Battle of Broodseinde, the Third Con- Secutive Step in This Series, Has Never Been Fully Recognised Except by the Commanders and Forces That Took Part

CHAPTER XX THIRD STEP-BROODSEINDE THEimportance of the Battle of Broodseinde, the third consecutive step in this series, has never been fully recognised except by the commanders and forces that took part. For the general public, accustomed to over- or under-emphasis in the press, there was little in the published news to indicate that this blow counted for more than others. But on the actual field both British and Germans were aware that the events of the 4th of October, 1917, were big with possibilities of decision. In the air was the unmistakable feeling, not to be experienced again by the A.I.F. until the 8th of August, 1918, that the British leaders now had the game in hand and, if conditions remained favourable, might in a few more moves secure a victory which would have its influence on the issue of the war. Even in the light of today’s fuller knowledge of the general situation, close study of this battle justifies that conviction. In the days following the step of September 26th there was ample evidence of the effect of that blow. Ahead of the 5th Australian Division’s new front at the Butte, the Germans appeared hardly to know where their own front lay. On September 5311, as dawn broke, the front posts of the 30th Battalion found, crouched in the crater-field under their very muzzles, a company of German infantry. Imagining that these troops intended to attack, the 30th fired an S.O.S. flare, and the artillery opened. But, far from attacking, the Germans made signals of surrender when fired on, and patrols rounded up the lot, 2 officers and 63 men of the 1/73rd R.I.R. It was evident that they had lost their way, and the prisoners confirmed this.’ ‘The 17th German Division, which had reinforced the 50th Reserve Division during the fight of the z6th, was in its turn being relieved by the 19th Reserve Division to which this regiment helon,yd. The diary of an officer, who hiniself was captured a few days later, says. It is impossible to stick one’s head ont by day. One of our men was sniped immediately . . . An entire detachment from our battalion got lost in the maze of trenches and walked straight into the arms of the English. Through the telescope I could see them being marched away in column of fours.” The entry immediately preceding this gives the writer’s first impression on arrival at this front. “Just the sort of place for us to come to after our glorious time in Russia. Is it not monstrous? Division after division is thrown into this part of the line to come out decimated a few days later. All that the newspapers tell us . . . is that the enemy has obtained trifling local successes. It is no longer possible to believe these reports.”

833 a34 THE A.I.F. IN FRANCE [Sept., 1917 In contrast to the condition of the Germans, the 56th Australian Battalion, which on the 26th had captured the front beyond Polygon Butte, had actually asked not to be relieved, the activity of the front line being preferable to being shelled in the support position. Both it and the 55th were therefore left in the front line until their division was relieved on September 30th. From the beginning of the Second Army’s offensive it had been recognised that the third step would be the most important.2 The objective was the northward-tending section of the main ridge known as the “ Broodseinde Ridge,” which, since its abandonment by the British after the Second Battle of Ypres, in 1915, had formed the main buttress of the German position there. Crowded with headquarters and observation post, it looked out on the famous British salient as on a spread-out map. For the operation in which it would be attacked, Generals Plunier and Harington had from the first intended to avail themselves of the assistance of the I1 Anzac Corps, preferably upon the left of I Anzac. Birdwood and White, however, had doubted whether any of the I Anzac divisions would last until the third attack, their experience of the Somme fighting having shown that each might be worn out in its first operation. General Godley, of I1 Anzac, was accordingly informed that his divisions might have to succeed to I Anzac’s task after the second step. But the 1st and 2nd Australian Divisions came through the first step so fresh chat it was at once decided to employ them, after a short rest, for making the main attack on Broodseinde Ridge. A conference of the corps staffs with General Harington, held on September 21st, recommended that I Anzac should again be shifted slightly northwards so as to make a straight attack on this position, and that I1 Anzac should take over the front of the V Corps (Fifth Army) on the left of its sister corps, and capture the junction of the ridge with the Gravenstafel spur, along which the left flank would be thrown hack. The X Corps would again buttress the right flank, this time by the difficult process of advancing beyond it to the end of the Polygon plateau at In de Ster and Reutel. 111 the immediately subseqiient steps, I1 Anzac Writing to General hI2nash and other commanders on the eve of this step General Harington said. Tomorrow’s battle . . . will be the biggest of the war ” BROODSEINDE 835 would piay t..e chie part by extending Le capture of the ridge to beyond Passchendaele. Presumably the Fifth Army, till then advancing on

comparatively low ground, J would next resume the leading rble by attacking the Westroosebeke - Staden heights. At a conference with the staffs of Fifth Army and G.H.Q. on September 22nd, this plan, so far as it concerned the third step, was approved. And, as soon as the stroke of September 26th succeeded-on the same afternoonS-Haig gave the order for I1 Anzac to take over the V Corps front. The I1 Anzac divisions proper-the New Zealand and the 3rd Australian-had only just begun to leave a far back area at Bl6quin and Lumbres, and the date for the third step depended upon how quickly they could be brought up and make their preparations. I1 Anzac was at this juncture made up to strength with two British divisions from the Fourth Army,4 the 49th and 66th, but it was not proposed to use them for this stroke. The date at first foreshadowed for it was October 6th. But, with autumn advancing and the weather risk increasing, it was decided to hasten the preparations, and to attack, if possible, on the 4th. Thus for the first time urgent considerations of weather brought an element of haste into the preparations of the Second Army, which hitherto had shaped its arrangements with one motive only-to make a certainty of succcess. For I Anzac the preparation was comparatively easy-its roads for this stage had been made before the second stage; its systems of supply and control were in working order; its formations knew the ground, and the step-by-step attack had heen so well practised that it was now almost a matter of routine, and operation orders and instructions largely consisted of references to those for the previous steps. Rut for 'After conference with Gough and Plumer at Cassel. 'The possible date of the coastal attack bad been again postponed. 836 THE A.I.F. IN FRANCE [2gth Sept.-1st Oct., I917

I1 Anzac, with short notice of its task, the preparatory work was much more difficult.6 On September zgth, when the 3rd Australian Division began to come in next to I Anzac and the New Zealand Division farther north, the roads, foot-tracks, and telegraph installation in the V Corps area were not nearly as far advanced as those of I Anzac,e and the expediting of the attack left insufficient time for their completion as desired. Between September 29th and October 1st the reliefs and adjustments of front were made. The X Corps relieved the 5th Australian Division at Polygon Wood, and the Ist, znd, and 3rd Australian, and the New Zealand divisions (in that order from south to north) came in7 on the front previously held by the 4th Australian Division and V Corps, and the two Anzac corps then adjusted their inner boundary between them, shifting it to the Ypres-Roulers railway.* The relief of the 5th Division was marked by the loss of one of the finest battalion commanders of the A.I.F., Lieutenant-Colonel Humphrey Scott, of the SGth, who had stayed behind to show his British successor the Polygon Wood front, and was shot dead while doing so at the B~itte.~ SGeneral Harington afterwards wrote to General hlonash that the way in which the 3rd Division made its plans at short notice and carried through the operation was beyond all praise. 'For example, ;he head of the buried cable for the rd Aust. Division was at " Bavaria House, half-a-mile behind<*the Frezenberg-desthoek ridge, when that for the 1st Division was approaching Iron Cross Wood," nearly a mile ahead of that rldge. The I1 Anzac cable was extended in time to Zevenkote level with the 1 Anzac cable-head, but the network was less complete than had'been intended The cable-burying parties of I Anzac suffered many cztsualtieg, on the night of Oct. I, but the work waa finished the next night The bury was supposed to be 7 feet deep, hut, according to the diary' of Private H. G Hartnett (Batlow, N.S.W.), 2nd Bn.. who worked upon it, each man had,;o dig a piece 6 feet long, 5 feet deep, lay the cable, and fill the earth in again 'Recent nights spent by these divisions behiiid the lines had been much disturbed by German air bombing. On the night of Sept. 28 at Reninghelst a bomb dropped beside the tents of 28th Bn. H.Q., killed Captain Gill and three others, and'wouiided Col. Read, Major A. Brown, Maior H. F. Darling (Ceraldton, W. Aust., and Northern Rhodesia), and ten other officers and men. The following night bombs did great damage in the 3rd and 4th Divisional Ammunition Columns. 'The and Uivision took oyer from the 3rd 800 yards of front south of the railway. All reliefs went smoothly except for a difficulty in ascertaining precisely where the right flank of the V Corps lay. Here Colonel hlorshend of the 33rd relieving part of the 3rd British Division, could obtain no precise information a; to wbether the British had a post at Zonnebeke church. He was determined to find out and, after spencllng several hour: together with a British guide, crawling about the ruined village, hopelessly lost (as he stated afterwards), he ascertained that the flank definitely lay at the church. sScott, who before the war had been a clerk in Dalgety's office Sydney and an officer of the militia, had distinguished himself in barricading the 'trenches'at Lone Pine, and at the age of 24 had been given command of the new 56th Battalion in Feb. 1916. He had made a striking success of his command but he had never been more successful than at Polygon Wood In the 14th" Brigade diary it had been recorded that. while all battalions did well, the 56th have done c:rellently well . both from the fighting and administrative point of view. despite the fact ;ha; their adjutant had been wounded. Had he survived, Scott would almost certainly have risen to brigade command. 1st OCt., 19171 BROODSEINDE 837 Thus, by October Ist, the two Anzac corps-four Anzac divisions-were for the first time side by side in the front line. Each of the three Australian divisions had a task about as extensive as those of the last two steps-an advance of I,ZOC-Z,OOO yardslo on a r,ooo-yard front. Their final objectives lay on the main ridge. The New Zealand Division, which would advance about 1,000 yards and seize the Graven- stafel spur, was allotted double the frontage. On the right the X Corps concentrated two divisions (21st and 7th) on a 1,400- yard front, in order to seize its fan-shaped and difficult objective on the heights, while another (5th) attacked in the Reutelbeek valley. The 37th Division (IX Corps) also would round off an indenta- tion south of the Menin road. The Fifth Army would attack with two divisions (48th and 11th) of the XVIII Corps and two (4th and 29th) of the XIV. To summarise, twelve divisions and parts of two others would attack on a 14,000 yards' front, from " Bitter Wood '' (south of Tower Hamlets) to the Ypres-Staden railway. The reliefs had just been completed when, shortly before dawn on October Ist, the sector newly taken over by the X Corps in front of Polygon Wood was intensely shelled, and at 5.30 German infantry were seen advancing in three waves. The zIst and 7th British Divisions opened with every barrel that could be brought to bear, some of them from the Butte, as did the southernmost Australian battalion (znd), just outside the flank of the attack, and most of the Germans were forced to shelter in craters half-way across No-Man's Land. A few came close enough to bomb an Australian post. But only south-east of Polygon Wood did some reach the British line ; here they retook Cameron Covert, which Colonel Norman Marshall had seized on September 27th in advance of the objective set for him. In the afternoon a second effort was seen to be made, after bombardment, but it failed completely. The importance of this attack was not realised until statements from Drisoners made it clear. It was an attempt to regain, after

10The right (1st Division) would go I,ZOO-I,~OO yards, the and 1,800-1,900, the 3rd. ~,900-2,100. 838 THE A.I.F. IN FRANCE [ 1st-3rd Oct., 1917 full preparation, the ground lost on the 26th at Polygon Wood. Two fresh counter-attack divisions, the 45th Reserve of the Ypres Corps, and the 8th of the Wytschaete Corps, each contributed a reginient- the 210th R.I.R. and 93rd I.R. respectively. These, with IZ storm- sections of the Fourth Army’s storm-battalion (to attack the pillboxes) and several tnitienwerfer companies, formed a special force under command of General von Gabain of the 17th Division.11 The history of the moth R.I.R. says that its troops on the right only advanced I40 yards, and those in the centre less than 80. The reneyal of the attack in the afternoon was ordered in spite of a protest from this regiment, which lost, in all, 6 officers and 350 others. During this day and the two that followed the Anzac engineers and pioneers were largely engaged in extending the duckboards along the tracks for the approach march, but there was nowhere time to lay them the whole way, and the roads prepared for the next advance of the artillery could not be planked. The weather was uncertain, and slight misty rain in the afternoon of October 3rd gave some warning of the difficulties to be faced if the fine spell broke. “Even the little rain last night made the roads poor,” says the diary of the 2nd Divisional Artillery. It adds that the positions to which the batteries were to be advanced (for the next step) would only be accessible in good weather. On the recommendation of I Anzac, the coming attack was to be made in two stages, the troops first advancing to a line-known as the “Red Line”-100-200 yards short of the crest, and then, after about an hour’s pause, rushing the crest and pushing forward to a “Blue Line” 200-400 yards beyond. The other corps made their arrangements to conform with this. As the railway veered to the north before cutting through the crest, the right of the 3rd Division (I1 Anzac) would in the second stage have to cross it diagonally. Each division attacked with two brigades. In I Anzac all brigades except one adopted the now normal method of employing one battalion for the first objective, two for the second, and one for reserve. In I1 Anzac the dispositions varied.12 The preliminary bombardment, as before, consisted largely of practice barrages with which, from October 1st twice daily, each corps swept the ground of the attack and the

=The 17th had counter-attacked on Sept. 26. and had since beer relieved by the 19th Reserve Division. as General hlonash arranged for the 3rd Division two intermediate objectives, making four in all, and each attacking brigade used one battalion for each of them In the New Zealand Division each brigade used two battalions for each objective. In I .Aniac General Wisdom of the 7th Brigade, as on Sept. 20. used only one battalion (26th) to capture the second objective, employing a second (27th) to support it, if required, and to dig a communication trench and other work& znd-4th Oct., 19171 BROODSEINDE 839 area beyond it. No other intense bombardment was to fall ur,til “ zero ”-6 o’clock on the morning of the 4th-when the whole orchestra would strike up and the infantry would siinultaneously advance. The arrangements for the great barrage were practically the same as on September ~6th,’~ but the artillery of I Anzac was considerably less strong than on that day. At least a day before the operation, all the Anzac divisions brought their hindermost attack-battalions east of Ypres, where most of them bivouacked in shell-holes during October 3rd.l‘ The I Anzac boundary had now been shifted to the Menin Gate, which was used by both corps, and all three Australian divisions had their headquarters in the dugouts tunnelled in the ramDarts. those of the 1st and 2nd being near

