Indonesia Border Diplomacy Under the Global Maritime Fulcrum

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Indonesia Border Diplomacy Under The Global Maritime Fulcrum

ANDIKA, Muhammad Tri*

“The dominant facilitator of globalization process has always been the sea.” (Sam Trangerdi)

Abstract

As an archipelagic country, border settlement is one of the critical issues for Indonesia. Ten countries have maritime borders with In- donesia: Australia, The Philippines, India, Malaysia, Palau, Pap- ua New Guinea, Singapore, Thailand, Timor Leste, and Vietnam. Therefore, this aspect becomes more important for Indonesia’s foreign policy, particularly after the Global Maritime Fulcrum (GMF) doctrine was launched by President Joko Widodo (popularly known as Jokowi). The GMF initiated by President Joko Widodo contains a derivative policy on strengthening Indonesia’s border diplomacy. It is also emphasised by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in its strategic goals 2015–2019. To reinforce this policy, Indonesia needs to take decisive actions, such as by giving instructions for sinking boats whenever they are caught fishing illegally or firing warning shots on illegal boats trespassing Indonesia’s territorial seas. These incidents often trigger diplomatic tensions with neighbouring countries. However, as Indonesia’s maritime doctrine, GMF also emphasises working with other countries in maritime- based cooperation for various dimensions, including the settlement of maritime borders, and in order to delineate maritime borders,

RITSUMEIKAN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS Vol.15, pp.45-66 (2017). * International Relations, Department of Political Science, Universitas Bakrie, Jakarta- Indonesia. [email protected] 46 RITSUMEIKAN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 【Vol. 15

negotiations with neighbouring countries are inevitable. Against this background, this article aims to elucidate the dynamics of In- donesia’s borders diplomacy under the doctrine of GMF. How should Indonesia engage in border diplomacy under the GMF? What are the most likely challenges facing Indonesia in dealing with border diplomacy that would arise under this new situation? This article argues that the doctrine of GMF has bolstered the efforts of the Indonesian government to take serious action on maritime border diplomacy. Nevertheless, Indonesia’s border diplomacy under the GMF is still facing major challenges.

Keywords:

Global Maritime Fulcrum, Borders, Diplomacy, Settlement, Sea

INTRODUCTION

The growing discourse on Indonesia’s maritime sector has been a re- markable breakthrough of President Joko Widodo’s foreign policy. By adopting pro-people diplomacy’s doctrine, President Joko Widodo (popularly known as Jokowi) aimed to use Indonesia’s foreign policy as a strategic instrument for the benefit of Indonesians. Of the various actions, giving special attention to building and empowering the maritime sector has been the strategic action of Jokowi’s administration. For Indonesia, this vision is inevitably based on various factors, including the nature of Indone- sia as an archipelagic country where the ocean symbolizes very important meanings in history, economics, and geopolitics. The president’s commitment to maritime security is followed by the launch of the Global Maritime Fulcrum (GMF). It is Jokowi’s maritime doctrine that aims to accelerate and evenly spread Indonesia’s economic growth and make Indonesia’s economy more efficient and competitive. It contains plans on how the maritime sector could contribute to the country’s economy. Thus, the GMF was launched to fulfil President Jokowi’s commitment to developing and empowering Indonesia’s maritime sector. On the other hand, the GMF doctrine also implies significant challenges. One of them is the settlement of maritime borders. The GMF initiated by President Joko Widodo aimed to strengthen Indonesia’s border di- 2017】 Indonesia Border Diplomacy Under The Global Maritime Fulcrum（ANDIKA） 47 plomacy. The Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in its strategic goals for 2015–2019 emphasised this vision. To reinforce this policy, it is una- voidable for Indonesia to take decisive actions, such as giving instructions to sinking boats whenever they are caught fishing illegally or firing warning shots on illegal boats trespassing Indonesia territorial seas. These are often triggered by diplomatic incidents with neighbouring countries. How- ever, the Indonesian maritime doctrine, GMF, also emphasises working with other countries in maritime-based cooperation for various dimensions. For the delineation of maritime borders, negotiations with neighbouring countries are inevitable. This article aims to elucidate the dynamics of Indonesia’s border diplomacy under the doctrine of the GMF. How should Indonesia apply border diplomacy under the GMF? What are the challenges facing Indonesia when dealing with border diplomacy that would arise under this new situation? This article argues that the doctrine of GMF has bolstered the efforts of the Indonesian government to take serious action on maritime border diplomacy. Nevertheless, Indonesia’s border diplomacy under the GMF is still facing major challenges. As an archipelagic country that adopted the archipelago outlook concept (Wawasan Nusantara), Indonesia has maritime borders with 10 neighbouring countries: India, Thailand, Malaysia, Vietnam, Malaysia, Singapore, The Philippines, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Australia, and Ti- mor Leste. However, the border agreements have not been fully completed and they still have much work to do on them. When the first negotiation started in 1970, except Palau and Timor Leste, Indonesia already had 18 maritime border agreements with 8 neighbouring states. The aspects that have been agreed on, among others, are continental shelf and territorial sea. However, it is not the case for the Economic Exclusive Zone (EEZ). The negotiation on EEZ with almost all neighbouring countries is still a long way from being settled. To exercise the link between GMF and settlement of maritime borders, this article is divided into several sections. The first section will elaborate on the principle doctrine of President Jokowi that is labelled as pro people diplomacy. The second part will discuss the origin of GMF and how it links with the effort to resolve maritime border disputes. The third section will present an analysis of Indonesia’s action in managing its border diplomacy, particularly in the maritime boundaries. The last part will present the conclusion. 48 RITSUMEIKAN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 【Vol. 15

