Anzac Intelligence — an Examination of the Role of Intelligence in the Planning and Conduct of the AIF’S Battles During the First World War

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Anzac Intelligence — An examination of the role of intelligence in the planning and conduct of the AIF’s battles during the First World War.

Jonathan Passlow

A thesis in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

School of Humanities and Social Sciences

Faculty of History

June 2015 ORIGINALITY STATEMENT

I hereby declare that this submission is my own work and to the best of my knowledge it contains no materials previously published or written by another person, or substantial proportions of material which have been accepted for the award of any other degree or diploma at UNSW or any other educational institution, except where due acknowledgement is made in the thesis. Any contribution made to the research by others, with whom I have worked at UNSW or elsewhere, is explicitly acknowledged in the thesis. I also declare that the intellectual content of this thesis is the product of my own work, except to the extent that assistance from others in the project's design and conception or in style, presentation and linguistic expression is acknowledged.

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Table of contents Page

Acknowledgements v

Abbreviations and symbols vi

List of images and maps viii

Introduction 1

Part 1 Intelligence organisations, structures and training

Chapter 1. Pre-war military intelligence doctrine and the

organisation of intelligence in the British Army 14

Chapter 2. ANZAC and Australian Corps Intelligence: 1915 to 1918 37

Part 2 Intelligence gathered using technical means

Chapter 3. Aerial reconnaissance and aerial photography 68

Chapter 4. Topographic intelligence 103

Chapter 5. Artillery intelligence 141

Chapter 6. Captured documents and enemy material 185

Chapter 7. Wireless intelligence, signals intercept and

communications deception 212

Part 3 Intelligence gathered using human means

Chapter 8. Human intelligence and counter-espionage

operations 243

Chapter 9. Trench raids 266

Chapter 10. Patrolling, reconnaissance, and observation 301

Chapter 11. Prisoners 324

Chapter 12. Intelligence and battle planning in 1918: An

Australian narrative 360

Conclusion 398

iii

Appendix 1. British military intelligence organisations in 1914 398

Appendix 2. British military intelligence organisations in 1914 406

Bibliography 412

Acknowledgements

This project had its genesis in a desire to undertake some more study and a conversation with Jeff Grey. Intelligence has always been a fascinating subject for me and I wanted to study it in more detail. I approached Jeff to ask his advice, and suggested looking at intelligence and the role it played in during Australia’s battles in the Second World War. It was Jeff who suggested the First World War. When I queried whether there was enough material to write about, he challenged me to take a look.

Little did I know how much intelligence was available during the First World War or how central it was to military doctrine at the time the war began. I had almost no concept that many of the different forms of intelligence which modern militaries take for granted had their origins just before or during the First World War. There is little that has been written about intelligence during the First World War and I hope this thesis adds to that small body of work.

It would not have been possible to complete this thesis without the support and assistance of so many people.

First and foremost are my family. Catherine, I would like to acknowledge your love, support, patience and forbearance over the last four years. My daughters, Hannah and Emily, who thought the idea of dad going ‘back to school’ a great laugh. Remember, you are never too old to keep learning.

On the academic side of the house, I would like to acknowledge Jeff Grey, who has been along since the start of this journey and who has done his best to keep me on the straight and narrow. My thanks also to Peter Stanley, who joined in somewhat later, but who has still offered valuable advice. Also to Jim Beach, who offered advice and suggestions as I was just getting started.

I’d also like to thank the staff at the research centre at the Australian War Memorial, who ably assisted me while I combed through operational records looking for snippets of information. Also the staff at the National Archive in the UK, the UK National Army Museum, the Imperial War Museum, and the Royal United Service Institute. Not to mention the many smaller museums I hunted through looking for material to support my thesis.

To Markus for reading my thesis and providing sage advice. Thanks also to Duncan Beard for his work in copy editing the final draft.

A special thanks to Chris, Tiff, Jake and Ava for letting me sleep on their sofa bed and share their home on my research trips to the UK, and to my work colleagues who graciously accepted my absences as I pursued my studies.

Finally, to all those who I may have missed, please accept my thanks for all your assistance and encouragement.

Abbreviations and symbols

18-Pdr — quick firing 18-pounder field gun

4.5” — quick firing 4.5-inch field howitzer

6” — breech loading 6-inch siege howitzer

60-Pdr — breech loading 60-pounder field gun

8” — breech loading 8-inch howitzer

9.2” — breech loading 9.2-inch siege howitzer

AFC — Australian Flying Corps

AIC — Australian Intelligence Corps

AIF — Australian Imperial Force

ANZAC — Australian and New Zealand Army Corps

AWM — Australian War Memorial

Bn — Battalion

Bde — Brigade

BEF — British Expeditionary Force

CBSO — Counter Battery Staff Officer

CEF — Canadian Expeditionary Force

CGS — Chief of General Staff

Corps Troops — Troops allocated under the control of a Corps Headquarters, usually specialists resources such as aircraft, heavy artillery, tanks and supply

CMF — Commonwealth Military Forces

Div — Division

DMI — Director of Military Intelligence

EPW – Enemy Prisoner of War

FOO — Forward Observation Officer

FSC — Field Survey Company

FSR — Field Service Regulations

GHQ — General Headquarters

GSO1 — General Staff Officer Grade 1 (Lieutenant Colonel)

GSO2 — General Staff Officer Grade 2 (Major)

GSO3 — General Staff Officer Grade 3 (Captain)

HE — High Explosive

IGS — Imperial General Staff

IWM — Imperial War Museum

MEF — Mediterranean Expeditionary Force

NID — Naval Intelligence Department

POW — Prisoner of War

RAF — Royal Air Force

RE — Royal Engineers

RFA — Royal Field Artillery

RFC — Royal Flying Corps

RGA — Royal Garrison Artillery

RHA — Royal Horse Artillery

RNAS — Royal Naval Air Service

vii

List of images and maps

Figure 1 — Copy of Army Form W.3092. p.52.

Figure 2 — A diagram showing the layout of the Hindenburg Line defences near

Bullecourt. p.94.

Figure 3 — Map of Pozières Village. p.120.

Figure 4 — Diagram of a house alongside the Albert-Bapaume Road in Pozières.

p.121.

Figure 5 — Army Form W.3363: Report on new pattern shell. p.201.

Figure 6 — Report on German yellow cross gas shell fuse, March 1918. p.208.

Figure 7 — A sketch showing the deployment of jamming sets. p.217.

Figure 8 — Map showing the planned XI Corps attack at Fromelles. p.283.

Figure 9 — A satirical look at the role of observers in the BEF printed in a trench

newspaper. p.308.

Figure 10 — An Australian patrol map from the Armentières Sector, June 1916.

p.317.

Figure 11 — Form for interrogation of prisoners, Appendix No. J36. p.344.

Figure 12 — Map showing the Hindenburg Line defences at Bellicourt. p.394.

viii

Introduction

Military intelligence is essentially the source from which all military

activity is actuated. It is on the knowledge of the military dispositions that

any operation of war is based. Intelligence is concerned in every phase of

attack and defence — from the action of a reconnoitering patrol in the

fighting front to the defence of ammunition factories in the heart of a

seemingly peaceful country.1

Intelligence is more than just information. Information is data that has been collected; intelligence is the product resulting from relating that information to an actual or proposed area of operations. Intelligence provides commanders with knowledge and understanding of the battlefield on which they must fight; it provides warnings about the development of hostilities and an understanding of the capabilities and intent of adversaries. Intelligence also provides an insight into friendly vulnerabilities. The British Army understood intelligence to be a fundamental element in the planning and conduct of operations, an essential factor for success in war.2

Like all of the British Empire Armies, the Australian Imperial Force’s (AIF) early understanding of the importance of intelligence was drawn from its British

Army roots. Despite popular myth, intelligence was an important part of battle planning during the First World War and the amount of intelligence available to the British Army increased exponentially over its course. From the time they arrived in Egypt and throughout the Gallipoli campaign, the AIF’s commanders

1 No.1 Course of Instruction for Intelligence Officers, February 1917, AWM25, 881/27/14. 2 War Office General Staff, Field Service Regulations: Part I: Operations (London, Harrison & Sons, 1909), p.112 — Henceforth: FSR I.

and staff had access to a large body of intelligence with which to plan its operations. Arriving on the Western Front, the AIF gained access to more forms and greater quantities of intelligence. Throughout 1916 and 1917, as Australian staff took a greater role in planning the battles fought by the AIF, there was continual improvement in the way in which they used intelligence to plan and conduct battles. By 1918, intelligence was often the determining factor in how and where the AIF's battles were fought.

This thesis offers a thematic examination of how the AIF used the different types of intelligence that were available at the outbreak of the war, or which became available as the war progressed, to plan and conduct its battles. It will focus on the different types of intelligence available to the AIF and the AIF’s use of these over the course of the war. Obtaining intelligence is only part of the picture. Intelligence is useless if it does not find its way to the troops and commanders who need to use it. This requires staff work, something that the

Australians (along with the rest of the British Expeditionary Force (BEF)) learnt and became progressively better at, until they were the ‘perfect instrument they were in 1918’.3

The intelligence staff process involves examining existing information and using that information to clarify a situation, or to produce assessments, predictions and conclusions in response to a commander’s intelligence needs.

The role of the intelligence staff was to obtain information about the enemy and the country in which they were operating, to analyse the information, and to communicate the information to the commander. When combined with an

3 Edmonds critising Bean as quoted in Gary Sheffield, Command and Morale: The British Army on the Western Front 1914–1918 (Barnsley, Pen & Sword Praetorian Press, 2014), p.66

understanding of friendly force capabilities and knowledge of the mission that the commander was required to complete, operational decisions could be made.4

Only in the most rare of circumstances did one single piece of intelligence change the way in which a battle was conducted. Almost all of the intelligence collected by the AIF formed part of a larger intelligence picture. Observations by troops in the front line of German activity in the trenches opposite them might lead to a trench raid that captured prisoners who under examination revealed information about new German tactics or weapons or intentions. It is also important to understand the context in which the AIF was fighting, since no examination of how intelligence was used can be divorced from an examination of battle planning or the AIF’s major battles.

In examining how the AIF used intelligence to plan and conduct its battles, this study focuses on Gallipoli and on the Western Front, but does not include the desert or Sinai-Palestine campaign. Without doubt, intelligence played an important part in these campaigns, but the intelligence environment on the Western Front, particularly from 1916 onwards, was far more complex than any other theatre during the war, and most of the key intelligence developments took place on the Western Front before being exported to other theatres. The intelligence structures in Mesopotamia, Egypt, Palestine, East

Africa, Greece, Macedonia and Italy were derivatives of those on the Western

Front and they were often deployed on a smaller scale some time after similar capabilities had been employed on the Western Front.5

4 FSR I, p.112. 5 Anthony Clayton, Forearmed: A History of the Intelligence Corps (London, Brassey's, 1993), pp.43–51.

Military intelligence can be considered broadly to be strategic, operational or tactical. Strategic intelligence shapes the formulation of national strategic policy and military plans, and focuses on foreign geography, infrastructure and force planning. It also looks at the development of new tactics and techniques, at new equipment and its application to future operations. Most importantly, strategic intelligence enables threats to be anticipated and countered. Operational intelligence spans the gap between strategic intelligence shaping national policy, and tactical intelligence, which is used to fight individual battles. Operational intelligence is the intelligence required for planning and conducting campaigns and major battles in order to accomplish strategic objectives. It is distinct from strategic intelligence because of its focus on the theatre in which the battle or campaign is going to be fought. Tactical intelligence is required for planning and conducting operations at the local level. It is largely focused on the enemy and is designed to assist in both locating the enemy force and providing information about enemy tactics, units and weapons. This study focuses primarily on the type of intelligence that was available at the operational

(corps) level, although to understand the context in which the Australians were operating we must also understand some of the intelligence picture at both Army and General Headquarters (GHQ) level. Similarly, we also need to look at the tactical level to see how intelligence was used by Australian units on the battlefield.

This study has adopted the same language used by intelligence officers and the intelligence staff to describe different forms of intelligence. This approach has occasionally made it difficult to differentiate between specific sources of intelligence. Secret service reporting offers a useful example of this,

with information obtained from GHQ controlled secret agent networks,

Mansfield Cummings’s secret service bureau, and information obtained from refugees and neutral travelers all being referred to as secret service reporting, although the information originated from different sources.6 Similarly, the term intelligence was often used interchangeably with the term information, particularly in pre-war military doctrine.7

In a recent survey of the literature and scholarly works that have been written about intelligence in the First World War, Daniel Larsen noted that the

‘conflict remains in many ways unexplored by intelligence scholars’. Larsen notes that, while military intelligence had a significant impact on the First World

War, ‘research here remains relatively limited’.8 Chris Coultard-Clark’s The

Citizen General Staff: The Australian Intelligence Corps 1907–1914 provides an understanding of pre-war intelligence structures in Australia.9 Michael

Occleshaw’s Armour Against Fate is the first published attempt to study military intelligence in the First World War.10 Dan Jenkins’ unpublished thesis, Winning

Trench Warfare: Battlefield Intelligence in the Canadian Corps 1914–1918, traces the evolution of battlefield intelligence in the Canadian Corps throughout the

First World War.11 Jim Beach’s recent Haig’s Intelligence: GHQ and the German

Army 1914–1918 looks at the intelligence system and the relationship between

6 Jim Beach, Haig’s Intelligence: GHQ and the German Army 1914–1918 (New York, Cambridge, 2013), pp.119–138. 7 FSR I, pp.112–125. 8 Daniel Larsen, 'Intelligence in the First World War: The State of the Field', Intelligence and National Security, 29(2) (2014), pp.1–21 9 Chris Coulthard-Clark, The Citizen General Staff: The Australian Intelligence Corps 1907–1914 (Canberra, Military History Society of Australia, 1976) 10 Michael Occleshaw, Armour Against Fate: British Military Intelligence in the First World War (London, Columbus Books, 1989). 11 Dan Jenkins, ‘Winning Trench Warfare: Battlefield Intelligence in the Canadian Corps 1914– 1918’ (unpublished PhD thesis, Carelton University, Ottawa, 1999)

intelligence and operations, primarily at the GHQ level, but also in the context of how GHQ intelligence related to subordinate formations of the BEF.12 There are other studies which relate to British military intelligence in other theatres such as the Middle East and Palestine, including Polly Mohs’s British Intelligence and the Arab Revolt: The First Modern Intelligence War and Yigal Sheffy’s British

Military Intelligence in the Palestine Campaign 1914–1918.13 While these are part of the larger history of military intelligence during the First World War, their usefulness to a study of intelligence on the Western Front is limited. Larsen also noted that ‘little meaningful has been published on intelligence concerning the

Dardanelles and Gallipoli’.14 This thesis builds on the earlier work of Coultard-

Clark, Beach and Jenkins filling in the gap that exists in our knowledge about how the Australians used intelligence to plan and conduct their battles during the

First World War.

Despite the limited amount of research into military intelligence during the First World War, there is a wealth of material relating to military intelligence doctrine, the role of military intelligence in operations, military intelligence training, and the different types of intelligence that existed before or were developed during the war. This study has drawn heavily on Australian unit war diaries, and the AIF’s written and operational records. These files contain not only operational records and reports but also copies of intelligence summaries and assessments, along with plans and official publications, all of which have assisted in tracing the use of intelligence by the AIF.

12 Beach, Haig’s Intelligence. 13 Poly Mohs, British Intelligence and the Arab Revolt: The First Modern Intelligence War (New York, Routledge, 2008); Yigal Sheffy, British Military Intelligence in the Palestine Campaign 1914– 1918, (London, Frank Cass & Co, 1998). 14 Larsen, ‘Intelligence in the First World War’, pp.1-21

Along with these official records are the private records of Australian intelligence officers and Australian members of the intelligence staff which provide a useful window into specific aspects of intelligence training and the roles that intelligence officers played at brigade, division and corps headquarters. Particular mention should be made of two Australian intelligence officers who kept extensive journals and notes relating to their training and employment. The first is Captain Frederick Robinson, who served as Divisional

Intelligence Officer for the 5th Division from January 1917 until the end of the war. Robinson attended intelligence training in the UK and served as the intelligence instructor at the Australian Corps School on several occasions. He was uniquely positioned to provide a detailed insight into the role of a divisional intelligence officer. The second is Lieutenant Charles Brossois, who recorded details about his training as an intelligence officer at the Intelligence Corps

School at Harrow.

The private records of many Australian commanders and senior officers have yielded much less evidence about the role intelligence played in the planning and conduct of the AIF’s battles. Despite extensive correspondence between many of them, few make any mention of intelligence in their writings, reflecting the fact that intelligence was not something that was spoken about openly. This has made it difficult to determine exactly what intelligence was provided to commanders and to attribute operational decisions based on intelligence that was available at the time. Only one or two of the more indiscreet commanders openly acknowledged specific intelligence as the source of their actions. Australian unit histories also provide useful context particularly when examining the type of intelligence that was available at the tactical level.

Australia's path to the Western Front saw it serve first as part of the

Mediterranean Expeditionary Force (MEF) and landing on Gallipoli as part of

British efforts to knock Turkey out of the war. The Australians’ first experiences of using intelligence in planning their battles came as they prepared for the landings. There was a large amount of intelligence available to commanders and their staff planning the Gallipoli landings, and while it appears that intelligence influenced operational planning on Gallipoli, it is often difficult to establish a direct link between the available intelligence and the final plans for the landings or other battles of the Gallipoli campaign. The intelligence arrangements in the early months of the campaign lacked many elements that would become commonplace on the Western Front, such as instructions on how to deal with prisoners of war (POW), plans for interrogating prisoners, or for collecting additional information to support the landing force. What is clear is that, at the start of the campaign, commanders had, at best, an incomplete understanding of the terrain over which they would fight and little understanding of their enemy’s capabilities, and they failed to assess how the enemy was likely to react. As the

Gallipoli campaign progressed, a more effective system designed to collect information and produce intelligence was established, which ultimately assisted in the meticulous planning for the withdrawal from Anzac.

Arriving on the Western Front, the Australians joined a highly organised intelligence system developed by the BEF since the beginning of the war.

Australian troops quickly gained experience conducting trench raids to secure prisoners, documents and a range of other information; patrolling no-mans land; and observing the activities of the Germans. Australian headquarters and commanders had much greater access to sources of intelligence, such as aircraft

and observation balloons, and more information than ever before. Throughout

1916 and 1917, the BEF’s ability to collect, analyse and report intelligence continued to develop. The importance of artillery spurred the development of capabilities to enable hostile artillery to be accurately located and neutralised.

Aerial reconnaissance and photography capabilities expanded further. Wireless interception also continued to be improved as the BEF’s intelligence capabilities reached an increasing level of sophistication.

The AIF’s battles in 1917 demonstrated what could be achieved through careful operational planning, and by incorporating a wide variety of different types of intelligence into operational planning. Intelligence permeated every aspect of the way the Australians operated. Detailed operational instructions and intelligence plans were issued down to the lowest levels to ensure that troops were prepared for each attack. This came to include providing small scale maps and aeroplane photographs to platoon commanders and walking troops through large scale models of the areas they were to fight to ensure that they understood their individual part in the operation. Complex artillery and counter-battery plans were developed to destroy or neutralise enough of the enemy artillery to allow the infantry to seize and hold their objectives. Commanders and their staff learned to use intelligence to support their operations and recognised that rushing headlong into battle without careful planning or understanding the operational situation inevitably led to operational failure.

By 1918, the Australian Corps was able to maintain a high operational tempo over a period of several months and was capable of rapid and complex actions with only the briefest direction. Battles of 1918 such as Hamel, Amiens

and the attack on the Hindenburg Line demonstrated how sophisticated the AIF’s use of intelligence in the planning and conduct of its battles had become.

As this thesis is a thematic examination of the different types of intelligence available to the AIF throughout the course of the war and how that intelligence was used, each major form of intelligence will be examined in an individual chapter. This allows for a detailed examination of a specific type of intelligence and its use by the AIF at different periods from the beginning until the end of the war. These chapters in turn have then been grouped together into parts with common themes. Part 1 deals with intelligence organisations, structures and training. Part 2 deals with types of intelligence gathered using technical means, such as aerial photographs or wireless intelligence. Part 3 deals with intelligence gathered using human means, through activities such as prisoner examinations or trench raids. The order of examination of the different forms of intelligence within each part has been determined by the order in which they emerged before or during the war. Chapter 1 examines pre-war intelligence doctrine and traces the evolution of British military intelligence through key post-Boer war reforms. It also examines the intelligence structures of the British

Army in 1914, which served as the pattern upon which all British Empire armies based their intelligence structures at the outbreak of the war, and compares them to the intelligence structures of 1917, when British military intelligence reached its apogee. Chapter 2 looks at the military intelligence organisation within the AIF and how Australians trained their intelligence personnel during the course of the war. Chapter 3 examines the development of aerial reconnaissance and aerial photography at Gallipoli and on the Western Front and how this form of intelligence was used by Australians throughout the course

of the war. Chapter 4 focuses on topographic intelligence and examines what information was available about the areas in which Australians would fight and how this information was incorporated into the AIF’s battle planning. Chapter 5 examines artillery intelligence and focuses on the importance of artillery intelligence to counter-battery operations. Chapter 6 looks at captured documents and captured enemy equipment as sources of intelligence. Chapter 7 examines wireless intercept and the growth of signals intelligence as a source of intelligence throughout the war. Chapter 8 focuses on human intelligence and counter-intelligence operations. Chapter 9 begins an examination of front line intelligence and focuses on trench raids a source of intelligence. This chapter also considers why the planning processes adopted for trench raids was not adopted for larger attacks such as the battle of Fromelles. Chapter 10 deals with reconnaissance patrols and observation. Chapter 11 finishes the examination of front line intelligence, looking at the examination of prisoners and deserters.

Chapter 12 examines in narrative form the AIF’s use of intelligence to plan and conduct its battles in 1918, focusing on key battles such as Amiens, the attacks on Mont St Quentin and Peronne, and the breaking of the Hindenburg Line. The examination of the use of different forms of intelligence in these later battles has been excluded from earlier chapters to allow for a comprehensive examination of how all forms of intelligence integrated into the Australians battle planning from the battle of Amiens until the end of the war. Finally, the conclusion brings together the findings of the thesis and demonstrates the types of intelligence available to Australians, how the availability and use of intelligence evolved throughout the course of the war until intelligence became a key operational driver at every level, and shows that by the end of the war Australians were

efficient collectors and effective users of intelligence in the way that they planned and conducted their battles.

Part 1 — Intelligence organisations, structures and training

Chapter 1. Pre-war military intelligence doctrine and the organisation of intelligence in the British Army

The acquisition of information about the enemy has always been

considered one of the most important elements of success in war.1

The British Army’s experience during the Boer War forced it to re-evaluate the importance of military intelligence and the role that intelligence played in war.

These lessons were captured by British military doctrine and passed on to the

British officer corps in the lead-up to the First World War.2 The importance of intelligence and the need for an ‘Intelligence Corps’ in any expeditionary force was well understood.3 These lessons were not lost on the Dominions either. Yet, at the outbreak of the war in 1914, the British Army maintained only a small intelligence staff and no standing intelligence corps existed. The Intelligence

Sections at GHQ of the BEF and in subordinate British military headquarters were small and the intelligence staff was responsible for an overwhelming multitude of tasks. Three years later, by the end of 1917, the intelligence organisation of the BEF had expanded in size and complexity. More information was available to military intelligence than ever before and intelligence personnel were now an integral part of the army at all levels of command.4

1 David Henderson, The Art of Reconnaissance (London, John Murray, 1907), p.1. 2 For pre-war British intelligence doctrine, see War Office General Staff, Regulations for Intelligence Duties in the Field (London, Byre and Spottiswoode, 1904); War Office General Staff, Field Intelligence: Its Principles and Practice, (London, Byre and Spottiswoode, 1904); War Office General Staff, Field Service Regulations: Part I: Operations (London, Harrison & Sons, 1909); War Office General Staff, Field Service Regulations: Part II: Organization and Administration (London, Harrison & Sons, 1909); War Office General Staff, Staff Manual: War (Provisonal) (London, 1912). 3 Jim Beach, Haig's Intelligence: GHQ and the German Army, 1916–1918 (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2013), p.16; Anthony Clayton, Forearmed: A History of the Intelligence Corps (London, Brassey's, 1993), p.16. 4 For the history of the British Intelligence Corps, see Jim Beach, Haig's Intelligence: GHQ and the German Army, 1916–1918 (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2013); Anthony Clayton, Forearmed: A History of the Intelligence Corps (London, Brassey's, 1993); Thomas Fergusson, British

This chapter examines pre-war British Army intelligence doctrine and structures. It compares the intelligence sections of GHQ BEF down to the headquarters of an infantry brigade in 1914 with the intelligence sections that existed three years later in 1917 to illustrate the growth in the size, complexity and capability of British military intelligence. This chapter also highlights some of the differences between the standard British Army military intelligence organisation and the organisation adopted by some of the Dominion forces, notably Canada and Australia.

Intelligence training and doctrine in the pre-war period

At the outbreak of the Second Boer War in October 1899, the British Army found itself opposed by a well-equipped enemy fighting on known terrain. Intelligence failures abounded. The British Army had no professional intelligence staff and successive British commanders-in-chief failed to understand, or ignored, the intelligence that was available to them. After a series of reverses, a more professional approach was taken to intelligence which eventually contributed to the defeat of the Boer forces in the field, followed by a longer but ultimately successful campaign against Boer guerrillas.5

Military Intelligence 1870–1914: The Development of a Modern Intelligence Organization (London, Arms and Armour Press, 1984); Peter Gudgin, Military Intelligence: The British Story (London, Arms and Armour Press, 1989); Jock Haswell, British Military Intelligence (London, Willmer Brothers Limited, 1973); Aubrey Herbert, Mons, Anzac & Kut: A British Intelligence Officer in Three Theatres of the First World War, 1914–1918 (Barnsley, Leonaur, 2010); Polly Mohs, Military Intelligence and the Arab Revolt: The First Modern Intelligence War (Milton Park, Routledge, 2008); Michael Occleshaw, Armour against Fate: British Military Intelligence in the First World War (London, Colombus Books, 1989); Yigal Sheffy, British Military Intelligence in the Palestine Campaign 1914–1918, (London, Frank Cass & Co. Ltd, 1998). 5 Clayton, Forearmed, pp.8–10.

The Boer War taught the British Army that ‘good intelligence saves lives, reduces risks and makes a major contribution to winning wars’.6 From the experiences of South Africa emerged the concept that the British Army required an intelligence corps to support it in the field, along with the recognition that professional military intelligence personnel would be required in any future war.7 Although there was still ‘no question of any sort of peacetime Intelligence

Corps’, by 1904 intelligence doctrine such as ‘Field Intelligence, Its Principles and

Practices’ and ‘Regulations for Intelligence Duties in the Field’ captured many of the lessons from Boer War. Indeed, both of these manuals were still in use when

Britain went to war in 1914.8 The development of this intelligence doctrine took place at a time when the British Army was being reshaped following the experience of the Boer War.9

By 1906, thoughtful British officers recognised that the likelihood of a

European conflict was growing. Many of the instructors lecturing at Staff College in the pre-war years, such as Colonel James Edmonds and Colonel Edward

Gleichen, were experienced officers who had served in intelligence roles. Both

Edmonds and Gleichen lectured on the importance of intelligence in war and were able to draw on the experiences of the Boer War, along with more recent conflicts such as the Russo-Japanese War, to provide examples of the role that intelligence played in contemporary conflict.10

6 Haswell, British Military Intelligence, p.71. 7 Clayton, Forearmed, p.13. 8 Fergusson, British Military Intelligence, pp.173–181; Haswell, British Military Intelligence, p.76. 9 Spencer Jones, From Boer War to World War: Tactical Reform of the British Army 1902–1914, Kindle edition (Norman, University of Oklahoma Press, 2012), pp.49–58. 10 Fergusson, British Military Intelligence, pp.185–186.

In 1907, the British Army’s Eastern Command established an ‘Intelligence and Reconnaissance Course’ which trained a small number of junior officers to conduct reconnaissance work based largely upon this early intelligence doctrine.11 The training stressed the importance of reconnaissance and also the value of scouts, guides and field intelligence officers.12 Brigadier-General David

Henderson, formerly Director of Military Intelligence (South Africa) and author of both Field Intelligence and Intelligence Duties in the Field, lectured on the course. Henderson also published his own book in 1907, ‘The Art of

Reconnaissance’, which drew on the experiences of South Africa and the Russo-

Japanese War to highlight the importance of tactical reconnaissance and the value of intelligence.13 Henderson argued that ‘the possession of correct information is the surest guard against surprise, and one of the most important factors of success’.14 In the third and final edition of his book published in May

1914, Henderson showed remarkable foresight by including a chapter on the role of aircraft and the value of aerial reconnaissance as a source of intelligence.15

The 1909 Field Service Regulations (FSR) Part I provided the general principles on which the British Army would conduct future wars. Chapter 6 —

‘Information’ was devoted entirely to intelligence. FSR stated that knowledge about an enemy’s dispositions and the terrain in which the army must fight were

‘essential to success in war’. The role of the Intelligence Staff was to obtain

11 Clayton, Forearmed, p.16; Fergusson, British Military Intelligence, pp.185–187. 12 FSR I, pp.113–119; Henderson, Art of Reconnaissance, pp.73–114. 12 War Office General Staff, Regulations for Intelligence Duties in the Field, p.5. 13 Fergusson, British Military Intelligence, pp.186–187. 14 War Office General Staff, Field Intelligence, p.8. 15 Fergusson, British Military Intelligence, p.187.

information about the enemy and the country in which the army was operating, and every source of information available needed to be ‘fully utilised’.16 Maps and reports prepared in peacetime, reconnaissance, special agents, statements from inhabitants, tapping telephones, newspapers, letters, documents, deserters, and prisoners, were all identified as potential sources of information. Once collected, information needed to be ‘sifted’, conclusions drawn and then presented to the commander to enable the commander to make operational decisions.17

Discussion of how intelligence was to be collected in FSR focused on reconnaissance. Cavalry played the leading role. The primary function of the cavalry was reconnaissance, with pre-war intelligence doctrine noting that ‘the search for information has been placed high on the list of duties of the cavalry in war’.18 The ability of the cavalry to move rapidly around the battlefield, to cover long distances and to operate ahead of the main force made them an efficient means of gathering information. Cavalry also had the dual role of preventing the enemy from gathering intelligence on friendly force movements and operations,

‘their secondary objective being the prevention of the enemy’s attempts to gain information by reconnaissance’.19

Later editions of FSR identified the developing capabilities of the Royal

Flying Corps (RFC) as another important means of gathering information on the activities of the enemy, albeit one to supplement and not replace the role of the cavalry.20 Aircraft could be used where cavalry had previously been sent to

16 FSR I, p.112. 17 FSR I, p.112. 18 War Office General Staff, Field Intelligence, p.8. 19 FSR I, pp.114–115; War Office General Staff, Field Intelligence, p.8. 20 FSR I, p.118.

obtain information, allowing the cavalry to focus on defeating enemy reconnaissance forces. They would then keep in touch with the main enemy force as it was brought to battle. In his writings, Henderson went so far as to suggest that aircraft could obviate the need for cavalry to operate far in advance of the main force, this role being performed by aircraft, allowing the cavalry to concentrate on tactical reconnaissance closer to the main force. It was only at night or in adverse weather, when aircraft could not operate, that the cavalry would need to work further forward to fill reconnaissance gaps left by aircraft.21

The ability of aircraft to respond to a commander’s information requirements meant that they needed to be distributed throughout the army.

This meant adopting a decentralised model, whereby aircraft were allocated to subordinate headquarters that controlled them directly to ensure the rapid transmission of information obtained during aerial reconnaissance missions.22

Early experiments with aerial photography on the eve of the war, which would grow into a fully fledged capability — along with the role that aircraft and balloons played in spotting for artillery — would make aerial reconnaissance and aerial photography one of the most important sources of intelligence available during the First World War.

Intelligence doctrine such as ‘Field Intelligence’ and ‘Intelligence Duties in the Field’ provided detail about the role of guides, scouts and field intelligence officers, along with networks of secret service agents, which received only a brief mention in FSR. From South Africa, the work of guides, scouts, field intelligence officers and secret service agents was well understood.23 Scouts, guides and field

21 Henderson, Art of Reconnaissance, pp.174–175. 22 FSR I, p.118. 23 War Office General Staff, Regulations for Intelligence Duties in the Field, pp.13–14.

intelligence officers would move with and ahead of the expeditionary force, identifying sources of information and collecting the intelligence required to support the army in the field. Networks of secret service agents would be established to monitor and report on the enemy as the British had been able to do in South Africa. The trenches of France and Belgium would require a critical re-evaluation of the role of scouts, guides and field intelligence officers in modern war.

Armies had always used local guides and informants, willing or not, and in

France and Belgium civilians became valuable sources of information, while efforts were also made to obtain information from behind the German lines.24

Secret service agents were sent into neutral countries to establish networks to provide information on the war and the activities of the enemy.25 The South

African experience had also taught valuable lessons about the need to ensure that enemy agents were unable to operate freely in friendly territory. Preventing enemy agents from collecting intelligence on the activities of friendly forces — counter-espionage — would be a key role of the intelligence police in wartime.26

Prisoners and captured enemy documents were already known to be excellent sources of intelligence, but the challenge that would be faced by the

British Army was how to obtain this information once the battlefield became locked into static trench warfare. Trench raids and patrols in no man’s land, to capture prisoners, documents and equipment, would become a regular feature of

24 War Office General Staff, Field Intelligence, pp.15–16. 25 Keith Jeffery, Mi6: The History of the Secret Intelligence Service 1909–1949 (London, Bloomsbury 2010), pp.68–97. 26 War Office General Staff, Regulations for Intelligence Duties in the Field, p.15; War Office General Staff, Field Intelligence, pp.45–49.

warfare, as would a systematised process for searching captured enemy positions to ensure that nothing of intelligence value was overlooked.27

In 1912, almost every aspect of British military intelligence doctrine as it related to intelligence in the field was brought together in the 1912 Staff Manual

— War (Provisional). Tables and instructions detailed the organisation of the

Intelligence Sections that the British Army would take with it to war and the intelligence staff processes that would be followed in headquarters.28 Most importantly, it created an Intelligence Corps which, on the outbreak of future hostilities, would contain ‘all persons (except secret service agents) permanently engaged in intelligence duties’.29

The generation of British officers trained in the lead-up to the First World

War understood the importance of intelligence and the role that it played in planning and conducting modern battles, perhaps more so than any previous generations of British officers. Many of these officers would occupy important staff positions in headquarters or in the field when the war began.

Intelligence training and doctrine in the pre-war period: The Australian context

The importance of military intelligence was not lost on Australia. Many of the changes adopted in Britain after the Boer War were implemented in Australia. In

January 1905, Lieutenant-Colonel William Bridges was appointed as the Chief of

Intelligence of the Commonwealth Military Forces (CMF), although, as Chris

Coulthard-Clark has noted, ‘the use of the title “Chief of Intelligence” suggested

27 War Office General Staff, Field Intelligence, p.14. 28 War Office General Staff, Staff Manual: War (Provisonal), (London, 1912), pp.77–80. 29 Haswell, British Military Intelligence, p.76.

an emphasis on intelligence which is misleading in today’s context, for Bridges’s duties covered general staff work as much as military intelligence.’30

Bridges advocated establishing an Australian General Staff to oversee and manage the military intelligence functions of the CMF, but his efforts in gaining support from the then Minister for Defence, Thomas Ewing, were unsuccessful.

One proposal which did find favor with the government of the day was a proposal to establish an Australian Corps of Guides, which could fill intelligence gaps in Australia’s knowledge about nearby territories and the Australian mainland.31 The Canadian Militia established a field intelligence force, the Corps of Guides, in 1903 to provide an organised field intelligence force should Canada ever go to war.32 Orders were issued to raise the Australian Intelligence Corps

(AIC) in February 1908. In addition to conducting intelligence training and collecting topographical and resource data within Australia, the role of the AIC was to collect information about foreign countries, with a particular focus on the

Pacific.33

By 1909, Bridges had been more successful in his efforts to establish a

General Staff with the formation of the Australian Section of the Imperial General

Staff (IGS). Bridges’s title was changed to that of the Chief of the General Staff

(CGS), a position that he held for only six months before being replaced by

Major-General John Hoad. By 1912, it was accepted that the AIC operated largely

30 Chris Coulthard-Clark, The Citizen General Staff: The Australian Intelligence Corps 1907–1914 (Canberra, Military History Society of Australia, 1976), p.9. 31 Coulthard-Clark, Citizen General Staff, p.13; Chris Coulthard-Clark, A Heritage of Spirit: A Biography of Major-General Sir William Throsby Bridges K.C.B., C.M.G., (Melbourne, Melbourne University Press, 1979), pp.69–72. 32 Dan Jenkins, Winning Trench Warfare: Battlefield Intelligence in the Canadian Corps 1914–1918 (unpublished PhD thesis, Carelton University, 1999), p.39. 33 Coulthard-Clark, Citizen General Staff, p.22; Coulthard-Clark, A Heritage of Spirit, p.71.

under the control and direction of the General Staff and that the need for it to remain separate had become unnecessary. In December 1912, the six sections of the AIC (one for each state) were merged to form the ‘Intelligence Section of the

General Staff’.34 This organisation mirrored that in Britain, with the intelligence staff reporting to the Chief of the General Staff through the Director of Military

Operations.

The pre-war AIC was poorly named, performing only a few intelligence functions, and militia politics ultimately resulted in its being disbanded on the eve of the war.35 Many officers who had some militia experience in the AIC quickly joined the AIF, but they were seldom employed in roles that made any use of their pre-war militia training.36 By comparison, the Canadian Corps of

Guides continued to exist in the lead-up to the First World War and provided the

Canadian forces with a body of trained scouts and intelligence staff that were readily employed in their pre-war roles, although they were heavily supplemented by other volunteers as the Canadian Expeditionary Force (CEF) expanded. While the Corps of Guides itself was not deployed overseas, a large number of its officers volunteered to serve in the Canadian contingent, many as intelligence officers. The established pre-war role of the Corps of Guides also helped highlight the importance of battlefield intelligence to the Canadians.37 It would take longer for the Australians to develop the same appreciation for the importance of intelligence.

34 Coulthard-Clark, Citizen General Staff, pp.42–44; Coulthard-Clark, A Heritage of Spirit, p.81. 35 Coulthard-Clark, Citizen General Staff, p.16. 36 Ibid., p.50. 37 Jenkins, Winning Trench Warfare, p.39.

Australian officers who attended Staff College at Camberley or Quetta, or who completed attachments to the British Army before the First World War were, like their British army colleagues, exposed to British doctrine and thinking about the importance of military intelligence derived from the experiences of the

Boer War and British study of later conflicts. After completing Staff College in

Quetta, Captain Thomas Blamey completed a series of attachments in the Indian

Army. Blamey’s final attachment was to Army Headquarters at Simla, which included time in the Intelligence Section. Blamey observed or attended intelligence courses conducted by British divisions in India, as well as those run by Army Headquarters, and he sent details of the contents of intelligence training courses back in his attachment report.38 Blamey’s report indicated that he served in a variety of intelligence roles which included work in counter-intelligence duties and secret service agent operations, along with appointments in analytical and intelligence staff roles. Blamey noted the importance of employing officers who were trained in intelligence duties in intelligence roles, and recommended that certificates and records of service should reflect that officers had completed intelligence training. ‘This would help to make the courses popular and would emphasise the importance of intelligence work’, even though only ‘thirty percent of attendees’ of intelligence courses showed the necessary aptitude and attitude for employment in intelligence roles.39 Blamey identified a number of important lessons about intelligence, such as the need for a more structured approach to intelligence training in Australia, which he noted in his report should be implemented in the permanent forces.

38 Attachment Report, 'Papers of Field Marshall Sir Thomas Albert Blamey', AWM 3DRL/6643. 39 Ibid.

British military intelligence organisations

In the years immediately before the war the British Army maintained a small

Intelligence Staff in the War Office. Most if not all of these officers occupied positions that were tied to GHQ intelligence in the BEF and at the outbreak of war almost all of them deployed to France.40 In 1914, the Intelligence Section at

GHQ BEF numbered only six staff officers. The section was initially managed by a

Colonel, the position later being upgraded to Brigadier-General (General Staff) who was one of two section heads reporting to the Chief of the General Staff (the other being the head of the Operations Section).41

The Intelligence Section was divided along functional lines into four sub- sections: information, secret service, topography, and censorship. The information sub-section, I(a), consisted of two Intelligence Staff officers, a GSO2 and a GSO3, and was responsible for the bulk of the analytical work within the

Intelligence Section. In particular, I(a) focused on analysing the enemy order of battle and the disposition of enemy forces.42 The secret service sub-section, I(b), consisted of a single Intelligence Staff officer, a GSO2, with an attached

Intelligence Corps officer and was responsible for all secret service activities.43

The topography sub-section, I(c), also consisted of a single Intelligence Staff officer, a GSO3, and was responsible for obtaining, collating and distributing information concerning the theatre of war.44 Finally, the censorship sub-section,

40 Beach, Haig’s Intelligence, p.24. 41 War Office General Staff, Staff Manual, p.77. 42 Beach, Haig’s Intelligence, p.28. 43 War Office General Staff, Staff Manual, p.77; War Office General Staff, Regulations for Intelligence Duties in the Field, p.7. 44 War Office General Staff, Staff Manual, p.77.

I(d), also consisted of a single Intelligence Staff officer, a GSO1, and two attached

Intelligence Corps officers. The censorship and press sub-section was responsible for censorship of communications and control of the press.45 Each sub-section also included a small number of other ranks to assist with the day- to-day functions of the sub-section.46 Appendix 1 provides additional detail on the roles and functions of the Intelligence Section and sub-sections in 1914.

By the end of 1917, the BEF had expanded to five armies, twenty corps and some sixty divisions.47 The organisation of British military intelligence had experienced corresponding growth to meet the ever-increasing demand for intelligence on the battlefields of France and Belgium. At GHQ, the Intelligence

Section had evolved and, most importantly, a distinction had been drawn between the operational and non-operational intelligence functions performed by the section.48

Nearly all of the staff officer positions managing the different intelligence sub-sections had been upgraded, reflecting their increased importance. The information sub-section, I(a), had been renamed Operational Intelligence and had expanded. The sub-section had expanded to include six Intelligence Staff officers, a GSO1, three GSO2s and two GSO3s, plus support personnel.49 The functions of the Intelligence Staff officers within the section had become more specialised, with officers now allocated to specific roles, each with specialised intelligence reporting duties. Importantly, I(a) now also had the complementary

45 Ibid. 46 Ibid. 47 Andrew Rawson, British Army Handbook 1914–1918 (Stroud, Sutton Publishing, 2006), pp.15– 42. 48 Occleshaw, Armour Against Fate, pp.388–389. 49 GHQ Memorandum O.B./2010, 7 April 1917, TNA WO158/961; Occleshaw, Armour Against Fate, pp. 388–389.

functions of collecting information about the German order of battle and front line dispositions, and of assessing German intentions.50

The secret service sub-section, I(b), had expanded to three Intelligence

Staff officers, a GSO1 and two GSO3s. I(b) was now responsible for the operations of the secret service in enemy occupied territory in coordination with the War Office, as well as counter-espionage operations in France and Belgium.

The topography sub-section had also expanded, albeit on a smaller scale than that of I(a) and I(b). I(c) was now managed by a GSO1 who was responsible for the technical control and supervision of all field survey units throughout the BEF, as well as the preparation, printing and distribution of mapping products.51

The most notable change in the structure of the Intelligence Section was the establishment of a new sub-section, I(e), which was responsible for wireless intelligence and ciphers, highlighting the increasing importance of wireless intelligence as the war progressed. Although the section consisted of only a single Intelligence Staff officer and support staff, it was responsible for providing information regarding enemy wireless systems, the preparation and issue of codes, ciphers, and the examination of enemy codes, ciphers and wireless equipment. British Intelligence Corps Headquarters also formed part of the

Intelligence Section and was designated as I(x). The Commandant of the

Intelligence Corps and his staff were responsible for the administration of all intelligence personnel, not including Imperial General Staff officers serving in intelligence appointments.52

50 Beach, Haig’s Intelligence, p.182. 51 GHQ Memorandum O.B./2010, 7 April 1917, TNA WO158/961; Occleshaw, Armour Against Fate, pp.388–389. 52 GHQ Memorandum O.B./2010, 7 April 1917, TNA WO158/961; Occleshaw, Armour Against Fate, pp.388–389.

Following fall-out from the ‘Times affair’ in February 1917, the Director of

Military Intelligence, Brigadier-General George Macdonogh, requested that the

Intelligence Section of GHQ BEF be reorganised to remove auxiliary functions such as press censorship.53 In April 1917, a Special Intelligence Section that reported directly to the Chief of the General Staff was formed to separate non- operational intelligence matters from operational intelligence.54

The Special Intelligence Section took responsibility for a range of functions, which, while still deemed to fall within the purview of ‘intelligence’, had less to do with the day-to-day operations of the BEF. It included: the press sub-section, I(d), which was now responsible for all press correspondents, censorship of the press and reporting on British and Foreign Press; a visitors sub-section, I(f), which was formed to manage the large number of dignitaries and visitors coming to GHQ; and a war trade sub-section, I(g), which was responsible for monitoring the effectiveness of the British blockade and the economic situation in Germany. The task of the military censor had also expanded significantly and was made the responsibility of a separate sub- section, I(h), which managed censorship regulations, postal and telegraphic censorship, and cooperation with allied censorship authorities. The decision to split non-operational matters from operational intelligence was described as one that ‘transformed GHQ Intelligence from being unwieldy to a far more efficient

53 In February 1917, the Brigadier-General Intelligence at GHQ BEF, Brigadier-General John Charteris, approved a series of articles for publication without reading them in their entirety. The articles contained Haig’s optimistic musings to French journalists, which were quoted directly and reprinted by The Times. The British Government ordered an investigation into the incident, which undermined Charteris’s position in GHQ and ultimately led to his removal in January 1918. Beach, Haig’s Intelligence, p. 31. 54 GHQ Memorandum O.B./2010, 7 April 1917, TNA WO158/961; Occleshaw, Armour Against Fate, pp.388–389.

organisation’.55 Appendix 2 provides additional detail on the roles and functions of the Intelligence Section, Special Intelligence Section and sub-sections in 1917.

Army/corps headquarters

In August 1914, the BEF consisted of a single army comprising two corps composed of a cavalry division and six infantry divisions.56 The Intelligence

Section of an army or a corps headquarters was organised along similar lines to that of GHQ BEF, albeit on a smaller scale.57 The Intelligence Section consisted of two Intelligence Staff officers, a GSO2 and GSO3, who worked directly for the

Brigadier-General, General Staff. The section itself was divided into two sub- sections: information and topography. The information sub-section was responsible for obtaining and collating information concerning enemy forces, while the topography sub-section was responsible for obtaining information about the theatre of war in which the army or corps was fighting.58

Early in the war there were some variations between British and

Dominion forces, most notably the Australians and Canadians. The Australian and New Zealand Army Corps commenced the Gallipoli campaign with only a single Intelligence Staff officer, a GSO2, in the corps headquarters.59 When the

Canadian Corps was formed in September 1915, it appointed a GSO2 to manage the Intelligence Section, assisted by a GSO3 and two additional Intelligence Corps officers. In British corps headquarters at this stage of the war there were no

55 Beach, Haig’s Intelligence, p.32. 56 Rawson, British Army Handbook, p.15 57 War Office General Staff, Staff Manual, p.78. 58 War Office General Staff, Staff Manual, p.78. 59 C.E.W. Bean, Official History of Australia in the War of 1914–18: The Story of Anzac — the First Phase, Volume I (Sydney, Angus & Robertson, 1921), p.280.

dedicated intelligence staff officers; instead, intelligence duties were undertaken on a ‘part-time basis’ by corps staff.60

By 1917, there was clear distinction between the intelligence organisation of an army and that of a corps. At army level, the size of the Intelligence Section had grown substantially and each army in the BEF collected, analysed, reported and distributed intelligence to higher headquarters and to its subordinate formations. Each army now included an Army Wireless Company, which provided wireless intelligence, and an Intelligence Corps officer from army headquarters was allocated specifically to the production of wireless intelligence.61 Each army maintained a Field Survey Company (FSC) that provided topographical and survey information. FSCs also maintained technical control of observation groups and sound-ranging sections allocated to subordinate corps to collect artillery intelligence that was critical to counter- battery operations.62 Each army also had its own RFC brigade that provided aerial reconnaissance and aerial photography.63 The RFC brigade headquarters had its own dedicated Intelligence Corps officers who were responsible for interpreting aerial photographs and reporting the outcomes of reconnaissance flights. Intelligence officers were also allocated down to RFC squadrons.

There had also been significant changes to the intelligence organisation of a corps by 1917. The Intelligence Section within a corps headquarters consisted of a single Intelligence Staff officer, a GSO2, and a number of Intelligence Corps

60 Jenkins, Winning Trench Warfare, pp.148–149. 61 Intelligence Organization in Second Army showing coordination with other Branches, Second Army Intelligence, February 1917, AWM26, 66/4; GHQ Memorandum I/628, 4 November 1918, TNA, WO158/961. 62 Intelligence Organization in Second Army showing coordination with other Branches, Second Army Intelligence, February 1917, AWM26, 66/4. 63 Ibid.

officers.64 The functions of the Intelligence Section in a corps headquarters mirrored those found within army headquarters. However, they were focused solely on the corps’ area of operations. Each corps was allocated an RFC squadron and a balloon company to provide aerial reconnaissance, aerial photography and fixed observation for the corps artillery. Aircraft from the corps squadron were available to meet corps requirements for observation and photography and could be supplemented by additional aircraft under the control of the army.65 Corps were usually allocated a Topographical Section from the FSC to provide maps and other topographical information to support the corps.66

Each corps headquarters now included a Counter-Battery Staff Office, where the

Counter-Battery Staff Officer (GSO1) coordinated and controlled the activities of the heavy artillery allocated to counter-battery operations.67 The Counter-

Battery Staff Office received all artillery intelligence and executed the corps’ counter-battery operations.68 Observation groups and sound-ranging sections from the FSC provided artillery intelligence for the Corps Counter-Battery Staff

Office along with reports from artillery Forward Observation Officers (FOO) and reports of shelling from divisions located along the front line.69

In 1917, organisational differences between the British Army and the

Australians and Canadians remained. Australians tended to have a small

64 Ibid. 65 First Australian Division Memorandum Aerial Photographs 100/456, 3 July 1918, AWM26, 451/3. 66 Intelligence Organization in Second Army showing coordination with other Branches, Second Army Intelligence, February 1917, AWM26, 66/4. 67 Paul Strong and Sanders Marble, Artillery in the Great War (Barnsley, Pen & Sword, 2011), pp.167–171; Intelligence Organization in Second Army showing coordination with other Branches, Second Army Intelligence, February 1917, AWM26, 66/4. 68 Instructions for Intelligence Duties, Second Army, General Staff Second Army 1 May 1917, AWM25, 423/4/3. 69 John Innes, Flash Spotters and Sound Rangers (London, George Allen & Unwin Ltd, 1935), p.69.

intelligence staff at Corps headquarters. At the time that Lieutenant-General John

Monash took command of the Australian Corps in May 1918, the Intelligence

Section at corps headquarters continued to be overseen by a single GSO2.70 The

Canadians, on the other hand, had allocated additional officers to intelligence roles and while the size of the Intelligence Section at corps headquarters changed little, there was a significant increase in the intelligence resources in subordinate formations.71

Divisions and brigades

The infantry division was the basic tactical unit of the First World War. At the outbreak of the war, a standard British infantry division was composed of three infantry brigades, along with artillery, engineer, signals, cavalry and support units.72 Despite being designed to operate as a largely self-contained formation, the 1914 British pattern infantry division contained only a few units whose functions included the collection and dissemination of intelligence.

The Intelligence Section in the division headquarters was staffed by a single Intelligence Staff officer, a GSO3, who was responsible for all the intelligence function within the headquarters.73 Under the idea of ‘open warfare’ envisaged in FSR, the division’s primary source of intelligence was its cavalry squadron. Other sources of intelligence included FOOs from the division’s artillery brigades, and front line troops. The infantry brigade of 1914 contained no personnel dedicated to collecting, collating or disseminating intelligence. The

70 C.E.W. Bean, Official History of Australia in the War of 1914–18: The A.I.F. in France December 1917–May 1918, Volume V (Sydney: Angus & Robertson, 1937), p.15. 71 Jenkins, Winning Trench Warfare, pp.258–259. 72 Rawson, British Army Handbook, pp.8–9. 73 War Office General Staff, Staff Manual, p.80.

small brigade staff consisting of a brigade major and a staff captain were responsible for all of the intelligence work within the brigade.74 Within the infantry battalions there were no soldiers dedicated to performing intelligence duties.

The organisation of intelligence within the infantry division in 1917 had changed little since the beginning of the war. The Intelligence Section at the division headquarters continued to be managed by a single Intelligence Staff officer, a GSO3. However, additional Intelligence Corps officers had been assigned to the headquarters to increase the capacity of the section to support the division.75 Each division now maintained a section or half section of observers who established observation posts in the division’s area of responsibility to observe sections of the enemy front line. Observation of the front line was coordinated with observation posts established by the division’s brigades and battalions.76 While the division still had few units whose sole function was the collection of intelligence, it was able to draw heavily on the intelligence resources available at corps and army level to meet specific intelligence requirements.77 Divisions could routinely call upon RFC aircraft and observation balloons to provide aerial reconnaissance, and were well supplied with aerial photographs and information from observation groups or sound- ranging sections as well as their own FOOs and front line troops. Intelligence

74 Ibid., p.75. 75 I ANZAC Corps Memorandum Ig 106/245, 7 January 1917, AWM25, 423/2/10; Intelligence Organization in Second Army showing coordination with other Branches, Second Army Intelligence, February 1917, AWM26, 66/4. 76 Notes on Intelligence Organization During Recent Operations and Hints on Training during the coming Winter, 18 November 1917, AWM26, 288/4. 77 Second Army Intelligence Memorandum I.g. 305, 7 April 1917, AWM25, 423/1/134.

from other sources, such as wireless intelligence, was also made available to support their operations.78

There had been considerable changes within the brigades and battalions of the infantry division. Within each brigade headquarters there was usually a

Brigade Intelligence Officer, who was responsible for the intelligence functions within the brigade. Initially, the Brigade Intelligence Officer was a junior officer, drawn from one of the infantry battalions in the brigade rather than an

Intelligence Corps officer. By 1918, the Brigade Intelligence Officer positions were finally filled by Intelligence Corps personnel.79 Brigades also maintained a section of observers, like those at division headquarters, who were deployed throughout the brigade area to monitor the enemy front line.80 Within each infantry battalion there was now usually a Battalion Intelligence Officer or Scout

Officer, or occasionally both, who was responsible for the Scout Section within each battalion.81 Battalion scouts were responsible for coordinating scouting activities in no-man’s land, maintaining battalion observation posts and providing guides for the battalion.82 Specialised observation and scouting sections at division, brigade and battalion reflected the importance of front line intelligence collection and the recognition that some intelligence collection tasks needed to be performed by troops with specialist skills and training.

78 Ibid. 79 Instructions for Intelligence Duties Second Army, 28 March 1916, AWM25, 423/2/30; Fifth Australian Division — Operations — Preliminary Instructions No.3 Intelligence And Examination And Disposal of Prisoners And Captured Documents, 9 April 1918, AWM25, 423/2/62. 80 Instructions for Intelligence Duties Second Army, 28 March 1916, AWM25, 423/2/30. 81 First Australian Division Notes for Brigade Intelligence Officers, 15 April 1916, AWM25, 423/1/6. 82 First Australian Division General Staff Memorandum No.21, 4 April 1916, AWM25, 423/1/6.

Specialisation of front line intelligence collection mirrored the specialisation that had occurred among the Intelligence Staff.

Differences between the British Army and Australian and Canadian forces were clearest at division, brigade and battalion levels at the beginning of the war.

The organisation of the Intelligence Section in the 1st Division in 1914 was identical to that of a British Army division except that section was managed by a

GSO2 rather than a GSO3 during the landings on Gallipoli.83 By the end of 1915, the Intelligence Section in the headquarters of the Canadian divisions consisted of a GSO2 and GSO3.84 The Canadians commenced the war with a Staff Captain

(Intelligence) as part of their Brigade Headquarters, while the Australians established positions for Brigade Intelligence Officers in April 1916.85 The British

Army waited until 1918 before introducing a permanent Brigade Intelligence

Officer position.86

In June 1915, the Australians had identified the need for a more coordinated approach to intelligence collection and had established an intelligence officer position in each battalion.87 By the end of 1915, the Canadians had similarly introduced a Battalion Scout Officer whose duties centered around the collection of intelligence at the battalion level.88

While British military doctrine acknowledged the importance of intelligence and while the British officer corps had a clear understanding of the need for intelligence at the beginning of the war, the British pattern army

83 Bean, Official History of Australia in the War of 1914–18, Volume I, p.76. 84 Jenkins, Winning Trench Warfare, p.140. 85 Jenkins, Winning Trench Warfare, p.48; First Australian Division General Staff Memorandum No.21, 4 April 1916, AWM25, 423/1/14. 86 Beach, Haig’s Intelligence, p.37. 87 First Australian Division Memorandum g.726, 12 June 1915, AWM25, 423/2/4. 88 Jenkins, Winning Trench Warfare, p.55.

contained few resources dedicated to collecting intelligence and only a small

Intelligence Staff. By 1917, the BEF had built a sophisticated and capable system which collected and distributed intelligence to all levels of the army in the field.

Intelligence Officers were now found at all levels, from battalion up to GHQ, and were an integral part of the British Army. While both the Australians and the

Canadians had patterned their forces on the British Army, there were differences in their intelligence organisations, even at the beginning of the war. The

Australians tended to have a smaller intelligence staff throughout the war, although they were quicker to establish intelligence positions within their battalions and brigades. The Canadians commenced the war with more intelligence personnel than either the British or the Australians. The number of intelligence personnel in Canadian formation expanded as the war progressed reflecting the more established role that intelligence played in the Canadian corps.

Chapter 2. ANZAC and Australian Corps Intelligence: 1915–1918

The Intelligence Section of the ANZAC Corps consisted of a single Intelligence

Staff officer when it arrived in Egypt. This small section was expected to undertake a myriad of tasks, many of which had only a tangential relationship to military intelligence. Early intelligence training for the Australians was scant at best. During the landings on Gallipoli, the ANZAC Corps Intelligence Staff was used in a variety of roles, few of which related to their primary function.

Gradually, the ANZAC Corps identified the need for a more structure approach to collecting intelligence. Training for intelligence personnel also improved.

Arriving in France, I and II ANZAC Corps were integrated into the already well- established intelligence organisation of the BEF. The role of the intelligence staff was much more clearly defined. Intelligence training was more organised in

France and intelligence personnel were provided with specialised training to enable them to perform their roles. This chapter examines the organisation of

ANZAC and Australian Corps intelligence from its time in Egypt through to the end of the war. This chapter will also examine the evolution of intelligence training in the ANZAC and Australian Corps, and the role that intelligence played in shaping other training.

ANZAC Corps Intelligence — 1915

While the importance of military intelligence was understood, the role of the

Intelligence Staff was less defined. The first instructions issued to the ANZAC

Corps Intelligence Staff while the corps was training in Egypt provided limited details about the role of intelligence or the duties of intelligence staff and

intelligence officers in the field.1 ANZAC Corps intelligence instructions noted that the intelligence staff was responsible for the checking of maps to ensure that they accorded with the actual topography of the area in which the force was fighting; the preparation of sketches and reports showing positions occupied by enemy forces and enemy artillery; for searching the enemy to obtain papers and other important information; and the transmission of information to higher headquarters in a timely and rapid fashion.2 These instructions were taken directly out of the 1912 Staff Manual — War (Provisional) and did little to further define the role of the ANZAC Corps intelligence staff.3

At this time, the Intelligence Section at ANZAC Corps Headquarters and the two divisional headquarters was small. Major Charles Villers-Stuart was responsible for ANZAC Corps intelligence, with Major Thomas Blamey and

Captain Robert Coningham commanding the Intelligence Sections of the 1st

Division and the New Zealand and Australian Division respectively.4

There is little mention of training for intelligence personnel while the

ANZAC Corps was in Egypt. Lectures on intelligence duties in the field delivered by the Intelligence Staff of the 1st Division acknowledged the need for continual efforts to collect and transmit information to headquarters to ensure that headquarters was kept constantly informed of the situation, along with instructions on how to deal with EPW and orders to search enemy dead for information.5

1 Australian and New Zealand Army Corps Memorandum Ia0009, 10 March 1915, AWM25, 423/1/1. 2 First Australian Division Intelligence in the Field I.g.283, 12 March 1915, AWM25, 423/1/1. 3 War Office General Staff, Staff Manual, pp.77–80. 4 Bean, Official History of Australia in the War of 1914-18, Volume I, p.280. 5 First Australian Division Notes on Intelligence Duties in the Field, 10 April 1915, AWM25, 423/2/4.

The landings on Gallipoli

The poorly defined role of the ANZAC Corps intelligence staff was well illustrated in their lack of involvement in the planning for the landings on Gallipoli, and the first few weeks of the Gallipoli campaign. ANZAC Corps staff arrived at Lemnos on 12 April 1915, along with staff of the 1st Division, to begin planning the landings. The ANZAC Corps Intelligence Staff almost certainly sailed on HMS

Queen on 13 April and conducted a reconnaissance of the coast on the morning of

14 April.6 Major Villiers-Stuart flew as an observer on an aerial reconnaissance flight over the peninsula that same day.7 ANZAC Corps Operation Order Number

1 ordered the corps to land ‘north of Kaba Tepe’ and occupy the heights covering the landing beaches as a preliminary to further operations, but the order contained little information about the Turkish enemy or the area over which the corps would fight.8 Orders for the 1st Division note that information about the disposition of Turkish forces would be ‘issued separately’ and that the landings would ‘probably’ be opposed.9 Copies of this assessment have not survived, however it is unlikely that it contained any additional information beyond that provided by GHQ MEF, which assessed that the Turkish strength on the Gallipoli

Peninsula was three divisions, with one division located at Bulair, a second division located between Anafarta and Kilid Bahr, and a third located between

6 Bean, Official History of Australia in the War of 1914–18, Volume I, pp.221–222. 7 Ibid., p.242. 8 1st ANZAC Corps General Staff Feb-May 1915 Operation Order No.1, 17 April 1915, TNA, WO95/4280. 9 1st Australian Division A.D.C. to G.O.C. Dec 1914–Apr 1915 Operation Order No.1, 18 April 1915, TNA, WO95/4326.

the Achi Babi Ridge and Cape Helles.10 The enemy was assessed to be holding the

Kilid Bahr plateau in strength, and a significant number of troops were concentrated in the vicinity of Maidos and Anafarta village. Gun emplacements and defences had also been located in the vicinity of Kaba Tepe .11 Orders for the

New Zealand and Australian Division simply noted that the ‘enemy was reported to be holding the Kilid Bair plateau and was concentrated about the Anafarta villages and Maidos’.12

None of the orders issued by either corps or division makes any mention of intelligence requirements once the Australians and New Zealanders were safely ashore. The value of prisoners as potential sources of information was addressed in general terms in the Standing Orders for the Australian and New

Zealand Army Corps, but there were no detailed plans in any of the orders issued to the ANZAC Corps about the handling of prisoners, the use of aerial reconnaissance, or other intelligence work to be undertaken once the landing force was ashore.13 During the landings, the ANZAC Corps intelligence staff were used as general staff officers rather than fulfilling any specific intelligence function. Major Villiers-Stuart was ordered, along with Major Duncan Glasfurd, to identify a position for the Second Brigade to assemble before it advanced to follow the Third Brigade, which had landed as the ANZAC Corps’ covering force.14

10 New Zealand and Australian Division General Staff Apr–Dec 1915 Extracts from Force Order No.1 (Secret), 13 April 1915, TNA, WO95/4349. 11 1st ANZAC Corps General Staff Feb-May 1915 Extracts from Instructions for G.O.C. A&N.Z. Army Corps (Secret) from General Headquarters, 13 April 1915, TNA, WO95/4280. 12 New Zealand and Australian Division General Staff Apr–Dec 1915 Operation Order No.1, 19 April 1915, TNA WO95/4349. 13 1st ANZAC Corps General Staff Feb–May 1915 Standing Orders for the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps, 5 March 1915, TNA, WO95/4280. 14 Bean, Official History of Australia in the War of 1914–18, Volume I, p.228.

Once ashore, there are gaps in the records and it appears that several days passed without any clear intelligence picture reflecting the confusion immediately following the landings, as the Australians and New Zealanders fought to establish their toehold. Fragmentary reports from prisoners and other sources which began to be collected from the day of the landings gradually started to arrive at division and corps headquarters, and a picture of the Turkish units engaging the Australians and New Zealanders around the Anzac position began to emerge.15 Gaps in the intelligence picture immediately after the landings reflect the poorly defined role of the intelligence staff.16 Major Villiers-

Stuart was killed by Turkish artillery at Gallipoli in May 1915 and was replaced by Major Stephen Butler who would serve as GSO2(I) with the ANZAC Corps and later I ANZAC Corps until 1918.17

By June 1915, the need for more intelligence at Anzac had been recognised and the intelligence organisation within the ANZAC Corps began to expand. On 12 June, the 1st Division issued orders to establish intelligence officer positions in each of its battalions. Battalions were also ordered to construct and maintain observation posts and to establish a coordinated observation plan across their front.18 The role of the Battalion Intelligence

Officer included collecting and transmitting all information obtained by the battalion on the enemy to Brigade Headquarters, along with reporting on topography and on the activities of friendly troops.19 Brigade commanders were

15 Intelligence Anzac Corps 1st–30th April 1915 prisoner debriefing reports, 29 April 1915, TNA, WO157/668. 16 Intelligence N.Z.&A Division 1st–31st May 1915, 1 May 1915, TNA, WO157/679. 17 Bean, Official History of Australia in the War of 1914–18, Volume I, p.551. 18 First Australian Division Memorandum g.726, 12 June 1915, AWM25, 423/2/4. 19 Second Australian Division Memorandum 83/I, 23 August 1915, AWM25, 423/2/1.

instructed to select ‘suitable officers’ for intelligence duties and to ensure that intelligence officers had ‘good powers of observation, were good map readers, were able to use and take bearings with the prismatic compass and were able to write an intelligible and logical report’.20 Officers were often selected for intelligence duties on the basis of the qualifications and skills they already possessed, and training provided to officers selected for battalion intelligence officer roles was limited to instruction on how to use compasses, map reading, preparation of reports, sketching and drawing.21 When they arrived at Gallipoli, the 2nd Division also established intelligence officer positions in each of its battalions.22

Despite the acknowledged need for a more organised intelligence system, in 1915, the Australians tended not to view intelligence work as a specialist task and battalion intelligence officers were also expected to perform other functions, such as commanding a platoon.23 An assessment of the role of the battalion intelligence officers written after the fighting in August 1915 noted that ‘the amount of work done [by the battalion intelligence officers] is not considerable’.

The same report also concluded that the ‘experience in Gallipoli showed the necessity of following a regular system’ of intelligence.24 The conclusions arising out of the Gallipoli campaign demonstrated a growing understanding in the

ANZAC Corps of the need for a structured approach to collecting, analysing and reporting intelligence.

20 Ibid. 21 Ibid. 22 Ibid. 23 Ibid. 24 Ibid.

ANZAC Corps Intelligence — 1916

Units new to France were almost invariably sent to the Second Army to gain experience in the ‘nursery’ sector of the front near Armentières. The experience of the Australian divisions was no different.25 Second Army had occupied the area around Ypres for a considerable time and since the Second Battle of Ypres the front line had been both stable and quiet. The stable nature of the front line around Ypres allowed Second Army the time to develop detailed orders for how intelligence was to be collected and managed by the corps and divisions under its control. Instructions for Intelligence Duties Second Army detailed the responsibilities for intelligence collection at army, corps and division level and provided instructions for front line intelligence collection.26 The role of the intelligence sections at different levels of command in France was much more clearly defined, as were the intelligence tasks that were expected to be undertaken by front line troops and managed at battalion and brigade level. As almost all newly arriving units spent time with Second Army, these intelligence instructions were almost universally adopted throughout the BEF and formed the basis of instructions issued for intelligence duties by other armies in the BEF.

The intelligence system adopted by Second Army meant some structural adjustments on the part of the Australians. The role played by front line troops in collecting intelligence during trench warfare was critical and formations were instructed: ‘it is to the troops in the front line that the primary duty of collecting information falls, and it is therefore essential that regimental officers and men should be interested in and impressed with the importance of collecting and

25 Bean, Official History of Australia in the War of 1914–18, Volume III, pp.117–141, 950. 26 Instructions for Intelligence Duties Second Army, 28 March 1916, AWM25, 423/2/30.

rapidly forwarding information.’27 Scouting and patrolling was identified as an important source of intelligence and a task to be carried out by specially trained personnel. Australian infantry battalions were ordered to organise a scout platoon to take on this role.28 The battalion intelligence officer normally commanded the scout platoon, although in some Australian battalions there was a scout officer and a battalion intelligence officer, depending upon the number of junior officers available.29 The exact composition of the scout platoon also varied from battalion to battalion. Scout platoons usually contained a number of separate sections that included scouts, snipers and observers. Sections of snipers and observers were responsible for locating and subduing enemy snipers; locating enemy machine guns and observation posts; and general observation and reporting of the German front line and supporting trenches.30 The scout section was responsible for conducting special reconnaissance activities and gathering information about topography and the enemy up to the German parapet through patrolling and scouting.31 In addition to patrolling, scouts established listening posts close to the enemy front line to monitor the enemy.32

In early April 1916, I ANZAC Corps issued orders to establish a Brigade

Intelligence Officer position in each Brigade Headquarters to ‘take charge of the intelligence duties of the brigade and such other duties as may be assigned him by the GOC Brigade.’33 Brigade intelligence officers were expected to produce a

27 Instructions for Intelligence Duties Second Army, 28 March 1916, AWM25, 423/2/30. 28 First Australian Division General Staff Memorandum No.21, 4 April 1916, AWM25, 423/1/14; Fourth Australian Division Intelligence, 17 June 1916, AWM26, 31/25. 29 First Australian Division General Staff Memorandum No.21, 4 April 1916, AWM25, 423/1/14. 30 First Australian Infantry Brigade Memorandum Subject:-Intelligence, 26 May 1916, AWM25, 423/1/14. 31 Fourth Australian Division Intelligence, 17 June 1916, AWM26, 31/25. 32 First Australian Division General Staff Memorandum No.21, 4 April 1916, AWM25, 423/1/14. 33 Ibid.

daily summary of all information obtained by the brigade during the previous twenty-four hours to send to the intelligence section at Division Headquarters.34

As intelligence summaries from corps and division could not be taken further forward than Brigade Headquarters, it was also the role of the brigade intelligence officer to ensure that company and battalion commanders were informed about intelligence that related to the enemy on their section of the front.35

Brigade intelligence officers were expected to play a key role in coordinating the work of observation posts within each of the battalions of the brigade ‘in order to obtain the most complete results from reconnaissance by observation’.36 Forward infantry companies were also expected to provide reports about German activity, the state of the enemy wire and locations of machine guns.37 While control of the observers in each battalion was the responsibility of the battalion scout or intelligence officer, it was the role of the brigade intelligence officer to coordinate observation of the front line across the brigade and to liaise with neighbouring brigades to ensure continuous observation of no-man’s land and the German trenches.38 Brigade intelligence officers were also required to coordinate patrol activities with their counterparts in battalions to ensure that patrols covered the right ground, as well as coordinating activities with those of neighbouring brigades.39 Battalions were

34 First Australian Division Notes for Brigade Intelligence Officers, 15 April 1916, AWM25, 423/1/6. 35 Second Army I.G.501 (39/1), 16 May 1916, AWM25, 423/1/15. 36 Instructions for Intelligence Duties Second Army, 28 March 1916, AWM25, 423/2/30. 37 Fifth Australian Division General Staff Circular Ig 26, 10 July 1916, AWM25, 423/1/24. 38 Fourth Australian Division Intelligence, 17 June 1916, AWM26, 31/25; Instructions for Intelligence Duties Second Army, 28 March 1916, AWM25, 423/2/30. 39 Instructions for Intelligence Duties Second Army, Revised to 10 June 1916, AWM25, 423/2/92.

ordered to send out ‘one reconnoitering patrol every night with definite orders to collect information’.40 Patrols, either scouts or troops from the front line battalions, were expected to patrol no-man’s land to provide information about the topography and characteristics of the terrain; the state of any the enemy defences; to determine whether there were any covered approaches to the

German front line; and to locate enemy listening posts and patrols and disrupt their activities.41

Front line troops were also expected to obtain intelligence through trench raids and small-scale assaults.42 During their time in the nursery sector, all of the

Australian divisions conducted raids on the German trenches opposite their position. When raids were conducted, intelligence staff moved forward to ensure that prisoners were examined quickly and that any information obtained from them was rapidly transmitted back to Corps Headquarters.43 Within the raiding party itself, specific tasks were given to members of the raid to collect enemy documents and other items for examination by intelligence staff.44

The examination of EPW was conducted at corps level. Second Army orders noted that ‘the examination of prisoners is [primarily] a matter for Corps

Headquarters’, and the intelligence staff at corps headquarters were responsible for ‘not only obtaining such information as affects their front, but also for obtaining information required by Army and General Headquarters.’45 Details of any prisoners captured were notified to army headquarters as quickly as

40 Third Australian Infantry Brigade Collecting Information Regarding Enemy, 14 December 1916, AWM26, 120/7. 41 Sixth Australian Infantry Brigade Memorandum I21/16, 13 April 1916, AWM26, 30/5. 42 Second Army Memorandum G.47, 1 October 1916, AWM26, 76/28. 43 Second Anzac Memorandum G.136/-/14, 2 October 1916, AWM26, 76/28. 44 Second Australian Division Memorandum G.46, 2 November 1916, AWM25, 423/1/24. 45 Instructions for Intelligence Duties Second Army, 28 March 1916, AWM25, 423/2/30.

possible, especially details which would allow army headquarters to determine any changes in the German order of battle such as the presence of previously unobserved units.46 Prisoners that were assessed to be concealing information or indicated an important change in the enemy’s order of battle would be sent to

Army Headquarters for further examination.47 The intelligence staff at Second

Army developed a range of questions to be asked of prisoners, including general lists of questions for all prisoners, special questions for prisoners assessed as likely to give additional information, further lists of questions for prisoners assessed as more communicative and intelligent, questions for prisoners with knowledge of mining operations, and special questions for aviators.48

The Australians were also instructed in the proper procedures for handling prisoners to ensure that maximum intelligence benefit could be obtained from them and from anything which they may be carrying.49

Dedicated RFC aircraft were allocated to the Australians for aerial reconnaissance, photography and artillery support tasks. The corps RFC squadron was responsible for providing information about ‘the enemy front line system and troops holding it; enemy movements; enemy communications; the rear organisation opposite the front and flanks of the corps concerned; along with information about the enemy’s artillery which can or does fire on the area of the corps concerned.’50

46 Ibid. 47 Ibid. 48 Ibid. 49 Ibid. 50 The Work of Branch intelligence Sections as Regards the Collection and Dissemination of Information, 30 March 1917, AWM25, 423/2/24.

