A Visit

to

South West Africa

David Tothill

Foreword by Dr Lorna Lloyd PO Box 32813 Glenstantia 0010 Pretoria South Africa

Copyright © David Tothill 2008

ISBN: 978-0-620-41650-4

2 In memory of Hilgard Muller and Brand Fourie.

3 Acknowledgements

I am grateful to Sir Brian Barder, formerly of Her Majesty’s Diplomatic Service, and to Dr Lorna Lloyd for their comments.

DT

4 Foreword

Dr Tothill’s scholarly articles on the making and execution of apartheid South Africa’s foreign policy are amongst the most useful on the subject. Now he takes us into the inner workings of the Republic’s diplomacy, through his 1972 record of, and contemporary thoughts on, a United Nations mission to Namibia (which he accompanied as the representative of the Department of Foreign Affairs). In so doing, he treats us to a fascinating example of what a former senior UN official described as South Africa’s apparently schizophrenic way of facing its problems: on the one hand agreeing in principle that the problem must be solved, on the other putting every possible obstacle in the way of solving it.1

South Africa was courteous to its unwelcome visitors, overcoming its instinct to conceal rather than reveal, and more or less letting them see what and whom they wanted. However, Dr Alfred Escher (the Swiss ambassador who headed the mission, and was the personal representative of the UN Secretary-General, Dr Kurt Waldheim) often spoke and behaved offensively to his hosts. His failure to guard his tongue and, on one occasion, his appearance at a semi-formal municipal reception (‘jacketless in an open-neck shirt, khaki trousers and black shoes’)2 was strange behaviour for a supposedly ‘able and experienced diplomat’.3 Even odder was his ignorance of not just Namibia but Africa, the United Nations, and key provisions of the UN Charter. (He was, though, the only member of the visiting mission who could converse with those Namibians whose first language was German.) All this no doubt reflected the difficulty which Waldheim had experienced in finding a personal representative who was acceptable to the South African government.

While Escher blundered his way across Namibia ‘like a second rate American politician’, some of his South African companions, such as Mr D.F. Mudge (Senior Member of the Executive Committee in South West Africa) and J.M. de Wet (the Administrator of South West Africa) [Commissioner-General for the territory’s non- white people], hardly conducted themselves better. Moreover, South African ineptitude was sometimes comical. There was, for example, the obtrusive surveillance aeroplane whereby representatives of the Bureau of State Security kept an eye on the mission, and the incompetently staged ‘accident’ to a light aircraft so that the party could avoid a large demonstration when they landed at Ondangwa. (The attempted deception was quickly evident to Escher’s party. And as for the demonstrators, they simply moved on - in larger numbers - to where the mission had lunch.)

However, two of the travelling party emerge well: M.E. Chacko, an Indian member of the UN Secretariat who was Escher’s principal adviser, and Tothill himself. Thanks to their good sense the mission was not derailed. Equally admirable is Tothill’s respect for truth, permitting us to read his unvarnished and unrevised private record of his

 © Lorna Lloyd 2008. 1 Brian Urquhart, A Life in Peace and War (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1987) 308. 2 Unreferenced quotations are from Dr Tothill’s personal account. 3 Kurt Waldheim, In the Eye of the Storm. The memoirs of Kurt Waldheim (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1985) 101.

5 time with the mission.

Tothill’s account is also valuable for the telling details that give life to history: the mission’s apparent acceptance of South Africa’s homelands policy; the exclusion of Escher’s (multiracial) team from a function where 'White women' were present; dinner companions who were scandalised when mission members said South Africa should amend its racial policy; white Namibians’ inability to understand why the authorities were tolerating peaceful and friendly demonstrations; the need for explicit ministerial approval for the mission to be entertained in a prestigious whites-only restaurant in Johannesburg; and the party’s fear of rampaging demonstrators (who showed no signs of being other than good-natured, except when Escher mishandled them).

In retrospect, Waldheim clearly could not then have made a breakthrough on the Namibian problem, and South Africa had gone too far down the road to pariah status for the tour to do it ‘a lot of good abroad’ in any substantive sense. And the outcome was unhappy, as there was outrage that Escher’s report appeared to endorse separate development. Waldheim’s assertion that he would never have agreed to it is at odds with Tothill’s statement that the one time the mission was in touch with the Secretary- General was when Escher sought, and obtained, Waldheim’s approval for the document which was being taken to New York. The Security Council rejected it. The Africans were furious that the UN had acted like a ‘toothless bulldog’. And Chacko, whose wedding anniversary had determined the date the mission left South Africa, was soon dead of a heart attack - which Waldheim thought might have been brought on by the shock of what happened.4

Scholars who want to get to grips with the diplomacy of apartheid South Africa and its attitude towards the United Nations will be deeply indebted to Dr Tothill for publishing this valuable document.

Lorna Lloyd Reader in International Relations Keele University Staffordshire UK November 2008

4 Waldheim, 102.

6 Preface

Australian and South African forces seized the German colonies of New Guinea and South West Africa early in the First World War. The Australian and South African governments were thwarted in their desire to annex these territories. Instead, as part of the post-war settlement, they were awarded their administration as League of Nations “C” Mandates, New Guinea going to Australia and South West Africa to South Africa.

The two governments followed a different approach towards their Mandates. Australia expropriated German properties in New Guinea and deported German nationals. South Africa allowed many Germans to remain in South West Africa and encouraged white settlement from South Africa itself. Financial inducements were provided for the purpose. Pursuant to the South West Africa Constitution Act, No. 42 of 1925, the white population was granted limited self-government similar to that enjoyed by a South African province.

Throughout the mandate period and beyond the presence of the whites was the key to the South African government's attitude towards the territory. The existence of a small but vocal self-governing white population right up to the time of the territory's independence in 1990 effectively conditioned the policies of all South African governments from the early 1920s onwards. In that way their options were limited - or so successive governments of differing political orientation believed. The presence of the whites lay at the heart of the dispute with the United Nations over the territory’s future which persisted for much of the second half of the 20th century.

White settlement was permissible because Article 22(6) of the League of Nations Covenant as well as Article 2 of the mandate instrument authorised the administration of the territory as an integral part of the mandatory state. Not only was white settlement permissible, but South Africa argued at the United Nations in 1946 and at the International Court of Justice in the 1960s that it was necessary in order to develop the territory. That was also its response to charges that it administered the territory for the benefit of the whites.

Initially, German voters outnumbered the others and German candidates were returned in seven of the 12 seats at the first elections to the Assembly in May 1926. Their advantage was only temporary and at the outbreak of the Second World War the South African element outnumbered the Germans by two to one. Within the former, Afrikaners outnumbered English-speakers by five to one. As a counter to pro-Nazi activity on the part of Germans who agitated for the territory's return to Germany, non-Germans in the white population pressed for incorporation into South Africa. The South West Africa Commission of 1935 concurred. In 1943 and 1946 the white Legis- lative Assembly passed resolutions requesting incorporation. The United Nations rejected South Africa’s proposal for incorporation at the 1946 session of the General Assembly.

From time to time after 1946, the international community attempted to break South Africa’s hold on the territory. Such efforts reached a climax in 1966 when the United Nations General Assembly ostensibly terminated the mandate. A low level guerrilla

7 war on the territory’s border with Angola commenced that year. This grew in intensity over the next two decades, eventually drawing in Cuban forces. Because of the white, mostly Afrikaner, presence which imparted a domestic political dimension to the situation, the South African government remained obdurate. Even so, seeing the writing on the wall, it sought to head off the United Nations by means of an internal solution that would leave intact most white authority over the territory. Its efforts proved unavailing and it was eventually obliged to accept the international settlement which led to the territory’s independence as Namibia in 1990.

From the beginning, the administration of South West Africa fell within the purview of the South African Prime Minister’s department which was also given oversight of South Africa’s external relations. When a Department of External Affairs was set up in 1927, the Prime Minister became its political head. The Prime Minister remained in charge of the two portfolios until a separate Minister of External Affairs was appointed in 1955. Given the territory’s international status, the Department of External Affairs (Foreign Affairs from 1961) was involved with it throughout. A special section was eventually established within departmental structures.

This liaised with the South West Africa Administration, monitored UN action relating to the territory, and prepared directives to the South African delegation in respect of the relevant item at annual sessions of the UN General Assembly. It also assisted the lawyers briefed to put South Africa’s case to the International Court of Justice in regard to various Advisory Opinions concerning the territory as well as the contentious proceedings of the 1960s. I was in charge of the section, which dealt also with other UN matters, from the beginning of 1970 until the end of 1975. My work took me to the territory many times during those years. Two such occasions were the visits of UN Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim and of his special representative Dr Alfred Escher, respectively at the beginning and the end of 1972.

Elected Secretary-General at the 1971 session of the General Assembly, Waldheim was eager to achieve a breakthrough on so intractable an issue as South West Africa. That was well before the United States declared him persona non grata on account of his wartime activities with the German army. From its side, having “lost” the 1971 Advisory Opinion at the International Court of Justice - the Court had confirmed the illegality of South Africa’s presence in the territory - the South African government was looking for a way forward, if not out.

To continue the contact that had commenced with his visits to South Africa and South West Africa early in 1972, Waldheim appointed Dr Alfred Escher, Swiss ambassador to Thailand, as his personal representative on the South West Africa issue. Escher was descended from the famous 19th century Dr Alfred Escher, founder of the Swiss railway system and of Credit Suisse, who is sometimes called the “founder of modern Switzerland”. He visited South Africa and South West Africa in October 1972. I represented the Department of Foreign Affairs on his 16-day journey through the territory. Early the following month I wrote up the visit in the form of a day-by-day account. It was an ex post facto document, not a diary, because I did not record my impressions at the end of each day.

Something I omitted from my account was that Dick van Zyl of the Bureau of State Security and his associates (see p.10 below) dogged the footsteps of the Escher party

8 throughout the tour. That had been the fate of Waldheim’s party earlier in the year. Their presence became so obtrusive that the objects of their surveillance would refer with amusement to the sight of same Dakota greeting their arrival at the outskirts of every hamlet and town they approached by road. Thus the watchers flew while we mostly travelled laboriously by road. Dick van Zyl was killed in a road accident not long after.

Except that I provide English translations of news items that appeared originally in Afrikaans, the pages that follow contain the complete, unabridged, and unedited account as I wrote it early in November 1972. AJP Taylor called history a version of events. This is my version. It sets out the facts as I saw them at the time.

Whatever else it does, it shows what one white South African Foreign Service officer did in a given historical context, thereby partly addressing the age-old question of what is it exactly that diplomats do? Looking back from vantage point of the present, I find myself in the position of those of whom Canadian historian Carl Berger has written: “our knowledge of the outcome makes it difficult to enter into the minds of men who lived in another age and who did not know that they worked in vain for a cause that would never be realized.” The coming end of white South Africa, especially how it ended - not with the widely predicted bang, but with the proverbial whimper - of which Namibian independence was part, may have been obvious to many in 1972, but not necessarily to contemporary South African politicians and government officials, including me.

The Escher visit was half a lifetime ago. 1972 was the year FW de Klerk entered Parliament; RF Botha, the later long time South African Foreign Minister, had done so two years earlier. BJ Vorster was six years into his 12-year premiership and at the height of his popularity and power. But his eventual nemesis, Eschel Rhoodie, had just made an entrance as Secretary for Information. Elsewhere, 1972 was the year of Watergate, which marked the beginning of the end of the Nixon presidency in the United States. A long time ago, but the ramifications live on.

David Tothill Pretoria November 2008

9 A Personal Account of Dr Alfred M Escher’s Visit to South West Africa, 12-28 October 1972

Prologue

On the morning of Monday 2nd October, six days before Dr Escher’s arrival, a meeting was held in the office of the Secretary for Foreign Affairs to discuss programme arrangements. Those attending included General van den Bergh, Mr Dick van Zyl of the Bureau’s Windhoek office, Commissioner-General J.M. de Wet, Commissioner-General E.F. Potgieter, Mr I.P. van Onselen (Secretary for Bantu Administration and Development), Mr Bosman (Secretary for Coloured Relations and Rehoboth Affairs), Colonel Fred van Niekerk of the Security Police, and myself.

The programme initially envisaged by the Department of Foreign Affairs would have had the party fly to Katima Mulilo, overnight there, continue by air to Rundu, then proceed by car to Grootfontein, Tsumkwe and Tsumeb, thence to Ondangwa and Oshakati. The remainder of the journey, through Owambo and Damaraland, to Swakopmund, Walvis Bay and Windhoek, and points further South to Oranjemund, would be by car. It was felt that air travel should be restricted to the necessary minimum so that Dr Escher could be given a realistic impression of the Territory’s vastness and the nature of its terrain. The party would return to Pretoria from Oranjemund by air. The duration of the journey would be sixteen days.

Some members of the group felt, however, that the visit should more properly commence at Windhoek. Mr de Wet was one of these. Both General van den Bergh and Mr Fourie opposed this suggestion, the latter considering that Katatura and Windhoek’s non-Whites would leave a bad impression in Escher’s mind. It was necessary, Mr Fourie felt, to open the visit with the northern homeland areas and thus encourage the possibility of Escher’s first impression being a good one.

Mr de Wet agreed with this, but also urged upon the meeting the idea that the visit should conclude in the northern homelands in order to cancel out, in a measure, unfavourable impressions left by stops further south, particularly Rehoboth and Windhoek. What he particularly had in mind was that Dr Escher should attend the opening meeting of the new Kavango Constitutional Committee in Rundu on 27th October. He thought that this would give Dr Escher a positive view of separate development in South West Africa.

The meeting eventually accepted this recommendation. Thus it was decided, subject to the Prime Minister’s approval later that day, that the visit would commence with a flight to Katima Mulilo, overnight there, then fly the next day direct to Ondangwa. The visit would terminate at Rundu on 27th or 28th October, the party having called at Windhoek only once, on 24th and 25th October. Both General van den Bergh and Mr Fourie insisted that the stop at Windhoek should be restricted to as short a time as possible. At Mr de Wet’s instance, Kaokoland (Ohopoho) and Hereroland (Okakarara) were included in the itinerary. Mr de Wet mentioned that he and his administrative officer, Mr F.J. Strauss, would accompany the party on its entire journey in the Territory.

After the meeting, Mr de Wet and I remained behind to discuss with Mr Fourie the

10 details of the arrangements. At that time, Mr de Wet put through a call to Mr Nesbitt, General Manager of Consolidated Diamond Mines at Oranjemund. In the absence of Mr Nesbitt he spoke with Mr Wessels of C.D.M. and set arrangements in train for the party to visit Oranjemund as guests of C.D.M. He suggested that the company fly the party from Walvis Bay to Oranjemund and permit it to travel by road through Diamond Area No.1 to Luderitz. Mr Nesbitt subsequently called back, confirming that these arrangements were in order, but said that for security reasons C.D.M. would provide the transportation to Luderitz.

A meeting was held that afternoon in the Prime Minister’s office to finalise the programme arrangements. It was attended by Minister M.C. Botha, Minister Hilgard Muller, Commissioner-General de Wet, Commissioner-General Potgieter, Mr Fourie and myself. Minister A.H. du Plessis later came up at the Prime Minister’s request.

Before the meeting, in the Prime Minister’s waiting room, Minister M.C. Botha informed Mr de Wet that he would be stepping outside his province if he proposed accompanying the party throughout its visit to the Territory. Mr de Wet explained that his authority of course extended only to the homeland areas but that his knowledge of the Territory as a whole would be useful. The Prime Minister subsequently instructed that Mr D.F. Mudge, Senior Member of the Executive Committee in South West Africa, should accompany the party in the White area and assume responsibility for the relevant programme arrangements.

The Prime Minister expressed the wish that Dr Escher should meet with as many influential Whites as possible and that he should be made aware of the extent of White achievement in the Territory. He said that South West Africa consisted of more than non-Whites and that Dr Escher should realise this. The Prime Minister also said that the Government was responsible for the programme and arrangements and that Dr Escher should fall in with these. Finally, he instructed that the press were not to accompany the party.

Mr de Wet availed himself of the opportunity presented by the meeting to raise the question of the South West Africa coastline north of Swakopmund. He said that the policy of excluding eventual homeland control over the adjacent coastal areas was difficult to justify and had the potential for causing much dissatisfaction among the non-whites concerned. The Prime Minister was in general agreement with Mr de Wet’s views and asked that he should submit them formally. Mr de Wet undertook to do this.

Dr Escher and his party, comprising Mr M.E, Chacko (India), Mr H.Y. Noel (France), Mr M. Pedanou (Togo) and .Miss B. Mallinson (Australia), arrived in Johannesburg on the afternoon of 8th October. They were met at the airport by Minister J.P. van der Spuy, Minister of National Education, who had been one of Dr Escher’s ambassadorial colleagues in Vienna, by the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, and by Mr von Bach and myself.

Dr Escher spoke briefly with the press at the entrance V.I.P. area, explaining that he had come with an open mind but that he had nothing further to say at that time. The party then proceeded by car to the Government Guest House in Waterkloof Heights. Dr Escher, his group, Mr von Bach and I, subsequently went to Mr Fourie’s residence

11 for drinks.

It was an affable occasion and business was not discussed. But in the car, returning to the Guest House, Dr Escher informed Mr Chacko that “for optical reasons” (one of his favourite expressions), the visit to South West Africa should commence at Windhoek. The party’s air tickets had, in any event, been booked from New York through to Windhoek. I conveyed this to Mr Fourie the same evening.