”The first zoo yards, at IOO yards in 4 minutes; thereafter, too in 6 to the first objective, and thence 100 in 8 to the second. The machine-gun barrage would begin seven minutes after zero. While the infantry dug in at the first objective, the heavy artillery barrage would, in 30 minutes, wander 1,000 yards into German territory and then suddenly return. At the final ObJectlve it would cease for a few minutes in order to allow its lines to be adjusted, and would then descend in three consecutive barrages, each lasting 45 minutes and sweeping forward 1,500 yards, with comparatively quiet intervals of an hour between. The continuous protective barrage of the field artillery would have ended at 11.ag. hut the last barrage of the ’’ heavies ” would not cease until I 44 p.m. The artillery, no longer having to deal with the valleys on the southern flank. had lost a double bombardment-group, transferred to X Corps. In the right sector the 1st and 5th Divisional Artilleries (4 brigades), ::turnin! from rest, had replaced the five brigades (3rd Div. Arty. and the three army brigades). 11 Anzac, having a larger front, was supported by a much stronger artillery. including most of the British field artillery that had been serving with the V Corps. The artillery now was - Z Anzac-Heavy Artdltry : One double bombardment-group and two double counter-battery groups (as for Sept. 16, less 53rd and 14th H.A.Cn.). Fwld Artrllery (eight brigades) right division-1st and and Bdes. (1st Div. Arty.) and 13th and 14th (5th DIV. Arty.); left division-10th and 11th Bdes. (4th Div. Arty.) and 4th and 5th (and Uiv. Arty.). ZZ Ansac.-Heavy Artrlkry: TWOdouble bombardment-groups (33rd, agth, 48th. 88th H.A.G’s), five counter-battery groups (znd, 13th, 4znd, 6gth, 70th). and a reserve bombardment-group (16th). Fdd Artdlcry (17 brigades, one, however, without guns). right division-50th and 51st Bdes. (9th Div. Arty.), 7th and 8th Aust. (3rd Aust. DIV. Arty.), 40th and 4nnd (3rd British Div. Arty.), and 64th “Army” Bde.; left division-1st and 3rd N.Z. Bdes. (N.Z. Div. Arty.), 245th and a46th (49th Div. Arty.), 38th, 86th, 108th, and z31nd “ Army ” Bdes ; also, until the night after the attack, 295th and ag6th Bdea. (59th Div. Arty.). At full strength, this artillery would comprise: Z Ansac-heavy artillery, 151 pieces; field artillery, ~gz(96 for each division). ZI Aroac-heavy artillery, 127 pieces; field artillery. 384. This would give a concentration of 955 guns on a 5.000 yards’ front, or I to every 5 yards. A fair number, however, were out of action, and the proportion of active guns was considerably lower than these figures imply. “As the 3rd Battalion came UP near Hooge on the night of Oct. a. a German airman dropped two bombs on the tail of tho column, killing or wounding 17 men of the battalion and of the 1st L.T.M. Battery. 840 THE A.I.F. IN FRANCE [3rd-4th Oct., I917 the Lille Gate, and those of the 3rd at the Menin Gate.18 At various hours after dusk on October 3rd the troops began to march to their tapes. In sharp contrast to their experience in the piecemeal fighting of the Somme, the troops of the 1st and 2nd Aus- tralian Divisions, after carrying out one great attack a fortnight before, advanced to this second operation in exuberant spirits. It was not merely that the days of those repeated batterings against isolated, narrow sectors appeared to have passed for ever, and that these well-planned operations on wide fronts were almost welcomed in comparison. But this night four Anzac divisions were marching to the line together. There were indications that the British command had caught some glimpse of the true reason lying behind the constant impor- tunings of the Australian authorities that their troops should be kept together, rather than dealt with as if they represented some portion of the United Kingdom.ls But it had certainly no conception of all that this meant to the troops then making their way through the dark. We are to have N.Z., 3rd, znd, 1st Australian Divisions in line (noted an Australian in his diary). . . . . The 3rd beside the 2nd and 1st will make a splendid combination-all keen to win and keep their reputations and their place in the force. It will bring the 3rd Division among their fellows at one step. . . . We passed the 3rd Division (11th Bde.) on the road . . . . yesterday, and I must say they looked magnificent. 1'11 swear they knew they were passing through the 1st Division, and their sleeves were rolled up. . . . There occur in the records several references to another satisfactory circumstance, that the division on the right flank of I Anzac was the 7th British, whose magnificent fighting quality the Australians had discovered at Bullecourt. The chief danger was the chance of a break in the weather,17 and, as the troops were moving to the front, it began to drizzle. Sharp, chilly squalls drove from the south- MSee Vql. XIZ, glotes 410-11. The dugouts and si al services at the Menin Gate were insufficient for a full divisional staff. Major-&era1 hlonash accordingly divided his headquarters, leaving his administrative staff at Brandhoek several miles in rear. Monash was the last commander to underrate the impdrtance of his administrative staff and his decision was probably inevitable but like that of Sir Ian Hamilton at {he Gallipoli Landing, it placed that pah o'f his staff .it a disadvantage, especially when the need arose to deal with a breakdown in the scheme tor evacuating the wounded la These requests bad long been accepted as representing a well-known contention of the oversea governments, but the official mind had not been convinced of its reasonableness The transfer of whole corps from one sector to another was an inconvenient process, but it was now being found to result in better fighting efficiency. l1 The forecast noted that an atmospheric depression was passing, but predicted cold, squally showers. 3rd-4th Oct., 19x71 BROODSEINDE 841 west-the rainy quarter. At 12.30 a.m. it was raining lightly, and the battlefield was greasy, but not drenched. The moon, which was full, was hidden, and, from the points where the duckboards ended, the tracks, although excellently marked with tapes and stakes, were difficult, especially in the Zonne- beke valley, which lay close behind the jumping-off tapes of the 3rd Division. Its engineers had bridged the swampy bed a: seven points with duckboards.l8 Some of these crossings had been destroyed by shelling, but most of the 10th and 11th Brigades, which had to pass there, found them, and those who could not struggled through the bog. The Germans close ahead were constantly firing white flares and coloured signals. The troops were accustomed to these signs of nervous- ness and were not in the least apprehensive,lu but the approach of the 3rd Division was under close observation from Windmill Cabaret Hill, and was delayed by the necessary halts when flares were up. Except in the 3rd Division, all the Anzac commanders ccncerned had decided to assemble the whole of their attacking battalions well forward, so that at zero they might quickly advance clear of the answering German barrage. But the space for the 3rd Division’s assembly ahead of the Zonnebeke was very narrow, and General Monash gave his brigadiers leave to hold back the battalions destined for the later objectives.*O The 41st Battalion was accordingly given an assembly area beside 11th Brigade Headquarters, 1,200 yards in rear.

~~ ~

‘8 The ,!st Diyfsion approactyd by ‘‘ Jabber ” and “ Helles ” trxks, the 2nd by “ Harris and Rifle Farm tracks (the last, in the ?!d V $yps,,area, had to be hastily extended), $e 3rd.b J,,” (Rai!yay), F, and K tracks, and the N.Z. Division by No. j and No. 6. Some shelling was experienced during the approach of several units. Lieuts. V. C hIcKell (1st Bn ) and J. T hlaguirc (8th) were thus killed. and Lieut. A E. Ballard (4and) mortally wounded (hlcKell belonged to Waverley, N.S.W.; Marmire to Bowendale. Vic.: Ballard to Windsor, Wand.) lo Apparently following the example of the 2nd Division on Sept. ao. That method, however, had now been abandoned by every brigade except the 7th, which used it only for a battalion (27th) charged with digging and not with actually attackinc 842 THE A.I.F. IN FRANCE [3rd-4th Oct., 1917 But on the actual night of the approach march Brigadier- General Cannan, having found that this area was constantly barraged, sent on the battalion to squeeze in behind the rest. The 40th Battalion had been similarly squeezed behind the 10th Brigade, and, crowded on the wet ground, waited for zero.

Thus in the early hours of October 4th the whole attacking force of I and I1 Anzac lay crowded about the front line, the foremost waves just ahead of it, the rear- attach* most just behind. On the right the troops borne down were very close to the enemy.*' As usual the possibility of detection added to the tension, but the night was quiet until shortly before dawn. What happened then is described in the diary of an observer who, at the time, was making his way to a shell-hole observation post a mile in rear. It was lowering and drizzly, and the German flares looked dull and glazed like fishes' eyes. . . . It was so overcast and drizzly that we could not see (the way). At about 5.20 . . . . a yellow flare went up on the Broodseinde Ridge, instead of a white (as heretofore). It was followed by a couple more, and then sheafs of them; then others to left and right, spreading gradually. About seven minutes later, or less, the German barrage began to come down, battery by battery. By 5.30 it was really heavy-crumb, crumb, crumb, crutnp, crumb-like empty biscuit-tins banging down into the valley ahead and on to the Glencorse heights. Of course we thought the attack had been discovered. It made one miserably anxious to hear it, but we had heard the same at Bullecourt twenty minutes before the attack, when one had learnt that our men can attack even after such a barrage. . . . . Then (at 6 a.m.) our barrage opened-tremendous. . . .

21 In front of the 1st Brigade lines near Molenaarelsthoek la a bog of black mud and it was decided to lay the tapes ahead of this despite tie risk of getting to; close to the enemy. The process for laying the &pes was as follows: the brigade intelligence officer, Lieut. J. F. Barnes (Kyahram, Vic.), with the battalion officers, Lieuts. H. D. Robb (3rd Bn., Medlow Bath and Arncliffe N S.W.) H. V. Chedgey (1st nn., Arncliffe), and W. A. Tebbutt (4th Bn., Sydn; ), dicided on a centre point for the brigade front. (Tebbutt was wounded bezre the actual taping began, and his corporal took his place.) This point having been chosen Barnes ran his tape from it direct to the rear, to serve as the boundary betwee; right and left battalions, and the officer for each battalion ran his tape along the intended front of his unit. The officer, holding the compass, would send one of his scouts with the tape as4.far as h:, coulda4see him;, directing him by',tugg;pg the tape-one tug: meaning go right, two go left, and a long tug halt. The tape would then be fixed down with sticks or clods and the process repeated. It required 50 reels to tape the brigade front. During the work Germans could be seen by the light of their own flares, and the Australians had to keep very low to avoid being sighted from the Molenaarelsthoek pillboxes. In the sector of the and Brigade immediately on the left of the 1st no tape was laid for the left rear battalion, the 7th, the intelligence officer Lieit. W. ti. Pollock (Brunswick, Vic ), being killed by a shell. Lieut. C. P. 'Clowe (Middle Park, Vic.) and the battalion scouts, however, guided the 7th to its proper position. 4th Oct., rgr?] BROODSEINDE 843

At the time, hardly a word of this German bombardment reached the various Anzac headquarters. The rain ceased, and at 6.58 news arrived through the 2nd Division that all was going well. At 7.20 success signals were reported to have been seen, fired at the first objective; at 8.55 they were seen at the second, At the same time the zIst Squadron, R.F.C. (attached to I1 Anzac), the first to send a machine struggling through the gale and low clouds, reported that flares (lit in shell-holes by the troops) were seen all along the final objective of its Corps: “ Our men appeared everywhere at ease and not troubled.” At 10.50 the 4th Squadron (I Anzac) reported sighting the electric lamp at some headquarters at Zonnebeke signalling “ O.K.,” and at 11.40 flares were lit for it all along the I Anzac objective also. The news from every other part of the front of attack was almost as good. The British line stood in advance of the positions lost in 1915; and reports from prisoners quickly made it evident that the success was even greater than at first appeared. It was reported to I Anzac Headquarters, and much later to I1 Anzac, that stubborn resistance had been met, but in the elation which followed, and the hurrying on of subsequent operations, it was not realised what vehement fighting had been necessary to secure success. The difficulties began before zero hour. The German barrage heard by observers at 5.27 fell, as they feared, directly upon the waiting line of I Anzac, hitting the 1st Division more severely than the and, but descending intensely upon both. The most forward battalions suffered least ; where there was room, some of the rear lines edged forward to escape the worst of the storm. Most of the men, lying in their shell- holes with their waterproof capes drawn over their heads against the rain, simply had to endure it. When a shell burst in an unoccupied shell-hole, it usually did little damage; when it burst in an occupied one, the men there were killed. The intense bombardment was strangely confined to the 1st and 2nd Divisions; the 3rd Australian and the 7th British Divisions were not under the rain of trench-mortar bombs hose fuses their men could see flying over thickly upon their neighbours at Zonnebeke and Molenaarelsthoek. When the day afterwards broke, the dead lay in groups along the I Anzac front. Numbers of the officers and men, including names 844 THE A.I.F. IN FRANCE [3rd-4th Cct., 1917 famous through the A.I.F., were never found again. Some twenty officers are known to have been killed by the bonibard- nient, and about a seventh of the attacking force of I Anzac appears to have been killed or wounded.22 Most officers felt certain that the assembly had been detected, but at the last moment the 29h, waiting on the edge of Zonnebeke, suspected another cause. Since 11 o’clock Germans had been seen continually passing across its front, and, although for some hours this was interpreted as a normal relief, its continuance and the weight of the subsequent bombardment convinced those on the spot that the Germans were about to attack. It was then, however, too late to fire the S.O.S. signal, since the artillery was forbidden to answer in the last ten minutes before the attack.28

