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The Politics of Espionage: Nazi Diplomats and Spies in Argentina, 1933-1945

The Politics of Espionage: Nazi Diplomats and Spies in Argentina, 1933-1945

The Politics of : Nazi Diplomats and Spies in , 1933-1945

A dissertation presented to

the faculty of

the College of Arts and Sciences of Ohio University

In partial fulfillment

of the requirements for the degree

Doctor of Philosophy

Richard L. McGaha

November 2009

© 2009 Richard L. McGaha. All Rights Reserved.

2

This dissertation titled

The Politics of Espionage: Nazi Diplomats and Spies in Argentina, 1933-1945

by

RICHARD L. MCGAHA

has been approved for

the Department

and the College of Arts and Sciences by

Norman J.W. Goda

Professor of History

Benjamin M. Ogles

Dean, College of Arts and Sciences 3

ABSTRACT

MCGAHA, RICHARD L., Ph.D, November 2009, History

The Politics of Espionage: Nazi Diplomats and Spies in Argentina, 1933-1945 (415 pp.)

Director of Dissertation: Norman J.W. Goda

This dissertation investigates Nazi ’s diplomacy and - gathering in Argentina from 1933-1945. It does so from three perspectives. This study first explores the rivalries that characterized the in the Third . It argues that those rivalries negatively affected Germany’s diplomatic position in Argentina. The actions of the AO in Argentina in the were indicative of this trend. This created a fear of fifth-column activity among Latin American governments with large German populations.

Second, this study explores the rivalry between the (Security

Service, SD) of the Reichssicherheitshauptamt (Reich Security Main Office, RSHA) and

Auswärtiges Amt (Foreign Ministry, AA). It argues that the rivalry between these two organizations in Argentina was part of a larger plan on the part of Amt VI, SS Foreign

Intelligence to usurp the functions of the AA. Intelligence operations were not necessarily undertaken to further the foreign policy goals of , but to further the ambitions of the head of Amt VI, .

Third, this dissertation looks at the issue of ideology. Argentina was one of the last countries to break relations with Nazi Germany. This dissertation attempts to answer the question of how much ideology permeated individuals who were not exposed to Nazi 4

ideology on a daily basis. This section attempts to add to recent studies that have argued

the importance of ideology in Nazi Germany.

In answering these questions, this study mainly relies on the German-language

records of the AA held in College Park, MD. It also utilizes interrogation reports of

individuals involved in diplomacy and espionage in Argentina, as well as messages

decrypted by the British between German spies in Argentina and their superiors in .

This study fits into new examinations of the nexus between intelligence and diplomacy and the role of ideology in the Third Reich.

Approved: ______

Norman J.W. Goda

Professor of History 5

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

No dissertation writes itself, this one included. I would like to thank the

people and institutions who helped in the research and writing. First, my very

long-suffering supervisor, Norman J.W. Goda, who suggested the Nazis and Argentina as

a topic of study. Thanks to some timely encouragement on his part this dissertation was

finished. His comments and criticisms have made this better than it would have been in

anyone else’s hands. Second, my friend and mentor Tom Taylor of Seattle University.

He has had to listen to more about Nazis in Argentina than any person should. He has

been a good friend and I thank him for listening patiently.

Next, I would like to thank the of the National Archives and Records

Administration, College Park, MD. I would especially like to thank Larry Macdonald

and Mary Tomic who helped me navigate my way through the myriad record groups that

formed the bulk of my research. The staff at The National Archives, Kew went above

and beyond the call of duty. The friendliness and efficiency of The National Archives

should be a model for archives worldwide. At Ohio University I would like to thank the

members of my dissertation committee along with my graduate coordinators, Katherine

Jellison and Chester Pach.

Finally, I would like to thank my family for their love and support. First, my aunts, Diane McGaha and Shirley Morgan, who always gave me a place to stay when I was doing research. Second, my father, Richard McGaha, who though he has no idea of what I am doing, continues to be supportive knowing only that I am happy doing what I am doing. Next, my wife Kristina who supported me in more ways than I can . I 6

hope this makes her proud. Finally, my son Ian Gabriel, of my life. Throughout the trials and tribulations of writing this dissertation he always reminded me that discussing the merits of different vacuums was far more important than what is in here despite my silly notion to think otherwise. All that is good in here belongs to them; the errors are, of course, my own.

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To my son Ian Gabriel, may he see better times than these

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Abstract………………………………………………………………………………… 3

Acknowledgements…………………………………………………………………….. 4

Introduction…………………………………………………………………………….. 9

Chapter 1: Thermann’s Arrival and the Crisis of the ‘New’ Diplomacy……………… 25

Chapter 2: The Patagonia Affair and the Fear of Nazi Fifth Column Activity, 1939…..76

Chapter 3: Ad-hoc Diplomacy, 1939-1942……………………………………………113

Chapter 4: The Rise and Fall of the in , 1941-1943………….169

Chapter 5: “Sargo” and the Creation of an SD Intelligence Network…………………210

Chapter 6: The Illusion of …………………………………………………….257

Chapter 7: The Case of Osmar Hellmuth……………………………………………...296

Chapter 8: The ………………………………………………………339

Chapter 9: Aftermath …………………………………………………………….……370

Conclusion…………………………………………………………………………….391

References…………………………………………………………………………….402

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Introduction

“[This] is a tale told by an idiot, full of sound and fury...”

—William Shakespeare, Macbeth, V, v, 261

In February 1946 the U.S. government published a document titled Consultation

among the American Republics with Respect to the Argentine Situation more commonly

known as the ‘Blue Book’ from the color of its cover.2 It alleged that Argentina

collaborated closely with Nazi intelligence agents during the war and that the government

of Argentina and Colonel Juan Domingo Perón were sympathizers. The ostensible

reason for publishing the ‘Blue Book’ was to expose Argentina’s lack of cooperation in

the defense of the Western Hemisphere and the reasons behind it. The real reason was to

thwart Perón’s presidential ambitions and hopefully replace him with someone more

amenable to the U.S.3 These questionable motives have led historians to discount the

revelations in the ‘Blue Book.’ As a result of the ‘Blue Book’ and news coverage the post-

war public viewed Argentina and as full of fascist sympathizers who gave

succor to fleeing Nazis. This perception was underscored by individuals, such as

Undersecretaries of State Spruille Braden and . In 1946 Braden

characterized Argentina as a hotbed of Nazi and fascist sympathizers.4 Braden’s charges

were similar to those made by Welles in 1942. The prominence of Braden and Welles

1 William Shakespeare, “Macbeth,” in Jessie M. Lander ed. Macbeth (: Barnes and Noble Shakespeare, 2007), p. 265. 2 U.S. Department of State, Consultation among the American Republics with Respect to the Argentine Situation (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1946). 3 See especially Gary Frank, Juan Perón versus Spruille Braden (New York: Rowan & Littlefield, 1982). 4 Ronald C. Newton, The ‘Nazi Menace’ in Argentina, 1931-1947 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992), pp. xiii-xiv. Braden’s view was colored by the fact that he and Perón loathed each other. For this see Frank, Juan Perón versus Spruille Braden. 10

added gravitas to the charges and influenced public opinion regarding the Nazis and

Latin America.

This perception continued through the 1980s and was buttressed by fact and

fiction. The arrest of by Israeli agents in Argentina in 1960 and his

subsequent trial captivated the world.5 This incident seemed to confirm that Argentina

and other countries willingly gave asylum to major Nazi war-criminals.6 Popular culture

also contributed to the idea of a Nazi resurgence in South America. Novels and movies

from the 1960s and 1970s reinforced fears that a secret cabal of Nazi war-criminals were planning for a “.” ’s novel The File mixed fact and fiction in its description of Nazis aiding their brethren in escaping justice. The fact that

Eduard Roschmann, one of the main characters was real made the novel more chilling.7

Ira Levin’s novel The Boys from also mixed fact and fiction.8 It related how Dr.

Josef Mengele, the so-called “Angel of Death” at Auschwitz, planned to bring about a

“Fourth Reich” through the cloning of a new Hitler. Nazis on creating a “Fourth

Reich” were popular topics for movies and books. These included, The Quiller

Memorandum, Marathon Man, The Holcroft Covenant and The Rhinemann Exchange to

5 Eichmann’s arrest and his trial has been the subject of numerous studies. See especially, , Eichmann in : A Report on the Banality of Evil (New York: Classics, 2006), David Cesarani, Becoming Eichmann: Rethinking the Life, Crimes, and Trial of a "Desk Murderer" (Cambridge, MA: Da Capo Press, 2006) and Hans Safrian, Die Eichmann-Männer (: Europaverlag, 1993). 6 War criminals found asylum in numerous countries including , , and the U.S. to name a few. See Michael Neufeld, Von Braun: Dreamer of Space, Engineer of War (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2007). Neufeld explores the issue of Von Braun’s complicity in the deaths of prisoners who built the V-1 and V-2 rockets. Also, Richard Breitman et. al., U.S. Intelligence and the Nazis (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005). 7 Fredrick Forsyth, (New York: Viking Press, 1972). The antagonist of the novel was the “Butcher of ” who obtained refuge in Argentina in 1948 until he was forced to move to in 1977 after demanded his extradition. 8 Ira Levin, The Boys from Brazil (New York: Random House, 1976). 11

name but a few.9 All of these were popular with audiences. This mixture of truth and fantasy made dispelling notions of Latin America as a hotbed of difficult.

Wherein does the truth lie? This study will examine German diplomacy and intelligence-gathering in Argentina from 1933-1945. It does so from a bilateral perspective focusing primarily on German actions and Argentine reactions. This study relies primarily on the captured records of the Auswärtiges Amt (German Foreign

Ministry usually abbreviated as AA) held in microfilm format at the U.S. National

Archives and Records Administration (NARA) in College Park, MD as part of Record

Group (RG) 242. It also utilizes the recently declassified records of The Nazi War

Crimes and Japanese Imperial Government Records Interagency Working Group (IWG)

located at NARA. These records contain the postwar interrogations of Walter

Schellenberg, head of Amt VI (Department VI) SS Foreign Intelligence, Theodor

Paeffgen, Schellenberg’s subordinate and head of Amt VI/D SS Foreign Intelligence for the Americas and their subordinates. The IWG reviewed and recommended for release from the records of the FBI, CIA and other agencies numerous files detailing German intelligence activities in Latin America. Interrogations of German diplomats stationed in

Argentina from RG 59, the Records of the Department of State and RG 65, Records of the FBI, are also used. These records are an invaluable source for researching German intelligence operations in the Americas.

9 Ludlum, The Rhinemann Exchange (New York: Doubleday, 1974) and The Holcroft Covenant, paperback ed. (New York: Bantam Books, 1984). The Rhinemann Exchange actually place in during autumn 1943. More recently, the writer W.E.B. Griffin wrote Secret Honor which takes place in Argentina in 1943. W.E.B. Griffin, Secret Honor (New York: G.P. Putnam and Sons, 2000). 12

Also used are the German messages decoded by British Intelligence (codename:

“”) between German agents in Latin America and their superiors in Berlin. These

messages are located at NARA in College Park, MD and at The National Archives, Kew.

Previous studies have not utilized these sources because of their classification. These

declassified documents from the U.S. and Great Britain allow historians to place German

intelligence operations within the power struggles between Hitler’s subordinates. This

broader look reveals that intelligence-gathering in the Third Reich was inherently

ideological and political. That is, intelligence operations were not necessarily initiated to

further the diplomatic aims of Nazi Germany. They were partly the result of

organizations undercutting each other in an attempt to gain the upper-hand in the

internecine struggles that characterized the bureaucratic structures of the Third Reich.

Most studies of German intelligence and diplomacy have treated the two as separate issues. As this study will argue intelligence and diplomacy were intertwined to the detriment of both. This was not only a hallmark of Nazi Germany, but went back to the Imperial German state in I. From 1914-1918, the German embassies in

Mexico, Argentina and the U.S. supported German efforts against the Allies.10

In World War II, the German embassy in Argentina not only supported intelligence activities, but actively participated in the smuggling of strategic materials. Neither of

10 Most prominent is Friedrich Katz, The Secret War in : , the and the Mexican Revolution (Chicago: The Press, 1981). See also Chad Millman, The Detonators: The Secret Plot to Destroy America and the Epic Hunt for Justice (New York: Little, Brown and Company, 2006), Jules Witcover, Sabotage at Tom: Imperial Germany's Secret War in America, 1914-1917 (Chapel Hill: Algonquin Books, 1989), and Robert Koenig, The Fourth Horseman: One Man’s Mission to Wage the Great War in America (New York: Public Affairs Books, 2006), pp. 233-235. 13

these activities could be construed as within diplomatic prerogatives. The reports of the

Anti-Argentine Activities Committee, the FBI, and Ultra bear this out.

This study of German diplomacy and intelligence-gathering will add to the

historiography of Germany relations in Latin America during World War II. The

historiography of Germany relations with Latin America during the Nazi period is thin.

The historiography concerning German diplomacy and intelligence operations in Latin

America is even more sparse. Most studies of German diplomatic relations with neutral

nations during World War II have tended to focus on Europe.11 The notable exception

was , which was an ally of Nazi Germany. Older studies that look at Germany and

Latin America have tended to be rather broad. They focused on either the period before

World War II, the region as a whole, or narrow issues, such as economics and trade.12

Newer studies by Olaf Gaudig, Holger Meding and others have continued this trend.13

While these studies are valuable, their scope limits their treatment of diplomacy or intelligence.

Scholarly studies of German intelligence in Latin America consist of three books.

While all three are valuable they all have one major shortcoming: the classification of

11 The literature in this regard is daunting. Two recent and notable books are Christian Leitz, Nazi Germany and Neutral Europe During the Second World War (New York: New York University Press, 2001) and Stanley G. Payne, Franco and Hitler: , Germany and World War II (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008). 12 See Thomas Schoonover, Germany in Central America: Competitive , 1821-1929 (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1998), Arnold Ebel, und Argentinien: die diplomatischen Beziehungen unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Handelspolitik, 1933-1939 (Köln: Böhlau, 1971) and Reiner Pommerin, Das Dritte Reich und Lateinamerika: Die deutsche Politik gegenüber Süd- und Mittelamerika (Düsseldorf: Droste Verlag, 1977). 13 Olaf Gaudig and Peter Veit, Der Widerschein des Nazismus: das Bild des Nationalsozialismus in der deutschsprachigen Presse Argentiniens, Brasiliens und Chiles 1932-1945 (Berlin: Wissenschaftlicher Verlag, 1997); Olaf Gaudig and Peter Veit, Hakenkreuz über Südamerika : Ideologie, Politik, Militär (Berlin: Wissenschaftlicher Verlag, 2004); Holger Meding ed. Nationalsozialismus und Argentinien: Beziehungen, Einflüsse und Nachwirkungen (: Lang, 1995). 14

relevant documentation at the times they were written. Stanley Hilton’s study of German

intelligence in Brazil is one of two monographs that studies German operations in one

country in any detail.14 Hilton’s work is outstanding but dated. While Hilton was

hampered by the classification of documents, particularly interrogations, FBI reports and

Ultra, he ably used the available archival material to produce a sound study. Leslie Rout

and John Bratzel’s study examines German intelligence-gathering and U.S. counter-

intelligence efforts throughout Latin America.15 Rout and Bratzel faced the same

problems Hilton did regarding sources so their focus in mainly on the Abwehr (Armed

Forces Intelligence), to the detriment of Amt VI. Utilizing mostly English-language sources, their study is well-constructed and masterfully argued. Their meticulous examination of the archival record produced tentative conclusions that hold up well in light of the declassification of intelligence documents. Both studies are in many ways fine examples of first-generation intelligence history.

Ronald C. Newton’s study is more recent. Like Hilton’s it also focuses on one

country. Newton’s study has much to commend it and is in some ways outstanding. It

utilized archives in Argentina, the U.S., Great Britain and Germany, but its use of

German sources is somewhat superficial. Newton also implied that he began his study by

trying to prove a negative. He began with the assumption that there was no Nazi threat to

the Western Hemisphere. His scope limited his use of German-language sources. This

underutilization of German archival material affected his conclusions. Also, historians of

14 Stanley E. Hilton, Hitler's Secret War in South America, 1939-1945: German Espionage and Allied Counterespionage in Brazil (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1981). 15 Leslie B. Rout and John F. Bratzel, The Shadow War: German Espionage and United States Counterespionage in Latin America during World War II (Frederick: University Publications of America, 1986). 15

Latin America in general tend to discount Hitler’s global ambitions. They usually cite

the inability to find any such plan in the archives as evidence such a threat did not exist.16

This fundamental misunderstanding of how Hitler operated affects their conclusions.

Newton was also handicapped by the classification of intelligence material, particularly Ultra, which showed what Allied policymakers knew regarding German actions in Argentina. His study also suffers from what historian Gordon Wood labeled

“presentism.”17 That is, he used present knowledge to work backward instead of

examining the evidence from the perspective of its contemporaries. He implied that since

the U.S. had been wrong about so much in Latin America, including Jacobo Arbenz in

Guatemala, Salvador Allende in Chile and others, it must have been wrong in Argentina.

Newton argues that U.S. policymakers saw what they wanted to see in Argentina to the

detriment of all else. This study rejects that view and shows that U.S. policy-making

towards Argentina was based on solid evidence.

Journalist Uki Goñi has also written two books that study German intelligence in

Argentina. Goñi is primarily interested in the connections between Perón and German

intelligence rather than the larger issues presented here. Goñi’s first book Perón y los

Alemanes (Perón and the /Nazis) examines the wartime contacts between

German intelligence and the Argentine government.18 His second book, The Real

16 This was the general consensus of numerous discussions held with Latin American historians at the CALAS Conference in Calgary in October 2006. A study which supports this argument is Norman J.W. Goda, Tomorrow the World: Hitler, Northwest , and the Path Toward America (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1998). 17 Gordon Wood, “Presentism in History,” in The Purpose of the Past: Reflections on the Uses of History (New York: Penguin Press, 2008), pp. 293-308. 18 Uki Goñi, Perón y los Alemanes (Buenos Aires, Sudamericana, 1998). 16

Odessa: Smuggling the Nazis to Perón’s Argentina, covers mainly the postwar period.19

While both studies use German-language sources, some of Goñi’s interpretations are overdrawn and not supported by the evidence. He is also hampered by an agenda seeking to undermine Perón. As will be shown, the evidence against Perón is a bit more ambiguous.

At its broadest level this study examines the issue of continuity versus change.

Was Hitler’s foreign policy simply a continuation of the expansionist policies of

Wilhelmine Germany or was it something more radical and new?20 The evidence

regarding Argentina is somewhat ambiguous. In the 1930s and the first two years of the war the Auswärtiges Amt (AA) pursued traditional economic policies towards Argentina.

Many of these policies dated to the nineteenth century. Following Hitler’s assumption of

power in 1933 new groups, such as the Auslandsorganisation (AO) and SS, increasingly

placed a primacy on ideology to the detriment of practical realities. This is not to argue

that the AA was not ideological. However, the AA could subordinate ideology to reality,

which the AO and SS were reluctant to do. In that sense, the AA represented continuity and the AO and SS change.

Previous studies, such as Hilton and Newton, did not examine how the intelligence-gathering apparatuses of the Third Reich fit within the regime. Describing the actions of a nation’s intelligence agency without the domestic context only tells half the story. Intelligence agencies are reflections of the society and governments that they

19 Uki Goñi, The Real Odessa: Smuggling the Nazis to Perón’s Argentina (; Granta Books, 2002). 20 The classic works on this question are Hans-Ulrich Wehler, The 1871-1918 (New York: Berg Publishers, 1985) and Fritz Fischer, Griff nach der Weltmacht (: Droste Verlag, 1964) and From Kaiserreich to the Third Reich: Elements of Continuity in German History 1871-1945 (London: Unwin Hyman, 1986) 17

serve. This study adds to recent efforts by historians to place the activities of the Abwehr

and Amt VI within the political and ideological context of the Third Reich.21 This has broadened our understanding of not only how intelligence agencies operated within an ideological environment, but also how they adapted. Recent studies also reveal the

competition between different intelligence-gathering agencies in the Third Reich.

In studying the German-language archival material on Argentina, it became

apparent that conflict between the AA and other Nazi organizations was endemic. This

in turn, affected how German diplomats handled issues that arose. The AA expended an extraordinary amount of time fending off challenges to its authority. The first challenge during the 1930s was from the AO. This was the agency of the that was responsible for Germans abroad. Following the outbreak of the war the SS went to great lengths to try and usurp the functions of the AA. The files of the AA are full of folders detailing SS intrigues in Argentina.22 Another issue that was that Germany lacked any

long-term geo-political strategy towards Argentina. The only clue to any coherent policy

is a statement Foreign Minister made to Otto Reinebeck, head of

Politische Abteilung IX which covered the Americas in the AA. Ribbentrop told

Reinebeck that “Argentina is the last German bridgehead in the Western Hemisphere, the

21 See the fine study by Katrin Paehler, “Espionage, Ideology and Personal Politics: The Making and Unmaking of a Nazi Foreign Intelligence Service” (Washington D.C.: American University, Ph.D diss., 2002). Also of interest is the forthcoming dissertation by Alexandra Luce which looks at German intelligence operations in . I thank her for bringing her study to my attention at the 2008 International Intelligence History Association conference in Hamburg, October 2008. 22 See especially, Abteilung Inland II G: Beauftragen Becker nach Südamerika, NARA, Record Group 242/Serial T120/Roll 228 and Abteilung Inland II G: Abwehr Angelegenheit Hellmuth, NARA, RG 242/T120/351. 18

maintenance and development of which are of the greatest significance for later on.”23

The meaning of this statement is ambiguous. The records of the AA show an agency engaged in reactive diplomacy. That is, the AA was simply dealing with matters as they came up instead of anticipating problems and devising solutions. The lack of any meaningful and broad look at German foreign policy by the diplomats in the

Wilhelmstrasse resulted in periodic crises, such as the so-called “Patagonia Plot” of 1939.

While this study relies mainly on the records of the German foreign ministry, it also utilizes material from U.S. and British archives. The material from the U.S. and

British archives consists mainly of interrogations of the principles involved.

Interrogations are problematic sources. They can be unreliable since witnesses lie, obfuscate or cannot remember details.24 In this case, the opposite is generally true.

Comparing the interrogations against the archival record show the interrogations are

reliable regarding events. The interrogators meticulously went through relevant German

documents in preparing for their interrogations. In some cases, where the interrogators

thought an individual was lying or needed his refreshed the subject under interrogation was shown documents. This showed the subjects that the interrogators knew their facts and that lying was futile. Where the interrogations tend to be less reliable is regarding an individual’s personal opinion towards Nazism. Here, most of the

subjects interrogated understandably downplayed their allegiance to Hitler. Where

23 “Interrogation of Otto Reinebeck,” 4 February 1946, NARA, Record Group 59, Records of the Department of State, File 862.20235/4-2646, Argentine Blue Book, p. 7. 24 For a discussion of the methodological problems inherent in using interrogations see Christopher R. Browning, Ordinary Men: Reserve Battalion 101 and the in , new edition (New York: , 2001) and Christopher R. Browning, Collected Memories: Holocaust History and Post-War Testimony (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2003). 19

information could not be corroborated I had to make a judgment based on my knowledge

of the documents regarding the reliability of the information.

Other source materials are FBI investigative reports and decrypted messages.

While Newton downplays the reliability of the FBI reports on the whole I have found

them to be reliable. This is particularly true after 1942-43 when the FBI managed to

obtain reliable sources in the Argentine police and government. A recently declassified

history of the SIS is frank regarding the issues the FBI faced in Latin America and

Argentina.25 The FBI also had access to decrypted messages between German agents in

Argentina and their superiors in Germany. This gave them an invaluable source of

information regarding German intentions and actions. The same material was available

to State Department policymakers including Secretary of State Cordell Hull and

Undersecretaries Sumner Welles and Adolf Berle. While interpretations of this material

could be overdrawn and sometimes exaggerated, it was in the main reliable.

Interrogations, Ultra material, and the captured documents of the German foreign

ministry were the documentary base for the ‘Blue Book.’

Historians have questioned the reliability of the ‘Blue Book’ as a historical source.

Historian Ronald C. Newton doubts the veracity of the document.26 He implies it was the result of long-standing U.S. ambitions to dominate Latin America and British manipulation of U.S. policymakers. Thus, there was no Nazi menace in the Western

Hemisphere. It was simply a figment of imagination. Historians Gary Frank and

25 See History of the SIS, 3 vols., declassified 8/10/04. I am grateful to Larry Valero for bringing this to my attention and providing me with a copy. 26 Ronald C. Newton, The ‘Nazi Menace’ in Argentina, 1931-1947 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992). 20

Michael Francis also discuss the ‘Blue Book’ in their studies of Argentina.27 However,

Frank and Francis focus on the narrow topic of U.S.-Argentine relations without extensively using German-language sources. It is this source material that exposes the extent of German activities in Latin America. The Ultra material adds detail to the documentary framework provided by the AA’s records.

Despite the abundant Ultra material any scholar using this material faces several challenges. The decoded messages are not very detailed which limits their usefulness.

The material is also not complete resulting in in coverage. This was mainly due to atmospheric problems which resulted in garbled and missed messages. This was a vexing problem to the Germans as well as the Allies. Also, most detailed reports were sent from

Argentina to Germany on ships which meant that very few were intercepted. These reports were destroyed at the end of the war. The loss of these reports limits the historian in understanding the intentions and proposed actions of German intelligence in

Argentina. Messages have to be placed within a larger context to discern meaning and intent. Most of the messages were not signed; instead codenames were used, if at all.

Some German agents had numerous codenames and aliases. For example, Johannes

Siegfried Becker, head of SS Intelligence for Latin America, had 31 different aliases and codenames. The combining of the Abwehr and SD radio networks in late 1942-early

1943 under the “Bolivar” heading makes it doubly difficult to assign authorship to any one individual. Despite these problems the Ultra material provides valuable insight and detail into the inner-workings of German intelligence.

27 Frank, Juan Perón versus Spruille Braden and Michael J. Francis, The Limits of Hegemony: United States Relations with Argentina and Chile during World War II (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1977). 21

This is also not a comprehensive -Argentine relations during

the period of the Third Reich since the records of the AA regarding Argentina from 1933-

37 have been lost. Additionally, Argentina did not play a major role in Hitler’s thinking.

Because of this it is difficult to draw any general conclusions regarding foreign policy in

the Third Reich. Instead, it focuses on three areas: bureaucratic infighting, ideology, and

the relationship between intelligence-gathering and diplomacy in the Third Reich. It

asserts that even people who were far removed from the Machiavellian intrigues that

characterized the bureaucratic structure of the Third Reich were not immune to their

consequences. It shows that diplomacy and intelligence were intertwined to an extent

previously unexplored. Underpinning all this is the question of ideology. Ideology

permeated all aspects of the Third Reich. It was also what drove the SS to undermine the

AA. Also presented is the argument that the SS was a parasitic organization that did all it

could to undermine and takeover rivals. This buttresses assertions Katrin Paehler made

in her study of Walter Schellenberg and the Reichsicherheitshauptamt (Reich Security

Main Office or RSHA).28

These arguments are presented in a case-study format. This format allows for a

clearer study of the organizations involved. Most events in Argentina took place

concurrently. Using each chapter as a mini-case-study allows for more depth and a

smoother narrative regarding events. The first chapter details German diplomacy from

1933-1938 and the AA’s struggle with the AO over foreign policy aims. This struggle resulted from Hitler’s penchant for allowing agencies to compete for power. The AA’s focus on European events meant that German diplomats in Argentina were forced to deal

28 Paehler, “Espionage, Ideology and Personal Politics.” 22

with problems with little support or guidance from the . The second

chapter details the so-called “Patagonia Plot” of 1939. It argues that this crisis was the

result of a hostile world climate in 1938-39. Germany contributed to this through its

actions in and . Suspicion of German actions meant President

Getúlio Vargas of Brazil and Roberto Ortiz of Argentina were willing to believe

information implicating Germans in plots to overthrow their governments. This chapter

asserts that the document which alleged Germany had ambitions to take over the

Patagonia region of Argentina was forged. However, it achieved its purpose of harming

Germany’s diplomatic and economic position in Latin America and drawing suspicion on

Germans residing there. Chapter three details German diplomacy from 1939-1942 and shows how the lack of any long-range policy hampered German diplomacy towards

Argentina. Chapter four chronicles the actions of the German naval attaché Kapitan zur

See Dietrich Niebuhr and his intelligence network in Latin America. It argues that the

German embassy was a hotbed of intelligence-gathering activities aided and abetted by the diplomatic staff. Ultimately, this cooperation would cost Ambassador Thermann his posting when he was declared in December 1941. The evidence argues that the claims of the Anti-Argentine Activities Committee should be taken seriously, despite the fact that the commission resulted from domestic power struggles in Argentina.

Also examined are Amt VI’s attempts to establish an intelligence network in Latin

America. Chapter five details Hauptsturmführer Johannes Siegfried Becker’s failure to establish an SS intelligence network in Argentina during 1940-41 and his return to

Germany in late 1941. It argues that Amt VI as early as 1940-41 attempted to 23

marginalize the AA only to fail. Chapter six chronicles Becker’s return to Argentina in

1943. It shows how Becker managed to obtain control of the Abwehr’s intelligence

networks and utilize them for the SD. This chapter also examines Becker’s dealings with

pro-Nazi elements in the governments of Argentina, Paraguay, Brazil and and the

attempt to create an anti-U.S. bloc of states friendly to Nazi Germany. The extent of

German involvement with prominent figures in the governments of Argentina, Paraguay,

Brazil and Bolivia are examined here for the first time. The chief of the Paraguayan Air

Force, Major Pablo Stagni, was specifically identified as a German agent with the

codename “Hermann.”29 Additionally, historians, such as Cole Blasier, have suspected

German involvement in the Bolivian coup of December 1943 which overthrew President

Enrique Peñaranda and installed a pro-German government.30 Blasier was unable to

confirm his suspicions because of the classification of records.

Chapter seven looks at the “Hellmuth Affair” of 1943. This ill-fated venture

between the Argentine government and SD highlights the increasing struggle between the

AA and Amt VI for control of foreign policy in 1943. It argues that Osmar Hellmuth’s

mission for the Argentine and German governments was the second major attempt that

year to wrest control of foreign policy from Ribbentrop and the AA. It also looks at how

the AA and SS were willing to place the blame for the failure of Hellmuth’s mission on

the Abwehr whereupon it was absorbed into the SS. Chapter eight examines the

diplomatic dealings between Nazi Germany and Argentina regarding the “Jewish

29 See History of the SIS, Volume 3: Accomplishments Mexico-Venezuela, declassified 8/10/04, pp. 529-530 and “Argentina to Berlin,” 28 February 1943, NARA, RG 226, Records of the OSS, OSS Communications Office Records, Ultra Decrypts, Entry 188. 30 Cole Blasier, “The United States, Germany, and the Bolivian Revolutionaries (1941-1946),” The Hispanic American Historical Review, 52/1, (February 1972): 26-54. 24

Question.” Even regarding subjects, such as the Jewish Question, where consensus on

the murder of the had ostensibly been achieved at the of

January 1942, there was still friction. The AA was in the position of having to defend

Argentina’s Jews from the SS and the Argentine government. The epilogue details the incarceration of German agents and Becker’s efforts to continue his network. It also

chronicles Argentine attempts to “sanitize” the confessions of German agents in their

custody. This attempt by Perón and others to construct a seemingly innocuous account of

German intelligence activities was meant to minimize Argentine involvement with Nazi

Germany. In one sense it succeeded since the interrogations of Becker and his henchmen

were carefully crafted. In the absence of corroborating evidence they have been accepted

by historians as reliable.31

This study offers new perspectives on German intelligence and diplomacy in

Latin America. The opening of records allows for a fresh look at German actions and

how they fit into broader interpretations of Nazi Germany. This in turn adds to our

understanding of how agencies operated in the Hobbesian world of Nazi politics. For

those who agree or disagree with the conclusions presented here I hope they take comfort

in the words of St. Augustine, “I think I have now discharged my obligation…in writing

this large work. Let those who think I have said too little, or those who think I have said

too much forgive me; and let those who think I have said just enough join me in giving

thanks…”32

31 Rout & Bratzel in particular are accepting of Becker’s statement to the Argentine . In their defense, the classification of material made any critical study of Becker’s statement difficult. 32 St. Augustine, The City of God, ed. and trans. Marcus Dods (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1841), p. 545. 25

Chapter 1

Thermann’s Arrival and the Crisis of the ‘New’ Diplomacy

“The beginning is easy; what happens next is much harder.”

—Anonymous

On January 30, 1933 was appointed Chancellor of the

by President . Hitler’s ascent to the Chancellorship and his

subsequent seizure of power heralded a new era in diplomacy. Recognizing this Gerhard

L. Weinberg titled the first volume of his study on Nazi foreign policy A Diplomatic

Revolution in Europe, 1933-1936.33 In some ways, the emphasis should be placed on “in

Europe” since Hitler was very continental in his outlook. He did not understand the world outside Europe and had little interest in such matters. Hitler’s view of the world beyond European shores was based primarily on the novels of Karl May and his viewing of movies which shaped his opinions of various countries.34 As ,

former president of the Senate and NSDAP member who broke with the Nazis,

points out Hitler was a poseur who pontificated on many subjects sketching images of

countries which usually bore no relation to reality.35

33 Gerhard L. Weinberg, The Foreign Policy of Hitler’s Germany: Diplomatic Revolution in Europe, 1933- 1936, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970). 34 See especially Gerhard L. Weinberg, “Hitler’s Image of the United States,” in World in the Balance: Behind the Scenes of World War II, (, NH: University Press of New , 1981), pp. 53-74. 35 Hermann Rauschning, Hitler Speaks: A Series of Political Conversations on His Real Aims (London: Thornton Butterworth Ltd., 1940). Rauschning is a controversial source, whose reliability has been questioned by several historians. defends Rauschning stating, “there is nothing in it [Rauschning’s book] which is not consonant with what is otherwise known of Hitler’s character and opinions.” Ian Kershaw, The Nazi : Problems and Perspectives of Interpretation, 4th ed. (London: Arnold, 2000), p. 156. For other interpretations of Rauschning’s reliability as a source, see , Hermann Rauschnings "Gespräche mit Hitler" als Geschichtsquelle (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1972). For an alternative view, see , ‘Enthüllung? Die Rauschning- 26

Hitler had no knowledge of Latin America and no interest in the region stating

that Latin America was part of the U.S. . However, his comments on

Latin America in were limited to one paragraph. He commented on the inferior ‘racial mixture’ of its peoples and contrasted them with the racial makeup of

North Americans.

North America, whose population consists in by far the largest part of Germanic elements who mixed but little with the lower coloured peoples, shows a different humanity and culture from Central and South America, where the predominantly Latin immigrants often mixed with the aborigines on a large scale.36

Hitler openly admired the Monroe Doctrine and wanted something similar for Germany

in Europe.37

In the 1930s German relations with Latin America as a whole, and Argentina in

particular, were primarily economic and military. For the most part, German policies

were a continuation of those that had taken place in the Wilhelmine and eras.38

While Hitler focused his attention on Europe, he left Latin American policy to his underlings. If Hitler’s guiding hand can be seen as the hallmark of Germany’s European policy, then it was conspicuously absent in Latin America. It was not only Hitler who treated Latin America with indifference. It was a backwater for the Auswärtiges Amt

Kontroverse’ in Nach Hitler: der schwierige Umgang mit unserer Geschichte, eds. Hermann Graml und Klaus- Dietmar Henke (: Oldenbourg, 1987), pp. 249-251. 36 Adolf Hitler, Mein Kampf , introduction by D.C. Watt, trans. Ralph Mannheim (: Houghton Mifflin, 1971), p. 260. 37 Jürgen Müller, “Hitler, Lateinamerika und die Weltherrschaft,” Ibero-Amerikansiches Archiv, 18, 1/2, (1992), 89-90. 38 Ronald C. Newton, German Buenos Aires, 1900-1933: Social Change and Cultural Crisis (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1977), Ronald C. Newton, The ‘Nazi Menace’ in Argentina’, 1931-1947 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992), Arnold Ebel, Das Dritte Reich und Argentinien: die diplomatischen Beziehungen unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Handelspolitik, 1933-1939 (Köln: Böhlau, 1971), Elizabeth B. White, German Influence in the , 1900-1945 (London; Taylor and Francis, 1991) and Jürgen Schaefer, Deutsche Militärhilfe an Südamerika; Militär-und Rüstungsinteressen in Argentinien, Bolivien und Chile vor 1914 (Düsseldorf: Droste, 1974). 27

(AA) which showed a lack of enthusiasm regarding policy towards the region. In their

post-war interrogations which are supported by the documentary record, Edmund

Freiherr von Thermann and Erich Otto Meynen, respectively ambassador and chargé d’

affairs at the German embassy in Buenos Aires, complained of the lack of any coherent

policy regarding Argentina.39 This lack of policy and the indifference of Nazi leaders

caused many problems for German diplomats in Latin America. This chapter aims to

examine German diplomacy towards Argentina from 1933-1938. It will argue that the lack of a coherent policy along with bureaucratic infighting hampered Germany’s efforts to construct an effective relationship with Argentina. As a result, German relations with

Argentina progressively worsened during the 1930s.

In some ways there is a certain irony in this disinterest given the large German population in Latin America.40 Hitler’s regime ostensibly went to great lengths to appeal

to ethnic German peoples residing outside of Germany’s borders. In his so-called

“Second Book” Hitler pontificated at length on the injustice that Germans in Austria, the

South Tyrol and elsewhere in Europe should be separated from their ethnic kin.41 This focus on Germans living in Europe and lack of interest in Germans living in Latin

America could buttress the argument that Hitler’s views were more geopolitical than ethnic.

39 “Final Interrogation Report of Edmund von Thermann,” 11 July 1945, National Archives and Records Administration (hereafter NARA), Record Group 59 (hereafter RG), Records of the Department of State, 862.20235/7-1145, Argentine Blue Book (hereafter ABB), Box 6736 and “Memorandum, re: Erich Otto Meynen,” The National Archives, Kew (hereafter TNA), KV 3/81. 40 By the 1930s the largest German populations in Latin America were in Brazil, Argentina and Chile. They numbered approximately 1,000,000, 500,000 and 250,000 respectively. 41 See ed., Hitler’s Second Book, Krista Smith trans. (New York: Enigma Books, 2003). 28

While the AA was ostensibly responsible for foreign policy in the Third Reich it

found many competitors, especially in the area of Germandom abroad. Before Hitler’s seizure of power in 1933, Germans abroad were represented by a variety of groups with their own areas of interest. For example, educational contacts were handled by the

Deutsche Akademie (German Academy) in Munich and the Deutsches Auslandsinstitut

(German Foreign Institute) in Stuttgart. The most powerful and influential group was the

Verein für das Deutschtum im Ausland (Association for Germans Abroad or VDA). It

was founded in 1881 and originally called the Deutscher Schulverein. While its focus

was on education, it also handled general social and cultural matters.42 Following the

Nazi takeover in 1933, the Auslands-Abteilung (Foreign Department), which dealt with

Germans abroad for the Nazi Party, was renamed the Auslands-Organisation (AO). It

moved quickly to supplant the leadership of groups, such as the VDA. The VDA had

worked closely with the AA and its yearly collections from the German communities

gave it considerable influence both financially and politically.

However, the AO pushed the VDA aside and quickly found itself at odds with the

AA over its activities which negatively affected Germany’s position in many foreign

countries. The AO was used by , deputy Führer of the NSDAP and Joseph

Goebbels, Minister of , as a way to “coordinate” the AA. They attempted to

replace the traditional diplomats with loyal Nazis. In this endeavor, Hitler was with them

in spirit. He had contempt for the diplomats at the Wilhelmstrasse, telling associates that

they were inept bureaucrats. However, Hitler also realized that he needed the

42 , The Sudeten Problem, 1933-1938: Volkstumspolitik and the Formulation of Nazi Foreign Policy (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press, 1975), p. 16. 29

experienced personnel of the German diplomatic service to move his foreign policy aims

forward. As long as the diplomats were useful then their position was secure.

However, the AO and other organizations encroached upon areas previously

under the purview of the AA. Coordinating Germans abroad into supporting the Nazi

regime was one such issue. Hess was a powerful patron and formidable adversary for the

AA. He believed in the AO’s mission remarking, “the greatest mistake of the former

regime was its refusal to keep up ties of blood which connect Germans in their homeland

with Germans abroad.”43 Remarks such as these fit with the Nazi world-view which was

obsessed with protecting Germans at home and abroad from the perceived threat of world

Jewry. Thus, the AO was on the frontlines of a worldwide struggle against Jewish influence and control.

Ernst Bohle, head of the AO, was given a powerful tool in his struggle with the

AA. The Law to Safeguard the Unity of the Party and State (Gesetz zur Sicherstellung der Einheit von Partei und Staat) was passed by the on 1 December 1933. It made the NSDAP the only legal authority in Germany and bound the party and state together. Whereas before this law was passed the AO had only represented party members, it now ostensibly represented all Germans residing abroad. Bohle argued that the AA could not represent Germany abroad “effectively and positively in the National

Socialist sense.” He proposed the creation of a ministry to represent and organize

Germandom abroad so it could serve Hitler’s . His ambitions were quashed

43 Donald McKale, The Outside Germany (Kent, OH: The Kent State University Press, 1977), pp. 3-7. 30

when he realized that Hitler had no intention of replacing the AA with the AO.44 Instead he concentrated on consolidating his control over areas where AO activity was already taking place.

Latin America was one area where early Nazi party activity occurred. In some ways this activity was natural since German communities in Latin America had been exposed to led by charismatic individuals that superficially resembled

Hitler’s movement.45 Living under these dictatorships created some sympathy for Nazism

among the Volksdeutsch (ethnic German) population in Latin America.46 This population

was quite large with over 800,000 ethnic Germans in Brazil, 500,000 in Argentina and

250,000 in Chile. In early 1930 Nazism arrived in Argentina imported by seamen from

the Hamburg-Süd and Hapag-Lloyd shipping lines. Nazi party workers in Hamburg had

recruited the merchant seaman for two purposes: to spread the Nazi movement among

German-speaking ’s world-wide and procure funds for the party. The success

in recruiting seaman owed much to , one of Hitler’s early followers, who

was killed in the “ of the Long Knives” in . Strasser fought to improve

conditions for shipboard workers and provided help for seaman in foreign ports. The

sailors’ treatment by the AO was in stark contrast to the customary dismissal they

received from German diplomats. The success of Strasser’s efforts, carried on by his

44 Smelser, The Sudeten Problem, pp. 27-28. 45 Heinz Sanke ed., Der deutsche Faschismus in Lateinamerika, 1933-1943 (Berlin: Humboldt-Universität, 1966), p. 22. 46 McKale, The Swastika Outside Germany, p. 22. 31

successors, can be gauged by the membership of seaman in the AO. By 1938 25,000 of the 55,000 AO members were merchant seaman.47

In 1931 the German community in Buenos Aires was invited to attend Nazi rallies

onboard ships docked in the harbor.48 On April 7, 1931 the Argentine Ortsgruppe (Local

Group) of the AO was founded with an initial membership of 59 members.49 It was at this

ceremony that the swastika was first displayed publicly in Argentina. In July the local

Nazi party held another rally where the speakers publicly harangued Chancellor Heinrich

Brüning and President Paul von Hindenburg. When the republican leaning German-

language newspaper Argentinisches Tageblatt published a disparaging editorial about the

AO Head of the Landesgruppe, Rudolf Seyd, challenged Ernst Alemann, the

paper’s editor, to a duel. On 9 August Germans who supported the Weimar government

held their own rally where they loudly denounced the Nazis.50 A rally in November

attracted over 800 people, another in in conjunction with other nationalist

groups attracted over 5,000 participants. By September 1932, the party had expanded

outside Buenos Aires to seven other locations and recorded 278 members in its rolls.51

Affiliates were also formed in Brazil and Paraguay. Despite this apparent success the

Landesgruppe went through a period of turnover in its leadership. In 1932 Seyd disappeared and was replaced by Eckard Neumann who was replaced at the end of the year by Rudolf Gerndt, editor of the German-language newspaper Deutsche La-Plata

47 Hans-Adolf Jacobsen, Nationalsozialistische Aussenpolitik, 1933-1938 (Frankfurt am Main: Alfred Metzner Verlag, 1968), pp. 90-107. 48 The German community in Argentina numbered approximately 150,000 with the majority residing in Buenos Aires. The figure is from Alton Frye, Nazi Germany and the American Hemisphere, 1933-1941 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967), p. 65. 49 Newton, The ‘Nazi Menace’, p. 38. 50 Ibid, pp. 38-39. 51 McKale, The Swastika Outside Germany, p. 23. 32

Zeitung. In early 1933 Gerndt was succeeded by Dr. Gottfried Brandt, a businessman

who owned a pharmaceutical distributorship. Brandt stayed as head until 1935 when he

was expelled from the party and the Landesgruppe for unknown reasons.52 However, for

the AO Latin America remained a backwater. By membership for the

Landesgruppe Argentina was 156.53

Like Hitler, Bohle had little interest in Latin America. As Max Paul Friedman

notes the Nazi and AO attitude towards Latin America was one of neglect.54 Bohle could

not speak Spanish or remember the names of Latin American diplomats in Berlin, and took to calling them all “Excellency.” Reichsdeutsche (German citizens) who visited

Berlin from Latin America offended Bohle by congregating at the South American Club and speaking Spanish among themselves. Bohle complained that Reichsdeutsche who immigrated to Latin America “tended to take on a very different outlook than was generally considered fitting for good Teutons – they became much more lively and light- hearted, and often assumed a rather Latin attitude toward life which made them rather hard to handle at times.”55 The official task of the AO in Argentina was to try to convert

Germans living abroad to the Nazi doctrine. However, Ambassador Thermann held a

low opinion of AO activity. He felt its leadership was of a “low caliber” and that

52 Newton, The ‘Nazi Menace’, p. 41. 53 “Parteimitgleider, Stand 30.6.1937,” Büro des Chefs der AO, NARA, Record Group 242, National Archives Collection of Foreign Records Seized, Inter-filmed Records of the Foreign Ministry and , Serial T-120, Roll 78, Frames 60145-60148 (hereafter RG/Serial/Roll/Frame Number), Jacobsen, Nationalsozialistische Aussenpolitik, pp. 661-664, McKale, The Swastika Outside of Germany, p. 41. 54 Max Paul Friedman, Nazis and Good Neighbors: The United States Campaign against the Germans of Latin America in World War II (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 46. 55 “Interrogation of Ernst Bohle,” 5-8 September 1945, State Department Special Interrogation Mission (Dewitt C. Poole Mission), RG 59/M679/1/12 and 20-1. Also quoted in Friedman, Nazis and Good Neighbors, p. 46. 33

individuals selected for its leadership positions were selected based on party affiliations.

Thermann’s opinion was shared by the AA where the AO never really achieved any

influence and Bohle was excluded from Hitler’s inner-circle of advisors.56

Thermann’s time in Argentina was marked by controversy and conflict between

the AA and AO. He had to deal with most of these problems by himself given the

Wilhelmstrasse’s lack of interest in Argentina. This indifference is supported by the

paucity of evidence in the documentary record which suggests that the AA was content to

let Thermann deal with problems that cropped up. Despite ups and downs during his time in Buenos Aires, Thermann retained the confidence of two foreign ministers,

Constantin von Neurath and Joachim von Ribbentrop, and stayed on station for close to a

, when ambassadors in places such as the U.S., , and England were

replaced regularly.

Thermann’s problems began even before his arrival. In January 1933,

Hindenburg approved the appointment of Heinrich Ritter von Kaufmann-Asser as the new head of mission in Argentina. Kaufmann was an experienced who spoke good Spanish and had served in postings from Vienna to Santiago. His pro-business approach quickly won him the approval of German businessmen in Buenos Aires. On

April 9, 1933 the Law for the Reform of the Civil Service was passed which barred Jews from the civil service. On 9 May the Argentinisches Tageblatt reported not only the passing of the law, but that Kaufmann, who had been in his post less than a month, was to be fired from his post due to Jewish ancestors. To add insult Kaufmann was required to

56 “Final Interrogation Report of Edmund Freiherr von Thermann,” 11 July 1945, NARA, RG 59, 862.20235/7-1145, ABB, Box 6736, p. 2 and McKale, The Swastika Outside of Germany, pp. 45-49. 34 remain at his post and keep quiet until a replacement could be found. The German business community in Argentina was outraged at Kaufmann’s dismissal. His successor,

Edmund Freiherr von Thermann, complained of the complications it caused for him.57 It was not an auspicious start.

Thermann was a career diplomat who came from a wealthy family. His career included postings in , , , and Washington, D.C. His posting prior to

Argentina was in Danzig where he was consul-general for almost nine years. Thermann described that posting as “difficult” since Danzig was a contentious issue in the Weimar

Republic. Following the Versailles Treaty it was declared a “Free City” and put under the control of the to give Poland access to a seaport on the Baltic.

During his time there Thermann had several confrontations with local Nazis who, he claimed, made life difficult for him and the Foreign Ministry. However, in March 1933, on his own initiative, he supported the Nazis during a dispute with the Danzig government. As Herbert Levine points out, Thermann and the AA managed to

“coordinate” themselves quickly to Hitler’s government.58 While there was common ground between Hitler and the Auswärtiges Amt regarding the rejection of the Versailles

Treaty the AA did not fully accept all of Hitler’s doctrines at first. However, they

57 Newton, The ‘Nazi Menace’, pp. 41-42 and “Klaus to Spaeth, Memorandum re: Von Thermann Interrogation,” 5 December 1945, NARA, RG 59, File 862.20235/12-545, ABB, Box 6736, p. 11. Arnold Ebel was told by the West German Foreign Office that Kaufmann was dismissed for “political reasons.” Arnold Ebel, Das Dritte Reich und Argentinien: die diplomatischen Beziehungen unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Handelspolitik, 1933-1939 (Köln: Böhlau, 1971), p. 101. 58 Herbert S. Levine, Hitler’s Free City: A History of the Nazi Party in Danzig, 1925-1939 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1973), p. 101, Gerhard L. Weinberg, The Foreign Policy of Hitler’s Germany: A Diplomatic Revolution in Europe, 1933-1936, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970), p. 61 and Paul Seabury, The Wilhelmstrasse: A Study of German Diplomats Under the Nazi Regime (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1954). Seabury argues that the Auswärtiges Amt was coordinated to Nazism by 1938, but the evidence suggests that it was much earlier. Staatssekretärs von Bülow confirmed Thermann was acting without orders from Berlin. See “Bülow Memorandum,” 24 March 1933, RG 242/T- 120/2373/E 190912-13 quoted in Weinberg, A Diplomatic Revolution, p. 61, note 13. 35

quickly adapted themselves to the new regime and its racist views. Given this it is not

surprising that Thermann was later able to foist Germany’s problems off on Jews and

Jewish circles, instead of the actions of Germany. Thermann’s actions following his

arrival in Buenos Aires and his comments in official correspondence give lie to

characterizations of him as an opportunist rather than a man of conviction. In 1933 he

joined the Nazi Party and later the SS. He later explained away his SS membership

stating that he enjoyed horse-riding and belonged to a club composed mainly of Junkers.

It was through them that he became socially involved with the mounted SS and it was his

friend Werner Lorenz, future Polizeiführer of Hamburg and then head of the

Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle (Vomi), who offered to induct him as an honorary member of

the SS before Thermann left Danzig in November 1932.59

In Staatssekretär (State Secretary) Bernhard von Bülow of the AA recommended Thermann to replace Kaufmann in Buenos Aires. Bülow’s recommendation was approved and Thermann was promoted to Minister First Class.

