, first published 1925, London, 2009, pp.99-101. Australian Infantry on the Western Front 114 Harold Walker, is telling. The 1st Australian Infantry Brigade of the 1st Australian Division records the month of June 1917 was spent training while in reserve. In précis: 2nd June: Training continues… 1st Battalion held a sports afternoon. 3rd – 6th June: Brigade sports competition conducted. 7th June: Syllabus of training to commence until week ending 10 June. News received of successful operation between Ypres-Messines. 11 – 16 June: Brigade sporting events and tactical competitions. 18th June: Tactical Competitions continue. 20th June: Courses in Bayonet Fighting and Assault practice conducted. 23th June: Syllabus for week ending June 30th issued. 25th June: Lecture on Venereal Disease given to entire Brigade by Lieutenant Colonel Butler DSO Brigade MO.38 The ’s diary points to the success of the Messines operation on 7 June 1917 for good reason. It is in this battle that the three Australian divisions of II ANZAC Corps are involved: the 3rd, its first major action; the 5th of Fromelles infamy; and the much worked 4th Division, recently detached from I ANZAC after the debacle at Bullecourt. II ANZAC was a Corps in General Herbert Plumer’s Second Army and the training and combat effectiveness achieved by these divisions is a reflection of Plumer’s standards. Indeed, when it came to attention to detail, Plumer was Gough’s antithesis. Known for their precise preparatory work, Plumer’s staff officers developed “Bite and Hold" operations in which limited objectives were set, attained and then consolidated. Such assaults were organised thoroughly and divisional and even corps formations stepped around each other as objectives were gained. Under Plumer, these “leap-frogging” tactics were perfected as the standard for the British Army. Thereafter, Plumer had every element of his Army down to platoon level practice these techniques in rehearsal for forthcoming operations, and in accordance with the standardised doctrine laid out in the SS series of pamphlets. By the second half of 1917, such activity heralded the practice of modern combined operations; indeed, Plumer’s infantry invariably advanced behind a creeping barrage coordinated to within seconds by meticulous staff officers with stop watches. The Australian infantry of the Second Army improved commensurately with Plumer’s practices. It is this timeline, in the middle of 1917, that is vital to charting the development of Australian infantry on the Western Front. This is the point in the Great War after which Australian troops truly achieved battlefield effectiveness. In the immediate aftermath of Messines, Plumer’s Second Army was rested. Gough’s Fifth Army was ordered to advance in the Flanders and commence planning for the opening operations which would eventually

38 AWM4 23/1/23 Unit Diary of the 1St Infantry Brigade June 1917. Lieutenant Colonel Butler was later the Official Medical Historian for AIF. Australian Infantry on the Western Front 115 comprise the Third Battle of Ypres. The significance for I and II ANZAC Corps is that they were both reassigned to Plumer’s Second Army in July 1917. For the first time, both Corps were in the same parent Army, and under the direction of an exemplary trainer and planner. The homogeneity attained by the Australians in this process was far-reaching. Australian infantry very much benefitted from the “Lessons Learned” and “Notes from the Front” series of pamphlets that were disseminated from Haig’s HQ to every division in the BEF. This was all the more so because they were in Plumer’s Army. Such notes show the evolving nature of infantry operations on the Western Front. Plumer was not the first GOC to pen the “notes” series, though it was his Second Army which perfected them. In particular, several paragraphs in one document: Notes on Training and Preparation for Offensive Operations39 are particularly telling of his methods: 1. The new system of defence adopted by the enemy, consisting of shell holes in depth and a large proportion of his strength disposed in readiness for counter- attack, is liable to produce a condition of affairs by which: a. The further we penetrate his line, the stronger and more organised we find him. b. The further we penetrate his line, the weaker and more disorganised we are liable to become. 2. The distance between the objectives and consequently the areas to be cleared will decrease as the advance progresses on any one day. Further, the number of troops allotted to the final objective will be proportionately greater than those allotted to the first, so as to ensure that there are sufficient to hold on against counter-attacks and exploit success when the counter-attack is repulsed. 3. It should always be assumed in every formation that they will meet a counter- attack, and steps taken to defeat it should be included in every plan, and all ranks should understand that this is their real opportunity for inflicting loss on the enemy. 4. During training, special attention must be paid to developing the initiative of junior commanders, creating unexpected situations, meeting and dealing with counter-attacks at all stages of the advance and re-organising when they have been dealt with. While Plumer was promulgating his progressive thinking, Gough’s senior officers were in dissent. Understanding the circumstance is relevant and worthy of some exploration. The most controversial event occurring at this time among the leadership team of the Fifth Army centred on a précis submitted to Gough recommending the adoption of “Bite and Hold” tactics during the forthcoming operation at Ypres. The document, penned by Gough’s

39 Major General C.H. Harington Director of Operations, Second Army: Notes on Training and Preparation for Offensive Operations, 31 August 1917 held in AWM25 947/17 Pt 2, Training – France Infantry 1917. Notwithstanding the notes, “The new system of defence” did not apply at Vimy Ridge during the Battle of Arras. The topography did not enable the Germans to prepare a defence in depth. Australian Infantry on the Western Front 116 Director of Operations, Major General John Davidson, is insightful for several reasons. Firstly, it shows that “general” – ie. bite and hold - practice in the BEF was not yet general. Secondly, primary sources indicate the toxic nature of the GHQ staff in the Fifth Army: Operations of the Second & Fifth Armies which are shortly to take place should not attempt to push infantry to the maximum distance to which we can hope to get them… Experience shows that such actions can, and often does, obtain spectacular results for the actual day of operations, but these results are obtained at the expense of such disorganisation of the forces employed as to render the resumption of the battle under advantageous circumstances at an early date highly improbable… An advance which is essentially sustained and deliberate may not achieve important results on the first day… but will in the long run be much more likely to obtain a decision… By a deliberate advance I refer to jumps… to a depth of not less than 1,000 yards and not more than 3,000 yards.40 In an act contrary to later perceptions of his genius for tactics and training, Gough’s GOC XVIII Corps, Lieutenant General Ivor Maxse – later to be the Inspector General of Training in the British Army, scrawled in the margin of his copy of this document: “BALLS!!” This revelation is astonishing. Ivor Maxse was an advocate of training for modern warfare. This was known during 1917, and indeed, it was the practice of his divisions to closely follow stipulated doctrine. One of them, the 9th (Scottish) Division would serve under Maxse in XVIII Corps during Third Ypres; and it recorded in its Unit History: The vast importance of constant training as a primary factor of efficiency had been long neglected in France, but when the start was made, development was continuous. The issue of pamphlets which dealt with the action of the platoon (SS143) and of the Division (SS135) in attack was… welcome. Hitherto officers and NCOs had been guided only by the general principles…, but the pamphlets provided illustrations showing the application of these principles to actual problems. The more junior the commander, the more desirable it was to make things clear to him…and in this respect SS143 was invaluable. The adoption of these pamphlets ensured both uniformity in training and organisation throughout the army and a practical knowledge of the methods of dealing with the problems of actual warfare.’41 Why Maxse chose not to support the advice of Davidson is unknown, and is outside the scope of this thesis, though the answer is probably aligned with his predilection for self-promotion. What is significant to the thesis is that Maxse’s comments and Gough’s thrusting were not yet aligned with the standardised processes that the BEF had mandated for operations on the Western Front. Conversely, in Plumer’s Notes on Training and Preparation he urged bite and hold tactics in order to ensure the infantry was less susceptible to German counter-attacks. In

40 Major General John Davidson Fifth Army Planning Conference, Director of Military Operations Précis to Gough and Corps Commanders for Operations at Third Ypres, GHQ Fifth Army 26 June 1917; General Sir Ivor Maxse papers, IWM. Documents 3255 accessed at http://www.iwm.org.uk/collections/item/object/1030003272 2 Jan 2014. 41 John Ewing, The History of the 9th (Scottish) Division 1914-1919, London, 2002, p. 175. Australian Infantry on the Western Front 117 any event, Davidson’s advice was discounted by Gough. At the end of 1917, the results would be manifested in the Third Battle of Ypres: Passchendaele. Passchendaele is an evocative noun; it is no longer a simple place name. In 1997, eighty years on from the battle, Ashley Ekins wrote that ‘the year 1917 was the nadir of the war for Australian soldiers. Passchendaele was the dismal culmination of this experience’.42 A decade later the Paul Gross film “Passchendaele” dramatised the significant role that the CEF played in the closing weeks of the battle. A century later the name Passchendaele still evokes the horror of the mud and slaughter that took place in the Flanders at this time. Passchendaele, the Third Battle of Ypres, also proved to be Haig’s low point of the Great War; it highlighted both his great strengths and inherent weaknesses. For the AIF, the word was indeed a “Byways to Hell”. The two ANZAC Corps came together for the first time under Plumer’s leadership, though their losses would be terrible. Even that superlative master of the understatement, Bean’s contempt is thinly concealed in his guise as a correspondent: I believe (noted one who was present) the official attitude is that Passchendaele Ridge is so important that tomorrow’s attack is worth making whether it succeeds or fails… I feel they are making a great, bloody experiment – a huge gamble… I feel, and most of the correspondents feel, …terribly anxious.43

Left: One of the most poignant photographs of the Great War. Australians traverse the duckboards, the only method of negotiating the shell churned mud, Passchendaele, 1917. (Frank Hurley)

42 Ashley Ekins, “Byways to Hell: The Battle for Passchendaele, Flanders 1917”, Wartime Magazine, Canberra, 1997, p.13. Lyn MacDonald’s more recent Passchendaele: The Story of the Third Battle of Ypres, London, 2013 provides further and more in-depth detail of the campaign. 43 Bean, OH, Vol. IV, p. 884. Australian Infantry on the Western Front 118

Above: An iconic image: 1st Australian Division troops moving along duckboards to the front in the Ypres Sector, , 1917. (Frank Hurley)

Above: Battle of the Menin Road 20 September 1917. Australian wounded lie along the side of the Menin Road awaiting evacuation. The Official Photographer was horrified by what he witnessed in the aftermath of this operation. (Frank Hurley)

Australian Infantry on the Western Front 119 Third Ypres was Haig’s intended breakthrough to the Flanders coastline and German U-Boat bases at the end of 1917. In his planning, recorded: now was the favourable moment…everything possible should be done to take advantage of it by concentrating on the Western Front all available resources. I stated that Germany was within 6 months of the total exhaustion of her available manpower.44 Meticulously planned by the Second Army, the operation commenced in July and continued until the fall of Passchendaele village on 6 November. Plumer’s Second Army had been in the Flanders since 1915, and Plumer was the GOC with the best local knowledge and most refined understanding of the war-fighting skill-sets required in the Ypres Salient. Nevertheless, Haig selected Gough’s Fifth Army for the job. The relationship between Haig and Gough is well documented and outside the scope of this thesis; suffice to state that Haig recognised Gough’s tendency to thrust, and he wanted this young ex-cavalry general to break through the German lines. Haig ordered Fifth Army move to the Flanders with the Second Army in support on the southern flank and a French Army to the north. These were not small changes; they comprised the movement and applied force of up to half a million men. In any event, the opening operation owed much to Plumer’s effective use of Bite and Hold tactics so successfully employed at Messines in June. Indeed, in some respects Messines was the necessary precursor to Passhcendaele; however the Allies lost the initiative by not commencing the follow-up operation until the end of July. In the end, Third Ypres resulted in Allied gains at appalling cost. The operation was the final great battle of attrition of the war. The attack commenced on 31 July with a heavy creeping barrage of 24 tons of shells per minute that aimed to weaken the German lines in preparation for the offensive.45 This had two consequences: the element of surprise was entirely lost; and the drainage system and infrastructure of the low lying Ypres Salient was completely destroyed. Roads, lines of communication and rail infrastructure were equally affected. Despite the initial successes, the work typified Fifth Army Commander’s thrusting and poor staff work. Gary Sheffield argues that Gough ‘implicitly underplayed the importance of artillery, relying instead on infantry’; moreover, in his use of infantry his ‘principles of attack were overly ambitious’.46 Strong and Marble argue that Gough wanted extravagant 2.5-3 mile advances, and that this was

44 Haig’s diary entry 19 June 1917 in Sheffield & Bourne (eds.), Douglas Haig: War Diaries and Letters 1914- 1918, London, 2005, p. 300. 45 Strong and Marble, Artillery in the Great War, p. 136. 46 Sheffield and Todman (eds.), Command & Control on the Wester Front: The British Army Experience 1914- 1918, Stroud, United Kingdom, 2007, p. 90. Australian Infantry on the Western Front 120 supported by other subordinate commanders including Ivor Maxse47; it will be remembered that Maxse wrote “BALLS!” across a memo calling for shorter gains. In any event, Gough prevailed, and although he had 2,200 guns in support, the depth of the objectives meant that they could not support the infantry all the way.48 Then, in the middle of August, the weather broke. The heaviest rain in a quarter of a century churned the Flanders lowland soil into an impassable swamp. Tanks, men, horses, artillery pieces; none were able to negotiate the morass. Descriptions of the Flanders battlefields at this time have haunted the world for nearly a century: The Menin Rd is one of the, if not the, most ghastly approach on the whole front. Accretions of broken limbers, materials & munitions lay in piles on either side, giving the road the appearance of running through a cutting. Any time of the day it may be shelled & it is absolutely impossible owing to the congested traffic for the Boche to avoid getting a coup with each shell. The Menin road is like passing through the Valley of Death, for one never knows when a shell will lob in front of him. It is the most gruesome shambles I have ever seen…49 Finally dissatisfied with Gough’s progress – perhaps belatedly after Pozières and Bullecourt – Haig replaced Fifth Army with Plumer’s Second Army at the end of August. Plumer was lucky and the weather began to dissipate. He immediately applied “Bite and Hold” techniques, and realised a series of small gains in deference to a breakthrough. Plumer focused his forces on the Menin Road (20 September), Polygon Wood (26 September) and Broodseinde (4 October). These were the battles in which the Australian infantry were involved and they established dominance in the area west of the Passchendaele village. What did this mean for the Australian infantry? For the first time on the Western Front they operate as a single Corps and in the most successful phase of Third Ypres. At Passchendaele they demonstrated that with the appropriate training and application of contemporary tactics they have realised a level of battlefield effectiveness equal to any other formation in the BEF. Indeed, even during operations, Plumer’s staff continued to disseminate the lessons learnt series to develop the tactical acumen of junior ranks: [It is] more and more evident that greater stress must be laid on training in open warfare to encourage initiative and power of leading in the ranks of Junior N.C.O.s and Privates, which are so necessary when Officers become casualties'.50 Frank Hurley, the Official Photographer witnessed the operations on the Menin Road:

47 Strong and Marble, Artillery in the Great War, p. 135. 48 ibid, p. 137 49 State Library of New South Wales, Sydney, MLMSS 389 / Box 5 / Item 1Diary of Capt. F. Hurley, Official War Photographer, 17 September 1917. 50 Comments On Operations, 20th Sept., 1917, Second Army, 28 September 1917, held in AWM25 947/17 Pt 2, Training – France Infantry 1917. Australian Infantry on the Western Front 121 All day with the… 2nd Division, near Renescue. Col. Reid gave me every assistance in his power and arranged routine drill for the camera & Cine. The men are practically all W. Australians. Their training reflects credit on their commanding officer, the men are well disciplined, their evolutions resembling a great machine. They performed exercises with the bayonet, Physical drill, Lewis gun exercise, & Signal Exercise etc. with a perfectness only attained by continued training & rigid discipline. The men are in fine fettle & will give an account of themselves in the very near future.51 At battalion level the preparations for combat reflected this precision. The 31st Battalion diary detailing the first weeks of September 1917 prior to its participation in the attack on Polygon Wood is a case in point. The entries are reproduced on the following page.52 The Menin Road, Polygon Wood and Broodeseinde operations were successful at achieving their aims, albeit with heavy casualties. Nevertheless, the results appeared to vindicate Plumer’s methodology. Along with the British Army, the Australians reaped the successes and lessons learnt from this series of operations. However in the first week of October the weather again turned. The dry weather of September broke after the attack on Broodseinde on 4 October 1917 and there followed the heaviest rainfall in the region in 75 years. The quagmire signified a new level of despair for those involved. Unwilling to concede, Haig pressed on with a further three assaults on the Passchendaele Ridge in October. The eventual capture of the village by Canadian troops on 6 November allowed Haig to call the offensive off without a loss of face. In the time since, Haig has come under intense criticism for persisting with the Passchendaele offensive after it became clear that a breakthrough was unlikely. The battle highlighted that although he understood what preconditions were necessary to combine the technical infrastructure of combined arms in an assault; he was not yet experienced enough to know when the law of diminishing returns dictated that he should “call it off”. 1917 was the costliest year of the war for the AIF53; and the battles culminating in Passchendaele represented its lowest point. Third Ypres disheartened Bean, and his descriptions of the battle are among his most melancholy: It was on the Menin Road that I first noticed the condition in which our men were coming back. A couple . . . passed us, going very slow. They were white and drawn and detached, and put one foot slowly in front of the other, as I had not seen men do since the Somme winter . . . but these men looked whiter. . . 54

51 State Library of New South Wales, Diary Hurley, 8 September 1917. 52 AWM4 23/48/26 – Unit Diary 31st Infantry Battalion, September 1917

53 Bean, OH, Vol. V, Chap. 22. The British Expeditionary Force (BEF) incurred some 310,000 casualties, with a similar, lower, number of German casualties: 260,000; Australian losses were over 20,000. 54 Bean, OH, Vol. V, p. 890. Australian Infantry on the Western Front 122 31st Infantry Battalion Training Program 3-15 September 1917 Date Morning Work Afternoon Work 3/9/17 0900-1200 Company or Platoon Scheme attack with 1400-1600 Platoon work in strong points. Dummy rounds and grenades accordance with notes. to be used. 4/9/17 Brigade route march all day 5/9/17 0900-1200 General Platoon Training. Nil Evening: Company and Platoon night schemes involving compass, tapes and luminous discs. 6/9/17 0900-1200 Company and Platoon schemes attack on 1400-1500 Platoon work in strong point. Standard bombing test all day. accordance with notes. 7/9/17 0900-1200 Company and Platoon training. 1400-1500 General Platoon Brigade tactical scheme without troops. Training. 8/9/17 Brigade route march all day Notes: • 20 Minutes PT and 20 Minutes assault training, and 15 Minutes gas drill to be carried out daily except on days of Brigade route marches. • Transport personnel to carry two practices week at rapid adjustment of anti-gas respirators on animals. The men to wear respirators while adjusting respirators on animals. • Rapid load with ball ammunition to be carried out against banks with suitable safety precautions. • Training of hand bombers with dummy bombs to continue daily. • Battalion rifle grenadiers will carry on with preliminary standard tests. • One night operation to be carried out by each company during the week. Orders to reach HQ on day of operation. 9/9/17 Rest 10/9/17 0800-1200 Brigade tactical scheme with troops. Nil 11/9/17 0800-1200 Brigade tactical scheme with troops. Nil 12/9/17 Brigade route march all day 13/9/17 0800-1100 Training of specialists and skill at arms. 1300-1700 Battalion tactical scheme with troops. 14/9/17 0800-1100 Training of specialists and skill at arms. 1300-1700 Battalion tactical scheme with troops. Notes: • 20 Minutes PT and 20 Minutes assault training, and 15 Minutes gas drill to be carried out daily except on days of Brigade route marches. • Battalion attack schemes will be carried out on a frontage of 300-400 yards and to penetrate 300-400 yards. • Particular attention to be paid to command initiative and rapid issuing and execution of orders by section leaders. • Transport personnel to carry out two practices in rapid adjustment of animals respirators by night; personnel to wear respirators during the practice.

Nevertheless, at the end of 1917 the AIF was in a better place than where it had been a year earlier. The lessons of the Somme had resulted in the dissemination of infantry doctrine that espoused centralised command and decentralised control. The ability of platoons to provide close-range automatic fire power, together with grenades, was revolutionary, and the Australian infantry greatly benefitted from these British practices. Concurrent refinement Australian Infantry on the Western Front 123 of divisional and corps schooling systems formed the basis of training and reinforcement. The British Army schooling system enshrined in SS152, drew it all together. The schooling system started with an infantry recruit’s ab initio training and culminated in platoon training exercises behind the lines. The training continuum between these two points comprised reinforcement for the soldier after he arrived in Europe, followed by divisional and battalion based exercises and schooling in specialist skills as they were required. This occurred for every British or Dominion soldier irrespective of where he enlisted. The popular Great War myth that men enlisted in the army and found themselves at the front within weeks was simply not true. The notion that Australian infantrymen arrived on the Western Front with little or no training, or that they were natural soldiers, is an even greater myth. Paddy Griffith indicates that the rapid expansion of the BEF to 60 infantry divisions by the end of 1916, with the absorption of Territorial, New Army and Dominion divisions, came at the cost of promoting inexperienced officers and NCOs into positions of responsibility.55 Poor training and inexperience, coupled with archaic tactics, were reflected in the results of battle until after 1916. Nevertheless, the BEF’s expansion in following two years to 1918 constituted an impressive achievement on a scale that has never been matched since in the Empire. Within this construct an entire schooling system for infantrymen was established and implemented. At the same time, new tactics and reinforcement training methods were devised and disseminated among five armies in the field. This did not always occur smoothly, and ineffectual command and dissemination often led to disastrous results in battle. The Australian infantry suffered such consequences. However, by the end of 1917, even after Third Ypres, the BEF held doctrinal ascendency. Hard won lessons and experience had been codified in doctrine that was necessarily shaping units in ‘order to ensure the necessary degree of uniformity of training and tactical method throughout the Army.’56 The next chapter will discuss how the effective incorporation of new weapons systems among Australian infantry units greatly assisted in their development during 1917 and 1918.

55 Paddy Griffith, Battle Tactics of the Western Front, Appendix- 3, p.218. 56 The Organization of an Infantry Battalion and the Normal Formation for the Attack, HMSO, London, April 1917, p. 2. Australian Infantry on the Western Front

CHAPTER 5 Weapons Systems and Specialist Training An Imperial Pattern for Australian Infantry on the Western Front 1916-1918 This chapter will focus on the platoon level weapons systems utilised by Australian infantry on the Western Front from 1916-1918. The introduction and use of these weapons occurred in concert with organisational and training developments that were concurrently occurring throughout the BEF. The weapon systems were in every sense the platoon level tools of the trade during the Great War. Developments in their tactical application evolved significantly after the Somme campaign of 1916. In particular, the British and Imperial platoon weapons systems of 1916-1918 comprised the rifle, bayonet, light machine gun (LMG), grenade and . All of these weapons were used by the Australian infantry platoon and its subordinate elements, the section, in the last two years of the Great War. This chapter will focus on the technical detail associated with each system, and in particular the schooling systems in which Australian infantrymen learned to operate and maintain their various weapons. This chapter will not discuss high-end weapons systems or combined arms operations – tanks, aircraft, artillery and the like – other than in the wider context of the development of infantry tactics. An appreciation of the development of platoon-level tactics associated with infantry weapons systems was discussed in Chapter 3, and in particular the stunning innovation enshrined in SS143 Instructions for the Training of Platoons for Offensive Action published in February 1917. A subsequent understanding of the technical specifications of these weapons is a very real adjunct to the tactical doctrine. Being relative new-comers to the Western Front, Australian infantry had little to do with developing tactics. However, the Australian divisions very much benefitted from the publication of such doctrine throughout 1917. In 1918, with the formation of the Australian Corps, Australian infantry would reach the apogee of their effectiveness. The Australian Corps would be well trained, imperially enabled and thoroughly professional during its operations in the final year of the Great War. To this end, this chapter will also describe the training and publications associated with attaining the skills needed to operate these new weapons at platoon level. The training was process driven; it emphasised a need for technical competence as fundamental to battlefield effectiveness. To this end, standardisation in the BEF made the attainment of technical competence universal. In this process, the platoon became central to British Army operations. Australian Infantry on the Western Front 125 Standardised skill sets and weaponry has as much to do with the efficacy of the Anzac legend as does Gallipoli, and is a reflection of what was by 1918 scientific process. By 1918, the firepower of platoon weapon systems, and the tactics and training used to hone the skills of the men manning them, can only be viewed through the prism of the wider BEF. The chapter will again compare the development of the Canadian Corps with the Australians. Tactically, throughout 1916 – and well into 1917 in some units – Australian infantry attacked in waves across a front as espoused in the Infantry Training Manual of 1914.1 As the manual stated: The main essential to success in battle is to close with the enemy, cost what it may… The object of infantry in the attack is therefore to get to close quarters as quickly as possible, and the leading lines must not delay the advance by halting to fire until compelled by the enemy to do so.2 These methods had proved costly at Gallipoli for Australians, and were obsolete when they arrived on the Western Front. Indeed, nothing would prove more efficient at shattering the mythology of Anzac than the finely honed steel of the Krupp’s German armaments factories. Understanding such matters and giving context to mythology is central to this thesis. Battlefield effectiveness is not about myth or self-promotion. It is about hard training, cohesion and discipline. The binding agent for these processes on the Western Front was not Picard clay; it was the time honoured essence of training for all military forces: standardisation. Standardised repetition in infantry training resulted in practical competence; the instinctive application of this competence became technical mastery. Technical mastery was about process and weapons systems. Professional mastery represented a step beyond this process, and was a tactical mindset underpinned by operational experience. The modern still considers professional mastery paramount: It is an expression of personal competence displayed by an individual’s ability to combine character, self-confidence, effective leadership, professional knowledge, professional military judgement and experience. It is measured by performance and is a process of continual learning developed education, training and experience.3 In 1917, the infantry of the BEF was starting to realise professional mastery. The BEF – and in particular, the platoon – was reorganised along standardised lines in an innovative, and

1 Infantry Training, 1914, His Majesty’s Stationary Office (HMSO), London, 1914. This excerpt was sourced in AWM25. 2 Infantry Training, 1914; Chapter X. Infantry in Attack; Section 121 General Considerations, Para. 5. 3 Land Warfare Doctrine 1, The Fundamentals of Land Warfare, Land Warfare and Development Centre, Tobruk Barracks, Puckapunyal, 2002, p. 15. The concept espoused in contemporary Australian Army doctrine is avowed by all three services in the ADF. At its basis is a training philosophy founded in the heritage of a Commonwealth and Imperial approach to the military. The developmental foundations are the underlying premise of this thesis.

Australian Infantry on the Western Front 126 almost technical, way. The thinking was based in the battlefield experience of the previous two years. On their arrival in France, this was experience that the AIF simply did not have. In February 1917, the establishment of the platoon and section as the core elements of the battalion provided impetus for these relatively new sub-units to focus on technical mastery in areas such as training, weapons systems and tactics. In 1917, Australian infantrymen held no monopoly on achieving technical mastery, or for that matter in formulating the higher concept of professional mastery. Such refinements were graduated and were experienced by the BEF as a whole. This was the essence of the oft-cited learning process. However, at the beginning of 1917, the subtleties of these processes were probably lost among the Dominion soldiers at the front. The winter of early 1917 was almost the coldest in living memory in Europe. 15th Battalion historian Tom Chataway wrote the weather: …in France tested the Australians troops more than any other experience they were to undergo. The intensity of the cold, especially the driving bitter winds that swept the country at intervals… seemed to penetrate every joint of the body… The countryside was frozen, and the Somme was a solid block of ice – an occurrence so rare that nobody had witnessed such a phenomenon for eighty years.4 Canadian soldier Charles Harrison considered the conditions of the trenches most unsanitary: We are filthy, our bodies are the colour of the earth we have been living in these past months. We are alive with vermin and sit picking ourselves like baboons. It is months since we have been out of our clothes.5 Australian Private Hugh Downing was most succinct in his estimation of the coming year: We just go into the line again and again until we get knocked. We’ll never get out of this. Just in and out…and somebody stonkered every time. Australia has forgotten us, and so has God. I wouldn’t wish my worst enemy to have to put up with this life…6 As grim as the front may have been, though, by January and February 1917 much progress was being made in tactical development at platoon level. For the individual soldier, the attainment of professional mastery began with his attainment of technical competence in the weapons systems employed within his section and platoon. Individual technical training was oriented towards contributing to the activities of the parent unit and formation. However, individual technical mastery did not necessarily provide for collective effectiveness. The higher collective, tactical standard required the technical mastery of all soldiers in a unit to reach a level where the various elements complemented each other. As the elements become cohesive, then the greater whole approached a standard of the earlier cited professional mastery. It took time. In the two year lens of the Western Front from 1916-18, battlefield

4 T. Chataway, History of the 15th Battalion, Brisbane, 1948, pp. 142 & 146. 5 C. Harrison, Generals Die in Bed, Toronto, 2002, p. 36. 6 W.H. Downing, To the Last Ridge: The WW1 Experiences of W.H. Downing, Melbourne, 2000, pp. 34-35.

Australian Infantry on the Western Front 127 effectiveness BEF wide equated to the sum of an individual’s and unit’s knowledge and technical skills, and the use of experience and intellect to apply the knowledge. The driving force was standardisation imposed from above. As a concept, training for technical mastery on the Western Front is little changed to the nature of military operations a century later. The next step after practical technical repetition is cognitive. In the British Army of the Great War this represented the step from training to education. The education provided in the BEF schooling system added tactical acumen to technical competence. Education was about thinking and training was about doing. The process provided the soldier with the mental skills to develop new and better practices in achieving effectiveness and mastery. In April 1917, Major General Newton Moore indicated that the pattern for training AIF replacements followed this very regimen: Training Units have as their primary object, the training of the individual solider…Each branch requires specialist instructors…A definite establishment has been laid down for the permanent staff, which is mainly drawn from the units overseas, and arrangements have been made for their periodic relief – a month’s overlap – being allowed for between the arrival of new instructors and the departure of old ones…There has been a great general improvement in organisation and in all branches of training…7 Skilled, efficient and experienced instructors to deliver effective training were the keystone to success. Complicated training required a regulatory framework; there is no mythology in this process. Ergo, the training received among British and Imperial infantrymen during the Great War was defined by the repetition of action to habituation, improvement of skills and muscle memory through practice, and the refinement of complementary skill sets to achieve small unit cohesion. The training pamphlets SS143, SS135 and SS152 each espoused such methods at the platoon, divisional and Army levels. Training to achieve technical competence was an absolute necessity, and the training regimen for Australian infantry was Imperial. On their arrival in France in 1916 Australian infantry were introduced to equipment and organisational changes that they had largely not encountered during their time on Gallipoli. Although Chapter 1 indicated that there were slight variations between Australian and British uniforms, AIF infantry operating on the Western Front used equipment in the Imperial pattern. Web equipment for carrying the infantryman’s kit was in the British 1908 pattern.8 Standardisation and cohesion among all elements of the BEF was the driving factor

7 AWM4 1/66/2 GOC AIF Depots in the UK, Major General the Honourable Sir Newton Moore, Report on the Administration of AIF Depots in the United Kingdom, April 1917. 8 The Pattern 1908 Web Infantry Equipment, His Majesty’s Stationary Office (HMSO), London, 1913. This excerpt was sourced in AWM25.

Australian Infantry on the Western Front 128 in the use of this equipment. The web equipment was perfectly balanced for the wearer the training pamphlet issued to cover the use of the equipment described its utility thus: Men can turn out in barracks or camp fully equipped in a few moments, even in the dark. Separate articles have not to be hunted for; all that each man has to do is to seize his rifle and equipment and double to the place of assembly, and within a few seconds of his arrival there he is ready to march off. Again, when a halt occurs on the line of march, every man can at once, if be wishes, divest himself of the whole of his load, resuming it the moment the order is given to fall in.9

Above: Pattern 1908 Pack and Webbing as used by Australian Infantry on the Western Front. (AWM RELAWM09176 & RELAWM07759.001) The 1908 Pattern webbing equipment comprised a belt and two sets of ammunition pouches, each with a capacity for 75-rounds. The weight of the pouches was held by shoulder braces. The basic ensemble also had a bayonet frog, an attachment for the entrenching tool handle and cover, water bottle carrier, and small haversack. A mess tin was worn attached to one of the packs, and was contained inside a khaki cover. Inside the haversack were personal

9 The Pattern 1908 Web Infantry Equipment, Section I.

Australian Infantry on the Western Front 129 items. These may have included a shaving brush, eating utensils, toothbrush and toiletries, pocket knife, housewife (sewing kit) and paybook.10 Other items often carried in a larger pack included a greatcoat, rubberised groundsheet-cape, food, a weapon cleaning roll and first-aid kit. Two further distinctive pieces of equipment were issued to all Australians on the Western Front. The first, a British box respirator, was standard issue for all Australians after 1916. Australians had not encountered gas on Gallipoli. Secondly, head and face injuries caused by airborne shrapnel, metal shell case shards, and other hazardous debris shooting through the air, were a far greater issue on the Western Front. This resulted in the development of the which was ubiquitous across the Empire and subsequent Commonwealth for nearly sixty years.11 The full set of webbing weighed 70 pounds (32 kg).

Left: British Box Respirator as issued to Australian Infantry on the Western Front. (AWM REL32946.001)

Right: British Brodie Pattern Helmet issued to Australian Infantry on their arrival at the Western Front. (AWM REL/00980)

10 Dr. Louise Loe et al, Remember Me to All p. 14. 11 Stephen Bull, World War 1 Trench Warfare (2), London, 2002 p. 10.

Australian Infantry on the Western Front 130 Of the weapons systems operated by Australians, the firepower of a 1917 BEF platoon included rifles, light machine-guns, grenades and rifle grenades. Of these weapons, the ubiquitous Short Magazine Lee Enfield (SMLE) rifle is particularly well remembered as the mainstay of the British and Empire forces. The Lee Enfield rifle, named for the American “Lee” bolt mechanism and for its place of initial manufacture in Enfield, was the adopted service weapon of all Australian forces for nearly sixty years. During the first half of the conflict, the Canadian infantry mainstay differed in the use of the . This will be further addressed later in the chapter, though it is suffice to note that the disparity between the Ross and Lee Enfield rifles was such that the Canadians eventually abandoned the experiment and adopted the Lee Enfield entirely. Over its life of type the Lee Enfield underwent many modifications, and was produced at the Australian small arms factory at Lithgow in New South Wales. The SMLE mark adopted for BEF use during the Great War was the SMLE No. 1, Mark III, and this weapon remained in Commonwealth use until well after the Second World War. A rugged and practical weapon, Australian troops of all corps took the SMLE to Gallipoli and then to France, where its durability in the trying conditions of the Picard and Flanders mud became legendary. Table 5-1 depict the general specifications of the SMLE rifle.12 As a comparison, Table 5-2 depicts the specifications of the Ross rifle. There are noteworthy differences in the length, weight and capacity of both weapons. The Lee Enfield rifle could be fitted with a sling, grenade launcher and a 17” bayonet.

Left: Musketry training at an Australian Infantry Brigade School with the SMLE rifle: Amiens 20 Jul 1918. (AWM E02827)

12 Musketry Regulations, Part I, 1909 (Reprint 1914, amendments July 1916), General Staff, War Office, .

Australian Infantry on the Western Front 131

Table 5.1 Short Magazine Lee Enfield (SMLE) bolt action No. 1 Mark III rifle.

General Data and Specifications

Length 44.5 inches

Weight 8 lbs 10 oz

Calibre .303 British rimmed

Magazine 10-round box Action Lee Bolt

Muzzle Velocity 2440 ft/second

Maximum Effective Range 550 yards

Table 5.2 .303 inch MK III Canadian Ross Rifle.