za Most of those who were “ missing ” after this attack were killed in this barrage. Amon the officers who, accordin to the records then lost their lives were (1st Bn ) bajor Philip Howell-Price fieut. C. Farry: (4th Bn.) Lieuts. R.’B. Bennett and J. Imine. (6th Bn.) Lieuts.’T. H. A. Boyd and E. W. Opie‘ (7th Bn.) Lieut. G. Heaton; (kth Bn) Captains R. N. C. Kirsch and J. R. Dahdson, and Lieut. L. G. l’. Errey; (arst Bn Lleuts J. S. T. Rigby and T. F. Heraud. (zand Bn ) Lieut. F. G. Kellaway; (~3rdBn.) Lieuts. A. C. Brewster, J. 0. E(hel1, and N. J Moore’ (24th Bn.) Lleuts. F. W. J. Murphy, E. S. Worrall, and A. Wilcock. (1st Div’ Arty) Capt J. R. Edd Among those wounded were (5th) Captain; C. hlcE.’Lillie’and A.’J. Phillips, &cuts. F. W. Corlett, E. L. Wilcock (a brother of A. Wilcock, abovementioned), H. H. Sinclair. C C. Hanson; (6th) Colonel C. W D. Dal (7th) Lieuts F. S. Wyeth and M. B Hambrook; (a3rd) Lieut. R Gordon. doith of the railway outside the area of intense barrage Capt F G bims Lieuts. T H Howden a’nd C. L Herbert (all of the 43rd) ’and Lieu; J: Larkk (41st) &re‘ killed. (Howell-Price belonged to Richmond ’N.S W.; Fkry to Ashfield, N.S.W.; Bennett to S dney; Irvine, whose correct ’name was J. D. Doak to Kalgoorlie W. Aust.; Joyd to Melbourne. Opie to Newtown Vic.; Heat& to St. Kild;, Vic.; Kirsch, whose brother WAS killed with the 38th the same day, to Hawthorn, VIL; Davidson to Warrnambool Vic.; Errey to Camperdown. Vic.; Rigby, whose brother was killed later in the ’fight, to Telangatuk East, Vic.; Heraud to Collingwood, Vic.; Kellaway to Northcote, Vic.; Brewster to Stawell. Vic.; Ethel1 to Laidley, Q’land; Mwre to Port Melbourne. Murphy to Fitzroy, Vic; Worrall to Prahran, Vic.; the Wilcock brothers to Bgndigo Vic.; Eddy to South Yarra, Vic.; Lillie to East Malvern, Vic.; Phillips to Alberj Park Vic.; Corlett to Nullawarre, Vic.; Sinclair to F~tzroy, Vic.; Hanson to Kyabram: Vic.; Daly to Canterbury, Vic.; Wyeth to Inverloch, Vic.; Hambrook to Gippsland, Vic Gordon to Essendon, Vic ; Sims to Broken Hill, N.S.W.; Howden to Ade(aide; Herbert to Papua and Adelaide; Larkin to Brisbane.) hfajor Howell-Price two of whose brothers (Colonel 0. G. Howell-Price yd, and Lieut R. G. IIodell-Price, 1st) had been killed at Flers and Bullecouri, ad just returned to his battalion. In an endeavour to preserve his life, General Birdwood had appointed him to the 1 Anzac staff, hut, on hearing that his old battalion was going into action, Price beg!ed to be sent back to it. According to one account, Lieut. F. W. Goodwin (of Goodwin’s Post ”) of the 8th. who also had prayed to he allowed to take part in this attack, was killed in this bombardment. Lieut. Brewster (~3rd)was the same who fought on Maxfield‘s right at Second Bullecourt. His company had for some days been holding the heavily-barraged ground south of Zonnebeke Lake. His last message before this fight was’ “This sort of thing is telling on the men’s nerves, and a more active programme will he welcomed by all.” =Two independent observers reported that an S O.S. signal was seen on the front of the 1st Division at j jj am. On this front, as it happened, at 5.15 a vatrol of the 5th Battalion had brought in five German prisoners. They seemed jery anxious to he sent quickly to the rear, and by questioning them It was learnt that they expected a German bombardment at j.30. Captain Lillie sent them on to and Brigade Headquarters with a message to that effect; but they made no mention of any impending attack. 4th Oct., 19171 BROODSEINDE 845 So severe was the strain upon the I Anzac line that more than one oficer in it wondered how his men would act upon the signal to advance. But on the moment when, at 6 o’clock, the tremendous British barrage crashed down, the German barrage stopped as if by clockwork. The troops, as they straightened themselves above their shell-holes, were, as if by a miracle, spared the explosion of German shells in their midst. With the casual manner that marked them in every battle, they lit cigarettes and moved forward. Most of the right and centre of I Anzac had to cross a slight open dip before reaching the up-slope to Broodseinde Ridge, It was at once noticeable that the great barrage, despite its roar, was not comparable in density to those of September 20th and 26th. The ground was wet and the shells raised no dust-cloud, but only smoke and steam. Moreover, on the I Anzac front, the nearest barrage line- that of the majority of eighteen-pounders-was so much thinner that part of the infantry, thoroughly expert in following it, found it “hard to say if it zvas our barrage or odd shells falling sh~rt.”~’The I Anzac troops, moving forward to catch it up, 150 yards ahead, had about reached it when, in the dim light, they descried, thirty yards farther on, moving objects which immediately afterwards were recognised as another line of troops who also were just rising from shell- holes. The strangers were extended at about two paces’ interval, far to right and left. Some were standing, some “ moving about,” as if disconcerted, looking for an order. Most of the Australians who saw them instantly grasped the fact that these were Germans. Many of the Australians (to quote one of their officers) blazed at once from the shoulder; one Lewis gunner on the left centre got down at once and opened fire. The (Australian) line did not stop a moment. The Germans . . . . fired a f:,w scattered shots and ran at once. . . . Some of our chaps shouted They’re your own chaps don’t fire.” A sort of a sudden fire of argument went along-“ Mind your own bloody business.” Most of the men went on shooting. At some points the Germans were advancing with bayonets fixed and rifles slunc when thus met with. Their first wave ”This statement by an officer of the 8th Battalion is confirmed by numerous other declarations, including some on the German side. The :nd Division reported that the barrage was not nearly so effective as on the 20th. It was less regular. not so intense.” The ‘!owltier barrage was dense, but did not fully screen. An observer noted that it looked like a crowd of steaming plates, placed close to one another all up the hillside, white steam streaming from them against the brown uarth.” 846 THE A.I.F. IN FRANCE [zoth Sept.-4th Oct., 1917 was largely shot down, and the Australians realised that on the other side of No-Man's Land a German attacking force must have been assembling at the same time as themselves, and the zero hour for the two attacks must have been the same; but evidently the Germans had arranged for their assault to be preceded by a half-hour's bombardment, whereas the British bombardment began at zero hour. The foremost German waves, like the British, escaped the heaviest of the bombardment, but the rear waves may have caught it. According to the account just quoted, they could be seen through it running 100 or 200 or 300 yards away . . . . too far for accurate shooting in this light. The German dead, over whom the Australian line passed, and the prisoners first taken, all belonged to the 212th R.I.R. But the pillboxes and shell-holes, with which the attack came immediately afterwards into holts, were found to be garrisoned by the 4th Guard Division. From prisoners it was almost immediately ascertained that an attack had been arranged on the German side against a front practically conterminous with that of I Anzac. Later in the day many of the orders for it were captured, and these, together with several accounts since published in Germany, make the story fairly clear. As was anticipated on the British side, the German command had been deeply disturbed by its helplessness against the British methods employed on September 20 and 26, and had made drastic changes (which will be described later) in its defence scheme. But one principle which it would not alter was that of maintaining an aggressive defence. General von Armin, commanding the Fourth German Army, truly contended that, even if the counter-attacks failed to gain their objectives, they forced the British to keep their forward areas heavily manned, and so subjected large forces to German artillery-fire during the days between the offensives. With less justification, he argued that the German forces lost no more heavily in counter-attacking than in merely waiting under the British barrages. Accordingly, in spite of the sharp defeat on October I, it was determined to proceed with a similar enterprise on the Ypres Corps front a few days later. It was a fresh division, the 4th Guard (old opponents of the Australians at Mouquet Farm, Flers, and Bapaume) which had urged this enterprise. Hurried forward to relieve the 3rd Reserve Division at Zonnebeke immediately after September 26, it was confronted with a tense situation25 and decided that, for the security of the Broodseinde crest, more room was vital. If a German counter-attack had to move over that exposed crest, it would be cut to pieces. The British must be denied the opportunity of massing behind Tokio Ridge, and the Germans given the chance of assembling there. For these reasons, it was proposed

~ "On Oct. I, at Zonnebeke, the 5th Guard Grenadier Regiyent suffered severeliq through Australian sniping. The regimental history states, as sufficient proof of the accuracy of this shooting, that a sniper shot five starlings from the bole of the tree beneath which lay the headquarters of the 5th Company. ~st-4thOct., 19171 BROODSEINDE 847

to recapture that ridge. from Zonnebeke to Molenaarelsthoek on the edge of the Polyg&. plateau. The three regiments of the 4th Guard Division itself (5th Guard Grenadier, 5th Foot Guard, and 93rd R.I.R.) would not be used for this offensive -a regiment (212th R.I.R.) the counter-attack divi- %n (45th Reserve) would be thrown through them, strengthened with 16 heavy and 16 light m'nenwerfer to intensify the bombardment on the flanks, and with 8 sections of the Fourth Army's storm- battalion for seizing defences in Zonnebeke and elsewhere. The three battalions of the 212th R.I.R. would attack from the three regimental sectors of the 4th Guard Division, whose own battalions would be maintained in position for security against a British attack. At the last moment the Ypres Corps specially ordered that no troops of the 4th Guard Division were to be brought forward in the operation, except to resist counter-attack, but all the infantry on the front of attack was grouped under the commander of the 5th Foot Guard Regiment (Lieutenant-Colonel von Radowitz) , and was subdivided into two commands: in the sector of the 5th Guard Grenadier (Zonnebeke), the 1/210th R.I.R. and 5th Guard Grenadier under the commander of the latter regiment, Major Freiherr von Schleinitz; south of this the I1 and III/zrzth R.I.R.. the 5th Foot Guard, and the two northernmost companies of the 93rd R.I.R., under the commander of the 212th R.I.R., Lieutenant-Colonel Rave. The attack was first arranged for dawn on October 3; but, when the related attack of October I on Polygon Wood failed, it was postponed to the 4th. The objective was curtailed on the southern flank, and half of the III/znth R.I.R., being released, was ordered to attack as a second wave behind the centre battalion (11). A contact aeroplane was to fly over at 7.30. The German bombardment began at 5.25, and ten minutes later all the mimwzuerfer and the artillery of the 4th Guard Division concentrated on the front to be attacked, while the artillery of the neighbouring divisions, to divert attention, barraged other sectors to right and left. Under this bombardment the three attack-battalions, which had assembled at midnight on the eastern slope of Broodseinde Ridge and had since been guided to the front line, were to push forward as close as possible to their barrage. But some opening shots at 5.25 seem to have fallen on the waves of the I/ZIZ and on the garrison of the I/5th Guard Grenadier at Zonnebeke. Many were killed or wounded, and yellow cluster flares were fired in sheaves as a signal to the artillery to lengthen range. These were the fireworks noted by Australian observers. At 6 the German bombardment lifted to allow the waves of infantry to attack. In order that they might work up very close, the last shells before the lift were fused so as to burst deep in the earth and scatter few splinters. The barrage was then to move zoo yards beyond the British line, and thence later to the back area. It is doubtful, however, whether these back-barrages were ever fired. The German artillerymen were bewildered by the crash of the British bombardment about them, and uncertain whether it meant an attack or merely a terrific reply to 848 THE A.I.F. IN FRANCE [4th Oct., 1917 the advance of their own troops. At the front line the waves of the 212th R.I.R. had not long passed tht-:ugh the garrison when their men appeared, running back with shouts, The English are coming." The meeting of the two attacks was attended by several interesting incidents. The attacking brigades of the 2nd Australian Division had to pass round different sides of Zon'nebeke Lake, a bleak waterhole 200 yards long by 100 wide.2B Here, in order to ensure that connection should be kept, a detached platoon from the 2znd Battalion (6th Brigade) south of the lake was to find touch with the 25th (7th Brigade) north of it, before zero, and a flank platoon of the 25th was to pass south of the lake. The 22nd's party duly set out, but its commander, Lieutenant Blanchard,*' was never seen alive again, though some of his men afterwards returned, greatly shaken. Of the 25th, Major Page, passing south of the lake, saw a number of men ahead. Taking them for Australians, he walked up to them, and found himself seized and made His revolver was tied to his wrist, but one of his captors had hold of it, when a British shell caused them to scatter. Page fired at them, and escaped. The zmd at the outset almost stumbled into Germans advancing with fixed bayonets. Lieutenant M~Intyre,?~who was directing the ~2ndwith compass, killed several with his revolver before he himself was shot through the head. Many of the Victorians fired from the hip, and here the enemy broke. In Zonnebeke, however, part of his line retired in good order, 30 or 40 yards at a time, his N.C.O's controlling it, and ordering rapid fire at each halt. Others, in cellars there, tried to fire with machine-guns into the back of the 25th, which had passed, but the cellars were quickly rushed by the following 26th.*O

The advanced post at Zonnebeke " Chateau" had been withdrawn at 5 a.m., in order to permit of a straighter barrage line. 27 Lieut. R. Blanchard, aznd Bn. Engineer; of Brighton, Vic.; b. Grimsby, Eng., 1887. Killed in 3cti0.1, 4 Oct, 1317. 28 For the capture ot prisoners, the German command offered rewards and leave, increasing with their rank. 'ULieut. J A. McIntyre. aznd Bn. Grocer; of V: mlhaggi, Vic.; b. ( Iementston, Vic.. 30 Sept., 1894 Killed in action. 4 Oct., I~I/ JOSome were rushed by the headquarters party of Captain G. H. G Smith's company C.S M. G. W. Seymour, who was wounded shooting three Germans. Captain 'W. H. Gray, leading another company of the'z6th. was also shot at a pillbox, but the machine-gunners were immediately killed by his men. Lieut. G. T. French also was killed here. Lieut H. J. Ryan's company (15th) had to fight at the gasworks (see I'd. XII, plate Bj), east of the village. (Smith belonged to 'I'oowoumba, Q'land, Seymour to Stanthorpe, Q'land; Gray to Hobart, Tar.; French to Woodford, Q'land; Ryan to Port Moresby, Papua.) 4th Oct., 19171 BROODSEINDE 849

In contrast with the experience of September 20t11, on a considerable part of the I Anzac front the Germans fought at most of the pillboxes. Immediately after rolling over the memy’s foremost wave.s1 the 1st Division received fire from the Molenaarelsthoek pillboxesa2and from ruins (“ Retaliation Farm in the centre, as well as a considerable amount of shell-fire. In the 8th Battalion every officer in the left company was hit.s4 Germans were found everywhere, but their pillboxes were quickly outflanked and captured, and the line moved through the stumps of “ Romulus ” and “ Remus ’’ Woods, and the open crater-field, to the line of the first halt, half-way up the slope. In the 2nd Division the right brigade (6th) seized four large pillboxes. In one, at de Knoet Farm, the garrison refused to surrender, and was killed with bombs.ss The advance of I Anzac had brought it, in this first stage, across remnants of the Flandern I line, and many pillboxes had consequently been met; I1 Anzac did not at this stage meet this line. On its front the resistance came first from the crest of Windmill Cabaret ridge, where this had not been seized on September 26th. The I1 Anzac barrage was perceptibly denser than that of I An officer of the 43rd Battalion describes it as “like a wall of flame.” The battalions of the 3rd Division did not differ from their sisters in following it more or less in one crowded line at the outset, the rear waves pressing upon the front ones in their haste to avoid the enemy’s barrage. The 43rd, which led the right brigade, met Germans at once. On the right a machine-gun