Prior to leaving for Argentina Thermann paid a formal visit to Bohle, perhaps to express his willingness to cooperate with the AO. Over the next several years Bohle and the AO would become the bane of Thermann’s existence. Relations were smooth for the moment. Thermann arrived in Buenos Aires wearing his full SS uniform. Bohle stated that he made an excellent impression and later commented to Hess that, “our entire work overseas would be substantially simpler if all Reich representatives took such a positive

59 For a discussion of Lorenz and the Vomi see Valdis O. Lumans, Himmler's Auxiliaries: The Mittelstelle and the German National Minorities of Europe, 1933-1945 (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1993). 36

attitude toward the new state as Herr von Thermann.”60 His postwar interrogators noted

that “Thermann gives the impression of being an opportunist rather than a man of

ideological principles,” and that “Baron von Thermann was .... in many ways dominated

by his wife, a woman of ruthless personal ambition, considerable intelligence, and

obviously unscrupulous character.”61 While this suggests that Thermann’s devotion to the cause should be taken with a grain of salt he went about his duties enthusiastically and energetically.

When Thermann arrived in Argentina on 10 December 1933, he had to deal with the Kaufmann affair and Germany’s withdrawal from the League of Nations in October.

Argentina was particularly unhappy about the latter since Buenos Aires had vigorously protested Germany’s exclusion in the early 1920s and sponsored its entrance in 1926.

Thermann did not help matters when he struck up a friendship with retired General Juan

Bautista Molina, Argentine military attaché in Berlin, who was an ardent admirer of

Hitler and . Thermann’s friendship with Molina caused some embarrassment to

him and the Argentine government.62 Ever the opportunist, Thermann (perhaps at his

wife’s instigation) set about showing his devotion to the new regime. At the dock he

gave Hitler’s personal to the crowd who greeted his arrival and then led them in

singing “Deutschland über Alles” and the “Horst-Wessel-Lied.”63

60 Newton, The ‘Nazi Menace’, p. 42 and McKale, The Swastika Outside of Germany, p. 66. 61 “Memorandum, Murphy to Secretary of State, Subject: Interrogation of Edmund Freiherr von Thermann,” 20 , NARA, RG 59, 862.20235/6-1645, ABB, Box 6736, p. 1 and “Final Interrogation Report of Edmund Freiherr von Thermann,” 11 July 1945, NARA, RG 59, 862.20235/7- 1145, ABB, Box 6736, p. 3. 62 “Interrogation of Edmund von Thermann,” 10 May 1945, RG 59, ABB, Miscellaneous Affidavits and Interrogation Reports, Box 26, Entry 1088, p. 6. 63 Newton, The ‘Nazi Menace’, p. 43. 37

After taking up his office, Thermann attempted to ingratiate himself with the

German community. On 15 December he appeared at the year-end ceremonies of the

Goethe School in Buenos Aires. Despite the fact that most of the students were

Argentine, Thermann demanded the school hall be decorated with Nazi banners and

pictures of Hitler and led the students in singing German patriotic songs and giving the

Hitler . The reaction to this display is unknown, but it could not have been overly

positive since Thermann believed that no segment of the Argentine public was ever

openly pro-German.64 On 17 December he attended the Nazi Party’s solstice festival. At

each of these events Thermann appeared in his full SS uniform to the delight of local

Nazis who believed that he would support them energetically and uncritically. However,

Thermann soon found himself locked in a struggle between the AO and other Nazi

organizations who felt he was not vigorous enough in defending them when actions they

undertook backfired.

Thermann’s wife, Vilma von Thermann, played a prominent role in

promoting him and German interests in Argentina. Like her husband she attempted to

take an active role in the German community there. One of her first acts was to visit the

Nazi women’s associations in and around Buenos Aires. There she announced that these

groups were the “bearers of the National Socialist worldview.” In an attempt to co-opt

the women outside of these groups, she invited them to teas and receptions at the

64 “Final Interrogation Report of Edmund Freiherr von Thermann,” 11 July 1945, NARA, RG 59, 862.20235/7-1145, ABB, Box 6736, p. 3. 38

Thermann’s residence. These events were popular with the women remarking to one

another what Frau Thermann had said to them.65

Thermann and his wife made contradictory impressions in Argentina’s diplomatic

community. British ambassador Sir remarked, “Both he and his wife are

excellent linguists….I have always found him a pleasant and correct colleague and his

wife an agreeable if somewhat exotically attired table companion.”66 While attending the

Chaco Peace Conference, which formally ended the war between Paraguay and Bolivia in

1938, Spruille Braden, U.S. ambassador to Colombia, stated that Thermann was a

“nonentity,” “none too bright,” and astutely observed that Frau Thermann was the driving

force in their marriage.67 During U.S. President Franklin Roosevelt’s 1936 visit to

Buenos Aires Thermann went to a diplomatic reception for President Roosevelt attired in a black suit with a swastika armband, which did not make a favorable impression. After observing Thermann for a time, Ovey reported that “I cannot help feeling that the somewhat blatant propaganda which he is called upon to make would be highly distasteful to anyone not highly devoted to his master.”68

Thermann quickly went about trying to undo some of the resentment in the

German business community as a result of Kaufmann’s dismissal. Why the business

community in Buenos Aires protested Kaufman’s firing is unknown. Perhaps the

65 Newton, The ‘Nazi Menace’ p. 43, “Memorandum, Murphy to Secretary of State, Subject: Interrogation of Edmund Freiherr von Thermann,” 20 June 1945, NARA, RG 59, 862.20235/6-1645, ABB, Box 6736, p. 2. 66 Esmund Ovey to Foreign Secretary, “Head of Foreign Missions, Report for 1937,” 2 March 1938, TNA, FO 371/21412, see also Newton, The ‘Nazi Menace’, p. 44. 67 On the Chaco Peace Conference see Leslie B. Rout, The Politics of the Chaco Peace Conference, 1935- 1939 (Austin, TX: Institute of , University of Texas Press, 1970). “Memorandum,” 3 August 1945, NARA, RG 84, 820.02, Box 65. 68 Esmund Ovey to Foreign Secretary, “Head of Foreign Missions, Report for 1937,” 2 March 1938, TNA, FO 371/21412. 39

German businessmen in Argentina were not “coordinated” to the regime’s racial policies yet. Every week Thermann lunched at the German Club with leading German businessman in Buenos Aires. While he later disparaged their “klieinbürgerlicher

Horizont” (petty bourgeois views) these lunches, along with a general trend toward

Argentina in Nazi economic policies, enhanced Thermann’s standing.69 His prestige was

further enhanced in 1935 when Hitler raised the German mission to embassy status, with

Thermann remaining on station as ambassador. The AA had been arguing since 1928

that Germany needed an embassy and ambassador in Argentina as a matter of prestige

since the British, French, U.S. and numerous other nations had them. Not only would it

bolster Nazi Germany’s status, but that of Argentina’s as well, since it would

acknowledge its aspirations as a great power.70

Thermann also ingratiated himself with powerful figures in the Nazi government.

When Thermann visited Hamburg in 1936 to push for the purchase of frozen beef from

Argentina, his friend and patron Werner Lorenz greeted him with a band followed by a banquet and ceremonies. Thermann also became close with who he had met while still consul in Danzig. In 1936, Thermann’s daughter became engaged to

Baron (fnu) von Hadern, Himmler’s adjutant and she married him in 1939. Thermann and his wife opposed the marriage since Hadern had no money. Thermann stated that he would have preferred his daughter to marry a diplomat or landowner to have “a secure existence.” Following Hadern’s death in in 1943, she married Fritz Darges one of

Hitler’s adjutants who was dismissed and sent to the Eastern Front in July 1944 for

69 “Memorandum, Murphy to Secretary of State, Subject: Interrogation of Edmund Freiherr von Thermann,” 20 June 1945, NARA, RG 59, 862.20235/6-1645, ABB, Box 6736, p. 2. 70 Ebel, Das Dritte Reich und Argentinien, pp. 128-129 and Newton, The ‘Nazi Menace,’ p. 45. 40 laughing as Hitler tried to shoo away a fly.71 Himmler also became a patron to

Thermann’s son Wolfgang who he suggested should learn Japanese. This would allow him to enter the Reichsicherheitshauptamt (RSHA or Reich Security Main Office) and contribute to its intelligence collaboration with Japan. However, Wolfgang joined the

Waffen S.S. instead and was seriously wounded during the French campaign in 1940. He was killed in action in 1944.72

While ambassador Thermann was given some latitude in conducting relations between Nazi Germany and Argentina, he was also given few broad directives regarding policy. Thermann’s approach to influencing Argentine society was multi-faceted. He later claimed to U.S. interrogators that he and his wife had a “carefully thought out program.”73 Thermann sought to appeal to Argentine and pride concerning political independence, especially from the U.S. He directed German-language newspapers to attack and sought good relations with the .

He exploited Argentina’s sense of shared kinship with Spain, especially following

Franco’s victory in the in 1939.74 Thermann promised that Argentina would profit from increased trade relations with Germany and lessen its economic dependence on Great Britain. By the 1930s Great Britain controlled the majority of

Argentine railways and meatpacking plants. Great Britain was the leading foreign

71 Ronald Newton spells his name as Darjes, Newton, The ‘Nazi Menace’, p. 45. 72 “Interrogation of Edmund Freiherr von Thermann by W. Wendell Blancke,” 27 September, 8, 10, 16, 20, 23, 24 October, 2, 6 November 1945, NARA, RG 59, 740.00116 EW, ABB, Box 6736. 73 Ibid. 74 This issue is explored by Christian Leitz in his article “Nazi Germany and the Luso-Hispanic World” Contemporary European History, 12/2, (2003), pp. 183-196. 41

investor in Argentina, so much so that Argentina was considered a part of the empire,

albeit informally.75

Thermann also worked to lessen French influence in the cultural field. He

arranged for honorary doctoral degrees from German universities to be conferred on

“prominent professional men” and trumpeted the accomplishments and superiority of

German science, art and music. His program called for nursing anti-U.S. sentiments in

Argentina and developing confidence in the strength of the German army.76 The U.S. viewed Nazi activities in Latin America with trepidation. U.S. relations with Argentina hit a low in the late 1920s and early 1930s as a result of an embargo placed upon imports of Argentine beef to the U.S. The U.S. claimed the embargo was necessary to prevent the spread of hoof and mouth disease, which the Department of Agriculture claimed was endemic in Argentina. To the this was more than an economic matter -- it was a matter of pride, with Argentine beef a symbol to nationalists who glorified

Argentina’s past.77 Another issue was the Smoot-Hawley Tariff of 1930 which virtually

excluded most Argentine agricultural products from the U.S. market and caused

consternation in Argentina at the U.S. refusal to make an exception.78

75 See Andrew Porter ed. The Oxford History of the Volume III: The Nineteenth Century (New York: , 2001), pp. 122-145, Wm. Roger Louis and Judith Brown eds. The Oxford History of the British Empire Volume IV: The Twentieth Century, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 623-642, Rory Miller, Britain and Latin America in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries (New York: Longman Group, 1993) and Winthrop R. Wright, British-Owned Railways in Argentina: Their Effect on the Growth of Economic Nationalism, 1854-1948 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1975). 76 “Final Interrogation Report of Edmund Freiherr von Thermann,” 11 July 1945, NARA, RG 59, 862.20235/7-1145, ABB, Box 6736, p. 2. 77 Michael J. Francis, The Limits of Hegemony: United States Relations with Argentina and Chile during World War II (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1977), pp. 48-49. 78 Joseph Tulchin, Argentina and the United States: A Conflicted Relationship (Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1990), p. 51. 42

The election of Franklin D. Roosevelt as President of the United States portended

the start of a new phase of U.S. relations with Latin America. Roosevelt felt that the past

policies of the U.S. which included, the Monroe Doctrine, the Roosevelt Corollary to the

Monroe Doctrine and Dollar Diplomacy had failed to change Latin Americas negative

opinion of the U.S. Instead, Roosevelt called for a new policy of being a good neighbor

and repudiating intervention in Latin America.79 Roosevelt also decided that a trade

treaty should be negotiated with Argentina.80 However, he and his Secretary of State

Cordell Hull kept a wary eye on German intrigues in Latin America. Hull was worried about the effect that Nazism was having on Latin American nations.81 The most troubling

areas, as Hull saw them, were the supposed militarization of German citizens in Latin

America, German military missions to Latin American nations and the increase in trade

between Argentina and Nazi Germany.82

At the Seventh Inter-American Conference, held in Buenos Aires in 1936, the

U.S. attempted to bring Latin America closer to the U.S. The U.S. wanted Latin

America’s states to agree to compulsory consultation should war appear imminent. The

U.S. also wanted to create an Inter-American Consultative Committee along with a common neutrality policy in the event of war in the Americas.83 However, the U.S. was

opposed by Argentine Foreign Minister Carlos Saaverda Lamas who was committed to

79 The standard work on the Good Neighbor Policy is Bryce Wood, The Making of the Good Neighbor Policy (New York: Press, 1962). While Wood concentrates on the Caribbean basin in his study, one gets the broad outlines of Roosevelt’s policy. 80 Tulchin, Argentina and the United States, p. 57. 81 Here I am presenting Hull’s view of the situation since it is his interpretation of these areas which influenced U.S. policy. 82 Cordell Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull, volume I (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1948), p. 496. 83 Robert Dallek, Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 1932-1945 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979), p. 133. 43

the League of Nations and to Argentine supremacy in Latin America. Saaverda Lamas

felt that the U.S. proposals were “nothing more nor less than a means by which the

United States hoped to extend its power and influence over the smaller nations of the

hemisphere.”84 This worked out well for Germany since it gave it more freedom to

pursue its policies towards Latin America.

Thermann had some autonomy regarding policy. Issues that arose were handled

through the embassy or in the case of extremely important matters, sent to Berlin and

handled there on an ad hoc basis.85 In economic matters Thermann deferred to Berlin.86

Thermann later explained, “The theory being that once the war was decided in

Germany’s favor her domination [Thermann surely meant economic] of Latin America would follow without too much effort.”87 While trade with Argentina had fallen to

historically low levels with the onset of the depression, Hitler’s ascension to power

brought trade up to previous levels.

Between 1880 and 1914 trade grew to the point that Germany was supplying

between 11 and 14 percent of total Argentine imports, second to Great Britain.88 By

1914 Argentina was Germany’s second largest trading partner outside Europe.89 For

84 Quoted in Ibid. 85 “Final Interrogation Report of Edmund Freiherr von Thermann,” 11 July 1945, NARA, RG 59, 862.20235/7-1145, ABB, Box 6736, p. 2. 86 Ibid. For a new view of Nazi economic policy see , The Wages of Destruction: The Making and Breaking of the Nazi Economy (New York: Viking, 2007). 87 Interrogation of Edmund Freiherr von Thermann by Captain Norbert Bogdahn, NARA, RG 59, 862.20235/5-1845, ABB, Box 6736, p. 10. 88 Great Britain was far and away Argentina’s largest trading partner and took in 25% of its exports and supplied 31% of its total imports by 1913. See Andrew Porter ed. The Oxford History of the British Empire Volume III: The Nineteenth Century (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 122-145, Wm. Roger Louis and Judith Brown eds. The Oxford History of the British Empire Volume IV: The Twentieth Century (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 623-642 and Rory Miller, Britain and Latin America in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries (New York: Longman Group, 1993). 89 Newton, The ‘Nazi Menace, p. 19. 44

Latin America as a whole, Germany supplied 16.3% of all imports. Conversely, 12.3%

of all Latin American exports went to Germany.90 The outbreak of war in

brought trade to a halt. Following the war one of the first orders of the German business

community in Argentina was to rebuild trade with Germany. As early as June 1919 when the Versailles treaty was signed Germany negotiated a two year credit of 100 million gold pesos to purchase Argentine goods.91 By 1920 trade had almost returned to normal and

two years later the German Chamber of Commerce announced that Germany had

regained its pre-war position in trade with Argentina. German trade with Argentina

continued to grow, ironically financed by U.S. money under the Dawes and Young

plans.92 In 1929 German sales in Argentina reached their peak at 371 million

Reichsmarks, German purchases of Argentine products were 1.76 billion .93

Germany bought a total of 16.5% of Argentina’s total exports. German farmers, especially the large landowners, prevented trade from expanding even more.

The caused many nations to change trade patterns. Instead of traditional arrangements based on equality of access, most favored nation status, and clearing of accounts, bilateralism and barter were the new systems of commerce. In terms of total trade with Latin America Germany ranked third behind Great Britain and the United States with 10.7% of trade. To protect its position in the world market

90 Christian Leitz, “Nazi Germany and the Luso-Hispanic World,” Contemporary European History, 12/2 (2003), p. 185. 91 Newton, German Buenos Aires, p. 70. 92 For discussions of the Dawes and Young Plans see especially: William C. McNeil, American Money and the : Economics and Politics on the Eve of the Great Depression (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), Theo Balderston, Economics and Politics in the Weimar Republic (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), and Knut Borchardt, Perspectives on Modern German Economic History and Policy, trans. Peter Lambert (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991). 93 Newton, German Buenos Aires, p. 70. 45

Argentina adopted the policy of “buy from those who buy from us.”94 Bilateralism was a

way to continue trade without exposing domestic markets to the instability of the world

market. However, Germany had not helped its case by protecting its domestic market at

the expense of trade. In 1928 under pressure from farmers the German government

reduced its tariff-exempt import quota of Argentine beef from 100,000 to 70,000 tons.

The following year it was reduced by a further 20,000 tons. This did not sit well with

major Argentine meat producers. German businessmen in Argentina attempted to block

the legislation, but were unsuccessful; by 1930 total Argentine sales to Germany had

declined by half relative to 1928.95

Since Nazi Germany was unable to feed its population from domestic agricultural production it had to turn to overseas markets to make up the shortfall. Argentina’s exports were exactly what Nazi Germany desired, especially cereals, wool, cotton, hides,

tannin and industrial lubricants. As Germany tried to make up for its shortages in

foodstuffs and raw materials world prices were rising which reduced Germany’s foreign

exchange reserves. In 1934 at the instigation of Reich Minister of Economics Hjalmar

Schacht, Germany sought out barter agreements for desired goods. Schacht announced an economic policy for Nazi Germany based on bilateralism along with controls to help preserve Germany’s foreign currency reserves. Imports would be controlled; production for export would be encouraged and new trading relations opened with smaller countries in Central and South America. Germany would import more and cheaper raw materials instead of more expensive finished and semi-finished goods. Stockpiling of raw materials

94 Ibid, p. 90. 95 Ibid, p. 92. 46

would also be encouraged. Schacht also announced that the could no longer be sold for other foreign currencies, but could only be used to purchase German goods.96

To seek out arrangements and encourage trade with Central and South America

Germany announced the creation of the Deutsche Handelsdelegation für Südamerika

(German Trade Delegation for South America) in . This trade mission under the direction of Otto Kiep spent seven months visiting nearly every Central and South

American nation.97 It concluded several trade agreements with various countries, most

prominently Argentina. On 28 September 1934 Kiep signed a balance-clearing

agreement with Argentina which was designed to provide stability for bilateralism. As

Christian Leitz points out, trade was re-established on a compensation system with the barter system being central.98 However, such agreements were anathema to Roosevelt

and Hull who argued for free and open markets. The agreements were quite complicated

but somewhat successful.

The Argentine government would make available to importers of German goods

foreign exchange at a rate equal to or great than that provided for imports from other

countries. The amounts would set at the Reichsmark value of sales of Argentine exports

to Germany. The German government agreed to give German importers of Argentine

goods an exchange at the most favorable rate. The Germans further agreed that it would

give Argentine goods the most favorable and equitable treatment possible. All of this

96 Ebel, Das Dritte Reich und Argentinien, pp. 116-117 and Newton, The ‘Nazi Menace,’ pp. 94-95. 97 Kiep had served as German Consul in Chicago, but was removed probably for not being sufficiently pro- Nazi. He was subsequently executed by the Nazis in 1944 for his participation in to assassinate Hitler. Seabury, The Wilhelmstrasse, p. 30. 98 Christian Leitz, Nazi Foreign Policy, 1933-1941: The Road to Global War (London: Routledge, 2004), p. 117. 47

was to take into account each country’s currency control laws and a complex structure

was to govern each nations import quotas. In short, each country would clear its accounts frequently and would only buy as much from the other as it sold to the other.99

When the first year following the signing of the treaty did not achieve the desired

results, the agreement was modified in October 1935. Germany agreed to import 25,000

tons of chilled beef following a two year halt to any imports; this was to allow Argentina

to liquidate the balance in its favor. This was raised to 54,000 and then 80,000 tons by

late 1936. This was shrewd on Germany’s part since it allowed Argentina to sell beef

which was formerly headed to Great Britain. The Conference of 1932 had

produced an agreement between Great Britain and her former colonies to grant

preferential treatment to members of the Commonwealth regarding trade. Argentina, to

its consternation, was excluded despite the high level of trade with Great Britain.

Christian Ravndal, U.S. consul in Buenos Aires, pointed out that, “Germany now

represents an outlet for that part of Argentina’s meat production which formerly was sold

in Great Britain but which is now excluded because of quantitative restrictions.”100

Ravndal also emphasized the importance of beef to Argentine sensibilities and its economy. As a result, by 1936, the German share of trade with Argentina had risen to

9.2%, and then fell to 5.7% of exports.101

99 “Otto Kiep to Staatssekretärs, Berlin,” 14 February 1935, Doc. 492, Documents on German Foreign Policy (hereafter DGFP), series C. (1933-1936), volume 6, (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1949-83), pp. 930-33. See also Newton, The ‘Nazi Menace’ p. 95. 100 Christian Ravndal, “Consul General Buenos Aires to Department of State, Subject: German Compensation Trade with Argentina,” 19 , NARA, RG 59, 635.6231/56, Box 27, pp. 30-31, and Newton, The ‘Nazi Menace’ p. 98. 101 Ebel, Das Dritte Reich und Argentinien, pp. 143-145. 48

However, Germany’s increased military demands produced a backlash. Schacht wanted a more balanced approach that attempted to meet the needs of both consumers and the military. Hitler chose the military. The diversion of resources to the military meant that Germany was unable to take in a significant amount of Argentine commodities. Compounding the problem was the inability of Germany to market its goods for export. What Germany was able to import was more expensive due to falling

U.S. agricultural production which drove up prices on the world market. This meant that trade balances with Germany were continually in Argentina’s favor and were dealt with through makeshift devices such as monthly quotas and other mechanisms. The treaty also provided for three accounts “A”, “C” and “M.”

Despite these initiatives trade failed to improve. By 1937 Thermann was lobbying for a return to the old system which called for an unrestricted clearing of accounts. However, there were problems regarding delivery times and the head of the

Wehrmacht’s economic staff (Wi-Rü Amt), General Georg Thomas, wanted to use civilian exports to pay for imports of raw materials. Since Germany was not credited with pesos until its goods had actually entered Argentina, slow delivery times meant that imports from Argentina had to be paid for in cash, further reducing Germany’s foreign currency reserves. By 1938, German exports of machinery, motors and motor vehicles rose with only the U.S. ahead in terms of total percentages. Most of this growth came at the expense of the U.S. since Germany’s trade treaty with Argentina allowed it to export 49

goods at the official exchange rate, while the U.S. was forced to pay the higher free

market rate.102

Another area where German sales rose was in arms sales. The Germany

military’s close relationship with the Argentine army, which went back to the 19th century, bore fruit. In Buenos Aires Staudt & Co, , and -Schuckert founded the Compañía Argentina de Comerico (Coarico) to promote German arms sales to Argentina. Staudt’s Berlin office acted as representatives for German arms makers to the Argentine military purchasing commission based first in Paris and, following the fall of , in . The was also forced to accept more Argentine officers for training since it would help promote sales. The Argentine military subsequently purchased a number of Ju-52 transport planes as well as licenses to build twenty

Focke-Wulf trainers in Argentina. The Argentine postal service also purchased Junkers planes and contracted Lufthansa to provide mechanics and facilities for servicing the planes. Thermann appeared ignorant of the economic aspects of his duties. He later stated that all economic activities in the embassy were under the control of Commercial

Attaché Richard Burmeister, who also helped negotiate the Compensation/Clearing

Agreement, Heinrich Volberg, head of the AO’s economic office in the embassy, and

Charge d’ Affairs Otto Meynen.103

It was Volberg and the AO that would cause Thermann headaches with their machinations and intrigues. Volberg had lived in South America since 1928 and by the

102 Newton, The ‘Nazi Menace’ p. 99. 103 “Final Interrogation Report of Edmund Freiherr von Thermann,” 11 July 1945, NARA, RG 59, 862.20235/7-1145, ABB, Box 6736, p. 4. 50

late 1930s was manager of Bayer’s dental department in Buenos Aires.104 Volberg used

his position in the embassy to favor “acceptable” German firms seeking to do business in

Argentina. “Acceptable” in the Nazi lexicon meant Aryan (“non-Jewish” firms) and those companies whose executives were members of the NSDAP. Volberg and his brethren in other countries pressured German companies to release Jewish employees or face a boycott along the lines of the failed April 1933 boycott of Jewish businesses in

Germany. They also blacklisted German firms that were not sufficiently pro-Nazi and forced German businessmen to join the NSDAP. The AO’s Foreign Trade Office was also responsible for vetting employees of German firms who were heading overseas. As

Donald McKale points out, if German businesses disapproved of these policies, they did nothing to stop them. Instead they played the AO against the AA when decisions did not go their way.105

Not only was the AO an issue, but the NSDAP had gained a reputation as a

rabble-rousing group. Thermann later described his relationship with the AO and

NSDAP as distant since he was not fully acquainted with their activities. The embassy

did not fund or control the Landesgruppe which operated in cooperation with the embassy, but was never subordinate to it. The Landesgruppe raised money in two ways.

The first was through monthly “contributions” from its members that Thermann

104 “Preliminary Interrogation Report on Heinrich Volberg,” 12 January 1946, PIR/105, RG 59, 862.20235/10-1646, Box 6736. 105 A good example of this was the case of Hans Gast, an employee of the company Gutehoffnungshüte in Bogota, Colombia who refused to be vetted by the AO. The AO ordered the company to replace Gast and bring him back to Germany. The company appealed to the AA who managed to keep Gast in Columbia. “Memorandum: AO to Gutehoffnungshüte,” 21 June 1934, Büro des Chefs der AO, NARA, RG 242/T- 120/357/264971-972, “Memorandum: Gutehoffnungshüte to AO,” 18 , Büro des Chefs der AO, NARA, RG 242/T-120/357/264969-970, “Memorandum: AA to AO,” 12 April 1935, Büro des Chefs der AO, NARA, RG 242/T-120/357/264988, cited in McKale, The Swastika Outside Germany, pp. 52-53. 51

recollected was 10 pesos each. Half of the money was sent to Berlin with the other half

used to help pay salaries, office and other expenses. As head of the AO’s economic

office Volberg was also in charge of collecting donations for Winterhilf charity. This was

a secular charity set up in Germany by the Nazis to help the unemployed. While contributions were “voluntary” in actuality businesses were forced to pay or else they would be reported to Berlin as insufficiently patriotic with the subsequent loss of government contracts. Volberg fixed the amount each company should pay and was given the power to examine each company’s books in order to assess the amount each company should “contribute.” As Thermann later explained, this gave Volberg the ability to dominate German-run businesses in Argentina. What the businesses thought of this mafia-style shakedown is unknown, but it is certain they did not appreciate someone examining their books and then demanding a “voluntary contribution.”

The AO also went about coordinating the German community in Argentina along

Nazi lines. It reorganized German clubs and worked its way into positions of influence in commercial firms, especially those that had headquarters in Germany. Thermann complained that the AO “interfered with everything” in the German community.106 It drove some German doctors who were not particularly pro-Nazi out of German hospitals and replaced directors of German charitable organizations with persons more amenable to the regime. The conflict even reached inside the German embassy. In 1938 the AO attacked Wilhelm Röhmer, the embassy doctor. The AO felt he was negligent in his examinations of Germans who wished to return to Germany for labor or military service.

106 “Final Interrogation Report of Edmund Freiherr von Thermann,” 11 July 1945, NARA, RG 59, 862.20235/7-1145, Box 6736, p. 7. 52

Röhmer had the added handicap of not being a Nazi Party member. Röhmer threatened

to take Alfred Müller, deputy Landesgruppenleiter, and Ludwig Rauenbusch, the party

court arbitrator, to court for this attack against his honor. Röhmer also threatened to go to

the press thus exposing internal strife within the German community. To defuse the

situation Bohle removed the Landesgruppenleiter, Fritz Küster, and replaced him with

the more pliable Alfred Müller. He also persuaded Thermann to remove Röhmer, but

conflict with the AO continued.107 Thermann later claimed he tried to stop the AO’s

activities but was unsuccessful. A major annoyance to Thermann and one that would

backfire later was the AO’s interference in German schools. The AO used the schools to

push Nazi propaganda and educate German students about National Socialist aims. What

Thermann realized, but the AO did not, was that the schools had become an integral part of the Argentine educational system. This nazification of the Argentine school system

did not sit well with some Argentine politicians who subsequently investigated the

German-language schools in Argentina.108

Thermann later stated to U.S. interrogators that he spent most of his time counteracting the NSDAP’s reputation. This was done he said by financing newspapers and organizations that presented a favorable view of Nazi Germany. The embassy founded or funded several newspapers. Most prominent were Pampero and the Deutsche

La Plata Zeitung, which were first subsidized through advertising, then directly by the

107 Ebel, Das Dritte Reich und Argentinien, pp. 335-336, “Memorandum,” 26 July 1938, Büro des Chefs der AO, NARA, RG 242/T-120/1304/487487-88; “Telegram: AO to German Embassy Buenos Aires,” 15 September 1938, Büro des Chefs der AO, NARA RG 242/T-120/218/168225; Alton Frye, Nazi Germany and the American Hemisphere, p. 103 and McKale, The Swastika Outside Germany, p. 150. 108 “Memorandum: Klaus to Spaeth re. Von Thermann Interrogation,” 5 December 1945, NARA, RG 59, 862.20235/12-545, ABB, Box 6736, p. 11. The investigation of the school system and the activities of the Anti-Argentine Activities Committee are discussed in Chapter 3. 53

embassy through Gottfried Sandstede with the active assistance of other officials.

Sandstede was an active party member and described as charming, a fluent

conversationalist and a foppish dresser. In 1933 Sandstede and his brother Karl were employed by the Antonio Delfino shipping agency, one of the oldest German companies in Argentina established in 1894.

Delfino urged Gottfried to open an office of the German State Railways in

Buenos Aires. It operated from 1933-1942 when it was shut down. The F.B.I. suspected that the Delfino company and Sandstede’s office were a cover for the movement of

German agents, funds, and propaganda materials from Europe to South America.109 The funding of Pampero and other papers was subsidized through a “Presse Fond” under the control of Sandstede and Meynen.110 Members of the embassy staff and other wealthy

Germans “voluntarily contributed” up to 50 % of their salaries. These contributions and

Winterhilfe funds were two rackets that allowed German propaganda to

function.111 German firms were also “encouraged” to obtain subscriptions to embassy-

financed newspapers. Volberg stated that Chargé d’Affaires Erich Otto Meynen asked

him to help “influence” German firms to place advertisements in newspapers and

magazines that were pro-German.112 However, funding was sometimes an issue.

109 Axis Espionage and Propaganda in Latin America, NARA, RG 319, Records of the Army Staff, Records of the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Military Intelligence Division. Separate Binder 110 “Preliminary Interrogation Report on Heinrich Volberg,” 12 January 1946, PIR/105, RG 59, 862.20235/10-1646, ABB, Box 6736. Volberg confirms that the embassy made a “loan” to Pampero to help cover outstanding debts and keep it operating since it was pro-German. 111 “Final Interrogation Report of Edmund Freiherr von Thermann,” 11 July 1945, NARA, RG 59, 862.20235/7-1145, Box 6736, p. 7 and Memorandum Klaus to Spaeth, re. Von Thermann Interrogation, 5 December 1945, NARA, RG 59, 862.20235/12-545, ABB, Box 6736, p. 4. 112 “Preliminary Interrogation Report on Heinrich Volberg,” 12 January 1946, PIR/105, RG 59, 862.20235/10-1646, ABB, Box 6736. 54

In 1938 Meynen informed the Wilhelmstrasse that the Deutsche La Plata Zeitung

was in a “state of crisis” and needed funds to continue operating. The problem had been

ongoing for several years and the situation was now critical with suppliers refusing to

supply newsprint thus forcing the paper to discontinue publication. He warned that

discontinuing publication would seriously damage “the position of the German colony

here and prestige of the Third Reich in Argentine circles.” Meynen told his superiors that

if the financial crisis were known then it could be “exploited by Jewish and Masonic

circles for their own purposes.”113 Despite these problems Thermann kept pushing Nazi propaganda themes and cultivating Argentine society, but as Ronald Newton points outs,

“the Third Reich’s ideological-strategic objectives in Argentina were less well defined than its economic ones.”114 While Thermann used his discretion regarding which propaganda themes would produce the greatest results, he later told his interrogators that there was one caveat placed on him by Hitler: National Socialist ideology was not to be spread to the general Argentine population, only to German nationals.115 This assertion is

highly dubious in light of Nazi Germany’s efforts to influence the Argentine

intelligentsia.

Germany pursued a two-track strategy regarding cultural policy, which was mixed

with economic policy through encouragement of tourism and promotion of German

113 “Meynen to Foreign Ministry,” 10 January 1938, Doc. 595, DGFP, D, v. 2, pp. 819-820. 114 Newton, The ‘Nazi Menace, p. 109. 115 Memorandum Klaus to Spaeth, re. Von Thermann Interrogation, 5 December 1945, NARA, RG 59, 862.20235/12-545, ABB, Box 6736, p. 4. Ronald Smelser in his study of the so-called “Sudeten Problem” states that Hitler did not want it known that Nazism was an export commodity. However, it is not known if Nazism was to be exported only to Germans or to foreign nationals. See Ronald Smelser, The Sudeten Problem, p. 10. 55

products to Argentine tourists to Germany.116 Thermann felt that these tour groups,

especially of German-speaking Argentines, would be more sympathetic to importing

German products. At the same time, German cultural policy was directed toward

maintaining the strength of the German race. The Germans in some respects were at a

decided disadvantage since their participation in politics and society was minimal.

Antonio Delfino stated, “The Germans are like orphans; they know no one and no one

knows them.”117 To this end, the Nazis set up groups to show Volksdeutsche (ethnic

Germans) and influential Argentines the “new” Germany.

The influencing of Volksdeutsche and influential Argentines was carried out

through organizations set up in Germany and Argentina. The main organization in

Argentina was the Institución Cultural Argentino-Germana (ICAG) founded in 1922 to

exchange artists and intellectuals. ICAG promoted lectures, films, exhibits and offered

German language instruction. The cultural attaché’s office in the embassy in cooperation

with the Ibero-Amerikanisches Institut in Berlin and the Deutsches Akademische

Austausch-Dienst (German Academic Exchange Service or DAAD) offered intellectuals

and artists the opportunity to see the new Germany. The cultural attaché’s office also

cultivated ties with indigenous organizations such as the Instituto de Estudios

Germánicos and other groups to send academics, professionals and students on tours of

Germany. The tour groups were received ceremoniously in Germany and were

sponsored by the Südamerika-Institut, IG Farben and the Ibero-Amerikanisches

116 Affidavit of Dr. L.S. Pamperien, 27 January 1946, NARA, RG 59, 862.20235/4-2626, ABB, Box 6740, pp. 5-7. 117 Quoted in Ibid, p. 6. 56

Institut.118 Certain influential Argentines were given free trips to visit the 1936 Olympic

Games in Berlin. Thermann’s wife even entertained Argentine Olympic medal winners

with a bizarre Greek Olympic dance which she choreographed herself.119 Despite the

time and effort the Nazis expended on impressing Argentine visitors to Germany, there

were the occasional gaffes. Some Argentines arrived in Germany to find their hosts had never heard of them. These guests were then shunted off and their stays in Germany conducted by Propaganda Ministry (ProMi) tour guides.120

Thermann also cultivated the Argentine military and was aided by German

military advisors. German military missions had been in Latin America since the

nineteenth century. Following the German victory in the Franco-Prussian war and

German unification non-European countries clamored for German advisors to train their

.121 In the 1890s Argentina decided to seek outside military assistance to

modernize its armed forces. Germany had experience in providing military advisors to

foreign governments. It had helped Japan modernize its army during the so-called Meiji

Restoration, and aided the armies of the and Chile. Germany had an

edge in competing for Argentina’s attentions since former German officers were already

serving in the Argentine Army. One officer, Rudolf von Colditz, headed the

topographical department of the Military Geographical Institute and served as an advisor

to the Argentine General Staff. Helping to pave the way for requesting assistance was

118 Newton, The Nazi Menace’, pp. 112-114. 119 Ibid, p. 43. 120 Ibid, p. 114. 121 See especially, Holger H. Herwig and William F. Sater, The Grand Illusion: The Prussianization of the Chilean Army (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1999); Elizabeth B. White, German Influence in the Argentine Army, 1900-1945 (London; Taylor and Francis, 1991); Jürgen Schaefer, Deutsche Militärhilfe an Südamerika; Militär-und Rüstungsinteressen in Argentinien, Bolivien und Chile vor 1914 (Düsseldorf: Droste, 1974). 57

General Lucio Mansilla who was appointed diplomatic representative in Berlin in 1898.

When the question of providing military assistance to Argentina was informally put to

Kaiser Wilhelm II, he replied no. However, when the Argentines formally requested

German help the following year Wilhelm assented. Wilhelm probably reversed himself for two reasons: First, the AA stressed the positive economic benefits which could result from closer relations with the Argentine military. Second, the previous year Argentina had purchased a substantial number of pieces from Krupp and promised to buy more in the future.122 With the defeat of Germany in 1918 the German military mission to Argentina was terminated from 1918-1923.

By 1923 German officers were again advising the Argentine Army. The advisors had officially retired or resigned their commissions, but still had to be approved by the

Truppenamt in Berlin. The head of the first post-war mission was Colonel Wilhelm

Faupel. Faupel had previously served in Argentina from 1911-14 following a distinguished career in China and in German Southwest Africa fighting the Hereros.

During the war Faupel further distinguished himself by winning Germany’s highest military decoration, the Pour le Mérite. Following the war, he formed his own and helped re-take Munich from the communists in February-March 1919. However, he was retired when the German army was reduced to 100,000 men under the Versailles

Treaty. In 1921 Faupel accepted an invitation from General José F. Uriburu, future

122 White, German Influence, pp. 3-4. 58

from 1930-1932, to deliver lectures and stayed in Argentina at

Uriburu’s request.123

In 1923 when the German military mission was re-opened it attracted the attention

of the French. When the French military attaché in Buenos Aires protested the presence

of German advisors he was pointedly told by Uriburu that Argentina had not signed the

Versailles treaty and warned France not to meddle in Argentina’s internal affairs.124 The

Allies did not lodge a protest with the Weimar Government concerning this violation of

Article 179 which forbade Germany from having any military missions in foreign countries. Even if they had, official German policy was that the advisors were private citizens acting on their own. Given that the advisors were separated from the German

Army, it is quite possible the Allies foresaw the response any protest would bring. While the advisors were nominally responsible to the Argentine military and not officially connected to the , as the German army was known following , they still felt duty bound to support German interests. Like their predecessors, they lobbied Argentina to purchase German arms. While Germany was forbidden to export , it managed to get around this provision as well. Many German armament contractors had set up subsidiaries in other countries such as , the ,

Sweden and where weapons could be designed and produced outside the treaty provisions of Versailles. Uriburu and other military officers also believed that

123 Ibid, p. 36. Interestingly Faupel would be cited by Spruille Braden in article for Atlantic Monthly in 1946, over twenty years after Faupel had left Argentina. See Newton, The ‘Nazi Menace’, p. xiii. 124 Ibid, p. 37. 59

Germany’s defeat was only temporary and that the country would again become a major

military power.125

With such a favorable attitude towards the German military, cultivating the

Argentine military would not be difficult. Former President Augustín Justo told

Thermann in 1933 that he favored giving commands to German trained officers since

they seemed to be the most competent. Thermann established relationships by founding

the German Riding Club where Argentine officers and their German advisors could ride

horses, discuss military affairs, and relax. He and his wife also hosted a lavish dinner

party every year for the Argentine War Minister and his aides. This was in keeping with

Thermann’s sense that he needed to establish friendly relations with Argentina’s highest

military officers and build up respect for the re-arming German army. To that end

Thermann encouraged visits to Germany by Argentine officers. Each group before it

departed and after it returned was invited to lunch with Thermann at the embassy.

Thermann also arranged trips to Germany for high-ranking officers. He later claimed that

he was not successful with every officer. He told his postwar interrogators that General’s

Arturo Rawson and Edelmiro Farrell, future War Minister and President after 1943, were

inflexibly pro-British. He also stated that most of his relations with Argentine officers

were purely social and that he was closest to General Molina with whom he traveled to

Argentina, but that their relationship cooled.126

While relations economically and militarily were good, relations with the Catholic

Church were initially a source of friction between the two nations, despite Hitler’s

125 White, German Influence, p. 34. 126 “Final Interrogation Report of Edmund Freiherr von Thermann,” 11 July 1945, NARA, RG 59, 862.20235/7-1145, ABB, Box 6736, pp. 7-8 and Newton, The Nazi Menace’, pp. 115. 60

signing of the Concordat in 1933. Thermann admitted that relations between the embassy and the Catholic Church in Argentina had been strained in the beginning, but by 1937 they remarkably improved. The turnaround was due to the visit of Cardinal Eugenio

Pacelli, elevated to the papacy in 1939 as Pope Pius XII, who visited Buenos Aires for

the Eucharistic in 1937. Pacelli caused a stir when he invited Thermann and his

wife to social functions as well as conversing with them in German. Thermann found out

that Pacelli was interested in aviation and offered to place a plane at his service for the

rest of his stay. Pacelli gratefully accepted and he and Archbishop Coppello of Buenos

Aires took a sight-seeing tour in the airplane. Thermann later claimed that this

cemented his relationship with Archbishop Coppello, who became a frequent visitor to

the German Embassy.127 This claim should be treated skeptically since the following

year Thermann reported that the Catholic Church in Argentina was still hostile towards

Germany, most likely following the 21 March 1937 publication of Pope Pius XI’s

encyclical, , which dealt with the condition of the Catholic Church

in Nazi Germany and attacked Nazism as atheistic.128

From his rocky start, the first half of Thermann’s tenure was full of conflict. Yet

he managed to allay the fears of the German business community in Argentina and trade

between the two nations was brisk and profitable for both sides. Most of the problems he

dealt with were internal to the German community in Argentina and were thus

manageable. However, by 1937, events were beginning to move in a different direction

127 “Final Interrogation Report of Edmund Freiherr von Thermann,” 11 July 1945, NARA, RG 59, 862.20235/7-1145, ABB, Box 6736, p. 3. 128 Thermann to Auswärtiges Amt, “Political Report, Subject: Anti-German Sentiment in Argentina,” 18 May 1938, Doc. 615, DGFP, series D, v. 2, p. 848. See Guenter Lewy, The Catholic Church and Nazi Germany (New York: McGraw Hill, 1964). 61

due to policies encouraged by Berlin. Presidents Hipólito Yrigoyen (1928-1930), José

Uriburu (1930-1932) and Augustín Justo (1932-1938) had endeavored to maintain good

relations with Germany during their tenures in office from 1928-1938. However, the election of Roberto Ortiz (1938-1941) to the presidency saw relations noticeably cool.

Ortiz was not a Germanophile and shared the misgivings of his ambassador in Berlin,

Eduardo Labougle. The new Ministers of War and Navy were particularly hostile towards

the German embassy. As a result most generals stopped attending social functions there.

Thermann later stated that his good relations with the army ceased when Ortiz became

President.129

The Argentine government had observed Nazism since its rise to power and while

some in Buenos Aires applauded the relationship between the two countries, others were

not so sure. Labougle understood the nature of Nazism and informed his superiors in

Buenos Aires of his misgivings. He saw Nazism as more than a political movement and saw that the Nazis anti-semitism was not religiously or politically based, but racial in nature. In a prescient report describing the regime’s anti-semitism he stated, “Its sole object…is to eliminate from national activity those elements that have conquered high positions but are not of pure Germanic race…these measures are of a radicalism without precedent in the long history of the Reich.”130 Labougle was also uneasy at the activities

of the AO and reported the presence of Argentine AO members at the rally in

1934. He railed about films which stressed themes concerning the dual nationality of

persons born in Argentina. He argued that these films divided the patriotic sentiments of

129 “Final Interrogation Report of Edmund Freiherr von Thermann,” 11 July 1945, NARA, RG 59, 862.20235/7-1145, ABB, Box 6736, p. 8. 130 Quoted in Newton, The ‘Nazi Menace’, p. 180. 62

Argentine citizens of German descent. Despite Nazi protestations of innocence as well as

Thermann’s postwar assertion that Nazism was not for export, Labougle remained

skeptical. He reported that “They have told us National is not a doctrine for export, the realities tell us categorically that means are not lacking to recruit adepts to the new…conception of State and Society…it is known that these groups are led from the

Reich.”131

Inside Argentina, observers were viewing Nazi Party events with trepidation. The

AO and Party had made connections with indigenous right-wing organizations. In

September 1934 these groups, with the encouragement of the AO attempted to bomb the

offices of the anti-Nazi newspaper Argentinisches Tagesblatt. Later that year a theater

showing a movie condemning Nazi anti-semitism was bombed. Bohle was forced to send

his assistant for South America, Willi Kohn, to Buenos Aires and tell the Landesgruppe

to cease such provocative activities.132 The German Youth Festival held in

aroused anger when the youths, most of who were born in Argentina, sang Nazi patriotic

songs. Observers noted that the same youths did not know the words to the Argentine

national anthem. Later the same month the annual Langemarck March was held. The

march perpetuated the myth that young German soldiers had gone into battle on 10

November 1914 singing the German national anthem in an unsuccessful attempt to

capture the French city of Langemarck. Onlookers were horrified at the columns of

marchers and youth goose-stepping to German martial music.

131 Ibid, p. 182. 132 McKale, The Swastika Outside Germany, p. 67. 63

The visit of the battle Schlesien during Christmas 1937 only exacerbated

matters. The visit began successfully with the Argentine Naval Ministry placing an

airplane at the service of the ship’s officers. The crew was treated to tours of Buenos

Aires. The Nazi Party celebrated the occasion by inviting the sailors to a torchlight

memorial service for General who died the same year. During the visit however, several of the ship’s officers made known their opinions of the Nazi Party’s efforts to organize overseas Germans. They opined that it delayed the assimilation of

Germans overseas and made enemies, unnecessarily in their view, of the people of South

America.133 When Müller, head of the Argentine Landesgruppe, heard of these remarks,

he reacted vehemently. Given the state of relations between the embassy and AO he

blamed German diplomats for these remarks instead of the fine officers of the

Kriegsmarine. Müller sent a letter to Bohle complaining of these remarks. Bohle

complained to Meynen telling him that the duty of the embassy was to “strengthen the

position of the NSDAP overseas with all means and at every opportunity.”134

Statements like Bohle’s alarmed politicians in Argentina. With the arrival of

Nazism to their country Argentines saw a threat to their sovereignty. One of main areas of contention was the 203 German primary and secondary schools in the country. In

1935 the Governors of La Pampa and Misiones Provinces complained about Nazi influence in the German schools. Following an inspection by the National Education

Council the complaints were dismissed. Following Ortiz’s inauguration, the government

133 Ibid, pp. 184-185. 134 Ibid, p. 185. Naval Attaché Niebuhr dismissed the incident as a minor one stating that, “there were ruffled feelings.” “Memorandum re: Dietrich Niebuhr,” 16 November 1945, RG 65, Records of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, File 64-20041, Box 9, p. 5. 64

pursued closer regulation of schools. However, the schools simply moved inside the

boundaries of . The governor, Manuel Fresco, was a

Germanophile and close to the embassy. He ignored any pressure to closely regulate the

schools.

By this time the press had picked up on the matter and published stories concerning the state of education in the German-run school system. They reported that students were not taught Spanish and instead learned German. The stories claimed that students had no more than a superficial knowledge of Argentine history, geography, civics, and historical figures. The papers railed about how students were exposed to

German nationalist propaganda and that most of the textbooks were published in

Germany. Most alarming was the teachers who were hired directly from Germany through the German Education Ministry. One of the conditions of their employment was that they had to be members of the National Socialist Teachers’ League. Many teachers were also alleged to be Nazi Party members. The stories related that students had to use

the Hitler salute and in some schools Mein Kampf was used as a textbook. There was a

demand that the government do something.

The Argentine Ministries of Justice and Public Education voided the National

Education Council’s autonomy and announced an investigation. The investigation forced

the closure of a number of schools as well as a decree forbidding the use of foreign

languages in public schools. The only exceptions to the use of foreign language were for

teaching religion and language. The decree also outlawed political and the

teaching of doctrines that could be construed as racist. The government also legislated 65

that during primary school, Argentine history, civics and geography must be taught by

Argentine citizens for a minimum of three and a half hours each day. Though these

measures were directed at the German colony in Argentina, some trepidation remained

among other schools. The federal minister of education, Dr. Jorge E. Coll, allayed those

fears when he remarked at the St. Andrew’s Scottish School that, “Argentine suspicions

of the educational and racial activities of immigrants are not directed toward those from

Great Britain.”135

If events inside Argentina were not complicating efforts enough, events in Europe

added to the friction. In March 1938 Hitler completed his of Austria, which

was greeted enthusiastically by Nazis in Argentina. To maintain the fiction of legality regarding the takeover of Austria Hitler arranged for a plebiscite to ratify the issue to take

place 10 April. Citizens of Austria and Germany who were overseas were especially

encouraged to vote. In order to avoid violating the sovereignty of Latin American

nations balloting would take place on ships in international waters. The Argentine

Landesgruppe even contracted with the Great Southern Railway to transport 30,000

people to the port of La Plata so they could vote. Ortiz, no friend of Nazi Germany,

refused to allow the vote to take place. To get around his order, the German embassy

arranged “symbolic” lists where Germans and could put forth their “opinion”

on the plebiscite. On the same day as the plebiscite, the Nazis arranged for a “Day of

Unity” rally at Luna Park, a popular amusement park on the Buenos Aires waterfront.

U.S. Vice-Consul William F. Busser attended the rally and reported that 10-20,000

people attended singing “Deutschland über Alles” and the “ Lied.” Chargé

135 Newton, The ‘Nazi Menace,’ p. 188-191. 66

Meynen and Richard Staudt, a wealthy Austrian-Argentine businessman and Austrian

Consul since 1932, gave speeches celebrating the event.136 The Argentine government

was further upset by counterdemonstrations which took place outside the rally and

produced violence and bloodshed.