General Data and Specifications Length 50.5 inches (6” longer than the SMLE)

Weight 9 lbs 14 oz (Over a lb heavier than the SMLE)

Calibre .303 British rimmed

Magazine 5-round internal

Action Straight-Pull Bolt

Muzzle Velocity 2600 ft/second

Maximum Effective Range 850 yards

Australian Infantry on the Western Front 132 British and Dominion infantry are renowned for their technical mastery of the Lee Enfield rifle during the Great War. Indeed, British infantry training early in the 20th century revolved around the tenet of musketry training13 and the value of this expertise is still held dearly among all the services in all nations of the Commonwealth. The standard was espoused in Musketry Regulations Part I (1909) and revised and reprinted several times during the war. This publication describes both the SMLE Mark III and Lee Enfield Mark IV.14 Particular attention is paid to weapon care and cleaning by the individual soldier, and there are detailed instructions for the provision of musketry and tactical exercises in addition to the theory and physics behind rifle fire. Musketry Regulations was adopted by the AIF and used for the duration of the war. In accordance with the publication, all recruits were tested in weapons care; rapid loading; aiming; range practices from 100 - 500 yards; judging distances; fire control and range movement. A schedule was incorporated into the recruit syllabus after week-8 of training, and all men were to qualify on the SMLE rifle in order to pass recruit training.15 Table 5-3 details the five required standards for musketry across all Empire forces.16 Indeed, by 1917 these in-depth skills were requisite for every man entering the line on the Western Front. These standards were extraordinarily high. Musketry Regulations got straight to the point in defining this requirement: To render the individual soldier proficient in the use of small arms, to make him acquainted with the capabilities of the weapon with which he is armed, and give him confidence in its power and accuracy.17 In accordance with this end state, all Empire soldiers were required to learn the fundamentals before actually getting to fire the weapon. The process detailed in Table 5-3 involved a thorough training and evaluation regimen of rifle firing practices that ranged from 100 to 600 yards. The soldier additionally learned to fire his weapon in various positions, and in applied, rapid and instinctive type scenarios. Such training highlights a very different process to what had happened in the training of AIF reinforcements arriving on Gallipoli during 1915.18 Musketry Regulations is a salient example of the quality of standardised Imperial training that so benefitted the development of Australians on the Western Front.

13 The specialist skill sets associated with the practical use and care for military small arms. 14 The Mark IV, referred to as the Long Lee Enfield was obsolete before the Great War and phased out of service. Musketry Regulations additionally describes the Mark I hand grenade, and the Webley service revolver in use with the British Army at the time. 15 AWM25 943/7 Pt 1, Weekly Syllabus for Musketry Training, 1917. 16 The applications were: Elementary/Repetition/Timed/Individual/Collective. They are little changed today. 17 Musketry Regulations, 1909 (Reprint 1914), Part I, Chapter I, p. 1. 18 Such were these earlier standards that some troops actually arrived at the front unable to load their weapons. This necessitated front line battalions having to set up training firing ranges immediately behind the lines on Galliopli.

Australian Infantry on the Western Front 133 Table 5.3 200-Round Empire Musketry Qualification: Musketry Regulations, 1909.

Part I No. Practice Target Distance # Conduct Grouping Bullseye 100 yards 5 Lying supported Elementary Application “ 200 5 “ Practice Grouping “ 100 5 Lying unsupported Application “ 200 5 “ Part II Grouping Bullseye 100 yards 5 Lying unsupported 2nd Class Application 200 5 Lying supported Figure “ “ 200 5 Lying unsupported “ “ 300 5 Lying unsupported Repetition “ 1st Class Figure 200 5 Kneeling Practice “ “ 300 5 Kneeling “ “ 400 5 Lying unsupported “ “ 500 5 Lying supported “ “ 500 5 Lying unsupported “ “ 600 5 Lying supported Part III 2nd Class Slow 200 yards 5 Lying unsupported Figure Slow “ 200 5 Kneeling Rapid “ 200 5 Lying: 40 second exposure st Timed Slow 1 Class Figure 400 5 Lying unsupported Practice Rapid “ 400 5 Lying: 40 second exposure Slow “ 300 5 Lying behind cover 2nd Class Lying: 6 second exposure per Snap shooting 200 5 Figure round “ “ 500 5 Kneeling behind cover Part IV Grouping Bullseye 100 yards 5 Lying Application 1st Class Figure 300 5 Kneeling Individual Rapid “ 300 5 Lying: 40 second exposure Practice 2nd Class Lying: 5second exposure per Snap shooting 200 5 Figure round Application 1st Class Figure 500 5 Kneeling behind cover Plus 20-rounds elementary/10-rounds attack 200-700 yards/10-rounds defence. Part V Collective Practice: 25-rounds expended

Australian Infantry on the Western Front 134 In accordance with the training standard, firing positions were learned, tested and reinforced. Weapons handling practices were learned until they became instinctive. “Dry- firing” with dummy rounds was practiced, and recruits were only allowed on a range to conduct live firing when they had met all of these pre-requisites. The process of maintaining these core skills did not end with recruit training. Once on the continent each of the British Armies established Musketry Schools in order to qualify instructors with the expertise to provide continuation training in the SMLE rifle. SS152 was explicit in the rationale for the training: It cannot be emphasised too often that all training, at all times and in all places must aim at the cultivation of the offensive spirit in all ranks… [When out of the line] Battalion, Brigade and Divisional classes should always be in progress for training in the following: 1. Musketry. 2. Lewis Gunnery. 3. Signalling. 4. Scouting (Observation & Sniping). 5. Dug-out making. 6. Bombing and Rifle-bombing. 7. Light Mortars. 19 For the musketry instructors trained at Army schools, the guidelines were equally precise. Once back at their Units as instructors they were to write up a detailed syllabus of training for when the unit was out of the line; and in accordance with the following general principles: 1. Instructors must recognise that it is necessary to revise the existing methods and spirit of elementary musketry training, insomuch as the recruit system is unsuitable for semi-trained soldiers. 2. In war conditions time is an important factor, and Musketry appliances are scarce. Therefore Instructors will constantly eliminate non-essentials and also devise methods of improvising simple appliances so that Musketry training will not suffer in back areas. 3. Intensive training methods will be taught with a view to assisting units to carry out Musketry training when out of the line for short periods. 4. All training should be Collective (by Sections) rather than Individual. The advantages of collective instruction are that it: a. Tightens discipline b. Saves time20

19 SS152, Instructions for the Training of Armies in France, HMSO, London, January 1918, Chap. 2, pp. 4-5. 20 Appendix VIII to SS152, Musketry Instructor’s Course, London, January 1918.

Australian Infantry on the Western Front 135 At formation level and below, when units were not on operations, training and musketry became the norm. A random selection of an Australian infantry brigade out of the line in the second half of 1917, the 8th Australian Brigade (29th–32nd Battalions), reflects these practices: 1st August training commenced in the present area but owing to the enclosed nature of the country much difficulty is explained in obtaining ground to carry out any operations with troops larger than a platoon. To overcome this, tactical exercises without troops are being carried out for training of platoon commanders and upwards, such exercises have been found very beneficial. Two days per week are devoted to route marching either as a brigade or by battalions – each march being not less than 12 miles. Gas drill, physical training and bayonet fighting together with elementary musketry are being carried out daily under… battalion arrangements.21 In these words lie the standardised training practices carried out BEF wide. Musketry training was integral to the process; standardisation underwrote it all. The long serving Australian Defence Minister, George Foster Pearce displayed instinctive and forthright skill in addressing such matters. Pearce came to office in the year that Musketry Regulations was promulgated – 1909 – and although an unashamed advocate for Australian independence, he nevertheless recognised the need for interoperability even before the Great War22. John Connor indicates that Pearce had been in office only three days before he received media pressure to adopt the Canadian Ross Rifle as the standard weapon for the Australian Defence Force23. The Ross was a superlative hunting and marksman’s rifle. The craftsmanship employed in machining its components was exquisite. Pearce simply and immediately rejected any pressure brought to bear on his portfolio over the issue. His rationale was as pragmatic as it was canny. If Australia was to remain interoperable with the British Army as a Dominion contributor then it would employ the SMLE as its standard weapons system. The Lee Enfield Rifle was more robust, it was accurate enough, and it was the pattern adopted by the Imperial Army. The contrast with what happened in the CEF over the same rifle and issue was profound. Pearce’s Canadian contemporary, Samuel “Sam” Hughes, was one of the most contentious Dominion figures of the Great War. A property speculator, newspaperman, and militia officer with Boer War experience, Hughes was the Canadian Minister for Militia from 1911 onwards. His zeal and passion for office were immediately evident. He increased the

21 AWM4 23/8/21 – 8th Infantry Brigade History 1 August 1917 . 22 The term “Interoperability” has entered the modern ADF lexicon having been “discovered” during contemporary operations in the Middle-East. The term generally refers to an Australian ability to provide a measured and often niche capability to augment a larger coalition force; in the modern sense this is generally led by the United States and has been reflected in Australian contributions in and Afghanistan. Australian military myopia tends to forget that it has always conducted operations at the forefront of its planning. Indeed, in the first half of the 20th century Australian defence was predicated on its interoperability with Great Britain. 23 John Connor, Anzac and Empire, p. 78.

Australian Infantry on the Western Front 136 Canadian budget and expanded the military; both led to improvements in the training of the Canadian militia and its preparations for war. When war was declared, it was largely due to Hughes’ efforts that the Canadians were able to mobilise and embark its first contingents of troops to Europe as quickly as they did. However, Tim Cook states that Hughes considered himself a “One-Man Army” and his backing of the Ross Rifle was almost pathological in its intensity.24 At Sam Hughes’ behest, the Ross Rifle was the principal arm adopted by the Canadian Military before the First World War. In combat though, the weapon was an astounding failure. Long and heavy, especially in comparison to the SMLE, the Ross rifle used a “straight-pull” bolt action which enabled it to be reloaded very quickly. While the earlier Tables 5.1 and 5.2 are pictorial, in Surviving Trench Warfare Bill Rawling indicates25 that the wider problems with the Ross rifle were far more extensive. Weight and length were foremost among these. The Ross rifle weighed 9lbs 14 oz (4.5kg), the SMLE 8lbs 10 oz. At 50.5”, the Ross was also too long for trench warfare, and its bayonet would often fall off when the rifle was fired. Further, although the Ross rifle was outstandingly accurate over great ranges, the loading mechanism was poor. It was far too sensitive when fouled by mud, and in the wet conditions of the Western Front it often failed to extract dirty ammunition. The overly complicated bolt action defied field maintenance practices and this further compromised reliability. Most significantly, when reassembling after stripping, the bolt could be inserted back the front. In this circumstance the rifle could be assembled and then fired with the bolt not locked to the receiver and breech block. This resulted in “blow-back” into the firer’s face 26 with obvious and disastrous consequences. The comparative problems with the Ross Rifle and the lack of standardisation between the CEF and BEF in this matter are self-evident27. Bill Rawling states that when they had opportunity Canadian troops threw the Ross away and picked up the Lee-Enfield rifle from dead British soldiers.28 The weapon proved so unpopular that by the end of the Somme Campaign the CEF had adopted the SMLE as its standard front line weapon, though the Ross continued to be used for training until the end of the war. In any event, Hughes attempted to force the continued use of the Ross Rifle, and even ignored

24 Tim Cook, The Madman and the Butcher, Chapter 6. Hughes was not even the Minister when the Ross rifle was adopted in Canada in 1903. Nevertheless, such was his drive that he was able to influence the incumbent Minister F.W. Borden that the Ross rifle was the weapon to choose. 25 Rawling, Surviving Trench Warfare, pp. 11-17 & 63-64. 26 Bill Rawling, Surviving Trench Warfare: Technology and the Canadian Corps 1914-18, Toronto 1992, p. 17. 27 Notes compiled from Rawling, Surviving Trench Warfare, pp. 11-17 & 63-64. 28 ibid, p. 63.

Australian Infantry on the Western Front 137 the advice given to him by General officers serving on the Wester Front. The issue would eventually contribute directly to Hughes’ dismissal from office in 1916. If there was disparity among front line rifles, in the use of the bayonet there was not. The bayonet had almost mythical status in the British and Empire Armies. The processes for its use were enshrined in doctrine.29 In particular, the SMLE was fitted with the single-sided British Pattern 1907 P-07 bayonet. The bayonet fitted onto the rifle via a solid metal boss on the underside of the nose cap. When in place the blade sat beneath the muzzle of the rifle and was firmly attached via a mortise groove in the handle of the weapon. The bayonet was a fearsome 17” long and despite the mechanisation of the Western Front, training with the bayonet attained a cult following. This philosophy had a flow on effect in the Dominion contingents of the Great War. The Infantry Training Manual of 1914 states: ‘A bayonet charge will normally be delivered in lines, possibly many deep, against a defending force also in lines, over rough ground, which may be covered with obstacles. Single combat will therefore be the exception, while fighting in mass will be the rule’.30 Not much changed in the next several years. As late as February 1917, SS143 indicated that ‘Bayonet fighting produces a lust for blood…’31

Above: Pattern 07 Bayonet and Scabbard. (AWM RELAWM13285.001) In a lecture to newly arrived Australian infantry six months before SS143 was issued, roving British lecturer, Major Ronald Campbell articulated clearly what this lust comprised: Some time ago I was asked to interview a Lance Corporal of the 37th Division who had killed two Boches. He was quite a different person to what I expected him to be. He was a very meek sort of chap, and the last person you would have expected to have done any killing. This Lance Corporal, it appears, was on patrol one night in company of two Privates. One of the men remarked that he heard someone approaching...and suddenly they saw a party of Germans approaching. The Lance

29 Bayonet Training, 1918 (Reprinted with amendments July 1916), General Staff, War Office; and Bayonet Fighting: Instruction with Service Rifle, HMSO, 1917. 30 Infantry Training Manual 1914, Chap. X, Para. 124 “The Assault and Pursuit”, issued by the War Office, HMSO, 1914. 31 SS143 Instructions for the Training of Platoons for Offensive Action, HMSO, February 1917, Part II Training, sub-para 3 (vi.).

Australian Infantry on the Western Front 138 Corporal hated the idea of killing with the bayonet, but nevertheless he went in at the nearest Boche and got him in the arm. He withdrew and the Boche made a point at him which he turned aside. He then made another point and this time bayoneted him in the liver. “After I had killed him,” he said, “I seemed to go mad and felt as though I wanted to go on killing”. I give you this story just to let you see that the man had the fighting spirit in him and was able to use it when chance came his way. Once your men have got this killing spirit they will take to it like drink.32 Such thinking was central to the British Army’s method of waging war. Indeed, the British Army’s philosophy was based on a theme of the offensive spirit, this founded on a philosophy that man held primacy on the battlefield.33 It was Campbell’s job to tour BEF- wide with a team to spread his graphic lessons in support of this martial spirit.34 Paddy Griffith indicates that while this neatly excused Campbell from any sort of perilous duty35, it in fact ignored the technical nature of the war and continued a process of weapon training in the British Army that was unchanged since the Napoleonic era.36 As late as 1916, Notes for Infantry Officers stated: ‘There is an insidious tendency to lapse into a passive and lethargic attitude, against which officers and all ranks have to be on their guard, and the fostering of the offensive spirit, under such unfavourable conditions, calls for incessant attention’. 37

Left: An Australian soldier on arriving in France 1916, Private James Wilson of the 53rd Battalion was killed at Fromelles on 19 June 1916. He wears the 1908 Pattern webbing and is armed with the Lee Enfield SMLE fitted with the Pattern 07 bayonet. When the 53rd Battalion arrived in France there were not enough Brodie helmets to issue among the entire AIF. Wilson wears the defining slouch hat of the Australian soldier. (AWM P05445.003)

32 AWM25 49/2/93, Lecture by Major Campbell on Bayonet Fighting, 7 July 1916. 33 Tim Travers, The Killing Ground, chaps 1-2. 34 Paddy Griffith, Battle Tactics on the Western Front, p. 71. 35 ibid, p. 190. 36 ibid., in particular chap. 2. 37 Notes for Infantry Officers on Trench Warfare, issued by the War Office, HMSO, March 1916, Part I, Para. 4, p. 8. Pamphlet loose in AWM25 947/8, Training – France, 1916.

Australian Infantry on the Western Front 139 The use of the rifle and bayonet came to represent the apotheosis of the British Army’s offensive spirit during the Great War. Significantly, this was not because the bayonet was a particularly efficient method of killing the enemy, but more so because the image of the British infantryman with a bayonet fixed was central to the Army’s martial theme. The offensive spirit facilitated the killing of the enemy. Even the generally reserved Bean was explicit in the usefulness of the concept of “blood-lust”: ‘The primitive bloodthirstiness which to some extent takes possession of most men in fighting, and especially in close fighting, is probably necessary for the due performance of such tasks’. 38 At the start of the war doctrine espousing the use of the bayonet was simple: during ‘a bayonet fight the impetus of a charging line gives it moral and physical advantages over a stationary line’.39 Bayonet Training 191640 represents the high point of the reinforcement of the offensive spirit among the other ranks of the BEF. Courageous advancing infantrymen, weapons held high with bayonets fixed, sweeping all defensive positions away, was the undeniably heroic image of the war. This was the manifestation of the British offensive spirit. On a practical level, the practice of fixing bayonets, the method of training with them – On Guard, Parry, Make a Point, Thrust, Butt-stroke – served to provide structure, and to reinforce the British and Dominion soldier’s raison d’être for serving. By 1917, the concept remained, though was refined by the clause: the ‘rifle and bayonet, being the most efficient offensive weapons of the soldier, are for assault’.41 In the third year of the war technological advancements introduced new weapons systems at platoon level. These weapons complemented the rifle and bayonet, the training publication SS143 pragmatically refined the platoon42:

All men in the Platoon are riflemen and bayonet fighters, except Nos. 1 and 2 of the Lewis Gun team. All men are bombers. All sections include an understudy of the Section Commander, and, if possible, two men trained in scouting. Taking an average strength in the sections of 36 O.R. [other ranks] the normal organisation will be:

38 Bean, OH, Vol. III, p. 248. 39 Infantry Training Manual 1914, Chap. IV, Company Organisation, issued by the War Office, HMSO, 1914. 40 Bayonet Training 1916, issued by the War Office, HMSO, 1916. 41 SS143 Instructions for the Training of Platoons for Offensive Action, Part 1. Pamphlet loose in AWM25 943/7 Pt 3, Training United Kingdom – 1917. 42 SS143, Part I, Para. 1. To emphasis the ubiquity of this British doctrine: Pamphlet loose in AWM25 947/76, Infantry Training France – 1917.

Australian Infantry on the Western Front 140 HQ: 1x Officer and 4 O.R. 4 No. 1 Section: 1x NCO and 8x O.R. (riflemen & bayonet fighters). 9 No. 2 Section: 1x NCO and 8x O.R. (rifle/bayonet fighters). 9 (Trained also as bombers) No. 3 Section: 1x NCO and 8x O.R. (riflemen & bayonet fighters). 9 (Trained also as rifle-bombers) No. 1 Section: 1x NCO and 8x O.R. (riflemen & Lewis Gun Team). 9 36 While the thesis has previously referred to the use of the Lewis Gun, it was the introduction of this quick firing weapon at platoon level that provided the impetus for the development of fire and movement tactics in the BEF. The Lewis Light Machine-Gun (LMG) was a .303 calibre, magazine fed, air-cooled automatic fire weapon system. Designed in America, it entered service with the British Army in October 1915. The weapon was produced by the tens of thousand at the Small Arms (BSA) factory later of motor cycle fame. Australian troops first encountered the Lewis Gun on their arrival to the Western Front in March 1916. Table 5.4 tabulates the general data and specifications pertaining to this weapon system.43

Table 5.4 .303 inch Lewis Light Machine-Gun.

General Data and Specifications

Length 50.5 inches (6” longer than the SMLE)

Weight 30lbs 20oz Calibre .303 British rimmed

Magazine 47 round drum pan

Action Gas fed automatic Muzzle Velocity 2600 ft/second

Maximum Effective Range 600 yards

Cyclic / practical rate of fire 550 / 120 rounds per minute

43 Data taken from SS448, Method of Instruction in the Lewis Gun, issued by the War Office, HMSO, May 1917.

Australian Infantry on the Western Front 141

Chapter 3 focussed on tactical innovation, and pointed towards the exponential increase in firepower afforded to the British platoon by the introduction of the Lewis gun. When the Lewis Gun replaced the Vickers medium machine gun within the battalion in mid- 1916 it offered numerous advantages. The gun weighed 28 pounds (empty), about half as much as the , and was chosen in part because it was more portable than the heavier tripod mounted weapon. The Lewis Gun could be carried and used by a single soldier and this made it the ideal platoon level automated weapon system. However, its cyclic rate of fire was such that most members of the platoon were required to carry extra ammunition for it. The gun was fitted with a 47-round drum magazine for infantry use, and this was invariably prone to jamming when wet or clogged with mud. Such matters were a very real factor in both operating and maintaining the weapon; so much so that more than half of the Lewis gun course was on the mechanical aspects of the weapon. Both SS448 Method of Instruction in the Lewis Gun and SS197 The Tactical Employment of Lewis Guns were derived from battlefield experience and explicit in the detail outlined in their subject topics.44 The AIF adopted the British method of training in the Lewis gun in its entirety and reference to both SS pamphlets may be found in AIF operational and training records. In particular, a Lecture on the Training of Lewis Gunners paraphrases the characteristics and intended use of the weapon as espoused by SS197: The Lewis gun is not altogether an easy weapon either to take care of or to handle. To get a gun into action in perfect condition, to keep it firing, and to provide it with an adequate supply of ammunition necessitates a very high standard of training in the Lewis gun sections. The [platoon] organisation throws a great deal of responsibility on each individual Lewis gun section. The circumstances favourable to the Lewis gun, this one weapon provides greater fire power than all the rest the platoon, the platoon will tend to rely upon it for the rapid production of heavy fire... The training of the gunners must therefore be such that they will be able to produce that fire whenever and wherever it is required.45 This thesis has already pointed to the development of Australian infantry on the Western Front being intrinsically linked to the development of infantry across the entire

44 SS197 The Tactical Employment of Lewis Guns issued by the War Office, HMSO, January 1918. 45 AWM25 937/15 Lecture on the Training of Lewis Gunners, 1917.

Australian Infantry on the Western Front 142 British Army. Training to operate the Lewis gun effectively in a BEF infantry platoon during the second half of the Great War is the Imperial exemplar for standardisation. At Army level, aide-memoire SS15246 provided for the development of instructors capable of training soldiers to attain technical mastery in the intricacies of the Lewis gun. Training of soldiers by these instructors was subsequently conducted at specific schools that existed only for the purpose of training Lewis gun operators. At a platoon level, SS143 indicated in theory and practice that the operation of the Lewis gun section was central to the provision of firepower and battlefield effectiveness among the smallest elements in the entire BEF. Attaining technical mastery was conducted in accordance with SS448, and the chapters of this pamphlet provided very specific detail over the sequencing of elementary training: 1. General Description of the Weapon 2. Stripping the Weapon and its various components 3. Mechanism 4. Points before, during and after firing 5. Instructions for cleaning 6. Examination of the gun 7. Stoppages 8. Additional notes on stoppages 9. Elementary drill 10. Tests of elementary training 11. Notes on range work In an Australian context, an AIF Lecture on the Training of Lewis Gunners47 apportions these requirements into a 36-hour (one week) training course. The course comprised four essential elements: 1. Mechanical Work. Every man must know the mechanism of the gun thoroughly so that he can take care of it, clean it, and remedy in the shortest time any stoppages that may occur. a. General Description (2-hours) b. Mechanism (6-hours) c. Stripping (6-hours) d. Immediate Actions and Stoppages (5-hours) e. Examinations and Repairs (1-hour) 22-hours

46 SS152, Instructions for the Training of the British Armies in France, issued by the war Office, HMSO, June 1917, revised January 1918. 47 AWM25 937/15 Lecture on the Training of Lewis Gunners, 1917pp. 1-2.

Australian Infantry on the Western Front 143 2. Drill. This must be continued until the personnel can make correct use of the gun unconsciously even under the hottest fire. Elementary, including correct firing positions. a. Aiming Drill, Fire Orders, Fire Discipline, etc (4-hours) b. Advanced, ie. practical use of broken ground (2-hours) 6-hours 3. Firing. Training in Accurate Shooting and Fire control are even more important than for the rifle owing to the close grouping of its fire. a. Preparation of guns and filling magazines (1-hour) b. Points before, during and after firing (1-hour) c. Range practice (4-hours) d. Cleaning guns (1-hour) 7-hours 4. Lecture. Organisation of a Section / Elementary Tactics (1-hour) Total: 36-hours48 These processes ensured a stringent method for attaining technical mastery on the weapon. By the beginning of 1918 such practices had become the norm across the BEF. They were, however, only half the answer. The rest of the solution focussed on the tactical employment of the Lewis gun in cohesion with the various other weapons systems employed at section, platoon and battalion levels. Fire and movement was central to this appreciation. Fire was used to suppress the enemy, either the intended target or a secondary threat, and to destroy the enemy or his infrastructure. Lewis gun fire was applied by the Lewis gun section in the attack to allow movement by another section. Movement was employed to gain better fire positions and to close with the enemy for the final assault. The firepower afforded by a Lewis gun section in a platoon was a vital contributor to enable the movement of its fellow sections. Again, the Australian infantry looked to British methods in implementing this process: The special tactics in which Lewis gunners are to be trained are specifically laid down in SS143. Before a Lewis gun section can play its proper part in platoon training with the three other sections in the platoon, it needs a certain amount of separate instruction in team work…All the section…have certain duties to perform with regard to the Lewis gun, either as scouts, observers or ammunition carriers, and must be arranged that they can at once replace casualties on the gun.49 The complementary nature of the skill sets among the members of a Lewis gun section during the Great War is also reflected in the symbiosis of the weapons used at platoon level. To this end, the other tremendous adjunct to firepower afforded to the platoon was the grenade, or bomb as it was widely referred to during the conflict. At their most basic,

48 SS448, Method of Instruction in the Lewis Gun, issued by the War Office, HMSO, May 1917. 49 AWM25 937/15 Lecture on the Training of Lewis Gunners, 1917, p. 4.

Australian Infantry on the Western Front 144 grenades were hand held fragmentary devices armed and thrown by the user to efficiently clear enemy emplacements impervious to rifle or machine gun fire. The utility of such a weapon had equally profound effects during the Great War as did the introduction of the light machine gun. In 1915 at Gallipoli, the Australian experience of bombing was rudimentary; most bombs utilised during the campaign were hand fashioned from jam or beef tins with a match lit wick, and all manner of explosive and shrapnel fitted into them. By 1918, the use of Mills bomb (the No. 5 and later No.s 23/36) was integral to platoon level operations throughout the British Army. This made it integral to Australian infantry operations, too. The Mills bomb, perhaps the most well-known grenade of its type in history, was introduced into British and Dominion service on the Western Front in 1915 as the No. 5 grenade. The British Army had entered the conflict well aware of the requirement for such a weapon, and had gone through several iterations of bomb to lesser success before settling on a fifth prototype in the Mills. The Mills bomb was robust and handy, about the size of a cricket ball, though oval shaped with surface indentations designed to promote . The body of the bomb was made of cast iron and weighed 1 lb 6½ oz. The explosive – generally or amatol – was housed internally and ignited when a pin was removed to activate a striker with a five second fuse. The impact of the striker fired a detonator which set off the main charge.50 Figure 5.1 depicts the Mills bomb, and its ubiquitous value is clearly stated in the aide memoire Training and Employment of Bombers issued 12-months after its introduction to service: The nature of operations in the present campaign has developed the employment of the rifle and hand grenades both in attack and defence to such an extent that the grenade has become one of the principle weapons in trench warfare. Every infantry soldier must, therefore, receive instruction in grenade throwing, and must at least know how to use the Mills grenade and have thrown a live one in practice.51 The introduction of new platoon level tactics in 1917 clearly demonstrated the importance and composition of the grenade section. Indeed, later in 1917 SS126 was superseded by SS182 Instructions on Bombing. Both pamphlets clearly indicated the section comprised an NCO and eight men, these made up of two bayonet men, two throwers, two carriers, one spare and a sniper. Every member was thoroughly trained in the duties of every position, so that he would be able to take any place in the section.52 The efficacy of the weapon and its potential was seized by all infantrymen in the British Army. Indeed, the

50 Statistics detailed in SS126 Training and Employment of Bombers, issued by the War Office, HMSO, . 51 SS126 Part I, Para. 1, p. 2. Pamphlet loose in AWM25 947/8, Training – France, 1916. 52 SS182 Instructions on Bombing issued by the War Office, HMSO, September 1917, para. 4, p. 9.

Australian Infantry on the Western Front 145 tactical developments in its use were standardised and very similar even between disparate formations. On 13 June 1917, the of the 2nd Australian Division issued a training memorandum focussing on organised bombing. The document stated: The necessity for systematic training and better organisation for bombing fights has been emphasised by our experience in recent operations… each man in the platoon should be able to perform the work of the bayonet man, the bomb thrower, and the rifle grenadier, but should be specially trained in one of these functions, which will be his particular duty in the fight.53 Only a week later, on 20 June 1917, the Canadian Corps’ method of instruction in the same weapons system covered the same topics: ‘Members should be trained in the duties of all the different members of a bombing squad, and drill should be carried out precisely as laid out in SS126 (pp. 9-12)’. The following tactical lectures should be dealt with: 1. Principles of throwing. 2. Service grenades. 3. Principles of trench clearing, blocking, barricading. 4. Care, supply and storage of explosives and grenades. 5. Elementary tactics. 54

Figure 5.1 The No 23 Mk II Mills Grenade, cutaway to display the pin, chamber and casing for instructional purposes. The grenade has a steel perforated jacket sectioned on one side revealing the igniter and firing mechanism.. (AWM REL34881)

The AIF Training Memorandum alluded to training rifle bombers, as this was a logical extension to hand throwing the Mills bomb. Initial developments in this process led

53 AWM25 947/17 Pt II Training France Infantry 1917, 7th AIF Infantry Brigade, Training Memorandum on Organised Bombing dated 13 June 1917. 54 LAC RG9 III Canadian Corps, General Staff Folder Folders 108-109, Suggested Syllabus for Corps Bombing School, dated 20 June 1917.

Australian Infantry on the Western Front 146 to the introduction of the No. 23 Mills bomb during late 1916 which increased the grenade’s range by using the SMLE as a parent propellant system. The No. 23 had a rod and cradle cup style launcher attachment which enabled it to be fitted to the barrel of the rifle. Figure 5.2 depicts the Mills No. 23 configuration. A specialised “blank” round provided the propellant. To use the weapon, the grenade was inserted into the cup, fixed to the muzzle of the rifle by placing the rod down the barrel, and the pin was pulled. The stock of the rifle was planted on the ground and the blank cartridge fired. While the resultant discharge propelled the grenade over distances up to 200 yards, the prolonged use of this system damaged the mechanism of the rifle beyond repair. The weapon was replaced after short period by the Mills No. 36 design which did not need the rod assembly to fit down an SMLE’s barrel. To this end, the No. 36 used a cup and cradle. Figure 5.3 depicts the layout of the No. 36 design and its fitment to the SMLE. The No. 36 weapon was fired in the same manner as the No. 23 grenade.

Figure 5.2 Right. The No. 23 Mills rifle bomb. This early design attempted to attach the grenade to the SMLE via a rod system. The attachment was damaging to the parent rifle and was discontinued in 1917.

Figure 5.3 Left and below. The No. 36 Mills rifle bomb cup and cradle system. This design attached the grenade to the SMLE via a cup and greatly improved the firepower of the British Platoon after

The complementary nature of these weapons at platoon level – rifle, bayonet, Lewis LMG and Mills bomb – cannot be overstated. They represented direct and indirect weapons systems, both aimed and ballistic, and by 1918, their cohesion at platoon level in the British

Australian Infantry on the Western Front 147 Army was standardised practice. The practice was reinforced via the plethora of training pamphlets issued by the War Office, and these documents were abundant by the last year of the war. In this context, SS143 states succinctly: ‘Cooperation means help’.55 However, as the byword in such matters, SS197 underwrote the entire process: The rifle combined with the bayonet is the main weapon of every infantry soldier… The bomb and rifle-bomb supplement the action of bullet and bayonet… [They] are designed to kill the enemy below ground or force him into the open, where he offers a target to the rifle and Lewis gun. The Lewis gun assists the rifleman to get forward by applying heavy covering fire instantaneously in any required direction…56 In the process of employing weapons systems the same way in every platoon in every company of every Dominion or British battalion of the BEF laid certainty. With standardisation came uniformity and one of the keys to battlefield effectiveness. Ostensibly, any soldier from any formation across the might of the BEF could effectively “plug-in” as required to any other sub-unit when needed. Of course, there were idiosyncrasies to the national contingents. As mentioned earlier, the Australians, Canadians and New Zealanders wore distinctive head dress, though they did not do so in combat after the Brodie helmet was issued. To this end, several of the Scottish Regiments had distinctive headdress as well; indeed, some of them wore kilts into battle. The cut of the Australian tunic was slightly larger than and the pockets were more utilitarian than its British counterpart, though it was still very similar. The Australians and Canadians wore distinctive colour patches on the upper sleeve to denote their various battalions and parent formations. However, every regiment and national contingent across the British Army had its own distinctive badge worn on the uniform or officer’s cap to imbue the same sense of belonging in the wearer. These splashes of colour and heraldry, though important, were superficial. The BEF – English, Scots, the Irish, Welsh and Newfoundlanders, Canadians, Antipodeans, Indians and South Africans – all were elements of the one Army. The ranks were the same. The 1908 pattern webbing, puttees and 1915 issued flat tin helmets were the same in all formations. The model for training at formation level, SS13557, even goes in to the level of detail required for individual kitting carried by soldiers participating in an operation:

55 SS143, Appendix VIII. The Platoon in a Trench to Trench Attack, para. iv. 56 SS197 The Tactical Employment of Lewis Guns, Chap. VI, para. 2. 57 SS135, Instructions for the Training of Divisions for Offensive Action, HMSO December 1916, revised June 1917, p. 58.

Australian Infantry on the Western Front 148 XXXI. Dress and Equipment 1. Officers. All infantry officers, taking part in an attack, must be dressed and equipped the exactly the same as their men. Sticks are not to be carried. 2. Fighting Dress. The following is suggested as the normal fighting dress for all ranks of infantry units: (i) Clothing: As issued. (ii) Arms: As issued. (iii) Entrenching tool: As issued. (iv) Accoutrements: As issued with the exception of the pack. The haversack will be carried instead of the pack. (v) Box Respirator and helmet. (vi) Articles carried in the haversack: Cap comforter, cardigan jacket, towel and soap, spare oil tin, holdall, iron ration, waterproof sheet. The mess tin and cover will be slung outside the haversack. In cold weather the great coat will be carried instead of the waterproof sheet. (vii) Ammunition: 170 rounds. (viii) Mills hand grenades: Two. (ix) Aeroplane flares: two. (x) Sandbags: Three. (xi) Rations and water: One iron ration and one filled water bottle.