Dr Escher and his Mission met with Mr Fourie in the latter’s office the next morning (Monday, 9th October). I was also present. Dr Escher was handed the large scale maps that he had requested in advance through the Permanent Mission, and also some small Shell tourist maps. The latter were to prove invaluable. The Mission was at the same time offered a selection of literature relating to the Territory i.e. SWA Survey 1967, Minister’s Letter to U Thant of 1969, Volume IV of our Written Statement to the International Court in 1970, the book Owambo, and South West Africa Case 1970-71: A Study in International Adjudication. Population statistics were also made available. It appeared that the Permanent Mission had previously supplied Dr Escher with most of this documentation.

Dr Escher submitted a list of twenty names of inhabitants of the Territory whom he wished to see. The names included all the leading non-White political and church figures in South West Africa. The only White was Mr Olle Erickson, Field Director of the Finnish Mission at Oniipa, Owambo. Dr Escher requested our assistance to enable him to see all of these people.

Dr Escher emphasized that the visit should commence at Windhoek and he brushed aside our arguments to the contrary. Mr Fourie mentioned that all the arrangements had been made and that it would be difficult at that late stage to change them, especially since the local people concerned were widely scattered across the Territory and could not easily be contacted. Mr Fourie also stated that it was difficult for us to comprehend Dr Escher’s insistence upon making Windhoek the first stop, for our programme included every part of the Territory.

It was obvious, though, that pressure had been brought to bear in New York and that Escher had been instructed to open his visit at Windhoek. His argument was that Windhoek was the Territory’s capital and that it would be considered strange if he were first to call at rural areas. Mr Chacko explained later that while the visit to South West Africa was obviously of subsidiary importance to the talks with the Government, if it was to take place at all it should, for reasons of public relations (Escher’s “optical reasons”), be seen to start at Windhoek. They were adamant about this and we were eventually obliged to give way.

That afternoon Escher, alone, paid a courtesy call on Minister A.H. du Plessis. Discussions were thereafter resumed in Mr Fourie’s office. In the evening, Minister van der Spuy hosted an informal dinner for Dr Escher at the Guest House. Apart from the members of the Mission, Mr Fourie, the Swiss Ambassador, Mr van Dalsen, Mr Taljaard, Mr von Bach and myself were present.

The Prime Minister, who was attending Kruger Day celebrations in Uitenhage and was thus away from Pretoria on Dr Escher’s arrival, had earlier offered to place an

12 aircraft at the party’s disposal to fly it to the Kruger Park on 10th October, which was a public holiday. Pleading pressure of work, Dr Escher had declined. At the dinner, however, Minister van der Spuy suggested that he arrange for Dr Escher to visit the National Zoological Gardens the next morning. Dr Escher was agreeable. The next day, therefore, Dr Escher, Mr Chacko, Miss Mallinson and myself were shown around the zoo by Dr Brandt, the Director. Dr Escher lunched with the Swiss Ambassador.

On the afternoon of Wednesday, 11th October, Dr Escher and his Mission met briefly with Dr Muller, thereafter for two hours with the Prime Minister in the latter’s office. Two basic impressions emerged. Firstly, Escher had only a sketchy grasp of the outline of the South West Africa issue, and none at all of its details. Secondly, his manner, possibly on account of nervousness, was aggressive and tended to antagonise. He certainly antagonised the Prime Minister, and Dr Muller, aiming to retrieve the situation, was on one occasion obliged to hint to Mr Chacko that he should join in the discussion.

At the conclusion of the formal meeting, the Prime Minister, Dr Muller and Dr Escher commenced informal discussions. The officials retired to Mr Fourie’s office to draft press releases, inter alia with regard to the programme. Dr Escher’s statement to the press read as follows:

As you will recall, gentlemen, at the time of my arrival, I indicated that it would be premature for me to make any statement to the press dealing with the substance of my mission. As you will readily understand, my first duty as representative of the Secretary-General is to report to him. If at the end of my stay there is any information which I feel I could share with you, I shall consider doing so.

That evening Dr Escher and his Mission attended a cocktail party at Dr Muller’s residence, Mr and Mrs Fourie, Mr and Mrs van Dalsen, Mr von Bach and I were also there. I had earlier drafted the following release on the programme which was telephoned to SAPA after the Minister’s party and also telexed to the United Nations in New York:

The Secretary-General’s Personal Representative, Dr Alfred Escher, and his party will fly to Windhoek tomorrow morning. They will be accompanied by Mr F.D. Tothill of the Department of Foreign Affairs.

After spending the 12th October and 13th October in Windhoek, they will depart early on the morning of the l4th October for Oshakati, and will spend two days in Owambo. From Oshakati they will travel to Ohopoho on 16th October, and will spend the night at Welwitschia. On the next day they will visit parts of Damaraland and will spend the night at Otjiwarongo. On the 18th October they will visit Okakarara, travelling later to Swakopmund, where they will spend that night and also the following night.

On the morning of the 19th October they will depart Walvis Bay for Oranjemund and will spend two nights there.

On the morning of the 22nd October they will depart Oranjemund for Keetmanshoop, where they will spend the night. They will return to Windhoek the next day via Gibeon and Rehoboth. The nights of the 23rd and 24th October will be spent in Windhoek.

13 From Windhoek they will travel to Tsumeb on the morning of the 25th October. The next day they will fly to Tsumkwe and also to Rundu. The nights of 26th and 27th October will be spent in Rundu.

From Rundu they will travel to Katima Mulilo, before returning to Pretoria.

The wording of this press release was a compromise between Dr Escher’s desire for maximum details of his programme to be publicised in advance in South West Africa, and our own wish (which was not disclosed to Escher) to conceal as many details as possible so as to avoid concentrations of demonstrators at points along the route. We were especially anxious to avoid details of Escher’s arrival in Windhoek being published in advance. To this end, Mr Fourie worked out a deal with the S.A.B.C. that while the programme would be released at midnight on 11th October, the latter would not broadcast it until 1.00 p.m. the next afternoon.

First Day (Thursday, 12th October)

Escorted by Colonel Fred van Niekerk and Major J.G. “Koos” Myburgh of the Security Police, who were designated Dr Escher’s bodyguards for the duration of his trip, the Escher group and I departed Jan Smuts Airport for Windhoek on flight SA 707 at 9.00 a.m. We arrived at J.G. Strijdom Airport at 10.45 a.m. and were met by Messrs J.M. de Wet, D.F. Mudge, and G.H. “Billy” Marais of the South West Africa Administration. There were no incidents and no demonstrations upon arrival.

I had previously arranged with Billy Marais for cars to collect the party on the tarmac. The baggage was to follow later. Thus the party was able to depart for Windhoek with the minimum of delay. The local press, who were grouped in the arrival hall, were slightly disconcerted by the speed of our departure. The Windhoek Advertiser ran an article that afternoon complaining about this.

Before we left the tarmac, Billy Marais mentioned that Mr Mudge was annoyed by the publicity given Mr de Wet in the local press - he had been blown up as the “leader” of the party and Mr Mudge’s name had not been mentioned. Mr Marais subsequently informed journalists that Mr Mudge would “lead” in the White area and Mr de Wet in the homelands.

While this personal rivalry was never really satisfactorily resolved, I made a point of impressing upon journalists whenever possible that Mr Mudge was responsible for programme arrangements in the White area and Mr de Wet in the homelands. My own job was to represent the Department of Foreign Affairs and to liaise between the Department and Dr Escher. As far as Escher himself was concerned, I made it clear that he was to communicate with the Department only through me. While the question of who was to “lead” was obviously of some importance to local officials, the Escher group did not consider that they were being led and tended to regard Messrs de Wet and Mudge and local officials in the light of functionaries smoothing their path.

From the airport the party proceeded to the Safari Motel where it arrived at 11.30 a.m. From 12.00 to 12.45 the group paid a courtesy call on the Administrator, Mr B.J. van der Walt. Sherry was served. From 1.00pm to 2.00pm Mr Mudge entertained the party to an informal lunch at the Safari Motel.

14 A photographer representing Die Suidwes-Afrikaner intruded and took between 30 and 40 pictures of the group seated at the table, before being asked to leave. Since this was a mixed gathering, the intention was apparently to embarrass Mr Mudge, the Leader of the National Party in the Legislative Assembly and Senior Member of the Executive Committee. The object seemed to be to catch Mr Mudge seated next to, or at least in conversation with, Mr Pedanou. That afternoon, in fact, Die Suidwes- Afrikaner ran a picture taken with a telephoto lens of Mr Mudge shaking hands with Mr Pedanou at the airport. It also carried a cartoon of Mr Mudge and Mr Pedanou.

After lunch, between 2.00 p.m. and 6.20 p.m., Dr Escher and his team met with some 24 persons representing he so-called “National Convention” .Leading figures in this group, who were on Dr Escher’s list, were Messrs Meroro, Kapuuo, Mutumbulua, Gerson Veii, H.C. Beukes, .H. Diergaardt, Mundjua, and Miss B. Beukes. The venue as the National Party caucus room in the Legislative Assembly Building. No South African officials were present, which was the pattern for all of Dr Escher’s interviews.

Mr de Wet had earlier that day, and unknown to me, addressed what amounted to a small press conference on the steps of the Administration Building. At that time he cordially invited correspondents, including B.B.C. television, to attend the opening meeting of the Kavango Constitutional Committee in Rundu on 27th October. He apparently also indicated that Escher would attend the meeting. Mr Kurt Dahlmann of the Allgemeine Zeitung gave prominence to this in that afternoon’s edition of his newspaper, which was drawn to Escher’s attention. (He was the only member of the Mission who could speak or read German.) At about 4.00 p.m. there was a break in the proceedings and Mr Pedanou was sent to summon me to Dr Escher’s presence. Dr Escher expressed grave concern over the report in the Allgemeine Zeitung and said that the whole idea of the meeting in Rundu violated the undertaking that the Prime Minister allegedly gave Dr Waldheim in July concerning the continued application of the homelands policy. He viewed the meeting as a threat to the success of his Mission and said that if it were not called off, he would not go to Rundu.

I replied that I had not been consulted on either the timing or content of Mr de Wet’s announcement. On the other hand, Dr Escher should not be alarmed by this meeting since it did not herald any new policy. It simply flowed from the Kavango Government’s request, on 17th July, for self-government, In fact, the request predated by some two weeks the Security Council’s consideration of Dr Waldheim’s first report and was thus covered by the Prime Minister’s statement in response to Dr Waldheim’s appeal.

Neither Dr Escher nor any member of his party had been aware of the background to the meeting, and my explanation seemed to mollify him to a certain extent. I also undertook to convey his representations to Pretoria, which I did, to Mr Fourie over the telephone. Mr Fourie said that he would pass them on, but that there was no possibility that the meeting would be cancelled or postponed. If Dr Escher didn’t want to go to Rundu, thus snubbing the Executive Council, there would probably be serious repercussions. I informed Mr Fourie of the invitation to journalists and suggested that he contact Minister M.C. Botha in this connection, with a view at least to prohibiting the admission of the television team which would only complicate our relations with Escher. Minister Botha later ruled that the B.B.C. could not be admitted to Kavango.

15 Between 7.00 p.m. and 10.00 p.m. the Administrator entertained the group to cocktails and dinner at the Safari Motel. The guests were primarily commercial figures and members of the Legislative Assembly and Executive Committee. Escher, Chacko and Noel were provocative, the latter especially scandalising those in his immediate vicinity at the dinner table with his view that South Africa should amend its policy. He said that the tendency in the modern world was togetherness rather than separation, and that policies of separate development were anachronisms. He cited the example of France, his own country, and Germany who, previously traditional enemies, had now managed to resolve their differences. Noel’s technique was to attack, but when his audience attempted to defend themselves he assumed an injured air and protested that a social occasion should not be abused.

We met after dinner, at Mr Chacko’s request, in my room to discuss the programme. Messrs de Wet and Marais were also present from our side and Noel, Pedanou and Miss Mallinson from the United Nations side. Mr Chacko said that all that they had seen of the programme was the brief press release which had been issued on the previous evening.

With the exception of the session of the Kavango Constitutional Committee in Rundu on 27th October, the United Nations group basically accepted the fifth detailed draft of our programme which set out places, dates, times and some of the personalities whom would be interviewed.

As far as the Council’s session was concerned, in response to my suggestion that this was something they would wish to inform themselves about even though the United Nations did not agree with the policy of separate development, Mr Chacko did not overrule attendance surreptitiously, in personal capacities. But under no circumstances would he agree to the Mission being involved officially. The fact that the press and television had been invited was obviously unpalatable to him.

While Mr Chacko left open the possibility of at least one member of the Mission attending the meeting in his personal capacity, Mr Noel was absolutely opposed to this. In the end, Mr Chacko said that he would talk it over with Dr Escher.

Our programme had made provision for the group to be entertained by several municipalities, i.e., Otjiwarongo, Swakopmund, Windhoek and Keetmanshoop. Inasmuch as the group included two non-Whites, it was thought that this would pose a problem so far as meals were concerned in White hotels. To overcome this problem, the strategy was devised whereby municipalities in the White area would host receptions. But, without being aware of the underlying reason for such entertainment, Mr Chacko expressed doubts on the grounds that the groups concerned were exclusively White and therefore closed. He would discuss the matter with Escher and let us know. He also mentioned that residents of Katatura had invited the United Nations team to attend a reception there. (This was later revealed to be a misunderstanding on Chacko’s part.)

Second Day (Friday, 13th October)

This was a long day, the interviews stretching from 8.45 a.m. to around 8.30 p.m., with a sandwich lunch at midday. Mr Kurt Dahlmann, Editor of the Allgemeine

16 Zeitung was the first to be interviewed, between 8.45 a.m. and 10.15 a.m. He was followed by two members of the Coloured Council - the Chairman, Mr D. Bezuidenhout, and Mr W.J. Filies. Then came two businessmen, members of the Legislative Assembly, Messrs W. Neef and H. van As. It appeared that Mr van As had been very annoyed by Dr Escher’s attitude. Mr J.W. Jagger - President of the Voice of the People, Mr Kefas Conradie - of the Old National Convention, and a group of six met with Dr Escher between 12.25 p.m. and 2.00 p.m. Around that time, Canon R.J. Wood of the Anglican Church submitted a written petition on behalf of twenty-four people, mainly non- Whites. The petition, inter alia, contained allegations against police methods. A spokeswoman for the Anglican Church telephoned to dissociate the Church from Wood’s views.

Between 2.00 p.m. and 4.30 p.m., Reverend Maasdorp, Pastor Gowaseb and Dr de Vries, the former of the Renish Mission, the last two both Evangelical Lutherans, were interviewed. They were on Dr Escher’s list. They were followed by the Katatura Advisory Board (4.30 to 5.50). Then came two members of the Windhoek Municipality, Messrs Kirkpatrick and Kaschik (5.50 to 7.00). These gentlemen were lawyers. From the substance of their remarks to me before their interview, I gathered that they, Kirkpatrick especially, were opposed to the maintenance of either a South African or a United Nations presence in South West Africa. They also objected to apartheid. From 7.15 to 8.05 Dr Escher met with the Reverend Kauraira, who was also on his list, and nine others representing the Herero Royal House. The day’s interviews concluded with Canon Wood, in his personal capacity, and Mr Whitford, Principal of St George’s School.

During the course of the afternoon, Mr de Wet telephoned Minister M.C. Botha to obtain ex post facto authority for his invitation to newsmen to attend the Rundu meeting. He phrased this in terms that he would like to invite the correspondents. Mr Botha concurred. Mr de Wet also received a call from Mr Willem Lubbe, Chief Director in Owambo, who reported that a large demonstration was being arranged by SWAPO and others on the occasion of Dr Escher’s arrival at Ondangwa airport the next morning. Mr de Wet conveyed this information to Minister M.C. Botha. He then telephoned Bishop Auala in Oniipa to request his co-operation in keeping the demonstration peaceful. Bishop Auala apparently stated that he had no influence over the people concerned.

It was at that time that Mr de Wet formulated the plan of staging an “accident” to one of the light aircraft that would convey the party to Ondangwa, necessitating its diversion to another point where the party could be picked up and transported further by Air Force helicopters. He sent word to the commanding officer at Ondangwa to give instructions to his pilots. I considered this plan slightly melodramatic but did not oppose it since the people on the spot were worried about the pending demonstration and Mr de Wet was convinced that it would be to our disadvantage to permit Escher to view the demonstration. In retrospect, this plan was completely misguided. That the Government was not seriously embarrassed was entirely fortuitous.

During the afternoon I telexed Mr Fourie regarding a discussion I had had with Chacko on the distribution of the costs of the trip –

17 Chacko had said that the party had enough money to cover hotel expenses but were not able to finance the cost of larger items such as air and road transportation. I had told Chacko that we would settle such costs and bill the United Nations at a later date. Chacko had also enquired about the possible date of the conclusion of the talks in Pretoria. He indicated that he was anxious to return to New York not later than Friday, 3rd November. I learned subsequently that it was his wedding anniversary on the Saturday.

Escher and his team and the South Africans dined separately at the Safari Motel that evening. Billy Marais and I were Mr de Wet’s guests, as were Mrs Sexta Maree (his typist), Fred Strauss and the latter’s Otjiwarongo girl friend. The main topic of conversation was the relations between various Government Departments which brought guests to South West Africa. Mr de Wet said that the present system where Information, Foreign Affairs, and the South West Africa Administration had a hand in bringing visitors to the homelands was unsatisfactory and should be changed. It would be preferable to channel visits through only one agency. He pointed out that Mr Marais, as an employee of the South West Africa Administration, had no locus standi in homeland areas and that the arrangement whereby he escorted guests of the Department of Foreign Affairs on visits to the homelands was purely an ad hoc one. What would happen, he asked, when Mr Marais no longer occupied his present position? I agreed with most of Mr de Wet’s observations, but said that while I personally was aware of the difficulty, I had not yet succeeded in impressing upon my Department that there was a problem.