Initially confined to the area outside the rally, the protests by anti-German

Argentines soon spread. Protestors burned German flags and threw rocks at German

banks and the Instituto Cultural Germano-Argentino. While the Argentine government

issued an apology for the violence, Germans, including Thermann, attributed the violence

to “an anti-German press campaign and ‘Jewish wire-pullers,’”137 President Ortiz and the

Argentine government saw the lists for what they were and were not pleased. The public

was also incensed at the apology made to the embassy. Further fuel was added to the fire

when the Germans received permission to decorate German clubs and businesses with the

swastika flag for Nazi Labor Day celebrations on 1 May. In reaction to the

demonstrations at Luna Park, on 27 April President Ortiz forbade the flying of foreign

flags. However, German groups disobeyed and the event proceeded as scheduled. Not

surprisingly, given the high level of anti-German sentiment, student demonstrators tore

down the flags provoking violence. The German embassy protested and again received a

public apology that was ill-received by the Argentine public.138

In Berlin, Ambassador Labougle was directed to ask for an appointment with

State Secretary Ernst von Weizsäcker to voice Argentine displeasure at the violations of

136 Ibid, p. 186. 137 Comments in Note 4, “Thermann to Auswartiges Amt, Political Report, Subject: Anti German Sentiment in Argentina,” 18 May 1938, Doc. 615, DGFP, D., v. 2, p. 850. 138 Newton, The ‘Nazi Menace’, pp. 187-188. 67

Argentine sovereignty. One meeting took place on 17 May at the ambassador’s residence where Labougle was so apoplectic that Weizsäcker suggested they have another meeting

so that Labougle’s complaints “could be given definite form.”139 Labougle called on

Weizsäcker the next day. He stated that until 10 April Argentine public opinion had been sympathetic to Germany, but that the violation of Argentine sovereignty in the form of the plebiscite had changed that. Weizsäcker said that the whole situation was a misunderstanding. If a violation did take place, there was no proof. Labougle admitted that there was no evidence of a violation of , but the real cause for concern was the matter in which the “vote” had been carried out and the subsequent rally.

Labougle told Weizsäcker that the rallies were distasteful to the Argentine people and that it “smacked of duress and control” from an outside country.140 He contrasted the

behavior of the Germans with that of the Italians, with whom the Argentines had few

difficulties and conducted themselves in a non-threatening manner. The real issue for

Argentina was the problem of dual citizenship which the Argentine government felt

divided loyalties even among those who were born there. The German embassy would

not issue visas to Argentine citizens of German extraction on their Argentine .

Instead, they would be issued German passports and then given their visas. The

Argentine government felt that this was an intolerable interference in the internal affairs

of the country along with the rabble-rousing carried out by unnamed German

organizations.

139 “Memorandum by the State Secretary,” 18 May 1938, Doc. 613, DGFP, D, v. 2, pp. 845-846. 140 Ibid, Doc. 614, pp. 847-848. 68

The ambassador hinted that such interference would not be tolerated for long and

that Argentina might have to adopt the methods Brazil did, such as forcible integration, to

quell potential internal unrest. Weizsäcker asked Labougle what, if any, “friendly

advice” he had to prevent any measures from being enacted. The ambassador replied that

Germany should dissolve its current organizations and replace them with groups less

offensive to Argentina. He warned Weizsäcker not to hide or camouflage the present

NSDAP organization since it could backfire. Instead, if the new groups were set up in an

unofficial and apolitical way, then the problem would go away. Despite his abhorrence

of Nazi anti-semitism Labougle seemed to desire good relations between the two

countries since he offered that his advice was strictly unofficial and that he was

expressing his personal thoughts on how Germany could regain the goodwill of the

Argentine people.141

Weizsäcker acknowledged the ambassador’s suggestions without accepting them.

The plebiscite was held under orders from Hitler with the AO taking responsibility for

Germans abroad. If Weizsäcker had acknowledged Labougle’s complaint, word would have gone back to the new Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop. Ribbentrop was a slavish follower of Hitler and would have fired Weizsäcker for such blatant criticism of the Führer’s decision. Additionally, the Auswärtiges Amt was placed in the difficult position of having to defend a decision it probably knew to be misguided. Given the climate within Nazi Germany it should not be surprising there was no record of criticism

141 Ibid. 69 regarding the plebiscite..142 Criticizing the AO for its behavior was one thing. Criticizing

Hitler’s decisions to a foreign diplomat was something else entirely. Weizsäcker could do nothing but defend Germany’s position and hope the whole incident blew over.

Thermann repeated Labougle’s assertions in a political report to the Auswärtiges

Amt. His explanation for anti-German sentiment was not the actions of the German community. It was “elements hostile to us, especially Jews and North American businessman.”143 He felt that the Ortiz administration, especially Foreign Minister José

Maria Cantilo, was composed of antifascists influenced by the anti-Nazi press.

Thermann contrasted the Ortiz government with Justo’s which had curbed “demagogic

tendencies” along with the previous Foreign Minister, Carlos Saaverda Lamas, who resisted North American pressure. While Thermann placed the blame on the government and anti-Nazi factions in Argentina, he did not absolve the German community of blame.

He stated that recent events had had an unfavorable effect on public opinion. Thermann admitted that the “opinion” lists were in fact an election that had harmed Germany’s

142 See Zachary Shore, What Hitler Knew: The Battle for Information in Nazi Foreign Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), pp. 11-13. Shore describes a climate of fear within the Auswärtiges Amt which included the tapping of telephones and bugs placed in offices. He states that Hermann Göring’s Forschungsamt “produced caution and fear among many…” While Shore’s sources are primarily secondary and memoir, there is nothing not in keeping with and Security Service methods. It also is in line with Robert Gellately’s study which argues that fear was a necessary element of Nazi control. See Robert Gellately, Backing Hitler: Consent and Coercion in the Nazi Germany (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001). For a somewhat contradictory view, see Eric A. Johnson, Nazi Terror: The Gestapo, Jews, and Ordinary Germans (New York: Basic Books, 2000). Johnson argues that the Gestapo possessed too few members to adequately keep track of people and instead relied on a network of informers to help it carry out its duties. also felt his office was bugged see Heinz Höhne, Canaris: Hitler’s Master Spy, trans. J. Maxwell Brownjohn (New York: Cooper Square Press, 1979) for Canaris’s suspicions. Staatssekretärs Ernst von Weizsäcker also felt he was under surveillance. When Sumner Welles visited him in 1940 he noted that Weizsäcker “drew his chair toward the center of the room and motioned to me to do likewise. It was evident that…German microphones were installed in the walls.” See Sumner Welles, A Time for Decision (New York: Harper, 1944), pp. 99-100 and Paul Seabury, The Wilhelmstrasse: A Study of German Diplomats Under the Nazi Regime (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1954), p. 194, note 21. 143 “Thermann to Auswartiges Amt, Political Report, Subject: Anti German Sentiment in Argentina,” 18 May 1938, Doc. 615, DGFP, D, v. 2, pp. 848-852. 70

position in Argentina and were held over the objection of the embassy. The participation

of Argentine citizens made the plebiscite particularly unpalatable to Argentina with

general opinion being that it was an unwanted and intolerable interference in Argentine

internal affairs.

Thermann felt there was a solution to this problem: separating Reichsdeutsche

from Volksdeutsche. He argued this could be accomplished by establishing an entirely

new organization which would be apolitical and thus acceptable to Argentine sentiments.

It would serve as a coordinating agency for all other German societies and remove real

and perceived sources of friction. Thermann stated that this had been a goal of his for a

long time. He intimated that the various German groups were at odds with each other

and caused innumerable problems for the embassy. Removing the Volksdeutsche would

be in line with policies carried out in Europe and would allow the embassy to coordinate

the competing aims of the numerous German groups in Argentina. However, he did not

propose to abandon the Volksdeutsche, instead existing organizations would focus on

them. They could be controlled by parsing out money, which Thermann admitted they

needed in order to survive. In this way, German goals in Argentina would be under the

control of the embassy. Thermann added that any new organization regarding German

nationals “would, of course, have to be directed entirely along the lines of our

Movement.”144

While Thermann’s suggestions were being considered, events in Argentina were

still at a critical stage. The ambassador learned that Ortiz was still considering measures against Germans in Argentina. Thermann felt that this was due to pressure from North

144 Ibid, pp. 850-852. 71

America as well as “North American Jewish capital,” which was trying to supplant

Germany economically in South America. Thermann stated that it was North American

Jewish circles and Jews who were manipulating Argentine nationalistic feelings in order

to turn Argentina against Germany. Thermann had no suggestions on how to answer this

threat except to advise the Auswärtiges Amt that German organizations should lay low

and offer no provocations that could exacerbate the situation.145 Thermann’s comments

echoed those of his master Adolf Hitler who viewed the world through the prism of

race.146 Hitler saw countries such as the United States dominated by Jews who controlled money and policy. His vision was shared by his minions, including Foreign Minister

Joachim von Ribbentrop, who allowed this world view to guide their thoughts and

actions.

In July Thermann attended a meeting of German ambassadors from Argentina,

Brazil, Chile and the Minister to . Thermann’s report on the meeting continued

the pessimism of his previous reports. The ambassadors agreed that the present anti-

German feelings in their respective countries were not transitory problems and were

instead long-term. The ambassadors asked Berlin to clarify its goals in South America.

The perception that Germany was pursuing power in South America was widespread and

must be repudiated.147 The fact that five years after assuming power Hitler’s government

145 “Thermann to Auswartiges Amt, Political Report, Subject: Position of the Germans in Argentina,” 7 , Doc. 621, DGFP, D, v. 2, pp. 858-859. 146 Gerhard L. Weinberg, “The World through Hitler’s Eyes,” Germany, Hitler and World War II: Essays in Modern German and World History (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp. 30-56. and Gerhard L. Weinberg, “Hitler’s Image of the United States,” World in the Balance: Behind the Scenes of World War II (Hanover, NH: University Press of New England, 1981), pp. 53-74. 147 Neither Hitler nor Ribbentrop was averse to such pronouncements. In was worried about German troop buildups in . Hitler assured Turkey that the movement of German troops into Bulgaria was not directed against Turkey. Hitler ordered that German troops remain outside a previously 72

had no geopolitical policy towards Latin America was astonishing and partially explained

German difficulties. The ambassadors offered that Germany strictly confine itself to

economic and cultural aims. If only these two areas were pursued, then there was a

chance the situation could be salvaged. However, the forthcoming meeting of the

American Republics in Lima seemed to promise more severe measures against Nazi Party

organizations in the Americas. Regarding trade policy, the recommendation was that

economic agreements be concluded for the next several years, with automatic extensions

if they were not canceled.

In dealing with the problem of Germandom in Latin America, the ambassadors

were unanimous in recommending that German nationals and Volksdeutsche have

separate organizations. They suggested that volksdeutsche schools be self-supporting and

that smaller schools be closed. The larger schools could be given subsidies from

Winterhilfe funds and those welfare organizations that lost money would have funds

replaced directly from the Reich. The ambassadors argued that this would make it harder

for the South American governments to protest politically against the use of such funds.

Additionally, teachers should be sent to Germany for training, especially those who

taught in secondary schools. Most likely so they could be trained to give volksdeutsche

students a proper National Socialist education. It is not clear why the Germans would

risk running afoul of authorities in Argentina and other countries unless the idea of a

racial education was something that appealed to teachers and students.

agreed security zone to allay Turkish fears. See Christian Leitz, Sympathy for the Devil: Neutral Europe and Nazi Germany in World War II (New York: New York University Press, 2001), p. 91. 73

Also discussed were complaints about the quality of propaganda from Germany.

It was felt that the majority of material sent to South America was not suited for either

the Volksdeutsche or indigenous population. It was suggested that the Cultural Policy

Department of the Auswärtiges Amt work with the cultural office of the AO to determine

permissible materials. of sponsored reading rooms for such material

would help in the supervision of such materials. However, the embassies should not

disseminate political documents. They should be sent directly to interested persons.

Mass influence of public opinion would be carried out through the press. They suggested

spending more money to counteract the negative press which the ambassadors suspected

was being sponsored by the U.S. government. The ambassadors felt that acquiring a large

daily newspaper might have the desired effect since threatening to pull advertising from

papers deemed unfriendly to German interests was insufficient. The assignment of a full

time press attaché in Buenos Aires responsible for South America would help solve this

problem.

However, the ambassadors praised recent AO directives ordering Nazi Party

organs in Latin America to show restraint in public.148 The ambassadors asked that the

AO clarify that these directives superseded any previous instructions regarding public displays of National Socialism, especially the wearing of uniforms and displaying

German flags. It was suggested that closer cooperation between Nazi Party organs and

the embassies be undertaken, with the ambassadors taking the lead. With the threat of

imminent punitive measures on the horizon, “decisive responsibility of the representative

148 “Telegram, Bohle to German Missions in Latin America,” 18 May 1938, Büro des Chefs der AO, NARA, RG 242/T-120/225/170914. 74

of the Reich must be assured.” The meeting showed that German policy towards Latin

America in general had no direction. Given the competing organizations, policy had to

be coordinated through one organization. Naturally, the ambassadors thought it should be the embassies, in any case, the problems discussed had to be solved and policy clarified. Only in this way could Germany’s present difficulties be overcome.149

Surprisingly, the AO in Argentina agreed with the recommendation that

Reichsdeutsche and volksdeutsche be separated and laid out their plan for doing so. It also reiterated its earlier position that Nazi Party organizations avoid any activity that could attract negative publicity.150 Thermann attempted to lessen the friction between the

two organizations, by suggesting the creation of a cover organization, under the control

of the Auswärtiges Amt, which would handle the Reichsdeutsche. Bohle had ordered the

Landesgruppe to do the same thing in his May directive, albeit reluctantly. While the

Nazi Party representatives objected, for the moment, the problem was sent to Berlin.

When Thermann traveled to Berlin in September, one of the main topics of discussion

was the Reichsdeutsche/Volksdeutsche issue. He was informed that while the

recommendations reached between him and the AO were approved in principle, his

recommendation for a cover organization had been rejected.151 While Bohle recognized

the magnitude of the problem facing the AO in South America he was not about to

149 “Aufzeichnung über die Zusammenkunft der deutschen Missionchefs in Argentinien, Brasilien, Chile, und Uruguay in Montivideo am 28 und 29 Juli 1938,” Büro des Chefs der AO, NARA RG 242/T- 120/218/168208-215 also “Thermann to Auswartiges Amt, Enclosure: Memorandum of the Meeting in of the Chiefs of Missions in Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Uruguay, July 28 and 29, 1938,” 2 August 1938, Doc. 624, DGFP, D, v. 2, pp. 863-867. 150 “Memorandum by an Official of the Auslandsorganisation,” 24 September 1938, Doc. 626, DGFP, D, v. 2, pp. 869-872. 151 Newton, The ‘Nazi Menace’, p. 193. 75

abdicate any authority over German citizens overseas. In internal Nazi Party politics,

such surrendered control of the AO. Thus, the situation stayed the same.

The latter half of the 1930s saw the German position in Argentina erode. The

Auswärtiges Amt and the embassy in Argentina desperately tried to staunch the flood of

anti-German feelings in Argentina. Thermann recognized that part of the problem

stemmed from the AO and attempted to bring it under foreign ministry control, but was

unsuccessful. The meeting of the ambassadors showed that the problem was not confined

just to Argentina. It was continent-wide. The main problem was that Germany lacked

any geo-political policy regarding Latin America. If a policy could be implemented, then

perhaps the situation could be rectified. Instead, groups such as the AO continued to

pursue their own goals, which were often at odds with the Wilhelmstrasse’s. Latin

America during this period was relegated to a backwater in German diplomacy, with

events in Europe dominating the attention of not only the Auswärtiges Amt, but Hitler as

well. This lack of direction from the top contributed to dysfunction in German

diplomacy. While the ambassador’s recommendations were not radical, they did require

attention. They also required cooperation among the various groups in Argentina, which

the AO and other groups were unwilling to give since it would undercut their authority

and position. If 1938 was a bad year for the Germans in Argentina, then 1939 would be

even worse. Events during that year would even require the attention, however brief, of

Adolf Hitler. The Germans were their own worst enemy in Argentina and even when events such as the so-called Patagonia Plot were patent forgeries, the ill-will Germany

had fostered would come back to haunt it. 76

Chapter 2

The Patagonia Affair and the Fear of Nazi Fifth Column Activity, 1939

By early 1939 war clouds loomed over Europe. Hitler had completed the

Anschluss of Austria and the Munich conference in between Neville

Chamberlain, Eduard Daladier, and Hitler had averted war for the time

being. Adding to the fear of war was Hitler’s occupation of on 15 March 1939.

On 23 March German troops marched into Memel, a primarily German-speaking area of

Lithuania. Additionally, the Spanish Civil War, which had dragged for almost three

years with the active assistance of Nazi Germany and was finally winding down. It

would end with the fall of Madrid on 30 March.152 Thus, the spring of 1939 was

especially tense worldwide. In Latin America, two events provided context for the

Patagonia Plot: the May 1938 plot against President Getúlio Vargas of Brazil and the

crisis over Czechoslovakia which culminated in the Munich conference where the

Sudeten area of Czechoslovakia was given to Germany.

While the world breathed a sigh of relief following the Munich conference, the

methods Hitler used to undermine Austria and Czechoslovakia created unease in many

countries, such as Argentina and Brazil, which had large German populations. In 1936,

the AO estimated that there were over a million persons of German descent in Latin

152 For details of German and Italian assistance to Franco’s Spain, see especially, Antony Beevor, The Battle for Spain: The Spanish Civil War, 1936-1939, revised edition (New York: Penguin Books, 2006) and Stanley G. Payne, Franco and Hitler: Spain, Germany and World War II (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008) chapters 1-3.For Canaris’s role in helping Franco see Heinz Höhne, Canaris: Hitler’s Master Spy, trans. J. Maxwell Brownjohn (New York: Cooper Square Press, 1979). Despite numerous errors see also Robert Whealey, Hitler and Spain: the Nazi Role in the Spanish Civil War, 1936-1939 (Lexington: The University of Kentucky Press, 2005). 77

America. Brazil was the largest with 800,000, followed by Argentina with 150,000 and

30,000 in Chile with the rest spread throughout the rest of Central and South America.153

This chapter examines the so-called Patagonia Plot and its effect on German-Argentine relations and explores the issue within the context of Latin American fears of Nazi fifth- columnists undermining the governments in countries where they resided. The affair was especially revealing regarding the Nazi world-view and the idea that a nebulous “Jewish” was behind it. It also shows how the embassy and Auswärtiges Amt viewed the world situation in 1939 and its rivalry with the AO.

In 1937 one of the major goals of Nazi foreign policy was to get the support of

Argentina, Brazil and Chile for the Anti-Comintern Pact which Germany had recently signed with Japan and Italy. Since the governments of Argentina, Brazil and Chile were vehemently anti-communist the AA felt that their signing of the Anti-Comintern Pact would bind them closer to Germany. Referat Deutschland in the Auswärtiges Amt felt that these were the only other countries of any political importance in Latin America and should be approached. However, the (Political Department usually abbreviated as Pol. Abt.) IX of the AA, which covered the Americas, felt that none of the countries would explicitly join. Pol. Abt. IX argued that joining would unnecessarily antagonize the U.S.154 Therefore , German Ambassador in Brazil, was

surprised when in December 1937 the Brazilian government suggested that the German

government prepare an anti-Communist exhibit to be shown throughout the country.

153 Alton Frye, Nazi Germany and the American Hemisphere, 1933-1941 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967), p. 65. 154 “Memorandum by an official of the Foreign Ministry,” 30 November 1937, Document 593, Documents on German Foreign Policy, Series D, Volume 5, (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1953), pp. 815-816 and Frye, Nazi Germany and the American Hemisphere, pp. 101-102. 78

Brazil was especially important to Nazi Germany economically. As Carl Clodius of the

AA’s Economic Policy Department pointed out, “From an economic point of view, Brazil was for us by far the most important country in South America.”155

Despite the pro-German tilt in Brazilian foreign policy, the government of

President Getúlio Vargas had watched the events in Europe warily. Vargas looked suspiciously at the large German population in Southern Brazil with its own German-

language schools, clubs and . Some Germans in Brazil even refused to learn

Portuguese. Like most dictators Vargas was paranoid and decided to eliminate this

potential threat by integrating the German-speaking population into Brazilian society.

Vargas’s pressure against the NSDAP, German schools and cultural associations caused

alarm in Berlin. As Alton Frye points out, “Germany now received a taste of its own

medicine as the Vargas regime…intensified its national campaign to insure national unity

in Brazil.”156 Events became more tense when Ernst Dorsch, the leading Nazi in Rio

Grande do Sul, was arrested in for “anti-government activities.” Ritter had

a stormy interview with Vargas protesting Dorsch’s arrest and used a threatening tone

with the president. Vargas refused to be cowed and Ritter backed down.157 Ritter blamed

the campaign against the Germans of Brazil on “Jews, émigrés, irate Catholic clerics…disgruntled and disaffected Germans and Austrians.”158 Ritter, like Ambassador

Thermann, saw the Jews behind all things anti-German. However, the events of May

1938 were to prove almost disastrous for Germany’s relations with Latin America and

155 “Memorandum by an Official of the Economic Policy Department,” 4 October 1938, Doc. 629, DGFP, D, v. 5, pp. 874-875. 156 Frye, Nazi Germany and the American Hemisphere, pp. 102-103. 157 Ibid, p. 102. 158 “The Ambassador in Brazil to the Foreign Ministry,” 30 March 1938, Doc. 599, DGFP, D, v. 5, p. 824. 79

resulted in the Ritter’s recall. The events in Brazil in 1938 also provided some of the context for the Patagonia Affair in Argentina.

The Intergralista Revolt of May 1938 in Brazil had shaken Vargas and implicated the German embassy in the plot to overthrow his government. The Integralistas were an indigenous organization with an authoritarian bent headed by Plinio Salgado. The group’s chief ideologue, Gustavo Barroso, was an open admirer of the Nazis. During the

1930s he published several anti-Semitic tracts attacking the alleged “international Jewish

conspiracy.”159 The Integralistas originally supported Vargas and felt he was supportive

of their ideology. Vargas saw them as challengers to his authority and broke with them.

The revolt was poorly planned and quickly quashed.160 Thought the revolt was domestic in nature, the Vargas government had no doubts about the participation of the German embassy and local NSDAP organizations. In April 1938 Vargas had banned all foreign political organizations, giving them one month to dispose of their assets. While this was a powerful motive on the NSDAP’s part to participate, there is no evidence it did. While the Nazis hoped the party could exist in another form, the revolt caused Vargas to ban it outright. The Brazilian police also arrested a large number of Nazi party members and ordered others to leave the country immediately.161

Ritter vehemently denied the participation of the embassy or NSDAP in the revolt

and demanded that evidence be produced to support the allegations. Even Ribbentrop

was uncertain whether Germans were involved and ordered Ritter to conduct an

159 Gustavo Barroso, “The Paulista Synagogue,” in Robert M. Levine and John J. Crocitti, eds. The Brazil Reader: History, Culture, Politics (Durham N.C.: Duke University Press, 1999), pp. 182-183. 160 Stanley E. Hilton, Brazil and the Great Powers, 1930-1939: The Politics of Trade Rivalry (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1975), pp. 168-175. 161 Frye, Nazi Germany and the American Hemisphere, p. 104. 80

investigation. While Ritter admitted there had been “bungling” he was convinced no

Germans had been involved. He also felt that the Brazilian government had no proof in

its possession or they would have produced it.162 Events proved Ritter correct. On 21

May, the Brazilian government announced that it had no evidence linking any German

citizens or organizations to the revolt. The statement was ambiguous and State Secretary

Ernst von Weizsäcker demanded that the Brazilian government unequivocally deny any

German participation.163

Ambassador Ritter eroded any remaining goodwill with his belligerent attitude.

On 24 May he snubbed an invitation from the Brazilian government to attend a formal

ball honoring the Chilean Foreign Minister. Given that Germans were under arrest for

unfounded accusations Ritter felt it would not be appropriate to attend. He informed the

Brazilian Foreign Minister, Oswald Aranha, that the Brazilian embassy in Berlin would

not receive similar invitations from the German government. Ritter was not authorized to

issue any such instructions. He was reprimanded by Weizsäcker and ordered to

apologize.164 By September Ritter’s conduct had become so intolerable that the Brazilian

Government asked the AA to recall him. The AA did, but also demanded that Brazil

recall its ambassador in Berlin, which it did.165 Suspicion of Germany and its objectives

in Latin America spread from Brazil to other countries and created difficulties for the

162 “The State Secretary to the Embassy in Brazil,” 16 May 1938, Doc. 609 and “The Ambassador in Brazil to the Foreign Ministry,” 18 May 1938, Doc. 610, DGFP, D, v. 5, pp. 842-843. 163 Frye, Nazi Germany and the American Hemisphere, p. 105, and “Memorandum by the State Secretary,” 18 May 1938, Doc. 612, DGFP, D, v. 5, pp. 843-845. 164 “The Ambassador in Brazil to the Foreign Ministry,” 25 May 1938, Doc. 617, note 7, DGFP, D, v. 5, pp. 853-854. 165 “Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department,” 21 September 1938, Doc. 625, 30 September 1938 Doc. 627 and “The State Secretary to the Embassy in Brazil, 3 October 1938, Doc. 628, DGFP, D, v. 5, pp. 868, 872-874. 81

heads of mission. The Eight Pan-American Congress was held in Lima, Peru in

December 1938 and produced the Declaration of Lima. The declaration stated its

opposition to political activities by foreigners and was directed against German minority

communities in Latin America.166 The declaration increased the mistrust of German

minority communities and Germany’s political objectives regarding Latin America.

Events in Europe added to the suspicion of Latin American leaders that the German-

speaking populations residing within their borders were engaged in activities designed to undermine their sovereignty.

Latin American governments looked on with dismay at the activities of Konrad

Henlein, head of the in Czechoslovakia. They, like their European counterparts, believed, correctly, that Henlein was acting as a tool of Hitler.167 The

agitation created by the Sudeten community in its struggle with the Czech state only

reinforced this view. Hitler’s pronouncements in favor of the Sudeten community as well

as his belligerent attitude added to Latin American fears that ethnic Germans in their

countries were operating under Hitler’s control. Additionally, German organizations in

Czechoslovakia were funded by the German government. The money was ostensibly to

be used for cultural, educational and economic groups. As Gerhard L. Weinberg points

out, the money had indirect political implications as well.168 The Germans were also

166 Frye, Nazi Germany and the American Hemisphere, p. 113. 167 Johann Wolfgang Brügel, Tschechen und Deutsche, 1939-1946 (Munich: Nymphenburger Verlagshandlung, 1974), Radomir Luža, The Transfer of the Sudeten Germans; A Study of Czech-German Relations, 1933-1962 (New York: New York University Press, 1964) and Ronald M. Smelser, The Sudeten Problem, 1933-1938: Volkstumspolitik and the Formulation of Nazi Foreign Policy (Middletown, Conn., Wesleyan University Press, 1975) are books which argue Henlein’s movement was oriented towards Nazism. 168 Gerhard L. Weinberg, The Foreign Policy of Hitler’s Germany: Starting World War II (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980) p. 314. 82

funding German organizations in Latin America. It would be reasonable to assume that

Vargas and Ortiz also saw the political implications of those groups. Hence, their heavy-

handed reaction to perceived German threats to their respective countries.

Unknown to world leaders was the fact that the Germans in Czechoslovakia were a simply a tool to be used to further Hitler’s broader aims.169 Hitler had no overriding interest in their welfare except as it fit into his plans. It is highly unlikely that Hitler

would have approved any plans to undermine the Brazilian state. If things went wrong

Germany would have not been in a position to protect the German community of Brazil.

However, this was not known at the time. Fears of a fifth-column were very real.170

Despite the angst regarding German activities inside Argentina, Ambassador

Thermann was optimistic regarding relations between the two countries. However, events of the previous two years had damaged relations between Germany and Argentina.

Instead of placing blame for the situation on the actions of the German government where it belonged, Thermann blamed the press which he stated was supported by anti-German immigrants, Jews and North American economic interests. He claimed they had misjudged Germany’s actions and caused the Argentine government to adopt a mistrustful attitude. Criticisms of the Argentine government by the AO and NSDAP had only exacerbated the situation. Thermann argued that if these groups stopped offending

Argentine sensibilities then the situation would improve. He also advised Germany to be

169 Ibid, p. 317. 170 For a discussion of U.S. fears see Francis MacDonnell, Insidious Foes: The Axis Fifth Column and the American Home Front (Guilford, CT: The Lyons Press, 2004). 83

sensitive in its relations with the Catholic Church and with commercial circles since they were influenced by “Jews and Freemasons.”171

Thermann had reason for optimism. The U.S. had also stumbled in its relations with Argentina. Thermann felt that errors on the part of the U.S. had reinforced resentment of the U.S. in Argentina, particularly among President Roberto Ortiz, and

Foreign Minister José María Cantilo. The main point of contention was an embargo placed on imports of Argentine beef to the U.S. The U.S. argued the embargo was necessary to prevent the spread of hoof and mouth disease, which the U.S. Department of

Agriculture claimed was endemic in Argentina. However, there were those who felt the embargo was excessive. Despite this the embargo remained in effect for most of the

1930s. Attempts to circumvent it ran into vocal opposition from U.S. Congressman who were beholden to cattlemen.

At the Second Pan-American Conference held in Buenos Aires in 1936 the U.S. wanted the states of Latin America to agree to compulsory consultation should war appear imminent. They also wanted to create an Inter-American Consultative Committee along with a common neutrality policy in the event of war in the Americas.172 The U.S.

was opposed by Argentine Foreign Minister Carlos Saaverda Lamas who was committed

to the League of Nations and to Argentine supremacy in Latin America. Saaverda Lamas

felt that the U.S. proposals were “nothing more nor less than a means by which the

United States hoped to extend its power and influence over the smaller nations of the

171 “Politische Bericht: Deutsch-argentinische Beziehungen,” 24 Februar 1939, Pol. IX, Akten betreffend: Politische Beziehungen Argentiniens zu Deutschland, April 1936-Mai 1939, The National Archives, Kew (hereafter TNA), File: GFM 33810. 172Robert Dallek, Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 1932-1945 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979), p. 133. 84

hemisphere.”173 Thermann advised that Germany needed to exploit the situation.

Germany, he said, should consider cultivating “special economic interests” meaning more

imports of Argentine beef.174 This would bolster Germany’s image with Argentina and

help repair some of the damage that had been done to relations between the two

countries.175 However, another incident occurred that rattled relations. It revolved

around a report concerning the Patagonia region of Argentina allegedly prepared in the

German embassy in Buenos Aires.176

On 20 March 1939 President Ortiz of Argentina was handed a photocopied document outlining an alleged Nazi attempt to annex the southern Argentine region of

Patagonia. The document was printed on the stationary of the German Embassy in

Buenos Aires and dated 11 January 1937. It carried the signatures of Alfred Müller and

Conrad von Schubert, respectively Deputy Landesgruppenleiter of the NSDAP in

Argentina and Counselor in the German embassy. It was addressed to Franz Ritter von

Epp, head of the Colonial Policy Office of the NSDAP in the Brown House in Munich.177

In the document Müller and Schubert informed Epp that the embassy was collecting information on Argentine military defenses in Patagonia. The German Chamber of

Commerce, banks and private firms were also collecting economic information on the area. The document explained that Nazi organizations such as the Volksbund and

173 Quoted in Ibid. 174 “Politische Bericht: Deutsch-argentinische Beziehungen,” 24 Februar 1939, Pol. IX, Akten betreffend: Politische Beziehungen Argentiniens zu Deutschland, April 1936-Mai 1939, TNA, GFM 33810. 175 Ibid. 176 “The Landesgruppenleiter in Argentina to the Colonial Policy Office of the Reichsleitung of the NSDAP,” Doc. 137, C, v. 6, pp. 279-281. 177 For more information on this and Nazi colonial policy in general see Gerhard L. Weinberg, “German Colonial Plans and Policies, 1938-1942,” in World in the Balance: Behind the Scenes of World War II (Hanover, NH: University Press of New England, 1981), pp. 96-136. 85

German Workers Front (Deutsche Arbeitsfront or DAF) were collecting information on

the racial makeup of the population in Patagonia. They were also investigating “the future

possibilities of on the theoretical supposition that the whole area will

become part of the German and economic sphere.”178

More disturbing were the names of the companies and banks that supposedly

aided in collecting information on the region. The companies named included Lahusen y

Cia Ltd. and A.M. Delfino y Cia, two of the oldest German companies in Argentina as

well as the Banco Germánico and Banco Aleman Transatlántico, two of the main

German banks in Argentina. The report also talked about photographs and maps

provided by certain ministries inside the Argentine government. The ministries named

included the National Petroleum , the National Bank and the War and Navy

ministries. The report concluded that Argentina had failed to properly colonize Patagonia

and would be unable to do so in the foreseeable future. Thus, it had no legal basis to

claim sovereignty over the area.179

On 21 March 1939 Ortiz ordered the authorities to look into this matter. The

police detained Heinrich Jürges, the man who had handed over the document, then

released him several days later. The incident was kept out of the public eye until 30

March when the newspaper Noticias Gráficas, probably at Jürges instigation, published

details of the document. The next day the anti-Nazi newspapers Argentinisches Tageblatt

178 The Landesgruppenleiter in Argentina to the Colonial Policy Office of the Reichsleitung of the NSDAP, DGFP, Doc. 137, C, v. 6, p. 280. 179 Ibid, p. 281. 86

and Ultima Edición published their own stories concerning the document.180 The same

day Alfred Müller was taken into custody for questioning by Argentine police and held at

Buenos Aires police headquarters. The following day prominent members of the German community in Argentina were brought in for questioning. They included, Eduardo

Delfino, head of A.M. Delfino y Cia, Ricardo Leute of the Banco Germánico, Carlos

Schmitts of the German Chamber of Commerce and Carlos Fleischer, head of the DAF in

Argentina. Fleischer had a particularly rough time since he had to explain away how and why DAF dues were being deducted illegally from employees at the metal-fabricating firm of Klöckner without their permission and in violation of Argentine labor laws.181

President Ortiz appointed a special judge to oversee the investigation. The judge in turn appointed a special attorney to conduct the actual investigation. As soon as the story broke in the Argentine press Meynen informed the AA. In response to the AA’s inquiry about the incident, the AO stated that no written or verbal correspondence concerning Patagonia ever occurred. Additionally, a subordinate of Müller’s named

Stoehrmann, who had arrived recently from Argentina, was interviewed by the AA. He adamantly denied that any discussions regarding Patagonia ever took place within the

Landesgruppe Argentina. State Secretary Ernst von Weizsäcker and ,

180 “Veröffentlichung gefälschten Botschaftsberichts,” 5 April 1939, BNA, GFM 33810. This file contains memorandum from Politische Abteilung IX, which covered the Americas for the Auswärtiges Amt. The original file is Pol. Abt. 9, Patagonien Affaire, March-May 1939, Volumes 1 and 2. There were two other files Büro des Staatssekretärs, Akten betreffend Patagonia, Jan 1937- and Büro des Chefs der AO, Argentinien, Fall Müller, 1937-1940, vol. 75. 181 Newton, The ‘Nazi Menace’, p. 196. For the questioning of German businessmen see “Veröffentlichung gefälschten Botschaftsberichts,” 5 April 1939, TNA, GFM 33810. 87

head of the Politische Abteilung (Political Department) in the AA, quickly concluded that

the document published in the Argentine papers was an “awkward falsification.”182

The AA also investigated Heinrich Jürges’ background. It seemed that he had worked for Propaganda Ministry and then left Germany where he went to work for the Landesgruppe in Chile. He then disappeared and turned up in Argentina where it was suspected he was working for ’s so-called “.”183

Otto Strasser was the brother of Gregor Strasser, both of whom were early supporters of

Hitler. After Gregor was killed in the in 1934, Otto fled

Germany fearing for his own life and became an opponent of Hitler. Weizsäcker and

Woermann suspected the document was a crude forgery designed to undermine

Germany’s position in Argentina and turn public opinion there against Germany. The fear was that the Argentine government would ban the Landesgruppe, as had happened in

Brazil. Weizsäcker instructed Woermann to work with the AO to prevent this.

Woermann instructed the German embassy in Buenos Aires to inform the Argentine government that the passage of any decree banning the Landesgruppe would adversely affect German-Argentine relations. The embassy in Buenos Aires was also told to sound out the Italian government about working together to prevent a ban from occurring.184

Weizsäcker informed the embassy in Buenos Aires that the document in question was indeed a forgery. He wanted Erich Otto Meynen, the embassy’s Chargé d’ Affairs, to communicate this in the strongest terms to the Argentine government. Weizsäcker also

182 “Betr. Argentinische Presseveröffentlichungen über eine angeblich beabsichtigte Anektierung Patagoniens durch Deutschland” 4 April 1939, TNA, GFM 33945. 183 Ibid. 184 Ibid. 88 instructed Meynen to demand the punishment of Jürges and anyone who assisted him in spreading lies. Meynen was to tell the Argentine government that while the Argentine government could not prevent the spread of such accusations, any action taken on the basis of those accusations would contradict any sense of justice on the part of Argentina.

Meynen was also told by Weizsäcker to communicate that any action taken against

Müller would hurt relations between Germany and Argentina. The Argentine ambassador in Berlin was also to be called in and told of Germany’s views regarding this matter.185 In short, the AA had decided that the best defense was a good offense, particularly after the events of the preceding year.

Meynen had anticipated some of the instructions he received from Berlin. On 31

March following Müller’s arrest he immediately sent a communiqué to the Argentine

Foreign Ministry denouncing the document as a forgery. He stated that its purpose was to slander the good name of the German diplomats of the Reich. He also offered evidence that the document was a forgery. Meynen asserted that the letterhead on the document had never been used by the embassy currently or in the past. Additionally,

Schubert had no authority to sign such a document; he would have to get permission to sign it. Also, Schubert’s title on the document was printed as Legationsrat (Legation

Councilor). Schubert was not a Legationsrat, but a Legations Secretary, a lower rank.

This and other evidence presented by Meynen argue that the documents were crude forgeries.

185 Draft “Telegramm, Nr. 91” 5 April 1939, TNA, GFM 33945. 89

Meynen asked that the Argentine Foreign Ministry inform him of what recourse

the embassy had regarding legal action against the newspapers.186 The same day Meynen

sent a letter to Foreign Minister José María Cantilo repeating his claims. He added that

the document did not represent the views of the German government. Meynen sharply

protested the publication of the document by the press. He politely inquired when the

Argentine government would conduct an investigation of this affair. Meynen felt that

any investigation would absolve the embassy and the German community. He further

asked if the Argentine authorities would pursue any legal action against the newspapers.

In any case, he would pass a copy of his previous communiqué as well as this one to the

press for publication.187

On 5 April the police raided the NSDAP offices located on the fourth floor of the

Banco Germánico building and the offices of other German associations in Buenos Aires.

The authorities also obtained a court order to have safe deposit boxes belonging to

German organizations opened. Across Buenos Aires and Argentina the police raided

German bars, clubs and organizations and carted away large quantities of documents.

Meynen believed that the AO and NSDAP had brought this turn of events upon

themselves. He reported to Berlin that, “I have learned that material has been…seized

from which can be determined the role played by party units in the work of organizing

local Germans and aligning them to the purposes of the Reich. Possibly a lot of material

186 “Anlage 2, Veröffentlichung gefälschten Botschaftsberichts,” 5 April 1939, TNA, GFM 33810. 187 “Anlage 3, Veröffentlichung gefälschten Botschaftsberichts,” 5 April 1939, TNA, GFM 33810. 90

will come to light that will be taken critically in the local liberal democratic

atmosphere.”188

On 6 April in Berlin Under-State Secretary Woermann met with Ambassador

Eduardo Labougle and told him that the AA had found no evidence that the document in question was authentic. He suggested that Argentina drop the matter. Labougle told

Woermann that only an Argentine investigation could clear up this matter and satisfy public opinion.189 Labougle stated in his report to Buenos Aires that the main issue was

the conduct of German organizations in Argentina. Argentine public opinion had turned

against Germany following the demonstrations of the previous year. While Labougle

agreed that there was a problem regarding Patagonia, he stated that Argentina, “could not

tolerate for long the way in which the NSDAP carries out its activities…Today’s

immigrant associations are different from earlier ones: [to them] the Party is the State and

the State is the Party.” He also alluded to the tense international situation and Germany’s

bellicose foreign policy. He was particularly concerned that the AO and NSDAP would

undermine Argentina internally, as had been done in Austria and Czechoslovakia. He

wrote that the groups “might undertake ‘special actions’ in the initial moments of a

conflagration…In Austria, the , Memel, and Bohemia-Moravia, the

way was prepared efficiently by these groups.”190 Labougle made a connection between

German actions elsewhere and the potential for such action in Argentina.

On 6 April during his home leave Thermann was asked by the AA to prepare a

report on German-Argentine relations. His report was a hodge-podge of insight and

188 “Telegramm, Nr. 1056” 12 April 1939, TNA, GFM 3337. 189 Newton, The ‘Nazi Menace,’ p. 200. 190 Newton, The ‘Nazi Menace,’ p. 201. 91

superficiality with racial characterizations. Thermann began with a general outline of

Argentine geography and demography. He stated that Argentina had always encouraged

immigration, but that it was the second generation which presented problems since they

felt themselves to be more Argentine than part of their parents’ heritage. However, since

Argentina did not provide care or aid to immigrants, German associations could

counteract this disturbing trend. Not surprisingly, Thermann stated that Argentina

preferred Germanic elements as immigrants, but that Argentina feared strong German

support for citizens of German descent, given previous demonstrations.

Thermann stated that while the Argentine government watched the NSDAP

closely, it did not prevent the party from carrying out its activities. In contrast, the Italian

Fascio and Spanish Falange were looked on more benignly since their activities were

culturally closer to Argentina’s. The previous eighteen months, said Thermann, had seen a change in the attitude of the Argentine government. Thermann attributed this to

“Jewish-Marxist” influences within the Argentine parliament who were stirring up agitation against the NSDAP. Like Labougle, Thermann recognized that Germany bore some responsibility for this change in attitude and cited the Argentine reaction towards the Langemarck march of 1 November 1937 as one example. Argentine newspapers which had previously ignored the NSDAP now protested energetically. Measures passed at the Lima Conference of 1938 were felt to be directed at Nazi Party activities and the resolutions which were passed gave the Argentine government the authority to intervene if they saw fit. 92

Thermann said that Germany should not retaliate against Argentine citizens in

Germany. This recommendation was not out of any squeamishness concerning such measures, but simply due to the fact that there were no Argentine citizens in Germany prominent enough for the Argentine government to take any interest in their fate. He further recommended that Argentina and Germany conduct thorough investigations so that the parties behind the Patagonia document could be punished. His next recommendation got to the heart of the matter, given his previous travails with the AO over the preceding six years. Thermann argued that Germany yield to Argentine demands that the AO and NSDAP become purely non-political associations. Such was consistent with Labougle’s recommendation to Weizsäcker on 17 May 1938. It would further have the effect of neutralizing two very powerful opponents. Unsaid was that fact that if these recommendations had been followed in Brazil the troubles there over any perceived German involvement in the Integralista Revolt might have been avoided.

Furthermore, Germany should restrict any political publications in Spanish since they invited accusations of “Nazi infiltration.” Germany should also strictly observe Argentine regulations regarding German schools in Argentina, especially since the “German

greeting” () had been banned by Argentine authorities and had been a major

concern of Vargas in Brazil. Thermann and Meynen were laying the blame for the

current situation squarely on the doorstep of the AO and NSDAP. Thermann concluded

that the situation could be substantially relieved by appropriate (emphasis mine)

negotiations.191

191 “Aufzeichnung über die deutsch-argentinischen Beziehungen,” 6 April 1939, TNA, GFM 3337, also National Archives and Records Administration, National Archives Collection of Foreign Records Seized, 93

The embassy took the lead and initiated an investigation. By 15 April Meynen

had completed it and submitted the results to the Argentine police. He hoped the

investigation would aid Müller’s defense. Meynen presented twenty-one points that

showed the document in question was a forgery.192 At the same time he sought to clarify

Müller’s diplomatic status, which Germany claimed he had and Argentina rejected.193 At

a meeting with Foreign Minister Cantilo, Meynen fibbed claiming that Müller was very

close to Hitler and that Meynen could lose his job if he were not released.194 Meynen’s

arguments were unpersuasive and Müller continued to languish in jail awaiting the results

of the investigation. Given that his evidence of the documents’ authenticity and his pleas to the Argentine Foreign Ministry were rejected Meynen tried a different tactic and released Jürges’s German police file to the public in the hopes of discrediting Jürges.

This tactic almost backfired when anti-Nazi elements pointed out that despite Jürges’s

criminal record he had served as a secretary to Propaganda Minister Joseph Goebbels. At

the same time, the Argentine police uncovered evidence that Jürges had written

Thermann the previous year offering to cease his anti-Nazi activities if Thermann would

give permission for his wife’s ashes to be buried in Germany.195 Thermann had refused

the request.

By the end of April the situation was becoming intolerable for the AA. They just

wanted the Patagonia Affair finished. To this end Weizsäcker arranged another meeting

Inter-filmed Records of the Foreign Ministry and Reich Chancellery, Büro des Staatssekretärs, Record Group 242/Serial T-120/Roll 25/Frames 26616-26620. 192 “Bericht,” 15 April 1939, TNA, GFM 33810. 193 There was no controversy at all surrounding Schubert’s status. 194 “Charles Dodd to Lord Halifax,” 4 July 1939, TNA, FO371/22757. 195 For the letter see, “Jürges to Thermann,” 15 Aug 1938, TNA, GFM 33810. 94

with Labougle. Weizsäcker told him that the document was a forgery and he could not

understand why the Argentine government could not accept this. He reiterated that

Jürges was a criminal who had served time in prison for forgery and that he was probably

in the service of “North American” interests.196 Weizsäcker expressed impatience with

the Argentine press and compared it with the restraint shown in the German press

regarding this matter. He explained that Müller’s lawyer was going to demand his immediate release, even if it required bail. If this demand were refused then there could be retaliation regarding Argentines residing in Germany. This was in direct contrast to

Thermann’s recommendations earlier in the month.

Weizsäcker also demanded that the Argentine government publicly admit that the document was false and that Müller’s arrest had been a mistake. He accused the

Argentine government of hiding behind judicial proceedings so that it would not have to admit its mistake. When Labougle objected that the judicial process would have to be completed, Weizsäcker responded that judicial proceedings could easily be manipulated or even terminated. He further informed the ambassador that Germany wanted Jürges punished for disturbing German-Argentine relations. Labougle also related another difficulty. The Landesgruppe in Argentina refused to acknowledge Argentine jurisdiction. As a result Müller had no legal counsel. This meant that no hearing could be held until he had obtained a lawyer. Weizsäcker expressed surprise and

196 “Aufzeichnung für eine Rücksprache mit dem Argentinischen Botschafter wegen der Dokumentenfälschung,” 24 April 1939, TNA, GFM 33945. 95

disappointment at this news, but repeated that the documents in question were false and that this incident could come to a positive conclusion.197

Weizsäcker informed Meynen that he should retain counsel for Müller and have

the attorney petition the court to release Müller on bail. Meynen was also to repeat

Weizsäcker’s threat of retaliation while stating that Germany expected an acquittal of

Müller. However, Meynen and Thermann understood that Argentina would not be

bullied and that negotiations were the only way to secure a favorable outcome. Along

with this threat Weizsäcker told Meynen to conduct discussions with the appropriate

Argentine authorities regarding the status of the NSDAP and the German community in

Argentina. It seems certain the events of the previous year in Brazil were on

Weizsäcker’s mind when he issued these instructions. Weizsäcker’s image as a cool,

confident diplomat is tarnished by the record he left. His alternating attempts to threaten,

cajole, and appear reasonable show a clumsy diplomat unable to come to grips with his

antagonist.

Gauleiter Ernst Bohle, head of the AO, added to the tension with a bombastic

speech in . He told that crowd that, “The present-day German Reich is unwilling

to stand by with folded arms while its totally guiltless citizens are persecuted. Foreigners

must realize that each and every German citizen stands under the protection of a world

power, one which will not tolerate that peaceable Germans living overseas should be

197 “Telegramm, Pol. IX 658,” 25 April 1939, TNA, GFM 33945, for his part Labougle reported that he and Weizsäcker both raised their voices, none of which is mentioned in Weizsäcker’s Memorandum of Conversation. For this see Newton, The ‘Nazi Menace,’ p. 202. 96

mistreated simply because they wish, as honorable men, to be National Socialists.”198

However, events soon began to overtake the strident calls of Weizsäcker and Bohle.

On 4 May, Dr. Miguel Jantus, the judge placed in charge of the investigation by

President Ortiz, ordered Müller’s release. In his summary of the case Dr. Victor J.

Paolucci Cornejo stated that the evidence seized in the raids of German bars, clubs and associations was insufficient to prove the charges leveled. Not only was Jürges’s testimony contradictory, but given that the document in question was a photocopy and not the original, no proof existed that a crime had been committed according to Argentine law. On 20 June the Federal Appeals Court upheld Dr. Jantus’s findings and acquitted

Müller of any wrongdoing. The court also recommended that Jürges be charged with perjury and harming relations between Argentina and a foreign government.199

If the German community and government felt that Müller’s release was a cause

for celebration then their enthusiasm was misplaced. Dr. Paolucci Cornejo’s decision

found that while Müller was not guilty of any wrongdoing, Müller had admitted that the

leadership of the Argentine Landesgruppe was not elected locally, but appointed by the

AO in Germany. Also, the rules which governed the AO originated in Germany, along with directives that discriminated against Argentine citizens and denied them membership. In promulgating such directives, the Nazi Party had shown contempt for

“Argentine culture, intelligence and respectability.” Nazi Party rules which proscribed racially mixed marriages were deemed insulting and illegal. Cornejo also found that the

NSDAP had monitored teachers in German-language schools in Argentina to make sure

198 Quoted in Newton, The ‘Nazi Menace,’ p. 202. 199 Ibid, pp. 202-203. 97

their curriculum was in line with National Socialist doctrine. He also alleged that the

Nazi Party had pressured children with dual German/Argentine citizenship to return to

Germany to perform military or labor service. He charged that Germany undermined the concept of by pressuring German parents to register their children’s births at the

German embassy in order to assure they received German citizenship and that the

Germans held the contrary principle of .200 In Cornejo’s judgment the

NSDAP and AO were undermining a fundamental principle of Argentine citizenship.

Cornejo also accused the Nazi Party and its organizations of being criminal

organizations that used threats and intimidation to ensure compliance. For example, he

dismissed the DAF’s claim to represent German workers, arguing that the workers were

covered under Argentine law. He noted that while Jews and non-Germans were forced to

pay dues to the DAF they were denied membership and that threats to relatives in

Germany were used to keep people quiet. In short, the NSDAP was not trying to

assimilate Germans into Argentine society. Instead, they constructed their own

community within Argentina with its own laws, rules and regulations. Cornejo charged

that this was contrary to the Constitution of 1853 which encouraged European

immigration with the expectation that immigrants would assimilate into Argentina.201

On 15 May President Ortiz received Paolucci Cornejo’s report and responded with a sweeping decree similar to Brazilian President Getúlio Vargas’. Ortiz ordered that henceforth all immigrant associations had to register with the police or face dissolution.

They were not to use any flags or symbols of foreign origin and their rules and statues

200 Jus Soli held that a person’s citizenship was determined by their place of birth. Jus Sanguinis holds that citizenship can be extended to an individual with an ancestor who is a citizen of that state. 201 Newton, The ‘Nazi Menace’ pp. 203-204. 98 had to be published in Spanish. They further had to demonstrate that they had organized because of the will of the local community and that their leaders were residents who were democratically elected. The decree also stated that immigrant associations could not publicly proclaim any stance regarding politics in another country or use threats or rewards to gain members. Furthermore all immigrant associations had to be self- supporting apart from a nominal amount approved by the authorities for charitable purposes. While the Argentine government denied the decree was directed at Germans specifically, the Argentine Foreign Ministry privately told the British ambassador,

Esmund Ovey, that it was aimed directly at the NSDAP.202 The reaction within the

German community was muted with no sense of the outrage following Müller’s arrest and the outbreak of the Patagonia affair. Meynen urged leaders in the German community to accept the Argentine decree. 203

On 25 June 1939 Hitler held an audience with Ambassador Labougle to discuss recent events in Argentina. Hitler was at his most charming and gracious during the forty-five minute meeting on which he rambled from topic to topic. He told Labougle that Germany had not forgotten Argentina’s neutrality and friendship during the First

World War. Knowing that war was going to break out soon, he cryptically stated that he hoped Argentina would stay neutral and that neutrality could be the basis of a closer relationship. Labougle assured Hitler that despite attempts to bring Argentina into the

First World War on the side of Germany’s opponents, Argentina had protected German interests including refusing to hand over to the Allies almost 100,000 tons of German

202 Newton, The ‘Nazi Menace,’ pp. 204-205 and “Charles Dodd to Foreign Office,” 22 May 1939, TNA, FO 371/22714. 203 “Telegramm,” 10 July 1939, TNA, GFM 33810. 99 shipping interned in Argentina. He also mentioned the unsuccessful attempt of the U.S. to bind Argentina closer to the U.S. during the recent Eighth Pan-American Conference.