To recognise the sheer complexity of the skills required to operate platoon level weaponry in the trenches of the Western Front is proof that standardisation worked. Both sides copied each other in such tactics. Stephen Bull indicates that much was made of the vaunted German “storm trooper”, and their superior tactical methods.58 However, the British Empire training system and coordinated use of platoon level weapons systems was inherent among all infantry units at all levels in the BEF where the German system was not. Because of this, Bull also argues that the British Army system of schooling – sniping, scouting, bombing, LMG training and musketry included – was ultimately more successful than the German methods in achieving a uniform standard.59 Under this system, soldiers from all over the Empire trained identically in these systems during the second half of the war. Understanding the technical training process gives insight to the experience of their development as infantry. This chapter has provided an overview of the platoon level weapons systems operated by Australian infantry on the western Front during 1916-18. It has done so by comparing aspects of the Canadian Corps and Australian use of weaponry. Both are viewed in an Imperial context. The rifle, bayonet, Lewis gun and grenade were the tools of the trade for Australian and wider BEF troops at platoon level during this period. By the second half of

58 Bull, World War 1 Trench Warfare, London, 2002 p. 44. 59 ibid, p. 45.

Australian Infantry on the Western Front 149 1917, the training, tactics and technical skill-sets of the men in the BEF were standardised. By 1918 capabilities such as the machinegun barrage, creeping artillery, the use of indirect weapons systems, were the necessary supporting adjunct to the infantry’s capability. Indeed, in 1918 it was combined arms operations that underwrote the success of Britain in the war. Australian infantry would develop in concert with the whole BEF during these two years. The BEF emerged as a stronger fighting force because of enforced standardisation and schooling in these processes. Nevertheless, by the end of 1917 and until the end of the war, platoon level operations were still the focal point for the entire British Army. In the standardisation of skills required to operate the platoon’s various weapon systems lay a tactical level innovation that provided the British Army infantry the decisive edge over their German counterparts. This represented a concurrent bottom up and top down approach to training, doctrine and education in the BEF. The entire process was mutually supporting. The next chapter will compare the rigour of such processes in comparing the individual Australian infantryman’s training continuum to several of the myths surrounding service in the AIF on the Western Front from 1916-18.

Australian Infantry on the Western Front

CHAPTER 6 Enlisted Men: Australian Infantry on the Western Front 1916-18

This chapter will view the preparation of Australian infantrymen for operations on the Western Front through the prism of the enlisted man; the popular history of Australian Infantry in the Great War does not include officers.1 Nearly a century has passed since the end of the conflict, and there are significant differences between the modern memory of Australian Great War infantrymen and the reality of their contributions and experiences. One is based in myth, the other a practical training and reinforcement process. In the context of Australian infantry on the Western Front, the myth had its heritage in the Anzac legend; the training regimen was the practical manifestation of service in the BEF. During the centenary commemorative period, it is important to acknowledge that both have contributed to a generally positive and enduring legacy. The thesis has already pointed to how training, tactics and technology in an Imperial context underwrote the achievements of Australian infantrymen on the Western Front. This chapter will highlight the significant differences in the training received by those troops who enlisted in 1914 in comparison to the rigour of training undertaken by those who enlisted from 1916-1918. It will highlight through a specific and random selection of enlisted men that the Australian Great War infantryman was not the physical giant of popular history. The chapter will debunk the “super human” qualities that Australian popular history sometimes bestows on its Great War infantrymen. In doing so, it will provide some context to the Anzac myth. Such matters are important; it is perhaps the body of men who served on the Western Front – and their battlefield record – which are the foundation for the Anzac legend. The salient point is thus: the extraordinary deeds of the 1st AIF contrasted with the very ordinariness of the Australian troops themselves. The Anzac legend is the myth. The image of the irreverent insouciance of the Australian soldier; the heroic, devil may care attitude; the wild “colonial boys” who required little or no training; the troops who saved the day for England, the poor quality of British leadership and troops – all of these notions contribute to the ANZAC legend. Bean was central to the creation of this mythology. Within the construct, the qualities of mateship, egalitarianism, endurance and battle toughness were forged by Australian troops in the crucible of Gallipoli, and then refined as the heritage was passed onto successive Australian

1 For examples of such prose, see John Laffin, Anzacs at War: The Story of Australian and New Zealand Battles, London, 1965; and, more recently, Peter Fitzsimons, Gallipoli, Melbourne, 2014. Australian Infantry on the Western Front 151 soldiers on the Western Front. To a greater or lesser degree, the belief is very much a part of every former Dominion’s view of its contributions during the conflict. As one old soldier reminisced after the conflict: The cubs of the Empire, Australian and Canadian, had smashed the unbreakable line. British, American, and French troops had taken up the chase. We knew at last that victory must crown our arms. Our fallen had paved the way for this. Our world was safe… And so, at the eleventh hour of the eleventh day, of the eleventh month came the silence.2 Nothing can take away from the sacrifice or achievement of Australian infantrymen during the Great War. Their experiences helped create and forge a national identity. However, the minutiae of detail in the processes that enabled Australian battlefield successes during the Great War have been largely overlooked in the popular history. The trauma suffered by many surviving veterans in the aftermath of the war is a reality. In the 1970s, Australian historian Patsy Adam-Smith demystifies the martial qualities of the Australian infantryman; she grew up during the inter-war period the daughter of soldier: We children of the 1920s and 30s didn’t need to be told by our parents that the angel of death had been abroad throughout the land: we had almost heard the beating of his wings.3 Adam-Smith’s prose softens the pervasive reality of psychological injuries in Australia during the years following the Great War. Modern focus does not. In Madness and the Military, Michael Tyquin highlights the profound affect that war induced trauma and its treatment had on Australian society in the two decades after the First World War.4 Tyquin points to the fact that Australia was so far removed from the horrors of the Western Front, that people at home had little understanding of what frontline conditions were like. To this end, the Australian experience and memory of the Great War is confronted by images of returned men suffering from the stress of their experiences. The myth and reality simply did not accord. Modern correspondent Sebastian Junger has an extensive experience of the battlefield and indicates while combat is connected to psychological trauma, the relationship is a complicated one.5 Junger points to the affect that training has on building the resilience of combat troops:

2 George Mitchell, Backs to the Wall, originally published 1937, Allen & Unwin, Melbourne 2007, pp. 214-215. 3 Patsy Adam-Smith, P., The Anzacs, Melbourne, 1985, p. 2. 4 Michael Tyquin, Madness and the Military: Australia's Experience of the Great War, Australian Military History Publications, Canberra, 2006. 5 See Sebastian Junger’s “How PTSD became a problem far beyond the battlefield” at http://www.vanityfair.com/news/2015/05/ptsd-war-home-sebastian-junger

Australian Infantry on the Western Front 152 A sense of helplessness is deeply traumatic to people, but high levels of training seem to counteract that so effectively that elite soldiers are psychologically insulated from even extreme risk. Part of the reason, it has been found, is that elite soldiers have higher-than-average levels of an amino acid… which acts as a chemical buffer against hormones that are secreted by the endocrine system during times of high stress.6 This is of course “new” science; in the course of this thesis an amalgam of the Anzac legend, the spectre of psychological injury and the lack of training still resonates through the prism of individual soldiers’ records. In Chapter 2, the thesis compared differences in training, operational and command performance of Australian infantry at Gallipoli to their record in France in 1918. Monash’s performance at Sari Bair on 8 August 1915 in comparison to 8 August 1918 was a salient example. On Gallipoli, ‘the training was simply the old British Army training. Little advice came from the Western front. The Australian and New Zealand officers had to rely almost entirely on themselves’.7 Indeed, the move from Gallipoli to the main front in Europe became a notable transition for the Australian infantryman. The experience of one of Monash’s men who survived the and who went on to serve in France also bears out the view of the myth and reality. My grandfather, William Millar Frederickson (1921-2007) was the son of a Gallipoli soldier.8 No. 1945 Private later Driver later Sapper William Frederickson9 enlisted in the 1st AIF at the end of February 1915 as a reinforcement soldier for the 15th Battalion, 4th Brigade, New Zealand & Australia (NZ & A) Division. He embarked from Australia on 16 April 1915, and joined his Unit at Gallipoli on 6 June.10 Private Frederickson’s record indicates he joined the 15th Battalion at a time it was in reserve after an extensive period in the firing line at Quinn’s Post. Peter Pedersen indicates that this group of reinforcements arrived in the 4th Brigade virtually untrained.11 My grandfather speaks of the enduring guilt his father, Private Frederickson, felt for killing a Turkish soldier on Gallipoli with a knife.12 It had happened in the dead of the night after he and his unit had walked out of Anzac Cove through the bush with rifle and bayonet fixed, but not being allowed to load the weapon in case an accidental discharge alerted the enemy. The Australians had clashed hand to hand with a party of Turks on the moonless night, and among

6 loc cit. 7 Bean, OH, Vol. I, p. 139. 8 Personal recollection of William Millar Frederickson to author July 2001. he speaks of his father, Private Frederickson, screaming in the night as he relived his war experiences during the early 1930s. 9 Service record of William Frederickson AIF available digitised at the National Archives of Australia on http://recordsearch.naa.gov.au/scripts/Imagine.asp?B=1994395&I=1&SE=1 10 Army Form B. 103: Particulars concerning the active service of No. 1945 Private William Frederickson. 11 Pedersen, Monash as a Military Commander, Melbourne, 1985, Chapter 6. 12 Personal recollection of William Millar Frederickson to author July 2001.

Australian Infantry on the Western Front 153 this sweating, cursing mass of soldiers the rifle and bayonet was useless. Private Frederickson was sickened by his action. He was wounded by shrapnel fire the next day and evacuated to Egypt. Private Frederickson’s record indicates “Shrapnel Wound” Right Arm: 7 August 1915; thence “Evacuated No. 4 Aux Hospital Heliopolis” 12 August 1915. These dates and the story equate to the 4th Brigade’s assault on Sari Bair. Private Frederickson was lucky. At dawn on 8 August 1915, the 4th Brigade was slaughtered in an assault against emplaced machine guns on the Sari Bair Range at Gallipoli.13

th st Above: No. 1945 Private William Frederickson MM 15 Battalion & 1 Divisional Signals Company. Wounded at Sari Bair 7 August 1915, Wounded at Broodeseinde Ridge 4 October 1917, awarded Military Medal for action at Chuignes 22-26 August 1918. The studio photograph on the right was taken post war, and probably after his return to Australia; Private Frederickson’s MM was not gazetted until 1919. The photograph on the left is circa 1918. Private Frederickson has two wound stripes on his left sleeve, and the “A” depicting Gallipoli service is faintly visible on his right sleeve. He is noticeably thinner than in the post war photograph and the strain of his experiences are evident in his face. These contrasting images are indicative of the toll that the war took on the individual combatants. (source: author/AWM/NAA) Why is an obscure Private’s Gallipoli record important to a thesis on the training and development of Australian infantry on the Western Front? Firstly, the individual’s experiences on Gallipoli highlight the differences between the reality of training for active service in the AIF during 1915, and the far greater rigour of preparation that the infantryman

13 See Chapter 2 for detail. The History of the 15th Battalion Nominal Roll indicates the service numbers five either side of Private Frederickson – 1945 – were killed or wounded on 8 August 1915.

Australian Infantry on the Western Front 154 went through to conduct operations on the Western Front. Private Frederickson was barely trained when he arrived on Gallipoli. Secondly, his traumatic recollections do not fit easily into the Anzac mythology. His story shows he was ill prepared for his first experience of warfare. The strain of the war is also depicted in the contrasting photographs of him on this page. Finally, the accounts of individual soldiers were being subsumed by the legend even while the troops were still serving on the peninsula. Indeed, the Anzac myth was taking hold even as the first newspaper despatches were being published. By 1916, individual Australian soldiers were household names. Distinguished soldiers including Albert Jacka and Harry Murray, both recipients of the and 4th Brigade veterans – both later commissioned – had become the face of the AIF. In the modern vernacular, Jacka and Murray were the “legends” of their era.

Left: An Australian recruiting poster circa 1916 depicting Albert Jacka VC, Australia’s first VC recipient of the war. The sporting analogy was far removed from the reality of experience for most men, including Jacka.

Jacka’s portrait was even used in AIF recruiting posters of the day. Edgar Rule, a decorated fellow soldier in the 14th Battalion, was in awe of Jacka’s prowess. ‘To me, Jacka looked the part; he had a medium sized body, a natty figure, and a determined face with a crooked nose...His leadership in his last battle was as audacious as his first...The brigade and

Australian Infantry on the Western Front 155 the whole AIF came to look on upon him as a rock of strength that never failed.’14 Bean wrote that Jacka’s later exploits with the 14th Battalion at Pozières on the Western Front stood ‘as the most dramatic and effective act of individual audacity in the history of the AIF’.15 The men of the AIF learned to trust and follow leaders like Jacka and Murray who led from the front and knew what they were doing.16 Nothing takes away from the bravery of such individuals, and the records of their exploits are a vital narrative in Australian history. Yet, while such stories set a standard for popular perceptions of the AIF, they are a stereotype. Bean reinforced this. He wrote of the 1915 Anzacs that ‘the huge men who at this time began to appear in the streets of Cairo gave the appearance of being built, if anything, on an 17 even larger scale than those of the first contingent’. These men probably were bigger than their British counterparts and even the later Australians that followed into their ranks. The standards of the AIF recruiting depots at the beginning of the war were extremely high; so much so that by 1918, those who remained of the 1914-15 men stood out from their comrades. In 1914 and early 1915 an applicant to the AIF was required to be at least 5 feet 6 inches tall, have a chest measurement of at least 34 inches, and be aged between 18 and 35 years. Additionally, the prospective soldier was to be free of ‘impaired constitution; defective intelligence; defects of voice, hearing or vision…or any other disease or physical defect calculated to make him unfit for the duties of a soldier’.18 As casualties mounted, it became more difficult to recruit replacements. The height requirements were progressively relaxed to 5’3” in mid-1915 and 5”1” in 1917. One year after the Gallipoli August offensives, Australian infantry were now in the line on the Western Front. By the end of July 1916, the 1st and 2nd Australian Divisions had been through the crucible of the Somme; the 4th Division, hailing the likes of Jacka and Murray, had followed suit. These divisions had had notable success, albeit at appalling cost. The 5th Australian Division had been rendered unfit for service for the remainder of the year after the debacle at Fromelles. Australian infantry had arrived on the Western Front in the prelude to the Somme campaign, and the environment was profoundly challenging. The soldiers were confronted not only by their inexperience in a new operational theatre, but additionally by the

14 Rule, E. J., Jacka’s Mob, Melbourne, 2000, original printing: Sydney, 1933, pp. 2-3. 15 Bean, OH, Vol.III, p. 720. 16 Details of this attitude are neatly captured in E.J. Rule, Jacka’s Mob, original printing: Sydney, 1933; I. Grant, Jacka VC: Australia’s Finest Fighting Soldier, Melbourne, 1989; J. Hatwell, No Ordinary Determination: Percy Black and Harry Murray of the 1st AIF, Perth, 2005. 17 Bean, OH, Vol. I, p. 136. 18 Attestation Paper of Persons Enlisted for Service Abroad in the Australian Imperial Force. The AIF service record – Form B.103 – is attached to every enlistee’s record in the National Archives of Australia.

Australian Infantry on the Western Front 156 wider learning process that the entire British Army was experiencing. Christopher Wray writes of the Australian baptism of shellfire at Pozières: Trenches were blown in, burying their occupants. Those who survived and were dug out would be buried again, or killed by shrapnel. Some men disappeared in a flash, blown apart by a shell, others were decapitated or dismembered, yet others eviscerated, their shattered bodies scattered across the shell ripped landscape, only to be mutilated again as shells continued to fall.19

Above: Ruins of the village of Pozieres village in the aftermath of fierce fighting involving the AIF during the Somme Campaign. The results of sustained shellfire are evident. (AWM E532) Of the many awards for heroism that Australians received at Pozières, the subsequent psychological injury suffered by Private Martin O’Meara of the 16th Battalion is most illustrative of the fallacy of the Anzac legend. O’Meara was wounded at Pozières, and Bean recorded of his work that: The carriage of water, supplies, and the wounded was sustained largely by the example of one man, Private Martin O’Meara, who four times went through the barrage with supplies, on one occasion taking with him a party, and who thereafter continued to bring out the wounded until all those of his battalion had been cleared.20 For his service at Pozières, O’Meara was awarded the Victoria Cross. He was wounded twice more in 1917. A quiet and reserved man, born in County Tipperary, the war drove O’Meara insane. In 1918 he broke down completely and was repatriated to arrive in Perth on 30 November. O’Meara was institutionalised for the next 17 years at the Claremont Repatriation

19 Wray, Pozières: Echoes of a Distant Battle, Melbourne, 2015, p. 131. 20 Bean, OH, Vol. III, p. 750.

Australian Infantry on the Western Front 157 Hospital where he died in 1935. Private Martin O’Meara, native of Ireland, recipient of the Empire’s highest military honour, destroyed by battle serving in the AIF, did not fit into the Anzac legend.21 Wray argues that the Pozières experience was so traumatic that it transposed into the Australian household; it affected an entire generation.22

Above: Captain Albert Jacka VC congratulates Private Martin O’Meara on the award of his VC after Pozieres. Jacka was wounded 7 times during the battle. Jacka wore an eye patch covering a wound received during the battle. An intensely shy man, O’Meara could barely look at Jacka’s face during the meeting. He was later driven insane by his wartime experiences and institu tionalised for life. (source: AWM) In August 1916 it would be the training of the 3rd Australian Division, raised in Australia and shipped directly to the Salisbury Plain, which provided some amelioration to the shocking experiences of the Somme. Training was to pave the way for the development of the Australian infantry on the Western Front, and this was not without coincidence. John Monash, recently promoted Major General, commanded the 3rd Division.23 He took every hard lesson that he had learned at Gallipoli – particularly with his 4th Brigade at Sari Bair – to Wiltshire with him. Monash, an engineer of exacting standards, applied these same mathematical principles to the preparation of his men for warfare. He trained them hard; he

21 Synopsis of O’Meara’s history in Wray, Pozieres, p. 139. 22 ibid, p. 128. Wray devotes a chapter to the PSYCHOLOGICAL INJURY precipitated by Pozieres, “Those Made Mad by War”. 23 3rd Division: 9th, 10th 11th Brigades, 33rd – 44th Battalions. The Division was given the derogatory nickname “Eggs a Cook” by Gallipoli veterans due to the oval shape of their colour patches and the slang that they had heard Egyptian street vendors call when selling their wares in Cairo.

Australian Infantry on the Western Front 158 was equally circumspect in the selection of his subordinate commanders and staff officers. The commander of the 11th Brigade was Brigadier Jim “Bull” Cannan. He was a Queensland officer who had commanded Monash’s 15th Battalion in which Private Frederickson had served at Gallipoli. At Monash’s behest, Cannan was instrumental in setting up a training trench network, the “Bustard Trenches”, named after a local pub. Cannan promptly wrote to colleagues in France requesting detail on their tactics, techniques and procedures in manning the trench systems of the Western front. He was interested in implementing the most realistic and exacting standards. On requesting and receiving the system of “Trench Standing Orders” from the 2nd Australian Division in France they were implemented, Cannan replied: Dear Colonel Jackson, many thanks for this copy of Trench Orders. It is proposed to issue a somewhat similar pamphlet for the 3rd Division in training; and to publish some brief extracts from “Notes for Infantry Officers on Trench Warfare” compiled by the WO.24 The Bustard network was designed to provide the maximum and most realistic exposure for recruits to conditions on the Western Front prior to them entering the actual line. Monash signalled each of his Brigades that ‘each company should spend two consecutive days on its trench area digging before being relieved by the next company. A further period can be spent later putting in dugouts, etc’.25 Cyril Longmore of the 44th Battalion recalled in his battalion history of these days: The most memorable training scheme in which the brigade took part was the occupation for three days of a system of trenches at… a place a few miles from Larkhill. In this stunt everything had to be carried out as though it was an ordinary front line system of trenches and with an imaginary active enemy opposite. The most persistent enemy the battalion had on this occasion (and it afterwards proved to be the same in France) was the rain. It scarcely ceased during the three days and nights in which the trenches were occupied, and what with that, the strain on the imagination in trying to "make believe" the enemy, the working parties constructing dug-outs and digging trenches and building everything that had ever bean built in trench warfare to that date, and the fact that no one excepting "brass hats" were allowed on top, it was no wonder that the troops were heartily glad when the time came for relief. Although the battalion did not realise it at the time, those three days paved the way very thoroughly for its first "dinkum" tour in the line at a later date.26 Private Eric Fairey recalled in the History of the 38th Battalion that: Rain swept the open country and poured into the white chalk trenches. When at night several companies entered the trenches to take up their positions, men floundered through pools of whitewash, and got covered with sticky white mud. Verey lights went hissing up through the driving rain, to illuminate a dreary landscape. Rifles

24 AWM25 943/14 Training United Kingdom Training Papers – Lark Hill – Trench Warfare. 25 ibid, G26/53 3rd Division HQ to 9/10/11 BDEs dated 9 August 1916. 26 Cyril Longmore, Eggs a Cook: The Story of the 44th Battalion, Perth (1920), reprinted London, 2002, p. 26.

Australian Infantry on the Western Front 159 cracked, and the dull detonations of hand grenades momentarily drowned the angry hissing of the rain.27 Another man wrote of this period: ‘We spent this time steadily acquiring the arts of war and assiduously training both body and mind for that great day when we should meet the enemy face to face’.28 The training was highly successful and even drew royal praise. Vivian Brahms of Monash’s 42nd Battalion recorded ‘on September the 27th, the Third Australian Division, of which we were a unit, was reviewed by His Majesty King George the Fifth. Including New Zealand troops there was a parade of 38,500 men. It was a most inspiring sight’.29 King George delighted Monash with his congratulations on the bearing, discipline and general efficiency of the men. Monash proudly wrote to his wife that the King had said to him: ‘Well, General, I heartily congratulate you. It’s a fine division. I don’t know that I’ve ever seen a finer one. The men look so splendid and so soldierly and steady’.30 The 3rd Division deployed to France under Monash in November 1916, and held the line with absolute professionalism during one of the worst winters in living history. During its first major action at Messines the following year, the 3rd Division again performed with extraordinary discipline and professionalism. Yet, this was no coincidence. Monash’s Division and its parent formation, II ANZAC, were allocated to Plumer’s 2nd Army. Plumer was as exacting as a trainer as Monash. In preparing for Messines all troops were aware of this. As Cyril Longmore wrote: The Brigade now practiced the attack on Messines – Operation “Magnum Opus” – over a system of shallow trenches made as much like the enemy system at Messines as possible. Everything possible was explained to the men, and officers were brought together for conference after conference. For three weeks this rather monotonous training went on, and then the battalion received orders to move back to the line.31 Messines was a resounding success. Afterwards, Monash lauded his division’s efforts: I desire to convey my gratitude to all commanders and all troops of the Division for the magnificent valour and splendid cooperation, as well as the high technical skill which all ranks and all arms and departments have displayed in the achievement of today’s great victory.32 What is not lost in Monash’s prose is the term “technical”; totally in keeping with his approach and a vital step in the development of Australian infantry on the Western Front.

27 Eric Fairey, The 38th Battalion AIF: the Story and Official History of the 38th Battalion AIF, 38th Battalion History Committee, , 1920, p. 7. 28 V. Brahms, The Spirit of the 42nd: Narrative of the 42nd Battalion, 11th Brigade, 3rd Division AIF 1914-18, Brisbane (1938) reprinted London, 2002, p. 31. 29 ibid, p. 33. 30 Tony MacDougall (ed.), War Letters of General Monash, Melbourne, 2002, p. 120. 31 Cyril Longmore, ibid, p. 62. 32 MacDougall (ed.), War Letters.. , p. 141.

Australian Infantry on the Western Front 160 The experiences of his men certainly bear this view out. Typical of these troops was Private Verdi Schwinghammer of the 42nd Battalion in Monash’s 11th Brigade.33 He kept a comprehensive diary of his war service.34 Schwinghammer’s service record indicates that as a reinforcement soldier for his parent brigade he was allocated to the associated 11th Training Battalion at Larkhill on the Salisbury Plain. Schwinghammer kept an extensive diary on his experiences. On arriving in England he boarded a train for the Salisbury Plain to: …arrive at a railway station at midnight. Then marched five miles, through a snowstorm, to our camps at Sutton Mandeville. We were billeted here in large huts with plenty of blankets and a fire continually burning in the hut. The food was very good and we had the usual recreation huts. For several days we were off duty as our hands and feet swelled up with the intense cold. Then commenced drilling and route marching, through the snow. Mumps broke out and we were isolated for a fortnight.35 In mid-March 1917 he was transferred to Larkhill Camp: On 16th March we went by train from Fovant to Amesbury and then marched to the main Australian camp at Larkhill, Salisbury Plains, and was billetted in No. 11 camp. Eighty thousand Australian troops were camped here. There were hundreds of large huts, and through them ran a large street containing halls, picture theatres, recreation huts &c – also shops where we could buy almost anything. The drilling here was very severe and strenuous. We were up at daylight every morning and continued drilling till dark, with half a day on Saturday and all day Sunday off.36

Left: No. 2639 Private Verdi George Schwinghammer C Coy 42nd Battalion AIF. A prolific diarist, Schwinghammer recorded the rigours of preparation he undertook before proceeding to the Western Front.

Private Schwinghammer’s record indicates that he proceeded “OSEA France ex-11 TNG Battalion” on 23 July 1917. During the period to July Private Schwinghammer conducted the

33 Service record of Private Verdi George Schwinghammer 42Battalion accessed at the NAA on http://recordsearch.naa.gov.au/scripts/Imagine.asp?B=8076591&I=1&SE=1 34 AWM 2DRL/0234, Diary of No. 2639 Private Verdi George Schwinghammer, C Coy, 42nd Battalion, AIF. 35 Diary of Verdi Schwinghammer. 36 Diary of Verdi Schwinghammer.

Australian Infantry on the Western Front 161 stipulated 14-week recruit training regime undertaken by all British and Dominion troops on enlistment after October 1916. After training, Schwinghammer records: On 23rd June the majority of our reinforcements left for France… kept back in England till 23rd July as we were required as witnesses on a case where a soldier was knocked down by a motor car and badly hurt. 37 Private Schwinghammer finally made it to France on 24 July 1917 where he was now required to undertake reinforcement training at the Le Havre depot: We stayed here a fortnight practising battle and trench warfare and going through rifle and gas drill. I was for three days guard at the German prisoners camp… Our way to the parade ground ("Bull ring") was through a beautiful avenue of trees.38 He joined the 42nd Battalion on 11 August 1917. What is significant in Schwinghammer’s training continuum is that by the time he joined his unit, he had undertaken nearly five months of training. When Private Frederickson was evacuated from Gallipoli almost exactly two years prior, his total preparation for operations was weeks. Such matters are significant in the development of British and Dominion infantry training in 1917. What is equally noteworthy in Private Schwinghammer’s memoir is that he was completely unremarkable. In manner, he was not atypical of the Australian troops who enlisted after Gallipoli and served in Europe. By the time the AIF reached the Western Front, the self-discipline of its recruits was improving commensurately with the rigour of its training. However, in 1917 this was the providence of the entire BEF, not just the Australians. Indeed, self-discipline among Australian troops came commensurately with the knowledge provided by training, and subsequent hard earned experience. Even in the modern military, self-discipline reflects professional and technical mastery; it is the force de rigueur. That such processes were occurring in the BEF and its Dominion contingents has already been demonstrated by the thesis. It is also reflected in the various records of most of the Private soldiers. The following individual records represent several themes. Firstly, they were not the huge men of Bean’s prose, and secondly, all Australians proceeding to the Western Front after 1916 were extensively trained. No. 291 Private William Arthur Pullen39 enlisted into the original 4th Brigade on 9 September 1914 as a member of the West Australian 16th Battalion. His file indicates he served on Gallipoli before posting to Monash’s 3rd Division on the Salisbury Plain. This was not uncommon; soldiers were sometimes posted between various units during the war. In

37 Diary of Verdi Schwinghammer. 38 Diary of Verdi Schwinghammer. 39 Hereafter, Private Pullen. Service record accessed at http://recordsearch.naa.gov.au/scripts/Imagine.asp?B=8023609

Australian Infantry on the Western Front 162 Private Pullen’s case, it also indicates a rational approach and appropriate emphasis placed on good training from mid-1916 onwards. Private Pullen’s attestation papers indicate he was employed as a ship’s fireman, that he and his next of kin were natives of Sussex England, and that he had previously served three years in the Royal Canadian Dragoons. At 27 Private Pullen was well travelled and likely world-wise. His medical records indicate that he was just shy of the requisite 5’6” tall – he was accepted anyway, weighed 136lbs, and had a chest expansion of 36 ½ inches. Even though he was not one of Bean’s “huge men”, he would have presented as a fit and wiry individual; the examination recorded he had a dark complexion, brown eyes and hair.40 As an “original”, Private Pullen undertook rudimentary drill and training at Black Boy camp in before arriving in Egypt with the 4th Brigade in February 1915. The entire Corps continued with pre-war style basic training until deploying to Gallipoli in April.41 The 4th Brigade disembarked at Gallipoli on 26 April 1915. Private Pullen’s Service Record42 indicates that he was hospitalised with “Insomnia” on 10 May 1915 and again with influenza and bronchitis on 26 May. On 21 August 1915 he presented with “Debility” and was subsequently evacuated and sent to England for hospitalisation with heart trouble. The terms insomnia and debility may have been a sympathetic Medical Officer’s cover for some form of psychological injury; in 1915 the psychological effects of combat were poorly understood and often went undiagnosed. At the end of May and again in August 1915, the 4th Brigade endured some of the most testing operational service of the entire Gallipoli campaign. Such travails would have worn down the hardiest of men. Private Pullen’s service with the 4th Brigade on Gallipoli coincides with its actions at the head of Monash Valley during the attempted Turkish break through on 19 May, and the abortive “Black Day” at Sari Bair. His illnesses are entirely understandable. The significance of his subsequent record is the modern and rational approach afforded to training, convalescence and reinforcement in the AIF; the formation’s arrival on the Western Front seems to have coincided with its professional development and a realisation of just how important human resources were in modern warfare! He arrived in England on 26 September 1915 and spent six months convalescing in the 5th Southern Hospital at Abbey Wood in England, before allocation to the AIF HQ at Bulford and then a Command Depot on the Salisbury Plain in June 1916. Here Private Pullen

40 Private Pullen Attestation Papers for the AIF, Medical Officer’s certificate. 41 Again this training was conducted in accordance with the Infantry Training Manual 1914; there is no contemporary record that lessons from the Western Front were afforded to the Mediterranean Naval & Expeditionary Force to which the AIF was assigned. This aside, the AIF was raised from the civil population of Australia and it was a feat of administration that it was trained to the standard it was at all before Gallipoli. 42 Form B103, at http://recordsearch.naa.gov.au/scripts/Imagine.asp?B=8023609

Australian Infantry on the Western Front 163 undertook reinforcement and continuation training aimed at raising him to an operational level of readiness for deployment. Private Pullen was subsequently posted to the 44th Battalion – the “Eggs a Cook” – on 15 October 1916. He assimilated into his new battalion missing the Bustard trenches exercises and deployed to France with the 3rd Division on 25 November 1916. Private Pullen endured the worst winter in France in living memory over Christmas 1916-17. This did nothing for his constitution as he was continually hospitalised or placed on convalescence for upper respiratory ailments during 1917. Nevertheless, he was promoted Lance Corporal and participated in the Messines offensive in June 1917 for which he was awarded the Military Medal for ‘Bravery in the Field’.43 By August 1917, his bronchial complaints had become so severe that he was again sent to the Salisbury Plain to recuperate. From August 1917 to January 1918, Private Pullen was variously attached to either the 4th or 2nd Command Depots as his condition improved or degraded. In accordance with AIF processes, the 4th Command Depot was designed to assist men recuperating and likely to be fit for service within 3 months; the 2nd Command Depot for men unlikely to be fit for service within 6 months and therefore to be returned to Australia. In late September, in addition to bronchitis and debility, Private Pullen was also diagnosed with urithritis, a debilitating infection in the pre-antibiotic era. He was discharged as medically unfit and returned to Australia in April 1918. The correspondence attached to his record is an indication that private Pullen fell on hard times post war. His address is recorded as the People’s Palace in either Melbourne or Perth, and he existed on a pension of £3 a fortnight. Private Pullen’s record was selected at random in order to view the training continuum that a 1914 man might experience. It is not atypical of most of the records. William Arthur Pullen was well travelled; he was also British, his constitution was unduly affected by his service, he was decorated for bravery, and it seems as though he faded into obscurity back in Australia. If, given their experiences during the war, any of these men could be remembered as ordinary; Private Pullen’s service is as generally unremarkable as any. “Ordinary” does not accord with the Anzac myth. Anzac histories are abundant in their disdain for the skills of the British infantryman. Australian soldiers were amateurs who showed the English professionals how to win the war. The Australian infantryman was a natural soldier who took to the Western Front many all of the necessary skill sets to win the war. The modern memory of the Australian soldier is of an enlisted man and his discipline is based on mateship more so than the enforced authority of the British Army’s hierarchy. Egalitarianism underwrites the myth,

43 Gazetted in London on 16 August 1917 and listed in the AWM records at http://www.awm.gov.au/people/rolls/R1526487/

Australian Infantry on the Western Front 164 and because the concepts of the myth are by their very nature intangible, they tend to reinforce themselves. Australians were independent, practical and did not display blind discipline to their superiors. They were disparaging of such traits in British troops and of their contributions to the war. Even Bean wrote: ‘The British private stood in somewhat distant awe of his officers as beings on a different plane. He was most conscientiously correct in his painstaking observance of all orders’.44 Bean argued that Australians were different: By reason of the open air life in the new climate, and of greater abundance of food, the people developed more fully the large frames which seem normal to Anglo-Saxons living under generous conditions. An active life, as well as the climate, rendered the body wiry and the face lean, easily lined, and thin-lipped. An accent neither English, Scottish nor Irish had begun to differentiate Australian speech. Bred of such stock, and left to develop themselves freely in their own way, Australians came to exhibit a peculiar independence of character. Their fathers, usually men of assertive and forcible disposition, had cut loose from tradition and authority when they left the British Isles; they refused to take for granted the prescribed opinions, but faced each question for themselves and gave to it an answer of their own. If there was in them something of aggressiveness, there was also a vigorous and unfettered initiative. In them the characteristic resourcefulness of the British was perforce developed further.45 Private Pullen’s story does not reinforce this view; however, popular memory of the colonial is far more interesting than the record of hard training. This cannot be over stated. As Gary Sheffield argues, when it came to regard to hard work and discipline, ‘the Dominion approach was rather more, and the British rather less, formal than is commonly believed...’46

Left: “At the landings and here ever since”. This view of the grizzled Australian infantryman was an image that Bean did not wish the young nation be noted for. His Australians were cleaner aesthetes. This particular caricature was submitted for Bean’s original ANZAC Book in 1915, but was rejected. (Source: AWM Art)

44 Bean, OH, Vol. I, p. 126. 45 Bean, OH, Vol. I, p. 5. 46 Gary Sheffield, Leadership in the Trenches: Officer-Man Relations, Morale and Discipline in the British Army in the Era of the First World War, London, 2000, pp. 171-2.

