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Battle of Broodseinde, the Third Con- Secutive Step in This Series, Has Never Been Fully Recognised Except by the Commanders and Forces That Took Part

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Battle of Broodseinde, the Third Con- Secutive Step in This Series, Has Never Been Fully Recognised Except by the Commanders and Forces That Took Part -- CHAPTER XX THIRD STEP-BROODSEINDE THEimportance of the Battle of Broodseinde, the third con- secutive step in this series, has never been fully recognised except by the commanders and forces that took part. For the general public, accustomed to over- or under-emphasis in the press, there was little in the published news to indicate that this blow counted for more than others. But on the actual field both British and Germans were aware that the events of the 4th of October, 1917, were big with possibilities of decision. In the air was the unmistakable feeling, not to be experienced again by the A.I.F. until the 8th of August, 1918, that the British leaders now had the game in hand and, if conditions remained favourable, might in a few more moves secure a victory which would have its influence on the issue of the war. Even in the light of today’s fuller knowledge of the general situation, close study of this battle justifies that conviction. In the days following the step of September 26th there was ample evidence of the effect of that blow. Ahead of the 5th Australian Division’s new front at the Butte, the Germans appeared hardly to know where their own front lay. On September 5311, as dawn broke, the front posts of the 30th Battalion found, crouched in the crater-field under their very muzzles, a company of German infantry. Imagining that these troops intended to attack, the 30th fired an S.O.S. flare, and the artillery opened. But, far from attacking, the Germans made signals of surrender when fired on, and patrols rounded up the lot, 2 officers and 63 men of the 1/73rd R.I.R. It was evident that they had lost their way, and the prisoners confirmed this.’ ‘The 17th German Division, which had reinforced the 50th Reserve Division during the fight of the z6th, was in its turn being relieved by the 19th Reserve Division to which this regiment helon,yd. The diary of an officer, who hiniself was captured a few days later, says. It is impossible to stick one’s head ont by day. One of our men was sniped immediately . An entire detachment from our battalion got lost in the maze of trenches and walked straight into the arms of the English. Through the telescope I could see them being marched away in column of fours.” The entry immediately preceding this gives the writer’s first impression on arrival at this front. “Just the sort of place for us to come to after our glorious time in Russia. Is it not monstrous? Division after division is thrown into this part of the line to come out decimated a few days later. All that the newspapers tell us . is that the enemy has obtained trifling local successes. It is no longer possible to believe these reports.” 833 a34 THE A.I.F. IN FRANCE [Sept., 1917 In contrast to the condition of the Germans, the 56th Australian Battalion, which on the 26th had captured the front beyond Polygon Butte, had actually asked not to be relieved, the activity of the front line being preferable to being shelled in the support position. Both it and the 55th were therefore left in the front line until their division was relieved on September 30th. From the beginning of the Second Army’s offensive it had been recognised that the third step would be the most important.2 The objective was the northward-tending section of the main ridge known as the “ Broodseinde Ridge,” which, since its abandonment by the British after the Second Battle of Ypres, in 1915, had formed the main buttress of the German position there. Crowded with headquarters and observation post, it looked out on the famous British salient as on a spread-out map. For the operation in which it would be attacked, Generals Plunier and Harington had from the first intended to avail themselves of the assistance of the I1 Anzac Corps, preferably upon the left of I Anzac. Birdwood and White, however, had doubted whether any of the I Anzac divisions would last until the third attack, their experience of the Somme fighting having shown that each might be worn out in its first operation. General Godley, of I1 Anzac, was accordingly informed that his divisions might have to succeed to I Anzac’s task after the second step. But the 1st and 2nd Australian Divisions came through the first step so fresh chat it was at once decided to employ them, after a short rest, for making the main attack on Broodseinde Ridge. A conference of the corps staffs with General Harington, held on September 21st, recommended that I Anzac should again be shifted slightly northwards so as to make a straight attack on this position, and that I1 Anzac should take over the front of the V Corps (Fifth Army) on the left of its sister corps, and capture the junction of the ridge with the Gravenstafel spur, along which the left flank would be thrown hack. The X Corps would again buttress the right flank, this time by the difficult process of advancing beyond it to the end of the Polygon plateau at In de Ster and Reutel. 