“Shortly after this the troops came upon numbers of tierman trench-mortars in shell-holes. Many of the crews they shot. a These lay so thickly that they resembled a village. After the attack had passed, many blockhouses still contained Germans. From one of these an egg-bomb was thrown. wounding Colonel Stacy (1st Bn.); but a single bomb in reply secured its surrender, and in such cases the enemy generally surrendered without resistance. Three machine-guns were captured here. ” Lieuts. G. F. Johansen and H. Ross were killed by shells, as was Lieut. H. J. F. Watson of the 3rd, and Lieuts. H Gilchrist and P. S. Backman of the 6th. Lieut. K. W. Graham, of the and L.T.M. Battery, as he ran forward with the 8th Battalion, was killed by the first bullets from a pillbox. (Johansen belonged to East Malvern, Vic.; Ross to Brighton, Vic.; Watson to Watson’s Bay, N.S W.: Gilchrist to Glenferrie, Vic.: Backman to Kew, Vic.. Graham to Lewisham, N.S.W.) “In the capture of one or more of these, the annd Battalion was assisted by the enterprise of L/Cpl W. E. Oliver (Moe, Vic.), arst Bn., who went forward firing from the hip with his Lewis gun. ‘ All reports agreed,” wrote General Monash, that it was ‘‘ excellent.” 850 THE A.I.F. IN FRANCE 14th Oct., 1917 opened from a pillbox near Zonnebeke station;37 on the left some post threw bombs from the hilltop. All were quickly suppressed, the Germans on the crest fleeing. On the left (10th) brigade front, the leading battalion (37th) had been shelled during the assembly, and to escape this had crept forward so far that, when the British barrage fell, its foremost men were within 30 yards of the pillboxes (Levi Cottages) on the summit. Machine-guns opened here too, but the blockhouses were quickly passed. A Lewis gunner of the 3rd Pioneer Battalion, Lance-Corporal Peeler, was observed to be particularly prominent in the advance.s8 Both brigades swept over the crest and into the next valley, beyond which rose the Gravenstafel ridge. On the left there now occurred a splutter of firing ‘ around a pillbox (“ Israel House”). German bombs were bursting ten yards in front of the shooting Victorians, but a party . could be seen working rmnd through a hollow. The smoke of a phos- phorus bomb appeared behind the pillbox. Resistance ceased, and the line swept on. The 10th Brigade was here bearing to the left, but presently two objects recognisable in the half-light-a blockhouse (“ Alma ”) in the bed of the valley, and some shelters (“ Judah House ”) sg behind a hedge-showed its proper direction. At this stage, in order to allow the New Zealanders to cross the bog farther north, the barrage rested for a double period, twelve minutes, and General Monash had therefore ’; At this stage in the 43rd, Lieut. D. S. Walsh and, in the 42nd. Lieuts. J. P. Kelly-Healy and W. H. Comper were killed. All the officers in Walsh’s company Iieiiig killed or n.ounded, bgt. W. Cameron commanded it until another oihcer, Lieut. I. G. Symons, took charge. (Walsh belonged to Wallaroo, S. Aust ; Kelly-Healy to Toowoomba, Q‘land; Comper to Limpinwood, N.S.W.; Cameron to Yatnla, S. Aust.; Symons to Alberton, S. Aust.) an Sgt. \V. Peeler, V.C. (No. 114; 3rd Pioneer Bn.). Orchardist, of Castlemine. Vic . b. Barker’s Creek, Vic g Aug 1887. He was attached to the 37th for anti- airdaft work, but he led &’fight on’several osts and for his gallantry, recewed the Victoria Cross. At Levi Cottages two rna%in&uns’were taken by Lieut. R. J. Smith (Epping. Vic.), at the head of his men, and one by Pte. C. J. McCoy (Paddington, N.S.W.). an In the fighting at these shelters. Sergeant J. S. Shilliday (bhldura, Vic.) and Corporal J. N. W. E Dunn (Canterbury, Vic.), 38th Bn , were prominent, Shilliday bombing the place and shooting the machine-gun crew with his revolver. 4th Oct., 19171 BROODSEINDE 851 placed here his first intermediate objective for the 3rd Division. The two leading battalions dug in, while the rest hurriedly reorganised, and then passed through. On the right boundary of the division the railway began to curve northwards on an embankment before cutting through the main ridge at Keerselaarhoek. Through the boggy crater-field its track was always a main avenue of communication, and shelters and pillboxes along it were now crowded with Germans. Many were brought in as prisoners by “ mopping-up ” parties, but some, with hands above their heads, ran in unsought. After the short halt the right brigade went on in excellent formation of section columns, the 42nd (Queensland) Bat- talion leading. Its right crossed the railway and reached the “ Red Line ” after a little fighting.‘” Its left, however, was quickly held up by fire from the bed of the valley behind Alma. Perceiving that a dangerous gap had opened, the commander of the reserve company, Lieutenant D~nbar,‘~swung two platoons across the front past Alma, filled the vacant space, and seized three pillboxes which, if unattacked, might have held up the whole centre of the division. In front of the left (10th) brigade, the artillery barrage seemed to continue for twenty-six minutes on the line of the intended Iz-minute halt, holding up the troops behind it. These saw on their left the New Zealand Division go splendidly forward, shaking out its lines, waves, and sections to proper distance and interval. It seized its first objective below the crest, and then pressed on into its own protective barrage on Abraham Heights (a section of Gravenstafel spur) in order to suppress active pillboxes there. At this stage the German artillery, which also had caused many casualties early in the advan~e,‘~began accurately ‘OPrecisely on the Red Line were two pillboxes, known as “Thames.” As the barrage lifted from these. Captain R. Skinner (Geraldton, W. Aust.) and Lieut. K. B O’Carroll (South Brisbane), 44th Bn., who were then crossing the railway made for them. A German half-issued from the left one, and then darted back: O’Carroll (a former stretcher-bearer of the 3rd Field Ambulance) shot him and pitched a bomb through the entrance, and 30 Germans surrendered. Sergeant H. Barr (Larne. Ireland, and Fremantle, W. Aust ) took the other pillbox without resistance While the troops were clearing these dugouts, a machine-gun opened near by. It could not at first be located, but O’Carroll presently detected it in a hollow scooped under the rails of the line. He shot the gunners. Another machine-gun had been firing from a loop-holed pillbox. Lieut. W. R. hfaddeford (Victoria Park W. Aust.) made for the rear of it, hut, finding that the place had steel doors, aiparently shut, he was nonplussed. Another Australian, however, rolled a bomb through the loop-hole and smashed the gun. Capt. G. A. Dunbar, M C.; 4znd Bn. University student; of Maryborough, c’land, b. Oxley, Q’land, 26 Fcb., 1895. ‘’Lieut. L. S. Dimsey (37th), Capt. E. F. Moore (38th), and Lieut. K. D. Speering (39th) were among those killed or mortally wounded by it. (Dimsey belonged to Geelong. Vic.; Moore to Bendigo, Vic : Speering to Grantbarn, Q’land.) 852 THE A.I.F. IN FRANCE [qth Oct., 1917 to shell the 10th Brigade in the valley. At the same time from some position in the bog, difficult to see, near a broken red wall known as '' Springfield," a German machine-gun was firing. Captain M~ule'~(37th) and his batman, niaking towards it, were badly wounded. Someone worked to its rear, and it ceased. When at last the covering barrage permitted the advance, the 10th Brigade, with the 38th Battalion leading, crossed the valley to the foot of the spur. Like the New Zealanders, the 38th had to suppress a machine-gun which fired on their left from beyond the objective,

At this objective (the " Red Line "), duly reached at times varying from 6.45 on the I Anzac right to 7.20 in the centre of the 3rd Division, there was to be a The flght during the halt halt until 8.10, for reorganisation of the battalions destined to attack the summit. But actually this pause saw some of the hardest fighting of the day. The Red Line for the 1st Division lay only 100-150 yards below the crest-line, which was thus barely in the fringe of the barrage; and from the numerous pillboxes, dugouts, and lengths of old trenches on the sky-line many Germans could be seen bolting to the rear. It was always difficult to keep Australians from following an enemy who was on the run, and numbers of men from the leading companies wetit on, chasing the Germans over the hilltop. Many of the troops, indeed, failed to notice the thin bursts of the protective barrage,44and, seeing through them the heavy artillery barrage still advancing, continued to follow it until recalled. This occurred with the front companies of most brigades in the Anzac attack. On the extreme right, part of the two leading companies of the 4th Battalion, thickly intermixed with the 2nd Gordon Highlanders, swept over the crest, through the protective barrage, and almost reached their second objective. The centre and left of the 1st Division, however, were stubbornly opposed. Just before the Red Line

"Capt F. G. hloulc. 37th Bn. Wool clerk; of Brighton, Vic.; b. Brighton, 23 hlarch, 1889. Died of wounds, 8 Oct., 1917. ''Th~s was so notwithstanding the fact that in the I Anzac Corps the usual rate for the protective barrage (one round per gun per minute) had been doubled for this halt. 4th Oct., 19171 BROODSEINDE 853 was reached, German shells, well aimed, had burst aniong the battalions emerging from Romulus and Remus Woods. Even files of the 3rd Division’s right, picking their difficult way through the bog and stumps of “Thames Wood,” found themselves being accurately followed by “ whizz-bang ” shells. “ By God, they’re sniping us,” said one of the crowd. At the halt numerous casualties occurred in the 8th Battali~n.‘~ Captain Traill, the thrusting, experienced fighter who led its line, was the first to realise that these shells were being fired over open sights. Looking towards the top of the ridge, he saw the flash of the guns, which other men were mistaking for the burst of their own shells. He hastened to warn the 24th Battalion on his left that they must on no account remain waiting for these shells to “lift,” and he himself took immediate steps to attack the battery. This, however, was only one of several sources of strong resistance. The section of crest known as Broodseinde Ridge-extending for a mile and a half north and south-was bare of trees or buildings. Its one landmark, the paved road from Becelaere to Passchendaele, ran along its crest completely open except for the occasional remains of hedgerows. But half-way along the ridge this road swerved in a semicircle round a large crater, made long before, presumably by the blowing-up of an ammunition dump. Half-a- mile farther north the main cross-road, from Zonnebeke

‘8 Lieuts. J W. Stubbs, R C. Daly, and W. T. Poynton were wounded Capt. J. C. hi. Trail! put Lieut. R. B. Glanville, and, when he was killed by ‘a shell, Lieut. P. Lay, in charge of an officerless company. (Stubbs, who died on 8 Sept., 1929, belonged to Abbotsford, Vic.; Daly to Melbourne and Echuca Vic . Poynton to Illabarook, Vic.; Traill to Stawell, Vic.; Clanvillc to Tirnaru distiict, 3.Z.; Lay to Ballan. Vic ). 854 THE A.I.F. IN FRANCE [4th Oct., 1917 to Moorslede, traversed the crest, and at the cross-roads lay the rubble of Broodseinde and the wooden crosses of a German cemetery. The southern half of the crest was narrow, at one point almost a knife-edge, but at Broodseinde cross-roads and farther north it was a quarter of a mile in breadth. Half-a-mile north of the cross-roads lay the cutting of the Ypres-Roulers railway. At this point the ridge veered north-east, to Passchendaele, beyond this day’s objective, which there curved back enclosing Abraham Heights. It was from the crater and from numerous headquarters and artillery observation posts, in sunken pillboxes and short trenches near the road, that resistance now came. A machine-gun firing from the crater (in which was a pillbox) caught numbers of the troops as they made for the crest north of it, with the result that here they could only edge gradually up towards assaulting di~tance.’~The field-guns and other posts were several hundred yards north of the crater. About eighty yards before the road was a bank or terrace, and below this the 2nd Brigade and part of the 6th clustered. The German posts could not be outflanked, since most of them were supported by the fire of others. But parties were organised spontaneously, men eagerly following the most vigorous officers and N.C.O’s. Lewis guns and riflemen fired from the edge of the slope while rifle-grenadiers opened bombardment from the dead ground below. The most difficult position, at the crater, resisted for twenty minutes. Then thirty Germans in the roadside ditch (or an old trench) south of the crater were forced by the bursting grenades into the open, and, surrendering, streamed to the rear with their hands up. Parties under Major Taylor and Captain Annear4?of the 6th Battalion now outflanked the crater and rushed it. For a few moments Annear, walking coolly round its brim, shot down at the enemy with his revolver while they threw bombs at him. Almost at once he was mortally hit.48 The crater and pillbox were captured, but a

“Farther south, in front of the 1st Brigade, a troublesome machine-gun waa suppressed by Corporal A. B. Macaulay (Newcastle, N S.W.), 4th Bn, who with a Lewis gun worked round it. (He was drowned in rgrg with his twin brother, also 4th Bn.). “Capt. H. N. Annear, 6th Bn Last maker; of Creswick and Fitzroy, Vic.; h. Yapeen, Vic., aa May, 1894. Died of wounds, 5 Oct., 1917. “ At the same time Lieut. W A. Minster (Ballarat, Vic.) was killcd by anc of the shells that occasionally burst overhead. 4th Oct., 19171 BROODSEINDE 855 group, mainly of German officers, had fallen I)ack from it and continued to fight with bombs and revolver shots from a short trench behind the hedge on the far side of the road. The Victorians again turned rifle-grenades upon them. The road and every exit of the trench being covered by fire, the Germans could only die or surrender. They leapt into the open, and the Victorians immediately rushed them. All surrendered except one who had to be bayonetted, and died later. He was found to be the commander of a battalion. From German sources it is evident that the crater contained tht headquarters of the forward battalion (I) of the 5th Foot Guard, and also of the W212th R.I.R. The commander of the former, Majoi Wegehaupt, managed to escape to the headquarters of the support battalion (at “Celtic Wood,” down the Waterdamhoek road on the reverse slope), where he appeared about 7 a.m. and reported that both battalions had been overrun. It thus seems probable that the officer (a captain) who refused to surrender was the commander of the II/212th R.I.R. Several hundred yards to the north of the crater a number of men following Captain Traill, Lieutenant Hick~on,‘~and other leaders of the 7th and 8th Battalions were attacking the field-guns. These ceased to fire as the troops approached, but were stubbornly guarded by entrenched machine-gunners, as well as by officers and others with revolvers and bombs, in old trenches and a sunken pillbox and at a sand hurrlmock beside the road. Cross-fire from the crater and elsewhere made progress difficult, but Traill, with Lieutenant WaterPo and three men, crept up a trench near the southernmost gun, while Lewis gunners kept the Germans’ heads down. Lieutenants Hickson and Lay and a few men similarly worked forward near a second field-gun. Before these troops made their rush, they crept so close that German bombs were bursting behind them. When they charged, a white flag appeared through a trap-door61 in the roof of the underground pillbox. The place proved to be an artillery headquarters. Most of its defenders were shot clown. The guns and all the positions defending them were taken, and the troops stood upon the crest shooting from the shoulder at Germans fleeing in all directions.62