Australian Infantry on the Western Front 165 That the Anzac myth is partially built on the Australian disregard for imposed discipline is based largely on the 1914-15 period, when the AIF experienced many disciplinary issues. At this time, Bean was entirely circumspect in his views of Australian behaviour away from combat. Intemperance, gambling, fighting and the widespread use of prostitutes, invariably associated with increased rates of sexually transmitted disease, simply did not fit his mould for the Australian character. In Egypt, he did admit that there were problems with discipline in the AIF, and that in addition to general Australian high spirits, ‘a much graver class of crime was appearing – heavy drinking, desertion, attacks upon natives, in some cases robbery. [However], the serious trouble came from one class of man – the old soldier. A large number of these men were not even Australians’.47 If the individual did not conform to Bean’s Australasian bushman-warrior caste, then in his view, the individual probably didn’t belong. Even so, until they arrived in Europe, intemperate excess was a very real trademark of the AIF. Popular Australian history views with pride perceptions of larrikin behaviour among its “diggers”; the intemperance and disdain for imposed British authority somehow equating to battlefield effectiveness. Such matters have been highlighted in earlier chapters, and then systematically laid bare. To be sure, there were a number of cultural differences between the former colonies and Britain. The oft-cited obvious among these are the use of conscripts, and by association the complete lack of a regular Army ethic or outlook in the AIF; the predilection for commissioning enlisted men into leadership positions; the “bushman- warrior” status of the Antipodean soldier; the lack of a class consciousness among Australians and Canadians in comparison to the British counterparts – each of these factors is often used to underwrite Dominion success on the battlefields of the Great War. However, as basis for fact these concepts lack in detail. All are at the very least open to question. Canada and Newfoundland introduced conscription in 1918, Britain and New Zealand had done so in 1916. Whether they were volunteers or conscripts, wider society comprised the source of manpower for the entire BEF. Arguably then by 1918 there was very little difference between a volunteer and conscript in any part of the Empire. As the axiom went, the better the training: the better the self-discipline: the better the soldier. The same principles apply even in modern training methods. Monash’s successful experiments on the Bustard were not the experience of the entire AIF; the other divisions had embarked directly for France. The question was one of what happened to the recruit who had enlisted in the period

47 Bean, OH Vol. I, p. 128.

Australian Infantry on the Western Front 166 that the AIF transitioned to Europe. To appreciate these men, the thesis will again look to the 4th Division which had been formed after Gallipoli from the nucleus of Monash’s alma mater, the 4th Brigade. No. 2129 Private Percy Wilfred Barnard48 enlisted in the 4th reinforcements for the 52 Battalion, , 4th Division AIF on 20 March 1916. His attestation papers indicate he was 18 years 10 months years old49, and the medical examiner recorded him as being 5’9” tall, weighing 11 stone and with a chest expansion of 38”. Private Barnard had light brown hair and hazel eyes. He trade was recorded as “lengsthsman”, a grounds keeper employed by the parish to inspect and clear crown and public areas. Private Barnard was very young, likely very fit given his work outdoors and the statistics we have of him, and likely had his “eyes full of stars” after reading the exploits of the 1915 Anzacs on Gallipoli. The AIF embarkation rolls indicate Private Barnard departed Australia aboard HMAT Boorara with the 2nd-9th Reinforcements of the 52 Battalion on 16 August 1916.50 HMAT Boorara arrived in Plymouth on 13 October 1916. Private Barnard marched into the 3rd Australian Command Depot at Fovant on the Salisbury Plain on 14 October 1916. He commenced training the next day.51 He did not undertake the 14-week syllabus directed by the War Office for recruits because he arrived in England before the syllabus was issued. Nevertheless, his training was comprehensive enough to comprise eight weeks, and his record indicates he deployed to France on 12 December 1916.52 Here he joined the 4th Australian Divisional Base Depot at Etaples for reinforcement training.53 Private Barnard’s formal initial and reinforcement training concluded on 23 December 1916 when he joined the 52nd Battalion in the field. Private Barnard received a gunshot wound to the right shoulder with the 4th Division at Bullecourt on 21 April 1917 and he convalesced in France. He again received reinforcement training this time at Le Havre and rejoined the 52 Battalion on 23 June 1917. He was hospitalised with influenza in mid-September 1917, before receiving a gunshot wound to the right buttock during the Third Battle of Ypres on 18 October 1917. Evacuated and

48 Hereafter Private Barnard: service particulars accessed at http://recordsearch.naa.gov.au/scripts/Imagine.asp?B=3050208&I=1&SE=1 49 ibid 50 AWM First World War Embarkation Rolls accessed at http://static.awm.gov.au/images/collection/items/ACCNUM_LARGE/RCDIG1067832/RCDIG1067832--302- .JPG 51 Army Form B. 103: Particulars concerning the active service of No.2129 Private P.W. Barnard. 52 Army Form B. 103: No. 21 29 P.W. Barnard. 53 The Australian Divisional Base Depots were all lodger formations at Etaples until June 1917, afterwhich they relocated to Le Havre in the Harfleur valley.

Australian Infantry on the Western Front 167 hospitalised this time in England, Private Barnard was discharged to No.1 Command Depot at Sutton Veny on the Salisbury plain on 13 . The role of No. 1 Command Depot was to administrate troops who were to return to active duty on the Western Front. After a well-deserved furlough in the UK, Private Barnard received reinforcement training at the Australian Infantry Base Depot Le Havre from 7-13 April 1918. He rejoined the 52 Battalion and was killed in action at Villers Bretonneaux on 24 April 1918. Private Barnard joined the AIF when he was 18 years of age. He was wounded at 19, wounded for a second time at 20, and killed before he was 21. He has no known grave and is listed on the Australian national memorial in France. Private Barnard was a young Australian infantryman of the Great War; he received training commensurate with the learning process and contributed as much as any private soldier during the most difficult year of the Australian Great War experience: 1917. On 26 March 1934, the Brisbane Courier Mail recorded the 50th wedding anniversary of Mr. Alfred and Mrs. Ann Barnard54 of Stanwell in Queensland. In their Golden Anniversary announcement they commemorated the loss of their son Percy Wilfred in France 16 years before. At just shy of 21 years of age, there is nothing of the bushman warrior in Private Barnard’s record. Certainly, there is no record of him receiving a disciplinary charge. Aside from the profound tragedy of his death – and it is a tragedy as significant as any other in the Great War – little distinguishes him from any ordinary young man of the Empire. Another soldier, No. 5064 Private Alexander Campbell55, of Redfern in Sydney, enlisted into the 16th Reinforcements for the 4th Battalion 1st Brigade of the 1st Division AIF on 8 February 1916. His attestation papers listed his father as next-of-kin, that he had previously been employed as a clerk, and that he was 21 years of age. Again, he was not one of Bean’s huge men. His certificate of medical examination records that he was 5’8” tall, weighed 9-stone 12lbs, and had a chest expansion of 33½”. This soldier was selected randomly as a man enlisting during early 1916, and who would receive his training during the second half of the year. His case is indicative of the AIF’s place in the learning process. Campbell would train for six months and this would prove longer than his actual period of service in France. Private Campbell was placed in the AIF training continuum immediately on enlistment. He departed Australia on April Fool’s Day 1916. As a former member of the pre-war 26th

54 Brisbane Courier Mail http://trove.nla.gov.au/ndp/del/article/1183312 55 Hereafter, Private Campbell. Service record accessed at http://recordsearch.naa.gov.au/scripts/Imagine.asp?B=1851466

Australian Infantry on the Western Front 168 Infantry Militia Regiment56 with four years service he was promoted Temporary Corporal during his induction and while undertaking recruit training on the Salisbury Plain. Such promotions were generally made to free experienced front line NCOs for more pressing duties. Under Newton Moore’s scheme Corporal Campbell joined the 1st Training Battalion in Wiltshire early May 1916.57 Although the Training Battalion construct had been put in place, instruction was not standardised until a War Office directive was issued in October 1916. Accordingly, Campbell’s stay on the Salisbury Plain lasted six months. He eventually deployed and proceeded to the 1st Australian Division Base Depot at Étaples on 17 November 1916 to conduct reinforcement training. Campbell was reverted in rank to Private when he joined the 4th Battalion in France on 3 December 1916. Promoted again on 17 January 1917, this time substantively, Lance Corporal Campbell served with the 4th Battalion in France for the next four months until he was wounded during an Australian assault on Lagnicourt north of the Somme. The ground captured by the AIF at Lagnicourt proved difficult to hold and the entire 1st Division was extended across an extensive front joined only by outposts. On 15 April 1917 the divisional front was subjected to a massive German counter-attack, and the 1st Brigade found itself in the centre of the line. The 4th Battalion was particularly pressed and as Bean recorded: Each of the three forward companies of the 4th was holding its front with a line of from three to six small posts, but each also held in support two platoons, stationed either in sunken roads or in strong-points of the older front line. Everywhere the Germans, after being sent to ground by sharp Lewis gun fire, made repeated attempts to reach the posts by rushes.58 At some point during the German assault, Campbell was shot in the right hand and lost his thumb. At Lagnicourt, the 1st Australian Division’s defences held; though just. Campbell was evacuated to England on 24 April 1917, and after hospitalisation was classified as unfit for further service in August. He embarked for Australia on 27 August 1917 and was medically discharged in Sydney on 21 November 1917. No one will ever know what went through Alexander Campbell’s mind in the months after he was discharged from the AIF. However, on 8 July 1918 he attempted to re-enlist as a private soldier under his own name. He was initially accepted, though his prior wounds were soon discovered and his application was rejected on medical grounds.

56 Attestation Papers Private Campbell at http://recordsearch.naa.gov.au/scripts/Imagine.asp?B=1851466 57 1st Training Battalion conducted Recruit Training for soldiers scheduled to march into the 1st Brigade (1st – 4th Battalions) AIF 58 Bean, OH Vol. IV, p. 367.

Australian Infantry on the Western Front 169

Left: Ruins of the village of Lagnicourt in the aftermath of fierce fighting involving the 1st Australian Division during 1917. (AWM ED4581)

At the end of 1916 the 1st Division Training construct was in place and effective. No. 7283 Private Patrick Joseph O’Donovan59 enlisted into the 24th reinforcements for the 8th Battalion, of the 1st Division on 10 January 1917. Private O’Donovan’s attestation papers indicate he was a Dairy Farmer. His next of kin were British Subjects emigrated from Ireland and now residing in Fern Tree Gully, Victoria.60 At just 21 years of age Private O’Donovan was only 5’3” tall and he was also married. O’Donovan’s medical records indicate that he weighed 112lbs and had a chest expansion of 32-33½ inches. His place of birth was listed as County Cork in Ireland. Private O’Donovan embarked from Australia on 19 February 1917 and arrived in England on 25 April. He was allocated to the 2nd Training Battalion. This unit conducted recruit training for the 2nd Brigade (5th-8th Battalions) of the 1st Australian Division. At the completion of recruit training, during which time he was found guilty of being absent from a place of duty, Private O’Donovan commenced reinforcement training at Le Havre on 19 October 1917. He joined the 8th Battalion as a rifleman on 1 November 1917 after more than six months in the new and now standardised training continuum. He was evacuated from France to the General Hospital at Colchester in England in December with an ear infection. On 3 February 1918 he was transferred to No. 1 Command Depot Overseas Training Brigade at Sutton Veny. Before he redeployed Private O’Donovan was selected to undertake training as a signaller at the 1st Brigade Training School on the Salisbury Plain. This was duly completed and he arrived in France for a second time on 1 July 1918. He rejoined the 8th Battalion as a

59 Hereafter, Private O’Donovan. Service record accessed at http://recordsearch.naa.gov.au/scripts/Imagine.asp?B=7995836&I=1&SE=1 60 Fern Tree Gully is now an outer eastern Melbourne suburb at the foot of the Dandenong Ranges. In 1916, it was a rural village.

Australian Infantry on the Western Front 170 signaller on 13 July 1918 in time for the Amiens offensive. The Official History notes that on 11 August 1918 the 8th Battalion was central to holding off strong German counter attacks around the township: Round the whole of hill the Australians now held an excellent position… [The Commanding Officer of the 8th] Col. Mitchell looked down on the waste of the old battlefield… As many Germans were moving in old trenches ahead, and field-guns firing from the wood, he asked for the protective barrage… The fighting lulled and in the heat the tired troops dozed standing in their posts, but were awakened to drive off the enemy, who all the afternoon crept up old trenches with bombs and machine-guns, trying to counter-attack and firing flares to show his position to his artillery. A strong attack was driven off at 4.30, north of the railway. Eventually the rifle ammunition of the 8th ran low and the bomb-supply was exhausted.61 At some point in this counter-attack, Private O’Donovan was wounded in action, and his record indicates that the nature of the wound was “Gas Poisoning”. He was again evacuated to the United Kingdom where he was hospitalised at Weymouth before being transferred to No. 2 Command Depot in October. He transferred to No. 1 Command Depot on 7 November 1918, four days before the Armistice. Private O’Donovan returned to Australia on 22 and was discharged in Melbourne on 29 . This soldier served for two years in the AIF, two months of which were on trying operational service. Ten months were spent in training for these operations, and of the remaining year, Private O’Donovan was either convalescing from wounds or sickness or was in transit.62 No. 3371 Private Bertram Byrnes63 enlisted in the AIF on 30 December 1916. He can have been under no illusion as to what was occurring on the Western Front. In the aftermath of the Somme, Private Byrnes must have seen the lists of thousands of casualties detailed in Australian newspapers. Bertram Byrnes knew of these things and he enlisted anyway. His attestation papers state his wife as next-of-kin, he was 24 years of age, and that he had previously been employed as a labourer.64 His certificate of medical examination records that he was 5’5½ ” tall, weighed 9-stone 6lbs, and had a chest expansion of 34”. Private Byrnes had a fair complexion, light blue eyes and light brown hair. Private Byrnes embarked from Sydney as a soldier in the 9th reinforcements for the 56th Battalion, 14th Brigade of the 5th Division on 24 January 1917 and arrived in England on 27

61 OH, Vol. VI, p. 676. 62 Form B103, accessed at http://recordsearch.naa.gov.au/scripts/Imagine.asp?B=7995836&I=1&SE=1 63 Hereafter, Private Byrnes. Service record accessed at http://recordsearch.naa.gov.au/scripts/Imagine.asp?B=3179822&I=1&SE=1 64 Private Byrnes’ Attestation Papers for the AIF, Medical Officer’s certificate.

Australian Infantry on the Western Front 171 March 1917. He was allocated to the 14th Training Battalion65 on the Salisbury Plain the same day. He completed his training and proceeded to France for reinforcement training on 23 July 1917. At the completion of the reinforcement cycle, Private Byrnes was taken on strength in the 56th Battalion on 11 August 1917. In late September, the 5th Australian Division became heavily involved in the Third Ypres when tasked to along with I ANZAC Corps to seize the Polygon Wood. Private Byrnes was wounded in action for the first time on 27 September 1917 when hit in the left leg by shrapnel. Given the severity of his wound, Private Byrnes was evacuated to England where his convalescence lasted ten months. On redeploying to France he underwent reinforcement training and rejoined the 56th Battalion again on 27 August 1918. At the beginning of September, the 5th Division was involved in operations spearheading the Allied offensive to break the German Hindenburg Line. On 2 September the 56th Battalion was tasked with securing the northern flank of the 14th Brigade during an assault to secure the village of Peronne. The battalion was directed to advance due east from the brigade northern extremity in order to extend its flank.66 Indeed, as Bean stated: The main task was that of the 56th Battalion, to advance north of Peronne; and unless the flanking machine-guns on Peronne ramparts were silenced [the main advance of the 14th Brigade] in the teeth of other machine-guns about St. Denis never was 67 practicable. The Official History indicates that the 56th Battalion advanced into a storm of machine-gun fire…; ‘it was daylight, the mist was rising, and the machinegun crews were visible along the ramparts’.68 At some point during the 56th Battalion’s endeavours on this day, Private Byrnes was wounded for a second time. With complete understatement, his service record Form B103 indicates the nature of the injury as being Gun Shot Wound: Face.69 Several entries later, the paucity of prose completes the graphic detail: ‘18/10/18: Embarked England’, the wound held Private Byrnes over in France, followed by: ‘20/10/18: Admitted Queen Alexandra Hospital, GSW Face, Fractured mandible severe’.70 Bertram Byrnes’ disfigurement must have been profound. He survived, embarked for Australia in , and was discharged on 29 .

65 Training Battalion for the 53rd – 56th Battalions. 66 Bean, OH, Vol. VI., p.863. 67 ibid, p. 865. 68 ibid, p. 866. 69 Accessed at http://recordsearch.naa.gov.au/scripts/Imagine.asp?B=3179822&I=1&SE=1 70 ibid. Queen Alexandra Hospital at Millbank in London was a Great War Hospital specialising in treating severe wounds to the face.

Australian Infantry on the Western Front 172 In November 1917 the AIF training system was rationalised on the Salisbury Plan.71 No. 7090 Private Thomas Edwin Mark entered this system as a 2nd Division infantryman when he enlisted into the 21st and last reinforcement contingent for the 25th Battalion of the 7th Infantry Brigade on 6 September 1917. Private Mark was a native of Wynnum, Brisbane, listed his occupation as labourer and his next of kin as his parents with whom he resided.72 He was 21 years of age. Private Mark embarked from Australia on 16 November 1917, and marched into the 5th Training Battalion (TB) in Wiltshire on 30 January 1918.73 Private Mark underwent the entire recruit training course with the 5th TB and deployed to France on 30 April 1918. After reinforcement training at Le Havre, he was taken on strength with the 25th Battalion in France on 8 . The 2nd Australian Division entered the line on the Western Front west of Morlancourt and north of Villers Bretonneaux to replace the 3rd Division on 11 May 1918.74 On 11 June 1918 the 7th Brigade containing Private Mark’s 25th Battalion was tasked to consolidate the line in what Bean considered a “minor operation”.75 Private Thomas Edwin Mark was killed in action during this operation. His record does not indicate how, though it may have been in one of the German counterattacks that the Official History indicates the 25th Battalion repelled after reaching its objectives.76 Private Mark had trained under the standardised British continuum for four months before deploying to France. His service on the Western Front lasted one. There is commonality among the experiences of the various private soldiers listed in this chapter. The first theme is physical. None of them were big men in the image of Bean’s soldiers who walked the streets of Cairo. None are among the “nation of six-footers” described in the earlier volumes of the Official History. In old terms, none weighs more than 11 stone; 69kg in contemporary measurements. Another common theme is one of shared tragedy. Every infantryman of the Great War experienced hardship, the horrors of battle, and tragedy in his own way. However, many of the soldiers depicted in this chapter suffered some form of psychological injury. Another common theme is that of the training experience of the men who marched into a TB on the Salisbury Plain in the last two years of the war. All undertook standardised training and reinforcement. They were all trained to Imperial

71 See Chapter 2: Table 2.3. See also record of reorganisation at AWM4, Australian Imperial Force Unit War Diaries. AWM4 23/79/2, 1st Training Brigade, November 1917; AWM4 23/80/1, 2nd Training Brigade, November 1917; AWM4 23/81/1, 3rd Training Brigade, November 1917. 72 Attestation of Private Marks accessed at: http://recordsearch.naa.gov.au/scripts/Imagine.asp?B=8207789&I=1&SE=1 73 ibid. Form B103. Service Record Private Mark. 74 See Bean, OH, Vol. VI, p. 94. 75 ibid, p. 219. 76 ibid, pp. 235-6.

Australian Infantry on the Western Front 173 standards. This is a far different experience to that of the Australians who trained in Egypt. This record is quite different to the record of popular history. Many of the soldiers viewed in this chapter were born overseas, and particularly in the United Kingdom. This being so, the presence of numerous Britons in the AIF would have had an undeniable impact on the culture of the AIF. Earlier chapters have pointed towards a British World at the turn of the twentieth century the similarities between the average Australian and English soldier were probably more than what is now acknowledged.77 To this end, raising a national Australian contingent of five divisions, later combined into a Corps, was a Dominion submission to the BEF’s five Armies. A final point – that popular history remembers the ANZAC as a “natural soldier” should be dispelled in viewing these, or any selection of Great War service records. Australian soldiers on the Western Front were not necessarily exceptional, even less so were they effortlessly better than their British and Dominion peers. The analysis of the private infantryman in the AIF from 1916-18 is therefore this: he trained hard according to a standardised pattern and performed very well in the context of the BEF’s overall campaign. However, he was foremost a soldier in the British Army and enabled by British logistics. The next chapter will take a similar view of the development of Australian infantry officers and commanders serving on the Western Front.

77 Carl Bridge & Kent Fedorowich, “Mapping the British World”, in The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 2003, 31:2, pp. 6-7, at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03086530310001705576

Australian Infantry on the Western Front

CHAPTER 7 Leadership and Training: Australian Infantry Officers on the Western Front AIF 1916-18

This chapter will highlight the influence that military leadership had on the development of Australian infantry on the Western Front. Even Haig, who most often has the blame for the conduct of the war laid at his feet, realised the importance of leadership and training. There was an absolute ‘need for the training of battalion commanders’, he wrote in February 1918, ’who in their turn must train their company and platoon commanders. This is really a platoon commanders’ war...’1 Nevertheless, popular history today reviles British generals of the Great War as callous and negligent.2 The background for such perceptions is decades old, and lies in the prose of a generation of war poets who wrote prolifically in the aftermath of the conflict.3 The genre was adopted across the Commonwealth education system in the 1960s as a wholesale reality of the war, and the work of Wilfred Owen is notable in the field.4 An infantry officer, in 1917 Owen was diagnosed as suffering from shell shock and sent to Craiglockhart War Hospital in Edinburgh where he wrote extensively. Of his poems The Parable of the Old Men and the Young stands out. It is an allegory based on the ascent of Abraham up Mount Moriah and the near sacrifice of his son, Isaac (Genesis 22:1-18).5 In The Parable of the Old Men and the Young Owen’s Abraham actually kills Isaac despite God’s intervention; the analogy representing the destruction of the future of Europe during the Great War. Such work is fiction. While it is important to understand the impact of casualties on communities, it must be viewed with balance. The difficulties faced by British commanders on the Western Front were significant and numerous. After 1916, the British high command was required to regenerate an army, grow a competent officer corps and develop and disseminate the doctrine necessary to win the war.6 This chapter will describe how Australian leadership shaped these events in the development of Australian infantry on the Western Front.

1 Sheffield, G.D. & Bourne, J. (eds.), Douglas Haig: War Diaries and Letters 1914-1918, London, 2005, p. 436. 2 For the ongoing reinforcement of such views, see, for example, John Laffin’s British Butchers & Bunglers of , Sutton Publishers, 2003; or Rowan Atkinson’s 1989 television series Blackadder Goes Forth in which the buffoonery of General Melchett personifies perceptions of the lunatic British Great War general. 3 For example, the disillusion of Sassoon’s fictionalised autobiography: Memoires of an Infantry Officer, 1930. 4 Wilfred Edward Salter Owen MC, soldier and poet, 2nd , KIA 04 November 1918. See Jane Potter, Wilfred Owen: An Illustrated Life, Oxford, 2014, pp. 124-129. Owen is also well remembered in Pat Barker’s Regeneration Trilogy of the 1990s, a fictional focus on the experiences of war damaged officers. 5 Douglas Kerr (ed.), The Works of Wilfred Owen, Oxford, 1994, p. 15. 6 Simon Robbins, British Generalship on the Western Front 1914 – 1918, London, 2005, p. 33. Australian Infantry on the Western Front 175 Before undertaking this approach, it is important to appreciate the meaning of leadership and command. The contemporary Australian Defence Force (ADF) defines leadership as the ability to influence the sailors, soldiers and airmen under command.7 Leadership supports command by adding personal influence to legal authority. Command is lawful authority exercised over subordinates by virtue of rank or assignment. Command includes the authority and responsibility for effectively using available resources and for organising, directing, coordinating and controlling forces in order to accomplish the assigned mission. The context of leadership and command, largely unchanged in concept since the Great War, challenges the orthodoxy of the Anzac legend. Within the AIF, the top down implementation of training standards, new tactics and improved technology by commanders introduces officers and dispels mythology; indeed, officers figure little in the history. As the Anzac legend goes officers drew legitimacy from the strength of their men’s approval and in their combat performance – the essence of egalitarianism and mateship – rather than by exacting qualifications obtained through training provided by the regular professional military. The best officers were those commissioned from the ranks. The myth completely or in large part ignores the minutiae of staff work and associated skill sets required to effectively train and lead large bodies of enlisted men. Further, the legend reinforces that the Australian infantryman was physically harder, more independent and more capable of innovative initiative on the battlefield. In short the Australian infantryman was better than his Imperial colleagues. The reality, less glamorous, indicates that while Australian soldiers performed well on the battlefield it was in large part due to effective leadership and training. By 1918, all units of the BEF were achieving results through the hard-earned employment of exacting standards. Accordingly, this chapter will focus on the characteristics and abilities of senior and some tactical level infantry officers in the AIF. This will contextualise the Australian infantryman’s training, development and battlefield prowess during 1916-18. The chapter will additionally view the process of commissioning soldiers from the ranks into junior leadership positions. The training that these soldiers received will also be addressed. In accordance with a top down approach, an initial overview provides context. The AIF’s performance at Gallipoli in 1915, while valiant, was typified by amateurish enthusiasm and the poor preparation. Yet, by 1918 the Australian Corps had become a professional, accomplished and integral national contingent of the BEF on the Western Front. Lieutenant General Sir John Monash, the senior Australian soldier on the Western Front,

7 Australian Defence Doctrine Publication 00.6, Leadership in the Australian Defence Force, Canberra, 2013. See also The Royal Australian Air Force Leadership Companion, Chapter 6, Canberra, 2014.

Australian Infantry on the Western Front 176 would reach the peak of his effectiveness in 1918 on assuming command of the Australian Corps. Such was his acumen, that in the weeks preceding Monash’s appointment, Bean would describe the cogency of his staff work and delivery of orders as … great powers of grasp and of lucid exposition at their best – the officers to whom they were read at the time recognised with a flash of pride, the “ old man’s ” masterly touch. The situation that called for each phase of action was clearly explained, and the action then crisply ordered.8 Indeed, Monash truly did achieve great success as a Corps commander through new and pioneering battlefield processes. Peter Pedersen gives credence to this sentiment in The ANZACS: Gallipoli to the Western Front, and he argues that Monash – the planner and engineer – personified the AIF and its innovative approach to operations.9 Yet, Pedersen also stresses that Australian leadership and success was a collaborative effort, hard earned and British enabled. Ross McMullin also studies Australian leadership, and neatly captures its nuances in Pompey Elliot.10 The theme of both historians is succinct. By 1918, the BEF’s battlefield effectiveness was realised by hard training and experience; the development of Australian infantrymen occurred in concert with the experience of its leaders and the command development of the wider BEF. Across the board, in 1918 the BEF demanded harder and more experienced commanders. When the Hindenburg Line was breached in September 1918 all elements of the British Army had them.11 By this stage of the conflict, at battalion level, all British and Dominion officers led from the front.12 This was doctrinal practice.13 That battlefield leadership of this sort was a singularly Australian trait is simply not true. Leaders at all levels across the Empire underwent the same learning process. Indeed, when interviewed around the time of the 80th anniversary of the Armistice, Robin Prior even indicated that inexperienced Australian officers were as adept as the Germans at killing their own men early in the conflict.14 In the course of the Great War, Sir John Monash rose to overcome this terrible circumstance.

8 C.E.W. Bean, The Official History of Australia in the War of 1914-18 (hereafter OH) Vol. V, The Australians in France, St Lucia, QLD, 1988, p. 177. 9 Peter Pedersen, The ANZACS: Gallipoli to the Western Front, Melbourne, 2007. 10 Ross McMullin R., Pompey Elliot, Melbourne, 2002. 11 J.M. Bourne, ‘The BEF's Generals on 29 September 1918: An Empirical Portrait with Some British and Australian Comparisons’, in P. Dennis & J. Grey (eds.), 1918: Defining Victory, proceeds of the Australian Army History Conference, Canberra, 1998, p. 111. 12 This is a figurative, not literal, interpretation. Depending on the tactical formation employed, commanders may well have been centrally located; or even immediately behind. What was significant is that commanders shared in every danger that other ranks were enduring. 13 For example, see SS143 Instructions for the Training of Platoons for Offensive Action, HMSO, War Office, February 1917, and revised throughout the war. 14 Robin Prior interviewed by Chris Masters, in 1918 Remembered, Four Corners Program, ABC, 1999.

Australian Infantry on the Western Front 177 In taking a top down view the immediate comparison lies between the AIF commander Monash and his CEF counterpart, Lieutenant General Sir Arthur Currie. The comparison is even more relevant if narrowed to the apogee of their respective military careers in 1918, and if confined by relevant terms of reference. The question is not a matter of who was the better commander or leader, nor even if either officer was in general better than the other “regular” corps commanders in the British Army. The question centres on what both men brought to the fight; on what qualities did they possess in order that their respective formations were able to so effectively reinforce and apply the new and evolving standards of the learning process. In short, the focus is on how both commanders contributed to the battlefield effectiveness of their individual national contingents. Lieutenant General Sir John Monash led the Australian Corps15 from his appointment in May 1918 until his return to Australia in the second half of 1919. Monash was brilliant, ambitious, meticulous, vainglorious, stout, and 53 years of age in 1918. The son of a German Jew he was the antithesis of Bean’s Anzac ideal. Until the Great War, he had succeeded in everything he had ever attempted. Monash had a comfortable – even privileged – upbringing in the Melbourne’s exclusive eastern suburbs and duxed his year at Scotch College in 1881. He proceeded to take degrees in the Arts and Law, followed by engineering, before settling into employment as a prominent Victorian civil engineer. He had been a citizen soldier and a member of the Melbourne University Rifle Regiment since 1884.16 It is certain that of the many General officers who served in the BEF, Monash was among the most intellectually endowed. The official historian was certainly no fan of Monash’s single-minded aspirations for advancement in the AIF. Yet, Bean also had the munificence to give true testament to the man’s personality: gifted, articulate, an officer and engineer who staked his reputation on the minutiae of elements associated with planning. Without realising it, Monash practiced command and management in a manner very similar to the modern ADF.

15 In effect, he led the AIF; the 5-divisions of his infantry corps effectively comprised the entire national contingent. 16 A synopsis of Monash is provided in: C.E.W. Bean, The Official History of Australia in the War of 1914-18 Vol. I, The Story of Anzac, St. Lucia, Queensland, 1988, p. 137. Detail is provided on Monash’s pre-war life in: Geoffrey Serle, John Monash: a Biography, Melbourne, 1982, Chaps. 1-7.

Australian Infantry on the Western Front 178

Left: Lieutenant General Sir John Monash, and Australia’s preeminent soldier of the Great War. Gifted, meticulous, a capable civilian soldier, his distinguished achievements during 1916-18 must be understood in the context of the changing nature and methods of warfare as the “learning process” unfolded. (source: AWM AO1241)

The contemporary ADF places great emphasis on the development of leadership, particularly in the preparation for command of its NCOs and officers. The leadership model used at team level is founded in the practices of businessman John Adair after which it is named. At a macro-level, the Adair Model is as practical as it is simple. It is also most applicable to military operations. The model comprises three interlocking circles in which the leader is required to focus on the task, team and individual at any point during a given task.17 The nature of the task, or operation in military parlance, will dictate the required level of focus needed in one or more of the domains at any given point. Where each of the pillars crosses over is indicative of mutual influence or requirement for the leader to place emphasis on two or more of the pillars at any given point. More specifically, when examining the Task, a military leader will take account a specific mission, desired outcomes, relevant courses of action, a timeline and resources required. When examining the Team, a military leader will delegate sub-tasks to individuals or groups with specific skill-sets, develop the skill-sets of individuals or groups in order to meet the requirements of a task, ensure the effective cooperation and interaction among individuals or groups conducting a task, clearly define and

17 By way of example, the RAAF Leadership Companion; Character, Ethics, Followership and Leadership, Canberra, 2013, pp. 92-93, indicates team leaders must think beyond the immediacy and primacy outcomes of their and their team’s decisions and actions... They must harness their own team’s identity, but ensure it is aligned with their parent unit and wider force... John Adair’s model is a primary reference for the team leader...

Australian Infantry on the Western Front 179 direct the requirements to meet the objectives of a mission, and set tangible goals and measurements of success in meeting the mission. When focusing on the Individual, a leader will develop and use the specific strengths of the members of a team, cater to their personal and professional needs18, understand the experience of individuals, and ensure each member’s active participation in achieving the task. Under the model, influence is often required in several of the domains at once; for example, when soldiers are required to conduct physical training, they will invariably conduct it in a group under the direction of a leader.

Left: Figure 7-1. The Adair Leadership Model. Depending on the circumstance, a leader at any rank level across the spectrum of command & control is in a position to focus on the element of the model most requiring attention. Monash, without realising and with an engineer’s mindset, was a practitioner of this form of leadership 80 years before it was in vogue.

This has tangible benefits for the team: group cohesion, cooperation, development of joint skill-sets. It is equally beneficial to the individual: increased fitness, focus and a sense of belonging. Even in this simplified example is a pathway to professional mastery. In the 1980s Peter Pedersen wrote that Monash was sometimes absent from the front when circumstances dictated that it should have been otherwise. On this point, Pedersen was succinct: ‘sometimes the authority imposed by a commander’s presence among his subordinates is essential. One such occasion arose on 8 June [1917] when a breakdown in communications and conflicting reports left Monash... unaware of the progress of an attack by the 44th Battalion [at Messines]... Monash did not appear at the [44th BN] headquarters’.19 This was recognised among the rank and file, and evident even in 1915: This officer did not at any time become part and parcel of the men’s lives. He was unknown except by name to most of us… On Gallipoli he was to us an unknown

18 This focus falls under the broad banner of “Noblesse Oblige”, literally “Privilege entails Responsibility”. The paternal notion of Noblesse Oblige has formed the cornerstone of an officer’s responsibility to a subordinate among the services of Britain and the Commonwealth for more than a century and a half. 19 Peter Pedersen, Sir John Monash, in (ed.), The Commanders: Australian Military Leadership in the 20th Century, Sydney, 1984, p. 101.

Australian Infantry on the Western Front 180 figure. All that mattered apparently was that he gave the orders and we obeyed them.20 Pedersen goes on to indicate that after Messines Monash made no effort to reconnoitre. Perhaps a failing, but his intellect compensated for this. ‘He prepared his plans after building up a mental picture of the terrain and its defences from maps and aerial photographs and discussions with his staff and commanders as he had done before the war’.21 This was Monash’s own mental engineering blueprint. Further, Monash was not saturated by the many tasks at hand. Other than networking every detail, he maintained his distance, and focussed on the wider objectives of the battle. He did have an ability to inspire his men, and he remained a distant though popular leader. Chaplain Gordon Cutriss of would write: The splendid fighting record of the 3rd speaks eloquently of his capable leadership and the rousing and prolonged cheering which greets him when presiding over or addressing an assembly of his men leaves no doubt in the mind as to his popularity.22 Monash was admired by his men, but he was different to them. Older, educated and focussed on the task at hand, he stood alone at the top. At Gallipoli, Serle pointedly believes that Monash didn’t ‘really understand the Australian ethos or begin yet to apprehend the apotheosis of the Australian common man which was occurring’.23 This might have been true. No one but Monash knew his own thoughts. Nevertheless, in his correspondence lies an indication of his approach to operations during the Great War. The 2002 republication of his Great War correspondence, War Letters of General Monash, is particularly insightful in this regard.24 It contains a plethora of examples of Monash’s engineering mindset; a few taken at six monthly intervals include: • 16 December 1915: I took my staff and commanding officers into my confidence and explained to them the outline of the general scheme, and the particular role each would have to play p.92. • 18 July 1916: London: 3rd Division: Total infantry 13,500... The whole command 20,000 troops, 7,000 horses, 64 guns, 192 machine-guns, 18 motor cars, 82 motor lorries, 1,100 other vehicles. • 11 January 1917: A front line battalion stays in only six days... at worst a single man seldom does more than 48-hours continuous front trench duty in 12-days, and every 48- days the whole brigade gets relieved... all this is my particular system – designed to spread the stress on the personnel as widely as possible. • 19 May 1917: Preparing for Messines: We have been making roads, building railways and tramways, forming ammunition dumps, making gun emplacements and

20 T. Chataway, The History of the Fifteenth Battalion, Brisbane, 1948, p. 97. 21 Pedersen, loc cit. 22 Chaplain Captain G.P. Cutriss, Over the Top with the Third Australian Division, London, 1917, p. 112. 23 G. Serle, John Monash... p. 220. 24 T. Macdougall (ed.), The War Letters of Lieutenant General Sir John Monash, Sydney, 2002.