JOKOWI’S PRO-PEOPLE DIPLOMACY

Indonesian foreign policy under Jokowi’s administration adopted a pro-people diplomacy approach. Under this vision, President Jokowi made strong efforts to carry out diplomacy activities for the benefit of the people. Diplomacy and foreign policy should actively deliver direct impacts on the people’s economy. However, Jokowi’s pro-people diplomacy is not an entirely new doctrine for Indonesian foreign policy. It has strong roots with the independent and active doctrine, underlining the main principles of Indonesian foreign policy. In this part, we shall discuss the independent and active foreign policy and how it links with Indonesia’s current approach – Joko- wi’s vision of pro people diplomacy. Elaborating the background is thus crucial to understanding the nature of Indonesia foreign policy. Independent and active, known as “bebas dan aktif”, have been the main principles of Indonesia’s foreign policy since the early period of the nation. It became the doctrine for Jakarta in its interactions with other states at the regional and global level. In light of these strong words, Indo- nesia started becoming independent of alliances or political blocks that ex- isted in the global stage. At the same time, they also imply Jakarta’s will- ingness to enhance its role in the international community. The “bebas dan aktif” doctrine shows Indonesia’s respect for sovereignty over other states. According to Mohammad Hatta, Indonesia adopts the active and independent doctrine because Indonesia does not wish to align itself with either the Western bloc or the Communist bloc. The active dimension shows that Indonesia actively carries out a peaceful policy as a loyal member of the United Nations.1） The independent dimension in the doctrine implies that the Indonesian government does not interfere with other states’ domestic political issues. As sovereignty is a sensitive aspect of every state, offending this aspect could easily bring countries to conflict. Indonesia believes each state has its own national autonomy and that should be mutually respected. Pro-people diplomacy made Indonesian foreign policy focus on people’s interest in Indonesian foreign diplomacy. It aims to secure the needs of In-

1） Mohammad Hatta, “Indonesia between the Power Blocs,” Journal of Foreign Affairs 36, no.3 (1958): 480. 2017】 Indonesia Border Diplomacy Under The Global Maritime Fulcrum（ANDIKA） 49 donesian people first and foremost. With regard to the origin, this doctrine also can be regarded as the result of the evaluation of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s (SBY) foreign policy. During SBY’s period, Indonesia adopted the “thousand friends – zero enemies” policy, which President Jokowi thought created a distance between the policy and domestic needs. Under this approach, foreign policy is often placed at the high profile level but lacks the roots of the domestic aspect. Therefore, in practice, Indonesia has often been viewed as receiving few benefits from foreign diplomacy with the others gaining more. Against this background, Jokowi’s administration embraced the new approach, i.e. “diplomasi pro-rakyat” or pro people diplomacy, embracing domestic needs as the centre of Indonesia’s foreign policy. Jokowi’s pro people diplomacy has its roots in the independent and active doctrine. The pro people diplomacy blends two strategies but with different levels of emphasis. If SBY’s diplomacy emphasised Indonesia’s presence in the regional stage, pro-people diplomacy focuses on optimizing all diplomacy activities to lead to domestic economic benefits. In this sense, the domestic factor becomes an important factor in the formation of Joko- wi’s foreign policy. The launch of pro-people diplomacy is also influenced by President Jokowi’s domestic life and idiosyncrasies. It is strongly related to the background of Jokowi and what people had expected from him during the elec- tions. With a strong image as a figure who was born from a non-elitist people, Jokowi has been widely expected as representing wong cilik or “poor people”. Under that image, Jokowi was respected as a populist figure. This framing also influenced the way in which Jokowi constructed the policy – It should not be elitist but must be populist. Therefore, domestic influenc- es contributed significantly to the formulation of pro people diplomacy. Following Jokowi’s direction on pro-people’s foreign policy approach, Indonesian foreign minister Retno Marsudi translated its new approach on her first annual policy statement on 8 January 2015. According to her, Indonesia will focus on three priorities: maintaining Indonesia’s sovereignty, enhancing the protection of Indonesian citizens, and intensifying economic diplomacy.2） On another occasion, she also placed emphasis on three imperative di-

2） Ibid. 50 RITSUMEIKAN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 【Vol. 15 rections as derivatives of the pro-people foreign policy. The first direction was that of strengthening Indonesia’s economy on diplomacy activity. In order to achieve this, there must be a mutual connection between the dimensions of foreign policy and economic development policy. The second direction was actively using the bilateral mechanism as a diplomatic instrument rather than multilateral forums. Resources would be directed to the bilateral forum instead of spending energy to activate multilateral forums. The third direction was that of enabling diplomat officers to be more active in promoting Indonesia’s economic competitive advantages.3） Diplo- mats are expected to play the necessary role to integrate Indonesia with the world market.

