Britain and the Greek Colonels: Accommodating the Junta in the Cold War by Alexandros Nafpliotis (Review)

Britain and the Greek Colonels: Accommodating the Junta in the Cold War by Alexandros Nafpliotis (review)

Neovi M. Karakatsanis

Journal of Modern Greek Studies, Volume 38, Number 1, May 2020, pp. 258-262 (Review)

Published by Johns Hopkins University Press DOI: https://doi.org/10.1353/mgs.2020.0017

For additional information about this article https://muse.jhu.edu/article/754273

[ This content has been declared free to read by the pubisher during the COVID-19 pandemic. ] 258 Book Reviews men invert the ideologies of the secondary texts that they employ and engage in polemics against their contemporaries (Byron satirizes Robert Southey while Roidis lampoons Panagiotis Soutsos). With inspiration from Byron’s mock epic, Roidis not only was able to find the right tone for his own history (which acted as a critique of historical fiction of the period) but also “contributed to the differentiation and therefore to the generic evolution of the novel itself” (233). This chapter is a highlight of the book. Near the end of the book, however, Lika writes that “even though Pope Joan traces back her lineage to Swift and Sterne, we can swiftly and sternly state that she is a Byronic offspring after all” (235). Lika thus unnecessarily pigeonholes her own study. Roidis and the Borrowed Muse is a meticulous book that evinces deep research into, and knowledge of, the sources that inspired Roidis’s Pope Joan. As this book has cross-disciplinary potential, it would have benefitted from a more thorough background on eighteenth- and nineteenth-century British historical and literary practices for readers unfamiliar with British writing of this period. Sometimes, too, the “borrowed muse” aspect of the study becomes strained when Lika charts thematic and literary similarities between Roidis and the writers whose work inspired his own but fails to explain how these similarities are manifest in Roidis’s novel. Despite these critiques, Lika’s generic and cross-cultural analysis of Pope Joan is a welcome addition to the field of comparative literature, which requires more studies that, like Lika’s, examine cross-cultural engagement between Greek and British literatures of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

ALEXANDER GRAMMATIKOS Langara College

Alexandros Nafpliotis, Britain and the Greek Colonels: Accommodating the Junta in the Cold War. London: I.B. Tauris & Co. Ltd., 2013. Pp. viii + 307. Cloth $40.38.