Australian Infantry on the Western Front 181 camouflaging them, preparing brigade and battalion HQ and laying complex systems of underground cables, fixing the positions of heavy machine guns and . • 18 October 1917: Throughout every department of the work, both fighting and feeding up supplies, stores and ammunition, I strive to introduce similar systematic methods and order, so that there shall be no muddling, no overlapping, no cross purposes, and everybody knows what his job is and when and where he has to do it. • One year later 27 September 1918: Hindenburg Line: I drew up a detailed plan for a large operation extending over several days. I have been engaged for the last six days in developing and perfecting the plan and holding a series of conferences to carry it into effect.25 Monash was not writing for posterity, he was passing his closest thoughts on to his family and friends. This is an insight into what he brought to the BEF’s table. Monash knew enough to understand that something manifestly important was happening to the Australian nation in this war, and that his men were central to this. ‘I am convinced that there are no troops in the world to equal the Australians in cool daring, courage and endurance’, he wrote.26 He also wanted recognition for being a part of it! The answer to how Monash addressed his responsibilities to the Task / Team / Individual process is straight forward. ‘The main thing is always to have a plan,’ he wrote, ’if it is not the best plan, it is better than no plan at all’.27 His plans were always detailed, and he made the most of conferencing to convey his intent to subordinate commanders. At the completion of such conferences, his officers had been briefed collectively, and understood their own and their colleagues’ part in the coming battle.28 Monash considered that adhering to the plan was absolutely central to any operation; he would prefer to cancel and re-plan an operation if it could not be completed on the lines originally scheduled.29 By 1918, in coordinating new technology that included aircraft and tanks, he was able to influence the battle-space at a standard that reflected best practice at the time.30 Monash’s methods at Le Hamel in June 1918 resulted in an overwhelming victory for the Australian Corps, and took only six minutes longer than the scheduled 90 minutes.31 War was a science and an exercise in planning and logistics rather than one of purely brute force. His Gallipoli experiences proved this true, and he reinforced his perceptions through the thoroughness with which he prepared the 3rd Division for operations in 1916-17, and then again as a corps commander in

25 The correspondence references are taken from MacDougall’s War Letters, pp. 92, 114, 127, 139, 158, 207. 26 Macdougall (ed.), War Letters... , p. 47. 27 B. Callinan, Sir John Monash, Melbourne, 1981, p. 15. 28 G. Serle, John Monash: A Biography, Melbourne, 1982, pp. 251, 333. 29 ibid, p. 384. 30 Peter Pedersen, Sir John Monash, in David Horner (ed.), p. 108. 31 Bean, OH, Vol V, The Australians in France.

Australian Infantry on the Western Front 182 1918. It has been said of Monash that he was a better divisional commander than brigade commander, and a better corps commander than divisional commander.32 Indeed, as his responsibilities increased his processes provide clear insight into the orderliness of his mind tempered by the vicissitudes of private practice and civilian industry. A subsequent view of Currie will show the Canadian officer to be very similar. Such hardships were not noteworthy in the lives of regular army officers. This perhaps set militia and regular officers apart; Monash undoubtedly realised that for an Australian senior officer to reach general rank and gain recognition - he was keen for both - had little to do with intellect or ability. The circumstance vexed the essence of Monash’s structured mind. In early 1916, he wrote: …one can see the cult of inefficiency and muddle and red-tape practiced to a nicety at the expense of the troops. There are ever so many gentlemen earning their war medals on board luxurious transports, decked all over with patches and arm-bands and lace…which means that the sacrifice of nearly 15,000 magnificent dominion troops has been useless and to no purpose!33 These thoughts in no way curtailed his ambition for advancement, though. Equally, he believed: One ought not to hide one’s light under a bushel, nor fail to have an eye to the future, and any discreet little publicity may weigh heavily in the scale when later it becomes a question for those in authority to decide on recommendations for the Honours List.34 By the time he gained command in 1918, Monash had overcome the tribalism of the regular Army. In the last 100 days of the war commencing on 8 August 1918, Lieutenant General Monash would lead his men with inspiration as the British Empire’s spearhead against the Germans in one of the finest actions of the Great War.35 Bean would credit Monash with the following statistics during this offensive: at a cost of 21,243 casualties, just over a quarter of who were killed, the Corps took over 29,000 German prisoners and captured 338 guns. They liberated 116 villages and towns. While comprising 8% of the British Army in the line on the Western Front, the Australians netted 22% of the captures of the entire BEF.36 After the war, Monash wrote of his approach to the Allied victory thus: A perfected modern battle plan is like nothing so much as a score for an orchestral composition where the various arms and units are the instruments and the tasks they perform their respective music phrases. Every individual unit must make its entry at

32 Dennis, et al (eds), The Oxford Companion to Australian Military History, Oxford 2009, p. xxx 33 Macdougall, War Letters..., pp. 81-2. 34 Monash quoted in Serle, p. 224. 35 This battle, the opening gambit for the breaking of the Hindenburg Line, was dubbed by Ludendorff as the ‘blackest day of the war’. See C.E.W. Bean, Official History of Australia in the War of 1914-18, Vol. V: Australia in France, St. Lucia, 1988. 36 Bean, OH, Vol VI, pp. 284-6.

Australian Infantry on the Western Front 183 precisely the proper moment, and play its phrase in the general harmony. The whole program is controlled by an exact harmony, to which every infantryman, every heavy or light gun, every tank and aeroplane must respond with punctuality; otherwise there will be discord which will impair the success of the operation and increase the cost of it.37 These words, a record of Monash’s defined processes, reflect his approach for the duration of his service on the Western Front. At Lark Hill, on 26 August 1916, the 3rd Division’s progress was inspected by Major General Francis Howard, Inspector-General of Infantry. Howard was impressed with the state of preparedness and reported: [Monash] despatched Officers and NCOs to schools and courses to be trained as instructors, obtained the loan of others from Southern Command and inaugurated a 9- weeks period of training for all units… [The 14-week prescribed syllabus had not yet been fully promulgated].38 Subsequently, the aim throughout has been to make the training as uniform as possible throughout all units and throughout every part of every unit, so that the whole Division should be progressively trained on uniform lines and be brought to a state of fighting efficiency in simultaneous progressive stages; the idea being that there would be no advantage to the Division as a whole in having some units further advanced in their training than others – This principle has been applied as not just between battalions, but also between parts in each battalion, a regular rotation of exercises throughout all companies and platoons within the battalion being insisted upon.39 High praise from a directorate of notorious curmudgeons; early October showed even better results: ‘The Division is being trained along thoroughly practical lines... A brigade system of trenches is being constructed at Bustard… Each brigade… does a five days turn with 2- battalions in first line trenches and 2 in reserve – They relieve each other at night… 40 This is an insight into training developments in the British Army during the Great War. Soldiers were initially trained individually to a prescribed standard. This was then followed by reinforcement at platoons and unit level. In 1916 these standards were not yet fully in place, but Monash had the foresight to see they were coming. In the interim, he set and enforced his own schedule of training. It was no small achievement. Monash concurrently faced proposals to disband the 3rd Division to replace losses incurred on the Somme. This threatened his very command.41 Monash’s response to demands to do was lucid, arguing the

37 Monash, The Australian Victories in France 1918, London, Imperial War Museum, 1920, p. 56. 38 AWM 3DRL/2316 Monash Papers, Series 3 Personal Files Book 13, 16 August – 30 September 1916, Inspection of the 3rd Australian Division by the Inspector of Infantry, Major General Francis Howard, General Remarks Para. 8, p. 9, dated 27 August 1916. 39 ibid, para. 11. 40 AWM 3DRL/2316 Monash Papers, Series 3 Personal Files Book 14, 6 October – 30 November 1916, Inspection of the 3rd Australian Division by the Inspector of Infantry, Major General Francis Howard, General Remarks Para. 1, 11 & 12, p. 9, of October 1916. 41 See AWM Monash Papers, Series 3 Personal Files Book 13, 16 August – 30 September 1916.

Australian Infantry on the Western Front 184 benefits of collective training versus breaking his command up, and he prevailed. The 3rd Division duly deployed in November, and its first major offensive occurred the following June at Messines as a division in Plumer’s Second Army. Monash’s approach to this battle, Operation Magnum Opus, is recorded as methodically as an engineering blueprint. The following pages bear this out. They are first-hand evidence of his major strengths, but equally, point to the maturation of the more forward looking British generals. Allocation to the Second Army was a boon for Monash’s development. Indeed, in 1917 the Second Army was renowned for wonderful organisation and attention to detail in its detailed preparations for battle down to battalion level.42 Before Magnum Opus Plumer took care to consult every Corps and Divisional commander’s opinion in order to adjust his plans to local needs and opinions.43 Plumer’s “bite and hold” tactics yielded great success. Monash followed suit. In particular, his networking and allocation of duties in accordance with a timeline indicates the level of efficiency his division had achieved in order to accomplish its set tasks. In 1918, Monash would achieve greater results coordinating the concerto of the Australian Corps. So what is the summary? What did Monash bring to the BEF that contributed to the development of Australian infantry? That bastion of British Leadership, Field Marshal Bernard Law Montgomery, himself a Great War veteran, provides one answer. In 1968, he would rate Monash as ‘the best general on the western front in Europe; he possessed real creative originality…’.44 The foregoing documents provide evidence of his processes. Further, while Monash was an ambitious man, he also possessed integrity and competence; he trained and honed the skill-sets of his soldiers with superlative efficiency. He was process driven; possessed an engineering mindset. Monash was able to balance the pillars of task, team and individual according to the priority of the time. Pedersen, himself a former Australian Army officer, places great emphasis on Monash’s skills as a trainer. In fact, the training of the 3rd Division – particularly on the Salisbury Plain – ranked among his finest achievements. In this undertaking, Monash ensured ‘all units down to platoon were rotated through the same exercises to ensure uniform efficiency’.45 Under Monash’s leadership, the AIF would also become great innovators and users of modern technology.

42 Simon Robbins, British Generalship on the Western Front, p. 48. 43 ibid, p. 80. 44 Quoted in Serle, p. 379. 45 ibid, p. 96.

Australian Infantry on the Western Front 185

Above: The precision and detail with which Monash approached his duties at Above: A list of duties and responsibilities Monash allocated to specific Battalion commandersMessines – inOperation their preparations Magnum forOpus Messines. – is ablyEach demonstratedis ticked when incompleted! this planning documents held in his personal papers. In particular, this conference agenda is an (source:insight into AWM Monash; Series he 3 hasPersonal neatly Filescrossed Book out 15,each 10 planning May - 9item June as it1917 is addressed. planning conferences Magnum opus)

Australian Infantry on the Western Front 186

Above: The 3rd Divisional timeline for Messines. The original was handwritten and as precise as a Melbourne Flinders Street Station train table with which Monash would have been familiar; he designed the adjacent bridge.

(source: AWM Series 3 Personal Files Book 15, 10 May - 9 June 1917 planning conferences Magnum opus; Responsibilities of Commanders 3/6/17)

Australian Infantry on the Western Front 187 The other ranking Dominion officer in 1918 was Lieutenant General Sir Arthur Currie. In many ways, Currie was the antithesis of Monash, but he had perceptive tactical acumen and a gift for innovation. In this respect, Currie brought to the BEF and Canadian Corps earnest endeavour to seek out modern methods and practice. This was subtly different to Monash, who though forward thinking, applied a mathematical approach to war. Like Monash, Curie was a citizen soldier.46 Born at Strathroy near London, Ontario in 1875, Currie (originally Curry) came from lower middle-class farming stock. Currie was gifted with a natural intellect, but on the death of his father in 1891, he may have been struck with a depressive illness. Training as a teacher, he could find no employment. He attempted to return to school in order to matriculate to university, but did not graduate. In 1894 Currie moved to Victoria, British Columbia, on the Canadian west coast where he finally established a successful real estate and property business. He had joined the Canadian militia the previous year, and this would be his saving grace. Tall, awkward with a noticeably pear shaped body, socially inept – even shy – Currie was declared medically unfit for service with the Canadian contingent during the Boer War. However, he was so energetic and efficient in this part time soldiering role, that by 1909 he has risen to command a garrison artillery unit.

Left: The other great Dominion general of the Great War, Lieutenant General Sir Arthur Currie, photographed with his son. Pear-shaped, socially awkward and unable to mix with his men, nevertheless, like Monash Currie had a military intellect of the highest order. In many respects, his abilities eclipsed those of all other British Corps Commanders, including Monash. (Canadian War Museum)

46 The synopsis in this chapter is gleaned from Tim Cook’s The Madman and the Butcher, 2010.

Australian Infantry on the Western Front 188 While Monash came from money and was shrewd in his business dealings, on the eve of the war Currie’s business was failing badly. In August 1914 he made a potentially career ending choice. Currie misappropriated, moved, diverted – he stole – over $10,800 from funds allocated for uniforms in his regiment to cover business losses. Tim Cook indicates that Currie well knew of the grave decision that he had made, though he did little to rectify the circumstance immediately.47 Indeed, it is difficult to reconcile the malfeasance of this deed and tardy attempts at reparation with his later superlative grasp of circumstances on the battlefield. The war then, came at a time to suit Currie; he was afforded opportunity to escape from his financial troubles. Like Monash, Currie was offered command of a brigade in the CEF and this diverted attention away from what should have been criminal charges laid against him. Currie felt deep chagrin for his reckless actions, and in the wider context his behaviour was out of character. However, while he admitted his violation – this took moral courage – it still took many years for the debt to be recovered.48 By any standard, Currie’s behaviour was unethical. This aside, he possessed true genius in the tactical science of battle. As Rawling writes, even in 1916 Currie’s interest in tactics resulted in each battalion under his command ‘practice its soldier’s skills in mock battles and exercises. Machine-gunners and mortar men participated in these manoeuvres, learning to support the infantry as best they could.49 Under the Canadian Corps Commander, Julian Byng, Currie rose to command the 1st Canadian Division in 1916. Currie was not charismatic. However, he displayed great physical courage when required. This was no more ably demonstrated than in the last stages of fighting of the Battle of the Somme in October 1916. During the 1st Division’s poorly conceived assault on Regina Trench, Tim Cook indicates that Currie accepted the orders as he had no choice. Then he spoke ‘to each of the attacking battalions going over the top… He looked his men straight in the eyes, explained why the operation had to be carried out, and treated them with respect’.50 The division was subsequently slaughtered on unbroken wire in the face of the entrenched Germans. Casualties could have been avoided with more suitable tactics, and Currie debriefed his battalion commanders accordingly. There should have been rehearsals; there was no attempt to inculcate rigid drills.51 Given his outlook, Byng sent Currie to the French in November 1916 to gain insight into their new platoon level tactics. The thesis discussed

47 Cook, The Madman and the Butcher, p. 73. 48 ibid, pp. 193-5. 49 Bill Rawling, Surviving Trench Warfare, p. 74. 50 Cook, The Madman and the Butcher, p. 157. 51 Bill Rawling, Surviving Trench Warfare, p. 74.

Australian Infantry on the Western Front 189 Currie’s report in Chapter 3 and it was a revelation. At platoon level it involved familiarising every soldier with the various weapons systems used by every man in the group, fire and movement and flanking tactics, consolidating gains, and a thorough preparation in which every man in the team knew the objectives.52 With his pre-war background, Currie was ipso facto a tactical manager. Despite his commercial failings, his business expertise inevitably meant that he was able to bring this perspective to military problems. He likely thought instinctively in this manner rather than in any intrinsic martial authority; by martial, this meant a manifestation of the “cult of the bayonet” in which the offensive spirit would prevail in war. Currie was open to innovation. His forte was tactics: he instinctively understood competitive advantage in the business world comes from exploiting new technologies and new methods of management. Currie encouraged such initiative among his subordinates. Indeed, he created an atmosphere which allowed for, in fact positively demanded, the movement of ideas from below.53 When the 1st Division took all of its objectives at Vimy in April 1917, it was equally attributable to both this factor and hard rehearsals. The 2nd Brigade’s Operation Order in preparation for the attack on Vimy has Currie’s stamp of authority all over it: The [brigade] will rehearse in every detail every phase of the attack, over a flagged course. Rehearsals will be in “full dress”, and in every respect a reproduction of the movements which are anticipated for the assault itself. Attention is called to SS135 “Instructions for the training of Divisions for Offensive Action; and SS143 “Instructions for the Training of Platoons for Offensive Action”. Dress and equipment will be as laid down in SS135 Section XXXI. 54 By this point in the war, Currie had established himself as hard working, conscientious and brave.55 Therefore, when Byng was promoted in June 1917, Currie was his natural successor as the Commander of the Canadian Corps. Monash would not achieve this distinction until a year later. Tim Cook writes that Currie was more than a Corps Commander in the BEF.56 Although the Corps was not an independent Army – it was a component of the wider BEF – it was an identifiable national contingent, and the mantle for this responsibility was thrust directly onto Currie’s shoulders. When the Australian Corps was formed later in the war, the same responsibility as a national entity was given to its commander, Monash. Currie led the Canadian Corps through Passchendaele in November 1917. The apogee of his

52 ibid, pp. 91-2. 53 Stephen Harris, Canadian Brass: The Making of a Professional Army, 1860-1939, University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 1988, p. 124. 54 LAC RG9 III Canadian Corps, Folder 14, File 4, Report on Operations carried out by the 1st Canadian Division 7 April -5 May 1917. 55 Cook, The Madman and the Butcher, p. 197. 56 ibid, p. 195.

Australian Infantry on the Western Front 190 achievements came in 1918 during the 100-days offensive. In concert with the Australian Corps, his Corps smashed the German line east of Amiens August, and the Canadians finished the war fighting at Mons, where it had all begun for the BEF four years earlier. What then did Currie bring to the BEF’s table? The answer is tactical acumen and a modern approach to problem solving. At a micro level this encompassed small team cohesion, technical mastery and innovative thinking. Monash was a trainer and planner: the time table was his tool of trade. Currie was a trainer and tactician: fire and movement was his key to success. Both men were required to apply the ruthlessness required by the very nature of their roles. This was most aptly recorded in Monash’s correspondence to a colleague: The great essential is to entirely suppress all personal considerations, and to take no notice whatsoever of one’s losses. There is a definite tactical objective, and that is all that is important… whatever it costs 100 or 500 men to do it, the great point is to do it… If one stops to count the cost or worry over the loss of friends, or the grief or sorrow of people at home, one could not simply carry on for an hour.57 Their approach, by no means limited to the Dominions, marked a professional transition within the BEF in the second half of the war. However, the need to meet this hard line in the BEF had a corollary. The longer the conflict lasted the more the Dominion forces from Canada and Australia, and to a lesser extent New Zealand, enforced their equality of status as national contingents.58 In 1919, the year after the war, Australia and Canada would still be a part of the British Empire, but the war irrevocably altered the relationship. While Monash and Currie are arguably the pre-eminent Dominion commanders – individually brilliant – what both officers practiced in 1918 was already in place. Their distinguished achievements must be understood in the context of the entire BEF. Such methods were the manifestation of three year’s hard gained experience on the Western Front. The top down implementation of British training, tactics and technology were the best of BEF-wide practices, and they relied on subordinate commanders down to the lowest levels to implement them.

57 G. Serle, John Monash: A Biography, p. 241. Serle is not a military historian. However, his insight into Monash’s processes in this environment alludes more to Monash’s engineering outlook than martial spirit. 58 For example, despite great pressure from the British military the 121 Australian soldiers sentenced to death for military crimes during the Great War were for reasons of domestic Australian politics were commuted or reprieved. See Gary Sheffield, Leadership in the Trenches: Officer-Man Relations, Morale and Discipline in the British Army in the era of the First World War, London, 2000, p. 170.

Australian Infantry on the Western Front 191

Above and Below: Lieutenant General Sir John Monash, photographed as a Corps Commander 1918; and inspecting the Australian front-lines with the Prime Minister, in July 1918. (source: AWM)

Australian Infantry on the Western Front 192 If this is so, then the partial answer to the Australian infantry’s battlefield prowess during 1918 lies in this dissemination process. Australian led infantrymen on the Western Front contributed out of proportion to their numbers during 1918, though this had not been the case in 1916 and 1917. Among their commanders, Monash was the best Australian General of the conflict. Command processes and discipline in the Australian Corps contrasted markedly with the first years of the war. The popular image of undisciplined Australians dates to its Gallipoli experiences and is comparable to the discipline issues encountered in the battalions of Kitchener’s volunteer New Armies. In 1915, Australian infantrymen were a rabble; their officers at best dilettantes.59 Yet by 1918, they had collectively become accomplished professional fighters. Their methods were characterised by small unit tactics, the men were well trained and multi-skilled, and they were led by battle hardened officers and NCOs with initiative. However, the same may be said of any number of British or Dominion formations; with a measure of pride Tim Cook’s history of the CEF even calls the Canadian’s “Shock Troops”. In particular, Monash and Currie were leaders who embodied the citizen soldier status of their respective nations.60 At Amiens, under the command of Rawlinson’s Fourth Army, the Australian and Canadian Corps were supported by co- ordinated artillery, armour and air cover. They then initiated the sweeping Allied advances that brought final victory. These are matters to be proud of as a nation. They should also be viewed in the context of the leadership that led to victory. Tomes have been written on Monash. Despite his vainglory, most generals are possessed of this trait, irrespective of what Imperial or national contingent comprised better fighters, this fact remains: in the last year of the war the professional excellence of Australian infantrymen was at its peak. By 1918, the battlefield was once more characterised by open warfare. It was fluid and faster moving. Tactics were complex, technology at a high point. In 1918 individual soldiers would reach their best state of training preparedness during the entire conflict. Previous chapters have highlighted that the well-developed British system of institutional, standardised education and training was beginning to flourish in the AIF. The logic behind resultant success is simple. These standards did not spontaneously generate among the Australians. Monash did not singly develop a system that produced such results. Nor did he communicate these methods directly to his enlisted soldiers. The logic states that British and Dominion success on the 1918 battlefield came about as result of innovative and

59 Sheffield, Leadership in the Trenches, p. 169 60 It might equally be argued that by 1918 every British Army Division was manned by similar “citizen soldiers” be they from London, , Durban, , Manchester or Sydney. Four years of warfare had effectively subsumed the small pre-war professional army.

Australian Infantry on the Western Front 193 fully committed commanders. After the Battle of the Menin Road in September 1917, the burgeoning Australian Corps was excellent; therefore its commanders must have been so, too. When Monash assumed command of the Australian Corps in June 1918 he commanded five infantry divisions comprising 15 brigades and 60 battalions. His force numbered more than 200,000 men, most of them infantry. Table 7-2 details the officers commanding these various formations from this point until the end of the war.61 These officers were integral to the development of Australian infantry, and central to their success. Monash was a pre-war militia officer. Of his divisional commanders so were Glasgow, Rosenthal, and Hobbs. Gellibrand was a regular officer recalled to service. Sinclair- MacLagan was a Regular Army officer, and Blamey, a talented militiaman, had managed to pass the British Staff Officer’s course at Quetta in 1913. Of the 1st Division Brigadiers, Mackay and Bennett were militia officers; both would serve again in the 2nd AIF. In the 2nd Division, Martin was a regular officer of the Australian Army, Robertson and Wisdom were militia officers. All three brigadiers in the 3rd Division were militia officers, and Cannan served again as the Quarter Master General of the 2nd AIF. He was the last Australian General of the Great War to pass away in 1976. Brand of the 4th Division was a militia officer with Boer War experience. Leane and Herring were both militia officers. All of the 5th Division brigade commanders were pre-war militia officers. Both Tivey and Elliott had served in South Africa, where Elliott was awarded the Distinguished Conduct Medal for bravery.62

61 Monash, The Australian Victories in France 1918, London, Imperial War Museum, 1920, pp. 17 & 299. 62 Each officer’s biographical detail may be accessed online at the Australian Dictionary of BiographyANU: Monash: http://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/monash-sir-john-7618 Blamey: http://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/blamey-sir-thomas-albert-9523 Glasgow: http://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/glasgow-sir-thomas-william-6397 Mackay: http://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/mackay-sir-iven-giffard-10977 Heane: http://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/heane-james-6623 Bennett: http://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/bennett-henry-gordon-9489 Rosenthal: http://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/rosenthal-sir-charles-8268 Martin: http://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/martin-edward-fowell-7503 Robertson: http://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/robertson-james-campbell-8234 Wisdom: http://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/wisdom-evan-alexander-9160 Gellibrand: http://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/gellibrand-sir-john-6295 Goddard: http://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/goddard-henry-arthur-6411 McNicholl: http://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/mcnicoll-sir-walter-ramsay-7436 Cannan: http://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/cannan-james-harold-9685 Sinclair-Maclagan: http://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/sinclair-maclagan-ewen-george-8438 Brand: http://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/brand-charles-henry-5338 Leane: http://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/leane-sir-raymond-lionel-7749 Herring: http://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/herring-sydney-charles-edgar-6651 Hobbs: http://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/hobbs-sir-joseph-john-talbot-6690 Tivey: http://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/tivey-edwin-8821 Stewart: http://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/stewart-james-campbell-8665 Elliott: http://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/elliott-harold-edward-pompey-6104

Australian Infantry on the Western Front 194

Table 7.2 Australian Corps Divisional Commanding Officers: 1918

Formation Commander

Corps Commander Lieutenant General Sir John Monash GCMG, KCB, VD

Chief of Staff Brigadier T. Blamey CMG, DSO

1st Division Major General Sir T. Glasgow KCB, DSO

1st Brigade Brigadier Mackay

2nd Brigade Brigadier Heane

3rd Brigade Brigadier Bennett

2nd Division Major General Sir C. Rosenthal

5th Brigade Brigadier Martin

6th Brigade Brigadier Robertson

7th Brigade Brigadier Wisdom

3rd Division Major General Sir J. Gellibrand KCB DSO

9th Brigade Brigadier Goddard

10th Brigade Brigadier McNicholl

11th Brigade Brigadier Cannan

4th Division Major General E. Sinclair-Maclagan CB, DSO

4th Brigade Brigadier Brand

12th Brigade Brigadier Leane

13th Brigade Brigadier Herring

5th Division Major General Sir J. Hobbs KCB KCMG VD

8th Brigade Brigadier Tivey

14th Brigade Brigadier Stewart

15th Brigade Brigadier Elliott

Australian Infantry on the Western Front 195

Left: T Blamey CMG DSO, of Australian Corps Headquarters. (source: AWM E5006)

Right: Officer Commanding 1st Australian Division, Major General T. Glasgow (seated) and his staff officers taken on Christmas Day 1918 (source: AWM E03953)

Left: Birdwood with the command team of the 2nd Division September 1918: from left Birdwood, Rosenthal, Wisdom and Robertson. (source: AWM E3273)

Australian Infantry on the Western Front 196

Above: Major General Major General Sir Above: Officer Commanding 4thAustralian J. Gellibrand KCB DSO, Commander 3rd Division, Major General Sinclair-Maclagan, Australian Division 1918 and his daughter Isobel. (source: AWM P01489.001) (source: AWM E03953)

Left: Major General Major General Sir , Commander 5th Australian Division 1918 (source: AWM E00742)

Australian Infantry on the Western Front 197 These were educated men; all of them had served on Gallipoli. Among their number were solicitors, teachers, accountants, an architect, politicians, engineers, pastoralists and businessmen. Of course, there were one or two regular soldiers as well. Given these facts, the popular notion is that the AIF leadership stood out as talented amateurs. This is not true. The commonality was not militia service: it lay in the collective development of staff officers in the British Army in France in the second half of the war. Staff officers at this command level were not only military officers; their work also encompassed what equated to business management. Of the 700 senior staff officer records utilised in compiling British Generalship on the Western Front, Simon Robbins refers to the records of no less than nine of the twenty AIF officers listed in Table 7-2.63 If nothing else, these numbers represent the true nature of the Australian contribution to the BEF coalition in 1918; nine staff officers out of 700 represented 1.2% of the total. Coincidentally, the thesis earlier indicated that the AIF represented 1.6% of the Allied infantry on the Western Front. In any event, staff work was a crucial factor in determining victory. From 1917 onwards, staff officer courses were conducted for both senior and junior officers in the United Kingdom.64 Both courses were six weeks long. The senior course syllabus was capable of training up to twenty senior officers per course, and the junior course up to fifty officers per course.65 The training focussed on the responsibilities of staff and operational officers at all levels of command in France with particular emphasis on the complicated process of planning and developing operational concepts, coordinating the different combat arms, conveying orders, and sustaining a logistics train for men in the field. Australian staff officers at all ranks were subject to the instruction provided in these courses. This practical knowledge was hard earned, and the huge expansion of the BEF from 1914-16 represented a tumultuous level change as command and staff at every level were confronted with the administrative realities of combat on the Western Front. Robbins argues that by ‘autumn 1918 staff work of the BEF had improved immensely and had become a smooth routine… which was one of the factors in the victories of that year’.66 With Monash’s accession as commander of the Australian Corps in May 1918 his officers command of five divisions in a total of sixty. The period from June to November 1918 is a snap-shot in time of the final months of service of Australian infantrymen on the Western Front. Prior to this, the command of Australian divisions and I & II Anzac Corps

63 Simon Robbins, British Generalship on the Western Front 1914 – 1918, London, 2005, Annex 1. 64 SS152, Instructions for the Training of British Armies in France, HMSO, London, 1917 (reissued January 1918), Section 3, p. 6. Staff Officers courses were variously conducted at Cambridge (Clare and Caius Colleges) and Infantry regimental Officers also received training at Aldershot. 65 Robbins, British Generalship, p. 42. 66 ibid, pp. 49-50.

Australian Infantry on the Western Front 198 was more often than not allocated to regular officers of the British Army or the Australian Permanent Forces. Among the more well known of these regular generals are Birdwood, Godley, Walker, Legge, Bridges and Smyth. McCay was a militiaman who had been posted to command the AIF Training Depots and Administrative HQ in England. Their merits or lack thereof have been noted elsewhere in this thesis. However, it was largely these officers and the other experienced Britons in staff positions who set the example and established the learning process for junior members of the AIF during the first half of the war. It must also be remembered that the senior soldiers and the entire BEF was concurrently learning, too. The men in command of the Australian Corps from June 1918 until the end of the Great War had commenced the war in subordinate positions. They were the conduit through which the positive outcomes of the learning process were conveyed to the mid-level commanders and enlisted infantrymen of the Australian Corps. It was their acumen as civilians that facilitated the spread of training, tactics and technology among their subordinate soldiers. This happened equally in other elements of the British Army as the great influx of recruits swelled the size of the BEF. Pre-war militia or territorial officers – soldiers from every part of the empire who had been granted a temporary commission – learned their trade by watching their commanders and through furthering the operational foundation set for them either on a staff course or through the myriad of courses laid out in SS152.67 They took the hard won knowledge of the learning process and best methods established in the British Army of which they were a part, and made it standardised practice. Pre-war militia service did not prepare these officers for the Great War other than to imbue them with enthusiasm. The militia promotion system – the promotion system of the regular British Army, too – contributed to poor leadership early in the war. Later in the conflict, promotion based on merit and ability had a profound effect on the professionalism of the army. By 1917, in concert with the entire BEF, Australian officers were starting to learn that fighting the Great War required all ranks to be trained and equipped in standardised manner. Among generals including Plumer, Rawlinson and even Birdwood, training practices, planning, rehearsals, tactical innovation and coordination of various arms were learned processes. For such commanders – Plumer in particular – the welfare of their men was central to the theme.68 Officers such as Solly-Flood, Byng and Currie, and later Ivor Maxse, were the human impetus behind the new methods. The British Army then went on to codify and implement these war winning solutions. To this end, several factors proved central to the

67 Sheffield, Leadership in the Trenches, pp. 98-100. 68 ibid, p. 97

Australian Infantry on the Western Front 199 Australian Corps successes in 1918, and they all tie into the learning process. Firstly, as the senior, often regular, officers in command of Australians during the first half of the war were promoted, the pre-war militia officers reached the experience levels to take their place. Junior officers were promoted to command companies and battalions. Former commanding officers assumed staff roles, while others were promoted into brigade and divisional commands. With the promulgation of SS152 in 1917, every Army in France established a school for newly promoted Commanding Officers. In part, the course was designed to: • Assist COs in any technical points in which they may need instruction, eg. Operation Orders, rapid framing of orders. • Assist COs by means of suggestion and discussion of the methods of training and latest methods of attack. • A series of addresses will be delivered by officers of the Instructional staff of the school and others on subjects of special interest to Commanding Officers. These addresses will be followed by discussion, and it is hoped by these means that much valuable information may be learned by those attending the course.69 In these words lay a flexibility of thought and process that epitomised the concepts of centralised command and decentralised control. Promotion on merit to senior positions was fundamental to Australian success, but this was occurring BEF wide. Indeed, after 1916 effective commanders were beginning to ‘emerge in the BEF who had gained experience and were active in pursuing new ideas while the process of the weak and ineffective being weeded out by the high command continued’.70 This was a system in which leaders from NCO and platoon through to divisional commander levels all played a crucial and indispensible role. It was an environment in which the agile intellect and civilian practices of the Divisional and Brigade commanders of the AIF thrived in the last 100-days of the conflict. The homogenous Australian Corps was set up for success in mid-1918 through its Imperial connections. Pre-war militia officer or not, regular or temporary commission; conscript or volunteer; Australian, Canadian, British, Scottish, Irish, Welsh or New Zealander, it is arguable that the entire BEF and all its constituents was professionalised from senior officer to private soldier by the time of “Der Schwartz Tag”. The model for conducting operations during the final 100-days campaign was set almost a year before during Haig’s last offensive of 1917, and codified in an updated version of SS135, The Training and Employment of Divisions in early 1918.71 Section XVI of this

69 SS152, Instructions for the Training of British Armies in France, HMSO, London, 1917 (reissued January 1918), Appendix II, p. 33. 70 Robbins, British Generalship, p. 58. 71 SS135, The Training and Employment of Divisions, HMSO, London, 1918.

