A Visit to South West Africa David Tothill Foreword by Dr Lorna Lloyd PO Box 32813 Glenstantia 0010 Pretoria South Africa Copyright © David Tothill 2008 ISBN: 978-0-620-41650-4 2 In memory of Hilgard Muller and Brand Fourie. 3 Acknowledgements I am grateful to Sir Brian Barder, formerly of Her Majesty’s Diplomatic Service, and to Dr Lorna Lloyd for their comments. DT 4 Foreword Dr Tothill’s scholarly articles on the making and execution of apartheid South Africa’s foreign policy are amongst the most useful on the subject. Now he takes us into the inner workings of the Republic’s diplomacy, through his 1972 record of, and contemporary thoughts on, a United Nations mission to Namibia (which he accompanied as the representative of the Department of Foreign Affairs). In so doing, he treats us to a fascinating example of what a former senior UN official described as South Africa’s apparently schizophrenic way of facing its problems: on the one hand agreeing in principle that the problem must be solved, on the other putting every possible obstacle in the way of solving it.1 South Africa was courteous to its unwelcome visitors, overcoming its instinct to conceal rather than reveal, and more or less letting them see what and whom they wanted. However, Dr Alfred Escher (the Swiss ambassador who headed the mission, and was the personal representative of the UN Secretary-General, Dr Kurt Waldheim) often spoke and behaved offensively to his hosts. His failure to guard his tongue and, on one occasion, his appearance at a semi-formal municipal reception (‘jacketless in an open-neck shirt, khaki trousers and black shoes’)2 was strange behaviour for a supposedly ‘able and experienced diplomat’.3 Even odder was his ignorance of not just Namibia but Africa, the United Nations, and key provisions of the UN Charter. (He was, though, the only member of the visiting mission who could converse with those Namibians whose first language was German.) All this no doubt reflected the difficulty which Waldheim had experienced in finding a personal representative who was acceptable to the South African government. While Escher blundered his way across Namibia ‘like a second rate American politician’, some of his South African companions, such as Mr D.F. Mudge (Senior Member of the Executive Committee in South West Africa) and J.M. de Wet (the Administrator of South West Africa) [Commissioner-General for the territory’s non- white people], hardly conducted themselves better. Moreover, South African ineptitude was sometimes comical. There was, for example, the obtrusive surveillance aeroplane whereby representatives of the Bureau of State Security kept an eye on the mission, and the incompetently staged ‘accident’ to a light aircraft so that the party could avoid a large demonstration when they landed at Ondangwa. (The attempted deception was quickly evident to Escher’s party. And as for the demonstrators, they simply moved on - in larger numbers - to where the mission had lunch.) However, two of the travelling party emerge well: M.E. Chacko, an Indian member of the UN Secretariat who was Escher’s principal adviser, and Tothill himself. Thanks to their good sense the mission was not derailed. Equally admirable is Tothill’s respect for truth, permitting us to read his unvarnished and unrevised private record of his © Lorna Lloyd 2008. 1 Brian Urquhart, A Life in Peace and War (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1987) 308. 2 Unreferenced quotations are from Dr Tothill’s personal account. 3 Kurt Waldheim, In the Eye of the Storm. The memoirs of Kurt Waldheim (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1985) 101. 5 time with the mission. Tothill’s account is also valuable for the telling details that give life to history: the mission’s apparent acceptance of South Africa’s homelands policy; the exclusion of Escher’s (multiracial) team from a function where 'White women' were present; dinner companions who were scandalised when mission members said South Africa should amend its racial policy; white Namibians’ inability to understand why the authorities were tolerating peaceful and friendly demonstrations; the need for explicit ministerial approval for the mission to be entertained in a prestigious whites-only restaurant in Johannesburg; and the party’s fear of rampaging demonstrators (who showed no signs of being other than good-natured, except when Escher mishandled them). In retrospect, Waldheim clearly could not then have made a breakthrough on the Namibian problem, and South Africa had gone too far down the road to pariah status for the tour to do it ‘a lot of good abroad’ in any substantive sense. And the outcome was unhappy, as there was outrage that Escher’s report appeared to endorse separate development. Waldheim’s assertion that he would never have agreed to it is at odds with Tothill’s statement that the one time the mission was in touch with the