111 the immediately subseqiient steps, I1 Anzac Writing to General hI2nash and other commanders on the eve of this step General Harington said. Tomorrow’s battle . will be the biggest of the war ” BROODSEINDE 835 would piay t..e chie part by extending Le capture of the ridge to beyond Passchendaele. Presumably the Fifth Army, till then advancing on comparatively low ground, J would next resume the leading rble by attacking the Westroosebeke - Staden heights. At a conference with the staffs of Fifth Army and G.H.Q. on September 22nd, this plan, so far as it concerned the third step, was approved. And, as soon as the stroke of September 26th succeeded-on the same afternoonS-Haig gave the order for I1 Anzac to take over the V Corps front. The I1 Anzac divisions proper-the New Zealand and the 3rd Australian-had only just begun to leave a far back area at Bl6quin and Lumbres, and the date for the third step depended upon how quickly they could be brought up and make their preparations. I1 Anzac was at this juncture made up to strength with two British divisions from the Fourth Army,4 the 49th and 66th, but it was not proposed to use them for this stroke. The date at first foreshadowed for it was October 6th. But, with autumn advancing and the weather risk increasing, it was decided to hasten the preparations, and to attack, if possible, on the 4th. Thus for the first time urgent considerations of weather brought an element of haste into the preparations of the Second Army, which hitherto had shaped its arrangements with one motive only-to make a certainty of succcess. For I Anzac the preparation was comparatively easy-its roads for this stage had been made before the second stage; its systems of supply and control were in working order; its formations knew the ground, and the step-by-step attack had heen so well practised that it was now almost a matter of routine, and operation orders and instructions largely consisted of references to those for the previous steps. Rut for 'After conference with Gough and Plumer at Cassel. 'The possible date of the coastal attack bad been again postponed. 836 THE A.I.F. IN FRANCE [2gth Sept.-1st Oct., I917 I1 Anzac, with short notice of its task, the preparatory work was much more difficult.6 On September zgth, when the 3rd Australian Division began to come in next to I Anzac and the New Zealand Division farther north, the roads, foot-tracks, and telegraph installation in the V Corps area were not nearly as far advanced as those of I Anzac,e and the expediting of the attack left insufficient time for their completion as desired. Between September 29th and October 1st the reliefs and adjustments of front were made. The X Corps relieved the 5th Australian Division at Polygon Wood, and the Ist, znd, and 3rd Australian, and the New Zealand divisions (in that order from south to north) came in7 on the front previously held by the 4th Australian Division and V Corps, and the two Anzac corps then adjusted their inner boundary between them, shifting it to the Ypres-Roulers railway.* The relief of the 5th Division was marked by the loss of one of the finest battalion commanders of the A.I.F., Lieutenant-Colonel Humphrey Scott, of the SGth, who had stayed behind to show his British successor the Polygon Wood front, and was shot dead while doing so at the B~itte.~ SGeneral Harington afterwards wrote to General hlonash that the way in which the 3rd Division made its plans at short notice and carried through the operation was beyond all praise. 'For example, ;he head of the buried cable for the rd Aust. Division was at " Bavaria House, half-a-mile behind<*the Frezenberg-desthoek ridge, when that for the 1st Division was approaching Iron Cross Wood," nearly a mile ahead of that rldge. The I1 Anzac cable was extended in time to Zevenkote level with the 1 Anzac cable-head, but the network was less complete than had'been intended The cable-burying parties of I Anzac suffered many cztsualtieg, on the night of Oct. I, but the work waa finished the next night The bury was supposed to be 7 feet deep, hut, according to the diary' of Private H.
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