After dinner, Messrs Chacko, Noel, Pedanou, de Wet, Marais and I met in my room to discuss the Rundu question. This was at my suggestion, for I wanted to show them a cutting from The Windhoek Advertiser of 17th July, 1972, proving that the Kavango Executive Committee had on that day requested self-government. It was again explained that the forthcoming meeting of the Constitutional Committee was the direct outcome of the request for self-government.

Third Day (Saturday, 14th October)

At 7.15 a.m. the party departed Eros Airport in two light aircraft, bound ostensibly for Ondangwa. Dr Escher, Mr de Wet, Mr Chacko, Miss Mallinson, Mrs Maree and Colonel van Niekerk were transported in the twin-engine Piper Navajo owned by the South West Africa Administration and piloted by the Administration pilot, Mr Nico Maritz. Major Myburgh, Fred Strauss, Noel Pedanou and I followed in a twin-engine Piper Aztec chartered from South West African Airways. The routes diverged: the Administration aircraft plotted a course to the Waterberg in preparation for the “accident”, while the second aircraft aimed at the Etosha Pan.

Nico Maritz apparently handled the “accident” convincingly. While in flight he switched off one of his engines, pleading a petrol blockage, and landed safely at Oshivelo. Chacko observed the loss of power as reflected on the aircraft’s instruments and was quite intrigued. On that evidence he had no doubt as to its genuineness. Unfortunately, however, the pilot of the second aircraft only received a radio message to divert to Oshivelo five minutes from touch down at Ondangwa. The airstrip was already visible. He then turned back and took another 25 or 30 minutes to fly to

18 Oshivelo, much to the dissatisfaction of Noel and Pedanou since the latter was suffering from airsickness. It would have been more convincing if this aircraft had landed at Ondangwa, leaving its passengers to face the demonstration. In any event, Noel and Pedanou were annoyed, but not suspicious at that stage.

While awaiting the arrival of the second aircraft at Oshivelo, however, the pilot of one of the two Airforce Puma helicopters sent to pick the party up, Captain Zunckel, fell into conversation with Miss Mallinson. He told her that orders had been received the previous evening for the party to be picked up at Oshivelo. Mrs Maree, who was also present, then told Captain Zunckel in Afrikaans that the United Nations team was not supposed to know that, and he hastily changed the subject. But the damage had been done, for Miss Mallinson realised what had happened and reported it to Dr Escher.

We were never formally taxed with this deception, but it was made clear on an informal basis that we had diverted to Oshivelo solely to avoid the “welcoming committee” at Ondangwa. We could only say in reply that all the Executive Councillors and Directors were waiting for us at Ondangwa, in the hot sun, and did the UN team think that we were actually so stupid as to organise such a childish prank? They agreed that they could hardly credit us with such stupidity, and there the matter rested.

The plan to avoid the demonstrators achieved nothing, because the same demonstrators, with their placards and reinforced by others in the meantime, merely moved from Ondangwa to the State Hospital at Oshakati, where the party was to lunch, and were present in strength when we arrived there.

The Piper Aztec arrived at Oshivelo at 9.35 a.m. The whole party then boarded the helicopters and were flown to Oshakati via Fort Namutoni and the Etosha Pan. Various species of game were sighted en route. The party arrived at Oshakati at 10.25 a.m., proceeding immediately to the soft drink factory for refreshments.

After a short tour through the furniture factory, the members of the party went to their respective residences. Dr Escher, Miss Mallinson, and Colonel van Niekerk were quartered with Mr de Wet. The remainder were accommodated by Fred Strauss. Chacko and I shared one room, Pedanou and Noel another. Koos Myburgh had a room to himself.

The group went to the hospital at 12.30 p.m., where they were welcomed by between 100 and 200 demonstrators bearing placards calling for Namibia to be free. The demonstrators were friendly to the South African officials. The party then split up into groups of one or two which were escorted over the hospital by Dr Gildenhuys and members of his staff. Before lunch Dr Gildenhuys addressed the whole party on the functions of the hospital and the nature of medical services in Owambo. Dr Gildenhuys hosted lunch for the party at the hospital. Interviews commenced in Mr de Wet’s office at 2.20 p.m., Dr Escher having first greeted a crowd of some 200 persons outside the Administrative Centre. He explained that he could not receive everybody but that he would meet with their representatives.

The first interview, between 2.20 and 3.45, was with the Owambo Executive Council. They were followed by Bishop Auala (3.50 to 5.00), and by Johnny Otto, Johannes

19 Nangutuuala and fifteen others representing SWAPO (5.00 to 7.00). Messrs Peter Kalungula, Olle Erickson, Nelengani and Shilongu were interviewed at intervals after 7.00 p.m.

Johnny Otto, Johannes Nangutuuala, Bishop Auala and Olle Erickson had been on Dr. Escher’s list.

The Owambo Executive Council entertained the party at a reception in the Administrative Compound at the conclusion of the interviews. This was similar to the reception given Dr Waldheim in March, but the food was more palatable. Miss Mallinson was the only woman present.

I met Bishop Auala’s sons, who seemed to be teachers or church workers. They were pleasant, if somewhat earnest people. They adhered to their father’s line about human rights and equal pay for equal work. One expressed the hope that labourers’ wages could be increased, for they were too low at present. Otherwise, he agreed with the principle of wage differentiation between educated and uneducated people.

The major commanding helicopters at Ondangwa mentioned that Airforce Headquarters in Pretoria had sent a helicopter for our use. It occurred to me that instead of proceeding to Ohopoho and Welwitschia by car we could use this helicopter and perhaps take a side trip to the Skeleton Coast. Unfortunately, however, this plan had to be abandoned on account of shortage of fuel and the fact that one helicopter could not transport the whole party for a long distance.

Fourth Day (Sunday, 15th October)

The first item on the programme was an official interview with Mr de Wet. After breakfast, however, Dr Escher raised the Rundu question again. He had refused to accept our explanation concerning the meeting of the Kavango Constitutional Committee and he insisted on telephoning the Prime Minister. Chacko said later that he had not discussed the Rundu meeting with Escher after our last discussion in Windhoek on the Friday evening and that it had been Escher’s own idea to raise it again at this stage.

It was not quite clear what Escher thought he was doing. He may have felt that Mr de Wet and I were leading him up the garden path and that all he had to do was report us to the Prime Minister for his wishes to be acceded to. Or he may simply have thought that he could bully the Prime Minister into submission. Whatever his reason he obtained no satisfaction from the Prime Minister.

Unknown to Escher, Mr de Wet and I listened in to the conversation in another office on an extension telephone. Escher protested that the meeting was a contravention of the Prime Minister’s undertaking to Dr Waldheim, and that if it was held, it would ruin his mission. It should, therefore, be cancelled or postponed. Dr Escher’s tone was again somewhat aggressive and the Prime Minister seemed to take offence. He said that he did not agree with Dr Escher and that he had no authority to cancel the meeting. Dr Escher replied that this was difficult to believe since everyone knew that if the Prime Minister didn’t want something to happen, it wouldn’t happen!

20 The Prime Minister reiterated that the meeting had been arranged by the Kavango peoples themselves and that he was powerless to stop it. He said further (on the basis of what Mr de Wet had told him over the telephone before he spoke with Escher) that it seemed to him that Dr Escher was meeting mainly with elements hostile to the South African Government, and that he would take a serious view of the situation if Dr. Escher did not meet with the Kavango Executive Council.

The conversation, which lasted about twenty minutes, ended somewhat in the air with Escher saying that he would take cognisance of the Prime Minister’s views, but that he had not yet decided if he would go to Rundu. He would only decide this later.

After this conversation Dr Escher asked that Mr de Wet and I should come and see him. He was most concerned and complained that it was a very sensitive issue and that the mission would be doomed if New York discovered that he had been to Rundu.

The Africans in New York were very concerned about the continued application of the homelands policy, and this was the sort of thing that could kill the mission, especially since a number of groups opposed the continuation of contacts with South Africa. He believed that this was South Africa’s last chance for a peaceful solution to the South West Africa question and he appealed to us not to do anything to make his task impossible. In any event, he said, the Africans believed that the South African Government was simply using the contacts to play for time. In regard to the Prime Minister’s remark that he seemed only to be meeting with hostile elements, Escher appealed to us to correct this impression, since he was prepared to see everyone.

I replied that I was very well aware of the situation in New York, having served at South Africa’s mission to the United Nations. I certainly knew that there were a number of groups which opposed the idea of contacts with the South African Government and wished to sabotage them. However, the Rundu meeting hardly fell into the category of something which could be seized upon as an excuse to terminate the contacts. If that was the case, any excuse would suffice.

I said that I did not understand the allegation that we were playing for time. A similar allegation had been made against us in connection with the former South West Africa Case at the International Court of Justice. For reasons that were not our responsibility, that case had lasted six years. But the present contacts were different. Dr Waldheim himself had said that the South West Africa issue did not lend itself to instant solutions. We agreed with that view.

In any event, one of the Great Powers in the Security Council (the Soviet Union) was opposed to the contacts, not simply because they were with the South African Government, but that they might lead to the Secretary-General enjoying an independent role, something to which, on the basis of their experiences with Hammarskjold, they were completely opposed. It was due to this Great Power’s insistence that the Secretary-General was obliged first to check everything with the Group of Three.

The reason for the establishment of the Group of Three was really unconnected with the merits of the South \vest Africa issue. Its existence only complicated matters, and the same could be said of all the other groups which expected to be consulted on

21 every move contemplated by the Secretary-General. Noel, Pedanou and Miss Mallinson took notes while I spoke. Chacko remained silent, leaving Escher to do the talking.

With reference to Escher’s view that his mission represented South Africa’s last chance for a peaceful solution, I briefly traced the history of the South West Africa question since 1966. The so-called hard-line had failed, giving way to the soft-line represented by Escher’s present mission. Did Escher believe that if the soft-line failed, the hard-line stood any better chance of success?

Our meeting lasted about 30 minutes. We then took up the rest of the programme, with the exception of Mr de Wet’s interview, which was postponed until a later date. Mr de Wet had previously been invited to address a gathering of the Owambo/Kavango Church at Ombalantu.

Consequently, he did not. accompany us for the rest of the day.

Accompanied instead by the Owambo Executive Council and two or three of the Directors, the party departed at 10.45 a.m. in two Puma helicopters for the Agricultural College at Ogongo. We arrived at 11.00 a.m. and were met by Mr van Heerden, Principal of the College. After taking tea, we inspected the premises and facilities, including staff and student housing. The college, which was under construction last year, will shortly receive its first students. Dr Escher was especially impressed by the herd of Swiss cattle which had been imported to improve the local cattle strain.

We departed for Ombalantu at 12.30, arriving 20 minutes later. Mr de Wet had wanted us to observe him addressing the Church service, but my main interest was to show Escher the large baobab tree.

Consequently, we avoided the service. An additional reason was the possibility of a demonstration, but this was a damp squib. After a stop of 20 minutes to take photographs of the tree, we took off for Ruacana, arriving about 25 minutes later.

We landed at the turning circle above the Falls and were met by Mr Truebody of the Department of Water Affairs, who transported us by bus to the crocodile pool for a sandwich lunch. Mr Truebody discussed the Ruacana Scheme over lunch with Dr Escher and members of his team. At 2.40 p.m. we took to the air again for an aerial inspection of the Falls.

The flow of water was disappointingly small. Thereafter, we took on fuel at Ruacana Airstrip and proceeded to Headman Kautuime’s kraal near Oshikango. We arrived at the kraal at 4.30 and, after a wait of 35 minutes, sampled mohango beer, mohango porridge and chicken, the latter prepared traditional style. Escher and Noel ate heartily of the chicken, but Miss Mallinson, Chacko and Pedanou preferred to do without. Pedanou’s stomach was especially sensitive to non-Western foods.

Escher had made an appointment to meet with Johnny Otto again at 5.30 and he was anxious to leave the kraal shortly after 5.00. But traditional Owambo hospitality dictacted otherwise. He was impatient at first, realised that he could not get away,

22 then enjoyed the dancing put on for our benefit until he could decently take his departure (at 6.25).

From 7.00 to 8.05 Escher and his team interviewed Johnny Otto and two others privately at Mr de Wet’s residence. Thereafter, Mrs de Wet served a light meal.

That evening I spoke with Billy Marais over the telephone. He was in Windhoek. He said that there appeared to have been a misunderstanding on the question of entertainment in Katatura. He had taken the matter up with Clemens Kapuuo, who knew nothing about it. Kapuuo had been given a document (Waldheim’s first report) which the UN group had asked to be returned to them. Kapuuo had previously suggested to Chacko that Dr Escher should meet with two white lawyers in Windhoek. Chacko had forgotten the names and had asked that Kapuuo be contacted to find out who they were. I conveyed this to Billy. Billy and I also agreed that in view of Chacko’s attitude towards entertainment by White municipalities it would, if possible, be advisable to cancel most of the receptions still scheduled.

This applied particularly to Keetmanshoop and Windhoek.

The day’s events concluded with a visit of an hour to the business premises of Mr Frans Idongo, who owns a bottle store, a wholesale and retail business, and a 28 bed hotel (14 rooms) with swimming pool. The hotel is patronised by Portuguese en route to and from Angola. Mr Idongo was employed at one time at a canning factory in Walvis Bay. There he saved enough money to open a small business seven years ago, and has never looked back. He never needed to apply for a loan from the Bantu Investment Corporation.

Before going to bed I drafted a telex for Mrs Maree to transmit to Mr Fourie the next morning, containing the names of four prisoners on Robben Island whom Dr Escher had asked to see. The names included Herman Ja-Toivo and Tuhadeleni. I made it clear to Chacko when he gave me the list that I was doubtful the request could be acceded to.

Fifth Day (Monday, 16th October)

The party departed Oshakati for Ohopoho, Kaokoland, at 7.25 a.m. in four cars. Dr Escher, Mr de Wet and Colonel van Niekerk occupied the first car; Mr Chacko, Miss Mallinson and myself the second; Messrs Noel and Pedanou the third; and Major Myburgh and Fred Strauss the fourth. The baggage followed in Major Myburgh’s Police van driven by W/O Piet Coetzee of the Security Police.

Messrs Gert Schoombee and Gielie Visser of the South West Africa Administration drove the first and second cars, both air-conditioned Ford Fairlanes provided by the Administration. The driver of the third car, also an Administration Fairlane, was W/O Wiland Wagner of the Security Police. This car was not air-conditioned, and in consequence, Noel and Pedanou suffered somewhat from dust and the heat. Fred Strauss drove the fourth car, air-conditioned Chevrolet Constantia, which was one of de Wet’s official vehicles.

The dust stirred up on the dirt-strip road by the sage of the vehicles was irksome and

23 the drivers were obliged to drop several hundred yards behind the car immediately in front. We reached the Kaokoland/Owambo border at 10.00 a.m. at which time the cavalcade stopped consume water. Three adult Ovahimbas in traditional dress, two males and a female carrying a small baby, provided a brief, but welcome diversion. The journey resumed at 10.05, the party arriving at Ohopoho at 10.50.

Escher plunged into his interviews immediately after our arrival. These took place in the office of Mr Jooste, Commissioner for Kaokoland. A group of some 300 persons surrounded the wood and iron administration building. They were told that Dr Escher could not see everybody and they were asked to designate representatives. A group of four Hereros belonging to the Clemens Kapuuo faction were heard first. The crowd excluded protested asked to be addressed as a group. A few other individuals were interviewed until 12.45. Since there was no chance Escher meeting everyone, Mr de Wet suggested that the former should say a few words to the crowd after lunch. All concerned were agreeable to this.

At Mr de Wet’s instance again, Escher and his team met at 12.45 with the persons apprehended in the recent incident between Owambos and Hereros on the Owambo/Kaokoland border, which had resulted in one or more deaths. Mr Aucamp, a magistrate, had come up from Windhoek in connection with the hearing. Afterwards, the party took a light lunch prepared by Mrs Jooste under the trees outside her house. The house itself, built of stone, dates back to the German period.

From 3.00 to 3.50 p.m. Dr Escher addressed a gathering of those he had not been able to hear that morning. At his request, no South African officials were present. This was the first public gathering that he was enabled to address and it seemed to whet his appetite.

We commenced the journey to Welwitschia at 4.00 p.m. At 6.00 we stopped alongside the fence bordering the Etosha Game Reserve for refreshments. A number of small buck and Ostrich were seen en route. The car transporting Chacko and me later experienced a flat tire which had to be changed. Miss Mallinson changed cars at that time, driving further with Noel and Pedanou. Near Welwitschia Gielie Visser took a dip, formed by a dry river bed, too quickly and dropped the silencer. Since Gielie was driving at speeds in excess of sixty miles per hour, Chacko was nervous and balanced himself on the edge of the seat. We limped into Welwitschia at 8.25 p.m.

With the exception of Messrs. de Wet and Strauss, who overnighted at Mr Piek’s (Damara Commissioner) house, the party was accommodated in the house constructed for the resident medical officer in Welwitschia.

Since this post has not yet been filled the house, which was furnished, was unoccupied. Dr Escher and Miss Mallinson were given rooms with baths. Chacko and I shared a room, as did Colonel van Niekerk and Major Myburgh. Pedanou and Noel, the latter sleeping on the floor, shared the study.

The party retired around midnight, after drinks and a cold buffet. Before going to sleep, Chacko mentioned that the people of Ohopoho appeared not to have been given advance notice of Escher’s coming. I denied this and asked how else would so many people have awaited our arrival? Chacko maintained that they had been there in

24 connection with the court case. But this could not have been so since a number of youths came prepared with posters to show Escher.