Secretary- General was when Escher sought, and obtained, Waldheim’s approval for the document which was being taken to New York. The Security Council rejected it. The Africans were furious that the UN had acted like a ‘toothless bulldog’. And Chacko, whose wedding anniversary had determined the date the mission left South Africa, was soon dead of a heart attack - which Waldheim thought might have been brought on by the shock of what happened.4 Scholars who want to get to grips with the diplomacy of apartheid South Africa and its attitude towards the United Nations will be deeply indebted to Dr Tothill for publishing this valuable document. Lorna Lloyd Reader in International Relations Keele University Staffordshire UK November 2008 4 Waldheim, 102. 6 Preface Australian and South African forces seized the German colonies of New Guinea and South West Africa early in the First World War. The Australian and South African governments were thwarted in their desire to annex these territories. Instead, as part of the post-war settlement, they were awarded their administration as League of Nations “C” Mandates, New Guinea going to Australia and South West Africa to South Africa. The two governments followed a different approach towards their Mandates. Australia expropriated German properties in New Guinea and deported German nationals. South Africa allowed many Germans to remain in South West Africa and encouraged white settlement from South Africa itself. Financial inducements were provided for the purpose. Pursuant to the South West Africa Constitution Act, No. 42 of 1925, the white population was granted limited self-government similar to that enjoyed by a South African province. Throughout the mandate period and beyond the presence of the whites was the key to the South African government's attitude towards the territory. The existence of a small but vocal self-governing white population right up to the time of the territory's independence in 1990 effectively conditioned the policies of all South African governments from the early 1920s onwards. In that way their options were limited - or so successive governments of differing political orientation believed. The presence of the whites lay at the heart of the dispute with the United Nations over the territory’s future which persisted for much of the second half of the 20th century. White settlement was permissible because Article 22(6) of the League of Nations Covenant as well as Article 2 of the mandate instrument authorised the administration of the territory as an integral part of the mandatory state. Not only was white settlement permissible, but South Africa argued at the United Nations in 1946 and at the International Court of Justice in the 1960s that it was necessary in order to develop the territory. That was also its response to charges that it administered the territory for the benefit of the whites. Initially, German voters outnumbered the others and German candidates were returned in seven of the 12 seats at the first elections to the Assembly in May 1926. Their advantage was only temporary and at the outbreak of the Second World War the South African element outnumbered the Germans by two to one. Within the former, Afrikaners outnumbered English-speakers by five to one. As a counter to pro-Nazi activity on the part of Germans who agitated for the territory's return to Germany, non-Germans in the white population pressed for incorporation into South Africa. The South West Africa Commission of 1935 concurred. In 1943 and 1946 the white Legis- lative Assembly passed resolutions requesting incorporation. The United Nations rejected South Africa’s proposal for incorporation at the 1946 session of the General Assembly. From time to time after 1946, the international community attempted to break South Africa’s hold on the territory. Such efforts reached a climax in 1966 when the United Nations General Assembly ostensibly terminated the mandate. A low level guerrilla 7 war on the territory’s border with Angola commenced that year. This grew in intensity over the next two decades, eventually drawing in Cuban forces. Because of the white, mostly Afrikaner, presence which imparted a domestic political dimension to the situation, the South African government remained obdurate. Even so, seeing the writing on the wall, it sought to head off the United Nations by means of an internal solution that would leave intact most white authority over the territory. Its efforts proved unavailing and it was eventually obliged to accept the international settlement which led to the territory’s independence as Namibia in 1990. From the beginning, the administration of South West Africa fell within the purview of the South African Prime Minister’s department which was also given oversight of South Africa’s external relations. When a Department of External Affairs was set up in 1927, the Prime Minister became its political head.