Io Lieut. F. Hickson, AI C.; 8th Bn. Horse driver; of blelbourne, b. Northwich, Cheshire. Eng., as Sept.. 1891. Died 18 April, 1920. $“ Lieut. P. A. Waters, A1.C , 8th Bn. Engine cleaner; of Traralgoii, Vic.; b Rosedale, Vic., 1892. ”’ Apparently for observation by perisro~e. a*AKany shots were fired at one stout officer, who ran ponderously in long stages until a bullet brought him down. 856 THE A.I.F. IN FRANCE 14th Oct., 1917 In front of the 2nd Division the eighteen-pounder barrage was noticeably denser and more regular than that which covered the 1st. But notwithstanding the danger of being caught in it, the sight of Germans fleeing over the hill-crest was too much for many of the foremost troops of the 6th Brigade. Part of the front companies of the Red Line battalion (22nd) and, despite their officers’ efforts to hold them, a number of men from the 21st and 24th, which were forming up for the next stage, went on. Some temporarily occupied a trench near the road on the crest; others tried to turn round two of the captured guns and to use them against the enemy.63 From near the cross-roads came sniping fire and at this juncture German reinforcements, hurrying towards that point, began to counter-attack. Signallers of the 8th Battalion, ensconced behind the hill with a Lucas lamp whose flashes, in the absence of dust, were easily picked up even from the The counter-attack.shows German distant rear, sent word of this to the artillery. Certain batteries were turned on, and their fire with that of the Australians on the crest, scattered the enemy. Farther north mopping-up parties of the 11th Brigade (3rd Division) were gathering prisoners along the railway line in swarms beyond all previous experience of the A.I.F., rounding them up from every pillhox and other shelter. “ Some guerilla warfare,” as an officer of the 4Ist Battalion called it, went on among these positions.64

~ ‘JThese had only lately been emplaced for defence against tanks. Either three or four guns were taken by the and and 6th Brigades. The Germans had removed one hreech-block, and a second gun had been damaged. On Oct. 6 two gun-detachments were sent up by the 2nd Uivlsion to put them into use against the Germans. Only one was found to be usable. On Oct. 8 it was fired for rrgistration, but its position was dangerously exposed, and iii the intense Germxn bomhardmeiit on the 9th it was destroyed by a direct hit, much to the relief of its crew 6‘The 10th Brigade, which was late in reaching its objective, does not appear to have gone beyond it. While digging in. it was fired on by a machine-gun, difficult to locate until figures were seen stirring in a heap of brick dust, the ruin of an old farm. Rifle-grenades were then turned on them, silencing the machine-gun until the barrage lifted, when it was rushed.

w 9 5 zn 4 0 a a z 0 n % 3

4 a 3 &c z 0 U< 4 w 0 ? 4 0Ls zu 0 20th Sept.-4th Oct., 19171 BROODSEINDE 857 All this fighting left many of the troops for the next stage with little time to reorganise. In spite of this, except on the 1st Division’s right, where it was mixed with the 2nd Gordons, the officers during the PhW halt managed to check direction.66 Most of the troops who had gone ahead to the crest were hastily brought back.66 Those of the 6th Battalion who had taken the crater were hurriedly reorganised along the road itself by Major Taylor, who at that moment was mortally hit, a loss sorely felt throughout the 2nd Brigade.67 Farther to the right Major Brown had brought back, through the barrage, part of of the 4th intermixed with a number of Scots. But Captain Judge68 could not collect his men in time, and sent word to his colonel (who had ordered their recall) that he would get them into shell-holes and take the risk of the barrage. The shock dealt to the Germans was all the greater by reason of certain events then unknown to the attacking force. Actually the German command, after the blows of Sept. 20 and 26, recognised that with its present tactics it was powerless against the British step-by-step method. Ludendorff, who, after every battle, discussed with the staff in Flanders the methods employed, this time hurried to Roulers, and on Sept. 29 fmferred with commanders on the spot as to the steps to be taken. Our defens‘ive tactics had to be developed further, somehow or other,” he writes. We were all agreed on that. The only thing was, it was so infinitely difficult to hit on the right remedy.” The complete breakdown of the current methods was exphined to him wit! an emphasis not exceeded even in the British reports.‘, In many cases, says a summary issued by the 5th Guard Inf. Bde., the counter-attacks hardly reached the front line then held. Heavy casualties were suffered and the whole thing was a failure, as our enemy contented himself with an objective 6’The tendency to advance parallel to the slope at hlolenaarelsthoek had caused the 1st Brigade and the 2nd ordons to veer slightly to the north. About the centre of the 1st Division’s front, aptain C. R. Pinney (Port bloresby. Papua) of the 6th Battalion led those near him strictly according to compass. Although his effort did not correct the divergence, it enabled it to be gauged, and the reserve company of the 6th was put in to fill a gap which opened there. Farther north some parts of the line which should have mounted a slope diagonally had gone straight up it causing a break. These gaps were filled, both by bringing back the diverging troop; and by putting in the supports. “Near Broodseinde cemetery Captain J. W. Pearce (Ballarat, VIC.) of the zIst, after his vain effort to stop them breaking forward, had followed, and brought them back just in time to escape the intensification of the barrage at 8.10. Lieut L. S. Marchant (Sale, Vic ) did the same in the 24th. How little these advanced troops heeded the risk of their own barrage may he judged from an extant inessage from Captain E. A. Davis (Ftscray, Vic.) of the aand, who himself had taken his companyS4tothe crest. We finished up a little to the left of our objective,” he wrote. Under cover of barrage we pushed to ridge and again met with opposition. Engaged them, when for some unknown reason word came from rear to retire, leavine oiir isolated Dartv in advance. A small oartv ot Fritz counter-attacked. but w&e beaten off. T6e coy. fell hack to red iine-(se, its proper objective); where we are now digging in.” 87 Lieut. W. R. Booth (Werribce, Vic.) of the 7th was killed there at about the same time. Capt. C. G. I(. Judge, b1.C 4th Bn. University student; of Guyra, N.S.W.: b. Wandsworth, N.5.W.. la Dei.: 1892. 38 858 THE A.I.F. IN FRANCE [zgth Sept.-4th Oct., 1917 already gained.” In this critical situation, although Ludendorff still believed in defence in depth, commanders on the spot, according to him, advocated a return towards the old system of holding the forward line in greater strength. Their hope was to disorganise the British attack at or before its commencement. At the same time, in the belief that the counter-attack divisions had usually arrived too late, it was ordered that they should be brought up beforehand, and their regiments distri- buted behind the front-line divisions. This would mean, says Ludendorff, the provision of “a second division for every fighting division in the front line, an unheard-of expenditure of force. . . . . Our lines on other fronts would have to be thinned out even more than . . . . hitherto. I said I would see what I could do.” Despite misgivings on the part of his staff, he agreed to the tactical changes. The altered method had forthwith been applied. The whole of each front-line battalion was concentrated forward, with two machine-gun Fompanies attached and two companies of the support battalion close in rear. In the 4th Guard Division all these troops were assembled on or in advance of the Broodseinde Ridge. with the remainder of the support battalions close up on the rear slope, and t!: reserve battalions in the artillery protection line” near its foot. In addition, since October 1 the counter-attack division (45th Reserve) had been alarmed almost nightly and hurried forward to an assembly position in front of Moorslede, only to be sent back to its billets during the morning. The dispositions of the 20th Division, facing I1 Anzac, were similar, and there too, on October 2, and again on the Dirpositim of 4th Cd. Dim. om 3rd, the counter-attack division morning of Oct. 4. (4th Bavarian) had been brought up to Passchendaele. The Fourth German Army knew that an offensive was imDendinrt.. and expected it on those mornings.6Q On the night of Octobk 3, dditional -evidence having been received that it might be launched in the morning, the German commanders were for a time in doubt whether to proceed with their own operation. Eventually they decided to go on, the artillery staffs, however, being warned that they might at any time be called upon to turn to the defensive. When the British barrage crashed about the battalion and forward artillery staffs on Broodseinde Ridge, and the regimental staffs on the Reiberg and at Waterdamhoek, they were uncertain of its meaning. The sight of fugitives of the 212th R.I.R. running past gave an early clue to some of the forward headquarters; for those on the summit, however, the first intimation of the danger of their own position was in many The Germans had detected new artillery positions at Wieltle, Bellewaarde Lake, Hooge Chateau, and Zilleheke Lake. The) had noted the heavy gas-shoots night1 on their batteries. Despite the had weather, British airmen had active1 reconnoitredl and British bombing aeroplanes, under escort, now attacked in plai; Jaylight as fa; hack as Bruges, Ghent, and Zeebrugge. A “very reliable agent had on Oct. I given warning of a great impending operation. Prisoners stated that this would he launched on Oct. z, and measures were taken accordingly, but it did not happen It was again expected at dawn on the 3rd. 4th Oct., 19171 BROODSEINDE 859

cases the appearance around them of the forward parties of Scots and Australians. Headquarters further in rear saw figures moving on the sky-line, some apparently British, others wearing German helmets. This again caused hesitation, and it was afterwards suspected that the Australians were wearing German helmets. There is no doubt, however, that the men in these were Germans, though possibly prisoners.60 It was the appearance of their opponents at this stage at various points along the main crest and at Abraham Heights that caused the German artillery so quickly to shorten its fire on to the western slopes of those ridges. The support and reserve battalions also were alarmed, and came forward automatically.@' Headquarters of the reserve battalion of the 5th Guard Grenadier was in a very advanced position, at a sandpit only 700 yards down the Moorslede road from Broodseinde cross-roads. When the forward and support battalions were overrun, this battalion was the first to come up. Its troops were much split up in passing through the British heavy artillery barrage, but it was their two leading companies that counter-attacked the advanced parties of the 6th Austra- lian Brigade near the cemetery. The regimental history states that the leader of the counter-attack, Lieutenant of Reserve Beck, was killed by a shell and the companies were much intermingled, but it is claimed that they caused the Australians to retire for a short distance. This retirement was probably the temporary withdrawal of the Australians by their officers immediately before the second stage of the attack. South of the Moorslede road Lieutenant Detlef von Hennig, leader of another company of the same battalion, nested himself within 100 yards of the road along the crest with a few bombers and two heavy machine-guns. At 8.10, after four minutes' intense artillery-fire' the second stage of the attack was launched. On the front of the 1st and 2nd Divisions the summit was crossed almost immediately, without difficulty, except on the left. Their own shrapnel was now bursting very high ; the gale was dispersing the smoke of the heavies'; and the troops found

Coming ,?ut after battle in I 16 Australians sometimes in sport wore " souvenired pickelhanbr helmets, w?~i& amused them, but they 'seldom put 'on the steel helmets. They knew the penalties far too well to wear either in battle. 61 In the 5th Foot Guard at 6.45 a.m. a messenger dog was sent from the support to the reserve battalion with news of the advance against the heights, and a pigeon was Bent to the division. 860 THE A.I.F. IN FRANCE [4th Oct., 1917 ’ themselves looking out upon a landscape that had been hidden from British infantry since May 1915. To the right, where the In de Ster end of the Polygon height protruded and dipped to the plain, the trees of Becelaere clustered about its church spire. Straight in front lay the Keiberg, a smooth, green spur which left the main ridge a mile north of Broodseinde and, curving southwards, served as “ back- stop ’’ (with Moorslede hill behind it as the only “ long- stop ”) against penetration beyond the main ridge. The ground on which the troops walked had been heavily shelled, the grass was torn by many craters, and the several woods down the slope had been broken and shredded. But the Keiberg lay green, and lightly fringed with trees. On the Flemish lowlands to the south-east, hedgerows and copses waved in the wind, and later, when the shelling died down, “carts could be seen moving, cows grazing, smoke going up from chimneys.” Big shells were falling accurately on the nearer roads and farms, and some of the buildings were beginning to blaze. Nearer still, on the slope below the 1st Division, Germans were running, a few close ahead, lower down fully-equipped men in groups, making between the heavy shell-bursts for shelter in the woods, some turning now and then to shoot. To the left, a mile up the main ridge, the road led straight to the arched red ruin of Passchendaele church.82 While crossing the ridge the troops, especially towards the left, received sharp fire from German reserves that had come up the rear slope during the halt, as well as some direct shooting from field guns in the woods. On the right the 1st and 4th Battalions had little difficulty in finding their objective on the down-slope near a line of field railway.63 The surface here was grassy, and all the soil on the ridge was sandy, excellent for trenching and well drained. The 4th dug-in in the open, partly behind German wire, and the 1st in old trenches. On their right the protruding In de Ster plateau was seized by the 7th and 21st British Divisions-in consequence of the swerve to the left the 2nd Gordons held part of the

~~ ~~ a See Vol. XII. plate 393. “Before reaching the crest the 1st Battalion met machine-gun fire and had Lieut. J. N. Bennett killed aid Lieuts. A. E. Tudehope, W. J. Johnston, and C. C. Judd wounded. At one of the hedges L/Cpl. J. E. Symington of the 4th had a rough-and-tumble fi bt wttb three Germans all of whom he shot. (Bennett belonged to Mungindi, N.S.&V.; Tudehope to Paddington, N.S.W.; Johnston to Annandak, N.S.W.; Judd to Yarck, Vic.; Symimton to Wallangra, N.S.W.) 4th Oct., 19171 BROODSEINDE 86 1 4th Battalion’s objective. The British at In de Ster enfiladed all Germans who attempted to cross the lower part of the valley to attack the 1st Australian Division. The 1st Division’s left brigade (the znd), which had to go a quarter of a mile beyond the road, received distant machine-gun fire from the Keiberge4 At a dug-out 300 yards down the slope three German officers fired with rifles until they were Through similar resistance in front of the next brigade (the 6th, of the 2nd Divi- sion) a well-known leader, Captain Pearce (zIst Battalion), was killed as he launched the attack.8e The brigade moved down the gradual slope, the right battalion (24th) making eagerly I towards a hedge which, from the intelligence maps, it knew to shelter a German headquarters (this was the active headquarters of the I II/StR Guard Grenadier at the sandpit). At that moment, however, several white smoke shells-the first of the protective barrage - burst half-way between, the warning for the troops that they were on their objective. “It would have been easy to go farther,” said an officer afterwards, “ had the barrage allowed it.”

They dug in along the The first and second objectrves attained objective which was easily on Broodsarde Rtdge. (The doited line at Dau Wood indicotrr the gart of the recognisable from air- final o&ective not reached. In the 1st Divs’s sector the actual gorts are photographs. Sharp sniping shorn.)