Australian Infantry on the Western Front 200 document, “Action of Tanks”, was a portent of things to come throughout the remaining year. The use of tanks, mechanically and tactically much refined after the debacle of Bullecourt during the Battle of Arras in April 1917, would predominate in an operation in late November north of the Somme at Cambrai.72 Although not written into doctrine until after the battle, planning for operations at Cambrai defined the characteristics of the tank as ‘Mobility, Security and Offensive power’.73 Allocated to the British II Corps under the Third Army’s great innovator and former commander of the Canadian Corps, Sir Julian Byng, tanks were expected to advance in three vehicle triangular formations giving screening cover to the following infantry. Close cooperation, communication and the offensive firepower of the combined tanks and infantry were expected to punch through the German lines.74 Under a veil of great secrecy, the Cambrai operation took place on 20 November 1917 and Australian infantry were not involved. In a complex sequence of events that are outside the scope of this thesis, the initial British action at Cambrai was overwhelmingly successful; however, the ground captured was not consolidated. This aside, such was the shock of the British attack that the method of employment of tanks in the Cambrai operation ‘became the model for the British attacks at Hamel and Amiens in 1918’.75 Indeed, Monash’s planning and preparation for his involvement at Hamel the following July owed much to the activity that had happened at Cambrai. On 31 January 1918 Major General Sir Archibald Montgomery76, GSO to the Fourth Army, penned the following words on the effectiveness of Platoon and Section Commanders in Lessons Learnt from the Experiences of a Division in the Cambrai Operations: November to December 1917: The initiative and resource shown by Platoon Commanders and Section Leaders... was a very marked feature in the conduct of defence and was the direct result of most careful instruction in the use of ground and knowledge of minor tactics inculcated during times of rest and training... Great care had been taken during training periods to encourage musketry and train infantry and Lewis Gunners in the art of using rapid fire... These forms of instruction fully repay the time devoted to them...77 Such were the positive methods and processes reinforced among junior battlefield leaders in Rawlinson’s 4th Army to which the Australian Corps would soon be allocated. This was the “coal-face” of leadership and development of battlefield effectiveness. Such lessons were

72 “Cambrai Day” is still celebrated in many armoured regiments around the Commonwealth 100-years later. 73 SS135, The Training and Employment of Divisions, Section XVI, p. 51, para. 1. 74 ibid, paraphrased para. 3-9. 75 Robbins, British Generalship, p. 80. 76 Not to be confused with Bernard Law Montgomery. 77 AWM25 947/17 Pt 2 Training France Infantry 1917: Précis of Lessons Learnt from the Experience of a Division in the Cambrai Operations 30 November to 6 December 1917, 4th Army HQ GS 221, 31 January 1918.

Australian Infantry on the Western Front 201 promulgated BEF wide to all infantry battalions, companies and platoons below formation – ie. brigade – level. Army Commanders of the calibre of Rawlinson and Plumer in which Australian formations had or would continue to serve enforced standardised operational and training requirements and in this lay the key to victory. Equally, it will be remembered that the Canadian Corps benefitted from the similar practices of Byng, the Third Army’s talented commander. In the Australian Corps, it was the battalion, company, platoon and section commanders who were tasked with implementing the prescribed BEF wide standards of operational preparedness among their men. These were not Australian concepts and in The Australian Victories in France Monash overstated the effectiveness and utility of Australian junior officers on and off the battlefield. He particularly noted the Australian predilection for commissioning from the ranks. ‘Those privates, corporal or sergeants who displayed, under battle conditions, a notable capacity for leadership were [selected] for commissioning... There was thus no officer class, no social distinction in the whole force’.78 This is an embellishment of Australian achievements. The argument that only the AIF commissioning system was based in meritocracy, most men being promoted from the ranks because Australia was a classless democracy, is specious. Yet, the notion remains in popular history. At the very least, the Australian commissioning system was similar to that of the entire BEF. Gary Sheffield argues that by 1917-18 the British army had largely abandoned its pre-war criteria for officer selection and was commissioning men because they had demonstrated leadership or leadership potential on the battlefield.79 has indicated because Australian society was characterised by egalitarianism, that this flowed into the AIF. However, this was probably not as pronounced as thought.80 Bean’s six volumes of the Official History of the AIF that he personally penned have an underlying theme when discussing the role of the junior officer in the AIF. The pattern of commissioning junior leaders was probably closer to the British model than popular history gives credit to. On the one hand, on Gallipoli when new ‘officers… were required, there were in the ranks of every regiment numbers of natural and acknowledged leaders, tested in action, and justly marked for promotion… as soon as vacancies occurred’. 81 In Egypt, instructors were for the most part veterans and were in most cases so ‘competent and experienced in teaching the recruit, and, though strict, so capable of handling men, that the majority of the

78 Monash, The Australian Victories in France 1918, p. 294. 79 Sheffield, Leadership in the Trenches, p. 101. 80 J. Grey, A Military History of Australia, Melbourne, 1990, p.91. 81 OH, Vol. II, pp. 412.

Australian Infantry on the Western Front 202 troops learned eagerly from them’.82 However, later in France, a new officer had for the sake of 'good discipline', to 'break with his old associates... The break was not much different to one in a great public school when one of them becomes prefect. As a rule the newly appointed officer gave a dinner in the nearest town to his old mates... and from that time on relations were formal’.83 Monash’s further thoughts on commissioning soldiers indicated: If their standard of education was good then they received a commission as soon as a vacancy would permit; if not they were sent to Oxford or Cambridge to be given an opportunity of improving both their general and their special military knowledge.84 Even before the AIF arrived in France, the British Army had established specific Battalions (OCBs) providing four month’s training to enlisted men aimed at securing them a temporary commission for the duration. By the middle of 1917, there were 22 OCBs each with an establishment of 400 students.85 The OCB system trained over 100,000 new officers during the Great War, and these men came from every British county or country in the Empire. This training was standardised. It established the backbone of effective junior leadership throughout the BEF during the second half of the conflict. These officers would be the conduit through which training, tactics and technological advances were reinforced in all five British Armies in 1918. Monash indicated that those lacking the prerequisites were sent to Oxford or Cambridge, and this is true. Both colleges conducted bridging courses for the OCB system for those men who did meet the academic requirements for commissioning. The OCB represents a microcosm of the BEF and reflects the processes that Australian infantry officers underwent in their development. ‘In fact, the Australian system of commissioning officers was virtually identical to the British’.86 To this end, the BEF was a multi-national force. It was also huge: five armies were raised in the field essentially from nothing. This is a task that contemporary society would be incapable of achieving. That Britain did so during the Great War should be remembered as a success. The AIF made a significant contribution to this success, though Australian popular history misrepresents how different our soldiers were from the rest of the Empire. As time went on class counted less than experience in the British Army. This is one of the reasons why so many men of working and middle-class backgrounds gained commissions during the war. This was an equally

82 OH, Vol. II, pp. 411. 83 OH, Vol. III, p. 54. 84 Monash, The Australian Victories in France 1918, p. 294. 85 Army Council Instructions 357 of 14 February 1916 called for the establishment of OCBs. E.A. James, British Regiments of 1914-1918, London, 1998, p. 119. 86 ibid, p. 168.

Australian Infantry on the Western Front 203 British as Australian concept. Gary Sheffield has gone as far as to state that that the OCB construct sustained the BEF's successful military efforts in during the Great War.87 To this end, the top down process of implementing training, tactics and technology was one that used junior and middle ranking leaders as the method by which new standards were reinforced across the BEF. These practices, and the training of junior leaders across the Empire, had all been standardised by 1918. Ergo, the development of the individual soldier occurred in concert with the whole. There were some differences in leadership style, but although officer- man relations were a little more informal than was usually the case in many British units, the differences between 'Imperial' and 'Dominion' should not be overstated.88 In the final analysis, the Australian Corps was less of a meritocracy than is popularly remembered. It successes were outstanding, but resulted not from the myth of Anzac or egalitarianism. Rather, the Australian infantryman’s peak of battlefield effectiveness in 1918 came about as a result of hard work, training standardisation, technological improvements, though most of all through the leadership of talented and experienced officers who reinforced these standards. Nevertheless, it remains surprising how much the Anzac Legend continues to shape the way Australia views its military. While this is important, it is equally so to appreciate the realities underwriting the myth. This chapter has shown rationally how leadership enabled the development of Australian infantry, and by proxy the now century old legend of the “”. The next chapter will detail the brilliant successes of the Australian infantry in France in 1918. This culminates in the 8 August 1918 Allied offensive which was spearheaded by the Australians and Canadians in concert. Arguably, the standard of efficiency had been achieved months before this point on the battlefields of Hamel.

87 Sheffield, Leadership in the Trenches, pp. 102-9. 88 ibid, p. 172.

Australian Infantry on the Western Front

CHAPTER 8 Training and Operations leading to the 100 Days The Apogee of Australian Infantry Development 1918

The Australian is accustomed to teamwork. The teamwork which he developed in the war was of the highest order of efficiency. Each man understood his part and understood also that which others had to play depended on the proper performance of his own. Sir John Monash1 This chapter will argue that the pinnacle of the Australian infantry’s development on the Western Front came in 1918 after their amalgamation as a five division Corps under Sir John Monash. In an Australian dress rehearsal for its part the coming 100-days offensive of August the Australians reached their apogee at the on 4 July 1918 ; thereafter maintaining a level of battlefield effectiveness that was in keeping with the entire fielded BEF. By this point in the conflict the longest serving Australian troops had been on the Western Front for about twenty months. British enabled, using British technology and tactics, the Australian infantryman individually and collectively had undergone the same learning process as the entire British Army. Australian troops were engulfed in the “industrialised- scale” combat of the Somme campaign during 1916. These events precipitated the learning process. 1917 was a crucible in which newly introduced training, tactics and technology were refined and endorsed. Australians took part in the ill conceived use of armour at Bullecourt during the Battle of Arras in 1917; and in the burgeoning use of “bite and hold” tactics at Messines in June 1917. Nevertheless, the Western Front in 1917 is most remembered for the Third Battle of Ypres which culminated at the village of Passchendaele, a battle ground synonymous with the mud and futility of the Great War.2 Passchendaele is also remembered as the nadir of the Australian experience of war on the Western Front in 1917. Indeed, Dan Todman indicates that the British war cemetery at on the Ypres battlefields is so large that the scale of death is physically hard to envisage.3 In 1997, Robin Prior spoke of the terrible environment thus: ‘We have the awful spectacle of troops crawling into battle across No Man’s Land so that their weight would be more evenly distributed to prevent them

1 Monash, The Australian Victories in France 1918, London, Imperial War Museum, 1920, p. 293. 2 For an evocative and informative historical narrative of Third Ypres, see: Lyn MacDonald’s Passchendaele: The Story of the Third Battle of Ypres, London, 2013. Although commonly referred to as Passchendaele, Third Ypres was a series of battles from July to November 1917 which culminated in the fighting around the village of Passchendaele. The Australian involvement occurred chronologically at Menin Road, Polygon Wood and Broodeseinde in September and early October. 3 Todman, The Great War: Myth and Memory, London, 2011, p. 43. Australian Infantry on the Western Front 205 sinking into the mud’.4 To this end, Passchendaele remains in popular memory as among the worst suffering experienced by British and Empire troops during the Great War. In context, a broad brush view of British operations from mid-1916 to the end of 1917 represents a truly remarkable evolution in tactical thinking.5 Indeed, the combined arms blueprint for all future operations would be unfolded in the last British offensive of 1917 at Cambrai. Australian troops did not take part at Cambrai. However, the British 29th Division, which like the older Australian divisions had served on Gallipoli, recorded in detail the great secrecy and preparatory efforts in planning for the operation.6 These processes were soon codified and issued as updates in the series of seminal SS pamphlets described earlier in the thesis.7 The documents and the success of the British Army in France in 1918 were not magic: they reflected the evolution of common tactical doctrine built upon hard work and standardised reinforcement down to the lowest levels. This chapter will detail the pinnacle of the Australian infantry’s high standards as a Corps within the British Army during 1918. It was a result nearly two years in the making. As early as March 1917, Monash wrote of the BEF’s habitual frontline practices as implemented in his 3rd Australian Division: A front line battalion stays in [the trenches] only six days, during which each platoon is changed around, so that at the worst a single man seldom does more than forty- eight hours continuous front trench duty in every twelve days, and every forty-eight days the whole brigade gets relieved by the reserve brigade and goes out for a complete rest, or for work in the back area, for a clear twenty-four days.8 Routine and standardised doctrine would come to be bywords for operations in the BEF during 1917. By 1918, after the trench-bound conflict of preceding years, open warfare was again to become the norm. Although the opening months of the last year of the war were marked by German offensives on the Western Front, the final analysis of these operations shows a definite evolving elasticity in British tactical thinking. The British had indeed been “bludgeoned” by the attrition warfare of 1917. However, developments in the BEF’s tactics had been commensurately high; so much so that by April 1918 the German assaults in the

4 Robin Prior, The British High Command at Passchendaele, in “1917: Tactics, Training and Technology”, proceedings of the 1997 Australian Army History Conference, Canberra, 1997, p. 138. 5 See Paddy Griffiths, Battle Tactics of the Western Front: The British Army’s Art of Attack 1916-1918, London, 200, pp. 93-94. 6 Stair Gillon, The Story of the 29th Division: A Record of Gallant Deeds (1925), republished Naval & Military Press, London, 2008, pp. 149-153. 7 SS143, The Training of Platoons for Offensive Operations, HMSO 1917 (reissued 1918); and SS135, The Division in the Attack, HMSO, 1918; and SS152, The Training of British Armies in France, HMSO, 1917 (Reissued 1918). The thesis has extensively referred to the three documents in earlier chapters. 8 T. Macdougall (ed.), Monash letter March 1917, The War Letters of Lieutenant General Sir John Monash, Sydney, 2002, p. 127. Australian Infantry on the Western Front 206 West petered out to result in a BEF defensive victory.9 From the beginning of 1918 onwards, initiative in the assault was foremost in BEF infantry thinking. The codified doctrine read: The successful conduct of a battle depends upon the rapidity with which local successes are gained and exploited. As the advance proceeds and the enemy’s organised defences are overcome, the actual direction, and to a large extent the control, of operations must necessarily devolve upon the commanders on the spot. It is absolutely essential, therefore, that commanders of all grades should be able quickly to grasp the salient features of a tactical situation and to act with boldness and decision.10 Doctrinal updates immediately affected the smaller infantry teams throughout the BEF. By the end of 1917, common practice distributed the various specialist weapon systems throughout the platoon rather than in individual sections. One Lewis gun section remained; however, the other three sections were by this time re-badged as rifle sections, each with a proportion of men carrying rifle grenades and attachments, and all men carrying hand bombs.11 Early the following year, the BEF discussed a proposal to increase the number of Lewis guns per platoon from one to two.12 When the initiative was approved this effectively increased Battalion firepower to 32 Lewis guns with an allocation of up to four more at headquarters level. While this may have represented the official promulgation of the number of guns, manning shortfalls across the BEF had already resulted in it occurring as unofficial practice in many battalions. Certainly, among Australian battalions at this point of the conflict there is anecdotal evidence to indicate a holding of extra Lewis guns at unit level to make up for dwindling numbers of replacements.13 In May 1918 SS143 was updated to reflect contemporary practice. Under the new system, the platoon was afforded greater manoeuvrability, and men who were cross-trained on different weapons were able to press on in the event of casualties. The amendments to training pamphlets were prima facie evidence of the evolving nature of the battlefield and how experience influenced future operations. SS143 was complemented by further training pamphlets also issued in 1917, including SS185 Assault Training (September) and SS195 Scouting and Patrolling (December). In each case the publications consolidated what was

9 Detail of the German strategy in the 1918 offensives, , is outside the scope of the thesis. However, a précis of the campaign and British defence may be read in Gary Sheffield, Forgotten Victory: First World War Myths and Realities, Chatham, 2002, pp. 221-227. 10 SS135 The Division in the Attack – 1918, HMSO, London, 1918, p. 15. 11 This amendment issued as a directive in AWM25 943/7 Part 6, distributed in this case to the 3rd Training Brigade after 2 April 1918. 12 A. Becke, Order of Battle of Divisions Part 2a & 2b: Territorial and Yeomanry Divisions, Naval & Military Press, London, 2007, Appendix 1. 13 For example, see W. Matthews and D. Wilson, Fighting Nineteenth: History of the 19th Battalion AIF 1915- 1919, Australian Military History Publications, Sydney, 2011, p. 326. Australian Infantry on the Western Front 207 already best practice on the Western Front and that which had been gained learned through the travails of battle since the days of the Somme, Arras, Passchendaele, and latterly, Cambrai. Even today, the concepts enshrined in these documents – training, drill rehearsals, fire and movement, and leadership – are still practiced among infantrymen all over the former Empire.14 At formation level, the promulgation in 1918 of revised divisional training methods in SS135 The Division in the Attack personified the standard of professionalism that the citizen soldiers of the British and Empire armies had reached at the beginning of the the last year of the war. These divisions may have comprised conscripts alongside volunteers, a few surviving regulars, 1914 men and those just from the training schools in England. The Australian divisions were no exception other than an absence of conscripts; nevertheless, a British conscript in 1918 underwent the same training and reinforcement process as a volunteer recruit. There were undoubtedly labourers from London, cane cutters from Queensland, teachers from Ontario, and cab drivers from Wellington – the permutations are infinite – and yet one fact remains immutable. In 1918 in every division in the British Army every soldier was trained and operated under common tactical principles within the construct of their formation. The symbiotic relationship between the soldiers and the framework of SS135 in their divisions is where Monash’s sense of Australian teamwork truly stemmed from. The documents were the utilitarian pattern to which the Australian Divisions subscribed as 1917 drew to a close. For example, when the 5th Australian Division commenced its duties holding the line at Messines after Third Ypres in November 1917, Major General Talbot Hobbs impressed upon his men to train over winter to these standards. Throughout 1917, Hobbs had turned around the 5th Division’s fortunes after the debacle at Fromelles when it had first arrived in France; like Monash, Hobbs had served on Gallipoli. His remedy for inexperience was hard training and standardisation. Indeed, the efficacy of Hobbs’ work stood him in contention for command of the Australian Corps in 1918. As it was he remained the commander of the 5th Division for more than two years, longer than any other Australian divisional commander of the Great War. Another pre-war militia officer, Hobbs is superbly described in the Australian Dictionary of Biography through the clear eyes of Alec Hill:

14 SS 185. Assault Training, HMSO, London, September 1917 & SS. 195 Scouting and Patrolling, HMSO London, December 1917.

Australian Infantry on the Western Front 208 His small stature and seeming frailness belied the energy and range of activities which distinguished Hobbs throughout his life. He was a keen sportsman, interested in fencing, gymnastics, rowing, sailing and boxing. A devout Christian, he was deeply involved in the affairs of the Anglican Church, serving in synod and on various councils and as architect to the diocese of Perth. Above all he was devoted to soldiering which became virtually a second career parallel to architecture.15

These traits clearly show what Hobbs brought to the military planning table.

Left: Portrait of Major General (later Lieutenant General Sir) Joseph John Talbot Hobbs, General Officer Commanding 5th Division during 1917-18. Hard working and efficient, Hobbs trained his men to a peak of efficiency. (AWM ART02926)

Hobbs certainly possessed talent among his brigade commanders, the most notable of whom was Brigadier Harold “Pompey” Elliot; fractious, indomitable, brave, larger than life, difficult to handle, though brilliant. A well regarded lawyer, politician and decorated citizen soldier from Melbourne, Elliot committed suicide in 1932, largely in part due to the unresolved trauma of his war experiences.16 Nevertheless, in 1918 Brigade and Battalion commanders represented middle management, a conduit between General Headquarters (GHQ) and the frontline troops. More often than not, these leaders had extensive operational

15 A.J. Hill, 'Hobbs, Sir Joseph John Talbot (1864–1938)', Australian Dictionary of Biography, National Centre of Biography, Australian National University, http://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/hobbs-sir-joseph-john-talbot- 6690/text11539, published in hardcopy 1983, accessed online 31 August 2014. Hill, a soldier of the Second World War, later became a noted academic and lecturer at Australia’s prestigious Royal Military College. He possessed subliminal intuition in his appreciation of the Australian Officer Corps of the Great War. 16 See Ross McMullin, Pompey Elliot, Melbourne, 2002. Senior Australian officers were not immune to the trauma of war; the Anzac myth was not immutable among these leaders, and in any case, the myth pays little heed to officers. Elliot, decorated for bravery in the Boer War, was deeply pained by the suffering of his men in the Great War. Australian Infantry on the Western Front 209 experience, and it was they who translated the GHQ staff work into operational reality. It was the command presence of these men that motivated the private soldiers in combat. The reinforcement of strict training standards balanced the process. Hobbs’ Staff Memorandum No. 187 of 25 November 1917 entitled Training Winter 1917-1918 is notable for its exacting standards and is reflective of contemporary best practice. Hobbs issued the directive after Third Ypres, and the opening orders read: Attention is directed to: SS152 “Training of British armies in France” SS135 “Training of Divisions for Offensive Action” SS143 “Training of Platoons for Offensive Action” (A) When Division is Holding the Line 1. A definite scheme of winter work will begin at once. The objects to be aimed at are a maximum of individual training, and the training of an adequate number of instructors when the division is withdrawn from the line. 2. As there will be one brigade and two battalions of the right brigade in reserve, a certain amount of collective training will be possible. This training will aim at effecting the efficiency of the platoon. 3. Every opportunity to be taken to impart practical musketry training. 4. Young soldiers from the Reinforcement Wing will be instructed in trench duties and accustomed to fire. (B) When the Division is Out of the Line 1. When in the support area will effect individual and collective training. Special attention will be paid to musketry training. 2. Collective training will be based on the principles of open warfare, and will aim at the perfection of section, platoon and company training. 3. Arrangements will be made for attaching infantry officers to artillery. A proportion of machine and Lewis gunners will be trained in anti-aircraft duty under the supervision of the divisional machine gun officer. 4. Periodic instruction will be given to officers and NCOs by means of exercises without troops. 5. Reinforcements will be trained either in sections or platoons. 6. When in reserve individual and collective training will be given effect to. 7. Musketry and the training of specialists will be given special attention. 8. Collective training will complete instruction up to and including the battalion, and will be effected in the principles of open warfare. 9. Classes to be held for the training of section and platoon leaders and NCOs. 17

17 AWM25 947/72, 5th Australian Division – Training Memos and Syllabus (France) up to July 1918, General Staff Memorandum No. 187, Training Winter 1917-1918, dated 25 November 1917. Australian Infantry on the Western Front 210 In 1918 these were the standards expected of a Divisional Commander in the BEF, and those by which the Commander trained his infantrymen. By way of comparison, the 9th (Scottish) Division, also holding a line in the Flanders after serving at Passchendaele underwent a similar regimen: ‘Towards the end of [January 1918] the Ninth was relieved, and for almost six weeks the Division remained out of the line, the time being spent in training...The training was along the lines of the open warfare system...Though the time was short every moment was fully utilised, and the Ninth had reached a very satisfactory stage of efficiency when they returned to the line’.18 Further, the increased 9th divisional firepower matched that of their Dominion colleagues in the AIF, each battalion operated 36 Lewis Guns with a further four allocated to anti-aircraft work.19 The Official History indicates the winter was cold for the Australian divisions on the Flanders in December 1917, the line long – some 12,000 yards – though Birdwood did not seem to believe the duty onerous. ‘Our greatest enemies,’ he wrote, ‘are likely to be trench feet and throat and chest complaints’.20 When not in the line the orders of the day focussed on the training of divisions. Indeed, when the 5th Division relieved the 1st Division at the end of January 1918, the formation schedule of training was remarkably similar to that outlined by the 5th Division’s Staff Memorandum No. 187.21 The only Australian Division not in Belgium was the 4th, this being the formation that had suffered the most grievously during the course of 1917. With the defeat of the conscription in October 1917, there had been attempts to break up the 4th Division in support of the remaining four, and Birdwood personally lobbied Haig to stop this happening. Haig relented, and on 7 November 1917 Birdwood was able to cable the Australian Government that: In view of prospective... lack of reinforcements vide telegram of 28 October one division is to be placed in reserve to act as feeder for remaining four (stop) This is being done in first instance rather than breaking up a division which would cause much heartburning here...22 The 4th Australian Division would become a “depot” division for the others while it recuperated further south at Cambrai, and then near the village of Peronne on the Somme. This move was advantageous on several levels. Birdwood showed canny judgement in his

18 John Ewing MC, History of the 9th (Scottish) Division 1914-1919, originally published London, 1921, reissued London, 2002, pp. 251-2. 19 ibid, p. 252. 20 C.E.W. Bean, The Official History of Australia in the War of 1914-18 (hereafter OH) Vol. V, The Australians in France, St Lucia, QLD, 1988, p. 20. 21 AWM4 1/42/37 PART 1 – 1st Australian Division War Diary entry for 5 February 1918, and associated syllabus detailed at APPENDIX II. 22 AWM25 839/13, Cablegram Birdwood (London) to Defence (Melbourne) countersigned GFP (Pearce), dated 7 November 1917, in Training of Reinforcements in France – November 1917. Australian Infantry on the Western Front 211 support for retaining the formation as an active unit.23 He well knew the affiliation that the men of the AIF had for their parent units, and the 4th Division contained some of the premier “fighting battalions” including Monash’s old 4th Brigade. They were sorely needed intact. Further, the work allotted to the 4th Division was important. Time out of the line afforded plenty of opportunity for rest, but just as importantly, to train. Percy Longmore of the 16th (Western Australian) Battalion wrote that the 4th Division spent the last month of 1917 near Peronne, and ‘the main job was training in open order work [where] lessons from the Cambrai Battle were being practiced, particularly the methods of defence in depth’.24 The AIF records of 1917 contain a copy of the 4th Army’s Précis of Lessons learnt from the experiences of a Division in the Cambrai operation, the opening line indicating that ‘this is an excellent example of how a defensive operation should be conducted’.25 Equally, while in depot, the 4th Division could be leavened with experienced officer and NCO instructors to furnish the training continuum for the Australian infantry still in France and Belgium. Edgar John Rule of the 14th Battalion was one of these men. Commissioned from the ranks and serving under the indomitable Captain Albert Jacka VC, Rule found to his dismay that he had been posted to a training battalion on the Salisbury Plain. ‘I was sent to England to do a tour of duty in Codford, training recruits,’ he wrote. ‘For six miserable months I was away from the battalion... I became homesick, and asked to be sent back to France, but was refused’.26 Such postings were sensible and routine, no matter how unpopular. Rule was a decorated and experienced frontline combatant and his tuition was undoubtedly put to good use in England. Not all men fared as well. Percy Longmore’s brother, Cyril, of the 44th (Western Australian) Battalion in the 3rd Australian Division recalled how a fellow officer, Lieutenant Joe Crawley, was shot in the head and killed on 2 December 1917 near Messines. ‘The most unfortunate part of the affair was that Lieutenant Crawley had been detailed to proceed to England in two day’s time for six month’s duty in a training camp’.27 In any event, it is a fact that the tangible operational experiences of such officers were effectively used to train Australian infantry recruits in the last year of the war. The three objectives listed in Notes for Officers Supervising Platoon Tactical Exercises in

23 The issue, outside the scope of the thesis, was one of gaining enough reinforcements to maintain the five Australian divisions. On a wider note, during 1917, Australia had again rejected a conscription referendum. There was compensation at unit level for the lack of manpower through the provision of greater firepower; for example, two or more Lewis guns per platoon instead of one. 24 P. Longmore, The Old Sixteenth, first published, Perth, 1929, republished 2007, p. 160. 25 AWM25 947/17 Pt 2 Training Infantry France 1917, Précis of Lessons learnt from the experiences of a Division in the Cambrai operation, 30 November 6 December 1917. 26 E.J. Rule, Jacka’s Mob, original printing Sydney, 1933, reprinted Melbourne 2000, p. 112. 27 C. Longmore, Eggs a Cook: The Story of the 44th Battalion, Perth (1920), reprinted London, 2002, p. 120. Australian Infantry on the Western Front 212 AIF Depots in the United Kingdom28 bear this out. The wisdom stems straight from the battlefield experiences of the now homogenous Australian Corps: 1. To give [an] officer practice in the handling and working of a platoon, to teach him the value of cooperation of the weapons with which the platoon is armed, and to practice him in simple tactical exercises. 2. To show NCOs the working of an organised platoon; to give them confidence in handling their sections; as a test in fire orders and fire control; and practice in initiative. 3. To teach the reinforcement private to be a useful member of a platoon in the field, by giving him confidence in his weapons, practice in fire discipline, and the use of ground and cover, and by showing him what to do in certain situations, so that, should similar circumstances present themselves in battle, he will instinctively do the right thing. It is always alluring in the military – perhaps in any field of endeavour – to believe that any notion of innovative thought is also the most recent of thought. This is not the case. In these objectives lies the very essence of the qualities that are still required to maintain technical mastery in the modern defence force. Understanding how such concepts were trained to an instinctive level underwrites the performance of Australian infantry during the last half of the final year of the Great War The processes are indicative of a standardisation beginning to take hold throughout the BEF in early 1918; one which was reinforced in the AIF by the new homogeneity of the Australian Corps and through the maturation of experienced divisional commanders. In conjunction with divisional training, the Australian Corps now had the added functionality of an established Corps School. This was initially established in the Picard village of and later moved to General Rawlinson’s 4th Army area on the Somme when the Australian Corps was relegated to this new command in 1918. Visitors from the 1st Division indicated that it was the: Largest and one of the best fitted Corps School in France. Each of the five divisions has its own wing and in addition there are technical schools for Lewis Guns, Stokes Mortars, Bombing, Intelligence, and gas instruction.29 I Anzac Corps did have an earlier established Corps School which operated from late 1916 to the end of 1917. In comparison, however, I Anzac was smaller than the Australian Corps’ five divisions. Further, by the last year of the war the Australian Corps School was unified in purpose with proven battlefield experience; the I Anzac Corps School of 1916-17 was still reinforcing lessons learned immediately from the front. The entire BEF was undergoing the

28 AWM25 943/7 Part V, Training United Kingdom Infantry – 1918, Notes for Officers Supervising Platoon Tactical Exercises in AIF Depots in the United Kingdom. 29 AWM4 1/42/37 PART 1 – 1st Australian Division War Diary entry for 5 February 1918. Australian Infantry on the Western Front 213 same process. By 1918, the Australian Corps was a symbol of national pride that provided homogeneity among the Australian divisions. It was feted by the media. In January 1918, a Sydney newspaper even published an article on the Corps School: The Australian Corps School has evolved into a magnificent institution. It has assumed the proportions of a small military college, with highly trained instructors. Each division sends 20 officers and 45 men for every course. The training embraces all details of infantry education, machine gun, Lewis gun, trench mortar, bombing, bayonet fitting, intelligence, signalling, cooking, and sanitation. It has acquired a very high standard of efficiency and discipline, and organised recreational sports are also compulsory. Under a system of competitive work by the divisions it turns out keen soldiers, and is of a high value as a preparatory school for officer candidates from the ranks. The men here learn not merely how to become good soldiers, but also military pride.30 Here then, at the beginning of 1918, was the approaching climax of the war and the forthcoming pinnacle of the Australian infantry’s achievements. Never before or since has such a large force of Australian infantrymen been assembled under one commander – soon to be an Australian commander – nor is this likely ever to happen again. 1918 was the final year in a four year training continuum that had been applied across British and Dominion forces. If at the beginning of the continuum, military tactics were outdated – they were not Victorian, though certainly Edwardian – then, by 1918 they were thoroughly modern. Indeed, the very conduct of the war was evolutionary as the shock of lessons were learned and then applied. The Somme and Passchendaele have entered the Great War lexicon as symbols of waste, they were indeed traumatic, but equally the transformation in the BEF that took place from 1916- 1918 was, at the very least, a marvel of British persistence, modernisation and forward thinking. Central to the process were the infantry, immediately supported by the artillery, but by the last year of the war the other arms had created a joint battlefield weapons system. The system incorporated the latest tactics and technology; including artillery, aircraft, machine- guns, gas and tanks. It was a war-winning formula. The constituents to the formula were several. Gary Sheffield and Dan Todman indicate the effective development of centralised command and decentralised control that was a hallmark of the British command structure by 1918.31 A “loosening of the reins” of control was a direct result of hard earned experience and typical of the maturation of the British General staff giving confident frontline commanders more leeway. Such methods remain best practice in the contemporary military. Sheffield also indicates the self-assurance and mutual

30 The Sydney Morning Herald, Tuesday, January 29, 1918. 31 Gary Sheffield & Dan Todman, Command and Control on the Western Front: The British Army’s Experience 1914-1918, Chalford, 2007. Australian Infantry on the Western Front 214 trust and respect that developed between officers and men, one that reached its high point as the BEF became most efficient in 1918.32 Of course, technology and associated tactics were deep rooted in the learning process. The essence of operating within prescribed doctrinal limits was still fundamentally important. However, what underwrites all of these was the process of standardisation and reinforced training methods. When such practice had become manifest, commanders allowed more licence to operate independently within understood doctrinal parameters.33 This was a British Army wide pattern that also predicates the Australian infantry’s development. This thesis has already viewed the doctrinal process involved in recruit, reinforcement and weapons system infantry specialist training for Australian infantry during the last two years of the war. The Canadians underwent the same learning process as the wider BEF, and were about a year ahead in development to the Australians. Tim Cook indicates that by 1917 the recruit training regimen for Canadian soldiers was 14 weeks in the United Kingdom.34 Constituent to the process was the organised concept of regionally based drafts of reinforcements all following the same process of training and reinforcement before proceeding to France or the Flanders. Cook further indicates that Canadian troops soon realised the benefits and realism of what was being imparted to them from instructors with recent frontline experience.35 What Cook does not state is that the 14 week Canadian process was not a CEF initiative. Rather it was one taken directly from the British pattern in the same manner that the AIF recruit training process on the Salisbury Plain was. Indeed, the Minister responsible for the Overseas Military Forces of Canada during 1917-18, Sir George Perley, liaised extensively with his Chief of Staff, Lieutenant General Sir Richard Turner, on adopting the British methodology.36 The 14 week training protocol was adopted in its entirety just as it was in the AIF, with the result in both forces that new infantrymen were being trained by battle hardened NCOs. These same NCOs were also an almost exclusive pool from which junior officers were commissioned when their supervisors were promoted or perished. The Canadian Corps put this practice into effect earlier than the Australian Corps simply because it predated the other in France. However, by the last year of the war the practice was standard across the entire BEF. With reinforcement and unit and formation based training

32 Gary Sheffield, Leadership in the Trenches: Officer-Man Relations, Morale and Discipline in the British Army in the Era of the First World War, London, 2000. 33 Specifically, see Paddy Griffiths, Battle Tactics of the Western Fron, pp. 98-100; and generally, Gary Sheffield & Dan Todman, Command and Control on the Western Fron, 2007. 34 Tim Cook, Shock Troops, p. 52. 35 ibid, pp. 52-3. 36 Stephen Harris, Canadian Brass: The Making of a Professional Army 1860-1939, Toronto, 1988, p. 128. Australian Infantry on the Western Front 215 practices conducted in accordance with hierarchical doctrine, by 1918 the efficiency of British Army infantry training was approaching an instinctive level. The overarching concepts were enshrined in aide memoire SS152, Instructions for the Training of British Armies in France.37 This document predicated all other training processes for the BEF on the continent, and clearly described the association among them. The 1918 issue of the pamphlet describes a relationship among the parts of the BEF weapons system that is almost symbiotic. All of the arms supported the infantry, but without the arms the infantry was disempowered. Training, standardisation and effective leadership are clearly articulated over and again throughout the entire document. The AIF applied SS152 to the letter, and this is all the more significant in 1918 as the supporting arms were for the most part British. Moreover, the AIF was now homogenous and its infantry were required to neatly fit into the pattern of the whole.38 The Australian Corps School was indeed the largest in France as it had to cater for the needs of five divisions. This was all the more reason why the regulatory framework described in the document was adhered to. SS152 indicated that at BEF Army level, one of the parent schools was to be an Infantry School, for the purpose of training Officers as company commanders and Sergeants as company sergeant-majors.39 There was an additional Infantry School at the next subordinate level, the Corps Infantry School, this for the purpose of training platoon commanders and platoon sergeants.40 This appendix to SS152 was the seminal operational training aide memoire of the BEF during 1918. From it flowed all other relevant training. The training of Platoon Commanders and SNCOs provided the perfect conduit through which the standardised processes of the parent Army – and also among the five British Armies of the BEF – were reinforced down to the lowest fighting elements of every formation. The learning outcomes are listed specifically as: Number of students: 80 officers (Platoon Commanders) 80 NCOs (Platoon Sergeants and under) Duration Five Weeks 1. General (a) Leadership: Its meaning and how to acquire the gift of it.