Labougle noted Argentina’s rejection of a U.S. sponsored statement that attempted to unite the countries of the American hemisphere against any perceived threat from

Europe. He reassured Hitler that Argentina wanted to keep its foreign policy independent.

Labougle then addressed the world situation observing that it seemed to have calmed down, but he noted that concerns lingered. Hitler then proceeded to dominate the conversation pontificating on the current world situation. Hitler told Labougle that the

Polish situation would have to be taken care of. However, if difficulties should arise then he expected that the Netherlands, , Yugoslavia and other countries to remain neutral. This was desirable since they could aid Germany through equal and favorable trade, which did not have anything to do with politics. Hitler then entered into a long diatribe against the U.S. perhaps sensing that he could play on Argentina’s anti-

Americanism and gain sympathy with Labougle.

He railed against the commercial policies of the U.S. which Hitler felt the U.S. was trying to force on Germany (and perhaps Argentina as well?). Germany naturally rejected this. Hitler told Labougle that the U.S. was the worst-governed country in the world. All one had to do was look at the unemployment, in contrast to Germany where

Hitler had brought full employment. Hitler accused Roosevelt of wanting war at the instigation of the Jews, who controlled industry and the press. He dismissed as ridiculous the claims of the “American Jewish” press that he wanted to conquer Canada or occupy 100

Patagonia. In Spain, the faced pilots from England, America, France and

Soviet Union and had still maintained air superiority. He regarded England as a paper

tiger with its little fleet and meager air force. While he could see no reason for a conflict

with England, Germany would continue to demand the return of her former colonies

seized during the First World War. He concluded by telling Labougle that he naturally

wanted peace since he had drawn up plans for the rebuilding of Berlin. In 10 years Hitler

related Berlin would be a beautiful city and that such construction could only take place

in peacetime. However he noted that peace depended on the German people getting what

they were entitled to.204 What Labougle thought of this conversation is not known.

There was also a surprising lack of candor on Hitler’s part as well as a refusal to

address outstanding issues between Germany and Argentina. Instead, Hitler dominated

the conversation. He told Labougle that Argentina’s friendship with Germany was dependent upon Argentina continuing its policy of neutrality and disinterest in European

politics. Were Hitler’s remarks an expression of his desires or were they

recommendations given to Hitler by his diplomatic advisors? Given his lack of

knowledge concerning Latin America, Hitler probably saw the merits of a benevolently

neutral Argentina and agreed with the Wilhelmstrasse that pushing for neutrality was the

best course of action. Indeed, Germany’s policy following the outbreak of the war would

be to promote Argentine friendship and neutrality.

Prior to Hitler’s meeting with Labougle, a meeting of Thermann and the other

ambassadors in Latin America was held in Berlin on 12 June to discuss the events of the

204 “Nachträglicihe kurze Inhaltsangabe über die Unterredung des Führers mit dem Argentinischer Botschafter Labougle bei dessen Verabscheidung im Führerban in München am 25 Juni 1939, 13 bis 13,45 Uhr,” 25 June 1939, TNA, GFM 3337. 101

past year. Unlike Hitler’s meeting with Labougle this one dealt with substantive issues.

While Thermann lambasted the Argentine press for their anti-German sentiments, he

argued that it was the AO which bore most of the blame for this unfortunate series of

events. Thermann recognized that the competing interests of the AO, NSDAP and AA

along with no clear delineation of responsibility exacerbated the situation. He suggested

that Germany adopt the Italian model where the senior diplomat in each country held

overall responsibility for the groups and associations in that country. To the AO’s

consternation he recommended that responsibility for ethnic Germans be given over to

the Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle headed by his old friend Werner Lorenz.205

Despite the AO’s unease at Thermann’s suggestions agreements were reached.

First, the Landesgruppe in Argentina would be dissolved and replaced with a new organization called the “Federación de Círculos Argentinos de Benificencia y Cultura

Alemanas” (Argentine Federation for German Culture and Charity). While this seemed to be a major concession on the part of the AO, the reality was that Ortiz’s decree had made this inevitable. If the AO was to survive in Argentina, it had to go along.

Additionally, the AO was to engage in cultural and charity work only and not engage in political activity. The issue of military and labor service in Germany by German citizens residing in Argentina would be handled in the embassy through the creation of a new

office called the “German Racial Community Administrative Section.” The NSDAP was

forbidden from interfering in matters handled by this office, but the head of this section

205 “First Meeting of the Latin American Conference in the Foreign Ministry, Berlin,” 12 June 1939, Doc. 509, DGFP, D, v. 6, pp. 700-707. 102

would “inform” the NSDAP’s liaison orally of any developments within the German

community.206

In August, Ribbentrop’s staff held a meeting delineating the ambassadors

authority in their respective countries, with the AO pointedly excluded. From this point

on the AA was to take the lead in any and all official foreign policy matters. In regard to

issues such as the press, propaganda and economic matters, the chief of mission would

take charge. In countries such as Brazil, where the NSDAP was already banned, the

ambassadors and the head of the NSDAP for that country were to consult on how best to

continue their activities without prejudicing the foreign policy objectives of the AA. It is

interesting that Ribbentrop and the AA were willing to incur the wrath of Vargas,

especially in a country deemed so important to Germany. Ribbentrop was also unwilling

to clarify any other outstanding issues between the NSDAP and AA given that his

attention in late August was directed at concluding the impending non-aggression pact

with the Soviet Union.207

The AO however was not going to surrender its prerogatives so easily to the AA.

Bohle now made Müller’s appointment as head of the Landesgruppe official. Thermann was forced to deal with his nemesis from the preceding years except now Müller had the backing of Bohle. Bohle instructed Müller that German schools in Argentina were to be kept open and he was to block any attempt by Argentine authorities to close them.208

This was not as difficult as it sounded, even given Ortiz’s decree. In July, Dr. Pedro

Ledesma, head of the Consejo Nacional de Educación (National Education Council), told

206 “Telegramm Nr. 168,” 21 June 1939, TNA, GFM 33810. 207 “Memorandum” 17 August 1939, DGFP, Doc. 103, D, v. 7, pp. 111-112. 208 Newton, The ‘Nazi Menace,’ p. 214. 103

a visiting German delegation that he had no intention of closing any German schools. He told the delegation that the inspectors were ordered to interpret the decree liberally and he said that portraits of Hitler could remain in the schools’ administrative offices.209

Whether Bohle knew this or not is unclear. The end result was that Bohle frustrated any attempt to bring organization to a chaotic situation.

On 27 June, following Müller’s release, Meynen submitted his report on the

Patagonia Affair. He partially blamed the general tension in world politics, which

Germany’s enemies used to their advantage. Brazilian President Getúlio Vargas’s decree of the previous year banning the NSDAP in Brazil added to the tension and gave the impression that ethnic Germans were subverting their host countries. Adding to this was a resolution from the Lima Conference of 1938 directed against foreigners in South

American countries. The events in Brazil confirmed President Ortiz’s suspicions when

Jürges presented him with the forged document. Meynen argued that President Ortiz had never been pro-German and that the disclosure of the document had allowed him to pacify radical anti-German elements in the government. The disclosure of the document allowed Ortiz to overcome any potential resistance from the army or police since Meynen claimed Ortiz was not very popular with these organizations. Ordering an investigation also bolstered his popularity among the general citizenry since the events of the previous year had tarnished Germany’s image in Argentina.

While the general world situation and internal politics certainly played a role in how the affair came about, Meynen noted the presence of foreign influences as well. To him it was obvious that Ortiz was under pressure from outside influences to clamp down

209 “Telgramm, Nr. 237” 12 July 1939, BNA, GFM 33810. 104

on the NSDAP in Argentina. Meynen blamed Jewish capitalist interests from North

America and England. Meynen rationalized that suppressing the NSDAP would bolster

the Jewish position in South America at the expense of Germany’s. Meynen saw the

British Secret Intelligence Service as the instrument of the Jewish capitalist interests.

From his point of view, the British were primarily responsible for this affair. Jürges was

simply a tool of the British and anti-German opposition. Meynen felt that Ortiz’s

secretary Dr. Luis Alberto Barberis had too much influence over Ortiz. Since Barberis

admitted to having Jewish friends, the conclusion was obvious.

However, not everyone in the government was anti-German. Meynen noted that

from the beginning of the affair Foreign Minister Cantilo was “quite uncomfortable” with

it. Indeed, Cantilo and Undersecretary of State Dr. Gache did everything possible to

bring about a speedy conclusion to the affair lest it adversely affect German-Argentine relations. Also, the Ministers of Public Works, Finance and Agriculture expressed their disapproval of Ortiz’s attitude and felt he had let himself be pulled into the affair.

Considering the extensive propaganda employed by the North Americans, English and

French against Germany, Meynen was pleased with the outcome. While Ortiz’s decree of 15 May was a blow, the fact that the NSDAP remained in Argentina, albeit under another name, was to be considered a victory. It was particularly satisfying that Müller was exonerated “with no taint on his honor, “as well as the news that Jürges would stand

trial for his misdeeds. However, Meynen cautioned that Jürges’s conviction was not a

foregone conclusion since he was still protected by powerful and influential friends.

Meynen especially commended the German community’s handling of the affair. He 105

stated that the German business community recognized from the start that the affair was

designed to damage Germany’s economic interests in Argentina and that the German

business community supported the embassy. The German business community also

helped retain Dr. Justo Bergadá Mújica, a prominent attorney as Müller’s counsel. The

business community’s unequivocal support of Müller was instrumental in counteracting

foreign influences. While the anti-German attitude of the press was noted, Meynen

argued that “serious” newspapers such as La Prensa and Nacíon had taken a reserved

attitude, with the result that the anti-German press became more muted.

Overall Meynen concluded that the affair had been “one hundred percent

favorable for us.” Despite their opponents “painful setback,” Germany’s enemies were

awaiting their next opportunity to deal another blow. Falsified documents might again be

employed to discredit German interests in the region. For that reason, Germany should

be on guard in case it had to deal with another crisis, perhaps in a different form.210

However, Müller’s release was not the end of the affair. It would drag on towards the end of the year, playing out in surreal fashion.

Before and after the affair Jürges wrote letters to officials in Germany as well as to Thermann. In one letter Jürges claimed credit for initiating the Patagonia Affair and that his actions caused the members of the NSDAP in Argentina to “be muzzled and handcuffed.” He hinted at a clue to his real motives when he stated that, “After the petty intrigues that have been going on here for so many years I felt obligated to show these

210 “Politischer Bericht: Patagonienangelegenheit, Abschluss Prozess Müller, Rückblick, Auswirkungen,” 27 June 1939, TNA, GFM 33810. 106

opportunistic…party comrades what an “old-guard” Nazi can do.”211 Given Thermann

and Meynen’s experiences with the AO and Nazi Party in Argentina, it would not be

surprising if Jürges became caught up in a petty rivalry inside these organizations and

came out on the losing end.

On 8 October following his arrest and awaiting trial on perjury charges, Jürges

sent a threatening letter to Ambassador Thermann. He reminded Thermann of his August

1938 letter and again offered to stop his anti-Nazi agitation if the Party would leave him

alone and make right the wrongs it had inflicted on him since 1933. He reminded

Thermann of the consequences of ignoring him [the Patagonia Affair]. If Thermann and the Party did not reply he menacingly noted that, “it will be my pleasure to ensure…that

Argentina becomes the first South American country to break diplomatic relations with

Germany.” He further threatened that if this occurred Argentina would, “place functionaries and party members behind barbed wire, suppress party publications and halt the activities of German businesses.” Thermann was given until 14 October to reply.

Instead Thermann handed the letter to Foreign Minister Cantilo and an investigation begun into possible extortion on Jürges’s part.212 Jürges was undeterred. In November he

offered to sell the Germans the originals of the Patagonia document, “as soon as the

British permitted him to do so.” The Auswärtiges Amt was interested since it believed the

British were behind the plot, per Meynen’s report of 27 June.213 It is unknown whether or

211 Quoted in Arnold Ebel, Das Dritte Reich und Argentinien: die diplomatischen Beziehungen unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Handelspolitik, 1933-1939 (Köln: Böhlau, 1971), p. 416 and Newton, The ‘Nazi Menace,’ p. 206. 212 Newton, The ‘Nazi Menace,’ p. 206. 213 Newton, The ‘Nazi Menace,’ p. 206. 107

not Jürges sold the document to the Germans, but it does raise interesting questions of

who was responsible for the Patagonia Affair.

There is also some controversy about the authenticity of this document. Gerhard

Weinberg asserts that the document is authentic. He bases the argument for authenticity

on the fact that it was published in the Documents on German Foreign Policy. He also uses Alton Frye’s study Nazi Germany and the American Hemisphere, 1933-1941 to bolster his case. However, Frye hedges his judgment using the qualifier “alleged” in describing the Patagonia Affair.214 Reiner Pommerin and Ronald Newton categorically claim the document is a forgery.215 The present evidence suggests that the document was

a forgery. Nowhere in the Auswärtiges Amt’s internal correspondence or the documents

of other nations is there evidence that the document originated within the German

embassy in Buenos Aires. Indeed, from the beginning of the affair Weizsäcker and

Woermann agreed that the document was false. If it were authentic then a mention of it would appear somewhere in the files so that a reasonable response could be crafted.

While it is possible that the embassy did draft the document at the request of Epp, such an explanation is also unlikely. Any competent diplomat, and there is no evidence to suggest that Schubert was incompetent, would have recognized the potential

explosiveness if the document became public. Around the time the document became

public Germany was concluding a lucrative agreement with Argentina where Germany

214 Frye, Nazi Germany and the American Hemisphere, 1933-1941 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967), pp. 122-23. 215 See Gerhard Weinberg, A World at Arms: A Global History of World War II, 2nd edition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), for the document see “The Landesgruppenleiter in Argentina to the Colonial Policy Office of the Reichsleitung of the NSDAP,” Doc. 137, C, v. 6, pp. 279-281. For Pommerin and Newton see: Reiner Pommerin, Das Dritte Reich und Lateinamerika, 1939-1942 (Düsseldorf: Droste, 1977) pp. 65-67, and Newton, The ‘Nazi Menace’, chapter 12. 108

would supply railway equipment including freight cars and locomotives in exchange for

Argentine wheat and wool. It is reasonable to assume that this deal was not secret and

the derailing of such a deal would have had negative consequences for the guilty party.216

Alternately, the document could have been a theoretical think piece to justify the

existence of the Colonial Policy Office. Again, such an explanation is unlikely since

negatively affecting relations between Germany and Argentina would have been a high

stakes gamble. If this had been the case the Colonial Policy Office probably would have explained that it was simply a theoretical document, not a suggestion for future policy.

Such an explanation would have made the AA aware of the intent of the document and help defuse the situation. Given that Hitler ultimately became involved any hint of a cover-up would have damaged the Colonial Policy Office’s standing with Hitler.

Additionally, the AA would have demanded that someone be punished given the severity of the crisis. None of this is even suggested in the internal correspondence between the

German embassy in Buenos Aires and the AA. All parties involved agree that the document was a forgery, and the records of four different countries would seem to bear out this conclusion.

Jürges’s responsibility remains murky. The evidence suggests that he was acting alone and was not in the employ of British intelligence. Apart from hints including

Meynen’s assertion that the fingerprints of the British intelligence service acting at the behest of “Jewish capitalist interests” was the culprit and Jürges’s letter stating that he could sell the Germans the Patagonia document “as soon as the British permitted him to

216 The deal was cancelled in when Germany concluded that they could not spare the railway equipment. See Newton, The ‘Nazi Menace,’ p. 199. 109

do so,” there is no direct evidence linking British intelligence to Jürges. Jürges was a

convicted forger and a proven liar, notwithstanding the fact he held a position as

Goebbels secretary. That fact proves nothing except that the Nazis had no qualms about

employing criminals as long as they were useful.217

It is also highly doubtful whether British intelligence would have undertaken such

a risky operation without informing the Foreign Office.218 The risk of exposure was too

high and even the British themselves believed the documents were false. In its own

investigation the British embassy concluded that, “there is no public gossip about any

organized attempt at penetration in the Southern territory such as would throw light on

the authenticity of the document.”219 Soon after the affair became public the British

embassy in Washington, D.C. met with Lawrence Duggan, head of the American

Republics section in the State Department to discuss the Patagonia affair. The report

stated that Duggan implied the document was false, but useful since it undermined

Germany’s position.220 Charles Dodd, Chargé d’Affaires in the British embassy in

Buenos Aires, stated to Lord Halifax that “I think that whatever Jürges’ motive, the

partisans of owe him some gratitude.”221 This suggests that the British were

as much in the dark concerning the affair as everyone else. Newton’s elaborate theory

concerning the provenance of the documents is well-researched and meticulously

documented, but it seems wrong. Newton gives too much credit to the British Secret

217 The list of convicted criminals who held high positions in the Nazi regime is long and extensive including Hitler and Hess. 218 Personal email correspondence between the author and Professor John R. Ferris, University of Calgary, 25 July 2007. 219 “Esmund Ovey to Halifax,” 28 April 1939, TNA, FO 371/22756. 220 “Mallet to Balfour,” 29 April 1939, TNA, FO 371/22756. 221 “Dodd to Halifax,” 4 July 1939, TNA, FO 371/22757. 110

Service. Their primary focus was imperial, especially the and Asia. Simply

put, they were not as good as the Germans or their contemporaries believed. However,

the affair does illustrate how German diplomacy operated in crisis mode.

Meynen and Thermann’s reports are, for the most part, examples of clear and

cogent analysis. They recognized that while the document was false, Germany’s prior actions in Argentina and Brazil made it highly unlikely that Berlin would be given the benefit of the doubt. They were aided in the fact that Jürges was a convicted criminal and

proven liar. Jürges’ inability to keep his story straight undoubtedly bolstered Germany’s case that the document was forged and the alleged Patagonia Affair a sham.

Weizsäcker’s actions are interesting. The record shows him pulling out all the stops in order to convince the Argentines that the document was false. The threat of retaliation he made to Ambassador Labougle is revealing in that Weizsäcker is usually portrayed as the consummate professional diplomat calm, cool and collected.222 It could be that

Weizsäcker was genuinely upset or under enormous pressure given the tense international

situation. However, the next day he instructed Meynen to pass along his threat to the

Argentine Foreign Minister.

Thermann’s report is interesting in that it shows how little the Auswärtiges Amt

knew about Argentina. Thermann’s references concerning Argentine preferences on

immigration seem to suggest that he was co-opted by Nazi ideology. Why else point out

that Argentina preferred immigrants of Germanic background? Most telling is his

comment regarding “Marxist-Jewish” influences within the Argentine parliament. If

222 See especially Gerhard L. Weinberg, The Foreign Policy of Hitler’s Germany: Starting World War II 1937-1939 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980) and Michael Bloch, Ribbentrop (London: Abacus Books, 1993). 111

Thermann did not believe in “Marxist-Jewish” influences then he could have left it out or

used a different description. However he chose to use “Marxist-Jewish.” It would seem

that Thermann himself believed Hitler’s theories regarding a Jewish conspiracy.

Suggesting that the AO and NSDAP were responsible for the situation in Argentina also

shows how deep the antipathy was between the embassy in Buenos Aires, the AO and

NSDAP in Argentina. His policy of cautious acceptance of Argentine restrictions shows

that he was a realist and understood the situation in Argentina. His suggestion that the

situation could be alleviated by appropriate negotiations argues that the Auswärtiges Amt

should take the lead in these negotiations with the AO and NSDAP subordinated to the

embassy.

Just as revealing is Meynen’s blaming of “Jewish capitalist interests” for the

Patagonia Affair. Meynen’s racist characterizations argue that even outside of Nazi

Germany, the Foreign Office was becoming “coordinated” with Hitler’s regime. Taking

his earlier 1936 comments and combining them with others gives lie to Thermann’s

characterization of Meynen as a “Nazi out of necessity.”223 Instead Meynen was willing

to believe Nazi propaganda regarding a non-existent Jewish threat and put that in messages to his superiors. This suggests that the level of indoctrination even among career diplomats was deeper and took place earlier than previously believed. It would seem that Thermann’s comments about Meynen were simply a cover and that he was protecting someone who he respected and admired. Whatever the case, Meynen’s image is tarnished by the archival record. The outbreak of the war in would

223 “Interrogation of Edmund von Thermann,” 27 September, 8, 10, 16, 20, 23, 24 October, 2, 6, November 1945, RG 59, State Department Special Interrogation Mission, ABB, Miscellaneous Affidavits and Interrogation Reports, Box 26, Entry 1088, p. 11 and Newton, The ‘Nazi Menace,’ p. 200. 112 put Meynen and Thermann to the test since they would have to deal with new organizations that were important to the war effort, the Abwehr and SD. The Auswärtiges

Amt’s battles with the AO would pale in comparison to the one it would wage against

Himmler’s SS for control of foreign policy.

113

Chapter 3

Ad-hoc Diplomacy, 1939-1942

The outbreak of the Second World War placed Argentina in a tenuous position

vis-à-vis Europe. Despite his pro-Allied sympathies President Ortiz followed his

country’s previous policy of neutrality during the First World War. President Hipolito

Yrigoyen, Argentina’s president during the First World War, declared the country neutral in 1914. Argentina’s declaration of neutrality fit in well with German foreign policy since Germany needed Argentine products. Argentine business interests also supported neutrality in anticipation of the same windfall it had received twenty years earlier.224

While Argentina had no problem selling its goods to both sides, it was always mindful of its position. Germany was supportive since it believed that Argentina could influence the policies of other Latin American nations.225 However, Thermann was cautious. He told

the AA that the anti-British attitude of the Argentine military and others “should not be

estimated too highly to our advantage, for it appears to be much more an expression of selfish national interests than a sign of solidarity with Germany.”226

This chapter examines German diplomacy in Argentina from 1939-1942. German

diplomacy in Argentina from 1939-1942 lurched from crisis to crisis. The lack of any

224 Ronald C. Newton, The ‘Nazi Menace’ in Argentina, 1933-1947 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992), pp. 222-223. 225 “Memorandum by Reinhold Freytag,” 7 September 1939, Doc. 86, Documents on German Foreign Policy (hereafter DGFP), series D. (1937-1945), volume 8, (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1949-83), p. 97 and “The Embassy in Argentina to the Foreign Ministry,” 28 September 1939, Doc. 150, Ibid, p. 250. 226 “Politische Bericht,” 10 December 1939, Politische Abteilung IX: Politische Beziehungen Argentiniens zu Deutschland, Band 2, National Archives and Records Administration (hereafter NARA), Record Group 242/Serial T-120/Roll 1322/Frames 512023-26. See also Elizabeth White, German Influence in the Argentine Army, 1900-1945 (London: Taylor and Francis, 1991), p. 117. 114 geopolitical strategy hampered Germany’s ability to conduct a meaningful foreign policy.

Instead, German policy tended to be reactive, not proactive. Germany anticipated quick victories over France and Great Britain, as a result Germany focused on economic affairs in its relations with Latin America. While the U.S. and Britain pressured Argentina to side with them, the Germans supported Argentina’s neutrality, promising generous trade deals once the war was over. There were also contacts between influential Argentine citizens and high-level German policy-makers regarding Argentina’s place in Germany’s new world order. However, German meddling in Argentine domestic politics strengthened suspicions regarding German motives. Most of these problems were due to inept guidance from Berlin and a general sense that the war would be over quickly. Once

Germany was victorious, it was believed in Berlin, any outstanding issues could be worked out.

In September 1939 following Germany’s , Argentine Foreign

Minister José María Cantilo called for inter-American consultations and agreed to a meeting to be held in Panama the following month. The most note-worthy resolution

Argentina endorsed at the conference was the creation of a three hundred mile neutrality zone around the Americas.227 When the German embassy protested, Foreign Minister

Cantilo told Ambassador Thermann, “neutrality is not indifference; it does not mean nonparticipation.” Germany knew it needed to tread lightly given previous mishaps.

Because of President Ortiz’s pro-Allied bent Argentina continued to recognize the Polish

227 Joseph Tulchin, Argentina and the United States: A Conflicted Relationship (New York: Twayne Publishers, 1990), p. 66. 115

government much to Germany’s consternation.228 Chargé Meynen reported the existence of “the foolish but accepted notion that expansionist ambition would make Germany a territorial and general threat to South America after the victorious conclusion of the war.

There is a general failure to understand Germany’s policy.” He presciently noted that

“Overall sentiment … is at present anti-German for ideological reasons and as a result of enemy propaganda, but Argentina will remain neutral as long as possible because of material considerations.”229 Meynen prudently left out the appeal of the German

ambassadors in South America from July 1938 that Germany clearly state its goals

there.230 The evidence suggests that Germany failed to heed the call of its ambassadors

and had to deal with the problems resulting from this omission. Thermann attempted to

neutralize anti-German sentiment by proposing that Germany respect the neutrality zone

and ban sabotage by German intelligence services.231 The Oberkommando der

Wehrmacht (OKW or Military High Command) acceded to the AA’s request, removing a possible threat to continued German-Argentine relations.232

228 “The Ambassador in Argentina to the Foreign Ministry,” 3 May 1940, Doc. 194, DGFP, D, 9, p 280. 229 “Politische Bericht: Deutsch-argentinische Beziehungen,” 27 September 1939, Büro des Staatssekretärs: Argentinien Band 1, National Archives and Records Administration, Record Group 242/Serial T-120/Roll 25/Frame 26622. 230 See “Aufzeichnung über die Zusammenkunft der deutschen Missionchefs in Argentinien, Brasilien, Chile, und Uruguay in Montivideo am 28 und 29 Juli 1938,” Büro des Chefs der AO, NARA RG 242/T- 120/218/168208-215 also “Thermann to Auswartiges Amt, Enclosure: Memorandum of the Meeting in Montevideo of the Chiefs of Missions in Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Uruguay, July 28 and 29, 1938,” 2 August 1938, Doc. 624, DGFP, D, 2, pp. 863-867. 231 “The Foreign Ministry to the Foreign Department of the High Command of the Wehrmacht,” 22 May 1940, Doc. 301, DGFP, D, IX, p. 414. 232 “The High Command of the Wehrmacht to the Foreign Ministry,” 18 June 1940, Doc. 483, DGFP, D, IX, p. 616. 116

President Ortiz attempted to pursue a pro-Allied strategy, but he had to tread

carefully given the pro-Axis sympathies of the military.233 While a minority in the

military admired German prowess, there was a general belief among Argentine officers

that Britain’s defeat would be to Argentina’s economic advantage. Great Britain’s defeat

would force it to give up its business interests in Argentina. Pro-German extremists in

the army sought to exploit anti-British sentiment and orient Argentina economically

towards the Axis. In December 1939 the Battle of the River Plate was fought between

the German Graf Spee and three British . Following the battle

Foreign Minister Cantilo realized the uselessness of the exclusion zone since there was

no means of enforcement. The U.S. Navy was focused on the Pacific and Great Britain was focused on Germany and its holdings in the Far East. On 19 Cantilo proposed privately to U.S. Ambassador Norman Armour that the nations of the Americas abandon neutrality and embrace non-belligerency. However, non-belligerence was not recognized in international law. It was invented by Benito Mussolini in September 1939 to declare his support for Germany without formally entering the war.234 Cantilo saw the

possibilities inherent in such a policy and argued it would give countries of the American

hemisphere greater flexibility. When Cantilo publicly suggested non-belligerency on 12

May, Germany and the Argentine military reacted vigorously. For its part, the Argentine

military pressured Ortiz to reconsider Cantilo’s proposal. Thermann reported to Berlin

that Ortiz was “strongly influenced by intelligence received shortly before from his

233 Tulchin, Argentina and the United States, p. 64 and “The Ambassador in Argentina to the Foreign Ministry,” 3 May 1940, Doc. 194, DGFP, D, 9, p 280. 234 Stanley G. Payne, Franco and Hitler: Spain, Germany and World War II (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008), p. 63. 117

special Army advisor that the Army was 90 percent pro-German” and that the War and

Navy ministers condemned Cantilo’s policy.235

On 14 May Weizsäcker asked the Argentine Ambassador in Berlin, Ricardo

Olivera, to call on him to discuss the situation. Weizsäcker demanded to know why

Argentina was abandoning its policy of strict neutrality, especially in light of its conduct

in World War One, which had contributed to current German-Argentine friendship.

Olivera stated that the issue was academic and not directed against Germany. Besides,

the ambassador said, Italy had declared itself to be a non-belligerent.236 In Argentina, pro-

German elements of the military interpreted Ortiz’s proposal differently. The military

felt that Ortiz and Cantilo were trying to drag them into the war. In Buenos Aires rumors

abounded of a coup against Ortiz involving the German embassy. However, there is no

evidence to support this.237 On 18 May Ortiz, probably under pressure from the German

government and the military, distanced himself from Cantilo’s proposal and stated that he

had no intention of involving Argentina in the war.238 This neutralized Cantilo’s non-

belligerency proposal and the attempt was abandoned. Despite the lack of evidence

regarding a coup, Meynen later reported that pro-German officers were being forced out

by the pro-Allied War Minister.239

235 “Thermann to Berlin,” 15 May 1940, Büro des Staatssekretärs: Argentinien, Band 1, NARA, RG242/ T- 120/Roll 207/156202 and 156204. The U.S. embassy also reported the same thing. See Robert A. Potash, The Army and Politics in Argentina 1928-1945: Yrigoyen to Perón (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1969), p. 121. 236 “Memorandum by the State Secretary,” 14 May 1940, Doc. 247, DGFP, D, 9, pp. 344-345. 237 Interestingly Newton reports that the German embassy sounded out contacts in the Argentine military about the possibility of a coup, but provides no source for his suspicion. See Newton, The ‘Nazi Menace’ p. 227. 238 Potash, The Army and Politics in Argentina, p. 120. 239 “Meynen to Berlin,” 8 June, 1940, Büro des Staatssekretärs: Argentinien, Band 1, RG242/T- 120/207/156240. 118

Whatever goodwill Germany had in the Ortiz government evaporated in the wake

of the Uruguay affair. On 27 May the Argentine freighter Uruguay bound for Antwerp

was stopped and sunk off the Spanish coast by a U-boat.240 Following the abortive

attempt to declare non-belligerency the Argentine press denounced the sinking and

demanded a break in relations. Similar incidents had occurred during the First World

War when a U-boat sank the Argentine freighters Toro in June 1917 and Oriana in July

1918. A minor scandal further resulted when the cables of the German Minister Karl

Graf von Luxburg were published in . In the cables Luxburg described Foreign

Minister Honório Pueyrredón as “a notorious ass and an .”241 Unlike its

Wilhelmine counterpart, the Nazi Foreign Office was not willing to placate Argentina.

Foreign Minister Ribbentrop ordered Thermann to deny German responsibility for the

sinking with “great emphasis.”242

The bulk of Thermann’s instructions consisted of condemning the Argentine

press’s attacks on Germany, intimating that they were the result of “English and

American wire-pullers.” The only attempt by Ribbentrop to mollify Argentine

sensibilities came when he promised to conduct a full investigation of the Uruguay

sinking. However, the promise of an investigation was not enough to defuse the crisis.

A meeting on 10 June 1940 between Weizsäcker and Olivera failed to resolve the issue.

Olivera referred to the incidents in the First World War and the favorable outcome for

German-Argentine relations. He regretted that the present German government was

unwilling to take similar action to resolve the issue. Though Weizsäcker expressed

240 Newton, The ‘Nazi Menace’ p. 227. 241 Tulchin, Argentina and the United States, p. 37. 242 “The Foreign Minster to the State Secretary,” 1 June 1940, Doc. 365, DGFP, D, 9, p. 493. 119

familiarity with the events of 1917 and 1918 he refused to offer any concessions, and

repeated the promise of a full investigation.243 Oddly, the following year Germany

entered into negotiations concerning the chartering of German and Dutch ships by the

Argentine government. In December 1941 Argentina even proposed buying three

German ships to make good losses suffered during the . However,

the negotiations ultimately went nowhere.244

Why Germany did not mollify Argentina immediately following the sinking of

the freighter is unknown. It would have defused a delicate situation. The threat of a

break in relations was serious enough that Thermann considered closing the embassy and

sending the diplomats back to Germany.245 It seems obvious that as a result of its

victories over Norway, the Low Countries and France, Germany became more defensive

regarding any criticism of its actions. Argentina’s proposal to abandon strict neutrality

along with suspicions that the German embassy had supported a coup attempt sowed the

seeds of mistrust. The Uruguay incident only added to this. An objective analysis of the

German campaign by either the AA or could have foreseen the

possibility that neutral ships could be accidentally sunk. There was precedent from the

First World War. Any study by either the AA or Kriegsmarine could then have proposed

guidelines for dealing with these situations. However, Germany was simply reacting to

events. Its attitude towards Argentina was a reflection of the lack of any long-term

243 “Memorandum by the State Secretary,” 10 June 1940, Doc. 412, DGFP, D, 9, pp. 543-547. 244 “Memorandums” 12 July 1941 and 19 December 1941, Handakten Clodius, NARA, RG 242/T- 120/178/86802 & 86960. 245 Newton, The ‘Nazi Menace’ p. 228. 120

geopolitical strategy and short-sightedness on the part of senior military leaders and policy-makers.

The diplomatic situation between Argentina and Germany soon went from bad to worse because of domestic politics within Argentina. On 17 June Ambassador Thermann reported that:

Argentine Chamber of Deputies took up 14 June urgent motion for issuance of an order for immediate removal from Argentine Army of officers of belligerent powers. Motion affects only German military advisors; no other belligerent country officers present. War Minister took no position whatsoever against this; rather, Inspector General suggested that adoption of motion desired by Government…military mission activities terminated 15 June.246

Robert Potash argues that this was a reflection of the tumultuous state of relations

between the Argentine military and civilian government.247 When looking at the larger

picture the evidence suggests there were also foreign policy considerations. Given the

events of the preceding month, German actions certainly played a major role in the

termination of the German military mission.

Thermann attempted to stabilize the situation and proposed a multi-step program

to improve German-Argentine relations. He suggested that Italy enter the war and

Germany issue a public statement that it had no territorial ambitions in South America.

He called for the NSDAP to tone down its activities and suggested that support for the

embassy-financed newspapers Pampero and Razón, be increased. Economically,

Germany would benefit if Argentina believed it would profit from a German victory.

Thermann argued that offering future economic incentives and increased trade would be

246 “Thermann to Berlin,” 17 June 1940, Büro des Staatssekretärs: Argentinien Band 1, NARA, RG 242/T- 120/207/156258. Also quoted in Potash, The Army and Politics in Argentina, p. 124 247 Potash, The Army and Politics in Argentina, pp. 123-124. 121

to Germany’s advantage. To this end he proposed bribing influential Argentines.

Weizsäcker agreed and gave Thermann half a million pesos to “win influential

Argentines.”248 This bribery was not without precedent. Germany did the same thing in

the First World War. In 1918 the French discovered that a German-controlled bank, the

Banco Alemán Transatlántico, had made “loans” to high Argentine officials, including

the minister of foreign relations, Honório Pueyrredón. As historian David Sheinin points

out, “it seemed [in 1918] that the Argentine government was in the pocket of German

bankers.”249 It could be argued that the bankers made these loans to protect Germany’s

economic position in Argentina. However, bribes could also have been employed to

make sure Argentine lawmakers followed a pro-German line. All of Thermann’s

recommendations were approved.

Thermann was also authorized by Emil Wiehl, head of the Economic Policy

Department in the AA, to enter into negotiations for the purchase and storage of

Argentine commodities. Wiehl suggested paying subsidies to existing companies in

Argentina since it would be cheaper than founding new ones. By the end of the year the

program ran into difficulties when the embassy was unable to find enough cover

companies to store the goods.250 Thermann probably knew his recommendations would

be accepted since he had been laying the groundwork in the preceding weeks. On 22

June 1940 he reported that “attention has been directed for weeks by me and members of

248 “Thermann to Berlin,” 8 June 1940, Handakten Clodius, NARA, RG 242/T-120/178/86301 and “Weizsäcker to Buenos Aires,” 14 June 1940, Ibid, Frame 86315. See also Newton, The ‘Nazi Menace’ pp. 228-229. 249 David Sheinin, Argentina and the United States: An Alliance Contained (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2006), pp. 84-85. 250 Thermann was also authorized to purchase RM 2-3 million worth of goods for storage. See “Memorandum by the Head of Political Division IX,” 18 June 1940, Doc. 482, DGFP, D, 9, pp. 614-616. 122 the embassy to the great possibilities for trade with Germany after the war; in this connection it has been suggested that it would be advantageous for Argentina to approach us with proposals as soon as possible.”251

The Argentines reacted enthusiastically to Thermann’s proposals. Argentina was also reassessing the state of its military. In June 1940 the Ortiz government submitted a bill to the Chamber of Deputies requesting one billion pesos so the army could acquire modern weapons and build more military bases in Argentina. The previous month the government had sent two officers to New York to purchase military hardware from the

U.S. As Elizabeth White points out, this along with Ortiz’s bill suggests that Argentina intended to cooperate with the U.S. regarding hemispheric defense. There are several reasons to doubt that contention. One reason was Germany’s victories over France and the Low Countries, which made a strong impression in leading Argentine circles. As a result Argentina pulled back from its overtures to the U.S. Another was U.S. heavy- handedness in attempting to impose its own conception of hemispheric defense with little input from South America nations. This, along with U.S. plans to build air bases in

Uruguay offended Argentine sensibilities. Argentina had traditionally viewed the La

Plata region as within its own sphere of influence and U.S. plans only confirmed the worst about U.S. motives in the minds of leading government officials in Argentina.

Moreover, the U.S. was only willing to sell outdated weaponry, not the modern equipment Argentina desired.252

251 “The Ambassador in Argentina to the State Secretary,” 22 June 1940, Doc. 534, DGFP, D, 9, p. 689. 252 White, German Influence in the Argentine Army, p. 121. 123

While the U.S. tried to convince Argentina to throw its lot in with the Allies,

Germany announced in May it would sell modern surplus war equipment in September or

October 1940. This appealed to the Argentine military since it had long-standing ties with Germany and German arms manufacturers. Germany made any potential deal more

attractive when it stated that it would sell the arms under a barter arrangement. When the

Argentine military was faced with the choice of obsolete weapons with numerous

conditions attached or practically unfettered access to modern weaponry, the choice was

clear. In July, the Argentine government sent a special committee to tour German arms

works.253 On 10 October in a meeting with Weizsäcker, Ambassador Olivera asked to

discuss with Wiehl postwar economic relations between the two countries. During his

meeting with Wiehl Olivera stated that with a German victory, Germany would take

Britain’s economic place in Argentina. While Wiehl noted that Olivera was probably not

speaking officially, his remarks were in line with Argentine overtures to Germany.254 On

11 October 1940 Germany also dispatched an engineer to Argentina to help build a powder factory for munitions.255 By the end of the year negotiations slowed to a crawl

since Germany was preparing for the invasion of the Soviet Union and needed all of its weaponry. It continued to encourage Argentina in its quest for weapons, even though it

failed to deliver.256 Argentina’s desire for weapons and Germany’s failure to deliver them

were one facet of the ill-fated Hellmuth mission in 1943 discussed later in this study.

253 Ibid, p. 122. 254 Olivera kept pushing this theme. The following year he told Wiehl that Germany should have the strongest possible political and economic interest in Argentina. See “Memorandum of Conversation,” 22 July 1941, Handakten Wiehl, NARA, RG 242/T-120/269/199267. 255 “Memorandum of Weizsäcker,” 10 October 1940, Handakten Wiehl, NARA, RG 242/T- 120/269/199335, and “Wiehl Memorandum,” 11 October 1940, Ibid, Frame 199337. 256 White, German Influence in the Argentine Army, p. 122. 124

Even with these trade negotiations Germany was haunted by past mistakes. In

May 1940 Thermann reported that rumors of a so-called “fifth column” and German

designs on territory in South America were rampant. He advised that an official

statement by “a person of authority” would help limit the damage these rumors were

causing. At the Havana foreign ministers meeting in July 1940 the nations of Latin

America pledged “to suppress activities directed, assisted, or abetted by foreign

governments…which tend to subvert the domestic institutions or to foment disorder in

the internal political life of the Americas.”257 On 21 June the Secretary General of the

Foreign Ministry, Dr. L.S. Casteneiras, told Ambassador Thermann that Argentina was

committed to the “principle of freedom of action.” Thermann was not convinced and

intimated that any declarations could be nullified if Germany mollified Argentina.258

What the did was one thing. Argentine public perception was another. In November Thermann and the other German ambassadors in Latin America again called for an official statement “from an authoritative German source” denying any

German interest in territorial conquests in South America. The lack of such a statement was causing nervousness and gave anti-Nazi elements in the press fodder for their propaganda. The ambassadors stressed that Brazil and Argentina were especially important since they exercised influence over the smaller nations of Latin America.259

Despite these problems Germany soon gained a valuable ally. President Ortiz had been ill with diabetes since the 1930s. By July 1940 his condition had deteriorated to the

257 Elery C. Stowell, “The and Inter-American Cooperation,” The American Journal of International Law, 16/1 (), p 127 and Rout and Bratzel, The Shadow War, pp. 30-31. 258 “The Ambassador in Argentina to the Foreign Ministry,” 21 June 1940, Doc. 519, DGFP, D, IX, p. 660. 259 “The Ambassador in Argentina to the Foreign Ministry,” 18 May 1940, Doc. 269, DGFP, D, 9, p. 371; “Thermann to AA,” 30 , Handakten Clodius, NARA, RG 242/T-120/178/86484. 125

point where he named Vice-President Ramón Castillo as Acting President. Castillo

shared none of Ortiz’s antipathy to Nazi Germany and was a staunch conservative.260

Thermann reported that Castillo intended to replace current ministers with ones more receptive to his policies. Most prominently mentioned was Thermann’s old companion,

Juan Bautista Molina, who was pro-Nazi. Given the tumultuous state of Argentine politics Thermann was hesitant to make definite predictions.261 Unlike Ortiz, Castillo and

his government were benignly indifferent to German activities in their country. As

historian Ronald Newton points out, “undoubtedly the half million pesos helped.”262

Despite the Ortiz government’s ambivalence over German activities there was an

air of insecurity surrounding German relations with Argentina. Attacks on Germany in

the Argentine press continued and Thermann believed relations were deteriorating. In a

March 1940 meeting with Castillo he pointed out that any further impairment of relations would harm Argentina economically. Thermann intimated that “future great economic

opportunities” awaited Argentina when Germany was victorious. Only by improving

treatment of Germans and limiting attacks on Germany and Hitler in the press could

conditions improve. In an earlier meeting Minister of Justice Guillermo Rothe

sympathized with Thermann’s concerns about the anti-Nazi stories in the Argentine

press. Rothe related to Thermann that he planned to propose a law to curb such abuses.

Castillo supported Rothe’s proposed law. While Thermann expressed his approval of

260 Potash, The Army and Politics in Argentina, pp. 128. 261 “Thermann to Berlin,” 20 July 1940, Büro des Staatssekretärs: Argentinien Band 1, NARA, RG 242/T- 120/207/156283. War Minister General Carlos Marquez was ultimately replaced by General Juan Tonazzi and the new Navy Minister was Mario Fincati, who later offered assistance to the SD in return for its help in setting up an Argentine intelligence service. See “Sargo (Becker) to Berlin,” 12 May 1943, NARA, RG 226, Records of the OSS, OSS Communications Office Records, Ultra Decrypts. 262 Newton, The ‘Nazi Menace’ p. 229. 126

such measures, he also protested the fact that Heinrich Jürges, the instigator of the

Patagonia Plot, had not been brought to justice. Castillo stated that the Interior Ministry

would begin proceedings against Jürges and that he supported this. Thermann felt

satisfied by his interview with Castillo and hoped relations would improve as a result.263

Ribbentrop was not satisfied and sent instructions to Thermann to try and

influence Argentine policy more effectively. Perhaps the half million pesos sent the

previous year to “win influential Argentines” needed to be augmented with more money.

Thermann was to found a society and attract “important Argentine politicians,

parliamentarians, and businessmen as members.” Ostensibly, the society would be

concerned with imports and exports of German-Argentine goods on “the broadest

possible basis.” Thermann replied that such an undertaking would require 380,000 pesos

(approximately $130,000.00) and requested authorization to expend the funds.264

Whether the money was transferred to Thermann is unknown. Given the amount of money involved and the fact that no archival record of any such society has been found, it is logical to assume that the money was to be used to bribe influential Argentines and orient them towards Germany. When viewed against the pervasive corruption in the

Third Reich as well as Hitler’s bribery of his generals, it should not be surprising that

263 “The Ambassador in Argentina to the Foreign Ministry” 6 March 1941, Doc. 128, DGFP, D, 12, pp. 228-229. 264 “The Ambassador in Argentina to the Foreign Ministry,” 9 April 1941, Doc. 298, DGFP, D, 12, p. 496. The telegram notes that it is for Ribbentrop personally, this suggests that more than the founding of a society was involved. In his postwar interrogation Thermann stated that Ribbentrop had ordered him to found a society. However, his 9 April message shows him asking, not vice versa. His explanation regarding the society leaves much to be desired, especially since he could provide no documentary evidence to support his assertions. See “Interrogation of Dr. Edmund Freiherr von Thermann,” 27 September, 8, 10, 16, 20, 23, 24 October, 2, 6, November 1945, NARA, RG 59, Argentine Blue Book, Miscellaneous Affidavits and Interrogations, Entry 1088, Box 26, p. 5. 127

Germany would attempt the same thing in other countries.265 Whatever Castillo’s attitude toward Germany was, it was not shared by his political opponents in the Argentine

Chamber of Deputies.

The Argentine Chamber of Deputies look on with dismay as the Castillo government drew closer to Nazi Germany. On 19 the chamber authorized the founding of an Investigatory Commission on Anti-Argentine Activities under the

leadership of Deputy Raúl Damonte Taborda. The commission was largely composed of

Castillo’s political opponents and used information supplied by the U.S. and British.266

There has been some controversy surrounding Taborda’s committee and its reports.

Historians Ronald Newton, Leslie Rout and John Bratzel have cast some doubts on the veracity of the committee’s reports. Rout and Bratzel state that the evidence produced by the committee was stretched to fit preconceived notions, but served as a powerful propaganda tool to use against Nazi Germany.267 Newton is more critical, implying that

the committee was a tool of the British and Americans insofar as they supplied Taborda

with information he used against Thermann and others.268 While Newton rightfully sees

the committee as a tool of Castillo’s political opponents, his skepticism of its findings is

problematic. Thermann was involved in many activities which the committee did not

uncover. His smuggling of diamonds and other valuable minerals were hardly

265 Regarding Hitler’s bribery of his generals see especially, Norman J.W. Goda, “Black Marks: Hitler's Bribery of His Senior Officers during World War II,” The Journal of Modern History, Vol. 72, No. 2, (June 2000), pp. 413-452. 266 “Memorandum,” 15 September 1941, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs Memorandums, NARA, RG 59, Box 17 and TNA, Kew, FO 371/25712. 267 Rout and Bratzel, The Shadow War, p. 323. 268 Newton, The ‘Nazi Menace,’ p. 235. 128

compatible with his diplomatic status along with the assistance of the embassy in aiding

members of the Graf Spee in their escape from South America.

Thermann was also cognizant of the activities of German intelligence agencies in

Argentina. It stretches the imagination that Thermann knew of smuggling efforts, but did

not know of intelligence-gathering efforts. Following SD intrigues in

Ribbentrop issued an order on 19 June 1941 stating that all ambassadors should know

about and approve any intelligence activities in their areas of responsibility.269 The order

was the result of SD support for and the trying to overthrow

Marshall Ion of Romania in January 1941. The SS supported the coup

attempt after Antonescu expressed his displeasure at the economic disruption caused by the Iron Guard’s against Romanian Jews. When Antonescu attempted to rein in

the Iron Guard, it revolted. The SD and SS initially supported the Iron Guard, but backed

away when Hitler placed German troops at Antonescu’s disposal. However, the SS

helped Horia Sima and others to escape to Germany. Such a revolt was not in keeping

with Hitler’s or Ribbentrop’s foreign policy goals. They needed Antonescu’s support for

the upcoming invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941. Himmler was suitably

chastened by the lack of support from Hitler and ordered his SD men in Romania to spirit

away Horia Sima and others who were behind the coup. The end result was an order

from Ribbentrop issued on 19 June 1941. The order stated that ambassadors were to be

made aware of any and all (emphasis mine) intelligence operations in their area of responsibility. It also forbade any employee of the AA to act as an agent for the SD

269 “Ribbentrop Order,” 19 June 1941, Büro des Staatssekretärs: Argentinien Band 2, NARA RG 242/T120/366/291266. 129

without the knowledge and permission of Ribbentrop. For its part, the SD ignored the

order when it could.270

Thermann was also aware that the SD, in the person of Johannes Siegfried

Becker, had initiated intelligence operations in Latin America.271 Thermann’s bribery of

prominent Argentine officials could hardly be defined as within diplomatic prerogatives.

The files of the German Foreign Ministry provide abundant evidence that German

embassies throughout South America were centers for numerous activities that violated

the neutrality of their host countries. Given the voluminous documentation detailing

Germany’s disregard for Argentine neutrality, Newton’s criticisms of the commission are in many ways irrelevant. While account should be taken of the domestic implications of the committee along with the sources of information it used to reach its conclusions, they are not reason enough to disregard its conclusions.

President Castillo attempted to thwart the commission at every turn, but the commission persevered.272 Thermann reported the commission’s formation as well as the

fact that it was investigating German citizens and associations for unauthorized political

activity.273 The Investigatory Commission also embarked on a series of raids. The most

serious occurred on 24 July when three German diplomatic bags enroute to Argentina

were seized from a Pan American Airlines plane in Peru. Inside the bags a shortwave

transmitter was found. The Commission was actively assisted by the U.S. State

270 For the events in Romania see Radu Ioanid, in Romania: The Destruction of Jews and Gypsies under the Antonescu Regime, 1940-1944 (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2000), pp. 43-61. See also Ribbentrop Order, 19 June 1941, Büro des Staatssekretärs, NARA RG242/T120/366/291266. 271 For Becker’s activities and his connection to various embassies throughout South America, see chapter five. 272 Newton, The ‘Nazi Menace,’ p. 232. 273 “Thermann to Berlin,” 20 June 1941, Büro des Staatssekretärs: Argentinien Band 2, NARA, RG 242/T120/207/156543 and “Thermann to Berlin,” 2 July 1941, Ibid, frames 156548-549. 130

Department which kept the bags in Lima, Peru for three weeks until Argentine authorities

could take custody of them. After Thermann protested the seizure of the bags Castillo’s

government decried the commission’s breach of diplomatic protocol and intimated the

bags would be returned.274 On 31 July the Commission seized German propaganda

material that arrived on the Japanese ship Nan Maru.275 The most provocative action took

place on 22 August when Federal Judge Ramón F. Vasquez ordered the arrest of thirty-

six Germans who held leadership positions in the outlawed German Worker’s Front and

other organizations. The charges were holding membership in illicit organizations and

misappropriation of funds.276 The arrests incensed the AA who felt that the U.S. and

British were behind Taborda and his commission.