It was at this time that we worked out a formula whereby Dr Escher could visit Rundu in accordance with the published programme. I said that we had never really expected them to attend the meeting of the Constitutional Committee in their official capacities.

On the other hand, we certainly expected them to meet with the Kavango Executive Council and that there could be serious repercussions if they did not do so.

I told Chacko further that they could expect to receive a formal, written invitation to attend the meeting. He said that he was glad to be informed of this at this stage, because if the formal invitation should be extended before their arrival in Rundu, they would not be able to go to Rundu at all. As things were at present, they were able to take the position that they had no official know ledge of the meeting.

I said that there would be no difficulty in withholding the invitation until their arrival in Rundu. On this basis, subject to Escher’s concurrence, and provided that they were not required to meet with the Council at the latter’s official premises, Chacko agreed that the party would go to Rundu as planned.

Sixth Day (Tuesday, 17th October)

Shortly after 9.00 a.m. Escher and his team were transported to Mr Piek’s office for their interview with the Damara Council. No other interviews were scheduled, which prompted Escher to enquire if his visit had been given any advance publicity in Damaraland. He was informed that this had been the case, but that the Damaras were quite happy that the Council should speak for them.

We learned that representatives of the press had arrived and Mr de Wet hastily exchanged his safari suit for a lounge suit in case they should wish to take pictures. The press men concerned were Messrs Clive Cowley (Argus Group), John Ryan (S.A.A.N.), Antonie van der Smit (S.A.B.C.) and van Niekerk (Die Suidwes- Afrikaner).

Escher met with the Damara Council between 9.25 and 11.30 a.m. This meeting gave rise to the first really controversial incident of the tour. Escher apparently propagandised the Damaras, who later revealed to the S.A.B.C. correspondent what they had told Escher and what he allegedly had told them. The other correspondents also interviewed the Damara Council, and claimed not to have heard their reference to Escher’s alleged remarks as quoted by the S.A.B.C. on this basis, Clive Cowley later accused the Government, in print, of using the S.A.B.C. to sabotage Escher’s mission.

It seemed, however, that Mr van der Smit of the S.A.B.C. had also met separately with the Council at which time he was given the information which he included in his report.

The following item, based on the S.A.B.C. report, appeared in Die Transvaler on 18th October 1972:

25 Dr Albert [sic] Escher, personal representative of UN Secretary-General Dr Kurt Waldheim, says that the UN will be obliged to ‘take other steps and bring pressure to bear’ if it appears that South Africa is not prepared to continue negotiations with a view to a solution of the South-West question.

Dr Escher addressed the Damara leaders and expressed the hope that South Africa and the UN will find a peaceful solution to the question. (Translation)

At 11.30 a.m. Dr Escher and his party were shown over the high school by the principal, Mr du Plessis. He inspected one or two classrooms. The children sang for him. He then toured through the township and visited a primary school there. Mr Gobs, a member of the Damara Council, took the party to his business premises -where he served soft drinks - and also to his home. While sarcastic about the intentions of the South African Government, he displays photographs of the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister in his living room.

The party returned to the government offices at 1.15 p.m. in order to receive a written statement which the Damara Council had drafted in the meantime. Chacko asked me why all the streets leading to the government offices had been blocked off with wooden barricades. He apparently saw these as analogous to the barricades used by the New York City Police to control demonstrations. I discovered that the purpose was to prevent vehicular traffic from stirring up dust in the vicinity of the offices and informed Chacko accordingly.

At 2.30 p.m., after a light lunch, the party drove out to the petrified forest, some thirty miles from Welwitschia. Miss Mallinson stayed behind to work. Mr Kotze of the Department of Bantu Administration and Development acted as our guide. The petrified forest comprises mainly fragments and chips of giant trees which no longer grow in South West Africa. Welwitschia plants are indigenous to the area.

At 4.00 p.m. the S.A.B.C. news flashes carried a report on Dr Escher’s alleged remarks to the Damara Council. I told Chacko, who was travelling in the same car, that Escher had better be careful, otherwise the Government would be obliged to go on record with a strong statement. Chacko said that he himself hadn’t been too happy at the time when Escher made the remarks.

We arrived back in Welwitschia at 5.00 p.m. and departed for Otjiwarongo at 6.00 p.m., arriving at 8.30 p.m. We were met, not only by Messrs Dirk Mudge and Billy Marais, but also by a large group of non-White placard holders outside the Hamburgerhof Hotel, where we were to spend the night. We had, in fact, to fight our way through the demonstrators to the hotel entrance. A message awaited me at the hotel to the effect that Mr Fourie would telephone at 7.00 a.m. the next morning.

The evening meal took the form of a reception hosted by the Municipality of Otjiwarongo. For some reason - possibly because it possessed a private dining room - the venue was a hotel situated a short distance from the Hamburgerhof. Escher’s attire gave rise to adverse comment. It was a semi-formal occasion, i.e., lounge suits, but Escher arrived jacketless in an open-neck shirt, khaki trousers and black shoes. The other members of his party were correctly dressed. To make Escher feel at home, most of the guests removed their jackets. Miss Mallinson was the only woman present.

26 This function was also controversial, as revealed by the following extracts from a report which appeared in Die Suidwester on 23rd October, 1972:

’n Inwoner van Otjiwarongo wat Donderdagaand [sic] ‘n buffetete bygewoon het wat die burgemeester, mnr H. van Wyk, ter ere van dr. Escher en sy geselskap aangebied het, het gisteraand aan Die Suidwester gesê: ‘Ek was verstom.

So iets het ek nooit verwag.’

A resident of Otjiwarongo who attended a buffet dinner that the mayor, Mr H. van Wyk, had hosted on Thursday [sic] evening in honour of Dr Escher and his group, told Die Suidwester yesterday: ‘I was amazed. I never expected anything like that.’

Hy het bygevoeg dat dr. Escher die vertrek binnegekom het en kort daarna weer uit is om gou met iemand te gesels wat hy vroeër in Windhoek ontmoet het. Toe het hy teruggekom en van begin tot end die geselskap oorheers.’

He added that Dr Escher had entered the room and shortly thereafter went out to speak quickly to someone he had met earlier in Windhoek. Then he returned and dominated the conversation from beginning to end.

Die tema van die eensydige gesprek was wat die Suid-Afrikaanse Regering moet doen en wat hy nie moet doen nie, en hoe gou hy dit alles moet doen.

The theme of the one-sided conversation was what the South African Government should and should not do, and how quickly it had to do it.

Mnr. A.J. Davids, onderburgemeester, het aan dr. Escher gesê al wat gevra word, is tyd om die nie-blankes op te lei sodat hulle later hul plekke kan volstaan in hul eie selfregerende gebiede.

Mr. A.J. Davids, deputy mayor, told Dr Escher that all that was asked was time to uplift the non-Whites so that they could eventually take their places in their own self-governing territories.

Dr. Escher was nie met hierdie argument gediend nie. Volgens omstanders het hy hom later selfs lelik vererg.

Dr Escher was not satisfied with this argument. According to bystanders he later became extremely annoyed.

‘Julle speel net vir tyd. Maar daar is nie tyd nie. In vyftig jaar het julle niks gedoen nie’, het hy gesê …

‘You are just playing for time. But there is no time. In fifty years you have done nothing’, he said …

Hy het op Otjiwarongo Duits gepraat en vol emosie uitgeroep: ‘Die huis brand.’

He spoke German at Otjiwarongo and cried emotionally: ‘The house is burning.’

Dr. Escher was so driftig dat van die mense wat Duits ken, maar nie so vlot soos die meeste Suidwesters praat nie, dit moeilik gevind het om hoegenaamd ‘n woord in te kry, aangesien hy hulle nie die kans daarvoor

27 gegee het nie.

Dr Escher was so voluble that people who knew German, but could not speak it as fluently as most South-Westers, found it difficult to get a word in especially since they were not afforded the chance to do so.

Dr. Escher het byvoorbeeld na Suidwes as ‘Namibië’ verwys, iets waarvan die ander gaste op die onthaal nie gehou het nie. Hy is daarop gewys.

Dr Escher referred for example to South-West as ‘Namibia’, which the other guests at the reception did not like. He was told that.

Aan die persoon wat dit aan hom gese het, het hy gese, dit is ‘Namibië’ en bygevoeg dat hy ‘nog nooit deur ‘n volwassene so in die rede geval is nie’.

To the person who told him that, he said it is ‘Namibia’ and added that he had ‘never before been interrupted like that by an adult.’

Otjiwarongo se voorste inwoners is so geskok oor dr. Escher se gedrag dat hulle nou nog nie daaroor uitgepraat is nie. Toe hy Vrydagoggend [sic] vertrek het, het van die inwoners besluit om ook ‘n hou in te kry en het hom gaan groet.

Otjiwarongo’s leading citizens were so shocked by Dr Escher’s conduct that they still haven’t stopped talking about it. When he departed on Friday [sic] morning, some of the citizens decided also to strike a blow and went to say goodbye to him.

Hulle het gevra wat Vittorio Carpio van sy reis deur Suidwes sou dink. Dr. Escher het hiervan niks gehou nie en geantwoord dat hy dr. Carpio nie ken nie.

They asked what Vittorio Carpio would think of his [Escher’s] journey through the Territory. Dr Escher didn’t like this at all and replied that he did not know Dr Carpio.

Otjiwarongo se mense kon nie help om na die onthaal ‘n vergelyking te tref tussen die gedrag van dr. Escher en mnr. Mangalam Chacko, een van die twee senior V.V.O.-amptenare wat dr. Escher vergesel, nie.

After the reception Otjiwarongo’s people couldn’t help comparing Dr Escher’s conduct with that of Mr Mangalam Chacko, one of the two senior UN officials who accompanied Dr Escher.

Mnr. Chacko het in sy gesprekke op die onthaal eerlik gesê die Suid- Afrikaanse Regering sal in pas moet kom. Hoewel hy glo dat die blankes eerlik is met hul bedoelinge, glo hy nie dit sal in die praktyk werk nie. Een mens, een stem is al oplossing, het hy gese.

In his conversations at the reception Mr Chacko said clearly that the South African Government would need to get in step. Although he believed that the whites were honest in their intentions, he did not think they would work in practice. One man, one vote was the only solution, he said.

Mnr. Chacko het dit egter op hoflike wyse gese en nie probeer om sy sienswyse op die ander gaste af te dwing nie.

However, Mr Chacko said this courteously and did not try to force his point of view on the other guests.

28 This report was a good example of the type of difficulty that Dr Escher and his team would cause. While they never spoke directly to the press they imagined, somewhat naively, that they could speak freely at social gatherings. However, those to whom they spoke were usually only too eager to give colourful versions of their remarks to representatives of the local press. And these reports, in turn, served to inflame White opinion in the Territory and led directly to the intervention by the Prime Minister and Dr Muller.

Noel was also somewhat provocative at this reception, but his conduct was far overshadowed by Dr Escher’s behaviour. At one stage I saw Noel deep in conversation with two German-speaking individuals. Noel, who comes from Normandy, had been imprisoned in Germany during the war. He told me later that one of these two men had been a member of the German army of occupation in Normandy and had said that he had greatly enjoyed his experiences there!

A number of the guests came to me during the course of the evening and expressed concern that the Government was changing its policy towards South West Africa. The words “sell-out” were used on more than one occasion. I assured them that this was not the case. But this was the attitude of many Whites in the Territory at the time of the visit. They could not understand why the Government had admitted Escher to South West Africa if it were not on the point of a policy change. White opinion, at least among Government supporters, was that the visit was a mistake and that it should be cut short. Government supporters were also generally in agreement that under no circumstances should a United Nations team again be permitted to tour the Territory.

White residents of small towns like Otjiwarongo are accustomed to a submissive attitude on the part of the non-Whites and they could also not understand why a demonstration, such as had occurred outside the Hamburgerhof, should be tolerated by the authorities. Their views were especially embarrassing to Mr Mudge, since Otjiwarongo falls within his constituency. As demonstrations go, it was peaceful and friendly, even unsophisticated, in fact more of a crowd of people standing in one place than anything else. But the fact that it had occurred at all, was not acceptable to the Whites, who probably saw it as the thin end of the wedge.

Seventh Day (Wednesday, 18th October)

Mr Fourie telephoned at 7.00 a.m. He was most concerned about Escher’s alleged remarks to the Damara Council, as reported by the S.A.B.C. He said that the Prime Minister was very annoyed, that things were going wrong, and that the Minister and himself would fly to Oranjemund on the Saturday (21st October) to have matters out with Escher. I should in the meantime inform Escher that the Minister’s programme would permit him to link up with the party at Oranjemund.

Armed with this, and supported by Messrs Mudge and de Wet (the former was especially indignant about the incidents of the previous evening), I told Chacko that we wished to have a word with Escher and himself before starting out on the day’s programme. The only suitable venue was Escher’s suite in the hotel.

I acted as spokesman. I told Escher that his mission did not involve the dissemination

29 of propaganda on behalf of the United Nations, but simply the ascertaining of views. He was certainly not entitled to make speeches or proposals. I also said that while he assumed the right to insist that the South African Government should do nothing to prejudice the outcome of the contacts with the Secretary-General, we had the right to put the same request to him. Escher said very little and appeared shaken.

Chacko then drew him aside and spoke privately with him for a few minutes. Judging by Escher’s conduct for the rest of the day, our talk made an impression.

We travelled by road to Okakarara between 9.00 and 10.00 a.m. From 10.30 to 1.00 the United Nations team met with four groups of Hereros. Escher was overheard to tell one of the groups that: “I can’t promise you anything because I have no decisions to take. But I am sure that a friendly solution with the South African Government would be the best for all concerned.” The group concerned had not expected such submissiveness on the part of a United Nations representative and muttered expressions of disappointment.

News was received from Walvis Bay during the course of the morning that trouble was brewing up there. Mr de Wet contacted the magistrate at Walvis Bay several times for his views on the situation. Messrs de Wet, Mudge and the Security Police were inclined to the recommendation that the Swakopmund/Walvis Bay leg should be deleted from the programme. But I was reluctant that any part of the programme should be cut, and said so. Escher was being difficult enough, and if we proposed major alterations at this stage, especially on grounds of law and order, it would be a confession of failure and give Escher the advantage. I maintained that we should rather attempt to complete the programme as published and deal with any difficulties as they arose.

The tour trembled in the balance, for if any hard news of demonstrations or strikes had been received from Walvis Bay, Messrs de Wet and Mudge would most likely have contacted the Prime Minister direct and recommended that the Swakopmund/ Walvis Bay stop, if not the rest of the programme, be cancelled. As it was, there were strong rumours that SWAPO would call the Walvis Bay workers, at least the Kuisebmond residents, out on strike. But in the event, the magistrate could not confirm that there would definitely be trouble, and my views prevailed.

After a buffet lunch, we drove back to Otjiwarongo where Escher interviewed prominent members of the White community - Messrs A. Pretorius, Mouton, H.K. Volkmann, H.J. Mandt, and N.J. Oelofse.

Afterwards, members of the so-called “National Convention”, including Mr E. Karita, who was on Dr, Escher’s list, were heard. Escher was informed at this interview that one of the demonstrators of the previous evening had been dismissed from his employment on account of his participation in the demonstration.

Escher asked to speak to me in this connection. He reminded me of the Prime Minister’s undertaking that no one would be victimised for making contact with him. I said that I would investigate the incident, but that if this was a private employer - as seemed to be the case since a local garage was involved - we could do nothing about it. The Security Police told me subsequently that the man had been dismissed because

30 he had not reported for work. I asked Chacko if he expected us to make representations the employer. He replied in the negative and the matter rested there.

Just before our departure from Otjiwarongo I telephoned Mr Fourie at his home in Pretoria to report on the day’s events, including our talk with Escher after breakfast.

We departed for Swakopmund, via Okahandja at about 30 p.m. Dr Escher, Mr Mudge, and Colonel van Niekerk were driven by Gert Schoombee in the first car. Gielie Visser drove Chacko and me in the second; and Wiland Wagner drove Noel, Pedanou and Miss Mallinson in the third. Fred Strauss and Mr de Wet occupied the latter’s official car, while Billy Marais was driven by one of his assistants who had brought up an additional car from Windhoek.

Around 6.00 p.m., travelling at 90 miles per hour, the right front tire of Gert Schoombee’s car blew out. Our car was several hundred yards ahead and chancing to glance behind, we observed what appeared to be a cloud steam emerging from Schoombee’s engine. Our first thought was that it had seized. But the car was at the time weaving all over the road.

Gert was fortunately able to bring the car to a stop without further damage to it or to his passengers. We reversed and Gielie assisted with the tire change. The occupants of the crippled car congratulated each other on their lucky escape and took photographs of the ruined tire. Dr Escher complimented Gert on his skill, but told me that we were fortunate that he had not been killed. Otherwise, he said, we would have been accused of plotting his assassination! I had the feeling that Dr Escher was somewhat overestimating the extent of his own importance.

Wiland Wagner’s engine seized a short distance outside Okahandja and his passengers transferred to Billy Marais’s car.

Not far from Swakopmund the party, which was again travelling in convoy after some miles of separation, had another narrow escape when five Kudu, attracted by the headlights, darted across the road. They passed in two groups between the first and second and the second and third cars. This was the first time that Mr Mudge could recall having seen Kudu in the desert so near to Swakopmund.

We arrived at the Hansa Hotel, Swakopmund, shortly before 10.00 p.m. After freshening up, we sat down to a late dinner at the hotel, thence proceeding to bed.

