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The Insurgency in Afghanistan's Heartland

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The Insurgency in Afghanistan's Heartland THE INSURGENCY IN AFGHANISTAN’S HEARTLAND Asia Report N°207 – 27 June 2011 TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS ................................................. i I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................. 1 II. RISE, FALL, RESURGENCE ......................................................................................... 3 A. ORIGINS ....................................................................................................................................... 3 B. KABUL WON AND LOST ............................................................................................................... 4 C. COLLAPSE .................................................................................................................................... 5 1. Operation Enduring Freedom ...................................................................................................... 5 2. Resurgence ................................................................................................................................... 5 III. STATE OF PLAY .............................................................................................................. 8 A. RECRUITMENT ............................................................................................................................. 9 1. Motivation .................................................................................................................................... 9 2. Mobilisation ............................................................................................................................... 11 B. COMMAND AND CONTROL ......................................................................................................... 13 1. Taliban command and control.................................................................................................... 13 2. The Haqqani network and Hizb-e Islami ................................................................................... 14 C. TAKING TERRITORY ................................................................................................................... 15 1. Kabul .......................................................................................................................................... 15 2. South of Kabul: Logar, Wardak, Ghazni ................................................................................... 16 3. North of Kabul: Parwan, Kapisa, Laghman ............................................................................... 18 D. COOPERATION AND COMPETITION ............................................................................................. 19 1. The Taliban, al-Qaeda and the Haqqani network....................................................................... 19 2. The Taliban and Hizb-e Islami................................................................................................... 21 IV. THE CURRENCY OF CONFLICT .............................................................................. 22 A. SHADOW GOVERNANCE/SHADOW ECONOMY ............................................................................. 25 B. PROFIT MOTIVES ....................................................................................................................... 26 V. CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................ 29 APPENDICES A. MAP OF AFGHANISTAN .................................................................................................................... 30 B. MAP OF INSURGENT INFLUENCE AROUND KABUL ............................................................................ 31 C. GLOSSARY ....................................................................................................................................... 32 D. ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP .................................................................................... 33 E. CRISIS GROUP REPORTS AND BRIEFINGS ON ASIA SINCE 2008 ......................................................... 34 F. CRISIS GROUP BOARD OF TRUSTEES ................................................................................................ 36 Asia Report N°207 27 June 2011 THE INSURGENCY IN AFGHANISTAN’S HEARTLAND EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS The insurgency in Afghanistan has expanded far beyond after the transfer of additional U.S. troops was completed, its stronghold in the south east. Transcending its traditional violence increased across the country, hitting new peaks Pashtun base, the Taliban is bolstering its influence in the in May 2011 as the Taliban launched their spring offen- central-eastern provinces by installing shadow govern- sive, which resulted in the highest recorded number of ci- ments and tapping into the vulnerabilities of a central gov- vilian casualties incurred in a single month since the U.S. ernment crippled by corruption and deeply dependent on engagement in Afghanistan began in 2001. It is unlikely a corrosive war economy. Collusion between insurgents that this trend will be reversed anytime soon. Following and corrupt government officials in Kabul and the nearby the announcement by President Barack Obama on 22 June provinces has increased, leading to a profusion of crimi- 2011 of U.S. plans to withdraw 33,000 troops by September nal networks in the Afghan heartland. Despite efforts to 2012, it appears likely that the insurgency will push force- combat the insurgency in the south, stability in the centre fully to gain more ground before the military drawdown has steadily eroded. Yet, with nearly one fifth of the popu- reaches its final phase by December 2014. lation residing in Kabul and its surrounding provinces, the Afghan heartland is pivotal to the planned transition from Nearly a decade after the U.S.-led military intervention be- international troops to Afghan forces at the end of 2014. gan, little has been done to challenge the perverse incen- Given the insurgency’s entrenchment so close to the capital, tives of continued conflict in Afghanistan. Insecurity and however, it appears doubtful that President Hamid Karzai’s the inflow of billions of dollars in international assistance government will be able to contain the threat and stabilise has failed to significantly strengthen the state’s capacity the country by then. Countering the insurgency in these to provide security or basic services and has instead, by crucial areas requires the implementation of long-overdue progressively fusing the interests of political gatekeepers reforms, including more robust anti-corruption efforts, and insurgent commanders, provided new opportunities stricter oversight over international aid and greater support for criminals and insurgents to expand their influence inside for capacity building in the judicial and financial sectors. the government. The economy as a result is increasingly dominated by a criminal oligarchy of politically connected Although the number of major attacks on Kabul has recently businessmen. On the surface, security conditions in the declined, insurgent networks have been able to reinforce capital city appear relatively stable. The nexus between their gains in provinces and districts close to the city, criminal enterprises, insurgent networks and corrupt po- launching smaller attacks on soft targets. Outmanned and litical elites, however, is undermining Kabul’s security and outgunned by the thousands of foreign and Afghan secu- that of the central-eastern corridor. Afghan citizens, mean- rity forces in and around Kabul, Taliban attacks inside the while, are squeezed on all sides – by the government, the capital are not aimed at controlling it physically but to insurgency and international forces. capture it psychologically. Once that objective is achieved, the political and financial cost of doing business for for- The insurgency’s penetration of the greater Kabul area has eign forces and diplomatic missions located in Kabul will also intensified competition between Taliban fighters asso- be too high to sustain for the long haul. ciated with Mullah Omar’s Quetta Shura (leadership coun- cil), the North Waziristan-based Haqqani network and An aggressive campaign of assassinations of government Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s Hizb-e Islami. Violent rivalries officials and infiltration of Afghan security forces in between commanders of these insurgent groups in places neighbouring provinces has, meanwhile, gutted the gov- such as Kapisa, Logar and Wardak have resulted in the ernment’s ability to expand its reach to the periphery. In loss of hundreds of lives. Caught in the middle are ordi- the rural areas of Ghazni, Wardak, Logar and other nearby nary Afghans who remain fearful of a Taliban return to provinces, where unemployment runs high and govern- power. Tasked with quelling the violence, NATO’s Inter- ment presence is low, the insurgency has found safe havens national Security Assistance Force (ISAF) is perceived as far from the borders of Pakistan. A little more than a year unable or unwilling to distinguish between civilians and The Insurgency in Afghanistan’s Heartland Crisis Group Asia Report N°207, 27 June 2011 Page ii insurgents and to reduce dependence on corrupt govern- c) clarify criteria for corruption investigations and ment officials in its counter-insurgency strategy. harmonise policy on pursuing sensitive cases involving high-level officials;
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