ORIGIN OF THE GMF’S DOCTRINE

This section elaborates on the origin of GMF as Indonesia’s maritime doctrine. How did the GMF doctrine emerge? In what context was the GMF doctrine implemented to transform Indonesia as a maritime power in the region? In this section, it will be argued that the doctrine of GMF is an evolutionary concept. Although the idea of GMF has been perceived as a novelty to many, it is not an entirely new idea. The GMF espoused by President Jokowi in 2014 has been a long tra- dition in the Indonesian foreign policy’s direction. It is actually not an entirely new concept. The elite’s awareness of importance of maritime vision had risen since the Soekarno era. After the independence declaration in 1945, Indonesia’s territory was set from the Netherlands 1939 Ordinance on Territorial Waters and Maritime Zones. However, this territorial divi- sion and the three-mile extent of sovereign water were vulnerable to foreign maritime encroachment in the archipelago. As a response to that dy- namic, it was Prime Minister Djuanda who declared Indonesia as an archipelagic state, which then is known as Djuanda Declaration 1957. 4） This declaration formed the foundation for President Soekarno to formu-

3） Parameswaran, P, “The Trouble with Indonesia’s Foreign Policy Priorities under Jokowi.” The Diplomat, date, 2015, accessed June 5, 2016, http://thediplomat.com/2015/01/the-trouble-with-indonesias-foreign-policy-priorities-under-jokowi/.

4） The Djuanda Declaration 1957 that has been widely recognised as the embryo of Indone- sia’s archipelagic doctrine depended largely on the interest to gain wide recognition of a newly independent Indonesia. 2017】 Indonesia Border Diplomacy Under The Global Maritime Fulcrum（ANDIKA） 51 late the concept of Wawasan Nusantara or Indonesia archipelagic outlook in 1966.5） The concept of Archipelago Outlook is a political concept reflect- ing that Indonesia is a unified archipelago. On the other hand, it is also in- dicative of Indonesia’s acute sense of vulnerability in its maritime do- main.6） Furthermore, the concept of Wawasan Nusantara was conveyed by the Indonesian government to various international forums. The agenda was to introduce and spread the idea that Indonesia is an Archipelagic State in the international community. Through the active campaigns conducted by the Indonesian government, in 1982, the concept of Archipelagic State has achieved recognition and the concept was adopted in the third United Na- tions Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III).7） Under Law No.17/1985, Indonesia had ratified the result of the UNCLOS. Thus, it becomes the main sprit of Indonesia’s maritime direction. The concerns regarding the maritime sector had risen in the period of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s administration (popularly known as SBY). During SBY’s period, the framework on maritime security was introduced as the national security framework. SBY set the agenda projecting Indone- sia as a major player in the Indo-Pacific water region. It was also reiterated by Marty Natalegawa, foreign minister in SBY’s period, who emphasised the importance of Indonesia’s role in the Indian Ocean.8） From the global perspective, this option was embraced, considering the trend of global pendulum at that time moved towards to the East. The Eastern region had become the new centre of gravity for politics and economics glob- ally. 9） It was also prompted by Indonesia’s active involvement and election as the vice chair of the Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooper-

5） Ahmad Habir and Muhammad Tri Andika, “Normative Priorities and Contradictions in In- donesia’s Foreign Policy; From Wawasan Nusantara to Democracy.” Australia National University, 2014, p.54, accessed date, http://nsc.anu.edu.au/documents/Indonesia-Article7. pdf. 6） Michael Leifer, Indonesia’s Foreign Policy (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1983). 7） UNCLOS defines the maritime zone of jurisdiction in three parts: territorial sea (12 m), Exclusive Economic Zone (200 m), and continental shelf. Under the UNCLOS jurisdiction, Indonesia got more than what it originally asked for. 8） Evelyn Goh, “Making Waves,” Australia: New Mandala Journal, 15 June 2015, accessed July 20, 2016, http://www.newmandala.org/making-waves/. 9） Keshav Prasad, “Indonesia and the Emergence of New Strategic Dynamics in Asia-Pacific Analysis,” Eurasia Review, vol, issue (2012), accessed July 20, 2016, http://www.eurasiare- view.com/24082012-indonesia-and-the-emergence-of-new-strategic-dynamics-in-asia-pacific-analysis/. 52 RITSUMEIKAN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 【Vol. 15 ation (IORA-RC) for the period 2013–2015.10） This was in line with SBY’s foreign policy vision of, increasing Indonesia’s leadership at the regional and global level. The spirit of Indonesia’s leadership at the regional and global levels was very imminent with the President Jokowi’s GMF. As mentioned by Ri- zal Sukma, one of the key advisors of foreign policy of President Jokowi, the idea of GMF aimed to transform Indonesia into the fulcrum of the two strategic oceans, the Pacific and Indian. However, it also had a slightly different maritime vision than that in SBY’s period. Jokowi’s GMF doctrine is wider. It aims at more than just increasing Indonesia’s regional leadership. In fact, Jokowi’s maritime orientation is similar to the Chinese maritime concept, with a strong emphasis on building the new 21st century maritime Silk Road. 11） Moreover, the launch of GMF could be seen as the effort of President Jokowi’s administration to increase the presence of the state in the maritime sphere. Since Indonesia’s waters contain abundant natural resources that could be converted to economic revenue, the GMF is a strategic instrument to capitalise Indonesia’s water sphere. There is also an argument that Indonesia’s reorientation towards its ocean was the product of an elite conception in serving Indonesia’s geopolitics and aspirations in accordance to its domestic needs.12） This view is in line with the view that the maritime doctrine is an evolutionary concept but with emphasis on Jokowi’s pro people diplomacy, which means Indone- sia’s diplomacy can have a direct impact on its people. However, what makes the pro people diplomacy interesting and dis- tinct from the previous maritime doctrine is that it is rooted in President Jokowi’s commitment to the maritime sector. It is should be acknowledged that the GMF has succeeded in not only increasing the awareness of Indo- nesians about the maritime sector but also convincing the international community that Indonesia has a strong commitment to its status as an ar-