On 25 and 27 August Ambassador Olivera was called in for a severe dressing

down by Weizsäcker and Woermann.277 Weizsäcker castigated Olivera about past

intrigues against Germans in Argentina, specifically the Patagonia affair. While

Argentine conduct had previously been exemplary, it seemed to Weizsäcker that the

Patagonia affair had changed the complexion of German-Argentine relations.

Weizsäcker intimated that the affair could have been avoided “if the promptings of

malevolent, non-Argentine (the U.S. and Great Britain) elements had not been

followed.”278 Having laid the groundwork he moved on to the present situation.

274 “Thermann to Berlin,” 26 July 1941, Büro des Staatssekretärs: Argentinien Band 2, NARA, RG 242/T120/207/156572-73 and “Ovey to Foreign Office,” 29 July 1941, TNA, FO 371/25711. 275 Rout and Bratzel, The Shadow War, pp. 322-324 and Newton, The ‘Nazi Menace,’ p. 234. 276 “Thermann to Berlin,” 22 , Büro des Staatssekretärs: Argentinien Band 2, NARA, RG 242/T120/207/156684 and “Thermann to Berlin,” 23 August 1941, Büro des Staatssekretärs: Argentinien Band 2, NARA, RG 242/T120/207/156686. 277 “Memorandum by Director of the Political Department,” 25 August 1941, Büro des Staatssekretärs: Argentinien Band 2, NARA, RG 242/T120/207/156693-94. 278 “Memorandum by the State Secretary,” 27 August 1941, Doc. 251, DGFP, D, 13, p. 401. 131

Weizsäcker criticized Taborda’s commission and protested the seizure of Germany’s diplomatic pouch. Weizsäcker also protested the arrest of the thirty-six Germans, along with the commission’s attacks on the German school system in Buenos Aires. Olivera meekly accepted the dressing down.279 Not having received any specific instructions to the contrary Olivera could do nothing to counter Weizsäcker’s points.

Between August and November 1941 the commission published five reports. The first, published on 29 August, described the hierarchical nature of German organizations in Argentina as well as the coercive methods used by those organizations to elicit funds from the German community. The report accurately described how German firms were forced to open their financial records to the embassy. Those that refused were threatened with the loss of lucrative contracts once Germany won the war. The report also alleged that those funds were used by the embassy for propaganda and other illegal endeavors.

On 5 September the second report detailed the expenses of the German embassy. It alleged that from 1 July 1940 to 30 June 1941 the German embassy spent over 6 million pesos (approximately U.S. $2 million) on operating expenses. Comparatively these expenses were seven times the amount the British spent and twelve times the U.S. during the same period. The third report examined German propaganda, the Transocean news agency and the Pampero newspaper. The fourth looked at German-language schools and recommended that control over them be tightened.280 The final report of 28 November

279 Ibid, pp. 401-402. 280 Argentine angst over the German-language schools is discussed in chapter one. 132

re-examined the Unión Alemana de Gremios and determined it was simply the outlawed

German Workers Front (DAF) in another name.281

At the end of August, the commission attempted to call the German embassy’s

press attaché, Gottfried Sandstede, to testify. Sandstede and the embassy refused

claiming that as a member of the embassy he enjoyed diplomatic immunity. The

commission rejected Sanstede’s claims stating it was not calling on him to testify as a

press attaché but in his capacity as an employee of the Antonio Delfino Company.

Sandstede again refused and the commission appealed to the Argentine Foreign Ministry

to force him to testify. The Foreign Ministry stalled for time and before it could act

Sandstede fled the country and returned to Germany.282 On 3 September the first calls for

Thermann’s recall were voiced in the Argentine Chamber of Deputies. Thermann queried

the AA as to its reaction to his recall. Ribbentrop replied that “a premature recall of

Thermann under pressure from Argentina was out of the question.”283

On 1 September 1941 Germany arrested eleven Argentine citizens in Paris in

retaliation for the arrest of Germans in Argentina.284 On 4 September Woermann received

Olivera for a discussion concerning the arrested Argentines. Woermann did not admit to

the ambassador that the arrests were a reprisal for the arrest of Germans in Argentina,

281 “Interpellation of the Minister of the Interior Regarding Anti-Argentine Activities,” 19 June 1941, NARA, RG 84, 820.02, Box 96; “Second Report of the Special Committee of the Argentine Chamber of Deputies Investigating Anti-Argentine Activities, 5 September 1941, Ibid; “Investigating Committee of Anti-Argentine Activities,” 28 November 1941, NARA, RG 226, Records of the OSS Research and Analysis Branch: Intelligence Reports, Box 42, Document 9797. 282 Newton, The ‘Nazi Menace,’ p. 234. 283 “The Ambassador in Argentina to the Foreign Ministry,” 3 September 1941, Doc. 274, DGFP, D, 13, pp. 443-444. 284 “Deputy Director of the Legal Department to the Embassy in Paris,” no date (probably late August), Büro UnterStaatssekretärs: Argentinien I, NARA, RG 242/T-120/198/165014-15, See also “Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department,” 4 September 1941, Doc. 279, DGFP, D, 13, pp. 451-52 note 1. 133

instead stating that they were under suspicion “of having acted against the security of the

state.”285 While Olivera was willing to acknowledge the point, he told Woermann that the

possibility of reprisals had to be considered. When asked when the Argentines would be

released, Woermann replied that “each case had to be examined and treated individually

and that the decision would be made by the competent authorities according to objective

principles.”286 Woermann stated that Olivera understood the situation but considered it

“sensible” to believe Woermann’s explanation. In his memorandum of conversation

Woermann acknowledged that the arrests were reprisals. In many ways this situation

illustrates Nazi Germany’s attitude even towards those who viewed Germany favorably.

With mostly under its control and the war in the Soviet Union seemingly finished it seems Nazi Germany felt no need to placate anyone.

Following the publication of the commission’s second report, acting President

Castillo was feeling pressure from his political opponents and the press. He felt that

Thermann’s voluntary recall would ameliorate the situation. Thermann passed along

Castillo’s request to Berlin stating that his tour of duty in Argentina was “exceptionally

long” and that a transfer would be seen as “quite normal.”287 Thermann stated that his

recall would prevent further problems for himself and German interests in Argentina.

Also, it would look better from a public relations standpoint since he would be accorded

“every honor” upon his departure. However, in Nazi Germany, as in most dictatorships,

285 “Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department,” 4 September 1941, Doc. 279, DGFP, D, 13, pp. 451-52. 286 Ibid. 287 “Thermann to Berlin,” 9 September 1941, Büro des Staatssekretärs: Argentinien Band 2, NARA, RG 242/T120/207/156732-33 and “The Ambassador in Argentina to the Foreign Ministry,” 9 September 1941, Doc. 293, DGFP, D, 13, pp. 469-70. 134

image could be an overriding, even irrational concern.288 A good example is the German

obsession with the Charlie Chaplin film “The Great Dictator.” Between and February 1941 the AA and Thermann both protested to the Argentine government regarding the showing of this movie since it was a thinly veiled satire of Hitler. On 10

September Olivera presented Weizsäcker with a note verbale from his government suggesting that Thermann be recalled in order to forestall a debate in the Chamber of

Deputies to declare him persona non grata. Weizsäcker expressed surprise at the suggestion and rejected it outright.289 On 13 September Woermann informed Thermann

he would not be recalled in response to any Argentine pressure.290

The embassy did not sit and wait for the commission’s recommendations. Along

with taking hostages, the embassies in Buenos Aires and Rio de Janeiro began looking into Damonte Taborda’s background. Taborda had a checkered past and burning ambition. Before being elected to the Chamber of Deputies he had worked as a teacher, lawyer, activist and journalist. He was elected a deputy in 1938 and attempted to find a

cause that would catapult him onto the national stage. His ambition proved too much

even for those assisting him. In March 1942, Robert Hadow of the British Embassy

wrote that neither himself nor U.S. Ambassador Norman Armour was, “impressed by

self-seeking climbers as Damonte Taborda, whose championing of the Allied cause does

288 See especially Ian Kershaw, The "Hitler Myth": Image and Reality in the Third Reich (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001). For the documents on “The Great Dictator” see Büro des Staatssekretärs: Argentinien Band I, NARA, RG 242/T120/207/156443-452 and 458 for Weizsäcker and Thermann’s protests. 289 “Memorandum of the State Secretary,” 10 September 1941, Büro UnterStaatssekretärs: Argentinien I, NARA, RG 242/T-120/198/164953-54. 290 “The Director of the Political Department to the Embassy in Buenos Aires,” 13 September 1941, Büro UnterStaatssekretärs: Argentinien I, NARA, RG 242/T-120/198/164930. 135

not conceal gnawing ambition.”291 In some ways criticism of his ambition was the least

of Taborda’s worries. In the fall of 1941 he visited the United States where he had an

interview with Eleanor Roosevelt and gave lectures at Harvard University and the U.S.

Military Academy at West Point. Unfortunately, it was the Cadillac that he brought to

Buenos Aires from the U.S. which caused the most conversation.292 Another source of

speculation was Taborda’s sexual escapades in the 1930s. The German embassy claimed

that Taborda had been involved in white-slavery in Argentina and charged with

corrupting a minor, but that the evidence had been destroyed. There was also a rumor

circulating in Buenos Aires that he was involved in white-slavery in Brazil and that the

documentation was contained in Taborda’s police file held in Rio de Janeiro.293 The efforts of the German embassy in 1941 to obtain a Brazilian police dossier on Taborda failed and the allegations were never proven. The issue became moot when Taborda resigned his chairmanship in June 1942 under a cloud of suspicion.

Despite the attempts to smear Taborda by the middle of September 1941 pressure from the Argentine Chamber of Deputies on Thermann was intense. On 15 September

Taborda stood up in the Chamber and demanded that Thermann be expelled. Castillo attempted to stop the expulsion, perhaps to shore up his shaky domestic position, by having Foreign Minister Ruíz-Guiñazú defend Thermann on the floor of the chamber.

The evidence against Thermann was overwhelming in the eyes of the chamber. It voted

79-1 that he had exceeded his diplomatic functions. They called on Castillo to declare

291 “Hadow to Minister of Information,” 2 March 1942, TNA, FO 371/30322 292 Newton, The ‘Nazi Menace,’ p. 235. 293 “Thermann to Berlin,” 27 October 1941, Büro des Staatssekretärs: Argentinien Band 2, NARA, RG 242/T120/25/26641, “Meynen to Berlin, 18 July 1942, Ibid, frame 27032 and Newton, The ‘Nazi Menace,’ pp. 235-36. 136

Thermann persona non grata and expel him from the country. Weizsäcker again called

in Olivera for a stern dressing down. Castillo and Ruíz-Guiñazú told the chamber they

needed time to investigate the committee’s allegations. Castillo’s cabinet also told

Castillo that he either needed to have Thermann recalled to Germany or resign. Castillo

managed to weather this storm, but by December the pressure was increasing. The

Chamber was clamoring for Thermann’s removal, and anti-German public

demonstrations had started.294 Taborda’s committee had ostensibly achieved its goal of

exposing Nazi infiltration into Argentina. What the committee exposed was really only

the tip of the iceberg. Nowhere in the reports released by the committee was there a

discussion or revelation concerning German intelligence-gathering activities in

Argentina. The activities of the embassy were much more pernicious than the committee

realized. The German embassy in Buenos Aires was the control center for intelligence

operations that stretched across most of South America.295

Oddly, at the peak of this crisis Ribbentrop thought it was an ideal time to discuss

Thermann’s removal. On 1 December he informed Thermann that he should begin discussions concerning his recall from Buenos Aires. The basis for discussion was a 22

October conversation between Meynen and the Foreign Ministry. Both Meynen and the

AA agreed to accept the Argentine proposal made in September offering the simultaneous recall of Thermann and Olivera. It was felt that this would calm emotions in Germany and Argentina.296 Ribbentrop consented to the Argentine proposal, but

294 Newton, The ‘Nazi Menace,’ p. 236. 295 This is discussed in chapter four. 296 “Meynen to Berlin,” 22 October 1941, Büro des Staatssekretärs: Argentinien Band 2, NARA, RG 242/T120/207/165226-227. 137

wanted it announced simultaneously with no comment by either government to avoid

aggravating the situation.297 When Thermann announced Ribbentrop’s proposal on 2

December he reported that Ruíz-Guiñazú appeared relieved and anticipated no difficulties

recalling Olivera.298 Complicating matters was the 12 December declaration of war by

Germany on the U.S. Following the Japanese and Germany’s

declaration of war, the U.S. called for a conference to take place in Brazil in January

1942. Germany was concerned that U.S. pressure would force Argentina to abandon its

policy of neutrality. In a telephone conversation with Weizsäcker, Thermann suggested

having Foreign Minister Ruíz-Guiñazú publicly announce his recall. Thermann felt this

would relieve some of the U.S. pressure on Argentina.299 Despite his telegram of 1

December Ribbentrop vacillated and wanted to avoid the perception that Germany had succumbed to Argentine pressure and appear weak in the eyes of the world.300

Castillo eased Ribbentrop’s fears when he acknowledged on 12 December that a

state of war existed between the U.S., Italy, and Germany. He had previously issued a

decree on 9 December which referred to the Japanese violation of U.S. territory and

branded it as aggression. The 12 December announcement did not refer to the German

and Italian declarations of war as aggression and stated that they were not a threat to

South America. Castillo also reaffirmed Argentina’s policy of neutrality.301 On 15

297 “The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Argentina,” 1 December 1941, Doc. 528, DGFP, D, 13, pp. 912-914. 298 “Thermann to Berlin,” 2 December 1941, Büro UnterStaatssekretärs: Argentinien 2, NARA, RG 242/T- 120/198/165222. 299 “Memorandum,” 11 December 1941, Büro des Staatssekretärs: Argentinien Band 2, NARA, RG 242/T120/207/156844. 300 “Weizsäcker to Buenos Aires,” 12 December 1941, Ibid, frame 156845. 301 “Thermann to Berlin,” 15 December 1941, Büro des Staatssekretärs, Argentinien Band 2, NARA, RG 242/T120/207/156852-53 and Potash, The Army and Politics in Argentina, p. 164. 138

December Thermann had an audience with President Castillo. Castillo told Thermann

that Argentina had no intention of abandoning its neutral position vis-à-vis the

belligerents. Argentina would resist any attempt to give up its sovereignty regarding

declarations of war or the breaking of relations with any country. Castillo related that the maintenance or breaking of diplomatic relations with any other country remained the decision of each individual country.302 Later in the month, unnamed persons in Castillo’s

entourage assured Thermann that Germany could take comfort from Argentina’s actions at previous pan-American conferences. Argentina had not allowed itself to become bound to any agreements, particularly at the Lima Conference in .

Argentina would go to Rio with the intention of pushing the concepts of freedom of action regarding continental defense and mutual assistance.303 Thermann’s telegrams and

Castillo’s pronouncements had the desired effect and Ribbentrop agreed to Thermann’s proposal regarding his recall to Germany. The Argentines also accepted Ribbentrop’s proposal. On 29 December Germany and Argentina simultaneously announced the recall of their respective ambassadors.304 Thermann departed Buenos Aires in

and returned to Germany to a less than enthusiastic reception. Ribbentrop was abrupt and cool in his audience with him and Hitler did not grant him an interview. Thermann was placed on a reduced salary and apart from an inspection trip to Russia and received no

302 “Thermann to AA,” 15 December 1941, Büro des Staatssekretärs, Argentinien Band 2, NARA, RG 242/T-120/207/156855. 303 “Thermann to AA,” 31 December 1941, Büro des Staatssekretärs, Argentinien Band 2, NARA, RG 242/T-120/25/26652-26654. 304 Potash, The Army and Politics in Argentina, p. 164. 139 real responsibilities.305 It seems even his friends and patrons could not erase whatever stigma was placed on Thermann during his service in Argentina.

In some ways, Thermann and the German embassy were guilty as charged, in others Thermann took the blame for activities carried out by the AO and other organizations over which he and other ambassadors had no control. In the end,

Thermann’s punishment fit the crime, even if he had been guilty of more serious offenses. With Thermann’s departure the embassy was left in the hands of Chargé Erich

Otto Meynen. Meynen was very capable with extensive experience in Central and South

America. He would head the embassy until Argentina broke diplomatic relations with

Germany in January 1944. The problems facing Meynen in the years ahead would tax even the most capable of diplomats. He had not only to conduct ‘normal’ diplomatic business, but also monitor the activities of naval attaché Niebuhr and Johannes Siegfried

Becker, head of SD Foreign Intelligence in Latin America.

Despite intense political and domestic pressure from anti-Nazi elements in

Argentina Castillo did not break relations with Nazi Germany over the activities of the embassy. Domestic political considerations played a role since Castillo, who had a weak powerbase at that time, would not want to be seen as caving in to outside pressure and alienate his right-wing and conservative supporters. The role of the Argentine army,

305 Newton, The ‘Nazi Menace,’ p. 236. The same thing happened to the military attaché to the U.S. General Friedrich von Bötticher on his return to Germany in 1942. If one is to accept Alfred Beck’s argument, the treatment of Bötticher is indicative of his ambivalence towards Hitler and the Nazi regime. However, Thermann’s dispatches to Berlin show a diligent servant attempting to serve his government. His anti-Semitic remarks contained in his messages along with his crude racial descriptions show someone who understood the nature of the leader he served and accepted its ideas. See Alfred M. Beck, Hitler's Ambivalent Attaché: Lt. Gen. Friedrich Von Bötticher in America, 1933-1941, (Dulles, VA: Potomac Books, 2006). In his postwar interrogation Thermann stated that his problems with the NSDAP and AO were the reason for Ribbentrop’s cool reception. See “Interrogation of Edmund von Thermann,” 10 May 1945, RG 59, ABB, Miscellaneous Affidavits and Interrogation Reports, Entry 1088, Box 26, p. 1. 140

which was powerful politically, and had close ties to Germany, was certainly a factor.

Castillo saw that the army desired continued neutrality, albeit with a pro-German slant.

Since Castillo was pro-German and also desired neutrality, continuing his policy of pro-

German neutrality would not be much of a concession. Another reason could be that

Germany was supporting Argentina’s policy of neutrality unlike the U.S. which wanted

Argentina to break relations and pursue former president Ortiz’s pro-Allied policies.

Also, Germany was willing to grant Argentina generous trade agreements with no quid pro quo. The U.S. would not do the same since Argentina’s primary exports competed with its products. In the forthcoming years, Meynen would have to manage a series of crises including Niebuhr’s expulsion in January 1943 and the ill-fated Hellmuth affair later the same year. Meynen would operate under the same constraints Thermann did, inept guidance from Berlin, bureaucratic infighting between various governmental organizations and Germany’s inevitable defeat. In many ways, Germany had managed to avoid a break in relations despite its many missteps. Whether Castillo’s refusal to break relations with Germany was due to German diplomatic skill or Argentina’s tilt towards

Nazi Germany is open to debate. In the coming years however Argentina would draw closer and closer to Nazi Germany.

Following the Japanese attack on the U.S. at Pearl Harbor and Germany’s declaration of war on the U.S., the countries bordering the Caribbean, including Mexico, almost immediately sided with the U.S. Other South American nations waited to see what would happen at the Rio Conference scheduled for January 1942. Despite

Thermann’s audience with President Castillo, Germany was particularly worried about 141

what Argentina, Brazil and Chile would do at the Rio conference. Thermann assured

Berlin that Argentina intended to maintain its neutrality. On 8 January 1942, Argentine

Ambassador Ricardo Olivera paid a farewell visit on Woermann. Olivera, seconding

Thermann, assured Woermann that he expected the position of the ABC (Argentina,

Brazil and Chile) states at the Rio Conference to be favorable to Germany.306

Olivera’s statement was confirmed, at least regarding Argentina, when a

“confidential source” in the Vice President’s office disclosed to Meynen Castillo’s instructions to the Rio delegation: “Under no circumstances were they to abandon

Argentina’s position regarding its sovereignty and neutrality.”307 However U.S. pressure

on Argentina at the Rio Conference was intense, so much so that Argentine Foreign

Minister Enrique Ruíz Guiñazú offered to contact Buenos Aires and request new

instructions.308 On 13 January in an audience with Meynen Castillo told the chargé of his instructions to the Rio Delegation. Castillo assured Meynen he would not be dissuaded from Argentina’s policy of neutrality.309 On 23 January, Ruíz Guiñazú, under instructions

from Castillo, announced in Rio that Argentina would reject any resolution calling for a

break in diplomatic relations with Germany, Italy or Japan.310 Following the Rio

Conference Meynen was informed by Ruíz Guiñazú and Carlos Torriani, director of

economic affairs in the Argentine Foreign Ministry that, “Argentine adherence to the Rio

306 “Woermann Memorandum,” 8 January 1942, Büro des Staatssekretärs, Argentinien Band 2, NARA, RG 242/T-120/25/26660. 307 “Meynen to AA,” 11 January 1942, Büro des Staatssekretärs, Argentinien Band 2, NARA, RG 242/T- 120/25/26662. 308 Leslie B. Rout and John F. Bratzel, The Shadow War: German Espionage and United States Counterespionage in Latin America during World War II (Frederick MD: University Publications of America, 1986), p. 173. 309 “Meynen to AA,” 13 January 1942, Büro des Staatssekretärs, Argentinien Band 2, NARA, RG 242/T- 120/25/26663. 310 Rout and Bratzel, The Shadow War, p. 173. 142

resolutions was a theoretical and opportunistic act only.”311 Given these statements,

Germany could breathe easier regarding its diplomatic relations with Argentina. Brazil

would not be so accommodating. Its decision to break relations with Nazi Germany and

side with the Allies caused fear and consternation in Buenos Aires.

Throughout the Rio Conference Brazilian President Getúlio Vargas kept his own

council on whether to remain neutral or side with either the U.S. or Nazi Germany.

Under intense pressure from the U.S. and his Foreign Minister, Oswald Aranha, on 28

January 1942 Vargas announced his decision to break relations with Nazi Germany.

Why did Vargas take this fateful step? There were two reasons. First, Aranha told

Vargas that he had promised U.S. President Franklin Roosevelt in early January 1942 that

Brazil would break relations with the Axis. Aranha argued that he had given his word

and that retracting his pledge could have fateful consequences. Second, the U.S.

promised massive amounts of modern military equipment ultimately worth U.S. $200

million.312 Argentina looked on with dismay at this turn of events. The Argentine

military felt that the U.S. decision to supply Brazil with so much weaponry upset the

balance of power in the Southern Hemisphere.

Despite its position, Argentina naively believed that the U.S. would supply it with

weaponry as well. The previous November the Argentines had dispatched a military and

naval commission to the U.S. to discuss weapons purchases and Argentina’s role in

311 United States Department of State, Consultation among the American Republics with Respect to the Argentine Situation (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1946), pp. 45-46. Ronald Newton casts doubt on this statement calling it ‘extraordinary.’ While no evidence for this statement has been found, it is consistent with Argentine assurances to Germany regarding its position. See Ronald C. Newton, The ‘Nazi Menace’ in Argentina, 1931-1947 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992), p. 238. 312 Rout and Bratzel, The Shadow War, pp. 173-174. 143

hemispheric defense. Felipe Espil, Argentine ambassador in the U.S., assured

Washington that Buenos Aires planned to fully cooperate in defending the hemisphere.

Argentina’s refusal to break relations with the Axis following the Rio Conference was

seen by the U.S. as contrary to that statement. The State Department refused to give

Argentina any weapons unless it changed its position regarding relations with Nazi

Germany and Italy. As a result the talks between Argentina and the U.S. regarding

weapons purchases and Argentina’s role in hemispheric defense were suspended on 20

March 1942. In June the Argentine commission returned to Buenos Aires empty-

handed.313 The U.S. had hoped the denial of weapons would bring about a change in

Argentine policy. The State Department argued that the denial of weapons would deeply

concern the Argentine military and bring about the desired result. Instead, Argentina

turned to Germany in an attempt to restore military parity between Argentina and Brazil.

In February and March 1942, the first overtures were made by private Argentine

citizens who claimed to be in contact with persons in the Argentine government. They

asked whether Germany could supply airplanes and other military equipment to

Argentina. Meynen understood these feelers to be tentative and unofficial, but felt an official request would soon follow. On 27 February and 24 March 1942, he asked for

“precautionary instructions as to whether Germany, in case of official Argentine steps

directed to the embassy in this regard, would be willing and able to deliver such

313 Robert A. Potash, The Army & Politics in Argentina, 1928-1945: Yrigoyen to Perón (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1969), pp. 168-169. 144

material.”314 Given the massive losses the German army had suffered in Russia, Germany could not spare any equipment for Argentina. By February 1942 the German army had suffered over a million casualties out of the 3.5 million who began the invasion on 22

June 1941. It also had lost more than a third of its and vehicles along with numerous artillery and anti- weaponry. In addition to these losses Germany was also supplying weapons to its Hungarian and Rumanian allies.315 Meynen was told to reply

that any official request would be communicated to Berlin.316 In July, General Domingo

Martínez, Police Chief of Buenos Aires, made another unofficial request for weapons on

behalf of Castillo. Martínez explained to Meynen that Castillo and the Argentine army

were worried about U.S. shipments to Brazil. Castillo felt that the U.S. would

issue an to Argentina about breaking relations with Germany. Martínez

assured Meynen that Castillo would resist any such ultimatum, including joining the Axis

if necessary.317

While Argentina had a geography which favored a defensive war along with a

German trained officer corps, it was short of modern weaponry. Martínez asked Meynen

the type and quantity of weaponry Germany was prepared to supply to Argentina and said

that Argentina had the necessary funds to pay for any weapons supplied by Germany. He

314 “Meynen to AA,” 27 February and 24 March 1942, Büro des Staatssekretärs, Argentinien Band 2, NARA, RG 242/T-120/25/26748 and 26790-92. Also quoted in Potash, The Army & Politics in Argentina, p. 170. 315 For a discussion of the losses in Russia and later North Africa see Robert Citino, Death of the Wehrmacht: The German Campaigns of 1942 (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2007). 316 As Potash points out, Berlin’s reply is not in the microfilmed records, but the AA’s reply to Meynen was contained in a memorandum prepared by Emil Wiehl, deputy in the Economics Policy Department in the AA. See “Wiehl Memorandum,” 28 August 1942, Büro des Staatssekretärs, Argentinien Band 2, NARA, RG 242/T-120/26/27255. 317 Potash notes that Martinez did this with the knowledge and consent of Castillo, but without the knowledge of War Minister Tonazzi, who was felt by Castillo to be pro-Allied. See Potash, The Army & Politics in Argentina, p. 170. 145

revealed Argentina’s vulnerable military situation and stated that, “even one full cargo

containing the most important items would bring essential help to Argentina.”318

Looming over all this was the British of Germany which forestalled attempts to supply weapons directly to Argentina.

Spain provided a possible solution to the vexing problem of the blockade. Spain was officially non-belligerent since June 1940, the Spanish leader Franco provided

Germany with valuable strategic materials including wolfram, which was vital in making high-grade and armor-piercing shells. Franco was also a virulent anti-communist who supported the Falange in raising the so-called “Blue Division” to fight on the Eastern

Front against the Soviet Union.319 In May a Spanish trade delegation under Count

Eduardo Aunos arrived in Buenos Aires to negotiate a trade agreement between Spain

and Argentina. Aunos told Meynen that Martínez had also approached him about

possible arms purchases.320 By mid-August 1942 a trade agreement between the two

nations was almost complete. The agreement contained secret protocols whereby Spain

would provide weaponry including tanks, modern aircraft, heavy artillery and modern

anti-tank to Argentina. General Pedro Ramírez was to travel to Spain with Aunos

and work out the details of the arms negotiations. However, the agreement was

contingent on Germany replacing the arms Spain provided to Argentina.321

318 “Meynen to AA,” 27 July 1942, Büro des Staatssekretärs, Argentinien Band 2, NARA, RG 242/T- 120/26/27170-171. Potash, The Army & Politics in Argentina, pp. 170-171. 319 Stanley G. Payne, Franco and Hitler: Spain, Germany and World War II (New Haven, Yale University Press, 2008) and Paul Preston, Franco (New York: Basic Books, 1994). 320 “Meynen to AA,” 27 July 1942, Büro des Staatssekretärs, Argentinien Band 2, NARA, RG 242/T- 120/26/27171-72. 321 “Meynen to AA,” 16 August 1942, Büro des Staatssekretärs, Argentinien Band 2, NARA, RG 242/T- 120/26/27212. 146

Franco had been disappointed by Germany’s failure to supply arms to Spain

since 1940. The Germans had continually made vague promises of weapons in return for

Franco entering the war, which Franco constantly promised to do. The Germans were

also pessimistic about the poor state of Spain’s armed forces. Whatever Franco’s motives in pursuing an arms deal with Argentina, the Germans, who were engaged in Operation

Blue, an operation designed to capture the oil-rich region of the and hopefully force the Soviet Union to surrender, on the Eastern Front, would be unable to provide them. Germany simply had no weaponry to spare for either Spain or Argentina.322

However, Germany was prepared to string Argentina along and play on its fears of invasion from Brazil and the U.S.

As it would happen, Argentine and events with Brazil played into

Germany’s hands. On 22 August 1942 Brazil declared war on Nazi Germany. Since the

U.S. was supplying Brazil with weaponry Argentina was worried about the balance of power now that Brazil was firmly in the Allied camp. The official response of the

Castillo government was to declare Brazil a nonbelligerent instead of a combatant; this would allow Argentina to continue normal economic and diplomatic relations.

International law stated that neutrals had to treat belligerents in a conflict exactly the same with regards to trade. However, declaring Brazil a non-belligerent meant that

Argentina could have freedom to pursue any diplomatic or economic policies it felt to be in its national interest. Despite its declaration concerning Brazil the Argentines were fearful. Castillo was paranoid regarding possible U.S. action in the La Plata region. He

322 For details regarding Spanish arms negotiations with Nazi Germany see, Payne, Franco and Hitler and Preston, Franco. Preston does an excellent job of showing how Franco admired both Hitler and Mussolini. 147

felt that the U.S. might use the pretext of a German threat to South America to occupy parts of Argentina and cut off her supply of oil from Venezuela and Mexico.323 Thus, it was imperative for Argentina to acquire weapons. Despite the inquiries made to Meynen, the Argentine government had not officially made a request for German arms. As Robert

Potash points out, the lack of an official request was done deliberately to keep

Argentina’s request for weapons secret from pro-Allied officials in the government who might report them to Allied intelligence. Even the agreement with Spain was deemed unofficial since no formal negotiations had taken place.324

The entry of Brazil into the war lent urgency to Argentina’s desire for armaments.

The same day Brazil declared war the Argentine government made a formal inquiry into

obtaining weapons from Germany and Italy. Naval attaché Niebuhr was asked by the

Argentine Navy Ministry if Germany could sell , airplanes, anti-aircraft guns

and other weaponry. Given Germany’s massive military commitments, German

policymakers and military leaders were in a quandary about how to respond.325 Argentina

and Spain must have expected a positive answer since Martínez and Count Aunos worked

out payment and transportation plans once the weapons were acquired. It was decided that Spain would supply the weapons to Argentina and Germany would replace those supplied. Spain would pay Germany through deliveries of Spanish goods and raw materials. Argentina would then replace Spanish goods exported to Germany.326

323“Meynen to AA,” 16 August 1942, Büro des Staatssekretärs, Argentinien Band 2, NARA, RG 242/T- 120/26/27212. 324 Potash, The Army & Politics in Argentina, p. 172. 325 See “Notiz für den Führer,” 31 August 1942, Büro des Staatssekretärs, Argentinien Band 2, NARA, RG 242/T-120/26/27264-27265. 326 “Meynen to AA,” 5 September 1942, Büro des Staatssekretärs, Argentinien Band 2, NARA, RG 242/T- 120/26/27297-27298, also Potash, The Army & Politics in Argentina, pp. 172-173. 148

Given the complexity of the deal Count Aunos and the AA agreed that further

details needed to be worked out. Argentina, like Spain, was disappointed in Germany’s

response. It seems that Hitler had not given any answer to Argentine requests for

weapons so the AA and OKW took a conservative approach. They told Niebuhr not to

promise any weapons deliveries, but only that the request was being considered. In

October Count Aunos sailed for Spain expecting General Ramírez and a representative of

the Argentine navy to arrive the following month to begin negotiations.327 Ramírez’s trip

was cancelled when Germany was slow in answering. Instead of giving a definite answer

the OKW advised the AA to string Argentina along until the war situation improved.328

In some ways this was sound advice since Castillo, by clinging to his policy of neutrality, had backed himself into a corner. Since he had formally approached Germany for weapons he could not easily turn to the U.S. This would require him to make an about- face on a policy he urgently desired. The AA and the German embassy made sure that

Castillo’s room for maneuver was severely restricted.

Castillo’s power base was among nationalist groups who desired neutrality. The

German embassy manipulated this support by financing and supporting a manifesto, allegedly signed by one million Argentines and presented to Castillo in September. The manifesto declared its support for the foreign policy carried out by Castillo and Foreign

Minister Ruiz-Guiñazú following the Rio Conference. If the number of signatures

327 See “Meynen to AA,” 7 September 1942, Büro des Staatssekretärs, Argentinien Band 2, NARA, RG 242/T-120/26/27302, “Aufzeichnung betreffend Waffenlieferung an Argentinien,” 21 September 1942, Ibid, Frames 27353-27354, “Meynen to AA,” 21 September 1942, Ibid, Frame 27351 and Potash, The Army & Politics in Argentina, p 173. 328 “Aufzeichnung über Stand der Erörterrungen betreffend Waffenlieferungen an Argentinien,” 3 November 1942, Büro des Staatssekretärs, Argentinien Band 2, NARA, RG 242/T-120/26/27476-27477. Potash, The Army & Politics in Argentina, p 173. 149

collected was accurate it either represented fraud on a massive scale or massive support

for the government’s policies.329 What was not known to the participants was the

involvement of the German embassy. Meynen reported that the manifesto had been carried out by the embassy financed with money from the press and information funds in

the German embassy. The project took several months to carry out with the assistance of

the military, local politicians and the church. Meynen could justifiably say with pride that the manifesto was “the most far-reaching propaganda action ever carried out by the embassy.”330 The extent of German propaganda can be measured by its expenditures.

From June-December 1942 the German embassy spent $166,000 on propaganda most of

which subsidized the German-language newspaper Pampero. Meynen requested a

further $124,000 to use from January-March 1943 for propaganda purposes.331

Along with German propaganda, pro-German Argentine citizens began a series of contacts with high-ranking German officials. The most prominent was Juan Carlos

Goyeneche (codename: “Locatelli”).332 Goyeneche was a well-connected Catholic

nationalist whose family was involved in politics in Uruguay and Argentina.

Goyeneche’s grandfather had served as president of Uruguay and his father had been the

mayor of Buenos Aires before the war. Thus, Goyeneche was well-connected in the La

329 The number of registered voters in Argentina was estimated at this time to be approximately three million. See Potash, The Army & Politics in Argentina, pp. 175-176. 330 “Meynen to AA,” 6 September 1942, Büro des Staatssekretärs, Argentinien Band 2, NARA, RG 242/T- 120/26/27300, Potash, The Army & Politics in Argentina, p. 176. 331 Newton, The ‘Nazi Menace’, p. 240. Newton uses the decrypts for these figures. 332 “Notes on the Interrogation of Theodor Paeffgen,” 4 February 1946, NARA, RG 59, ABB, Box 6740, p. 6. The U.S. knew almost from the beginning of Goyeneche’s trip to Europe and kept watch on him throughout his stay. See “,” April-December 1942, NARA, RG 59, Buenos Aires Confidential Files, File 820.02, Box 6738, this file has various memoranda from April-December 1942 detailing the activities of Goyeneche in Spain. See also “Blancke to Spaeth, Subject: Juan Carlos Goyeneche,” 18 January 1946, NARA, RG 59, ABB, Box 6740, “Cabot to Secretary of State,” 8 February 1946, NARA, RG 59, Buenos Aires Embassy Confidential Files, 862.20235/2-846, Box 6738. 150

Plata region. He arrived in Madrid in April 1942 as the cultural attaché in the Argentine embassy. His appointment was ostensibly at the invitation of Franco’s so-called

‘Hispanic Council’ which sought solidarity between Spain and Latin America.

Uki Goñi and Ronald Newton claim Goyeneche was on a secret mission for

Foreign Minister Ruiz-Guiñazú and his assistant .333 In his postwar

interrogation Walter Schellenberg described Amadeo as pro-German and someone who

provided information to Amt VI using Goyeneche as an intermediary.334 Along with

Amadeo, Goyeneche was also close to the Argentine Ambassador to Spain, Adrián

Escobar, and consul, Aquilino López. Like Amadeo, Escobar and López were German

agents who informed the SD in Paris of their dealings with Spanish and Allied

diplomats.335 One reason Escobar collaborated with the SD was that he was seeking

German support to succeed Castillo. Escobar told Standartenführer , head of the SD in Paris, that he was pro-German and “if and when he should become a big shot in Argentina, he wanted this understood.”336 What Goyeneche’s mission was is

333 Uki Goñi, The Real Odessa: Smuggling the Nazis to Perón’s Argentina (London: Granta Books, 2002), p. 3. Newton, The ‘Nazi Menace’, p. 240. Newton claims he was acting as the representative of Castillo and Adrián Escobar, Argentine ambassador to Spain. The Argentine government publicly stated on several occasions that Goyeneche was not an accredited diplomat, but simply a private citizen. While this was probably true in a literal sense, the evidence suggests he was pursuing high-level contacts in Nazi Germany. For the Argentine denials regarding Goyeneche see “Juan Carlos Goyeneche,” April-December 1942, NARA, RG 59, Buenos Aires Confidential Files, File 820.02, Box 6738. See also Michael Phayer, Pius XII, The Holocaust and the (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2008), pp. 178-180. It should be noted that Phayer relies on Goñi for his evidence. 334 “Affidavit of Walter Schellenberg,” 6 February 1946, NARA, RG 59, ABB, Box 6740, p. 4. 335 “Notes on the Interrogation of Walter Schellenberg,” 6 February 1946, NARA, RG 59, ABB, Box 6740, p. 5. “Blancke to Spaeth, Subject: Enclosing Testimony of Helmut Herbert Knochen,” 21 February 1946, NARA, RG 59, ABB, Box 6740, p. 4, Goñi, The Real Odessa, p. 5. Knochen was also a war criminal who was involved in the of French Jews to Auschwitz. When asked about Goyeneche the interrogator, W. Wendell Blancke, noted a very long pause on Knochen’s part and was forced to remind Knochen who Goyeneche was. Blancke also had to remind Knochen that this interrogation was not part of any alleged war crimes on Knochen’s part, whereupon he became a bit more . 336 “Notes on the Interrogation of Walter Schellenberg,” 6 February 1946, NARA, RG 59, ABB, Box 6740, p. 5. 151

still unclear. Goñi, Newton and others have speculated that Goyeneche was to broker a

compromise peace between Germany and the Western Allies with Argentina and the

Vatican acting as intermediaries.337 The 1942 peace initiative is one of murkier episodes

of the war and raises some important questions.

This initiative supported by Schellenberg, and possibly Himmler, was designed to

split the Western alliance. If Schellenberg could negotiate a peace and spilt the anti-

Hitler alliance he hoped to turn Amt VI into a new foreign ministry with himself as

foreign minister.338 Schellenberg planned to use the Vatican and Argentina as his

intermediaries. Argentina and the Vatican had desired to broker a peace between

Germany and the Western Allies as early as 1941. In July 1941, Argentine Foreign

Minister Dr. Enrique Ruiz-Guiñazú told Ambassador Thermann of his offer to mediate a

peace agreement between Germany and Great Britain. With the defeat of the Soviet

Union seemingly on the horizon Dr. Ruiz-Guiñazú felt that a magnanimous peace towards Great Britain would offer Germany great economic prospects. Thermann averred stating that he did not have authorization to pursue any such discussions. He would have to await instructions. Ribbentrop refused to entertain such notions given how well the war was progressing in the Soviet Union. However, he told Thermann that he should continue to cultivate Dr. Ruiz-Guiñazú’s friendly attitude towards Germany.339

337 Goñi details Ruiz-Guiñazú’s attempts to broker a peace between the belligerents with Argentina and the Vatican as intermediaries. However Goñi does not elaborate on whether or not this was Goyeneche’s mission to Madrid. Goñi, The Real Odessa, chapter 1. 338 For a discussion of Schellenberg’s peace efforts see: Katrin Paehler, “Espionage, Ideology and Personal Politics: The Making and Unmaking of a Nazi Foreign Intelligence Service” (Washington D.C.: American University, Ph.D diss., 2002), chapter 10. 339 “The Ambassador in Argentina to the Foreign Ministry,” 5 July 1941, Doc. 73, DGFP, D, 13, pp. 86-88 and “The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Argentina,” 16 July 1941, Doc. 112, DGFP, D, 13, p. 142. 152

Thermann felt that Ruiz-Guiñazú’s motives were not a desire for peace as such; he

thought Ruiz-Guiñazú wanted a Nobel Peace Prize.340

Ruiz-Guiñazú was not deterred and hoped that Argentina could act as a mediator.

Sometime between July 1941 and January 1942 Goyeneche was made privy to Ruiz-

Guiñazú’s desire for peace. Ruiz-Guiñazú may have been confident he could succeed;

however, Goyeneche was not so sure. On 25 January 1942 he wrote a letter to the

Argentine foreign minister cautioning him that U.S. diplomatic pressure on Argentina to

break relations with Nazi Germany might endanger “the possibility of a world peace

being signed in Buenos Aires in the near future.”341 Ruiz-Guiñazú probably felt that with

Vatican backing he could overcome any U.S. pressure. He was certain that the Vatican

and pro-Axis elements in Spain, Portugal and Italy would support his efforts.

Between July 1941 and March 1942 Argentine diplomats in Spain, Portugal and

Switzerland were approached by unnamed individuals who wanted Argentina to act as an intermediary for a negotiated peace with the U.S. and Great Britain. In July 1941 the papal nuncio in Switzerland had informed the Argentine representative in Berne that following Germany’s defeat of the Soviet Union Hitler would begin peace negotiations with the Western Allies and that Argentina would play a role. Whether this was at the instigation of Pope Pius XII, Vatican Secretary of State Cardinal Luigi Maglione or other high-ranking officials in the Vatican is unknown. At approximately the same time unnamed persons allegedly representing Spain and Portugal requested that the Argentine

340 “Interrogation of Dr. Edmund Freiherr von Thermann,” 27 September, 8, 10, 16, 20, 23, 24 October, 2, 6, November 1945, NARA, RG 59, ABB, Miscellaneous Affidavits and Interrogations, Entry 1088, Box 26, p. 5. 341 Quoted in Goñi, The Real Odessa, p. 3. 153

ambassador in Vichy inquire about Argentina acting as a mediator in a negotiated

settlement that had the support of the Vatican. According to Uki Goñi, the Argentine

embassy in Berlin was also approached by an “important Italian person” who suggested

Chile and Argentina act as mediators in a negotiated settlement.342 While Argentina’s

motives seem clear, this begs the question of why the Vatican would become involved in

such a scheme. After all, it was Cardinal Eugenio Pacelli, now Pope Pius XII, who had

contributed to Pius XI’s encyclical Mit brennender Sorge, which attacked Nazism as

atheistic.

As Michael Phayer argues, Pius XII was a staunch anti-communist. This dated

from 1919 when he was held hostage in Munich by communist revolutionaries who had taken over the city.343 Pius’s assistant, Monsignor Domenico Tardini, told the U.S.

diplomat Harold Tittmann that Nazism and communism were both dangers to Europe. If

both Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union were defeated then Europe would have peace,

but if the Soviet Union prevailed Europe would face a disaster since communism was inherently hostile to .344 Thus, Pius XII felt that Germany was the lesser of two evils; after all he had negotiated a Concordat with Hitler in 1933 affirming the position of the Catholic Church in Germany. He had negotiated no such agreement with

Stalin. In the Pope’s mind Germany would serve as a bulwark to keep the communists at

bay and preserve a Christian Europe. Countries such as Spain, Portugal, Argentina or

Chile would serve as perfect intermediaries for any peace settlement between Germany

342 Goñi, The Real Odessa, p. 4. All of Goñi’s assertions about Argentina acting as a mediator come from the archives of the Argentine Foreign Ministry. 343 For an account of Pius XII’s early years and formative influences see Phayer, Pius XII, The Holocaust and the Cold War. 344 Ibid, p. 39. 154

and the West since they were staunchly Catholic and fiercely anti-communist. By mid-

1942 with Germany seemingly on the verge of victory over the Soviet Union, the time

seemed propitious to begin negotiations. Juan Carlos Goyeneche eventually became the

intermediary between Argentina, Nazi Germany and the Vatican.

Following his arrival in April 1942 Goyeneche was kept busy meeting various

officials in Spain and German-occupied Europe. In May he traveled to France with

Escobar and López to meet with . Laval was the pro-German Prime Minister

of Vichy, which was of the area of France not occupied by the German following their

victory over France in June 1940. The three then traveled onto Biarritz where they were

joined by Ricardo Olivera, newly appointed Argentine ambassador to Vichy. In Biarritz

the four met with Knochen who was asked to arrange a trip to Berlin for Escobar.345

Escobar’s reasons for travelling to Berlin are unknown. In his postwar interrogation

Knochen simply stated that Escobar asked him to arrange the trip but Knochen’s interrogator’s never followed up on why Escobar wanted to go.

In July Escobar requested permission for he and Goyeneche to travel to France a second time and then to the Vatican for an audience with Pope Pius XII. While the issues to be discussed have not been fully revealed, they were sensitive. Ruiz-Guiñazú told

Escobar to make sure the meeting with Pius XII was “strictly private.” Escobar and

Goyeneche departed on 12 August for their meeting. Despite Ruiz-Guiñazú’s instructions, details regarding the meeting at the Vatican were leaked to the press. El

Tiempo de Bogotá, a Colombian newspaper, reported that Escobar had held a long meeting with Pius XII who was receptive to Argentina acting as a mediator for a possible

345 “Interrogation of Helmut Herbert Knochen,” 21 February 1946, NARA, RG 59, ABB, Box 6740, p. 4. 155

peace settlement between Germany, the U.S. and Great Britain.346 Subsequent meetings

were held between the Argentine ambassador to the Vatican, Secretary of State Maglione,

and the Pope to reaffirm Argentina’s commitment to act as a mediator between Germany

and the Western powers.347

The meetings between Escobar, Goyeneche and the Vatican caught the attention

of Walter Schellenberg, head of Amt VI SS Foreign Intelligence. Schellenberg explained

to his postwar interrogators that:

Escobar was a man who was very strongly oriented towards Europe and he had a high estimation of Germany. I would like to contrast him with the military faction in Argentina – politically he was not one-sided. He believed that under the influence of the Vatican, Latin America in conjunction with Spain and Portugal should create a new political sphere of influence. It was his idea to unite all the Roman Catholics. It was the .348

Schellenberg thought that, “Escobar had good connections with the Vatican and I intended above all to make use of him in this direction in putting out a feeler for a compromise peace.”349

Whatever Schellenberg’s motives, his desire for peace should be treated skeptically. More than likely Schellenberg was positioning the SD and Amt VI to replace the AA in foreign policy matters. However, Escobar was transferred to a new posting as

Argentine ambassador to Brazil.350 That left Goyeneche as intermediary between

346 Goñi, The Real Odessa, pp. 6 and 350, note 20. 347 Goñi, The Real Odessa, pp. 6-7. 348 “Affidavit of Walter Schellenberg,” 6 February 1946, NARA, RG 59, ABB, Box 6740, p. 4. stated that Goyeneche shared Escobar’s ideals. See “Interrogation Report of Karl Gustav Arnold” 9, 11, 12, 17 September; 15,16, 18,21,24, 29, 31 October; 5, 8 12 November 1946, NARA, RG 65, Records of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, File 64-24854-Sec. 1, Box 17, p. 38. 349 “Affidavit of Walter Schellenberg,” 6 February 1946, NARA, RG 59, ABB, Box 6740, p. 4. 350 The SD had dealings with Escobar and Goyeneche into 1943. Amt VI seemed to be unsure of how much influence both men had, as well as their reliability. In May, they asked Becker his opinion of Goyeneche and Escobar. In June 1943 Escobar, now ambassador to Brazil, contacted Knochen in Paris and 156

Argentina and Nazi Germany. Goyeneche was used since Castillo and other pro-German

members of the Argentine government did not trust their diplomatic corps, especially the

chargé d’ affairs in Berlin, Luis Luti.351 Goyeneche explained to Otto Reinebeck, head of

Pol. Abt. IX in the AA, which was responsible for the Americas, that Luti was not

sufficiently pro-Nazi.352 While Luti was anti-German, the Argentine naval attaché,

Commander Eduardo Ceballos, was a close collaborator. Ceballos was also intimately

involved in the ill-advised Hellmuth affair of 1943 and passed information to Karl

Arnold, head of Amt VI in Spain.353 Ceballos also allowed the SD to use the Argentine

diplomatic pouch to send reports to and from Amt VI personnel in Argentina.354

Goyeneche went to Berlin in October 1942. He then traveled in the company of

Gottfried Sandstede to visit the Spanish “Blue Division” on the Eastern Front. When

Goyeneche returned to Germany he called on Reinebeck. In his postwar interrogation

Reinebeck stated that Goyeneche wished to meet with Foreign Minister Ribbentrop and with Hitler.355 Goyeneche requested the meetings with Hitler and Ribbentrop at the

behest of Castillo and Ruiz-Guiñazú. On 16 November the German embassy in Buenos

Aires requested that the AA agree to a meeting between Goyeneche and Ribbentrop. The

request came from Ruiz-Guiñazú through Amadeo. The meeting was ostensibly to

asked him what help Germany could give him in the presidential election. Becker stated that Goyeneche was acceptable and advised caution with Escobar. See “Argentina to Berlin,” 18 May, 9 June, and 4 July 1943, RG 226, Records of the OSS, OSS Communication Office Records, Ultra Decrypts. 351 “Affidavit of Otto Reinebeck,” 24 January 1946, NARA, RG 59, ABB, Box 6740, p. 4. 352 Ibid and “Interrogation of Theodor Paeffgen,” 1 October 1945, RG 59, M679, Roll 3, Frame 950. 353 “Affidavit of Theodor Paeffgen,” 4 February 1946, RG 59, ABB, Box 6740, p. 6. For his part Arnold stated that Ceballos never worked for the SD in any official capacity. See “Interrogation Report of Karl Gustav Arnold” 9, 11, 12, 17 September; 15, 16, 18, 21, 24, 29, 31 October; 5, 8, 12 November 1946, NARA, RG 65, File 64-24854-Sec. 1, Box 17, p. 40. 354 “Affidavit of Walter Schellenberg, 6 February 1946, RG 59, ABB, Box 6740, p. 2. 355 “Affidavit of Otto Reinebeck,” 24 January 1946, NARA, RG 59, ABB, Box 6740, p. 3. It does not seem that Goyeneche met with Hitler however the evidence on this point is contradictory. 157

discuss various cultural, political and economic matters important to Argentina.