Eighth Day (Thursday, 19th October)

This was another controversial day. After breakfast a group of non-White placard bearers congregated on the sidewalk across the street from the hotel entrance. Escher wandered over and said a few words to them. He said that he would be prepared to meet with their representatives that afternoon.

The agreed programme had made provision for the morning to be spent in Swakopmund on interviews and a visit to the saltworks. The party was to lunch with the Coloured Council at Walvis Bay, thereafter visiting the Coloured township, a fish factory and the harbour. Interviews were scheduled in Walvis Bay between 4.30 and

31 6.30 and the party would return to Swakopmund in time for a cocktail party/dinner hosted by the municipality.

But because of the tension generated by the possibility of trouble in Walvis Bay, the South African side considered it best to dispose of that part of the programme as quickly as possible. Walvis Bay had originally been included in the programme on account of its harbour’s importance for the South West Africa economy. It was felt that Escher should inspect the facilities. The restriction of Gottlieb Nathaniel, who was on Escher’s list, to the Walvis Bay area was also a factor.

The question arose as to whether Escher should see Nathaniel at Walvis Bay or whether he should be brought to Swakopmund for the interview. His restriction order had been lifted for purposes of the interview, so a trip outside the Walvis Bay area was quite feasible. It was felt, on the other hand, that if he were to be removed from Walvis Bay to Swakopmund, this would encourage his supporters to follow him to Swakopmund. Arrangements were accordingly made for the interview to be conducted at the Walvis Bay Municipal Buildings.

Without going into the details, we managed to obtain Escher’s consent for the change in plan.

Lieutenant Koffie of the Security Police brought Nathaniel to the Municipal Buildings at 9.30 a.m. He was joined by four supporters, all SWAPO members, who described themselves as representatives of the “Western Committee of the National Convention of non-Whites”. A large group of Nathaniel’s followers arrived a few minutes later to give him moral support and to display placards. When asked to disperse, they did so peaceably and in good humour.

Nathaniel and his companions waited outside the building at the conclusion of their interview. It was rumoured that they had invited Escher to accompany them on an inspection tour of the Kuisebmond location. The conditions under which Nathaniel’s banning order had temporarily been lifted enabled him to attend the interview only. Thus his wait outside the building was technically a violation. But he was permitted to stay until Escher emerged so as not to give the latter a grievance. When Escher eventually appeared - Messrs Mudge and de Wet having in the meantime departed for Narraville - I informed him that Mr Nathaniel was a restricted person and would now have to be escorted back to his residence. Dr Escher at first demurred at the role played by Lieutenant Koffie - he drew my attention once again to the Prime Minister’s undertaking - but was obliged to give way.

Other persons interviewed at Walvis Bay were the Mayor and Town Clerk, Dr Loubser and Mr Wilken, and Messrs Viljoen and de Jager, respectively of the local Chamber of Commerce and Afrikaanse Sakekamer. Technically speaking, these interviews were unnecessary, even inadvisable, since Walvis Bay is a part of the Republic of South Africa. The same could be said of Dr Escher’s meeting with the Coloured Council.

We departed for Narraville at 1.00 p.m., after Escher had taken an earnest farewell of Mr Nathaniel. Colonel van Niekerk and Dr Escher were in the first car; Chacko, Pedanou and I in the second; Billy Marais, Noel and Miss Mallinson in the third. At a

32 cross roads, leading in one direction to the Kuisebmond location and in another to Narraville, we were intercepted by a large crowd of non-Whites, including many children, bearing placards. They surrounded the cars, completely obstructing their passage. So dense was the crowd that the vehicles in front and behind could not be seen at all. I instructed Gielie Visser to proceed very slowly and, above all, not to injure anyone. The other drivers were given the same instructions. Dr Escher had wanted his car to be stopped so that he could address the crowd, but Colonel van Niekerk vetoed this. In a sense, though, Escher had the last word, for he leaned out of the window and told the crowd that he would return. It is not clear whether he meant this literally, but the crowd accepted it as a statement of fact.

Pedanou and Chacko were rather nervous, the former apparently imagining that he was on the point of being assaulted by a raging mob. But all that was required of him by those who stretched their hands in through the open window was a friendly handclasp. He was even told by some members of the crowd that he should not wash his hand for ten days! Chacko entered into the spirit of the thing, but Pedanou remained tense. Segments of the crowd chanted “Free Namibia”, “Vorster must go”, and other slogans. This situation was potentially dangerous and we were perhaps fortunate to emerge unscathed.

I had torn my trousers when entering the car at Walvis Bay and was obliged to return to Swakopmund to change. The rest of the party lunched with the Coloured Council at the Desert Inn Hotel in Narraville. I returned at 2.10 p.m.

The party drove back to Swakopmund at 2.40 p.m., the schedule now not permitting a visit to the harbour and a canning factory. An unfortunate misunderstanding arose. A crowd was still assembled at the cross roads, awaiting Escher’s promised return. The Magistrate of Walvis Bay asked if we could not perhaps drive past as this would help alleviate the tension. I was agreeable, but Dr Escher’s car had already departed, bypassing the cross roads, on the shortest route to Swakopmund. And our efforts to catch up were interpreted by the driver as a sign to increase speed. The crowd was thus disappointed. Later it turned ugly and beat up an African Municipal Policeman and a White Inspector at Kuisebmond. Both were hospitalised.

Back at Swakopmund, the Escher team interviewed the Mayor and Town Clerk, Messrs Deetlefs and van Niekerk. This meeting gave rise to more difficulty than any other during the entire tour. Either Mr van Niekerk or his wife, or both, are part-time stringers for the S.A.B.C. Mr van Niekerk subsequently reported to the regular S.A.B.C. correspondent, Mr Sarel de Beer, what Escher was alleged to have said - i.e. that South Africa lagged far behind the rest of the world in her attitudes and that the world could no longer tolerate the inhuman aspects of the policy of separate development.

After this interview, at 4.00 p.m., the party visited the saltworks, then split up: some visited the Native Township, while Billy Marais, Miss Mallinson and I went shopping for semi-precious stones.

At 6.00 p.m. a large crowd of Swakopmund non-Whites, reinforced by 30 or 40 non- Whites from Walvis Bay, gathered in the street outside the hotel. I had gone up to my room for a few minutes, and when I returned to the lobby what appeared to be a vast

33 throng had clustered at the hotel’s entrance. Dr Escher and his team and Messrs Mudge, de Wet and Marais were standing in the lobby. It appeared that Mr Mudge had asked Dr Escher to tell the crowd that he could not meet them all, but that he would receive a delegation. Dr Escher had apparently vacillated.

This seemed to me to be an intolerable situation, and I immediately asked Dr Escher to inform the crowd that he would see a deputation and that the others should kindly disperse since they were blocking the entrance to the hotel and the road beyond. He did so and the crowd departed.

This deputation told Escher that non-Whites at Walvis Bay had been assaulted by the Police. The contrary, however, was true and Mr Mudge at first contemplated driving Escher to Walvis Bay to interview the injured policemen. This plan was later abandoned.Around this time, I met with Messrs Nesbitt (General Manager of Consolidated Diamond Mines), Mortimer (Public Relations Consultant to the Anglo- American Corporation) and Wilson (also of Anglo-American), to discuss the arrangements for the next day’s flight to Oranjemund. Messrs Mortimer and Wilson had flown from Johannesburg, and Mr Nesbitt from Oranjemund, in order to escort the party further. It was decided that Billy Marais, Noel, Mortimer and Pedanou would fly in the slower aircraft, departing at 7.00 a.m., the remainder of the party following 30 minutes or so later.

The reception hosted by the Swakopmund Municipality was due to commence at 8.00 p.m. Shortly before that time, Mr Fourie telephoned from Pretoria to ask what Escher had said earlier that afternoon to Messrs Deetlefs and Van Niekerk because the S.A.B.C. had carried a report on his remarks. Mr Fourie said that the Prime Minister was extremely annoyed and that he intended to make a statement on the News at Nine to the effect that if Escher had been quoted correctly, he might as well go home immediately. I told Mr Fourie that I would check into Escher’s alleged remarks and call him back.

The reception had meanwhile commenced. With Billy Marais’s help I prevailed upon Sarel de Beer to break away from the party, to which he and other correspondents had been invited, and read his notes to me. Aided by Miss Mallinson, I transcribed these and told Chacko that if Escher had not made the remarks attributed to him, they should issue a denial immediately. I had hoped in this way to produce evidence on which the Prime Minister could base a decision not to proceed with his statement.

Chacko and Noel consulted with Escher, decided that the latter had been misquoted, and produced an innocuous denial along the lines that certain reports had come to Escher’s notice and that he had not made the remarks ascribed to him. This was at 8.30 p.m. At 8.40 I spoke with Mr Fourie on the telephone and informed him of developments. He said that it was too late for the Prime Minister to cancel his statement. I then gave the denial to Sarel de Beer and said that it was most important that it should be broadcast at 9.00 p.m.

The News at Nine first broadcast the Prime Minister’s statement, then Escher’s denial. After saying that if Escher had been reported correctly, he was acting outside his terms of reference and that further discussions with him would be pointless, the Prime Minister indicated that Dr Muller would fly to Oranjemund on 21st October for

34 discussions with Escher on his mandate.

Ironically enough, while I was going through Sarel de Beer’s notes with him outside the dining room, Dr Escher was making yet another public declaration to the guests assembled within. His speech was couched in terms similar to the remarks attributed to him earlier by the S.A.B.C. People would emerge from the room, beckon furiously to Sarel de Beer, and look nonplussed when I prevented him from returning.

The Windhoek Advertiser of 20th October reported Escher’s statement as follows:

Swakopmund. The white-haired, soft-spoken Dr Alfred Escher, Personal Representative of U.N.

Secretary-General, Dr. Kurt Waldheim, threw down the gauntlet to the South African Government at a dinner here last night that left little doubt as to the alternative if talks failed.

Speaking at the civic function he said that his mission here was the last chance the South African Government had of coming to a peaceful solution over the S.W.A. question.

Speaking clearly, he said: ‘If my mission fails, there will be no further dialogue with South Africa on this matter ..and another solution will have to be found.’

Looking round at the guests, he added: ‘I appeal to everyone to make his contribution so that, in a quiet and peaceful atmosphere without any tension, my mission will succeed’.

At 9.30 I had something to eat, then filled Messrs de Wet and Mudge in on what had happened. Noel and Chacko joined me for a drink at 10.30. We were joined later by Billy Marais, Miss Mallinson, Clive Cowley and John Ryan. On the basis of the Prime Minister’s statement, and events of the previous days, Clive Cowley decided that the South African Government was doing its best to sabotage the Escher mission. I found this rather ironic in the circumstances.

Ninth Day (Friday, 20th October)

At 7.15 a.m. Dr Escher, Mr Chacko, Miss Mallinson, Colonel van Niekerk, Mr de Wet, Mr Strauss, Major Myburgh and I, accompanied by Mr Nesbitt of Consolidated Diamond Mines, and Mr Wilson of Anglo-American, drove to Rooikop Airbase. Messrs Mortimer, Pedanou, Noel and Marais had departed half-an-hour earlier. Mr Mudge had a speaking engagement in Tsumeb that evening and he flew off later in the South West Africa Administration aircraft which had been sent to pick him up.

The following report which appeared in The Windhoek Advertiser on 2Oth October was inspired by, and gives a useful indication of, the very tense atmosphere which now prevailed in South West Africa as a result of Escher’s loquacity and the Prime Minister’s intervention. It is also a good example of completely inaccurate reporting.

Swakopmund: Drama built up here this morning as rumour succeeded rumour in a tension-loaded atmosphere waiting for Dr Alfred Escher, U.N. Secretary- General’s Special Representative, and his party to take off for Oranjemund.

35 The tension and speculation was built upon South African Prime Minister, Mr Vorster’s remarks last night that if what the U.N. Special Envoy had said to Swakopmund’s Mayor and Town Clerk was correctly reported, there was no further purpose in continuing discussions.

Dr Escher was reported to have said that South Africa lagged far behind and the world would not tolerate separate development in South West Africa. Dr Escher had afterwards denied making this remark.

The possibility of South African Government intervention built-up when a S.W.A. Administration aircraft stood by waiting with full tanks at the local airport here. The drama was further heightened when it seemed that Dr Escher was separated from his party and it looked as though he might be escorted to the S.W.A. Administration aircraft.

Near the Administration’s aircraft was the streamlined plane waiting to take off for Oranjemund - next destination of Dr Escher and his party.

There was some relief when the Administration aircraft took off with four local officials aboard bound for Tsumeb.

Even as the Oranjemund-bound aircraft nosed upwards into the clear blue sky with Dr Escher and his party aboard, there were still strong rumours that the aircraft might be diverted to Pretoria or to another destination where a top level meeting would be held.

There were still rumours that a meeting between Dr Escher and South African Foreign Minister Mr. Muller would take place, either at Oranjemund or in Pretoria later this week-end.

Another report in the same newspaper, on the same day, also had its remarkable aspect. Datelined Oranjemund, it read:

A top-level meeting threatens to explode Dr Alfred Escher’s South West Africa Mission. It depends on whether South African Prime Minister, Mr Vorster, accepts the United Nations Special Representative’s denial of remarks reported to have been made to Swakopmund’s Mayor and Town Clerk.

The possibility of a top-level meeting was giving [sic] further credence at midnight last night in a leakage to Pressmen. This report, from an extremely high-placed official, states that Dr Escher is to meet with Dr Hilgard Muller, South Africa’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Mr Brand Fourie, Secretary for Foreign Affairs.

According to this source, the Minister would have flown to Oranjemund - a highly unlikely possibility. However, as the Gulfstream jet of Consolidated Diamond Mines neared Oranjemund today, these reports grew stronger.

The Consolidated Diamond Mines sent two aircraft - the other a Baron Beechcraft - to take Dr Escher and his group to South West Africa’s diamond fields.

In both Swakopmund and Walvis Bay, certain people, most of them Whites in key positions, are aghast at what they heard from the Special Representative.

The Advertiser was told that there was absolutely no doubt about the correctness of the remarks attributed to Dr Escher.

36 ‘He said those things. It is absolutely true’, our correspondent reported this morning.

From Oranjemund, where more than 4,000 Ovambo workers are employed, it was reported that Dr Escher had landed and was met by various C.D.M. officials. Just before 12 noon today it was once again reported that Dr Escher and South Africa’s Minister of Foreign Affairs will meet this weekend either in Windhoek or in Pretoria. But it could not be officially confirmed at the time of going to press.

These reports, either or both of which may have emanated from John Ryan of S.A.A.N., were published the day after the Prime Minister had announced that Dr Muller would fly to Oranjemund on 21st October for discussions, with Escher on the latter’s mandate. But inasmuch as the South African members of the Escher party themselves were confused at this stage, a certain amount of confusion on the part of the press was perhaps also permissible!

We took off for Oranjemund at 8.00 a.m. in a fifteen-seat Grumman Gulfstream, an American aircraft powered by two Rolls-Royce engines of the same type, but stronger, than those used in [Vickers] Viscounts. Mr Nesbitt drew attention to various points of interest related to the diamond industry as we flew down the coast. We arrived at Oranjemund - a very short airstrip - at 10.00 a. m. and were met by the Assistant General Manager, Mr Hartley, and by Messrs Parker, Stopforth and one or two others.

With the exception of Escher’s meeting with representatives of the Owambo workers, an inspection of their living quarters and dining facilities, and a lecture on training methods by Mr Stopforth, the rest of the day was given over to observing all stages of the diamond recovery process up to the sorting house, and recreation.

Dr Escher and Messrs Chacko, Noel and Pedanou were quartered in C.D.M.’s main guest house, each with his own bath. Colonel van Niekerk, Major Myburgh, Billy Marais, Miss Mallinson and I were placed at the adjacent “Agate House”. Miss Mallinson occupied a suite with bath. Messrs de Wet and Strauss, and Mudge (who arrived the next day) shared a flat.

After a braaivleis at Mr Nesbitt’s house we retired to bed, shortly after 11.00 p.m.

Tenth Day (Saturday, 21st October)

By the time the South African contingent reached Oranjemund, it was half-way convinced that Dr Muller would be arriving under instructions from the Prime Minister to cancel the balance of the tour. But this was not the case.

Dr Muller and Mr Fourie touched down at Alexander Bay n a South African Airforce Hawker-Siddeley “Mercurius” at 10.30 a.m. Alexander Bay is some five miles from Oranjemund, across the Sir Ernest Oppenheimer bridge over the Orange River. Its airstrip is the only one in the area able to receive jet aircraft.

They were met by Messrs de Wet, Mudge (who had flown in from Tsumeb an hour earlier), Billy Marais and me. Antonie van der Smit of the S.A.B.C. was also there. He

37 said that Dr Muller had asked for an S.A.B.C. man to be present and he had chartered an aircraft in Windhoek for the purpose. Dr Muller had not, however, made such a request. Mr van der Smit accompanied us back to Oranjemund and remained in one of the guest houses until his departure at 4.00 p.m. He received no information for broadcast, thus his stay was unproductive.

Consolidated Diamond Mines accommodated Dr Muller and Mr Fourie in a flat across the road from the main guest house.

After tea at the guest house, the South Africans met in Dr Muller’s flat to discuss the course of events. I had had a preliminary chat with Dr Muller and Mr Fourie in the car from Alexander Bay, during which I had outlined my views on Escher’s personality and general unsuitability for so delicate an assignment. I had also said that Messrs de Wet, Mudge and I were working together splendidly, without any friction whatsoever, to which Dr Muller replied that he was glad to hear this. I also reported on the formula arranged with Chacko regarding the Rundu visit.