Despite the 45 years that have passed since the collapse of the Greek Junta, more questions than answers remain regarding the role of foreign powers in the Colonels’ regime. What role did the “Great Powers” play in instigating and supporting the coup (1)? Once in power, how did these governments work with the Colonels to further their own economic, security, and other interests? Many have speculated on answers to these questions. However, only a minority of scholars have systematically studied the role of foreign governments and Book Reviews 259 international institutions in the Colonels’ regime. Important exceptions include the academic research of Louis Klarevas (2004), Konstantina Maragkou (2006, 2009, 2010, 2013 and 2014), Effie Pedaliu (2007, 2011, 2016) and Mogens Pelt (2006), the historical and personal accounts of James Miller (2014) and Robert Keeley (2011), and a few other studies (including my own 2018 book co-a uthored with Jonathan Swarts). Alexandros Nafpliotis’s monograph, Britain and the Greek Colonels: Accommodating the Junta in the Cold War is another notable exception. In this thoroughly researched monograph, Nafpliotis sets out to provide one of the first accounts of British policy towards the Colonels’ Greece from 1966 to 1974. His investigation builds upon and complements the publications of the aforementioned scholars, and uses British, Greek, and American primary (particularly archival) sources, as well as information garnered from personal interviews, to analyze the Wilson and Heath governments’ policies towards the regime. Focusing on the diplomatic, economic, and defense relationships that Greece and the UK maintained during this period, Nafpliotis investigates possible foreknowledge and involvement of Britain in the Colonels’ coup. His book also offers a thorough analysis of the UK’s response to the regime, focusing on important events in Britain and Greece and how those events affected the Anglo-Greek relationship. Nafpliotis’ main hypothesis is that both the Labour (1967–1970 and 1974) and Conservative (1970–1974) governments in Britain were financially and internationally weak and, therefore, were forced to pursue pragmatic policies toward the regime as well as policies intended to prove the UK’s subordination to US and NATO interests. Divided into eight chapters and following a chrono- logical approach, the book commences in 1966, when rumors of a military coup began to emerge. Chapter One investigates the preconception held by many Greeks that foreign governments—in this instance, the Wilson government (and, to a lesser extent, the Johnson administration in the US)—had foreknowledge of or involvement in the coup. The chapter also highlights the Wilson government’s response to the Colonels once the Junta was firmly ensconced in power. Chapters Two through Eight follow historical events chronologically, including the change of government in London in 1970 and its impact on Anglo- Greek relations, growing concern regarding the concentration of power in the hands of Papadopoulos but also over the possibility of an overthrow of the regime by extremists, the impact on the regime of British membership in the European Economic Community, the Ioannides regime, and the Cyprus crisis. Several significant contributions stand out in Nafpliotis’ study. First, through careful archival research, Nafpliotis counters a long-held misconception 260 Book Reviews regarding the Colonels’ regime: that the coup itself was instigated and supported by foreign powers. The author argues that, on the contrary, in the years preced- ing the Junta, Britain believed that a right-wing coup was not imminent as long as King Constantine was opposed to it. Nafpliotis also maintains that while Britain’s position regarding a possible coup was that of a “neutral observer” (18), the US position was much less neutral, actively warning against a coup and encouraging a democratic course in Athens. However, once the coup occurred and it became clear that the regime was firmly in place, both countries estab- lished working relations with it to safeguard their interests. British policy, informed by a Realpolitik focus on international relations, included the fair treatment of British citizens as well as its economic interest in trade with Greece. Specifically, Nafpliotis argues that Wilson’s initial policy of “inertia” was transformed into one of a “good working relationship” with the Colonels in order to ensure that Athens would maintain its NATO obligations (3). Later, the British Conservatives pursued a “pragmatic policy par excellence,” attempting to further strengthen Britain’s good working relationship with Athens (4). Thus, rather than publicly condemn the Colonels, London argued that “the timing of Greece’s return to a democratic system [was] a matter for the Greek government” to decide (40). Maintaining that Realpolitik led the Tories to follow Labour’s previously-developed doctrine of “disconnected responsibilities” (4), Nafpliotis argues that it was essentially this doctrine that led both governments to argue that the consequences Greece might face within the Council of Europe should not affect its membership in NATO. Thus, Britain (like the United States) supported the Colonels as a key ally within the NATO context. A second important contribution of this study is the degree of agency Nafpliotis assigns to the Colonels rather than simply treating them as puppets of foreign powers. Many examples of this agency are presented, and readers consistently see the Colonels rebuffing the UK when they perceive London’s actions or words as interference in Greek domestic affairs. Indeed, Nafplio- tis shows how factors such as the 1968 Czechoslovakian crisis and increased instability in the Middle East allowed the Junta to use their country’s geostrategic importance to resist pressure for democratization. In this way, Nafpliotis demonstrates Greece’s “augmented significance as a player (rather than pawn) on the Cold War confrontation chessboard” given its geostrategic position and NATO membership (80). A third important insight is British reluctance to go it alone when formulating policy towards Greece. Instead of taking an independent course, Britain consistently looked to the US (and, to a lesser extent, to its European allies) in formulating its policies toward the Colonels, always following in American Book Reviews 261 footsteps rather than taking the lead. Nafpliotis highlights how the two democracies took similar positions on many issues: their initial policy of inertia, their subsequent recognition of the regime, arms sales, Greece’s NATO membership, and the decision not to “over-emphasise” the Colonels’ suspension of consti- tutional articles (85). Given his extensive archival research, Nafpliotis’ analysis is nuanced and multifaceted. He highlights disagreements within the British government, between members of government and Parliament, the Foreign Office and the British embassy in Athens, the House of Commons and the House of Lords. By calling attention to such conflicting policy positions, Nafpliotis nicely illustrates how, while the British government sought liberalization in Greece as a matter of principle, the appearance of progress in that direction was often seen as most important. Divisions between the British embassy in Athens and members of the government in London, as well as between the elected members of government and the unelected members of the House of Lords, further illustrate the competing interests and nuanced policy positions that are often ignored in studies of foreign policy that reify government as single actor with a single, consistent set of views. In conclusion, Nafpliotis’ study is a thorough and detailed account of British policy towards the Colonels’ regime. However, one cannot do it all, so opportunities remain for future inquiry. For example, while the author maintains that Britain and the Greek Colonels examines the diplomatic, economic, defense, and cultural relationships between Greece and the UK during the Junta, the book spends little time on the cultural relationship. And, while Nafpliotis acknowledges that events in Cyprus were important and had definite connections to developments in London, he concludes that a thorough analysis of Cyprus lies beyond the scope of his book. Given the importance of Cyprus at this time, particularly for the UK, a study focusing on the tripartite relationship—Britain, Cyprus, and the Colonels—would be illuminating. Those who are familiar with America’s foreign policy toward the Colonels will find striking similarities between the policies of Britain and those of the US—an interesting avenue for further research. As was the case in London, the Johnson administration was taken by surprise when the coup was launched, and President Johnson (like Wilson) adopted a wait-and-see approach that quickly switched to a policy of “business as usual” (3). Moreover, the Americans, too, were mindful of the Greek Colonels’ sensitivity to pressure for democratization, and they preferred to believe that officials in Greece could cajole Papadopoulos towards constitutionalism. Despite such similarities, important differences also emerge: the importance of Cyprus (understandably stronger for the UK 262 Book Reviews than the US), Britain’s concern over trade with Greece, and London’s dealings with former King Constantine, given his familial ties to the British crown. A systematic comparative study of these democracies’ foreign policies towards the Colonels’ regime, taking into consideration such important similarities and differences, would further illuminate Anglo-American accommodation of the Junta. Britain and the Greek Colonels is an excellent starting point for such analyses. Nafpliotis’ monograph will remain a standard text for years to come.