~LieutA J. Hyde, 6th Bn., was killed at this stage. BOThe place proved to he an artillery headquarters. “It is said that he was shot by a German officer at IOO yards’ range and that L/Cpl. P L. Ord (hlount Cole, Vic.), who saw the shot fired, walked acrok, bombed the trench, killed the officer, and captured 13 Germans. Licnt. F. B. Collins (Ker, Vic.), aist Bn., was killed about the name time as Pearce. 862 THE A.I.F. IN FRANCE [4th Oct., I917 continued to come from close ahead. The Australian shrapnel was bursting much too high to prevent it, and in the 24th two well-known leaders, Captains Godfrey and Harriott;’ and in the 21st Lieutenant Rigbyen and many N.C.O’s and stretcher-bearers, were sniped. It was from the Moorslede road northwards that the real tussle of the second stage took place. As has been explained, the 7th Brigade was attacking its objective with only one hattalion, the 26th (Queensland and Tasmania). A second, the 27th (South Australia) had been brought up by 8 o’clock to the rear of the first objective to support, if necessary, and to dig communication trenches. The objective of the 26th extended from Broodseinde towards the railway, including, as it happened, the point towards which nearly all reinforcements of the 4th Guard Division were directed-the Broodseinde cross-roads. As the battalion began its advance through the cemetery here, a machine-gun opened from the ugly stubble of “Daisy Wood” just over the brow to the right front. Lieutenant MacDonnell,Be a well-loved leader, was shot through the heart and the advance was checked. Captain SmithTotook charge, and the battalion made towards the wood, but fire from hedges and demolished houses slightly short of it caused so many casualties that part of the battalion’s line was driven back to shelter in an old trench in advance of the road. Thence Captain Herbert71 sent back to the 27th for IOO men, and at 9.50 two companies under Captain GouldT2and Lieutenant Lanipard were sent forward to assist him. Gould, an experienced officer of the militia, reached tlie old trench, filled a wide gap between the 6th and 7th Brigades, and then himself crept forward along a deserted sap towards Daisy Wood. After careful reconnaissance, he decided that

01 Capt. G. Harriott 24th Bn. Farmer; of Wkkliffq Vic.; b. Prahran, Vic. 4 Nov., 1891. Killed :n action, 4 Oct., 1917. WLieut. F. Rigby, aIst Bn. Sawmiller; of Telangatuk East, Vic.; b. Telangatuk East, 1891. Killed in action, 4 Oct., 1917. .S Lieut. L. F. hlacDonnel1, 26th Bn. University student; of Gympie, Q’land; b. Gympie, 1896. Killed in action, 4 Oct., 1917. ‘0 Lieut.-Col. G. H. G. Smith, hZ C.; 26th Bn. Managing law clerk; of Toowoomba, Q’land, b. Ipswich. Q’land, 14 Sept., 1886. “Capt. J. E. Herbert, M.C.; 26th Bn. General storekeeper. of Nerang, Q’land; b. Toowoomba, Q‘land, 4 June, 1881. Died of wounds, 17 Aid, 1918. “Capt E. S. Gould, 27th Bn. Arcbitect; of Unley, S. Aust.; b. Bowen, S. Aust., 13 July, 1893. Killed in action. 9 Oct., 1~17. 4th Oct., 19171 BROODSEINDE 863 his position in the old trench gave a much better view and command than could be obtained from the objective on the edge of Daisy Wood. He therefore kept his men where they were. While digging, they came constantly upon the - uniforms of British soldiers, killed years before, and rightly guessed that they were in the old British front line of 1914 and 1915.~' Lampard's company gained touch with the 6th Brigade. The left also was well advanced;in touch with the 41st Battalion (3rd Division). The 3rd Division, attacking the junction of the ridge and the Abraham Heights spur, also employed only one battalion for the objective in each brigade sector, but with another battalion leading the way up to within 200 or 300 yards of the final objective and digging-in there in close support. The Flandern I Line ran diagonally across the ground to be traversed. The right brigade began to encounter it at once, and, crossing the old wire-entanglements in swampy ground north of the railway, parts of the 4th and 41st Battalions were unable to keep up with the barrage. Germans in pillboxes along the demolished trench brought machine-guns into action. A pillbox, " Seine," which proved to be another battalion headquarters," was taken by Lieutenant Brenineri6 (4th) and some men working to its rear. Another pillbox was fired on with rifle grenades and then rushed by Lieutenant FraseP (41st), who thus set free the checked troop^.^' In the 10th Brigade the 39th Battalion met fire from posts along an old switch line, and, while engaged with these, was stopped by machine-gun fire from the New Zealand front. A party of the 4oth, following behind, together with a Stokes mortar, pounced upon this machine-gun and thus helped the 39th to seize its objective, but the barrage had by then gone ahead, and the

"During the Second Battle of Tpres it seems to have been held by the zSth Division. The Germans attacked It on the day of the Anzac Landing, 2; April, 1915. The British line was withdrawn on May 3. (See Military Operations, France and Beigium, Vol. XI, by Brig -General Sir James Edmonds.) "A senior German officer was killed there, and a second, with 30 other Germans, captured. It was presumably the forward battalion headquarters of the 79th 1.R (loth Divn ). "Capt. H. G. Bremner, h1.C.; 44th Bn. Accountant; of Perth, W. Aust.; b. Ballarat, Vic., 26 Jan, 1855. Captain W. A. Fraser, D S 0 ; qist Bn. Electrician; of Brisbane; b. Cliffe, Kent. Eng., 1852 "In thls incident IO Germans were killed. and 21 nith three machine-guns captured. 864 THE A.I.F. IN FRANCE 14th Oct., 1917 40th) although it went on without a pause, could not catch it up, and now met intense fire from the Flandern I Line.78 Both the battalions of the 3rd Division allotted for this final stage were among the finest in the A.I.F., combining fighting vigour with a special degree of orderliness, due to General Monash’s careful handling. On the right the 41st (Queensland) reached with little difficulty its objective near Nieuwemolen cross-roads, the key of the ridge. The 11th Machine Gun Company at once established there two guns,78 which, together with those of the 7th Machine Gun Company on the right and the Lewis guns of the 41st Battalion on the left, swept the farther slopes from the Keiberg to the railway. The objective of the left battalion (4oth, Tasmania) lay, on the right, slightly short of the summit of the main ridge, but on the left just over the crest of the Gravenstafel spur where the Flandern I Line (“Dab Trench ”) crossed it. Although this trench was thoroughly broken and its entanglement passable, withering fire came from both the trench and the thickly-garrisoned pillboxes. Ten machine-guns were firing into the 40th from front and left.8o The Tasmanians could advance only by rushes, and suffered great loss. Captain McVilly, already wounded, stood out calling to the right company, but was again hit, severely.81 Lieutenants GatenbyBZand McMillan88 were wounded.

7‘ The 39th also received this while di ging in. Lieut. D. G. Mackay was mortally wounded, and Lleut. hl. hlaxwcll (brotaer of the hlaxwells of hlouquet Farm and Messines) badly wounded. (hlackay belonged to St. Kilda, Vic.; Maxwell to Hohart ) Under Lieut. L. J. Parks. (Pertb. W. Aust.); he was 600n wounded, but Lleut. Harvey Freeman (Gcelong, Vic.), had already come up from the supports and took charge. Freeman was killed on Oct., 15. 80 Fifteen Here captured by the 40th. Of these, seven, all of which had been in action, Here found in the trench in front of the left company of the 40th. 81 hlcvilly was the winner of the Diamond Sculls at Henley-on-Thames in 1913. He survived to join General Dunsterville’s force. Lieut. J. J. Gatenby, 40th Bn. Pastoralist; of Epping, Tas.; b. Epping, 19 Sept, 1888. >Lieut; S. S. S. McMillan, M.C.; 40th Bn. Engineer; of Sydney; b. Glasgow, Scotland, 17 May, 1883.

W z4 2 0 a z 0

YI 4" -r2 PI W d 0 E 2 (r. 4th Oct., 19171 BROODSEINDE 865 The situation was critical, but Captain Ruddocka' seized the one chance of outflanking the German position by working the left company round through some half- sheltered ground in the New Zealand sector.a5 By opening fire from there he suppressed the Germans in the trench, and a series of gallant attacks on those in pillboxes then began. From the roof of one of these a machine-gun was firing. Sergeant McGees6 ran forward fifty yards and shot the crew with his revol~er.~' The next blockhouse, *' Hamburg," was charged by Lieutenant Meagheras of the mopping-up company, who had advanced in answer to a signal to fill a gap. He was killed, but Lieutenant Grantsg continued to lead, and the place was captured together with 25 prisoners and four machine-guns. The right was strengthened by Captain Dumaresqeo with part of the reserve company, and, together with the neighbouring part of the 41st under Captain Redmond"' and Lieutenants Fraser and Price,gZ it fought down pillbox after pillbox, practically every blockhouse being taken by some act of individual daring. After the objective was reached, a group of eight German officers or N.C.O's still fought on, in a pillbox ahead on the left, until killed. In front of the right Captain Dumaresq with some men captured two other blockho~ses.8~By 9.12 the 40th (with whom were many of the 39th) had its whole objective. On the left the New Zealanders, by fighting of a somewhat similar nature, secured theirs.

~~ s'hlajor W. C. G. Ruddock, M.S.M.. 40th En. Member of Aust. Permanent Forces; of New Town, Tas.; b. Hobart, 4 Sept , 188% MA full account is given in The Fortieth, by Captain F. C. Green. Snt. L. McGee, V.C. (No. 456; 40th Bn.). Engine-driver; of Avoca, Tas : b. Ross, Tas., 1888. Killed in actlon, IZ Oct., 1917. I' hIcCee, who already had a famous fighting record. at once organised a bombing party to attack another pillbox. which was duly captured. He was recommended for a commission and for the Victoria Cross, but was killed on Oct 12. The V.C., howe\er. aras posthumously awarded to him. 88 Lieut. N. R. T. Meagher, 40th Bn. Law student; of Hobart, b. Hobart, 4 Jan., 1886. Killed in action, 4 Oct., 1917. 'PLieut. A. H. Grant, 40th Bn. Grazier; of Clermont, Q'land; b. Clermont, I Jan., 1859. Killed in actlon, 12 Oct, 1917. 80 Lieut -Col. H J. Dumaresq, M.C.. V.D.; 40th Bn. Farmer and grazier, of Longford. Tas., b Art. Ireh, Longford, 24 Jan., 1888. SlCapt. J. Redmond, 41st Bn. Cominission agent; of Bundaberg, Q'land; 6. Bundaberg, 16 June, 1876. Llled In actton, 5 Oct.. 1917. W Lieut E D. Price, h1.C.; 41st Bn. Motor mechanic; of Condah, Vic ; b. Homerton. Vic., 5 Apr.. 1890. Jt 1s said that as Dumaresq reached one pillhox he felled by a hit on the jaw a German officer who emerged. revolver in hand Leaving him there, Dumaresq went on to help in the clearing of a second blockhouse. 39 866 THE A.I.F. IN FRANCE [4th Oct., 1917 The whole objective of I and I1 Anzac (except for the small dent at Daisy Wood, which was entirely unimportant) had been gained. The troops were aware that Later developments they had won an overwhelming success. Had it been arranged that they should go farther, covered by artillery, either at once or afte; a short pause, they could have done so. But the step-by-step method forbade any such attempt, and one of the difficulties that would have been involved in it was evidenced by a certain falling short of the barrage of the 3rd Division, some of whose field-guns were now firing at very long rax1ge.8~ The orders were to dig in, and for this there remained two and a half hours before the protective barrage ceased. The 1st Australian Division fortified its line with much skill, deliberately adopting a system of unconnected posts. Six important ones-four on the crest, and two behind it-were specially laid out by the engineers, but the rest, forty to fifty in number, were irregularly situated in " improved " shell-holes or old trenches along and behind the two objectives. The 6th Battalion covered its posts, when dug, with light camouflage netting, with the result that they remained undetected by the German artillery. The and Division made use chiefly of old trenches, which it quickly connected into an almost continuous front line, with covering posts ahead. The 3rd quickly dug, under supervision of its engineers, perhaps the most complete and accurately-sited front and support lines ever made by Australians in All the divisions strengthened their line with special strong-points, and cut, through the brow of the hill, communication trenches which, when complete, would allow troops to reach parts of the front without appearing against the sky-line.8e The almost immediate German reply to the attack had been an intense shelling of the area immediately on the British side of Broodseinde Ridge.O' In the 1st Division's area a barrage E'The nearest guns were over 5,000 yards from the 3rd Division's line. They could not fire effectively beyond 7.000 yards. u6An officer of the 199th Brigade (66th Divn.), which Look them over 36 hours later, m!d an Australian at Corps H.Q. that it was a wonderfully well-dug position Aeroplane photographs support this testimony. In wet weather, however, many Australians would not use them, preferring bullets to the mud. "This continued with varying intensity during most of Oct. 4. Lieut.-Col. C. R. A. Pye, the fine young commander of the 19th Battalion (in :ivil life ?, doctor), was killed on the duckboards. At about IO o'clock, back at Potsdam pillbox, headquarters of the 44th Battalion, a shell came through the window and struck the telephone, wounding Lieut.-Col. J. P. Clark and his adjutant, Captain C. H. C Hillary. hlajor hl. H. a'Beckett and Capt. C. Longninre replaced thrm. Major W B Craig, medical officer of tbe zmd, was badly wounded. The barrages were 4th Oct , 19171 BROODSEINDE 867 was also placed upon the crest,88 and field-guns, probably firing direct, sniped even at single men crossing the summit, Through the barrage behind the ridge not only runners and stretcher-bearers, but the parties for digging strong-points, marking tracks,BBand carrying ammunition had to move ; and in the midst of the barrage on the crest the 1st Field Company dug its strong-points. Yet every strong-point was duly dug; and the tracks were taped and marked-in the 1st Division not only to battalion headquarters but to each company, a precaution which proved exceedingly helpful. The front line was accurately mapped by surveyors, and lists of the pillboxes were drawn up, showing the available accommodation. Some of these places still contained numbers of Germans, including three more battalion headquarters and an artillery staff .loo On the right the Australians on the final objective were not disturbed by even a semblance of counter-attack; the machine- and Lewis-guns of the 7th British Division on the In de Ster promontory made organised movement in that area practically impossible for the enemy. Farther up the valley signs of an effort to assemble were constant. Behind the woods particularly severe on the 11th Brigade, Lieuts. M. Hart and A. W. Lamhden (qand), 0. W. Crick (43id). and Capt. T. H Bone and Lieuts. T. L. Pitman and A. H. Bond (44th) being among the killed or mortally wounded;, , Pitman: signalling officer of the 44th. gave up his place in his advanced pillbox at lhames to allow some of his tired men to sleep inside, while he lay outside beside the wall. Here a shell killed him. In other units, in addition to other officers mentioned. Capts. A. L. Hewisli and R. 1. hloore and Lieut. E. Clark (3rd En.) Lieut. H. Davenport (4th). and Lieuts. H. R. Hill and A A. Scott (25th) were Ihed by enemy shell-fire. (Pye helonged to Windsor, N S.W.; Col. Clark to Hobart; Hillary to Kenwick district, W. Aust.; a'Beckett to bale, Vic.; Longmore to Perth, W. Aust.; Craig to Warrnanibool, Vic.; Hart to Brishane; Lambden to Seymour, Vic., and Brisbane; Crick to North Adelaide; Bone to Boulder, W. Aust.; Pitman to Norwood, S. Aust.; Bond to Perth, W. Aust.; Hewish to Alhury, N.S.W.; Moore to Emmaville, N S \V . Lieut. Clark to Paddington N.S.\V . Davenport to Wongarbon N.S.W.; Hil! td'Toowong, Q'land. Scott to hornet Bynk Station, Taroom, Q'lanh.) The artillery also was fired on by long-range guns, which made several damaging hits. During the barrage the ammunition of the 66th Siege Battery near St. Jean was hit, and two gun-detachments were killed. At 8 a.m., just after a relief of the gun-detachments, the 55th (Aust.) Siege Battery, near by, received a serieq of well-directed 5.9-inch shells, which put out of action practically all the crews. The relieved crews, which had just set off for Ypres, returned immediately, cleared the wounded, and continued to fire the one gun that remained in action. This battery lost 20 killed and 40 wounded (a quarter of its strength) in three days. Lieut. N. P. Power (tiympie, Q'land), 4th Bn., and Lieut. H. W. Harper (hfelbourne), arst Bn., were among those killed by this fire. ""The commander of the 26th Battalion wrote to the O.C., 7th Field Comp.my, that hf. saw Lieut. A. L. Polson (Sydney) of that company coolly leading a tape through one of the heaviest, and certainly the deepest, enemy barrages that partyhave ever seen." mo When the zznd Battalion was mopping-up the ground taken by the 24th Pte B. J. Urewry (Barnbra. Vic.) found two battalion commanders and their st)affs- presuninbly those of the 111/5th Guard Grenadier and I/aIzth R.1 R-in a pillbox on the crest. In an armoured dugout a little farther south, Lieut. A. E. Tayles I tlamrlton. Vic.) Ioiind five artillery officers lying quietly. fully armed. apparently awaiting a chance of escape; from a third, Captain P. I. Stewart (Trafalgar, Vic.. died on 9 Oct., 1932) took 39 Germans and four machine-guns. In front of the 868 THE A.I.F. IN FRANCE [4th Oct., 1917 in the valley, where lay the “ artillery protection line,” movement was continually seen. No sooner had the left of the 1st Division reached its final objective than hundreds of Germans were seen advancing only a few hundred yards away along the spur south of the Moorslede road, with numbers of others still running back through them. Farther back men appeared advancing like a long string of ants. The two machine-guns of the 11th Company on the crest turned on them, and at half-a-mile’s range broke up the order of the advance. The Germans still came on, hopping from shell-hole to shell-hole, but could do no more than reinforce the sniping line in front of the 2nd Division and of the left of the Ist.lol North of the Moorslede road the 26th Battalion called down the artillery on numbers of Germans concentrating in Daisy Wood. Captain Gould, in the old British trench near by, noted that the guns “got hits.’’ Neither in that sector nor in any other did the Australians feel the least apprehensive ; Gould’s 80 or go men had eight Lewis guns and a Vickers machine-gun North of the railway, where the line of the 3rd Division began to curve from the main crest, the 41st Battalion had only been digging for twenty minutes when Germans were seen coming up in sections by rushes to the hedge of Keerselaarhoek cemetery close in front, which here bounded the battalion’s view.lo2 These Germans made some attempt against Captain Ca10w’s~~~company, and were driven off. At about 11 o’clock another force appeared, coming down in sections from the direction of Passchendaele, crossed the railway, and settled