Front line troops were instructed in the importance of collecting shells, bombs, fuses and other items to assist with identification of new equipment in use by the German Army.51 Instructions were also issued to ensure that downed enemy aircraft were located and guarded until members of the RFC examined them.52

Collating and reporting of intelligence

The Intelligence Section of I ANZAC Corps was expected to produce a daily intelligence summary that was both sent to Army Headquarters and issued down to Brigade Headquarters.53 At corps level, there was no expectation that detailed analysis of information would be undertaken and Second Army instructions noted that ‘no time should be wasted in attempting to collate information obtained from air reconnaissance, examination of prisoners, etc., as this work is carried out by Army Headquarters, and the results notified to corps.’54 Corps summaries were compiled from intelligence reports received from their subordinate formations, who either issued their own intelligence summaries or provided corps headquarters with reports about intelligence collected in their areas of responsibility. Second Army’s intelligence instructions noted that corps intelligence summaries were to be compiled from reports furnished by divisions, and this should ‘accustom new formations to the reporting of information received through the proper channel.’55 From the front line rearwards, a regular

51 Instructions for Intelligence Duties Second Army, 28 March 1916, AWM25, 423/2/30; First Australian Division General Staff Memorandum No.24, May 1916, AWM25, 423/1/14. 52 Instructions for Intelligence Duties Second Army, 28 March 1916, AWM25, 423/2/30. 53 Ibid. 54 Ibid. 55 Ibid.

system of intelligence reporting was established to ensure information was transmitted to the intelligence staff. Battalion intelligence officers were required to provide a daily report on enemy defences, movements within enemy lines, signalling, gas (with special attention being given to the location of enemy gas cylinders), artillery, equipment, and aircraft movements.56 These reports were then compiled into brigade intelligence reports and sent back to division, corps, army, and ultimately GHQ Intelligence.

Specialisation

The duties of intelligence officers became increasingly specialised, mirroring the changes that were taking place among front line troops engaged in intelligence collection. Intelligence officers were posted to the corps heavy artillery headquarters and focused on collecting intelligence on enemy artillery to aid counter-battery operations.57 Intelligence officers serving in the heavy artillery were required to ‘have a good knowledge of the organisation of the German artillery, the nature of its armament, the shells and fuses employed by it, and the methods of identification at present in use by the British Army.’58 Information on enemy artillery was obtained from front line and other units through reports of enemy shelling, along with reports from RFC aircraft and information collected by the observation groups and sound ranging sections of the FSC. Intelligence officers assigned to artillery intelligence roles were provided with copies of daily intelligence summaries from Corps and Army Headquarters to enable them to understand how enemy artillery might be attempting to support or respond to

56 Sixth Australian Infantry Brigade Memorandum I21/16, 13 April 1916, AWM26, 30/5. 57 Duties of Intelligence Corps Officers with Corps Heavy Artillery, 4 June 1916, AWM25, 75/1/34. 58 Ibid.

events occurring along the front.59 Intelligence officers working in artillery intelligence duties began to produce specialised reports to support the operation of the corps heavy artillery. This included reporting on: the activity of enemy heavy artillery, paying particular attention to ‘any unusual increase of new emplacements in any area; any particular batteries which fire only on certain occasions, such as during an attack by either side; the main enemy counter- battery groups; indications of batteries being moved, or of a general increase or decrease in the enemy’s artillery; the principal targets of enemy artillery; and the nature of the ordnance with which the enemy’s aeroplanes have been working, and any increase or decrease noticed in their activity’. Intelligence officers serving with corps heavy artillery were also expected to produce ‘a list of properly verified batteries which have been active during the week’.60

Intelligence officers were also posted to the Branch Intelligence Section attached to army wings and corps squadrons of the RFC. The role of intelligence officers posted to RFC units was to ‘collect and sift all information obtained by the personnel of the RFC by observation and photography; and ensure that such information reaches all whom it may concern in a convenient form without delay.’61 Army wings were responsible for obtaining information about movements and activities in enemy rear areas; information on work on rear lines of defence; photographs of rear lines of defence; oblique photographs of the enemy’s front line systems; and photographs of enemy artillery positions.62

Corps squadrons were responsible for obtaining information about the enemy

59 Ibid. 60 Ibid. 61 The Work Of Branch Intelligence Sections As Regards The Collection And Dissemination Of Information, 30 March 1917, AWM25, 423/2/24. 62 Instructions for Intelligence Duties Second Army, 1 May 1917, AWM25, 423/2/46.

front line system and the troops holding the front line, enemy movements, communications, and enemy artillery firing on the corps area of responsibility.63

Intelligence officers posted to branch intelligence section briefed pilots and observers before their missions and maintained situation maps showing current information about the corps or army area of responsibility.64 They also debriefed pilots and observers after they returned from missions to ensure that all relevant information was obtained.65 The branch intelligence section was responsible for printing, examining and distributing photographs, including special advanced copies of photographs, along with indexing and filing photographs for later study.66 Artillery information of direct interest to the artillery intelligence officer was communicated directly to the corps heavy artillery, in addition to being passed onto Corps Headquarters.67

Intelligence training

Intelligence training in France was more structured and organised than anything the Australians had encountered previously during the war. At its simplest,

Australians were issued with cards (see Figure 1) that told the front line soldier what type of information he needed to collect, highlighting the need to obtain equipment, documents and identity discs from dead enemy soldiers or from within German positions that had been attacked or raided by British troops.68

63 Ibid. 64 Duties With Regard To The Formation Of The 3rd Corps Intelligence Section Attached To The 34th Squadron Royal Flying Corps, 1 January 1917, AWM25, 106/263. 65 Ibid. 66 Ibid. 67 Ibid. 68 Army Form w.3092, Stationery Services Press, P759, 60,000, 10/15

Figure 1 — Copy of Army Form W.3092 (Army Form w.3092, Stationery Services Press, P759, 60,000, 10/15)

However, specialist personnel such as scouts and observers required specialist training. In 1916, specialist training courses for intelligence officers and intelligence staff were conducted at schools run by Army Headquarters, while training courses for personnel engaged in front line intelligence collection, such as battalion scouts, were conducted at corps schools and within each division.69 When they arrived in France, Australian officers and soldiers attended many British Army schools that provided specialist training and took these skills back to their own units and formations.

Lectures given to intelligence officers in 1916 identified ten primary sources of information that could be drawn upon in the field: espionage; civil inhabitants of the theatre of war; wireless interception; telephone and telegraph interception; aerial reconnaissance and photography; prisoners; captured documents; captured material; ground observation; and reports from patrols and fighting troops in contact with the enemy.70 A large amount of this information came from front line troops and ‘of the ten sources of information mentioned above the last five are dependent entirely upon the efforts of the fighting troops and, if aerial photography be excluded, it may safely be said that these five sources provide 75 per cent of our information.’71

An increasing effort was made to educate officers, NCOs and soldiers on the role that they played in the collection of intelligence in the front line, highlighting that:

69 Notes For A Course Of Instruction For G.S.O’S 3 (Div) Held At S.O.S School 5th Army, 1916, AWM 3DRL/6288; Fourth Army Syllabus For Course For Intelligence Officers I.G 471/5, 10 December 1916, AWM25, 881/27/1. 70 Notes For A Course of Instruction for GSO3’s (Div) Held at S.O.S School 5th Army, 1916, AWM 3DRL/6288. 71 Ibid.

an efficient intelligence service is dependent on the efforts of the fighting

troops. It seldom handles conclusive information: it secures its results by

the compilation and collation of small inconclusive items of information. A

large proportion of these ‘inconclusive items’ are actually derived from

the reports of the fighting troops. They travel back to the higher

formations and are there blended with information from other sources. It

is essential therefore that, however trivial, they should be absolutely

accurate. The troops should not expect sensational results from their own

reports. They may not hear of them again but they are invariably being

made use of behind.72

At division level, intelligence training for intelligence officers and intelligence staff focused on several key areas: reconnaissance of the divisional area; compilation of information; application of information received; and the dissemination of information.73 Intelligence officers and intelligence staff were responsible for ensuring they had a thorough understanding of the enemy within the division’s area of responsibility. This included compiling information about the enemy troops opposite the division, establishing what was considered

‘normal’ activity for the enemy opposite, and checking and summarising all reports about the enemy before transmitting them to Corps Headquarters.74

Knowledge of the enemy and its routines was particularly important, as changes in enemy routine could indicate preparations for German offensive action or some other alteration in the enemy situation.75 Intelligence training stressed

72 Ibid. 73 Ibid. 74 Ibid. 75 Ibid.

that, where possible, reports should be sent rearwards to corps and army level in the exact format received from the front line troops. Intelligence staff were cautioned, however, that it was the role of intelligence officers at the Division

Headquarters to ensure that the information was checked and compared with what was already known.76

1916 was a year of growth, change and learning for intelligence personnel in the ANZAC Corps. Arriving in France, the Australians learnt many new lessons about intelligence that would be required for operational success on the Western

Front. Fortunately, the Australians had the benefit of learning from the experiences of the BEF who had been fighting in France for eighteen months by the time they arrived at the front. Personnel engaged in intelligence duties were seen as specialists, reflecting developments across the BEF more generally with the training of other specialists such as machine gunners and bombers. The

Australians also gained valuable experience operating in one of the quieter sectors of the front before the later battles on the Somme.

ANZAC Corps Intelligence — 1917

By 1917, the role of intelligence was more clearly defined than ever before. The battles of 1917 would demonstrate the importance of integrating intelligence into operational planning and ultimately how intelligence could be used to lead operations.

The fighting of 1916 had demonstrated the need for more intelligence personnel. In January 1917, GHQ approved the appointment of Divisional

76 Ibid.

Intelligence Officers to assist the GSO3 at Divisional Headquarters with the growing range of intelligence tasks and the increasingly complex intelligence work within the division.77 Divisional Intelligence Officers were expected to complete a wide range of duties including: supervising the demand and issue of maps throughout the division; the supervision of demand and issue of aeroplane photographs and their study and interpretation; compilation, study, recording and dissemination of all intelligence from lower formations (brigades, battalions, artillery FOOs, trench mortar batteries and machine-gun companies) and corps headquarters; the study and preparation for use — and distribution when required — of all the country and defences immediately in the rear of the enemy’s line (up to 3,000 yards/2,700 metres); the supervision of records on maps of enemy’s front trench line for tactical use; the examination of prisoners of war with a view to extracting information of immediate tactical importance (the final examination of prisoners remained the responsibility of the corps rather than the division); and the compilation of information to be embodied in the daily summary of intelligence along with the ‘preparation of drafts as the GSO3 may direct.’78

Additional intelligence officers were also allocated to the RFC units.79

Intelligence officers allocated to RFC units were expected to ensure that every pilot and observer was interviewed by the Branch Intelligence Section in order to take full advantage of any information they may have acquired. Intelligence officers became an integral part of the squadrons they worked with, and the

77 First ANZAC Corps Memorandum Ig 106/245, 7 January 1917, AWM25. 78 Second Army Intelligence Memorandum I.g.305, 7 April 1917, AWM25, 423/1/134. 79 Instructions With Regard To The Formation And Duties Of The 3rd Corps Intelligence Section Attached To The 34th Squadron Royal Flying Corps, 1 January 1917, AWM25.

officer-in-charge of the section lived at the Squadron Headquarters, making it his business to become personally acquainted with the pilots and observers.80 The

Branch Intelligence Section was expected to disseminate information obtained from RFC units as quickly as possible and to provide photographs, sketches and other information required by Corps Headquarters.81

Open warfare

When the German Army withdrew into the Hindenburg Line in April 1917, the

Australians experienced a brief period of open warfare for the first time since

1915.82 Topographical information became more important than ever, as the

Australians advanced over territory that had been held by the Germans for nearly two years.83 British and Australian troops discovered a wealth of information left behind by retreating German forces, including complete copies of German orders detailing their plans for the withdrawal, highlighting the value of searching enemy positions for documents and other intelligence.84 Advancing troops became the primary source of information, while battalion and brigade intelligence officers acted as a conduit to ensure that all the information that was collected was rapidly sent back to higher headquarters.85 Intelligence officers with battalions and brigades were frequently deployed forward with the advancing troops to ensure a constant flow of information during the advance.86

80 Instructions With Regard To The Formation And Duties Of The 3rd Corps Intelligence Section Attached To The 34th Squadron. Royal Flying Corps. 1 January 1917, AWM 25. 81 Ibid. 82 Second Army Notes on Intelligence in Open Warfare, 14 July 1916, AWM25. 83 Second Australian Division G24/1/127, 10 April 1917, AWM25, 423/1/134. 84 Second Army Notes on Intelligence in Open Warfare, 14 July 1916, AWM25. 85 Ibid. 86 Second Australian Division G24/1/127, 10 April 1917, AWM25, 423/1/134.

The speed of the advance meant that there was often insufficient time to process all the information that had been collected and the rapidly changing situation meant that the minute details that were routinely recorded in trench warfare were also often no longer relevant.87 Daily intelligence summaries ceased, with Corps Headquarters passing information to advancing divisions as it became available and Army Headquarters following a similar process.88 The adaptability of the British intelligence system during the German withdrawal to the Hindenburg Line demonstrated the flexible nature of the intelligence system which the British had built. The ability to change from a system designed to collect and report intelligence on a largely static battlefield to one that could keep pace with a rapidly advancing battle would especially become important in

1918.

Front line intelligence

During the fighting of 1917, the Australian divisions continued to refine their approach to front line intelligence. Australian orders detailed specially selected troops to follow attacking troops as closely as possible to collect any intelligence left behind by the enemy. Reports about the value of this system noted that ‘the ear-marking of any NCO’s or men who can read German has been found most useful in other divisions at time of attack. They have done invaluable service in the collecting of papers and maps from captured German dugouts and were organised for the search by brigades’.89 Another report noted that ‘during the recent operations many valuable papers etc. have been collected by “searchers”

87 Second Army Notes on Intelligence in Open Warfare, 14 July 1916, AWM25. 88 Ibid. 89 Third Australian Division Memorandum G45/123, 18 April 1917, AWM26, 85/1.

or “Intelligence Police” specially detailed to systematically search for and collect papers from enemy dead and wounded, and from enemy H.Q. whether company, battalion or regimental. All orders for a counter-attack were found in one H.Q.’90

While the practices of the Australians were not markedly different to British or

Canadian divisions, the inclusion of specific intelligence tasks in the Australian orders were a far cry from the orders issued for the landings on Gallipoli and showed how far the Australians had come in understanding the importance of collecting intelligence.

Intelligence training

During the winter of 1916–1917, I ANZAC Corps established a corps school to conduct a range of specialist training and short courses.91 The corps school taught basic infantry skills, such as the use of the light machine gun and trench mortar, along with other specialist skills such as intelligence and scouting.92

Soldiers from battalions allocated to intelligence duties completed elementary training focused on skills such as observation, sketching, interpretation of air photographs, scouting, and patrolling in trench warfare conditions as well as in semi-open and open warfare. Instruction was also given in the use of the prismatic compass and protractors; in the duties of searchers and the use of

Germans speakers; elementary knowledge of the German Army including the organisation of the German Army and uniforms; the writing of intelligence reports; and general intelligence instruction. 93

90 Seventh Australian Infantry Brigade 238/67, 30 September 1917, AWM25, 423/2/44. 91 First ANZAC Corps General Staff Circular No.72 Schools G.188/1/288, 23 April 1917, AWM26, 173/12. 92 Ibid. 93 Third Australian Infantry Brigade Memorandum G.131, 10 March 1917, AWM25, 881/29/17.

The growing number of intelligence personnel in each battalion meant that intelligence courses were usually attended by officers and NCOs, who were expected to conduct similar training for men within their battalion when not in the front line.94 Courses of instruction were also run to provide basic German language skills to enable front line troops to understand key German phrases and instructions, and to enable quick examination of prisoners to obtain immediate tactical information. 95 Another of the divisional intelligence officers roles was coordinating and organising the training of intelligence personnel in their division.96

Intelligence was also used to design training for front line troops.

Information obtained from captured German documents provided details about the changing structure of the enemy defensive line. Unlike the Somme in 1916 in

1917, the German defensive line now consisted of a series of posts defended

‘with light machine-guns and rifles’. Wire obstacles were constructed on an irregular basis and dummy positions were constructed to draw fire.97 The change in the layout of the German defensive line meant that ‘no trenches are dug except the occasional communications trenches’, and in forward positions the enemy fought from shell-holes which were often camouflaged. Behind the front line posts, second line defences consisted of dug-outs and machine-gun positions with stronger wire obstacles. In the main defensive line, concrete

94 Second Australian Infantry Brigade Memorandum Intelligence Training, 23 August 1917, AWM26, 236/9. 95 Third Australian Division Notes on Interview with G.S.O.(I), First ANZAC Corps Concerning Intelligence Arrangements, 16 November 1917, AWM25, 423/25/44. 96 First ANZAC Corps Memorandum Hints on Training During the Coming Winter, January 1917, AWM25. 97 First Australian Division Notes from Recent Intelligence Summaries, 11 August 1917, AWM26, 231/39.

strong-points were constructed which were capable of withstanding heavy bombardments. During heavy bombardments, German orders directed that defending troops hold their front line ‘thinly’, while trenches at the rear were to be evacuated except for troops sheltering in strong-points.98

This information was incorporated into I ANZAC Corps training with tactical schemes and manoeuvers focusing on how to deal with enemy pillboxes and strong-points, which had previously proven effective in breaking up attacks and separating the advancing infantry from the protection of the creeping barrage. Copies of intelligence summaries were widely circulated to ensure that the Australian infantry understood the new defensive tactics that had been adopted by the Germans in Flanders, along with instructions that ‘all officers and

NCOs were to be thoroughly familiar with the developments in enemy tactics’.99

Specific tactics were designed to enable platoons to overcome the new German defensive arrangements. Strong-points occupied by German defenders were suppressed by the Lewis gun section of an Australian platoon, while other sections moved around to the flanks to engage the position with rifle grenades or hand grenades, before rushing the garrison. Mopping up parties were strengthened to ensure that they were able to deal with enemy positions that may have been missed. At least one platoon per attacking company was now detailed to mopping up. Mopping up platoons were also equipped with smoke bombs and Stokes mortars to suppress enemy positions or screen attackers.

Engineers and pioneers were ordered to support infantry attacks and conduct demolition work on German concrete posts and dug-outs. Counter-attacks were

98 First Australian Division Notes from Recent Intelligence Summaries, 11 August 1917, AWM26, 231/39. 99 Ibid.

to be expected at any time once the barrage had passed, and commanding officers were advised to move forward to their battalion’s objective as quickly as possible to take control of the defence.100

At the end of 1917, the AIF conducted a review of its intelligence system to identify areas for further improvement. The key lesson identified by the

Australians was the need for intelligence personnel to go as far forward as possible behind the front line troops to take immediate advantage of information as it became available.101 The review noted that ‘the system of having the divisional intelligence officer forward worked well. Information came back quickly and at the same time was made use of by brigades and commanders on the spot.’102 The value of having intelligence personnel who spoke German accompanying the front line troops was highlighted as it ensured that tactical intelligence (the location of German headquarters, gun batteries and other key installations) was quickly obtained and exploited.103 The advance following the

German withdrawal to the Hindenburg Line had demonstrated the flexible and adaptable nature of the intelligence system and highlighted the different types of intelligence that would be required during open warfare.

ANZAC and Australian Corps Intelligence — 1918

Compared to the earlier years of the war, in 1918 there were few changes in the intelligence structure or organisation within the British Army. The tried (and

100 7th Australian Infantry Brigade Notes on N.Z. Front, 10 September 1917, AWM26, 247/1. 101 Notes On Intelligence Organization During Recent Operations, First ANZAC Corps, 18 November 1917, AWM25, 423/2/46. 102 Ibid. 103 Third Australian Division General Staff Circular No.64.A. Intelligence System — Organization and Policy S.G. 45/292, 28 November 1917, AWM25, 423/25/44.

largely proven) methods of collecting intelligence that had been developed or that had evolved throughout 1916 and 1917 continued to be refined, but remained mostly unchanged until the end of the war. Changes in the intelligence structures of the ANZAC and Australian Corps were also relatively minor.104

The most obvious change to the ANZAC and later the Australian Corps reflected the Australians dwindling numerical strength. As the number of reinforcements decreased, the size of the scout platoon in the battalions also decreased, as did the size of the observation sections at brigade and division level.105 This had little impact on the Australians’ ability to gather front line intelligence, as the skill and experience of the Australian infantry by this stage of the war had largely negated the requirement for specialist scouts that had existed earlier.

At the Brigade Headquarters, the Brigade Intelligence Officer was now an

Intelligence Corps officer rather than a regimental officer drawn from one of the battalions in the brigade.106 The practice of providing specialist intelligence support to RFC, tank and artillery units, which had commenced in 1916 and

1917, continued in 1918 and intelligence officers were found at all levels throughout the BEF. After the battle of Amiens, as the British and Dominion armies pushed the Germans back, the intelligence system once again transitioned from supporting a largely static battlefield into one where open warfare was normal.107

104 Third Australian Division Intelligence Course (Officers) Intelligence Within Brigade — Active Operations, 19 January 1918, AWM25, 423/2/14. 105 Ibid. 106 Fifth Australian Division — Operations — Preliminary Instructions No.3 Intelligence And Examination And Disposal of Prisoners And Captured Documents, 9 April 1918, AWM25, 423/2/62. 107 32nd Division Instructions No.5 Disposal Of Prisoners And Intelligence G.S.1882/16/6, 31 August 1918, AWM26, 483/21.

Intelligence training

Training for intelligence personnel in 1918 continued to evolve. For soldiers, training focused on skills such as map reading, using a compass, sketching, and panorama drawing. Other skills such as writing patrol reports and messages, and the duties of observation post staff, were also taught.108 For officers, intelligence training included additional subjects such as interpreting aerial photographs, intelligence and counter-battery liaison, war trade intelligence, and training on the different types of chemical weapons employed by the Germans.109

Intelligence training was also expanded beyond those personnel specifically allocated to intelligence duties, with infantry officers from battalions and officers from the machine gun companies and light trench mortar batteries also attending intelligence training courses.110 The aim of this training was to instruct officers on the role of intelligence and the organisation of intelligence within the Australian divisions, and to ensure that officers understood the role that they played in the larger intelligence structure.111 Intelligence training also gave officers an appreciation of the BEF’s intelligence organisation and the intelligence organisation within the artillery, tank and RFC units which supported or fought alongside them.112 An Australian Corps school was established during the winter of 1917/1918. However, the German March

108 Second Australian Infantry Brigade Syllabus Of Training For Battalion Intelligence Sections Under Battalion Intelligence Officers, 2 January 1918, AWM25, 881/29/37. 109 Third Australian Infantry Brigade Memorandum g.1921, 4 February 1918, AWM25. 110 Ibid. 111 Third Australian Division. Intelligence Course (officers) Introductory Lecture, 5 January 1918, AWM25, 881/29/193. 112 Ibid.

offensive caused many of the courses to be cut short as the troops were rushed back to their divisions.

For Intelligence Corps officers, training had become much more specialised. Lieutenant Charles Brossois attended the first Combined Intelligence

Course run by the British Intelligence Corps at their school in Harrow.113 This was a long course, running from14 May to 6 July 1918, aimed at preparing

Intelligence Corps officers for all aspects of their duties. The course syllabus was detailed and covered instruction in the same skills that soldiers serving in intelligence roles in the front line were expected to have mastered, such as map reading, sketching and drawing, and the use of the prismatic compass and protractor.114 More advanced training was provided on the intelligence organisation of the British Army and the different types of intelligence that was available to the BEF, such as wireless intelligence and field survey (flash spotting, sound ranging, and topographic intelligence).115

Other specialised training included training in translating German documents, interpreting aerial photographs, plotting intelligence information on maps, postal censorship, war trade intelligence, counter-espionage, technical intelligence to ensure that the officers had a good understanding of German arms and equipment, and the interrogation of prisoners.116 Intelligence corps officers studied the German Army to ensure they had a thorough understanding of the enemy and a similar effort was made to instruct them in the intelligence system in use by the French Army to enable better cooperation.117 In addition to the

113 Programme for Intelligence School Harrow, 2 July 1918, AWM25, 879/1/9. 114 Ibid. 115 Ibid. 116 Ibid. 117 Ibid.

skills learnt on the course, Intelligence Corps officers were expected to have a good command of German and to be able to rapidly translate German into

English.118

The Australians followed the pattern of the British Army when it came to the intelligence structures which supported their formations. There were some minor differences that reflected the different operational circumstances in which the Australians found themselves. Experiences on Gallipoli led the Australians to establish battalion intelligence officers well before the British Army, and they maintained these positions throughout the war. In France, the Australians were early adopters of the approach of having German speakers move forward with the attacking troops, with intelligence personnel following quickly behind to collect intelligence left behind by the enemy. Intelligence training for the

Australians was also largely similar to that of the British Army. While there was little specialist training in Egypt for personnel engaged in intelligence duties, by the time the Australians arrived in France there was a well established system for training intelligence personnel, and by the end of the war the Australians were fully integrated into the British Army system of intelligence training.

118 Ibid.

Part 2 — Intelligence gathered using technical means

Chapter 3. Aerial reconnaissance and aerial photography

Pre-war military doctrine identified the value of aircraft in providing commanders with information about the battlefield, and the RFC deployed several squadrons to France to support the BEF at the outbreak of the war. By the time the Australians entered the war, the value of aerial reconnaissance was understood beyond doubt, but the capability was still relatively new and evolving rapidly. Aerial reconnaissance was one of the earliest types of intelligence that the Australians had access to during the war, as aircraft were deployed to support the fleet and the landing force on Gallipoli. It was the transition from using aircraft purely for observation purposes into a platform that also adjusted and controlled the fire of artillery that cemented the true value of aerial reconnaissance, particularly on the Western Front. Aerial photography was another capability that was still new and untested at the outbreak of the war but which Australians were exposed to early on. Early photographic equipment and techniques were rudimentary. However, as the capability developed, aerial photography became a key source of intelligence used to plan nearly all the major battles in which the Australians fought. This chapter examines the development of aerial reconnaissance and aerial photography and the exposure of the Australians to this type of intelligence throughout the war and looks at how the Australians used intelligence derived from aerial reconnaissance and aerial photography in battle planning from Gallipoli through to their final battles in 1918.1

1 For aerial photography and aerial reconnaissance, see General Staff (Intelligence), 'SS 550 — Notes on the Interpretation of Aeroplane Photographs' (1917); Terrence Finnegan, Shooting the Front: Allied Aerial Reconnaissance in the First World War (Stroud, Spellmount, 2011); Peter Hart, Somme Success: The Royal Flying Corps and the Battle of the Somme 1916 (Barnsley, Leo Cooper, 2001); Peter Hart, Bloody April: Slaughter in the Skies over Arras 1917, (London, Weidenfeld &

Aerial reconnaissance

On 13 August 1914, shortly after war was declared, the first units of the RFC crossed the channel and deployed in support of the BEF.2 Within days of their arrival, reconnaissance operations commenced.3 British aerial reconnaissance activities quickly gathered pace and it was an aerial reconnaissance report that identified that the BEF was likely to be outflanked by the advancing German

Army in its positions around the Mons Canal.4 Intelligence derived from aerial reconnaissance allowed the BEF to begin its retreat from Mons and remain ahead of the advancing German forces which threatened to envelop them. As the

BEF and French forces retreated, the RFC provided reconnaissance reports about the location of the advancing German armies.5 It was the RFC that detected signs that the Germans had changed direction as they were advancing and that instead of continuing west the German armies had swung around and were now headed southeast.6 This critical information allowed the retreating British and French forces to avoid a potentially decisive manoeuver. The value of the RFC and aerial reconnaissance was now accepted and ‘the RFC achieved tremendous credibility at this climactic moment.’7

Nicholson, 2005; Peter Hart, Aces Falling: War above the Trenches 1918 (London, Orion, 2007); Peter Mead, The Eye in the Air: History of Air Observation and Reconnaissance for the Army 1785– 1945 (London, Her Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1983); Michael Molkentin, Fire in the Sky, Kindle edition (Crows Nest, Allen & Unwin, 2010); Michael Molkentin, Australia and the War in the Air (Melbourne, Oxford University Press, 2014); Roy Nesbit, Eyes of the RAF: A History of Photo- Reconnaissance (Stroud, Alan Sutton Publishing, 1996). 2 Finnegan, Shooting the Front, p.29. 3 Finnegan, Shooting the Front, p.30; Mead, The Eye in the Air, p.52. 4 Nesbit, Eyes of the RAF, p.16. 5 Nesbit, Eyes of the RAF, p.16. 6 Finnegan, Shooting the Front, p.35; Mead, The Eye in the Air, p.55. 7 Finnegan, Shooting the Front, p.35.

During the battle of the Marne, British and French reconnaissance aircraft confirmed other intelligence reports about the dispositions of German forces, including that by 9 September 1914, the Germans were retreating northwards.8

As British and French forces followed the retreating German Army, aircraft began to be used to locate targets for the artillery. The installation of early radio sets and the adoption of the squared map quickly allowed aircraft to pinpoint targets for engagement by friendly guns.9 Throughout the remainder of

September and October 1914, experiments over the front enabled the development of aircraft-artillery cooperation procedures which would evolve and be refined throughout the remainder of the war.10 Trench warfare once again made the use of fixed aerial observation platforms, such as observation balloons, another viable means to gather intelligence.11 Observation balloons, also referred to as captive balloons, had been used by the British with some success in the Boer War.12 The French introduced the first operational balloons on the Western Front in October 1914 and the British followed suit in May 1915 with the deployment of their first kite balloon at Poperinghe in Belgium.13

Captive balloons could be connected directly to the artillery units via a telephone line, which provided an efficient means to communicate to the artillery. Detailed observation information could be supplied over the telephone rather than the brief wireless messages that could be transmitted from aircraft.14 However, the

8 Finnegan, Shooting the Front, p.39; Mead, The Eye in the Air, p.56. 9 Finnegan, Shooting the Front, p.41; Mead, The Eye in the Air, p.66. 10 Finnegan, Shooting the Front, pp.42–43. 11 Finnegan, Shooting the Front, p.44. 12 Jock Haswell, British Military Intelligence (London, Willmer Brothers, 1973), pp.69–70, Mead, The Eye in the Air, pp.23–27. 13 Finnegan, Shooting the Front, p.44. 14 Finnegan, Shooting the Front, p.44.

fixed nature of the observation balloons and the knowledge that they were spotting for the artillery made them stationary targets for long range enemy artillery and enemy aircraft.15

Gallipoli — 1915

Both aircraft and balloons were deployed to support the attacks on the

Dardanelles forts and the subsequent land campaign. The official history of the

Gallipoli campaign noted that ‘it had been decided by Lord Kitchener that any air requirements of the army [on Gallipoli] must be met by the Royal Naval Air

Service’ (RNAS).16 This reflected the fact that the RFC was fully engaged in supporting the BEF on the Western Front. Initially, the naval campaign was supported by the four aircraft and four seaplanes embarked upon HMS Ark

Royal.17 After the failed attempt to force a way past the Dardanelles forts, additional RNAS aircraft were sent to support the MEF. At the ‘end of March No.3

Squadron RNAS arrived, and from that date, though no cameras were available for another fortnight, matters began to improve. Bombing flights were now undertaken, and a certain amount of information was collected.’18 On 9 April

1915, the SS Manica with No.1 Experimental Kite Balloon Section onboard also arrived to support the landings.19

An increasing number of reconnaissance flights over the Gallipoli peninsula began shortly after No.3 Squadron arrived, although weather

15 Nesbit, Eyes of the RAF, p.30. 16 C.F. Aspinall-Oglander, History of the Great War, Based on Official Documents: Military Operations, Gallipoli: Volume I (London, William Heinemann, 1929), p.139. 17 Hugh Dolan, Gallipoli Air War, Kindle edition, (Sydney, Pan Macmillan, 2013), Chapter 1. 18 Aspinall-Oglander, History of the Great War, Volume I, p.139. 19 Dolan, Gallipoli Air War, Chapter 2.

conditions at that time of year meant that there were many days where flying was not possible.20 Information obtained from these early flights was useful in identifying key topographical features on the peninsula, such as roads and towns. Importantly, early reconnaissance flights were also able to identify the location of enemy forces, particularly enemy artillery.21

Intelligence staff officers from Corps and Division Headquarters were carried aloft on some of the reconnaissance flights to allow them to develop an appreciation of the topography of the peninsula. Major Villiers-Stuart, the

GSO2(I) from ANZAC Corps Headquarters, was carried as an observer on a reconnaissance flight over Gaba Tepe on 14 April 1915.22 Villiers-Stuart’s report from the flight focused heavily on the location of enemy troops, artillery and defences confirming that the landings at Anzac would be contested. Subsequent reconnaissance flights identified additional enemy troop concentrations and artillery that were in a position to interfere with the landings.23

RNAS aircraft were also engaged in spotting for Royal Navy ships as they attempted to engage targets on or near the peninsula.24 Reconnaissance and artillery spotting flights provided a significant amount of information on the

Turkish positions both at Helles and around Gaba Tepe, which was compiled into sketches and plotted onto maps at GHQ MEF.25 On the day of the landings, aerial reconnaissance flights were conducted. However, ‘General Birdwood’s request

20 Aspinall-Oglander, Military Operations, Volume I, pp.139–141. 21 GHQ Mediterranean Expeditionary Force Memorandum, 14 April 1915, TNA, WO157/678. 22 Intelligence Summary for April 1915 Australian and New Zealand Army Corps, 1–30 April 1915, TNA, WO157/668. 23 Dolan, Gallipoli Air War, Chapter 2. 24 Intelligence N.Z. & A Div Aeroplane Report, 14 April 1915, TNA WO157/678. 25 Intelligence N.Z.&A Div Information On Villages, Roads, and Water in the Gallipoli Peninsula, 16 April 1915, TNA, WO157/678; Intelligence ANZAC Corps Corrections To Sketch Plans (Dated 18th April 1915) Of Gallipoli Peninsula Showing Results of Air Reconnaissances, 22 April 1915, TNA, WO157/668.

for two machines to be allotted to his front could not be granted and the Anzac landing could only be supported by a balloon ship with one kite balloon.’26

After the landings, regular aerial reconnaissance flights, including those conducted by the French on the Asiatic side of the Dardanelles, continued to provide a steady flow of intelligence about the location and movements of enemy forces.27 The ANZAC Corps requested that aerial reconnaissance flights be conducted over several locations thought to be enemy gun battery positions.28

Aerial reconnaissance was also particularly useful in providing warnings of large attacks on the Anzac perimeter following the arrival of Turkish reinforcements on the peninsula in late May 1915.29

The lack of Turkish or German aircraft and the state of aerial combat at this early stage of the war meant that British and French aircraft could operate with impunity. British and French aircraft conducted reconnaissance flights up the peninsula to Bulair and across to Chanak, both key transportation nodes on the routes used by the Turks to move troops, equipment and supplies to Helles and Anzac.30 By May 1915, RNAS aircraft were carrying wireless transmitters and were communicating with ships bombarding targets around British and

French positions at Helles and Anzac.31

By the end of June 1915, ANZAC Corps headquarters had begun to look for ways to break the deadlock at Anzac. Aerial reconnaissance proved useful in

26 Aspinall-Oglander, Military Operations, Volume I, p.139. 27 Intelligence ANZAC Corps French Aeroplane Report, 20 May 1915, TNA, WO157/669. 28 Intelligence Anzac Corps 1st-31st May 1915 Australian and New Zealand Corps Memorandum, 6 May 1915, TNA, WO157/669. 29 Ibid. 30 Report of month’s work from 16th July to 19th Dec inclusive, carried out by Capt A.H.K. Jopp AIF, December 1915, AWM25. 31 ANZAC Intelligence Summary, 24 May 1915, AWM25.

identifying the extent of the Turkish positions around the Anzac perimeter along with the locations of enemy reserves. Aerial reconnaissance reports noted that the Turks’ main reserve was located behind the high ground to the north of the

Anzac position.32 Similar efforts were also being made to locate enemy artillery that was shelling the Anzac position to permit its engagement by ANZAC artillery. Seventeen active enemy gun positions of varying calibers and types had been identified by aerial reconnaissance and engaged by mid-June, and by July

1915 the artillery staff were beginning to produce maps of enemy gun positions based on aerial reconnaissance reports to enable counter-battery operations to be conducted.33

In advance of the August offensive, further aerial reconnaissance flights were conducted over the Gallipoli peninsula including multiple flights over the

Turkish positions around Lone Pine and Johnson’s Jolly. 34 One reconnaissance report noted that aircraft ‘reconnoitered Johnson’s Jolly and Lonely Pine [sic] to report on state of overhead cover — if existing and that a detailed report was forwarded to the ANZAC Corps’.35

An assessment of a possible attack on Lone Pine, which drew on a range of intelligence sources including aerial reconnaissance reports, was prepared before the August offensive. The assessment noted that the enemy strength in this position was unknown, but estimated a thousand men in the enemy front

32 1st ANZAC General Staff 1–30 June 1915 Notes on Further Operations by Australian & New Zealand Corps, 30 June 1915, TNA, WO95/4281. 33 Intelligence N.Z.&A Division 1st–30th June 1915 memorandum for N.Z&A Division, 17 June 1915, TNA, WO157/680; Mediterranean Expeditionary Force Dardanelles CRA (GHQ) Mar-Nov 1915 sketch plan showing hostile guns, 2 July 1915, TNA WO95/4267. 34 Rhys Crawley, Climax at Gallipoli: The Failure of the August Offensive (Norman, University of Oklahoma Press, 2014), pp.18–19. 35 Report of month’s work from 16th July to 19th Dec inclusive, carried out by Capt A.H.K. Jopp AIF, December 1915, AWM25.

line trenches, with an unknown number in support trenches, and reserve towards the rear of the position.36 The terrain separating the Anzac position and the Turkish trenches was assessed as unfavourable, as movement against enemy positions would be subject to fire from enfilade and flanking locations near

Johnston’s Jolly, Pine Ridge and Snipers Ridge. The frontage of the area to be attacked was narrow and the distance to the enemy trenchline varied from seventy to two-hundred yards.37 No mention was made in the appreciation of the overhead cover on the Turkish trenches or the likely impact this would have on the assaulting troops even though the overhead cover had been identified and observers had been asked to report on the state of the overhead cover in advance of the attack.38 There is no evidence in any of the orders issued to the attacking troops that information about the overhead cover on the enemy trenches was passed on.

Reconnaissance flights conducted after the offensive commenced identified Turkish reinforcements moving towards the Anzac position, along with an increasing number of artillery emplacements and Turkish camps, indicating that the Turks had responded rapidly to deal with efforts to break out of the position at Anzac and to contain the landings at Suvla.39 This information helped convince the ANZAC Corps, IX Corps and GHQ MEF that the offensive and the efforts to break out had run their course.

36 Australian Division General Staff Aug 1915 Notes on the Attack of Lone Pine, July 1915, TNA, WO95/4329. 37 Ibid. 38 Report of month’s work from 16th July to 19th Dec inclusive, carried out by Capt A.H.K. Jopp AIF, December 1915, AWM25. 39 Ibid,

After the August offensive wound down, aerial reconnaissance flights continued to provide useful information about the development of the enemy positions and the flow of reinforcements.40 ANZAC Corps Headquarters was able to identify the increasing strength of the Turkish garrison surrounding the

Anzac/Suvla perimeter, including well developed trenches, large camps with dug-outs to shelter troops, and the locations of several enemy headquarters.

Enemy artillery remained difficult to locate and while many gun emplacements could be identified, they were often empty making effective counter-battery operations difficult.41 Reconnaissance and artillery spotting flights continued over Anzac and Suvla until the evacuation of British, New Zealand and Australian forces in December 1915.

Pozières and Mouquet Farm — 1916

By the time the Australians arrived in France a number of advances had been made in the way that the RFC was conducting aerial reconnaissance. By April

1915, army and corps headquarters in the BEF had been allocated aircraft and observation balloons to enable them to conduct aerial reconnaissance of their areas of responsibility along the front line.42 Increasingly, the role of reconnaissance aircraft was to spot for artillery, with ‘pure’ reconnaissance activities becoming a secondary task. Methods of accurately adjusting the fire of friendly artillery onto their targets had also advanced. The squared artillery maps introduced at the battle of the Aisne were further refined, while new

40 Intelligence N.Z.&A Division 1st–31st October 1915 RNAS. Summary of Information Report, 8 October 1915, TNA, WO157/684. 41 1st Australian Division General Staff October 1915 Air Reconnaissance 4/10/15, 4 October 1915, TNA, WO95/4330. 42 Finnegan, Shooting the Front, pp.61–62.

means of directing the fire of friendly artillery, such as the ‘clock code’, had been introduced.43 These methods proved highly effective and allowed the rapid engagement of targets. So important was artillery observation that it was to remain the the RFC’s primary role until the end of the war.44

Another new task for reconnaissance aircraft that had been used to great success was the ‘contact patrol’.45 During attacks, aircraft flew overhead to identify the locations of friendly forces. Advancing troops often burnt flares in the bottoms of captured trenches or used other means of identification to enable aircraft to identify the furthest advances by friendly troops.46 This information was then quickly relayed to higher headquarters to prevent troops from being inadvertently bombarded by friendly artillery, and to ensure friendly troops could receive artillery support when the enemy counter-attacked.47

By the beginning of June 1916, the Fourth Army was well established along its front on the Somme and had begun to collect information about the

German positions opposite. Almost the entire RFC was tasked to support the battle of Somme. The ‘Fourth Army was supported by 68 planes, 30 of which were allotted to counter-battery spotting, 16 to spotting trench bombardments,

9 to aerial photography, and 13 to contact patrols to monitor the advance of the infantry.’48 British reconnaissance aircraft were especially active, locating

German gun positions and supply dumps, and photographing the German front line trenches. The state of the German front line trenches was assessed to be

43 Nesbit, Eyes of the RAF, p.26. 44 Ibid, 45 Notes On Course Of RFC School Of Instruction For Other Arms, 1916, AWM26, 6/165. 46 Ibid, 47 Ibid, 48 Robin Prior and Trevor Wilson, Command on the Western Front: The Military Career of Sir Henry Rawlinson 1914–18 (Oxford, Blackwell, 1992), p.165.

good. German troops were also observed strengthening their second line of defences.49

After their stint in the ‘nursery’ sector in 1916, the Australians were sent to the Somme. The fighting along the Somme front had been underway for several weeks by the time the Australians arrived and aerial reconnaissance was being routinely conducted over the battlefield. Information obtained by aerial reconnaissance flights was incorporated into operations orders and intelligence summaries which were made available from Army Headquarters to brigade level. Copies of Australian battalion orders included intelligence derived from aerial reconnaissance indicating that Brigade Intelligence Officers were briefing or passing on to battalion staff intelligence that related to their section of the front line or their part in the attack.

As the 1st Division was entering the front line in preparation for its attack on Pozières, aircraft reconnaissance reports noted that the Germans continued to repair communications and fighting trenches around Pozières, as well as constructing what appeared to be new dug-outs, but that wire entanglements and other obstacles had largely been destroyed.50 After the success of the attack on Pozières, further aerial reconnaissance reports noted that while artillery fire had severely damaged the German trenches in many locations, the O.G.2 (Old

German) line of trenches which ran along the Pozières heights was still in a fair condition, especially between Mouquet Farm and Courcelette Road. Support trenches were reported to be in a poor state of repair as were several switch trenches leading to Mouquet Farm. Aerial reconnaissance identified only two

49 Fourth Army Intelligence Summaries June 1916 Intelligence Summary No.92 , 1 June 1916, TNA, WO157/171. 50 Reserve Army Summary of Information, 21 July 1916, TNA, WO157/200.

communications trenches which led into the German front line, with one of the communication trenches being described as ‘shallow and narrow’, while the other, further north, was assessed to be the main route used for traffic moving up from Courcelette. These two trenches were identified as important targets to be barraged during the next Australian attack.51 This was a good example of how the Australians were incorporating intelligence obtained from aerial reconnaissance directly into their battle planning.

In August 1916, the Fifth Army allocated I ANZAC Corps No.13 Kite

Balloon Section for artillery spotting.52 Australian battery commanders were ordered to ensure that FOOs used balloons to register targets where they could not achieve good observation from the ground. Both the I ANZAC Corps Heavy

Artillery and Australian divisional artillery had direct communications with the balloon section, and observation balloons allowed FOOs to accurately register artillery targets which were almost impossible to discern in the churned up landscape around Pozières and Mouquet Farm.53

After capturing Pozières, I ANZAC Corps turned its attention to the capture of Mouquet Farm. Mouquet Farm ‘did not quite lie on the crest’ of the ridge but was ‘some 500 yards to the east’. The main German position appeared to be ‘Fabeck Graben’ (High Trench) which lay on the crest of the ridge itself.

Capturing Fabeck Graben and the area around Mouquet Farm would allow for the left side of the Australian line to be brought up and for the farm to be surrounded, setting the stage for the capture of Mouquet Farm itself.54 Aerial

51 First Anzac Corps Intelligence Summary No.6, 29 July 1916, AWM26, 52/2. 52 Reserve Army Memorandum, 1 August 1916, AWM26, 41/64. 53 Ibid. 54 C.E.W. Bean, Official History of Australia in the War of 1914–18: The A.I.F. in France 1916, Volume III (Sydney, Angus & Robertson, 1929), p.759.

reconnaissance reported that coils of wire and other defensive stores were stacked behind the German defensive line.55 Intelligence reports indicated that the Germans appeared to be reinforcing some of their battered units around

Mouquet Farm and Thiepval, and the Germans were observed repairing and improving the trenches around both locations.

Reconnaissance flights also reported that large numbers of Germans were observed moving towards Mouquet Farm, reinforcing the German positions, and this information was later confirmed through information obtained from prisoners.56 Knowledge that the Germans were reinforcing their positions around Mouquet Farm and attempting to repair the defences should have led commanders to the conclusion that the narrow piecemeal attacks that were subsequently launched by the Australian divisions were unlikely to succeed in capturing and holding the farm, but the divisions of I ANZAC Corps continued to batter away at the German positions, making only minor gains until relieved by the Canadians in early September 1916.

Bullecourt — 1917

In October 1916, No.3 Squadron RFC was allocated to I ANZAC Corps and provided weekly reports on the location of enemy artillery, including coordinates and descriptions of each target.57 The establishment of Branch

Intelligence Sections at the headquarters of RFC squadrons in early 1917 also improved the intelligence support to I ANZAC Corps.58

55 First Anzac Corps Intelligence Summary No.6, 29 July 1916, AWM26, 52/2. 56 First Anzac Intelligence Summary No.15, 8 August 1916, AWM26, 52/4. 57 No.3 Squadron — Royal Flying Corps Weekly Artillery Report, 6 November 1916, AWM26, 110/43. 58 Second Australian Division Memorandum Ig 145/89, 25 January 1917, AWM26, 115/9.

Construction of the Hindenburg Line began while the fighting on the

Somme was still underway. In September 1916, construction began on a new line of German defenses that was designed to shorten the German frontline by twenty-seven miles (forty-three kilometres) and free ten infantry divisions from front line duty. These divisions could be held in reserve to defeat the allied attacks that the Germans expected to come in 1917.59 The new defensive line was initially identified by RFC aircraft patrolling in the Arras sector in October

1916. Further reconnaissance flights in November 1916 indicated that the enemy was constructing new trenches from Quéant to Bullecourt.60 Subsequent intelligence reports indicated that the new line of defences included concrete dug-outs and weapon pits protected by thick belts of barbed wire.61 It was not until mid-February 1917 that reconnaissance flights were finally able to confirm that the new defensive line ran from Quéant to Bellicourt, north of St Quentin.62

At the beginning of March 1917, portions of the Hindenburg Line still remained incomplete. Where the line was complete, aerial reconnaissance reported that the Germans had constructed two or three lines of defences along with communications trenches and a large number of dugouts.63 Front line shelters appeared to be constructed of concrete and were dotted along the enemy line at frequent intervals. First and second lines of trenches were deeply dug and both lines of trenches had deep wire obstacles in front of them. To the rear of the position a number of light railways had also been constructed.64 The

59 Paul Kendall, Bullecourt 1917: Breaching the Hindenburg Line (Spellmount, Stroud, 2010), p.42. 60 Kendall, Bullecourt, p.43. 61 Ibid. 62 Ibid. 63 Fifth Army Intelligence Summary March 1917 No:334, 2 March 1917, TNA, WO157/208. 64 Fifth Army Intelligence Summary March 1917 No:341, 9 March 1917, TNA, WO157/208.

section of the Hindenburg Line running from Tilloy to Bullecourt was assessed as largely complete, while from Bullecourt to Moeuvres construction was not as advanced. In the final section of the Hindenburg Line from Moeuvres to

Havrincourt only the first line of defences had been constructed.65Aerial reconnaissance reports noted that, by 24 March 1917, the German position around Bullecourt appeared to have been completed.66 The wire obstacle protecting the Hindenburg Line was reported to be between one hundred and one hundred and fifty metres deep with lines of barbed wire and gaps all protected by machine gun fire.67 Based on the information collected during its construction British and Australian staffs knew that the Hindenburg Line represented a significant obstacle.

Despite the fact that sections of the Hindenburg Line were not complete the Germans commenced their withdrawal to their new defensive line on 23

February 1917. The aim of the withdrawing troops was to delay the advance of the British Army through the use of rearguards and lines of fortified positions to allow time for the Hindenburg Line defences to be completed and for all the material and equipment that the German Army could salvage to be moved behind the new front line or destroyed to prevent its use by the advancing

British troops. During the withdrawal reconnaissance aircraft once again showed their value, reporting on the area into which the British and Australians were advancing after the withdrawing Germans.68 Aircraft were sent out to report on

65 Ibid. 66 First Anzac Corps Intelligence Summary from 6.30p.m 23rd March to 6.30p.m 24 March 1917, 24 March 1917, AWM26, 153/6. 67 First Anzac Corps Intelligence Summary from 6.30p.m 2nd April to 6.30p.m 3rd April 1917, 3 April 1917, TNA, WO157/565. 68 Report of AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE — taken by ‘phone’ from No.3 Squadron RFC at 9.45am, 22 March 1917, AWM26, 145/18.

the condition of enemy trenches to give commanders an understanding of the ground over which their troops were now advancing, and were useful in identifying the likely locations of enemy rear guards and strong points in the path of advancing troops.69 Aerial reconnaissance reports were quickly passed down to commanders, often by phone, as soon as the pilot had returned from his mission.70 The other task that continued to occupy reconnaissance aircraft was spotting for artillery, and as British guns moved forward behind the advance they engaged German rearguards and strong points.71 The RFC continued to support the BEF conducting aerial reconnaissance flights in support of attacks at

Messines and Ypres.

Hamel, Amiens and the advance to the Hindenburg Line — 1918

By 1918, the system of aerial reconnaissance had reached its peak. As the front line stabilised following the German offensives in 1918, RFC units returned to providing routine aerial reconnaissance support. Increasing numbers of aircraft were available to divisions to conduct reconnaissance flights across their front.

Instructions issued by the Australian Corps in April 1918 reminded the

Australian divisions that ‘the Corps [RFC] Squadron is always available for the purpose of carrying out reconnaissances, weather permitting, and besides the usual daily programme, will be prepared to make special reconnaissances.’ The

Australian divisions were ‘encouraged to make full use of the Air Service, and

69 Second Australian Division Memorandum, 4 March 1917, AWM26, 163/9. 70 Report of AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE — taken by ‘phone’ from No.3 Squadron RFC at 9.45am, 22 March 1917, AWM26, 145/18. 71 AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE REPORT Received by telephone from 4th Squadron RFC, 7 April 1917, AWM26 145/19.

reconnaissances of any special area required can be carried out. Applications should be made to “I”, Corps Headquarters.’72

As the Australians prepared for the attack at Hamel, RFC aircraft were active over the German lines examining enemy defences.73 The Australian Corps deployed a British balloon company to support the corps’ counter-battery operations, and reconnaissance aircraft flew contact patrols to confirm the locations of the Australian troops as they advanced during the attack.74 Aerial reconnaissance and artillery spotting missions continued to be flown in support of the Australians until they were withdrawn in early October 1918.75

Aerial photography

The development of aerial photography in the British Army during the war shared many similarities with the development of aerial reconnaissance. In the months prior to the war, RFC units had conducted experiments with aerial photography and had demonstrated the intelligence value of aerial photographs.76 During the first months of the war, RFC units attempted to take aerial photographs as part of their reconnaissance activities, but the results were disappointing.77 Over the winter of 1914/1915, efforts were made to improve the capability, and after studying the French aerial photographic organisation the RFC quickly established an experimental photographic section.78 This

72 INSTRUCTIONS FOR DEFENCE No.6, Headquarters Australian Corps, 10 April 1918, TNA, WO 95/984. 73 Fourth Australian Division — Intelligence Summary No.501, 2 July 1918, AWM26, 408/5. 74 Artillery Instructions No.208, 3 February 1918, TNA, WO95/995; Fourth Australian Infantry Brigade Notes on Hamel Offensive 4 July 1918, 12 July 1918, AWM26, 418/3. 75 Precis Of Fourth Army Orders Affecting Artillery For The Attack Of The Hindenburg Line, 29 September 1918, AWM26, 473/6. 76 Finnegan, Shooting the Front, pp.24–27. 77 Nesbit, Eyes of the RAF, p.22. 78 Nesbit, Eyes of the RAF, p.18; Mead, The Eye in the Air, p.66.

experimental photographic section expanded and photographic sections were soon established with each RFC Wing Headquarters.79 Aerial photography was embraced by the British Army as a key source of intelligence during the planning for the attack at Neuve Chapelle in 1915, when aerial photographs provided by the RFC were responsible for identifying German positions, troop concentrations, and artillery batteries. For the first time in the war, the British

Army went into action with an almost complete picture of the nature of the terrain over which it was to fight and the German defences it was to attack.80

Despite the failure of the attack, the value of aerial photography as a source of battlefield intelligence had been proven, and an expansion of the RFC’s aerial photography capabilities was authorised.81 Much of the early photographic equipment used by the RFC was adapted from civilian use and most of the cameras were hand held, resulting in photographs of variable quality.82 By early

1915, purpose designed cameras were being built to provide higher quality photographs, and development of new cameras continued throughout the war.83

Gallipoli —1915

The RNAS aircraft ordered to Gallipoli to support the MEF also brought along several cameras to take aerial photographs.84 RNAS aircraft were fitted with ‘A’- type cameras, which were the same cameras operated by the RFC on the

Western Front and provided a similar aerial photographic capability.85 Just like

79 Finnegan, Shooting the Front, pp.51–53. 80 Ibid., pp.54–56. 81 Nesbit, Eyes of the RAF, p.27. 82 Finnegan, Shooting the Front, p.43. 83 Nesbit, Eyes of the RAF, p.35; Mead, The Eye in the Air, p.66. 84 ANZAC Intelligence Summary Aeroplane Report, 23 May 1915, AWM25. 85 Finnegan, Shooting the Front, p.58.

the BEF, the aerial photography and photographic interpretation capability of the MEF was embryonic. The MEF was poorly equipped to print and distribute photographs and to interpret the information contained in them. Poor quality maps (discussed in greater detail in Chapter 4) meant that information obtained from photographs would have been difficult to plot accurately.86 Reconnaissance reports and intelligence summaries note that aircraft operating over the Gallipoli peninsula both before and after the landings carried cameras and undertook photographic reconnaissance missions.87 Hamilton recorded that before the landings he examined photographs taken by RNAS flights over Gallipoli.

Hamilton also noted that he showed photographs of the Turkish positions to ‘two of the Australian Commanding Officers’.88 Despite occasional references, no specific mentions are made about aerial photographs in intelligence summaries or reports. Aerial reconnaissance is mentioned as an important source of intelligence on several occasions and it is likely that any aerial photographs taken during reconnaissance missions were considered to be part of the intelligence obtained by RNAS reconnaissance aircraft.

Pozières and Mouquet Farm — 1916

By the time the Australians arrived in France, RFC’s ability to provide aerial photographs of the front had increased significantly.89 With several new types of aircraft, the RFC managed to achieve a degree of dominance over its German opponents and aerial photographs of the front lines were available in quantities

86 Peter Chasseaud and Peter Doyle, Grasping Gallipoli: Terrain, Maps and Failure at the Dardenelles 1915 (Staplehurst, Spellmount, 2005), pp.184–187. 87 Intelligence N.Z. & A Div Aeroplane Report, 14 April 1915, TNA, WO157/678. 88 Dolan, Gallipoli Air War, Chapter 2. 89 Finnegan, Shooting the Front, p.74.

that had not been seen previously.90 Just days before the Somme offensive commenced, aerial photographs taken by the RFC showed the extent of the destruction of the German defences caused by the artillery, along with the state of enemy barbed wire entanglements in front of its trenches.91 From the opening of the battle, the RFC continued to provide a large quantity of aerial photographs, and this continued for the remaining five months of the Somme battles.92

Both the Fourth Army and the Reserve Army used aerial photographs to plan their attacks and to assess the results of attacks.93 I ANZAC Corps intelligence reports noted that aerial photographs were used to identify new enemy defences, enemy gun positions, trenches and other features on the battlefield: ‘recent air photos (taken 31-7-16) show the trench starting from the road just E. of the windmill has been lengthened N.W. to meet the communication trench and has the appearance of being continued further to meet O.G.2 line, probably where it cuts the communication trench.’94 Copies of aerial photographs were made available to Division and Brigade Headquarters for planning purposes and photographs were often used to confirm information obtained through other sources, such as prisoner interrogations.95

Division and Brigade Headquarters were initially required to request copies of aerial photographs. However, it was soon realised that a more practical approach was to provide copies of every aerial photograph taken in their area of operations to Division Headquarters, divisional artillery, and corps heavy

90 Hart, Somme Success, pp.572–637 91 Finnegan, Shooting the Front, p.75. 92 Finnegan, Shooting the Front, p.75; Mead, The Eye in the Air, pp.78–84. 93 Finnegan, Shooting the Front, p.75. 94 First ANZAC Corps Intelligence Summary No.9, 1 August 1916, TNA, WO157/557. 95 First ANZAC Corps Intelligence Summary No.14, 7 August 1916, TNA, WO157/557.

artillery, and leave distribution of aerial photographs to lower units in the hands of their parent formation.96 As the RFC’s ability to supply aerial photographs improved, so did the demand for aerial photographs. Australian operational files contain numerous requests for photographs, photo mosaics, enlargements, and oblique photographs of the areas in which the Australians were fighting.97

Aerial photographs were an important source of intelligence for the

Australians as they planned their attacks around Pozières and Mouquet Farm.

After the Australians successfully captured Pozières on 23 July 1916, aerial photographs showed that the Germans had begun to construct additional trenches designed to strengthen their position around Mouquet Farm to protect against further attacks from the south and southwest (the Australian positions).

A second line of trenches was also photographed being constructed in front of the ‘windmill’ (Hill 160) to strengthen the existing German trenches, which had been severely damaged in some places by artillery fire.98 Additional aerial photographs taken before the Australian attack on 4 August showed German efforts to improve the trenches around the ‘windmill’. Accompanying intelligence reports noted that the windmill and these trenches played a key role in anchoring the defences of the O.G.2 line around Pozières heights.99

As the Australian infantry made further efforts to push along the Albert-

Bapaume road, they continued to be supplied photographs of the area. One report noted that that ‘the GSO3 1st Aust Div provided maps and prints of aerial photographs of the area to be attacked by the Second Brigade which identified

96 Headquarters First ANZAC Corps Memorandum 145/72, 18 September 1916, AWM26, 75/23. 97 First Anzac Corps Memorandum Ig 185/84, 28 December 1916, AWM26, 114/28. 98 First Anzac Corps Intelligence Summary No.6, 29 July 1916, AWM26, 52/2. 99 First Anzac Corps Intelligence Summary No.9, 1 August 1916, AWM26, 52/2.

key friendly trenches identifying those in good condition and those which had been heavily bombarded’.100 Intelligence reports also highlighted that, while enemy trenches were ‘hard to recognise [from the front line] aeroplane photographs show them to be well made and situated just over the crest’.

Despite evidence that the Germans were strengthening their defences and anticipated further attacks no additional artillery or other support was requested or made available to the Australians, and while ultimately successful, the cost of capturing the Pozières heights was high.101

After the capture of Pozières and the Pozières heights, I ANZAC Corps turned its attention to Mouquet Farm. Aerial photographs taken in late June

1916, before the opening of the battle of the Somme, showed that Mouquet Farm was the junction of several major trenchlines leading from Thiepval to

Courcelette.102 The Australians commenced attacking towards Mouquet Farm on

8/9 August, attempting to capture a series of trenches and trench junctions that would put them in a position to launch an attack on the farm itself. The results of these attacks were mixed. While some key trench junctions were taken by the

Australians, other attacks failed to secure their objectives or were forced back by

German counter-attacks. Aerial photographs taken over the period that the

Australians were attacking continued to show German efforts to repair their existing trenches and construct new trenches to stem the Australian advance.

Fresh ‘white patches’, which resulted from the spoil when deep dugouts and other underground positions were constructed, was evident in some photographs, indicating that the Germans continued to construct underground

100 Information Right Brigade Sector Australian Divisional Front, August 1916, AWM26, 54/7. 101 Information Right Brigade Sector Australian Divisional Front, August 1916, AWM26, 54/7. 102 Graham Keech, Pozières (Barnsley, Leo Cooper, 1998), p.82.

shelters for their troops. Aerial photographs showed new heavy weapons emplacements, strong-points, machine gun posts, and trench mortar positions.

Aerial photographs also showed the layout of the current German trench system and locations where trenches had been repaired or had been constructed.103

The shelling and lack of landmarks made it difficult for the troops to determine their exact location as they advanced on Mouquet Farm.104 To aid in finding their way, aerial photographs were made available down to company commanders to aid in identifying objectives for their attacks.105 Throughout the entire time that the Australians were attempting to capture Mouquet Farm, intelligence from aerial photographs showed the Germans continued to reinforce and repair their positions. The Australian attacks on a narrow front allowed the

Germans to continue to feed reinforcements and supplies into the area, making efforts to capture the position difficult and unlikely to succeed without the allocation of additional troops and artillery, or an attempt to take the position as part of a broader offensive, which would prevent the Germans from reinforcing or supporting the position as they had been able to do.

Bullecourt, Messines and the third battle of Ypres — 1917

By 1917, the distribution of photographs taken by corps squadrons was standardised, with prints being provided to Army Headquarters as well as Corps

Headquarters, corps heavy artillery, and all divisions and brigades in the area of the photographs under standing arrangements. Reprints were also automatically

103 First Anzac Intelligence Summary No.27, 20 August 1916, TNA, WO157/557; First Anzac Intelligence Summary No.31, 24 August 1916, TNA, WO157/557. 104 Bean, Official History of Australia in the War of 1914–18, Volume III, p.829. 105 Ibid., p.830.

printed and issued to field survey units, artillery units, and other headquarters.106 Intelligence sections were instructed to ensure that new photographs of the enemy front line were compared with earlier photographs and information available to front line troops through their observation and monitoring across no-mans land.107 Front line troops were instructed to note anything new along the German front or support lines, and battalion intelligence officers were expected to report these changes to their Brigade Headquarters and to confirm any new information that might be available through observation and patrols.108 Intelligence staff and intelligence officers at Brigade and Division

Headquarters were also expected to compare aerial photographs with daily intelligence reports and other sources of intelligence to ensure that they obtained ‘the full value’ from aerial photographs.109 Where front line troops or intelligence personnel identified possible changes, aircraft were often sent to obtain additional photographs of an area to enable the intelligence staff to assess the nature of the enemy activity.110

Detailed analysis and interpretation began to accompany aerial photographs sent out by the intelligence sections collocated with RFC squadrons.

This significantly increased the value of the intelligence contained in aerial photographs.111 An interpretation report accompanying a photograph taken behind a section of the Second Army’s front, for example, noted ‘a number of

106 Scale of Distribution of Aeroplane Photographs taken by Corps Squadrons RFC I.G.422, 15 February 1917, AWM26, 66/4. 107 First Anzac Corps Notes on Comparison of Aero plane Photographs 145/98, 21 February 1917, AWM26, 115/10. 108 Ibid. 109 Ibid. 110 Tenth Australian Infantry Brigade request G6/16, 4 March 1917, AWM26, 90/4. 111 Second Army Intelligence Studies Of Recent Aeroplane Photographs, 1 February 1917, AWM26, 66/4.

tramway lines hitherto unknown. South of the wood there are numerous batches of dug-outs, battery positions, etc. It is possible that the whole area may be used as an infantry and artillery training ground. Its proximity to SPRIET, where rest billets are known to exist, further strengthens this theory.’112 The ability to combine other intelligence with information contained in aerial photographs gave commanders and staffs a powerful tool.

As the Germans prepared their new positions along the Hindenburg Line, the RFC photographed the new construction.113 Aerial photographs of trenches east of Bullecourt showed that there were multiple trench lines, which included a separate fire trench, and another trench which appeared to contain entrances to dug-outs or shelters. Concreting in this section of trench appeared to have been completed, although work to cover the concrete structures with earth had not yet been finished.114 Frequent aerial photographs taken of the same area allowed intelligence staff to assess how quickly the Germans were building their new positions and their rates of work. Aerial photographs also confirmed information obtained from prisoners about the deep residential dug-outs that had been constructed as part of the defences. The presence of shallower concrete shelters in the fire trench was confirmed, while concrete emplacements for machine guns, trench mortars and artillery were also identified.115 Photographs of

Bullecourt showed that ‘trenches on all sides of the village are connected with one another by communications trenches’. A zig-zag trench line had been constructed immediately behind the front line and photographs confirmed

112 Ibid. 113 Fifth Australian Division extract from Fifth Army Intelligence Summary 9th March 1917, 10 March 1917, AWM26, 98/16. 114 General Headquarters Summary of Information Serial No. 85, 26 March 1917, AWM26, 144/2. 115 Annex to Fifth Army Summary of 6th April 1917, 6 April 1917, TNA, WO157/209.

information obtained from prisoners about covered passages between the front line and support trenches.116 Aerial photographs also allowed the intelligence staff to assess the condition of enemy trenches and provide an indication of enemy intentions.117

Maps like the one shown in Figure 2 were prepared from aerial photographs, indicating the likely locations of enemy machine guns sited to fire along wire obstacles.118 Aerial photographs also enabled specialists, such as the engineer officer, to study the new fortifications to identify vulnerabilities or improvements in the German defences without having to expose themselves.

116 Fifth Army Intelligence Summary March 1917 No:357, 25 March 1917, TNA, WO157/208. 117 Second Australian Division report A13/14, 4 March 1917, AWM26, 163/9. 118 Note on the Hindenburg Line, 1 April 1917, AWM26, 152/7.

Figure 2 — A diagram showing the layout of the Hindenburg Line defences near Bullecourt (AWM26, 152/7)

Aerial photographs of the Hindenburg Line showed that the Germans had adopted a different defensive arrangement than the one they had used on the

Somme the year before. Intelligence reports noted that ‘in place of the hitherto normal system of deep and extensive dug-outs in the front as well as the support line, it appears that shelters are comparatively shallow, but roofed with concrete, are being made in practically every fire-bay in the front line, while dug-outs are being relegated to the support line and even further to the rear.’119 Perhaps most importantly for the Australian infantry, aerial photographs clearly showed the extensive belts of wire protecting the new fortifications: ‘from BULLECOURT to

MOEUVRES the stage is not so advanced but from the first line is protected by three to six belts of wire.’120

Preparatory orders for the Australians’ first attack on the Hindenburg

Line noted that the ‘aeroplane photographs’ had indicated the enemy was beginning to prepare for an attack on the Hindenburg Line and had begun to construct additional wire obstacles.121 This should have served as one of the many warnings to Fifth Army that a hasty attack was unlikely to succeed.

Despite the large amount of information available about the Hindenburg

Line defences, the Fifth Army attempted to push quickly through the German defences at Bullecourt rather than take a more methodical approach to its first attack. The Fifth Army plan for the attack identified four objectives for the attacking force including the village of Bullecourt along with two other villages,

119 Fifth Australian Division extract from Fifth Army Intelligence Summary 9th March 1917, 10 March 1917, AWM26, 98/16. 120 Fifth Australian Division extract from Fifth Army Intelligence Summary 9th March 1917, 10 March 1917, AWM26, 98/16. 121 First Anzac Corps Preliminary Instructions for Next Operation Set No.2, 6 April 1917, AWM26, 152/7.

Riencourt and Hendecourt, both well behind the Hindenburg Line.122 An assessment of the proposed operation by I ANZAC Corps noted that there were large distances between the objectives set down by the Fifth Army, and that each subsequent objective would need to be suppressed or neutralised while earlier objectives were captured and consolidated.123 Photographs and reconnaissance reports indicated that enemy troops in the Drocourt-Queant line would be able to engage the attacking troops while the right flank of the attack could be engaged by German positions further along the Hindenburg Line.124

With the intelligence that was available about the Hindenburg Line, it is difficult to understand why the Fifth Army launched the first attack at Bullecourt when the likelihood of failure was so high. Perhaps they hoped to rush through the Hindenburg Line before the recently arrived German defenders were settled.

The need to support the offensive at Arras notwithstanding, the Germans had executed a skillful withdrawal to their new defensive position, which they had sited to make best use of the ground and spent months constructing. The size and strength of wire obstacles, the number of dug-outs and shelters, and the strength of strong-points and villages in the Hindenburg Line had been catalogued over the months that it had been under construction. The Germans seemed ready to meet an attack and it made little sense to attempt to rush an attack without adequate preparation. I ANZAC Corps’ appreciation prepared in advance of the attack had identified many of these difficulties but had failed to convince the Fifth Army Headquarters that the attack would not succeed. Even with additional resources and a more methodical approach to reducing the

122 Fifth Army Order No.52, 8 April 1917, TNA, WO95/982. 123 First Anzac Corps Operations S1901, 5 April 1917, AWM26, 152/7. 124 Ibid.

German defences, the second attack on the German positions around Bullecourt proved a costly undertaking.

The attack by the Second Army at Messines in June 1917 tested almost every aspect of the military intelligence system, of which aerial photography was but one part.125 Extensive use was made of aerial photographs in the planning phase of the operation, with headquarters receiving a regular supply of aerial photographs along with photographic interpretation notes.126 Branch

Intelligence Officers with corps and army RFC squadrons were asked to ensure rapid debriefing of observers and rapid processing, interpretation and distribution of aeroplane photographs. Corps squadrons were allocated responsibility for photographing and reporting on the zone in front of their parent corps to a depth of three miles behind the enemy front line, while army squadrons operated along the entire army front to a depth of fifteen miles.127 The

3rd Division received a steady supply of photographs and reports that enabled them to understand in detail the area over which they were expected to fight.

Photographs and their accompanying reports identified not only German trenches, but also individual dug-outs and fortifications; tracks and pathways used by enemy forces when moving to and from the front line; rest billets in rear areas; artillery batteries and mortar positions; supply dumps; and likely enemy headquarters.128

125 Finnegan, Shooting the Front, p.88. 126 Third Australian Division Notes on Air Photographs G21/98, 12 May 1917, AWM26, 98/16. 127 Second Army Intelligence Outline of Intelligence Arrangements for Offensive, 16 May 1917, TNA, WO157/114. 128 Third Australian Division Notes on Aeroplane Photographs G21/112, 25 May 1917, AWM26, 175/1.