10） Veeramallah Anjaiah, “RI elected as vice-chair of Indian Ocean Rim Association,” The Ja- karta Post, 5 November 2013, accessed July 20, 2016, http://www.thejakartapost.com/ news/2013/11/05/ri-elected-vice-chair-indian-ocean-rim-association.html. 11） Ibid. 12） This argument was echoed by Mr. Jonathan Chen during the conference on “Indonesia’s Global Maritime Fulcrum Challenges and Trajectories”. The result of the discussion can be retrieved from https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/ER160714_Global-Mar- itime-Fulcrum.pdf. 2017】 Indonesia Border Diplomacy Under The Global Maritime Fulcrum（ANDIKA） 53 chipelagic country. These are the features of Jokowi’s GMF that made it more attractive and prominent although it is not entirely a new concept. As the GMF was constructed by President Jokowi, it is worth tracing the background of Jokowi’s GMF. The discourse on Indonesia’s maritime power started to get more attention after the presidential debate in 2014. As a presidential candidate, Jokowi tried to establish his distinction through his vision. Jokowi was committed, as written in his manifesto, to revamp Indonesia into a GMF.13） The idea had been reiterated in various forums, including his inauguration speech in October 2014. To strengthen his commitment to the maritime sector, he used the unique words Jalsveva Jayamah, emphasising his vision to make Indonesia a maritime nation.14） As Indonesia’s maritime doctrine, the GMF has been an important instrument showing that Indonesia has been aware of and responsive to the current geopolitical situation. The GMF is a tool for Indonesia to delineate its position in the region and Indonesia has a solid strategy to respond to potential external security threats. The growing military presence in the Pacific Ocean, the escalation in South China Sea, and the growing tension in Natuna after China’s claim over it, in fact, have bolstered Indonesia’s fears. In addition to the security factor, the GMF is strongly related to the efforts of the government in optimising the state’s revenue from the maritime sector. As mentioned by President Jokowi on many occasions, the con- tribution of the maritime sector now is still less than 30% of the GDP. In 2014 and 2015, government’s income from the fishery sector was only about 250 billion rupiah.15） In fact, the potential revenue that could be ex- tracted from the maritime sector is about US$ 1.2 trillion.16） Therefore, given with the vast maritime area and its abundant resources, the low Government revenue from maritime and fishery sectors has become the

13） Indonesia Secretariat Cabinet, “President Jokowi at IMO Forum; I’m Committed to making Indonesia Global Maritime Fulcrum,” Indonesia Secretariat Cabinet, 20 April 2016, accessed July 2016 http://setkab.go.id/en/president-jokowi-at-imo-forum-im-committed-to- making-indonesia-global-maritime-fulcrum/. 14） Jakarta Globe, “Jokowi’s Inaugural Speech as Nation’s Seventh President,” Jakarta Globe, October, 20, 2014, accessed March 15, 2016, http://jakartaglobe.beritasatu.com/news/ jokowis-inaugural-speech-nations-seventh-president/. 15） Badan Pusat Statistik (Indonesia Statistic Agency) 16） Arie C. Meliala, “Potensi Laut Indonesia Belum Dimanfaatkan Secara Optimal,” Pikiran Rakyat, June 15, 2016, accessed October 25, 2016, http://www.pikiran-rakyat.com/nasional/2016/06/15/potensi-laut-indonesia-belum-dimanfaatkan-secara-optimal-371905. 54 RITSUMEIKAN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 【Vol. 15 background to Jokowi’s administration to optimise the revenue from the maritime sector for the well-being of its citizens.

MARITIME BORDER DIPLOMACY

The current global trend shows that a state’s interaction may be conducted in a borderless word. However, for a state entity, the national border remains when performing important function as an identity. Since border and sovereignty are very closely linked, border diplomacy is a vital element for a state to delaminate its sovereignty. The border is the prima- ry aspect for every state enforcing its territory and exclusion. Also, the border is the central feature of a state’s architecture in global politics, ori- enting the convergence of people with a given territory and notions of a common history, nationality, identity, language, and culture.17） However, in the age of global interdependence, there is a rising challenge facing the state’s border. The border is no longer seen as an exclusive territorial barrier. The border, in fact, has become a strategic point for every state where economic, political, and social interactions take place. The global environment that contains economic benefits for state’s revenue has pushed every state to adapt to cross border movement. In addition, according to Walker, the principle of sovereignty enables and depends upon spatial demarcation between life inside and outside a centred political community. Within this concept lie the notions of here and there, us and them, affirming the presence of a political community.18） Given the context as archipelagic countries, having solid maritime borders is an inevitable aspect for Indonesia in affirming its sovereign territory. Without having a solid legal standing on maritime borders, Indone- sia can be fragile in the case of maritime issues, such as border disputes, illegal fishing, or illegal ship trespassing. Furthermore, this makes Indo- nesia vulnerable to tensions or disputes with neighbouring countries. Take the example of the incident between Malaysian fisherman, Indonesian pa- trol boat, and Malaysian marine police in the waters off Tanjung Berakit in 2010. Another example is the incident between Indonesia and Malaysia