37 SS152, Instructions for the Training of the British Armies in France, HMSO, June 1917, reissued Jan 1918. 38 The pattern is largely unchanged today. In a contemporary coalition operation the Australian military still tends to attach a “brick” (analogous to a Lego building brick) niche capability trained to an exacting standard that will fit into a common overarching capability. 39 This syllabus for this five week training block is detailed in Appendix 1 to SS152, Instructions for the Training of the British Armies in France, January 1918. 40 SS152, Section 3 (B) and (C), pp. 7-8. Australian Infantry on the Western Front 216 (b) Discipline: General behaviour and conduct of officers. Turn-out, physical fitness, punctuality, saluting. (c) Morale: Its meaning and importance. Responsibility of officers and NCOs regarding it. Patriotism, espirit de corps, psychology of the war. (d) Power of Command: Necessity of system of command. Bearing of Officers and NCOs towards their men. (e) Organisation: Battalion, Brigade, Division – a chain of responsibility. (f) Duties of Platoon Commanders: In billets, on line of march, in trenches and attack. The Appendix goes on to list 15-subjects of instruction to be covered in this junior leader’s course. They comprise drill, the attack, organisation for defence, musketry, Lewis guns, cooperation among different arms, map reading, messages and reports, system of supply, sanitation and medical, gas defence, physical training, military law and tactical schemes. The subjects are important because they illustrate the depth of knowledge associated with complexities of this vital role in the last year of the conflict. The sub-headings associated with each are a veritable trove of subordinate training documents at the tactical level of BEF operations. Variously listed as references to the subject headings are: 1. SS135 Instructions for the Training of Divisions for Offensive Action (revised 1918). 2. SS137 Recreational Training. 3. SS143 Instructions for the Training of Platoons for Offensive Action, 1917 (Feb 1917). 4. SS144 The Normal Formation for the Attack (Feb 1917). 5. SS185 Assault Training (Sept 1917). 6. SS191 Intercommunication in the Field. 7. SS193 Gas Defence. 8. SS197 The Tactical Employment of Lewis Guns (Jan 1918). 9. SS202 Organisation of Positions for Defence.

Above: Lieutenant General Sir John Monash KCMG KCB VD, General Officer Commanding, Australian Corps (seated), with senior Staff Officers of the Australian Corps at Chateau 22 July 1918. Brigadier Thomas Blamey is standing immediately behind Monash. Monash, the consummate professional, planned an operation with all the precision of his engineering background. Blamey, his Chief of Staff, structured his commander’s orders in explicit detail. The two officers were a perfect complement to each other (AWM E02750) Australian Infantry on the Western Front 217 Arguably then, the syllabus for the Corps Infantry School listed in SS152 was the seminal training document for the entire British Army during the last year of the Great War. The document’s prescriptive guidelines fully enabled the Australian Infantry of 1918. Further, they were entirely in keeping with the practices of the force’s ranking general. Promoted Lieutenant General, Monash assumed command of the Australian Corps on 30 May 1918. He selected Brigadier Thomas Blamey to become his Chief of staff. Monash well knew Blamey's skill as a staff officer and planner. He was one of the few Australian officers to graduate from British Staff Officer training at Quetta in British India. He had extensive operational experience on Gallipoli and had served as Major General Harold Walker’s Chief of Staff in the 1st Australian Division during its service on the Western Front. This experience made him the best suited man to serve in the demanding staff post. Monash took over ‘a perfect fighting machine… experienced, proud, war-weary and intensely homesick, but not dispirited, united now with hardly a trace of... inter-divisional jealousy’.41 It is true that Corps homogeneity in 1918 afforded the Australians an identity and relative stability. However, the CEF was also a Corps sized national contingent, and as this thesis has pointed out elsewhere the Canadians made very real claims for being a “perfect” fighting force of “shock troops”, too. Nevertheless, as the Australian and Canadian formations were permanent organisations in 1918, they employed common doctrine, staffs and commanders who were experienced and accustomed to working together. This was difference to British Corps in the BEF which rotated staffs and subordinate units in and out as required. However, it was not a crucial difference! Training, tactics and technology were common across the entire fielded expeditionary force in 1918. Accordingly, while homogeneity reinforced national identity – even battlefield effectiveness because of this – the real benefit of uniformity to the Australian and Canadian Corps was the facilitation of standardised training practices and operational processes consistently over a period of time. Of course, these practices and processes were British. The Australians and Canadians were also British enabled. ‘The majority of the artillery that played such a crucial role in Australian successes was British: the credit for Australian [victories] belongs to the British gunners as well as antipodean infantry. The same basic point applies to British logistic and combat support units’.42 Further, by this stage in the war, Monash’s planning and use of technology was consistent with trends in the entire British Army. While Dominion troops did achieve

41 Geoffrey Serle, John Monash: a Biography, Melbourne, 1982, p. 330. 42 G. Sheffield, ‘The Indispensible Factor: The Performance Of British Troops In 1918’, in P. Dennis & J. Grey (eds.), 1918: Defining Victory, Proceeds of the Australian Army History Conference, Canberra, 1998, p. 80. Australian Infantry on the Western Front 218 excellence through the stability offered by a consistent parent division or corps, there were equally outstanding divisions and corps within the British Army, too. Indeed, as Peter Dennis and Jeffrey Grey indicate, by 1918 Dominion troops had far more in common with their British counterparts than has sometimes been allowed43, and their battlefield successes are commensurate with this statement. The Australian infantry indeed underwent the same development processes as their counterparts. To this end, it was not until 1918 that the British Army learned to reconcile the hitherto immutable problem of facing massed infantry against modern rapid firepower.44 While the battles of 1914-1916 reinforced the complete inadequacy of the “offensive spirit” against the machine gun, and 1917 was the test bed for new tactics and technology, this three year period at least expedited the BEF to a point of modernity. Nevertheless, it was an expensive experience to learn the process of combined arms warfare. Cooperation between infantry and artillery, involving directed heavy artillery fire, indirect fire against unseen targets, creeping barrages and counter-battery work had to be learned during this period at the cost of massive casualties. By 1918, infantry-artillery coordination had been expanded upon. The application of infantry fire and movement supported by tanks, aircraft, machine-guns and artillery had become the norm. It is in this context that the Australian Infantry’s development as a professional fighting force must be viewed. Britain’s ultimate successes in 1918, and the commensurate reputation of Australian and Canadian infantry, was as a result of standardised training and tactics, hard earned operational experience, and with technically enabled mastery. Writing after the fact, Monash indicated that the Australian Corps spent the opening months of 1918 in extensive preparation for an expected German assault: The information at our disposal led to the inevitable conclusion that during, January and February, the enemy was busy in transferring a great deal of military resources from the Russian to the Western Front. No one capable of reading the signs entertained the smallest doubt that he contemplated taking the offensive, in the spring, on a large scale.45 This was an embellishment, of course. However, with the Russians out of the war after the Tsar’s abdication and the Bolshevik revolution of October 1917, the Allies in the West fully expected a German offensive. Bean indicates in the Australian Official History that the

43 Foreword to P. Dennis & J. Grey (eds.), 1918: Defining Victory, proceeds of the Australian Army History Conference, Canberra, 1998. 44 Tim Travers, ‘The Army and the Challenge of War 1914–18’, in Chandler & Beckett (eds.), The Oxford Illustrated History of the British Army, Oxford, 1994, pp. 216–36. 45 Monash, The Australian Victories in France 1918, p. 20. Australian Infantry on the Western Front 219 German objectives for such a large assault were several.46 Firstly they would attempt to divide the French and British forces north of the Somme, and concurrently capture the strategic Picard rail head held by the British at Amiens.47 They would additionally seek to capture the vital channel ports on the coast of the Belgian Flanders. Finally, the Germans were well aware that now the United States was in the war on the side of the Allies, they must make every attempt to degrade British and French strength before the Americans were to arrive in any great numbers.48 John Harris indicates that while Haig was not absolutely convinced the Germans would attack he still made every attempt to ensure that the British Army would be as best prepared for the forthcoming defence as possible.49 To this end, the BEF commenced fortifying the ground north and south of the Somme during February and early March. On 2 March 1918, Haig went as far as to warn his Army commanders: ‘I emphasised the necessity for being ready as soon as possible to meet a big hostile offensive of prolonged duration’.50 The British Third Army under General Julian Byng – Currie’s former commander – was concentrated in the north, and General Sir Hubert Gough’s Fifth Army in the south. Of this period, Monash indicated: The principles of defence in successive zones, of the rapid development of infantry and artillery fire power, of the correct distribution of machine guns, of rear-guard tactics, and questions of the best equipment for long marches and rapid movement were debated and resolved upon, in both official and unofficial conferences of officers.51 Monash remained commander of the 3rd Australian Division during this time, and ensured that promulgated training practices were appropriately reinforced across all of his battalions. Cyril Longmore of the 44th Battalion indicates that this took place throughout December 1917 and into February 1918.52 It is at this point that he also records immediate evidence of the focus of small unit tactics and training within the Australian Corps:

46 Bean, OH, Vol. V, pp. 86-88. 47 Robert Foley, “From Victory to Defeat: The German Army in 1918”, in Ashley Ekins (ed.), 1918 Year of Victory: The end of the Great War and the shaping of history, Sydney, 2010, pp. 72-73, 87. A Reichstag committee meeting convened to establish the causes of the German Army’s collapse indicated that it was in part due to the arrival of the Americans. 48 Robert Foley, “From Victory to Defeat: The German Army in 1918”, in Ashley Ekins (ed.), 1918 Year of Victory: The end of the Great War and the shaping of history, Sydney, 2010, pp. 72-73, 87. A Reichstag committee meeting convened to establish the causes of the German Army’s collapse indicated that it was in part due to the arrival of the Americans. 49 J. P. Harris, Douglas Haig and the First World War, Cambridge, 2008, pp. 432-3. 50 G. Sheffield & J. Bourne (eds.), Douglas Haig: War Diaries and Letters 1914-1918, London, 2005, p. 385 51 Monash, The Australian Victories in France 1918, p. 20. 52 C. Longmore, Eggs a Cook: The Story of the 44th Battalion, pp. 120-1. Australian Infantry on the Western Front 220 The platoon organisation at this time consisted of a Lewis gun section, rifle grenade section, bombing section, and a section of riflemen. With these four, each with its own special weapon, it was possible for the Platoon commander to organise schemes for the Platoon in attack.53 Of course, an updated publication of SS143 would soon rationalise these tactics to spread the varying capabilities across all sections of the platoon during 1918. However, Longmore does indicate that the Australians were ostensibly following contemporary training and operational practices, though the chapter has earlier shown that the number of Lewis guns per platoon was often more than one.. Nevertheless, the Australian Corps training school reinforced the processes among platoon commanders selected from the ranks, and platoon sergeants selected from among the junior NCOs in the platoon. At the next level, the Army Infantry School further emphasised these practices through the training of company commanders and sergeant majors. Monash well knew the benefits that such homogeneity had brought the Canadian Corps and was now being realised for the Australians: It is impossible to overvalue the advantages which accrued to the Canadian troops from this close and constant association of all the four divisions with each other, with the Corps commander and his staff, and with all the accessory Corps services. It meant mutual knowledge of each other among all commanders, all staffs, all arms and services, and the mutual trust and confidence born of that knowledge.54 By mid-March 1918, the German Army had moved 40 divisions from the Eastern front to the West.55 The British expected an assault on a wide front. They were wrong. On 21 March both Byng and Plumer were completely surprised when the Germans launched a single incisive blow – Operation Michael – between their two Armies in the Somme sector.56 Facing more than fifty German divisions, the British held the Somme sector with 26 Divisions; they were divided and forced to retreat. German shock troops, using fire and movement tactics similar to the British method, followed up with a rapid advance behind an artillery screen; each infantry platoon was self-sufficient with its various weapons systems divided among sections – gruppe.57 In the next five days, the Germans retook nearly two year’s worth of Allied gains.58 While this was happening the Australian Corps continued to hold its positions north in the Messines area of the Flanders. By 22 March the Australian

53 ibid, p. 121. 54 Monash, The Australian Victories in France 1918, p. 5. The British method differed significantly to the Canadian and Australian Corps in that divisions were rotated among parent Corps headquarters on an as required basis. 55 55 Robert Foley, “From Victory to Defeat: The German Army in 1918”, in Ashley Ekins (ed.), 1918 Year of Victory, p. 71. 56 Bean, OH, Vol V. pp. 98-108. 57 Foley, “From Victory to Defeat: The German Army in 1918”, p. 72. 58 Bean, OH, Vol V. pp. 109-112. Australian Infantry on the Western Front 221 divisions – particularly the 3rd and 4th who were resting out of the line – began ‘to strain on the leash which held them idle in the north’.59 During the ensuing week the Germans advanced nearly 30 miles towards Amiens south of the Somme. Facing this tide, the Fifth Army retreated, while north of the river the Third was not far behind. Haig recorded on 23 March that he: went to Villers-Bretonneux and saw General Gough commanding 5th Army... His troops are now behind the Somme. Men very tired after two days fighting and long march back... I cannot make out why 5th Army has gone so far back without making some kind of stand.60

Above: German shock troops, storm troopers, training in fire and movement tactics across prepared training grounds. The photograph is a virtual replica of Allied training methods depicted in the photograph in Chapter 3 on p. 94. Such similarities are indicative of the learning process undertaken by all combatant armies on the Western Front. (AWM H13478)

59 ibid, p. 114. 60 Sheffield & Bourne (eds.), Douglas Haig: War Diaries, p. 391. Australian Infantry on the Western Front 222

Above: Troops of the 4th division asleep in the narrow reserve trenches near Wood on 28th March 1918, the morning after they first met and stopped the German advance on Amiens. They had been on the march for several days previously in cold

and drizzling rain, and the temporary rest was more than welcome. (AWME01921)

By 25 March, the Germans had reached a point where they threatened the town itself. On the next day the 3rd, 4th and 5th Australian divisions were hastily despatched south in a move of all available British troops to shore up the crumbling defences. Vivian Brahms of Monash’s 42nd Battalion recorded the shambles representing the BEF’s retreat: The scene that unfolded itself was one of the utmost confusion. We saw retreating troops of the 5th Army intermingled with hundreds of French civilian refugees, thronging the highway and seriously impeding our forward movement... Hopelessly mixed in with all this movement towards the rear, was a steady stream of guns of all types and calibres...61 Arriving in the Somme sector, the three Australian divisions were allocated a stretch of defensive line in front of the German advance between the Picard villages of Albert and Villers-Bretonneux. The 3rd and 4th Divisions were in place by 29 March with the 5th Division in reserve. By the end of the month the massive German assault had outrun its own supply

61 V. Brahms, Spirit of the Forty-Second: Narrative of the 42nd Battalion, 1tth Infantry Brigade, 3rd Division AIF, 1914-18, first published 1938, Brisbane, pp. 62-63. Australian Infantry on the Western Front 223 line; this was a curious reversal of the hard lessons that the BEF had learned during its 1916- 17 offensives. Attacks coming against the Australian divisions in the line were halted with heavy casualties. While their defence was heroic – indeed, so were the efforts of the entire BEF in stemming the tide – it was not the infantry alone responsible for halting the German Army. Ian Malcolm Brown writes that in the two month period around this time, the BEF fired ‘nearly nine million 18lb shells, and a total of over 15 million shells’ in support of the infantry.62 Whether or not the Fifth Army’s initial retreat was shambolic, it is equally as likely that the Australian divisions would have crumbled too if it had been they facing the initial German attacks. In any case, the mammoth effort of supplying the guns highlighted just how significant technology and logistical were in determining the outcome of the war. During this period, only the 1st Australian Division remained in situ in Belgium to help hold the line there. In April 1918 the Australians went on the offensive and recaptured the hamlet of Villers-Brettoneux. This was a magnificent feat of arms and one achieved primarily by the 5th Australian Division. Even today, the slogan Noublions jamais L’Australie: Never Forget Australia, is embossed in large letters across the buildings of the local primary school. In 1927, the Victorian Education Department raised funds to help rebuild the school. A plaque laid in tribute to the Australian losses during the action reads: This school building is the gift of the school children of Victoria Australia to the children of Villers Bretonneux as proof of their love and good will towards France. Twelve Hundred Australian soldiers, the fathers and brothers of these children gave their lives in the heroic recapture of this town from the invader on the 24th April 1918 and are buried near this spot. May the memories of great sacrifices in a common cause keep France and Australia together forever in bonds of mutual esteem.63 By themselves, these events are a splendid record of operational activity in which the Australian nation can still be justifiably proud. The military action of the 5th Division points to the AIF’s place on the learning curve and its use of recent experience. Equally, the memorial erected at Villers Bretonneux and the phrase “Never Forget Australia” signifies an important milestone in the development of the Australian national identity. That the Australian Corps had evolved to this point of effectiveness by April 1918 is the real tribute to these soldiers; more so than the popular history of battle. On 4 June 1918 Corporal Thomas, 6th Battalion, wrote: In supports, the old original front line... We came in here last night and relieved them. Fritz seems furious and he pounded hell out of us and we came right through his barrage, on a death trap road, how we escaped beats all, we had three killed and nine

62 Ian Brown, British Logistics on the Western Front: 1914-1919, Conneticut, 1998, p. 189. 63 Photographed by author 9 November 1998. Australian Infantry on the Western Front 224 badly wounded in our company alone. Oh, it is a lovely war. It is very nerve wracking to be constantly under shell fire and horrors and dirt and filth. I am sick and tired of the blasted show. It is cruel!64 In many ways, these sentiments were typical of the entire BEF in the middle of 1918. This was born of more than three years hard combat, and equally due to recent setbacks in stemming the German advances. In three years, the BEF had expanded enormously to five armies. Moreover, in terms of tactics, training and technology it was thoroughly modern and professional in both doctrine and practice. The BEF of 1918 had little in common with the force that had deployed to France in 1914. It was equally different to the Army that had fought on the Somme in 1916.65 By 1918 the experience that the BEF had gained resulted in a highly professional, coordinated and capable force, led by thoroughly competent commanders from all outposts of the Empire. Indeed, it is arguable that there was very little difference among the 60 British and Empire deployed across the Western Front. In this standardisation lay the strength of the entire Imperial force.66 Monash was of this ilk, though he was by no means unique. What Monash represented was the cognitive element of a war-winning weapons system: a melding of the various arms and components into a mutually supporting whole.67 As a result of meticulous planning, each cog was integrated with, and provided maximum support for, every other cog in the machine. In the middle of 1918, these concepts represented the keys to success on the Western Front. In June the Australian Corps was formally allocated to General Sir Henry Rawlinson’s Fourth Army, and Rawlinson tasked Monash to demonstrate the BEF’s doctrinal capability at Hamel in the Somme sector. The term “demonstration” in this instance is an apt description for what occurred. Le Hamel is a village east of Villers-Bretonneux, and is today the site of the Australian Corps memorial in France.68 The attack at Hamel – to be planned down to the finest detail – would reaffirm and reinforce processes that were relatively recent, but by now standard practice in the BEF. Monash planned to combine all the critical lessons gleaned from the learning process over the preceding two years. This comprised merging the concept of a “limited objective” with sychronised artillery, armour and infantry operations. The operation was to be conducted

64 AWM 3DRL/2206 Transcript of Diaries of 3470, Corporal Arthur Thomas 6th Battalion, 2nd Brigade, 1st Division AIF, entry 4th June 1918. 65 G. Sheffield, ‘The Indispensible Factor: The Performance of British Troops In 1918’ in P. Dennis & J. Grey (eds.), 1918: Defining Victory, Proceeds of the Australian Army History Conference, Canberra, 1998, p. 75. 66 Gary Sheffield,”Finest Hour? British Forces on the Wester Front in 1918: an overview”, in Ashley Ekins (ed.), 1918 Year of Victory: The end of the Great War and the shaping of history, Sydney, 2010, p. 54. 67 Trevor Wilson, The Myriad Faces of War: Britain and the Great War, 1914-1918, Oxford, 1986, p. 7. 68 This monument was rededicated around the 80th anniversary of the battle by the AustralianGovernment. Australian Infantry on the Western Front 225 as a set piece battle in accordance with doctrine laid down in SS135 and under Monash’s mantra of unity of thought, purpose and tactical method.69 The lessons of such coordination had been effectively learned by the BEF at Cambrai the previous November. However, Monash well knew the Australian mistrust of tanks that stemmed from the disastrous 1917 Bullecourt offensives. During these battles early model British tanks broke down, were bogged in mud churned up by friendly artillery, or were simply too slow to arrive on time.70 Monash also knew that command and control of the armoured asset was a critical concept for the bourgeoning capability. This was a case of the chicken and the egg: did the autonomy of the armour come first, or would leadership be ceded to an infantry commander? Indeed, after Bullecourt mutual trust and respect between armour and Australian infantry had broken down completely, and became a significant focus for Monash during his planning for the forthcoming operation. Monash’s process was an effective method of familiarisation: Battalion after battalion [of Australians] were brought by ... to spend the day at play with the tanks. The tanks kept open house, and in the intervals of more formal rehearsals of tactical schemes of attack, the infantry were taken over the field for “joy rides”, were allowed to clamber all over the monsters, inside and out, and even allowed to drive them and put them through their paces. Platoon and company commanders met dozens of tank officers face to face, and they argued each other to a standstill upon every aspect that arose.71

Above: Australian troops pose with a British tank crew in France, 1918 . (AWM E04922)

69 Peter Pedersen, “Maintaining the Advance: Monash, battle procedure and the Australian Corps in 1918”, in Ashley Ekins (ed.), 1918 Year of Victory: The end of the Great War and the shaping of history, Sydney, 2010, p. 134. 70 Bean, OH Vol. V, pp. 405-6. 71 Monash, The Australian Victories in France 1918, p. 49. Australian Infantry on the Western Front 226 Monash sought input from the British armoured commander and this was duly forwarded on 20 June 1918 by Brigadier AnthonyCourage of the British 5th Tank Brigade.72 In this document lie the concepts and processes for infantry and armour coordination that remain extant today. Courage submitted that the tanks apportioned into three sections – Advance, Main and Mopping-Up:

1. Advanced Tank Section. Operate independently of the infantry in the initial attack. 2. Main Body Tank Section. To lead the infantry to their objective and give immediate protective fire. 3. Mopping-Up Tank Section. To follow the assaulting infantry to replace any tank put out of action and to go to the assistance of any infantry held up by machine-gun fire.73 The infantry and armour would remain highly mobile, and would be screened by a creeping artillery barrage to their immediate front. Courage’s recommendations went into some detail to highlight the roles of the tanks and infantry. He went as far as to state that: A few aeroplanes with a noisy type of engine should fly above the tanks and enemy lines in order to drown out the noise of the tank engine. If the enemy is bombed it will tend to keep him below ground. This will help to ensure the attack coming is a surprise to the enemy… In the event of guns being observed the personnel should be bombed and fired at with machine-guns [by aeroplanes], to assist the tank in putting them out of action.74 With, this information at hand, Monash’s engineering skill sets now came to the fore. On 21 June 1918 he informed Rawlinson that he would submit detailed plans only after he had conferences with representatives of all arms and services involved.75 Although the Hamel offensive was to be conducted on a far smaller scale, the Cambrai operation effectively served as a blueprint for the planning that took place for all subsequent offensives in the Great War. Monash submitted that the operation would take 7 days planning which would focus on the following proposals: a. The operation will primarily be a tank operation. b. The whole battle front will be placed temporarily under the command of one divisional commander. c. The infantry employed will comprise one division plus one brigade. d. The action will be designed to enable tanks to to capture ground, the following infantry will: i. Reduce strong-points. ii. Mopping Up. iii. Consolidation.

72 AWM 3DRL/2316, Monash Personal Files Book 19, 4 Jun – 24 Jun 1918: Brigadier A. Courage, Appraisal of Tank Attack against Hamel, HQ 5th Tank BDE No. G.26/16 dated 20 Jun 18. 73 ibid, Para. 4. 74 ibid, Para. 13. 75 AWM 3DRL/2316, Monash Personal Files Book 19, 4 Jun – 24 Jun 1918: Monash to Rawlinson Hamel Offensive Proposal, dated 21 June 1918. Australian Infantry on the Western Front 227 e. Apart from neutralising all enemy artillery likely to engage our troops our artillery will be employed to keep under fire enemy centres of resistance and selected targets; in front of the advance of tanks. Artillery detailed for close targets will work on a prearranged and detailed time table which will be adjusted to the timetable of the infantry and tank advance. f. Contact and counter-attack planes and low flying bombing planes prior to and during the advance must be arranged for. g. Artillery… smoke to screen operations… are required.76

Monash further recommended that training in joint operations between tanks and infantry should be arranged with thorough liaison prior to and during the operation being a special feature.77 On 24 June 1918 Rawlinson gave approval for the demonstration to go ahead. The planned date for the attack was 4 July. In his initial planning conference dated 28 June 1918, Monash listed 115 agenda items centring primarily on timing, tactics, coordination among infantry/artillery/armour, and a schedule that was an exact 3 hours and eight minutes long.78 With such precision Monash’s Australian Corps became a “demonstrator” for the BEF’s 1918 approach to warfare. The archival documentation indicates the process was firmly based in the use of modern tactics and technology, all underwritten by robust training practices. Rawlinson’s final endorsement later on 28 June indicated the infantry was to advance in a “leap-frogging” manoeuvre, units comprising elements of the 2nd Division (), 3rd Division (11th Brigade) and 4th Division (4th Brigade). Five companies (60 tanks) were to take part in the operation, 42 in the front line and 18 in reserve. At zero + 4 a creeping barrage was to move forward at the rate of 100 yards per minute. The Tanks and infantry were to follow.79 Operational security was paramount. No troop movement even in the areas behind the Allied trenches was permitted except at night. To prevent the noise of the tank engines being overheard when they were moving forward to reach the starting line, RE8 observation aircraft from No. 3 Squadron Australian Flying Corps (AFC) were directed to fly up and down the entire Army front when the armour was running.80 Artillery and armour moved into position and camouflaged behind the lines before the operation at night to conceal their disposition

76 ibid, Para. 5. 77 ibid, Para. 7. 78 AWM 3DRL/2316 , Monash Personal Files Book 19, 23 Jun – 7 Jul 1918, Hamel Offensive Agenda dated 28 Jun 1918. 79 Rawlinson to Monash GS 190 (G), in AWM 3DRL/2316 , Monash Personal Files Book 19, 23 Jun – 7 Jul 1918, dated 28 June 1918. In the Official History, Vol VI, p. 256, Bean indicates the actual rate was 100 yards per three minutes. 80 AWM 3DRL/2316 , Monash Personal Files Book 19, 23 Jun – 7 Jul 1918; and SS218 Notes compiled by GS 4th Army on the operations by the Australian Corps against Hamel, Bois de Hamel, and Bois de Vair on 4th July 1918. Australian Infantry on the Western Front 228 and concentration.81 Significantly, numbers of American infantry were now beginning to reach the Allied front lines. These troops were quite inexperienced, though exceedingly keen to see action. To facilitate this exposure, four companies of American infantrymen were allocated to the operation.82 A final planning conference was conducted on 1 July in which all minor detail was discussed. Monash firmly insisted that the tanks must follow the orders of the infantry to whom they were attached.83 After the conference, no changes to the plan were allowed.84 The objectives were fixed and limited to a distance of 2.5 km beyond Hamel. Thereafter, all troops trained for the operation in which they would shortly be involved. Edgar Rule of the 14th Battalion later wrote: From now on we were given our plans and orders, and conference followed conference, until we all had our part down pat; each new what his brother officer had to do, and could take command in case of anyone else being cracked.85 Zero hour was fixed for 0310 on 4 July, and the infantry duly formed up in front of their lines. As they had done so for several days previously aircraft flew up and down the line to confuse the Germans with strafing and bombing. The noise covered the sound of the tanks moving into place. At 0302 preliminary smoke and the artillery bombardment added to the effect. This had also been conducted regularly over preceding days to encourage the Germans into seeking cover. It would further achieve a tactical surprise, as the Germans would not know which barrage preceded the attack.86 The infantry then began to move forward. The War Diary of the 44th Battalion states: At ten minutes past three our barrage came down with ferocious suddenness upon the enemy’s front line area, and pounded, battered and chopped it to pieces with shells of heavy calibre: light, medium, heavy, gas, shrapnel, high explosive, and phosphorous shells. The Boche here suffered four minutes hell before the barrage began to lift in hundred yard stages every minute, allowing our first wave (43rd Battalion) to advance to the attack with the cooperation of “tanks”, which smelt out the vicious machine-guns in the enemy strong-points, and summarily dealt with them in their own quaint manner. Not many minutes past before the first wave (43rd Battalion) had taken the first objective, and the oncoming tide of the 44th Battalion swept over it and on and up the coveted ridge. ‘A’ and ‘B’ companies working round the left and ‘C’ and ‘D’

81 loc cit. In addition, SS135 pp. 6-8 was explicit in the processes to be followed in the maintenance of this security. 82 See Meleah Ward, “The Cost of Inexperience: Americans on the Western Front 1918”, in Ashley Ekins (ed.), 1918 Year of Victory: The end of the Great War and the shaping of history, Sydney, 2010. Nevertheless, the AEF’s commander Pershing fought to keep the American Army as a distinct national force for the duration of the conflict. 83 Bean, OH Vol. VI, p. 269. 84 SS218 Notes compiled by GS 4th Army... 85 E. J. Rule, Jacka’s Mob, Melbourne, 2000, original printing: Sydney, 1933, p. 130. 86 SS218 Notes compiled by GS 4th Army... Australian Infantry on the Western Front 229 companies round the right of the village of Hamel, leaving the village to the of the Hotchkiss and six-pounders aboard the tanks. Three tanks accompanied each half of the Battalion around the village.87 The operation among all participating units went exactly as experienced by the 44th Battalion. Monash allocated 188 minutes for its completion. It took 195 minutes. SS218 indicates the Allies captured 2 x 77mm guns, 26 mortars and 177 machine guns. 41 officers and 1,431 other ranks were taken prisoner. Bean writes that the Australian and American infantry suffered 1,380 casualties.88 Two men were awarded the Victoria Cross, both soldiers members of Monash’s alma mater in the 4th Brigade: Private Dalziel 15th Battalion and Corporal Axford 16th Battalion. Dalziel had been present at the Sari Bair fiasco on Gallipoli.89

Above: An R.E.8 aircraft of 3 Squadron AFC, France, November 1917.The RE8s of 3SQN were used extensively by Monash to cover the noise of advancing armour during the battle of Hamel. (AWM E01359).