Now, in the Minister’s flat, Mr Mudge, myself and Mr de Wet, at the latter’s suggestion, each gave our views in turn. Messrs de Wet and Mudge expressed considerable concern over the effect that the tour was having on White and non-White opinion in the Territory. They thought that much damage had been done to the Government’s image, and they felt that the tour should forthwith be abandoned. They were also concerned about the possibility of trouble in Rehoboth and Windhoek in the course of the following week if the tour should be permitted to continue.

I disagreed with the view that the tour should be abandoned. I said that it was undoubtedly doing South Africa a lot of good abroad, especially in the major Western countries, and that we should continue if this were at all possible. The Minister agreed with me. He explained that while we had no hope of reaching a settlement with the United Nations, it was necessary to convince the three Western Permanent Members of the United Nations Security Council - France, the United Kingdom and the United States - that we were doing everything possible to co-operate with the Secretary- General in the search for a solution to the South West Africa question.

Dr Muller met with Dr Escher after lunch, and Mr Fourie with Chacko. Dr Escher apparently understood Dr Muller’s point of view fully and conceded that he had been at fault. But when Mr Fourie spoke to Escher later in the afternoon, he denied everything that he had told the Minister and claimed that the latter had completely misrepresented his position. This incident prompted Mr Fourie to remark afterwards that Escher was akin to some small, nervous wild animal: if too much pressure was brought to bear and cornered, he would lash out to save his own skin irrespective of whom or what he injured in the process.

Dr Muller, Mr Fourie and I ran up several drafts of a joint declaration on Dr Muller’s talks with Dr Escher, the fifth or sixth being produced late that evening, after Mr Nesbitt had entertained the whole group to dinner. These drafts were based upon the three points contained in paragraph 21 of Dr Waldheim’s report. We retired to bed 1.00 a.m.

During the evening I mentioned to Dr Muller that there was friction between Messrs

38 de Wet and Mudge over who was to “lead” the party, and I suggested that he call them together and straighten the matter out. He did so before his departure the next day.

Eleventh Day (Sunday, 22nd October)

The party was to have overnighted at Keetmanshoop and the programme called for departure from Oranjemund after breakfast. It had already been felt the previous day, however, that it would not be possible to keep to this schedule and there was even talk that we should spend the Sunday night at Oranjemund. Although this did not materialise, there was a half-day’s delay. Escher and his team refused to accept our final draft, which was the least that the South West contingent considered acceptable, and after some time produced their own draft. They said that this was the furthest that they were prepared to go. Mr Fourie told them that if that was the case, there would be no point in proceeding and he implied that the tour would be terminated. But he and Dr Muller thereafter worked out a strategy whereby the essence of the Escher draft would form a joint declaration, while Dr Muller would issue a separate statement unilaterally. So the matter was resolved.

The joint declaration, which was not considered satisfactory by the South West African members of the party, read:

Reports published in the press in the past few days indicate that some misunderstandings and speculation have arisen regarding the task of the representative of the Secretary General.

This matter was discussed by Dr the Hon. H. Muller, Minister of Foreign Affairs and H.E. Dr Alfred Escher, the Secretary-General’s representative, at Oranjemund on Saturday, 21 October.

They are in full agreement on the interpretation of his task and understanding was reached on all points discussed.

Dr Muller’s statement, which gave an interpretation of the joint declaration, was:

When asked for his views on the task of the Secretary-General’s representative, Dr Muller replied as follows:

It will be remembered that when speaking on radio a week ago, I was asked in what light South Africa regarded Dr Escher’s present mission to the Republic and South West Africa.

I then said, inter alia, that the appointment of Dr Escher as the personal representative of the Secretary-General was the result of the discussions with Dr Waldheim during his visit to South Africa earlier this year and my visit to New York during May, that his task will be to act as go-between, to build bridges between the parties concerned, and that we assume that the representative - like the Secretary-General and ourselves - will be determined to ensure that a spirit of mutual trust and confidence is maintained at all times in any future talks we may have with each other.

I was throughout involved in the negotiations it has been clear throughout that the personal representative would make recommendations and not take decisions, and that he would act objectively impartially like an honest broker.

The purpose of his present visit to South Africa is not to conduct an inquiry

39 and make findings, nor to propagate there any specific of action, but it is to acquire as much information as possible about the inhabitants and conditions in the Territory as background for discussions with the South African Government and his report to the Secretary-General.

Dr Muller’s statement followed the lines of the text of the joint declaration that we had wanted Escher to agree to. The wording of the joint declaration was only settled at lunchtime, whereupon Dr Muller and Mr Fourie left immediately for Alexander Bay and Pretoria. They felt that it would be tempting fate to remain longer and run the risk of amendments being proposed.

The Escher team and the South African contingent departed Oranjemund for Luderitz at 2.30 in a luxury bus driven by a senior member of the Consolidated Diamond Mines Security staff. The route traversed the entire length of Diamond Area No.1. We arrived at Luderitz around 5.30 and proceeded to Kapp’s Hotel, where arrangements had hurriedly been made for us to overnight.

Mr Fourie telephoned at 6.00 p.m. to say that the joint declaration and the Minister’s statement had been given to SAPA (South African Press Association) for release at midnight. His call removed last lingering doubts among South African members of the party that the Prime Minister would repudiate the joint declaration.

There was some tension between Mr Mudge and Mr Chacko in the early part of the evening. The former apparently felt that the latter was not displaying sufficient respect for his position as senior member of the Executive Committee. They exchanged words on the subject.

There was also an allegation from the South African side that Escher and his party had made “secret” telephone calls to Windhoek and Keetmanshoop through the hotel exchange during the temporary absence of the telephonist. The next morning, on a confidential basis, we obtained a list of out of town calls from the Luderitz Post Office.

The allegation appeared to be groundless.

Also in the early part of the evening I received a number of calls from journalists who had awaited our arrival in Keetmanshoop in accordance with the original schedule. They wanted to know particularly whether the tour would continue. Dr Hans Germani, representing To the Point, was one of these. He said that Dr Rhoodie, the new Secretary for Information, had suggested that he contact me for background information on developments. I learned later that Mr Fourie had, in fact, been responsible for the suggestion. I agreed to see Germani sometime the next day.

Twelfth Day (Monday, 23rd October)

The most important interview was with Minister A.H. du Plessis, Leader of the National Party in South West Africa, who flew in on the Administration aircraft around 10.30 a.m. Mr du Plessis was to have seen Escher in Windhoek later in the week, but it was considered advisable to make up the half-day lost at Oranjemund by cutting short the second stopover in Windhoek.

40 Mr du Plessis’s interview lasted about an hour. Other interviews were with two representatives of the Coloured community; the mayor (Mr S.A. Jungst) and town clerk (Mr J.F. du Toit) and a member of the Chamber of Commerce (Mr A.W. van Breda); two representatives of the Anglican Church; and six businessmen.

The interviews were held in the private bar of the hotel.

The procedure followed by the Escher team was that whenever Whites were involved, Pedanou or Chacko would escort the individuals or groups into the room. Noel would handle the non-Whites. Minister du Plessis was escorted by both Chacko and Pedanou!

The party departed Luderitz after lunch. There had been argument with Chacko as to the next overnight stop. According to the original programme, this would have been Keetmanshoop on 22nd October. Messrs de Wet and Mudge were adamant, however, that a stop at Keetmanshoop should now avoided. They suggested the Administration rest camp at Ai Ais, near Oranjemund. Chacko refused categorically, saying that if they insisted, that would be the end of the tour! (He may not have been serious).

There was then some talk of Mariental, to which Escher and Chacko were agreeable. In truth, however, Billy Marais had already made arrangements for the party to be accommodated in the rest camp at the Hardap Dam, some ten miles north of Mariental. This had a dual purpose:

(a) Escher and his team, particularly the two non-Whites, would be kept away from a White town, and (b) the whole party plus hangers-on could easily be accommodated at Hardap, whereas rooms would have to be shared at Mariental.

After breakfast on the 23rd the four cars - driven by Messrs Visser, Schoombee, Fred Strauss and Wagner - were sent to Keetmanshoop, light aircraft having in the meantime been chartered from South West Africa Airways to transport the group there. The cars had been driven over 700 miles, from Swakopmund to Luderitz, while the party was at Oranjemund.

After a brief drive around Luderitz and its harbour, we went to the airstrip, taking off in a minor sandstorm around 2.30 p.m. Minister du Plessis, Dr Escher, Mr de Wet, Mr Mudge, Colonel van Niekerk and Miss Mallinson occupied the Administration Piper Navajo. Chacko, Koos Myburgh and I occupied the one charter Piper Aztec, and Billy Marais, Noel and Pedanou the other.

We arrived at J.G. van der Wath Airport an hour or so later and partook of refreshments in the airport building. Dr Germani and Messrs Cowley and Ryan were also there. I introduced Germani to Escher, telling the latter that Germani only wanted to meet him and that this was not an interview.

After spending an hour in Keetmanshoop - Escher imagined that there would be interviews and wanted to wait at the town hall - we drove off to Mariental. Escher and I occupied the first car; Mudge and Billy Marais the second; Noel, Pedanou and Miss Mallinson the third; and de Wet and Fred Strauss the fourth.

41 To pass the time, I again gave Escher my views on the history and background of the South West Africa issue since 1966. He listened attentively, but said little.

Escher had expected that we would overnight in the town of Mariental and was surprised when we by-passed it. This occasioned some dissatisfaction and the UN group later alleged that we had deliberately kept them away from Mariental where people would most likely have wanted to see them.

After a cold meal at the small restaurant below the dam wall, attended also by Germani, Cowley and Ryan, the party split up: the Escher team proceeding to bed, while the South Africans (sans journalists) threw a small party. We slept in the rest camp’s luxury bungalows.

Thirteenth Day (Tuesday, 24th October)

This was United Nations Day. Ever since the tour had commenced, the South African side had speculated that the UN team would attempt to hold a flag-raising ceremony. This was in fact the main reason why it had been decided to make up the time lost at Oranjemund by arriving late at Windhoek and then keeping to the original schedule. It was feared that Windhoek’s non-Whites would organise a massive demonstration in support of the United Nations and that if Escher was involved in flag-raising ceremonies, the situation would become explosive!

In retrospect, it is not quite clear what grounds there were for this trepidation. Chacko would from time to make joking references to the possibility of their raising the flag on United Nations day, but they did not any event have a flag in their possession in South West Africa.

At 8.00 a.m. the party retraced its steps some 55 miles, through Mariental where we stopped for newspapers, to Gibeon for interviews with the Namas.

The previous afternoon’s newspapers - particularly Die Suidwester - provided the first indication of the effect of Dr Muller’s statement and the joint declaration. Headlined “Dr Escher in Sop”, Die Suidwester’s article helped assuage local White feeling and contributed greatly towards defusing the situation.

It commenced:

Dr Alfred Escher, persoonlike verteenwoordiger van dr Kurt Waldheim, Sekretaris-generaal van die V.V.O., het sy magte in Suid- en Suidwes- Afrika oorskry en hy is die naweek op ondubbelsinnige wyse in die bek geruk.

Dr Alfred Escher, personal representative of Dr Kurt Waldheim, Secretary- General of the U.N. exceeded his authority in South and South West Africa and was this weekend corrected smartly.

It also stated, inter alia, that:

Net die tydige optrede van die Suid-Afrikaanse Regering het waarskynlik verhinder dat dr Escher se besoek in ‘n tweede Carpio-fiasko ontaard.

42 Only the timely intervention of the South African Government probably prevented Dr Escher’s visit from turning into a second Carpio fiasco.

This of course missed the point of the Carpio fiasco.

Two groups were interviewed at Gibeon: a group of seventeen headed by Chief Samuel Witbooi, who was on Escher’s list, followed by two representatives of the Bondels. The younger members of Witbooi’s group appeared repudiate him.

While the interviews were underway, I spoke with Hans Germani, who tape-recorded my background analysis of the South West

Africa issue. After editing this formed the basis of his report in To the Point on 4th November. I told Germani that no direct quotations were to be used, nor were the Department of Foreign Affairs or the South African Government to be cited as the source. Our talk was purely for background purposes, to give his reporting greater depth.

After a light lunch at Gibeon, we proceeded by road to Rehoboth. According to the original programme we were to have lunched at Rehoboth as guests of the Baster Council. But the Basters were not happy about this - especially since the magistrate, who had organised the lunch, had included Dr Afrika of the opposition Rehoboth Baster Vereniging in the guest list. The Basters also did not approve the inclusion of South African officials. They made their views known in no uncertain terms to The Windhoek Advertiser and other local newspapers, which reported them. In the circumstances, we thought it best to cancel the Rehoboth lunch.

We arrived at Rehoboth around 2.30 p.m. and were met by a very festive and basically well-dressed crowd lining both sides of the road into the town. (It had been rumoured among the South Africans that the Basters would wear their oldest clothes to emphasize the disadvantage at which they found themselves under the present regime!) This was the most impressive welcome extended Dr Escher anywhere in South West Africa. Much of the crowd was armed with placards calling for South Africa’s removal from the Territory.

The interviews lasted about 4 hours. Five groups were heard, including the Baster Council, Dr Afrika’s Baster Vereniging and representatives of the Voice of the People, the latter delegation comprising Damara servants of the Basters. The V.O.P. urged that Dr Escher should drive through Rehoboth location, where a number of children had died recently from typhoid fever, to see for himself the disgraceful conditions under which the Damaras were obliged to live. They held the Baster Council responsible, but the magistrate told me later in private that since he was ex officio Chairman of the Council, the South African Government had the authority to insist that conditions in the location be improved.

Encouraged by Mr de Wet, certain Basters made adverse comments on the dress of the Escher party - safari suits - to representatives of the press, which may have published them.

43 Dr Escher was naturally unable to meet with every individual Baster standing around the administrative building where the interviews were held. And he was asked by one of the groups to address the people before he made his departure. Despite his apparent undertaking to Dr Muller at Oranjemund that he would make no further public statements, he accepted this invitation. In anticipation of his speech the Basters positioned a loudspeaker van outside the building. I became aware of these arrangements when Escher emerged from the meeting. I drew him on one side -Messrs de Wet and Mudge had earlier departed for Windhoek - and said that the Department of Foreign Affairs would be most displeased if he addressed the crowd, especially with the aid of a loudspeaker, in the presence of press representatives, including the S.A.B.C.’s Windhoek correspondent.

Dr Escher said that he had already promised to “say a few words” and that he could not back down. Under those circumstances I consented to his making the statement, but said that I could by no means permit the loudspeaker. He should also confine his remarks to a few generalities in the sense that he was pleased to have visited Rehoboth and met with its people. He agreed to do this. The statement proved uncontroversial. The S.A.B.C. correspondent held up his microphone to catch Escher’s remarks, but these were not sufficiently interesting for broadcast.

We then took our departure, driving first through the location. We arrived in Windhoek between 7.30 and 8.00 p.m. and once again overnighted at the Safari Motel.

No formal interviews had been arranged by us for that evening. But Escher met in his room with certain non-Whites, including Clemens Kapuuo.

Hans Germani of To the Point was also at the Safari Motel. His version of the events that evening was published in his magazine’s 4th November issue. It was entitled “The Escher Caper” .The following is an extract from his report:

The most serious incident occurred in Windhoek the same day. Militant Hereros (one of the Territory’s black groups) had leaked information that they were going to obtain draft documents secretly from members of the UN delegation that evening, which they would present to the UN as their own.

Just after 8 p.m. a member of the delegation informed TO THE POINT that they would be in conference that night and unable to meet him. After dinner, a large envelope was seen lying on the dining table which the delegation had just left. It was picked up by a waiter.

Meanwhile, two members of the delegation, Macaire Pedanou and Miss Mallinson, had left the motel and gone into the dark at the side of the building. They were joined soon afterwards by [p. 62] Chacko, the Indian member.

When Germani approached the three, they displayed marked signs of nervousness, in contrast to their usual friendliness.

At that stage a car pulled up at a petrol station near the motel. A white man and two blacks stepped out, and Pedanou and Mallinson hurried over to them. Pedanou then rushed to the motel and recovered from a waiter the envelope which had been left on the table. The delegation members and the

44 visitors went into the building where they spent some time together. The visitors left after 10.00 p.m.

Observers were struck by the secretiveness of the whole incident, since the delegation had been free to meet openly anybody they wished to see. To the locals the ‘Escher mission’ had become the ‘Escher caper’.

Germani showed me the text of his story the next morning before he sent it off. I said that I had no objection to its content.

This did not, of course, mean that I necessarily agreed with the formulation quoted above. Much of it was probably over-dramatized. However, two things struck me about this incident. The first was the furtive way in which the Escher group arranged their meeting with the non-Whites. This was completely unnecessary. The second was Chacko’s refusal, after publication of the report, to take me up on my invitation to put him in touch with an editor of To the Point (Gordon van der Merwe) if they wished to issue a rebuttal. Instead, when approached for comment by the Pretoria News, they preferred to issue a denial for publication in that paper. Pedanou told me later that their visitors had been a small church group - the alleged white was in fact a Coloured - and he felt that they had made a mistake in not consulting with us. The Prime Minister was, in any event, sufficiently amused by the report to give Escher an advance copy of the issue in which it appeared. And Dr Muller assured Escher that Germani was a very reliable journalist!

Fourteenth Day (Wednesday, 25th October)

Inasmuch as our second trip to Windhoek had been cut short by a full working day - we were originally scheduled to arrive on the evening of 23rd October - two day’s interviews had to be compressed into the space of one. These were largely with White supporters of the South African Government.