17） Nick Vaughan, Border Politics; The Limits of Sovereign Power (Edinburgh University Press, 2012), 54 18） Ibid 2017】 Indonesia Border Diplomacy Under The Global Maritime Fulcrum（ANDIKA） 55 in the northern part of Malacca Strait in April 2010.19） These are a few ex- amples of tensions emerging from unresolved maritime boundaries between two countries. Unresolved maritime boundaries will only present challenges to Indonesia in its security, economy, and political stability and disturb Indonesia’s national interest. Therefore, border diplomacy with neighbouring countries needs to be managed sensitively. If we go back to the history of Indonesia’s maritime delimitation, the efforts to settle maritime boundaries with neighbouring countries were started in 1969. In the first round, Indonesia conducted negotiations with Malaysia, India, Thailand, Papua New Guinea (PNG), and Australia. It re- sulted in 10 agreements of continental shelf. The process continued in 1970–1973 with negotiations on the territorial boundary with Malaysia, PNG, and Singapore. After Indonesia ratified UNCLOS, in 1997, the negotiation on Exclusive Economy Zone (EEZ) had started with Australia. Furthermore, during SBY’s period, Indonesia made several agreements on maritime boundaries. In 2014, Indonesia made a maritime border agreement with the Philippines. This agreement marked the end of 20 years of negotiation between Indonesia and Philippines on the overlapping EEZs in the southern part of the Philippines. Indonesia also made another agreement with Singapore in 2009 on boundaries of the western section, and in 2014, on boundaries along the Singapore Strait.20） It is worth noting that in the context of maritime border diplomacy, there are three types of maritime boundaries: territorial sea, EEZ, and continental shelf boundaries. With regard to these three types, Indonesia has five segments of joint land boundaries, 11 segments of joint territorial sea boundaries, 15 segments of joint EEZ boundaries, and 15 segments of joint continental shelf boundaries. As a result, in total, Indonesia has 46 maritime boundary lines with 24 tri-junction points that need to be resolved with its neighbouring countries, and these numbers are yet to be completed.21） The following table illustrates the existing maritime bounda-

19） Made Andi Arsana, “Predicting Indonesia’s Maritime Boundaries,” The Jakarta Post, 2011, accessed October 5, 2016, http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2011/12/22/predicting-indonesia-s-maritime-boundaries.html. 20） Saiful Bahri, “Indonesia moves closer to ratifying maritime border treaty with Singapore,” Channel News Asia, 7 October 2016, accessed October 20, 2016, http://www.channelnewsasia. com/news/asiapacific/indonesia-moves-closer-to-ratifying-maritime-border-treaty- with/3187408.html. 21） Sobar Sutisna, “International Boundary Fixing and the Roles of Indonesian Surveyors,” 56 RITSUMEIKAN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 【Vol. 15 ry agreements between Indonesia and its neighbouring countries.

Table 1. Indonesia’s Maritime borders Agreements22） State Agreements Date Malaysia 1. Agreements on Delimitation of the conti- 27 October 1969 nental shelves between the two countries 2. Treaty on delimitation of the Territorial 17 March 1970 Seas of the Two Countries in the Strait of Malacca Australia 3. Agreement on establishing certain sea-bed 18 May 1971 countries 4. Agreement on establishing certain sea-bed 9 October 1972 boundaries in the area of the Timor and Arafura seas, supplementary to the Agree- ment of 18 May 1971 5. Agreement concerning certain Boundaries 12 February 1973 between Papua New Guinea and Indonesia 6. MOU on the operations of Indonesian Tra- 7 November 1974 ditional Fisherman in Areas of the Australi- an Exclusive Fishing Zone and Continental Shelf 7. MOU Concerning the Implementation of a 29 October 1981 Provisional Fisheries Surveillance and En- forcement Arrangement 8. Treaty on establishing an exclusive econom- 14 March 1997 ic zone boundary and certain seabed boundaries India 9. Agreement on delimitation of the continen- 8 August 1974 tal shelf boundary between the two countries 10. Agreement on the extension of the 1974 14 January 1977 continental shelf boundary between the two countries in the Andaman Sea and the Indi- an Ocean Papua New Guinea 11. Agreement concerning the Maritime Bound- 13 December 1980 ary between the Republic of Indonesia and Papua New Guinea and Cooperation on related Matters

Australia FIG Congress, 2010, accessed October 2, 2016, https://www.fig.net/resources/proceedings/fig_proceedings/fig2010/papers/ts02a/ts02a_sutisna_3888.pdf. 22） I Made Arsana, “The Delineation of Indonesia’s Outer Limits Of Its Extended Continental Shelf And Preparation for its Submission: Status And Problems. (The United Nations-Nip- pon Foundation Fellowship Programme 2007 – 2008). 2017】 Indonesia Border Diplomacy Under The Global Maritime Fulcrum（ANDIKA） 57