From photographs, the Australians were able to determine locations of headquarters and communications nodes and identify enemy positions which required additional bombardment to be neutralised or destroyed.129 One report sent to the Tenth Brigade taken from aerial photographs noted that ‘wire was well cut and trenches were knocked about on [the] New Zealand Front. Wire in the vicinity of the Douve [river] in No Man’s Land is still very thick. Wire along rest of front is fairly well cut.’130 Additional artillery was concentrated on the area identified in the photograph to ensure the wire was cut and that the infantry could advance unhindered.131

The Divisional Intelligence Officer of the 3rd Division provided detailed briefings on the terrain over which the Australians were to advance based on the aerial photographs that were available to assist in familiarising the attacking troops with the battlefield.132 Copies of aeroplane photographs were also distributed to company officers, showing the locations of enemy emplacements, dug-outs and strong points which were likely to be encountered in their advance.133

The Second Army reinstituted many of the processes it had adopted for the attack at Messines when it took over the third battle of Ypres. In preparation for the attack at Menin Road, reproductions of aeroplane photographs, photo- mosaics, and oblique photographs of the areas to be attacked were issued down

129 Third Australian Division Memorandum G1/258/481, 27 May 1917, AWM26, 193/29; Third Australian Division Notes on Aeroplane Photographs G21/112, 25 May 1917, AWM26, 175/1. 130 10th Australian Infantry Brigade Aero Photo 42 B 1112, 1 June 1917, AWM26, 198/4. 131 Peter Oldham, Messines Ridge, (Barnsley, Pen & Sword Books, 1998), pp.77–98. 132 Eleventh Australian Infantry Brigade Memorandum, 27 May 1917, AWM26, 200/1. 133 Notes on Aeroplane Photographs — 42 B 1007, 3 June 1917, AWM26, 198/4.

to units. 134 Oblique photographs provided commanders with a much clearer and more realistic understanding of the terrain forward of their positions and, when combined with photo-mosaics of vertical photographs, enabled detailed maps of the terrain and likely enemy positions to be produced.135 Sketch maps based on aerial photographs were then issued to company and platoon commanders, identifying enemy trench lines and strongpoints in the line of advance.136

Locations of enemy dug-outs and shelters identified in aeroplane photographs or through aerial reconnaissance was communicated to the attacking troops. Australian orders identified enemy pill-boxes, dug-outs, and other structures to be encountered by the advancing troops before they reached each of their objectives.137 Aerial photographs were also used to identify the locations where support troops or reserves were located, and these areas were targeted by artillery to prevent them from responding to the Australian attacks.138

Photographic Interpretation Training

By 1917, interpretation of aerial photographs was recognised as a specialist intelligence skill, and intelligence officers received formal training on how to read and interpret aerial photographs.139 Training notes on photographic interpretation identified the need for intelligence staff to visit different types of

134 Progress of Intelligence Preparations for September Offensive, 8 September 1917, AWM26, 209/3. 135 Second Australian Division Notes on Oblique Photographs P4B. 58, 59, 60, 21 October 1917, AWM26, 244/6. 136 B.I.S No.4 RFC Map, September 1917, AWM26, 222/3. 137 Second Australian Infantry Brigade Appendix ‘D’ to accompany Bde. Order No.52 (Intelligence), 1 October 1917, AWM26, 237/5. 138 Second Army Intelligence Enemy’s Probable Counter-Attack Policy, 11 October 1917, AWM26, 209/8. 139 Notes on the Interpretation of Aeroplane Photographs, 1 February 1918, AWM26, 288/6.

captured German positions to familiarise themselves with the layout, comparing the features of the position with aerial photographs to aid in the identification of similar positions behind the German lines.140 Intelligence officers were taught to recognise a variety of different types of machine gun, mortar and gun emplacements, along with enemy wire, and to use evidence from buried cables to identify likely headquarters locations.141 Intelligence officers were also taught to consider the effects of shadows and how the shape of objects could change based on the way that light was falling on an object on the ground.142 As new types of

German positions were identified, copies of aerial photographs were circulated among the intelligence staff and intelligence officers to ensure that they were aware of how the new enemy emplacements looked from the air.143

The Australians also used aerial photographs to examine their own positions to assess the effectiveness of camouflage. Records show the Eighth

Field Artillery Brigade receiving a message from its parent headquarters, the 3rd

Division, advising it that in recent aerial photographs insufficient care had been taken in selecting and camouflaging battery positions.144

Hamel — 1918

By June 1918, detailed intelligence reports based on a combination of vertical and oblique aerial photographs, together with small trench maps, were commonly available for Australian battalions and brigades.145 In preparation for

140 Ibid. 141 Ibid. 142 Ibid. 143 Australian Corps Notes Ig 27/656, 27 February 1918, AWM26, 288/7; New Enemy Method of Wiring I.G.22/5/3, 8 February 1918, AWM26, 281/3. 144 Third Australian Division Artillery S.382, 23 April 1918, AWM26, 390/1. 145 Forth Army intelligence I.G.5/3, 1 July 1918, AWM26, 350/9.

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the attack on Hamel, the Australian Corps had access to aerial photographs and detailed maps of the entire area to be attacked. In order to maintain surprise, the

Australians were careful to maintain a normal pattern of aerial reconnaissance and aerial photography activity over their front line.

The Australian Corps requirements for aerial reconnaissance and photography were the responsibility of the Fifth Brigade RAF and No.3 Squadron

AFC. Contact patrols and artillery observation aircraft operated as normal with

‘photographs, both oblique and vertical, taken frequently up to the 29 June of the selected sector as well as the remainder of the corps front’.146 After 29 June, no further photography was permitted of the area to be attacked and copies of the photographs taken in the lead-up to the attack were distributed to the attacking force. Photo mosaics overlaid with grid squares and contour lines with relevant annotations were issued on a scale of one per NCO taking part in the attack, as were oblique photographs of the area to be captured, while two copies of vertical photographs of the area to be attacked were issued to each company and battery.147

The success of the attack at Hamel owed much to the detailed planning undertaken before the attack. Almost all of the enemy strong-points to be attacked had been accurately identified prior to the battle and were dealt with by the artillery barrage or tanks and infantry.148 Aerial photographs were a vital source of intelligence, not only for the infantry as they attacked, but also for the artillery. Artillery intelligence staff were able to identify routes used by the

146 Preliminary Report Capture of Hamel and Hamel Ridge by the Australian Corps, 4 July 1918, AWM26, 361/3. 147 Ibid. 148 Eleventh Australian Infantry Brigade Notes on HAMEL Operation 4th and 5th July 1918, July 1918, AWM26, 404/1.

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Germans when moving men and supplies up to the front line and were able to use artillery to interdict these routes preventing the Germans from reinforcing their positions.149

Aerial photographs played a similar role in the planning and conduct of the battle of Amiens as they did during the battle of Hamel, although on a much larger scale. The advance to the Hindenburg Line throughout August and

September 1918 continued to receive support from the RAF and AFC.

Photographs of the Hindenburg Line showed efforts by the Germans to strengthen and improve the defences as the British and Dominion forces advanced and these were accounted for in battle planning.150 Aerial photographs continued to be used in the planning of the Australians’ battles right up until the end of the war.

From the beginning of the campaign at Gallipoli, Australians had access to dedicated aerial reconnaissance assets and an aerial photography capability that was equivalent to that being used by the BEF on the Western Front. The

Australians used intelligence supplied through aerial reconnaissance and obtained in aerial photographs almost from the beginning of the war, and it was an important source of intelligence that was incorporated into their battle planning particularly in the later years of the war.

149 Third Australian Divisional Artillery Report B.M.6/7., 27 July 1918, AWM26, 391/3. 150 Fourth Army Summary of Information No.272, 16 September 1918, TNA WO157/198.

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Chapter 4. Topographic intelligence

The battlefields of the First World War were larger than in any previous war.

Commanders no longer had the ability to observe their entire battlefield from a single vantage point and control the movement of their troops. Commanders were now required to make decisions about where they would fight based purely on their understanding of a battlefield taken from a map. Accurate topographic intelligence, coupled with the ability to appreciate how terrain could affect the battle, could make the difference between success and failure.

Understanding and appreciating the terrain over which a battle would be fought was as important as understanding the enemy’s order-of-battle, movements, locations, intentions and defenses. Despite the likelihood of war in Europe, from a topographic intelligence perspective, the BEF was poorly prepared to fight in northern France and Belgium. British knowledge of the terrain over which they would fight was poor, and the BEF was equipped only with a limited series of small-scale maps. While adequate for a war of manoeuver, they proved inadequate in a war in which trench warfare was the norm. In other theatres, the situation was much worse, with maps being unavailable, inaccurate or out-of- date. Accurate, large scale, gridded maps with tactical intelligence plotted from aerial photographs were essential for battle planning. While this chapter is not about the development of mapping or survey, no examination of how topographic intelligence was used in battle planning would be complete without a basic understanding of the development of the British Army’s field survey organisation.1 This chapter focuses on the availability of topographic intelligence

1 For topographic intelligence and mapping, see Peter Chasseaud, Topography of Armageddon: A British Trench Map Atlas of the Western Front 1914–1918 (London, Mapbooks, 1991); Peter Chasseaud, Artillery's Astrologers: A History of British Survey and Mapping on the Western Front

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to the Australians throughout the war and looks at how the Australians used topographic intelligence in their battle planning.

Survey and topographic intelligence at the beginning of the war

It was not until the British Army began to prepare for a possible continental conflict against Germany that efforts were made to obtain topographic intelligence to support a military campaign in Europe. The British Army expected the war to be one of rapid mobilisation followed by a short but mobile conflict, lasting weeks not years. Battles would be characterised by manoeuver and would be short, sharp affairs rather than protracted sieges.2 Based on these assumptions about how any future war would be fought, the

Topographical/Geographical Section of the General Staff made decisions about the types of maps and geographic information needed to fight in France and

Belgium. The BEF’s early maps of what would become the Western Front were based on French topographic surveys and focused on small-scale maps covering possible areas of operations in France, Belgium, the Netherlands and Germany.3

The BEF was ill-equipped to undertake its own survey work. While the

Royal Engineers (RE) maintained a number of survey sections in readiness to mobilise with the BEF, the prevailing view among the General Staff was that the

BEF was expected to fight in areas that were already adequately mapped. When the BEF deployed, it would do so with ‘no survey support, no unit capable of

1914–1918 (Lewes, Mapbooks, 1999); Peter Chasseaud, Mapping the First World War: The Great War through Maps from 1914 to 1918 (Glasgow: HarperCollins, 2013); Peter Chasseaud and Peter Doyle, Grasping Gallipoli: Terrain, Maps and Failure at the Dardenelles 1915 (Staplehurst, Spellmount, 2005); H.S.L Winterbotham, 'British Survey on the Western Front', The Geographical Journal, 53 (1919). 2 Chasseaud, Artillery’s Astrologers, p.6. 3 Chasseaud, Artillery’s Astrologers, p.6; Chasseaud, Mapping the First World War, p.12.

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originating topographical survey, of fixing artillery battery positions and targets for the artillery relative to each other on a trigonometric framework, and of reconciling data relating to projections, coordinates and levels of different national [survey] systems’.4

While the BEF included no ‘organic’ survey capability, lessons drawn from the need to print maps in the field during the Boer War meant that the BEF did deploy with a printing capability that could reproduce maps in the field. The 1st

Printing Company, RE, was equipped to move with the BEF and produce small runs of maps with great speed. Mobile printing sections were designed to be allocated to corps to produce either cartographic products (maps, sketches, diagrams, etc.) or letterpress products (orders, circulars and the like).5

The opening days of the war

During the opening days of the war, operations on both sides failed to unfold as planned or predicted. The BEF’s first encounters with the German Army at Mons saw the British Army retreating from the areas for which they had prepared maps. Reserve supplies were called forward and the BEF drew heavily on French maps to make up their shortfall. French maps were not well liked by the British.

They had different and unfamiliar map scales, were difficult to read, and in some cases were out-of-date. British officers found it difficult to identify locations on

French maps, and GHQ distrusted the information displayed on the maps, refusing to commit troops based on an appreciation of the terrain from French maps alone.6 The retreat back to the Marne and subsequent operations showed a

4 Chasseaud, Artillery’s Astrologers, p.10. 5 Ibid., p.11. 6 Ibid., p.25.

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significant deficiency in the quality and quantity of maps and topographic intelligence available to the BEF.

As the front line stabilised, intelligence work, including the collection of topographic intelligence, expanded rapidly. Efforts to obtain large-scale maps that could support accurate indirect artillery fire began, as did the development of maps printed with a standard system of squares and referencing.

Enlargements of inaccurate or out-of-date maps exacerbated problems, and the

British Army soon acknowledged the need for new surveys of the areas of France and Belgium in which the BEF found itself operating. By the beginning of 1915, the task of surveying the BEF’s section of the front had begun.7

Topographic intelligence

The relationship between intelligence and mapping was an important one. As information was collected on the battlefield it needed to be compiled, recorded and displayed to enable commanders to make decisions. As the RFC’s aerial reconnaissance and aerial photography capabilities developed, the information they obtained needed to be plotted. Maps showing the location of enemy trenches, gun batteries, and machine gun locations were vital to effective battle planning. By the first battle of Ypres sketch maps based on aerial photographs had begun to be issued.8 Developments continued, and by early 1915 systematic efforts were being made to overlay topographical information with intelligence about the enemy obtained from a range of sources to provide a ‘fairly complete picture of German tactical dispositions’.9 For the intelligence staff, knowing

7 Chasseaud, Artillery’s Astrologers, pp.50–51; Chasseaud, Mapping the First World War, pp.38–50. 8 Chasseaud, Artillery’s Astrologers, pp.51–53. 9 Ibid., p.52.

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about the enemy was only part of the picture. They needed to know where the enemy was to enable them to make assessments about what the enemy might do or how they might react.

The First Army’s attack at Neuve Chapelle in early March 1915 was the first example of the BEF making extensive use of topographic intelligence to plan a battle. Prior to the attack, the RFC was tasked to systematically photograph the area, and this information was transferred onto a series of maps produced for the attack. Panoramas and sketches and plans of the area to be attacked were also produced by the First Army intelligence staff to assist with battle planning.

Neuve Chapelle was the first BEF battle planned using maps and aerial photographs, and despite the ultimate outcomes of the battle, the process of photographing and plotting intelligence was adopted by staff planning future battles.10 Subsequent BEF attacks at Aubers Ridge and Festubert were modeled on Neuve Chapelle and were planned in a similar fashion.11

Gallipoli — 1915

Given its strategic importance, the Dardanelles had long occupied British military thinking. The strait connected the Aegean Sea and the Mediterranean with the Sea of Mamara, the Bosporus, and the Black Sea. The strategic city of

Constantinople lay astride this route, and access to the Russian Black Sea ports required ships to transit the Dardanelles. The Gallipoli peninsula guarded the narrow entrance to the Dardanelles.12 Several British studies had been made of the peninsula during periods of international tension as far back as the Crimean

10 Chasseaud, Artillery’s Astrologers, p.53; Chasseaud, Mapping the First World War, p.139. 11 Chasseaud, Artillery’s Astrologers, p.80; Chasseaud, Mapping the First World War, pp.149–151. 12 Chasseaud and Doyle, Grasping Gallipoli, p.49.

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War, with plans and intelligence being updated periodically depending upon the political situation in Europe. In 1906, Captain Charles Ottley of the Naval

Intelligence Department (NID) undertook a study that examined options for an amphibious operation at the Gallipoli peninsula to seize control of the fortifications and permit the passage of a British Fleet into the Sea of Mamara and beyond. Assessments of the viability of an amphibious landing varied, with some military planners determining that an operation was likely to end in disaster, while others assessed that plans for an amphibious landing were viable.13 In the immediate years before the First World War, no additional plans for military or naval operations on the Gallipoli peninsula or through the

Dardenelles were developed. However, both military and naval intelligence sections continued to monitor the capabilities of the Ottoman Army and Navy and the capabilities of the forts and guns along the Dardenelles.14

British military intelligence had also collected a significant amount of information about the Gallipoli peninsula before the outbreak of the war. The terrain of the peninsula had been studied and the British had a good understanding of the topography that was relevant to military operations.

Topographical assessments of the peninsula noted that it was fifty-two miles

(eighty-three kilometres) long from Cape Helles to Bulair, with a varying width of twelve miles (nineteen kilometres) at its widest point in the centre of the peninsula to only one and a half miles (two and a half kilometres) at Bulair.15

Inland, the country was described as undulating, with sections of the peninsula

13 Ibid., pp.60–61. 14 Ibid., p.63. 15 Intelligence N.Z&A Div 15th to 30th April 1915, Report on Gallipoli Peninsula, 1915, TNA, WO157/678.

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reported to be under cultivation by the local inhabitants. Topographical reports noted that no supplies were available locally and that any military force would be required to bring all of the items they required with them. This was particularly the case for water, and reports stressed that only limited supplies were available on the peninsula.16 Several amphibious landing sites were identified, including sites north of Bulair, at Ejelmar Bay north of Suvla, Suvla

Bay itself, although reports noted that the lagoon (salt lake) rendered access inland difficult and limited (something not taken into account when IX Corps landed in August 1915), and north and south of Kaba Tepe (Gaba Tepe).

Additional landing places were identified at Tekke Burno, Sedd-el-Bahr, Morto

Bay, Kilia Bay, and Maidos.17

Topographical intelligence reports also identified roads, port facilities, and major and minor settlements.18 Older reporting was supplemented by information obtained from a range of new sources, particularly Greeks who had previously inhabited the peninsula. Information on roads in the peninsula noted that the road from Gallipoli to Maidos had been repaired in 1913 and 1914 and was suitable for the movement of heavy artillery, although the undulating terrain in the vicinity of Karna Bili made for difficult going.19 Several secondary roads ran from Gallipoli to Madios and while not suitable for the movement of artillery, they were suitable for use by troops moving on foot.20 Information reports also noted that new roads had been constructed by the Turkish Army from Gallipoli

16 Ibid. 17 Ibid. 18 Ibid. 19 Information on Villages, Roads and Water in the Gallipoli Peninsula Australian Division Ig(1)4455, 16 April 1915, AWM25. 20 Ibid.

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to Bulair that were suitable for use by vehicles, while another road linked

Gallipoli to Bulair via the Gulf of Saros.21 Information on the roads and towns of the peninsula was confirmed by aerial reconnaissance flights in advance of the landings, and later on during the campaign many of these areas were photographed by reconnaissance aircraft.22

Information reports also noted that on many of the routes there were several sources of water, such as streams and wells, that could be used by troops moving down the peninsula.23 Sources of water for troops once they were ashore were particularly important, as any force landed on the peninsula would quickly find itself in a difficult position if it was unable to obtain water locally or if arrangements were not made to provide a regular supply of water.

Access to reliable maps of the Gallipoli peninsula was limited. Despite having been the focus of military planning for many years, when planning for a military operation began in earnest, the best British map available was a one- inch scale map (GS 2285) which was prepared in 1908, based on an earlier

French map which had been surveyed in 1854.24 The British 1908 map had been redrawn from the earlier French map which had reduced its scale from 1:50,000 to 1:63,360 and which, perhaps more problematically, reduced the contour interval on the map from ten metres to approximately one hundred feet. This had the unintended consequence of ‘suppressing’ or flattening the relief, making

21 Ibid. 22 Intelligence N.Z&A Div 15th to 30th April 1915 Memorandum, 14 April 1915, TNA, WO157/678; Report of month’s work from 16th July to 19th Dec inclusive, carried out by Capt A.H.K. Jopp AIF, December 1915, AWM25. 23 Information on Villages, Roads and Water in the Gallipoli Peninsula Australian Division Ig(1)4455, 16 April 1915, AWM25. 24 Chasseaud and Doyle, Grasping Gallipoli, p.63.

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features on the map seem smaller than in reality.25 The British map was then enlarged (to 1:40,000 scale) and overlaid with a numerical grid. This became the standard operational map that was used during the landings and throughout the earlier parts of the campaign, until better Turkish maps were captured and copied. Because of the need for naval gunfire support, the 1:40,000 scale map was used by both the army and the navy.26

Once planning for the landing had commenced, further reconnaissance was conducted from the sea to confirm possible landing sites between Gaba Tepe and Cape Helles.27 Suitable landing beaches were identified to the north and the south of Gaba Tepe, where forces could be landed easily, although this would depend on favourable winds and any potential opposition ashore.28 South of

Gaba Tepe, the country was described as ‘generally flat’ and ‘open country’ rising towards the villages of Krithia and Achi Baba, which dominated the surrounding countryside. Additional landing sites were identified around Cape Helles, including beaches where landing troops could be supported by warships close into shore.29

With more time, aerial photographs could have been used to verify the topographic information and other details on the maps. However, the speed with which the operation was undertaken meant that there was no time to confirm any of the survey details. It was not until early April 1915 that significant numbers of maps became available for issue, and once maps did become

25 Ibid., p.157. 26 Ibid., p.146. 27 Intelligence N.Z&A Div 15th to 30th April 1915 Report of Landing Facilities between Gaba Tepe and Cape Helles — Gallipoli Peninsula, April 1915, TNA, WO157/678. 28 Ibid. 29 Ibid.

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available they were hurriedly issued to headquarters, the landing divisions and the ANZAC Corps covering force in significant numbers. In his assessment of the maps that were available at the beginning of the campaign, Chasseuad notes that:

the one-inch map…was simply the best available, and was not a bad

reconnaissance map for rapid unopposed or lightly opposed landings and

exploitation operations. Like most maps of most theatres in those days it

was not suitable for position warfare…30

Topography was clearly a factor that was considered when planning the landings. But that consideration only seems to have extended to identifying suitable landing locations away from concentrations of enemy troops and guns, or terrain and likely routes that the enemy would take to reinforce their positions further down the peninsula or interfere with the ANZAC Corps landings. The ANZAC Corps landing site was chosen on the basis that enemy defences were weaker in that area and that, based on the enemy gun positions that had been located, it was unlikely that enemy artillery would be able to fire directly on the landing beaches. However, ANZAC Corps assessments of the terrain failed to consider the effect that the terrain would have on the ability of the attacking troops to move inland in a cohesive manner and secure their objectives before the enemy could react. There was also little consideration of how the terrain would affect the ability of ANZAC Corps artillery to engage

Turkish positions, or the ability of the Royal Navy to provide naval gunfire to support the landing force. The lack of emphasis in corps and division orders about the need to seize key terrain, rather than simply establishing a beachhead,

30 Chasseaud and Doyle, Grasping Gallipoli, p.160.

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represented a failure at both corps and division level to understand the available topographic intelligence. This, however, represented a failure in operational planning rather than a lack of intelligence.

Turkish maps captured during the landings provided a more accurate source of topographic intelligence for the landing force. Captured maps were re- photographed, translated, and issued as quickly as possible. The ANZAC Corps included a small printing section that had been formed in March 1915 in Egypt and which subsequently embarked for Imbros in early April 1915 with the rest of the ANZAC Corps staff. The ANZAC Corps printing section was later reinforced by another RE printing section sent to support the MEF in May 1915.31

Throughout June and July, new large-scale map sheets replaced the older series of maps, and efforts were made to plot tactical information, such as the layout of enemy trenches and other Turkish defences, onto more accurate maps. While useful for the infantry, without a control framework and accurate survey these maps were only of limited value to the artillery.

Efforts to produce maps based on vertical photographs taken from the air, which could be used by the artillery, yielded some results and improved the artillery’s accuracy. Increased efforts were also being made to locate enemy guns that were active in shelling the Anzac position, in order to permit their engagement by ANZAC artillery. Seventeen active enemy gun positions of varying calibers and types had been identified and engaged by mid-June, and by

31 Chasseaud and Doyle, Grasping Gallipoli, pp.218–219.

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July 1915 artillery staff were beginning to produce maps of enemy gun positions to enable counter-battery operations to be conducted.32

Survey work commenced in June 1915 at Cape Helles, and later at Suvla, while trench surveys were conducted at Anzac.33 Mapping the Anzac sector was extremely difficult given the rugged terrain and the limited space that the ANZAC

Corps occupied. Movement around the perimeter at Anzac was fired upon quickly by the Turks making normal survey and mapping almost impossible. 34

The August offensive

By July 1915, efforts were being made to identify a means to seize the key terrain which dominated the Anzac position. The New Zealand and Australian Division was give responsibility for conducting ground reconnaissance of routes out of the northern side of the Anzac perimeter that would allow them to seize Chunuk

Bair and Hill 971. This reconnaissance provided detailed intelligence about the terrain, routes to these objectives, and the ability of troops to move through this terrain by day and by night.35

The approaches to this key terrain were broken and rugged, and in some locations impassable.36 To facilitate the exit from the northern side of the Anzac perimeter, ANZAC Corps Headquarters recommended a concurrent attack against Turkish positions on the southern side of the perimeter to fix Turkish

32 Intelligence N.Z.&A Division 1st–30th June 1915 memorandum for N.Z&A Division, 17 June 1915, TNA, WO157/680; Mediterranean Expeditionary Force Dardanelles CRA (GHQ) Mar-Nov 1915 sketch plan showing hostile guns, 2 July 1915, TNA, WO95/4267. 33 Chasseaud and Doyle, Grasping Gallipoli, pp.221–225. 34 Ibid., p.231. 35 Intelligence N.Z.&A Division 1st–31st July1915 Memorandum, 5 July 1915, TNA, WO157/681. 36 Australian Division General Staff Aug 1915 appreciation of the Situation at Anzac, 9 July 1915, TNA, WO95/4329.

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troops in location and ensure that the enemy’s attention was concentrated away from the northern side of the Anzac position.37 An assessment of a possible attack on Lone Pine was conducted in July 1915. It noted that the terrain separating the Anzac position and the Turkish trenches was not favourable and that movement against enemy positions would be subject to fire from enfilade and flanking locations near Johnston’s Jolly, Pine Ridge and Snipers Ridge.38

Despite this assessment of the terrain, the decision was made that the 1st

Division would seize and hold the 400 Plateau (Lone Pine) and threaten (and capture, if possible) Johnston’s Jolly and German Officer’s Trench to draw the attention of the Turkish forces surrounding the Anzac position to the southern portion of the perimeter.39 This action, combined with an attack at Helles, was intended to distract the Turks, while the main effort would take place on the northern side of the Anzac perimeter. Despite the pre-war assessment of the difficulties associated with the terrain around the lagoon north of Anzac, GHQ

MEF decided that a new force would be landed at Suvla Bay and would advance to seize the ‘W’ and Chocolate Hills and the enemy guns located there, while the

New Zealand and Australian Division and the 29th Indian Infantry Brigade would advance and occupy key terrain which dominated the Anzac position, including

Chunuk Bair and Baby 700.40 The positions at Anzac and Suvla would then link up.

37 Ibid. 38 Australian Division General Staff Aug 1915 Notes on the Attack of Lone Pine, July 1915, TNA, WO95/4329. 39 Australian Division General Staff Aug 1915 Army Corps Order No.16, 3 August 1915, TNA, WO95/4329. 40 Ibid.

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When the August offensive was finally launched, attacking troops were unable to find their way at night through the maze of gullies and ridges and aid in the assault on Chunuk Bair, which was captured and held by the New Zealanders, but later lost. The landings at Suvla successfully placed IX Corps ashore, but efforts to capture the ‘W’ and Chocolate hills foundered, and the British found themselves confined to another perimeter overlooked by Turkish positions.

Stalemate once again ensued.41

Despite having been ashore for several months and being more familiar with the terrain over which they had to fight, the appreciation of the impact of the terrain over which the attacking troops would be expected to move and fight during the August offensive was especially poor. The attacking troops were expected to move through complex and difficult terrain that slowed their marching speed to a crawl. So difficult and complicated was the terrain that the attacking troops were unable to locate themselves on newly issued large scale maps. These two factors combined to ensure that surprise and cohesion was lost.42 Failure to understand the terrain over which attacking troops needed to move and fight was a significant factor in the failure of the August offensive, but, once again, this was a failure in operational planning rather than a lack of intelligence.

Pozières and Mouquet Farm — 1916

By the time the Australians arrived in France, significant strides had been made in overcoming the lack of topographical information available to the BEF when it

41 Intelligence Anzac Corps 1st–31st August 1915 Memorandum, 27 August 1915, TNA, WO157/672. 42 Rhys Crawley, Climax at Gallipoli: The Failure of the August Offensive (Norman, University of Oklahoma Press, 2013), pp.65–66.

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went to war in 1914. The BEF’s survey capability had expanded exponentially.

Efforts to survey the British section of the Western Front were well underway.

British artillery positions were able to be accurately surveyed and their positions fixed. Accurate survey now allowed aiming points to be plotted, which increased the accuracy of British artillery fire.43 The importance of accurate artillery survey was well understood and would become the highest priority survey task as the war progressed. Lessons drawn from the fighting in 1915 had also been absorbed. Accurate large-scale maps were required to support battle planning and maps needed to be printed in quantities that allowed them to be issued to every officer, NCO, and soldier who needed a map to carry out their duties.44

British plans for the battle of the Somme were ambitious. British artillery would flatten German defences and crush resistance across a broad front, allowing advancing infantry to capture the German front line from ‘Serre to the junction of the French Army’ in the vicinity of Montauban.45 The main attack would be launched by the Fourth Army, with the French Sixth Army attacking on the right of the Fourth Army, and the Third Army launching a small diversionary attack towards Gommencourt on the left. The Fourth Army was formed in

February 1916 and later that month the Fourth FSC was formed to provide topographical survey and artillery intelligence for the new army.46 The scale of the Somme offensive dwarfed any of the earlier British attacks, and the

43 A.H. Dowson, Lawrence Bragg and H.H. Hemming, Artillery Survey in the First World War (London, Field Survey Association, 1971), pp.10–12. 44 Chasseaud, Artillery’s Astrologers, p.116. 45 Gary Sheffield, The Somme (London, Cassell, 2003), p.21. 46 Chasseaud, Artillery’s Astrologers, p.188.

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preparation and issue of maps to support the attack absorbed all of the resources available to the Fourth Army.47

On the second day of the offensive, the Reserve Army, commanded by

Lieutenant-General Sir Herbert Gough, was activated and given responsibility for the northern section of the Somme battlefield. Three weeks later, the Australians, led by the 1st Division, arrived to join the fighting on the Somme. Reserve Army

Headquarters ordered the 1st Division to immediately attack and capture the village of Pozières. Gough greeted the commander of the 1st Division, Major-

General Harold Walker, simply by saying ‘I want you to go into the line and attack Pozières tomorrow night!’48

The original orders issued by the Reserve Army to the 1st Division instructed it to attack and capture a trench to the south of Pozières (known as

Pozières Trench) along with part of the German second line of defences (known as the Old German line). Once Pozières Trench was successfully captured, the 1st

Division was to send out patrols towards Pozières to establish positions along the Albert-Bapaume Road.49 With little knowledge of the situation along the front line and limited time to prepare, Walker successfully argued for a postponement to allow his troops to occupy positions along the front line and to allow for adequate planning and preparation.50

Having secured a postponement, the commander of the 1st Division conducted a thorough reconnaissance and took a ‘member of the Reserve Army staff’ forward with him to examine the approaches to Pozières. Walker’s plan

47 Ibid., p.194. 48 Bean, Official History of Australia in the War of 1914–18, Volume III, p.468. 49 Reserve Army Operation Order No 12, 20 July 1916, AWM26, 41/60. 50 Bean, Official History of Australia in the War of 1914–18, Volume III, p.468.

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called for the 1st Division to attack from the southeast rather than the southwest, as was the Reserve Army’s preference. Walker argued that an attack from the southeast avoided exposing his left flank to German fire and that the terrain would help screen his right flank.51

Much was known about the village of Pozières itself. The village was described as a ‘series of modern houses made of stone along the Bapaume Rd’, and ‘a group of houses north-west of the main road which are not as strong, excepting those just round the square (Place de l’eglise) which are stoney and have cellars’. Intelligence reports noted that houses to the south of the Bapuame

Road ‘were demolished and burnt down by the Germans, the cellars being left alone’. The woodwork from houses not occupied by the Germans had also been taken and used as firewood.52 Houses on the east side of the village had been burnt down by the Germans during their advance in 1914 and most of these had been pulled down although the cellars remained.53 Other reports confirmed that there was communications ‘between the cellars in some parts of the village’.54

Four public and ten private wells provided for a good supply of drinking water, with many of the houses along the Bapaume Road having a private well. All of the houses also had cisterns for collecting rainwater.55 Intelligence reports provided individual descriptions about many of the prominent buildings or houses in the village:

51 Ibid., p.469. 52 Pozières, June 1916, AWM26, 35/15. 53 Ibid. 54 Ibid. 55 Ibid.

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House belonging to Mme. Roy (one storey), X.4.b.9.4, a new house facing

the Bazetin road, — courtyard in front, walls all round — strong cellars —

could easily be made into a strong point of defence.56

The locations of each of these buildings was marked on a map of the village which was provided to the attacking Australian troops (see Figures 3 and 4).

This type of topographic intelligence was vital if the attacking Australians were to capture and hold the village.

Figure 3 – Map of Pozières Village (AWM26, 35/15)

56 Ibid.

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Figure 4 – Diagram of a house alongside the Albert-Bapaume Road in Pozières (AWM26, 35/15) Intelligence reports about the village also noted that all of the houses along the main street had ‘good cellars’ which could easily be joined and reported that several of the pre-war residents had already done so.57 Artillery fire had severely damaged or destroyed most of the houses in Pozières, but the information about the cellars meant that the garrison was likely to have been protected from all but the heaviest artillery.

57 Ibid.

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Other reports available to the Australians indicated that the Albert-

Bapaume road was in good condition and was about two and a half metres wide as it passed through the village. There were high embankments along the road leading to Contalmaison and towards Thiepval. The road between Pozières and

Theival was ‘commanded by the Ferme Mouquet’ which was described as being of strong brick construction with ‘five strong cellars and a well’.58 The windmill located on Hill 160 to the rear of Pozières was described as having very strong stone walls one and a half metres thick.59 Intelligence reports noted that the

‘windmill on the road to Bapaume’ was used as an observation post and was ‘the billet of a few officers’. Other reports noted that the windmill had ‘been fortified by the enemy’ and turned into a redoubt which had been constructed using

‘timber and concrete’.60 Information about the terrain over which the 1st

Division was expected to fight was issued down to the attacking battalions as part of the battalion orders.61

Walker’s refusual to attack until he had been able to conduct a reconnaissance of the ground over which his troops were expected to move and fight was critical to the success of the Australian attack at Pozières. It showed how important it was for commanders to understand the terrain over which they expected their troops to fight and highlighted the importance of commanders using every means at their disposal, including personal reconnaissance, to understand how terrain could impact a battle.

58 Ibid. 59 Ibid. 60 Ibid. 61 Bn Order No.1 (Third Australian Infantry Battalion), 22 July 1916, AWM26, 53/20.

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The other critical lesson learnt by the Australians on the Somme was the need to allow sufficient time for troops to move into and occupy positions. From the time the Australians entered the front lines near Pozières, the infantry found conditions ‘widely different from any in their previous experience’. Routes were heavily shelled and pathways and trenches were frequently blocked or congested. While it was easy to provide the Australians with a map showing the trenches they were expected to occupy as they moved into the front line, time needed to be allowed for the attacking troops to dig jumping off trenches in anticipation for the attack.62 Before they could be constructed, jumping off trenches needed to be surveyed to ensure that they were accurately positioned.

Subsequent attacks by the Australians at the Somme paid less attention to the terrain over which the infantry needed to move or fight, especially as the

Australians attempted to attack along the German trenches that ran along the rear of Pozières and as they attacked towards Mouquet Farm. ANZAC

Corps Headquarters realised that trench maps needed to be re-issued every few days, as artillery churned up the landscape and without accurate maps it was almost impossible to understand the situation at the front line. Aerial photographs needed to be taken on a daily basis and turned rapidly into trench maps, as this was the only way to understand how trenches disappeared under bombardments or where new trenches had been constructed during the previous night by working parties. As Bean noted, ‘this precious assistance to brigadiers and battalion commanders was [as yet] rarely provided’.63

62 Bean, Official History of Australia in the War of 1914–18, Volume III, pp.479–481. 63 Ibid., p.663.

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Withdrawal to the Hindenburg Line, Messines and the third battle of Ypres

— 1917

At the beginning of 1917, orders were issued by the Fifth Army (following GHQ approval) to begin the formation of Corps Topographical Sections. The role of the corps topo section was to perform artillery survey work and reproduce a range of different maps for the corps.64 On 5 February 1917, I ANZAC Corps raised its own Topographic Section. I ANZAC Corps topo section was commanded by

Lieutenant Herbert Buchanan, formerly an engineer from Victoria. The section initially consisted of three topographers, six draftsmen, a clerk, an orderly, and a lithographer. Over half the original section was drawn from the Branch

Intelligence Section attached to No.3 Squadron RFC, highlighting the important link between aerial photography and topographic intelligence at this stage of the war. When the section was formed, I ANZAC Corps elected to purchase a high grade press, which enabled the ANZAC Corps topo section to produce a wider range of mapping and survey products than could be produced by other corps topo sections equipped with smaller presses.65

At the beginning of March 1917, the ANZAC Corps topo section fixed the locations of twenty-one artillery batteries and prepared a network of survey points which could be carried forward in the event of an advance. This meant that, if the guns moved forward, their new positions could be quickly fixed on the map rather than needing to wait for survey data. This practice increased the abilty of the artillery to provide accurate fire after the guns moved. The fixing of forward battery positions in this manner was an example of how survey was

64 Chasseaud, Artillery’s Astrologers, p.257. 65 Ibid., p.258.

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being used to increase the accuracy of gunnery. The process of ‘carrying forward’ survey would be replicated by the Third Army at Arras and the Second Army at

Messines.66

The German withdrawal to the Hindenburg Line, while anticipated, caught the British and the French unaware. However, British troops quickly followed up the withdrawing Germans, with the Australians at the forefront of the advance. The Australians sent two brigades forward of I ANZAC Corps to act as advance guards, and for the first time since 25 April 1915 the Australians experienced ‘mobile’ operations. The Australians advanced over terrain that had been held by the Germans for over two years and which had not been accurately surveyed. I ANZAC Corps orders highlighted the importance of topographical intelligence and noted that this information needed to be passed to the advance guards as soon as possible, while at the same reminding advancing troops of the importance of collecting information about the terrain over which they were operating and sending it back to their headquarters.67 Cavalry or in the

Australian’s case, light horse patrols, were sent forward of the advance guards to survey the terrain and identify areas of enemy resistance as the withdrawing

Germans attempted to hold lines of villages along the route of their withdrawal.68

I ANZAC’s Corps brief experience of ‘mobile’ warfare quickly came to a halt as it fought past the German outpost line and encountered the defences of the

Hindenburg Line at Bullecourt. This brief experience of open warfare highlighted the importance of topographic intelligence in more mobile forms of warfare.

66 Ibid., pp.258–259. 67 General Staff Circular No.63 Topographical Information, 26 March 1917, AWM26, 152/6. 68 First Anzac Corps Summary of Operations for Week Ending 8 a.m. 23rd March 1917, 23 March 1917, AWM26, 152/6.

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While I ANZAC Corps was engaged in fighting around Bullecourt, II

ANZAC Corps occupied a section of the front line around Messines south of

Ypres. The BEF had fought two major battles around Ypres, the first in 1914, when much of the original BEF had been destroyed, and the second in 1915, which marked the first use of poison gas in the war. The original salient around the town had been squeezed inwards, with the Germans able to overlook it on almost every side. GHQ had long considered Ypres as a location for a major offensive, but before any drive northwards out of the salient could be attempted, the high ground along the Messines-Wytshaete Ridge, which ran along the southern side of the salient, needed to be captured.69 The Germans had occupied positions along the ridge for nearly two years and the front line ran along the western slopes of Messines Ridge, consisting of a number of trench lines reinforced with concrete machine gun posts. Several farms and small villages had also been incorporated into the German front line. A second line of defences ran along the top of Messines Ridge just in front of the villages of Messines and

Wytschaete. The second line of trenches incorporated concrete machine gun posts, trench mortar positions, and a number of concrete shelters. On the reverse slope of the ridge the Germans had constructed a third line of trenches (the

Oosttaverne Line) that held their support troops. A final line of defences was constructed at the very rear of the ridge line, which was known as the Warneton

Line, which included a number of shell-proof concrete shelters.70 The Germans used the topography of the Messines-Wytshaete area to their best advantage when constructing their defences and it was a formidable defensive position.

69 Peter Pedersen, The Anzacs: Gallipoli to the Western Front (Camberwell, Penguin Books, 2007), p.253. 70 Peter Oldham, Messines Ridge (Barnsley, Pen & Sword Books, 1998), p.59.

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Like all of the intelligence planning for the attack at Messines, topographic intelligence had been carefully considered. Maps showing the layout of enemy trenches that were to be attacked were issued to platoon commanders, detailed models of the area to be attacked were constructed, and each platoon rehearsed its part in the attack.71 Artillery units, RFC squadrons, and the counter-battery staff office received a separate series of maps, drawn from a common survey showing the location of enemy gun batteries, while larger situation maps were provided to Division, Corps and Army Headquarters.72 In the days before the attack, the 3rd Division noted that it wanted attacking platoon commanders to use the same map as the Division Commander, and that it would be better for infantry officers to carry a single common map rather than a series of maps of differing scales. The 3rd Division also requested that maps of the area behind the location that the attacking troops were expected to consolidate be provided, as ‘it was unfamiliar’ to the attacking troops.73

Descriptions of the terrain over which II ANZAC Corps would advance were provided as part of intelligence summaries. They highlighted key topographic features such as large expanses of meadows, brooks, culverts, and roads, and described which way the terrain sloped. This allowed the attacking troops to identify embankments, ditches, and other features that might offer cover or become obstacles during the advance.74 To aid with mopping up operations, the attacking troops were also provided with descriptions of farms, villages, and towns that would be encountered during the attack. II ANZAC Corps

71 Supply of Maps, 31 May 1917, AWM26, 198/4. 72 Present Situation of Maps for Forthcoming Offensive I.g.51, 14 May 1917, TNA, WO157/114. 73 Third Australian Division G1/258/433, 26 May 1917, AWM26, 193/29. 74 Commune of Messines & Warneton, 31 May 1917, AWM26, 191/9.

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intelligence reports identified several buildings in Messines and Warneton, along with other locations such as Steignast Farm or the Basseville Sugar Refinery, which were known to have cellars or were strongly constructed and could house a possible German garrison.75

Based on the intelligence provided by the Second Army and II ANZAC

Corps, the 3rd Division appreciation of the terrain identified the river Douve, which passed obliquely across no-man’s land, as a potential obstacle to the attacking troops. Aerial photographs identified that the Douve contained water but its proximity to the German front line made it difficult to assess the water’s depth and therefore the effect it would have on the attacking troops. The commander of the 3rd Division, Major-General John Monash, directed the battalion leading the assault in the area of the Douve (the 40th Battalion) to carry a number of small bridges to aid in fording the river.76 Once the assault began, the attacking troops quickly discovered that the Douve could be crossed on foot, and the bridges were discarded as the attacking troops moved on.77 This was, however, a good example of how the Australians were using topographic intelligence and the available types of information about the terrain over which they were to attack in order to plan their battles.

The Second Army’s attack at Messines was a prelude to the BEF’s next operation, which attempted to capture the lines of German defences along

Pilckem Ridge and the Gheluvelt Plateau before breaking through the remaining

German lines of defence running along the Passchendale–Staden Ridge.78 The

75 Ibid. 76 Bean, Official History of Australia in the War of 1914–18, Volume III, pp.576–577. 77 Ibid., p.595. 78 Pedersen, The Anzacs, p.272.

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offensive would deny the Germans the ability to observe into the Ypres salient as they had been able to do for nearly two years and would open the way for an advance northeast towards Brugge and the u-boat base of Zebrugge. A subsidiary attack along the coast would meet an amphibious landing force securing the

Belgian coast and deny its use to the German navy, eliminating the threat to

British supply lines across the channel.79

The Fifth Army was given responsibility for undertaking the attack.80 The offensive was planned to commence on 31 July 1917, nearly six weeks after the attack at Messines had concluded, allowing the Germans ample time to reconstitute the units which had been badly damaged in the earlier fighting and for the German artillery to make good their losses.81 The Germans also strengthened their defensive positions, constructing new machine gun emplacements, concrete shelters and strong-points. The Germans adopted a new defensive strategy designed to absorb British attacks with minimal casualties while inflicting heavy losses on the attacking force. Despite overwhelming artillery superiority and ample preparation, the Fifth Army failed to capture all of the objectives that had been set for the first day. On the northern flank of the attack, British and French forces captured and held the third line of German defences, but on the southern flank of the attack the advance had only made it as far as the second line of German defences.82 Rain had begun to fall, turning the battlefield into a quagmire, making the movement of guns and troops extremely difficult. Undeterred, the Fifth Army conducted a series of small attacks,

79 Pedersen, The Anzacs, p.272. 80 C.E.W. Bean, Official History of Australia in the War of 1914–18: The A.I.F. in France 1917, Volume IV (Sydney, Angus & Robertson, 1933), p. 695. 81 Pedersen, The Anzacs, p. 702. 82 Bean, Official History of Australia in the War of 1914–18, Volume IV, pp. 711–712.

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reminiscent of the earlier fighting on the Somme, in an attempt to capture those objectives which had not been secured on the opening day of the battle. These attacks failed on almost every occasion.83

By mid-August, the weather had improved slightly and the Fifth Army prepared to launch its second major attack, aimed at securing Polygon Wood ridge. On the left flank of the attack, British and French forces once again seized all of their objectives. But in the centre and along the right hand flank of the attack, troops struggled to move across the battlefield, encountering strong opposition, and in some places being driven back by German counter-attacks.84 It was clear to GHQ that the advance along the coast had become increasingly unlikely; instead, the focus of the battle became the capture of the Passchendale–

Staden Ridge and the breakthrough into the country beyond.85 A review of the fighting concluded that success was unlikely unless the high ground on the southern side of the Ypres salient was captured. GHQ decided to shift responsibility for the capture of this area to the Second Army.86

Before launching its first attack, the Second Army paused for several weeks to allow time for the attack to be prepared. Once again, Second Army made sure that there was an adequate supply of topographic intelligence for their attacking formations. Additional topographic maps were printed and issued down to lower formations in quantities which ‘provided a copy for every officer’.87 I ANZAC Corps topo section provided survey for dozens of artillery battery positions, produced a range of supplementary maps for I ANZAC Corps,

83 Bean, Official History of Australia in the War of 1914–18, Volume IV, pp.722–723. 84 Ibid., pp.723–724. 85 Ibid., p.724. 86 Ibid., p.726. 87 Second Army Memorandum G.335, 2 September 1917, AWM26, 273/16.

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and constructed (with the assistance of an engineer section) a model of the terrain opposite the corps front showing the locations of roads, railways, woods, houses, battery positions, machine guns, and other key features. The corps topo section also ensured that the model was updated using information obtained from aerial photographs.88

The I ANZAC Corps plan called for the attacking force to strike along the main ridgeline while its right flank was protected by the British X Corps. The first task would be the capture of the ruins of the village of Velhoek and then the ridgeline which ran along the edge of Polygon Wood. The first step in the ANZAC

Corps plan would be known as the ‘battle of Menin Road’. The next step would be the capture of Polygon Wood itself before a final attack aimed at securing

Broodseinde Ridge. To make certain of achieving each step, careful consideration was given to ensuring that the objectives of each phase of the attack could be achieved. 89

As the Australians moved forward and prepared to attack, I ANZAC Corps

Intelligence Staff produced an appreciation of the area in which the Australians were expected to fight, describing key features such as woods, rivers and streams, as well as giving details of the topography over which the Australians would fight. The appreciation noted that like the Somme battlefields the effect of weeks of artillery fire had been to destroy most of the features on the battlefield and the appreciation noted that ‘actual trench lines have practically ceased to exist’.90

88 Chasseaud, Artillery’s Astrologers, pp.339–340. 89 Bean, Official History of Australia in the War of 1914–18, Volume IV, pp.738–739. 90 First Anzac Corps Intelligence, 2 September 1917, AWM26, 221/6.

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Divisional Intelligence Officers produced similar appreciations of the areas over which their division was expected to fight. The terrain over which the

1st Division was to fight included a number of key features. The Nonne Bosschen area was described as ‘marshy but passable by troops in extended order’. Aerial photographs identified three strong points and at least four ‘concrete constructions’ in the Nonne Bosschen area.91 Glencourse Wood was described as

‘very marshy’ and movement along the northern side of the wood was described as ‘impossible’. The wood itself was almost devoid of ‘undergrowth’, with ‘fallen trees helping the passage over wet ground rather than hindering’. A series of strong-points along a line through the wood were identified as ‘the most formidable obstacles in the wood’. One particular strong-point was constructed to allow it to be defended against attacks from ‘all round’.92 Further east in the direction of the Australian attack were a number of old gun positions, while other concrete constructions and strong-points were also identified. Polygon

Wood was described as ‘heavily shelled’, and there was ‘no signs of organised defence’ except for lines of holes and one or two small trenches. A number of concrete constructions were identified in the wood, and the Butte (described in the appreciation as ‘the knoll’) was noted to be visible from the ‘whole of the wood’.93 Similar assessments were prepared by the other divisions in I ANZAC

Corps.94

91 Summary of information relating to the Enemy Sector facing the 1st Australian Divisional Sector, 1 September 1917, AWM26, 231/39. 92 Ibid. 93 Ibid. 94 Fifth Australian Division Description of Enemy are opposite Corps front, 6 September 1917, AWM26, 263/15.

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The final objective for the battle of Menin Road was a line which ran along the eastern slopes of Tower Hamlets, Veldhoek Ridge, through Polygon Wood, and along the western slopes of Upper Steenbeek Valley. Before the attacking troops reached the final objective, there were two intermendiate objectives which they were to capture and hold. One Australian officer noted that:

the incoming troops knew their tasks as they had never known them

before…memoranda and maps, numerous aeroplane photographs had

been sent to each battalion…“The men”, said an officer of the 17th

Battalion afterwards, “knew the theory as well as the officers.”95

By the time of the battle of Menin Road, the Australians’ use of topographic intelligence was becoming increasingly sophisticated. Assessments of the terrain over which the infantry would attack allowed commanders and their staff to determine locations where enemy resistance might be encountered, and to ensure that reinforcements were on hand in the event that the assault was held up. Understanding the terrain allowed artillery planners to assess the likely speed of advance. Speed of advance needed to be carefully matched with the speed of the creeping barrage to ensure that the attacking troops received the maximum protection and that they were supported by the artillery all the way onto their objectives. It also allowed commanders to determine locations to be consolidated during the differed phases of the attack.

After the success of the battle of Menin Road, I ANZAC Corps prepared to capture the remainder of Polygon Wood, the Butte and part of the German

‘Flandern I’ line. As with the attack on Menin Road, the Intelligence Staff

95 Bean, Official History of Australia in the War of 1914–18, Volume IV, pp.751–753

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identified key topographical features over which the Australians would fight. For the next attack the Butte in Polygon Wood was noted to rise twenty-five to thirty feet (eight to ten metres) above the surrounding terrain, affording an extensive view over the area the Australians were to attack. Other features such as streams, lakes and woods were also identified. The main enemy defences were along the Zonnebeke-Staden Line, and a description was provided of the system of trenches which comprised the line. Aerial photographs and aerial reconnaissance reports described the Zonnebeke-Staden Line as ‘by no means complete’, the trenches and defences were assessed as shallow and ‘little work appears to have been done’.96 Reports noted that the enemy had constructed a series of dug-outs and shelters in front of and behind their main defensive line, with entrances facing east, and the locations of possible headquarters were identified. Forward of the main line of defence, a series of occupied shell holes, in keeping with the defensive strategy adopted by the Germans at the time, had been identified along with a number of machine gun positions along the line of advance.

After the successful capture of Polygon Wood, the third and final step in the plan to capture the Gheluvelt Plateau was seizure of Broodseinde Ridge. The attack on Broodseinde Ridge followed the same process that had worked so well in planning the assaults on Menin Road and Polygon Wood. Once again, the attacking units produced detailed appreciations of the area to be attacked. The key topographical features were the Broodseinde-Passchendale Ridge, which allowed the enemy to observe the areas occupied by I and II ANZAC Corps.

96 Description of the area immediately in front of 1st Anzac Corps, 22 September 1917, AWM26, 221/9.

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Gravenstaffel Ridge with the Abraham Heights, several smaller hills on the flanks of the attack and the valleys through which flowed the Hanebeek and Zonnebeke were identified as important terrain.97 The main line of enemy defences was the

Zonnebeke-Staden Line. The German defensive line consisted of a single line of trenches which reports noted ‘have not been properly completed’. The trench line appeared to have numerous concrete emplacements and was protected by a continuous wire obstacle, although an assessment of the enemy wire noted that

‘at present [it]would not appear to be a formidable obstacle’.98 No communication trenches were identified leading from the enemy front line to the rear of the position. Forward of the Zonnebeke-Staden Line, the enemy continued to occupy shell hole positions like those encountered by the

Australians in earlier attacks.99

The attack on Broodseinde Ridge began at 6.00am on 4 October 1917. The

Germans attempted to fight from their strong-points and pillboxes, but were quickly outflanked by the Australians. The first objective was reached by I and II

ANZAC Corps by 7.20am where the attack paused before continuing. Fighting continued during the period of consolidation as the Australians dug-in along their first objective and ensured that enemy dug-outs and pillboxes had been dealt with.100 At 8.10am, the barrage began to move forward once again, with the attacking troops crossing the summit of the ridge. The advance proceeded smoothly in some places while the Australians encountered fierce resistance in others, fighting from pillbox to pillbox in order to move forward. First reports of

97 Situation Opposite the Corps Front, 28 September 1917, AWM26, 229/30. 98 Ibid. 99 Ibid. 100 Bean, Official History of Australia in the War of 1914–18, Volume IV, pp.852–853.

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the Australians having reached their final objective were received at 8.55am, and by 11.40am all of the objectives along the I and II ANZAC Corps front had been captured.101

Despite the large number of casualties taken by the attacking divisions during the battles for Menin Road, Polygon Wood, and Broodseinde, the

Australians had managed to smash through successive lines of German defences.

Careful planning and a thorough understanding of the terrain over which they were fighting was an important factor in their success. An understanding of the terrain over which the attacking troops would fight, combined with information about the dispositions of enemy troops and artillery, and the ability to neutralise and engage both proved to be an effective battlefield combination.

Hamel — 1918

By 1918, topographic intelligence was incorporated into all of the Australians’ battle planning. The Australian Corps adopted a similar approach to that used by

I and II ANZAC Corps during its planning for the battles of Menin Road, Polygon

Wood, and Broodseinde Ridge when planning the attack at Hamel and later during the battle of Amiens.

In June 1918, the village of Hamel sat in a small salient that jutted into the

Australian Corps front lines. The village had been incorporated into the German defences and to its rear the ground rose up to a ridgeline that provided the

German defenders with excellent visibility over the British lines.102 The

Australian Corps had identified Hamel as a potential location for a minor

101 Bean, Official History of Australia in the War of 1914–18, Volume IV, pp.869–870. 102 John Laffin, The Battle of Hamel: The Australians’ Finest Victory (Sydney, Kangaroo Press, 1999), p.55.

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offensive in response to a request by Fourth Army to identify locations that might be suitable for a small attack. The Australian Corps noted that capturing

Hamel and the area surrounding the salient it occupied would be a most useful operation that could be carried out to ‘seize enemy localities of tactical value’.103

During a visit to the Australian Corps on 18 June 1918, the commander of the

Fourth Army, General Sir Henry Rawlinson, discussed the proposal to capture

Hamel with Lieutenant-General John Monash, the commander of the Australian

Corps and Major-General Ewan Sinclair-Maclagan, the commander of the 4th

Division.104 Monash and Rawlinson had both been impressed with the recently arrived Mark V tanks of the 5th Tank Brigade, and the terrain around Hamel was deemed as particularly suitable for a tank attack. The ground was hard and had not been subjected to heavy bombardments which had caused large craters, while folds in the ground would also help to hide the approaching tanks from the

Germans.105 The appreciation of the ground surrounding Hamel and its suitability for tank operations demonstrated that terrain was an increasingly important factor in determining where attacks would be launched.

Monash briefed the commander of the 5th Tank Brigade, Brigadier-

General Anthony Courage, on the idea for an attack on Hamel on 19 June 1918, and Courage sent Monash a proposal for an attack the following day.106 Courage identified three objectives to be captured in an attack: Vaire and Hamel Wood; the circular post; and Hamel village. The proposal noted that ‘there is no defined system of trenches, except the old British line East of HAMEL VILLAGE to

103 Australian Corps Memorandum S/4632, 13 June 1918, TNA, WO95/981. 104 Laffin, The Battle of Hamel, p.56. 105 Pedersen, The Anzacs, p.396. 106 Ibid., p.397.

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capture, but the area between the tactical points mentioned above, and to the east of them, probably consists of a number of machine gun nests.’107

Courage’s original plan called for four companies of tanks supported by infantry to be employed in the attack. An advanced body of tanks, operating independently, would move ahead of the main body of tanks and infantry to capture key points and cut-off the enemy retreat. The main body of tanks and infantry would then follow and assault the objectives, after which mopping up sections would move through to deal with any remaining resistance.108 The plan would later be modified to include a creeping barrage, removing the use of the advanced group of tanks. On 21 June 1918, the Australian Corps submitted a plan to Fourth Army Headquarters proposing to capture the village of Hamel along with Vaire and Hamel Woods as part of a minor offensive operation. The

Australian Corps proposal noted that capturing Hamel would shorten and straighten the Australian front line; provide better observation over the German lines while denying the Germans observation into the British rear areas; improve jumping-off positions for further offensive action; and inflict losses on the enemy.109 The appreciation of the terrain helped determine the limits of the attack and the objectives to be captured during the battle.

To ensure that the attacking troops understood the ground over which they would attack, copies of photographs taken in the lead-up to the battle were distributed to the attacking force. Photo mosaics overlaid with grid squares and contour lines — with relevant annotations — were issued on a scale of one per

NCO taking part in the attack, as were oblique photographs of the area to be

107 5th Tank Brigade Memorandum G.26/16, 20 June 1918, AWM26, 358/16. 108 Ibid. 109 Hamel Offensive S/4671, 21 June 1918, TNA, WO95/981.

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captured, while two copies of vertical photographs of the area to be attacked were issued to each company and battery.110 A special operations map (1:20,000 scale) was prepared and issued to all officers taking part in the operation, while a small message map (1:20,000 scale) was issued to all NCOs taking part in the attack. Artillery target maps (1:20,000 scale) were issued to all batteries and battalions, and a copy of the field artillery barrage map was issued to each company and battery commander. A larger scale map (1:40,000 scale) showing the detailed distribution of the enemy forces to be attacked was also issued to each company commander.111

At 3.02am on 4 July 1918, the Australian Corps artillery once again began normal harassing fire to screen the noise of the tanks moving forward to their start line. At zero hour (3.10am) the Australian barrage descended onto the

German front lines and enemy battery positions, and after four minutes the creeping barrage began to slowly move forward. Infantry and tanks advanced quickly with the Germans only resisting along the ‘Pear Trench’ until the garrison was quickly dispatched. The Australians then quickly pushed forward to their final objective and consolidated their position. By 10.00am, a continuous trench and wire obstacles had been constructed along the entire Australian objective.112 Australian losses were light, while some 1,300 prisoners, along with a large amount of equipment, was captured during the attack.113 The approach adopted by the Australian Corps when preparing for the attack on Hamel would

110 Preliminary Report Capture of Hamel and Hamel Ridge by the Australian Corps, 4 July 1918, AWM26, 361/3. 111 Ibid. 112 Fourth Australian Division Narrative of Operation against Hamel and Ride to East of that village on July 4th 1918, July 1918, AWM26, 408/5. 113 Fourth Australian Division — Intelligence Summary No.303 From 6 a.m. 3rd to 6 a.m. 4th July 1918, 4 July 1918, AWM26, 408/5.

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be repeated during the battle of Amiens, and topographic intelligence would play an important role in preparation for and the outcome of the battle.

By the end of the war, the BEF’s survey capabilities had expanded and advanced to a point where they were able to provide accurate topographic maps or varying scales to support the BEF’s operations. Artillery survey allowed for artillery to be accurately located on the map and enabled it to fire accurately on targets. Intelligence staff at all levels routinely produced assessments of the terrain over which troops were expected to move and fight, and this information helped shape battle planning. By the wars end, the Australians had demonstrated that they understood the importance of topographic intelligence and how to use topographic intelligence to effectively plan their battles.

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Chapter 5. Artillery intelligence

Artillery intelligence was derived from information collected about enemy artillery, such as the location of enemy gun batteries, observation posts, communications and command posts. It was used primarily to support counter- battery operations, enabling counter-battery artillery to neutralise or destroy enemy guns in order to prevent them from interfering with friendly attacks or supporting attacks launched by the enemy. Artillery intelligence and counter- battery operations go hand-in-hand. Artillery intelligence could also provide indications and warnings of enemy activity, as there were never enough guns to cover the entire front and artillery, particularly heavy artillery, needed to be concentrated to support an attack. The AIF’s first real exposure to artillery intelligence occurred when it arrived in France. While there were some counter- battery efforts made on Gallipoli, these lacked the systematic approach that would become the hallmark of counter-battery operations on the Western Front, nor was there a dedicated artillery intelligence collection effort at Gallipoli. From

1916 onwards, effective counter-battery operations were recognised as essential to battlefield success.1 This chapter examines the development of artillery

1 For artillery intelligence and counter-battery operations, see General Staff at General Headquarters, ‘CDS 98/4 —Artillery Notes No.4 Artillery in Offensive Operations’ (1916); General Staff, ‘SS 552 — Sound Ranging’ (1917); General Staff (Intelligence), ‘SS 580 — Notes on What Can Be Done by Our Batteries to Avoid Detection by Enemy Sound Ranging’ (1917); General Staff at General Headquarters, ‘SS 139/3 Artillery Notes No.3 — Counter-Battery Work’ (1917); General Staff at General Headquarters, ‘SS 139/4 Artillery Notes No.4 — Artillery in Offensive Operations’ (1917); General Staff (Intelligence), ‘SS 139/3 — Artillery Notes No.3 — Counter-Battery Work (Revised Edition)’ (1918); General Staff at General Headquarters, ‘SS 139/7 Artillery Notes No.7 - Artillery in Defensive Operations’ (1918); General Staff, ‘SS 199 — Co-operation of Sound Ranging Sections and Observation Groups with Artillery’ (1918); General Staff, ‘SS 199/1 — Ranging with Observation by the Field Survey Company’ (1918); Lieutenant-Colonel C.N.F Broad, 'The Development of Artillery Tactics 1914–18', The Journal of the Royal Artillery 49(2) (1922); Lieutenant-Colonel Robert Madden, 'The Myth of Destruction: Artillery in the Great War', Field Artillery, August (1994); Albert Palazzo, 'The British Army's Counter-Battery Staff Office and Control of the Enemy in World War I', The Journal of Military History, 63(1) (1999); Shelford Bidwell, Gunners at War: A Tactical Study of the Royal Artillery in the Twentieth Century (London, Arms and Armour Press, 1970); David Horner, The Gunners: A History of Australian Artillery

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intelligence throughout the war, the evolving role that artillery intelligence played in counter-battery operations, and how the Australians used artillery intelligence to plan and conduct operations.

Pre-war artillery doctrine and the early days of the war

Like most British pre-war military thinking, the Royal Artillery’s view of counter- battery operations was shaped by the experiences of the British Army during the

Boer War. The notion of neutralising the enemy’s guns to enable friendly attacking infantry to reach an objective was well understood. Boer guns were usually well dug-in and dispersed, making them hard to hit and even harder to destroy. British gunners needed to deluge an area with shells, which they didn’t have, in order to destroy an enemy gun, or spray an area with shrapnel to suppress Boer artillery rather than destroying it.2 The few guns that the Boers possessed posed little threat to British infantry, and as the war progressed Boer shellfire inflicted only a few losses, being used in a largely harassing role. British howitzers saw little action, owing to their lack of mobility when compared with field artillery, while few heavy or seige guns were employed.3 All of these factors meant that counter-battery operations received little attention in pre-war doctrine. Field Service Regulations mention nothing about counter-battery

(Sydney, Unwin & Allen, 1995); John Innes, Flash Spotters and Sound Rangers (London, George Allen & Unwin Ltd, 1935); A.H. Dowson, Lawrence Bragg and H.H Hemming, Artillery Survey in the First World War (London, Field Survey Association, 1971); Paul Strong and Sanders Marble, Artillery in the Great War (Barnsley, Pen & Sword, 2011); Sanders Marble, British Artillery on the Western Front in the First World War: 'The Infantry Cannot Do with a Gun Less' (Surrey: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2013); Alan Smith, Do Unto Others: Counter Bombardment in Australia's Military Campaigns (Newport, Big Sky Publishing, 2011). 2 Marble, British Artillery on the Western Front, p.17. 3 Ibid.

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operations, although they did note that with regard to heavy artillery or siege artillery ‘its principal duty is to engage shielded artillery’.4

At the outbreak of the war, the British Army had some of the best field artillery available in the world, with each division having a complement of fifty- four 18-pounder field guns, eighteen 4.5-inch field howitzers, and four 60- pounder guns. The 18-pounder was designed with a flat trajectory and equipped with a gun shield to be employed in, or close to the front line and engage in direct fire duels with enemy infantry and artillery. Shrapnel was the only round produced for the 18-pounder, reflecting its direct fire role. The 4.5-inch howitzer provided an indirect fire capability and its high explosive (HE) round was designed to destroy minor field defences, buildings and other targets best reached by the howitzer’s high angle of fire. The 60-pounder was the only artillery piece that was intended for long-range fire and was provided with both

HE and shrapnel rounds. It was the only weapon available to British divisions that could be used in a long-range counter-battery role. Heavier artillery, including the small number of 6-inch howitzers operated by the Royal Garrison

Artillery, were considered ‘seige artillery’. Heavy guns lacked mobility and their use had not been considered in pre-war thinking beyond how they might be employed in siege operations. As a result, most of the heavy artillery was left behind when the BEF deployed to France.5

The effect of German artillery, particularly German heavy artillery, came as an unpleasant surprise for the British, with German heavy howitzers able to destroy buildings which were generally immune to field artillery. The first efforts

4 FSR I, p.17. 5 Marble, British Artillery on the Western Front, p.43.

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to gather artillery intelligence and conduct counter-battery operations involved

RFC units being ordered to identify enemy batteries and drop maps marked with the location of the enemy guns near a British headquarters to enable counter- battery fire to be brought to bear on these targets.6 By the end of 1914, the BEF had just fifty-four heavy and medium artillery pieces supporting it in the field, and these were fully occupied with supporting the infantry.

Counter-battery operations in 1915 were rudimentary and largely uncoordinated. During British attacks in 1915, counter-battery operations were conducted and heavy and medium guns were allocated counter-battery tasks.

RFC aircraft were also ordered to watch for previously undetected batteries so that these could be engaged by the counter-battery guns. But for most of 1915 counter-battery fire was not a high priority when British infantry could seemingly make no headway against well dug-in German infantry and machine guns.7

Gallipoli — 1915

Before the landings on Gallipoli, RNAS aircraft had identified a number of

Turkish guns during reconnaissance flights. In addition to shelling the Turkish forts, the Royal Navy and their French counterparts attempted to engage Turkish gun batteries on the peninsula but had little success, even with the assistance of spotting aircraft. The flat trajectory of the naval guns made it almost impossible to strike at Turkish batteries emplaced behind ridges or in folds in the ground.

There was no alternative during the landings other than to use British and

6 Ibid., p.49. 7 Ibid., pp.80–86.

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French warships to provide naval gunfire support to the landing force, yet there appeared to be no recognition by naval or military planners of the impact that the topography around the landing site at Anzac would have on the warships ability to engage Turkish guns and prevent them from firing on the landings. Nor was their a plan to systematically engage enemy artillery, reflecting the priority of counter-battery operations at this stage of the war.8

Once the landings had been made, the intention was to land sufficient field artillery to support the landing force, but there were insufficient guns and ammunition for this task. Neither the 1st Division nor the New Zealand and

Australian Division had their full complement of artillery. In particular, they lacked 4.5-inch howitzers. The flat trajectory of the 18-pounder field guns, their limited elevation, combined with the difficult terrain, made the 18-pounders poorly suited for providing artillery support in the rugged terrain around Anzac.

4.5-inch howitzers, able to fire higher trajectories, were vital, but the ANZAC

Corps had only one howitzer battery available and ammunition was in short supply.9 By mid-morning on the day of the landings, Turkish artillery was engaging positions around the perimeter at Anzac and there was little that could be done to silence them by the landing force. It was not until late on the first day that any field artillery was landed and moved into position to engage enemy guns that had been shelling the Australians and New Zealanders all day. Even then, the guns had to be pushed into the very front lines to do so.10

In late June 1915, several heavy howitzers were landed at Anzac and formed into a heavy howitzer battery and efforts were made to identify the

8 Horner, The Gunners, p.88. 9 Ibid. 10 Ibid., p.91.

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locations of Turkish guns to enable counter-battery operations to be undertaken.11 In preparation for the August offensive, additional howitzers and ammunition were landed at Anzac. However, the additional artillery was used to bombard Turkish trenches and to cut wire obstacles in front of the Turkish positions that were to be attacked, rather than in a counter-battery role.

In the last months at Anzac the strength of the Turkish artillery steadily increased as new heavy German and Austrian guns arrived. The new Turkish heavy artillery was now able to destroy sections of the Australian trenches, removing the protection previously afforded to the troops, and additional field and heavy howitzers were positioned at Anzac to respond.12 Once the order for the withdrawal had been issued the number of guns on Anzac was gradually reduced, their absence hidden by the extended periods of silence which the

Australian and New Zealanders introduced to condition the enemy into believing that the position at Anzac remained occupied. Several guns were left in position to respond to enemy artillery and were destroyed by the Anzacs when the last troops left the position.13

The Australians’ experience of Turkish artillery at Anzac influenced their early attitudes towards artillery intelligence and the importance of counter- battery fire. During the first few days of the landings, Turkish artillery fire inflicted a number of casualties on the ANZAC Corps, but once trenches had been constructed. the impact of Turkish shelling lessened and seems to have become an annoyance that was largely ignored by the Australians and New Zealanders.

When heavy artillery was available once more, efforts were made to engage

11 Ibid., p.102. 12 Ibid., p.107. 13 Ibid., pp.109–110.

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enemy artillery, but this seemed to be more akin to an ‘artillery duel’ than a systematic process of counter-battery operations, and it was only when the

Turkish heavy howitzers began bombarding the position at Anzac that a more determined effort was made to engage the Turkish guns. There was certainly no systematic process to collect intelligence on enemy artillery to aid in locating the

Turkish guns or to enable effective counter-battery operations. These experiences combined to make the Australians less concerned about the impact of enemy guns and casualties caused by artillery fire. This attitude would persist until the Australians joined the battle of the Somme.

Early development of artillery intelligence capabilities

The first experiments with flash spotting began to be conducted in late 1915, using three or more observation posts and a small headquarters to plot and record bearings to the flashes produced by enemy guns when they fired. Flash spotting could be used in flat terrain, such as around Ypres during the day, but tended to work best at night when it was possible to see the flash from guns firing from behind cover.14

Unknown before the beginning of the war, sound ranging was to become one of the most accurate techniques to locate enemy artillery developed and employed during the war. The first experimental sound ranging section was sent to the front in October 1915, and used a series of sensitive microphones that were spread along a section of the front line to record the sound of enemy guns being fired. By December 1915, the results of the experimental section had been

14 Dowson, Bragg and Hemming, Artillery Survey, pp.22–24.

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considered promising enough that the formation of two sound ranging sections in each British Army was authorised.15 Early microphones proved problematic, but improvements in technology meant that by June 1916 it became possible to locate almost any gun with a high degree of accuracy under favourable conditions. One of the most significant advantages of sound ranging over flash spotting, apart from its ability to operate day and night, was the ability to discern the caliber of the enemy gun being fired by the noise it made. By June 1916, sound ranging sections began to be deployed throughout the BEF and by August

1916, every corps was allocated a sound ranging section.16

Captive balloons and reconnaissance aircraft also continued their work to locate enemy artillery. Although there were limitations on the ability of observers in balloons to see far behind enemy lines where guns might be located, captive balloons had the advantage of having good communications, and they could contact and range British artillery onto hostile batteries much faster than reconnaissance aircraft.17 The importance of the RFC to counter-battery work was also well understood, with artillery training notes stating that ‘the assistance in counter-battery work that can be afforded by the Royal Flying Corps is beyond dispute.’18 Molkentin notes in his book about the Australian Flying Corps that artillery observation work was the cornerstone of the RFC’s work, and that ‘the most common targets were enemy batteries that had been identified by the photographic and flash reconnaissance patrols’.19 Artillery intelligence obtained

15 General Staff, 'SS 552 — Sound Ranging' March 1917. 16 Innes, Flash Spotters and Sound Rangers, pp.148–149. 17 General Staff (Intelligence), 'SS 139/3 — Artillery Notes No.3 — Counter-Battery Work (Revised Edition)', March 1917. 18 Ibid. 19 Michael Molkentin, Fire in the Sky, Kindle edition (Crows Nest, Allen & Unwin, 2010), Chapter 9.

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by the RFC was relayed to the artillery liaison officer with the corps squadron and was used to update the hostile battery list maintained by each squadron.20 It was usual for each corps RFC squadron to have at least one aircraft flying in the corps area whenever possible to locate targets and when circumstances permitted to engage hostile batteries.21

Aerial photographs also proved to be particularly effective in locating positions or emplacements constructed for enemy guns, and as the photographic interpretation skills of the intelligence officers posted to corps squadrons grew, it was possible to identify even the most well camouflaged enemy battery.22

Continuous photography of areas where hostile batteries were active was required to ensure that new gun positions were identified and so that the outcomes of previous counter-battery operations could be assessed.

By the beginning of 1916, responsibility for counter-battery fire in the

BEF had been centralised and placed under control of corps headquarters.23 To meet the demands for artillery intelligence, the BEF grouped topographic survey, flash spotting, and sound ranging capabilities into Field Survey Companies (FSC).

Each company contained a topographic survey element, a number of observation groups whose role was flash spotting, and several sound ranging sections.24

Sections and groups from the FSC were then allocated to each corps to support counter-battery operations based on the artillery intelligence they collected. The compilation office in the FSC became the location responsible for collating all of

20 General Staff at General Headquarters, 'SS 139/4 Artillery Notes No.4 — Artillery in Offensive Operations', February 1918. 21 Ibid. 22 Dowson, Bragg and Hemming, Artillery Survey, pp.17–18. 23 Marble, British Artillery on the Western Front, p.118. 24 Innes, Flash Spotters and Sound Rangers, pp.46–47.