Those concerned were the Afrikaanse Sake Kamer, the Chamber of Commerce, the United Party, the Federation of Business and Professional Women, the Dutch Reformed Church and the Executive Committee of South West Africa. Senator von Bach, and Messrs Kashick and Kirkpatrick (of the City Council) were also heard. The last-mentioned two had met with Escher on his first stopover in Windhoek and he had asked to see them again.

The two advocates whom Kapuuo had suggested should be contacted were Mrs K. Blum, daughter of Advocate Goldblatt, and Mr H. Berker.

They were reluctant to accede to Escher’s invitation, but put in an appearance all the same. Two non-White groups were heard: the South West Africa Non-European Unity Movement (SWANEUM) and the Federal Coloured People’s Party. Both groups were led by Mr A.J.F. Kloppers.

Visits to Katatura and the Augustineum had been scheduled for around 12 noon. Both had been requested by Escher, the latter perhaps at the urging of the Damaras rather than as a result of an initiative on our part. As the morning progressed, the Escher team fell further and further behind schedule and it was obvious that they would not be able to complete the morning’s interviews before noon. Escher became more and

45 more concerned that he would not be able to arrive at Katatura on time. While we were not at first aware of the exact reason for the importance of the time factor, we suspected that Escher had given an undertaking to meet someone in Katatura at a fixed time.

Our suspicions were confirmed when Escher insisted - without indicating whom he was to meet - on waiting a few minutes at the Katatura administrative centre. His contact did not arrive and we then drove through Katatura. Our presence passed almost unnoticed and there were no demonstrations, crowds or any other unusual forms of activity.

We did not visit the compound. Before moving on to the Augustineum we stopped off once again at the administrative centre, but in vain, for the contact - apparently Mr Meroro - did not materialise. Mr Mudge protested to Escher about this procedure.

We toured the Augustineum in the company of its principal for about three quarters of an hour. Dr Escher was not, on this occasion, permitted “to say a few words”. Noel, an enthusiastic photographer, had taken a number of pictures from the car during our drive through Katatura. He was noticeably less enthusiastic to photograph the Augustineum, which gave rise to pointed remarks from Messrs Mudge and de Wet. In order not to appear partisan, Noel was obliged to take pictures. We returned to the Legislative Assembly Building for a sandwich lunch, whereupon the interviews resumed.

On each occasion when Escher was due to visit areas where non-Whites preponderated, a condition of nervousness tantamount to panic would overtake the South African contingent. The visit to Katatura was no exception. It was first hoped that Escher would be so caught up with his schedule that the Katatura visit could be avoided altogether. When this proved impossible, it was with some trepidation that the local members of the party entered the cars to commence the drive.

It was against the background of expected trouble in Katatura that I separated Pedanou - usually the focal point for non-White interest - from the rest of the party. Pedanou handled the Mission’s accounts. Earlier that morning he had made enquiries about funds which the United Nations was supposed to have telegraphed to Pretoria, but which he had not yet received. I ‘phoned Carl von Bach and asked him to trace the money and arrange for its telegraphic transfer to the bank’s Windhoek branch.

Pedanou had no idea which bank was involved, so von Bach had to call them each in turn. Since he had only wanted enquiries made, Pedanou was rather bewildered when I told him that the money itself was awaiting his disposal in Windhoek. And inasmuch as I delayed conveying this information to him until 12.40, twenty minutes before the bank’s Wednesday closing time, he was confronted with the choice of either visiting Katatura or going to the bank. He went to the bank. I had also given instructions that the bank should take its time in processing his case, so there was no possibility of his catching up with the party in Katatura or at the Augustineum. Chacko had, however, wanted him to do this.

The interviews concluded around 3.30 p.m., with departure from Eros Airport for Tsumeb in a South West Africa Airways charter Dakota scheduled for not later than

46 5.00 p.m. The deadline was set because aircraft are unable to land at Tsumeb after dark. The South African contingent suspected that Escher would attempt to delay the party’s departure beyond the scheduled time so as to force it to spend another night in Windhoek. This fear proved groundless, except that Noel was nowhere in evidence when the rest of the group was transported the short distance from the Safari Motel to Eros Airport, and a car had to return for him.

Clemens Kapuuo and about forty or fifty of his followers arrived at the hotel some thirty minutes before our departure in order to take leave of Escher. I had again to remind him that he was not to make any public statements. He contented himself with shaking hands with each in turn.

The party airlifted in the Dakota consisted of Dr Escher and his group, Mr and Mrs de Wet, Mr Mudge, Billy Marais, Fred van Niekerk, Koos Myburgh and me. We arrived at Tsumeb shortly after 6.30 and were met by Mr Ratledge, General Manager of the Tsumeb Mine and other mine officials. Arrangements had been made for Mr and Mrs de Wet and Fred Strauss, who in company of Gielie Visser and Gert Schoombee had driven up by car, to sleep in the mine guest house. The remainder of the party was accommodated at the Minen Hotel.

No programme was drafted for the evening and everyone accordingly went their separate ways.

Fifteenth Day (Thursday, 26th October)

The first item after breakfast was interviews at the municipal centre. Hearings were granted to the Mayor of Tsumeb (Mr D. van

Wyk), the Town Clerk (Mr A. Kruger), two local businessmen (Messrs R.C. Bohme and H. Rohr), and nine Hereros.

Mr Ratledge then gave a short talk on the Tsumeb Corporation’s activities in South West Africa. He indicated that the Corporation was a consortium consisting of two large American companies - the Newmont Corporation and American Metal Climax -with smaller British and South African interests. Between 1947 and the present time, the corporation had paid some R97 million in taxes to the South African Government and had incurred capital expenditure in the amount of R207 million in the same period. The Tsumeb Mine was the largest individual employer of labour in South West Africa - 4526 Bantu and 1315 Whites. With reference to the mine’s cost structure, Mr Ratledge said that if wages were doubled, the mine would be obliged to shut down its operations.

After taking tea with Mr Ratledge, we inspected the facilities for testing aptitudes of Bantu workers. Then came the accommodation and dining facilities maintained for the Bantu workers and a quick drive through the mine complex to inspect the various processes for copper and lead extraction. The U.N. group displayed remarkably little interest in either the mine or the workers’ conditions.

It had rained heavily during the night in the Tsumeb area and also in Bushmanland, which was our next stop, and there was some doubt that we would be able to land on

47 Tsumkwe’s dirt-strip. But this presented no problems and we touched down there about 12 noon. Messrs Mudge and Billy Marais, having seen the party safely through the White area, had returned to Windhoek in the Administration Piper Navajo. Mrs de Wet and Fred Strauss had driven up to Oshakati. Thus the Dakota’s passengers were the Escher team, Mr de Wet, Fred van Niekerk, Koos Myburgh and me. We were met at the Tsumkwe airstrip by the Bushman Commissioner, and Dominees Weich and Swanepoel. The Bushman Commissioner hosted lunch at his residence.

Escher met after lunch with a delegation of four Bushmen. The preliminaries were amusing. The Bushmen seemed to feel that Pedanou and Chacko, being non-Whites, could speak Afrikaans and they politely declined Ds Weich’s offer to interpret for them! It took some time to convince them that Pedanou and Chacko were not South West African non-Whites.

We took off in the same charter Dakota around 3.30 p.m. for Rundu, arriving an hour later at the military airfield. The latter did not appear to be of undue interest to the U.N. group and I did not observe Noel or other members take photographs. We drove immediately to the administrative buildings where Escher interviewed the Kavango Council. In the aircraft, Mr de Wet had handed over the written invitation to attend the Constitutional Committee’s formal opening meeting. Dr Escher informed the Council at the interview of his inability to attend the meeting. He likewise refused to be photographed by the press - Messrs Cowley and Ryan - together with the Council. Messrs Cowley and Ryan accordingly reported at length on this slap in the face for the Kavango Government.

Between my talk with Chacko in Welwitschia on 16th October and our arrival in Rundu, the question of the meeting had not again been raised. It can only be concluded, therefore, that Escher chanced his arm, realised that he could not persuade the Prime Minister to change his mind, and then gave way with as good a grace as possible.

While Escher was interviewing the Council, Mr de Wet, Captain Erasmus (the officer commanding the Security Police in Rundu) and I fell into conversation. Mr de Wet maintained that it was essential to ban S.W.A.P.O as a political party in South West Africa before next year’s elections in Owambo. Captain Erasmus agreed with him. Mr de Wet also said that he had been instrumental in having the Prime Minister give thought to this question in July. And he (Mr de Wet) was not discouraged by the decision not to ban S.W.A.P.O. at that time. He intended to raise the matter again, either in December 1972 or January 1973.

I said that we were ad idem as to the harmful nature of S.W.A.P.O.’s activities and I conceded that it might, at some stage in the future, be necessary to ban that organization. But it was all a question of timing. If we were, for example, to take such action while the contacts with the Secretary-General were still under way, it would be sure to kill them. We should rather wait until the contacts had broken down because of their own lack of impetus, or as a result of United Nations action, and then make our move. I could see, however, that Mr de Wet did not agree with this approach.

The meeting with the Kavango Council was succeeded by one with a four-member deputation which presented contrary views.

48 The Council then hosted a reception. This lasted until about 11.00 p.m. Chacko was anxious for details of the next day’s programme - probably with a view to making quite certain that the group would be nowhere in the vicinity of the Constitutional Committee meeting.

After consultations with Mr Jacobs (the Chief Director), it was decided that the party would first visit the furniture factory, then follow the road East along the Okavango River to the Leper and Tuberculosis Hospital at Masare, visiting on the way the Vungu-Vungu Irrigation Scheme, a community centre and a Roman Catholic Mission. Chacko carefully scrutinised the details, had Miss Mallinson type them up, then obtained Escher’s approval.

Chacko also told me that the “people were very afraid of the power of the South African Government”, and that they disliked Mr de Wet. This had apparently emerged at the interview with the Council. His criticism of Mr de Wet was made in response to my view that Mr de Wet was respected and liked by South West Africa’s non-White peoples in general.

As at Oshakati two weeks previously, the party could not all be accommodated in one place. Thus Escher, Noel, Pedanou, Chacko and Fred van Niekerk occupied the guest house attached to Mr Jacobs’s residence. Koos Myburgh lodged with the police. Mr de Wet and his personal clerk, Willem Nel, who had replaced Fred Strauss, stayed with Mr Louis Burger, Director of Education in the Kavango. I lodged with Mr Louis Stopforth, a member of the Bantu Administration staff in Rundu, whom I had first met during the legal team’s tour two years ago. Miss Mallinson was quartered with Commandant Verster, O.C. air operations at Rundu.

Sixteenth Day (Friday, 27th October)

Mr de Wet’s long-delayed interview was the first order of business. This lasted almost an hour, until 10.00 a.m., whereupon the Escher team, Koos Myburgh, Fred van Niekerk and I, accompanied by Louis Stopforth and another official, and tailed by Messrs Cowley and Ryan and Venter of SAPA, went to the furniture factory. Mr de Wet went to open the meeting of the Constitutional Committee and we did not see him again until dinner time.

An amusing incident occurred en route to the furniture factory. It was impossible to avoid passing the Legislative Council Hall - we had in fact hoped that the sizeable crowd standing outside the hall and the generally festive air prevailing would impress the Escher party. The group was as usual divided between several cars. Noel and Miss Mallinson shared one; Chacko, Pedanou and I another; and Escher, escorted by Stopforth, had a car to himself. His car led off, followed by Noel’s car, and then ours.

As we approached the Council Hall, the photographer in Noel’s nature overcame more prudent instincts and he insisted that the car should be stopped. He jumped out and started photographing the crowd outside the hall. Chacko and Pedanou, who were seated in my car, were mortified - I could hear Chacko muttering “stupid fool”. Both opened their doors - we were perforce obliged to stop since Noel’s vehicle completely blocked our passage - and gave the impression that they were prepared to use physical

49 means to compel Noel to abandon his photography. He belatedly realised that he was causing embarrassment and returned to his car before Chacko and Pedanou could alight from ours.

The visit to the furniture factory was one of the highlights of the entire tour. I had thought that this would be the case, and thus insisted that it should be included in the itinerary. We spent about an hour there, inspecting articles and making purchases. Escher was presented with the prototype of a small stool that the Bantu Investment Corporation was considering putting into production.

After calling briefly at a community centre seven or eight miles from Rundu, we proceeded to Masare. The cars stopped en route and one of the accompanying officials outlined the operation of the irrigation scheme, but we did not actually inspect this. Dr Kushke (brother of the late Dr Siegfried Kushke), head of the State Hospital in Rundu, was making his monthly visit to the Hospital at Masare. He explained its work and facilities. He showed us, at close range, several leprosy patients and one or two whom had been cured of the disease. Dr Escher was interested, but the members of his team were decidedly jittery.

The projected visit to the Catholic Mission had given rise, earlier that morning, to a minor panic in the ranks of the South Africans.

It was rumoured that some demonstration was being planned, and Mr de Wet and his local officials were adamant that we should avoid the Mission. But since the idea of this visit had emanated from the local officials, it was not quite clear to me how circumstances could have changed in so short a space of time. While I had no objection to our by-passing the Mission, it seemed to me that the suggestion should come from the United Nations group since they were usually insistent upon the agreed programme being followed to the letter. This was arranged by keeping them occupied at Masare - 25 miles from Rundu - until after 1.00 p.m., with the afternoon’s interviews scheduled to commence at 2.30 p.m.

Chacko thereupon asked, with some reluctance, if we could drive straight back to Rundu. With equal reluctance, I agreed!

The afternoon’s interviews were, firstly, with five secondary school students and, secondly, with five representatives of Rundu Hospital employees. Both of these groups were opposed to the continuation of the South African Government’s presence in the Territory. The first group consented to publication of their names, but the hospital employees asked that their names should not be disclosed.

We then paid a brief visit to the State Hospital, and were shown round by Dr Kushke who had returned from Masare. The hospital employees had told Escher of a case where the police had shot dead a Bantu man without provocation and that a witness to this incident was being detained at the hospital. They undertook to pass the name of this individual to Escher when he visited the hospital and at some stage during the visit a piece of paper on which the name had been written was slipped to Pedanou. Making sure that I was out of hearing range, Dr Escher furtively drew Dr Kushke to one side and quizzed him as to the incident. His curiosity had also been aroused by the sight of a mental patient kept handcuffed in a small ward, and he probably

50 wondered if there wasn’t a connection.

When I comprehended what was going on, I immediately complained to Chacko about Escher’s attitude. He explained what had happened, whereupon I said that if any allegations whatsoever had been made, it was their duty to draw them to my attention so that they could be properly investigated. It was no good at all for them to act in a furtive and suspicious, even under-handed, manner. I possibly dwelt on this incident at greater length than its nature actually warranted, but I felt that the point should be made. Chacko conveyed my views to Escher. He told me later that they had decided that the allegation was without foundation and that they intended to let the matter drop.

In the latter part of the afternoon we drove west along the river to an Evangelical mission station fifteen miles from Rundu. The head of the mission, Pastor van Niekerk, and his wife entertained us to tea in their home. It had been hoped that Pastor van Niekerk could arrange a boat trip for us on the Okavango, but the level of the water was the lowest that it had been for some years and the river was no longer navigable at this point.

Pastor van Niekerk, who had visited Australia, Europe and the United States in the course of his calling, made a speech and presented Escher with a gold coin as a souvenir of his visit. The pastor said that his church, which had a world-wide following, was completely non-political. He said that he was greatly appreciative of the co-operation and assistance rendered the mission by the South African Government. For once, possibly because of the small size and complexion of his audience, Escher’s reply was uncontroversial.

We returned to Rundu at 6.00 p.m. Escher, Chacko, Noel and I went for a stroll along the river bank. The homelands policy came up in the course of our conversation. I was surprised to hear both Escher and Chacko say that the South African Government was not expected to dismantle the homelands. All that was required was the institution of a very light degree of central control. The homelands could be thought of as provinces and their governments as provincial or regional authorities.

Chacko referred in this connection to the constitutional theory underlying the United States of America where the separate states - especially the Southern States - still adhered to the fiction that they were sovereign. The provincial or regional governments could be granted a considerable amount of autonomy. But it was nevertheless essential that the territorial integrity of South West Africa should be preserved. Fragmentation was not acceptable.

Dinner, which was to be braaivleis served indoors at the Rundu “club”, was scheduled for 7.30 p.m. This was the subject of a minor dispute between Mr de Wet and myself. It seemed to be the social function of the year and the whole of Rundu’s white population was involved. But since White women would be present, and since Escher’s team included two non-Whites, Mr de Wet was not prepared to have them attend. Nor would he accept my suggestion that I drive the UN party to a spot outside Rundu where we could hold our own braaivleis.

Instead, he wanted to isolate Escher’s people from the main function but at the same

51 time emphasize to them that they were being isolated! Aside from the presence of White women, Mr de Wet apparently also wanted to “punish” the Escher party for their behaviour at other social functions and because of their attitude towards “white” functions in general. To this end, he instructed his local officials to arrange for the main party to eat in a large hall at the “club” while Escher and his team would dine in solitary state in a smaller room.

Although Mr de Wet had wanted the South African contingent to join the main party, I told him that I considered it my duty to associate with the Escher group. If they had been discourteous in the past, it did not mean that we should be discourteous in turn. Mr de Wet accepted that. In the end, to make our isolation seem less obvious, I asked Fred van Niekerk and Koos Myburgh to come in with us, which they did.

The extent of Escher’s lack of knowledge of United Nations affairs was revealed by his puzzled enquiry - during a conversation between Chacko and me - as to what Article 2(7) of the Charter was all about! The pending Viet Nam peace settlement, announced that day, was also discussed. Chacko said that he had expected it since it had been clear for some time that something would happen before the American election.

