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Download (2MB) Campbell, Christopher (2021) Are we doing enough? US foreign policy and the Soviet nationalities, 1977-1984. PhD thesis. http://theses.gla.ac.uk/82268/ Copyright and moral rights for this work are retained by the author A copy can be downloaded for personal non-commercial research or study, without prior permission or charge This work cannot be reproduced or quoted extensively from without first obtaining permission in writing from the author The content must not be changed in any way or sold commercially in any format or medium without the formal permission of the author When referring to this work, full bibliographic details including the author, title, awarding institution and date of the thesis must be given Enlighten: Theses https://theses.gla.ac.uk/ [email protected] “Are We Doing Enough?” US Foreign Policy and the Soviet Nationalities, 1977-1984 Christopher Campbell Submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy School of Social and Political Sciences University of Glasgow June 2020 Abstract Between 1977 and 1984, a group of policymakers inside the United States government attempted to harness the growing unrest among the Soviet Union’s ethnic nationalities, with the objective of undermining their geopolitical rival and serving America’s Cold War interests. These officials were motivated by long-standing beliefs about the nature of the Soviet system and the latent power of nationalism as a crucial vulnerability within the USSR. As the relative stability of the détente era passed, a more confrontational relationship emerged between the United States and the USSR. The growth of the global human rights movement and deep structural changes within the international system during the 1970s had opened up new opportunities for American policymakers to attack the internal legitimacy of the Soviet Union. During the Carter administration, and with the blessing of the president, national security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski and a small cadre of hard-line officials began to focus on the internal nature of the Soviet regime and the domestic drivers of Soviet foreign policy. Through increased research and regular seminars, these officials hoped to improve awareness and knowledge of Soviet nationality issues inside the US government and explore ways to reach the ethnic groups inside the USSR. Radio broadcasting and covert book publication programs were a central part of this strategy, although these policies were never fully accepted as a central part of the administration’s Soviet strategy. In 1981, the incoming Reagan administration contained many individuals, such as Soviet expert Richard Pipes, who were highly sympathetic to these ideas. Reagan officials were eager to explore ways of assaulting the internal cohesion of the Soviet Union as an official objective of US foreign policy, in order to promote greater democratisation and pluralism within the USSR. As such, serious attempts were made to craft concrete policies which would exploit ethnic tensions inside the Soviet Union, before these concepts finally fell from favour in 1984. This thesis explores these themes, offering an in-depth study of the Carter and Reagan administrations’ efforts to exploit the weaknesses of the USSR by manipulating the growing ethnic resentments within the Soviet system. These policies were driven by hard-line individuals in both administrations, figures who held long-standing beliefs that the US government should be doing more to undermine the USSR by embracing policies designed to stir up the Soviet nationalities. Table of Contents List of Abbreviations .................................................................................. i Acknowledgements .................................................................................... iii Authors Declaration ................................................................................... v Dedication............................................................................................... vi Introduction............................................................................................. 1 I. THE STIRRING OF THE NATIONALITIES Zbigniew Brzezinski, the Carter administration, and Soviet ethnic tensions ...... 30 US Soviet Relation in 1977 .................................................................. 30 Jimmy Carter, human rights, and the 1970s ............................................. 34 Brzezinski, the Soviet nationalities, and the return of ideology ..................... 42 Expanding activities ......................................................................... 47 The birth of the Nationalities Working Group .......................................... 50 Facing internal resistance ................................................................. 55 The Muslims of Soviet Central Asia ........................................................ 58 Growing tension with Moscow .............................................................. 64 “Are we doing enough?” .................................................................... 71 Looking ahead ............................................................................... 77 II. PROMOTING CHANGE FROM WITHIN Ronald Reagan, the Soviet nationalities, and US policy toward the USSR .......... 81 Reagan’s worldview .......................................................................... 82 Grand strategy? ............................................................................... 86 Richard Pipes, nationalism, and the Soviet regime ..................................... 89 Crafting strategy ............................................................................. 96 Clarke brings coherence .................................................................. 102 George Shultz asserts himself ............................................................ 106 The return of the Nationalities Working Group ........................................ 109 Pipes departs ................................................................................ 114 NSDD-75 and Shultz’s competing four-part framework ............................... 119 The Nationalities Working Group expands its activities .............................. 125 US Consulate in Kiev ....................................................................... 129 Tensions mount ............................................................................. 138 Draft NSDD on Soviet nationalities ....................................................... 142 A change of course .......................................................................... 147 The end of the Nationalities Working Group ........................................... 149 Conclusion ................................................................................... 154t Bibliography ................................................................................. 165 i List of Abbreviations AAD Access to Archival Databases BBC British Broadcasting Corporation BIB Board for International Broadcasting CIA Central Intelligence Agency CPSU Communist Party of the Soviet Union CSCE Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe DCI Director of Central Intelligence DIA Defense Intelligence Agency DJCL Digital Jimmy Carter Library FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation FBIS Foreign Broadcast Information Service FOIA Freedom of Information Act FRUS Foreign Relations of the United States FY Financial Year GDP Gross Domestic Produce ICA International Communication Agency ICBM Intercontinental Ballistic Missile INR Intelligence and Research JCPL Jimmy Carter Presidential Library KGB Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti (Committee for State Security) LoC Library of Congress NARA National Archives and Records Administration NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation NFAC National Foreign Assessment Center NGO Non-Governmental Organisation NSA National Security Agency NSC National Security Council NSDD National Security Decision Directive NSPG National Security Planning Group NSSD National Security Study Directive NWG Nationalities Working Group OMB Office of Management and Budget PD Presidential Directive ii PPS Policy Planning Staff RFE/RL Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty RRDL Ronald Reagan Digital Library RRPL Ronald Reagan Presidential Library SALT Strategic Arms Limitation Talks SCC Special Coordination Committee SDI Strategic Defense Initiative SIG Senior Interdepartmental Group UN United Nations US United States USG United States Government USIA United States Information Service USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics VOA Voice of America iii Acknowledgements Being able to undertake this doctorate in a subject I love has been one of the great blessings of my life. It has also been one of the toughest things I’ve ever done. When I commenced this project 4 years ago nothing prepared me for the ways it would challenge me, stretch me, push me to the very limits of what I was capable of, and maybe even a little beyond. This work has elated me, frustrated me, depressed me, and fulfilled me. The fact I have even reached the end, and I’m now able to submit this thesis, is quite simply because of the support and love I’ve had along the way from good people. Firstly, I want to thank my doctoral supervisors in the Department of Central and East European Studies at the University of Glasgow; Professor Geoffrey Swain and Dr Vladimir Unkovski-Korica. To this day, Professor Swain’s seminar on ‘Stalin and Stalinism’ remains my favourite class of the entire time I’ve spent in higher
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