87 AWM4 23/61/22 Part 1, ‘Narrative of Hamel Offensive, July 4th-6th 1918’, War Diary for the 44th Australian Infantry Battalion, July 1918. 88 Bean, OH Vol. VI, The AIF in France: During the Allied Offensive 1918, p. 326. 89 See AWM for Axford: http://www.awm.gov.au/people/P10676228/ Dalziel: http://www.awm.gov.au/people/P10676276/ Australian Infantry on the Western Front 230

Above: A Tank put out of action after suffering a direct hit at the Battle of Hamel on 4 July 1918. Tanks of this unit fought with 44th Australian Infantry Battalion during the battalion’s attack on the Hamel village. (AWM E03843)

Above: German weapons captured in AIF operations at Ville–sur–Ancre and Le Hamel, on display during an address by Lieutenant General Sir John Monash, 13 July 1918. (AWM E02732)

Australian Infantry on the Western Front 231 The Battle of Hamel was only a small operation. However, the foregoing statistics are vitally important for several reasons. Foremost, the entire process was imperially enabled, and the attacking force’s casualties were less than the defending force’s losses. The training, tactics and technology encompassed the latest and most advanced all-arms doctrine within the BEF. Indeed, the battle most ably demonstrated the outcomes of the learning process in the British Army. Further, the records indicate collaborative effort among the participants; British and Australian generals, American and Australian Infantry, and British Tanks. The after action précis even stated: That thanks to the preliminary practice with the tanks, the cooperation between them and the infantry was excellent. In general, the attack went so satisfactorily that the infantry found little difficulty in overcoming any hostile opposition that was not dealt with by the tanks.90 Such was the success of the demonstration, that Rawlinson immediately lobbied Haig for a similar blow, but this time on a far larger scale; his intent: an Army sized blow against the German lines.91 In addition to III Corps and the Australian Corps, Rawlinson also sought command of the homogenous Canadian Corps, which had commenced 1918 confident, battle tested and significantly improved during its three and a half years on the Western Front.92 Haig concurred, and the command team of the Fourth Army – Rawlinson and Lieutenant Generals Butler (III Corps), Monash (Australian) and Currie (Canadian) – met on 17 July 1918. Rawlinson briefed his staff noting: the open nature of the country, which rendered it particularly favourable for an operation with tanks… the moral superiority gained by the Australian Corps over the enemy during the last three months… assuring the safety of Amiens and driving the enemy out of shell range of the town… and the possibility of inflicting a serious blow on the enemy when his morale will be low.93 Rawlinson’s selection of the “morally superior” Australians and “confident” Canadians to act as the leading edge of the operation, with III Corps covering the northern flank, was no coincidence. It was a direct reflection of the high standards of operational readiness that the Australian Corps had reached by July 1918. To this end, the operational method proposed was, quite explicitly, a scaled up version of Hamel that also drew some inspiration from the

90 SS218 Notes compiled by GS 4th Army on the operations by the Australian Corps against Hamel, Bois de Hamel, and Bois de Vair on 4th July 1918, Para. 31. 91 J.P. Harris, Douglas Haig and the First World War, New York, 2008, p. 487. 92 T. Cook, “Bloody Victory: the Canadian Corps in the Hundred Days campaign”, in Ashley Ekins (ed.), 1918 Year of Victory: The end of the Great War and the shaping of history, Sydney, 2010, pp. 163-166. 93 Extracts from Letters and Conferences Concerning the Preparation for Operations on August 8th 1918, in 3DRL/2316, Monash Personal Files Book 19, 7 July - 30 July 1918. Australian Infantry on the Western Front 232 opening blow of the Cambrai offensive the previous November.94 The offensive was scheduled for 8 August 1918, three years to the day after Monash’s “Black day” at Gallipoli. Monumental artillery support and 432 tanks were allocated for the offensive. Hamel had proved the efficacy of combined arms warfare. Having received orders from Rawlinson, on 31 July Monash conducted his first planning conference instructing that his ‘divisions were to conduct a set-piece attack, under barrage, with tanks’ in accordance with procedures conducted at Hamel’. Thereafter, the ‘division were to leap frog – and fight on principles of open warfare’ in a mammoth exercise of fire and movement.95 Bean noted the plan was worked out to the finest detail; by ‘assembling and advancing, the tanks for the first objective would move with the infantry on the fringe of a creeping barrage’.96 On the same day Monash met with his commanders, Haig noted his approval of the new methods: Remarkable progress has been made since [Nov 1917], not only in the... tank, but also in the method of using them. Tanks now go first, covered by shrapnel barrage, and break down all opposition. Enemy in strong points and machine gun nests are then flattened out by the tanks. The latter then signal to the infantry to ‘come on’, and these then advance in open order and mop up the remaining defenders, and collect the prisoners. During consolidation tanks zig-zag in front to cover the operation.97 Haig’s Special Order of the Day of 4 August 1918 stated ‘The enemy has made his effort to obtain a decision on the Western Front, and has failed’.98 Monash wrote to his Corps on 7 August that for the first time all five divisions of the Australian Corps were about engage in the largest and most important operation ever undertaken by the Australians. ‘The full resources of our sister Dominion, the Canadian Corps, will operate on our right…’; and ‘there can be no doubt that by capturing our objectives, we shall inflict blows upon the enemy that will bring the end appreciably nearer’.99 During the night of 7-8 August 1918, Bean witnessed Australian infantry winding along their numerous approach tracks, constantly passing black silent masses of waiting tanks and crowded guns, were excited… that at last all five divisions of their national army were attacking together, [and] that the Canadian force was attacking beside them….100

94 J.P. Harris, Douglas Haig and the First World War, p. 487. 95 Australian Corps Conference of 31 July 1918: Corps Plan of Battle, in AWM 3DRL/2316, Monash Personal Files Book 19, 7 July - 30 July 1918. 96 Bean, OH, Vol. VI, p. 496. 97 Haig Diary 31 July 1918 in Sheffield & Bourne (eds.), Douglas Haig: War Diaries and Letters 1914-1918, London 2005, p. 436. 98 Special Order of the Day by Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig 4 August 1918, in AWM 3DRL/2316, Monash Personal Files Book 20, 31 July – 15 August 1918. 99 Monash to the Australian Corps 7 August 1918, in AWM 3DRL/2316, Monash Personal Files Book 20, 31 July – 15 August 1918. 100 Bean, OH, Vol. VI, p. 526. Australian Infantry on the Western Front 233

Above: H. Septimus Power: Australians advance on 8th August 1918; Der Schwartz Tag for the German Army and a display of the extraordinary development of the British and Empire infantry over the course of the war. (AWM ART 12208) The artillery gathered to support the advance was phenomenal: about 2,000 guns for a

front of 16,000 yards that narrowed to 11,000 yards at a depth of about four miles.101 Over 2,000 British and French aircraft were allocated in supporting, observation, scouting and ground attack roles. The attack duly occurred on 8 August and was a resounding success. The German Commander in the West, Ludendorff, labelled the rolling back of his forces as Der Schwartz Tag – The Black Day – of the German Army for the war. Haig’s diary read: Situation at 4:30pm stated the Canadian Corps had captured Beaucourt, and Amiens outer defence line east of Caix. Cavalry Corps south and east of Caix. Australian Corps Corps at their objectives all along their front… Enemy blowing dumps in all directions and streaming eastwards.102 8 August demonstrated just how much Australian infantry had developed. All objectives were taken efficiently and in accordance with the promulgated schedule. Currie was so impressed with the effective cohesion between the Australian and Canadian Corps that in correspondence to Monash dated 22 August he stated:

101 Extracts from Letters and Conferences Concerning the Preparation for Operations on August 8th 1918, in 3DRL/2316, Monash Personal Files Book 19, 7 July - 30 July 1918; and J.P. Harris, Douglas Haig and the First World War, New York, 2008, p. 493. 102 Haig Diary 8 August 1918, in Sheffield & Bourne (eds.), p. 440. Australian Infantry on the Western Front 234 There are no troops who have given us as loyal and effective support as the Australians and I am sure I speak for all Canadians when I say that we would like to finish the war fighting side by side with you.103 It was not to be. Haig allotted Byng’s Third Army to the offensive on 22 August, and although both the Australian and Canadian Corps remained on operations, the Third Army inflicted damage in equal measure against the crumbling German line. This was significant. Aside from the New Zealand Division, the Third Army’s formations were British, their ranks mainly conscripts after the casualties incurred in the German Spring offensives. That these troops performed every bit as effectively as their Dominion colleagues in the Fourth Army is testament to the effectiveness of British training, technology and tactics at this point in the war; more so, of the operational methods by which these were being and employed.104 After 8 August, the Australian Corps remained on operations until 4 October, the tempo constant. In every respect this period represented the maintenance of a standard reached by the BEF in mid-1918. Nevertheless, the Australians tired rapidly under the strain of battle, and Bean recorded that ‘the length of the war was beginning to try some of the older hands. A man gets sick at heart – stays away [from battle] for 24 hours – and is then afraid to come back’.105 There are records of the growing fatigue. In September, Private J.E. Bartley of the 30th Battalion indicated that the leap-frogging, energy momentum of constant operations gave way to constant feelings of feeling tired, a lack of rest, and want for a spell from battle.106 The rest did not come. During September 1918 Monash continued to push his Australian Corps in unison with the other British and Dominion Corps in an orchestrated BEF offensive. Indeed, the Australian Corps was simply one cog in the massive British operational homogeneity of 1918. The drive was relentless, the casualties high, though the effectiveness of infantry operations down to section level were, by this stage in the conflict, almost intuitive. Still the pressure started to tell when on 21 September a company the 1st Australian Battalion refused to re-enter the line after claims of insufficient rest from operations.107 The list of Australian operations associated with the 100-days offensives is impressive. The larger included Chuignes in late August, followed by , Mont St Quentin, and finally, Bellicourt at the end of September. The final action for Australian infantry occurred at Montebrehain on 5 October 1918 after which the Corps was withdrawn

103 Letter Currie to Monash 22 August 1918, in Bean’s Papers: AWM38 3DRL 606/274/1 August-October 1918. 104 J.P. Harris, Douglas Haig and the First World War, New York, 2008, p. 498. 105 Bean Diary 14 May 1918 AWM38 3DRL 606/274 106 No. 2280 Private J.E. Bartley 30BN/8th BDE/5th Australian Division, Diary extracts recorded post-war, in Bean’s Papers: AWM38 3DRL 606/274/1 August-October 1918. 107 Bean, OH, Vol. VI, pp. 933-4. Australian Infantry on the Western Front 235 to rest. In the preceding months the rate of effort had resulted in such casualties that seven battalions were disbanded in order to maintain the strength of the remainder.108 As autumn turned in early November the Corps was warned to prepare to re-enter the line in France. Before it did so, the Armistice was signed on 11 November. The roll call of French and Belgian Battlefields of the preceding two years are still household words a century later: Fromelles, the Somme, Pozières, Bullecourt, Messines, Passchendaele, Villers–Bretonneux, the Battle of Amiens and the Hindenburg Line. The toll was extraordinary: 215,585 casualties for 331,781 men embarked.109 When casualties incurred on Gallipoli and the Middle East are tallied and subtracted from these figures110, over 45,000 Australians were killed and 130,000 wounds sustained on the Western Front, almost all of whom were infantrymen. Despite these figures, in three years of evolution, expended effort, testing and adjusting, the entire process of the British Army came into focus during 1918. Training and fighting was codified in reams of training pamphlets that were based on the experiences of the Western Front. All arms doctrine was the force majeur in the realisation of battlefield effects. If it was drab, mechanised and surgical in application, all-arms doctrine was nevertheless the demonstrated war winning formula. All-arms application was underwritten by the sensibility of standardised training and hard work. Equally, the hubris, patronage and nepotism of the pre-war officer class had been replaced by the far more efficient and effective institutional mechanisms of Great War training. The Australian officer Corps, and as a consequence the Australian infantry, had come through this process in the experiences stemming from Gallipoli to the Western Front.111 By 1918, Hamel represented the apogee of battlefield effectiveness for the Australian Corps during the Great War. Australian infantry were at a comparable standard to the entire BEF, and had the added benefit of being a homogenous corps with stable and experienced leadership. These soldiers were imperially enabled, trained in a standardised pattern, and practiced their tasks in accordance with the latest battle-proven methods of the British Army. By August 1918, the Australian infantryman was working to a standard that would see him individually and collectively prepared for the rigours of the last three-months of combat during the 100-days offensives.

108 Bean, OH, Vol. VI, p. 1044. From 1 Jun - 5 Oct, the Australian Corps lost 1,833 officers and 32,895 other ranks, of whom 469 officers and 6,610 other ranks were killed or died of wounds. From 8 Aug- 5 Oct, the Corps lost 1,317 officers and 22,845 other ranks. 109 Ernest Scott, OH, Vol. IX, Australia in the War, Appendix 6, St. Lucia, 1992. 110 See Bean OH, Vol. II for Gallipoli: 26,094 casualties, 7, 594 dead. See Gullet OH, Vol. VII for MEAO: 4,851 casualties, 1374 dead. 111 This shared commonwealth development of the Officer Corps is well described in Tim Travers, “Command and Leadership Styles in the British Army: The 1915 Gallipoli Model”, in the Journal of Contemporary History, July 1994, Volume 29, No. 3, pp. 428–39. Australian Infantry on the Western Front

Conclusion By the last year of the Great War Australian infantry on the Western Front had developed to a highly capable and professional standard. This thesis has shown that the Anzac legend cannot account for this evolution; effectiveness was hard-earned through the rigours of systematic training, and in a specialist schooling system common across the entire British Force. The corollary is clear. Australian infantry progressed because of their ties to the British Empire. Indeed, by the time that Australians arrived on the Western Front, monumental developments in small arms and quick firing weapons were precipitating a complete rewrite of the tactical methods employed by small infantry units in the BEF. Because of this, by 1918 effectiveness equated to standardised training, operational experience and technical mastery. The Anzac myth pays little credence to such matters; even less to the dull aspects of logistics and fire support, most of which was supplied to the Australian infantry by Britain. In concert with the wider force, by 1918 Australian infantry had developed to a point where they were well-trained, technically savvy, and battle hardened. They were powerfully armed, and ably led by officers in receipt of the latest doctrine. The platoon was central to the assault, and each platoon was trained to effectively use fire and movement tactics under the cover of one or more allocated Lewis machine guns. When the Australian infantry conducted their first major operation together as a Corps under Sir John Monash at Hamel on 4 July 1918, they employed these tactics to great effect. Under the umbrella of combined arms operations, the performance of the Australians infantry at Hamel represented a standard reached then maintained for the remainder of the war. The standard was British, and the Australian and every other Dominion contingent fitted into that construct.

Left: Australian infantry Lewis Gun training in France during 1918. By 1918, the incorporation of increased firepower at platoon level was a BEF wide phenomenon. IWM E (AUS) 683

Australian Infantry on the Western Front 237 This thesis gives clear insight into the specificity of the development of Australian infantry on the Western Front. On a wider note, the two and a half year period covering this topic from mid-1916 to the end of 1918 has had a profound impact Australia’s relationship with its heritage; and in particular, with the Australian experience of war. Indeed, the employment of Australian infantry during the Great War set a pattern for all future wars that the nation has been involved in. To this end, the Australian contribution to the BEF on the Western Front represented a “Capability” Brick that fitted neatly into a British Army infantry construct. The success of Australians came about because of their involvement in the wider whole, and a mythology surrounding the qualities of Australian infantrymen continues to grow. In 1941 Charles Bean wrote the following oft-misrepresented words about Australian martial prowess: Anzac stood, and still stands, for reckless valour in a good cause, for enterprise, resourcefulness, fidelity, comradeship, and endurance that will never own defeat.1 In ensuing years, the term has come to stand for the qualities that all Australian military personnel display in the various wars in which Australian forces have since been involved. Descriptors including endurance, courage, sacrifice, and mateship predominate.2 In popular history, Anzac also encompasses fortitude, a sense of humour in the face of adversity, insouciance and ingenuity; the list goes on. The Anzac legend is so ubiquitous today that it has entered the Australian vernacular to encompass these similar qualities across wider society.3 As for the influence of the legend in this thesis, let the records of the several dozen officers and soldiers selected in general for the study provide a snapshot of the qualities of these men. They did not stand out as more physically robust than their peers in the wider British world. Though some of them were decorated for bravery, all were subjected to the same stressors as the entire Imperial Army on the Western Front; and clearly, some them broke under this unbearable strain. Of the 1918 Australian higher command team, their processes were stewarded by the British Camberley trained staff-work system, and enabled

1 C.E.W, Bean, Anzac to Amiens, originally published 1941, St Lucia, 1992, p. 181. 2 See for example the Australian memorial to its soldiers who fought in the during 1942 near Kokoda. These troops, interestingly militiamen, are memorialised as exemplars of the Anzac myth on the Isurava cairn: “COURAGE ENDURANCE MATESHIP SACRIFICE”. This memorial was opened in 1992 on the 50th commemoration of the battle. In a similar vein, the Royal Australian Navy is on its third iteration of vessel named HMAS ANZAC. In an RAAF context, during the Second World War No. 461 Bomber Squadron was named the “Anzac” squadron. 3 In this contemporary context the term Anzac, particularly in Australian society, has reached mythological or legendary status. The terms are synonymous and interchangeable. According to the Macquarie Dictionary, ‘myth refers to the collective belief that is built up in response to the wishes of the group rather than through analysis’; and ‘legend refers to a non-historical or unverifiable story handed down by tradition from earlier times and popularly accepted as history’. Both are applicable in context throughout the thesis. Australian Infantry on the Western Front 238 by codified, common all-arms doctrine. Junior officers were similarly trained in appropriate methods of battlefield command and leadership along side their Imperial colleagues at any one of the 21 wartime Officer Cadet Battalions raised in the United Kingdom.4 Among the rank and file infantrymen, battlefield success and ultimate survival lay in the detail of standardised training, technical competence, and in intuitive process that came only with experience on operations. A century on, such is the mythology of the Great War that it is difficult to focus on the minutiae of such detail and process that went into realising an Allied victory. On a global- level, it is difficult for the modern world to grasp the size of the conflict. The scale, in terms of personnel, logistics and geography was enormous. Aside from the Western Front – the focus of this thesis – the Great War stretched from the Falkland Islands through and the Middle East, from the ports of the Chinese coastline to the steppes of Russia, and seaward from France into the Atlantic trade routes. It was a conflict to which the British Empire committed six and a half million fighting men, among them 300,000 Australians, a fifth of whom paid the ultimate sacrifice.5 World wide, the conflict is still commemorated on the date of the 1918 Armistice, 11 November, and one hundred years on it continues to generate debate. As late as Armistice Day 2013, former Australian Prime Minister Paul Keating stated the war was the result of a ‘‘quagmire of European tribalism’’. Australia need not have been involved; when Australian troops went into battle, Australia had no need to reaffirm its European heritage at the price of being dragged into a European holocaust.6 Yes, the Great War was complicated, but its conduct was as a result of interwoven treaties and political aims that were as valid then as the ANZUS Treaty is for Australia today. In 1914 Australia was a Dominion within the British Empire. Dominion status granted Government autonomy for internal matters, while Britain retained control over foreign affairs.7 Under this arrangement, the Dominions entered a state of war when Britain declared war, and the best support that Australia could provide Britain was in the provision of soldiers. The Great War was a also world war. Germany had possessions in the Pacific in , New Guinea and on Samoa; a German victory in Europe would have directly affected the security

4 E.A. James, British Regiments 1914-1918, London, 1998, p. 119. Indeed, under this system James indicates some 73,000 British and Dominion officers were commissioned into this system. 5 Dan Todman, The Great War: Myth and Memory, London, 2005, p. 3. 6 Keating was widely publicised in the media after his staements which were printed by all major Australian newspapers. See, for example: http://www.smh.com.au/federal-politics/political-news/paul-keating-decries-great-war-in-remembrance-day- address-20131111-2xbla.html 7 See: James Olsen, Historical Dictionary of the British Empire, Volume 1, Greenwood Publishing Group, Connecticut, 2000, p. 377. Australian Infantry on the Western Front 239 of Australia and New Zealand.8 The opening chapter of this thesis clearly describes this very British world in which Australia was a member state. In 1914 the Australian way of life was encompassed within a British framework. That many of the Australian infantrymen of the Great War were English or foreign born is not well remembered. What is remembered is that Australians were eminently practical soldiers imbued with the ethos of the outback. They were immortalised as warrior athletes whose natural skills with a rifle enabled them to prevail despite, not because of, their association with the British. This was simply not true. Indeed, in the concept of being British there was a thread all the way to Australian infantry operations on the Western Front. During the four and a half year course of the Great War Australia raised five infantry divisions for operational service overseas. These formations variously served on Gallipoli and on the Western Front. Of these, the two older divisions, the 1st and 2nd Divisions served in both theatres. When the 1st and 2nd Divisions withdrew from Gallipoli at the end of 1915, a cadre from both went on to form the 4th and 5th Australian Divisions. Accordingly, some soldiers in the 1st, 2nd, 4th and 5th Divisions served from the outbreak of the conflict to the Armistice. Conversely, the troops of the 3rd Australian Division trained and served only in Europe. The statistics behind these operations are significant. The first Australian infantry operations occurred on Gallipoli in 1915 during a campaign that lasted approximately eight months. In comparison, Australian infantrymen served on the Western Front from March 1916 to October 1918. This period was nearly four times as long as, and significantly more complex than, Gallipoli. Nevertheless, Gallipoli holds iconic stature in Australian culture; to a far greater extent than the later, larger and, arguably, more militarily significant battles in France and Flanders. Such was the power of the Gallipoli experience that, even today, it is little recognised that the most effective Australian infantrymen were those who fought on the battlefields of the Western Front in 1918. Indeed, the Western Front was where the outcome of the war was decided. The Western Front generated its own mythology. In this theatre, the mud, barbed wire and death in the trenches eclipsed every conflict that had gone before. “Château” generals, safe from the fighting, sent thousands to their deaths for gains that could be measured in yards, not miles. This remains the prevailing view. Poets, notably Siegfried Sassoon and Wilfred Owen, provided unforgettable images of the tragedy of the common soldier in this

8 Moses and Pugsley (eds.), The German Empire and Britain’s Pacific Dominions: 1871-1919 Essays on the role of Australia and New Zealand in World Politics in the Age of Imperialism, Victoria, British Columbia, 2000. Australian Infantry on the Western Front 240 brutal mechanised war. Indeed, so central has the work of the war poets become to how the modern world interprets the Great War that its existence has become subsumed into the wider mythology.9 For its part, the Anzac legend contextualises the work of the Great War poets to promote the “superhuman” qualities of the Australian infantryman. In 2006, Peter Edgar quoted the 1918 Commander of the 1st Australian Division, Major General Thomas Glasgow’s approach to the development of the Australian infantryman in the Great War: Although we had the services of a large number of experienced and enthusiastic citizen force officers and men, it took approximately six months to train them to a sufficient standard to enable them to take part in military operations… Although we established our organisation in 1914, and started training in Egypt in 1915, the force did not reach the zenith of its efficiency until the autumn of 1917.10 The title of this thesis, and the evidence shown throughout the preceding chapters, bears these sentiments out. The Development of Australian Infantry on the Western Front begs two questions: were Australian infantrymen effective, and how did they become so? In answer to the first question, as the thesis has shown and Glasgow indicates, by 1918, Australian soldiers were effective. The answer to the second question is more complicated. Collective Australian battlefield effectiveness during the Great War stemmed from standardised practice that was occurring in all five Armies of the BEF. Standardisation ensured the integrity of implementing lessons learned in the BEF, and was manifest among doctrinal innovations in training, technology and tactics. The constant training and the actual experience of battle turned the Australian amateurs of 1915 into the hardened professionals of 1918. To this end, the essence of the Anzac legend lay more in the combat of 1918 than 1915. The overarching reality was that Australians were part of an empire; this is what enabled their fine performance on the battlefield during the last year of the war. The learning process that the BEF endured on the Western Front dispelled all notions of British martial mythology. Indeed, the learning process is the lens through which the development of Australian infantry from 1916-18 is most clearly viewed. By the end of 1916, after the Australian divisions had arrived, the foundation skills for all infantrymen deploying to the Western Front was a standardised 14-week basic training course. From this course naturally stemmed comprehensive reinforcement and specialist training. To this end, no Australian infantryman enlisting after the middle of 1916 arrived at his unit in France in 1917

9 Dan Todman, The Great War, p. 153. Todman devotes an entire chapter to the work of the British Great War poets. 10 Peter Edgar, To Villers-Bretonneux with Brigadier-General William Glasgow, DSO and the 13th Australian Infantry Brigade, Sydney, 2006, p. 264. Australian Infantry on the Western Front 241 until he had conducted about 6-months of intensive training. Then in France, at Army, Corps, Brigade, Division, Battalion, Company and finally, Platoon and Section levels, when the infantryman was not on the line he was trained, and then retrained, in preparation for the next operation. Throughout 1917 tactical innovation was codified by the War Office issue of training pamphlets. Notable among these were SS143 “Instructions for the Training of Platoons for Offensive Action”; SS135 “The Training and Employment of Divisions”; and SS152 “Instructions for the Training of British Armies in France”. In particular, SS143 provided for decentralised command and control among infantry units, and its tenets became central to the British Army’s method of waging war. To date, the application of the doctrine in these pamphlets by Australians has not been extensively studied. SS143 in particular irrevocably altered all earlier infantry tactics and precipitated the use of platoon level automated weapons, grenade launchers and specialist systems. Once, the battalion commander had controlled these weapons; now, the new method of fire and movement pioneered by the French enabled the platoon to be self supporting as it advanced. By 1917, these tactics provided an immense array of firepower for the platoon commander to control.11 The thesis has demonstrated that the development of Australian infantry on the Western Front occurred in unison with an Imperial design. By 1918 the Australian infantry were enabled by a superb staff and planning methodology, and supported by a comprehensive logistics infrastructure. Centralised command and decentralised control enabled the platoon to operate independently with overwhelming automatic fire support. In such practices, by October 1918 all British and Dominion infantry were highly skilled, efficient and professional. For the Australians, the war probably finished just in time. The pace of operations during its last months in France had been so fast, its casualties so high, that seven battalions were disbanded in 1918 to make up for manpower shortages in the others. 12 Compensating for such shortages through an increase in platoon level firepower only worked to a point. In the final analysis, it was then that the training and experience came into play. By 1918, the level of both in the Australian Corps was extremely high. Because the mutual understanding among the various Australian brigades and battalions at this stage of the war

11 Paddy Griffith, Battle Tactics of the Western Front: The British Army’s Art of Attack 1916-1918, London, 2000, p. 77. 12 Bean, OH, Vol VI, St Lucia, 1992, pp. 937-940. Australian Infantry on the Western Front 242 was so high, they could almost anticipate each others actions.13 This is an explicit and fitting final tribute to the development of Australian infantry on the Western Front. The war left a long-term legacy for all involved. Empires vanished, monarchies were deposed, the balance of power in the world changed. The conflict influenced the arts, national memory and political thought.14 Indeed, the memory of the Great War was the cornerstone of British culture during the 1920s and 1930s.15 So too was it in Australia; but the memory in Australia was somehow different. In the very act of rallying to the Empire, Australia had commenced the process of severing its ties to Britain. The social ramifications were immense. The experiences and record of Australian soldiers during the Great War forged a growing sense of national unity. After the war, these men were no longer Queenslanders, Victorians, New South Welshmen, Tasmanians, Western or Southern Australians; they were simply Australians. The terrible losses incurred scarred the national consciousness, and the echoes of these experiences may still be seen in the many monuments erected in almost every town, suburb and city of the country. In a final analysis, even in the necessarily narrow focus of this thesis – The development of Australian infantry on the Western Front – one can read that all things are interrelated. By the end of the war, Australian infantrymen were good, but other British and Empire troops were good, too. As a small nation, Australia was simply part of a much larger Imperial effort. Indeed, a century later the Australian involvement in contemporary conflict remains shaped by our Great War efforts: a small contribution to a larger standardised coalition; and one in which our contribution remains a national contingent. Such efforts have served Australia well. Even so, while Australia may have emerged from the Great War with a sense of identity, it was also a nation in mourning. In the loss of 60,000 soldiers, the country forsake a generation of potential doctors, teachers, farmers, craftsmen, any number of skilled men; but more importantly, countless fathers, sons and brothers. In this sense, Australia will never really know what may have been, and this is one legacy of the country’s involvement

13 Peter Pedersen, “Maintaining the Advance: Monash, battle procedure and the Australian Corps in 1918”, in Ashley Ekins (ed.), 1918 Year of Victory: The end of the Great War and the shaping of history, Sydney, 2010, pp. 144-145. 14 One need only refer to the modernist movement and strains of nihilism that stemmed from both battle and home front experiences during the war; the immense mourning and waves of commemoration that grew in the following decades; and the rise of Naziism and the appeasement policies of the 1930s. In fact, the advent of was accelerated by the Great War. While the modernist movement pre-dated the war, the mechanised scale and brutality of the conflict motivated many artists and writers of the genre. The war ended many of the class associated norms and mores that had extended from Victorian and Edwardian times, and in terms of its sheer technical and impersonal size, the older forms of writing and painting no longer seemed to adequately describe the war. 15 Todman, The Great War, p. 17. Australian Infantry on the Western Front 243 in the war. Yet equally, it was into a British world that these Australians were born or arrived, and it was under this protective mantle that these soldiers went to war to help defeat the justifiably wickedness of Prussian militarism. There is less than a year remaining before Australia commemorates the centenary of the arrival of the AIF in France, and Charles Bean’s words still ring true: That famous army of generous men marches still down the long lane of its country's history, with bands playing and rifles slung, with packs on shoulders, white dust on boots, and bayonet scabbards and entrenching tools flapping on countless thighs-as the French country-folk and the fellaheen of Egypt knew it. What these men did nothing can alter now. The good and the bad, the greatness and smallness of their story will stand. Whatever of glory it contains nothing now can lessen. It rises, as it will always rise, above the mists of ages, a monument to great-hearted men; and, for their nation, a possession for ever.16 Among Bean’s words, generous, greatness, good, nothing can lessen, a monument to great hearted men – above all, a possession forever – these words resonate most. This is the legacy of Australian infantrymen of the Great War, and in this heritage is an ethic for all Australians to emulate. In the hard work of training, self-discipline and commitment to others – our mates – is the fundamental basis upon which Australian society continues to prosper.

*

16 C.E.W. Bean, The Official History of Australia in the War of 1914-1918, Vol. VI. Australia in France, St. Lucia, 1992, p. 1096. Australian Infantry on the Western Front

BIBLIOGRAPHY ARCHIVAL SOURCES , Canberra AWM4 AIF War Diaries consulted: Headquarters AIF Depots UK War Diaries of the Australian & New Zealand Division 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th Infantry Divisions 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 8th, 10th, 11th, 12th, 13th, 15th Brigades 1st,3rd, 4th, 6th, 8th, 9th, 11th, 13th, 14th, 15th, 16th, 21st, 22nd, 25th, 27th, 28th, 30th, 31st, 32nd, 42nd, 44th, 47th, 48th, 52nd, 54th, 57th, 59th, 60th Battalions 1st – 3rd Training Brigades No.s 1 – 4th Groups and associated Training Battalions, UK War Diaries of the Australian & New Zealand Division

AWM25 Written Records 1914-18 War: 49/2 A Talk to officers and NCOs on “The Bayonet” and “Bayonet Training” 213/2 Part 18 Conferences – Administrative, Training Brigades, United Kingdom 327/16 Part 2 Special instructions to overseas training Brigade, necessity of reducing number of Infantry Groups, October 1917 707/16 Part 133 Special Routine Orders, No.s 4297 and 4424. By Major-General, The Honourable JW McCay, General Officer Commanding Australian Imperial Force Depots in United Kingdom, 4 and 16 April 1918. Amalgamation of Training Battalions 721/56 Organisation. Training Units, Infantry, 1916-1918 879/6 Schools, United Kingdom. Notes on system and sequence of musketry training as taught at The Australian School of Musketry, Bhurtpore Barracks, Tidworth, 1918 879/25 Schools, United Kingdom. Training Officers as Battalion Commanders, Aldershot 881/11 Schools, France. Training Instructions, Organisation, GHQ recommendations, 1916 937/15 Training, General. Lecture on the “Training of Lewis Gunners”. 937/20 Training, General. Lessons from operations 1917 937/28 Notes on demonstration in method of instructing a platoon, held at 1st Anzac Corps School 7-14 July 1917 943/7 Parts 1-8 Training, United Kingdom. Infantry 1916-18 943/11 Training, United Kingdom-Egypt. Special order by Major-General, The Honourable JW McCay, General Officer Commanding Australian Imperial Force Depots in United Kingdom, October 1917 943/11 Training, United Kingdom. Training Papers, Lark Hill, Trench Warfare 1916. 947/6/495 Training Memorandum 2nd Australian Division to I ANZAC 1917 Australian Infantry on the Western Front

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947/9 Training, France. 1st Anzac Corps 947/17 Parts 1 – 2 Training, France. Infantry 1916-1917 947/18 Training, France. Instructions for the training of Platoons for offensive action, 1917 947/26 Training, France. Notes on the employment of machine guns, compiled from experiences gained in recent operations, 1917 947/30 Training, France. Trench to trench attack by 3rd Australian Infantry Brigade. July 1917 947/52 Training, France. Exercise in cooperation between infantry and tanks as carried out by special demonstration companies of infantry at a tank driving school (July-august 1918) 947/68 Training, France. Machine gun training. Notes on operations recently carried out by Canadian Corps, 1916-1918 947/72 Training, France. 5th Australian Division. Training memos and syllabus up to July 1918 947/75 Training, France. Brigade tactical exercise, 18 June 1917 947/76 Training, France. Infantry Training, France, 1917 947/77 Training, France. A few notes on the action of the machine guns of the Australian Corps on 18 September 1918

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Library and Archives Canada (LAC), Ottawa LAC RG9 III Canadian Corps, Folder 90, File 10, correspondence Turner to Persey dated 16 & 20 December 1916. LAC RG9 III Canadian Corps, Folder 14, File 4, Report on Operations carried out by the 1st Canadian Division 7 April -5 May 1917. LAC RG 9 III C1 Vol 3864, Folder 99, File 3, Canadian Corps HQ General Staff. LAC, RG9 III C3 108, File 29, 1st Canadian Divisional Training School Syllabus of Instruction 25 Feb – 10 Mar 1916. LAC RG 9 III C1, Folder 109, File 1, Canadian Corps HQ General Staff. LAC RG 9 III C1, Folder 109, File 6, Canadian Corps HQ General Staff. LAC RG 9 III C1, Folder 109, File 9, Canadian Corps HQ General Staff. LAC RG 9 III C1, Folder 109, File 10, Canadian Corps HQ General Staff. LAC, RG9 III C3 Vol. 4026, Folder 10, File 2, Operations Order for the 1st Canadian Infantry Brigade, 21 Mar 1917, Ottawa. Australian Infantry on the Western Front

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LAC, MG 30 E100, Currie Papers Vol 35, file 159 ‘Report made by the Board of Inquiry’, Oct 16, 1916, Ottawa. LAC, MG 30 E100, Currie Papers, file 159 ‘Notes on French Attacks, North-East of Verdun in October and December, 1916.’ Ottawa.

AWM Private Records: AWM38 3DRL606 Diaries and Records of C.E.W. Bean various 3DRL/2316 Monash Personal Files various 2DRL/234 manuscript of wartime experiences of Private Verdi Schwinghammer, 42nd Battalion, 11th Brigade, 3rd Division, AIF. 3DRL/2206 diaries of Sergeant Arthur Thomas, 6th Battalion, 2nd Brigade, 1st Division, AIF.

National Archives of Australia AIF Service Records used: No. 1945 Private William Frederickson: http://recordsearch.naa.gov.au/scripts/Imagine.asp?B=1994395&I=1&SE=1 No. 2639 Private Verdi George Schwinghammer: http://recordsearch.naa.gov.au/scripts/Imagine.asp?B=8076591&I=1&SE=1 No. 291 Private William Arthur Pullen http://recordsearch.naa.gov.au/scripts/Imagine.asp?B=8023609 No. 2129 Private Percy Wilfred Barnard http://recordsearch.naa.gov.au/scripts/Imagine.asp?B=3050208&I=1&SE=1 No. 5064 Private Alexander Campbell http://recordsearch.naa.gov.au/scripts/Imagine.asp?B=1851466 No. 7283 Private Patrick Joseph O’Donovan http://recordsearch.naa.gov.au/scripts/Imagine.asp?B=7995836&I=1&SE=1 No. 3371 Private Bertram Byrnes http://recordsearch.naa.gov.au/scripts/Imagine.asp?B=3179822&I=1&SE=1 No. 7090 Private Thomas Edwin Mark http://recordsearch.naa.gov.au/scripts/Imagine.asp?B=8207789&I=1&SE=1 No. 2135 Sergeant John Page http://recordsearch.naa.gov.au/SearchNRetrieve/Interface/ViewImage.aspx?B=8000566

Other Websites: Australian Dictionary of Biography, http://adb.anu.edu.au AWM: http://www.awm.gov.au/encyclopedia/gallipoli/ AWM Private AxfordAxford: http://www.awm.gov.au/people/P10676228/ AWM Private Dalziel: http://www.awm.gov.au/people/P10676276/ Australian Infantry on the Western Front

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Commonwealth War Graves Commission: http://www.cwgc.org/find-a- cemetery/cemetery/56500/ETAPLES%20MILITARY%20CEMETERY Department of Defence: http://www.defencejobs.gov.au/army The Labor Call, 6 August 1914, accessed on Trove http://192.102.239.158/ndp/del/page/17865107 Library and Archives Canada: http://www.collectionscanada.gc.ca/military-peace/index-e.html Western Front Association, http://www.westernfrontassociation.com

War Office Training Pamphlets Field service Manual: 1914 Infantry Battalion, His Majesty’s Stationery Office (HMSO), London. Musketry Regulations, 1909 (Reprint 1914), HMSO, London, 1914. Notes for Infantry Officers on Trench Warfare, issued by the War Office, HMSO, March 1916. Bayonet Training, 1918 (Reprinted with amendments July 1916), General Staff, War Office; and Bayonet Fighting: Instruction with Service Rifle, HMSO, 1917. The Organization of an Infantry Battalion and the Normal Formation for the Attack, HMSO, London, 1917. SS126 Training and Employment of Bombers, HMSO, September 1916. SS135 Instructions for the Training of Divisions for Offensive Action, HMSO, London, 1916. SS135 The Employment of Divisions, His Majesty’s Stationary Office, HMSO, London, 1918. SS143 Instructions for the Training of Platoons for Offensive Action, HMSO, London, February 1917. SS144, Normal Formation for the Attack, HMSO, London, March 1917. SS152, Instructions for the Training of the British Armies in France, HMSO, June 1917. SS182 Instructions on Bombing, HMSO, London, September 1917. SS185 Assault Training HMSO, London, September 1917. SS197 The Tactical Employment of Lewis Guns, HMSO, January 1918. SS218 Notes compiled by GS 4th Army on the operations by the Australian Corps against Hamel, Bois de Hamel, and Bois de Vair on 4th July 1918, HMSO, London, 1918. SS448, Method of Instruction in the Lewis Gun, HMSO, London, 1917.

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