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the artillery intelligence information to enable production of lists of active hostile batteries, which were then transferred onto hostile battery maps.25

The first Counter Battery Staff Officer (CBSO) was appointed just before the battle of the Somme, with X Corps establishing the position and locating their

CBSO next door to No.2 Observation Group at Bouzincourt in order to take advantage of the artillery intelligence available from the group.26 Other corps also formed their own counter-battery offices and worked closely with the FSC to produce hostile battery maps. Close liaison with the RFC meant that aerial reconnaissance flights could be used to confirm the location of enemy batteries identified through other means, or to take aerial photographs of enemy batteries to support the counter-battery effort.27

During planning for the battle of the Somme and during the seven-day opening bombardment of the German lines before the attack, there was little counter-battery work.28 Counter-battery fire was a lower priority than wire cutting and harassing fire, and the lack of counter-battery orders from Fourth

Army meant that each corps could decide on how it wanted to conduct its counter-battery activities.29 Some corps paid little attention to the need to conduct counter-battery fire, being ‘busy enough bombarding enemy defences, cutting barbed wire, interdicting communications, firing feint artillery barrages, and planning infantry support’ for the opening of the battle. The British plan to break through the successive lines of German defenses, rather than the ‘bite-and- hold’ method used in battles in 1917 and 1918, meant that there were far more

25 Chasseaud, Artillery's Astrologers, p.194. 26 Ibid. 27 Ibid., pp.194–195. 28 Marble, British Artillery on the Western Front, p.145. 29 Ibid.

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targets than the available artillery could effectively deal with.30 The number of guns available for counter-battery fire meant also that neutralisation, rather than destruction was the aim of most of the counter-battery fire conducted in the days preceding the battle.

As the battle of the Somme progressed, British artillery gradually destroyed the physical defences constructed by the Germans, who were forced to rely more and more on their artillery in defence. The Germans accepted that the amount of British artillery which was available meant that ‘losses of ground will be inevitable even in the finest positions’, and instead of concentrating their defences forward, trenches were held with fewer troops supported by long- range machine gun barrages, defensive artillery fire and counter-attacks.31 When the British were attacking, German artillery concentrated on firing a defensive barrage switching to suppress the British guns during their own attacks or counter-attacks.32 British counter-battery fire needed to begin at zero hour, if not slightly earlier, to control German artillery and assist the attacking troops onto their objective in just the same way that the accompanying barrage suppressed the German front line troops long enough for the attacking infantry to make it into the enemy trenches.33

British gunners began to experiment with the use of alternative types of ammunition, such as tear gas, to neutralise rather than destroy enemy guns. The long-lasting effect of tear gas meant that the neutralisation effect continued after the target had stopped being shelled.34 While counter-battery techniques

30 Ibid. 31 Strong and Marble, Artillery in the Great War, p.95. 32 Ibid., pp.95–96. 33 Marble, British Artillery on the Western Front, p.146. 34 Ibid., p.147.

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continued to develop, the ability to locate German batteries quickly was a significant limitation. During periods when the infantry were not attacking,

British artillery continued with efforts to engage and destroy German guns. This had the unintended effect of forcing the Germans to relocate their artillery, meaning that the enemy guns had to be identified and located before they could be engaged again. In the meantime, enemy guns were free to shell British troops without fear of British counter-battery fire.35

Armentières and Fromelles — 1916

While the Australians had been shelled by German artillery at Armentières, this shelling caused few casualties. Reports about enemy artillery fire were incorporated into daily intelligence reports produced by the Australian infantry brigades.36 Information about the activities of hostile batteries was also collected and circulated among the Australian field artillery.37 Australian artillery units engaged in several counter-battery ‘shoots’ and cooperated with RFC squadrons providing support to the artillery.38

The first major attack undertaken by the Australians after arriving in

France occurred at Fromelles. In addition to the field artillery of the attacking divisions, XI Corps was allocated additional medium and heavy artillery to support the attack.39 Ammunition for the field guns and the heavy artillery was limited due to the fighting already underway on the Somme, but XI Corps

35 Ibid. 36 6th Field Artillery Brigade Intelligence Report, 11 April 1916, AWM26, 29/8. 37 5th A.F.A Brigade Circular Memorandum No.20, 14 April 1916, AWM26, 29/9. 38 Second Division A.I.F. Centre group Operation Order No.F2, 24 April 1916, AWM26, 29/10. 39 5th Australian Division General Staff Attached Troops, 16 July 1916, AWM26, 32/33.

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assessed the allocation as adequate for the attack.40 Aircraft from No.10 and

No.16 squadrons RFC supported the attack and assisted the artillery with registering and engaging targets. No.10 kite balloon section was also allocated to

XI Corps to provide artillery observation. However, bad weather during preparation for the attack hindered the RFC’s ability to identify and observe for the artillery.41

Artillery preparation for the attack focused largely on breaching the enemy wire, as well as destroying trenches and strong points. During the attack, the role of the artillery was to suppress the enemy trenches to enable the infantry attack to succeed. Field guns were used to cut the enemy wire while heavy artillery was used to bombard enemy strong-points.42

There is no mention of counter-battery fire in XI Corps orders, although medium and heavy guns were used in response to German shelling of British and

Australian observation posts, and heavy artillery fired on a number of enemy gun batteries that had been identified in the area.43 The position of the German trenches on higher ground overlooking the Australian and British positions meant that the Germans had been able to observe the build up of Australian and

British forces for the attack. Communications trenches, observation posts and supporting artillery were all shelled by the Germans, as were engineers and pioneers attempting to construct crawl trenches across no-mans land.

Once the Germans identified that the attacking British and Australian troops had successfully captured sections of their trenches, these were also

40 First Army Memorandum No. G.S. 421, 14 Jul 1916, AWM26, 18/53. 41 Paul Cobb, Fromelles 1916 (Stroud, Tempus Publishing, 2007), p.20. 42 XIth Corps Order No.57, 15 July 1916, AWM26, 19/27. 43 Summary of events at Adv XIth Corps H.Q., 19 July 1916, AWM26, 19/27.

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shelled by German artillery.44 The outcomes of the attack are well known, and the failure cannot be attributed to any one factor. The priority task assigned to the heavy guns was supporting the bombardment rather than neutralising or destroying enemy guns, which was to be one of the most important lessons learned by the Royal Artillery in 1916.

Pozières and Mouquet Farm — 1916

Arriving on the Somme in July 1916, I ANZAC Corps quickly became aware of the importance of counter-battery fire. Lessons from the opening day of the battle of the Somme had been circulated throughout the BEF, and the success of the

French attack was attributed to ‘excellent counter-battery work’ and ‘good artillery preparation’.45 French artillery was issued with a daily update showing active German artillery batteries based on a summary of ‘air photos; land observation; balloons; planes; sound; flashes; infantry and artillery reports’. This intelligence ‘greatly facilitated counter-battery work’.46 Notes circulated to Corps and Division Headquarters on counter-battery work indicated that ‘fire from 60- pounders on dug-in batteries is most ineffective’, and that heavy howitzers, 8- inch, 9.2-inch or 12-inch, were essential in dealing with them’.47 It was recommended that each corps appoint a senior officer to assist the Brigadier-

General Corps Heavy Artillery with counter-battery work as CBSO, and that the

CBSO work closely with the corps RFC squadron to coordinate counter-battery activities.48 I ANZAC Corps was slow in adopting this recommendation and it was

44 Cobb, Fromelles 1916, p.67. 45 Secret L.S. 98, 2 July 1916, AWM26, 24/10. 46 Ibid. 47 Notes on Counter-Battery work with Aeroplanes, 21 July 1916, AWM25, 75/4/66. 48 Ibid.

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not until the decision was made by GHQ to establish a CBSO in every corps during the winter of 1916/1917 that a CBSO joined I ANZAC Corps. I ANZAC

Corps Heavy Artillery did, however, establish an intelligence officer position to collate information about the location of hostile guns, enemy observation posts, and the effect of friendly and enemy artillery on I ANZAC Corps.49

I ANZAC Corps artillery intelligence reports written during the Somme fighting indicate that information about German guns was being received from the two artillery survey groups within the Reserve Army zone, along with information from aerial photographs, aerial reconnaissance reports, and ground observers.50 Field survey posts also provided intelligence about the locations of

German artillery batteries, identifying five batteries ‘south of Puisieux’, fourteen batteries south of Beaumont Hamel, and a further twelve batteries further west.51 While intelligence reports from this period provide details about enemy shelling and the location of enemy batteries, there is no evidence that artillery plans for any of the Australian attacks considered the need for counter-battery fire. Nor is there any evidence at army, corps or division of a counter-battery plan designed to support any of the attacks conducted by the Australians while they were fighting on the Somme.

The success of the Australian attack at Pozières coincided with a noticeable change in the artillery tactics used by the Germans. The Germans launched a number of counter-attacks to attempt to recapture some of the positions that had been lost. However, these were beaten back and heavy losses

49 First Anzac Corps List of Supposed Hostile Batteries Reported Active 30th August–6th September 1916, 6 September 1916, AWM26, 76/7. 50 Ibid. 51 Fourth Army Intelligence Summaries June 1916 Intelligence Summary No.118, 27 June 1916, TNA, WO157/171.

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were inflicted on the attackers. After several failed attempts, the Germans shifted concentrations of their artillery fire onto the Australian front lines in an attempt to destroy the Australians and to prevent reinforcements and reserves from moving up.52 Pozières was an easy target and the Australians quickly found themselves suffering the ‘worst shellfire’ of the war. Casualties mounted, and units quickly found themselves exhausted and at the limit of their endurance.53

Intelligence reports note that many gun battery locations had been identified by aerial reconnaissance, but at this stage of the war there was still no centralised system for collecting intelligence on the activities of enemy artillery or conducting counter-battery fire to neutralise or destroy enemy batteries.

Requests for counter-battery fire to ease the effect of the German bombardment received the response that artillery allocated to conducting counter-battery fire

‘were already doing all they could’. In an attempt to assist with neutralisation of the German artillery, and at the request of I ANZAC Corps, additional batteries of

British heavy artillery were tasked to assist with counter-battery fire.54

Efforts to improve I ANZAC Corps’ understanding of the importance of artillery intelligence seemed to have met with mixed results, with one comment on an artillery intelligence report noting that ‘it does not seem to be quite understood that all indications of the nature and position of hostile guns are most valuable.’55 The importance of effective cooperation between the infantry and artillery was emphasised in memorandums from I ANZAC Corps

Headquarters, which stated that ‘the most important duty of the heavy artillery

52 Strong and Marble, Artillery in the Great War, p.95. 53 Bean, Official History of Australia in the War of 1914–18, Volume III, p.581. 54 Bean, Official History of Australia in the War of 1914–18, Volume III, p.581. 55 Location of Hostile Batteries, 27 September 1916, AWM26, 76/8.

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is counter-battery work — the neutralisation and destruction of hostile batteries’. The Australian divisions were instructed that it was vitally important for infantry to report all enemy shelling, regardless of whether they considered it

‘heavy’ or ‘worthy of retaliation’.56

Training notes provided by the artillery intelligence officer in I ANZAC

Corps Headquarters explained that it was the role of artillery intelligence ‘to keep a register of hostile batteries, so that if retaliation is asked for to stop hostile shelling it may be known with some degree of certainty where the offender is’.57 Efforts were also made to improve the effectiveness of artillery liaison officers serving at brigade, battalion and company level to ensure that information about enemy artillery activity was collected and passed back to

Divisional Artillery Headquarters as rapidly as possible.58

By the end of the Somme offensive in November 1916, a number of important lessons had been drawn about counter-battery operations. Firstly, that artillery plans needed to be developed at army level to ensure effective coordination. The distribution and employment of artillery on the army front needed to be viewed as a whole. While each corps planned its own counter- battery operations, these plans needed to fit within a larger army plan.59

Secondly, there needed to be as much counter-battery fire as possible. If an enemy battery could be located, it should be destroyed, as the chance my never recur. The temptation to use heavy artillery and observation aircraft for tasks other than counter-battery work, such as bombardment of trenches, needed to

56 Notification of Hostile Artillery Fire, 29 January 1917, AWM25. 57 Location of Hostile Batteries, 27 September 1916, AWM26, 76/8. 58 1st Australian Group R.A. 177, 25 October 1916, AWM26, 112/12. 59 Artillery Lessons Drawn from the Battle of the Somme, December 1916, AWM26.

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be avoided. Once an attack began, the role of counter-battery artillery was to neutralise those enemy guns which had not been destroyed, and all available heavy guns and howitzers needed to be employed for this task.60 Thirdly, the accuracy of British artillery needed to be improved to ensure maximum effect with minimum waste. The destruction of enemy batteries demanded great accuracy of fire; considerable expenditure of ammunition; time; aeroplane observation; and favourable weather. Finally, better artillery intelligence was needed, as without intelligence there was little chance of conducting effective counter-battery operations.61 The emphasis on counter-battery fire would be a major change in the way British operations were conducted from the beginning of 1917 onwards.62

Further development of the counter-battery and artillery intelligence system

Over the winter of 1916/1917, artillery doctrine was revised by GHQ to reflect the lessons learned on the Somme. GHQ established a Counter Battery Staff

Office within each Corps Headquarters and appointed CBSOs to oversee each corps counter-battery operation. Heavy artillery brigades and divisional artillery headquarters were allocated an intelligence officer, called an artillery reconnaissance officer to avoid political machinations at GHQ, to improve the collection and distribution of artillery intelligence.63 New artillery doctrine recognised that counter-battery work was not a ‘spasmodic effort’, rather it was

60 Ibid. 61 Ibid. 62 Strong and Marble, Artillery in the Great War, p.100. 63 General Staff at General Headquarters, 'SS 139/4 Artillery Notes No.4 — Artillery in Offensive Operations', February 1917.

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a continuous operation which depended on ‘accuracy of fire’, ‘continuity of plan’,

‘unremitting study’, and ‘firm control’. Failing to discover enemy gun batteries and destroying or neutralising them was likely to render the capture of an objective difficult and costly, and subsequent enemy bombardments would make its retention impossible.64

Coordination of counter-battery work was improved and the General

Officer Commanding Royal Artillery (GOCRA) at Army Headquarters assigned areas of responsibility to each of the different corps within the army based on the heavy artillery that was available within each corps. Coordination of counter- battery fire across corps boundaries was the responsibility of Army

Headquarters, along with all matters relating to the work of the artillery and RFC at army level. The GOCRA was also responsible for close liaison with the intelligence staff and the FSC on all matters relating to artillery intelligence.65

At corps level, the GOCRA of the corps had similar responsibilities for corps heavy artillery and any field artillery directly under corps command. The

Brigadier-General heavy artillery executed the corps counter-battery plan assisted by the CBSO who was part of the artillery staff of each corps headquarters.66 New instructions noted that a ‘definite number’ of batteries within each corps needed to be allocated for counter-battery work. 8-inch howitzers and bigger weapons were required for ‘destruction’ of enemy guns, while 6-inch howitzers were ‘very effective’ when used to neutralise enemy guns.67 The new doctrine noted that it was ‘futile’ to attempt the destruction of a

64 General Staff at General Headquarters, 'SS 139/3 Artillery Notes No.3 — Counter-Battery Work', February 1917. 65 Ibid. 66 Ibid. 67 Ibid.

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hostile battery with a small number of rounds and a recommended minimum number of rounds for different calibers of heavy artillery was identified.68

Destructive engagement of enemy guns whenever they were located became a standard part the heavy artillery’s daily work.

The training of artillery officers was also updated and efforts were made to standarise and update the training of artillery personnel with some success.

Throughout 1917, the technical gunnery skills of the Royal Artillery increased and reached a high standard.69

From GHQ down, the number of staff employed in collecting, collating and disseminating artillery intelligence increased. At GHQ, the artillery intelligence function ‘was nothing more than the collation and examination of reports from below, looking for patterns that had been missed lower down’.70 The movement of different types of German artillery and how the Germans employed their guns could provide useful information about German intentions. At army level, the role of the Headquarters was to ensure that collection and dissemination of artillery intelligence was coordinated across the army, and that artillery intelligence units were allocated appropriately. At corps level, the role of artillery intelligence was focused on collecting and analysing information, identifying the location of enemy artillery, and enabling counter-battery work.

The German withdrawal to the Hindenburg Line and Bullecourt — 1917

Despite the experiences of the Somme fighting, the Australian infantry still did not seem to attach much importance of artillery intelligence and its role in

68 Ibid. 69 Marble, British Artillery on the Western Front, pp.161–165. 70 Marble, British Artillery on the Western Front, pp.171–172.

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counter-battery work. In early 1917, I ANZAC Corps sent out several messages to the Australian divisions noting that:

It has come to notice that immediate notification of the commencement,

duration, nature and cessation of all hostile artillery fire to the First

ANZAC Heavy Artillery is not being carried out as rapidly as necessary to

secure the best results possible.71

I ANZAC Corps had to issue a number of orders directing infantry commanders to report hostile shelling by telephone to corps counter-battery staff and the divisional artillery headquarters.72

Orders for the I ANZAC Heavy Artillery show that the first CBSO for I

ANZAC Corps, Lieutenant-Colonel Charles Pritchard, RGA, commenced duty early

January 1917, taking control of the counter-battery operations of I ANZAC

Corps.73 Pritchard remained in the CBSO role for I ANZAC Corps for only a short time, before being replaced by an Australian artillery officer. I ANZAC Corps artillery instructions noted that ‘active measures against hostile artillery are taken in the Corps Counter-Battery Office’, and that it was the role of the CBSO to

‘formulate a definite opinion’ about the ‘strength and intentions of the hostile artillery’. The CBSO required all information about enemy artillery activity transmitted to ‘him at once’ by the fastest means available. Branch intelligence officers with the corps RFC Squadron, along with infantry commanders, were instructed to provide any information that was obtained about enemy artillery or enemy shelling. The CBSO was also to be given the opportunity to examine any artillery personnel captured, as prisoners and hostile maps or documents

71 Notification of Hostile Artillery Fire, 29 January 1917, AWM25. 72 First Australian Division memorandum 12/96, 26 March 1917, AWM25, 75/7/58. 73 First Anzac Heavy Artillery Counter Battery Orders No.25, 11 January 1917, AWM26, 117/10.

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relating to enemy artillery were to be forwarded to the CBSO without delay.

Daily conferences were held between the corps counter-battery office, the corps

RFC squadron, the Corps Headquarters Intelligence Section, the GOCRA I ANZAC

Corps, and the FSC to discuss enemy batteries that were active in the previous twenty-four hours, along with new batteries that had been identified or new gun positions that had been located. This information was to be sent to army headquarters and passed to the neighboring corps as well.74

Despite the recalcitrant attitudes of the Australian infantry, weekly

ANZAC Heavy Artillery intelligence summaries and counter-battery operations orders show that I ANZAC Corps was actively engaged in counter-battery operations. Hostile battery lists compiled by the I ANZAC Corps Heavy Artillery show that information about enemy artillery locations was being obtained from a variety of well established sources, including sound ranging sections, flash spotting groups, and reports from observation posts, in addition to information supplied by the RFC.75

Construction of the Hindenburg Line had been watched with interest by the BEF for some months. Artillery intelligence reports from the time of the

German withdrawal noted that hostile artillery action had been ‘slightly above normal’, with the German artillery employing all calibres of guns. Other artillery intelligence reports noted that ‘the principal weapon appears to have been the

10.5cm gun’, and that positions occupied by less mobile heavier guns appear to have been vacated and were occupied by more mobile batteries of ‘smaller

74 Artillery Intelligence 13/349, 23 February 1917, AWM25. 75 First Anzac Heavy Artillery Counter Battery Weekly Intelligence Summary, 31 January 1917, AWM26, 117/10.

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calibre’ guns.76 German artillery remained active, although as the withdrawal drew closer, the Germans used heavier artillery, which could fire at longer ranges to enable them to withdraw their field artillery to intermediate positions along their lines of withdrawal.77 Once the field artillery had established itself in these intermediate locations, German heavy artillery withdrew to new positions behind the Hindenburg Line.78 Once the withdrawal was underway, artillery intelligence reports noted that there were increases in shelling from heavier guns, which had now been successfully withdrawn to new positions behind the

Hindenburg Line and had longer range, while there was a noticeable decrease in shelling from smaller caliber, most likely because they were still being withdrawn into their new positions behind the new front line.79

While changes in the pattern of activity for the enemy artillery were reported, the Intelligence Staff failed to connect these changes with the start of the German withdrawal. It was unfortunate that the connection between the types of shelling and the German intentions was not drawn before the withdrawal commenced.

The Australians eventually arrived at the Hindenburg Line where an attempt would be made to force a way through the line at Bullecourt.80 An assessment produced by I ANZAC Corps indicated that a large amount of artillery would be required to support an attack on the Hindenburg Line, including field guns and howitzers for wire cutting and bombardment tasks, as well as heavy

76 First Anzac Corps Report on operations for week ending 8 a.m. 9.3.17, 9 March 1917, AWM26, 152/6. 77 Fifth Army Intelligence Summary March 1917 No:344, 12 March 1917, TNA, WO157/208. 78 Fifth Army Intelligence Summary March 1917 No:347, 15 March 1917, TNA, WO157/208. 79 Weekly Summary of Operations for Period 8 a.m. 9th March to 8 a.m. 16th March, 16 March 1917, AWM26, 152/6. 80 Note on the Hindenburg Line, 1 April 1917, AWM26, 152/7.

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artillery for counter-battery tasks.81 This was one of the first mentions of the need for counter-battery support to an Australian operation, which reflected the lessons learned by the Australians the year before on the Somme.

I ANZAC Corps intelligence noted that the Germans had placed artillery ranging marks forward of the new defensive line, and that they had probably reconnoitered the area and ranged artillery onto locations that could be used for observation posts or as jumping off positions for attacks. This demonstrates the

Australians’ growing appreciation for the power of German defensive artillery barrages.82 As it began planning for the attack, I ANZAC Corps also noted that ‘we are somewhat in doubt as to the enemy’s intentions and the disposition of his guns’, reflecting the fact that the artillery intelligence picture of the Hindenburg

Line was incomplete. Artillery intelligence collection methods, aerial reconnaissance, aerial photographs, sound ranging, and flash spotting all needed time to build up an accurate picture of the enemy guns. Fifth Army’s rush to attack the Hindenburg Line denied the Australians the time necessary to develop an artillery intelligence picture required to support an attack on a heavily fortified and well defended area.

To obtain the information required, the Australians conducted a number of artillery attacks, combined with machine gun barrages, to observe the enemy reaction and to draw fire from enemy guns.83 The German defensive positions were well sited, usually on the reverse slopes, and it was difficult for artillery observers to identify many of their targets. It was also difficult for the artillery to complete tasks such as wire cutting. By the time some of the medium and heavy

81 Notes on Future Operations, 31 March 1917, AWM26, 152/7. 82 Enemy Ranging Marks, 31 March 1917, AWM26, 152/7. 83 I Anzac Corps Operations S1915, 7 April 1917, AWM26, 152/7.

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guns finally caught up with the advance, many of the German batteries had still not been identified.84 The inability of observers to determine the effectiveness of the artillery meant that, in many instances, the Australians were forced to send out patrols to attempt to confirm the effect of wire-cutting work.85

The 4th Division launched the first attack on the Hindenburg Line on 11

April 1917. Inaccurate reports about the attack and confusion about the position of the attacking Australians meant that artillery support was withheld for fear of firing on friendly troops. German counter-attacks supported by artillery eventually forced the Australians out of the Hindenburg Line with heavy losses.86

The 2nd Division attacked again on 3 May 1917, after extensive preparations.

The heavy artillery available to support the attack had almost doubled, and ammunition for the guns was plentiful. In the two weeks leading up to the attack, heavy artillery conducted an extensive campaign of counter-battery fire against the German guns. Despite detailed planning and preparation, German artillery fire was still effective and German guns fired on the Australian artillery, disrupting the barrage, while German strong-points that had not been destroyed or neutralised were able to impede the progress of the infantry.87 The battle ended a fortnight later on 17 May 1917, with the Australians still in possession of a section of the Hindenburg Line but having suffered nearly 7,000 casualties.88

Messines — 1917

The first major attack of 1917 in which counter-battery fire played a key role

84 Horner, The Gunners, pp.140–141. 85 First Anzac Corps Operations S1915, 7 April 1917, AWM26, 152/7. 86 Horner, The Gunners, p.141. 87 Ibid., pp.145–146. 88 Ibid., p.146.

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from the outset of planning was the offensive at Arras/Vimy Ridge. Following the lessons learned on the Somme the previous year, a thorough plan was developed to prevent German artillery from interfering with the attack.89 Artillery was earmarked solely for counter-battery fire and plans were made to reinforce the counter-battery guns by switching guns from bombardment tasks to support the counter-battery fight if required. Conversely, guns allocated to counter-battery work were not permitted to be switched to bombardment tasks when not being used to engage enemy batteries and instead were held ready to engage German guns as they might appear on the battlefield.90

Reconnaissance was thorough and there was a large amount of artillery intelligence available about the location of German batteries. Artillery planning followed the new artillery doctrine with counter-battery groups targeting isolated batteries for destruction in the days leading up to the offensive, while larger concentrations of guns were engaged closer to the battle, and instead of attempting to destroy them, counter-battery fire attempted to neutralise them.91

The biggest problem for the counter-battery effort was locating new or hidden enemy guns. British artillery fired on roads and junctions to interdict the movement of German artillery and it was accepted that not all enemy guns would be located before the battle commenced. Counter-battery artillery held in reserve was quickly able to bring fire onto guns that revealed themselves after the attack had commenced in order to prevent them from interfering with the attack.92 At Vimy Ridge, two hundred and twelve German guns were identified

89 Marble, British Artillery on the Western Front, p.177. 90 Ibid. 91 Ibid., p.178. 92 Ibid.

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and counter-battery fire accounted for eighty-three per cent of the German guns.

While the Germans did fire a defensive barrage when the attack commenced, the counter-battery efforts were so successful that Germans guns fell silent after twenty minutes.93

The next major BEF attack of 1917 was the Second Army’s assault on

Messines Ridge. Messines Ridge had been held by the Germans since 1914 and was heavily fortified. Preparations for an attack at Messines had commenced much earlier in 1915, with the construction of a series of twenty-four underground mines which were pushed forward from the British front lines underneath the German positions on the ridgeline. The mines would be detonated as a prelude to an offensive to capture Messines. Second Army would attack with three corps. The British X Corps would attack on the northern side of the salient, the British IX Corps would attack in the centre and was tasked with capturing the village of Wytschatete, and the II ANZAC Corps would attack in the south and was to capture the village of Messines.94 The attack at Messines was the largest underground mining operation of the war with over a million pounds of explosives fired at the beginning of the battle.95

Second Army had been in location around Messines and Ypres since the beginning of the war and had amassed detailed knowledge about the German units opposite. This knowledge, combined with the lessons learnt on the Somme and vindicated by the approach that had proven so successful in neutralising enemy guns during the attack at Arras/Vimy Ridge, meant that a detailed

93 Ibid. 94 Ian Passingham, Pillars of Fire: the Battle of Messines Ridge June 1917, (Stroud, Sutton Publishing, 1998), pp.34–38. 95 Marble, British Artillery on the Western Front, p.183.

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counter-battery plan was developed to support the attack.96 Artillery intelligence was key and every effort was made to locate and identify every German gun and mortar at Messines. IX Corps and II ANZAC Corps, both of whom had been in the front lines around Messines for some time before the attack, knew the locations of the German guns and their patterns of activity well.97

Nearly thirty per cent of the total British artillery available at Messines was dedicated to counter-battery work, which was employed in a continuous and methodical manner in the lead-up to the attack. On the front to be attacked, the British allocated one counter-battery gun for every German gun that had been located, while German guns located on the flanks of the attack and which could fire into the battle area, were allocated one counter-battery gun for every four German guns.98 A record number of counter-battery ‘shoots’ were fired by the Second Army before the attack, and counter-battery fire continued once the battle had commenced. The results of Second Army’s meticulous planning were

‘excellent, perhaps the acme of destructive CB in 1917’.99

Although the II ANZAC Corps had been involved in trench raids and minor attacks, Messines was to be its first major battle. II ANZAC Corps used RFC aircraft, balloons, and ground observers as well as flash spotting and sound ranging sections to collect intelligence on the enemy artillery across the corps front.100 As the attack approached, the frequency of counter-battery planning meetings increased, with conferences being held daily. The frequency of artillery

96 Marble, British Artillery on the Western Front, p.183; Strong and Marble, Artillery in the Great War, pp.133–134. 97 Marble, British Artillery on the Western Front, p.184. 98 Ibid., p.185. 99 Ibid. 100 Outline of Intelligence Arrangements for Offensive, 16 May 1917, AWM26, 187/13.

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intelligence reports, along with lists of enemy batteries and accompanying maps, also increased as the attack approached, until they were also being issued daily.101 The counter-battery battle began on 4 May 1917, systematically engaging German guns whose locations had been well established in the lead-up to the battle. For the attack, II ANZAC Corps was allocated four heavy artillery groups, in all an extra one hundred and sixty-eight guns, in addition to its own organic artillery.102 Heavy artillery engaged in series of destructive counter- battery shoots supported by aerial observers, both aircraft and balloon, and field survey units.

Army artillery instructions for the attack stated that ‘the upper hand must be gained by vigorous and controlled counter-battery work’.103 Discussions about the location of enemy batteries, changes in the enemy’s gun positions and patterns of behavior, construction of new gun positions and the use of camouflage, and coordination between intelligence staff and artillery reconnaissance officers, helped to ensure that every aspect of the counter- battery battle had been considered. Second Army orders reminded corps that it was necessary for heavy artillery to concentrate on German gun positions and that destructive fire should continue on enemy gun positions until confirmation had been received that destruction or another satisfactory result had been achieved.104

Attempts by the Germans to keep some of their guns hidden were defeated by counter-battery bombardments fired as boxes around areas

101 Ibid. 102 Horner, The Gunners, p.147. 103 Conditions to be fulfilled before the attack can be launched, May 1917, AWM26, 193/29. 104 Second Army Memorandum G.963, 5 May 1917, AWM26, 85/1.

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assessed as likely battery locations.105 In addition to being allocated a large amount of heavy artillery for counter-battery shoots, as at Arras/Vimy, all heavy artillery that could be spared from specific bombardment tasks was allocated to the CBSO for use in counter-battery work.106 The corps RFC squadron was instructed to maintain two aircraft on patrol to support counter-battery work, with a further three aircraft to be available for registration and other artillery support tasks.107 Counter-battery fire conducted before the attack utilised HE rounds, with orders noting that the use of gas shells would be reserved for neutralisation tasks once the attack had commenced.108 Plans for the attack included pushing forward flash spotting groups to provide artillery intelligence,

RFC reconnaissance flights, and artillery spotting missions. 109

An active counter-battery policy was maintained in the lead up to the attack, and destructive counter-battery work continued with the aim of inflicting casualties on the enemy guns, forcing them to relocate or to return fire, thereby assisting British artillery intelligence units to locate them.110 Second Army identified that German artillery around Wytschaete had been reinforced towards the end of May 1917 by another ten batteries, and noted that several new gun positions had been identified but not yet occupied.111 When the preliminary bombardment for the attack commenced on 3 June 1917, counter-battery operations increased in tempo. Artillery intelligence estimated that some fifty

105 Oldham, Messines Ridge, pp.65–66. 106 2nd Anzac Corps Magnum Opus Artillery Instructions for the Attack, 25 May 1917, AWM26, 191/4. 107 Ibid. 108 Second Army Operation Order No. 1, 10 May 1917, AWM26, 85/1; Second Army Intelligence Outline of Intelligence Arrangements for Offensive, 16 May 1917, TNA, WO157/114. 109 Second Army Operation Order No.1 Artillery Plan, 10 May 1917, AWM26, 191/3. 110 Ibid. 111 Second Army Summary of Intelligence 15th to 31st May 1917, 31 May 1917, AWM26, 187/14.

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enemy batteries were active in the area to be attacked and that the Germans had brought in additional heavy guns.112 Prisoners later reported that counter- battery operations had been effective in destroying a number of German guns and disrupting communications between forward observers, front line troops, and the guns themselves.113

The attack opened with the detonation of nineteen mines under the

German front line, along with a massed artillery barrage. Counter-battery artillery targeted not only the enemy guns, but also observation posts, headquarters, and communication links. The enemy defensive barrage was described as ‘nowhere heavy’, with most enemy artillery fire coming from gun batteries located along the flanks of the attack. The counter-battery program had been so effective that most of the enemy batteries immediately east of

Wytschaete had been withdrawn or destroyed.114 By mid-morning the attacking troops held the enemy trenches along the ridgeline and had captured the remains of Messines and Wytschaete. A five hour pause followed while artillery moved forward to occupy new positions, and then a further advance was made to capture the final objective. By mid-afternoon, the Oosttaverne Line had been captured and a German counter-attack launched from north of Messines had been defeated.115 Further counter-attacks which were also defeated were launched on the evening of 7 June followed by a much stronger counter-attack on the evening of 8 June that included a heavy artillery bombardment.

112 Second Army Daily Intelligence Summary No.687, 5 June 1917, TNA, WO157/115. 113 Information obtained from Prisoners, 9 June 1917, AWM26, 188/1. 114 Second Army Summary of Intelligence 1st to 15th June 1917, 15 June 1917, AWM26, 188/2. 115 The Battle of Messines, 7 June 1917, AWM26, 187/11.

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For II ANZAC Corps, the counter-battery battle at Messines was a resounding success, and German artillery was unable to interfere with the attack.

Its first objectives were captured quickly, although German resistance stiffened, with the fight for the second series of objectives being much tougher but equally successful.116 While Second Army was responsible for much of the planning and orchestration of the counter-battery effort, the outcomes of the battle demonstrated how effective counter-battery operations could be when they were based upon detailed and accurate artillery intelligence.

The third battle of Ypres

The next major BEF attack was at Ypres when the Fifth Army attacked out of the

Ypres salient towards Roulers, seven weeks after the Second Army’s successful attack at Messines.117 The delay between attacks allowed the Germans to strengthen their defences and bring up additional artillery which could fire into the Ypres salient. This complicated the counter-battery task and additional time was required to locate, identify, and engage the German guns. The congested

Ypres salient was an ideal target for German gunners, who could fire into the salient with a reasonable expectation of causing casualties. Harassing fire, the use of gas, interdiction of routes into the salient, and night bombing all served to make the British task of defeating the German artillery even harder.118

Fierce counter-battery battles took place in the lead-up to the opening attack as the Germans attempted to respond to the growing British artillery dominance and both British and German artillery suffered heavy casualties. Both

116 Horner, The Gunners, pp.148–149. 117 Marble, British Artillery on the Western Front, pp.187–188. 118 Ibid.

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sides replaced their losses and continued the artillery battle, seeking to gain the upper hand. The Fifth Army had won the counter-battery fight by the time the infantry attacked on 31 July 1917.119 British artillery also targeted roads, railways, and the areas around enemy gun positions to prevent guns from being relocated or to prevent more ammunition from being brought forward. Continual firing by British guns eventually destroyed half of the German heavy guns and a quarter of the available field artillery, and forced the withdrawal of the remaining German artillery out of the range of British guns.120

As had occurred on the Somme, British guns destroyed the Germans’ physical defences, leaving defensive barrages and infantry counter-attacks as the only means available to the Germans to defend their positions. Despite the counter-battery effort, the opening day of the battle failed to achieve the same success that the attacks at Vimy Ridge and Messines had achieved. The Germans held on to key terrain and launched counter-attacks to recapture vital ground that had been lost. In an attempt to generate high operational tempo, the Fifth

Army attempted to attack every two or three days, which allowed insufficient time for operational planning. The supremacy of British artillery in the counter- battery battle was eroded as guns were diverted away from counter-battery fire to bombardment tasks. Terrain and weather also played a part in slowing the infantry and tank attacks, as the ‘Flanders mud’ caused the battle to bog down.121

By the end of August 1917, GHQ had handed control of the battle over to Second

Army.

119 Marble, British Artillery on the Western Front, p.188; Strong and Marble, Artillery in the Great War, pp.135–137. 120 Marble, British Artillery on the Western Front, p.190. 121 Ibid., p. 191.

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Second Army paused operations and began again with a more methodical approach to the battle. Second Army re-emphasised the importance of counter- battery fire and adopted a slower tempo of operations, attacking each week.122

Second Army’s ‘bite and hold’ strategy aimed at capturing enemy ground and holding it against counter-attacks that would follow.123 Second Army planned to dominate German artillery, which had been effective in breaking up many of the attacks launched by the Fifth Army. Counter-battery instructions noted that

‘hostile batteries will be systematically destroyed by observed fire from the air or ground’. Isolating fire was to be carried out ‘day and night’ along the whole of the Second Army front to prevent movement along any approach route. Machine- gun emplacements and strong points were to be ‘bombarded by Heavy Artillery using delay fuzes’, telephone exchanges were ‘to be destroyed and all hostile

OP’s were to be destroyed not later than two days before the attack’.124

Additional sound ranging bases were established by the FSC and observation groups were relocated to improve the collection of artillery intelligence.125

Enemy artillery was described as ‘very active’, with shelling being directed at approaches and front line troops. German artillery also attempted to conduct counter-battery operations against British artillery.126

It was not until 20 September 1917 that the Australians were committed to the third battle of Ypres at Menin Road.127 As had been the case in the lead-up

122 Ibid., p.192. 123 Marble, British Artillery on the Western Front, p.192; Strong and Marble, Artillery in the Great War, pp.139–140. 124 Second Army Artillery Instructions No.2, 2 September1917, AWM26, 273/16. 125 Progress of Intelligence Preparations for September Offensive, 8 September 1917, AWM26, 209/3. 126 First Anzac Corps Intelligence, 2 September 1917, AWM26, 221/6. 127 Horner, The Gunners, p.155.

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to the attack at Messines, Second Army was methodical in the manner in which it sought to locate enemy guns and each corps was allocated areas of responsibility for counter-battery activity, while a deeper counter-battery battle was conducted directly by Second Army.128 Artillery intelligence reports noted that in

I ANZAC Corps area ‘field guns have not been in evidence’ while ‘high velocity guns are fairly numerous and are placed both singly and in batteries’. The most important counter-battery target was identified as a ‘group of 11 positions behind Hollebosch Wood’.129 Sound ranging and flash spotting units were deployed as close as possible to identify enemy gun batteries, while RFC aircraft were used to conduct counter-battery shoots whenever weather permitted.

Where aerial observers were unavailable due to weather or at night, I ANZAC

Corps conducted programs of synchronised fire to ‘search’ areas such as Polygon

Wood for enemy guns believed to be firing from these locations.130 At zero hour on the opening day of the attack at Menin Road, thirty-three hostile batteries positions were subjected to neutralising fire based on artillery intelligence about positions most likely to be active and firing on the assault. As observers reported no fire from these positions, heavy artillery allocated to counter-battery tasks moved onto new targets, which included a number of hostile batteries that began firing from ‘hitherto unknown positions’.131

Intelligence collected as the battle progressed noted that several concentrations of enemy guns had dispersed and occupied new positions on the flanks of the attacks. I ANZAC Corps counter-battery staff quickly brought fire

128 Second Army Reconnaissance Photographic Area, 2 September 1917, AWM26, 209/5. 129 1st Anzac Corps Counter Battery Area, 8 September 1917, AWM26, 224/8. 130 1st Anzac Corps Counter Battery Report from 6 p.m. 18.9.17 to 6 p.m. 19.9.17, 19 September 1917, AWM26, 224/11. 131 Counter Battery 1st Anzac Corps, 20 September 1917, AWM26, 224/11.

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onto these locations, coordinating the fire with neighbouring corps where targets fell outside the I ANZAC Corps counter-battery area. Observers reported

‘numerous explosions and fires, in or near battery positions’. Successful counter- battery efforts forced the Germans to scatter their guns over a wide area, making it hard for the enemy to concentrate their fire, but at the same time minimising the effectiveness of neutralising British fire.132

After the successful attack at Menin Road, the Second Army paused for a week, to allow time for guns and other equipment to be moved into position before launching its next attack to capture Polygon Wood. The delay between the attacks allowed time for intelligence to be collected on the locations of German batteries. As with the attack at Menin Road, the German guns were subject to destructive counter-battery fire before the attack commenced. While Australian casualties were high, the attack was a complete success and all of the Australians’ objectives were captured and held. A week later, I ANZAC Corps captured

Broodseinde Ridge. As with the earlier attacks at Menin Road and Polygon Wood, the attack at Broodseinde was a complete success, although once again infantry casualties were heavy.133

The importance of artillery intelligence and counter-battery operations to the Australians was clearly demonstrated during the fighting in Flanders. Enemy guns were unable to interfere with Australian attacks, which were able to break through sophisticated German defensive positions. Despite dominating German artillery, the cost to the Australian infantry was high. Without the ability to

132 Counter Battery 1st Anzac Corps, 20 September 1917, AWM26, 224/11. 133 Horner, The Gunners, p.159.

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neutralise the enemy guns it is doubtful whether any of these attacks would have succeeded.

Cambrai and the future

While the I and II ANZAC Corps played no part in the last major battle of 1917, the British attack at Cambrai, it demonstrated the level of technical competence that the Royal Artillery had reached and the critical role that artillery intelligence would play in the major battles of 1918. Accurate artillery survey meant that gun positions could now be prepared in advance and readied for British guns to occupy shortly before an attack was due to commence.134 British guns could now fire accurately without the need for preliminary registration, meaning that artillery barrages could support surprise attacks. Surprise meant there would be little opportunity for the Germans to move infantry or artillery reinforcements into the area to prepare for an attack.

Counter-battery fire in surprise attacks was devoted entirely to neutralising German artillery as the attack began, so the need for artillery intelligence to locate enemy guns was essential.135 At Cambrai, there were only thirty-four German guns facing the main assault, while the British had 1,003 guns available. Two-thirds of these were devoted to counter-battery fire, a ratio that would continue to be used for the remainder of the war. It was not just

German guns that were neutralised as part of the counter-battery effort, instead,

British artillery concentrated on disrupting all of the components of the German artillery system. Observation posts were shelled to disrupt their activities or

134 Marble, British Artillery on the Western Front, pp.198–199; Strong and Marble, Artillery in the Great War, p.148. 135 Marble, British Artillery on the Western Front, p.199.

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blinded using smoke. Telephone exchanges and headquarters were shelled to disrupt command and control. Anti-tank guns were given high priority, with RFC aircraft and ground observers being instructed to locate and engage them with dedicated counter-battery artillery. German guns also received a mix of HE and gas shells designed to reduce their effectiveness and achieve maximum neutralisation.136

Counter-battery fire was highly effective on the opening day of the battle, but as the British advanced, information about enemy artillery became less and less certain and the counter-battery effort fell back on the old barrage tactics which had been used previously. Poor weather kept the RFC from flying, while flash spotting and sound ranging units did not move forward and establish themselves on the newly-won ground. The lack of artillery intelligence meant that the British were surprised by the German counter-attack at Cambrai and were unable to respond effectively.137 If the BEF was to take the offensive in the future, it needed to learn how to extend the reach of its artillery intelligence to ensure that repeats of Cambrai did not occur.

Defeat and victory in 1918

By the beginning of 1918, it was clear that the Germans lacked the heavy artillery to mount simultaneous attacks. The British and the French were also aware that

Germany had moved many of the divisions previously engaged in fighting the

Russians over to the west and that a major German offensive was likely to

136 Ibid., p.200. 137 Marble, British Artillery on the Western Front, p.201; Strong and Marble, Artillery in the Great War, pp.151–152.

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launched.138 Identifiying concentrations of German heavy guns was essential in pinpointing the location where the Germans planned to attack, and would allow the British and French to pre-position resources to blunt or stop an attack once it commenced.139

The CBSO system had been proven to work in 1917 and was left unchanged in preparation for the fighting of 1918. Counter-battery staff now had a better ‘feel’ for the manner in which the Germans used their artillery and could read ‘signs’ that indicated that German guns were being used in a defensive or offensive manner.140 The Germans also exhibited patterns of activity that provided a clear indication of an impending attack. Firing rates rose as newly arrived gun batteries familiarised themselves with the area, then decreased as orders to restrain activity to avoid raising suspicion were issued. While the

Germans had the capability to calibrate their guns and fire without the need for registration, they did not entirely trust this method and inevitably fired a few registration rounds. These patterns of activity meant that counter-battery staff could obtain valuable intelligence about the intentions of the Germans opposite them.141

Despite knowing what to look for, British military intelligence failed to identify that the first blow of the German offensive would fall on the Fifth Army, and no artillery reinforcements were sent to assist. The Germans successfully pinpointed British artillery positions and bombarded them with gas, reducing the effectiveness of the gunners. Mist and fog, combined with German shelling,

138 Marble, British Artillery on the Western Front, p. 207. 139 Ibid., pp. 210–211. 140 Ibid., p. 211. 141 Marble, British Artillery on the Western Front, p. 212; Strong and Marble, Artillery in the Great War, pp.164–166.

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disrupted communications and there was little artillery support for the infantry and no centralised counter-battery or counter-preparation fire.

The BEF’s counter-battery infrastructure collapsed as communications were destroyed and artillery intelligence units were forced to retreat along with headquarters and front line units. Without targets, counter-battery artillery could do little to respond. The ponderous size of many of the heavy guns meant that they could not be withdrawn and many guns were captured. Even when they were in action, the lack of artillery intelligence meant that the heavy guns often lacked targets and the gunners were forced to return to engaging only targets which could be observed by FOOs.142

The lessons of 21 March 1918 were not lost on the British, however, and the next German offensive launched at the Third Army along the Scarpe was stopped largely by British artillery fire, with the attacking Germans entering the

British front lines in a few places only to be quickly ejected again. Another

German offensive launched at Ypres and across the River Lys made some headway. While the BEF was forced to withdraw guns and troops once the

Germans had managed to create a hole in the front lines, the offensive failed to achieved the results of their earlier March attack. By May 1918, German efforts had been redirected against the French on the Aisne, and after the German attacks had been blunted both sides paused.

In June 1918, the BEF was ready to take the offensive again and launched some minor attacks to improve positions along the front line as a step towards a larger offensive. Counter-battery work was a high priority for these attacks and

142 Marble, British Artillery on the Western Front, pp.219–222.

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an aggressive counter-battery policy was maintained. Once the Australians had settled into positions around Amiens, this policy was embraced. Australian Corps counter-battery policy stated that ‘any hostile battery which is seen active and can be ranged should immediately be engaged for destruction’.143 Once a destructive shoot had been completed, the Australian Heavy Artillery continued to engage the hostile battery position, which was to be ‘subjected to harassing fire at intervals throughout the day, and especially during the hours of darkness’.144

Hamel — 1918

When the Australians attacked at Hamel, two-thirds of the available artillery was dedicated to counter-battery work. As with the attack at Cambrai, no registration took place before the attack in order to preserve surprise. In the lead-up to the attack at Hamel, weekly artillery intelligence summaries noted that ‘artillery had been quiet compared with previous weeks’ and reported that the Germans had three hundred and ninety-seven guns which could fire on the

Australian Corps area.145 Aerial photographs identified suspected headquarters, ammunition dumps, mortar positions and gun emplacements, as well as tracks and roads that were in use by enemy artillery units.146 The artillery plan for the attack at Hamel placed nine brigades of heavy artillery under the control of the

CBSO in the preparatory phase of the operation to conduct destructive counter-

143 Counter Battery Australian Corps Heavy Artillery Instructions No.18, 27 April 1918, AWM26, 364/4. 144 Ibid. 145 Counter Battery Australian Corps H.A. Weekly Intelligence Summary 3 p.m. 19/6/18 to 3 p.m 26/6/18, 26 June 1918, AWM26, 364/11. 146 Australian Corps Heavy Artillery Notes from Photographs and Intelligence No.17, 18 June 1918, AWM26, 364/11.

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battery shoots.147 Sound ranging sections and flash spotting groups were deployed along the Australian Corps front to locate enemy guns, supported by kite balloons and RAF reconnaissance flights.148 A total of ninety-three hostile batteries or hostile battery locations were identified as part of the intelligence planning for the attack.149

Counter-battery targets were engaged from zero until plus 150’ (one hundred and fifty minutes after the attack started) at varying rates and counter- battery orders noted that batteries engaging enemy targets would search ‘at least 50 yards each way and sweep at least 25 yards’ around targets to ensure that enemy guns were effectively dealt with.150 Large quantities of gas shells were used to neutralise enemy guns. Heavy artillery orders stated that ‘6” Hows will use gas unless otherwise ordered, opening with a burst of LETHAL, and continuing with LACHRYMATOR.’ Guns firing HE rounds were to use instantaneous fuses and twenty-five per cent or greater of HE rounds were to be shrapnel — a lethal combination of effects that would kill many German gunners and prevent them from firing on the attack at Hamel.151

Importantly, several of the Heavy Artillery Brigades were superimposed on areas being fired on by other heavy artillery units enabling them to respond quickly to calls for fire when hostile enemy batteries appeared that had not been previously identified. FOOs, balloon observers and supporting AFC and RAF aircraft were authorised to engage ‘at once hostile batteries seen active’.152

147 Counter Battery – Australian Corps H.A. Operation Order No.7, 1 July 1918, AWM26. 148 Artillery Instructions No.208 by G.O.C.R.A. Australian Corps, 3 February 1918, TNA, WO95/994. 149 Counter Battery – Australian Corps H.A. Operation Order – No.7, 1 July 1918, AWM26, 365/14. 150 Ibid. 151 Ibid. 152 Counter Battery — Australian Corps H.A Operation Order — No.7, 1 July 1918, AWM26, 365/14.

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Enemy artillery around Hamel in late June 1918 was described as active, and an increase in enemy activity was reported in intelligence summaries.

Enemy guns frequently fired heavy concentrations of gas and HE shells at areas occupied by the Australians or into the Australian rear areas.153 Reports from 1 and 2 July 1918 noted enemy shelling was ‘lighter’ on forward areas, although concentrations of gas shells were still being fired into rear areas.154

When the attack began early on 4 July 1918, the German artillery was

‘practically silenced’ during the attack and there was only a limited response from the German guns, allowing the attacking infantry to secure their objectives with only minor losses.155 The successful approach adopted at Hamel was replicated by the Australians during the remainder of their battles in 1918.

Initially slow to understand the importance of counter-battery operations and the artillery intelligence that underpinned them, by the wars end the

Australians had demonstrated a degree of mastery in using artillery intelligence and incorporating it into their operational planning. The impact of artillery on the fighting at ANZAC undoubtedly coloured the Australians’ views about the effectiveness of artillery, and their initial experiences in France had done little to improve their understanding of the power of enemy artillery. Like much of the

BEF, it was not until they joined the fighting on the Somme in 1916 that the

Australians gained a true appreciation of the need for effective counter-battery fire. Throughout the fighting of 1917, the Australians demonstrated a growing understanding of the importance of counter-battery work and the need for

153 Fourth Australian Division — Intelligence Summary No.299 From 6 a.m. 29th to 6 a.m. 30th June 1918, 30 June 1918, AWM26, 408/5. 154 Fourth Australian Division — Intelligence Summary No.301 From 6 a.m. 1st to 6 a.m. 2nd July 1918, 2 July 1918, AWM26, 408/5. 155 Smith, Do Unto Others, p.124.

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artillery intelligence. By the time of Hamel, counter-battery work and the collection of artillery intelligence had become a routine part of the Australian

Corps operations, and artillery intelligence was a critical component in all operational planning.

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Chapter 6. Captured documents and enemy material

Captured enemy documents were identified in pre-war doctrine as important sources of intelligence. For the intelligence staff, even the smallest fragment of a document could yield insights into the enemy’s activity, the situation behind the lines or back in Germany itself. Diaries, letters and postcards might be just as valuable as copies of enemy orders or maps. Documents were captured under a variety of different circumstances. Some were obtained from prisoners captured on the battlefield, others were taken during trench raids or were found by advancing troops searching enemy positions after their capture. Searching prisoners and enemy positions for documents became an important and structured task for intelligence personnel as the war progressed. The value of documents captured on enemy personnel or in enemy positions also served as an important warning to the British Army about the need to ensure that similar intelligence was not provided to the enemy.1 The First World War was also a war in which technology evolved rapidly, and new weapons found their way onto the battlefield with increasing regularity. Often British troops only became aware of a new enemy weapon when it was used against them in battle for the first time.

To understand the effectiveness and impact of these new weapons, samples needed to be collected and examined by technical experts. It was only through the examination of captured enemy weapons that counter-measures could be developed. More mundane items taken from the battlefield, such as enemy rations, were also useful in providing an understanding of the state of the enemy

1 For captured documents, see General Staff (Intelligence), 'SS 151 — Information from Captured Documents' (1917); General Staff (Intelligence), 'SS 568 — Extracts No.8 from German Documents and Correspondence' (1917).

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war effort.2 This chapter examines the importance of captured enemy documents and equipment as a source of intelligence and how the Australians collected and used intelligence derived from captured documents and equipment in their battle planning process.

Pre-war doctrine and the opening days of the war

Pre-war doctrine identified captured documents as an important source of information about the enemy and his activities. Dealing with captured documents was considered in both Field Intelligence: Its Principles and Practice and Regulations for Intelligence Duties in the Field 1904. Field Intelligence stated that the task of examining captured documents was a ‘laborious task but not a difficult one’. The role of the intelligence staff was to ensure that captured documents were translated, where necessary, before being examined to determine which papers were considered to be of ‘immediate importance’. Those documents containing useful information being ‘marked and registered’ and passed to those branches of the army or headquarters ‘to whom the information is likely to be useful’.3

Pre-war doctrine suggested that a single document could be dealt with easily and required no special system, but where large quantities of documents were captured, a system of collating and interpreting captured documents was vital to ensure that information of immediate importance was identified.4

Intelligence Duties in the Field noted that the processing of captured documents

2 For captured enemy material, see General Staff (Intelligence), 'SS 647 — List of German Material Required for Inspection' (1918); General Staff (Intelligence), 'SS 782 — List of German Material Required for Inspection' (1918). 3 War Office General Staff, Field Intelligence, p.19. 4 Ibid.

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required their examination by ‘staff officers for intelligence duties’ to determine their value. The acquisition of captured documents was to be notified to the

Director of Military Intelligence (DMI) who would determine whether further examination was required and to whom the documents should be passed.5

Once the war began, one of the earliest tasks for officers selected to join the newly formed Intelligence Corps was the translation of captured documents.

Almost all of the officers selected to joined the Intelligence Corps at the beginning of the war were linguists, which made them invaluable in examining captured enemy documents. The examination of captured documents taken from prisoners or captured during raids or attacks would remain an important source of intelligence and an important function of the Intelligence Corps throughout the war.6

Conversely, there are no references in any of the pre-war doctrine about the value of enemy equipment as a source of intelligence. The British Army assumed that any future conflicts to be fought in Europe would be of short duration and fought with the weapons that were available at the time the conflict began. Studies of the German Army undertaken before the war included information about the types of weapons in use by all branches of the German

Army. Knowledge about enemy weapons and capabilities was compiled by the

Intelligence Staff to understand the types of equipment a potential adversary

(Germany) would take to war, but almost no observers anticipated a war that would stretch on for four years, with both sides continually seeking

5 War Office General Staff, Regulations for Intelligence Duties in the Field, p.17. 6 Anthony Clayton, Forearmed: A History of the Intelligence Corps (London, Brassey's, 1993), pp.17–18; Jock Haswell, British Military Intelligence (London, Willmer Brothers Limited, 1973), p.138.

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technological advantages over the other as a way of breaking the deadlock that existed on the Western Front.

The emergence of an intelligence system

As with many other types of front line intelligence, the Second Army played a significant role in the development of many of the intelligence processes that were adopted by the BEF.7 As units passed through Second Army, which controlled the ‘nursery sector’, they adopted many of the practices and procedures established by Second Army for the collection, processing, and dissemination of intelligence, including procedures for dealing with captured enemy documents and equipment. Second Army intelligence instructions noted that ‘experience has proved that intelligence derived from documents is second only in value to that derived from the actual examination of prisoners. Too much stress cannot be laid on the importance of the rapid and systematic examination of every single document captured.’8

The processes for examining captured documents developed in parallel with the processes for examining enemy prisoners. Prisoners were an important source of documents and the processes for examining prisoners are dealt with more fully in Chapter 11. In instructions issued in March 1916, Second Army set out the procedure to be used by its formations to examine captured documents.

Second Army directed that enemy documents be collected at Corps Headquarters where they were to be examined to determine their importance.9 This approach was consistent with the practices set down in pre-war doctrine. Once an initial

7 Clayton, Forearmed, pp.26–42 8 Instructions for Intelligence Duties Second Army, 10 June 1916, AWM25, 423/2/92. 9 Instructions for Intelligence Duties Second Army, 28 March 1916, AWM25, 423/2/30.

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examination of the documents was completed they were then forwarded to

Army Headquarters for translation. In June 1916, Second Army’s orders were refined with Corps Headquarters being ordered to sort captured enemy documents and send only ‘those of any importance to Army Headquarters’.10

Where possible, documents were to be kept together with the prisoners from which they were obtained, as this would allow intelligence officers involved in examining captives to question the prisoners about information contained in the document if required.11

It was recognised that two or three intelligence officers may need to be dedicated to the task of examining documents, but intelligence instructions emphasised that ‘time so spent will seldom be wasted’.12 The importance of information contained in captured enemy documents was determined by a range of factors, including whether they contained information of immediate tactical importance, possibly requiring the immediate examination of a prisoner; identification of units or formations previously unidentified or about whose movements information was particularly required; documents concerning movements of troops or equipment; official documents and diaries; documents which contained information which appeared to disagree with information contained in the British military intelligence manual ‘The German Forces in the

Field’; and letters or other documents which spoke about economic or social issues. Where captured documents contained information of immediate tactical importance they were referred immediately to intelligence officers responsible for examining prisoners to enable intelligence officers to confirm the veracity of

10 Instructions for Intelligence Duties Second Army, 10 June 1916, AWM25, 423/2/92. 11 Instructions for Intelligence Duties Second Army, 28 March 1916, AWM25, 423/2/30. 12 Instructions for Intelligence Duties Second Army, 10 June 1916, AWM25, 423/2/92.

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the information, while information about the identification of new units was sent immediately to army headquarters.13

During periods of trench warfare, obtaining enemy documents for examination by the intelligence staff was the responsibility of front line troops.

Orders for dealing with EPW noted the importance of preventing captured enemies from disposing of any documents that may be in their possession to ensure they arrived with the prisoner at corps POW cages for processing. In addition to prisoners, front line troops were ordered to search enemy dead to ensure that any documents in their possession were sent back for examination by intelligence staff, including removing identity discs from enemy dead to aid in identification of enemy units.14 Where attacks or raids were planned, members of the raiding force were allocated the task of searching enemy dug-outs and enemy dead to collect documents and equipment for return to the British lines for subsequent examination.15

During periods of open or mobile warfare, the British Army recognised that it would be difficult to examine captured enemy documents with the same degree of scrutiny that was available when the front line was more static. Orders noted that captured documents were to be ‘examined with as much time and care as possible to furnish information required to support current operations.

Further examinations of captured enemy documents could then take place during pauses in fighting to ensure that information was not missed or overlooked’.16

13 Instructions for Intelligence Duties Second Army, 10 June 1916, AWM25, 423/2/92. 14 Instructions for Intelligence Duties Second Army, 28 March 1916, AWM25, 423/2/30. 15 Instructions for Intelligence Duties Second Army, 10 June 1916, AWM25, 423/2/92. 16 Instructions for Intelligence Duties Second Army, 1 May 1917, AWM25.

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Training for Intelligence Officers

Intelligence Officers were taught how to examine captured documents as part of their training and about the types of information available from documents routinely captured with enemy soldiers. One of the most common documents captured with German soldiers was their ‘Soldbuch’, which contained details about their pay, rank, qualifications, and other information about the soldier.

During his training, Captain Fredrick Robinson of the 5th Division was taught that ‘enemy papers’ were broadly classified under four classes: postcards, notebooks, letters, and official papers and maps.17 Robinson’s notes state that postcards contained a range of useful information, such as details of the addressee, including their unit; the full particulars of the sender, which allowed for units to be identified and placed on the German order of battle; corrections, censors’ marks, and postmarks all provided information about the origin of the soldier’s unit and the formation to which the unit belonged; the contents of postcards occasionally yielded information about new developments at home or on the front line; and pictures provided useful details about uniforms and equipment.18 Details of the soldiers unit contained in the address were particularly valuable in aiding in the identification of new units arriving on the

Western Front.

Notebooks were frequently used as diaries or contained notes from military training courses or other tactical information. Diaries were often well kept and contained details about the soldiers life, including where his unit had

17 CAPT F.W. Robinson Intelligence Course Notes, 2 February 1917, AWM, 3DRL/3907. 18 CAPT F.W. Robinson Intelligence Course Notes, 2 February 1917, AWM, 3DRL/3907.

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been, lists of addresses, and often information about railway movements and other timetables which were extremely valuable. Notes from courses or details about British bombardments or other actions often confirmed information obtained through other sources such as aerial photography and could be used to confirm other intelligence such as secret service reporting.19 Notebooks were also valuable to intelligence officers examining prisoners as they could be used to ‘fact check’ the responses given by EPW during their examination. Letters, on the other hand, tended to be heavily censored, although occasionally they contained information of value about the economic conditions in Germany or the calling-up of particular classes of reserves for service.20

Robinson noted that when it came to ‘official papers’ it was more common to find copies of company or battalion orders and instructions which were valuable. Regimental and divisional orders were rarer, and therefore more valuable, while an army or corps order would be of great value if found.

Company rosters and information about personnel were valuable, as they provided information about enemy unit strengths, while maps showing the location of weapons and headquarters were invaluable when planning attacks on enemy positions or counter-battery operations.21

The collection of enemy weapons and equipment also yielded valuable intelligence. The process for the examination of captured enemy weapons and equipment evolved as the war progressed. Specialist intelligence personnel were critical in identifying enemy weapons and equipment collected on the battlefield.

The role of intelligence staff and technical specialists was closely linked to the

19 Ibid. 20 Ibid. 21 Ibid.

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production of intelligence about enemy weapons and equipment. Intelligence officers working in the artillery were responsible for identifying and examining

German artillery equipment. This included not only shells, fuses, and guns but also surveying equipment, artillery plotting equipment, equipment used for collecting artillery intelligence (flash spotting or sound ranging equipment), optical equipment such as range finders, and other equipment used by the

German artillery. Chemical advisers at Corps and Army Headquarters were responsible for examining and identifying new German chemical weapons, their delivery mechanisms, and new anti-gas equipment. When German tanks eventually emerged onto the battlefield, intelligence officers from the tank corps examined captured German machines to understand their capabilities. Likewise, intelligence officers serving with the RFC examined crashed and downed enemy aircraft to understand their capabilities.

In many instances, as reports emerged from front line troops of new weapons and equipment, specialist intelligence staff were required to identify whether new weapons actually existed and to order front line troops to collect samples of the equipment for examination. Once the items were obtained, they were initially sent back to specialist intelligence staff for examination. On other occasions, items of enemy equipment were captured and sent back for examination, finding their way into the hands of the appropriate specialist intelligence officer. Once enemy equipment had been examined, details were issued in intelligence reports. In some instances, reports were issued directly by

GHQ, while in other instances equipment was sent back to Britain for further examination. Importantly, all front line units played a key role in the collection of enemy equipment and benefited from intelligence that was produced as a result.

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Gallipoli — 1915

Almost immediately upon landing on Gallipoli, the Australians began to collect

Turkish documents. Documents taken from EPW and from enemy dead in the first few days of the landings included copies of Turkish orders, instructions to attack positions at Anzac and Helles, along with reports of the results of Turkish attacks on the British, Australian, New Zealand, and French positions that had been attempted. Captured documents also revealed information about the deployment of different Turkish divisions and artillery units, along with information about their orders.22

Captured enemy documents were particularly useful in helping the MEF understand the enemy organisation. Several captured documents provided information about the reorganisation of the Ottoman Army on the Gallipoli peninsula shortly before the landings and provided information about the location of the different Turkish divisions on the peninsula on the day of the landings.23 Documents captured during and shortly after the landings also helped confirm information obtained from some of the first prisoner examinations. This included information about the formation of the Turkish Fifth

Army under the command of Liman von Sanders, comprising two Corps, III Army

Corps on the Gallipoli peninsula, and XV Army Corps south of Chanakale.24 The information contained in captured enemy documents combined with other

22 Anzac Corps Intelligence Summary Translation from Turkish Divisional Order No.1, 26 May 1915, AWM25. 23 ANZAC Corps Intelligence Summary, 26 May 1915, AWM25. 24 Anzac Corps Intelligence Summary Translation from Turkish Divisional Order No.1, 26 May 1915, AWM25.

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intelligence also helped provide the intelligence staff with a clearer picture of the different Turkish units arrayed around the position at Anzac.25

The types of documents found or captured by the Australians and New

Zealanders at Anzac varied. Captured orders, such as the copy of the Turkish

19th Division’s order for an attack on the Anzac position on 7 May 1915, showed the Ottoman intention to push the Australians and New Zealanders out of their position at Anzac and drive them back into the sea.26 Other enemy documents mentioned on several occasions the excessive use of ammunition by some

Turkish units, confirming reports from prisoners that supplies of ammunition for the Turks were scarce.27 Copies of personal diaries and letters provided useful information about the strength of Turkish units facing the Australians and the conditions in the Turkish trenches.28 They also highlighted that the Turkish

Army was far from a homogeneous force, and that many of the different ethnic groups which made up the Turkish forces were reluctant to fight or had poor morale.

Once the perimeter at Anzac was secured, and after the battle had settled into stalemate, documents continued to be obtained from deserters, prisoners and from enemy dead. The dates on many of the documents and the dates on the translations show that it often took several weeks for the information contained in captured enemy documents to be translated and made available. This reflected the fact that there were few officers available who could speak Arabic or other dialects and these officers were also involved in conducting prisoner

25 Australian and New Zealand Corps Regiments Opposing Anzac, 24 June 1915, AWM25; Australian and New Zealand Army Corps Intelligence Note, 16 July 1915, AWM25. 26 Translation of captured Turkish documents Headquarters 1st Anzac, 16 May 1915, AWM25. 27 ANZAC Corps Intelligence — Intelligence Bulletin, 22 July 1915, AWM25. 28 Translation of a Turkish Coy Commanders Report of the Battle of 4th June, 7 June 1915, AWM25.

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examinations and other intelligence duties.29 To speed up the translation of enemy documents, some were sent to Egypt for translation.

As the ANZAC Corps prepared for the August offensive, captured documents contributed to the British understanding about the strength of enemy forces around the perimeters at Anzac, Helles and away from these areas. Away from the Turkish positions at Anzac and Cape Helles, the enemy strength was relatively weak and the available intelligence indicated that the enemy garrison from Ejelmer Bay to Sheitian Krui on the northern coast of the Gallipoli peninsula was composed of a single company of gendarmerie.30 This information contributed to the decision to undertake the landing of IX Corps at Suvla Bay and attempt a break-out through the northern side of the Anzac perimeter to capture key terrain blocking the British advance. Despite the failure of the August offensive, a significant amount of enemy documents were captured, especially around the former Turkish positions at Lone Pine.31

There are no records of the Australians collecting enemy weapons and equipment for examination during the Gallipoli campaign. Although there are references in intelligence reports relating to Turkish grenades, this is mostly in relation to the lack of a suitable British grenade to use against the Turkish troops. It is likely that British and Dominion troops captured examples of

Turkish rifles and equipment and that these were examined during the campaign. The Turkish trenches captured at Lone Pine during the August

29 Translation of a Turkish Coy Commanders Report of the Battle of 4th June, 7 June 1915, AWM25. 30 Intelligence N.Z.&A Division 1st–31st July 1915 Australian and New Zealand Army Corps Intelligence Note Ig 22, 16 July 1915, TNA, WO157/681. 31 Intelligence Anzac Corps 1st–31st August 1915 Intelligence Summary 14 August 1915, 14 August 1915, TNA, WO157/672.

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offensive would have contained samples of Turkish weapons, equipment and rations, which may have been examined by the intelligence staff.

France and Belgium — 1916

After their arrival in France, the Australians adopted the practices developed by the BEF for collecting documents from the enemy and processing them. This included the practice of detailing personnel to conduct searches of

German dug-outs and enemy dead during raids and attacks on German positions.

I ANZAC Corps ordered that ‘at least two members of each Battalion Intelligence

Section be detailed’ to search ‘the battlefield for maps, documents etc’, and that during attacks or raids searchers were to be provided with maps showing the locations of enemy headquarters to enable them to be searched for intelligence.32

It was not enough that searchers obtained documents to be examined by the intelligence staff, they were also expected to note where they had found the information to provide the intelligence staff with some context for the intelligence. I ANZAC Corps orders also noted that searchers should be accompanied by ‘at least’ one runner to enable any captured documents to be sent back to headquarters as rapidly as possible.33

At the corps POW cage, I ANZAC Corps orders stated that at least one intelligence officer assisted by several German speaking intelligence police were responsible for sorting captured enemy documents, and that after ‘information of tactical importance’ had been extracted, documents were to be bundled into four groups — orders and official documents; maps and memoranda affecting

32 Intelligence Instructions for the Examination of Prisoners, and the Rapid Procuring and Dissemination of Information Concerning the Enemy, February 1917, AWM26, 115/10. 33 Ibid.

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the tactical situation; correspondence throwing light on morale; and diaries — before being sent to Army Headquarters for translation and further examination.34

As with the examination of prisoners, there were slight differences in how captured documents were handled from army to army. Second Army instructions to II ANZAC Corps directed that documents could be examined at

Corps Headquarters or at the corps POW cage. Documents were to be screened and sorted using similar categories to those used by I ANZAC Corps.35 Only documents or extracts of documents concerning the operations of Second Army were to be translated, with documents containing information of general interest or affecting other armies being sent directly to Army Headquarters, where they were examined and processed.36 Each corps in Second Army was ordered to prepare a ‘precis of the important documents examined during the day’, to be sent to Army Headquarters along with the original documents.37 Information relating ‘enemy’s morale and the state of affairs in Germany’ were only to be translated if ‘time permits’.38 Documents that were assessed to be ‘of no matter’ were to be destroyed.39 Important information obtained from captured documents that had been reliably corroborated was to be sent to Army

Headquarters as soon as it was obtained.40

34 Intelligence Instructions for the Examination of Prisoners, and the Rapid Procuring and Dissemination of Information Concerning the Enemy, February 1917, AWM26, 115/10. 35 Staff and Procedure at Divisional Cages, 21 May 1917, AWM26, 175/1. 36 Staff and Procedure at Divisional Cages, 21 May 1917, AWM26, 175/1. 37 Arrangements for Examining Prisoners and Captured Documents in Active Operations, 21 May 1917, AWM26, 175/1. 38 Staff and Procedure at Divisional Cages, 21 May 1917, AWM26, 175/1. 39 Ibid. 40 Arrangements for Examining Prisoners and Captured Documents in Active Operations, 21 May 1917, AWM26, 175/1.

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Intelligence gleaned from captured documents or pieced together from several documents captured over a period of time often led to significant changes to the way that the BEF conducted its operations. An intelligence report issued to Australian battalions in July 1916 stated that ‘documents captured from the enemy have shown that the Germans have been making considerable use of their apparatus for overhearing telephone conversations in our lines’.41

Based on this information, new instructions were issued to the entire BEF about the need to safeguard messages transmitted via telephone to prevent the

Germans from listening in to conversations along the British front line.42

By the time the Australians had arrived in France, the BEF had been collecting enemy weapons and equipment for examination by the intelligence staff for some time. Once the Australians moved into the front line, they began to receive the same requests as other front line units to obtain samples of enemy weapons and equipment for examination. A request sent to the 5th Division in

May 1916 noted that ‘GHQ require, for purposes of examination, a German automatic pistol, preferably one with drum attachment. Please endeavor to obtain a specimen.’43 The most common method for obtaining specific enemy equipment, ordinance and weapons was through trench raids, although clashes between patrols in no-man’s land (equipment being taken from dead or wounded enemy) also yielded equipment.

All too often front line troops misidentified new German equipment, weapons and ordinance leading to fantastic rumors about ‘explosive bullets’ or other weapons designed to cause horrific injuries. More often than not, these

41 Eighth Australian Infantry Brigade Memorandum S8/349, 23 July 1916, AWM26, 34/2. 42 Ibid. 43 Fifth Australian Division Memorandum Ig34/3457, 23 May 1916, AWM26, 36/5.

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exaggerations occurred because of misidentification. One example included front line troops mistakenly identifying wooden training rounds as a horrific new type of enemy weapon.44

Samples of enemy shells, including ‘duds’, were easier to obtain after they landed on or near the Australian positions.45 Where shells that had not been seen before were found, intelligence reports of the type shown in Figure 5 were often sent back to headquarters to advise the intelligence staff that a new type of enemy shell had been located. In many instances, shells not previously seen by front line troops were already known to the intelligence staff. At times, front line troops also encountered new weapons or discovered enemy ordinance that was not able to be identified using existing intelligence.46

Diagrams and descriptions of enemy weapons and shells collected on other parts of the British front line were issued to aid in the collection of technical intelligence by front line troops.47 The collection of enemy ordinance, particularly enemy artillery and mortar shells, was a hazardous undertaking.