Singapore 12. Agreement stipulating the Territorial Sea 25 May 1973 Boundary Lines between Indonesia and the Republic of Singapore in the Strait of Singa- pore 13. Treaty Between the Republic of Indonesia 3 September 2014 and the Republic of Singapore relating to the Delimitation of the Territorial Seas of the Two Countries in the Eastern Part of the Strait of Singapore. Thailand 14. Agreement between the Government of the 17 December 1971 Kingdom of Thailand and the Government of the Republic of Indonesia relating to the delimitation of a continental shelf boundary between the two countries in the northern part of the Straits of Malacca and in the An- daman Sea 15. Agreement between the Government of the 11 December 1975 Kingdom of Thailand and the Government of the Republic of Indonesia relating to the delimitation of the sea-bed boundary between the two countries in the Andaman Sea India & Thailand 16. Agreement between the Government of the 22 June 1978 Kingdom of Thailand, the Government of the Republic of India and the Government of the Republic of Indonesia concerning the determination of the tri-junction point and the delimitation of the related boundaries of the three countries in the Andaman Sea Malaysia & Thailand 17. Agreement between the Government of the 21 December 1971 Republic of Indonesia, the Government of Malaysia and the Government of the King- dom of Thailand relating to the Delimita- tion of the Continental Shelf Boundaries in the Northern Part of the Strait of Malacca Vietnam 18. Agreement between the Government of the 26 June 2003 Socialist Republic of Vietnam and the Gov- ernment of the Republic of Indonesia concerning the delimitation of the continental shelf boundary The Philippines 19. The agreement delineates the boundaries of 23 May 2014 both nations’ overlapping exclusive economic zones in the Mindanao Sea, the Celebes Sea, and the Philippine Sea.

It is also worth highlighting the progress that has been achieved on maritime borders. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs through its speaker, Mr Armanatha Cristian Nasir, claimed that 65% of Indonesia’s maritime 58 RITSUMEIKAN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 【Vol. 15 boundaries have been completed.23） Except with two countries, i.e. Palau and Timor Leste, Indonesia has 19 maritime border agreements with 8 neighbouring states. Strikingly, most of the agreements just resolved the territorial and continental zone, but not the EEZ. The target to resolve EEZ is still a long way to be settled.

Table 2. Maritime boundaries between Indonesia and neighbouring countries Territorial Continental Exclusive Economic Zone • Malaysia • Thailand • Malaysia • Singapore • Malaysia • The Philippines • Papua New Guinea • Australia • Australia • Timor Leste • India • India • Vietnam • Thailand • The Philippines • Vietnam • Timor Leste • Timor Leste • Palau • Palau

To speed up the settlement of maritime borders, the Ministry of For- eign Affairs adopted its vision into a strategic plan. The ministry created a roadmap regarding the need to hasten negotiations. There are several negotiations on maritime borders planned to settle between 2016 and 2019: initial meeting on maritime borders with Timor Leste; negotiations regarding EEZ with Vietnam; discussion on regional sea, EEZ, and continental shelf with Malaysia; and negotiations on the continental shelf with the Philippines.24） However, this vision still lacked implementation. Although Jokowi completed two years in presidency, the maritime doctrine provided few instructions.

Table 3. Progress status of negotiation on maritime boundaries State Status 1. Timor Leste Initial meeting 2. Vietnam Negotiations on Economic Exclusive Zone 3. Malaysia Talking on regional sea, economic exclusive zone, and continental shelf 4. The Philippines Negotiations on the continental shelf

23） Sugandi Afandi, “65 Percent of Maritime Borders Agreement, Finished (65 Persen Persoa- lan Perbatasan Rampung,” RRI Jakarta, January 3, 2015, accessed July 15, 2016, http:// www.rri.co.id/post/berita/129994/nasional/kemenlu_65_persen_persoalan_perbatasan_ rampung.html. 24） The Ministry of Foreign Affairs Republic of Indonesia, “Annual Press Statement Minister for Foreign Affairs 2015,” accessed June 8, 2016, http://www.kemlu.go.id/Documents/ PPTM%202015/PPTM%202015%20ENG%20FINAL%20PDF.pdf. 2017】 Indonesia Border Diplomacy Under The Global Maritime Fulcrum（ANDIKA） 59

The strategy of settlement maritime borders officially also has been in the Government’s Work Plan’s document (Rencana Kerja Pemerintah). Ac- cording to the Government’s Work Plan 2017, the government has set gradual target to settle state’s maritime borders from 2014–2019. In 2015 Indonesia targeted 6 negotiations, 12 negotiations in 2016 and 2017, and expected time for the all completion is by 2019.

Table 4. Indonesia government’s target of negotiations to resolve maritime borders25） 2014 2015 2016 2017 2019 1 state 6 negotiations 12 negotiations 12 negotiations Negotiations with 10 maritime zone

In general, Indonesia has made significant progress with four neighbouring countries: Malaysia, Singapore, The Philippines, and Timor Leste. With Malaysia, there have been 29 negotiation meetings on maritime boundary in the period of 2005–2016. Indonesia and Philippines carried out 8 meetings from 1994 to 2014, which concluded the EEZ boundary agreement in the Mindanao Sea, the Celebes Sea, and the Philippine Sea. With Singapore, Indonesia had 10 meetings from 2011 to 2014, which concluded the Batam-Changi part. 26） During the years of Jokowi’s administration, several maritime border negotiations had just started. In mid-August 2015, Indonesia has just be- gun negotiations with Timor Leste. Both nations share the maritime borders at three points: Ombai Strait, Wetar Strait, and Timor Sea. During the state visit of Prime Minister Rui Maria De Aroyo to Jakarta, both countries agreed to begin negotiations on unresolved land and maritime borders. Both countries realised that border settlement needs to be started soon to accelerate the trade and investment relations between them. Indo- nesia and Timor Leste already had a similar meeting in 2013. It was during the state visit of Prime Minister Xanana Gusmau to Jakarta. However, the process discontinued without any specific reason. The maritime issue with Timor Leste might be not as crucial as it is with Malaysia, but the maritime border with Timor Leste is important for Indonesia since the area contains a larger amount of fishing and other natural resources.