Goyeneche was to report the results of his meetings to Castillo, Ruiz-Guiñazú and leaders

in the nationalist movement in Argentina.356

Reinbeck arranged the meeting which was held on 30 November 1942 at

Ribbentrop’s estate in , with Sandstede acting as interpreter. The meeting

covered various topics and lasted for several hours.357 Goyeneche told Ribbentrop that he

had come to see for himself the situation in Europe and learn the opinion of the German,

Italian, Spanish and Portuguese governments regarding Argentina. Goyeneche would

then relay their answers to Castillo and leaders in the Argentine nationalist movement,

especially the military. Goyeneche wanted to address three points:

1. Following Germany’s conquest of Russia and its attainment of autarky, will Germany still be interested in trade with Argentina? 2. Will Germany recognize Argentina’s right to the ? 3. Given that Argentina has a natural affinity with Europe and considers itself economically, racially, and culturally European what is the German opinion regarding Spain serving as a bridge in helping Argentina adjust to the new European order?

Goyeneche also sought German support for a nationalist candidate (possibly Escobar) in

Argentine presidential elections scheduled for 1943. If Germany would not give such

support, then would Germany consider supporting a coup to maintain President Castillo

in office? Goyeneche stated that this was especially important given the “life and death

356 “Pochhammer to AA,” 16 November 1942, Büro des Staatssekretärs, Argentinien Band 2, NARA, RG 242/T-120/26/27496. 357 For transcripts of the meeting see, “Aufzeichnung des Wissenschaftlichen Hilfsarbeiter Brandau, Betrifft: Unterredung des Herrn Reichsaussenministers mit dem Argentinier Juan Carlos Goyeneche am 30 November 1942 im Gut Westfalen,” 7 December 1942, Document No. 264, Akten zur Deutschen Auswärtigen Politik, Serie E, Band IV, 1 Oktober bis 31 Dezember 1942 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Rupprecht, 1975), pp. 464-472 and “Blancke to Cummings, Full Translation of Ribbentrop-Goyeneche Conversation,” 17 July 1945, RG 59, ABB, Miscellaneous Affidavits and Interrogation Reports, Box 23, Entry 1088. 158

struggle” between Argentina and the U.S. “which threatens the existence of the nation.”

Goyeneche also wanted an official German statement that Germany had no territorial ambitions in South America. He explained this would counteract U.S. propaganda and feature prominently in his pro-German propaganda program.358

Ribbentrop was verbose in his answers. He first stated that he was glad to hear

that Argentina recognized that the current situation was “a battle that would determine

the fate of all civilization for centuries…We know that international Jewry, on the one

hand behind the capitalistic mask and on the other behind the Bolshevist, pursues its

end.”359 Ribbentrop then went on to answer Goyeneche’s queries. In answering the first

question Ribbentrop replied, “If Argentina maintains its present stand, she will profit

greatly over the countries which have not taken such a stand. We could take everything

that Argentina produced no matter how much it might be.” Regarding the second

question Ribbentrop told Goyeneche:

England is our enemy… is truly a grotesque example in this story, for certainly nobody can question that it lies on the Iberian Peninsula. Likewise, the Falklands are at least nearer Argentina than to England. Therefore we have great sympathy for the justifiable Argentine interest. But, I believe that, unless Argentina takes care, it may be that the United States will take over these islands.

On the issue of Spain constituting a bridge between Argentina and Europe Ribbentrop

stated: “The establishment of her cultural and spiritual relationship with Europe is in the

first rank of Argentine duties. We shall in any case constantly promote the existing unity

between Spain and Argentina.”360

358 Ibid and “Affidavit of Otto Reinebeck,” 24 January 1946, NARA, RG 59, ABB, Box 6740, p. 3. 359 “Unterredung des Herrn Reichsaussenministers mit dem Argentinier Juan Carlos Goyeneche” 7 December 1942, No. 264, E, IV, p. 465. 360 Ibid, pp. 470-472 and Goñi, The Real Odessa, pp. 8-9. 159

The rest of the interview consisted of a long anti-semitic diatribe delivered by

Ribbentrop. Given Goyeneche’s racial views, as well as Argentina’s reactions towards its Jewish citizens in Nazi-occupied Europe, Ribbentrop’s diatribe was understandable.

At the conclusion of their meeting Ribbentrop presented to Goyeneche a photograph of himself with a personal dedication.361 While Ribbentrop’s private views of Goyeneche are unknown, Goyeneche was unimpressed with Ribbentrop and found him distasteful.362

He wrote Amadeo that, “As an individual he [Ribbentrop] causes a bad impression, pedantic and close-minded.” He later told Karl Arnold that Ribbentrop “had left a bad taste in his mouth” and had not allowed Goyeneche “to say more than a half a dozen sentences.”363 Whatever Goyeneche’s opinion of Ribbentrop, he obtained permission from the Foreign Minister to use the German diplomatic code to send the results of his meeting back to Buenos Aires. Reinebeck encoded the message and sent it to Meynen in

Buenos Aires who passed it onto persons in the Argentine government.364 Even though

Ribbentrop was cooperative Goyeneche found another willing partner in Ribbentrop’s rivals, Walter Schellenberg and Heinrich Himmler.

361 “Affidavit of Otto Reinebeck,” 24 January 1946, NARA, RG 59, ABB, Box 6740, p. 5. 362 See Michael Bloch, Ribbentrop (London: Abacus Books, 2003). 363 “Interrogation Report of Karl Gustav Arnold,” 9, 11, 12, 17 September; 15,16, 18,21,24, 29, 31 October; 5, 8 12 November 1946, NARA, RG 65, File 64-24854-Sec. 1, Box 17, p. 38 and Goñi, The Real Odessa, p. 9. 364 Reinebeck confirms that Goyeneche asked to use the German diplomatic code. He states that Goyeneche wanted to use it to send the information to Colonel Enrique P. González who would give it to Juan Perón. However, at this time González and Perón were not involved in the government. This could either be a misstatement on Reinebeck’s part or there was a later meeting between Goyeneche and Ribbentrop following the coup of 4 June 1943. Reinebeck also contradicts himself, stating in his 24 January 1946 affidavit that the messages were to be sent to González for Perón. In his 4 February 1946 affidavit he states the messages were to be given to Commander Eduardo Aumann and passed onto Amadeo. See “Affidavit of Otto Reinebeck,” 24 January 1946, NARA, RG 59, ABB, Box 6740, p. 3 and “Affidavit of Otto Reinebeck,” 4 February 1946, NARA, RG 59, ABB, Box 6740, p. 5. Goñi accepts Reinebeck’s 4 February assertion uncritically. See Goñi, The Real Odessa, p. 11. 160

Following his meeting with Ribbentrop, Goyeneche made the acquaintance of

Theodor Paeffgen, head of Amt VI/D 4, a sub-office of Amt VI responsible for

intelligence operations in North and South America and the Iberian Peninsula.

Goyeneche was then introduced to Schellenberg who had various talks with him.

Schellenberg then arranged for Goyeneche to have an audience with Himmler at the

latter’s headquarters on the Eastern Front sometime in December 1942. The purpose of

the meeting is somewhat contradictory in the documentary record. Goyeneche reported

that the meeting was a general conversation, with both Himmler and himself being very

cautious. Schellenberg avoided specifics and told his postwar interrogators that Himmler

showed only his best side and would only engage in discussions concerning political

matters.365 Given Goyeneche’s previous conversation with Pius XII about Argentina

mediating a peace between Germany and the Western Powers, it is likely such a

settlement was a topic of conversation.

For his part Goyeneche scolded Himmler about Nazi church policy. Goyeneche

told Himmler that he needed to be aware that Catholicism and Latin America were

linked. If Germany failed to protect the Catholics of Europe, then South America would

be lost as well. Schellenberg later stated that Himmler listened attentively and allowed

Goyeneche to complete his line of argument. Instead of entering into a debate with

Goyeneche Himmler skillfully turned the discussion toward common points of

agreement, mainly their shared antipathy to . It is not known if Goyeneche

broached the idea of a coup to Paeffgen, Schellenberg, or Himmler as he did with

365 “Affidavit of Walter Schellenberg,” 6 February 1946, NARA, RG 59, ABB, Box 6740, pp. 4-5, “Affidavit of Theodor Paeffgen,” 4 February 1946, RG 59, ABB, Box 6740, p. 5, Goñi, The Real Odessa, p. 13. 161

Ribbentrop. He did discuss a link to the Vatican. What this link would entail is

unknown. Perhaps it was part of Schellenberg’s desire to split the Western Alliance.

Goyeneche later told Amadeo that Himmler “was very interested to hear that I would be seeing the Pope and expressly asked me to inform the Pope that I found him to be a very approachable person, especially in religious matters.” While these matters were probably discussed, there were other possible reasons for the meeting. In his postwar interrogation Paeffgen stated “the real purpose of seeking contact with Escobar, Amadeo and Goyeneche, was to obtain intelligence regarding the U.S., in addition to getting reliable South American political information.” For his part Karl Arnold stated that the purpose of Goyeneche’s visit with Ribbentrop and Himmler was to “reconcile Hitlerism with Catholicism.”366 Goyeneche left Germany for Spain in late 1942 or early 1943 to

prepare for a second meeting in Rome with the Pope and Mussolini. While in Madrid he

met with Franco’s brother in law, Ramón Serrano Suñer. The meeting was ostensibly to

discuss his upcoming meetings with Mussolini and Pius XII. Goyeneche arrived in Rome

in March 1943. He held several meetings with Cardinal Giovanni Montini, the future

Pope Paul VI, and two meetings with Pius XII. Whether he passed on Himmler’s

message or reiterated Schellenberg’s and Himmler’s desire for peace is unknown.

The vagueness of the participants’ description of the Himmler/Goyeneche

meeting begs several questions. Schellenberg told his postwar interrogators that his

desire for a with the U.S. and Great Britain dated to the late summer of

366 “Notes on the Interrogation of Walter Schellenberg,” 6 February 1946, NARA, RG 59,ABB, Box 6740, p. 6, “Notes on the Interrogation of Theodor Paeffgen,” 4 February 1946, NARA, RG 59, ABB, Box 6740, p. 6, “Interrogation Report of Karl Gustav Arnold,” 9, 11, 12, 17 September; 15,16, 18,21,24, 29, 31 October; 5, 8 12 November 1946, NARA, RG 65, File 65-24854-Sec. 1, Box 17, p. 38, and Goñi, The Real Odessa, p. 13. 162

1942. Schellenberg claimed that in August 1942 he held a meeting with Himmler at the

latter’s headquarters on the Eastern Front where he broached the idea of a separate peace.

A separate peace would serve two purposes: first, it would allow Germany to concentrate

its military power against the Soviet Union and facilitate the ousting of Foreign Minister

Ribbentrop. Ribbentrop was a bitter rival of Himmler and Schellenberg. Certainly

Schellenberg, and possibly Himmler, felt that Ribbentrop was the main obstacle to any

peace initiative. Schellenberg related that while Himmler was initially resistant to the

idea he gave Schellenberg tentative approval.367

Schellenberg told his postwar interrogators that Himmler promised to try and

convince Hitler that Ribbentrop had to be removed. However, Himmler was also very

careful in approving Schellenberg’s proposals. In his memoir and postwar interrogation

Schellenberg claimed that Himmler told him “if you make a serious error in your

preparations I will drop you like a hot coal.”368 Had Himmler decided in the summer of

1942 that Germany could lose the war and the only way to salvage any hope of victory lay in Schellenberg’s scheme? If Himmler had decided this then it certainly ran counter to Germany’s perceived military situation in the summer of 1942. At the time the meeting took place German forces had pushed deep into the southern region of the Soviet

Union and stood poised to capture and the oil-rich region of the Caucasus. In

North Africa, Rommel had taken Tobruk and pushed the British back into where

367 Paehler, “Espionage, Ideology and Personal Politics,” pp. 412-413. 368 Walter Schellenberg, The Labyrinth: Memoirs of Walter Schellenberg, Hitler’s Chief of , trans. Louis Hagen (New York: Harper & , 1956; reprint, Cambridge MA: Da Capo Press, 2000), p. 315 and “Final Report on the Case of Walter Schellenberg, NARA, RG 319, Individual Records Repository (IRR), XE 001725, Walter Schellenberg, Folders 7 & 8. Quoted in Paehler, “Espionage, Ideology and Personal Politics,” p. 413. Paehler notes there is no independent confirmation of the meeting, even Himmler’s very detailed appointment book does not note the meeting. 163 he stood poised to capture the Suez Canal.369 Germany was seemingly on the edge of victory: Why pursue any peace negotiations at that moment?

If one accepts Schellenberg’s account, the question of why Himmler would risk sticking is neck out begs an answer. Ribbentrop was still in a strong position with Hitler and it was by no means certain that ousting him was a foregone conclusion. While removing Ribbentrop would have increased Himmler’s and Schellenberg’s power,

Hitler’s reaction was another story. How would Hitler have reacted to any such proposal? Hitler believed in victory over his enemies even in the face of evidence to the contrary.370 Hitler’s reaction to any proposal to split the alliance that possibly rested on

Germany giving up any of its conquests would have been unknown. Himmler was also one of Hitler’s most devoted followers. Why would he (literally) risk his neck supporting

Schellenberg’s iffy proposition?

There is also the question of Himmler’s meeting with Goyeneche in December

1942. Schellenberg’s and Goyeneche’s accounts of the meeting raise several questions.

What was really discussed in the meeting between Goyeneche and Himmler? It stretches the imagination that Himmler would have agreed to a meeting with an unofficial

Argentine envoy simply to be chastised about Nazi views on Catholicism. Such an outcome would have probably earned Schellenberg a tongue-lashing from the extremely busy Reichsführer, not to mention a rebuke for wasting Himmler’s time on such a trivial matter. Himmler knew that Goyeneche was going to meet Pius XII did he know about

369 For the German victories in 1942 see Citino, Death of the Wehrmacht. 370 The best biography on Hitler remains the two-volume study by Ian Kershaw. For his analysis of Hitler’s views on Germany’s victory in the war see Ian Kershaw, Hitler: 1936-1945 Nemesis (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2000). 164

Goyeneche’s first meeting with the Pope? If he was aware of the first meeting, did he

know that the topic of a separate peace with the Western Allies was discussed? As

historian David Alvarez points out the Germans knew a lot of what was discussed in the

Vatican.371 If Himmler knew the details of the meeting his reaction is unknown. Also,

why would Himmler need Goyeneche to give the Pope assurances that Himmler was

“very approachable, especially in religious matters?”372 Surely Himmler had other people

to do that for him.

The purpose of Himmler’s meeting with Goyeneche remains murky.

Schellenberg’s timeline of his scheme to split the Western Alliance fits with the available

evidence. However, Schellenberg is far from a reliable witness and Goyeneche’s account

is too general to be helpful. Was ousting Ribbentrop the point of Schellenberg’s scheme?

In Schellenberg’s view it was a necessary precondition. Were Goyeneche’s two meetings

with the Pope undertaken at the behest of Schellenberg? What was Himmler’s role in

Schellenberg’s plans? If Schellenberg’s account about his meeting with Himmler in the

summer of 1942 is true, it raises questions about Himmler’s views of Hitler and his

loyalty to the Führer. Of course, the possibility that Goyeneche’s and Schellenberg’s

accounts of the meeting between Himmler and Goyeneche are true has to be considered.

However, the questions raised above argue that such might not be the case.

What is certain is the AA was unhappy about Goyeneche’s conversation with

Himmler. On 4 January 1943 Schellenberg gave , head of Abteilung

Deutschland, the SD’s analysis of Goyeneche’s conversation with Ribbentrop.

371 For this see David Alvarez and Robert Graham S.J., Nothing Sacred: Nazi Espionage against the Vatican (Portland, OR and London: Frank Cass, 1997). 372 Goñi, The Real Odessa, p. 13 165

Schellenberg also made recommendations for follow-up action.373 Luther sent

Schellenberg’s memorandum to Ribbentrop who was not pleased at Schellenberg’s

brazenness. He ordered Woermann to draft a reply to the SD stating the AA was aware

of the issues Goyeneche related and told the SD not to meddle in AA business.374

Foreshadowing future events, Reinebeck later claimed to his postwar interrogators that

Ribbentrop told him SD intrigues would ruin Germany’s relationship with Argentina.375

Following Thermann’s departure, the U.S. entry into the war and military reverses

on the Eastern Front, German relations with Argentina seemed relatively secure. U.S. aid to Brazil had forced Argentina to turn to Nazi Germany for weapons. Castillo had continually assured Germany that it would not break relations. Goyeneche’s contacts with high-level officials in Nazi Germany augured well for the future. However, there were reasons for worry. Germany’s inability to supply weapons to Argentina continued to be a source of contention between the two nations. Additionally, Goyeneche’s conversations with Himmler were the beginning of SS attempts to supplant the AA as the

primary instrument of Nazi foreign policy. While Ribbentrop apparently understood the

threat the SS posed, for the moment he was unable to act. Ribbentrop had more

immediate concerns regarding Argentina. However, the lack of any long-range strategic

policy again came to the fore. In late November AA requested Meynen make

recommendations to bolster Castillo and Argentine neutrality.

373 “Schellenberg to Luther,” 4 January 1943, Politisches Archiv Auswärtiges Amt, Berlin, Inland II G: Südamerika: SD-Meldungen aus Südamerika. 374 “Woermann to Schellenberg,” 13 January 1943, Ibid. 375 “Interrogation of Otto Reinebeck,” 4 February 1946, RG 59, 862.20235/4-2646, ABB, Box 6740, p. 10 and Newton, The ‘Nazi Menace’, p. 241. 166

On 3 December 1942 Meynen recommended that Germany adopt the following

measures to support Castillo and his policy. First, Germany should supply practical help

to the Argentine military. Second, assure Argentina that it would respect its merchant shipping and ships flying the Argentine flag. Third, provide financial support to

Robustiano Patrón Costas the presidential candidate Castillo anointed as his successor.

Fourth, strengthen Chilean neutrality through economic offers. Continued Chilean neutrality would bolster Argentina’s neutrality. Economically, Germany should enter into negotiations to buy Argentine products. Despite being unable to export the products, an agreement would show Argentina that it was important to Germany economically.

The Wehrmacht should issue statements trumpeting German military superiority. This would convince Argentina that Germany will win the war and counteract U.S. and British propaganda. The embassy would also increase its support to pro-German newspapers.

This press campaign would include supporting Castillo’s chosen successor. This support

would counteract U.S. backing for former president Justo who was expected to run

against Castillo’s candidate. Meynen noted that funds were badly needed to carry out the

propaganda campaign. He concluded by telling the AA that Argentina had to be

convinced that Germany would eventually win the war.376

Most of Meynen’s recommendations were not new. In 1939 Thermann and the

other German ambassadors in Latin America had made similar recommendations.377

376 “Meynen to AA,” 3 December 1942, Büro des Staatssekretärs, Argentinien, Band 2, NARA RG 242/T- 120/26/27543-27544. 377 See “Aufzeichnung über die Zusammenkunft der deutschen Missionchefs in Argentinien, Brasilien, Chile, und Uruguay in Montivideo am 28 und 29 Juli 1938,” Büro des Chefs der AO, NARA RG 242/T- 120/218/168208-215 also “Thermann to Auswartiges Amt, Enclosure: Memorandum of the Meeting in Montevideo of the Chiefs of Missions in Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Uruguay, July 28 and 29, 1938,” 2 August 1938, Doc. 624, DGFP, D, v. 2, pp. 863-867. 167

Most of the issues Meynen covered could have been anticipated by a comprehensive

review of Germany’s foreign policy towards Argentina. It appears that no such review

was conducted or even recommended. The fact that the same recommendations had been

made for over three years without being implemented is inexplicable. While Germany’s

main foci were the war in Russia, the Atlantic and North Africa it did consider Argentina

important. Ribbentrop’s statements to Reinebeck illustrated the importance Nazi

Germany placed on continued Argentine neutrality. In his postwar interrogation

Reinebeck stated that Ribbentrop told him “Argentina is the last German bridgehead in

the Western Hemisphere, the maintenance and development of which are of the greatest

significance for later on.”378

While the meaning of this statement is open to interpretation, the archival record is clear. German diplomacy towards Argentina was conducted on a reactive ad hoc basis.

Whether this was through incompetent guidance, neglect, or design is not clear. One

explanation for his statement to Reinebeck is that Ribbentrop felt that Germany would

win the war and any long-term problems could then be solved. Ribbentrop also could

have discerned Hitler’s wishes in one of his many conversations with him and saw

himself as “working towards the Führer.”379 Perhaps Hitler saw Argentina as a future

ally or as a base for operations against the Western Hemisphere once the war in the East

was won.380 Since Hitler had not formulated clear plans regarding future goals in the

Western Hemisphere, this forestalled any long-term planning on the AA’s part. The fact

378 “Interrogation of Otto Reinebeck,” 4 February 1946, RG 59, 862.20235/4-2646, ABB, p. 7. 379 For a discussion of this concept see Ian Kershaw, The “Hitler Myth”: Image and Reality in the Third Reich (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001). 380 See Norman J.W. Goda, Tomorrow the World: Hitler, Northwest Africa and the Path Toward America (College Station: Texas A&M Press, 1998). 168 that German diplomats in Latin America sent the AA the same recommendations over and over illustrates the myopia or incompetence of the AA. Additionally, Thermann was never queried as to his opinion regarding German-Argentine relations. His experiences in Argentina would have been an invaluable contribution to any prospective policy.

The fact that Castillo did not break relations with Nazi Germany is somewhat remarkable. Argentina was probably convinced Germany would win the war and enrich it through lucrative trade deals. Castillo and Ruiz-Guiñazú also stood to gain international prestige if they could mediate a peace agreement between Germany, the

U.S. and Great Britain. 1942 also saw the SS hunger for more and more control over foreign and domestic affairs in Nazi Germany. Ribbentrop realized that SS meddling in foreign policy would be disastrous. Himmler’s meeting with Goyeneche and

Schellenberg’s impertinence towards the AA foreshadowed a full assault by Schellenberg on Ribbentrop and the AA. Himmler and Schellenberg’s support of Martin Luther against Ribbentrop in February 1943 and the Hellmuth affair of were serious attempts by the SS to remove Ribbentrop and replace the AA as the lead agency in Nazi foreign policy.

169

Chapter 4

The Rise and Fall of the Abwehr in South America, 1941-1943

Hitler viewed neutrality with disdain. Such was exemplified by his complete

disregard for the neutrality of Denmark, Norway, Holland, and Belgium. In contrast, his subordinates were very pragmatic. While they had no hesitation about using neutral territory to aid their master’s expansionistic policies and help Germany attain her goal of world domination, they were mindful of Argentina’s neutrality. In some ways, this respect for Argentina’s neutrality was reminiscent of Germany’s policies during the

First World War when Argentina was a center for German intelligence operations.

German spy networks at that time were controlled through the German embassy in

Buenos Aires under the direction of German Minister Count Karl von Luxburg, then later the German Naval Attaché Augustus Moller.381 This setup was similar to that being run

by the German Embassy in the U.S. during the First World War where intelligence and

sabotage activities were headed by the German military attaché and future Chancellor

Franz von Papen.382 This pattern of directing intelligence activities under the protection

of diplomatic immunity was repeated during the Second World War.383

381 Joseph S. Tulchin, “The Origins of Misunderstanding: United States-Argentine Relations, 1900-1940,” in Argentina between the Great Powers, 1919-1946, ed. Guido di Tella and D. Cameron Watt (Oxford: Macmillan, 1989), p. 42. 382 See Chad Millman, The Detonators: The Secret Plot to Destroy America and the Epic Hunt for Justice (New York: Little, Brown and Company, 2006). Millman used the extensive records of the German- American Mixed Claims Commission as the basis for his book and many of the principles who were involved with the Mixed Claims Commission would deal with Germany or German espionage in World War II, such as John J. McCloy and J. Edgar Hoover. Cordell Hull would be briefed on the German- American Mixed Claims Commission as well, which probably influenced later decisions he would make 170

Abwehr intelligence and smuggling activities in Latin America were under the

control of naval attaché Kapitan zur See (Captain) Dietrich Niebuhr (codename:

“Diego”). His activities are shrouded in more secrecy than those of the German

diplomatic mission. Exploring the diplomatic side of German actions in Argentina is

relatively easy given the voluminous records of the German Foreign Office. Niebuhr’s

activities are more difficult to follow since he consistently lied during his postwar

interrogations. One interrogator noted that, “I got the feeling that he [Niebuhr] was really

laughing at us…Getting information you want out of him was like pulling teeth…”384

The loss and destruction of most of the Abwehr’s records at the end of the war similarly make a detailed reconstruction of Niebuhr’s activities difficult.

Latin America was not high on the list of priorities facing the Abwehr and SD in the first year of the war. When the Luftwaffe was defeated in the skies over Great Britain in August and forcing the postponement of a German invasion, Latin

America became a higher priority. The Battle of the Atlantic required intelligence on shipping and Buenos Aires and other Latin American cities were major ports. Niebuhr had to build a network from scratch. That he did so is a testament to his skill and resourcefulness. Unlike the AA and Abwehr’s contentious relationship with the SD,

Niebuhr and the Abwehr had a generally harmonious relationship with the embassy and

AA. Canaris and his subordinates generally deferred to the career diplomats on matters

regarding Argentina. See also Jules Witcover, Sabotage at Black Tom: Imperial Germany's Secret War in America, 1914-1917 (Chapel Hill: Algonquin Books, 1989). 383 The Germans were not the only ones who did this, most of the major belligerents in the Second World War used their embassies to direct intelligence and counter-intelligence operations. 384 Handwritten note attached to “Final Interrogation Report of Kapitan zur See Dietrich Niebuhr,” (hereafter Niebuhr Interrogation 1), 20 , National Archives and Records Administration, Record Group 65, Records of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, File 64-20041, Box 9. See also Rout and Bratzel, The Shadow War, p. 330. 171

affecting Germany’s relations with other countries unlike the SD who ignored the AA

when it could.385 In return, the embassy staff covertly aided operations such as the escape

of the crew of the battle cruiser Graf Spee back to Germany. It also provided money for

agents and information. Niebuhr set up an intelligence network that provided valuable information to the Kriegsmarine on British ships entering and leaving Buenos Aires

harbor. Niebuhr’s network provided exactly what his superiors in Germany desired and

focused on providing tactical intelligence. As Roberta Ratcliff points out, “longer-term,

strategic intelligence held less interest for Wehrmacht commanders.”386 This description

could also apply to the which wanted enemy shipping information for its

U-boats. Niebuhr and his organization focused on providing tactical intelligence to the

detriment of strategic issues. Such intelligence-gathering harkened back to the First

World War, where German spies provided similar information.

This chapter investigates German intelligence activities in Argentina from 1939-

1943. This period was the high-water mark for the Abwehr in Latin America. It will also

examine the creation of the “Bolívar” radio network which marked an unusual attempt at

cooperation between the AA, Abwehr, and SD. As Gustav Utzinger (aka Wolf Franczok,

codename: Luna), creator of Bolívar remarked, “It was well known that between 1942

and 1944 there was a jurisdictional fight between Heinrich Himmler’s RSHA and the

military Abwehr.”387 He was probably aware of such a struggle between the SD and AA

385 Katrin Paehler, “Espionage, Ideology and Personal Politics: The Making and Unmaking of a Nazi Foreign Intelligence Service” (Washington D.C.: American University, PhD diss., 2002), p. 366. 386 R.A. Ratcliff, Delusions of Intelligence: Enigma, Ultra, and the End of Secure Ciphers (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), p. 34. 387 “Report of Interrogation of Wolf Emil Franczok Alias Gustav Utzinger,” July-September 1947, NARA, RG 65, 64-22460-13, Box 14, p. 25. While Franczok was his real name, he was known under the alias of 172

as well. This chapter will argue that Argentina benignly allowed naval attaché Niebuhr to run his intelligence-gathering network until U.S. pressure forced his removal. It will also show the interconnection between intelligence-gathering activities and diplomacy in the Third Reich and the effect of such activities on German relations with Argentina.

Niebuhr had been the German naval attaché to Argentina since 1936. He was born on 21 October 1888 in and entered the German Imperial Navy in 1907.

During the First World War he served on U-boats and was the first officer on U-233 which had the distinction on 5 of being the first ship to fire a torpedo striking a British vessel. Niebuhr was promoted and slated to command U-45 until an illness caused his transfer to the Office of the Chief of Staff in charge of submarine warfare. In 1919 Niebuhr was discharged from the Navy and married Elisabeth Schubert.

While his activities from 1919-1923 are unknown, he claimed to his post-war interrogators that from 1924-1930 he managed a farm for his cousin in Esdorf, Silesia.

In 1930, he further stated that he moved to another farm and took classes at the

University of Breslau.388

Niebuhr’s postwar claims about his activities during this period were false. In

1929 he was hired by the (as the was known in the 1920s) to act as its representative in Argentina.389 This appointment might have been at the behest

of Captain Wilhelm Canaris who had visited Argentina the previous year, but more likely

it came from Kapitan zur See Konrad Patzig. He was an old classmate of Niebuhr’s and

Gustav Utzinger, which will be used throughout this study. As for his interrogation and affidavits, both names are used interchangeably and the original title of each will be used. 388 “Final Interrogation Report of Kapitan zur See Dietrich Niebuhr,” 20 June 1946, NARA, RG 65, 64- 20041, Box 9, p.2. 389 Elizabeth White, German Influence in the Argentine Army, p. 47. 173

Wilhelm Canaris’ predecessor as head of the Abwehr. In his postwar interrogation

Niebuhr claimed that he only returned to the Navy in 1932 after being asked by two

former classmates Gunther Lütjens, future admiral aboard the ill-fated battleship

Bismarck, and Patzig. Niebuhr said he was unable to return to active duty right away due

to the limitations of the Versailles treaty, so he served as a civilian in the Abwehr but was

paid an officers salary. Contradicting his earlier testimony Niebuhr also stated after the

war that because of financial difficulties he was unable to continue his studies and took a

job as a salesman for the Dutch firm Ingeneur Kontor für Schiffsbau.

Elizabeth White shows that during 1932 his job took him to Spain, Argentina, Portugal

and Brazil. This job was a cover for his real activities, including the lobbying of South

American governments so that they would buy German ships and equipment. Niebuhr

was successful. The Argentine Navy purchased large quantities of equipment from the

Dutch subsidiaries of German companies including Zeiss and Siemens. It is also possible

Niebuhr helped arrange the travel of Argentine naval officers to Germany so they could

be trained on the equipment their government purchased.390 In October 1933 Niebuhr

was commissioned as a supplementary officer with the rank of Korvettenkapitan

(Lieutenant Commander). In 1936 he was promoted to Frigattenkapitan (Commander) and finally Kapitan zur See in April 1939.391

Niebuhr openly admitted in his postwar interrogation that he had worked for the

Abwehr, but he said that this connection lasted only until 1936 when he sought a better

390 Ibid. 391 “Final Interrogation Report of Kapitan zur See Dietrich Niebuhr,” NARA, RG 65, 64-20041, Box 9, p. 3. 174

posting.392 In any event he was appointed naval attaché in Argentina owing to his mastery

of Spanish. He was also accredited to Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay and Chile. The

outbreak of the war found Niebuhr scrambling to set up a network to provide shipping

information to U-boats operating in the Atlantic. Niebuhr knew that setting up

intelligence networks required money and he had a ready supply at hand. He claimed in

his postwar interrogation that between 1936 and 1939

(OKM) Abt A/3 (later Information Abteilung, Seekriegsleitung) sent him approximately

650,000 Reichsmarks in dollars, pounds and Argentine pesos. It was a lot of money in

light of Germany’s shortage of foreign currency reserves.393 While Niebuhr never fully

elaborated on how he was to use the money, he admitted to his interrogators that he used some of the money to pay his agents.394 He was probably being truthful with the

exception of substituting OKM Abt A/3 for the Abwehr. It is also possible that the

Abwehr sent him the money to use for intelligence purposes if war broke out.

Upon the outbreak of the war Niebuhr’s first task was to arrange for the departure to Germany of as many merchant ships as possible. Niebuhr was aided in this endeavor

by the embassy, Antonio Delfino, and Thilo Martens, North German Lloyd agent for

Argentina. Niebuhr claimed the embassy was instructed to give him all possible

assistance and not to interfere. He used 500,000 pesos (approximately $170,000) to help bribe officials and secure passage for the ships. It should be noted that the shipping agents paid the actual expenses for supplies, fuel and equipment. The operation was

392 “Memorandum, re. Dietrich Niebuhr,” NARA, RG 65, 64-20041, Box 9, p. 3. 393 See Adam Tooze, The Wages of Destruction: The Making and Breaking of the Nazi Economy (New York: Viking, 2007). 394 “Final Interrogation Report of Kapitan zur See Dietrich Niebuhr,” NARA, RG 65, 64-20041, Box 9, p. 6. 175 considered a success since 50% of the shipping managed to make it safely back to

Germany. Three ships that were unable to leave were later purchased by the Argentine government when it formed its State Merchant Fleet.395

Niebuhr’s skills were tested following the Battle of the River Plate in December

1939. On 13 December 1939 the pocket battleship Graf Spee was forced to put into

Montevideo, Uruguay to repair battle damage from its fight with three British cruisers.

According to international law combat vessels were only allowed to remain in neutral harbors for seventy-two hours. , captain of the Graf Spee, unable to persuade the to extend the deadline, determined that his ship would be unable to defeat the British ships awaiting his exit from the harbor. On 17 December

Langsdorff sailed his ship into international waters and scuttled it. Several days later he committed suicide.396 The German embassy in Buenos Aires asked the Argentine government to accept the internees. The Ortiz government vacillated and claimed it did not have facilities to house the men. While the embassy awaited an answer Niebuhr arranged with his friend Rudolf Hepe to hire Delfino company vessels to bring the surviving one thousand crew members to Argentina. The arrival of the crew members presented the Argentine government with a fait accompli and caused a storm of protest in

395 “Interrogation of Captain Dietrich Niebuhr,” 25 October, 2 and 6 November 1945, RG 59, State Department Special Interrogation Mission (Dewitt C. Poole Mission), Serial M679, Roll 3, p. 10. Poole had served in the U.S. embassy in Buenos Aires during the war. Following Germany’s surrender he was charged with determining the extent of German intelligence activities in Latin America. Despite operating under enormous pressure and time constraints, his team’s interrogations are very well done. It is amazing how much they knew before they sat down and interrogated their subjects and were able to get most to talk freely and honestly. 396 See Rout and Bratzel, The Shadow War, p. 332. The battle was much-publicized and written about. A recent search revealed almost 500 books in Spanish, English and German relating to the Graf Spee and the Battle of the River Plate. It is astonishing that a minor skirmish such as this could generate so much scholarship. 176

Argentina. Niebuhr managed to calm the situation by suggesting that the officers and

men be housed in German structures such as rest homes and schools. The Argentine

government rejected Niebuhr’s suggestion and placed the crew in camps

controlled by the Argentine military. It helped that Niebuhr was generous in handing out

bribes to prevent the crewmembers being returned to Uruguay.397

After ensconcing the crew in their internment camps, Niebuhr set about arranging

their escape back to Europe. He and his assistants, Lieutenant Franz Mammen and

Lieutenant Martin Müller, visited the camps several times and ascertained that the

Argentine guards would do little to stop a determined escape effort. Mammen was a

merchant marine officer whose ship was interned in Uruguay in . When

the ship was sold to Argentina in he moved to Buenos Aires and obtained a

job on Niebuhr’s staff. Mammen’s duties were limited to being a cipher clerk and

performing general duties. Müller was a timber merchant from Hamburg who was

caught in South America when war broke out. He was subsequently attached to

Niebuhr’s office where he acted as Niebuhr’s assistant. Müller also functioned as

Niebuhr’s contact with the various agents employed by the attaché’s office.398 Under

Niebuhr’s orders he directed missions, made payments to agents and contacted

informants. Both men were also commissioned reserve naval officers.399 They stated to

their postwar interrogators that their knowledge of intelligence operations was limited.

Both men claimed Niebuhr was extremely secretive and the only person he appeared to

397 “Memorandum, re. Dietrich Niebuhr,” RG 65, 64-20041, Box 9, p. 8, Rout and Bratzel, The Shadow War, p. 332. 398 “Full Report on Brandt et. al.,” February 28, 1946, NARA, RG 65, 65-56876-1, Box: Targets, pp. 2-3. 399 “Interrogation of Brandt et. al.,” NARA, RG 59, 862.20235/10-1646, Box 6742, p. 2. 177

confide in was Chargé d’ Affairs Meynen.400 In January 1940 two other men, Eugen

Langer (: “Eugen”) and Wilhelm von Seidlitz (code name: “Dicker”) helped

arrange for some Graf Spee crewmembers to be smuggled back to Germany on Spanish and Portuguese ships leaving various ports in Argentina. Other men were taken to Chile where another member of Niebuhr’s network, Friedrich von Schulz-Hausmann, director of North German Lloyd’s Valparaiso affiliate, arranged for their passage back to

Germany via Vladivostok on Japanese flagged ships.401

Like the escape of the merchant ships, the repatriation of the Graf Spee crew was considered a success. Nearly two hundred crewmembers were returned to the Third

Reich. Most were officers and technicians who returned to the war in the Atlantic. The cost of the operation was at least seventy thousand dollars.402 In some ways, it was a

bargain for the German Navy since it got back trained, battle-tested crewmen. In his

postwar interrogation Niebuhr expressed surprise that the Argentine parliament and press

had attacked him for aiding the escape of the Graf Spee crew. He stated that no crew

member had broken his word of honor or taken advantage of any furlough to escape.

Niebuhr emphasized that the sailors were duty-bound to do everything possible to escape.

Nevertheless, Niebuhr explained that the sailors had only promised not to escape when on leave and it was only valid for the duration of the leave. Besides, Niebuhr innocently explained, he had not taken part in the escape of the crew members. How could he, when

400 Ibid, p. 11. 401 For more information on Schulz-Hausmann’s background see NARA, RG 319, GELA, p. 101. 402 “Final Interrogation Report of Kapitan zur See Dietrich Niebuhr,” NARA, RG 65, 64-20041, Box 9, p. 6 and “Sworn Statement of Esteban J. Amorin,” 8 May 1947, NARA, RG 65, 64-20041, Box 9, p. 1. 178

he was sitting at his desk in the embassy?403 Thermann and Niebuhr decided in

November 1940 to halt the escape of the Graf Spee crew.404 The operations were causing

diplomatic problems with other Latin American nations.

Niebuhr also headed the effort to smuggle strategic materials from Latin America to Germany. The smuggling of such materials was initially a low priority. However, the

British made the acquisition of minerals such as mica, platinum

and industrial diamonds imperative since Germany needed these materials for its war

industries. Niebuhr delegated day to day operation of smuggling to Seidlitz. Seidlitz was

also a contact person for Johannes Siegfried Becker, head of SD intelligence for South

America. Seidlitz recruited two Spaniards, Esteban Jesús Amorin and Juan Antonio

Prieto, to scour the dock areas of Buenos Aires and find sailors willing to act as couriers.

Another recruit was José Mella Alfageme, who allegedly worked for Spanish military

intelligence. Over the course of his smuggling career Alfageme admitted to smuggling a

ton and a half of liver extract to German agents in Spain.405 Liver extract was highly

valued since it was thought to improve night vision. While Amorin and Prieto operated

out of Buenos Aires, Alfageme set up his base in Rosario, Argentina’s second largest

403 “Memorandum, re. Dietrich Niebuhr,” NARA, RG 65, 64-20041, Box 9, p. 9 and “Interrogation of Captain Dietrich Niebuhr,” NARA, RG 59/M679/3, p. 11. 404 “Thermann to Berlin,” 30 November 1940, Handakten Clodius, NARA, RG 242/T-120/178/86484, also “The Embassy in Argentina to the Foreign Ministry,” 30 November 1940, Doc. 429, DGFP, D, XI, p. 754. 405 German Espionage in Latin America (hereafter GELA) (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1946), p. 140, NARA, RG 319, Records of the Army Staff, 1903-2006. Leslie B Rout Jr. and John F. Bratzel, The Shadow War: German Espionage and United States Counterespionage in Latin America during World War II (Frederick, MD: University Publications of America, 1986), p. 333. GELA was published by the FBI following the war for use by various agencies in determining the extent of German espionage in Latin America. It is extremely detailed and its findings are supported by documentary evidence from the German archives and interrogation reports. While its conclusions are a bit overdrawn, in the main it is a reliable source. 179

port.406 German agents in Argentina copied their predecessors from World War I and

developed a sophisticated communication and smuggling network to Europe. Spanish

steamers that put into ports in Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay were used to transmit

military and economic reports back to Germany.407 While shipboard smuggling was

essential for bulky items, most of the mica, platinum and industrial diamonds were

smuggled via the Italian airline LATI which had flights from South America to Europe

until January 1942. With the invasion of Russia in June 1941 Germany’s need for these

materials increased and the Abwehr station in Berlin decided to send an agent dedicated

solely to the acquisition of needed materials. The agent, Georg Bücker, was a member of

the I-L section (which handled aviation intelligence) in the Berlin Abwehr station.

The Abwehr was a large organization with a cumbersome command structure. It consisted of four functional divisions and one administrative division. Abteilung I was the largest. It coordinated operations and forwarded requests for information from other agencies and then sent the answers to the requesting agency. Abteilung II was responsible for physical sabotage and undermining enemy morale. It was under the command of Colonel, later Major-General, Erwin Lahousen. Abteilung III was responsible for counter-sabotage, counter-espionage and security and was under the control of Colonel, later Major-General Franz-Eccard von Bentivegni. The administrative section, Abteilung Z was under the direction of Colonel, later General

406 See “Full Report of Gottfried Julius Brandt, Johann Martin Müller, Wilhelm von Pochhammer, Friedrich Grimm, Franz Mammen, Heinrich Volberg,” (hereafter Full Report of Brandt et. al.), February 28, 1946, NARA, RG 65, 65-56876-1, Box: Targets, pp. ii and iv-vi. 407 Sheinin, Searching for Authority, p. 84. 180

Hans Oster.408 It performed administrative and finance operations for the respective

Abteilungen. It also functioned as a historical archive and records-keeping department.409

There was also a foreign section called Amtsgruppe Ausland, which dealt with the various military attachés throughout the world. Though attachés were nominally under the control of their respective services they also served as intelligence gathering personnel and forwarded pertinent information to the Abwehr.410

The principle task of the administrative sections was to supervise the units which carried out espionage and sabotage missions on the ground. These units were called

Abwehrstellen, commonly abbreviated to Ast. Before the war there were twenty-one

Abwehrstellen, one for each military district in Germany. As the German army conquered more territory this number increased to thirty-three. Each Ast was usually commanded by an army colonel or navy captain and each was organized along the same lines as the headquarters in Berlin with an intelligence, sabotage and counterintelligence section. While the division chiefs in Berlin nominally issued orders and guidelines to the respective Ast, the Ast commanders could go directly to Canaris. Additionally each Ast was responsible for recruiting and training of agents. The Asts responsible for the

Western Hemisphere were in Berlin, Hamburg and Brussels. Abwehrstellen also had branch offices called Nebenstellen, abbreviated as Nest. They were organized along the same lines as their parent Abwehrstellen and recruited and directed their own agents.

408 Oster was a participant in numerous plots to overthrow Hitler. He was arrested, tried and sentenced to death by . See Michael Müller, The Life and Death of Hitler’s , Geoffrey Brooks, trans. (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2007), pp. 257-258. 409 Kahn, Hitler’s Spies, 237-238 and Lauran Paine, German Military Intelligence in World War II: The Abwehr (New York: Stein and Day, 1984), pp. 12-13. 410 See Testimony of General Erwin Lahousen, 31 October 1945, NARA, RG 59/ M679/2/945-46. Lahousen describes the relationship between the Abwehr and attachés. 181

Commanded by a lieutenant colonel or commander, the two Nebenstellen concerned with

Latin America were Nest Cologne and Nest .411

Alfred Burmeister, the commercial attaché in the embassy in Buenos Aires, was

charged with procuring funds for Bücker through Niebuhr.412 However, by the time he reached Buenos Aires in December 1941, Germany was at war with the U.S. and the

LATI air route was shut down. The emphasis thus shifted to shipboard smuggling of materials.413 Germany’s declaration of war on the U.S. also caused problems for

Niebuhr’s smuggling network in procuring needed materials. Recognizing Germany’s

need for platinum and other materials, the U.S. attempted to stop the sale of these minerals to German agents by contracting for the purchase of all legitimate stocks of platinum.414

These contracts drove up the price of platinum on the . By June

1942, the price had reached two hundred dollars an ounce. Sellers could charge such a high price since German agents were the only other market for their materials. The rise in prices for strategic materials forced the network to seek funds from Burmeister. On 6

November 1941 Ambassador Thermann reported the departure of a courier, Gustav

Kahlmann, traveling with two platinum bars worth 15,874 pesos (approximately

$3500.00). The bars had been purchased per instructions of the Auswärtiges Amt to the

411 Rout Bratzel, The Shadow War, pp. 5-6. 412 “Full Report on Brandt et. al.,” February 28, 1946, NARA, RG 65, 65-56876-1, Box: Targets, pp. iv-vi and “Memorandum re; General Friedrich Wolf,” 17 October 1945, NARA, RG 84, Records of the Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State, 1788-1964, Buenos Aries Embassy General Reports, File 820.02, box 533, appendix D, p. ix. 413 See “Memorandum re: Georg Bücker,” NARA, RG 84, 820.02, box 533 and “Memorandum re; General Friedrich Wolf,” 17 October 1945, NARA, RG 84, 820.02, box 533, appendix D, p. xvii. 414 The U.S. undertook vigorous efforts to stop the purchase of materials by German agents. See Rout and Bratzel, The Shadow War, pp. 334-335. 182

embassies in Rio de Janeiro and Buenos Aires.415 The extent of the network can be measured by estimates that placed the value of platinum, mica and industrial diamonds smuggled to Germany from 1941-44 at $1 million.416 Thermann later denied any

knowledge of smuggling activities, but the evidence suggests otherwise. When the LATI

air route was running it smuggled strategic materials back to Europe from 1940-41.417

Given the difficulty of traveling on LATI with the war in progress, the embassies in Rio de Janeiro and Buenos Aires had to have aided in the transport of these materials, especially if a courier was used.418

Niebuhr understood that intelligence activities were incompatible with his

diplomatic status. To give himself plausible deniability Niebuhr operated through a

series of front men who would meet with agents, make payments, and if necessary, take

the blame in order to protect him. One of Niebuhr’s recruits was Thilo Martens. Martens

was the North German Lloyd Agent in Buenos Aires. Kapitan zur See Werner Dietel, head of the German Marine Auslands, which focused on foreign navy operations, later claimed that Martens had been an agent of the Sonderdienst since at least

1935.419 Martens was in Germany when the war broke out discussing unknown matters

with Sonderdienst personnel. Having served in the Navy in World War I, Martens wanted to rejoin the Navy, but Canaris persuaded him to return to Argentina. Canaris

assured him that he would be more valuable there. Martens returned to Argentina

415 “Thermann to Berlin,” 6 November 1941, Handakten Wiehl, RG 242/T-120/269/199292. 416 Rout and Bratzel, The Shadow War, pp. 334 417 “Enclosure to Dispatch No. 8342: Smuggling of Strategic Materials Out of Argentina for Enemy Destinations,” 25 January 1943, RG 84, 820.02, Box 33, p. 3. 418 Johannes Siegfried Becker is a good example of the difficulty in traveling on LATI in 1940-41, see chapter 5. 419 “Preliminary Interrogation Report on Capitan Werner Dietel, Chief of the German Marine Sonderdienst,” 19 , NARA, RG 59, 862.20235/10-1946, Box: Niebuhr, p. 2. 183

through and the United States and then by airplane to Argentina. He then served as an intermediary between Niebuhr and agents in Brazil and Argentina.420

German businesses in Latin America provided cover for intelligence activities. It

was not unusual for shipping agents to be around dock areas where they could report on ships arriving and departing. Businessmen could also travel without arousing suspicion.

While businesses were ostensibly rivals, members of the Abwehr and SD acting under business cover could visit counterparts in other countries without drawing suspicion. In his post-war interrogation Hans Haack, an official in the AA Politische Abteilung

(Political Department), stated that the Delfino Company was especially helpful in this regard.421 Ottomar Müller, Hans Napp and Friedrich Tadeo von Schulz-Hausmann

operated under the guise of businessmen in carrying out their activities.422 The shipping company Transmare set up by the Abwehr as an intelligence front in Argentina was

reportedly so successful that the business covered the costs of its agents. The German

radio company was also active in financing intelligence activities and money

it allotted for this was credited to its account in Germany.423 Surely the men running these

businesses knew of their employees activities. Gathering and transmitting information is

a time-consuming process that would interfere with any legitimate business the company

420 Ibid and Rout and Bratzel, The Shadow War, p. 232. Though Martens was arrested in 1942 and 1944 in connection with espionage activities on both occasions he was released after a few days. In 1945 Martens visited the Legal Attaché at the U.S. embassy in Buenos Aires and denied he ever took part in any intelligence operations. He claimed that he never took part in any activity that aided the German war effort and any activities which may have aided that effort were only done in the normal course of his duties at North German Lloyd. See “Memorandum: re Thilo Martens,” 5 October 1945, RG 59, 862.20235/10-3045, Box 6736: Becker, pp. 1-5. 421 “Affidavit of Hans Haack Regarding Argentine-German Collaboration,” 18 January 1946, RG 59, 862.20235/4-2646, ABB, Box 6740, p. 4. 422 Kahn, Hitler’s Spies , p. 279. 423 Mader, Hitlers spionagegenerale, 90 also “Affidavit of Hedwig Sommer,” RG 59, 862.20235/4-2626, ABB, Box 6740, p. 7. 184

was conducting. The companies that participated in these activities probably felt that

they were doing their patriotic duty, especially from 1939-42 when it appeared Germany

would win the war.

Niebuhr’s first network was in Brazil and codenamed “CEL.” At the beginning of

the war German’s viewed Brazil as the major base of operations. It had a large colony of

almost 800,000 ethnic Germans as well as air routes to Europe which facilitated the

sending of intelligence reports to Germany.424 The head of “CEL” was Friedrich Kempter

(codename: “King”). Kempter, a German citizen, had been in South America since 1923

working for various German firms. Kempter’s recruitment is instructive as it shows the

ad hoc nature of Abwehr intelligence operations and shows how the Abwehr was forced

to use untrained people who, under normal circumstances, would never have been

considered for intelligence work. Kempter’s recruitment also shows the unorthodox

methods the Abwehr employed to find people willing to engage in intelligence work.

The outbreak of the war in 1939 found Kempter unemployed. By January 1940

he obtained a position as representative of the Krack-Schwenzer firm. The following

month he received a letter from his employer stating that the Swedish firm of Nordisk

Durium Aktiebolaget, a credit reporting company with offices in Hamburg, wanted to hire

him. Nordisk wanted him to send shipping information and cargo manifests along with

other information to a post office box in Hamburg. Kempter later claimed that he had no

knowledge of any spy work and that he had no idea what the information was for, but he

dutifully gathered it. He later claimed that he was sent a letter telling him that since 1

424 For a detailed account of German activities in Brazil see, Stanley Hilton, Hitler's Secret War in South America, 1939-1945: German Military Espionage and Allied Counterespionage in Brazil (New York: Ballantine Books, 1982). 185

March 1940 he was an agent of the Abwehr working for Ast Hamburg’s I-M section,

which covered naval matters. Despite his mail-order recruitment, Kempter was

industrious and effective so much so that he was eventually decorated with the War

Service Cross First Class, with swords.425

Thanks to his success in setting up the “CEL” network in Brazil, Kempter was

ordered to Buenos Aires to attempt the same thing. The new network was codenamed

“Meldeköpfe (MK or Message Center) Argentina.” Two agents who Kempter recruited

would be problematic for Niebuhr: Ottomar Müller (codename: “Otis”) and Hans Jakob

Napp (codename: “Berko”). Müller was a fanatical Nazi who broadcast a show called

“The German Hour” on a local radio station. Like Kempter, Müller was solicited through

the mail in early 1940 by a Hamburg-based firm, Schmitt and Company, which was

operating as a front for Ast Hamburg. The Abwehr could not always recruit the most

capable agents. His handlers directed Müller to provide reports on British ships entering

and leaving Buenos Aires. Müller must have been diligent, at least in the beginning.