Several types of German fuses (the K.Z.11 and K.Z.05 for example) were especially dangerous and contained multiple detonators which may have not exploded even thought the fuse had functioned.48

44 German Explosive Bullets, 20 March 1917, AWM26, 157/2. 45 Eighth Australian Infantry Brigade Memorandum 1237, 2 September 1916, AWM26, 34/2. 46 First Australian and New Zealand Army Corps Intelligence 26/58, 12 June 1916, AWM26, 36/5. 47 New Type of German H.E. Shell with False Cap Ia/18909, 24 September 1916, AWM26, 64/5. 48 Reserve Army Memorandum G.A. 36/0/1, 24 July 1916, AWM26, 41/63.

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Figure 5 - Army Form W.3363: Report on new pattern shell (AWM26, 185/10)

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Information gleaned from German weapons and ordinance was often the first indication that a new weapon — or type of weapon — may have been introduced into service. Often the acquisition of shell fragments or other equipment spurred GHQ to issue orders to the entire BEF to obtain samples in order to confirm the existence of a new weapon.49

Captured enemy ordinance was often used to confirm information about enemy weapons obtained through other sources, such as captured enemy documents. After captured documents with references to a ‘green cross shell’ (a new type of lethal agent) were obtained, orders were dispatched to front line troops to obtain samples of unexploded shells and shell fragments of artillery rounds marked with a green cross to confirm the types of artillery used to deliver the new gas.50

Bullecourt and the third battle of Ypres — 1917

In late February and early March 1917, the Australians captured a series of

German documents that confirmed the German intention to withdraw to the newly completed Hindenburg Line.51 Copies of orders captured by the

Australians provided details about the composition of rear-guards, the withdrawal of artillery, lines of march for the withdrawing troops, and other invaluable information.52 The German orders confirmed locations of strong points and villages that were to be held by the German rear-guards, including

49 Ninth Australian Infantry Brigade Report (77mm shell fragments), 13 February 1917, AWM26, 87/3. 50 First Australian Division Memorandum 70/141, 13 October 1916, AWM26, 80/1. 51 Second Australian Division Memorandum G1/360, 15 March 1917, AWM26, 163/10. 52 Ibid.

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where the Germans were attempting to mount deception activities to make it appear as though they were still holding some locations in strength.

Another set of German orders, found on ‘the body of a German officer killed on the 18 March 1917, at Delaux Farm’, provided detailed information about the line of German outposts left behind by withdrawing troops, information about patrols, communications plans, and the locations of local reserves.53 Intelligence obtained from captured German orders allowed I ANZAC

Corps to follow up the retiring Germans more quickly than had been planned, and subsequent information obtained by the Australians showed that the

Germans were forced to deploy additional forces in an attempt to check the

Australian advance and allow the withdrawal to be conducted in an orderly fashion.54

While the Australians were ordered to send prisoners along with all of their possessions, including any documents, to intelligence officers for examination, there is ample evidence that this did not always occur. The habit of many Australian soldiers of ‘souvenering’ items found on German prisoners often meant the loss of valuable intelligence. In at least one attempt to satisfy the

Australian soldiers’ desires to collect souvenirs, the 3rd Division issued orders which noted that ‘papers which do not contain intelligence required by corps’ would be returned to the division for distribution among the troops.55

Following the success of the attack at Messines, documents captured in

July 1917 showed that the Germans had completely revised their system of defence and their defensive tactics. Copies of translated German documents that

53 Fifth Australian Division Memorandum G26/4214, 19 March 1917, AWM26, 173/6. 54 Second Australian Division Memorandum G1/360, 15 March 1917, AWM26, 163/10. 55 Third Australian Division Memorandum G401/1/33, 5 May 1918, AWM26, 387/9.

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explained how their defensive layout was structured and functioned when attacked were circulated amongst the Australians to ensure that that the troops understood that the enemy was now using shell holes, rather than lines of trenches, which the Australians had seen at the Somme or Bullecourt. The documents also showed how the forward areas of the German defensive zone were designed to break-up attacks and inflict casualties before the attackers were stopped in the ‘battlezone’ where the attacking troops would be defeated.56

At I ANZAC Corps Headquarters, knowledge of the way in which the

German defences were constructed and designed to operate had a significant bearing on the plan for the attack developed for the battles of Menin Road,

Polygon Wood, and Broodseinde Ridge. Translated copies of the revised German orders were issued to brigade level (and lower) to enable attacking troops to adapt their tactics prior to the opening of Second Army’s attack.57 During the attacks of August and September 1917, captured enemy documents revealed that the Germans had once again altered their defensive strategy in an attempt to overcome changing British tactics. Translated copies of the German instruction

‘The Employment of Counter-Attack Troops’, issued by Second Army Intelligence to all corps, showed that the Germans were attempting to counter British attacks through the use of immediate counter-attacks by reserve forces held in close proximity to the front line.58 This enabled attacking British troops to understand changes in the German defensive system and to adapt their tactics accordingly, including anticipating German responses to British attacks.

56 The Enemy’s Defensive Policy Translation of captured order issued by German Fourth Army dated July 1917, 18 August 1917, AWM26, 243/3. 57 Enemy’s Defensive Policy Fifth Australian Division G6/2506, 22 August 1917, AWM26, 263/14. 58 First Anzac Corps Memorandum G24/1/162, 4 September 1917, AWM25.

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A review of the intelligence arrangements for the attack on Polygon Wood noted that ‘the value of intelligence was especially great’. The work of intelligence police and battalion intelligence personnel was described as

‘especially good’, noting that ‘papers, letters, documents’ maps etc. began to arrive back at Brigade Headquarters early and in large quantities’. Among the documents were papers that showed ‘enemy dispositions, intentions and assembly places for counter-attacks’. Captured maps showed complete trench systems, machine gun positions, dug-outs, dumps, track systems, and assembly locations. Other documents showed the location of enemy gun batteries. Enemy codes and information about the German wireless system were also captured and used by British wireless intercept units to monitor German radio activity.

Documents enabled the intelligence staff to make several new identifications, including units believed be in Russia or thought to be held in reserve in

Flanders.59

Other documents captured during the fighting of the third battle of Ypres showed the effectiveness of British artillery at suppressing German batteries, and of the need to move guns frequently to prevent them being targeted by

British counter-battery fire.60 Documents captured during the fighting in October

1917 showed that the Germans had altered their defensive policy yet again, in an effort to overcome British tactics, adopting a revised tactical scheme incorporating ‘shell hole’ defence to attempt to reduce the effectiveness of

British attacks, as well as new orders for the employment of ‘Counter-Attack

59 Notes on Intelligence in Recent Operations carried out by 5th Australian Division on 26th September 1917, 26 September 1917, AWM26, 263/23. 60 First Anzac Corps Memorandum G24/1/162, 4 September 1917, AWM25.

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Divisions’.61 Once again, British infantry tactics were altered to overcome changes in the German defences.

A second line of enemy defences, the Passchendale–Terhand Line, had been identified under construction behind Broodseinde Ridge. British intelligence reports noted that a ‘great deal of work has recently been done on this system’. Documents captured during the attack on Menin Road showed this new line had been ‘heavily wired but the trenches [were] very incomplete’, and it was assessed to present less of an obstacle to attacking troops than was first thought. Captured documents also showed German plans to construct another four lines of trenches between the Passchendale–Terhand Line and Roulers.62

Captured documents provided further information about changes to the

German defensive posture and policy, which noted that the enemy ‘had now chosen to oppose the British advance as far forward as possible’ by increasing the strength of his front line troops. Counter-attacks remained a key facet of

German defensive operations but front line troops were now ordered to launch local counter-attacks ‘more quickly’ before attacking British troops had time to organise themselves and prepare for German counter-attacks.63 The modified defensive instructions relied on holding up British attacks in the forward battle line using the rapid fire of machine guns, rifles and trench mortars, while bringing forward support and reserve battalions to counter-attack ‘without delay’.64 Changes to the way the Germans conducted their defence meant that

61 First Anzac Corps Memorandum G106/609, 28 October 1917, AWM25; Captured Order dealing with the Employment of a Counter-Attack Division, 19 October 1917, AWM26, 209/8. 62 Situation Opposite the Corps Front, 28 September 1917, AWM26, 229/30. 63 Second Army Intelligence Enemy’s Probable Counter-Attack Policy, 11 October 1917, AWM26, 209/8. 64 Ibid.

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support and reserve divisions of front line battalions would be drawn more quickly into the fighting. While there was a risk that a German counter-attack could catch an attacking force unprepared, it also meant that reserves would be depleted faster, and that the Germans would need to bring forward more troops or run the risk that their rear areas would be temporarily depleted of reserves.65

Knowledge of the changes to the defensive tactics was combined with information obtained from captured counter-attack maps showing likely approach routes of counter-attack divisions. These could then be bombarded to prevent reserves or counter-attack troops from reaching the front.

By mid-1917, the intelligence capabilities of the BEF had developed to a point where they were rapidly able to identify new German weapons. In May

1917, GHQ notified the entire BEF of a new type of chemical weapon, mustard gas, which was first fired at the First Army in late April 1917. Soil samples provided by the First Army chemical adviser were analysed to determine the nature of the new threat. Additional samples of the new weapon were then requested to allow a more detailed examination of this new weapon and to allow the British to develop effective anti-gas measures.66 Identification of a new type of gas weapon led to all formations of the BEF being passed a range of intelligence on the effects of the new type of gas and training in the measures

‘necessary for the protection against it’.67

As artillery intelligence increased in importance, ‘shopping lists’ of different German fuses and shells required for examination were sent to front line troops with requests for troops to find samples from captured stores of

65 Ibid. 66 Fifth Australian Division General Staff Memorandum No.145, 21 May 1917, AWM26, 179/1. 67 New Type of Enemy Gas Shell, 28 July 1917, AWM26, 220/8.

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ammunition or ‘blinds’: shells fired into the front lines which failed to explode.

Samples of specific Germans precision fuses, such as the Dopp.Z.16 clockwork fuse which was used to engage aircraft, and in particular balloons, were required to enable the intelligence staff to understand how the Germans were able to construct such accurate fuses.68 Gas shells and other artillery components were often sketched and described — like the one in Figure 6 — before being sent back for examination, adding to the information available.

Figure 6 – Report on German yellow cross gas shell fuse, March 1918 (AWM26, 321/2)

One of the most important pieces of enemy equipment captured by the

Australians in 1917 was a German wireless interception or Telefunken set that was captured by the ‘Fifth Brigade at Anzac House’ during the advance to the

Hindenburg Line. German wireless intercept equipment had not previously been captured by the BEF and examination of this equipment allowed the BEF to

68 Third Australian Division Memorandum G.45/193, 11 July 1917, AWM26, 194/3.

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understand its capabilities and develop counter-measures to defeat German wireless intelligence collection capabilities.69

The Australians, like the rest of the BEF, occasionally fielded strange requests for samples, including one from the Chief Engineer for samples of different types of rocks captured in German engineer stores depots. At least one of the these ‘rock requests’ received by I ANZAC Corps was marked ‘please treat this request as urgent’.70

The German offensive, the battle of Amiens and the advance to the

Hindenburg Line — 1918

Copies of German documents captured in early 1918 provided insights into

German planning for offensive operations. Updated German offensive doctrine noted the need to overcome the ‘skillfully worked out but rigid British artillery barrage’ and to ‘seize upon and exploit tactical success’. Revised German tactical doctrine stressed the need to avoid ‘strong points and centres of resistance’ and seek to break down enemy resistance by moving through the flanks or the rear of an enemy position.71 These tactics were the essence of the German storm troop tactics employed only months later in the German spring offensive. Revised

German artillery instructions that were captured and translated provided an understanding of how the Germans would employ their artillery to facilitate

69 I Anzac Corps Message, 20 September 1917, AWM26, 221/9. 70 Second Army Memorandum E.5968, 17 October 1917, AWM25, 23/31. 71 Australian Corps Intelligence Translation of German Documents Notes on the Offensive Battle, 25 January 1918, AWM26, 288/6.

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future offensive action. Again, these artillery tactics were the same ones employed by the Germans in their offensives at the beginning of 1918.72

The rapid advance following the success of the Amiens offensive yielded an enormous number of captured enemy documents. Captured German tactical orders showed that the Germans had once again modified their defensive tactics to deal with the increasingly successful employment of tanks by the British.

German tactical doctrine stressed the employment of artillery to engage British tanks as early as possible to prevent them from supporting the infantry assault on the main German defensive position. This intelligence resulted in changes to the way that tanks were employed, ensuring that they were adequately protected and available for use at locations of greatest value on the battlefield.73

One of the most important documents captured in the Australian’s area of operations was a copy of the maps and instructions showing the defensive layout of the entire Hinderburg Line. Chapter 12 will examine the circumstances under which these documents were captured and how the intelligence contained in the documents was used by the Australians.

The appearance of German tanks during the attack on Villers-Brettonneux allowed the Australians to play a unique role in developing technical intelligence about them. The capture of an intact German tank enabled a comparison with current British and French tanks and the identification of vulnerabilities in

German tank construction, which could be exploited by defending infantry. Other limitations, such as the ability of German tanks to cross ditches or trenches,

72 Translation of a German Document Notes on the Creeping Barrage, 8 March 1918, AWM26, 345/6. 73 GHQ Memorandum O.A. 109, 1 September 1918, AWM26, 468/5.

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could also be tested to aid in the construction of field defences.74 Towards the end of the war, requests for samples of enemy equipment became more specific, with GHQ requesting optical instruments, plotting boards used by German artillery, and sound ranging equipment in use by the Germans. Orders noted that, if necessary, GHQ was prepared to send forward recovery teams in order to retrieve items deemed too large or delicate to be sent back through normal channels.75

Captured enemy documents and equipment were important sources of intelligence for the Australians. Like other units in the BEF, the Australians were also actively engaged in collecting enemy documents and equipment for examination by the intelligence staff. The process for collecting enemy documents and equipment was largely common across the BEF. The Australians made good use of the intelligence obtained through captured enemy documents.

By 1917, information contained in captured German manuals was used to develop new infantry tactics and training to overcome the formidable German defences in Flanders. As the Germans adapted their tactics to the British, new information drawn from captured German documents was again circulated and formed the basis for further changes to the approach adopted by the front line troops as they fought through the German defences.

74 Notes on German Tank Captured at Villers-Brettonneux, 5 May 1918, AWM26, 358/9. 75 Fifth Australian Division Memorandum Ig26/503, 16 August 1918, AWM25, 423/2/64.

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Chapter 7. Wireless intelligence, signals intercept, and communications deception

During the First World War, ‘wireless intelligence’ covered a broad spectrum of intelligence activities. At its heart was the interception of communications and the analysis of enemy message traffic to provide an understanding of the enemy’s activities or to enable inferences to be drawn from enemy communications procedures. A critical aspect of wireless intelligence related to the breaking of enemy codes and ciphers to enable intercepted enemy communications to be understood. Gaining access to enemy communications also taught the BEF to protect its own communications. This led to the use of codes and ciphers to protect friendly communications along with the restrictions on different types of communications equipment that could be used in the front line. Later in the war, understanding both friendly and enemy communications practices and wireless intelligence capabilities made it possible to use communications to deceive and mislead the enemy about friendly intentions.

The Australians had access to a number of early forms of wireless intelligence from the time they arrived on the Western Front. By the end of 1917, all of the armies within the BEF were equipped with wireless interception equipment, and wireless intelligence was acknowledged as an important source of intelligence until the end of the war. This chapter will examine the types of wireless intelligence that the Australians had access to and how they used wireless intelligence in the planning and conduct of their battles. No examination of wireless intelligence can be undertaken without a brief look at the development of wireless intelligence over the course of the war. However, this examination will not delve into the more technical areas of wireless intelligence, such as

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cryptography and ciphers, other than to mention they were used to protect communications or needed to be overcome to enable access to enemy communications.1

Wireless intelligence at the beginning of the war

Before the outbreak of the war, many European armies had used wireless radio communications as a means of keeping in contact with their forces spread across the battlefield. Wireless communications supplemented other, more common, forms of communications such as telegraphs, telephone and dispatch riders. In the opening months of the war, wireless communications were used by the

British, French, Germans and Russians. On the Eastern Front, the value of wireless intelligence was demonstrated early in the war when the Germans successfully intercepted unecrypted Russian radio messages. The intelligence obtained from Russian communications contributed directly to the German victory at Tannenburg. On the Western Front, intercepted German radio messages allowed the British and French to learn ‘the precise time, location and strength of six full scale attacks on its front, each involving four or more German

Corps’. The ‘miracle of the Marne’ was no miracle as ‘en clair transmissions’ and decrypted German radio messages enabled the British and French to understand the Germans next moves.2

1 For wireless and signals intelligence, see Patrick Beesly, Room 40: British Naval Intelligence 1914–18 (London, Hamish Hamilton, 1982); John Ferris, 'The British Army and Signals Intelligence in the Field During the First World War', Intelligence and National Security, 3(4) (1988); John Ferris (ed.), The British Army and Signals Intelligence During the First World War (Stroud Alan Sutton Publishing, 1992); Ernest Hinrichs, Listening In: Intercepting German Trench Communications in World War I (Shippenburg, The White Mane Books, 1996). 2 Ferris, The British Army and Signals Intelligence, p.5.

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Early wireless intelligence on the Western Front — 1916

Despite the value of wireless intelligence in the opening days of the war, the BEF paid little attention to wireless and other signals intelligence until 1916, when it began to be recognised as an increasingly valuable source of information. The static nature of trench warfare allowed both sides to construct sophisticated networks of telephones and telegraphs to ensure rapid communications between the front line and headquarters often located many miles to the rear. Both sides quickly realised that communications over these networks could be intercepted and exploited for intelligence purposes. Both sides also quickly realised that communications security was an important means of defeating enemy wireless intelligence collection capabilities.3

At the tactical level, wireless intelligence provided useful information about the intentions and activities of German units in the front lines opposite the

British. At the strategic level, wireless intelligence provided information about larger enemy intentions. 4 By 1916, wireless (radio) communications had become the primary means through which artillery observation aircraft were able to communicate with friendly gun batteries to direct their fire onto hostile targets.5 Monitoring the radio traffic between enemy observation aircraft and enemy guns could provide local warning of shelling, while concentrations of enemy guns could provide indications and warnings about possible enemy attacks.

Wireless intelligence was virtually unknown to the Australians before they arrived in France. Communications at Gallipoli were rudimentary at best,

3 Ibid., pp.13–14. 4 Ibid., p.3. 5 Ibid., p.14.

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and the Turkish Army had few of the communications capabilities deployed by the German Army on the Western Front.

Intelligence reports from early April 1916 noted that the Germans used a

‘listening apparatus’ to intercept British front line communications, including telephone messages and power buzzer messages (power buzzers were an earth induction communications system used to send morse type messages). The

German listening apparatus was operated by the German Signal Service and provided information about ‘reliefs, return of wounded etc’.6 Captured enemy documents revealed that German signals intelligence had been able to furnish the enemy with information about British attacks, and Australian orders reinforced the need for telephone security including the need to use codes

‘where confidential information has to be transmitted’.7

By July 1916, the BEF had deployed similar listening sets to the Germans, both to monitor German telephone conversations and to monitor friendly traffic in an attempt to improve communications security.8 Each army headquarters was allocated an officer to supervise the listening sets under the direction of the

Officer Commanding the Army Wireless Company, and at least two listening sets were provided to each corps. A small detachment of personnel, including two signals corps telegraph operators, three intelligence corps interpreter operators, and a signal corps linesman, were assigned to each listening set.9

The initial focus of the British Army wireless listening sets was directed more towards monitoring the security of friendly communications than

6 Annex to GHQ Summary, 1 April 1916, AWM26, 18/1. 7 5th Australian Division General Staff Memorandum No.3, 7 July 1916, AWM26, 35/15. 8 Headquarters 8th Infantry Brigade Memorandum S8/349, 23 July 1916, AWM26, 34/2. 9 GHQ Memorandum O.B./630, 4 August 1916, AWM26, 40/33.

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collecting intelligence on the Germans. The Intelligence Staff were responsible for selecting sites for listening sets and were instructed to notify the General

Staff ‘where such conversations contrary to orders’ were overheard.10 Copies of reports obtained from listening sets were provided to the brigade ‘ in whose area the “set” is working for transmission to Division; a copy to the Intelligence Staff at Army Headquarters through Corps Headquarters; and a copy for GHQ

Intelligence Staff’.11

By August 1916, British intelligence had established that ‘the enemy can intercept buzzer signals passing within 2 miles [3 kilometres] and speech over telephone within 500 yards [450 metres] of their line’. To improve communications security, technical changes were made to the way in which signals corps constructed communications circuits, and a system of position calls and code names were allocated to locations and units to prevent the enemy from learning about British activities through their listening equipment.12

In addition to monitoring enemy and friendly communications, efforts were made to prevent the enemy from overhearing friendly communications through the use of jamming equipment. Jamming sets were designed to be deployed across the front line and were kept running constantly except when turned off to allow friendly listening sets to function. Each of the divisions in I

ANZAC Corps was issued four jamming sets in September 1916, with orders for their deployment and maintenance. Orders stated that the equipment was to remain in the front lines and was handed over to incoming divisions when they

10 Headquarters 8th Infantry Brigade Memorandum S8/349, 23 July 1916, AWM26, 34/2. 11 GHQ Memorandum O.B./630, 4 August 1916, AWM26, 40/33. 12 5th Australian Division General Staff Memorandum No.9, 4 August 1916, AWM26, 33/1.

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were relieved.13 Figure 7 shows the layout of jamming sets along a divisional front line.

Figure 7 — A sketch showing the deployment of jamming sets (AWM26, 75/23)

While jamming sets may have protected friendly conversations from detection by the Germans, they also prevented friendly listening sets from functioning. As one complaint from the 1st Division noted: ‘an enemy conversation was in part picked up, but much of it was lost through the action of the jambing [jamming] buzzer. I would suggest that arrangements be made to enable operators on listening sets to stop the action of the jambing buzzer when

13 1st Anzac Memorandum 175/15, 10 September 1916, AWM26, 75/23.

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an enemy conversation is picked up.’14 Information obtained from prisoners during September 1916 confirmed the presence of German listening equipment opposite I ANZAC Corps and that the enemy had been able to overhear messages from the Australians.15

Wireless intercept reports from October 1916 noted that the number of listening sets across the BEF front line had increased from twenty to twenty-six and that there had been a corresponding increase in the amount of German communications that was intercepted. The reports noted that some listening sets had obtained ‘particularly good’ information from the enemy. Listening set reports also noted that British communications had been regularly intercepted from a number of formations including II ANZAC Corps.16 There had, however, been an overall improvement in communications security across the BEF, there being ‘a diminution in the amount of dangerous information being sent over the telephone.’17 A subsequent report in November 1916 indicated further improvements in the amount of information that could be overheard from BEF units, which was described as a ‘remarkable decrease in the instances of dangerous conversations’.18 Information collected by listening sets indicated that the Germans had also started to deploy similar jamming technology to the British to prevent their front line communications from being monitored.19

14 First Australian Division S.1302, 7 October 1916, AWM26, 80/1. 15 First Anzac Intelligence Summary No.44 from 6 a.m. on 5th to 6 a.m. of 6th Sept 1916, 6 Sept 1916, AWM26, 75/26. 16 Report on the work of Listening Sets during the month of October 1916, 10 November 1916, AWM26, 104/7. 17 Ibid. 18 Report on the work of Listening Sets during the month of November 1916, 11 December 1916, AWM26, 104/9. 19 Report on the work of Listening Sets during the month of October 1916, 10 November 1916, AWM26, 104/7.

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Most of the information collected by British listening sets in November

1916 was tactical in nature, such as information about reliefs or reinforcements in the German lines opposite. Other messages intercepted included warnings that a German gas attack may be planned for a particular sector: ‘the “Flaschen” that came up the previous night will be placed in the first line’. ‘Flaschen’ was translated as cylinders, and an accompanying intelligence report noted that the

German transmission probably related to gas, or trench mortar bombs. Front line units were warned to take precautions along this section of the front in view of a possible gas attack.20 Wireless intelligence also allowed for the definite identification of seven enemy units, the possible identification of five units, and the interception of twenty-four cipher messages.21

While serving in the front line around Guedecourt in December 1916, listening sets in the I ANZAC Corps area reported collecting German conversations on a daily basis and noted that the German units used codes names such as ‘Anna, Franz and Carl’. However, traffic analysis had failed to identify the units that were associated with these code names.22 Other intercepted messages provided warnings of German attacks on the I ANZAC

Corps positions. Information obtained by listening sets deployed close to the front line provided warnings to friendly troops, in this case the Australians, of likely attacks or bombardments, allowing precautions to be taken to repel any enemy action. A message intercepted on 5 February 1917 indicated a possible attack on the Seventh Brigade, which was to be coordinated with a trench mortar

20 Important German Conversations Intercepted, 11 December 1916, AWM26, 104/9. 21 Report on the work of Listening Sets during the month of November 1916, 11 December 1916, AWM26, 104/9. 22 Summary of Results Obtained by listening sets in Fourth Army during December 1916, 11 January 1917, AWM26, 106/7.

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bombardment, as the British and German front lines were too close together for an artillery bombardment.23 These types of tactical warnings were invaluable to front line troops and enabled them to prepare both for the German barrage and the likely assault that would follow.

During their training, intelligence officers were taught that wireless intelligence was an important source of information about the enemy. Tapping of enemy ‘telegraphs and telephones’ and intercepting ‘radio telegraphic messages’ were identified as two of the important sources that were likely to provide information about the enemy to the intelligence section.24

Bullecourt, Messines and the third battle of Ypres — 1917

Orders and reports issued in February 1917 reported that German wireless intercept capabilities had been brought to ‘such a degree of sensitiveness and perfection that very special measures must be taken to prevent information of importance to the enemy from reaching him’. All ‘instruments’ within 3,000 yards [2,750 metres] of the front line were assessed as being vulnerable to enemy interception.25 Telephone circuits as far forward as Brigade Headquarters were assessed to be ‘reasonably safe’ from enemy listening sets. Forward of

Brigade Headquarters, it was preferable to use telephone rather than buzzers for communications. However, all communications were ‘likely to be picked up by the enemy’. All messages passed by ‘buzzer’ were to be encoded and

23 7th Australian Infantry Brigade 39/107, 5 February 1917, AWM26, 129/19. 24 Item 20–21, No.1 Course of Instruction for Intelligence Officers, February 1917, AWM, 3DRL/3907. 25 Second Army Instructions Regarding the use of Signalling Communications near the Front, 14 February 1917, AWM26, 98/18.

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transmissions needed to be approved by an officer who was ‘personally responsible for the contents of the message’.

All telephone conversations that contained any information that may be of use to the enemy needed to be encoded, and units had to be referred to by their allocated codename.26 Of the different communication systems available to

British troops, orders directed that runners and Fullerphones were to be used for operational communications, preferably runners, if time permitted. Pigeons, visual signalling, and wireless were all liable to interception.27

In addition to using listening sets to collect wireless intelligence along the front lines, the British also established a number of wireless interception stations further behind the trenches, to collect German wireless traffic, and wireless compass stations, to plot the locations of ground based and airborne

German wireless transmitters. As the Germans prepared to withdraw to the

Hindenburg Line, wireless intelligence contributed much to the British understanding of German intentions. Messages intercepted on 20 and 21

February 1917 between German wireless stations at ‘Achiet-le-Petit, Grevilliers and north of Bapaume’ contained instructions to dismantle their wireless equipment and to be prepared to move. The intercepted messages also identified one of the new positions that the enemy wireless stations were to occupy. The intelligence report noted that, since the message was intercepted, none of the wireless stations had been observed transmitting any further messages.28 The intelligence assessment appended to the report noted that ‘while no definite

26 Second Army Instructions Regarding the use of Signalling Communications near the Front, 14 February 1917, AWM26, 98/18. 27 Ibid. 28 Fifth Army Operations I/7/20, 22 February 1917, AWM26, 108/3.

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conclusions as to the withdrawal of troops can be drawn from the intercepted messages, they are undoubtedly significant, and, if indications from other sources could be obtained of alternations in the enemy’s dispositions, they might furnish valuable corroborative intelligence’.29 Several days later, the German

Army commenced its withdrawal back into the newly prepared Hindenburg Line.

By March 1917, listening posts began to notice that, while they were able to hear when German signallers made a call, no voice was heard once the connection was established. Intelligence Staff suggested that this could indicate that the Germans had brought into service a device similar to the British

Fullerphone, which enabled conversations to take place without the risk of interception.30 Information obtained from prisoners noted that the Germans were using their listening sets in the same manner as the British (to monitor friendly as well as enemy communications) and that where German telephone conversations could be overheard, steps were taken to repair or replace the line to prevent British listening sets from overhearing.31

One of the most significant breakthroughs for British wireless intelligence came as the Australians followed up the retreating Germans moving back into the Hindenburg Line. The 1st Division captured a complete German listening set in Lagnicourt on 26 March 1917, providing the British with a set of German listening equipment that could be examined for the first time.32 One prisoner captured during the Australian attack on Lagnicourt was from the ‘19th Funken

Section’ and was in charge of the wireless post installed in the village to jam

29 Fifth Army Operations I/7/20, 22 February 1917, AWM26, 108/3. 30 Report on the work of Listening sets during the Month of March 1917, 9 April 1917, AWM26, 144/3. 31 Ibid. 32 First Australian Division S/5185, 2 April 1917, AWM26, 157/3.

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British message traffic. Other prisoners revealed that German listening sets were able to ‘read our code names for formations, and thus identify battalions, brigades and divisions’.33 While prisoners captured around Bullecourt revealed that the German Sixth Army had a Listening Set Section that consisted of four groups that operated across the army front. Prisoners also reported that the

Germans had installed larger and more capable listening sets in the galleries that had been constructed under the Hindenburg Line.34

Information obtained from prisoners about British and French communications security painted an interesting picture. According to German prisoners, French communications were easier to intercept because ‘they always spoke in clear’, and German wireless listening posts had been able to obtain information about ‘preparations for attacks’ or when ‘artillery was being ranged onto targets’. British conversations were intercepted as well. Based on intercepted conversations, German listening posts were able to provide warnings to allow troops to seek shelter from British bombardments.35 German prisoners noted that other information intercepted by German listening sets, such as ration returns, strength states and casualty reports, provided useful information, particularly when the identity of the unit sending the return was already known. Prisoners claimed that German listening sets experienced many of the same problems as those of the British, and that they were often prevented from working effectively by German jamming equipment. To overcome this

33 First Anzac Intelligence Summary No.241 From 6.30 p.m. 27th March to 6.30 p.m. 28th March 1917, 28 March 1917, AWM26, 153/6. 34 Item 9, Annex to Third Army Intelligence Summary No.699, 16 October 1917, AWM, 3DRL/3907. 35 Employment of German Listening Sets, 24 April 1917, AWM26, 175/1.

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problem, the Germans had instituted periods of ‘silent hours’ when jamming equipment was not operated.36

The Germans also used their listening sets aggressively, with intelligence reports indicating that ‘portions of the wiring of a German listening set’ were discovered just in front of the Australian outpost line. Discovery that the

Germans were deploying listening sets close to the Australian lines highlighted the need for good communications security practices and the vulnerability of telephone and buzzer messages to interception by the enemy. During the hours of darkness, the Australian front line also needed to be patrolled continuously to prevent listening sets from being deployed close to the Australian trenches, and

Australian patrols were issued with instructions to search for wires attached to enemy listening sets.37

Wireless intelligence was identified as one of the key sources of intelligence used in the planning of the Second Army’s attack on Messines.

Second Army Intelligence Staff recognised that the improving capabilities of

British intercepting and compass stations needed to be carefully integrated into the intelligence plan in order make the most efficient use of the information obtained from enemy communications. Effective communications links were required to ensure that information obtained from wireless intelligence units was quickly relayed to other units to enable them to respond, particularly where the information related to the detection of enemy aeroplane signalling as a prelude to a bombardment by enemy artillery; the intentions of the enemy to

36 Extract from Examination of an Interpreter on German Listening Set Post A13 or “ASTO 13”, 11 May 1917, AWM26, 98/21. 37 8th Australian Infantry Brigade Memorandum G66, 13 May 1917, AWM26, 176/3.

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attack or counter-attack; and to provide British artillery the best opportunity to undertake counter-battery operations.38

Orders for the intelligence arrangements to support the attack at

Messines noted that wireless intelligence was an important source of information which had the:

Special role with Intelligence which comprises operation of (1)

Interception of messages from enemy’s ground wireless stations (2)

Interception from enemy’s aeroplane wireless operating with his

Artillery, facilitating our counter battery work, (3) Compass Stations to

locate enemy’s wireless sets (ground and aerial), and (4) Listening Sets at

Front line to detect enemy conversations.39

Wireless intelligence allowed enemy observation aircraft to be located and for

RFC units to be tasked with disrupting artillery spotting activities. Front line troops could also be warned about hostile shelling.40

The Second Army Wireless Intelligence Officer was located at the Army

Reports Centre which had been established at Locre Chateau. Information obtained from the British Intercepting Stations at Abeele and Locre was deciphered and passed to the Wireless Intelligence Officer along with information plotted by the Field Compass Stations at Hondschoote, Abeele, and

Hocques, which were monitoring the locations of German wireless sets. Wireless intelligence was collated, analysed and passed directly to the General Staff and

38 Outline of Intelligence Arrangements for Offensive, 16 May 1917, AWM26, 187/13. 39 Ibid. 40 Second Army Intelligence Outline of Intelligence Arrangements for Offensive, 16 May 1917, TNA, WO157/114.

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Intelligence Staff at Army Headquarters and issued down to subordinate formations.

GHQ memorandums note that by May 1917 each army in the BEF was allocated one aeroplane intercepting station and two aeroplane compass stations, which were employed to intercept communications between German observation aircraft and German artillery batteries, to locate German artillery spotting aircraft to enable interception by RFC units or anti-aircraft batteries.

Aeroplane wireless units also provided warning about targets which German artillery might be attempting to range and engage.41 In the case of Second Army, a second officer, the Aeroplane Wireless Intelligence Officer, was located at

Abeele, where he was responsible for plotting messages intercepted from

German artillery observation aircraft.42

A review of battle of Messines noted the value of the decision to collocate a wireless intercepting station with the Army Reports Centre and highlighted that, in doing so, it ‘enabled the enemy’s messages to be rapidly deciphered, translated and distributed to formations concerned along with deductions as to the enemy’s actions’.43

In the lead-up to the offensive, the Second Army collected large numbers of enemy messages. However, the inability of British wireless intelligence staff to break the German ciphers meant that pattern analysis had to be relied upon to look for abnormal activity that might indicate enemy action. Wireless compass stations continued to plot the locations of German wireless stations. This

41 Ferris, The British Army and Signals Intelligence, p.15. 42 Second Army Daily Intelligence Summary No.688, 6 June 1917, AWM26, 187/14; Second Army The Operation of Wireless Intelligence Battle of Messines June 1917, June 1917, AWM26, 205/1. 43 Army Centre Battle of Messines June 1917, 2 September 1917, AWM26, 273/16.

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information was updated every two hours and plotted on maps to provide a clear picture of enemy activity.44 Heightened amounts of message traffic from German wireless field stations around Wytschaete, Gheluvelt, and Messines in early June

1917 indicated that the Germans were aware of the build-up of British forces and preparations for an attack on Messines. But there was little corresponding traffic from German observation aircraft ranging artillery in the area to be attacked, which indicated that the Germans were unaware that the attack was due to commence within a matter of days.45 Had the Germans been aware of the date of the attack, it is likely that they would have attempted to disrupt British preparations by every means available, especially through artillery bombardments.

British wireless intelligence units also noted several periods of silence in the days leading up to the attack and assessed that the Germans were taking steps to relocate a number of their wireless field stations. The presence of several new wireless stations to the rear of the German lines, in addition to the possible movement of existing field wireless stations, suggested that the

Germans were active in moving troops and equipment around at night to prepare for the expected British attack.46 Wireless intelligence reported that, on the two days preceeding the attack at Messines, ‘the enemy displayed a very great increase in activity, mainly between the Ypres and Wytschaete salients’,

44 Second Army The Operation of Wireless Intelligence Battle of Messines June 1917, June 1917, AWM26, 205/1. 45 Second Army Daily Intelligence Summary No.683 Evening Summary 11p.m, 3 June 1917, AWM26, 187/14. 46 Second Army Daily Intelligence Summary No.684 Evening Summary 11p.m., 4 June 1917, TNA, WO157/115.

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and that this activity was correlated with sixteen new ground stations that were identified opposite the British front lines.47

An assessment of the enemy activity suggested that, as the Germans noticed the build-up of British forces in the lead up to the attack, they had drawn in additional resources in preparation for defeating the British attack. Prisoners later confirmed that the increase in German radio traffic was in response to the build-up of British forces and that every German division from Langemark to

Basse-Deule had been equipped with wireless communications in preparation for a British offensive.48 This was to ensure that, in the event of an attack, communications with front line formations could be maintained, as British artillery would destroy telephone lines and make communications with front line units difficult.

Despite the German precautions, communications failed during the opening of the attack at Messines, with the artillery bombardment destroying many of the German radio aerials.49 On the day of the attack, wireless intelligence collection units reported that ‘enemy wireless ground stations had entirely ceased operations’, while stations located outside the area attacked by the Second Army ‘have been talking in clear during the morning’ significantly aiding the efforts of British wireless intelligence units to monitor German communications.50

47 Second Army Wireless Intelligence Summary for week ending 7th June 1917, 7 June 1917, TNA, WO157/115. 48 Second Army Wireless Intelligence Summary for week ending June 21st, 1917, 21 June 1917, TNA, WO157/115. 49 Second Army Wireless Intelligence Summary for week ending June 21st, 1917, 21 June 1917, TNA, WO157/115. 50 Second Army Daily Intelligence Summary No.689, 7 June 1917, AWM26, 188/1.

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By the evening of the day of the attack, German wireless ground stations began to re-establish themselves to the rear of the area that was attacked and there was a large volume of radio traffic between the different stations. Patterns of abnormal activity and an increase in message traffic provided indications about the major German counter-attack that was launched on 8 June 1917.51

German wireless communications immediately after the battle of Messines were described as ‘chaotic’ and, when plotted, the German radio stations were found to be located behind the Ypres-Comines Canal, nearly 2,000 yards [1,800 metres] behind the German front line.52 In the days that followed, the attack levels of traffic returned to normal as the Germans re-established their front line positions and telephone and telegraphic communications.

Several factors greatly assisted the wireless interception efforts at

Messines. The Second Army established multiple Wireless Intercept Stations, which allowed for messages to be intercepted from more than one location. This helped fill gaps that appeared in intercepted German message traffic. Portions of

German radio messages received by each station could be combined to provide a more coherent picture of enemy activity. The British troops attacking at

Messines were also fortunate enough to capture a German wireless operator who ‘did not withhold any information’ when examined. During a lengthy examination, the prisoner was able to fill in many of the gaps which existed in the British knowledge about how the German wireless equipment was employed and operated. From this examination, the British learned enough to recognise

51 Second Army The Operation of Wireless Intelligence Battle of Messines June 1917, June 1917, AWM26, 205/1. 52 Second Army Wireless Intelligence Summary for week ending June 21st, 1917, 21 June 1917, TNA, WO157/115.

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when a German wireless station was about the move, and therefore the enemy regiment that it was supporting, eight hours before the move took place.53

Documents captured during the attack provided information about the

German wireless organisation within each German division. The Germans had a transmitting and receiving station in the ‘first line’ and another station near regimental headquarters for communications with division headquarters. The capture of a German codebook during the attack enabled the British to read all of the German messages. British wireless intelligence intercepted a message indicating that a codebook had been lost and that an emergency code was to be used. A copy of the emergency code was also discovered and ‘for a further two days we had a complete knowledge of what enemy wireless stations were saying’.54

Despite the successes, there were some valuable lessons learnt from the attack at Messines. When the attack commenced, three enemy wireless stations fell into British hands along with their codebooks. Delays in identifying the codebooks meant that British wireless intelligence staff did not receive a copy of a captured German codebook until late on the first day of the battle. A second copy of the codebook arrived the following day. The failure of the attacking troops to recognise the codebooks and to make their retrieval a high priority highlighted the need for intelligence personnel to move forward behind the advancing troops in order to take advantage of intelligence left behind by the retreating enemy. Similarly, Intelligence Officers screening prisoners failed to

53 Second Army The Operation of Wireless Intelligence Battle of Messines June 1917, June 1917, AWM26, 205/1. 54 Ibid.

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identify and separate German wireless operators to enable them to be questioned by specialist wireless intelligence personnel.55

The decision by Second Army to establish a separate system of wireless intercept stations to take bearings on radio signals from enemy reconnaissance aircraft also paid dividends. Three wireless compasses and a series of visual observation posts were all connected via a series of telegraph and telephone lines to Corps Headquarters, anti-aircraft batteries, corps heavy artillery, and

RFC units allocated to Corps and Army Headquarters.56 As German reconnaissance aircraft flew across the front lines and transmitted observation reports, the wireless compass stations would attempt to take simultaneous bearings which would then be plotted to identify where the aircraft was operating. Intelligence reports noted that the average time to plot the location of an aircraft was twenty minutes. Anti-aircraft guns and RFC units were then ordered to disrupt the activities of the observation aircraft while corps heavy artillery attempted to bring counter-battery fire on the enemy gun battery that the aircraft was observing for.

Second Army noted that between 1 and 14 June, fifty-five warnings of hostile aircraft were sent from wireless intercept stations. In thirty-three cases, efforts to disrupt the reconnaissance aircraft were successful and enemy artillery activity ceased.57 Analysis of hostile reconnaissance aircraft wireless signals also led Intelligence Staff to identify increases in German artillery units allocated to the Wytschaete and Ypres Sectors.58 During the battle of Messines, few enemy

55 Ibid.. 56 Ibid. 57 Ibid. 58 Second Army The Operation of Wireless Intelligence Battle of Messines June 1917, June 1917, AWM26, 205/1.

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reconnaissance aircraft were spotted and it was not until the weeks following the attack at Messines that German artillery spotting flights began to increase in numbers again.59

By July 1917, in addition to intercepting enemy wireless communications, efforts were now being made to jam enemy wireless transmissions, with British wireless transmitters sending out transmissions on frequencies known to be used by the Germans.60 Second Army Headquarters reminded formations, including II ANZAC Corps, that jamming activities needed to be carefully coordinated across the army to avoid interfering with friendly communications.

As the build up began for the third battle of Ypres, detailed maps were constructed showing German wireless communications networks and the coordinates of German wireless stations.61 In mid-July, German wireless stations around Ypres began to change their ‘field station calls’ to prevent British wireless intelligence from identifying new stations which were moving into the area. Nonetheless, the presence of additional German field stations indicated that more German units were being moved into the area in anticipation of the next

British offensive. Shifting calls interfered with the identification of units, but large amounts of German radio traffic continued to be intercepted and British wireless intelligence units continued to be able to plot the locations of German wireless stations.62

59 Second Army Wireless Intelligence Summary for week ending June 21st, 1917, 21 June 1917, TNA, WO157/115. 60 Second Army Memorandum O.B./1995, 15 July 1917, AWM26, 185/4. 61 Second Army Wireless Intelligence Hostile Field Stations Week ending Noon 3rd July 1917, 3 July 1917, TNA, WO157/116. 62 Second Army Wireless Intelligence Hostile Field Stations Week ending Noon 10th July 1917, 10 July 1917, TNA, WO157/116.

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In late July, several Germans employed on a German listening station were captured and examined by Wireless Intelligence Officers. The prisoners reported that a ‘new and improved apparatus’ was in use by the Germans that could intercept telephone messages between front line brigades and divisions.

Instructions were issued for the capture of one of these devices as soon as possible to enable technical experts to assess its capabilities.63 Based on the information obtained from the prisoners, it was determined that the Germans operated a number of different types of wireless collection equipment. The

‘G.Fuk instrument’ was powered by a motor or man-driven dynamo and was deployed by division or brigade stations while the ‘M.Fuk instrument’ — which was powered by ‘accumulators’ (batteries) — was employed by regimental or battalion stations, and it was possible to identify the different types of German listening units through the equipment that they used.64

Information obtained from German prisoners about the capabilities of

German wireless intercept equipment highlighted the need to protect information about similar British capabilities. In August 1917, I ANZAC Corps circulated reminders that ‘[it] is very undesirable that the knowledge about our wireless work should get widespread throughout our Army’, and intelligence staff were reminded that information obtained from wireless intercept should be shown in intelligence summaries as having been obtained ‘by document or by prisoner’s statement’ and no extracts should be made from wireless intelligence reports.65 Instructions to disguise wireless intelligence in intelligence reports, assessments and summaries from August 1917 has made it difficult to determine

63 Third Australian Division Memorandum SG.45/196, 25 July 1917, AWM26, 194/3. 64 Ferris, The British Army and Signals Intelligence, pp.43–45. 65 Second Australian Division Memorandum 016/1/35, 20 August 1917, AWM25, 422/2/44.

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how much wireless intelligence was passed onto front line units from this time onwards, but given the amount of information that was available during the battle of Messines it is likely that similar volumes of wireless intelligence were collected and disseminated to the Australian troops fighting in the third battle of

Ypres.

At the end of August 1917, when the Second Army was handed responsibility for the capture of the Gheluvelt Plateau, the army paused for three weeks during which time it re-established many of the same intelligence structures that had been in place for the battle of Messines, including re-opening the Army Reports Centre at Lochre.66 Correlation of radio traffic with enemy counter-battery and artillery spotting activity showed that the more active a

German field radio station attached to an artillery unit, the more likely it was to be engaged in counter-battery operations or artillery ranging.67 Analysis of enemy traffic, combined with other intelligence, enabled the intelligence staff to identify which German field stations were associated with specific German divisions and allowed division and brigade headquarters locations to be identified for nearly all of the German divisions in the front line around Ypres.

The presence of a new grouping of field radio stations usually indicated the presence of a new German division.68 This information was passed to the

Australians, along with other corps in the Second Army, as they prepared to attack at Menin Road.

66 Second Army Memorandum G.335, 2 September 1917, AWM26, 273/16. 67 Second Army Wireless Intelligence Summary Hostile Artillery Aeroplanes Week Ending 2nd August 1917, 2 August 1917, TNA, WO157/117. 68 Second Army Wireless Intelligence Summary German Field Stations Week Ending Noon, 7th August 1917, 7 August 1917, TNA, WO157/117.

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Maps showing the ‘approximate locations’ of enemy wireless sets were issued down to brigade level, with orders to ensure that intelligence personnel were made aware of the probable locations of enemy wireless stations. Orders noted that as soon as the area where the enemy wireless station was located was found and the wireless station became accessible, intelligence personnel were to search for any documents, especially code and cipher books. These were to be returned to Corps Headquarters as quickly as possible by any means available.69

The necessity of getting captured code books back to wireless intelligence officers as quickly as possible had been learnt from the experiences of Messines.

Orders for attacking units to capture German wireless stations paid dividends, especially during the attack on Broodseinde Ridge, when the

Australians captured fifteen prisoners, German wireless operators and power buzzer operators, during the attack. The prisoners were from five different

German wireless stations, all of which had been identified by British wireless intelligence. Examination of these prisoners provided additional information about the training and organisation of German wireless communications units, and the types of radio equipment used in Flanders by the Germans.70

The German offensive, Hamel and the battle of Amiens — 1918

By January 1918, the BEF had reached the conclusion that the German Army would resume the offensive in an attempt to force a decision in the west. What was unclear was whether the attack would strike at the British or the French, and what form the offensive might take. An assessment produced by the Fifth

69 Second Army Intelligence Memorandum I.G.1104, 17 September 1917, AWM26, 209/4. 70 Report on the Examination of 15 Wireless Operators and one Power Buzzer Operator captured on the 4th October 1917 (Ypres Sector), 8 October 1917, AWM26, 207/3.

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Army, on whom the offensive would eventually fall, in February 1918 noted that changes of ‘call-signs and wireless codes’ indicated the possibility of a new

German Army group in the area between Lens and Pontruet. Wireless activity also indicated that additional enemy divisions may have been put into the front line.71 Analysis of patterns of activity in enemy wireless and other communications traffic provided insights into the German order of battle, allowing the allies to identify and locate German infantry and artillery units; it could also be used to divine enemy intent. However, traffic analysis was far from infallible and could fall prey to enemy deception. A retrospective analysis of the

German offensive in March 1918 showed that, while there were indications and warnings of the attack which were missed, the Germans had been able to use their communications in such a way as to deceive the British about their intentions.72 The Germans effectively used communications deception to hide the build-up of their forces for the attack. A review of enemy wireless activity after the offensive noted that ‘German field wireless station activity was maintained without any change during the whole month’ and there was no indication of the enemy’s intentions. Changes in call signs were noted to have complicated the identification of enemy units.73

In early May 1918, as the front line settled down after the fighting in

March and April, wireless intelligence reports showed that along the Fourth

Army front, most of the German activity was concentrated on the northern portion of the III Corps front. Further south, opposite the Australian Corps there

71 Ia/46035 Indications on the Enemy’s Intentions in the Sector Between the Scarpe and St Quentin, 23 February 1918, AWM26, 351/4. 72 Ferris, The British Army and Signals Intelligence, p.16. 73 Ia/52565 Indications of the German Offensive of 27th May, 31 July 1918, AWM25.

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was little enemy wireless activity and few aircraft spotting for artillery.74

Intelligence reports from this period noted that German field wireless activity had been ‘normal’, with changes of ‘codes’ used by some German units indicating that the boundaries of the German Second Army had changed and the 183rd

Division which was in the front lines around Albert moving under control of a new headquarters with the boundary change.75

By mid-May 1918, the situation had changed and wireless intelligence reports showed that enemy attention was focused on the Australian Corps front, and that there had been a considerable increase in the number of artillery spotting flights and corresponding amounts of enemy radio transmissions.

Enemy artillery concentrated around Villers-Bretoneaux and wireless intelligence reports noted that the enemy activity was similar to that observed before the German offensive was launched in March 1918.76 This caused the

Australian Corps and other units of the Fourth Army to be kept on heightened states of alert until the possible threat had passed. Captured enemy documents from this period revealed that the Germans were aware that British wireless intelligence units were intercepting their messages and efforts were made to reduce the use of wireless transmissions.77

Reports from June 1918 showed that German field wireless stations maintained ‘comparatively normal levels of activity’, except on those occasions when the British attacked German positions or conducted raids. Wireless

74 Weekly Summary of Enemy Wireless Artillery Aeroplane Activity Week-Ending May 9th 1918, 10 May 1918, AWM26, 349/9. 75 Weekly Appreciation for period May 4th to May 10th 1918, 10 May 1918, AWM26, 349/4. 76 Weekly Summary of Enemy Wireless Artillery Aeroplane Activity Week-Ending May 16th 1918, 17 May 1918, AWM26, 349/6. 77 Fourth Army Wireless Intelligence Summary German Field Stations Week Ending Midnight 20th/21st May 1918, 22 May 1918, AWM26, 349/6.

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intelligence reports noted that increases in wireless transmissions also occurred when the Germans prepared to conduct counter-attacks.78 By July 1918, the volume of intelligence being generated from British Wireless Observation

Groups was so large that it was ‘now impossible to make full use of the material’.

The importance of information obtained from enemy communications, particularly during periods of active operations when tactical information could assist with the outcomes of the fighting, was clearly understood.79

In preparation for the Australian attack at Hamel in July 1918, a report centre was established along the same lines as those used by the Second Army at

Messines and during the later stages of the third battle of Ypres.80 Intelligence summaries showed the location of German units opposite the Australian Corps front, including identifications of enemy artillery units, some of which were obtained through wireless intercept. Locations of enemy regimental and division headquarters opposite the Australians were also identified.81 A wireless intelligence report, covering the period 29 June to 5 July 1918, noted that

German wireless activity ‘was almost entirely confined to periods when operations were in progress (i.e. the Australian attack on Hamel) and while there was a considerable amount of message traffic, the number of German wireless stations identified was not assessed as unusual. Wireless intelligence reports also noted that the Germans tended to use their wireless sets more in

78 Wireless Intelligence Summary German Field Stations June 25th to July 1st inclusive, 2 July 1918, AWM26, 350/9. 79 M.G.G.S (S.D.) Memorandum, 1 July 1918, TNA, WO158/962. 80 Australian Corps Heavy Artillery Order No.143, 1 July 1918, TNA, WO95/304. 81 Fourth Australian Division Intelligence Summary No. 303 From 6 a.m. 3rd to 6 a.m. 4th July, 4 July 1918, AWM26, 408/5.

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emergencies, such as during an attack, relying on other means when the front lines were quiet.82

The Australian Corps repeated what it had learnt in Flanders in 1917 during the battle of Amiens. During the days immediately following the attack, enemy wireless traffic was disorganised, but by 15 August 1918 more regular patterns of wireless communications had emerged as the Germans re- established control over their front line.83 The fluid nature of the fighting along the Western Front after the battle of Amiens meant that wireless communications continued to be used extensively by both sides until the end of the war to control the battle and provide further opportunities to collect intelligence using wireless intelligence collection units.

Communications Deception

Understanding enemy wireless intelligence capabilities and their ability to monitor British communications allowed the BEF to use communications deception to achieve surprise. Sophisticated communications deceptions employed in 1918 allowed the BEF to achieve operational surprise in what was to become the beginning of the final series of battles that would bring the war to a conclusion.84

The Australian experience of communications deception was limited to the battle of Amiens, but this was also perhaps the best example of British communications deception during the war. In preparation for the battle of

82 Wireless Activity, 6 July 1918, TNA, WO157/196. 83 Wireless Intelligence Summary German Field Stations August 10th to August 16th (inclusive), 17 August 1918, AWM26, 472/3. 84 Ferris, The British Army and Signals Intelligence, pp.19–21.

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Amiens, units from the Canadian Corps were deployed to Flanders to establish wireless communications patterns normally associated with the deployment of advance parties of the Canadian Corps. Like the British, by this stage of the war

German wireless intelligence had identified patterns of communications activity associated with the deployment of particular enemy units. By deploying units of the Canadian Corps, which normally preceded the corps when it moved, and by ensuring that other communications activity remained normal, the Germans were fooled into believing that the Canadian Corps was being deployed to

Flanders and the first inkling that they had that the Canadians were alongside the Australians was when the Fourth Army’s attack at Amiens commenced. Other examples of communications deception include those used by the Third Army after the battle of Amiens, when GHQ ordered that no additional wireless traffic should become apparent on their front, while the Fourth Army, Cavalry Corps and Tank Corps should all maintain their present levels of wireless activity to convince Germen wireless listening units that the focus of the British effort remained on the Fourth Army front.85 Similar activities were undertaken by the

First Army in September 1918, with wireless sets associated with the Cavalry

Corps being transferred to the First Army area to convince the Germans that the

British main effort had shifted to the First Army front.86 The use of communications deceptions demonstrated the level of operational sophistication that the BEF had achieved by this stage of the war and it allowed the British to achieve surprise on the battlefield in a way that they had previously been unable to.

85 Ibid., pp.182–183. 86 Ibid., p.184.

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While wireless intelligence units were not directly under the control of the Australians, they nonetheless contributed to the intelligence picture that was available to the Australians as they planned their attacks in 1917 and 1918. At the tactical level, listening sets provided insights into the activities of the enemy opposite the Australian front lines and provided warnings about enemy attacks, raids, and bombardments. At the strategic level, wireless intelligence provided insights into enemy intentions. During the battle of Messines, wireless intelligence allowed the British to monitor the build-up of German forces and pinpointed the locations of German headquarters and artillery units. It also allowed the British to prepare for German counter-attacks and to ensure that they retained the ground that had been captured. The decision to disguise wireless intelligence to prevent the Germans from understanding the full extent of the British capability has made it difficult to measure how much wireless intelligence the Australians had access to in late 1917 and 1918. Using Messines as a yardstick, it seems likely that it provided valuable information during the

Australian attacks at Menin Road, Polygon Wood, and Broodesiende Ridge. After the German offensive in March 1918, wireless intelligence was used to monitor

German activity and provided inputs into planning for the battle of Amiens which would eventually lead to victory.

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Part 3 — Intelligence gathered using human means

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Chapter 8. Human intelligence and counter-espionage operations

Secret agents had been used throughout recorded history. Their role was well understood and they were seen as an important source of intelligence in pre-war military intelligence doctrine. While prisoners and deserters could provide information about enemy activity on the front lines, their knowledge was often limited to the area in which they were based and it seldom extended far into the enemy’s rear. Secret agents offered glimpses of what was happening far behind the enemy lines and well placed agents could provide intelligence on enemy movements and the impact of fighting on the enemy forces, or provide information about the enemy’s future intentions. During the First World War, the activities of secret agents were controlled by GHQ and by other secret service organisations in Britain. Unlike other forms of intelligence that were more readily available at the operational level and which contributed directly to battle plans, few reports from secret service sources found their way down to corps or division level. Nonetheless, intelligence from secret service sources, often disguised to prevent recognition that it came from a secret agent, is scattered throughout intelligence reports and summaries issued to the Australians. These mentions are more frequent early in the war. Over the course of the war, the frequency of reports that were attributed to secret agents diminished. There is almost no mention of secret service sources in any of the Australians’ operational or intelligence files by the end of the war. This reflected greater efforts to disguise intelligence obtained from secret agents to protect their identity in the event that their intelligence fell into enemy hands. Human intelligence was also obtained from local inhabitants, particularly those who had lived in an area for a long time. French and Belgian civilians were often able to

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provide detailed information about the towns and villages that they had previously occupied and which were now in German hands. This information was invaluable at the operational level and was frequently incorporated into appreciations prepared in advance of attacks. Combined with other intelligence, this information enabled the staff to identify locations where enemy strong points or headquarters were located, as well as providing a clearer understanding of the terrain over which the troops would advance during the battle. The presence of civilians immediately behind the front lines was, however, a constant source of concern for the British Army. The threat of

German agents concealed among the civilian population located directly behind the front lines, reporting on the activities of the British and French armies, prompted the British to establish a large counter-espionage organisation designed to prevent the leakage of intelligence to the enemy and to locate enemy agents.1 This chapter examines the types of human intelligence available to the

Australians and how they were used to plan and conduct operations. This

1 For secret service and counter-espionage operations, see Christopher Andrew, The Defence of the Realm: The Authorised History of Mi5 (London, Penguin Group, 2009); Jim Beach, Haig's Intelligence: GHQ and the German Army, 1916–1918, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2013); Nicholas Everitt, British Secret Service During the Great War (Milton Keynes, Leonaur, 2013); Keith Jeffery, Mi6: The History of the Secret Intelligence Service 1909–1949 (London, Bloomsbury, 2010); Allan Judd, The Quest For ‘C’: Sir Mansfield Cumming and the Founding of the British Secret Service (London, Harper Collins, 1999); Polly A. Mohs, Military Intelligence and the Arab Revolt: The First Modern Intelligence War (Milton Park, Routledge, 2008); Janet Morgan, The Secrets of Rue St Roch: Hope and Heroism Behind Enemy Lines in the First World War (London, Penguin Books, 2005); Michael Occleshaw, Armour Against Fate: British Military Intelligence in the First World War (London, Colombus Books, 1989); Philip Murphy, Philip Davies and Gerald Hughes, 'The British Secret Intelligence Service, 1909–1949', Intelligence and National Security, 26(5) (2011); Yiggal Sheffy, 'The Spy Who Never Was: An Intelligence Myth in Palestine, 1914– 18', Intelligence and National Security, 14(3) (1999); Yigal Sheffy, 'British Intelligence and the Middle East 1900–1918: How Much Do We Know?', Intelligence and National Security, 17(1) (2002); Yigal Sheffy, British Military Intelligence in the Palestine Campaign 1914–1918 (London: Frank Cass & Co. Ltd, 1998); Michael Smith, The Spying Game: The Secret History of British Espionage (London, Politico’s Publishing, 1996); Michael Smith, Six: A History of Britain’s Secret Intelligence Service: Part 1, Murder and Mayhem, 1909–1939, (London, Dialogue, 2010).

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chapter also looks at the role that the Australians played in counter-espionage operations.

Preparations and the opening days of the war

Pre-war British military intelligence doctrine identified secret agents as an important source of intelligence. Secret service agents could provide a range of information of varying accuracy and value. Secret agents worked for a range of often complicated reasons. Many were not men of ‘high character’. Intelligence officers needed to understand and exploit a secret agents motivations to have them undertake the potentially hazardous task of collecting intelligence.

Secret service work was challenging and dangerous, with many ‘inherent difficulties’. A large proportion of enterprises ended in failure, trust was scarce, and treachery abounded. But ‘occasional information derived from this source is, as a rule, so valuable that an intelligence officer should never allow the most depressing succession of failures to discourage his efforts’, for ‘one day, some small piece of the right kind of information will arrive, a repayment in full the trouble and expense and worry’.2

At the outbreak of the war, there were a number of different organisations in Britain responsible for gathering intelligence using secret agents, and conducting counter-intelligence and counter-espionage activities.3

The British ‘Secret Service Bureau’, established in October 1909, should have united domestic counter-espionage and foreign intelligence collection efforts.

Instead, Vernon Kell’s domestic counter-espionage service and Mansfield

2 War Office General Staff, Field Intelligence, pp.21–27. 3 Andrew, The Defence of the Realm, p.25.

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Cummings’s foreign intelligence collection organisation quickly embarked on independent missions.

From 1910 to 1913, Cummings’s organisation established a number of secret agent networks in Belgium and Holland in expectation of the need to support an expeditionary force. In July 1914, as war approached, Cummings activated his operations in Belgium. By mid-August, the Germans had pushed their way through Belgian defences at Liège and the advancing German Army rapidly began to dislocate British and French forces. Officers charged with running secret service operations were forced to retreat, along with the remainder of the BEF. Most of the pre-war intelligence networks established by the Secret Service Bureau were now deep behind enemy lines and out of contact with the intelligence officers charged with overseeing their activities.4

It was at this point that Cummings was badly injured in a car accident that killed his son. With Cummings incapacitated and with the BEF in desperate need of intelligence, GHQ took steps to establish its own secret agent networks.

Military intelligence officers rapidly moved to establish networks in Belgium by seeking out refugees and others who could be prevailed upon to return home and work for British military intelligence. Intelligence collected by these networks was sent out of the German occupied areas through neutral countries such as Holland.5

After Cummings returned to work in November 1914, he set about expanding his organisation. While GHQ focused its attention on France and

Belgium, and on the German Army in particular, Cummings’s organisation had a

4 Beach, Haig’s Intelligence, pp.116–119. 5 Ibid., p.125.

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much wider remit. In addition to conducting secret agent operations in France and Belgium, Cummings was also responsible for secret agent operations undertaken against Austria-Hungary and the Ottoman Empire.6 Cummings’s organisation was also responsible for reporting not only military intelligence but also providing intelligence on economic matters and political issues. This led to

Cummings’s organisation moving closer to the Foreign Office rather than the

War Office.7 The relationship between Cummings’s organisation and the War

Office was not an easy one, with constant efforts by the War Officer to exert greater control over or to take control of Cummings’s organisation. This lead to rivalry and tension that would exist until the end of the war.8

Cummings’s organisation was known by several cover names over the course of the war. Initially it was referred to as MO6(c) by the War Office. In

1916, Cummings’s organisation adopted the designation MI(c) and it was known by this designation for the remainder of the war.9

Egypt and Gallipoli — 1915

Just before the outbreak of the war, the British maintained eleven consular officers in Syria and Palestine who were uniquely placed to provide intelligence on the activities of the Ottomans, particularly any designs they might have had on Egypt. Unbeknown to the British, on 2 August 1914, Germany and the

Ottoman Empire signed a secret treaty of alliance, and the Ottoman Army began to mobilise on the very same day. While Ottoman intentions were focused on

6 Jeffery, Mi6, p.45. 7 Beach, Haig’s Intelligence, pp.126–127. 8 Jeffery, Mi6, pp.47–55. 9 Ibid., p.50.

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Russia, plans were also developed for military action against Egypt.10 British intelligence managed to learn about the mobilisation of the Ottoman Army the day before it occurred, but the British were largely unaware of the Ottoman’s intentions, and this was to be the focus of British intelligence collection against the Ottoman Empire. The most pressing question for the British was whether the

Ottoman Army would attack Egypt and threaten the Suez Canal, a vital supply line for the British Empire. Optimistic diplomatic reporting and a misreading of

Turkish intentions meant that few expected any sort of military campaign aimed at Egypt.11

British military intelligence in Egypt assessed that if the Ottoman Empire entered the war on the side of Germany, the best the Ottoman Army might achieve would be the dispatch of a force of Bedouin raiders into the Sinai to threaten British interests. By November 1914, the British Army had established a

Canal Defences Command which was responsible for the security of the Suez

Canal, including establishing and maintaining a network of agents throughout the Sinai and Suez regions to provide information about Ottoman activities.

Gradually, information began to accumulate which indicated the likelihood of an attack on the Suez Canal by the Ottoman Army. Reports from secret agents in the

Levant provided information about the laying of railway lines from Damascus further south and works to improve roads in southern Palestine. The progress of these works were the chief means through which British military intelligence was able to determine the timetable for the Ottoman attack. Aerial reconnaissance was also used to monitor the progress of the advancing Ottoman

10 Sheffy, British Military Intelligence, pp.34–36. 11 Ibid., pp.41–44.

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Army, which finally attacked British positions along the Suez Canal on the night of 2/3 February 1915.12

As the intelligence picture surrounding the Ottoman Army’s thrust towards the Suez Canal began to develop, the Australian and New Zealand troops training in Egypt were called upon to assist with strengthening the defences along the canal. Australian engineers were used to construct trenches and pontoon bridges for the garrisons strung out along the Suez Canal. As the

Turkish forces drew closer to the canal, several battalions of the New Zealand infantry brigade were used to reinforce the canal defences and several of the

Australian battalions were selected to be used as part of a combined force to counter-attack the Ottoman Army. However, after their abortive attacks on the canal defences, the Ottoman Army quickly retreated and no follow up action was required.13 By mid-February 1915, British intelligence in Egypt had reached the conclusion that the Turkish Army’s gaze was focused elsewhere and that, apart from minor raids and other small scale operations, there was no significant threat facing the British in Egypt.14

By March 1915, both British and Ottoman attention had shifted to the

Dardanelles. British military intelligence had collected a significant amount of information about the Gallipoli peninsula prior to the outbreak of the war. The primary source of this intelligence were expeditions undertaken by British military officers or attachés that had operated in the region. However, a series of international crises had, from the turn of the century, focused British military and naval intelligence at different times on the Gallipoli peninsula and provided

12 Ibid., pp.45–54. 13 Bean, Official History of Australia in the War of 1914–18, Volume I, pp.140–165. 14 Sheffy, British Military Intelligence, p.107.

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the catalyst for the dispatch of secret agents into the region to ‘spy out’ the lay of the land. As explained in Chapter 4, this provided the British with a detailed understanding of the topography of the Gallipoli peninsula from a military perspective.15 As the likelihood of military action against the Ottoman Empire increased, older intelligence was supplemented by information obtained from new agents, particularly Greeks who had previously inhabited the peninsula.16

The sensitive nature of secret service activities meant that information obtained from secret service sources was not widely disseminated, even in the early days of the war. Intelligence from secret service agents is frequently recorded in the intelligence diaries of both GHQ MEF and Corps Headquarters.

There are, however, only infrequent mentions of the secret service as the source of specific intelligence in the intelligence diaries of the 1st Division or the New

Zealand and Australian Division. Despite there being no specific references to secret service reports, the information contained in many intelligence reports, such as the strength of the enemy on the Gallipoli peninsula before the landings, could only have come from secret service agents. As planning for the landings at

Gallipoli commenced, other intelligence derived from secret service agents, such as reports on the state of the Ottoman Army, the location of Turkish troops and their ability to respond to an attack by the British, can be observed in plans and orders even if the source of the intelligence is not stated.17 Where secret service reporting is specifically referred to, in almost all instances some description of

15 Peter Chasseaud and Peter Doyle, Grasping Gallipoli: Terrain, Maps and Failure at the Dardenelles 1915 (Staplehurst, Spellmount, 2005), pp.54–71. 16 Information on Villages, Roads and Water in the Gallipoli Peninsula Australian Division Ig(1)4455, 16 April 1915, AWM25. 17 Intelligence, General Headquarters Mediterranean Expeditionary Force March-April 1915, AWM4, 1/5/1.

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the secret service agents reliability or access to intelligence is included, with reports often marked that they were obtained by ‘reliable agents’, ‘reliable sources’, or a ‘well informed man’.18

In late March 1915, secret service information indicated that the Turks expected an attempt on the Dardanelles and were confident that sea mines and other defences would prevent a fleet from forcing passage. In anticipation of a landing on the Gallipoli peninsula, the Turks began to move a large number of troops from Constantinople to Gallipoli. Other secret service reports told of trucks containing rifles and guns, torpedoes, and sea mines arriving in

Constantinople to equip the forces that were holding the Dardanelles.19

One of the most significant intelligence challenges facing GHQ MEF was determining the strength of the Turkish forces on the Gallipoli peninsula.

Hamilton noted that estimates of Turkish troops on the peninsula in March 1915 were between 30,000 and 40,000 troops. While Hamilton does not cite the source of this information, it is likely that secret service reports were the source.20 In addition to understanding the exact numbers of Turkish troops on the peninsula, GHQ MEF also needed to know about the locations of reserves close to Constantinople and the number of troops that were located on the

Asiatic side of the Dardenelles. This information seems to have been provided by

18 Dardanelles GHQ Intelligence Summary from 6th March to 31st July, Jul 1915, TNA, WO157/647. 19 Ibid. 20 Ian Hamilton, Gallipoli Diary (New York, George H Doran Company, 1920), Volume 1, p.28. Hamilton’s Gallipoli Diary attempts to cast Hamilton’s role in the course of events in a more positive light and there is doubt over the accuracy of many of his statements. Estimates of the number of enemy troops on the peninsula contained in Hamilton’s work need to be considered in this light.

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a number of secret service sources. Secret service reports also identified many of the Turkish divisions and regiments that made up the Dardanelles garrison.21

A large amount of the information about the operations of the Germans and Turkish forces at Gallipoli was obtained through secret service agents operating in Greece.22 Other sources annotated in the reports include Military

Attaches throughout the region, as well as travelers and other neutrals that had recently been in Constantinople.23 While many of the reports lacked operational detail, they were able to provide useful information about the locations of reserves and key commanders, and the fears that the Turks had about the conflict spreading to involve neighboring countries such as Bulgaria.24 This information enabled British commanders to assess the likelihood of the Turks being able to deploy additional forces to the peninsula and provided some understanding of how long it was likely to take Turkish forces to move into positions to contain the landings. One report received from an agent stated that the German Ambassador did not expect an attack on the Dardanelles until the end of May 1915. However, the accompanying assessment noted that this statement was probably designed to deliberately mislead British intelligence.25

After the landings on Gallipoli, reports from secret service agents about the number of casualties being transported to Constantinople provided some insight into the likely scale of the Turkish losses, ‘8000 Turkish wounded arrived

21 Dardanelles GHQ Intelligence Summary from 6th March to 31st July, 27 March 1915. TNA, WO157/647. 22 Dardanelles GHQ Intelligence Summary from 6th March to 31st July, Jul 1915, TNA, WO157/647. 23 GHQ Intelligence MEF Intelligence Summary August 1915, 2 August 1915, TNA, WO157/648. 24 Dardanelles GHQ Intelligence Summary from 6th March to 31st July, 5 April 1915, TNA, WO157/647. 25 Dardanelles GHQ Intelligence Summary from 6th March to 31st July, 6 April 1915, TNA, WO157/647.

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in C’PLE April 28th.’26 Estimates of enemy casualties obtained through secret service reporting were often wildly inaccurate and varied. After the landings and the early fighting in May 1915, secret agent reports claimed that the number of enemy dead and wounded ranged from 20,000 to 50,000. While there had been severe losses on both sides, rumor and hearsay were often reported as fact, leading to wildly exaggerated reports of enemy casualties.27 Reports from the

French secret service were shared with their British counterparts and were useful in corroborating reports received from British agents. One French report from early May 1915 told of the large number of wounded arriving in

Constantinople and the lack of hospital facilities to treat the wounded.28

Information obtained from prisoners and secret service agents also indicated varying levels of shortages of ammunition, food and other war materiel.29

Monitoring the movement of enemy trains across the Turkish railway network proved to be a useful way to determine the number of reinforcements being sent to Gallipoli. Several reports from secret agents provided information about the frequency and size of trains being sent from Constantinople with reinforcements.30

There are one or two occasions where it is possible to connect human intelligence and military action on the part of the Australians. Reports from

‘reliable sources’ in early July 1915 told of a critical shortage of munitions on the

Ottoman side of the battle. Secret service reporting indicated that the Turks were

26 Dardanelles GHQ Intelligence Summary from 6th March to 31st July, 9 May 1915, TNA, WO157/647. 27 ANZAC Corps Intelligence — Intelligence Bulletin, 25 May 1915, AWM25. 28 ANZAC Corps Intelligence — Intelligence Bulletin, 26 May 1915, TNA, WO157/669. 29 ANZAC Corps Intelligence — Intelligence Bulletin, 28 May 1915, AWM25. 30 ANZAC Corps Intelligence — Intelligence Bulletin, 3 June 1915, TNA, WO157/670.

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awaiting shipments from Germany and that they lacked the ability to manufacture their own munitions, although Turkish factories were expected to be able to produce ammunition and other munitions ‘shortly’. The 1st Division ordered front line troops to make additional efforts to draw fire from the Turkish positions and directed that additional patrols and bombing parties be used to harass the Turks and encourage them to expend ammunition needlessly.31 Secret service reporting also spoke of the strained relationship between the Germans and the Turks, along with the poor state of morale amongst the Turkish troops, both regular and volunteers, who had been demoralised by the large number of casualties incurred by the Turkish Army.32 This reporting, before the opening of the August offensive, may have been an encouraging sign that the planned attack would succeed.