25） Document of Indonesian Government Work Plan 2017. 26） Explanation from Ambassador Eddy Pratomo, the Indonesia Special Envoy for border diplomacy with Malaysia. 60 RITSUMEIKAN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 【Vol. 15

Progress has also been made with Vietnam. In 2003, Indonesia and Vietnam signed an agreement on maritime borders concerning the delimitation of the continental shelf boundary. After the negotiation of EEZ, it seems like it has been “hibernating” for 12 years, but there is a bright sign for both countries to restart the negotiations on EEZ. According to Indone- sia’s foreign affairs minister, Retno Marsudi, since 2014, the negotiations between both nations occurred 7 times. However, the efforts to resolve delimitation in EEZ have indeed been very challenging for both countries. Although Vietnam accepted Indonesia as an archipelagic country, both countries are yet to reach the consensus particularly on the standards for measuring borders.27） Another significant development can be seen between Indonesia and Singapore. Both nations have signed the treaty relating to the Delimita- tion of the Territorial Seas of the Two Countries in the Eastern Part of the Strait of Singapore on September 2014.28） Within two years of Jokowi’s presidency, in October 2016, the Indonesian government brought the treaty to be ratified by parliament. While the process is on-going, the discussion in its parliament has reached the final stage. With regard to The Philippines, both countries have shared maritime borders on the continental shelf and EEZ. In May 2014, significant progress was achieved. Indonesia and The Philippines signed the agreement to delineate the boundaries of both nations’ overlapping EEZs in the Mindanao Sea, the Celebes Sea, and The Philippine Sea. In the latest agreement, both countries had another meeting in July 2016, ensuring commitment towards taking the final step. According to the statement of Retno Marsudi, the Indonesian foreign minister, both nations have agreed on the need to accelerate the settlement negotiations on the continental shelf boundaries.29）

27） Dimas Nurzaman,“Ten Nations to Negotiate Maritime Borders,” Gress News, March 14, 2016, accessed June 8, 2016, http://gres.news/news/international/103941-ten-nations-to-negotiate-maritime-borders/0/. 28） The Ministry of Foreign Affairs The Republic of Indonesia, “Press statement on State Visit of the President of the Republic of Indonesia Dr Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, 2 to 4 Sep- tember 2014,” accessed June 20, 2016, https://www.mfa.gov.sg/content/mfa/media_centre/ press_room/pr/2014/201409/press_20140903.html. 29） Liza Yosephine, “Indonesia, Philippines to finalize overlapping maritime boundaries negotiations,” The Jakarta Post, July 2, 2016), accessed August 10, 2016, http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2016/07/02/indonesia-philippines-to-finalize-overlapping-maritime-boundary-negotiations.html. 2017】 Indonesia Border Diplomacy Under The Global Maritime Fulcrum（ANDIKA） 61

The progress of negotiations can also be seen with Malaysia although at a slower pace. Between Indonesia and Malaysia, there are many bilateral issues still pending. The settlement of agreement on the EEZ boundary is one of the many bilateral issues that are still pending. In February 2015, President Jokowi made his first official bilateral visit to Malaysia as an opportunity to take the negotiation on the maritime boundaries to a new level. At that state visit, President Jokowi and PM Najib agreed to ex- pedite the conclusion of the maritime boundaries and the Special Envoy Mechanism to give a political push to the process. As follow up, President Jokowi appointed Special Envoy, Ambassador Eddy Pratomo, to accelerate border diplomacy with Malaysia. Meanwhile, Malaysia also appointed Tan Sri Moh. Radzi as Special Envoy since 2014. From the above explanations on the progress of negotiations, this article argues that the government made great efforts to settle unresolved maritime boundaries. This is evidenced by the number of negotiations that succeeded within two years although all of these developments are still far from complete, except the agreement with Singapore that has entered the final step of ratification.

CHALLENGES AHEAD

Although the GMF has raised public optimism about Indonesia’s ocean policy, the challenges ahead in implementing the GMF cannot be ig- nored. This work found at least two important challenges that might be faced by related agencies in a bid to bring Indonesia towards the aim of being a GMF. The first challenge is the lack of a detailed plan on GMF, complicating the coordination among agencies. The second challenge is related to the economic slowdown experienced by Indonesia since 2015. The GMF has become the main strategic policy for Indonesia as an archipelagic state. Thus, to embody the goals, the GMF needs to have a detailed plan. The initial expectation to know GMF’s derivative direction comes when the President Jokowi’s delivered his speech in the 9th East Asia Summit in Nay Pyi Daw, Myanmar 13 November 2014. In that forum, President Jokowi reiterated his commitment to make Indonesia a maritime power. President Jokowi conveyed Indonesia’s vision on GMF into five elements, namely (i) cultivating a maritime culture, (ii) preserving and managing maritime resources, (iii) developing maritime infrastruc- 62 RITSUMEIKAN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 【Vol. 15 ture and connectivity, (iv) maritime cooperation through diplomacy, and (v) building a strong maritime defence.30） Although President Jokowi has lowered the concept of GMF into five elements, actually it still provides little for Indonesia’s maritime agenda. The GMF vision is criticised because of the lack of an archetype or even master plan. It is still guided by a detailed policy blueprint. Although the efforts to realise the doctrine have been underway, there is no detailed document plan. For example, the plan on the maritime sector has been includ- ed in Indonesia’s National Medium Term Development Plan 2015–2019 although the scope is still too broad.31） Moreover, as asserted by Keoni and Adhi, the omission of a detailed plan has two implications. First, since the maritime sector has an intersectoral agenda, with no detailed plan, coordination among the government agencies became difficult and complicated. Second, it also easily leads the government agencies linked with this sector to have various interpretations of the policy.32） In addition to the lack of a detailed plan, the recent budget cuts for all ministries caused by the huge state revenue deficit also forms an important challenge that needs to be considered. As the budget gap widened, President Jokowi demanded all ministries to restrain their spending. After the revision of fiscal shortfall to 2.5% of the GDP, there is gap in the state revenue of about 219 trillion rupiah ($16.7 billion).33） This is due to the recent deterioration of the Indonesian economy caused by a shortfall in tax revenue and falling commodity prices. According to the Presidential In- struction No 8/2016, President Jokowi reduced the budget for 85 state agencies. Furthermore, the budget for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was reduced to about 700.8 billion rupiah.34） Although the budget cut is not larger than that for other ministries such as the Ministry of Defense or

30） Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Presiden Jokowi Deklarasikan Indonesia Sebagai Poros Maritim Dunia”, accessed June 25, 2016, http://www.kemlu.go.id/id/berita/siaran- pers/Pages/Presiden-Jokowi-Deklarasikan-Indonesia-Sebagai-Poros-Maritim-Dunia.aspx. 31） Keoni Indrabayu and Adhi Priamarizki, “Indonesia’s maritime ambitions remain rudderless,” East Asia Forum, vol, issue (2016), accessed October 5, 2016, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2016/09/02/indonesias-maritime-ambitions-remain-rudderless/. 32） Ibid. 33） Karlis Salna and Agus Salim, “Jokowi Demands Spending Restraint as Indonesia Budget Widens,” Bloomberg, date, 2016, accessed October 28, 2016, http://www.bloomberg.com/ news/articles/2016-08-04/jokowi-demands-spending-restraint-as-indonesia-budget-gap- widens. 34） President Instruction No.8/2016, The Cabinet Secretariat of The Republic of Indonesia. 2017】 Indonesia Border Diplomacy Under The Global Maritime Fulcrum（ANDIKA） 63

Ministry of Education, it inevitably has a significant impact on the diplomacy activities carried out by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It is worth noting that to execute maritime border diplomacy sensitively, the Indonesian government needs to consider these two following factors: political principle and technical principle. The political principle promoted by good bilateral relations is a prerequisite for initiating border negotiations. Good diplomatic relations between Indonesia and its neighbouring countries is important to accelerate maritime border settlement. However, there are some states, e.g. Palau, with whom Indonesia has nev- er had negotiations on maritime border settlement owing to no diplomatic relations between them. The second principle is technical aspect, which in- cludes survey activity, remote sensing, and other technical spatial map- ping. This aspect is no less important than the political principle. Without comprehensive supporting documents, the process of negotiation would be uncertain.

CONCLUSION

To sum up, the settlement of maritime border disputes is essential to support the GMF’s agenda. Another point supporting the doctrine is that having a firm maritime border is in line with international law; therefore, it is critical for Indonesia to continue its agenda on its maritime sector. It is a pivotal factor for Indonesia’s efforts to transform the country as a global maritime power. Thus, Indonesia could effectively manage all resources within its sovereignty and use them for the benefit of the people. This article also argued that the doctrine of GMF has bolstered the efforts of the Indonesian government to take serious action on maritime border diplomacy. This can be seen from several evidences, such as the opening negotiations on maritime boundaries with Timor Leste, negotiations on exclusive economic zone (EEZ) boundaries with Vietnam and Malaysia, continuing negotiations on continental shelf boundaries with The Philip- pines, and ratification of maritime agreement with Singapore that has entered the final stage. Nevertheless, Indonesia’s border diplomacy under the GMF still faces major challenges. The first challenge arises from the lack of a detailed plan or strategic map in implementing GMF, particularly for accelerating the settlement of maritime borders. The government could argue that they 64 RITSUMEIKAN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 【Vol. 15 have already set the plan on the National Ocean Policy or in the Paper of Government Work Plan. However, the documents of Government Work Plan have few details on concrete tactics. In addition, the challenge for In- donesia lays in the inability of state agencies to resolve issues in a timely schedule. Another potential challenge is triggered from Indonesia’s economic slowdown. After the revision of the fiscal shortfall to 2.5% of GDP in mid- 2016, there is gap in state revenue of about 219 trillion rupiah (US$16.7 billion). As a consequence, President Jokowi reduced the budget for 85 state agencies, including the budget for the Ministry of Foreign affairs that was reduced to about 700.8 billion rupiah. The state budget cut is strongly believed to influence the performance of maritime border diplomacy. Moreover, other challenges come from the effort to fulfil the main principles in border diplomacy. The settlement of maritime border disputes requires the fulfilment of two important aspects: political principle and technical principle. As discussed above, both aspects are needed to run negotiations. Without good diplomatic relations with neighbouring countries, the negotiation process would be very complicated. On the other hand, to have solid preparations on all technical matters is also crucial for supporting the negotiation. Without comprehensive supporting document, the process of negotiation would follow an uncertain path. Although there are still many challenges ahead, the presence of GMF’s doctrine has increased public awareness on the significance of maritime security for Indonesia’s national interest. The GMF has succeeded in enhancing the significance of maritime security for Indonesia’s national policy. The sea power is not only about the physical instrument of naval or military force but also about the non-physical aspects, i.e. agreement on maritime borders. The agreements on maritime borders are imperative for enhancing Indonesia’s maritime capacity.

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