NEOVI M. KARAKATSANIS Indiana University South Bend

REFERENCES CITED

Karakatsanis, Neovi M. and Jonathan Swarts. 2018. American Foreign Policy Towards the Colo- nels’ Greece: Uncertain Allies and the 1967 Coup d’État. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Keeley, Robert. V. 2011. The Colonels’ Coup and the American Embassy: A Diplomat’s View of the Breakdown of Democracy in Cold War Greece. University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press. Klarevas, Louis. 2004. “Were the Eagle and the Phoenix Birds of a Feather? The United States and the Greek Coup of 1967.” Discussion Paper No. 15. Hellenic Observatory-European Institute, London School of Economics. Maragkou, Konstantina. 2006. “The Foreign Factor and the Greek Colonels’ Coming to Power on 21 April 1967.” Southeast European and Black Sea Studies 6 (4): 427–443. ———. 2009. “Favouritism in NATO’s Southeastern Flank: The Case of the Greek Colonels, 1967–74.” Cold War History 9 (3): 347–366. ———. 2010. “The Wilson Government’s Responses to ‘the Rape of Greek Democracy.’ ” Journal of Contemporary History 45 (1): 162–180. ———. 2013. Britain, Greece and the Colonels, 1967–74: A Troubled Relationship. London: Hurst Publishers. ———. 2014. “The Relevance of Détente to American Foreign Policy: The Case of Greece, 1967– 1979.” Diplomacy and Statecraft 25 (4): 646–668. Miller, James. E. 2014. The United States and the Making of Modern Greece: History and Power, 1950–1974. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press. Pedaliu, Effie G. H. 2007. “Human Rights and Foreign Policy: Wilson and the Greek Dictators, 1967–1970.” Diplomacy & Statecraft 18 (1): 185–214. ———. 2011. “ ‘A Discordant Note’: NATO and the Greek Junta, 1967–1974.” Diplomacy & State- craft 22 (1): 101–120. ———. 2016. “Human Rights and International Security: The International Community and the Greek Dictators.” The International History Review 38 (5): 1014–1039. Pelt, Mogens. 2006. Tying Greece to the West: US-West German-Greek Relations, 1949–1974. Copenhagen: Museum Tusculanum.