40th Battalion a pillbox from which shots had previoxsly been received was visited by C.S.M. H: Boden (Myrtle Bank, Tas and Sgt. S. J. Barrett (Beaconsfield, Tas.). As they approached, an officer tried to escape but was shot. After another shot at someone who appeared at the loop-bole, a white rag was waved there, and a battalion commander (probably of a rear battalion of the 79th I.R.) and 40 men were captured. Field wireless sets, a listening set, and valuable maps and orders were among the general booty. Two German carrier-pigeons were captured by the 6th Brigade. The sense of humour of their captors prevailed over their appetites. one pigeon being released with the message “Ueutschland uber Alles. Hal ha1 We don’t think.” mln the afternoon, in response to requests from the 7th Battalion, which was suffering from enfilade, the 6th Brigade bombarded the nearest German post with Stokes mortars and then sent out a party to occupy it. This party saw the tiermans limping away, carrying their wounded, hut the 24th found the post commanded by the enemy and withdrew from it. As its tenure would necessitate the capture of other posts, Brig-tien. Paton, after reconnoitring the position hlmsell, decided to suppress any Germans there with trench-mortars The enemy who reoccupied it, however. continued lo harass the 7th “’Some of the 41st at one time went zoo yards beyond the objective. in order to obtain a better view, causing thereby much anxiety to General Monasli who feared that the barrage would drop on them; but the forward troops were deavily sniped at, and came back. Capt. P. .F. Calow, M.C.; 41st Bn. Schoolmaster; of Sandgate, Q’land, and Armidale, N.S.W.; b. London, 18 Sept., 1884. 4th Oct., 19171 BROODSEINDE 869

into old trenches 200 yards from the 41st. The 4rst fired at them ; Calow and all other officers of the centre company having been wounded, Lieutenant Skeweslo4 of the support company with two platoons had gone forward and taken charge.lo8 The Germans in front began to snipe sharply. It was getting too hot (said a member of Skewes’s company afterwards), so 5kewes said, “Oh F. it, we’ll go out and stop this.” When they got out in shell-holes about 50 yards away (from the Germans), Skewes pulled out his revolver and said, “Damn it, we’ll give it a g-et ready to charge.” Then he gave the word, and they got out, all shouting for all they were worth, and the Germans ran. After following them with shots fired from the hip, the Queenslanders returned, but Lieutenant Butlerlo6 noticed that Skewes was absent. Butler went out and found him dead, and was himself wounded in getting his leader’s body into a shell-hole. By 11 o’clock the reports of the contact airmen assisting both I and I1 Anzac had reached corps headquarters. The airmen had picked up the infantry’s flares all along the Anzac final objective except at Daisy Wood, where the flares were a little short of the objective, and near the railway, where they were well ahead of it. The news from other parts of the battlefront was almost equally good, even to the northern extremity of the attack, where the 29th Division had taken its objective to the west of Poelcappelle. It was certain that a great success had been achieved, and, like their troops, most of the corps commanders felt that, while the enemy was reeling from this shock, there must occur some passing opportunity of pressing him further. At noon Lieutenant-General M~rland,~~’commanding the X Corps, telegraphed to the x’*Licut. A. W. Skewes, 41st Bn. Miner; of Charters Towers, Q’land; b. Charters Towers, 13 Nov., 1891. Killed in action, 4 Oct., 1917. 1- Skewes also sent to Captain Skinner of the 44th, behind him, for reinforcements. bkinner sent up a platoon, together with some ammunition. Skewer kept the ammunition, but sent back the platoon. ‘“Lieut. C. H. Butler, M.C ; 41st Bn. Station overseer; of Barcaldine and Ilfracombe, Q’land; b. Kilcoy, Q’land, 7 Feb.. 18ga. 1mGeneral Sir T. L. N. hforland, K.C.B., K.C.M.G., D.S.O., PAC. Com- manded 5th Divn., 1g14/15. X Corps, 1915/18; XI11 Corps, 1918/19. Officer of British Regular Army; of’ Farnborough. Hants, Eng.; b. Q Auy., 1865. Died 11 May, 1925. 870 THE A.I.F. IN FRANCE [4th Oct., 1917 commander of the 7th Division that he was anxious to exploit success northwards-presumably by an advance from the In de Ster promontory against the Germans opposite I Anzac. General Godley of I1 Anzac, believing the enemy to be sufficiently demoralised,1°8 favoured a thrust along the heights by the railway, and about 11 o’clock General Plumer gave consideration to a plan by which I Anzac would take over the 41st Battalion’s front south of the railway and advance eastwards in co-operation with the right of I1 Anzac. General Monash, being consulted, agreed that, although his two leading battalions had suffered severely, he might, by swinging up his right, secure a better jumping-off line for the next attack. Preparations were forthwith niade.lo@ But Plumer, visiting Birdwood, found him to be strongly against the project. The commander of the 7th Division also opposed the proposal for a thrust from the northern side of the In de Ster promontory, being not quite sure of the success of the 2rst Division on the southern side. At 2 o’clock Plumer abandoned the notion of exploiting success. The New Zealand Division, however, was ordered to co-operate at 5.10 with an attempt to be made by the right of the Fifth Army to secure a better jumping-off line.l*O In contrast to all recent experiences, on this occasion no counter-attack whatever appeared against the Fifth Army, but the evidence of efforts to counter-attack at Broodseinde was continuous. Owing to the fire of the forward machine- guns, the Germans could assemble only at two points, the dead ground near the railway and Daisy Wood. At 2 p.m., a force was seen approaching from Passchendaele, and shortly afterwards another marched along the near side of the Keiberg. Of some unit which came over the Keiberg, and was seen to be directed towards Daisy Wood, an officer of the 26th stated : Our shells were falling into this infantry all the time. The troops seemed very windy and not at all keen-everv shell would make them lOB Geyral Monash reported at I I 39 that his leading battalions had lost ‘‘ rather heavily ; and at a.aa that all reports showed that the fighting had bey? severe; and at 2.59 that Lieut. C. H. Cane (Hobart) of the 40th Battalion had FFptured 31 prisoners single-handed from one blockhouse without firing a shot. But General Godley’s impression was formed before this news arrived. The capture of prisoners had hen abnormally great. lwhfonash warned General McNicoll (loth Bde.) that he might be required to undertake this, using two battalions from the 9th Bde, then in reserve. The 9th was warned to hold these ready. none line to be secured was Adler Farm-Inch House-Oxford House-Beek House 4th Oct., 19171 BROODSEINDE 871 scatter. There were mounted men with these-five or six. Every now and then a part of the infantry would break away. The mounted men would round them up, much as you round up stock.*ll There were Germans at the same time also moving down from a pillbox on the Moorslede road to dead ground behind Daisy Wood. The infantry called down the artillery on to these as they were clearly reinforcing Daisy Wood. . . . . When, between 3.30 and 4 pm., the S.O.S. was put up in front of Daisy Wood, the barrage was very solid and quick. The machine-gun barrage was always first in : the bullets could be seen playing on one spot just N.E. of Daisy Wood where it was marshy, and the spray was being flung up. . . . Australian artillery observers stationing themselves on Rroodseinde Ridge had a magnificent view of these Gerinan efforts. Lieutenant Linsleylla by pigeon message directed fire upon the centre of German activity on the Moorslede