Escher’s view of the situation in South East Asia seemed to be based on the popular theories of the 1950’s. He expounded, for example, the now generally discredited “domino theory” first postulated by John Foster Dulles. Chacko and I disagreed with him. Pedanou, in turn, did not agree with me that African delegations at the United Nations enjoyed much more freedom of action than Western delegations.

Despite our enforced separation, it was not an unpleasant evening. I did, however, become slightly annoyed when some of the local officials craned smirking faces into the room as if to watch the animals feeding! One inebriated director made a nuisance of himself by coming in under the pretext of serving wine. I was obliged to ask him to leave.

We retired to bed after midnight.

Seventeenth Day (Saturday, 28th October)

This was the last day of the tour. We breakfasted at 7.00 a.m. The Escher group settled their bills for accommodation and food before our departure for the airfield. Mr de Wet had ruled that they should be charged R15 for the day and two nights in Rundu, which they considered excessive having regard to quality, but they paid it. The members of the South African group were charged R10 for the same period, and even this I felt to be excessive. (The UN group was not told of the lower rate applicable to South Africans.)

We took off for Katima Mulilo at 8.00 a.m. in a South African Airforce Viscount, arriving there at 8.45. Although his official responsibilities had now ended, Mr de Wet came along for the ride. He was due in Pretoria on the Monday and this was the most convenient means of transportation. For the same reason, I had allowed Mr Japie Venter of SAPA to accompany us back to Pretoria in this aircraft. But I made it clear that it was purely an informal arrangement and that he was not to report on the visit to

52 Katima Mulilo.

We were met at Mpacha airstrip outside Katima Mulilo by Professor E.F. Potgieter, the Commissioner-General; Mr Gregory, the Chief Director; Colonel Swanepoel of the Security Police; and others. The party was transported in landrovers to Katima Mulilo.

Escher’s team was suitably impressed by the knowledge that the very road on which they were travelling had from time to time been mined by terrorists.

Escher’s principal interview was with the Eastern Caprivi Executive Council. He met also with four youths, one of whom was apparently the son of a Councillor, who were opposed to the South African Government’s policy and claimed to speak for the majority of the people of the Eastern Caprivi. The last interview was with a former terrorist who had joined the South African Police.

The last name on Escher’s list was Brendon Simbwaye of CANU, who had last been seen shortly before Escher’s arrival in the Territory on 12th October but had since disappeared. One theory for his disappearance was that when he had heard that the authorities were looking for him, not realising that this was because Escher wanted to see him, he simply slipped over the river into Zambia.

Miss Mallinson here met someone who was almost a fellow countryman - a Dutch immigrant who had lived in Queensland, Australia, for six years. He was now a member of the South African Security Police. (She wasn’t made aware of this.)

The Executive Council hosted lunch at the administrative offices. It was served by Mrs Potgieter, wife of the Commissioner-General, and the wives of White officials. Professor Potgieter delivered a few words of welcome. Escher’s reply was unexceptionable. At the conclusion of his remarks he turned to me and asked if I was happy with the content!

An official of the Education Department told Pedanou the following “joke” over lunch: In the early part of this century a certain South African hotel was very popular with the British nobility. A new “tea boy” was employed and as part of his instruction it was impressed upon him that he should announce himself with a knock on the door and “Good morning, my Lord, the boy is here with the tea”. On his first call, however, overcome by nervousness, the poor fellow knocked, saying “Good morning, my boy, the Lord is here with the tea”. Pedanou said that he would certainly object if anyone called him “boy”. I shuddered and hastily changed the subject.

Colonel Swanepoel gave a brief talk on terrorism after lunch. He was particular critical of the World Council of Churches for their aid to terrorists. He displayed Chinese and Russian weapons captured from terrorists, also mines and various “home made” explosive devices excavated from the roads and bush of the Eastern Caprivi. The Escher group listened most attentively to the lecture, paused at its conclusion, then respectfully asked if Noel could photograph the weapons.

Permission was granted.

53 Our last hour and a half before departure was spent inspecting the hospital - to the boredom of the Escher team, then driving a few miles downstream to peer across the Zambezi at the Zambian shore. What appeared to be a para-military unit quickly assumed positions on the other side of the river.

We took off for Pretoria at 4.30, arriving at Waterkloof Air Station at 6.30. The aircraft’s approach brought it in low over Pretoria’s eastern suburbs, thus affording its passengers a good view of the purple profusion of jacarandas. On this, the final leg of the tour, the passengers were: the Escher team, Professor and Mrs Potgieter, Mr de Wet, Mr Japie Venter of SAPA, Colonel Fred van Niekerk, Major Koos Myburgh and me. We were met by Mr Fourie and his son Gerhard, and by Carl von Bach. Escher and his party drove wearily to the guest house in Waterkloof Heights, laden with souvenirs of the Rundu woodcarvers’ art. The rest of us went our separate ways. So ended the tour.

Epilogue

Having toured South West Africa for seventeen days, Dr Escher returned to Pretoria with the most important aspect of his visit to Southern Africa - the discussions with the South African Government - still ahead of him. He and the members of his party were decidedly nervous about the resumption of talks and were somewhat at a loss as to how to handle them.

On the evening of Sunday, 29th October, I was Chacko’s guest at dinner. Escher had accepted a dinner invitation from Minister van der Spuy, and the group at the guest house consisted of the four members of the UN team and myself.

Before dinner Chacko and I had a long talk over drinks in his suite. He wanted to know how I envisaged developments in the coming week. I advised very earnestly against Escher repeating the tactless and aggressive approach that he had employed at the formal meeting on 11th October. Chacko had previously said how relaxed and informal he had found the Prime Minister by comparison to the latter’s meeting with Dr Waldheim in March, when Mr Vorster had seemed tense and nervous. I said that I thought he had misread the situation because Escher’s manner had annoyed the Prime Minister. And if Escher were now either to put demands to the Prime Minister or to ask him baldly what concessions he intended to make, it could be disastrous.

Instead, I said that it would be better if Chacko himself and Mr Fourie were to get together informally to see whether they could not perhaps find any common ground. Chacko, whose opinion of his nominal superior was obviously not very high, agreed with this. But he asked that the suggestion should come from our side, because Dr Escher considered himself to be the Secretary-General’s representative in every sense of the word. Dr Waldheim, however, of whom Chacko thought very highly, had told the latter before his departure from New York that he expected him to handle the negotiations. So Chacko had no qualms on that score. It was simply a matter of getting Escher to fall in with the arrangement.

In his turn, Chacko urged that the South African Government should not, under any circumstances, attempt to define further or spell out its interpretation of self- determination. He said that if we maintained or persisted in the interpretation given by

54 Ambassador von Hirschberg to the Security Council in October 1971, it would mark the immediate end of the contacts with no hope of their resumption. This question should be left as vague as possible for the time being. I agreed with this and I passed it on to the Prime Minister, Dr Muller and Mr Fourie at our meeting the next morning. Both Chacko and I were completely in agreement that all we could hope for at this stage was continuation of the contacts for a further period.

The South Africans who had accompanied Escher in South West Africa gave the Prime Minister their impressions of the visit the next morning.

Messrs de Wet, Mudge, Billy Marais, the Administrator of South West Africa (Mr B.J. van der Walt), and Advocate Eben van Zyl, a Member of the Executive Committee, saw the Prime Minister first. Dr Muller, Minister A.H. du Plessis, Mr Fourie and I met with Mr Vorster thereafter.

When asked for my views, I said that Escher was basically a light-weight who possessed very little knowledge of the South West Africa question, and perhaps even less political feeling. He tended to conduct himself like a second rate American politician and he had been a considerable embarrassment to his own party, particularly Chacko, who was the only member who counted for anything. Pedanou had been included in the team, as had also been the case in March, on account of his colour. Otherwise, his only substantive task appeared to be accounts and administrative matters. Noel was also a light-weight. I mentioned Waldheim’s idea that he had two representatives on this mission: Escher as the figurehead, and Chacko, who would operate behind the scenes and do most of the negotiating.5 I also mentioned that Chacko was nervous about Escher’s forthcoming meeting with Mr Vorster, and that he wished to get together informally with Mr Fourie.

As far as the tour itself was concerned, I thought that it had done us a lot of good abroad, especially in the Western countries, because we had demonstrated our willingness to co-operate fully with the Secretary-General. Escher had seen everybody and everything that he had wanted to see, except Brendon Simbwaye, who could not be traced. On the other hand, I felt that the tour’s internal effects had probably been unfavourable. The Prime Minister disagreed with this.

He thought that the tour had even achieved useful results internally because, for the first time, South West Africa’s Whites had been made to appreciate the significance of the United Nations threat to their security.

During this meeting, the Prime Minister gave us an insight into the tactics he proposed following at his first meeting with Escher that afternoon. He said that it was clear that he should commence by taking a very hard and forthright line. Remembering what had occurred at Oranjemund, I suggested that he should not press Escher too hard, whereupon the Prime Minister simply smiled. In the result, he appeared to have softened Escher up, for when the latter emerged from their meeting he was trembling like an aspen and muttered darkly that the contacts were finished!

5 It seems that Waldheim was about to appoint Mr. Chacko as his personal representative for South West Africa with the rank of assistant secretary general, superceding Escher, when Chacko died of a heart attack at his home in New York on 12 March 1973. He was 57. The New York Times, 13 March 1973.

55 For the rest of the week, the Prime Minister, Dr Muller and Escher would meet separately, leaving Mr Fourie and Chacko to draft the basis of something that Escher could take back to New York. Neither Noel nor Pedanou on the United Nations side, nor myself on the South African side, were involved in these discussions. There were, in fact, no formal meetings, except perhaps the five minute gathering in the Prime Minister’s office on the day of Escher’s departure, to allow the press to take photographs.

On Wednesday, 1st November, Escher and Chacko were informed of the Government’s rejection of their request - made in Oshakati on 15th October -to interview four prisoners on Robben Island. They accepted the position without comment. They had also wanted to see David de Beer and had suggested that they meet with him at the airport shortly before their departure. But de Beer’s restriction order did not permit him to leave the Johannesburg magisterial district. And he was apparently not prepared to apply for the order to be lifted temporarily. So Escher did not see him.

The Administrator, Mr de Wet, Mr Mudge, Advocate van Zyl and Billy Marais remained in Pretoria until Thursday, 2nd November, lest the Prime Minister should wish to consult further with them. They were not particularly happy with the course of events and suspected that important concessions would be made to Escher at the last moment. They returned to Windhoek - Mr de Wet to Oshakati - after the Prime Minister had briefed them on the ten points agreed upon for inclusion in Dr Escher’s report. With the possible exception of the proposed establishment of an advisory council in South West Africa, to be presided over by the Prime Minister, they could see that no concessions had been made, and they departed in a reasonably happy frame of mind.

Both Mr Fourie and I were slightly surprised at first that Chacko should have acquiesced in the ten point “agreement”. But he seemed optimistic that he could sell this to the United Nations. Interestingly enough, despite the furore which developed during the course of their visit to the Territory, neither Escher nor Chacko had found it necessary to get in touch with Dr Waldheim in New York. Pedanou would from time to time send brief telegrams to the United Nations Field Service, giving details of the party’s movements. But nothing of substance was sent until their return to Pretoria. And then, only on one occasion, did Escher communicate with the Secretary-General - by telephone. This was on 31st October or 1st November when he apparently sought, and obtained, Waldheim’s approval for the ten points. Waldheim and Chacko seemed, therefore, to have misjudged the state of feeling in New York.

At 2.30 p.m. on Friday, 3rd November, Escher read the statement quoted below to the press in the conference room opposite the Department of Foreign Affairs library. He declined to answer questions. The text had been telexed to the United Nations a few minutes earlier.

Following my preliminary discussion with the Prime Minister after my arrival in South Africa, I proceeded on a visit to Namibia. During an extensive sixteen day tour, I had the opportunity to see many parts of this vast Territory and to meet a cross-section of the people at the places I visited. I avail myself of this opportunity to express my appreciation to the

56 Prime Minister for the very efficient manner in which the necessary arrangements were made for the tour. The knowledge I gained during my visit has been of great assistance to me in the fulfilment of the task entrusted to me by the Secretary-General. On my return to Pretoria I had lengthy discussions with the Prime Minister and the Minister of Foreign Affairs. These discussions took place in an atmosphere of mutual understanding. A wide field of basic issues was covered and I feel that progress has been achieved. As representative of the Secretary-General, it is my duty to report to him first. You will understand, therefore, that I am not in a position to give any more information at this stage.

After taking leave of the Prime Minister, Dr Muller and Mr Fourie and meeting briefly with the press, the Escher team was driven to Johannesburg for a visit to the J.G. Strijdom Tower in Hillbrow. Mr G.J. de Kock, Acting Regional Director, Witwatersrand, escorted us over the Tower, then entertained the group to drinks in one of the restaurants there.

Special arrangements for this visit had to be concluded between Dr Muller and Minister Marais Viljoen. Owing to the presence of Chacko and Pedanou, the Postmaster-General’s staff refused to authorise the visit, but required explicit ministerial approval. Once this had been obtained, however, they were most co- operative and the visit passed off without a hitch. It was also a highlight of Escher’s trip.

The Escher party was booked to depart Johannesburg on Swissair flight 283 at 7.25 p.m. But bad weather in Europe delayed the aircraft’s arrival at Jan Smuts Airport until 10.30 p.m. that evening, and it only took off again after 1.30 the following morning. We were given advance warning of this delay, and the United Nations group spent most of the evening packing and resting. They eventually drove out to the airport at 11.00 p.m.

Seen from the aspect of South Africa’s international relations in the short term Dr Escher’s visit to South West Africa was, in retrospect, highly successful. Its effect in the Territory itself, however, even though it may have had its useful political aspects, was undoubtedly less felicitous.

Dr Escher’s conduct upset the Territory’s powerful White element, while at the same time probably raising the hopes of dissident non-White groups. Had Escher been more circumspect in his semi-public utterances, the offence given the White group could possibly have been avoided, or at least minimised. But as regards the non-Whites, I have little doubt that a tour such as this serves to bring home to them the reality of the United Nations existence and its interest in their aspirations and welfare. In this way, the authority of the South African Government tends to be undermined. On Escher’s tour, for example, non-White crowds would observe the Comissioner-General for South West Africa and the Senior Member of the Executive Committee standing around for hours outside halls and offices, while the U.N. team interviewed non- White leaders inside. For this reason, I used to suggest to Messrs de Wet and Mudge that they should rather travel on to the next stop, because if they were made to appear like functionaries, this would derogate from the offices which they held.

Dr Muller made it clear to Dr Escher in New York, Pretoria and Oranjemund that his visit to South West Africa was not equivalent to the Pearce Commission in Rhodesia

57 and that he was not entitled to make findings. The primary purpose of the visit, which admittedly also involved meeting the Territory’s peoples and hearing their views, was to enable Escher to acquaint himself at first hand with conditions in South West Africa so that he would be in a better position to converse knowledgeably with the South African Government.

But while Dr Escher never formally contradicted Dr Muller’s understanding, his conduct in South West Africa and, above all, the reception accorded his report in New York, were diametrically opposed to the South African Government’s view. Escher’s actions in South West Africa revealed that he saw as the basic purpose of his mission to divine and record the state of non-White opinion, particularly groups already known to oppose the South African Government.

Anything else - meetings with White supporters of the South African Government and visits to hospitals and schools etc - were not considered by him or the members of his team to have much official significance. He personally enjoyed visits to hospitals and other institutions, but his team members scarcely managed to conceal their boredom.

And as far as the Whites were concerned, there is little doubt that Escher felt that he should promote the United Nations point of view. In the context of the talks with the South African Government, this was naive. But it had a purpose, since Chacko told me on more than one occasion that they could not agree with the present situation whereby South West Africa’s Whites appeared to possess a veto right over any decision regarding the Territory’s future.

Escher’s report was hailed even by moderate Western and Latin American States as incorporating the results of some kind of plebiscite among the Territory’s inhabitants. And since this ostensibly disclosed that the majority of the inhabitants were opposed to the South African Government’s presence, policies, actions and view of South West Africa’s future, it can be expected to be used against us. Thus whatever the outcome of the present contacts with the Secretary-General, it seems likely that the Escher report will be quoted for some time to come as definitive evidence of majority opinion in South West Africa.

A key element in our attempts in the past to defend and justify our administration of South West Africa has been our view that the great majority of the inhabitants support South Africa’s continued presence and the implementation of the policy of separate development. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the international community may not have agreed with this proposition, but it could not disprove it.

Our view as to the inhabitants’ feelings attained a high point with the plebiscite offer to the International Court of Justice early in 1971. It first began to appear to the outside world to be unfounded when Bishop Auala - considered to be a firm supporter of South African Government policy - addressed his open letter to the Prime Minister in June 1971.

Escher’s report has now produced further evidence along these lines which, in the long term, may have a deleterious effect on our very necessary efforts to justify our continued presence in the Territory. We may, as the Prime Minister and Dr Muller have done, contest Escher’s opinion. But unless we can produce incontrovertible

58 proof that he is wrong, our denials will not be accepted, not even by well-disposed Western States.

All of this, including that which has yet to come to pass, was possibly inevitable since it stemmed from our undertaking to admit the Secretary-General’s personal representative to South West Africa. But the Government would, in my view, be unwise to permit further visits of this nature. Nor, indeed, would these be welcomed by the White population of South West Africa. Messrs de Wet, Mudge and other South West African Whites associated with the Escher team, are adamant about this.

F.D. Tothill November 1972

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