Captain Herman Menzel, chief of I-M told Niebuhr that Müller was a “trusted V-man

(Vertrauensmann or informer)” who should “work by himself.”426 Müller’s partner Napp

however, was a ne’er do well who had been convicted of extortion and passing bad

checks. He also had the habit of carrying a .38 revolver. Despite Menzel’s instructions,

Müller and Napp eventually came under Niebuhr’s authority.427

425 Rout and Bratzel, The Shadow War, pp. 126-127. 426 Rout and Bratzel, The Shadow War, p. 127. 427 Franz Mammen, Martin Müller and Wilhelm von Pochhammer state that Ottomar Müller and Napp were only placed under Niebuhr’s control after receiving direct orders from Berlin to do so. See “Interrogation of Brandt et. al.,” NARA, RG 59, 862.20235/10-1946, Box 6742, p. ii and NARA, RG 65, 65-56876-1, Box: Targets, p ii. For his part, Niebuhr gave contradictory statements claiming that sometime in 1941 Müller showed up at his office asking him to help set up a communications network so he could pass his 186

Müller and Napp’s first recruit was Walter Freiwald (codename: “Tannin”), a

Volksdeutsch born in Paraguay and a professional diver, recruited in May 1941. Freiwald was an eager recruit who wanted to place bombs on British ships docked in Buenos Aires harbor. Müller and Napp radioed their superiors in Hamburg that Freiwald had an intimate knowledge of the Buenos Aires harbor floor and asked for “your exact opinion before we continue further with this matter.” 428 The OKW had forbidden sabotage in the

U.S. and South America as of 18 June 1940. In keeping with the ad hoc nature of German policy in South America, the AA failed to inform the embassy of this order.429 What

Niebuhr thought of Müller and Napp’s scheme is unknown.

Even plans for sabotage seemed to be ad hoc. When the war broke out in

September 1939 the British had expected sabotage to be directed against their ships in

Buenos Aires.430 This threat was very real. In May 1939, Niebuhr was briefed on a top secret operation called “Operation South Pole.” This operation was the creation of

Colonel Erwin Lahousen, head of Abwehr Abteilung II. While Abwehr Abteilung I was nominally in charge of sabotage, Lahousen’s group was separate and directly responsible

reports to Germany. Niebuhr stated he was not impressed and requested instructions and was told that while Müller was an Abwehr agent he should have nothing to do with him. Conversely, he claimed that Müller showed up claiming to be in financial difficulties and wanted a reward for his “valuable services to the Reich.” Niebuhr alleged that he averred and that three or four months later Müller showed up stating that he was destitute and his wife was ill with tuberculosis. Niebuhr agreed to cable Berlin and stated that he received orders to pay Müller a sum of 700 pesos a month. Niebuhr’s story regarding Napp is fairly similar, however Niebuhr never admitted that they worked for him as agents. See “Niebuhr Memo,” NARA, RG 65, 64-20041, Box 9, p. 5 and “Interrogation of Captain Dietrich Niebuhr,” RG 59/M679/3, p. 4. 428 Untitled report Special Intelligence Service, Miami Beach, Florida, 26 April 1944, Enclosure 2: “South America to Germany” 12 May 1941, NARA, RG 165, Box 966: Axis and Subversive Activities, Argentina, n.p. Also in NARA, RG 84, Records of the Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State, Buenos Aires Embassy Confidential Files, 820.02, Box 19 File 18. 429 “The High Command of the Wehrmacht to the Foreign Ministry,” 18 June 1940, Doc. 483, DGFP, D, 9, p. 616. In a marginal note made on a draft telegram, it was decided not to send a copy of the order to Buenos Aires because of “military reasons.” 430 See “Ovey to Foreign Office,” 28 October 1939, TNA, FO 371/22757. 187

to Abwehr headquarters in Berlin. The first two members were Karl Otto Grohl, a

German engineer working for the Brazilian government, and Albert Julius von Appen

(codename: “Apfel”), an employee of Hamburg-American shipping line in Valparaiso,

Chile. Grohl and Appen traveled to Germany for sabotage training and returned to their

respective countries in January 1940. In June 1940 they were joined by Georg Konrad

Friedrich Blass (codename: “Dr. Brown”). Blass had been selected by Lahousen to act as sabotage chief in South America. By November 1940, Blass and his recruits were ready to undertake sabotage operations in South America.431

Niebuhr and Thermann were against undertaking “Operation South Pole.” They argued that the effects of the sabotage were likely to be minimal compared to the vehement reaction the sabotage would provoke.432 Niebuhr told Lahousen that the

Abwehr could either conduct sabotage or collect intelligence, but it could not do both

effectively. Despite Niebuhr’s objections Appen, now Abwehr chief of operations for

Argentina, Chile and Peru, directed Merchant Marine Captain Wilhelm Lange to attack

the British merchant ship Gascony in Buenos Aires harbor. On June 10, one of two

bombs brought aboard the ship by an Argentine accomplice exploded prematurely. The

bomb damaged the ships engines, blew a hole in the hull and killed the person who

planted the bombs. Instead of being praised for his actions Lange was subjected to a

savage dressing-down from Niebuhr and a reprimand from Blass.433

431 Rout and Bratzel, The Shadow War, pp. 449-452. 432 “Thermann to Berlin,” 30 November 1940, Büro des Staatssekretärs, NARA, RG 242/T-120/178/86484 433 Rout and Bratzel, The Shadow War, pp. 449-451 and Newton, The ‘Nazi Menace,’ p. 247. 188

Despite Menzel’s confidence Niebuhr had contempt for Müller and Napp and did

nothing to disguise it.434 Müller was ordered by Niebuhr to cease all sabotage and set up a

radio network to report on ships movements in Buenos Aires harbor. According to Rout,

Bratzel and Newton, there were two problems: Müller had no knowledge about how to

operate a radio and he lacked enthusiasm for the more pedestrian task. Still, Müller set about cultivating contacts. Sometime in July 1941 Müller claimed he was offered a new bombsight invented by an Argentine officer and asked if the Abwehr was interested.

While the Abwehr was interested it wanted to know more about the device and cautioned

Müller that the offer could be made up in order to expose him as a German agent.435

Ultimately, the offer went nowhere.

In examining the documentary record it is of interest that the Abwehr managed its agents to a far greater degree than the SD, which, at the start of the war, gave its agents general instructions regarding assignments. Müller and Napp’s activities are documented on an almost daily basis for a period of over a year. These messages detail not only

Müller and Napp’s activities, but Freiwald’s and Niebuhr’s.436 Perhaps Müller and Napp

needed to be kept under a guiding hand in order to carry out their activities. It is hard to

say without the records of the Abwehr, but the archival record shows two conscientious

agents attempting to fulfill their superior’s orders.

434 “Interrogation of Dietrich Niebuhr,” 20 June 1946, CI-FIR/115, NARA, RG 238, Collection of World War II War Crimes Records, 1933 – 1950, box 7, annex 2, pp. 10-11. 435 “Untitled report Special Intelligence Service, Miami Beach, Florida,” 26 April 1944, Enclosure 2: “South America to Germany” 7 & 15 July 1941, NARA, RG 165, Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs, 1860 – 1952, Box 966: Axis and Subversive Activities, Argentina, n.p. 436 See “Untitled report Special Intelligence Service, Miami Beach, Florida,” 26 April 1944, Enclosures 1- 8, NARA, RG 165, Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs, 1860 – 1952, Box 966: Axis and Subversive Activities, Argentina and “Enclosures to Espionage Groups I, II and III,” no date, NARA, RG 84, Buenos Aires Embassy Confidential File, 820.02, File 18, Box 19. 189

Another agent who was part of the Niebuhr organization was Hans Rudolf Leo

Harnisch (codenames: “Boss,” “Kopf,” and “Viereck”) who provided economic

intelligence for the Abwehr. Like Müller and Napp, Harnisch become infamous for espionage. In terms of evidence Harnisch’s espionage involvement is more problematic

than that of Müller and Napp. Harnisch admitted to espionage in his 1947 interrogation,

but he claimed his value was limited. Harnisch was born in Hamburg on July 23, 1898.

In 1920, Harnisch immigrated to Argentina and worked for five years as a representative

of an import-export firm. In 1925 Harnisch settled permanently in Argentina and became

relatively prosperous. In 1936 he joined the steel firm of Böker y CIA (Böker and

Company) as a solicitor and in 1939 joined the NSDAP. Harnisch claimed that he only

joined the Party in order to overcome a series of difficulties that the Party was creating

for him. He later claimed he withdrew his application in 1940. NSDAP records only

show him joining on October 1, 1939, but not his withdrawal.437 By 1940 it seemed

Harnisch’s fortunes were taking a turn for the better when he was approached by Richard

Staudt a well-known Buenos Aires businessman. Staudt offered him the position of

director in Bromberg y CIA which was part of the Staudt consortium. Staudt wanted to

reorganize the company as a purely Argentine enterprise and eliminate any German

capital in the firm. This was probably to minimize the interference of Müller and the AO

in the operation of his business.

437 “Report of Interrogation of Hans Rudolf Leo Harnisch (hereafter Harnisch interrogation),” July- September 1947, NARA, RG 84, Buenos Aires Political Reports (hereafter BAPR), File 862.20235/10- 3147, Box 102, p. 4. While the Harnisch interrogation is contradictory in places, some of his more controversial assertions regarding Hellmuth, Konnecke and Becker are backed up by Gustav Utzinger in his interrogation. See “Affidavit of Wolf Emil Franczok Alias Gustav Utzinger,” 17 September 1947, NARA, RG 65, Records of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, File 64-22460-13, Box 14, p. 3. 190

In 1941 Harnisch traveled to Germany on business for Staudt. While in Hamburg

preparing to leave Germany Harnisch made the acquaintance of a “Dr. Kramer.” Kramer

had been told about Harnisch by an unnamed business associate. Kramer asked him if he

could give him copies of monthly economic reports on Argentina that Harnisch prepared

for Böker. Harnisch agreed and Kramer provided him with an address in Cologne where

he could send the reports. Kramer claimed to represent several industrial combines, but

Harnisch later learned that he worked for the Abwehr. Harnisch returned to South

America on June 25, 1941. On the return flight he met Major Ludwig von Bohlen who

was going to Chile as the German Air Attaché. Harnisch and Bohlen struck up a quick

friendship and kept in touch when Bohlen was in Buenos Aires. Upon his return to South

America Harnisch provided the requested information, sending it to Berlin via LATI.

When the LATI air route was shut down in 1942 Harnisch allegedly stopped sending his

reports. For months, he later claimed he heard nothing until Niebuhr called him to the

embassy and asked him why he was not sending his reports. Harnisch explained that with the closure of the air route he could not get his information to Germany. Harnisch later claimed that Niebuhr did not press the point possibly because he had recruited

Werner Könnecke, Harnisch’s subordinate at Böker y CIA, to obtain the requested information.438 However, Harnisch continued to frequent the embassy where his relationship with the diplomatic staff was tense. In 1942, Meynen informed the AA that

“I do not like Harnisch as business manager …. [he] does not enjoy our confidence.”439

438 Ibid, p. 5&15. 439 Newton, The ‘Nazi Menace’, p 304. 191

Harnisch’s alleged refusal to work was no loss to the Niebuhr organization since

Könnecke had access to the same information. It consisted of data on the production of chrome, steel and other metals in the U.S. and other countries. When in Harnisch was

shown by his postwar military interrogator reports that had allegedly originated with him,

he denied that he was the author. Though the material came from his office, he claimed

that Könnecke and another member of Niebuhr’s organization, Carlos (Charlie) Neiling,

had altered the messages and that many were false.440 Like other claims made by

Harnisch, these were false.

Despite this, Niebuhr managed to make his motley crew function somewhat

effectively. The fact that Taborda’s committee was unable to discover the existence of

Niebuhr’s network is either a testament to Niebuhr’s diligence and ingenuity or bribery

on a massive scale, more than likely both. While the end of 1941 saw the expulsion of

the German ambassador, Niebuhr’s organization continued to operate unbothered.

However, 1942 brought more problems that required Niebuhr to refocus his efforts and rebuild networks shattered by Brazil’s breaking of diplomatic relations with Germany in

February 1942 and its declaration of war on Germany in August 1942. The U.S. looked on with dismay at German efforts to rebuild intelligence networks that were broken up following the Rio Conference.

Niebuhr had expended great effort in setting up an intelligence-gathering network in Brazil. This network under Kempter’s direction had established several radio

440 Utzinger supported this assertion stating to his interrogators that many of the messages attributed to Harnisch were delivered to him by Könnecke or one of his associates. While this does not prove that Harnisch was not the author of the messages, it makes their provenance more problematic. “Report of Interrogation of Wolf Emil Franczok Alias Gustav Utzinger,” NARA, RG 65, File 64-22460-13, Box 14, p. 8. 192

networks under what was known as “FMK Brazil” (Funkmeldeköpfe: Radio Reporting

Point).441 Through cajolery and bribery at the Rio Conference, the U.S. closed this

important intelligence-gathering area. Brazilian authorities quickly arrested the members

of Kempter’s network. U.S. Ambassador Jefferson Caffery also demanded that Brazil

arrest German Ambassador Curt Prüfer, military attaché General Gunther Niedenführ,

and Press Attaché Walter von Cossel. Such would have been a serious breach of

diplomatic protocol. Usually when accredited diplomats were accused of espionage they

were declared persona non grata and ordered to leave the country. Vargas, under

pressure from his Minister of Justice, Francisco Campos, and Chief of Police in the

Federal District, Major Felinto Muller, rejected Caffrey’s “request.” The AA knew of

Caffrey’s demand since Muller had informed Niedenführ.442 Caffery with the support of

Aranha and Vasco Leitão da Cunha, Campos’s successor as Minister of Justice, managed

to have Muller removed from his post.443 The FBI quickly established a presence in

Brazil and proceeded to take the lead in rounding up Kempter’s operatives. Germany

retaliated by targeting Brazilian ships in the Atlantic.444

There is disagreement over the effectiveness of Niebuhr’s remaining network in

Argentina in 1942 and afterwards. Rout and Bratzel describe the efforts of “MK

Argentina” as “not merely uninspiring, [but] unrelieved mediocrity.”445 Ronald Newton

441 The networks under the control of FMK Brazil included the LIR, CIT, LFS, JOH-RND and others throughout Brazil. See Rout and Bratzel, The Shadow War, chapter 4 and Stanley Hilton, Hitler's Secret War in South America. 442 Rout and Bratzel, The Shadow War, pp. 175. For the messages identifying Muller as an informant see “Prüfer to AA,” Büro des Staatssekretärs, Akten Betreffend: Brasilien, Band 1, NARA, RG 242/T- 120/223/157294-157295. 443 Ibid, p. 176. 444 Newton, The ‘Nazi Menace,’ p. 238. 445 Rout and Bratzel, The Shadow War, p. 336. 193

goes further stating that Niebuhr’s network was a failure since British cryptographers had broken the Enigma code and warned ships in danger.446 Rout and Bratzel’s assertions are

closer to the mark. A memorandum dated 26 May 1943 from Captain A. v. S. Pickhardt,

Assistant Director, Intelligence Group, Division of Naval Intelligence, provides

information on the sinking of ships sunk by enemy action while sailing to and from

Buenos Aires.447 It lists 38 ships sunk in the period between 8 March 1942 and 1 May

1943, for an average of 2 ½ ships a month out of a total of 1168.448 While it is difficult to prove conclusively that Niebuhr’s network contributed directly to these sinkings, this

memorandum provides evidence that a fair number of ships departing Buenos Aires were attacked. It not a very distinguished record, but it shouldn’t be regarded as a failure. The

volume of messages leaving Buenos Aires regarding enemy shipping movements bears

this out.449 Agents are not responsible for how their intelligence is used.

Niebuhr scrambled to fill the void left by the end of his network in Brazil. He had

little confidence in Ottomar Müller and Hans Jakob Napp, his erstwhile subordinates in

Argentina. Kempter had also lost confidence in Müller and in October 1941 ordered him to turn over his duties to Napp and disassociate himself from “MK Argentina.” It appears his confidence in Napp was misplaced as well. In January 1942 Kempter ordered Napp to stop sending reports to Brazil and send them directly to Niebuhr. At the same time

446 Newton, The ‘Nazi Menace,’ p. 251. 447 “Memorandum for Liaison Officer, Subject: Ships sunk sailing to and from Buenos Aires,” 26 May 1943, NARA, RG 59, 862.20210/2381, Box 849. I would like to thank John Bratzel for providing me with this document. 448 Figures are from Samuel Eliot Morison, The Battle of the Atlantic, 1939-1943, History of United States Naval Operations in World War II, Volume I (New York: Little Brown & Co., 1947), p. 410. 449 See especially, Records of the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht, Amt Ausland Abwehr, RG 242/T 77/137, this roll contains reports from South America to Abwehr Nebenstelle, Bremen. Most of the reports on this roll contain information on shipping arriving and departing Buenos Aires. 194

Niebuhr was under pressure from his superiors in Germany to make Argentina a full-

fledged FMK.450 He cobbled together a network, but Niebuhr knew he needed a

professional to handle transmissions between Argentina and Germany. In July 1942 he found such a person in Gustav Utzinger (real name: Wolf Emil Franczok, codename:

“Luna”).

Utzinger’s path to Argentina was circuitous. He was born in Munich on March

10, 1914. He graduated from Gymnasium in 1932 and then attended Berlin University and the Technische Höchschule from 1932-39 with a one year break in 1935-36 to complete his service in the German Navy. On the outbreak of the war Utzinger was called to active service. He claimed to his postwar interrogators that in 1940 he was released from active duty in order to finish his doctorate in electronics. In fact he served as a technical advisor to the Reichs Minister of Economics, the German Navy and RSHA

Amt VI.451 By the summer of 1941 Amt VI was satisfied with Becker’s progress in organizing an intelligence network in Argentina and entrusted Utzinger with handling

Becker’s radio transmissions. Ewald Geppert, Theodor Paeffgen’s predecessor as head of Amt VI/D which covered the Americas, decided that Utzinger was the man most qualified for that position.452

Utzinger claimed in his postwar interrogation that he was neither a member of the

SS or the RSHA.453 But it is highly unlikely the SD would have entrusted such a sensitive

450 Ibid, p. 250. 451 “Utzinger Interrogation,” July-September 1947, NARA, RG 65, 64-22460-13, Box 14, p. 2, “Report of Interview of Elizabeth Hedwig Weigelmayer Sommer,” 5 October 1945, NARA, RG 65, 65-56221, Box 211, p. 19. 452 Ibid. 453 “Utzinger Interrogation,” July-September 1947, NARA, RG 65, 64-22460-13, Box 14, p. 2. 195 position to someone outside of the organization. In any event, Utzinger’s cover was to be as a representative of Telefunken, a German radio firm that allowed Amt VI operatives to use employment as representatives of the company as cover. Telefunken covered the cost of intelligence-gathering operations and was later reimbursed.454 Utzinger departed Berlin

in August 1941 for Rome where Eva Markhart, the Telefunken representative and Amt VI

operative, made arrangements for his Brazilian visa. Utzinger arrived in Rio de Janeiro in September 1941. He later claimed that he only met Becker briefly.455 This is doubtful

since Utzinger and Heinz Lange sent a message to Germany stating they did not want to

work with Becker.456 Following Becker’s departure, Utzinger devoted his time to cutting and smuggling quartz back to Germany.457

In January 1942 Utzinger made contact with Benno Sobisch, who was part of the

Abwehr’s “CEL” network in Brazil. Sobisch wanted Utzinger to help build a power source to reactivate a transmitter used by Friedrich Schlegel, another member of the network.458 The project was abandoned when Brazil broke relations with the Axis. With

German intelligence networks smashed and its members arrested, Utzinger needed to

454 This is confirmed in “John Edgar Hoover to James F. Joice Jr.,” 8 October 1945, NARA, RG 65, 64- 22460, Box 14, p. 1. The memo was an extract from the interrogation of Eva Markhart who served as the Telefunken representative in Rome related Utzinger’s arrival there and the fact that he carried a letter of introduction from a Dr. (fnu) Landsberg of the company. Sommer relates she was in contact with a certain Dr. Landsberg at Telefunken as well. See “Report of Interview of Elizabeth Hedwig Weigelmayer Sommer,” 5 October 1945, NARA, RG 65, 65-56221, Box 211, p. 19. 455 Sommer claims unequivocally that Utzinger was to be part of Becker’s network. However, by the time Utzinger arrived in Brazil Becker was on his way back to Germany to confer with Schellenberg, Daufeldt and Geppert. Given the chronology and the expectation that Becker would return relatively quickly to South America (see chapter 4). Utzinger was probably told by Becker to assist the Abwehr network in Brazil until his return. 456 “Report of Interview of Hedwig Elisabeth Weigelmayer Sommer,” p. 34. Interestingly Utzinger’s interrogators never followed up on this since they probably knew he was lying about his SD association. 457 “Utzinger Interrogation,” July-September 1947, NARA, RG 65, 64-22460-13, Box 14, p. 2. 458 Rout and Bratzel, The Shadow War, p. 348. Utzinger claims Sobisch was not a member of the CEL network, but merely did “technical work” for Friedrich Kempter. See “Utzinger Interrogation,” July- September 1947, NARA, RG 65, 64-22460-13, Box 14, p. 3. 196

leave Brazil. He departed Brazil for Argentina using a forged in the name of

Juan Manuel Stewart and arrived in Buenos Aires in April 1942. On his arrival he made contact with his superiors in Berlin using the Telefunken radio network in Argentina.

Sometime during Utzinger’s time in Brazil, or his brief sojourn in Argentina, he met

Major Pablo Stagni, commander-in-chief of the Paraguayan air force. Stagni felt

Utzinger would be a valuable employee for the Paraguayan Air Force. Stagni knew of

Utzinger’s employment by the SD and still offered him a job.459 Stagni (codename:

“Hermann”) was later identified as a German spy.460 Utzinger later claimed that

Telefunken gave him permission to sever his contacts with the company and secure

employment with the government of Paraguay.461 More likely, Amt VI gave him

permission to enter into Paraguayan service.

Utzinger traveled to Asunción to take up a position as a radio-engineer with the

Paraguayan air force. Following a three-month probationary period he was appointed

“Professor for Radio-communications and Meteorology” at the Paraguayan War

Academy.462 Paraguay was nominally pro-Allied. President Higinio Morínigo depended

on the U.S. supplying the country with economic and military aid.463 Washington also

understood that the Paraguay’s support for the Allies was contingent on the aid the U.S.

459 In his interrogation Utzinger does not tell when he met Stagni. Rout and Bratzel, The Shadow War, p. 348 notes 162-163. 460 See History of the SIS, Volume 3: Accomplishments Mexico-Venezuela, declassified 8/10/04, pp. 529- 530. For Stagni’s identification as a German agent see “Argentina to Berlin,” 28 February 1943, NARA, RG 226, Records of the OSS, OSS Communications Office Records, Ultra Decrypts, Box 19. For details of Stagni’s cooperation with German intelligence see chapter 6. 461 “Utzinger Interrogation,” July-September 1947, NARA, RG 65, 64-22460-13, Box 14, p. 3. 462 “Utzinger Interrogation,” July-September 1947, NARA, RG 65, 64-22460-13, Box 14, p. 3. 463 For this see Michael Grow, Economic Expansion and Great Power Rivalry in Latin America during World War II in Paraguay (Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press, 1981), pp. 69-70 and 75-76. Rout and Bratzel, The Shadow War, pp. 348-349. 197

provided. The U.S. was also aware of the pro-German sympathies of many Paraguayan

military officers. Surely the Americans would not have approved of an active SD agent

securing a sensitive position with the Paraguayan armed forces.

In July 1942 Utzinger made the first of several trips to Buenos Aires in the

company of Stagni. In Argentina he met Niebuhr who asked him for help in setting up a

radio network. Niebuhr turned to Utzinger because Müller and Napp were incompetent.

In his postwar interrogation Niebuhr said as much. Müller and Napp, he said, used “a

childish code that any professional could break.”464 But he denied knowing of any

intelligence activities carried out by Utzinger and claimed to know only of Utzinger in his capacity as an employee of Telefunken. Niebuhr stated that he had no need of Utzinger’s

services since he had his own Enigma coding machine.465

Utzinger was more forthcoming. Niebuhr, Utzinger told his interrogators, was

under intense pressure from his superiors to establish a secure radio connection with

Germany. Niebuhr, he continued, knew of the competition between the SD, Abwehr, and

AA and the need to keep each organization separate for security reasons. But, as

Utzinger noted he and Niebuhr both understood that if their respective SD and Abwehr

networks were to succeed they needed to cooperate regardless of the security risk and

competition between their agencies. Both men agreed that they would not inform

superiors in Germany of their cooperation for the moment.466

464 “Interrogation of Captain Dietrich Niebuhr,” 10 November 1945, State Department Special Interrogation Mission, NARA, RG 59, Serial M679, Roll 3, Frame 936. 465 Ibid. 466 “Affidavit of Wolf Emil Franczok,” 17 September 1947, NARA, RG 65, File 64-22460-14, Box 14, p. 2. 198

However, Utzinger and Niebuhr subsequently changed their minds. Utzinger proposed to Niebuhr a system whereby the rival intelligence organizations in Berlin would believe that they “owned” their own radio network. In reality, one transmitter was used utilizing the frequencies and codes of each individual organization. This gave the impression of an extensive radio network. It should be noted that in this instance

Utzinger was successful in this scheme. The U.S. believed that the so-called “Bolivar” network was more extensive than it was.467 Utzinger was not sure that his

would be believed since there was only one receiving station in Germany reliable enough

to handle all the message traffic. He regarded the whole situation as foolish. Utzinger

felt that any competent individual would figure out that the messages were all coming

from the same transmitter since they went to the same receiver. However, given the

technical issues involved as well as the lack of qualified radio operators this was the best

that could be done.

Another issue was how to finance the joint network. Utzinger and Niebuhr

decided that each group, the Embassy, the Abwehr, and the SD, would all pay according

to their use of the network. It was agreed that the ratio for expenses would be 7:3:3

respectively. In his postwar interrogation Utzinger stated that he also demanded that the

accounting books for the radio organization be kept by an individual unaffiliated with any

group.468 A minimum of $60,000 was spent on “Bolivar” in 1943. Utzinger claimed

467 See, German Espionage in Latin America (hereafter GELA), NARA, RG 165, Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs, 1860 – 1952 (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1946) pp. 153-172. In this report the FBI stated that there were nine different radios operational in Argentina. Utzinger could be proud that his charade at least fooled the FBI and Federal Communications Commission (FCC) which handled radio interception duties. See GELA, p. 153. 468 “Utzinger Interrogation,” July-September 1947, NARA, RG 65, 64-22460-13, Box 14, p. 5. 199

Niebuhr put up all the money to get the network running, with Werner Könnecke of the

Abwehr and Johannes Siegfried Becker of the SD contributing later. Niebuhr’s and

Könnecke’s shares were paid by the embassy from different accounts under the control of

Richard Burmeister, commercial attaché in the German embassy.469 Following his

expulsion from Argentina Niebuhr told his superiors in Berlin of the arrangement. In

March 1943 a conference was held to discuss the particulars. SD and Abwehr

representatives agreed that the arrangement worked out by Utzinger and Niebuhr worked.

Paeffgen stated to his postwar interrogators the SD and Abwehr cooperated closely in

Argentina.470 Schellenberg agreed noting that such cooperation was “unusual.”471

In the meantime, the U.S. was concerned with Niebuhr’s intelligence activities and the intransigence of the Castillo administration regarding German intelligence- gathering activities heightened American worries. In May 1942, U.S. Embassy Consul

Clifton P. English told Washington that the embassy was at a loss regarding German agents. In July Foreign Minister Ruiz-Guiñazú deflected U.S. ambassador Norman

Armour’s objections stating that Argentina could take no action unless the U.S. had solid evidence German agents were radioing ships movements and that these reports had led to sinkings.472 While the U.S. had evidence that German agents were sending ship

information to Germany, directly linking those reports to lost ships was impossible.

469 “Utzinger Interrogation,” July-September 1947, NARA, RG 65, 64-22460-13, Box 14, p. 6 and GELA, p. 138. 470 “Interrogation of Dr. Theodor Paeffgen,” 19 October 1945, State Department Special Interrogation Mission to Germany, NARA, RG 59, M679, Roll 3, Fr. 944. 471 “Interrogation of Walter Schellenberg, 20 November 1945, NARA, RG 263, Records of the Central Intelligence Agency, Name Files: Walter Schellenberg, p. 4. 472 Rout and Bratzel, The Shadow War, p. 338. 200

Additionally, producing any such evidence would reveal that the U.S. was intercepting

German messages.

In October 1942 U.S. Undersecretary of State Sumner Welles gave a speech in

Boston accusing Argentina and Chile of harboring German spies. Chilean authorities took action and arrested most of the so-called “PYL” group.473 Argentina remained

obstinate and Ruiz-Guiñazú challenged Welles to prove his charges. On 3 November

1942 Ambassador Armour presented Minister of the Interior, Miguel Culaciati with a

memorandum titled “German Military Espionage in Argentina.” Armour felt that Ruiz-

Guiñazú would disregard any findings in the document and do nothing while Culaciati was felt to be more pro-Allied. The document named thirty-two alleged Abwehr agents and charged that some of them were known leaders in the local Nazi Party. It also alleged that the agents operating in Argentina were responsible for the deaths of hundreds as well as the sinking of numerous ships. However, it only connected the sinking of one

ship, the Andalusia Star, to the activities of Niebuhr’s network. In fact, the majority of the messages mentioned originated in Chile and Brazil from the “PYL” and “LIR” networks respectively.474 But, the document still contained the names of German

intelligence agents.

Armour’s faith in Culaciati was justified. On 5 November the Argentine police

raided Napp’s office and found copies of messages detailing ship movements in and out

of Buenos Aires harbor. More damning was that the recipient was identified as the

473 For a good, though superficial introduction to German activities in Chile see: Graeme S. Mount, Chile and the Nazis: From Hitler to Pinochet (: Black Rose Books, 2001). 474 See Ibid, pp. 339-347 for an extended discussion of the merits of the document as well as its exaggerations and obfuscations. 201

“attaché” or “Niebuhr.” Also found were the names of other individuals connected to

Niebuhr. The Argentine police proceeded to arrest Ottomar Müller, Walter Freiwald,

Martin Schneider, Lothar von Reichenbach and Helvecio Ortelli all of whom were

connected to Niebuhr. They were unable to locate Napp who had been under

surveillance by the FBI Legal attaché William Doyle. Doyle suspected that Napp was tipped off by Argentine police shortly before they arrived. He was finally arrested on 18

November by Argentine police with the assistance of Doyle.475 In the custody of

Argentine police who possibly used “aggressive interrogation methods” Napp told all he knew.476 Also arrested were Thilo Martens, Rudolf Hepe and Friedrich Tadeo von

Schulz-Hausmann. All denied having anything to do with any intelligence-gathering.

The only thing Hepe and Schulz-Hausmann admitted to was being “acquainted” with

Niebuhr.477

The arrests and revelations brought Castillo under increasing pressure from the

Argentine Congress. The Anti-Argentine Activities Committee which had caused

Thermann’s departure reopened investigations into German activities in Argentina.

Between April and December 1942 it published numerous reports. Castillo renewed his opposition to the commission’s work, but was under intense U.S. pressure to allow the commission to function. Castillo was particularly angry about U.S. charges that he sabotaged the work of the commission. Persons close to Castillo told Meynen that the

475 Ibid, p. 343 and “Meynen to AA,” 4 November 1942, Büro des Staatssekretärs, Argentinien, Band 2, NARA RG 242/T-120/26/27478-479, “Meynen to AA,” 6 November 1942, Ibid, Frame 27482. Meynen reported that the memorandum was given to Ruiz-Guiñazú, not Culaciati. 476 “Hoover to Berle, Subject: Juan Jacobo Napp, with aliases,” 12 May 1943, NARA, RG 59, 862.20235/1159, Box C354. This contains Napp confession to the Argentine police dated 19 November 1942. 477 Rout and Bratzel, The Shadow War, p. 343. 202

president wanted the commission to focus on communist activity as well as that of the

U.S.478

By late November Castillo’s international situation was difficult. Meynen

reported that Castillo believed Sumner Welles’s speech in Boston and the publication of

the U.S. memorandum on espionage were preludes to more coercive methods by the U.S.

and England. Argentina was also worried about the Allied invasion of North Africa

earlier in the month, since it might force changes in Spanish and Portuguese policies

toward the Axis. Despite this, Meynen felt that Castillo was too closely associated with

his policy to change it. Meynen also attributed recent government actions against

German agents to “Jewish North American Freemasons” in the Interior and Finance

Ministries and he was not sure how to strengthen Castillo’s neutrality policy under these circumstances.479

Napp’s confession, meanwhile, implicated Niebuhr. The anti-German Argentine

press reported Napp’s confession and Niebuhr’s involvement with intelligence activities.

The press also reported that there were calls in the Argentine Congress for Niebuhr to

testify regarding allegations that could cause him to be declared persona non grata.

Meynen asked the Argentine Foreign Ministry to ensure the allegations were properly

treated in the press and that any unproven allegations be omitted in the newspapers.

Given that none of the allegations against Niebuhr had yet been proven approval of

Meynen’s request would have halted all coverage of the affair. In the meantime the

478 “Meynen to AA,” 18 November 1942, Büro des Staatssekretärs, Argentinien, Band 2, NARA RG 242/T- 120/26/27503-504. 479 “Meynen to AA,” 26 November 1942, Büro des Staatssekretärs, Argentinien, Band 2, NARA RG 242/T- 120/26/27516-27519. 203

Interior Ministry appointed an independent prosecutor to examine allegations concerning

German intelligence activities.480 Meynen had no contacts in the Interior Ministry and

had to rely on the press for his information. Meynen and the AA felt that the pressure on

Castillo was sufficient that he could change his policy on neutrality, though at a high

political cost to Castillo. However, Castillo stood steadfast in the onslaught of pressure.

On 4 December, Belisario Gache Pirán, a prosecutor appointed by the

commission to oversee the case against Napp et al., presented his findings. He laid out

his evidence and stated that the defendants had implicated Niebuhr. On 10 December

Judge Miguel Jantus stated that the defendants should be held for trial and agreed that

Niebuhr was also involved. After reviewing the evidence Attorney General Dr. Juan

Álvarez requested the Argentine Supreme Court petition the Castillo government to have

Niebuhr placed under the court’s jurisdiction.481 Since the embassy and the AA were

unsure of how the court would rule, they waited. On 22 December the Supreme Court

made an announcement on whether Niebuhr could be questioned regarding German

intelligence activities in Argentina. Instead of issuing a ruling the court requested that

the Castillo government formally ask the German embassy to waive Niebuhr’s diplomatic

immunity and allow him to be questioned. Once this request had been made the Supreme

Court could then rule on the legality of questioning Niebuhr. Woermann cabled Meynen

that such a request was out of the question. If any request were made, it should be

480 “Meynen to AA,” 27 November 1942, Büro des Staatssekretärs, Argentinien, Band 2, NARA RG 242/T- 120/26/27522-27523. 481 “Meynen to AA,” 5 December 1942, Büro des Staatssekretärs, Argentinien, Band 2, NARA RG 242/T- 120/26/27552 and Rout and Bratzel, The Shadow War, p. 344. 204

immediately sent to him so that a formal rejection could be drafted.482 Meynen replied

that the Argentine Foreign Ministry had not made a request and suggested waiting.483

On 24 December the Argentines made a formal request that Niebuhr waive his diplomatic immunity and place himself under Argentine jurisdiction.484 Meynen sent a

copy of the request to Woermann. He informed him that with the Christmas holidays

approaching and the Supreme Court in recess during January it would probably not be

able to rule on whether Niebuhr could be questioned until February. Meynen agreed that

the request should be rejected, not from lack of respect for the Argentine courts, but

based on diplomatic immunity. Germany, Meynen said, should further state that ship movements in harbors were publicly accessible. There was no need to report secretly.

Niebuhr would have no interest in secretly transmitting such well known information.

And since Buenos Aires was 2000 miles from the war-zone, which covered the Northern

Atlantic and Caribbean, any information transmitted would be useless.485 Meynen did

not suggest denying the existence of any intelligence network, just that Niebuhr was

associated with it. His description of the network as primitive and the problems of

transmitting information ring true. They probably reflected Niebuhr’s and Meynen’s

opinion of the Müller-Napp ring and the problem of transmitting intelligence over large

distances.

Despite Meynen’s hope for a respite, time was running out. On 29 December

Ruiz-Guiñazú asked for an expedited answer on whether Berlin would waive Niebuhr’s

482 “Woermann to Meynen,” 22 December 1942, Büro des Staatssekretärs, Argentinien, Band 2, NARA RG 242/T-120/26/27585. 483 “Meynen to AA,” 23 December 1942, Ibid, Frame 27592. 484 “Meynen to AA,” 24 December 1942, Ibid, Frames 27593-27594. 485 “Meynen to AA,” 28 December 1942, Ibid, Frames 27595-27596. 205

diplomatic immunity. Meynen stalled stating that an answer before the end of the year would be impossible.486 On 30 December the Argentine chargé in Berlin, Luis Luti,

called on Woermann and presented Argentina’s demand for an answer regarding Niebuhr

before 1 January. Luti added his personal view that public opinion might be sympathetic

to Niebuhr causing the case to be dismissed, but added that this was only his personal

view. Woermann told Luti that an answer before 1 January would be difficult. He had

instructed Meynen to relay this to Ruiz-Guiñazú.487

Ribbentrop asked Woermann why he did not simply state that waiving Niebuhr’s

diplomatic immunity was out of the question. Woermann replied that while the

Argentine government was anxious for a decision, it did not want to announce Germany’s

refusal renouncing Niebuhr’s diplomatic immunity either. Thus, any announcement by

the Argentine Supreme Court on whether Niebuhr could be questioned would be delayed.

If the court went on it holiday without any decision, it would give the Argentine

government a month to clear up this matter. Woermann attempted to stall for time and

asked Luti “If you know of any case where a government has renounced the diplomatic

immunity of one of its members?” Woermann then answered, “I do not.” Woermann

stated that this exchange avoided giving the Argentine government an official decision

before 1 January.488

The Argentine government was not easily put off. On 5 January the Argentine

Foreign Ministry again asked Meynen for a decision regarding Niebuhr. They felt that a

486 “Meynen to AA,” 29 December 1942, Ibid, Frame 27597. 487 “Woermann Memorandum,” 30 December 1942, Ibid, Frames 27599-27600. 488 “Woermann Memorandum,” 31 December 1942, Ibid, Frames 27602-27603. Woermann told Ribbentrop that his question to Luti and his answer were not recorded in his memorandum of 30 December. 206 quick answer would avoid hurrying any decision by the court.489 Ribbentrop rejected this and told Otto Reinbeck, recently appointed head of Pol. Abt. IX, that Niebuhr would not be given over to the jurisdiction of the Argentine courts.490 On 9 January Ribbentrop told

Meynen via telegram to inform the Argentine Foreign Ministry orally that a waiver of

Niebuhr’s diplomatic immunity was out of the question. It was a principle of the German diplomatic corps that its members never fall under foreign jurisdiction. Ribbentrop also chastised Meynen for his handling of the situation. Meynen, he said, should have refused the Argentine request from the start and he was now to refrain from any discussions after delivering the message. He told Meynen he was surprised that the Argentine government had even suggested that Niebuhr submit to the jurisdiction of its courts. Never, said

Ribbentrop, had any German diplomat submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of a foreign court.491

The tenor of Ribbentrop’s message indicated he did not approve of the professional diplomats handling of the situation. Though Ribbentrop assumed

Woermann and Meynen were either incompetent or weak-willed, the diplomats understood that time would clear up the matter without a serious breach. Regardless,

Meynen delivered Ribbentrop’s rejection on 9 January and reported that the undersecretary who received his oral message requested a written text. On 11 January

1943 the Argentine government declared that Niebuhr had abused his position and privileges. A note to Meynen asserted that Niebuhr’s activities violated Argentine

489 “Meynen to AA,” 5 January 1943, Ibid, Frame 27606. 490 “Memorandum,” 6 January 1943, Ibid, Frames 27607-27608. 491 “Ribbentrop to Meynen,” 9 January 1943, Ibid, Frames 27609-27610. 207

neutrality and his continued presence would harm relations between Germany and

Argentina. It asked for Niebuhr’s dismissal.492

On 12 December, Luti called on Woermann to formally declare Niebuhr persona

non grata. Woermann expressed regret that Argentina had resorted to such drastic action

on the basis of faulty information. Luti expressed his own regret at the situation and

added that he hoped German-Argentine relations would not be damaged. Woermann

suggested a face-saving trade-off. Luti’s assistant Moss, Woermann said, was anti-

German and had expressed repeated negative opinions of Hitler. He was also a notorious

currency speculator in violation of German law. Perhaps Moss could be recalled. Then,

Germany could recall Niebuhr without any public airing of charges against either man.493

Woermann’s suggestion avoided the perception the Niebuhr was guilty. Simultaneously recalling Moss and Niebuhr would preempt any propaganda by Germany’s enemies.

Ribbentrop agreed with the proposal in principle, but made modifications. He told Woermann that there was to be no simultaneous recall. Moss was to be declared persona non grata for currency speculation. Woermann was also to repeat that the charges against Niebuhr were unfounded and that Germany was displeased with

Argentine policy.494 Woermann told Luti on 13 January that Moss was to be declared

persona non grata for currency speculation but said that the declaration should not

prevent friendly relations. Luti stated that he did not want to report Moss’s possible

involvement in currency speculation. Woermann stated that it was his duty to report the

reason to his government and could not understand why he would conceal it. Luti

492 “Meynen to AA,” 11 January 1943, Ibid, Frames 27616-27617. 493 “Woermann Memorandum,” 12 January 1943, Ibid, Frames 27624-27625. 494 “Woermann Memorandum,” 13 January 1943, Ibid, Frame 27632. 208 remained silent. Woermann felt that Luti’s reporting of these charges would only complicate the situation. Woermann admitted that Moss was probably innocent of the charges since a different member of the embassy was under suspicion for currency speculation. In any event, Niebuhr was ordered to leave Argentina before the second half of February.495

Ribbentrop thought his bullying would strengthen the Argentine government in its dealings with the U.S. “Only if we in turn apply pressure, said Ribbentrop, “can [U.S. pressure on Argentina] be avoided.” “Our objective,” he continued, “is not harshness per se but to make Argentina braver vis-à-vis the United States.”496 Ribbentrop’s statements show simple incompetence. Woermann and Meynen had counseled caution because both knew time was on their side regarding Niebuhr. Ribbentrop had learned nothing from

Thermann’s departure. Ribbentrop believed that the simultaneous recall of Moss and

Niebuhr would be no different than the expulsion of both men. It is clear however that

Germany continued its short-sighted policies towards Argentina. The possibility that

Niebuhr’s network could be uncovered was never discussed. Thus, Germany continued to handle its affairs in Argentina in an ad hoc manner.

Niebuhr’s travails were not over. In order for Niebuhr to travel back to Germany he needed an assurance of safe conduct from the British. The British believed that

Niebuhr would be posted to another neutral country to continue his intelligence work.

More importantly, Niebuhr’s return to Germany could compromise Ultra, since MI-6 believed Niebuhr had learned of British and American code-breaking. The British

495 Ibid, Frames 27633-27634. 496 Newton, The Nazi Menace, p. 239. 209

suggested to the FBI that Brazil detain Niebuhr if he stopped in their country during his

voyage. Yet Niebuhr was an accredited diplomat. The FBI suggested that the State

Department handle the problem.497 The State Department vigorously argued that Niebuhr

needed to be granted safe passage as a matter of diplomatic law. By the end of January

the British had decided that Niebuhr was no danger to Ultra and he was allowed passage to Germany.498 At the end of the war Niebuhr’s name was placed on a list of persons to

be detained in order to question them about German intelligence activities in Latin

America. Following Germany’s surrender in May 1945 Niebuhr was taken into custody

by U.S. authorities.

The arrest of Niebuhr’s associates and his departure shut down the Abwehr

networks in Latin America. 1939 to early 1943 was the high-water mark for the Abwehr

in Latin America. Johannes Siegfried Becker’s initial forays into Latin America would

be less than promising. Thermann and Niebuhr’s departure left matters in the hands of

Meynen and General Friedrich Wolf, Niebuhr’s replacement. While Meynen could be

assertive, Becker’s return left him uninformed regarding any activities by the SD. Wolf

was not Niebuhr and seemed content to do the minimum amount of work to get by. This

left the SD to help the German effort in Latin America.

497 “Little to Ladd,” 25 January 1943 and “Carson to Ladd,” 26 February 1943, NARA, RG 65, 64-20041- Sec. 1, Box 9. Both memoranda refer to Ultra as the “ostrich source.” 498 Discussions concerning Niebuhr’s diplomatic status and decisions on whether or not to detain him are in NARA, RG 65, 64-20041-Sec.1, Box 9. 210

Chapter 5

“Sargo” and the Creation of an SD Intelligence Network

Johannes Siegfried Becker (codename: “Sargento,” abbreviated as “Sargo”) was

probably the most effective and important agent the SD placed in a foreign country.499

An FBI report from 1946 stated, “any attempt to decide who was the most important

German agent in the Western Hemisphere during World War II would find Siegfried

Becker a leading candidate for the dubious distinction.”500 Becker was an effective agent

who put together a large network of agents that caused the FBI and OSS sleepless nights

and made his superiors in Germany happy with his voluminous and detailed reports.501

However, these events would occur during Becker’s second South American sojourn from 1943-45.

During his first trip in 1940-41 Becker, unlike the more discreet Niebuhr, caused numerous problems for the German embassies in Buenos Aires and Rio de Janeiro. This chapter examines the early life and career of Becker, particularly his time in Argentina from 1938-1941. It will look at the men who headed Amt VI and the evolution of the SD into a foreign intelligence service. Also examined are the Auswärtiges Amt’s attempts to

499 Becker’s codename was confirmed by his superior Theodor Paeffgen. “Interrogation of Theodor Paeffgen,” 29 December 1945, CI-IIR/40, Record Group 263, Records of the Central Intelligence Agency, Name Files: Theodor Paeffgen, Box 39, p. 12. Becker also had numerous aliases and codenames, in 1944 the FBI knew of 31 that Becker used. For the complete list see “Memorandum re: Johannes Siegfried Becker with aliases,” 5 , NARA, RG 65, Records of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, File: 64-27116 Sec.2, Box 19, p. 1. 500 German Espionage in Latin America, (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1946) NARA, RG 165, Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs, 1860 – 1952, p. 161. See also, Leslie B. Rout Jr. and John Bratzel, The Shadow War: German Espionage and United States Counterespionage in Latin America during World War II (Frederick: University Publications of America, 1986), p. 353. 501 Between June 1943 and August 1944 Becker’s network transmitted 2500 messages back to Germany. Rout and Bratzel, The Shadow War, p. 353. 211

control the SD and its operations in Latin America. Directing this effort was Martin

Luther, head of Abteilung Deutschland (Domestic Department) in the AA. The AA

expended much effort fending off the SD and its efforts to interfere with German foreign

policy in Argentina. The destruction of Amt VI/D’s records at the end of the war make

reconstructing Becker’s activities difficult. However, the AA archives have voluminous

files on Becker and his activities in Argentina.502 Between these files and interrogations

of members of Becker’s network it is possible to trace the contours of Becker’s career.

Johannes Siegfried Becker was born in Leipzig on 21 . Following

his graduation from Gymnasium he served in a series of commercial apprenticeships with

I.L. Graumper and Soehnee in Leipzig.503 In 1931-32, like many Germans during the

Great Depression, Becker was unemployed. He joined the Nazi Party and the SA in

August 1930 and then the SS in April 1931. His Nazi Party Number was 359, 966 and

his SS Number was 9,393, both of which were quite low.504 The Nazi Party would

eventually grow to over four million members and the SS over a million. Becker studied

at the University of Leipzig from 1931-32 without earning a degree. In his statement to

the in 1945 Becker claimed he joined the German Army,

502 See especially, Abteilung Inland II G: Beauftragen Becker nach Südamerika, NARA, Record Group 242/Serial T120/Roll 228 and Abteilung Inland II G: Abwehr Angelegenheit Hellmuth, NARA, RG 242/T120/351. 503 The following account of Becker’s life is taken from Ronald C. Newton, The ‘Nazi Menace’ in Argentina, 1931-1947 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992), pp. 252-3 and Becker’s statement to the Federal Police in Argentina, RG 65, 64-27116, pp 1-3. 504 “Personalakten Johannes Siegfried Becker,” Files, SS Officer Files, NARA, RG 242/A3343/051/Frames 57730-31. Most of Becker’s Personnel File has been lost therefore it is difficult to trace Becker’s activities before 1939. Given that Becker does not mention his SS or Nazi Party membership in his statement along with other inaccuracies his statement to the Federal Police must be treated with extreme caution. Relying on Becker’s statement Rout and Bratzel claim that Becker entered the Army in 1933 achieving the rank of 2nd Lieutenant see Rout and Bratzel, The Shadow War, pp. 13-14. David Kahn in Hitler’s Spies does not mention Becker’s Army service at all; it is likely that Becker was omitting details so as not to further incriminate himself. See David Kahn, Hitler’s Spies: German Military Intelligence in World War II (New York: Da Capo Press, 1978), p. 321. 212

becoming a military instructor and he was commissioned as a second lieutenant. He also claimed that in April 1935 he left the army and accepted a position with the National

Socialist Popular Welfare.505 Nowhere did he reveal his membership in either the Nazi

Party or SS.