More detailed and more accurate information was occasionally available, such as a report obtained from a ‘special agent’ in August 1915 which provided information about Turkish military plans; fortifications around Constantinople; estimates of enemy troops killed and wounded; troop locations and concentrations; the ability of the Turks to manufacture ammunition and other military supplies; the Turkish navy; submarines and torpedo boats; and the supply of coal and other war essentials. Copies of this report were specifically sent to the commanders of the 1st and 2nd Divisions at the direction of GHQ

MEF.33

31 1st Australian Division Memorandum, 10 July 1915, TNA, WO95/4328. 32 GHQ Intelligence MEF Intelligence Summary August 1915, 2 August 1915, TNA, WO157/648. 33 Report of a Special Agent General Headquarters Mediterranean Expeditionary Force I.106, 5 September 1915, AWM25.

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After the withdrawal from Gallipoli, the Australians resumed security operations along the Suez Canal. British military intelligence remained active and secret service agents operated throughout the Levant, reporting on the condition and location of the Turkish Army and critical items such as water supplies, which would be important should the Turks decide to attack Egypt again.34 Secret service agents also reported on possible lines of advance across the Sinai, which the enemy planned to use to conduct further attacks on the Suez

Canal.35 Australian troops manning the canal defences were also warned that secret service agents were being sent across the Sinai by the Chief Intelligence

Officer and that they were to be checked by the security force when leaving

Egypt, and searched and detained upon their return.36

France and Belgium — 1916–1918

Arriving in France, the Australians continued to receive intelligence from secret service agents, although specific references to secret service reporting diminished significantly and were seldom seen in intelligence summaries or reports distributed to operational level headquarters. Intelligence reports frequently contained information about the situation behind the German lines or back in Germany which could only have come from secret service sources, even if there was no attribution to the secret service.37 While secret service reporting undoubtedly contributed to the overall intelligence picture in France and

34 Intelligence — 1st Anzac Corps, 7 February 1916, AWM26, 5/24. 35 Second Australian Division Intelligence Summary No.3, 30 January 1916, AWM26, 4/13. 36 Second Australian Division Circular Memorandum, 10 February 1916, AWM25. 37 Second Army Daily Intelligence Summary No.231, I.G.582, 4 April 1916, AWM26, 16/15.

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Belgium it is difficult, particularly at the operational level, to determine how human intelligence was used, specifically in battle planning.

Despite the lack of obvious connections with the battles that the

Australians fought on the Western Front, there is no doubt that intelligence derived from secret service sources helped British intelligence understand the

German Army’s intentions. Train movements were an important source of intelligence frequently obtained by secret service agents operating behind

German lines. The composition of a train, determined by the types of wagons, was often an indication that a German infantry, cavalry, or artillery unit was being moved to a new position along the front.38 Train movements allowed GHQ to track the movement of German formations from west to east, and around the battlefield.

Reports would provide the time, date and routing information that enabled GHQ to assess the composition of the unit being moved, along with its likely destination. One such report obtained from on secret service agent noted:

…between the 8th and 10th November [1916], inclusive, 50 trains,

carrying all arms, were counted passing from NAMUR to CHARLEROI. A

large proportion of these trains (mostly artillery and guns) were

subsequently observed moving to MAUBERGE. A simultaneous movement

of 31 trains, carrying all arms, was noticed during the same period from

CHARERLOI to NAMUR, apparently originating from direction of

MAUBERG and MONS respectively.39

38 GHQ Summary of Information Ia/24150, 22 November 1916, AWM26, 104/9. 39 GHQ Summary of Information Ia/24150, 22 November 1916, AWM26, 104/9.

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So sensitive was the information about train movements that details were issued only in GHQ intelligence summaries, with specific instructions that intelligence relating to train movements was not to be reproduced in army or corps intelligence reports.40

Occasional reports from secret service agents were still passed directly down to corps level. These reports were often quite fanciful: ‘a reliable agent reports that by the first week in March [1917], the Germans will have completed

100 tanks, more powerful than the British ones and capable of containing a crew of 50 men.’41 Reports of this nature added little value to the intelligence picture and more often than not cast doubt on the value of secret service reporting.

While they were serving on the canal defences in Egypt, the Australians were alerted to efforts to send secret service agents across the Sinai to monitor the activities of the Turkish Army. Similar efforts were attempted in France and

Belgium, although the nature of the battlefield was very different and prevented the movement of agents into enemy territory via the front line. Nonetheless,

Australian troops were warned that friendly agents may on occasion attempt to pass through the front line, and that anyone claiming to be an allied agent should be detained and immediately passed to Division Headquarters for examination.42

The Australians were also warned to be aware of efforts by allied agents to send information back to British intelligence. One scheme involved the use of balloons to transmit information from behind German lines. Australian troops were

40 Ibid. 41 Fifth Army Memorandum S.G. 67/1, 22 February 1917, AWM26, 104/13. 42 First Australian Division S/5289, 12 April 1917, AWM25, 325/3/48.

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warned to expect balloons and that, if spotted, balloons should be collected and forwarded to Division Headquarters without delay.43

Civilians

Perhaps the most obvious difference between the battlefields of Gallipoli and those of France and Belgium was the immediate proximity of civilians to the battlefields. While there were concerns that some French or Belgian civilians were working for German intelligence, they also proved to be a useful source of intelligence, given their knowledge of the local area now crisscrossed by the front line.

When preparing for the attack on Pozières in July 1916, information obtained from former inhabitants provided details about the layout of the village and the structure of the houses, and indicated were the Germans had constructed observation and signaling posts, command posts, weapon positions, and supply dumps.44 During the fighting of 1917, information obtained from former local inhabitants appeared frequently in intelligence appreciations. When troops from II ANZAC Corps attacked during the battle of Messines, to aid with mopping up operations, the attacking troops were provided with descriptions of farms, villages and towns that would be encountered. II ANZAC Corps intelligence reports identified several buildings in Messines and Warneton, along with other locations such as Steignast Farm and the Basseville Sugar Refinery, which were known to have cellars or were strongly constructed and could house a German garrison.45

43 Fifteenth Australian Infantry Brigade Memorandum 21/519, 8 April 1917, AWM26, 177/4. 44 Pozières, June 1916, AWM26, 35/15. 45 Commune of Messines & Warneton, 31 May 1917, AWM26, 191/9.

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As the Australians attacked towards Passchendale, intelligence assessments contained information obtained from local inhabitants which described a number of farms were identified in the line of advance, including

Snipe Hall, Duck Farm, Graf, Waterfields, Heine House, Vienna Cotts, and Tiber.

Details were provided about each of the farms, including whether they had deep cellars which could serve as dug-outs.46 Descriptions of Passchendale village identified several key buildings to the attacking troops, including the concert hall and cinema, doctors house, brewery, mill, post office, and several houses described as having large, vaulted cellars. This information could only have come from the former local inhabitants, now refugees in allied territory.47

Counter-espionage

While the activities of the secret service remained unknown outside of the intelligence staff, Australian troops were more familiar with counter-espionage operations. Counter-espionage staff were responsible for the detection of enemy spies and the prevention of the leakage of military information. While counter- espionage staff were part of the Intelligence Branch of the General Staff, they maintained a close relationship with the Provost Marshal and the military police.48 The training for counter-espionage staff was also slightly different to the training given to other intelligence officers. A large part of their training revolved around understanding the system of passes and permits, laws and regulations that were in force in the areas in which they were operating. Knowledge of

46 Third Australian Division Information on Houses, Woods, Roads etc Commune of Passchendale and south-west, 8 October 1917, AWM26, 250/4. 47 Third Australian Division Memorandum S.G.400/9, 8 October 1917, AWM26, 250/4. 48 ‘Counter-Espionage’, April 1916, AWM25, 325/3/48

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signaling, codes and communication were also taught to counter-espionage staff to enable them to detect enemy activity rather than to enable them to communicate securely. Other more common skills, such as map reading, using compasses, interrogation and questioning suspects, were also part of counter- espionage staff training.49

During the Australians’ time in Egypt, there were concerns about ‘enemy spies’, and efforts were made to monitor the movements of Bedouins and others across the Sinai. Steps were also taken to prevent civilian access to military areas to counter concerns about spies. However, these arrangements were largely ad hoc and left to the military police.50

On Gallipoli, while the troops ashore experienced many ‘spy scares’, there was little likelihood of ‘enemy spies’ operating behind British or Australian lines.

Being hemmed in on all sides, there was no requirement for counter-espionage activities at Anzac. Military police performed other intelligence functions. One notable example was the decision to use military police from the First Brigade to search the brigade areas during the withdrawal from Anzac to ensure that any important papers left behind by the withdrawing forces were located and destroyed to deny information to the enemy.51

In France, the situation was more complicated, with French and Belgian civilians living in close proximity to the front. Counter-espionage was deemed to be an important function and counter-espionage systems were organised within

49 Memorandum on the Duties and Establishment of Intelligence Police I(b) 2479, 1 May 1916, AWM25, 423/2/5. 50 Second Australian Division Circular Memorandum, 21 February 1916, AWM25, 325/3/36. 51 Bean, Official History of Australia in the War of 1914–18, Volume I, pp.470–471; General Staff 1st Australian Divisions 1st–30th November 1915 Part II Notes on the Withdrawal from Anzac Appendix II Summary of means taken to preserve normal conditions and prevent the enemy discovering our movements, December 1915, TNA, WO95/4332.

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the area of each army.52 Counter-espionage personnel were recruited from within the BEF and attached to the Intelligence Corps as Intelligence Officers or

Intelligence Police.

Counter-espionage officers were responsible for the examination of any case that could conceivably be connected with enemy espionage.53 The focus of

Intelligence Police activity was mainly the civil population, although counter- espionage personnel also investigated cases in which German agents were reported to have posed as British officers.54Instructions were issued to

Australian troops, along with the rest of the BEF, to heighten their awareness of the potential for enemy agents to obtain information about their activities.

Warnings about the dangers of correspondence with strangers and about the leakage of information to the enemy were frequently issued.55

In the early years of the war, there was an overwhelming fear about organised networks of German spies operating in Belgium and France, and these views were well entrenched when the Australians arrived. The Australians were frequently warned about the dangers of discussing military matters with civilians when out of the front line.56 Fear of German ‘infiltrators’ and spies led to many arrests and reports. A typical counter-espionage report from early April

1916 noted ‘a man of suspicious appearance, wearing a British Infantry Uniform, was arrested at WISSANT on the 4th of April, escaped from his escort that evening. Description Height about 5ft.8ins; fair hair; well built. No regimental

52 Second Army Counter-Espionage Instructions, March 1916, AWM25, 325/3/48. 53 Intelligence Corps Memorandum on the Duties and Establishment of Intelligence Police I(b) 2479, 1 May 1916, AWM25, 423/2/5. 54 Ibid. 55 First Australian Division A.A.&Q.M.G. Ref.47/49, 19 June 1916, AWM25, 325/3/36; Leakage of Military Information G.R.C.1709, 24 July 1916, AWM25, 325/3/36. 56 First Australian Division Memorandum S.896, 29 August 1916, AWM25.

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badge or number on uniforms; two stripes. Wearing gaiters and trousers. Says that he belongs to the Connaught Rangers.’ These sort of reports undoubtedly served to increase rather than reduce concerns about enemy agents operating among British and French troops. Similar reports about the activities of French and Belgian civilians would also have served to heighten the suspicions of front line troops rather than allay them.57

Scares about German spies continued throughout the war and Intelligence

Police investigated many reports of enemy agents operating in and around towns near the fighting. As one investigation report noted, ‘while every suspicious incident should be reported at once and any suspect immediately arrested, it is felt that the number of cases now and heretofore investigated, not only in France, but in Belgium as well, show that the suspicions of the average soldier are very easily aroused’.58

I ANZAC Corps established a small counter-espionage section in June

1916, consisting of one Australian officer, three Australian Intelligence Police, and three Belgian/French Sûretè officials. Belgian and French Sûretè officials were allocated to the section depending upon whether the Australians were operating in France or Belgium at the time.59 The counter-espionage section within I ANZAC Corps was later expanded to twelve men, drawn from the Corps

Cyclist Battalion. Personnel identified for duties as Intelligence Police were expected to be fluent in French and have some ability to speak German and

Flemish. Previous employment in police or investigative roles was also looked

57 Second Army Daily Intelligence Summary No.262, I.G.303, 5 April 1916, AWM26, 16/15. 58 Second Army Intelligence Report I.b.466, 2 March 1917, AWM25. 59 First Australian and New Zealand Army Corps General Staff Circular No.12 Counter-Espionage, 16 June 1916, AWM25, 423/2/5.

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upon favourably.60 Intelligence Police were placed under control of Army

Headquarters and were commanded centrally by counter-espionage staff. In the case of the Second Army, counter-espionage activities were managed from a central office in Poperinghe.61

Prevention of ‘leakage of information’ to the enemy was also a function of the counter-espionage staff and intelligence police. Lectures about the need prevent ‘the leakage of information’ were a standard part of every soldiers training when out of the front lines. Front line troops were cautioned about the need to prevent their activities being watched or overheard by the Germans.

They were also warned about the capabilities of German listening apparatus and about German spies.62 Even in the last days of the war, every platoon in the

Australian Corps was expected to be given a fortnightly lecture on ‘giving away information’ that highlighted the different methods employed by the Germans to obtain information from British troops.63

During an attack, Intelligence Police rejoined their parent corps and were employed searching German trenches, strong-points, and dug-outs after the advancing troops had moved past them.64 Intelligence Police were used to collect documents, maps and other materials from dead Germans, relieving advancing infantry of the requirement to carry out this function during the attack.65

In the final battles of the war, Intelligence Police continued to complete their counter-espionage duties as the Australians advanced through villages and

60 First Australian and New Zealand Army Corps General Staff Circular No.13 Counter-Espionage no.106/52, 1 July 1916, AWM25, 423/2/5. 61 First Australian Division Memorandum 100/78, 24 September, AWM25, 423/2/5. 62 Lecture by Capt Greenwood on Intelligence & Security, 19/6/16, AWM25, 457/4/8. 63 Lecture ‘Giving Away Information’, June 1918, AWM26, 424/6. 64 First Australian Division Memorandum 100/88, 24 October 1916, AWM25, 423/2/5. 65 First Australian Division Memorandum 100/88, 24 October 1916, AWM25, 423/2/5.

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towns abandoned by the Germans. Intelligence Police were ordered to identify and arrest German agents, monitor potential sympathisers, and search for concealed communications devices, documents, and other equipment left behind by the retreating Germans.66 Counter-espionage staff were also responsible for interviewing local inhabitants to obtain information that was of use to the advancing armies.67

Secret service reporting was an important source of intelligence that offered unique insights into the activities and intentions of the enemy. British military intelligence understood the value of human intelligence and this was reflected in pre-war doctrine. Despite rivalries between the different organisations responsible for undertaking secret agent operations, British military intelligence was well served across all of its theatres by its secret service sources. At the operational level, however, it is difficult to see or assess the direct impact that human intelligence had on the way in which the Australians planned or conducted their battles. Little secret service reporting found its way directly to corps level headquarters or subordinate formations and, as the war progressed, the amount of intelligence directly attributed to secret service sources that was passed to I and II ANZAC Corps diminished further.

Nonetheless, it is possible to see an indirect link with intelligence derived from secret service agents, often attributed to other sources to protect details of secret service reporting, referred to in intelligence summaries and reports used by the

Australians. The Australians also established and maintained a counter- espionage section. The role of counter-espionage officers differed during periods

66 Scheme for the work of Intelligence (b) with Australian Corps in the case of an advance during which civilians are encountered Ig.106/1066, 28 September 1918, AWM25, 423/2/27. 67 Ibid.

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of static trench warfare and during attacks or advances. When the front was static they played an important and more visible role investigating reports of espionage and monitoring the activities of civilians. Their most important role, however, was performed when they moved behind the advancing troops searching for documents and interviewing civilians.

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Chapter 9. Trench raids

By 1916, trench raids were a common occurrence, undertaken by both the

British and their German counterparts.1 Trench raids served many purposes. For divisions newly arrived in France or Belgium, trench raids were an opportunity to gain much needed combat experience and put into practice the theory that had been taught during training. Trench raids were useful for preparing troops for larger, more complicated battles; they helped to inoculate ‘green’ troops and provided junior leaders such as platoon and company commanders much needed battlefield experience. Trench raids also provided an opportunity for troops to familiarise themselves with the workings of artillery, trench mortars, and machine guns, along with more basic infantry weapons such as grenades.2

Trench raids were also undertaken to collect intelligence. The objective of a trench raid was almost always the capture of prisoners or intelligence derived from enemy documents, equipment, or supplies. Trench raids could be small enterprises carried out by an infantry company, or they could be much larger, with entire battalions undertaking large scale raids. Trench raids yielded valuable information and while never popular with the troops they were an important source of information from the front line. Trench raids also required careful planning and provided an early example of how intelligence could be used to plan attacks. The minute planning of trench raids offers a useful

1 For trench raids, see Tony Ashworth, Trench Warfare 1914–1918: The Live and Let Live System (London, Pan Books, 2000); Nicholas E. Efstathiou, Brave Men: Allied Trench Raiding in the First World War, Kindle edition (September 2010); Paddy Griffith, Battle Tactics of the Western Front: The British Army’s Art of Attack 1916–1918 (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1994); Paddy Griffith (ed.), British Fighting Methods in the Great War (London, Frank Cass, 1996); Captain Hugh Knyvett, ‘Over There’ with the Australians (New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1918); Captain George McKean, Scouting Thrills, (Canada, 1919); Bill Rawling, Surviving Trench Warfare: Technology and the Canadian Corps, 1914–1918 (Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1992); Anthony Saunders, Raiding on the Western Front (Barnsley, Pen & Sword Books, 2012). 2 Griffith, Battle Tactics, pp.60–62.

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comparison when examining the way in which larger attacks, such as Fromelles, were planned and what may have been possible with better use of intelligence when planning attacks at this stage of the war. This chapter examines the

Australian experience of trench raiding, how intelligence was used to plan trench raids, and the way that trench raids were used to gather different types of intelligence. This chapter also examines the planning for the battle of Fromelles and the similarities between an attack of this type and a trench raid.

Early trench raids

The first trench raids are claimed to have taken place as early as October 1914, but it was not until 1915, when the front line had stabilised, that trench raids became a normal part of warfare on the Western Front. In order to maintain some form of offensive activity, while the Western Front stood on the defensive, the Commander-in-Chief of the BEF, Field Marshal Sir John French, called for

‘constant activity’ along the front.3

The raid model largely adopted by British and Dominion forces was first used by the Canadians on 16/17 November 1915 on the Douve River, when the

5th and 7th Canadian Battalions conducted an attack on the German trenches opposite. Detailed planning and the use of intelligence was the hallmark of this attack. The raid had several objectives: the capture of enemy prisoners to identify units opposite and gaining information through their interrogation; to induce the enemy to send forward reserves to counter-attack and expose them to British artillery; and to lower enemy morale.4

3 Stephen Bull, ‘The Somme and Beyond’, War On The Western Front in the Trenches of World War I, Gary Sheffield (ed), (Oxford, Osprey, 2007), p.229. 4 Rawling, Surviving Trench Warfare, p.48.

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Before the raid, aggressive Canadian patrolling in no-man’s land had forced the enemy to withdraw listening posts, which that meant that the enemy was not warned of the approaching raiding force. A replica of the section of trench to be raided was constructed to the rear of the Canadian lines and the infantry who were to conduct the raid carried out detailed rehersals in advance of the attack. Ninety raiders were divided into two groups, within which were sections devoted to different tasks such as wire cutting, bombing and blocking, rifle grenadiers, covering sections, and a reserve.5 Dividing the attacking force into two groups meant that once the German trenches were entered, the force could attack down the trench in both directions simultaneously and establish blocks to prevent counter-attacks.6

On the day of the raid, artillery and trench mortars targeted enemy machine guns and wire, firing from early in the morning and continuing after nightfall. Once darkness had fallen, and under the cover of artillery and machine gun fire, scouts moved out into no-mans, clearing gaps in the enemy obstacles and ensuring that bridges were in place across ditches and the Douve River.7

During the raid, artillery planned to bombard the enemy support trenches to prevent enemy counter-attacks and allow the raiding force to complete their task. As the raiders withdrew, the artillery planned to shell the front line trench that had just been raided, permitting the raiding force to escape.8 During the actual raid, the right hand group was detected after five men fell noisily into a water-filled ditch and were discovered by the Germans, who quickly opened fire.

5 Ibid. 6 Sheffield, War On The Western Front, pp.230–231. 7 Rawling, Surviving Trench Warfare, p.49. 8 Ibid.

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The raiders were forced to withdraw under pressure. The left hand group was more successful, achieving surprise and entering the enemy trench, bombing enemy dug-outs and taking prisoners before withdrawing. The cost of the raid was one dead and one wounded.9

The Australians first attempted a trench raid while they were on Gallipoli.

The first recorded Australian raid occurred on 8 May 1915, when a platoon of soldiers from the 4th Battalion crept forward to the Turkish trenches with a view to rushing the enemy trench. It was discovered that the Turks were alert and the prospect of the raid being successful was assessed as minimal. The raiding party withdrew without conducting the attack.10

Armentières — 1916

The first Australian trench raid in France took place in the Armentières sector and was conducted by the Seventh Brigade in early June 1916.11 The raiding party was composed of sixty-six men (six officers and sixty other ranks) drawn from the 26th and 28th Battalions. The objectives of the raid were to obtain prisoners for purposes of identification; to collect information regarding the condition of, and method of, holding the enemy’s trenches; to kill as many of the enemy as possible; and to capture or destroy a machine gun which was thought to be in the area.12 The plan was for a silent raid that would slip across no-man’s land and through gaps that had been opened in the enemy defences.13

9 Sheffield, War On The Western Front, p.231. 10 Bean, Official History of Australia in the War of 1914–18, Volume I, p.55. 11 Bean, Official History of Australia in the War of 1914–18, Volume III, p.243. 12 Report on Minor Offensive Operation carried out by the 7th Infantry Brigade, 2nd Australian Division on Night of 6th/7th June 1916, June 1916, AWM26, 28/31. 13 Ibid.

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Two officers from the 1st Canadian Division, Lieutenant Allan Connors and Lieutenant Stanley Kent, were loaned to the Australians to assist in training the raiding party.14 Following the model established by the Canadians and largely adopted by the BEF, a detailed replica of the area to be raided, based on maps and aerial photographs, was constructed behind the lines. The raiding party was removed from the front line and rehearsed the raid numerous times until each member of the raiding party knew his job thoroughly. Members of the raiding force were assigned similar tasks to those devised by the Canadians, with tasks being allocated to scouts, bombers, blockers, carriers, messengers, and intelligence men.15

The ‘intelligence men’ consisted of an NCO and another soldier whose tasks were to search the German dead and to examine enemy dug-outs, removing objects of intelligence value.16 The party was issued with special clothing that contained no identifying marks, so that if they were killed or captured while on the raid, the enemy would gain no intelligence about the raiding force. Bayonets were painted and the raiders blackened their faces and equipment to prevent them from showing up easily in the dark.17

During the first week of June 1916, 2nd Division artillery began registering targets in the area of the raid. Registration was carried out gradually in response to German shelling in an attempt to deceive the enemy and not to

14 Bean, Official History of Australia in the War of 1914–18, Volume III, p.244. 15 Report on Minor Offensive Operation carried out by the 7th Infantry Brigade, 2nd Australian Division on Night of 6th/7th June 1916, June 1916, AWM26, 28/31. 16 Ibid. 17 Bean, Official History of Australia in the War of 1914–18, Volume III, p.245.

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indicate that planning for an attack or raid was underway.18 The raid was scheduled for the night of 5 June 1916, but while attempting to open a gap in the enemy wire, Australian scouts were discovered and returned to the Australian lines where the raid was postponed for 24 hours.19 Following the failed attempt at a silent raid, the decision was made for artillery to screen the raiding force when they attacked again the following evening. On the morning of 6 June, medium trench mortars began bombarding the enemy wire at the point of entry into the enemy lines to help clear gaps, and just prior to the raid divisional artillery, trench mortars and heavy artillery opened fire at points along the enemy front line to mislead the enemy into thinking the raid was taking place north and south of the objective. Ten minutes before the raid, the artillery switched targets and placed a box-barrage around the area to be attacked.20

The raiders swept into the enemy trench, finding it apparently deserted and different to the replica in which they had practiced the raid. While the practice area had been modeled on information obtained from aerial photographs, poor interpretation of the photographs had failed to show the true nature of the enemy trench construction.21 Despite the unexpected layout of the trench, the blocking parties moved forward and located the communications trenches that joined the front line trench. Here they established their ‘blocks’ while the bombing parties began to move their way along the trench, rolling

18 Bean, Official History of Australia in the War of 1914–18, Volume III, p.245; Report on Minor Offensive Operation carried out by the 7th Infantry Brigade, 2nd Australian Division on Night of 6th/7th June 1916, June 1916, AWM26, 28/31. 19 Bean, Official History of Australia in the War of 1914–18, Volume III, p.246. 20 Report on Minor Offensive Operation carried out by the 7th Infantry Brigade, 2nd Australian Division on Night of 6th/7th June 1916, June 1916, AWM26, 28/31. 21 Bean, Official History of Australia in the War of 1914–18, Volume III, p.249.

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grenades into each enemy dug-out they discovered.22 Several Germans emerged, and those failing to immediately surrender were quickly killed by the

Australians. After searching the dug-outs and clearing the enemy trench, a flare was fired, signaling the withdrawal. The Australians returned to the point of entry and then followed a line of luminescent tape laid by scouts across no-mans land. The Australians had been in the German lines for six minutes.23 A total of thirteen Germans were encountered, nine were killed, one severely wounded and three prisoners from the 231st Reserve Infantry Regiment were captured.24

No Australians were killed or wounded while in the German trenches and it was only during the return to the Australian lines that a German shell landed among a group of the raiders, killing two and wounding four.25

This first trench raid set the standard for subsequent Australian raids and the next raid was conducted a week later by the 6th Battalion.26 Once again, reconnaissance had identified an area where German wire appeared to be thin and could easily be destroyed by trench mortars to create gaps for raiders to pass through. The objective of this second raid was similar to the first and the raiders’ tasks included capturing prisoners; collecting identifications, papers and maps; killing Germans; and capturing or destroying enemy heavy weapons such as machine guns or trench mortars.27 As with the first raid, the raiding party was

22 Ibid., p.250. 23 Report on Minor Offensive Operation carried out by the 7th Infantry Brigade, 2nd Australian Division on Night of 6th/7th June 1916, June 1916, AWM26, 28/31. 24 Report on Minor Offensive Operation carried out by the 7th Infantry Brigade, 2nd Australian Division on Night of 6th/7th June 1916, June 1916, AWM26, 28/31; Bean, Official History of Australia in the War of 1914–18, Volume III, p.251. 25 Report on Minor Offensive Operation carried out by the 7th Infantry Brigade, 2nd Australian Division on Night of 6th/7th June 1916, June 1916, AWM26, 28/31. 26 Operation Order No.3 by Lt.Col. H.G. Bennett. C.M.G. Commdg. 6th Battalion, 8 June 1916, AWM26, 27/9. 27 Ibid.

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withdrawn from the front line for training and rehearsals, and a replica trench was constructed based on aerial photographs of the German trenches.28

Unlike the earlier raid, no personnel were ordered to collect intelligence from the German trenches. Although the Battalion Intelligence Officer,

Lieutenant John Rogers, accompanied the raiding party, he did not enter the

German trenches and there is no indication that the raid collected any intelligence beyond the six prisoners who were captured.29

Further raids were conducted by the Australians throughout June 1916 on various sections of the German front line. While the collection of intelligence and capture of prisoners was always a stated aim of these operations, it appears that the emphasis on collecting intelligence as opposed to conducting assaults aimed at inflicting casualties and capturing or destroying German weapons was largely at the discretion of the officer planning the raid. This contrast is illustrated in the orders for raids by a mixed party from all the battalions in the

Fifth Brigade on 25/26 June 1916, and by the 1st Battalion on 28/29 June 1916.

Both sets of orders mention the requirement for intelligence personnel to accompany the raiding force, but the emphasis placed on the role of intelligence personnel in each set of orders is very different.30 The Fifth Brigade’s orders are explicit in detailing intelligence personnel to search for pay books, identity discs, shoulder straps, letters, pocket books, and samples of enemy equipment such as flares, grenades, and gas helmets. Intelligence personnel were also tasked with

28 Report on a Minor Enterprise by party from 6th Battalion A.I.F on a portion of enemy trench in FLEURBAIX on night 12/13th June 16, 15 June 1916, AWM26, 27/9. 29 Ibid. 30 Operation Order No.14. by Brigadier-General W. Holmes. C.M.G. D.S.O. V.D. Commanding Fifth Australian Infantry Brigade, 23 June 1916, AWM26, 30/2; Trench Operation Order by Lieut.Col. J.Heane D.S.O. Commanding 1st. Bn., 21 June 1916, AWM26, 27/2.

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reporting on the construction of enemy trenches and dug-outs.31 In contrast, the orders for the 1st Battalion give intelligence personnel no specific tasks to be completed during the raid.32

Most of the early Australian trench raids in France were conducted by groups of 60–70 men, but larger raids were also undertaken. On the evening of

29/30 June 1916, a raiding force of two hundred and fifty-three Australians drawn from the Sixth Brigade attacked the German trenches opposite their position near Armentières.33 The raiding force was split into three groups and planned to enter the enemy trenches at three separate points.34 This meant that the preliminary bombardment needed to cut the enemy wire in multiple locations, which it failed to do, forcing the raiding party to cut through the enemy wire or locate alternative points of entry into the German trenches. All three parties eventually made their way into the trenches, with varying degrees of success, although only one party managed to secure any enemy prisoners. The raiders claimed to have killed between eighty to one hundred of the enemy at the cost of eight killed, twenty-five wounded, and three missing.35

Common to all of the raids conducted by the Australians after first arriving on the front line in France was the amount of operational planning and preparation that accompanied each raid. Before each raid was conducted, detailed reconnaissance was undertaken in no-mans land to identify routes to and from the objective, as well as any major obstacles that needed to be crossed

31 Operation Order No.14. by Brigadier-General W. Holmes. C.M.G. D.S.O. V.D. Commanding Fifth Australian Infantry Brigade, 23 June 1916, AWM26, 30/2. 32 Trench Operation Order by Lieut.Col. J.Heane D.S.O. Commanding 1st. Bn., 21 June 1916, AWM26, 27/2. 33 6th Australian Infantry Brigade Operation Order No.18, 24 June 1916, AWM26, 30/9. 34 Operation No 18, 24 June 1918, AWM26, 30/9. 35 Operation No 18, 24 June 1918, AWM26, 30/9.

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or avoided.36 Weak points in the enemy wire were identified as potential points of entry into the German lines, and on several occasions the site of a raid was selected on the basis of the condition of the enemy wire.37 Aerial photographs were used to construct replicas of the enemy trench to be attacked and were shown to the raiding party to help identify the locations of machine guns, trench mortars, and likely enemy dug-outs, as well as giving them an appreciation of the layout of the trench they were to assault.38 Intelligence files and log-books were scrutinised for information relating to the German units believed to be opposite the Australians and the position to be attacked.39 Operation orders were painstakingly detailed, specifying the roles of individual soldiers during the raid.40 The minute planning involved in undertaking a raid, and the use of multiple sources of intelligence to ascertain the best location for the raiders to target, showed the kind of operational planning that the Australians (and the

BEF) were capable of at this stage of the war. What is less clear is why this same level of detailed planning did not translate to larger attacks, such as the attack at

Fromelles.

Fromelles — 1916

In late June 1916, I ANZAC Corps was ordered to join the fighting on the Somme, while II ANZAC Corps moved into the front lines at Armentières to replace it.

Originally part of II ANZAC Corps, the 4th Division joined the 1st and 2nd

36 Report on Raid on enemy trench I.32.c.11.9. on the night 26/27th June 1916. Carried out by the 18TH. Battalion AIF, 30 June 1916, AWM26, 30/2. 37 Ibid. 38 Ibid. 39 Ibid. 40 Operation Order No.15. by Brigadier-General W. Holmes. C.M.G. D.S.O. V.D. Commanding Fifth Australian Infantry Brigade, 24 June 1916, AWM26, 30/2.

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Divisions in I ANZAC Corps heading south to the Somme. This left II ANZAC Corps with just two divisions, the newly arrived 5th Division and the New Zealand

Division.41 On 5 July, it was discovered that the 13th Jäger Battalion, which had previously occupied positions opposite the II ANZAC Corps, had been redeployed to the Somme.42 The movement of German reinforcements from other parts of the front to strengthen the German defences on the Somme was viewed with concern by GHQ, and II ANZAC Corps Headquarters issued instructions that raids and other offensive operations needed to be conducted to hold German units in place in order to prevent them from being withdrawn to support the fighting further south.43 This was to be the genesis of the failed attack at Fromelles.

The objective of the attack at Fromelles was not the collection of intelligence. Nonetheless, the principles that had been used in the planning of smaller trench raids could equally be applied to larger attacks like the one XI

Corps planned to undertake. Indeed, the attack was very similar to a trench raid in many respects, except for its much larger scale.

On 21 June, GOC XI Corps, Lieutenant-General Sir Richard Haking, wrote to Second Army Headquarters proposing an offensive operation be conducted

‘opposite Fauquissart’.44 Haking initially proposed a joint operation with II

Corps, to capture part of the German front line and support trenches from ‘about

Mauqissait’ across ‘the Fauqissart-Aubers road’ and along the ‘River Layes to an area in the vicinity of Sailly-Fromelles’.45

41 Bean, Official History of Australia in the War of 1914–18, Volume III, p.328. 42 Ibid. 43 Ibid. 44 First Army War Diary G.S. 1st–30th June 1917 & Weekly Reports Letter to Second Army, 21 June 1916, TNA, WO157/460. 45 Ibid.

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Changes to the frontages of the First and Second Army meant that Haking modified his initial plan and proposed an attack be conducted by XI Corps in the

‘Fauquissart’ area to seize and hold the German salient known as the ‘Sugar

Loaf’.46 Haking noted that a ‘sap’ had been dug from the corps on the left hand flank of XI Corps (then occupied by I ANZAC Corps), and he proposed constructing a similar sap, extending out from the XI Corps position, to lessen the distance that was to be crossed in an attack on the Sugar Loaf. Once the Sugar

Loaf position was occupied, Haking proposed digging forward to connect the position with the existing British trenches.47 Haking noted that, in order to successfully hold the Sugar Loaf position, it would be ‘much easier’ if the British trenches could be moved forward to incorporate the Sugar Loaf position into the

British front line.48 Haking stated that the likely success of the operation would

‘greatly improved’ if he was able to obtain artillery support for his attack from formations on the left and right flanks of his corps. He requested support to bombard the German trenches to the ‘north east’ of the Sugar Loaf salient and advised that preparations for an attack could be completed in a ‘few days’.49

One important factor that Haking did not explicitly mention in his proposal was that the Sugar Loaf salient also served as the boundary between the First and Second Army, and this would necessitate the operation being conducted jointly, or would require a temporary shift of the army boundaries to allow the attack to take place. When Haking initially proposed his plan in late

46 Ibid. 47 Ibid. 48 Ibid. 49 Ibid.

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June 1916, Second Army agreed that I ANZAC Corps could play a small part in the attack, but Second Army would only spare one division for any undertaking.50

On 8 July 1916, Haking was directed by First Army to commence planning for the attack. Haking re-submitted his proposal to seize and hold the German front lines near the village of Fromelles (the exact description was ‘a frontage of

4200 yards [3800 metres], the right on the Fauquissart-Trivelet Road and the left on Condonneire Ferme-Les Clochers Road’).51 The attack would be made by two divisions, one from XI Corps and the other borrowed from the Second Army, each with three brigades in the attacking line. Each brigade was to attack with two battalions, who were to capture the enemy front line and deploy their remaining two battalions in reserve to carry out attacks on subsequent objectives.52

In order to achieve success, Haking requested an additional ten brigades of artillery be allocated to XI Corps to support the operation, in addition to XI

Corps artillery. The artillery plan called for a superiority in artillery, in order to

‘compel the enemy to move his guns out of reach’ and to kill or demoralise the infantry and machine guns in the front line trenches.53 Haking proposed that several artillery ‘lifts’, combined with ‘Chinese attacks’ — demonstrations in the

British front line trenches to make it appear as though an infantry attack was about to commence— would bring the defenders out of their dug-outs. The artillery fire would then resume on the front line trenches, killing the defenders.

50 Bean, Official History of Australia in the War of 1914–18, Volume III, p.331. 51 XI Corps General Staff July 4th to 9th 1916 note to First Army SS/1205/1, 9 July 1916, AWM26, 19/26. 52 Ibid. 53 Ibid.

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This tactic would be repeated four times, causing the Germans to remain in their dug-outs when the real infantry assault would take place.54

XI Corps advised the First Army Headquarters that it could conduct the attack with four days notice and that it required the artillery to be available four days before the assault to register targets. Haking was informed on 12 July that the attack would not be carried out. However, news that the Germans had transferred a number of battalions from the Lille-Lens area to reinforce their battered formations fighting on the Somme caused GHQ to re-examine Haking’s proposal to attack at Fromelles.55 The revised plan initially called for First and

Second Army to concentrate a large artillery and infantry force for an attack on the Aubers-Fromelles area to convince the German High Command that another attack was about to commence. No attack would take place, but an ‘artillery demonstration’, combined with a number of raids, was assessed as an effective means to convince the Germans to halt the transfers of any further units to the

Somme.56 This revised proposal was different from Haking’s original plan, which called for the capture of the German front line and support trenches opposite his position. Following further discussion between the First and Second Army on 14

July, it was agreed that an infantry attack would form part of the demonstration, and Haking’s original plan was once again adopted.57

There was a significant amount of intelligence available about the German positions opposite the Australians. First and Second Army, along with XI Corps,

54 Ibid. 55 Bean, Official History of Australia in the War of 1914–18, Volume III, p.332. 56 Ibid. 57 Bean, Official History of Australia in the War of 1914–18, Volume III, p.333; First Army Operations from 1st July to 31st July 1916, Note on Operations on First Army Front, 16 July 1916, TNA, WO157/461.

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had at their disposal a number of different units that could collect additional intelligence in advance of the attack. The site chosen for the attack had been attacked previously by the British. On 9 May 1915, the First Army, then under the command of General Haig, attacked the Germans at Aubers Ridge. The attack was conducted on the German trenches between the Sugar Loaf salient and

Delangrè Farm. Several mines were dug under the German front lines and were detonated as the attack began. Masses of heavy artillery and field guns shelled the area to be attacked, destroying the enemy wire and trenches in several locations. Despite suffering heavy casualties crossing no-man’s land, the attacking troops managed to gain entry to the German trenches, but the defending German troops contained the assault and ejected the attackers from their trenches late on the same day. British losses were heavy.58 After the battle, the Germans repaired their trenches and set about reinforcing and strengthening their positions, constructing several new lines of trenches behind the original front line and building shelters to protect troops from enemy artillery fire.

A II ANZAC Corps report on the enemy defences around the Sugar Loaf position noted that the Sugar Loaf itself was a salient that was protected by a chain of strong points. Three strong points were identified: one at N.14.b.4.3

(map reference), which was described as ‘not very strong and not known to be wired but possibly containing machine guns’; another at Ferme Delaporte which was assessed as very strong, with significant earthworks linked to a system of trenches, wire and known to contain machine guns; and a third at Ferme

Delangre, which was also protected by earthworks with strong wire and known

58 Peter Barton, The Lost Legions of Fromelles: The True Story of the Most Dramatic Battle in Australia’s History (Australia, Allen & Unwin, 2014), pp.42–55.

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to contain several machine guns.59 Both Ferme Delaporte and Ferme Delangre were reported to appear to be ‘much knocked about’ by artillery fire in aerial photographs.60

The entire Sugar Loaf salient was described as well built, with strong wire entanglements around the position and also to the rear of Sugar Loaf. At least four machine guns were identified within the salient, along with a strongly fortified ‘maze of trenches’.61 Additional positions near the salient at Ferme De

Mouquet and ‘the Tadpole’ contained machine guns and could bring flanking fire to bear on the Sugar Loaf position. Six trench mortar positions were also identified.62 To the rear of the Sugar Loaf position, the enemy had constructed a heavily wired second line of defences. No machine guns were identified in the enemy second line, but machine gun emplacements had been located.63

Raids on the German trenches opposite the positions of XI Corps before the battle of Fromelles had also yielded valuable information about the construction of the enemy trenches to be attacked. Around the Boar’s Head position to the south-west of Nueuve Chappelle the trenches were described as

‘8 feet deep’ and boarded on both sides. The trenches were very narrow and it was difficult to move and throw bombs except in bays which had been built into the trench.64 Aerial photographs were also available, showing details of the

59 Report on Enemy’s Defences about Sugar Loaf, 17 June 1916, AWM26, 36/5. 60 Ibid. 61 Ibid. 62 Ibid. 63 Ibid. 64 Report on enemy trenches and dug-outs opposite the First Army Front, 17 June 1916, AWM26, 36/5; Roger Lee and John Bourne, British Battle Planning in 1916 and the Battle of Fromelles, , ebook, (Farnham, Ashgate Publishing, 2015), p.157

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enemy position and aircraft from the First Brigade, RFC, had been allocated to support the XI Corps attack.65

Haking held his final planning conference for the attack at XI Corps

Headquarters on 15 July 1916 and issued XI Corps Operation Order No.57 that ordered the attack. The map contained in Figure 8 shows the objectives for the two attacking divisions. The orders were almost identical to his original plan developed in early June 1916. The 5th Division and the 61st British Division were to attack across no-mans land and capture the enemy front line and support trenches, including the two German strong points at Ferme Delaporte and Ferme Delangre. Haking’s plan incorporated some of the new tactics that had been successfully used on the Somme, including moving troops out into no- man’s land during the barrage to ensure they were close to the enemy front line when the barrage lifted, but XI Corps orders contained no information about the

65 First Army Operations from 1st July to 31st July 1916, Operation Order No.40 by Brigadier General D. le G. PITCHER, Commanding 1st Brigade Royal Flying Corps, 15 July 1916, TNA, WO157/461.

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enemy and provided no information about the positions which were to be attacked or the likely enemy reaction to the assault.66

, WO157/461) ,

(TNA

Map showing the planned XI Corps attack at Fromelles at attack XI Corps planned the showing Map

—

Figure Figure

66 First Army Operations from 1st July to 31st July 1916 XIth Corps Order No.57, 15 July 1918, TNA, WO157/461.

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The GOC of the 5th Division, Major-General James McCay, later claimed that while he was aware of the attack prior to the orders being issued, he had no input into planning the operation.67 The 5th Division issued its operation order, Secret Order No.30, on 15 July 1916, but like those of XI Corps the orders failed to provide any information about the enemy and noted simply that the 5th

Division was to participate in an attack with the 61st British Division on the enemy front line from ‘Trivelet to Fme Delangre’.68 Orders issued by the attacking Australian Brigades also contain no information about the enemy or the objective to be attacked and held by the Australians.69

The requirement to concentrate the 5th Division for the attack and failure to allow the artillery sufficient time to bombard the German positions meant that the attack was delayed from 16 July until 17 July. Orders issued on 17 July delayed the attack again and directed that patrolling of no-man’s land needed to continue to report on the state of the enemy wire. Australian orders noted that

‘plans of enemy trenches should be laid out and parties from assaulting battalions would be exercised over them as far as possible’.70 Orders also noted that enemy strong points and machine gun positions should be marked on plans to allow the assaulting troops an opportunity to rehearse their attack.71 Those troops remaining in the front line were instructed to continue to observe the enemy front line and no-man’s land and to report all information to Division

67 Robin Corfield, Don’t Forget Me, Cobber: The Battle of Fromelles (Melbourne, Melbourne University Press, 2000), p.93. 68 5th Australian Division General Staff Order No.30, 15 July 1916, AWM26, 32/34. 69 8th Australian Infantry Brigade and Battalions Jul 10th to 21st 1916 Brigade Order No.23, 16 July 1916, AWM26, 34/1. 70 5th Australian Division General Staff Divisional Order No.34, 17 July 1916, AWM26, 32/33. 71 Ibid.

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Headquarters.72 It is difficult to reconcile the orders issued by Corps, Division and Brigade Headquarters to continue to collect intelligence on the German positions opposite with the orders for the attack in which the enemy were almost an afterthought. Weather and other delays conspired to have the date for the attack changed once again, to 19 July 1916.

Opposite the Australian position, the 6th Bavarian Reserve Division (6th

BRD) was known to be holding the line with three regiments, the 21st, 16th and

17th Bavarian Reserve Regiments, each having a battalion in the front line trenches with a second battalion in support trenches to the rear and the remainder of the regiment billeted in rest areas further back. The German reserve was located in a strong point on the ridge in front of the Fromelles railway station. Based on prisoner interrogations, the average strength of the companies in each regiment was known to be between one hundred and twenty to one hundred and thirty men. Each infantry regiment also included a machine gun company, equipped with up to twenty machine guns.73 On the evening of 16

July, just prior to the originally set date for the attack, Australian patrols inspected the enemy wire and noted that, while the enemy parapet was badly damaged in some places, the enemy wire was ‘in good order’.74 Patrols from the

Fifteenth Brigade on the evening of 17 July reported that damage to the enemy parapet was slight and that enemy wire was ‘good’ all along their front line. The depth of the river Laises was only three inches [ seven centimetres] of water but in some parts the banks of the river varied between five and fifteen feet deep

72 Ibid. 73 XI Corps Intelligence German Regiments Holding the line from Trivelet to Fme. De Langre, and Method of Holding the Line, 16 July 1916, AWM26, 19/39. 74 15th Australian Infantry Brigade Summary of Intelligence No.5, 16 July 1916, AWM26, 34/11.

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[one and a half to four and a half metres].75 On the same day, patrols from the

Eighth Brigade reported that opposite their front the enemy wire was located approximately twenty yards [eighteen metres] from the enemy parapet and that in some places the enemy parapet and wire was badly damaged. Enemy work parties had been observed attempting to repair both the damaged sections of trench and wire, and the Australians used artillery and machine gun fire to disperse them on several occasions.76

On 18 July, the Fifteenth Brigade observed the enemy continuing to repair and strengthen his trenches, including constructing overhead cover around strong points. Patrols again noted that enemy wire remained strong and was uncut.77 Patrols from the Eighth Brigade noted that artillery fire had been effective in breaking the enemy wire in several places and opening large gaps in the enemy parapet, and that there was no sign of any enemy repair parties attempting to fix either the wire or the parapet. Artillery and trench mortar fire was observed hitting both the front line and enemy support trenches.78

On 19 July, British and Australian artillery increased their rate of fire, concentrating on bombarding the enemy wire and front line. Patrols from the

Fifteenth Brigade reported that the enemy parapet had suffered considerable damage and that, while the enemy wire had been cut in places, it remained a strong obstacle.79 Another report from 5th Division Artillery noted that the

Fourteenth Brigade had reported at 3.05pm that enemy wire along its front was

75 15th Australian Infantry Brigade Summary of Intelligence No.6, 17 July 1916, AWM26, 34/11. 76 8th Australian Infantry Brigade Intelligence Summary No.7 from 6 a.m. 17th. to 6a.m. 18th July 1916, 18 July 1916, AWM26, 34/1. 77 15th Australian Infantry Brigade Summary of Intelligence No.7, 18 July 1916, AWM26, 34/11. 78 8th Australian Infantry Brigade Intelligence Summary No.8 from 6 a.m. 18th. to 6 a.m. 19th July 1916, 19 July 1916, AWM26, 34/1. 79 15th Australian Infantry Brigade Summary of Intelligence No.8, 19 July 1916, AWM26, 34/11.

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not sufficiently cut and that further artillery action needed to be taken. At

5.00pm the attack began with tragic consequences.80

A review of the intelligence available before the attack, along with intelligence obtained during the assault, was prepared the day following the battle.81 The report noted that the enemy front line trenches were well constructed and strongly built, with deep dug-outs that were connected underground and by the trenches above. Iron plates with sliding ‘loop holes’ were placed at regular intervals for machine guns and snipers. Trench mortar positions were located to the rear of enemy dug-outs.82 What was believed to be a second line of enemy trenches, based on information obtained through previous assaults on Aubers Ridge and aerial photographs, were actually a series of water filled ditches.83

Ferme Delangre was strongly held, with high, dense wire entanglements surrounding the position. At least one machine gun was installed in the strong point.84 The enemy parapet and wire were found to have been ‘greatly damaged’ by artillery fire and the attacking Australians reported no difficulty entering the enemy trenches. During the bombardment, enemy dug-outs were destroyed and it appeared that large numbers of enemy troops withdrew from the front line into dug-outs on the flanks. Where enemy troops remained in the front line, they were either killed or captured during the attack.85 Information obtained from

80 Fifth Australian Division Artillery Intelligence Report, 19 July 1916, AWM26, 33/9. 81 31st Australian Battalion Report on Intelligence Summary up to 6 a.m. 20.7.1916, 21 July 1916, AWM26, 34/1. 82 31st Australian Battalion Report on Intelligence Summary up to 6 a.m. 20.7.1916, 21 July 1916, AWM26, 34/1. 83 Ibid. 84 Ibid. 85 Ibid.

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patrols was found to be correct and no difficulty was experienced moving across no-mans land or over any of the obstacles that had been identified.86

Aerial photographs of large sections of the German front lines were available before the attack, showing the varying distances between the

Australian front lines and those of the Germans opposite. These photographs show the distance between the British front line and the forward trenches of the

Sugar Loaf position, which would require the Fifteenth Brigade to attack over a gap of four hundred and fifty yards [four hundred and ten metres] in some places. At the other end of the Australian line, the Eighth Brigade had to cross a much smaller distance of around two hundred yards [one hundred and eighty metres] between their own front line and that of the enemy.87

The attack at Fromelles captured one hundred and nineteen prisoners, one hundred of whom were reported as being unwounded.88 The prisoners captured during the attack belonged to the 6th BRD. Examination of the prisoners identified that all the regiments of the division were present at

Fromelles, along with miners, pioneers, and heavy Landstrum gunners from other units. Enemy prisoners claimed that the artillery bombardment and attack inflicted ‘heavy losses’ and that the enemy had been ‘unable to withdraw any infantry and probably only a few guns’ from the First Army front.89

The planning for the attack at Fromelles was poor at all levels and while intelligence about the German positions, the terrain over which the attack was to be launched, the condition of the enemy wire and strong-points was all available

86 Ibid. 87 Corfield, Don’t Forget Me, Cobber, pp.97–98. 88 1st Army Intelligence Summaries July 1916, First Army Summary of Operation on the Western Front during the 24 hours ending in the early morning of 20/7/1916, 20 July 1916, AWM26, 36/5. 89 Ibid.

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it seems to have played little role in the planning of the operation at any level.

The planning for the attack stands in stark contrast to the minute detail that was considered when conducting smaller raids. Admittedly, comparing a small tactical activity to a much larger operation risks an uneven comparison, but it helps illustrate the point that the staff officers did have capacity to plan detailed operations that incorporated up-to-date intelligence and which were planned around knowledge of the enemy. There are no records that the intelligence staff in XI Corps conducted an appreciation of the enemy or the position to be attacked, nor are there any indications that the Australians undertook similar assessments. The role that the 5th Division staff played in the planning of the attack is unclear. In one sense, the enemy was an afterthought and likely enemy reaction or response did not factor into the operational plan. It is also worth noting that the attack was conducted by XI Corps and not II ANZAC Corps.

Records note that II ANZAC Corps Headquarters played no role in the planning of the attack.

The 5th Division was the last to arrive in France from Egypt and had only just come into the front line when it was ordered to attack at Fromelles. At the time of the attack, the 5th Division was the least experienced of all the Australian formations in France. This undoubtedly contributed to the lack of planning and the poor use of intelligence in the lead-up to the operation. While the 1st, 2nd and 4th Divisions were fighting on the Somme, the 5th Division, badly damaged in the attack at Fromelles, remained in the Armentières sector, making good its manpower losses and training.90 Raiding activities continued and provided an

90 Fifth Divisional Artillery Order No.36, 25 August 1916, AWM26, 33/10.

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opportunity to integrate reinforcements into the 5th Division and collect information on the movement of German formations to the fighting around the

Somme battlefields. Being a quiet sector, Armentières continued to be used to rest German formations after they had been used in the fighting further to the south.

Ypres and Gueudecourt — 1916/1917

After participating in the fighting at the Somme, I ANZAC Corps returned to the

Ypres salient to rest, and by September 1916 the Australian Divisions had returned to conducting raids on enemy trenches, although the enthusiasm seen during the early raids conducted in June 1916 was no longer evident. Raids continued to be conducted to collect intelligence through the capture of prisoners or other material from the enemy trenches. Australian orders also noted that raids should continue to inflict losses on the enemy to ensure that troops were not withdrawn from any part of the front line and sent south to join the heavy fighting on the Somme.91 While resting at Ypres in September and

October 1916, I ANZAC Corps carried out a series of raids on 15, 25 and 26

September and 12 October 1916 that coincided with attacks being conducted further south on the Somme. 92

As the Australians conducted more raids, they gathered information on the reaction of the Germans to raids conducted by British troops.93 The Germans had identified that raids invariably used gaps or targeted weak points in their

91 2nd Australian Infantry Brigade Reference S1103 of 21/9/1916 Minor Enterprises, 22 Sep 1916, AWM26, 81/2. 92 Bean, Official History of Australia in the War of 1914–18, Volume III, p.878. 93 Fifth Australian Division General Staff Memorandum No.31, 18 September 1916, AWM26, 95/16.

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wire as the route to raid their front line trenches and machine guns were fixed to fire on the gaps in the wire at night.94 Areas with known weaknesses or gaps were left ungarrisoned during the night while the enemy troops withdrew to support trenches to the rear.95 The enemy garrison that had been withdrawn to the support trenches because of the gap was also kept at a high state of alert.

Artillery barrages in advance of any raid were likely to alert the garrison to the increased likelihood of a raid and steps would taken to prepare for an attack.96

Any enemy encountered in an area where wire had gaps or was cut was likely to belong to a working party repairing the wire rather than the front line garrison.97

The conclusions drawn from the Australians’ experience included that wire cutting needed to be general across the front, should not be concentrated solely in the area where the raid was to be conducted, and that raids should aim to push beyond the enemy front line trench into support trenches, as this is where enemy troops and other items of intelligence interest were more likely to be located.98 This would require raiding parties that were big enough to fight through to the enemy support trenches. Flanking enemy machine guns needed to be identified and suppressed, and counter-battery artillery needed to be ready to respond to the likely enemy barrage.99

By September 1916, thanks to intelligence obtained from other sources, mostly prisoners and aerial reconnaissance, GHQ was aware that the Germans were constructing a new defensive line well to the rear of their position. There

94 Ibid. 95 Ibid. 96 Ibid. 97 Ibid. 98 Ibid. 99 Ibid.

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was doubt, however, about whether the Germans intended to retire to this new line of defences or whether the defences were being constructed in anticipation of the British and French resuming the Somme offensive once the weather improved.100 In early 1917, the Australians rejoined the Fifth Army and found themselves back in the front line facing towards Bapaume. As evidence of a possible German withdrawal mounted, the Australians conducted a series of raids designed to test the German intentions and collect information on their activities. At the beginning of February 1917, the 1st Division instructed the First and Second Brigades to conduct raids on the German trenches at a position known as the ‘Maze’, which was believed to be strongly held and therefore offered a significant chance of securing a valuable prisoner, and at ‘Bayonet trench’, which contained an enemy post complete with a machine gun position and several dug-outs ‘about which information was required’.101

Preparation for these raids followed the procedure that the Australians learnt at Armentières, with the raiding party being withdrawn from the front lines and sent to the rear to train on a model of the enemy trenches. Patrols were sent out every night from 3 February to examine the enemy wire and collect information about the enemy activity in the places to be raided. Aerial photographs, including enlargements, of the points to be attacked were provided to the attacking brigades and battalions, and the Division Intelligence Staff supplied sketch maps and other information to assist the raiders with their planning.102

100 Bean, Official History of Australia in the War of 1914–18, Volume IV, p.58. 101 First Australian Division Report on Raids of 4th & 5th Bns on night 10/11 Feb. ’17, 15 Feb 1917, AWM26, 119/15. 102 Ibid.

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Despite their preparation, the raiding parties found a very different enemy than the one encountered in the Armentières sector. The first raiding party assaulting the Maze from the 4th Battalion managed to get a few men through a narrow gap cut in the enemy wire, but found no enemy in the narrow section of trench they were able to enter.103 The second raiding party from the

5th Battalion failed to breach the enemy wire and enter the enemy trench. Deep belts of wire, uncut in many places, prevented entry, and the German garrison was alert and aggressive. The raiding party noted that the Germans in both the

Maze and Bayonet Trench were resolute and alert, and both positions were strongly held. A report prepared by the 1st Division after the raid noted that ‘in normal circumstances and against a normal enemy garrison, the parties should have crossed the wire with little delay and should have reached their objectives’.104 Other raids conducted by the Australians during this time were more successful, with a raid on the night 20/21 February 1917 by the Twelfth

Brigade on Stormy Trench yielding 29 prisoners from the 362nd Infantry

Regiment.105

Armentières and Messines — 1917

Arriving from England in November 1916, the 3rd Division joined II ANZAC

Corps and, like the other Australian Divisions, was sent into the front lines in the

Armentières Sector to gain some operational experience.106 While there, each

103 Ibid. 104 Ibid. 105 Fourth Australian Division Memorandum G.5/189, 23 February 1917, AWM26, 169/34. 106 Bean, Official History of Australia in the War of 1914–18, Volume IV, p.563.

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brigade of the 3rd Division undertook a series of raids on the German trenches opposite.107

The first of these raids, the largest raid undertaken by the Australians during the war, was conducted on 27 February 1917 at Houplines, where a composite battalion from the Tenth Brigade seized and occupied the German front line trench and parts of the second and third lines of trenches opposite their position for between forty and sixty minutes. The objective of this raid was to capture and destroy a section of the enemy trench, with the collection of intelligence being a secondary objective.108 Plans for the raid called for a force of between eight hundred to 1,000 troops, along with machine guns and light trench mortars, to conduct the attack.109

Initial orders for the raid noted that the entire 3rd Division front should be investigated to select a location for the raid and that the objective of the raid, once identified, should be studied through reconnaissance, tasking patrols, and examination of aerial photographs and other intelligence reports.110 Where up- to-date aerial photographs were unavailable, requests were to be made to Corps

Headquarters for additional photographs and enlargements for the raiding force to study.111 Plans of the enemy trenches were compiled from aerial photographs.

Diagrams of no-man’s land and the front line, marking enemy searchlights, machine guns and trench mortars, were issued to the raiding party.112 Final orders for the raid were issued by the 3rd Division on 19 February 1917 and

107 Ibid., p.566. 108 Third Australian Division Minor Enterprise to be carried out by 10th Infantry Brigade, 17 January 1917, AWM26, 84/3. 109 Ibid. 110 Ibid. 111 Ibid. 112 AWM26, 84/3, Third Australian Division Order No.16, 19 February 1917

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included a detailed summary of information about the enemy and the position to be attacked.113

Orders for the raid noted that the enemy line was believed to be held by the ‘23rd Bavarian Infantry’. The enemy was assessed as holding his front line strongly, and that, when raided, ‘he either fired a barrage on the British front line and a portion of no-man’s land, while simultaneously bombing his own wire and firing across the front of his position using machine guns firing on fixed night lines or he withdraws from his own front line and places a barrage on his front line position’.114 The enemy had also been observed to send out parties to attack into the flanks of raiding groups.115 The enemy was noted to put down a barrage between two and five minutes after British artillery had fired on his position and

‘on a recent occasion shortened on to his front line within seven minutes. He fired 5.9” [artillery] into his front line on 11 February, showed a green light and thereupon lengthened.’116 The carefully planned raid was successful and captured seventeen German prisoners, equipment, and other material.117

A second major raid, conducted by the Eleventh Brigade on the 13 March

1917, ended in disaster with the raiding force suffering a large number of casualties and barely entering the German front line, despite careful planning.

The third major raid to be conducted by the Ninth Brigade was programmed for

15 March, but never took place. Smaller raids conducted by units of the 3rd

Division in February and March were also successful, although occasionally

113 Third Australian Division Order No.16, 19 February 1917, AWM26, 84/3. 114 Ibid. 115 Ibid. 116 Ibid. 117 Bean, Official History of Australia in the War of 1914–18, Volume IV, p.566.

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costly, and secured German prisoners, documents, and equipment as part of ongoing intelligence collection activities.118

In preparation for the Second Army’s attack at Messines, II ANZAC Corps moved north in late April 1917 to occupy positions on the southern flank of the

German salient at Messines.119 Once settled into the positions from which they would launch their assault, the 3rd Division conducted a series of raids to gather intelligence on the German forces opposite them. During the month of May 1917, the Tenth Brigade conducted raids on 22, 27 and 31 May to obtain identifications and to capture prisoners prior to the attack.120

Not everything went the Australians’ way. On 9 October 1917, as the

Australians consolidated their gains after the battle of Broodseinde Ridge, a raiding party of eighty-five men from the 10th Battalion set out to raid German positions in Celtic Wood. The objective of the raid was to capture prisoners for identification purposes and destroy a number of German dug-outs in Celtic

Wood. German positions in Celtic Wood had been raided by the 11th and 12th

Battalions only days before and a large number of prisoners had been captured, with only two of the Australians in the raiding party wounded. Unbeknown to the Australians, the Germans reinforced their positions in Celtic Wood and further attacks by the Australians were expected. The decision to raid the same area seems foolhardy and only fourteen men returned unwounded.121

118 33rd Battalion AIF Report on minor operation carried out on the night of February 24th/25th, 1917 zero hour 10.30p.m., 25 Feb 1917, AWM26, 88/2. 119 Bean, Official History of Australia in the War of 1914–18, Volume IV, p.568. 120 10th Australian Infantry Brigade Order No.39, No.42 and No.44, May 1917, AWM26, 198/4. 121 Tony Spagnoly and Ted Smith, The Anatomy of a Raid: Ypres Sector 1914–1918 (Barnsley, Pen & Sword, 1998), pp.54–65.

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Trench raiding — late 1917 to the Armistice

Instructions issued by I ANZAC Corps at the end of 1917 codified many of the lessons that the Australians had learnt about organising and conducting raids.

Raids were divided into three classes: those carried out by small parties (from five to fifteen men) with artillery preparation, depending for success entirely on surprise; those carried out by twenty to forty men, with or without artillery preparation; and those carried out by parties of up to a battalion or larger size force, depending entirely on artillery preparation for success.122

Successful raids required that superiority be achieved in no-man’s land to enable reconnaissance patrols to locate weaknesses and strong-points in the enemy defenses, and for the raiding party to gain experience over the ground through which they would pass.123 The selection of the location for the raid depended on the type of information required. Where identifications of front line units or details about an enemy unit’s character or battle efficiency were required this would determine the raid location.124 This was a change from the earlier approach to raiding, in which weaknesses in the enemy front line often determined where a raid would be conducted. Having determined where the raid must be conducted, raiders were then free to consider other factors which were key in planning, including details about the terrain that was to be crossed, distances between friendly and enemy trenches, and locations of enemy wire, machine guns and strong points.125 The size of the raiding party was determined by the length of time the raiders were required to remain in the enemy trenches.

122 Organisation for Raids, 11 December 1917, AWM26, 285/20. 123 Ibid. 124 Ibid. 125 Ibid.

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The longer the raiding party was required to remain, the stronger the party would need to be in order to defend itself and make its way safely back to friendly lines. I ANZAC Corps instructions noted that raids ‘longer than ten minutes will, nine times out of ten, have to resist a counter attack’.126

Intelligence preparation was a key requirement for success. All available information was to be made available to the raiding party. It was the responsibility of the Division Intelligence Staff to ensure that this information was passed to the raiding force. Success of the raid would ‘largely depend on its accuracy and fullness’.127 Maps of the enemy defences needed to be prepared, showing the raiders all known enemy trenches and the position of dug-outs, machine guns, and trench mortars.128 Reports of raids in the neighbourhood should be made available, especially where previous raids had failed.129 Division

Intelligence Staff should issue briefings about the habits of the enemy troops and provide clear instructions on where documents such as identity books or other forms of identification could be located on the German troops.130 The Intelligence

Staff should issue the raiding force with the latest aerial photographs and assist the raiding force to interpret the information contained in the photographs.131

Once the German Offensive began in March 1918, the Australian Corps had little opportunity to conduct carefully choreographed raids in the style that had been conducted in 1916 and 1917. It was not until May 1918 that the front finally stabilised and the threat of further German attacks passed. The need for

126 Ibid. 127 Ibid. 128 Ibid. 129 Ibid. 130 Ibid. 131 Ibid.

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intelligence remained. However, the ability of Australian patrols to penetrate sections of the now porous German front line meant that the highly choreographed raids that were conducted earlier in the war were no longer required in order to obtain intelligence. On 28 June 1918, the Thirteenth Brigade was advised that ‘no identification has been obtained on the front lately’ and that

‘it is of urgent importance that we should know more of the enemy’s dispositions on this front’. A hand written note attached to the bottom of the message simply noted ‘action taken 29th inst’, suggesting that the information requested by the

Division Commander had been obtained without the need for a trench raid, which would have been required in 1916 or 1917.132

After the opening of the battle of Amiens and during the drive on the

Hindenburg Line, the fluid nature of the battle meant that raiding was discontinued and there is no evidence of the Australians conducting further raids before the end of the war.133

Trench raids were an effective way of gathering intelligence and inflicting casualties on the enemy. Trench raids provided opportunities to capture prisoners, documents, equipment, and other items for examination by the intelligence staff. They provided an opportunity to examine the enemy trenches and to assess enemy morale through his response to the raid. The Australians showed themselves to be adept at trench raiding, although no more so than their counterparts in British or other Dominion armies. While many Australian raids were successful, many others failed, often at high cost. A successful trench raid

132 Headquarters 4th Australian Division Memorandum No.G.5/671, 28 June 1918, AWM26, 408/4. 133 The term ‘peaceful penetration’ was often used by the Australians to describe activities such as quietly cutting out opponents machine gun positions or strong points or venturing into No- Man’s Land to capture German patrols or prisoners.

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required careful planning. Intelligence about the target to be attacked was required and raids were unlikely to be successful without accurate intelligence.

Successful trench raids demonstrated how intelligence was incorporated into operational planning, but the careful planning exhibited in trench raids seems not to have translated into the way in which larger attacks, such as the battle of

Fromelles, was planned and executed.

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Chapter 10. Patrolling, reconnaissance, and observation

Observation and patrolling were both important sources of intelligence collected in the front line. An important daily task for troops in the trenches was observing the activities of the enemy opposite their position. The infantry watched for signs of enemy movement or activity that might indicate an impending enemy attack. Forward observation officers looked for artillery targets and ranged friendly artillery onto enemy positions. Small groups of specially trained intelligence observers attempted to peer deeper into the enemy rear areas to obtain intelligence on enemy actions. At night (and occasionally during the day) patrols were sent out into no-man’s land to collect information on the enemy and to deny them the opportunity to do the same. Observation and patrolling were familiar activities to the Australians. Once the perimeter at Anzac had been secured, the Australians and New Zealanders established a series of observation posts to watch the Turkish positions opposite. Patrols slipped out of the perimeter at Anzac through the maze of gullies and ravines to bring back information about the enemy. By the time the Australians arrived in France, the

BEF considered patrolling and observation to be specialist intelligence collection tasks. The Australians were directed to form specialist scout platoons and intelligence observation sections to undertake observation and patrol tasks. By

1917 and into 1918, infantry from the front line battalions increasingly undertook patrols that would have once been the responsibility of specialist scouts. Observation of the enemy trenches continued, but as manpower reserves dwindled the number of specialist observers decreased. This chapter traces the development and evolution of patrolling and observation across the Anzac and

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Australian Corps and looks at how the information obtained from patrolling and from observers was used to plan and conduct the Australian’s battles.

Observation on Gallipoli — 1915

Once the Australians and New Zealanders were ashore and established on

Gallipoli, they set about developing a system to collect intelligence on the

Turkish troops opposite their position. Observation at Gallipoli initially focused on monitoring the Turkish trenches for signs of possible attacks, as both sides struggled to secure their positions. In the days after the landing, observation of the enemy positions was a hazardous undertaking, as troops needed to expose themselves to the enemy in order to watch what was occurring in the enemy trenches.

Later, the Australians and New Zealanders used trench periscopes to keep a watch on the Turkish trenches to provide warning of Turkish attacks. The armistice on 24 May 1915, following a major Turkish attack on the Anzac position, provided an opportunity for the Australians to observe the Turkish positions and the Turkish soldiers up close. Officers and soldiers working outside the perimeter gathered intelligence during the armistice and were debriefed on their return to the Anzac position. Information obtained included identifications of enemy forces opposite the Australian and New Zealand positions, along with information about the weapons, equipment, and rations carried by the enemy.1

1 1st ANZAC Corps General Staff Feb–May 1915 Notes on Points Observed during Armistice May 24th, 29 May 1915, TNA, WO95/4280.

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By June, a more organised system of intelligence collection was established. Efforts had been made to make intelligence collection activities more systematic and series of observation posts were established to observe the enemy front line and collect information on the Turkish positions.2 Each battery and battalion at Anzac was expected to establish an observation post that was to be constantly manned. These posts were ordered to report on movement in the enemy lines, new works or improvements to the enemy trenches, information about the construction of enemy positions, lights, signals, new types of projectiles, or any other other information of interest. Information from observation posts around the Anzac position was collated and summarised daily.3

The work of observers at Gallipoli remained entirely focused on the activities of the Turkish troops in the trenches surrounding the Australian and

New Zealand positions. The terrain at Anzac made observation of the enemy rear areas virtually impossible, with Turkish troops concealing their headquarters and encampments in locations behind folds in the ground or in gullies and ravines to the rear of the position at Anzac. Enemy artillery was also concealed in this manner.

Observation in France and Belgium — 1916–1918

In France, the Australians found a much more organised and structured approach to the observation of the German front line. Observation of the enemy to collect intelligence was the task of specially trained Intelligence Observers

2 First Australian Division Memorandum, 12 June 1915, AWM25, 423/5/1. 3 General Staff 1st Aust Div 1st Nov to 30th Nov 1915, Intelligence, TNA, WO95/4332.

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that were employed within infantry battalions, as well as at brigade, division, and even corps level to operate a series of fixed observation stations to provide constant observation of the entire front line.

Front line battalions were generally responsible for observation of no- man’s land and the German front line.4 In some Australian Battalions, observers were incorporated into the battalion scout platoon. The scout platoon usually contained scouts trained in both observation and scouting, along with the battalion’s snipers. In other Australian battalions, a separate section of observers was established, placed directly under the control of the Battalion Intelligence

Officer.5 Where the battalion observers were separate from the scout platoon, there was usually no more than eight other ranks in the section, allowing for two four-man observation posts to be established and manned within the section of the front line occupied by the battalion.6

Each battalion was expected to establish a series of observation posts within the battalion area, to enable the battalion front to be continuously observed. Observation of the front was coordinated with neighbouring battalions to ensure that the entire front line was covered. Observers were equipped with telescopes, compasses, maps, and log books to record their observations.

Information gathered by battalion observers was consolidated by either the

Battalion Scouting Officer or Battalion Intelligence Officer and included in the daily intelligence report that was sent to Brigade Headquarters.7

4 2nd Australian Division Memorandum I.g.738, 7 April 1916, AWM25, 423/2/26. 5 Infantry Observation, February 1918, AWM25, 423/2/28. 6 Ibid. 7 General Staff (Intelligence), 'SS 195 — Scouting and Patrolling', December 1917, p.31.

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Observers were trained to identify enemy sentries (enemy snipers, working parties, and periscopes), enemy trenches (saps, look-out posts, breaches in the enemy trench, loopholes, machine gun positions, trench mortars, signs of relief, dug-out’s, headquarters, stores, and latrines), wire (gaps in the wire, tracks of patrols through the wire, and telephone wires), smoke, dumps, mining

(signs of excavated soil and mining materials), gas or liquid fire (indications such as the escape of gas after shelling, and suspicious emplacements), enemy batteries (activity, nature of guns, shells, and direction of fire), lights (signals, rockets, flares, and searchlights), weather (wind direction and strength, and visibility), aeroplanes and balloons.8

Observers were also trained to recognise the regimental numbers sewn onto German tunics and the distinctive headdresses and accoutrements of the different types of German troops opposite them (e.g. jaegers, artillery, pioneers, infantry, cavalry).9 Early in the war, different German troops were quite distinctive and there were significant differences between the accoutrements and colours of their uniforms. Later in the war, these distinctions became less obvious but could still be identified by trained observers. The work of observers and scouts was carefully coordinated, with patrols often being used to confirm information that was obtained by observers, such as the movement of new enemy units into the trenches opposite the British front lines.10

Observation deeper into the enemy rear areas was the responsibility of intelligence observers at brigade or higher level. Several Australian infantry brigades maintained a section of observers, but this also varied from brigade to

8 Ibid., pp.25–26. 9 Ibid., p.29. 10 Ibid., pp.34–35.

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brigade. Some Australian divisions also established separate sections of observers who operated across the division’s entire area.11

Specialist observation groups, equipped to enable long-range observation deep into the German rear areas, were also formed at corps level. Specialist observers were usually under the direct control of the Intelligence Staff at Corps

Headquarters and were deployed throughout the corps area.12 Specialist observation groups were mobile and moved around the corps area seeking the best locations from which to observe the enemy or collect specific intelligence on enemy activity. Specialist observation posts often had a direct telephone link to headquarters to enable them to report their observations to headquarters or call immediately upon heavy artillery. German gunners often shelled locations thought to be observation posts to prevent them from reporting on activities in the German trenches or rear areas.13 I ANZAC Corps established a Corps

Observation Group in November 1916.