road, Lieutenant ClarkllS I upon another at “ Dame W00d.”l14 The German force from Passchen- daele was dispersed 4 largely by the keenness ....z of trench-mortar officers. ! Opposite the 41st Bat- talion German officers , could be seen trying to fi line out their men behind ’ the cemetery hedge, north of the railway. At k 3 p.m., the barrage & was called down on ; them; but, in addition, Lieutenant Couchman115 brought one of his guns to the front line, and whenever sufficient For the sake of clearness, the order of sentences has been altered. lZyLieut. G. Linsley h1.C . 10th A.F.A. Bde. Station bookkeeper; of Waverley, N S.W.; b. Kempsey,’N.S.W., aa Dcc., 1890. Died of wounds, 7 April. 1918. llaLieut. M. C. Clark, M.C.; 13th A.F.A. Bde. Farm hand; of Talgai, Q’land; b. Talgai, 31 Dec.. 1891. ll‘All day such directions contlnued, often sent by Lucas lamp. Several forward observation and lratoon nfficers lost their lives. These included Capts. J. R. Eddy and W. H. East, and Lieuts. B. Thompson and J. C. Williamson. Other artillery officers killed were Lieuts R. A. Bcnnet, W. J. MchIullin, and T E. Mucbmore. (Eddy belonged to South Yarra Vie ; East to Rochester, Vic ; Thompson to Wagga Wagga. N S.W.; Williamson ’to Lismore. Vic.; Bennet to Koruinburra, Vic ; Mchlullin to Scone, N.S.W.; Muchmore to Adelaide.) u1 Capt C. W. Couchman. M.C.; 11th L.T.M. Rty. Civil aervant; of Perth, W. Aust.; b. Toowoomba, Q’land. a8 May, 1871. Died a4 Aug., 1935. 872 THE A.I.F. IN FRANCE [4th Oct., 1917 Germans assembled he let fly, scattering the enemy. Lieutenant Howielle turned another Stokes gun upon concen- trations in “ Dairy Wood ” (150 yards north of Daisy Wood). By next day the cemetery had been abandoned. The last effort seen was a movement late in the afternoon towards the New Zealanders, but it could not even approach them. The German counter-attack had indeed been concentrated against Broodseinde to an extent which the British command did not realise or the German command intend. The reserves of the front-line regiments had come forward just as the Australians launched the second phase of the attack.ll7 On the southern flank the 93rd R.I.R., endeavouring to regain its position on the In de Ster plateau, was driven back farther still. Opposite the 1st Australian Division the reserves of the 5th Foot Guard (the 1115th Food Guard and the III/zIIth R.I.R., both from the artillery protection line), crossing the valley under machine-gun fire from In de Ster, found numbers of troops retiring through them and could only line parts of the hedges and woods below the 1st Australian Division’s objective. Headquarters of all the forward battalions in this sfctor withdrew to the rear headquarters in the artillery protection Of the northern regiment, the 5th Guard Grenadier, the reserve battalion (11) had already established part of its scattered companies in front of Daisy Wood. The sight of German troops now streaming to the rear over all the slopes to the south110 caused the headquarters of this battalion, in the sandpit on the Moorslede road, to apprehend that its own troops might be cut off. Part of the reserve battalion of their neighbour, the 5th Foot Guard, and some of the II/z11th R.I.R. which came up soon afterwards, were accordingly placed to guard that flank. But the Australians next were seen going past on the north, and this movement started an alarm which largely influenced the subsequent movement of German reserves. The front line of the II/5th Guard Grenadier was ordered to fall back to Daisy Wood,’*O the rest of the II/zIIth R.I.R. was placed in touch with it, and word of the break- through was sent to the SFgimental commander, Major Freiherr von Schleinitz, at “Eddy Farm on the Keiberg. This message said that the British were advancing in the direction of the Keiberg, and, exaggerated by other reports, it ushered in two hours of intense anxiety. Schleinitz, physically a 1ight-w:ight but a thorough fighter, had at the moment no more reserves. I was determined, whatever came. to hold my headquarters,” he wrote afterwards. “If 1’aLieut. J W. Howie, h1.C.; 11th LT.hI. Bty. Fuel merchant; of Fortitude Valley, Q’land; b. Dundee, Scotland, 24 March, 1892. 117 These reserves had been increased by the allotment of a battalion of the 211th R.1 R. to each regiment. ‘“At Dame Wood. This was also the headquarters of Colonel Rave, 212th R.1 R, who that evening was killed by a shell. =SA message, captured by the British, of an officer of the 19th Reserve Divisioi said that large numbers of the 93rd R 1.R. were retiring towards Becelaere apparently under orders of an officer, and that nothing could stob them. About this time Captain Freiherr von Hanstein. commanding the battalion, was wounded, and the command fell to his adjutant, Lteutenant Heinrich von Hennig. While this officer was placing in position the II/zrrth R.I.R., he saw the front line running back to Daisy Wood. Full of indignation. he hurried across to sty these men, when a figure just as indignant emerged from a shell-hole and called Leave my men alone-they’re perfectly right1 I’ve ordered them to the western edge of the wood, as the English are advancing.’’ It was his brother, Lieut. Detlef von Henning, to whose company they belonged, 4th Oct., 19x71 BROODSEINDE 873 that fell, the road to the east lay open to the enemy. Then-it was about 11.15 a.m.+ Bavarian infantryman came up to me. He had been sent to find out the situation for his regimental commander. I asked, ’ Where is the regiment? How far from here? ’ It was only 11-2 kilo- metres east of the regimental headquarters, though in the sector of the rieighbouring division. It was the 5th Bavarian I.R. Under whos: command it was, I did not know. My decision was made at once. Major von Schleinitz sent to the commander of this regiment an order to attack, and dire$ons, as if the regiment,, had been placed under his own command. The C.O.,” he continues, was a lieutenant-colonel. I was only a major. . . . Would he act upon my operation order? . . . . There passed about two hours with much depressing news from the front. . . . The enemy needed only to march forward and he would have been able to push through.” But the Bavarian regiment apparently acted on his order. About 1.30 p.m. came a message from Lieuten:nt von Hennig, on the right of the sector: “ ‘ Hurrah, reinforcements! Nothing more, but I knew enough. . . . The front was closed again, and the situation had been saved.” Actually, a small reinforcement had come up just before. The counter-attack division (45th Reserve) still had available the regiment whose attack had been defeated on October I, the 210th R.I.R. This was given to the 4th Guard Division, which, at 11.25, sent a battalion to reinforce each sector. But these troops were thoroughly exhausted and, although between I and 2 p.m. part of the allotted battalion got through to the front of the 5th Guard Grenadier, its commander represented that it was unfit to attack, and it was therefore sent back to the .artillery- protection line where its two sister battalions also were re- tained. The 5th Bavarian I.R., an- nexed by Major von Schleinitz. was part of the 4th Bavarian Divi- sion, which had been ordered up to the area between Passchendaele and Moorslede. apparently as counter- attack troops for Route of%rman counter-attacking troops, Oct. 4, the 20th Division. showing the concentration about Daisy Wood. At 11.25, on re- ceipt of the urgent call from the 5th Guard Grenadier, it was directed to Eddy Farm (Kapell+of) on the Kciberg, which was said to be the only convenient point for its passage through the wire of the Flandern I1 Line. It advanced at once with the I Battalion, followed 874 THE A.I.F. IN FRANCE [4th Oct., 1917 by the 111. From the Keiberg Schleinitz directed it straight to Brood- seinde. Both battalions reached the forward headquarters at the gravel pit with slight loss, but at that stage they received strong machine-gun fire, which drove them to shelter in Daisy Wood with the remnant of the 5th Guard Grenadier. Meanwhile the other two regiments of the 4th Bavarian Division were to attack astride and north of the railwav. The 0th Bavarian I.R. was at 12.5 directed from the north-east agah Broodseinde.lz1 At 12.30 its I1 Battalion advanced south of the railway, but, passing over the Keiberg, it came, first into a thick barrage and then into machine- gun fire which broke it up. Much scattered, it managed to reach the remnants of the 4th Guard Division at Daisy Wood and farther south. The I Battalion, which was to attack north of the railway, advanced at I.45,122 but it was first hampered in crossing the wire of the Flandern I1 Line, then came under fire at the cutting through the Keiberg, and finally received from its right machine-gun fire so deadly that it also was driven south to Daisy Wood. (Those evidently were the troops which tried to assemble in front of the 41st Battalion at 2.30.) The 111 Battalion advanced down the crest from Passchendaele on the right of the other two, but received such fire from Australian machine-guns on the crest that it swerved to its right into the valley in front of the Gravenstafel spur, where it found itself mixed with the third regiment of the division, the 5th Bavarian R.I.R., which had attempted to advance against the New 2ealanders.lzs At 3 o’clock, on further alarm of a break-through towards the Keiberg, the last battalion of this Bavarian division, the II/sth Bav. I.R., was ordered to attack from Eddy Farm towards Broodseinde cross-roads. This direction took it also straight to Daisy Wood, where It found both its sister battalions, together with the 9th Bav. I.R. and the remainder of the 5th Guard Grenadier,l24 the whole collection being pounded by the British artillery. According to its regimental history, the II/5th Bav. I.R. began to advance from there, apparently faced by only a few “English” infantry and machine-gunners, and these were already dropping back when the German barrage fell upon the battalion and stopped the attack. (The events described are obviously those which occurred about 3.30 p.m., when the 26th Australian Battalion fired the S.O.S. ’The Australian line, however, did not retire.) Opposite the In de Ster plateau reserves were borrowed from the Wytschaete Corps,lzB but they could not recapture this important height. On the British side the attempt by the Fifth Army to exploit success was made by the XVIII Corps at 5.10. The German resistance had by then stiffened, rain was falling, the barrage was lost, and the effort failed. On the I Anzac front

111 The three field-batteries attached to the three regiments took position at different points on the Keiberg, and supported the advance by direct fire. They suffered many casualties. 111 It was wrongly held hack by the 79th 1.R. (20th Division). -8 One battalion of the 5th Bav. R 1.R. was sent round the north of Passchen. daele along the Meetcheele-Bellevue spur. The 3rd Australian Division sniped vigorously into its flank. U4The History of the 5th Guard Grenadier states that its front was held by parts of the 1/g Bav 1.R the II/5 Bav. 1 R., ll/g Bav. I.R., the remainder of 1115 Gd. Gren., a few rnin of the II/ZII R.l R, the 115 Bav. 1.K. and parts of the I11/5 Bav. 1.R. Parts of the 111/5 Bav. 1.R. were also in reserve. First the 93rd 1.R. (8th Divn.), and then the 94th R.I.R. (aad Rea. Divn.). 4th Oct., 19171 BROODSEINDE 875 the Germans laic, down a precautionary bombardment _.om 5.30 to 6.30, but no movement of infantry occurred. At IO p.m. an S.O.S. signal brought down the British barrage.lZ8 The 4th Battalion was warned to have men ready to assist the 41st, but the 41st did not need them. The German counter- attacks had not necessitated the bringing forward of a single unit, and at midnight even one of the two companies of the 27th that had come forward in the morning was withdrawn.

An overwhelming blow had been struck, and both sides knew it. The objective was the most important yet attacked bv the Second and Fifth Armies, and they An cad again done almost exactly what they had overwhelming blow ___.. planned to do.lz7 The recent German decision to hold the front line in greater strength had merely resulted in the destruction of the troops placed there. The German staffs waiting on Broodseinde Ridge for news of the success of their own enterprise at Zonnebeke had found their attack-troops swept away, and the wave engulfing themselves. The subsequent throwing of two counter-attack divisions against the Anzac front failed to regain an inch of ground.lP8 The Anzac troops, despite the intense fire laid on them before the start, had never fought better. This was the third blow struck at Ypres in fifteen days with complete success. It drove the Germans from one of the most important positions on the Western Front ; notwithstanding their full knowledge that it was coming, they were completely powerless to withstand it. As regards merely the extent of the front and the forces engaged, it was no greater operation than Messines, which also was comparable to it in the cleanness of the result. But, coming on top of the achievements of September 20th and 26th, its success was of m To avoid waste of ammunition, S.O.S. barrages were now limited to 15 minutes, unless the signal was repeated. ='The exceptions were of no importance in their influence on the genera!'rcsult. They Spmprised a slight falling short on a sector of the XVllI Corps at Burns House and the neighbouring cemetery; others, on the X Corps front, at Reutel and Polderhoek and that of the 2nd Australian Division at Daisy Wood. -A subseqdent German ,report that parts of the 45th Reserve, 4th Bavarian and 25th Reserve Divisions, advancing from the direction of the Keiberg succeeded, after heavy fighting. the issue v,f which remained long uncertain, in finally driving the enemy back on Broodseinde was based on the erroneous belief that the British had penetrated. and intended to penetrate, to the lieiberg. Far from this being attempted, General hlonash spoke strongly to Brig &en. Cannan because part of the 41st was suspected of being at Kerselaarhoek cemetery, aoo yards ahead Of its OhJeCtiVe. 876 THE A.I.F. IN FRANCE [4th-~thOct., I917 an entirely different order. “ The black day of October 4tl1,” the German Official History calls it.lZ0 Ludendorff says that the battle “was estraordinarily severe, and again we only came through it with enormous losses.” No army could continue to withstand such blows. These clean victories on comparatively wide fronts were in sharp contrast with the uneven successes of the First Sonime. It is true that the British loss also, at least in the two Anzac Corps, was severe.130 The Germans had fought hard; the spirit of many of their divisions was still stubborn. But the German command had this day barely been able to supply the reserves required, and the reserves when thrown in had been far less effective than their commanders realised. One or two more such strokes, and, with proper provision beforehand, even “ exploitation ” mThe history of the 5th Foot Guard Kegimyt describes it as “the hardest day yet experienced by the regiment in the war. The Australian losses were. 1st Australran D:vision (total loss. 2,448). 1st Infantry Brigade. 2nd Infantry Brigade. 3rd Infantry Brigade. Off. O.R. Off. O.R. Off. O.R. 1st Bn. _. 11 a67 sth Bn. .. 7 166 sth Bn. .. 6 100 and hn. .. 16 144 Zth Bn. .. 14 243 ioth Bn. .. 4 45 3rd Bn. .. la a25 7th Bn. ,. 14 zfg 11th Bn. .. 3 sb 4th Bn. .. 5 190 8th Bn. . . 14 a54 12th Bn. .. 4 b7 1st M.C. Coy. a a6 and M.C. Coy. 4 18 3rd M.G. Coy. - 19 1st L.T.M. Btv. --- ao 2ndL.T.M. Bty. --- 14 3rd L.T.M. Bty. --- a --42 871 --53 934 --I7 289 Arti!lery .. 3 71 aIst M.G. Coy. - 21 Pioneers .. a 61 Engineers .. 5 46 Fld. Ambs. .. a 30 2nd Australian Divisior (total loss, a.174). 5th Infantry Brigade. 6th Infantry Brigade. 7th Infantry Brigade. Off. O.R. Off. O.R. Off. O.R. 17th Bn. .. - 28 aist Bii. .. I3 332 15th Bn. .. I2 239 IXth Bn. .. 3 93 aand Bn. .. 6 183 16th Bn. 311 19th Bn. .. 3 52 afrd Bn. .. 3 101 27th Bn. :: z 143 20th Bn. .. I 55 24th Bn. .. IO as4 28th Bn. .. 8 95 5th hl ti Coy. a a4 6th M.G. Coy. 3 18 7th M.G. COY. 3 28 5th L.T.M. Bty. - -a 6th L.T.M. Bty. --a 17 7th L.T.M. Bty. - -4 -9 -a54 --37 90s -3s -820 Artillery .. 7 IS Signal Coy. .. - 15 Pioneers . . - 21 Engineers .. - ax aand M.C. Coy. - 13 Fld. Ambs. .. I I8 3rd Australwan Diuis:on (loss. 1810). 10th Infantry Brigade. 11th Infantry Brigade. Off. O.R. Off. O.R. 37th Bii. .. 7 a16 4Ist Bn. .. g 248 38th Bn. .. a 183 4and Bn. .. 13 aio 39th Bn. .. 8 aoa 43rd Bn. .. 6 178 40th Bn. .. 7 a43 44th Bn. .. Ia 193 loth h1.G. Coy. - 26 11th M.C. Cog. I 18 1othL.T.M. Bty. I 9 X1thL.T.M.Bty. - 8 4th Oct , 19171 B ROODSEINDE 877 might be attempted with confidence. The success of those strokes could be made a certainty, provided good weather continued. Granted this condition, there was little doubt that the commanders could at last powerfully affect, if not decide, the issue of the war. It was this fact that differentiated the Battle of Broodseinde from all previous “ victories ” in which the Australians had participated in France, and even from the Battle of Arras, in which the first stroke was perhaps more stunning but subsequent success was never really on the horizon. It is true that, as before, the British and French people, and even their Governments, recognised only another of the “ victories ” that they had heard shouted so often. Sir Henry Wilson, now in London promoting a proposal of his noted on October Sth, “Lloyd George has no illusions about Haig’s ‘ victory ’ of yesterday.” Yet, among many well-informed observers at the front-such, for example, as the British war-correspondents, who were, in fact, keenly sensitive to the failures of the past-there was a definite feeling that this battle was the most complete success so far won by the British Army in France.132 The fact that the condition necessary to the consummation of the step-by-step campaign-good weather- was improbable, makes no difference to the import of the Battle of Broodseinde. For the first time in years, at noon on October 4th on the heights east of Ypres, British troops on the Western Front stood face to face with the possibility of decisive success.

“‘The concentration of troops in Palestrric during the winter months to knock Turkey out of the war. la2 Gyeral Plumer IS said to have called it “the greatest victory since the Marne