Observation of the enemy front line and rear areas occurred during battle and periods of static trench warfare. During attacks, front line infantry maintained watch on the enemy, confirming the presence of enemy obstacles, warning of possible enemy counter-attacks, or reporting on the effect of friendly artillery fire on targets to be attacked. After the successful capture of Pozières, the Australians prepared to attack the German trenches to the rear of the village.

Observation reports from front line troops noted that the German wire in front of the O.G.1 trench line was ‘considerably damaged’, while two lines of wire

11 Seventh Australian Infantry Brigade Memorandum G16/1/77, 14 June 1918, AWM25; Suggestion for the organisation of infantry observers in a Division, 25 November 1916, AWM26, 106/5. 12 First Australian Division Corps Observation Group, 4 November 1916, AWM26, 119/8. 13 First Anzac Corp Memorandum 181/15, 2 November 1916, AWM26, 114/24.

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remained in front of the O.G.2 trench line, which included a low wire obstacle and a second higher wire obstacle. Observation reports also noted that the wire in front of the O.G.2 trench line was only damaged in part, and in ‘some places appeared to be quite strong’.14 Reports from front line observers indicated that large numbers of Germans had been observed along the second line of German defences that ran along the rear of Pozières.15

The Australians sent patrols out into no-mans land, but at night ‘could not obtain any definitive information re wire entanglements etc’.16 At least one of the attacking brigades (Seventh Brigade) also sent its Intelligence Officer forward to observe the effect of artillery fire on the enemy wire to ensure that gaps had been cut in the wire in front of both German trenches.17

As the Australians prepared to attack Mouquet Farm, intelligence reports indicated that large numbers of Germans had been observed around the

Mouquet Farm position. Examination of prisoners confirmed that a number of new German regiments had come into the front line opposite the Australians, including the 133rd Regiment, 139th Regiment and the 179th Regiment, and that the garrison of Mouquet Farm had been significantly strengthened.18 These are both good examples of how intelligence collected by observers was used to inform operational planning or how it was incorporated into other intelligence collection efforts such as the examination of prisoners.

14 Report on Observation of O.G.1 and O.G.2 during 2nd August 1916, 3 August 1916, AWM26, 58/9. 15 Reserve Army Summary of Information, 21 July 1916, TNA, WO157/200. 16 Seventh Australian Infantry Brigade Report G3/17, 12 August 1916, AWM26, 58/9. 17 Ibid. 18 First Anzac Intelligence Summary No.18, 11 August 1916, TNA, WO157/557.

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The role of intelligence observers was perhaps somewhat misunderstood by the infantryman standing watch in the trenches, as this satirical poem from

The Ypres Times shows (Figure 9).

Figure 9 — A satirical look at the role of observers in the BEF printed in a trench newspaper (The B.E.F. Times No.2 Vol.1, 25

December 1916)

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Patrolling

Reconnaissance patrols were another important means of collecting information on the activities of the enemy. Far from being a barren wasteland, as is implied by the term ‘no-man’s land’, the area between friendly and enemy trenches was vigorously and continually contested. While there was little movement during the day, when activity was likely to attract the attention of machine guns, snipers, mortars, or even artillery, at night the area between friendly and enemy trenches was alive with reconnaissance patrols seeking information about the enemy and fighting patrols sent out to disrupt enemy intelligence collection in no-man’s land. Initially an activity undertaken by regular infantry, scouting and patrolling evolved into a specialist intelligence collection task undertaken by specially trained scouts. Larger patrols were often supplemented by infantry, while fighting patrols were often large and composed of infantry, rather than specialists such as battalion scouts. As the war progressed, standard infantry undertook many of the tasks that had previously been undertaken by specialists such as battalion scouts. This reflected the increased skill of the infantry as well as the shortage of manpower in the Australian battalions.

Patrolling on Gallipoli — 1915

Despite the difficult terrain of the Anzac position, it was not long after the landings that the first patrols moved out at night to examine gullies or terrain close to the front line. There were no specialist scouts in the ANZAC Corps at this stage of the war, at least not as they would be trained and organised later in the war, and patrols were normally undertaken by the infantry. Many of these early

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patrols were unsanctioned and were undertaken on the initiative of local commanders by adventurous troops eager to escape the confines of the Anzac perimeter. Bean noted that, as early as 5 May 1915, patrols crept out through gaps near Courtney’s and Steele’s posts to inspect an enemy trench which the

Turks were developing one hundred yards from Steele’s Post (this trench would later be known as German Officers’ Trench).19

The proximity of the enemy trenches and the concentration of enemy troops around the outposts held by the Australians and New Zealanders in the central section of Anzac meant there was little chance of movement being undetected by the enemy. Recognising that the ANZAC Corps would be unable to break through the lines of Turkish trenches to their front, the Corps Commander,

Lieutenant-General Birdwood, sought another means of outflanking the enemy and began to look to the north and south of the Anzac position for a way around the Turkish trenches.20 Patrols from both the Australians and the New

Zealanders went out to locate Turkish positions and seek routes for possible flanking movements around the Turkish locations.21 In early May 1915, reconnaissance patrols were able to move south down as far as Gaba Tepe, although they encountered enemy resistance. On the northern side of the Anzac perimeter, reconnaissance patrols were able to identify routes that led up to the key terrain (Chunuk Bair, Battleship Hill, and Hill 971) that dominated the Anzac position. While patrols still encountered the enemy, the northern side of the

Anzac perimeter did not appear to be as strongly held by Turkish troops,

19 Bean, Official History of Australia in the War of 1914–18, Volume II, p.55. 20 Rhys Crawley, Climax at Gallipoli: The Failure of the August Offensive (Oklahoma, University of Oklahoma Press, 2014), p.25. 21 Bean, Official History of Australia in the War of 1914–18, Volume II, pp.174–182.

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particularly in the area around Suvla Bay. This information focused the attention of the Anzac Corps staff on the possibilities of turning the Turkish flank by moving out of the northern side of the Anzac perimeter and would form the basis of what would later become the August offensive.

Following the initial reconnaissance, additional patrols were sent out in

June to confirm the strength of Turkish troops and the locations of Turkish defences. This information was incorporated into the planning for the attack.

Australian and New Zealand patrols reported that the enemy presence north of the Anzac position remained low, but was increasing. By July 1915, as planning for the attack progressed, reconnaissance of routes to Sari Bair also continued, with particular attention being given to the location of enemy defences.22 Efforts were also being made to identify routes that would enable an attacking force to seize the key terrain that dominated the Anzac position.23

A number of officers and ‘intelligence personnel’ were selected to assist with the route reconnaissance to act as guides during the attack on 6 August. A detailed patrol report, written by Lieutenant George Taylor of the Canterbury

Mounted Rifles and Lieutenant Elliot Wilson of the 8th Light Horse, noted that enemy trenches were ‘well picqueted at night, less so during the day’. Patrols described the slopes as ‘steep’ with thick scrub in many places. Movement was described as difficult, although rates of march were estimated at between one and two miles per hour on different parts of the route reconnoitered. The officers conducting the reconnaissance failed however to estimate the effect that

22 Bean, Official History of Australia in the War of 1914–18, Volume II, pp.456–457; Crawley, Climax at Gallipoli, p.27. 23 Intelligence N.Z.&A. Division 1st–31st July1915 Memorandum, 5 July 1915, TNA, WO157/681.

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the terrain would have on a large body of troops moving through the area at night.24

There were clearly some disagreements between the officers conducting the reconnaissance patrols as well as disagreement with the patrol reports.

Major Percy Overton, the second-in-command of the Canterbury Mounted Rifles, had undertaken some of the first reconnaissance patrols out of the northern side of the Anzac perimeter. He advised that it was impossible to pass between the junction of the ‘Table Top’ and ‘Old No.3 post’, particularly after the ‘Old No.3 post’ had been recaptured by the Turks on 29–30 May. Major-General Alexander

Godley, the General Officer Commanding New Zealand and Australian Division, noted that he did not agree with Overton’s assessment, recalling that on the day of the landings a large number of New Zealand troops were able to move through this area. Godley failed, however, to account for the changed conditions and increased enemy presence around the perimeter at Anzac. He also failed to consider that the Turks had significantly reinforced their position at the Old No.3 post after they recaptured it. Instead, Godley suggested that ‘a way through could be found’, but failed to offer any alternative approaches. Even with Overton as their guide, the Fourth Australian and Twenty-Ninth Indian Brigades were given an almost impossible task to find their way through the maze of gullies and ravines at night to be in a position to attack the Turkish positions on Hill 971.25

After the failure of the August offensive, the Australians and New

Zealanders returned to their trenches and resumed the routine of trench

24 Reconnaissance called for 5 July, 15 July 1915, Intelligence N.Z.&A Division 1st–31st July1915, TNA, WO157/681. 25 New Zealand & Australian Division Minute No.2420, 16 July 1915, Intelligence N.Z.&A Division 1st– 31st July1915, TNA, WO157/681; Bean, Official History of Australia in the War of 1914–18, Volume II, pp.583–595.

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warfare. Throughout September, Australian and New Zealand patrols identified the Turkish troops making increased efforts to secure their positions with new barbed wire entanglements, while enemy trenches were strengthened and new trench lines were constructed.26 Once the decision had been taken to withdraw from Gallipoli, the Australians and New Zealanders set about conditioning the

Turkish troops to extended periods of silence and inactivity. The ANZAC Corps conducted a ‘silent ruse’, remaining silent for three days during the last week of

November. Patrolling ceased and the Australians remained within their perimeter. When the enemy investigated the silence and sent out patrols to reconnoiter the Anzac position, they were met with hostile fire, suffering casualties and withdrawing to their own lines.27 While the Australians and New

Zealanders maintained a large amount of visible activity to convince the Turkish troops that the position at Anzac remained occupied and defended, intelligence reports from late November and December 1915 contain no information from patrols, suggesting that patrol activity was suspended as the withdrawal drew closer.

France and Belgium — 1916–1918

Patrolling in France and Belgium was more structured than on Gallipoli. Orders issued to the Australian Divisions in early April 1916 noted that ‘the intelligence service is often dependent on the scantiest items of information to obtain some clue as to the enemy’s movements and intentions’.28 Battalion commanders were

26 General Staff Anzac Corps 1st–31st August 1915 Anzac Intelligence Summary 29 September 1915, 29 September 1915, TNA, WO95/4282. 27 General Staff 1st Australian Divisions 1st–30th November 1915 Part II Notes on the Withdrawal from Anzac, December 1915, TNA, WO95/4332. 28 Second Australian Division Memorandum I.g.738, 7 April 1916, AWM25, 57/6.

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instructed that they were responsible for obtaining information about the enemy on their front through both active reconnaissance and observation, with coordination of these activities being provided by Brigade Staff.29

The Australians first experience with patrolling in France came when they were occupying the front around Armentières. Small reconnaissance patrols, in some cases just three men (usually an officer and two other ranks), were sent out with a specific task, such as assessing the condition of the enemy wire opposite the front line or moving to a position close enough to the enemy line that they could listen to the enemy activity in the trenches. The instructions issued to reconnaissance patrols varied, but the types of questions the patrol was expected to answer might include:

Duties & Instructions

1. I want to know if the road is occupied by troops or transport, and if

so how much of it.

2. What the country is like in vicinity of road.

3. What view to N. and N.E. can be obtained.

4. Any Germans seen.

5. Remove identity discs and papers from any dead.

6. Inform Units Right and Left when you are going out and report on

return.30

To inspect the condition of the enemy’s wire entanglements or to identify routes into the enemy trenches, patrols frequently needed to move into the enemy wire, often crawling under the enemy wire and attempting to lift it or remove the

29 Second Australian Division Memorandum I.g.738, 7 April 1916, AWM25, 57/6. 30 Fourth Australian Division General Staff 7–15 August 1916 Copy of telegram from 12th . Aus. Inf. Brigade to 4th Australian Division, 10 August 1916, AWM26, 59/6.

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stakes holding it in position. The slightest noise was likely to draw enemy machine gun fire or a shower of grenades.31

Despite these risks, reconnaissance patrols were able to gather valuable information which was used for planning raids and attacks. Patrol reports provided minute details about the enemy positions opposite the British front line which were particularly useful to the infantry who may later have to attack over the area that had been reconnoitered: ‘there is a ditch running from the left of 57 to the right 200 yards, 4’ x 7’ just in front of the parapet. It contains water, barbed wire and refuse (mostly tins). The ditch would only be crossable by means of bridges.’32

Every member of the patrol, whether they were a scout or regular infantryman, was expected to collect information while in no-man’s land. This included: the composition and extent of the enemy wire; the locality and size of shell holes and ditches; the location of gaps in the enemy wire; information about landmarks of any kind; the locations of machine gun emplacements; information about the condition of enemy trenches and parapets; and information about any movements by the enemy.33 Patrols were also expected to use their initiative to explore gaps in enemy wire and look for weakly held trenches that could be raided by the patrol if possible.34 The Battalion Scouting Officer recorded the information obtained by the patrol onto patrol maps, including information about the route that the patrol took through no-man’s land. This information was passed on to Brigade Headquarters as part of the daily summary of intelligence

31 5th Australian Infantry Brigade and Battalions Patrol Reports, 28 April to 15 May 1916, AWM26, 29/27. 32 Ibid. 33 Ninth Australian Infantry Brigade Patrols, 4 December 1916, AWM26, 87/4. 34 Ibid.

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collected by the battalion.35 Division and corps intelligence summaries almost always included a paragraph on patrol activity undertaken during the previous twenty-four hours, especially when patrols encountered German patrols or other unusual activity.

Like other intelligence reports, patrol reports usually followed a common format. They normally described the route the patrol took, including points used to gain access to no-man’s land and the point through which the patrol returned.

The report then described the outcomes of the patrol, specifically addressing the questions that the patrol had been sent out to answer and providing information about enemy reactions to the patrol or other events that took place.36 Details about friendly patrols were also circulated to front line troops, especially information about the times and locations patrols would enter and leave the trenches to avoid being fired upon by friendly troops.37 Battalion Intelligence

Officers and Scout Officers maintained maps of patrol routes taken through no- man’s land and coordinated patrol activities with neighboring battalions and brigade headquarters to ensure that the entire brigade area (and higher) was being adequately patrolled. An example of an Australian battalion patrol map from the Armentières Sector is included as Figure 10.

35 Ninth Australian Infantry Brigade memorandum, 19 February 1917, AWM26, 87/6. 36 5th Australian Infantry Brigade and Battalions Patrol Reports, 25 May 1916, AWM26, 30/1. 37 5th Australian Infantry Brigade and Battalions Patrol Reports Operation Order No.11, 9 July 1916, AWM26, 32/13.

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Figure 10 — An Australian patrol map from the Armentières Sector, June 1916 (AWM26, 36/5)

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Patrolling was a regular activity for all British troops when they were in the front line. Operational summaries show that, when they were in the front lines, the Australian Divisions sent out at least one patrol every night, with most nights seeing two or three patrols being sent into no-man’s land. On some occasions, the Australian divisions sent out as many as seven patrols each night.38 The only break in this constant patrol activity came on bright moonlit nights, when enemy observation of no-man’s land prevented patrols from operating safely.39 Snow during the winter of 1916/1917 added a further complication, as patrols left footprints which could be followed by the enemy and their drab uniforms showed up more clearly against the bright white background, limiting their ability to operate without winter camouflage equipment.

The frequency of patrols was often determined by the tempo of battle.

Headquarters often directed that patrols be sent out to obtain information, especially where an attack was being planned. Multiple patrol reports were then compiled, along with sketches and maps showing information obtained by the patrols.40 Patrols continued even in the midst of major battles. When the

Australians were not committed to attacks, battalions continued to send out reconnaissance patrols to identify the location of the enemy and inspect the state of enemy trenches and defenses. Even during the heaviest fighting on the

Somme, the Australians continued to send out patrols to identify enemy and friendly locations: ‘the suspected enemy strong point between points 88 & 91 in

38 Second Australian Infantry Brigade Summary of Operations for the Week Ending 14/9/1916, 14 September 1916, AWM26, 81/2. 39 Seventh Australian Infantry Brigade Summary of Operations for Week Ending Wednesday 11 October 1916, 12 October 1916, AWM26, 83/11. 40 First Australian Division Memorandum 148/83, 9 September 1916, AWM26, 79/28.

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Sq. R.34. a & c, [map references] as reported yesterday no trace of this strong point could be found by a patrol which went out to investigate last night.’41

Patrols were often used to corroborate information obtained through other means, particularly through aerial reconnaissance.42 Reconnaissance patrols were sent out to locate enemy machine guns or strong-points which had been observed firing on the Australians during the day.43 Where targets could be located, patrols were directed to report any opportunities to engage the enemy with machine guns or mortars and artillery to brigade headquarters.44

When the 3rd Division arrived in Flanders in November 1916, it established an aggressive patrolling program. Instructions issued by Division

Headquarters ordered each battalion to send out four patrols of battalion scouts each night. Each patrol was instructed to include an additional infantryman to ensure that the experience gained from working with battalion scouts was passed onto the regular infantry companies in the battalion.45 3rd Division patrols were ordered to ensure that the Australian supremacy of no-man’s land was maintained from dusk until dawn and that patrol activity should be continuous during the hours of darkness.46

Despite the importance of reconnaissance patrols as a source of intelligence, operational records contain numerous directions from brigade, division, and even corps headquarters instructing battalions to make better use

41 Second Australian Division Summary of Patrol Etc Reports Received, 3 August 1916, AWM26, 56/5. 42 Sixth Australian Infantry Brigade Somme 1916 23-27 August 1916 Patrol Report “A’ Coy, 25 August 1916, AWM26, 58/4. 43 First Australian Division Intelligence Summary No.14 from 6 a.m. 29-12-17 to 6 a.m. 30-12-17, 30 December 1917, AWM26, 292/12. 44 Fourth Australian Division G.S. Circular No.43, 29 August 1916, AWM26, 59/12. 45 Third Australian Division General Staff Circular No.11A, 18 December 1916, AWM26, 84/2. 46 Ninth Australian Infantry Brigade Patrols, 4 December 1916, AWM26, 87/4.

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of their scout platoons as a means of collecting intelligence, and of the need for battalions to carefully select and train members of scout platoons in order to maximise the information that was collected by reconnaissance patrols.47 These instructions were frequently accompanied by requests for information from higher headquarters about the enemy situation opposite the Australian positions.48 While a valuable source of information, patrolling no-man’s land was clearly not a task that all Australian Battalions approached eagerly.

By early 1917, the average strength of a reconnaissance patrol had more than doubled, with patrol strengths now averaging between ten and twenty men, reflecting the need for patrols not only to be able to collect information but also to fight, if necessary, in order to return to friendly lines.49 Patrols requently included a Lewis gun section, bombers, and rifle grenadiers for increased firepower.50 Larger patrols were now often ordered to seek out the enemy as well as collect information while moving through no-man’s land and were composed of a mix of battalion scouts as well as an officer and regular infantry.51

This began to blur the lines of the once clear distinction between reconnaissance patrols that were responsible for stealthily collecting intelligence, and fighting patrols that were sent out to engage the enemy. While scouting was still viewed as a specialist skill, the limited number of scouts available to each battalion often meant that regular infantry were called upon to undertake patrols. In most cases, the experienced infantry were more than capable of these tasks.

47 Third Australian Infantry Brigade Organisation and Training of Scout Platoons, 26 January 1917, AWM26, 120/9. 48 First Australian infantry Brigade memorandum, 8 February 1917, AWM26, 121/11. 49 Fourteenth Australian Infantry Brigade patrol report, 4 February 1917, AWM26, 137/8. 50 Fifth Australian Infantry Brigade Summary of information gained by patrols operating in Sector N.8.a.5.4 to N.1.a.7.4 on night 9th/10th March 1917, 10 March 1917, AWM26. 51 33rd Battalion AIF Fighting Patrols, 19 March 1917, AWM26, 88/3.

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The German withdrawal to the Hindenburg Line initially caught the

British unaware, but British troops quickly followed up the withdrawing

Germans, with the Australians at the forefront of the advance.52 Scouts and light horse patrols were sent forward of the advancing Australian troops to identify areas of enemy resistance as the withdrawing Germans attempted to hold lines of villages along their withdrawal.53 Once the Australians reached the

Hindenburg Line, patrols moved forward to identify weaknesses in the German defences that might be suitable to attack. The location of the Hindenburg Line defences on the reverse slopes around Bullecourt and Riencourt made observation of artillery fire engaged in wire cutting difficult and the Australians were forced to send out patrols to attempt to confirm the effect of wire-cutting work.54 Details about the construction of the German wire obstacles forward of the front line trenches and between the first and second line of trenches, and the locations of machine gun positions forward of the front line trenches that were sighted to fire along the enemy wire were also confirmed by patrols.55 Despite information from patrols and other sources, the Fifth Army decided to attack and the first battle of Bullecourt ended with heavy losses.

In preparation for the attack at Messines, Second Army maintained an aggressive program of patrols to gather intelligence on the German defenders.

According to Second Army intelligence, the Messines-Wytschaete Ridge was occupied by two German Divisions, the 2nd Division occupied the area around

52 General Staff Circular No.63 Topographical Information, 26 March 1917, AWM26, 152/6. 53 First Anzac Corps Summary of Operations for Week Ending 8 a.m. 23rd March 1917, 23 March 1917, AWM26, 152/6. 54 First Anzac Crops Operations S1915, 7 April 1917, AWM26, 152/7. 55 Ig No.262 Report on the defences of the Hindenburg Line by Officers who took part in the attack on April 11th with 14th and 16th Battalions, 18 April 1917, TNA, WO157/565.

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Wytschate, while the 40th (Saxon) Division occupied the area around Messines.

As the attack approached, patrolling continued, and a number of prisoners were brought back to British lines for examination.56 Intelligence officers examining prisoners or debriefing patrols were directed to pay particular attention to information about whether additional German units had been brought into the front line to reinforce the existing garrison, or whether the current front line garrison had been relieved.57

After the successful capture of the Messines-Wytschaete Ridge, Second

Army successfully weathered a number of German counter-attacks. These were unable to dislodge the Second Army from the captured ground and in the days following the battle patrols confirmed that the Germans had withdrawn to defensive positions along the Warneton Line, which was at the rear of the

Messines-Wytschaete Ridge and which now became the enemy front line.58

During the heavy fighting of the third battle of Ypres, the Australians sent forward patrols to report on the condition of the ground over which they expected to continue to advance. Patrols were sent forward into areas such as

Polygon Wood to report on the condition of the ground. Reconnaissance patrols advanced eight hundred to 1,000 yards [seven hundred to nine hundred metres] forward of the front line and reported that the ground was dry and that movement in standard formations was easy. In contrast, the terrain around

Broodseinde Ridge was described by patrols as ‘extremely boggy and in places impassable’.59

56 Second Army Daily Intelligence Summary No.687, 5 June 1917, TNA, WO157/115. 57 Third Australian Division Memorandum G1/258/922, 9 June 1917, AWM26, 194/1. 58 The Battle of Messines, 7 June 1917, AWM26, 187/11. 59 Report on patrol formations adopted by 14th Aust. Infantry Brigade during recent operations, 27 October 1917, AWM26, 268/10.

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After the British front line had stabilised following the German Offensive in March 1918, Australian reconnaissance patrols pushed forward aggressively, collecting intelligence, probing for weaknesses in the enemy line, and often attacking German positions.60 Around Villers-Bretonneux, Australian patrols identified that the units facing them were under strength and noted that German troops were not taking steps to strengthen their defences or prepare for further attacks on their positions.61 Enemy morale was observed to be low and

Australian patrols were able to dominate no-man’s land. German patrols seldom ventured out. Australian troops were able to penetrate German lines almost at will and occasionally captured strong points and other positions. This information helped shape plans for the attacks at Hamel and Amiens.62

Observation and patrolling were important sources of front line intelligence. While they seldom provided definitive intelligence on their own, they contributed to the overall picture of the enemy. They often helped confirm other intelligence or inform other actions. Observing the front was not only the task of specialist intelligence observers, it was also a task undertaken by regular infantry, although the observation tasks assigned to specialist observers were very different from those undertaken by front line troops. Similarly, patrolling was a specialist task, although, as the war progressed, it was a task that was increasingly undertaken by regular infantry. While the Australians showed that they were adept at patrolling, their skills were comparable to other British and

Dominion units which all undertook similar activities until the end of the war.

60 Patrolling Operations Night 24th/25th April 1918, 25 April 1918, AWM26, 397/1. 61 Notes on the Country in the Enemy’s Occupation between the River Somme and the Amiens Railway, 1 August 1918, AWM26, 492/2. 62 Fourth Army Intelligence Assessment 220(g), 17 July 1918, AWM26.

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Chapter 11. Prisoners

Prisoners were a well known source of intelligence. Even before a prisoner had been examined, information obtained from a prisoners uniform, equipment, and personal effects could provide intelligence about the location of various German formations, the condition of the enemy, and provide insights into what was happening in Germany itself. Examination of prisoners provided further information, particularly if a prisoner could be encouraged or tricked into revealing information to his captors. As the war progressed, intelligence officers developed more subtle and sophisticated ways of taking advantage of the dislocation prisoners felt when captured in order to obtain a wealth of valuable information. The Australians’ first encounters with enemy prisoners came almost as soon as they landed on Gallipoli. Some of the earliest intelligence reports after the landings noted that, within days of the landings, over 1,000 prisoners had surrendered or had been captured around Anzac. Once the positions at Anzac and Helles became largely static, deserters crossed over the

British or Anzac lines, providing further information about the enemy. In France and Belgium, the Australians captured many German prisoners during major battles, in addition to the prisoners taken during raids and captured by patrols.

These prisoners were all examined and useful intelligence wrung from them before they were sent onto POW camps. Until the end of the war, prisoners were an important source of battlefield intelligence. This chapter examines prisoners as a source of intelligence, how intelligence was obtained from prisoners, the types of intelligence prisoners provided, and how this intelligence was incorporated into Australian battle planning.

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Pre-war intelligence doctrine

The experiences of the war in South Africa had taught the British the value of information that could be obtained from prisoners and deserters. Field

Intelligence: Its Principles and Practice noted that ‘a single prisoner or deserter, a garrulous inhabitant, a scrap of neglected paper or an intercepted love letter, may any of them afford a clue to the strength, the position, the designs or the condition of the enemy.’1

Interviewing prisoners and deserters was a key function of intelligence officers in the field. The Boer War had taught that a prisoner should be questioned immediately upon capture, ‘while his nerves are still likely to be shaken’.2 As soon as prisoners were captured, they were to be immediately asked for their name, rank, and regiment, and if the prisoner showed no hesitation in answering these questions, the intelligence officer was to continue to ask questions about the prisoners brigade, division, and seek further information about his commanding general and the number of other troops in the area.3

Where large numbers of prisoners were captured, they were to be questioned separately in the same way in order to allow statements from different prisoners to be compared and generate more reliable and accurate information.4 South

Africa also taught the British that prisoners should be searched immediately upon capture to prevent them from disposing of any material of intelligence value they have upon their person.

1 War Office General Staff, Field Intelligence, p.14. 2 Ibid., p18. 3 Ibid. 4 Ibid.

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Field Intelligence stressed that questioners needed skill in eliciting information and noted that this was a skill that grew over time and as intelligence officers became more familiar with their subject.5 Doctrine suggested that information could be obtained from prisoners through a variety of different approaches, such as exhibiting ‘camaraderie with prisoners or affected suspicion with deserters’. Other strategies for questioning prisoners included ‘gentleness to melt reserve or harshness to break it down’, ‘ridiculing the enemy to start a justifying or enlightening argument’, or ‘gratitude for small favours to draw out admissions’. Field Intelligence also noted that ‘a bottle of brandy is a powerful weapon against a physically exhausted man’.6 Other methods included a combined harsh and soft approach (questioning by a harsh officer and then dealing with a more sympathetic underling), unfounded accusation of wrong-doing to generate pleas of innocence, and even the use of bogus ‘death sentences’ to obtain information from prisoners.7

Pre-war doctrine noted that deserters should be disarmed and sent to the rear for detailed examination. Examination of deserters needed to be conducted carefully and was best carried out ‘in camp or quarters’. Deserters needed to be treated with suspicion as this role was ‘frequently adopted by spies’.8

The role of the Intelligence Corps

After war was declared, one of the first roles of the newly formed Intelligence

Corps was the questioning of prisoners. By Autumn 1915, it was recognised that

5 Ibid., p.14. 6 Ibid. 7 Ibid., p.15. 8 Ibid., p.18.

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the casual questioning of prisoners by non-Intelligence Corps personnel was counter-productive and the practice was stopped.9 By 1916, one of the primary functions of Intelligence Corps personnel attached to Corps Headquarters was the ‘examination of German prisoners and deserters, including wounded in clearing stations’.10 As the war progressed, the processing and examination of prisoners by the Intelligence Corps became much more systematic and streamlined. Orders issued in mid-1917 noted that responsibility for examination of prisoners rested entirely with the Intelligence Section of the

General Staff and that examining officers were not to be interfered with in any way in the conduct of their duties.11 Only General Staff Officers and Intelligence

Corps Officers concerned with examining prisoners were to be present during the examination of prisoners. The fact that an officer was of a more senior rank or was the commander of the formation that captured the prisoner did not give him the right to be present during the examination.12 Orders stated that if a commander required certain information, the examining officer would obtain it for him.13

Examination of prisoners by divisions and lower level formations and units was deemed to be a waste of resources and was assessed as ‘probably prejudicing the success of examination by Corps Headquarters’.14 Once captured, prisoners were moved as quickly as possible to a POW cage, usually at corps level. After being disarmed, most front line troops directed their captives

9 Beach, Haig’s Intelligence, p.102. 10 Instructions for Intelligence Duties Second Army, 28 March 1916, AWM25, 423/2/30. 11 12th Australian Infantry Brigade Orders, 24 June 1917, AWM26, 187/11A. 12 Ibid. 13 Ibid. 14 Instructions for Intelligence Duties Second Army, 28 March 1916, AWM25, 423/2/30.

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rearwards to Brigade or Division Headquarters, usually with an escort.15 Despite orders to send prisoners to the rear immediately after capture, there were numerous occasions where prisoners were employed by front line troops as

‘carrying parties’ to carry wounded to casualty clearing stations, delaying their arrival at POW collection points.16 Front line troops were ordered to ensure that a note stating where the prisoners had been captured was forwarded to POW collection points with the prisoner, and escorts were cautioned to prevent prisoners from conversing on their way to POW collection points to prevent information from being lost.17 Responsibility for gathering prisoners and moving them rearward from forward collection areas rested with the Provost Marshal and military police.18

Examination techniques

Once captured, prisoners were marshalled and separated by battalion and regiment. The numbers of personnel from each German class (i.e. class of 1918,

1919, 1920) was ascertained and this information was passed to Corps

Headquarters.19 Analysis of the composition of German units and the presence of certain ‘classes’ was used as one measure to assess the impact of the war on

German manpower reserves. Officers, NCOs and soldiers were separated and officer prisoners were generally kept separate from each other before they were

15 12th Australian Infantry Brigade Standing Orders, 12 June 1916, AWM26, 32/13. 16 Third Australian Division General Staff Circular No.60A, 23 September 1917, AWM26, 250/2. 17 War Diary of Fourth Australian Division General Staff, 21 July 1916, AWM26, 59/2; 12th Australian Infantry Brigade Standing Orders, 12 June 1916, AWM26, 32/13. 18 For further information on the role of Australian Military Police, see Geoff Barr, Military Discipline: Policing the 1st Australian Imperial Force 1914-1920, (Sydney, D Books, 2010); Glenn Wahlert, The Other Enemy? (South Melbourne, Oxford University Press, 1999). 19 Notes for the Corps Cage, 24 June 1918, AWM, 3/DRL/4182.

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examined.20 Separation of officers, NCOs, and soldier prisoners was important.

Records show that where insufficient care was taken by front line units, officers and NCOs were able to remind soldiers of their responsibilities to not answer questions, ‘spoiling’ batches of prisoners for examination.21 Enemy prisoners were screened as soon as possible after capture to identify captives who were likely to speak more freely than others or who exhibited specialist knowledge or training.22 Where a prisoner was obviously concealing knowledge that could not be obtained through normal examination, or where a prisoner indicated a change in the enemy order of battle, they were sent to Army Headquarters for more detailed examination.23

At the beginning of the war, the questions asked of prisoners beyond their name, rank and regimental identification were left largely to the discretion of individual intelligence officers. By 1915, a standard form listing questions to ask a POW had been produced.24 The use of a list of questions and the writing down of answers during the interview seems to have acted as an inhibitor, ‘putting prisoners on their guard’, and was quickly done away with.25 Instead, a more conversational approach was taken, with intelligence officers asking questions and introducing new topics should a captive prove cooperative.26 Special lists of questions were developed for miners, aircrew, and other specialists who might

20 8th Australian Infantry Brigade Intelligence, 29 October 1916, AWM26, 136/4. 21 Second Australian Division Memorandum G.16/1/84, 7 July 1918, AWM25, 423/2/1. 22 Instructions for Intelligence Duties Second Army, 10 June 1916, AWM25, 423/2/92. 23 Ibid. 24 Beach, Haig’s Intelligence, p.103. 25 Ibid. 26 Beach, Haig’s Intelligence, p.103; Instructions for Intelligence Duties Second Army, 28 March 1916, AWM25, 423/2/30.

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be captured.27 Documenting the intelligence obtained during the examination was usually completed after the prisoner had been taken away.28

During periods of normal trench warfare, the number of prisoners taken was usually small and easily able to be dealt with. During major battles, when large numbers of captives were likely to be taken, screening prisoners early was vital to ensure that limited Intelligence Corps resources were used effectively.29

Dealing with prisoners during periods of mobile warfare posed particular challenges. During mobile warfare, it was thought likely that large numbers of enemy prisoners would be captured that would require rapid screening and examination in order to provide reliable information quickly to the advancing troops.30 Restrictions on intelligence officers at brigade and division examining prisoners were lifted and quick examinations could be conducted to obtain tactically relevant information before passing prisoners to the corps POW cage for further examination.31 It was also impractical to send large numbers of prisoners to Army Headquarters for examination, because of the need to obtain information quickly. Instead, Army Headquarters would send additional intelligence officers to lower level headquarters to supplement their intelligence personnel and aid in the rapid collection and transmission of information.32

In addition to preventing EPW from speaking, front line troops were ordered to ensure that all officers were searched immediately upon capture to prevent them from disposing of any documents or other materials in their

27 Instructions for Intelligence Duties Second Army, 10 June 1916, AWM25, 423/2/92. 28 Beach, Haig’s Intelligence, p.103. 29 Instructions for Intelligence Duties Second Army, 10 June 1916, AWM25, 423/2/92. 30 Second Army Notes on Intelligence in Open Warfare, 14 July 1916, AWM25. 31 Ibid. 32 Ibid.

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possession. Any documents or other materials were to be tagged and sent rearwards with the POW to ensure that the information was matched to the correct prisoner. Soldiers were disarmed but not immediately searched upon capture for documents, although escorts were cautioned to ensure that prisoners did not destroy or throw away any documents or other materials en route to

POW collection points. All prisoners were allowed to retain their identity discs and their paybooks.33 Troops were also ordered not to provide prisoners with food, drink, or tobacco as they were escorted rearwards to POW cages, as this could interfere with their examination.34

By early 1917, it was recognised that there was value in sending forward intelligence officers to obtain early identifications of prisoners and other tactical information which would be of direct value to the commander on the spot.

Division intelligence officers and intelligence officers from Corps Headquarters often moved to Brigade Headquarters, or even further forward, during operations to obtain information and conduct quick examinations of two or three prisoners before sending them to the corps POW cage.35 By 1918, the process for dealing with prisoners and their subsequent screening and examination was well established. Front line units were notified in their orders of the location of POW cages and the time that cages would be opened and closed by the Provost

Marshal. Intelligence officers were sent forward to conduct tactical questioning at Brigade Headquarters and additional resources were deployed from Army

Headquarters to support attacks. Intelligence officers were also sent to casualty clearing stations to interview wounded German prisoners before they were

33 War Diary of Fourth Australian Division General Staff, 21 July 1916, AWM26, 59/2. 34 Third Australian Division Diversion Circular No.6 Intelligence, 27 July 1917, AWM26, 194/3. 35 Divisional Intelligence Officers, 17 February 1917, AWM25, 106/324.

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evacuated. Prisoners were screened and interviewed at corps POW cages and any prisoners considered of value was forwarded to Army Headquarters for detailed examination.36

Following the success of the Amiens offensive in August 1918, the only change to this approach was allowing battalions to conduct short examinations of some prisoners to obtain tactical information which may aid in the advance before they were sent rearward. Battalions were permitted to retain important documents found on prisoners if they were immediately required by the front line commander, although details of any documents or material kept by front line troops needed to be sent to higher headquarters.37 Questioning at Battalion

Headquarters was limited to information about enemy dispositions and local enemy intentions and was facilitated by the attachment of German speakers to

Battalion Headquarters.38

Deserters

Despite pre-war doctrine stating that deserters should always be treated with suspicion and carefully examined to prevent espionage, there were no specific instructions for the treatment of deserters beyond those issued for EPW. Beach notes that deserters proved to be an invaluable source of information and, far from being spies, they were usually ‘reluctant soldiers’ from areas such as

Alsace-Lorraine or Poland, with limited loyalty to Germany. Others, such as

Socialists, also had a strong political motivations to desert.39 Far from being

36 Fourth Army Intelligence I.G 74/1, 5 August 1918, AWM26, 472/3. 37 Tenth Australian Infantry Battalion Memorandum 19 November 1918, AWM25, 423/2/64. 38 Australian Corps Memorandum, 24 November 1918, AWM25. 39 Beach, Haig’s Intelligence, p.106.

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dubious sources of information, deserters spoke willingly about a range of military and non-military subjects, providing intelligence officers with an understanding of the situation in the front lines and Germany itself. Deserters were therefore highly prized sources of intelligence and would be subject to long and detailed examinations to ensure that maximum intelligence benefit was obtained from them.40 For this reason, and to prevent harm to the families of deserters and other prisoners who communicated freely with intelligence officers, it was necessary for Army Headquarters to warn lower level formations not to include any information about the identity of deserters or prisoners in their intelligence summaries.41

Training Intelligence Officers to examine prisoners

There are few available records about the training of Intelligence Corps officers early in the war, especially in relation to questioning or examining prisoners. A pre-requisite skill for any intelligence officer was a skill with languages.

Knowledge of the German Army was also extremely important and the British were fortunate to be able to draw on detailed pre-war studies of the German

Army that were updated as the war progressed.42 Many intelligence officers kept their own records about German units and formations that they had previously encountered, including details about the make-up of the unit, its command structure, and information about the commander, formation and quality of the unit.43

40 Ibid. 41 Fourth Army Intelligence GHQ(I) No.Ia/49048, 2 May 1918, AWM26, 346/10. 42 Notes on German Tactics, 24 June 1918, AWM, 3/DRL/4182. 43 , 2nd LTC.J Brossois Intelligence Course Notes, 8 October 1917, AWM, 3/DRL/4182.

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Intelligence courses run by divisions or corps schools touched on the subject of examining prisoners, but only briefly. A twenty-three day long course for intelligence officers conducted by the Fourth Army at the end of 1916 included only one lecture on the examination of prisoners.44 This improved later in the war, with officers posted to Division Headquarters as Divisional

Intelligence Officers and Intelligence Corps Officers posted to Corps and Army

Headquarters being provided with much more comprehensive training in examining prisoners.

Captain Fredrick Robinson, AIF, completed his training as an Intelligence

Officer in early 1917, and then serving as the Divisional Intelligence Officer of the

Fifth Division until the end of the war. Before the war, Robinson had been a militia officer and an Associate Professor of languages, teaching at the Royal

Military College at Duntroon in Canberra. Robinson wrote detailed notes about his training, including training on how to examine prisoners.45 According to

Robinson’s notes, prisoners were under no obligation to provide any information other than their name and rank. Prisoners could not be forced to provide information, nor could they be punished for providing false or misleading information.46 Extracting information from prisoners was a matter ‘of individual personality and method’. As a starting point, it was important that the prisoner understood in all instances that he was now a captive and that the intelligence officer was in charge. German soldiers were instructed to treat British officers in the same manner as they would treat a German officer. This approach took advantage of the conditioning and military training German soldiers had

44 Fourth Army Syllabus for Course for Intelligence Officers, 10 December 1916, AWM25. 45 CAPT F.W. Robinson Intelligence Course Notes, 2 February 1917, AWM, 3/DRL/3907. 46 Ibid.

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received and made them more likely to respond to orders or requests from the intelligence officer examining them.47

A different approach was required for German officer prisoners or where the prisoner may be of a higher rank than the intelligence officer. Senior officers were dealt with in a different manner to junior officers. In all cases, however, officer prisoners were to be made to understand that the intelligence officer was in charge, regardless of their rank.

Before any examination, the intelligence officer needed to consider what information he wanted to obtain from the prisoner; how much time was available to obtain the information; what the rank of the prisoner was; and what the physical condition of the prisoner was.48 All examinations of prisoners opened with the intelligence officer establishing the prisoners identity, which was aided by their identity discs and ‘soldbuch’ (paybook) — hence the importance of leaving these items with prisoners — before proceeding with further questioning.

At division level, the normal approach to prisoner examination was called the ‘rapid squeeze’, with the prisoner being questioned about local conditions, such as the locations of machine guns, heavy weapons and artillery. Intelligence officers were instructed to act as if they ‘had complete knowledge’ of any subject by mentioning a few things and waiting for the prisoner ‘to fill in the gaps’. Care needed to be taken to avoid giving away friendly information with this approach.

Other strategies depended upon the captive. Loquacious prisoners were allowed to talk until they contradicted themselves and provided the intelligence officer

47 Ibid. 48 Ibid.

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with an opportunity to confront them about an obvious lie. Orders to front line troops to not provide food or water or tobacco were important, as this allowed the intelligence officer to provide or withhold these items and generate gratitude from the prisoner, which might help loosen his tongue.49

Intelligence officers were encouraged to tabulate their questions, translate them into German, and to learn them by rote in order to guide examinations and ensure that they achieved the desired outcomes. In other respects, however, they had a large amount of freedom in how they examined prisoners.50 Robinson’s intelligence course notes discuss the use of questionnaires and other papers in prisoner examinations and suggested that it was for the intelligence officer to decide if and when to use them, as some prisoners would see the papers and ‘shut up’ while others ‘became more accurate’. Having maps and aerial photographs to hand was deemed useful, as prisoners who were willing to pass on information could often be encouraged to point out the locations of troops, headquarters, or weapons on them.51

A single intelligence officer conducted most interviews and the use of notetakers was discouraged. If a notetaker was required, intelligence officers were instructed to have them remain silent and out of sight behind the prisoner.

Two man interviews offered a different and varied approach to prisoner examinations, with both intelligence officers, one on each side at an ‘angle of 45 degrees’, alternatively asking questions or repeating the same questions to a prisoner instructed to remain looking forward. The intelligence officer conducting the interview was required to ‘stage manage’ this approach carefully,

49 Ibid. 50 Ibid. 51 Ibid.

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but Robinson’s notes say this method could be very effective. He also noted that

Germans were sensitive to ridicule and that specific units, such as Jägers, had specific sensitivities associated with Bavaria that could be exploited during questioning.52

When small numbers of prisoners were captured, it was possible to examine them all. Robinson noted that soldiers should be interviewed before

NCOs, with officers being interviewed last. When large numbers of prisoners were captured (Robinson gives a figure of in excess of one hundred in his notes), it was necessary to line the prisoners up and give them some orders in German, watching for the way that they responded. Based on the responses, several NCOs and more ‘intelligent’ soldiers could then be selected for interview, making sure that captives from every unit identified were interviewed.53 Having selected candidates for interview, they were to be held separately from other prisoners and the intelligence officer needed to ensure that they could not observe other prisoners being interviewed, to ‘preserve the effect’. After they had been interviewed, prisoners would again be held separately until it was decided whether further questioning was required.54

The types of questions to be asked of prisoners was also important.

Intelligence officers were cautioned not to ask questions to which the prisoner could respond ‘ja’ or ‘nein’ (yes or no). Instead, questions should begin with

‘wenn, wie, wo, was’ (when, why, who, what). After the prisoner’s identification had been established, a good approach was to ask ‘a few leading questions’ to ‘set the tongue wagging’, such as ‘when you were caught…’, before centering the

52 Ibid. 53 Ibid. 54 Ibid.

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questions around one idea (e.g. the location of enemy machine guns or reserves) at a time. Once a line of questioning had been exhausted, the intelligence officer could then move onto another, until the examination was complete.55

Robinson’s notes make the point that there was no reason not to repeatedly interrogate prisoners to obtain information, and that repeated interrogations allowed intelligence officers to focus their attention on one particular point or issue, or to take a pause in an examination of a prisoner to allow the intelligence officer to review other information before continuing.56

The biggest single issue that the intelligence officer needed to consider was how much time he had available, noting that the further forward that he was deployed, the greater the need for immediate information and the less time available for repeated or longer interviews with prisoners.57 Repeated interrogation was a useful technique in extracting information from prisoners who refused to talk, and Robinson noted that, over time, prisoners would become ‘dejected’ and more amenable to conversing with the intelligence officer.

Providing prisoners with a map and pencil and informing them that they had

‘homework’ to do before a second examination was completed, or agreeing to allow them to write a letter home if they cooperated, were other ways of encouraging them to provide information.58

Where a prisoner was identified as belonging to a regiment about which

GHQ or Army Headquarters required information, or when a prisoner was

55 Ibid. 56 Ibid. 57 Ibid. 58 Ibid.

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assessed to have special value, they were ‘blacklisted’ and sent back for further examination as soon as possible.59

Another Australian Officer, Lieutenant Charles Brossois, AIF, completed

Intelligence Officer Training at the Intelligence School at Harrow in the UK, which included multiple lessons on the examination of prisoners, the preparation of interrogation reports from prisoner interrogations and some practical work.60

Gallipoli — 1915

Once ashore on Gallipoli, several days passed without any clear intelligence picture, reflecting the confusion immediately following the landings as the

Australian and New Zealanders fought to establish their toehold. After several days, fragmentary reports from prisoners captured on the day of the landings gradually began to arrive at Division and Corps Headquarters. Three prisoners from the 27th Regiment were captured on 25 April 1915; an Armenian Officer from the 77th Regiment was captured on the 26 April; and a soldier from the

57th Regiment was captured on 27 April.61 Prisoners captured during and after the landings were quickly examined by the ANZAC Intelligence Staff: ‘3 prisoners all Turks from Asia Minor were examined. They are from 1st & 2nd Battalions

(Col Shetye Effendi) of the 27th Regt of the 9th Division of 3rd Army Corps’.62

59 Ibid. 60 Programme for Intelligence School Harrow, 2 July 1918, AWM25, 879/1/9. 61 Intelligence Anzac Corps 1st–30th April 1915 prisoner debriefing reports, 29 April 1915, TNA, WO157/668. 62 Intelligence Anzac Corps 1st April–30th April 1915 Prisoners of War taken near Kaba Tepe, 25 April 1915, TNA, WO157/668.

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Information obtained from these examinations was sent directly to ANZAC Corps

Headquarters.63

In the days after the landings, more prisoners were captured and examined by the Intelligence Staff, providing a picture about the Turkish views of the landings — ‘the Turks are much shaken by our shell-fire and by our refusal to retire’ — and information about German officers serving with Turkish forces —

‘there is one German Officer to each 4 gun battery of artillery’ — and the state of different Turkish formations — ‘The Arabs of the 19th Div. are heartily sick of the war’.64 Some prisoners provided specific information: ‘20th Regt has 10 or 15 mountain and screw-guns. Our shell-fire yesterday was 300–400 yards over their batteries — but the day before we destroyed 2 of their guns’.65

Almost as soon as they landed on Gallipoli the Australians encountered deserters, with early examination reports showing that Greeks and Armenians who had been drafted into the Ottoman Army were frequently unhappy with being sent to the front and were eager to escape the fighting.66 Examination of deserters showed that when conditions in the front lines deteriorated, or when front line troops were treated harshly by their superiors, Ottoman troops were more likely to desert.

Prisoners and deserters were important sources of information, enabling

ANZAC Headquarters and GHQ MEF to identify the different Turkish regiments and divisions that surrounded the positions at Anzac and Helles. Both the 1st

63 Ibid. 64 Intelligence Anzac Corps 1st April–30th April 1915 Examination of Prisoners 26/27 April 1915, 27 April 1915, TNA, WO157/668. 65 Intelligence Anzac Corps 1st April–30th April 1915 Prisoners of War, 29 April 1915, TNA, WO157/668. 66 Intelligence Anzac Corps 1st April–30th April 1915 Examination of Deserter, 29 April 1915, TNA, WO157/668.

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Division and the New Zealand and Australian Division were instructed to send information about any new units that were identified through the examination of prisoners or deserters to GHQ MEF as quickly as possible.67

Turkish attacks against the Anzac position in May 1915 yielded a steady stream of prisoners, enabling intelligence staff to identify new Turkish units that had arrived on the peninsula and to confirm the identification of units already thought to be fighting around Anzac.68 The number of prisoners captured by the

Australian and New Zealanders during the landings and in fighting around the perimeter of the Anzac position was surprisingly high. By 21 May 1915, a total of

1,047 prisoners were reported to have been captured.69

The Australians and New Zealanders quickly learnt that the numbers on the left-hand side collar of Turkish uniforms indicated which Regiment a Turkish soldier was from, with the right-hand side indicating the company within the

Regiment. Instructions were also issued for numbers to be taken from dead or wounded Turkish troops to aid in the identification of enemy units.70

In addition to enabling the intelligence staff to identify the different

Turkish units that surrounded the British positions on Gallipoli, prisoners also provided information about the state of the Turkish war effort, talking about the amount of food, ammunition and artillery available to the Ottoman Army fighting on the Gallipoli peninsula, as well as providing information about losses, morale, and the location of reserves stationed near Constantinople or being brought onto

67 Intelligence N.Z.&A Div 1st–31st May 1915, 1 May 1915, TNA, WO157/679. 68 ANZAC Corps Intelligence Summary, 20 May 1915, AWM25. 69 ANZAC Corps Intelligence — Intelligence Bulletin, 21 May 1915, AWM25. 70 Ibid.

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the peninsula to join the fighting.71 Information obtained from prisoner examinations became a regular feature of ANZAC Corps intelligence summaries once they began to be issued regularly from mid-May 1915.72

Most, if not all prisoners captured by the Australians and New Zealanders were examined by intelligence officers at Anzac. There are no references to screening prisoners and selecting the best candidates for interview, as was the practice in France by this stage of the war. The constant trickle of prisoners and deserters was able to be absorbed by the small number of intelligence officers available to conduct prisoner examinations. The process followed by intelligence officers examining Turkish prisoners at Gallipoli seems to have followed the standard approach of establishing the prisoner’s identity and then questioning him about the military situation.

Intelligence Officers conducting prisoner examinations used a form (Form for Interrogation of Prisoners Appendix No. J36) to record details of the prisoner’s identity and unit, as well as comments about ammunition, food and morale.

Archival copies of completed forms are typewritten, suggesting that the forms were completed after the intelligence officer had interviewed the prisoner.73 An example of a prisoner examination form is shown in Figure 11.

Many of the early prisoner examinations conducted at Anzac were not undertaken by Intelligence Corps officers. The ability to speak Arabic or other dialects meant that officers, such as Lieutenant H. Pine Gordon, RNVR, and

71 Dardanelles GHQ Intelligence Summary from 6th March to 31st July 1915, 4 May 1915, TNA, WO157/647. 72 ANZAC Corps Intelligence Summary, 19 May 1915, AWM25; ANZAC Corps Intelligence — Intelligence Bulletin, 21 May 1915, AWM25. 73 Intelligence N.Z.&A. 1st June–30th June 1915 Form for Interrogation of Prisoners, 23 June 1915, TNA, WO157/680.

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Lieutenant J. Hay, SSO, were employed conducting prisoner examinations. The use of the form and a series of set questions may have been adopted to ensure that inexperienced non-Intelligence Corps officers collected the information that was required from prisoner examinations.74

74 Intelligence Anzac Corps 1st April–30th April 1915 Examination of Deserter, 29 April 1915, TNA, WO157/668.

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Figure 11- Form for Interrogation of Prisoners, Appendix No. J36 (TNA, WO157/680)

Information obtained from prisoners in the lead-up to the August offensive continued to provide GHQ MEF and ANZAC Corps Headquarters with a

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picture of how the Turkish troops were arrayed around the perimeter of the position at Anzac, helping to confirm information obtained from patrols and from observing the Turkish positions.75 Prisoners also provided useful information about how the Turkish troops manned their front line and reserve trenches, their morale, and likely response to an attack. This information was incorporated into plans for the assault on Lone Pine, with orders for the attack noting ‘that any assault on the position at Lone Pine would be hard fought’.76

During the attack on Lone Pine, a number of prisoners were captured and in the days after the offensive several Turkish soldiers gave themselves up to the

Australian and New Zealanders.77 Prisoners revealed that Turkish losses during the August offensive fighting had been high, particularly at Lone Pine, where the

Turks had decided to cease attempting to recapture the lost trenches.78 Prisoners also confirmed the presence of three new enemy formations — the 13th, 9th and

25th Divisions — around the Anzac perimeter. These formations had been moved into position after the offensive commenced to contain the Australians and New Zealanders.79

Once planning for the evacuation began, intelligence collection efforts were focused on determining whether the Turks were aware that the evacuation was underway. Deserters indicated that the Turkish Army was standing on the defensive and that there were no plans for any further attacks on the Anzac

75 Notes on further operations by Australian & New Zealand Army Corps, 30 June 1915, TNA, WO95/4281. 76 Intelligence Anzac Corps 1st–31st August 1915 Turkish Dispositions, 5 August 1915, TNA, WO157/672. 77 Intelligence Anzac Corps 1st–31st August 1915 Intelligence Summary 14 August 1915, 14 August 1915, TNA, WO157/672. 78 Ibid. 79 General Staff Anzac Corps 1st–31st August 1915 Memorandum IG714, 9 August 1915, TNA, WO95/4282.

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position. Food and ammunition were plentiful, and while no winter clothing had been issued it was expected to arrive soon.80 As the Anzac position was prepared for evacuation, the position fell quiet for extended periods of time and there are few records of prisoners being captured after the end of October 1915.81

However, deserters continued to find their way into the Anzac position and the positions held by IX Corps at Suvla and VIII Corps at Helles. Information obtained from their examination confirmed that the enemy was unaware of the plans to evacuate the Gallipoli peninsula. The last examination report for a deserter arriving at the Anzac position is for a soldier from the 16th Regiment who surrendered to the Australians on 11 December 1915. There is no information in his examination report that would indicate that the Turks were aware of the imminent withdrawal.82

Armentières, Fromelles and the Somme — 1916

Once in France, the Australians adopted the standard BEF processes for examining prisoners. The first prisoners captured by the Australians in France were taken during trench raids conducted as the Australian Divisions rotated through the Armentières Sector. The process of sending prisoners quickly to the rear to divisional collecting stations with details of their capture; of searching and disarming prisoners upon their capture; and separating officers, NCOs and soldiers, were all quickly assimilated into the way that the Australians

80 General Staff Anzac Corps 1st–31st August 1915 Information from a deserter, 19 September 1915, TNA, WO95/4282. 81 1st Anzac Corps General Staff War Diaries Oct–Nov 1915, Nov 1915, TNA, WO95/4283. 82 H.Q. Dardanelles Army Intelligence Summary 26.11.15 to 31.12.15, 11 December 1915, TNA, WO157/651.

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operated.83 Even though the outcome of the attack at Fromelles was disastrous, the 5th Division and the 61st British Division captured one officer and one hundred and eighteen soldiers during the assault. The examination of these prisoners confirmed that all four regiments from the 6th Bavarian Reserve

Division remained in the line at Fromelles instead of having been sent further south to join the fighting at the Somme.84 Perhaps there was some justification for the attack on the basis that the entire division remained in place.

Before the battle of the Somme, the Fourth Army conducted a number of raids on German positions. Prisoners captured during the beginning of June 1916 gave no indications that the Germans were aware of the impending British offensive, but examination of prisoners revealed that the Germans occupied well prepared positions.85 GHQ intelligence tracked the number of German units being rotated through the front line of the Somme battlefield. As units were worn out, they were sent away and replaced with fresh units. GHQ intelligence equated the speed and frequency with which German units entered the battle and were subsequently replaced with the concept that they were ‘wearing out’ the German

Army. The more units used up in the battle, the fewer reserves the Germans would have, and eventually they would not be able to resist British attacks.

There was intense interest in whether the Germans were milking other parts of their front line in order to provide troops for the fighting on the Somme, or if they were calling up reserves and new ‘classes’ of soldiers for training to make

83 Fourth Australian Division Intelligence Memorandum, 19 July 1916, AWM25, 423/1/85. 84 Preliminary Report of Prisoners Captured in the attack of the 19th July 1916 between Ferme Delangre and Trivelet and also during subsidiary raids on the night 19th/20th July 1916, 21 July 1916, AWM26, 35/15. 85 Fourth Army Intelligence Summaries June 1916 Examination of FRANZ BUBA 10th Company 3rd Battn 23rd Regiment, 4 June 1916, TNA, WO157/171.

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up manpower shortages.86 Prisoners captured during the fighting provided information about the different German units fighting on the Somme and GHQ were able to track with some accuracy the movement of different German units into the front lines and then identify when those units were exhausted and were sent to quieter sectors to recover.

Intelligence reports indicated that the German front line around Pozières on 20 July 1916 was occupied by units from the Guard Fusiliers Regiment, the

8th Bavarian Reserve Regiment, and the 185th Regiment.87 The exact nature of the garrison in the village of Pozières itself was unclear, as the Germans were suffering heavy losses and it was not uncommon for regiments and battalions to be separated from their parent formations and sent to replace exhausted units.

Additional information obtained from prisoners on 20 July 1916 indicated that the 62nd Regiment had relieved the 185th Regiment, while the 23rd and

63rd Regiments were believed to have reinforced the Thiepval sector. Prisoner examinations revealed the presence of new German regiments around Pozières in addition to those units already identified, including the 22nd Reserve Infantry

Regiment and the 23rd Regiment. Prisoners reported further reinforcements from the 180th Infantry Regiment arriving in Bapaume.88

After the successful capture of Pozières, the Australians were ordered to capture Mouquet Farm and advance along the old Roman road towards

Bapaume. Information obtained from prisoners noted that the Australians faced a mix of German units, including the 9th Reserve Jägers, 162nd Regiment, 62nd

86 John Chateris, At G.H.Q. (London, Cassell and Company, 1931), pp.155–158. 87 Reserve Army Summary of Information, 20 July 1916, TNA, WO157/200. 88 Reserve Army Summary of Information, 27 July 1916, TNA, WO157/200.

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Regiment, 63rd Regiment, 84th Reserve Regiment and the 86th Reserve

Regiment.89

As the Australians pressed on through the maze of trenches that led towards Mouquet Farm, the examination of prisoners captured in the vicinity of the ‘Quarry’ identified units from 29th Regiment and 69th Regiment now facing the Australian advance.90 Other prisoners reported that, due to the heavy bombardments, many of the cellars and dug-outs around Mouquet Farm had been destroyed, along with the enemy wire.91 Prisoners reported that there were five dugouts still intact underneath Mouquet Farm, with multiple entrances on the south-west and north-eastern side, and that the farm was occupied by approximately one hundred men with other defences including at least four machine guns.92 Other prisoner reports noted that a strong-point with a deep dug-out had been constructed under an old house to the north-west of Mouquet

Farm, and that the farm house had previously been a Brigade Headquarters, but was now defended by two infantry companies.93 Identifications indicated that that the 5th Guard Grenadier Regiment, the 2nd Guard Reserve Regiment and the

93rd Reserve Regiment occupied the trenches the Australians were to attack.94

During the final Australian attacks on Mouquet Farm in early September 1916, prisoners indicated that the German defenders at Mouquet Farm had been relieved again and the Australians now faced the 99th Reserve Regiment and the

5th Foot Guard Regiment.95

89 First Anzac Intelligence Summary No.15, 8 August 1916, AWM26, 52/4. 90 First Anzac Intelligence Summary No.18, 11 August 1916, AWM26, 52/4. 91 Reserve Army Summary of Information, 10 August 1916, TNA, WO157/201. 92 Reserve Army Summary of Information No.148, 28 August 1916, AWM26, 42/24. 93 Second Australian Division Secret Report G.60 Appendix No.57, 27 August 1916, AWM26, 56/8. 94 First Anzac Intelligence Summary No.35, 28 August 1916, AWM26, 52/7. 95 First Anzac Intelligence Summary No.39, 1 September 1916, AWM26, 52/7.

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After the fighting on the Somme, the Intelligence Staff at I ANZAC Corps and the Divisional Intelligence Officers of the 1st, 2nd, 4th and 5th Divisions considered how to improve the process of examining prisoners, especially ways of improving identification and rapid transmission of information.96

Consideration was given to making better use of Brigade Intelligence Officers to keep higher headquarters informed and enable intelligence officers to be ready at the corps POW cage to receive prisoners as soon as they arrived.97 The

Australians were also keen to allow limited tactical questioning to be conducted at Brigade Headquarters, enabling commanders to receive information that may aid them in fighting the battle. Where this was not possible because the Brigade

Intelligence Officer could not speak German, the suggested alternative was to have Brigade Headquarters liaise directly with the corps POW cage and ensure that their specific intelligence requirements were made known to the intelligence officers conducting the examinations.98 This flexible approach offered advantages to the front line troops, but there were concerns that brigades should not detain prisoners any longer than required, nor should their questioning extend beyond the immediate tactical information requirements of the brigade.99

I ANZAC Corps — 1917

By February 1917, I ANZAC Corps had adopted a uniform approach to dealing with prisoners and obtaining information from prisoner examinations.

96 Headquarters 1 Anzac Corps Memorandum Ig 150/2/81, 5 November 1916, AWM26, 114/24. 97 Headquarters 1 Anzac Corps Memorandum Ig 150/2/81, 5 November 1916, AWM26, 114/24. 98 Ibid. 99 Ibid.

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Instructions issued by Headquarters I ANZAC Corps were based largely on the standard practice across the BEF, with some slight modifications to fit the way the Australians operated.100 A corps POW cage was established and permanently manned by an intelligence officer and members of the intelligence police. During periods of active operations, two additional intelligence officers were detailed to assist with the examination of prisoners at the corps POW cage. The corps POW cage was connected to Corps Headquarters via telephone in order to enable the rapid transmission of intelligence obtained during examinations.101

An advanced corps POW cage was established further forward rather than using individual divisional POW cages. An intelligence corps officer and two additional intelligence police manned the advanced corps POW cage. The role of the advanced corps cage was to conduct cursory examinations and obtain urgently required tactical information. The advanced corps POW cage was also connected directly to Corps Headquarters.102 Divisional Intelligence Officers were deployed forward to Brigade Headquarters to obtain information immediately required by division or brigade. Where large numbers of prisoners were captured, Divisional Intelligence Officers were instructed to select one or two for questioning, sending the remainder to the advanced corps POW cage for processing.103 Arrangements were to be made for every battalion to have at least one German speaker, who was to accompany the Commanding Officer (or

Battalion Intelligence Officer) to extract ‘information concerning the enemy

100 Intelligence Instructions for the Examination of Prisoners and the Rapid Procuring and Dissemination of Information Concerning the Enemy, February 1917, AWM26, 115/10. 101 Intelligence Instructions for the Examination of Prisoners and the Rapid Procuring and Dissemination of Information Concerning the Enemy, February 1917, AWM26, 115/10. 102 Ibid. 103 Ibid.

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which may prove of vital importance’, although it appears that they were used primarily to search dug-outs, headquarters and other locations for documents and other materials left behind by the Germans, rather than for tactical examination of prisoners.104

Instructions for searching and separating enemy prisoners were largely consistent with BEF practice, although extra emphasis was placed upon not removing pay books and other identity documents from German soldiers and ensuring that all materials taken from Officers and NCOs was sent rearward with the prisoner for examination.105 While not explicitly stated, it is likely that this emphasis occurred in response to the habit of Australian soldiers of souveniring attractive items from German prisoners. An instruction sent out by the Fifth

Brigade noted the effect this habit had upon prisoner examinations, as ‘a large number of prisoners are arriving at the Corps cage in a very sulky condition, the result being that practically no information is obtainable from them. The reason for prisoners arriving in this state is that all their personal property, even money, on many occasions, has been taken from them by their escorts’.106

II ANZAC Corps —1917

The 3rd Division, which was part of II ANZAC Corps, adopted a different method of processing and examining prisoners to that employed by the other four

Australian Divisions. The 3rd Division joined the II ANZAC Corps and Second

Army when it arrived in France at the end of 1916. The detailed planning for the battle of Messines meant that Second Army played a much greater role in

104 Ibid. 105 Ibid. 106 Fifth Australian Infantry Brigade Memorandum 9/97, 1 April 1917, AWM26, 166/6.

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overseeing the arrangements for the examination of the large number of prisoners expected.107 Uniform arrangements were established across the entire

Second Army, which resulted in each division establishing a separate POW cage, manned by the Divisional Intelligence Officer assisted by a number of German speaking NCOs. The role of the Divisional Intelligence Officer was to sort the prisoners, identify them, and send them rearward as quickly as possible for examination at the corps POW cage. 108 Intelligence Officers at the corps POW cage, supplemented by additional intelligence officers from Army Headquarters, were responsible for the examination of prisoners and for selecting prisoners for further examination by Army Headquarters.109 Corps POW cages were required to send Second Army Intelligence information about the total number of prisoners captured in each twenty-four hour period (along with information about what units they were from) and the total number of enemy weapons captured (machine guns, trench mortars, flamethrowers and artillery pieces), along with a summary of all information obtained from examinations each day and a précis of any documents that were captured and examined.110

In the lead up to the attack at Messines, identification of the German units in the front lines became increasingly important. When prisoners were captured, the Divisional Intelligence Officer was often sent forward to return them to the rear to ensure that they were not interfered with and that they arrived with all their belongings before they were examined.111 Reminders were sent out to the

107 Second Army Intelligence Arrangements for Examining Prisoners and Captured Documents in Active Operations, 21 May 1917, AWM26, 175/1. 108 Ibid. 109 Ibid. 110 Second Army Intelligence Arrangements for Examining Prisoners and Captured Documents in Active Operations, 30 July 1917, AWM26, 205/1. 111 Third Australian Division G43/160, 20 May 1917, AWM26, 193/29.

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Australians to cease the practice of using captured German soldiers for manual labour and to ensure that personal papers and other items which aided identification were left with the prisoner.112

Once preparations for the attack began, there could be little doubt that the British intended to attack at Messines, as the Germans were able to observe the steady build-up of forces. The only issue that remained in doubt was when the attack would be launched. Prisoners captured during the attack reported that an offensive similar to the attack on the Somme had been expected and that

Messines would be the start of a ‘great British summer offensive’ which aimed to breakthrough the German lines.113

During the third battle of Ypres, I ANZAC Corps adopted Second Army’s practice for processing prisoners, doing away with an advanced corps POW cage and instituting the practice of gathering prisoners at divisional POW cages, where cursory examinations were conducted before prisoners were sent back to corps POW cages for more detailed examination.114 The Australian divisions were required to staff division POW cages using their own resources. As a result,

Divisional Intelligence Officers and German-speaking Intelligence Police or other officers and NCOs drawn from the division, were required to remain at the POW cage rather than deploying forward to Brigade Headquarters, as had been the practice previously.115

112 Third Australian Division General Staff Circular No.60A Procedure to be adopted for Collection of Information from Prisoners, Documents etc., 23 September 1917, AWM25, 423/1/22. 113 Information obtained from Prisoners, 9 June 1917, AWM26, 188/1. 114 Arrangements for Examining Prisoners and Captured Documents in September Operations, 18 September 1917, AWM26, 209/4. 115 Ibid.

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As the third battle of Ypres progressed, prisoners remained an important source of intelligence, with Second Army and GHQ seeking to understand the enemy’s intentions and its ability to resist the attack. The Australians in the front line frequently received orders to conduct patrols, raids, and small attacks to capture prisoners. The 1st Division issued the following instructions to its brigades while they consolidated their positions around Broodesiende Ridge: ‘it is of the first importance to obtain an identification tonight in order to ascertain if the enemy has put any fresh troops on our front. Please arrange to carry out a small offensive enterprise tonight 6/7 Oct with this object in view.’116

Examination by specialist personnel

Questioning of prisoners with specialist knowledge was the responsibility of specialists within each corps. Second Army issued orders that prisoners with knowledge of German gas and anti-gas matters were to be questioned by the

Corps Chemical Adviser and that, where possible, prisoners should be examined directly by the Corps Chemical Adviser, rather than having intelligence officers simply put lists of questions to them.117 Chemical Advisers were responsible for collecting information about British gas attacks, German anti-gas appliances, gas training, and new gas weapons. Enemy artillery and trench mortar personnel were to be questioned about how German gas shells functioned and the effectiveness of British gas shells when used for counter-battery operations.

Enemy medical personnel were also to be questioned about the effects of British gas attacks, the effectiveness of German gas masks and oxygen breathing

116 First Australian Division Order, 6 October 1917, AWM26, 232/3. 117 I Anzac Corps Memorandum, 2 December 1917, AWM25, 423/3/44.

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equipment, as well as medical anti-gas measures and treatment of personnel effected by gas.118 Lists of regiments known to operate German gas equipment and details of recent German and British gas attacks were maintained to aid in identifying and questioning prisoners.119

The Australian Corps — 1918

Despite their experience, Intelligence Officers were sometimes deceived by prisoners who passed on false information. These instances occasioned messages from GHQ to the entire BEF, reminding the Intelligence Staff of the need to check and verify information contained in prisoners statements before passing it onto higher headquarters. GHQ noted that intelligence officers were failing to compare the statements of their prisoners with other sources of available information. Instead of verifying the information, it was passed on to

Army Headquarters and GHQ as verified: ‘during the past two months there has been a tendency for army headquarters to accept the wildest prisoners statements elicited by examining officers at corps or divisional headquarters’.120

GHQ also noted that some Intelligence officers were occasionally guilty of suggesting responses to the prisoner being examined in order to obtain a more fulsome outcome from the examination and reminded the Intelligence Staff of the requirements for effective prisoner examination.121

The German spring offensive in 1918 initially surprised the BEF, but

British forces recovered quickly and sought information about further German

118 Ibid. 119 Ibid. 120 GHQ Intelligence Memorandum Ia/44236, 20 January 1918, AWM26, 338/6. 121 Ibid.

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attacks. The Australian Corps adopted the earlier practices of I ANZAC Corps when examining prisoners, deploying German speakers forward with battalion commanders and sending Divisional Intelligence Officers to Brigade

Headquarters to obtain information of immediate tactical importance before sending prisoners to corps POW cages for further examination.122

Despite numerous directions from headquarters, many prisoners continued to arrive for examination having had their documents and personal effects taken by their Australian captors.123 Likewise, there continued to be examples of escorts failing to take proper care when bringing German prisoners rearward, allowing Officers, NCOs, and soldiers to mingle ‘spoiling’ opportunities to gather information from them.124 Australian troops were frequently reminded of the requirement to search all captured officers and NCOs and to ensure that prisoners were sent back with any documents that were taken from them; that information about where EPW were captured was also to be sent back with each prisoner; that officers, NCOs, and soldiers were to be separated and prevented from communicating; and that only intelligence personnel were to interrogate or converse with EPW.125

By July 1918, the Australians found themselves opposite German formations of a much lower caliber than they had faced previously and the

Australians were able to easily penetrate German lines to obtain prisoners for examination. After the opening of the Amiens offensive, reports from the

122 Headquarters Australian Corps Instructions for Defence No.6 Intelligence and Disposal of Prisoners of War, 10 April 1918, AWM25. 123 Fifth Australian Infantry Brigade Memorandum 7/444, 8 July 1918, AWM26, 440B/7. 124 Fifth Australian Infantry Brigade Memorandum 7/429, 20 June 1918, AWM26, 382/4. 125 Instructions to Accompany Aust. Corps Order 120 Intelligence and Disposal of Prisoners of War, July 1918, AWM26, 361/2.

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examination of prisoners noted that, while German officers still exhibited high morale, most German soldiers were happy and relieved at being captured, as it meant an end to their involvement in the war.126 Other examination reports noted that relations between German officers and their troops seemed strained and that soldiers had declared their unwillingness to return to the front line.127

As the allied offensive continued into September 1918, large numbers of

German prisoners continued to be captured by British and Dominion troops.

While prisoner examinations continued, the rapid advances required a greater focus on tactical questioning and use of German speakers close to the front line to obtain information that could be used immediately to influence the outcome of a particular action. Standard lists of questions were prepared and issued to

German speakers within the Australian units to ensure that tactical information was available to the advancing troops before prisoners were sent rearward.128

The flexible system of examining prisoners adopted by the Australians appears to have worked well during the transition to more mobile warfare. Reports written once the Australians were withdrawn from the fighting in October 1918 noted that the system had proven effective and no changes or improvements were identified.129

Prisoners were an important source of a wide range of intelligence.

Captured enemy troops provided valuable insights into the enemy’s intentions, morale, capabilities, and manpower levels. As the war progressed, intelligence officers developed increasingly sophisticated means of obtaining information

126 First Australian Division Memorandum 100/448, 18 August 1918, AWM26, 503/5. 127 Second Australian Division Memorandum G22/58, 18 August 1918, AWM26, 516/1. 128 Questionnaire for German Speakers, 6 September 1918, AWM26, 516/7. 129 Third Australian Division G45/479, 21 November 1918, AWM25.

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from prisoners and methods of questioning prisoners evolved to deal with the different battlefield conditions. Australian intelligence officers, like their British counterparts, were routinely involved in the examination of prisoners and information obtained from prisoners was frequently incorporated into battle planning at the tactical and operational level.

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Chapter 12. Intelligence and battle planning: An Australian narrative

Soon after taking command of the Australian Corps in May 1918, Lieutenant-

General John Monash noted that as corps commander he had access to a ‘very large body of secret information, which was methodically distributed daily by

GHQ intelligence’. Military intelligence was able to determine from day to day the number of enemy divisions facing the Australian Corps; the quality and battle readiness of the enemy troops opposite the Australian front line; and the availability of enemy reinforcements, including the time it would take the enemy to reinforce the front opposite the Australians.1 In 1918, the Australian Corps had reached the peak of its efficiency. Despite shortages of manpower, it contained a higher proportion of veterans than average infantry formations of the BEF. Australian soldiers were well-trained and experienced. The Australian divisions had also been combined into a single Australian Corps.2 The Australian

Corps had refined its staff processes and intelligence featured heavily in battle planning at the operational and the tactical levels. The Australian attack at Hamel demonstrated the level of operational sophistication that the Australians had reached and what could be achieved during a small-scale battle. At Amiens, the

Australian Corps contributed significantly to a battle that was shaped by intelligence and showed how sophisticated the BEF’s battle planning had become.3 This chapter is a narrative which examines intelligence in the battle of

1 John Monash, The Australian Victories in France in 1918, (London, The Naval & Military Press, 1919), pp.41–42. 2 C.E.W. Bean, Official History of Australia in the War of 1914–18: The A.I.F. in France May 1918 — the Armistice, Volume VI, pp.5–31; Gary Sheffield, Command and Morale: The British Army on the Western Front 1914–1918 (Barnsley, Pen & Sword Praetorian Press, 2014), pp.66–67. 3 For the battle of Amiens and the 100 days campaign, see Bean, Official History of Australia in the War of 1914–18, Volume VI; Dale Blair, The Battle of Bellicourt Tunnel: Tommies, Diggers and Doughboys on the Hindenburg Line, 1918 (Barnsley, Pen & Sword Books, 2011); Michele Bomford, The Battle of Mont St Quentin-Peronne 1918 (Canberra, Army History Unit, 2012); Ashley Ekins (ed.), 1918 Year of Victory: The End of the Great War and the Shaping of History (Auckland, Exile

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Amiens and the Hundred Days campaign and looks specifically at how the

Australians used all forms of intelligence to plan and conduct their battles in the final six months of the war.

Amiens — 1918

After the success of the attack at Hamel on 4 July 1918, Monash expressed an eagerness for the Australian Corps to undertake a larger attack. Monash indicated to the commander of the Fourth Army, General Sir Henry Rawlinson that he could launch a decisive attack if his front line was reduced; if the 1st

Division was returned to the Australians Corps; and if his right flank was protected during the attack by the Canadian Corps.4

Monash was unaware that Rawlinson had dusted off a scheme proposed several months earlier for an attack in front of Amiens. The plan had been developed by Lieutenant-General Sir William Birdwood and Major-General Cyril

White before they handed over command of the Australian Corps to Monash.

German offensives against different parts of the British and French front lines had caused the scheme to be postponed several times, but the time now seemed right to launch the attack.5 By mid-July 1918, there was sense that, after the

French had successfully counter-attacked the German salient around Soissons,

Publishing, 2010); J. Paul Harris, Amiens to the Armistice: The BEF in the Hundred Days' Campaign 8 August–11 November 1918, (London, Brassey's, 1998); Alastair McCluskey, Amiens 1918: The Black Day of the German Army (Oxford, Osprey Publishing, 2008); Charles Messenger, The Day We Won the War: Turning Point at Amiens 8th August 1918,(London, Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 2008); Lieutenant-General Sir John Monash, The Australian Victories in France in 1918 (London, The Naval & Military Press Ltd, 1918); Peter Pedersen, The Anzacs: Gallipoli to the Western Front (Camberwell, Penguin Books, 2007); James McWilliams and R. James Steel, Amiens 1918: The Last Great Battle (Stroud, Tempus, 2007); David Stevenson, With Our Backs to the Wall: Victory and Defeat in 1918 (London, Penguin, 2011). 4 Pedersen, The Anzacs, p.414. 5 Ibid., p.415.

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the tide of battle had once more turned in the allies’ favor. Marshal Ferdinand

Foch urged Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig to move over to the offensive and

Haig consulted his army commanders to see what options for an offensive existed along the BEF’s front line.

Rawlinson confirmed the availability of the Canadian Corps to attack alongside the Australians on 15 July and sent a detailed proposal to GHQ for approval on 17 July 1918. Haig approved the Fourth Army plan on 19 July, and on 21 July 1918, Rawlinson, Monash, and Lieutenant-General Sir Authur Currie, the commander of the Canadian Corps, met to begin detailed planning for the attack.6

The intelligence genesis of the plan

Assessments of the enemy opposite the Australian Corps front contributed significantly to the decision to launch a major offensive there. Fourth Army intelligence cited the weakness of the German defences, along with the poor morale of the German defenders as a reason to conduct an offensive. Rawlinson described the conditions for an attack as ‘extremely favourable’, on the basis that

‘there are no well organised systems of defence’. Rawlinson also noted that the trenches captured on 4 July, during the battle of Hamel, were in a bad condition and there was little enemy wire.7

Rawlinson pointed to further reasons why Amiens was the best location to attack the Germans: the superiority that the Australians had established over the German forces opposite their positions; the absences of nearby enemy

6 Ibid., p.414. 7 Fourth Army Memorandum 220(G), 17 July 1918, AWM26.

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reserves; the nature of the terrain and its suitability for tank operations; the excellent observation and artillery positions currently occupied by the British and French further to the south; and covered lines of approach to enable preparations for the attack to be completed without the enemy becoming aware.8 Intelligence and the understanding it provided of the enemy and the battlefield, rather than other factors, determined where the offensive would be launched.

Rawlinson proposed that the Australian and Canadian Corps, supported by III Corps to the north and the French to the south, would attack along a wide front and drive deep into the German lines with the ultimate objective of the attack being the old French ‘Amiens Outer Defence Line’. Before securing their final objective, the Australians and Canadians would capture and consolidate a number of intermediate objectives in a series of bounds and would be prepared to exploit opportunities to advance further should circumstances permit.9

On 31 July, the Australian Corps issued its initial battle instructions. The plan drew heavily on the approach taken during the attack on Hamel and from the Australians’ experiences in Flanders the previous year. The 2nd and 3rd

Divisions would attack side by side. Australian infantry would be supported by large numbers of tanks and would advance behind a barrage to their objectives.

Once the first objective was secure, the 4th and 5th Divisions would pass through the first two attacking divisions and continue to the second objective. Once the second objective was secure, the 4th and 5th Divisions would continue and secure the final objective.10 The 4th and 5th Divisions were each allocated three

8 Ibid. 9 Harris, Amiens to the Armistice, pp.61–66. 10 Australian Corps Memorandum L717, 31 July 1918, AWM26, 361/3.

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brigades of field artillery to move forward and provide artillery support for the second and third phases of the attack. Artillery would be pushed forward to support the attack on the second objective and each of the attacking divisions was allocated a battery of 60-pounders for employment by division commanders as required. Pioneer and engineer units were also distributed to the attacking troops to support the attack.11 The attack would be conducted using all of the capabilities that the BEF could field and would synchronise infantry, tanks, artillery, aircraft, and other supporting arms.

Intelligence about the German positions and troops opposite the

Australian front line suggested that, once the attacking troops had penetrated the German front line and captured their objectives, the lack of ‘rear defences’ meant that it was unlikely that the enemy would be able to man any positions in sufficient strength to require the use of a protective artillery barrage. Instead, the primary role of the tanks would be providing protection for the advancing troops, while artillery would be prepared to engage targets as required.12

Pre-battle intelligence assessments

Following the practices developed in 1917, the Australian Corps Intelligence

Staff issued an appreciation about the area to be attacked. Aerial photographs and reconnaissance showed that the topography over which the Australians were to attack between the River Somme and the River Luce was a ‘high watershed’, with ‘deep indentations in the shape of long ravines running north and south’. These ravines provided locations for troops to assemble and areas

11 Ibid. 12 Ibid.

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where artillery batteries could be concealed.13 The appreciation identified that the enemy’s forward line of defences was based on the old British ‘Hamel’ line, except for the last 1,500 yards [1,350 metres] adjacent to the Somme itself, where there was no continuous line of defences. The appreciation noted that, based on the available intelligence, it appeared that no attempt had been made by the Germans to construct lines of defence to the rear of their front line. Old

French defensive positions along the ‘Mericourt–Harbonnerres line, which consisted of a double line of trenches’ showed no evidence of any work.14

Support and reserve troops were located in small shelters and dug-outs scattered throughout the German rear area. Wire obstacles were small and hastily constructed. There was no evidence of forward ammunition dumps other than possible dumps for artillery ammunition and the main German supply area was located at the advanced railhead at Guillaucourt some distance from the front line.15

Prisoners, patrols, and observers indicated that, opposite the Australian

Corps, the German trenches were held by the 43rd Reserve Division, the 13th

Division and the 41st Division. Of the three, only the 43rd Reserve Division was regarded as being ‘a good quality fighting division’, with the 13th and 41st

Divisions being assessed as ‘trench divisons’ which were under strength and suffering from poor morale.16 Seven German battalions held the front line trenches between the Somme and the Amiens railway line with a further fourteen battalions in support and reserve positions. The German Second Army,

13 Notes on the Country in the Enemy’s Occupation between the River Somme and the Amiens Railway, 1 August 1918, AWM26, 492/2. 14 Ibid. 15 Ibid. 16 Ibid.

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which was responsible for holding the front opposite the Australian Corps, was assessed as having four divisions held in reserve: two located east of the

Hindenburg Line, a third in the Morcourt area, and a fourth at Villers-Carbonel.

These four divisions had been rested for over a month and were assessed as being close to full strength.

Artillery intelligence reported that along the Australian Corps front there were one hundred and ninety-two field guns and howitzers and a further one hundred and sixteen heavy artillery pieces.17 Australian Corps intelligence assessed the attitude of the enemy ‘as hard to determine’, noting that it appeared to be purely defensive. Prisoners indicated that the German attitude was to avoid provocation of and confrontation with the Australians and to keep the sector as quiet as possible. The Australians reported that the Germans patrolled infrequently and no raids or attacks were conducted. German defensive works that were observed seemed to be constructed in a haphazard manner and were not continuous along the whole front, suggesting to Australian Intelligence Staff that they were locally constructed obstacles rather than being part of a larger defensive plan.18

Artillery intelligence

Artillery intelligence identified six hundred and eighty German guns that could fire on the area to be attacked by the Fourth Army.19 Sound ranging sections operating on the Australian Corps front worked ‘day and night’ and ‘located every gun which fired’, revealing the dispositions of enemy artillery. This

17 Ibid. 18 Ibid. 19 Fourth Army Artillery in the Battle of Amiens August 8th 1918, 26 August 1918, AWM326, 10/3.

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information was confirmed by observation through the use of ‘aeroplanes, balloons and observation groups’. A series of ‘excellent air photographs, taken about 3 August was also of the greatest value’ in confirming the location of enemy guns.20 The Fourth Army had available six hundred and seventy-two heavy guns and howitzers, of which nine brigades of heavy artillery were allocated to the Australian Corps, along with eighteen brigades of field artillery.21

The bulk of the artillery supporting the attack moved into position along the

Fourth Army front and would fire with no registration in order to maintain surprise. To ensure accurate fire, almost all of the guns and howitzers were calibrated prior to moving into position. The 4th Field Survey Battalion also surveyed and laid out the positions that were occupied by the artillery firing in support of the attack.22

Heavy artillery engaged in counter-battery operations were allocated targets by gun, section, or battery depending on the size of the target, along with rates of fire to be used during the attack. To prevent counter-battery fire from impacting on friendly troops as they advanced, counter-battery operations conformed to the movement of the artillery barrage.23 Unlike the attack on

Hamel, no gas rounds were used to neutralise enemy guns; instead, heavy artillery firing on counter-battery targets used HE with instantaneous fuses.24 As at Hamel, a number of sections of heavy artillery were reserved and were

20 Notes on Counter Battery work in Battle of 8/8/18, and the advance from Villers Bretonneux to the Hindenburg Line, October 1918, AWM26, 494/2. 21 Fourth Army Artillery in the Battle of Amiens August 8th 1918, 26 August 1918, AWM326, 10/3. 22 Notes on Counter Battery work in Battle of 8/8/18, and the advance from Villers Bretonneux to the Hindenburg Line, October 1918, AWM26, 494/2. 23 Counter Battery — Australian Corps H.A. Operation Order No.12, 5 August 1918, AWM26, 494/2. 24 Ibid.

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available to engage German batteries that had not been located prior to the attack.

The counter-battery instructions for the attack also included precautionary plans to engage enemy batteries at an earlier stage, in the event of a heavy gas bombardment or if preparations for a German attack were detected.

To maintain surprise, only guns located in old gun positions would be used for these tasks and no guns which had been moved into the area to support the attack at Amiens were permitted to fire except by special order from Corps

Headquarters. In order to maintain surprise, the Australian Corps also maintained normal counter-battery operations using existing Corps heavy artillery.25

Plans were made to advance artillery intelligence units behind the attacking troops in order to provide artillery intelligence once the attack had reached its objective. This would prevent a recurrence of the problem encountered during the battle of Cambrai, when attacking troops moved beyond the range of artillery intelligence units and lost the ability to conduct effective counter-battery operations. During the attack at Amiens, observation groups planned to move forward with the heavy artillery to establish observation posts that could support counter-battery operations. Sound ranging sections also planned to advance on the day of the attack. However, it normally took several days to re-establish sound ranging bases and provide new information once a sound ranging section moved.26

25 Ibid. 26 Fourth Army Artillery in the Battle of Amiens August 8th 1918, 26 August 1918, AWM326, 10/3.

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Australian Corps intelligence instructions

Australian Corps intelligence instructions for the attack were issued on 3 August

1918. By this stage of the war, the Australians had adopted a standardised approach to intelligence matters during attacks. Instructions for dealing with

EPW, for searching the battlefield, and the issue of maps and aeroplane photographs were issued at corps level. In the case of the attack at Amiens, the instructions were almost identical to those issued for the attack on Hamel. These arrangements had worked well and were well understood by the troops.

Officers were issued with a map of the area to be attacked; message maps were issued to all NCOs; a limited number of trench maps (1:10,000 scale) were issued to the attacking troops; copies of the barrage map were issued down to company commanders; and each company commander was issued with an organisation map and notes on the enemy. In addition to maps, a photo mosaic of each division’s area — squared, contoured and annotated — was issued down to each NCO, and oblique photographs of each division’s area were made available for distribution to officers.27 Importantly, the maps used by the troops in the attack were identical to the maps used by the headquarters of the Australian

Corps and its subordinate formations to avoid any confusion about information sent back from the front line.

Australian division intelligence instructions

Each of the attacking Australian divisions issued their own intelligence instructions for the battle. Security was identified as essential to the success of

27 Australian Corps Battle Instructions No.10 Intelligence and Disposal of Prisoners of War, 3 August 1918, AWM26.

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the operation. Units in the attacking divisions were instructed that ‘everything must be kept as normal as possible’. Troop movements, the creation of ammunition dumps, and the movement of extra equipment was ordered to be carried out only at night.28 To prevent the Germans from taking prisoners, instructions were issued for larger than normal patrols to remain active along the Australian front line. Larger patrols would be more easily able to defend themselves should they encounter any enemy and aggressive patrolling would ensure that the Germans were unable to conduct any intelligence collection without the Australians noticing.29

Particular care needed to be taken as the number of reconnaissance officers moving up to the front line increased and the security instructions noted that ‘while it is essential that the most complete reconnaissance be done, it should be done with great discretion and under control as to the time and place.’30 Troops were issued with a cover story to explain any activity that might be observed occurring behind British lines. The cover story included details about the Canadian Corps moving into the area to serve as a reserve and fill gaps created by other British Corps which had moved south to support the French.31

Australian units were reminded to ensure that no secret papers were left about and that only those personnel who needed to know about the planned attack were informed. Details about the planned attack were ‘not to be hinted at or discussed in the presence or hearing of any one not in the know’.32

28 Second Australian Division Operations Instructions No.2, 2 August 1918, AWM 3DRL/6443. 29 Ibid. 30 Ibid. 31 Ibid. 32 Ibid.

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While intelligence arrangements for handling prisoners and searching were developed at corps level, divisional intelligence instructions for the attack contained some additional details or instructions. Each division’s intelligence instructions were slightly different. Intelligence instructions issued by the 2nd

Division gave the location of Intelligence Staff, detailed the procedures for handling EPW and searching enemy positions, and provided additional details about the area to be attacked. In addition to the maps and photographs issued by the Australian Corps, the 2nd Division also provided aeroplane photographs with an enlargement of the area of Warfusse–Abancourt and vertical photographs of the entire area likely to be operated over.33

Intelligence instructions issued by the 5th Division included specific information requirements that intelligence personnel were expected to meet during the attack, including obtaining information about the position of friendly troops; the position and strength of the enemy; the nature and position of enemy defences; the nature and direction of hostile shelling; and the identification of

German units.34 The 5th Division issued maps and photographs on a similar scale to the 2nd Division but also included a letter and map giving a description of enemy defences, distribution of enemy forces, and topographical description of country. Sufficient copies were made available for headquarters and company commanders. The 5th Division ordered the map ‘to be carefully studied and important information marked on the other maps issued’.35

33 Second Australian Division Operations Instructions No.5 Intelligence and disposal of prisoners of war, 4 August 1918, AWM 3DRL/6443. 34 5th Australian Division Battle Instructions No.3, 2 August 1918, AWM26, 559/5. 35 5th Australian Division Battle Instructions No.4 Maps and information regarding the enemy, 2 August 1918, AWM26, 559/5.

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Brigade intelligence instructions for the attack were almost identical to those issued by their parent division, although they provided some additional instructions about dress and equipment to be carried by ‘Intelligence Personnel’.

Instructions were issued to ensure that ‘officers and NCOs give every possible assistance to these personnel in carrying out their special [intelligence] duties’.36

Intelligence was considered at all levels and was included in orders to the attacking troops.

Ongoing intelligence assessments of the enemy

Efforts to monitor the distribution of enemy forces continued as the battle approached. By 5 August, intelligence assessments indicated that the German

Second Army had five divisions in reserve: the 243rd Division was believed to be located around Albert, the 54th Division was located around Péronne, the 108th

Division was reported to be in the Morcourt area, as was the 107th Division, and the 21st Division was located around Castel. Of the reserve divisions available to the German Second Army, only the 243rd, 54th, and 108th Divisions were assessed as ‘fit’, while the 21st and 107th Divisions were assessed as ‘tired’.37

The adjoining German Eighteenth Army, which occupied the area between Moreuil and Oise, had a further five divisions in reserve, three assessed as fit and a further two assessed as tired. To the north, between Lens and Aveluy, the German Seventeenth Army had a further five, possibly six, divisions in reserve, all of which were assessed as fit.38

36 7th Australian Infantry Brigade Order No.211, 5 August 1918, AWM, 3DRL/6443. 37 Situation with Regard to German Reserves I.G. 31/8/1, 5 August 1918, AWM26, 472/3. 38 Situation with Regard to German Reserves I.G. 31/8/1, 5 August 1918, AWM26, 472/3.

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Fourth Army Intelligence Staff estimated that within twenty-four hours up to five German divisions could be expected to arrive on the Fourth Army front. Within forty-eight hours, a further division along with elements of two other divisions could be expected to arrive. Within seventy-two hours, a total of eight reserve divisions could be expected along the Fourth Army front, with a further two divisions expected to arrive each day thereafter.39 The assessment of when enemy reserves could be expected to arrive was particularly important. As more enemy forces reached the battlefield, the attacking troops would need to ensure that they had consolidated their gains and that artillery and other supporting units had moved forward and were in a position to defeat any enemy counter-attacks that might emerge.

Information about the German forces operating on the Fourth Army front remained vitally important. On 5 August, III Corps was in the process of relieving the 18th British Division with the 58th British Division when a severe bombardment opened up on the British front line. This was quickly followed by an assault on the British positions which penetrated the front line and saw a large number of British troops captured. British counter-attacks halted the

German attack and regained much of the lost ground.40 Unbeknown to Fourth

Army intelligence, the Germans had moved the 27th (Württemburg) Division, described by Bean as ‘of Bullecourt fame, perhaps the toughest enemy ever met by the Australians’, into the front line to replace the exhausted 107th Division.

The 27th Division had been ordered to halt the continual loss of ground to the

39 Estimated Time of Arrival of German Reserves on the Battlefield I.G. 31/8/2, 6 August 1918, AWM26, 472/3. 40 Bean, Official History of Australia in the War of 1914–18, Volume VI, p.522; Pedersen, The Anzacs, p.418.

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Australians and to regain some of the ground that had already been lost.41 The

Germans reported capturing eight officers and two hundred and seventy-four other ranks from the 18th and 54th British Divisions as well as some troops from the 50th British Division. While the British troops had been warned not to speak about the forthcoming offensive, it seemed inconceivable that the Germans would not learn about the planned attack. But as night fell on 7 August, there seemed to be no evidence that the Germans were aware of what would follow the next day.42

The battle of Amiens

Early on the morning of 8 August, the troops from the two attacking Australian divisions began their approach march to the jumping-off line for the attack. By

3.00am, most of the attacking troops were assembled on their start line and the divisions that would follow and pass through the leading divisions were also assembling. At 4.20am, the guns of the Fourth Army and the French First Army opened fire.43 The barrage fell two hundred yards [one hundred and eighty metres] in front of the attacking troops, who rose and moved into the thick mist and smoke to follow it onto their first objective. The Australians had the most straightforward task, a single thrust in one direction over ground that was good going for tanks, with ample artillery support.44 German resistance was weak and there was little German artillery fire owing to the effectiveness of the counter- battery plan. While isolated pockets of Germans offered stiff resistance, large

41 Bean, Official History of Australia in the War of 1914–18, Volume VI, p.522. 42 Ibid. 43 Bean, Official History of Australia in the War of 1914–18, Volume VI, pp.526–530. 44 Harris, Amiens to the Armistice, p.89.

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numbers of German troops were captured in their dug-outs or sheltering in their trenches and were eager to surrender to the advancing Australians.45

The German artillery was reached by the attacking troops as the fog and mist began to clear and the attacking troops quickly captured the guns and their ammunition supplies after driving off, capturing or killing the German gunners.

An assessment of the enemy artillery after the attack noted that ‘it was immediately clear that not only had nearly the whole of the enemy’s artillery in the line been captured, but also that his available reserve was very small.

Scarcely any shelling whatever occurred for nearly 72 hours’.46

By 7.00am, the Australians had captured their first objective and were digging in. The 4th and 5th Divisions then began to move forward, ready to resume the attack at 8.20am. The attacking brigades of the 4th and 5th Divisions advanced, accompanied by a field artillery brigade and a field engineer company, as well as the 30 Mark V tanks allocated to each of the divisions, and a company and a half of Mark V* tanks carrying machine gun and Lewis gun detachments.47

The tanks played a much greater role in supporting the infantry attack now that the advance had moved beyond the range of much of the British artillery, which had supported the initial attack.

While slightly more resistance was encountered, particularly from the

Germans holding Chipilly Spur on the left flank of the Australian attack, the advance was successful and by 11.00am the second objective had been reached.

Cavalry, light tanks (Whippets), and armoured cars all moved through the

45 Harris, Amiens to the Armistice, pp.90–92. 46 Notes on Counter Battery work in Battle of 8/8/18, and the advance from Villers Bretonneux to the Hindenburg Line, October 1918, AWM26, 494/2. 47 Harris, Amiens to the Armistice, p.90; Pedersen, The Anzacs, p.417.

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Australian front line to advance to the final objective and to harass the confused enemy. By 1.15pm, the final objective had been captured by the Australian

Corps.48

The Canadian Corps attack had been just as successful as the Australians.

The French First Army had also been successful, although it had failed to capture all of the objectives that had been set for the attack, with the village of Fresnoy remaining in German hands. Only on the northern flank of the attack had things not gone according to plan, with III Corps making limited headway against the

Corps objectives, which it was to have captured to prevent interference with the left flank of the Australian Corps attack.49

The intelligence arrangements that had been established to support the attack had worked well on the opening day. Prisoners from seven different

German divisions were captured along the Fourth Army front (27th Division,

43rd Reserve Division, 108th Division, 13th Division, 41st Division, 117th

Division, 225th Division), all of which were known, except for the 117th Division, which had not been previously identified. The 117th Division was assessed to be at full strength, unlike many of the German Divisions known to be in the front line. On the French First Army front, prisoners were captured from the 14th

Bavarian Division, which had relieved the 109th Division on the night before the attack. German prisoners reported units from the 115th and 105th Divisions were in the rear areas, although this was assessed as unlikely. Other divisions expected to arrive on the battlefield included the 54th Division, 243rd Division,

5th Reserve Division, 82nd Reserve Division, and the 26th Reserve Division.50

48 Pedersen, The Anzacs, p.423. 49 Harris, Amiens to the Armistice, pp.92–98. 50 Fourth Army Summary of Information No.233, 8 August 1918, AWM26, 473/3.

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By the time the offensive resumed on 9 August, the Germans had been able to bring up additional reserves more rapidly than intelligence assessments had anticipated. A further six divisions were identified on the second day of the battle, three of which were ‘fresh’; one had been partly engaged by the French on the opening day of the offensive and two more had previously been holding the front line north of the Somme.51 While many of the German reserves were depleted formations who arrived without artillery, they could still be used to plug gaps, and resistance began to stiffen. By 11 August, the Fourth Army was badly in need of rest and the Germans had begun to launch counter-attacks, some of which achieved local successes before being repulsed.52 Additional

German units were identified opposite the Australian Corps, including the 5th

Bavarian Division, 107th Division and the 38th (Saxon) Division. Prisoners reported panic and confusion in the German rear areas, as units were rushed to the front. Casualties were heavy, with large numbers of wounded being captured and the advance being so rapid that German casualty clearing stations and aid posts were overrun by the advancing troops.53

On the afternoon of 11 August, at a corps commanders conference,

Rawlinson indicated that he intended to pause the offensive for several days before the Fourth Army attacked again.54 Intelligence had shown an increasing number of German units moving into the battle area to attempt to stem the

British advance. At the same time, the attacking troops were becoming increasingly tired and were outpacing artillery and other supporting units.

51 Fourth Army Weekly Appreciation for period 3rd to 9th August 1918 (inclusive), 10 August 1918, AWM26, 472/2. 52 Harris, Amiens to the Armistice, pp.114–116. 53 First Australian Division Intelligence Summary No.1, 11 August 1918, AWM26, 503/4. 54 Harris, Amiens to the Armistice, p.115.

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GHQ was eager for the Fourth Army to renew its attack, but German reinforcements had been brought up to strengthen the defences opposite the

Canadian and Australian Corps. Aeroplane photographs of the German positions showed that the Germans were prepared for a renewed assault and both the

Australian and Canadian Corps assessed that heavy casualties would result.

Intelligence assessments noted that the Germans had continued to feed fresh divisions into the front lines opposite the Fourth Army, while at the same time returning a number of under strength divisions to the front lines, most likely in the expectation that the battle of Amiens would be renewed.55 An examination of the available intelligence indicated that further efforts to exploit the success of the opening day of the battle could lead to disaster. Once again, the available intelligence played a determining role in the decision to bring the offensive to an end. GHQ cancelled plans for further attacks on 15 August and looked to the First and Third Armies to attack along a different section of the front.56

The counter-battery battle

Efforts to collect artillery intelligence to support the battle of Amiens were an outstanding success and the counter-battery effort during the battle was described as ‘remarkable’. Of the five hundred and thirty German guns facing the

Fourth Army, five hundred and four (ninety-five per cent) had been identified before the attack commenced. The counter-battery plan and the allocation of two-thirds of the available heavy artillery to suppress the German artillery resulted in few casualties from enemy shells. While few German guns were

55 Fourth Army Weekly Appreciation for period 17th to 23rd August 1918 (inclusive), 24 August 1918, TNA, WO157/197. 56 Harris, Amiens to the Armistice, pp.120–121.

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destroyed by the counter-battery fire, the advancing infantry found that in some positions there were many dead German gunners and horses — evidence that the Germans had attempted to shift positions to escape the counter-battery fire.

In other locations, guns were captured with their camouflage netting in place and the muzzle covers still on the guns, indicating that the guns were not manned at the time of the attack and that no effort had been made to bring them into action.57

During the later phases of the opening day of the battle, German gunners managed to bring a number of individual guns into action and these were used with great effect against British tanks inflicting a significant number of losses. By

12 August, the Germans began to make good artillery losses with noticeable increases in shelling from heavy 10.5cm, 15cm and 21cm guns that were sited in the enemy rear areas.58 As observation groups and sound ranging sections moved forward and followed the attack, responsibility for locating enemy guns fell mainly to artillery spotting aircraft and balloons. The exceptionally good weather during the attack assisted the search for enemy artillery and ‘much valuable information was obtained from these sources’.59

Intelligence collection during the battle

Arrangements to search enemy positions for documents and other items of intelligence value were also successful. Reports after the first day of the attack noted that ‘large quantities of papers began to arrive at the [corps POW] cage

57 Harris, Amiens to the Armistice, p.106; Fourth Army Artillery in the Battle of Amiens August 8th 1918, 26 August 1918, AWM326, 10/3. 58 Notes on Counter Battery work in Battle of 8/8/18, and the advance from Villers Bretonneux to the Hindenburg Line, October 1918, AWM26, 494/2. 59 Ibid.

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shortly after zero’.60 One of the most significant intelligence coups of the war occurred when armoured cars from the 17th British Armoured Car Battalion passed through the advancing Australians to strike into the German rear areas.

One section of armoured cars, commanded by Lieutenant Ernest Rollings, headed west for the village of Framerville:

Coming across a headquarters of some sort on the eastern side of town,

Rollings raced upstairs revolver in hand, to discover offices abandoned

only minutes before. Documents were everywhere. Hastily jamming great

wads of them into sandbags, he rushed back into the street at the same

moment that four German staff officers rode up. These were immediately

shot down and their papers added to the sandbags.61

Rollings had manage to capture a copy of the plans and maps for the entire

German Hindenburg Line defences. These would be invaluable as the BEF began to drive the Germans back following the success at Amiens.62

Intelligence and battle planning during the 100 days campaign

On 23 August 1918, the 1st Division and the 32nd British Division (which was under command of the Australian Corps at the time) resumed the attack between

Herleville–Chuignes–Chuignolles. Since the end of the battle of Amiens, the

Australians had continued to improve their positions, ‘nibbling away’ at the

German lines. The 3rd Division also assisted III Corps to secure objectives to the

60 Operations Report No.5 Notes on operations of 2nd Aust. Div. on 8th August and Succeeding Days, 5 September 1918, AWM, 3DRL/6643. 61 McWilliams and Steel, Amiens 1918, p.180. 62 Messenger, The Day We Won The War, pp.234–239.

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north of the Somme and advanced the front line to Bray-sur-Somme.63 Opposite the Australian Corps front were many of the divisions which had been badly mauled in the battle of Amiens, although some new units such as the Alpine

Corps had been moved into the area to help strengthen the German line.64

The attack on the 23 August was conducted in three phases, supported by artillery and tanks. All of the objectives set for the attack were gained and the

Australian Corps penetrated the German front line to a depth of one and a half miles [two and a half kilometres]. Reports from the attack noted that ‘good progress was made along the entire front of attack and except at one or two places strong opposition was not encountered’.65 While the enemy was alert, the attacking troops achieved surprise and were able to fully exploit the success of the attack. That same night, the 3rd Division captured Bray-sur-Somme and advanced the front line further east. North and South of the Somme, both the

Australian Corps and III Corps continued to advance their front line keeping the pressure on the retreating Germans.66 Prisoners revealed that the Germans had begun to withdraw to more easily defended positions, leaving a series of rearguards behind to delay the British advance. Additional fresh divisions were also brought in to strengthen the German defences.67

Battle instructions issued by the Australian Corps noted that there were other indications of a ‘possible enemy withdrawal’, including explosions in the

63 Report on the Operations of Australian Corps The advance to the Somme and Capture of Mont St. Quentin & Peronne 15th August to 4th September Phase C, 26 October 1918, AWM, 3DRL/6643. 64 Serial No.41 German Order of Battle 24.8.18, 24 August 1918, AWM26, 469/5. 65 Report on the Operations of Australian Corps The advance to the Somme and Capture of Mont St. Quentin & Peronne 15th August to 4th September Phase C, 26 October 1918, AWM, 3DRL/6643. 66 Ibid. 67 Fourth Army Weekly Appreciation for period 24th to 30th August 1918 (inclusive), 31 August 1918, TNA, WO157/197.

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enemy lines, dense columns of smoke and flares and other signals.68 By 29

August, the advance had captured a number of towns and villages along the

Somme, with the Somme canal south of Péronne being reached by the 32nd

British Division, 5th Division and 2nd Division.69 On the northern side of the

Somme, the Australian Corps front line advanced to within 1,000 yards [nine hundred metres] of Clery-sur-Somme. Patrols crossed the river south of Péronne, discovering marshy ground which was impassable. By 30 August, the village of

Clery had been cleared of enemy, although hostile machine gun fire covered most of the river crossings.70

Prisoners reported that the enemy intended to continue retiring, although it was not known how far the enemy intended to withdraw and it was expected that they would attempt to hold the line of the Somme for some time before retiring further back to the Hindenburg Line.71 Air reconnaissance reports confirmed that the retreating Germans were successful in destroying many of the bridges and crossings over the Somme. Two key features now stood in the way of the Australian Corps advance, the town of Péronne and the village of Mont St

Quentin.

Mont St Quentin and Péronne

Mont St Quentin sat on a wide smooth hill between the Somme and the Canal du

Nord about a mile [one and a half kilometres] north of the town of Péronne. The hill rose about one hundred and forty feet [forty metres] above the town of

68 Australian Corps Battle Instructions Series C No.8, 24 August 1918, AWM, 3DRL/6643. 69 Report on the Operations of Australian Corps The advance to the Somme and Capture of Mont St. Quentin & Péronne 15th August to 4th September Phase C, 26 October 1918, AWM, 3DRL/6643. 70 Ibid. 71 Fourth Army Summary of Information No.255, 30 August 1918, TNA, WO157/197.

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Péronne and commanded both the east-west and north-south approaches to the

Somme. The slopes of the hill were devoid of vegetation and allowed good fields of fire.72 Intelligence assessments noted that the German positions at Mont St

Quentin were well constructed and were described as ‘a complex system of hostile trenches covered by exceedingly strong lines of wire’.73 German forces holding Mont St Quentin were assessed as ‘very considerable opposition’ and the

German intention was ‘to hold the Mt. St Quentin–Péronne–Doingt line at all costs for a few days at least’.74 The defence of Mont St Quentin was the responsibility of the 2nd Guards Division, which had a reputation as a good fighting division, although prisoners, even guardsmen, told intelligence officers that they were pleased to have been captured and morale of the German units facing the Australians was assessed as ‘poor’.75 Captured documents revealed that the Germans were well aware that they were facing the Australians. An extract from an Intelligence Summary written by the 185th Division stated:

The latest identifications show that the 2nd Australian Division is in the

line from North of RAINECOURT to half-right the FRAMERVILLE–LIHONS

Road. South of this is the 1st Australian Division. Both divisions are

known as first class assault divisions.76

The Fifth Brigade moved into position on the night of 30 August and at 5.00am the following morning stormed the German positions on Mont St Quentin.

Supporting artillery fired a hurricane barrage rather than providing a creeping

72 Harris, Amiens to the Armistice, p.159. 73 Report on the Operations of Australian Corps The advance to the Somme and Capture of Mont St. Quentin & Péronne 15th August to 4th September Phase C, 26 October 1918, AWM, 3DRL/6643. 74 Second Australian Division Intelligence Report No.206, 31 August 1918, AWM26, 516/4. 75 Harris, Amiens to the Armistice, p.159; Second Australian Division Intelligence Report No.206, 31 August 1918, AWM26, 516/4. 76 Second Australian Division Intelligence Report No.206, 31 August 1918, AWM26, 516/4.

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barrage for the troops to advance behind. In what was described as ‘a most brilliant feat of arms’, the Australians captured the German position by 7.00am, although they were vigorously counter-attacked and pushed back from the position during the day. After a day of heavy fighting, the exhausted Fifth Brigade withdrew and consolidated a line just to the west of Feuillacourt and Mont St

Quentin which they held on the night of 31 August/1 September.

The situation at Mont St Quentin was unclear to the Australian Corps and the decision was taken to reinforce the Fifth Brigade with the Sixth Brigade, which would continue the attack. While the fighting for Mont St Quentin continued, the Fourteenth Brigade pushed towards Péronne with the aim of capturing the town. To north of Mont St Quentin, the Third Division and the III

Corps also attacked the German line. The Sixth Brigade’s advance was interrupted by heavy enemy shelling and it succeeded in reaching the start line for their attack with only minutes to spare. Despite a vigorous attack, the Sixth

Brigade became bogged down just short of Mont St Quentin village and an intense bombardment of the village was requested in the early afternoon to allow the advance to continue. As soon as the bombardment lifted, the Australian infantry attacked again. By mid-afternoon, Mont St Quentin was securely in

Australian hands and the Australians had begun to push east of the village.

As the Fourteenth Brigade approached Péronne, it came under fire from

Mont St Quentin and German troops holding woods near the town. The

Australians cleared the woods before continuing their advance. The town of

Péronne was surrounded by a moat and the Germans had destroyed most of the bridges and causeways. However, the Australians found two narrow footbridges which they seized and then stormed into the town. By early morning they had

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penetrated into the centre of the town and by dusk all but a tiny corner of the town was in the Australian’s hands.

Identifications obtained from prisoners showed that the Germans had concentrated nine divisions in the sector north of Péronne. In the intense fighting for Mont St Quentin, the Australians captured 2,600 prisoners from the

2nd Guards Division, 14th Bavarian Division, 21st, 38th, and 185th Divisions.

The attack also broke through the German ‘Winter position’ and precipitated a further withdrawal to the defences of the Hindenburg Line. In all, the Germans launched fifteen counter-attacks in an attempt to retake Mont St Quentin on

30/31 August 1918, but were beaten off, with heavy losses being inflicted on the attackers.77

Attacking the Hindenburg Line

After the successful capture of Mont St Quentin and Peronne, intelligence assessments noted that it was ‘almost certain that he [the German] intends to retire to the Hindenburg Line’, and that ‘after a series of heavy defeats which have been inflicted upon him by the Allied Armies and the heavy losses in personnel and guns that he has incurred he will be obliged to retire behind the strong line of defences along the St Quentin canal’.78 On 2 September 1918, the

German Army began to withdraw. Along the Fourth Army front, the Germans needed to retreat over a large distance, nearly ten miles [sixteen kilometres] in

77 Fourth Army Weekly Appreciation for Period from August 31st to 6th September 1918 (inclusive), 7 September 1918, AWM26, 12.6. 78 Fourth Army Weekly Appreciation for period 24th to 30th August 1918 (inclusive), 31 August 1918, TNA, WO157/197.

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some places, before they would be secure behind the defences of the Hindenburg

Line.79

In front of the Fourth Army were six lines of defences that they would need to cross, three of which were former British trenchlines — the ‘Old British

Reserve Line’, the ‘Old British Main Line’, and the ‘Old British Outpost system’ — as well the three lines of defences which comprised the Hindenburg Line — the

‘Advanced Hindenburg System’, the ‘Main Hindenburg System’, and the ‘Reserve

Hindenburg System’.80 The Fourth Army’s intelligence assessments of the defences noted that the Old British Reserve Line had already been penetrated by the Australian Corps, that it consisted mainly of machine gun positions, and that

‘this line could probably be gained without serious difficulty’. The Old British

Main Line contained several strong localities with wire east of the trenches. The

Germans were expected to attempt to hold this line and it would ‘not be captured without a struggle, unless the enemy’s morale is very bad’. The Old British

Outpost Line was expected to fall at the same time as the Old British Main line, and was not expected to ‘offer much difficulty’.81 The Advanced Hindenburg Line was originally the outpost line for the Main Hindenburg Line system. However, intelligence reports had noted that it had been ‘materially strengthened’ and

‘may have been modified’. The Advanced Hindenburg Line was described as ‘ a well-prepared defensive system with dugouts and good wire’. The Main

Hindenburg Line was still assessed as the basis of the German defences and

‘cannot be captured without employing strong forces with tanks and plenty of artillery’. The Reserve Hindenburg Line was not fully completed, and it was

79 Harris, Amiens to the Armistice, p.168. 80 Ibid., p.169. 81 Fourth Army Letter 265(g), 11 September 1918, TNA, WO95/438.

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assessed that if the main system was captured and the attack pressed that it would be possible to capture these positions ‘on the same day’.82

Intelligence assessments noted that the German front line opposite the

Fourth Army front was held by seven divisions, none of which were ‘fresh’. In all, twenty-one different divisions had been engaged along the Fourth Army front since the battle of Amiens, and it was noted that ‘the large majority have suffered severe casualties’. Information obtained from prisoners showed that enemy morale was low and that ‘numerous cases have occurred where men offered little resistance, and have surrendered with slight excuse’. Even in elite units such as the Alpine Corps, the ‘morale of the men has not been so good’, and on many occasions even ‘machine gunners have surrendered without firing’.83

Rawlinson urged GHQ to allow him to continue to press the retreating Germans.

He noted that, ‘every day on which there is no attack the situation improves and recuperation is rendered possible’.84

The British were fortunate enough during the battle of Amiens to have captured a file containing the complete defence scheme for the ‘Siegfried Line’ from Bellicourt to Itancourt. The file contained information about the topography along the line, the distribution of enemy forces, and notes of how a battle along the defensive line would be conducted. Maps showed the location of artillery positions (battery positions, observation posts, barrage zones, artillery headquarters, and information about British artillery positions opposite); infantry positions (trenches, wire, dugouts, headquarters); signal arrangements

(lamp stations, wireless stations, telephone exchanges); and other information

82 Ibid. 83 Ibid. 84 Ibid.

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such as the location of aerodromes and support units.85 The information contained in the file provided ‘excellent descriptions of the ground from the point of view of the defender’. British artillery was provided with detailed information about targets and was also given information about positions to avoid (i.e. positions identified as targets by German artillery).86

The intelligence assessment accompanying the captured German plans noted that, while the scheme was ‘out of date’ and German methods of defence had changed, it was also likely that the Germans would use many of the positions that already existed, and it was unlikely that the enemy would ‘radically change the general plan of defence’.87 Strong advance guards were pushed out to follow- up the retiring enemy and steady pressure was maintained by the Australian

Corps, which continued to drive towards the Hindenburg Line.88 Through

‘vigorous patrolling’ and small actions against enemy points of resistance’, the

Australian Corps had advanced its front to the old British Reserve Line of trenches by 17 September.89 Australian orders issued for the attack were brief and the short paragraph about the enemy showed that intelligence was considered as part of the battle planning process. The brevity of the orders also speaks for the level of operational sophistication that had been reached by the

Australians at this stage of the war. An example of an Australian Brigades battle instructions during the advance stated:

85 Australian Corps Memorandum AC/51, German Defence Scheme St. Quentin Sector of the Siegfried Line, 8 September 1918, AWM, 3DRL/6643. 86 Ibid. 87 Ibid. 88 Report on the Operations of Australian Corps (i) German retreat (ii) Capture of Hindenburg Advanced System 4th September to 20th September Phase D, 26 October 1918, AWM, 3DRL/6643. 89 Ibid.

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The enemy is known to be in position WEST of JEANCOURT and Hill 140.

It is not known in what strength but it is not thought he is very strong.

Enemy order of battle from North to South is 80th Fusiliers, 81st Infantry

Regiment, 87th Infantry Regiment. These are the troops we defeated

August 23rd.90

From this position, on 18 September, the Fourth Army, along with the Third

Army to the north and the French First Army to the south, launched an attack on the German positions forward of the Hindenburg Line. For the Australian Corps, the attack on the outer Hindenburg Line defences was conducted by the 1st and

4th Divisions. The attack advanced behind a creeping barrage and was carried out in three phases, which included the capture of a number of objectives, followed by consolidation and then exploitation through to the line of outposts forward of the main Hindenburg Line (the Advanced Hindenburg Line).91

The attack commenced at 5.20am. While the Australians encountered strong resistance around the village of Le Verguier, there was no other serious opposition. By 10.00am, the entire Australian Corps was consolidating on their final objective. Large numbers of German prisoners were captured and the

German response seemed confused.92 The Australians immediately began to advance. While the 1st Division succeeded in capturing all of its objectives along the Advanced Hindenburg Line, the 4th Division stopped just short, with the

Divisional Headquarters deciding to halt the advance and rest, continuing the

90 1st Australian infantry Brigade Battle Instructions N0.6 — Series C, 10 September 1918, AWM26, 511/3. 91 Report on the Operations of Australian Corps (i) German retreat (ii) Capture of Hindenburg Advanced System 4th September to 20th September Phase D, 26 October 1918, AWM, 3DRL/6643. 92 Report on the Operations of Australian Corps (i) German retreat (ii) Capture of Hindenburg Advanced System 4th September to 20th September Phase D, 26 October 1918, AWM, 3DRL/6643.

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attack later that night. At 11.00pm, the 4th Division advanced again behind a creeping barrage and captured the remainder of their objectives.93 With this attack, the Australian Corps had captured part of the Advanced Hindenburg Line.

Attacks on either side of the Australian Corps, by III Corps in the north and IX

Corps in the south, had not advanced as far as the Australians, but both corps succeeded in capturing their main objectives.94

The battle of Bellicourt

The Australian divisions continued to patrol aggressively along their front line and improve their positions by capturing sections of the German front lines. The

Australian Corps was reinforced with two American Divisions (the 27th and 30th

Divisions, which formed the II American Corps) and preparation commenced for an attack on the main Hindenburg System.95 One of the most formidable obstacles that had been built into the Hindenburg Line was the St Quentin canal, which connected the Oise, the Somme, and the Escaut rivers. Intelligence reports noted that the canal varied in width and depth, but its width at the level of the river bed was approximately twelve metres, between banks of eighteen to twenty metres, with an average depth of two metres. The canal flowed through several large tunnels, the largest which ran from the village of Bony to the south of the village of Bellicourt.96

93 Ibid. 94 Harris, Amiens to the Armistice, pp.178–179. 95 Report on Operations of Australian Corps Capture of the Beaurevoir Defences and Montbrehain 20th September to 6th October Phase E, 26 October 1918, AWM, 3DRL/6643. 96 Description of the St. Quentin Canal from St. Quentin to Cambrai, 16 September 1918, AWM26, 473/5.

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The Hindenburg Line defences ran along the eastern bank of the canal as it exited the tunnel, and a direct assault across the canal and through the defences was a formidable task. When preparing for the attack, Monash proposed that the Australian Corps would drive towards Bellicourt over the tunnel, as he considered an attack directly across the canal as ‘an ill-advised and costly tactic — one that Monash said he would not have asked of his own troops and one that he could not, in good conscience, propose for others’.97 In order to prepare for the attack, the 27th American Division conducted a preliminary operation to capture the start line for the attack on 27 September. While the

American attack seemed successful, some discrepancy existed about the final positions secured by the attacking troops. The Germans counter-attacked aggressively, forcing the Americans back in some places, which necessitated further local attacks to restore the situation.98 It was subsequently determined that the American attack had not captured the start line for the next attack, which complicated the next attack on the Hindenburg Line, as the artillery barrage could not be brought back for fear of hitting parties of American troops that had managed to get forward in the preliminary attack. Instead, the attacking troops were reinforced strongly with tanks and ordered to advance quickly to catch the barrage before proceeding to follow the barrage to the first objective.99

The attack was to be carried out in two phases. The 27th and 30th American

Divisions would advance to their objective line and consolidate. The 3rd and 5th

Divisions would then pass through the Americans and advance to the next

97 Blair, The Battle of Bellicourt Tunnel, p.6. 98 Report on Operations of Australian Corps Capture of the Beaurevoir Defences and Montbrehain 20th September to 6th October Phase E, 26 October 1918, AWM, 3DRL/6643. 99 Report on Operations of Australian Corps Capture of the Beaurevoir Defences and Montbrehain 20th September to 6th October Phase E, 26 October 1918, AWM, 3DRL/6643.

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objective line, where they would consolidate their positions. IX Corps would attack alongside the Australian Corps to the south, while, to the north, III Corps would protect the flank of the Australian attack.100

In prepration for the attack, the German defences and approaches were bombarded for forty-eight hours.101 Sufficient time was available for artillery intelligence units to be deployed to locate enemy guns before the attack, although weather limited aerial photography and artillery spotting flights.102

Observation groups were deployed forward to provide information about enemy artillery activity and were tasked to move forward with the attacking corps once they had crossed the Hindenburg Line. Sound ranging sections were deployed in the lead-up to the attack and were ordered to concentrate after the battle had commenced, with orders to move ‘into action immediately a favourable opportunity occurs’.103 Counter-battery operations were largely successful in neutralising enemy artillery and forcing German guns to be widely dispersed, preventing them from effectively concentrating their fire. Heavy artillery firing on counter-battery targets used a mix of high explosive (with instantaneous fuses) and gas shells to neutralise enemy guns. Protected emplacements were engaged with special delay action fuses. When the infantry overran the German positions, it was evident that many of the guns captured had ‘not opened fire’.104

Special maps were issued, giving details of the enemy’s headquarters, machine gun emplacements, tunnels, battery positions, barrage lines,

100 Ibid. 101 Ibid. 102 Instructions for Sound Ranging and Observation during attack on Hindenburg Line, 27 September 1918, AWM26, 474/2. 103 Ibid. 104 Notes of the Fourth Army’s attack on the Hindenburg Line 29th September 1918, October 1918, AWM26, 12.8.

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observation posts, and communications arrangements. These maps all contained information ‘derived from captured German maps and documents prepared in connection with the defence scheme for the Hindenburg Line’.105 A copy of a special map issued to the attacking troops is included at Figure 12.

The attack opened at 5.50am of 29 September 1918. While the 30th

American Division started well, the 27th American Division immediately ran into difficulties attempting to move up to the barrage. German machine gun positions inside the gap between the infantry start line and the artillery barrage start line took a heavy toll on the attackers and broke up the assault. German guns quickly knocked out the tanks that had been assigned to assist the attack. The protection of the artillery barrage was lost, allowing the German defenders to apply the full weight of their fire onto the attacking Americans.106 The 30th American Division gradually lost cohesion as it advanced through the complex network of trenches and by the time the assault had reached the village of Bellicourt they had also lost the protection of the barrage.107

Moving up behind the attacking American Divisions, the 3rd and 5th

Divisions began to take fire from parties of Germans that had not been mopped up by the attacking Americans. The advancing Australian Divisions were forced to fight their way forward and take over the battle from the Americans. The 5th

Division was able to carry the fighting forward against vigorous opposition, with many of the Americans joining the attacking Australians. The 3rd Division was

105 Precis of Fourth Army Orders affecting Artillery for the attack on the Hindenburg Line 29th September 1918, October 1918, AWM26, 12.8. 106 Report on Operations of Australian Corps Capture of the Beaurevoir Defences and Montbrehain 20th September to 6th October Phase E, 26 October 1918, AWM, 3DRL/6643. 107 Ibid.

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able to advance on the right flank, but the left flank of the attack was brought to a standstill.108

Figure 12 — Map showing the Hindenburg Line defences at Bellicourt (AWM, 3DRL/4182)

108 Ibid.

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Early the following morning, 30 September, the 3rd and 5th Divisions attacked in a north easterly direction along the Hindenburg Line. Because parties of the 27th American Division remained forward of the attacking troops, artillery support was limited and the fight was largely conducted by infantry. In the face of heavy opposition, the Australians reached the outskirts of the village of

Bony.109 The morning of 1 October, the 3rd and 5th Divisions resumed their attacks, with tanks in support . The 3rd Division mopped up the village of Bony and progressed along the Hindenburg Line, securing the northern entrance of the Canal Tunnel. The 5th Division captured the Millridge–Estrees line and

Follenprise Farm. Patrols were once again pushed forward and by nightfall were reported on the high ground near Le Catelet. The whole of the Hindenburg Main

Line along the Australian Corps front was captured.110

Beaurevoir and Montbrehain

The Germans attempted once again to re-establish their defences along the

Beaurevoir Line. Prisoners taken since 29 September 1918 had revealed that their orders were to ‘hold the Beaurevoir Line at all costs’, and intelligence indicated that seven German divisions were now in the front lines opposite the line of advance, although only one was considered ‘reasonably fresh’ and the

Intelligence Staff were unable to identify any available reserves.111 Despite this, it was obvious that a planned attack would be required if the Beaurevoir Line was to be captured. Planning commenced for an attack on 3 October 1918. At

6.05am on 3 October 1918, XIII Corps, the Australian Corps (2nd Division and

109 Ibid. 110 Ibid. 111 Harris, Amiens to the Armistice, p.234.

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32nd British Division), and IX Corps attacked, supported by heavy artillery and tanks. The villages of Beaurevoir and Montbrehain were taken, although German counter-attacks recaptured both the villages. Fighting continued on 4 October, and on 5 October 1918, with the 2nd Division re-capturing Montbrehain after hard fighting. Beaurevoir finally fell to the British on 6 October 1918. With the capture of Montbrehain, the Fourth Army had broken through the final line of

German defences and reached the open country behind the German lines.112

The attack on Montbrehain was to be the Australians last battle of the war. The Australian Corps had come into the front lines along the Somme at the end of March 1918, securing the front lines around Amiens and preventing the capture of Villers-Bretonneux. From 8 August 1918, the Australian Corps was in continuous action for over two months, during which time they had captured nearly 23,000 prisoners and three hundred and thirty-two enemy guns, pursued the enemy for thirty-seven miles [sixty kilometres] and recaptured one hundred and sixteen towns and villages, and a total area of two hundred and fifty square miles [six hundred and fifty square kilometres].113 The Australians had demonstrated their ability to conduct mobile operations, to rapidly plan and conduct all arms battles, incorporating intelligence into their planning, and to maintain a high tempo that kept the retreating Germans off balance. By the time they were withdrawn, the Australian Divisions were exhausted and ready for an extended period of rest in anticipation of renewed fighting in 1919. The signing

112 Harris, Amiens to the Armistice, p.235. 113 Report on Operations of Australian Corps Capture of the Beaurevoir Defences and Montbrehain 20th September to 6th October Phase E, 26 October 1918, AWM, 3DRL/6643.

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of the armistice ended the war before the Australian Corps returned to the front.114

114 Report on Operations of Australian Corps Capture of the Beaurevoir Defences and Montbrehain 20th September to 6th October Phase E, 26 October 1918, AWM, 3DRL/6643.

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Conclusion

Like the British Army on which it was patterned, the AIF entered the First World with only a small Intelligence Staff, albiet one that understood the role that intelligence would play in modern conflicts. Pre-war military thinking about intelligence was, to a large extent, based on the experiences of the Boer War.

Intelligence was acknowledged as an important input into military planning, but the maintenance of a large Intelligence Staff or a standing Intelligence Corps was viewed as an extravagance in peace time. While plans were made to quickly constitute such a force in times of war, future conflicts were expected to be wars of movement that took place over a short span of time. For the Australians, pre-war militia structures, such as the AIC, provided little to build upon when war finally came.

Contrary to popular belief, the Australians had access to a large amount of intelligence during the planning of the Gallipoli campaign. Not only had the British conducted numerous studies of the Gallipoli peninsula in the years leading up to the war, they also had access to a range of new sources of intelligence immediately preceding the landings. Aerial reconnaissance flights and aeroplane photographs, combined with information obtained from former local inhabitants and other sources, provided a clear understanding of the terrain over which the landing forces would need to fight. Information about the Turkish forces on the peninsula was also surprisingly accurate. While the maps that were available to the landing force were not as good as maps that would become available later in the campaign, they were adequate for the task at hand. At GHQ MEF, intelligence was considered and incorporated into the plans for the landing, although little consideration was given to the likely response of the Turks. The information supplied to subordinate formations, such as the ANZAC Corps, the 1st Division, and the New Zealand and

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Australian Division, was wholly inadequate, and they in turn seemed to have failed to provide their subordinate units with much needed information about the enemy or the terrain over which they would fight.

Intelligence played a more significant role in the August offensive. On the northern side of the Anzac position, patrols identified areas through which an assaulting force could move to capture the key terrain which dominated the Anzac position. On the southern side of the position, aerial photographs and aerial reconnaissance provided information about the Turkish defenses around Lone Pine, which would be attacked to keep the Turkish defenders attention fixed on the southern side of the Anzac perimeter, away from the main effort that was to be launched in the north. While the effort to seize the terrain that dominated the Anzac position failed, there is clear evidence that intelligence played an important role in operational planning.

The final act at Anzac, withdrawal, depended on establishing and maintaining an elaborate deception plan that allowed the Australians and New

Zealanders to leave their position with minimal losses. In planning for the withdrawal, there is clear evidence that intelligence was an important factor.

Throughout the withdrawal, the Australians constantly looked for indications that the Turkish Army was aware of their intentions. For the first time, the Australians also prepared an appreciation — based on intelligence they had about the Turkish forces surrounding their position — of likely enemy actions in the event that the withdrawal was discovered. In the eight months of the Gallipoli campaign, the

Australians demonstrated an increasing understanding of the importance of intelligence and how to incorporate it into their operational planning.

In France, the Australians found themselves operating in a much more complex and structured intelligence environment. The Australians also gained

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access to new types of intelligence, and much greater quantities of intelligence than ever before. Battlefield intelligence took on a much more important role and every front line infantryman had a role to play in intelligence collection. By the time the

Australians joined the fighting on the Somme, the battle had been underway for several weeks and was largely directed by Army Headquarters. The 1st Division attack of Pozières provides a good example of how intelligence could be incorporated into attacks conducted during battles such as the Somme. The commander of the 1st Division’s refusal to attack until he had sufficient time to plan and incorporate available intelligence into the battle plan stands in stark contrast to other Australian divisions who allowed themselves to be rushed into conducting attacks around Pozières and Mouquet Farm without adequate planning. By the end of the fighting on the Somme, the Australians had also begun to appreciate the importance of artillery intelligence. This was an important lesson that was learnt not just by the Australians but by the entire BEF. Artillery, rather than infantry, would dominate the fighting in 1917 and 1918. Counter-battery operations to silence enemy guns, along with creeping barrages to protect the infantry as they advanced onto their objectives, would determine the outcomes of battles.

For the Australians, the fighting in 1917 opened with I ANZAC Corps’ attack on Bullecourt. The first attack on the Hindenburg Line should never have taken place given the detailed intelligence available to the Australians (and the British) about the position to be attacked. That the attack failed was no fault of the

Australian Intelligence Staff or their analysis of the available intelligence. The second attack was more carefully planned and succeeded, although the cost of the battle was high. On the other hand, II ANZAC Corps participated in Second Army’s meticulously planned attack on Messines. Years in the planning, Second Army left almost nothing to chance and incorporated all the available intelligence into

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planning for the attack. Second Army’s use of intelligence set the benchmark for subsequent fighting in 1917 and demonstrated what could be achieved in a major battle with careful operational planning that made the best use of all the intelligence available.

By the time the Australians joined the fighting during the third battle of

Ypres, they were once again fighting under the direction of Second Army, which re- established many of the intelligence structures and practices that had served so well at Messines. The Australian attacks at Menin Road, Polygon Wood, and

Broodeseinde Ridge demonstrated their ability to plan and conduct successful attacks over difficult terrain against a determined enemy. Intelligence played a key role in planning these attacks and ensuring that the attacking troops had the best chance of success. Detailed appreciations of the ground over which they would fight, along with knowledge of the layout of the German defences and battle tactics, provided the attacking troops with the ability to dominate the battlefield. This knowledge, combined with the Australian’s experience, made for a potent combination.

It was not until June 1918 that British and French forces had recovered sufficiently from the German offensives of early 1918 to resume offensive operations. While only a small attack, the Battle of Hamel was the culmination of all the operational experience that the Australians had gained since the war began. The attack was planned down to the last detail and intelligence was a key driver behind the decision to attack at Hamel and the way in which the battle was fought. Hamel was not only an example of how infantry, tank, artillery, and aviation assets could be synchronised and coordinated to achieve maximum effect on the battlefield, but it also demonstrated how intelligence could be used to lead operations and to determine where and when to attack. The battle of Amiens confirmed the

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importance of intelligence in determining when and where operations should be launched, along with providing the attacking forces a detailed understanding of the capabilities and intentions of the enemy they were about to attack. The coordination and synchronisation of the Australian, Canadian, British, and French forces at

Amiens was only possible because of the detailed knowledge that was available about the enemy and the ground. Intelligence proved vital in enabling commanders to make decisions about when and where to attack. Intelligence was also just as important in enabling commanders to determine when to bring the battle to a close.

Intelligence continued to be an important input as the Australians pushed the Germans back to the Hindenburg Line and beyond. Although the nature of the battlefield changed once the Australians moved into more open terrain, knowledge of enemy intentions and positions helped them maintain pressure on the retreating

Germans and prevent them from re-establishing a defensive line. By the end of the war, the Australians had shown themselves to be adept users of and effective collectors of intelligence, which was a key input into every level of operational planning.

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Appendix 1. British military intelligence organisations in 1914

General Headquarters (BEF) Intelligence Section

Commander-in- Chief

Chief of the General Staff

Operations Intelligence Section Section

Information Secret Service Topography Censorship sub-section I(a) sub-section I(b) sub-section I(c) sub-section I(d)

Table 1 — Responsibilities of the Intelligence Sub-sections within GHQ Intelligence1

I(a) Information I(b) Secret Service  Obtaining and collating all information  All secret service activities including dealing concerning enemy forces with spies and agents  Special reconnaissance  Co-operation with intelligence organisations  Examination and disposal of captured in Britain documents  Use of codes and ciphers  Examination of prisoners of war  Study of enemy ciphers  Provision of guides  Flags of truce and correspondence with the  Maintenance of intelligence diaries enemy  Questions of policy in connection with international or martial law  Dealings with foreign secret service organisations  Expenditure and accounting of intelligence funds I(c) Topography I(d) Censorship  Obtaining, collating and distributing  Censorship of communications information concerning the theatre of war  Control of the press  Provision, revision and issue of maps  Control of foreign attachés  Provision and distribution of plans, sketches and photography

1 War Office General Staff, Staff Manual; GHQ Memorandum O.B./2010, 7 April 1917, TNA, WO 158/961; Michael Occleshaw, Armour Against Fate: British Military Intelligence in the First World War (London, Colombus Books, 1989)

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Army/Corps Headquarters

Army Commander

Brigadier-General General Staff

Operations Intelligence Section Section

Information Topography sub-section sub-section

Table 2 — Responsibilities of the Intelligence Sub-sections within an Army or Corps Headquarters Intelligence Section2

Information Sub-section Topography Sub-section  Obtaining and collating information  Obtaining information about the theatre concerning enemy forces of war  Special reconnaissance  Providing maps, plans and sketches, and  Examination of captured documents photography  Interrogation of prisoners  Provision of guides  Maintenance of intelligence diaries  Censorship and control of the press within the army’s area of operations  Other tasks under the direction of GHQ such as secret service operations

2 War Office General Staff, Staff Manual; GHQ Memorandum O.B./2010, 7 April 1917, TNA, WO 158/961; Michael Occleshaw, Armour Against Fate: British Military Intelligence in the First World War (London, Colombus Books, 1989)

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Division Headquarters

Division Commander

Divisional General Staff Artillery

Operations Intelligence Artillery Section Section Batteries

Forward Cavalry observation Squadron Officers

Table 3 — Sources of intelligence available to a Division Headquarters and the functions of the Intelligence Section at Division Headquarters3

Intelligence Section  Obtaining, collecting and compiling information about the division’s area of operations  Demanding and distributing maps  Providing sketches and plans  Obtaining and collating information regarding the enemy’s forces  Interrogating prisoners of war  Examination of captured documents  Provision of guides and interpreters  Political work under the instruction of GHQ  Maintenance of intelligence diaries  Management of secret service activities under GHQ direction  Censorship

3 War Office General Staff, Staff Manual; GHQ Memorandum O.B./2010, 7 April 1917, TNA, WO 158/961; Michael Occleshaw, Armour Against Fate: British Military Intelligence in the First World War (London, Colombus Books, 1989)

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Appendix 2. British military intelligence organisations in 1917 General Headquarters (BEF) Intelligence Section

Commander-in- Chief

Chief of the General Staff

Operations Intelligence Section Section

Operational Secret Service Topographical Wireless and Intelligence Intelligence I(a) I(b) and Maps I(c) Ciphers I(e) Corps I(x)

Table 1 — Responsibilities of the Intelligence Sub-sections within GHQ Intelligence4

I(a) Operational Intelligence I(b) Secret Service  Obtaining information regarding German armaments, uniforms and  Operations of the equipment. secret service in  Monitoring enemy order of battle and enemy organisation enemy occupied  Preparation of reports showing the distribution of German forces territory in  Reporting on German recruiting and conscription efforts coordination with  Examining captured German documents the War Office  Production of situation maps  Production and  Production of intelligence reports on the German lines of distribution of secret communications and the theatre of war behind the front lines service reporting  Reporting on strategic enemy movements  Counter-espionage  Reporting on probable enemy plans and operations activities, including  Dissemination of information the control of  Collecting intelligence on German artillery, the preparation of daily counter-espionage and weekly summaries of artillery activity, and the preparation of personnel and reports on artillery groupings intelligence police  The issue of periodical intelligence summaries, and reporting on railways, roads, bridges, canals and rivers I(c) Topographical and I(e) Wireless and Ciphers I(x) Intelligence Corps Maps  Technical control and  Provision of information  Administration of all supervision of the field regarding enemy wireless systems Intelligence survey units throughout  Preparation and issue of codes personnel, not the BEF and ciphers including Imperial  Preparation, printing and  Examination of enemy codes, General Staff officers distribution of mapping ciphers and wireless equipment serving in products intelligence appointments

4 War Office General Staff, Staff Manual; GHQ Memorandum O.B./2010, 7 April 1917, TNA, WO 158/961; Michael Occleshaw, Armour Against Fate: British Military Intelligence in the First World War (London, Colombus Books, 1989); Intelligence Organization in Second Army showing coordination with other Branches, Second Army Intelligence, February 1917, AWM26, 66/4.

406

General Headquarters (BEF) Special Intelligence Section

Commander-in- Chief

Chief of the General Staff

Special Intelligence

Postal and Press I(d) Visitors I(f) War Trade I(g) Censorship I(h)

Table 2 — Responsibilities of the Sub-sections within the Special Intelligence Section of GHQ (BEF)5

I(d) Press I(f) Visitors I(g) War Trade I(h) Postal and Censorship  Control of all  Management of  Monitoring the  Censorship press dignitaries and effectiveness of regulations correspondents visitors to GHQ the British  Censoring postal  Censorship of the blockade of and telegraphic press Germany communications  Reporting on  Reporting on the  Cooperation with British and economic allied censorship Foreign press situation in authorities Germany

5 War Office General Staff, Staff Manual; GHQ Memorandum O.B./2010, 7 April 1917, TNA, WO 158/961; Michael Occleshaw, Armour Against Fate: British Military Intelligence in the First World War (London, Colombus Books, 1989); Intelligence Organization in Second Army showing coordination with other Branches, Second Army Intelligence, February 1917, AWM26, 66/4.

407

Army Headquarters

Army Commander

Major General Royal Flying Artillery General Staff Corps

Operations Intelligence Signals Army Wing

Field Survey Army Wireless Company Company

Table 3 — Sources of intelligence available to an Army Headquarters and the functions of the Intelligence Section at Army Headquarters6

Intelligence Section  Collection, analysis, reporting and distributed of intelligence obtained within the army’s area of responsibility to higher headquarters and to subordinate formations  Regular photography of the enemy front line  Translation of captured documents  Examination of enemy prisoners  Reporting on the movements of the German Army within the army’s area of responsibility

6 War Office General Staff, Staff Manual; GHQ Memorandum O.B./2010, 7 April 1917, TNA, WO 158/961; Michael Occleshaw, Armour Against Fate: British Military Intelligence in the First World War (London, Colombus Books, 1989); Intelligence Organization in Second Army showing coordination with other Branches, Second Army Intelligence, February 1917, AWM26, 66/4.

408

Corps Headquarters

Table 4 — Sources of intelligence available to a Corps Headquarters and the functions of the Intelligence Section at Corps Headquarters7

Intelligence Section  Collection, analysis, reporting and distributed of intelligence obtained within the corps area of responsibility to higher headquarters and to subordinate formations  Regular photography of the enemy front line  Translation of captured documents  Examination of enemy prisoners

7 War Office General Staff, Staff Manual; GHQ Memorandum O.B./2010, 7 April 1917, TNA, WO 158/961; Michael Occleshaw, Armour Against Fate: British Military Intelligence in the First World War (London, Colombus Books, 1989); Intelligence Organization in Second Army showing coordination with other Branches, Second Army Intelligence, February 1917, AWM26, 66/4.

409

Division Headquarters

Division Commander

Divisional General Staff Artillery

Intelligence Operations Artillery Section Section Batteries

Divisional Forward Observation Posts Observation / Divisional officers Observers

Table 5 — Sources of intelligence available to a Division Headquarters and the functions of the Intelligence Section at Division Headquarters8

Intelligence Section  Collection, reporting and distributed of intelligence obtained within the division area of responsibility to higher headquarters and to subordinate formations  Intelligence training for intelligence personnel within the division

8 War Office General Staff, Staff Manual; GHQ Memorandum O.B./2010, 7 April 1917, TNA, WO 158/961; Michael Occleshaw, Armour Against Fate: British Military Intelligence in the First World War (London, Colombus Books, 1989); Intelligence Organization in Second Army showing coordination with other Branches, Second Army Intelligence, February 1917, AWM26, 66/4.

410

Brigade Headquarters

Infantry Brigade

Brigade Major Infantry Battalion Infantry Battalion Infantry Battalion Infantry Battalion

Brigade Battalion Battalion Battalion Battalion Intelligence Intelligence Intelligence Intelligence Intelligence Officer Officer Officer Officer Officer

Infantry Brigade Battalion Scout Battalion Scout Battalion Scout Battalion Scout Observers Section Section Section Section

Table 6 — Sources of intelligence available to a Brigade Headquarters and the functions of Intelligence personnel within a brigade9

Brigade or Battalion Intelligence Officer  Collection, reporting and distributed of intelligence obtained within the brigade or battalion area of responsibility to higher headquarters and to subordinate formations  Intelligence training for intelligence personnel within the brigade or battalion

9 War Office General Staff, Staff Manual; GHQ Memorandum O.B./2010, 7 April 1917, TNA, WO 158/961; Michael Occleshaw, Armour Against Fate: British Military Intelligence in the First World War (London, Colombus Books, 1989); Intelligence Organization in Second Army showing coordination with other Branches, Second Army Intelligence, February 1917, AWM26, 66/4.

411

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432 PLEASE TYPE THE UNIVERSITf OF NEW SOUTH WALES Thesis/Dissertation Sheet

Surname or Family name; Passlow

First name: Jonathan Other name/s: Grant

Abbreviation for degree as given in the University calendar: PhD

School: Humanities and Social Sciences Faculty: Faculty of History

Title: Anzac Intelligence — An examination of the role of intelligence in the planning and conduct of the AIF's battles during the First World War.

Abstract 350 words maximum: (PLEASE TYPE)

The pre-war British Army understood well the importance of intelligence. Like the British Army on which it was patterned, the AIF entered the First World with only a small Intelligence Staff, albeit one that understood the role that Intelligence would play in modern conflicts. Intelligence was acknowledged as an Important element of military planning, but the maintenance of a large Intelligence Staff or a standing Intelligence Corps was viewed as an extravagance in peace time.

Despite popular myth, intelligence was an important part of battle planning during the First World War and the amount of intelligence available to the British Army increased exponentially over Its course. From the time they arrived in Egypt and throughout the Gallipoli campaign, the AIF's command and staff had access to a large body of intelligence with which to plan its operations.

Arriving on the Western Front, the AIF gained access to more forms and greater quantities of intelligence. Throughout 1916 and 1917,as

Australian staff took a greater role in planning the battles fought by the AIF, there was continual Improvement in the way in which they used Intelligence to plan and conduct battles. By 1918, intelligence was often the determining factor in how and where the AIF's battles were fought and by the end of the war, the Australians had shown themselves to be adept users of and effective collectors of intelligence. Intelligence was a key input into every level of operational planning.

Anzac Intelligence offers a thematic examination of how the AIF used the different types of intelligence that were available at the outbreak of the war, or which became available as the war progressed, to plan and conduct Its battles. It will focus on the different types of intelligence available to the AIF and the AIF's use of these over the course of the war.

Declaration relating to disposition of project thesis/dissertation

I hereby grant to the University of New South Wales or Its agents the right to archive and to make available my thesis or dissertation in whole or In part in the University libraries in all forms of media, now or here after known, subject to the provisions of the Copyright Act 1968. I retain all property rights, such as patent rights. I also retain the right to use in future works (such as articles or books) all or part of this thesis or dissertation.

I also authorise University Microfilms to use the 350 word abstract of my thesis in Dissertation Abstracts International (this is applicable to doctoral theses only).

.8 September 2015. •Signature ^ Witness Date

The University recognises that there may be exceptional circumstances requiring restrictions on copying or conditions on use. Requests for restriction for a period of up to 2 years must be made in writing. Requests for a longer period of restriction may be considered In exceptional circumstances and require the approval of the Dean of Graduate Research.

FOR OFFICE USE ONLY Date of completion of requirements for Award:

THIS SHEET IS TO BE GLUED TO THE INSIDE FRONT COVER OF THE THESIS

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