In April 1937 Becker departed Germany to take a job with a German-Argentine firm run by Federico C. Koller. He arrived in Buenos Aires in May 1937. Becker’s SS file states that he was promoted to Untersturmführer (Second Lieutenant) in April 1937 before he left for Buenos Aires and Obersturmführer (First Lieutenant) on January 30,

1938 while in Buenos Aires.506 It is reasonable to assume that Becker was in some sort

of active status in order to be promoted, but his status is unclear. In July 1938 Becker

returned to Germany for approximately two months on “business.” Becker told the

Argentine Federal Police that during his stay in Germany he was appointed the manager

of his firm, replacing Koller. He also secured a position as a representative for various

German firms in Buenos Aires.507

Historian Ronald Newton has asserted that Becker’s job may have been a cover

for intelligence activity.508 One clue to Becker’s activities from 1937-1939 is in the

interrogation of Karl Arnold, representative of the shipping agency Norddeutscher-Lloyd

505 In his statement to the Argentine Federal Police Becker claims that he entered the Army in 1933 serving in the Division as a second lieutenant until 1935. At no point in his statement does Becker say that he was a member of the S.S. or Nazi Party before 1940. See “Hoover to Lyons, 10-5-45, Memorandum Subject: Johannes Siegfried Becker,” NARA, RG 59 Records of the Department of State; see also, “Hoover to James P. Joice, Memorandum Subject; Johannes Siegfried Becker,” 7 November 1945, NARA, RG 65 Records of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, File 64-27116-Sec. 5.” Given the rivalry between the SS and the Army it is highly doubtful that served in both the SS and the Army. Becker’s activities before 1939 must remain in the realm of conjecture. See also Rout and Bratzel The Shadow War, pp. 13-14 and Newton, The ‘Nazi Menace’, p. 252-3 506 “Personalakten Johannes Siegfried Becker,” NARA, RG 242/A3343/051/57730. 507 “Johannes Siegfried Becker Statement to the Federal Police in Argentina,” NARA, RG 65, 64-27116, p.4. 508 Ibid. 213

and future head of Amt VI activities in Spain. Arnold, in his postwar interrogation, made

the mysterious comment that Becker “recruited German-Argentine craftsman for training

in Germany.”509 Another clue comes from documents belonging to Becker that fell into

British hands in 1945. Among these documents are two letters, the first dated 30 January

1938 promoting Becker to Obersturmführer. The other, dated 23 December 1939,

accredits Becker as a representative of the German Consulate. It states that Becker “is in

charge of giving legal advice to the 2nd Commander of the Cruiser Admiral Graf Spee

Naval Captain Kay in his communications in Spanish, in the character of interpreter.”510

This is strong circumstantial evidence that Becker was either working for Amt VI before the war broke out, or performing in some official capacity. In his postwar interrogation

Thermann related that Becker called on him shortly following his arrival. Becker told

Thermann he was responsible for arranging instruction in woodcarving between

Argentine and German craftsman. Thermann stated that he did not believe Becker and he related Becker’s story to the commercial attaché Richard Burmeister who was “equally non-plussed.”511 In all probability Becker was an observer for the SD. As Katrin Paehler

points out, observers were members of the SS and SD, but worked outside of the SD

itself, usually in the civil service or in the professions. They received training from the

SS and fell under its judicial authority. While they were not employed full time by the

509 “Interrogation Report of Karl Gustav Arnold,” NARA, RG 65, Box 17, File 65-24854-Sec. 1, p. 8. 510 “Francis Crosby to J. Edgar Hoover,” 22 November 1944, NARA, RG 65, 64-27116. The dating of the memo is confusing since during this period Becker claimed to be traveling back to Berlin. Either he returned to Berlin earlier than previously believed, or later than previously believed. The memo could also have been prepared for Becker when he returned to Argentina, either way it is a very telling piece of evidence. 511 “Interrogation of Dr. Edmund Freiherr von Thermann,” 27 September, 8, 10, 16, 20, 23, 24 October and 2, 6 November 1945, NARA, RG 59, Argentine Blue Book, Miscellaneous Affidavits and Interrogation Reports, Entry 1088, Box 26, p. 32. 214

SD or SS they were expected to wear their SS uniform, most likely while at

headquarters.512 But again, Becker’s status with the SS was unclear.

Adding to the confusion is a memorandum concerning Becker prepared for the

AA. It discusses Becker’s background and his work in Argentina from 1937-40. There

is no mention that Becker was ever employed by any German intelligence agency or was

even a member of the SS during this period. It simply states that he was employed in

South America as a businessman and does not mention Becker performing any duties on

behalf of the Graf Spee internees.513 This is surprising since the Graf Spee operation was

conducted with the cooperation of the embassy. If Becker had been employed by

German intelligence it should have been mentioned. It is possible that Amt VI did not

fully inform the AA of Becker’s background.514 While problems with sources account for

an unclear and confusing picture of Becker’s activities in the 1930s, his subsequent

activities showed how intelligent and shrewd Becker was.

Becker claimed that when World War II broke out on 1 September 1939 he went

to the German embassy in Buenos Aires to try and return to Germany. Becker was

certainly in Argentina in late October 1939 since he was arrested for a traffic violation by

the Buenos Aires Police on 26 October.515 In light of the evidence later found by the

British and FBI, it is probable that Becker stayed in Argentina until early 1940. He also

learned that the embassy was unable to help him. While the embassy could not help him

512 Katrin Paehler, “Espionage, Ideology and Personal Politics: The Making and Unmaking of a Nazi Foreign Intelligence Service” (Washington D.C.: American University, Ph.D diss., 2002), p. 211. 513 “Memorandum D II 77/40, author unknown,” 19 August 1940, Abteilung Inland II G: Beauftragen Becker nach Südamerika, NARA RG 242/T120/228/224998. 514 On the rivalry between the German Foreign Ministry and SD see Paehler, “Espionage, Ideology and Personal Politics.” 515 “Memorandum re: Johannes Siegfried Becker,” 5 August 1944, NARA, RG65, 64-27116-56. 215

return to Germany, it provided him with a passport dated 30 November 1939. It is not

clear why. Becker used his own considerable skills to return to Europe.516 His adventures

in returning to Europe were similar to those of Wilhelm Canaris during World War I.517

Becker paid a crewman $100 to stow away aboard the Portuguese flagged ship

Gunene bound for Lisbon. He was discovered two days out of port, but he managed to

convince the ship’s officers to let him stay. Becker later stated that the captain did not

believe his story, but allowed Becker to stay nonetheless so long as he performed duties as a crewmember.518 The captain entered Becker into the ship’s logbook under the name

Clemente Perez, the alias on a passport Becker carried.519 Becker’s false passport raises

suspicions of his claim to have been an ordinary businessman. It also raises the question

of where he obtained the false identity.

Becker evaded controls at the island of Madeira by secretly disembarking the ship and appearing at the local German Consul’s office. He asked the consul to hide him for the fifteen days the Gunene would be in port, but the consul refused. Becker returned to the Gunene where he was interrogated by Portuguese port authorities with British officials present. He repeated the same story he told to the captain of the Gunene, but was not sure that he was believed. Becker felt that when the ship left Portuguese waters he would be removed forcibly by the British. Therefore, he decided to try a different tack. According to his later statement he had himself moved in the custody of port officials to the Italian ship Conte Grande. Left unsaid was whether

516 “Memorandum re: Johannes Siegfried Becker,” 5 August 1944, NARA, RG 65, 64-27116-56. 517 Heinz Höhne, Canaris: Hitler’s Master Spy, trans. J. Maxwell Brownjohn (New York: Cooper Square Press, 1979), pp. 33-35. 518 “Johannes Siegfried Becker Statement to the Federal Police in Argentina,” RG 65, 64-27116 519 Ibid. 216

the British knew he was being transferred. When the Conte Grande arrived in the Canary

Islands, Becker jumped ship and was able to secure passage on a small Spanish ship headed to the port of Las Palmas, also in the Canaries, where he again presented himself to the German consul. The consul issued Becker a passport in his real name and Becker left Las Palmas by airplane the following week.520 Who paid for the airplane ticket is unknown.

Becker arrived in Madrid and made his way to Rome later claiming he was almost broke when he arrived there. He went to the German Embassy to request help in getting

back to Germany. He informed the embassy’s civil attaché, probably a member of the

SD, how he had returned. Becker later stated that he was supplied with a credit of five

thousand lire and was told that when he arrived in Berlin he should report to the

Sicherheitsdienst (Security Service or SD) of the Reichsicherheitshauptamt (Reich

Security Main Office or RSHA).521 Since Becker was telling his story to the Argentine

Federal Police, his statements must be used with caution.

The Sicherheitsdienst was part of the SS. Himmler had been concerned about

infiltration of the Nazi Party since 1927 when he ordered all SS men to report any

suspicious activity.522 By the summer of 1931 Himmler created an intelligence position

for his staff and recruited , a cashiered naval officer, to fill it.523 In

June 1932 this intelligence service was named the Sicherheitsdienst. Heydrich recruited

520 Ibid. 521 “Johannes Siegfried Becker Statement to the Federal Police in Argentina,” NARA, RG 65, 64-27116. 522 George C. Browder, Hitler’s Enforcers: The Gestapo and the SS Security Service in the Nazi Revolution (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 105. See also Paehler “Espionage, Ideology and Personal Politics” especially Chapter 3. 523 Ibid and Kahn, Hitler’s Spies, p. 56 also see Shlomo Aronson, Reinhard Heydrich und die Frühgeschichte von Gestapo und SD (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlaganstalt, 1971), p. 208. 217

subordinates who built networks at the local level. An organ of the Nazi Party rather than

the state, the SD had no budget and was dependent on whatever funds Heydrich or

Himmler could provide. Its headquarters was minimal consisting of six poorly paid members who spent their time cutting articles out of newspapers and filing them.524

One of the SD’s early problems was a lack of a clear mandate. Such was especially pronounced after the Nazi seizure of power in 1933. The upside for the SD was that it could broaden its own area of competence.525 In November 1933 the SD

became its own independent office in the SS structure and named the Sicherheitsamt

(Security Office). Heydrich was appointed its chief. The SD was now composed of six departments and two independent desks. Department I took care of organizational and personnel matters. Department II was concerned with pay, finances and supplies.

Department III focused on domestic political information. Department IV handled

Counterespionage and Foreign Inquiry. Department V dealt with the Freemasons. One of the independent desks dealt with the press and the other provided technical and organizational support.526

Department IV, of basic importance for the present study, handled many different

areas and consisted of six sections. Section One managed “Foreign Intelligence” while

Section Two dealt with Jews, pacifists, emigrants while collecting intelligence on anti-

Nazi propaganda. Section Three handled espionage and immigrants. Section Four dealt with counterespionage and Section Five watched armaments issues. Section Six worked

524 Browder, Hitler’s Enforcers, pp. 109, 112. 525 Paehler, “Espionage, Ideology and Personal Politics,” pp. 49-50. 526 Browder, Hitler’s Enforcers, pp. 119, 252-253 and Paehler, Espionage, Ideology and Personal Politics, p. 50. 218

on economic matters and issues of corruption.527 Given that Department IV had sections

dealing with foreign intelligence and counterespionage, there was a considerable amount of overlap between the SD and Abwehr which generated friction between the two.

In 1934 the role of the SD was redefined and an official decree made the SD the sole intelligence service of the Nazi Party. Other such intelligence services were to be abolished and their duties and/or personnel transferred to the SD.528 In January 1935, the

SD was elevated to a SD-Hauptamt (Main Office) status. During a further reorganization

Department IV was renamed Office III, with one section dealing with countering

espionage and foreign intelligence services operating in Germany. Even though the SD,

Abwehr and AA were battling for control over intelligence-gathering operations,

Heydrich, like Ribbentrop, was not very interested in intelligence matters. According to

Walter Schellenberg, head of Amt VI SS Foreign Intelligence, Heydrich “concerned

himself with home affairs and possessed no great knowledge [of] foreign countries.”529

In September 1939 the SD and police organizations were merged to create the RSHA

(Reichsicherheitshauptamt) under the control of Heydrich. Following this reorganization

Heydrich appointed to head Amt VI, now the SS Foreign Intelligence. When

Jost was placed in charge the problems facing Amt VI were numerous. David Kahn states that the task before Jost was “heartbreakingly difficult even in peace: creating an espionage organization to spy in belligerent countries.”530

527 Paehler, “Espionage, Ideology and Personal Politics,” p. 51. 528 Aronson, Reinhard Heydrich, p. 196 and Paehler, “Espionage, Ideology and Personal Politics,” pp. 53- 54. 529 “Final Report on the Case of Walter Schellenberg,” NARA, RG 319, IRR, XE 001725, Folders 7 and 8. See also Paehler, “Espionage, Ideology and Personal Politics,” p. 254. 530 Kahn, Hitler’s Spies, p. 253. 219

Jost’s main problem was to find qualified personnel to fill available positions.

There were few who possessed the necessary language skills or were reliably informed

about the countries they monitored. A report on Amt VI/D states all such were

“essentially [sic] qualifications for any person who sought to conduct intelligence

operations against these countries.”531 When Jost took over Amt VI he was only able to

find two officers who had suitable qualifications. Jost’s tenure was described by his

successor Schellenberg as “rank dilettantism” and this assessment was seconded by the

post-war examiners of Amt VI.532 Jost took a lackadaisical approach to running Amt VI,

working only a few hours a day and allowing his subordinate to work with minimal

supervision.533 But Jost’s subordinates were just as lackadaisical as he.

Latin America originally came under the purview of Amt VI/E which also had

responsibility for Italy and Spain. Its first head was Hans Daufeldt who served from

1939-1941. Daufeldt was born in 1908 in Kappeln and studied economics at the

University of . He joined the NSDAP in 1932, and then the SS. He attended an SS police school and was eventually assigned to the RSHA. Since he spoke English and had studied in London in 1936-37 this supposedly made him useful to Amt VI.534 In truth,

Daufeldt was unqualified for his position; he was described as “weak … inefficient … and incompetent.”535 In his postwar interrogation Daufeldt claimed that he lacked the

531 “Counter Intelligence War Room, Situation Report No, 9, Amt VI of the RSHA Gruppe VI D,” NARA, RG 319, IRR, XE 002303, p. 4. Amt VI C was placed under Amt VI D in another reorganization under Schellenberg in 1941. 532 Ibid, p. 6. 533 Paehler, “Espionage, Ideology and Personal Politics,” p. 245. 534 Reinhard R. Doerries, Hitler’s Last Chief of Foreign Intelligence: Allied Interrogations of Walter Schellenberg (New York: Routledge, 2003), p. 343 n. 108. 535 “Counter Intelligence War Room, Situation Report No, 9, Amt VI of the RSHA Gruppe VI D,” NARA, RG 319, IRR, XE 002303, pp. 5-6. 220

training and education for the position.536 In January 1941 responsibility for Latin

America along with Scandinavia, the United States and Great Britain was passed to Amt

VI/D with Daufeldt still in charge.

The Latin American Desk of Amt VI/D was designated D/4 and its first head was

Ewald Geppert. Geppert, like Jost, was not held in much esteem by his subordinates.

Karl Arnold, head of SS intelligence in Spain, noted that Geppert was lame due to a leg

injury, which caused him to spend considerable time away from the office. But, Geppert was ambitious. Arnold and Hedwig Sommer, a secretary in Amt VI, thought he was a

“gangster” and “misanthrope” who had no scruples about making promises of any sort.537

Despite his personal shortcomings Geppert’s tenure was marked by some success. He managed to recruit Heinz Lange and Johannes Siegfried Becker for service in South

America. Geppert also managed to infiltrate the Brazilian Embassy in Berlin with Toni

Kurfürst. Kurfürst had been a longtime employee of the embassy and was the ambassador’s valet. He was able to secure copies of all the reports the Brazilian ambassador sent back to Rio de Janeiro.538 From these reports the SD learned that the

ambassador was a sworn enemy of Nazi Germany. It was also reported that during air

raids he “became delirious with joy, even running into his garden and flashing a lantern

to help.” In 1941 Geppert was transferred to Amt VI/F, the documents and forgery

536 “Interrogation Report of Hans Daufeldt,” 29 Dec 1945, NARA, RG 263, Records of the Central Intelligence Agency, Name Files: Theodor Paeffgen, Box 39. 537 “Arnold Interrogation,” p. 12 and “Sommer Interrogation,” p. 10. 538 “Interrogation of Theodor Paeffgen,” 29 December 1945, NARA, RG 263, Name Files: Theodor Paeffgen, Box 39, p. 4. 221

section.539 He may have been transferred because he was not a Schellenberg man. He

was replaced with Ernst Schambacher, who lasted in the post for a short time due to

health problems. Schambacher’s replacement was Obersturmbahnführer Dr. Theodor

Paeffgen, who took up his position in August 1942 and stayed until the end of the war.

Paeffgen was born on 12 June 1910 in Cologne. He graduated from the

Staatliches Gymnasium in 1928 and then studied law at the Universities of Geneva,

Bordeaux and Edinburgh from 1928-1936. After earning his final law degree he applied

for the German diplomatic service in 1937 and 1938 with no success. He then entered

the SD Hauptamt in 1938. His first assignment was in Amt I/II under Schellenberg. He

was transferred to the SD Bureau in , France in July 1940 following the defeat of

France where he wrote reports on the political situation in Lorraine. He also played a

prominent role in expelling French civilians from Lorraine who did not want to become

German citizens. He was recalled to Berlin in June 1941 where he compiled reports from

the operating in the USSR. Paeffgen subsequently served for a time in

East and then transferred to Bialystok combating “partisans.” In August 1942 he

went back to Berlin to take up a position in Amt VI/D.540

In his postwar interrogation Paeffgen was described as having no qualifications

for intelligence work. His interrogator noted that “Under a political system that put a

premium on the absence of critical faculties Paeffgen was slated for success.” The report conceded that he had “a smattering of languages, a fair knowledge of geography,” but

539 “Arnold Interrogation,” NARA, RG 65, 64-24854-Sec. 1, p. 12; See also “Interrogation of Hedwig Elizabeth Weigelmayer Sommer, 5 October 1945, NARA, RG 65, 65-56221, p. 10. Sommer states he was transferred due to lack of success. 540 “Paeffgen Interrogation,” p. 4. 222

that “he had never heard of Houston, Texas.”541 Hedwig Sommer stated that Paeffgen

was a decent man who was “basically an intelligent person, and generally successful in his position.” She related that he exercised firm control over his subordinates and “was a hard and conscientious worker.” But she admitted that she had very little contact with

Paeffgen during her time at Amt VI.542 Paeffgen, it would seem, was appointed to his

position because of his personal loyalty to Schellenberg. The fact that Paeffgen was the

“best candidate” for the position shows the paucity of qualified personnel available.

Whatever Paeffgen’s faults, Schellenberg thought very highly of him stating later that he

was “my most important collaborator for South America … He enjoyed my full

confidence. He kept me currently informed regarding the most important results of the

secret service work in South America.”543

Geppert’s successor as the head of Amt VI D/4, which covered the Americas, was

Hauptsturmführer Kurt Gross.544 In a department full of incompetent, corrupt officials, it

would not be an exaggeration to say that Kurt Gross was among the worst. Karl Arnold

had met Gross in 1931 when both were in Argentina and both joined the Nazi Party.

Arnold later described Gross as a fanatical Nazi who contributed a lot of time and money

to the Party. In 1934 Gross returned to Germany working as a deckhand on a tramp

steamer due to lack of funds. Back in Germany Gross joined the SS and was then posted to Spain during the Spanish Civil War. During that conflict he served in the counter-

541 Ibid, p. 3. 542 “Sommer Interrogation,” p. 10. 543 “Affidavit of Walter Schellenberg,” 6 February 1946, NARA, RG 59, 862.20235/4-2646, Argentine Blue Book (hereafter ABB), Box 25. 544 Kurt Gross was unable to be located at the end of the war and not interrogated. See “Byrnes (Department of State) to Buenos Aires,” 3 June 1946, NARA RG 65, 65-56627. Hedwig Sommer claims that Johannes Siegfried Becker headed Amt VI D/4 for a period following Geppert’s removal see “Sommer Interrogation,” p. 21. 223

intelligence branch of the and was decorated for his work. Upon his

return to Germany he was assigned to the Gestapo at Kehl am Rhein and then transferred

to Amt VI which posted him to Biarritz. Gross was recalled after having a brawl with a

German general and assigned back to the Gestapo.545

Arnold related that over time Gross became ever more cynical and disillusioned

with National Socialism and that he wanted to extract as much material gain from his

position as he could. He badgered his subordinates abroad for luxury goods such as

cognac, cigarettes, coffee and silk stockings. Arnold was allowed to send home three

kilograms per week through the diplomatic pouch, and tried to send as much as possible

to his wife and parents. But Gross’s demands took up a large portion of the allotment.

Additionally, every time Arnold was ordered to Berlin for consultations, the order was

accompanied by a long shopping list of items Gross wanted. Gross also appropriated the

majority of presents Arnold sent back to Berlin for the employees of D/4. This habit soon came to be called “Grosería.”546 It is interesting that Jost was removed for alleged corruption while Gross was allowed to strong-arm his subordinates into supplying him

with hard-to-find items. Gross was also completely amoral when it came to politics. He

told Hedwig Sommer that had he not become a National Socialist, he would have become

a Communist.547

Gross had two other failings. First, he was not a good judge of men. Arnold

described him as “capable and intelligent with a good feel for ” but his failure to

545 “Personalakten Kurt Gross,” Berlin Document Center Files, SS Officer Files, NARA, RG 242/A3343/051/57730. “Arnold Interrogation,” NARA, RG 65, 64-24854-Sec. 1, p. 13. 546 Ibid. 547 “Sommer Interrogation,” p. 11. 224

properly judge men resulted in him picking a “series of incompetents and knaves to carry

out his missions abroad.”548 He also had the habit of making threats against the lives of

agents whose work displeased him. Arnold related that Gross once ordered him to

murder three of his own agents in Spain. Not only did Arnold refuse, but he told Gross

“not to be childish and…that only if he received a letter from Schellenberg himself would

he even contemplate compliance with such a ridiculous order.” Arnold placed the blame

for incompetent and dishonest agents squarely on Gross’ shoulders since Gross was the

one who sent them abroad in the first place.549

Despite his shortcomings Gross was proactive, visualizing plans and submitting

them to Paeffgen and Schellenberg for approval. Most plans were approved, which

showed the high regard in which he was held by Schellenberg and Paeffgen. However,

Gross was overzealous and as a result he clashed with Paeffgen. Once, Gross questioned

Paeffgen’s authority and Paeffgen threatened him with a combat posting. Gross quickly

retracted his statements.550 Even given all Gross’s faults, Hedwig Sommer concluded that he was suited for intelligence work because of his interest in it and the fact that, at least

superficially, he was a good National Socialist.551

Gross’s second in command was Untersturmführer Robert Grosse. Grosse’s main value was his blind devotion to Gross and his willingness to carry out orders without question. He and Gross were previously stationed together in the Gestapo at Kehl am

Rhein. Grosse also served as a member of the Border Patrol at Singen on Lake

548 “Arnold Interrogation,” NARA, RG 65, 64-24854-Sec. 1, p. 13. 549 “Arnold Interrogation,” NARA, RG 65, 64-24854-Sec. 1, p. 14. 550 “Sommer Interrogation,” p. 11. 551 Ibid, p. 12. 225

Constance. He had no experience traveling abroad, spoke no foreign languages and lacked other qualities that would make him successful. He still had a high opinion of himself. Like Paeffgen, Grosse was chosen due to loyalty rather than any qualification.552

Given the lack of success or lack of loyalty to Heydrich, Amt VI under Jost came

under intense scrutiny. Jost attempted to buttress his position telling Heydrich that “you

will recognize from this that even Amt VI fulfills its responsibility and duty and that it is

surely worth the support by other offices and departments…” But Jost failed to take any

responsibility upon himself, stating that Amt VI’s perceived failures were due to a lack of

funding and cooperation with other agencies. As Katrin Paehler points out, “Any

institution that needs to stress that work is actually done is clearly in dire straits.”553 By

1941 Jost had ceased to have any control of Amt VI and Schellenberg maneuvered to remove him. Irregularities with Amt VI finances triggered an investigation that connected Jost to embezzled money. Jost was removed and Schellenberg himself was appointed acting Amtschef.554 His appointment was confirmed on 22 June 1941.

When Becker arrived in Berlin sometime in early 1940 he expected to be

recommissioned in the army. Instead he was allegedly recruited into the SD by Major

Hermann Rossner who wanted Becker to return to South America and set up an

552 Ibid, pp. 12-13. 553 Quoted in Paehler, “Espionage, Ideology and Personal Politics,” p. 241. 554 Paehler points out that Jost had generated ill will in the RSHA including Heydrich and Heinrich Müller, head of the Gestapo. Wilhelm Höttl, head of Amt VI in Vienna office stated that Heydrich had wanted to get rid of Jost as early as 1940 and had Schellenberg do the deed. Whatever the case, it seemed that the general consensus regarding Jost was that he was incompetent and lazy. See Paehler, “Espionage, Ideology and Personal Politics,” p. 246. 226

intelligence gathering and espionage network.555 After a brief period of training at RSHA

headquarters Becker was named SD chief in southern South America. As Newton points

out “nothing could be more indicative of the SD’s unpreparedness for South American

operations.”556 While criteria for recruiting agents early in the war were vague, they were

clearly based on ideological assumptions. A handbook from 1944 described the

qualifications those persons engaged in intelligence activities should have. It stressed the

importance of their activities with regards to Hitler. The handbook implied that being a

member of SS Foreign Intelligence was the highest calling a true German could aspire to.

Only the best of the best, it said, were selected as intelligence officers. Only officers with the purest blood, who were true believers in Nazi ideology, could perform the tasks that needed to be done. As an early member of the SS Becker had his genealogy checked back to 1750 to ensure racial purity along with the SS blood group tattoo under his arm.557 The ideal intelligence officer was described as one who had:

Absolute loyalty and obedience to the Führer, courage and determination, toughness and endurance, fanatical devotion to the profession, iron self-discipline, an ice-cool mind and judgment, adaptability and capacity for understanding, lightning-fast understanding of a situation and ruthless execution, the best comrade among comrades and subordinates, full of energy and always with a positive attitude towards the outside.558

555 In her interrogation Hedwig Sommer states that Becker was recruited to work for the SD by SS Untersturmführer Ewald Geppert, head of Amt VI D/4 until June 1942. See “Report of Interview of Hedwig Elizabeth Weigelmayer Sommer,” NARA, RG 65, Box 211, File 65-56221, p. 15. Karl Arnold in his interrogation confirms Becker’s statement that Rossner recruited him. He states that Rossner headed Amt VI B until 1941 with Geppert heading VI B/4 see “Interrogation Report of Karl Arnold,” NARA, RG 65, 65-24854-Sec. 1, p. 14. 556 Newton, The ‘Nazi Menace’ p. 253. There is some disagreement regarding this since Hedwig Sommer states that Becker and Lange received no training since that practice had not been initiated yet. “Report of Interview of Hedwig Elizabeth Weigelmayer Sommer,” NARA, RG 65, Box 211, File 65-56221, p. 15. 557 Heinz Höhne, The Order of the Death’s Head: The Story of Hitler’s SS, trans. Richard Barry (New York: Ballantine Books, 1971), p. 162. Enlisted men in the SS had their genealogy checked back to 1800. 558 This statement is taken from “Handbuch des Meldedienstes,” Bd. 1 Vom Meldewesen, 888/44 gKdos, Reichssicherheitshauptamt-Amt VI AR, 95, U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum, 14.016 M, 409, and quoted in Paehler, “Espionage, Ideology and Personal Politics,” p. 214. 227

In some ways Becker fell short of this ideal, but he had been a member of the SS for

almost a decade, which ostensibly made him reliable.

During his training Becker was introduced to Heinz Lange, another SD agent who

was going to South America. Lange had lived in Asunción, Paraguay from 1931-39

working for a maritime firm. He had been a member of the Nazi Party but was expelled

in 1928 for unexplained antiparty activity. When he returned to Germany in 1939 he

carried copies of the electrical plans for the National Bank of Argentina. It is presumably

because of this that Lange’s past was forgiven and Rossner was allowed to recruit him.559

Becker and Lange were told that upon their arrival in Buenos Aires, they were to make contact with Wilhelm von Seidlitz (aka Guillermo Otto Alberto von Seidlitz), a businessman employed by the Antonio Delfino Company, and Gottfried Sanstede, Press

Attaché in the German Embassy in Buenos Aires. Becker and Lange were also to contact

Sanstede’s brother, Carlos Enrique Sanstede who was also employed at Delfino.560

Becker and Lange’s instructions were to:

recruit collaborators and extend to neighboring countries the network Lange was supposedly creating in Argentina. Second, to collect information on a variety of matters including the political and social atmosphere of South American countries in their reaction to the war; commerce between Germany’s enemies and neutrals; the Latin American response to German propaganda; enemy technical advances; British and U.S. influence in Latin American politics; communism; the consequences to German firms being included on Allied blacklists; the situation of German communities; and possible interallied conflict. Third, they were to set up a courier system between Argentina and Germany. They were also ordered to avoid contact with German diplomatic missions and leave military intelligence to the Abwehr.561

559 Rout and Bratzel, The Shadow War, p. 13. 560 “Johannes Siegfried Becker Statement to the Federal Police in Argentina,” NARA, RG 65, 64-27116. 561 Ibid, pp. 253-4. See also Rout and Bratzel, The Shadow War, pp. 13-15. 228

The last issue was in keeping with agreements that had been reached between

Reinhard Heydrich and Admiral Wilhelm Canaris five years earlier. On 17 January 1935

a meeting was convened to delineate responsibility between the Gestapo and the Abwehr.

Canaris and an aide represented the Abwehr while the Gestapo was represented by

Heydrich, Dr. and Dr. Günther Patschowski. Jost was also in attendance.562

Agreement was quickly reached that established the respective role of each organization with regard to counterespionage. It delineated the functions of the Abwehr as follows: “1.

Military espionage and counterespionage. 2. Intelligence work in the Reichswehr and in

Reichswehr owned areas. 3. Supervision and implementation of all regulations enacted as safeguards against espionage… 4. Control and supervision regarding enrollment in the

Wehrmacht. 5. Direction and determination of policy in all matters relating to national defense.” The signatories also stated, “Other intelligence services are not recognized and must be suppressed by all available means.”563 As Katrin Paehler points out, the SD

ended up with the better part of the bargain.564 The agreement also required the Abwehr

to share information and assist the Gestapo, “thus facilitating the latter’s expansion.”565

The net result was that the SD was recognized by the Abwehr as an official intelligence- gathering department in Nazi Germany with responsibility for foreign political intelligence gathering.

Becker and Lange were each given $8,000 to help carry out their instructions. As travel to South America was difficult, Rossner decided to have Becker appointed as a

562 Kahn, Hitler’s Spies, p. 231, Höhne, Canaris, p. 177 and Katrin Paehler, “Espionage, Ideology and Personal Politics,” p. 63. 563 Ibid. 564 Paehler, “Espionage, Ideology and Personal Politics,” p. 66. 565 Ibid. 229

diplomatic courier. The SD coordinated its activities with Abteilung Deutschland in the

AA. Abteilung Deutschland was under the control of Martin Franz Julius Luther, a tenacious bureaucratic infighter. Abteilung Deutschland had existed in the Weimar

Republic under the name Referat Deutschland. In its original incarnation it acted as a

liaison between the Foreign Ministry and the various political parties in the Reichstag.566

As Heinz Trützschler von Falkenstein, a member of Politische Abteilung II (Pol. II) related during his interrogation, Referat Deutschland “picked up the odds and ends of various activities in the Auswärtiges Amt.”567 Luther also had another important duty.

His office was in charge of approving travel abroad of all persons on party and state

business.

Ribbentrop also placed all contacts abroad by German organizations under

Luther’s control. Thus the SD had to deal with Luther and the Foreign Ministry if they

wanted to send Becker to South America as a diplomatic courier. Additionally, in

October 1939 the AA and SD had concluded an agreement delineating the relationship

between the two organizations.568 The AA acknowledged that Amt VI could collect

political information abroad and report directly to their RSHA superiors in Berlin. The

AA also agreed, within limits, to ignore any illegal activities that Amt VI undertook. In

566 “Interrogation of Heinz Trützschler von Falkenstein,” Poole Mission, NARA RG59/ M679/Roll 3/ Fr. 1275. 567 Ibid. 568 Peter Black, : Ideological Soldier of the Third Reich (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), p. 179 and Paehler, Espionage, Ideology and Personal Politics, p. 362. Following Amt VI support for a coup by the Iron Guard in Romania in January 1941 Ribbentrop had another agreement drawn up dealing with the role of RSHA representatives abroad. Any acts of sabotage had to be approved by Ribbentrop. See Paehler, “Espionage, Ideology and Personal Politics,” p. 364. 230 turn, Amt VI would send any intelligence gathered to Abteilung Deutschland for evaluation and approval.569

On 27 May 1940 the SD asked to have Becker appointed a diplomatic courier.570

The SD asked that Becker go to Buenos Aires on LATI, the Italian airline, which still had trans-Atlantic service to South America. In 1945 the FBI received information from the

OSS stating that when Becker was in Rome awaiting transport to South America he left a box in his room. The box allegedly contained a bacterium which was to be used to infect meat being shipped from Argentina to Great Britain, making it inedible. It appears that this allegation was unproven since no corroboration for it was found 571 Scholarly studies of German efforts to manufacture biological weapons are contradictory. In their study of chemical and and Jeremy Paxman state that the

Germany did not begin a serious biological warfare program until July 1943. They conclude that German biological warfare efforts were “literally years behind…the

Allies.”572 In contrast, Tom Bower states that an SA general, , had once asked

569 Paehler, “Espionage, Ideology and Personal Politics,” p. 363. 570 “Memo Amt VI E 3 to D II Werner Picot,” 27 May 1940, Beauftragen Becker nach Südamerika, NARA, RG 242/T120/308/224991. 571 The OSS obtained the information from “two top-ranking SD men in Rome” whose names are identified only as Subjects A and B. See “J. George Gately (OSS) to C. Darwin Marron (FBI), Subject: Siegfried Becker and Biersack,” 28 September 1945, NARA, RG 65, 64-27116-Sec. 5, Box 20 and Hoover to Joice, Subject: Johannes Siegfried Becker, 7 November 1945, NARA, RG 65, 64-27116-Sec. 5, Box 20. However author Robert Koenig states categorically that the Germans waged germ warfare in Argentina during World War I. See Robert Koenig, The Fourth Horseman: One Man’s Mission to Wage the Great War in America (New York: Public Affairs Books, 2006), pp. 233-235. This is in contrast to the sordid record of their ally the Japanese and its notorious Unit 731. For information on Unit 731 see Daniel Barenblatt, A upon Humanity: The Secret of Axis Japan's Germ Warfare Operation (New York: Harper Collins, 2004) and Tien-Wei Wu ed., The Journal of Studies of Japanese Aggression Against China - Special Edition for Unit 731: Japan's Biological Warfare against China (Society for Studies of Japanese Aggression, 1995). 572 Robert Harris and Jeremy Paxman, A Higher Form of Killing: The of Chemical and Biological Warfare (New York: Random House, 2002), p. 87. 231

Himmler for funds to finance a medical institute where experimental vaccines could be

tested on concentration camp inmates.573

Becker was to leave from Rome on 30 May 1940 with 55 kg of luggage. No

details of why Becker was traveling to South America were given. Amt VI’s request stated that “no details for a return trip can be given since he [Becker] might be in

Argentina for a long period of time.”574 The SD also asked the AA for assistance in

obtaining a transit visa through Brazil and an entrance visa for Argentina.575 Given that

Becker was leaving in three days, the AA moved quickly to obtain the necessary

documentation apparently satisfied with the vague explanations as well as the lack of a

return date.

Becker left Rome on 30 May and arrived in Rio de Janeiro on 2 June 1940

traveling onto Buenos Aires on 5 June. Becker’s troubles began when he arrived in

Buenos Aires.576 On leaving Rome Becker had listed two suitcases on his baggage

manifest, but when he arrived at the embassy in Buenos Aires he was in possession of

one trunk. When the baggage manifest was checked the discrepancy was discovered.

Baffled, Ambassador Thermann had Becker open the trunk. Thermann was shocked to find it filled with explosives. Thermann ordered Becker to dispose of the explosives by

573 Tom Bower, The Paperclip Conspiracy: The Hunt for Nazi Scientists (Boston: Little, Brown, 1987), p. 254. 574 “Memo Amt VI E 3 to D II Werner Picot,” 27 May 1940, Beauftragen Becker nach Südamerika, NARA, RG 242/T120/308/224991. 575 “Memo Amt VI B/4 to Picot,” 27 May 1940, Beauftragen Becker nach Südamerika, NARA, RG 242/T120/308/224992. 576 “Prüfer to Picot,” 2 June 1940, Beauftragen Becker nach Südamerika, NARA RG 242/T120/228/224993 and “Thermann to Picot,” 6 June 1940, Ibid, Frame 224994. 232

dumping them in the river.577 Thermann also related to his postwar interrogators that

Becker also refused to state his reason for his presence in Argentina. Becker admitted

only to membership in the SS.578 Perhaps he thought his SS membership would give him more credibility with Thermann, who was also a member of the organization.

Thermann had reason to be leery of sabotage. The situation in Argentina was

tense following the sinking of an Argentine flagged ship S.S. Uruguay by a German

submarine. An angry Thermann wrote Berlin regarding Becker’s cargo.579 According to

Thermann, Becker told him he was called for a message at the airport in Rome and was

able to gain access to the baggage area and make the switch. Thermann did not think the

AA or the embassy in Rome were aware of Becker’s duplicity and demanded an

investigation. Amt VI conducted an investigation and sent a report to D II.580 Office D II,

under the control of Rolf Pusch, was responsible for liaisons between the SS and AA.

Amt VI informed the AA that documents were altered and the two suitcases listed were

switched with the trunk. Hedwig Sommer later confirmed that Becker was ordered by

Geppert to “undertake sabotage which would injure the British.”581 However, Amt VI

stated that “Becker on behalf of the RSHA had received instructions not to undertake any

577 Newton, The ‘Nazi Menace’, p. 254. Newton’s account was taken from Thermann’s postwar interrogation. See “Interrogation of Dr. Edmund Freiherr von Thermann,” 27 September, 8, 10, 16, 20, 23, 24 October and 2, 6 November 1945, NARA, RG 59, Argentine Blue Book, Miscellaneous Affidavits and Interrogation Reports, Entry 1088, Box 26, p. 32. Thermann’s account is supported by the file of Inland II Geheim, Beauftragen Becker nach Südamerika. 578 “Interrogation of Dr. Edmund Freiherr von Thermann,” NARA, RG 59, Argentine Blue Book, Entry 1088, Box 26, p. 32. 579 Thermann to AA, 18 June 1940, Beauftragen Becker nach Südamerika, NARA, RG 242/T120/228/224996. 580 “Amt VI author unknown to D II, Serial No. D II 77/40,” July 1940, Beauftragen Becker nach Südamerika, NARA, RG 242/T120/228/224997. 581 “Director FBI to Legal Attaché Rio de Janeiro, Subject: Elizabeth Hedwig Sommer,” 25 November 1946, NARA, RG 65, 65-56279, p. 1. 233

operations. Amt VI holds the view that any action should be undertaken only with the

cooperation of the Auswärtiges Amt.”582

This explanation and show of humility was apparently accepted by D II and

Luther. Luther added that, “Independent action by Becker or other persons is not to be

expected.”583 It could also be that Luther and D II were aware of the explosives, as another memo dated 19 August 1940 states, “the arrangement was that the suitcases were to be used for different purposes only on the specific direction of the Chief of the

Security Police and SD [Heydrich] in agreement with the Foreign Ministry.”584 Luther

was probably reassuring Weizsäcker and Ribbentrop that the SD and Amt VI would not

undertake any act of sabotage that could be traced back to Germany. Luther concluded

stating “this direction should be strictly followed in light of messages coming out of

Buenos Aires so that unpleasant surprises do not occur.”585 In light of these comments, it

seems Luther was walking a fine line between angering Ribbentrop and satisfying the

SD, but his admonishment to the SD is clear. No sabotage was to be undertaken by the

SD unless approved in advance by the AA. However, if there was no written agreement

specifically addressing the issue of sabotage, then there was no way to stop Amt VI from

carrying out sabotage.586 Even so, Ribbentrop’s order of 19 June 1941 should have

582 “Amt VI author unknown to D II, Serial No. D II 77/40,” July 1940, Beauftragen Becker nach Südamerika, NARA, RG 242/T120/228/224997. 583 Ibid. 584 “Memorandum, author unknown,” 19 August 1940, Beauftragen Becker nach Südamerika, NARA, RG242/T120/228/224998. 585 Ibid. 586 In his postwar interrogation Karl Arnold claimed that Hitler had forbidden sending agents to the Western Hemisphere and that anyone whose espionage activities caused trouble in North America would be shot. See “Interrogation Report of Karl Gustav Arnold,” 5 December 1946, RG 65, File 64-24854-1, Box 17, p. 10. It is not known if this decree covered South America at all, especially given Operation South Pole etc. None of the documents dealing with the forbidding of espionage state any possible 234

cleared up any subsequent knowledge on Thermann’s part concerning intelligence activities in his area of responsibility.

During the rest of his stay in South America Becker limited his activities to recruiting agents and intelligence gathering. However, Becker’s altercation with

Thermann was the first in a string of errors. He contacted his erstwhile subordinate

Lange who arrived sometime after Becker did and suggested they pool their money.

Lange refused stating he would not give his money to Becker.587 Becker also had little

luck recruiting agents. The only person he was able to recruit in Argentina was Wilhelm

von Seidlitz, who he had been instructed to contact on arrival. Seidlitz’s recruitment

brought the total number of SD agents in Latin America to four: Becker, Lange, Wilhelm

Hammerschmidt, press attaché for the German embassy in Chile, and Seidlitz. It should

be noted that Becker was very loosely controlled by his superiors. As Katrin Paehler

notes, this was indicative of Jost’s tenure as head of Amt VI.588

As per his orders Becker became acquainted with Seidlitz, who was employed by

the Antonio Delfino shipping agency.589 The Delfino agency had represented German

business interests in Buenos Aires since the 1890s and was a very prominent company.590

punishment. This could have been a misunderstanding or exaggeration on Arnold’s part. See “The High Command of the Wehrmacht to the Foreign Ministry,” 18 June 1940, Doc. 483, Documents on German Foreign Policy, Series D, Vol. 9 (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1983), p. 616 for the order forbidding sabotage in the Americas. The document does not specifically forbid the SD from undertaking sabotage, only the Abwehr. It seems Amt VI had been preparing for sabotage operations even before Becker arrived in Germany in early 1940. See Paehler, “Espionage, Ideology and Personal Politics,” p. 221 which states that preparations for sabotage operations in South America had been completed by January 1940. 587 Ibid, pp. 353-4. 588 Paehler, “Espionage, Ideology and Personal Politics,” ch. 6 and “Report of Interview of Hedwig Elizabeth Weigelmayer Sommer,” NARA, RG 65, File 65-56221, Box 211, p. 16. 589 Ibid. Newton does not give him the honorific ‘von’ while Rout and Bratzel do. See Rout and Bratzel, The Shadow War, p. 332. 590 Newton, The ‘Nazi Menace’, p. 53. 235

Thermann later called Antonio Delfino “a great friend, who helped out in many ways.”591

Seidlitz was involved in intelligence gathering for either the Abwehr or Amt VI before meeting Becker, but it is unclear if Becker knew. Seidlitz was recruited by either

Dietrich Niebuhr, the German naval attaché in Buenos Aires, or Gottfried Sandstede, a representative of the German State Railways in Argentina and alleged Gestapo agent.592

He helped Niebuhr with the escape of members of the crew of the pocket battleship Graf

Spee before being recruited sometime in 1940.593 According to Becker’s later

interrogation, Seidlitz tried to involve him in the escape of the Graf Spee crew. Becker

claimed this involvement would have violated his instructions, but he did not object to

Seidlitz’s or Lange’s involvement. He stated that such was his way of lending “moral

support” to the affair “but duly appreciating the importance of the case.” He also stated

that he might have helped in the escape of a few crewmembers, but that the majority of

the repatriations were handled by Niebuhr.594

In July Becker decided to take a trip around South America leaving his ‘new’

recruit Seidlitz in charge of his fledgling network in Argentina instead of his trained

subordinate Lange. According to Arnold, Lange was not very useful in intelligence-

gathering activities and had no conception of how to put together a coherent intelligence

591 “Interrogation of Dr. Edmund Freiherr von Thermann,” NARA, RG 59, Argentine Blue Book, Entry 1088, Box 26. Ernst Bohle confirmed this stating that Delfino was “very chummy with the Party.” See Ibid, footnote. 592 Rout and Bratzel state Seidlitz was recruited by Niebuhr sometime in the 1930s, interestingly Rout and Bratzel do not mention Sandstede at all, see The Shadow War, p. 332. Newton states he was recruited by Sandstede, who was also an agent for the Gestapo and later Amt VI until August 1941 when he was expelled from Argentina. Newton does acknowledge that Seidlitz worked for Niebuhr as well as Sandstede. The U.S. early in the war used the Gestapo as a catchall phrase for all German agents. See Newton, The ‘Nazi Menace’, p. 55. 593 Rout and Bratzel, The Shadow War, pp. 332-3 and Newton, The ‘Nazi Menace’, p. 246. 594 “Johannes Siegfried Becker Statement to the Federal Police in Argentina,” NARA, RG 65, 64-27116, Box 20. 236

report.595 But the Argentine police were looking for Becker.596 Why Becker was wanted

is unknown, but he was warned by Karl Arnold, future head of Amt VI activities in

Spain, who was headed back to Germany from Argentina.597 Becker hurriedly left

Argentina and traveled to Rio de Janeiro, Lima, and La Paz, recruiting agents in each

city. Additionally, he put together a communication system with Berlin that was

independent of the German embassies.

In Rio de Janeiro Becker used his friendship with Dr. Clara Fadda, President of

LATI, to convince several pilots for LATI to carry messages to Rome. The pilots agreed

to hand them over to Fadda when they arrived in Rome. Becker later explained that

Fadda forwarded them to a mail drop in Berlin that he designated. The mail-drop was the

firm of Janike-Ortner, operated by an SS man. Arrangements had been made by the SD

that all mail sent to this address was exempt from inspection.598 Becker discovered however that this method was time consuming, and that getting a reply was far from certain. And during his trip Becker managed to create more political trouble.599 In Rio de

Janeiro he had an affair with the wife of a Brazilian cabinet minister who then became pregnant. The German ambassador in Brazil, Curt Prüfer, sent a telegram to Berlin asking that Becker be recalled to Berlin for “political reasons… [Becker’s] return to

595 “Interrogation Report of Karl Gustav Arnold,” 5 December 1946, RG 65, File 64-24854-1, Box 17, p. 9. 596 “Telegram Thermann to D II,” 24 September 1940, Beauftragen Becker nach Südamerika, NARA, RG 242/T120/228/225002. 597 Ibid, Arnold was recruited by Geppert in October 1940 and went to work for Amt VI as an advisor to its B/4 (Latin America) desk. In 1941 B/4 was renamed D/4 in Schellenberg’s reorganization. He was subsequently placed in charge of Amt VI activities in Spain. See Rout and Bratzel, The Shadow War, p. 17. 598 “Report of Interview of Hedwig Elisabeth Weigelmayer Sommer,” NARA, RG 65, 65-56221, p. 16. 599 Rout and Bratzel, The Shadow War, p. 354. 237

Germany urgently desired.”600 Yet, Becker spent another year in South America

attempting to fulfill his assignment.

In October 1940 Becker visited La Páz, Bolivia and Lima, Peru again. He

recruited two agents, Helmuth Strehmel in La Páz and Gerston Ganter in Lima.601 Both

proved unreliable, they did not submit reports as ordered. Becker also had problems with

communications to Berlin despite the LATI connection. In Rio in the fall of 1940 Becker

recruited Albrecht Gustav Engels (codename: “Alfredo”), an Abwehr operative.602 Becker had no qualms about recruiting anyone he felt would help him in his mission, even an agent from the competition. Engels would not be the last Abwehr agent Becker would recruit into his organization.

Engels was born into a wealthy family on , 1899. He enlisted in the

German Army in 1916, was wounded in 1917 and commissioned a lieutenant in 1918.

He was mustered out in 1919 and attended the Technical University of Berlin to study electrical engineering. The hyperinflation of 1923 convinced Engels to seek his fortunes elsewhere and in August 1923 he arrived in Rio de Janeiro. In 1938 he became an officer in the company directorate and subdirector of AEG’s Brazilian subsidiary.603 In 1938 he

600 Telegram Prüfer to D II, 10 October 1940, Beauftragen Becker nach Südamerika, NARA RG 242/T120/228/225003. Rout and Bratzel date Becker’s decision for his trip in October 1940, however, given Prüfer’s telegram, along with the biological fact that it takes time for someone to discover they are pregnant, I date Becker’s decision back to July 1940. This is one of the pitfalls of relying on interrogations to establish time and date given the fallibility of human memory. See Rout and Bratzel, The Shadow War, p. 354. 601 Ibid. 602 Extract from Report on Albrecht Gustav Engels, 5-16-43, The National Archives, Kew (hereafter TNA) KV 2/89. 603 Rout and Bratzel, The Shadow War, p. 114. Rout and Bratzel do not mention that Engels was recruited by Becker, arguing that he worked for Hermann Bohny, assistant Naval attaché in Brazil, and the Abwehr as part of the CEL Radio Network. 238

returned to Germany and was recruited into the I-Wi section of Abteilung I in the

Abwehr.604

In the fall of 1940 Becker showed up at Engels’s office and introduced himself as

Fritz Noering. He said he brought from “Schernik” a friend of Engels in Berlin.

After a short conversation Becker told Engels his real name and reason he was in Brazil,

which was to enlarge and improve communications between Germany and Brazil.

Engels later stated to his interrogators that he had little contact with Becker until the

spring of 1941 when Becker supplied him with a machine for producing microdots for

reports to Germany. Becker also gave Engels invisible ink to write secret messages, plus

instructions on how to use it. Engels later related that Becker was in close contact with

Hermann Bohny, the assistant naval attaché in Brazil and Niebuhr’s subordinate. Engels

thus believed that Becker worked for the Abwehr and was a major in the German

Army.605 Why Becker felt the need to hide his real affiliation is unclear, but Engels

believed his story. According to Engels, Becker was also well supplied with money,

probably from Bohny. During the operation of network “CEL,” Engels received

approximately $112,000 from Becker and Niebuhr to operate his network.606

Engels also helped Bohny establish the radio network codenamed “CIT” with

Becker’s assistance. On Becker’s instructions he established still another radio network

(codename: “LIR”) with approximately $7,500. Becker also gave a fourth radio network

in Rio de Janeiro (codename: “HTT”) approximately $15,000. Engels also helped Becker

604 Ibid, p. 115. I-Wi was the economic intelligence section of the Abwehr. Abteilung I was responsible for collecting secret intelligence and was under the direction of Col. Hans Pieckenbrock from 1937-1943. 605 “Report on Albrecht Gustav Engels,” 16 May 1943, BNA, KV2/89. 606 “Memorandum re: Johannes Siegfried Becker,” 15 February 1944, NARA, RG 65, 64-27116-32. 239

extend his reach to Ecuador where he contacted Hans Biebel, Walter Giesse and Heinrich

Loenschner, the main Abwehr agents operating there.607 Whatever Engels believed or

told the police later, he acted as Becker’s paymaster for the radio rings operating in Brazil

and Ecuador from 1940-42. In his interrogation of Engels, Francis Crosby, the F.B.I.

legal attaché in Argentina, stated that Engels was “clever … personable and the best-

known and best liked German in Rio de Janeiro.” As Rout and Bratzel point out, Engels

must have been an outstanding man and outstanding agent to receive such an accolade

from an adversary.608

In the fall of 1940, at approximately the same time Becker recruited Engels, he

recruited Hans Muth, who was employed as a radio engineer by Siemens-Schuckert in

Rio de Janeiro. Becker introduced himself to Muth using the name “Clon” and he spoke

to Muth in Spanish. He told Muth that he was from the German High Command and

wanted Muth to construct a radio transmitter capable of sending messages to Germany.

Why Becker still felt the need to hide his SS affiliation is unclear. Like Engels, Muth

believed his story. Muth built Becker a small transmitter which Becker took. Several

months later Muth learned Becker’s real name when he encountered him at the German

Embassy in Rio de Janeiro. Over the course of his clandestine career Muth constructed approximately six transmitters for the “CEL,” “LIR,” and “HTT” radio networks that

operated in Brazil.609

In January 1941 Becker ordered Lange to set up a radio network and recruit

agents in Rio de Janeiro, but Lange proved incompetent in carrying out this task. Becker

607 Ibid. 608 Rout and Bratzel, The Shadow War, p. 114. 609 Ibid. 240

planned to use Brazil as a base of operations and again placed Seidlitz in charge of SD

operations in Argentina while he traveled around South America recruiting agents.

Becker did manage to set up radio contact with Berlin, possibly with the assistance of

Engels or Muth. He continued to use his courier system for lengthy messages and

messages that were not time-sensitive. At first Becker wrote his letters in open text, but

as time went on used invisible ink. Eventually he graduated to a cipher system using

numbers in groups of ten.610

In June 1941 Amt VI provided Becker with assistance in the person of Alfred

Engling. Engling traveled to Brazil by ship and his cover was as an engineer for a

German firm. Hedwig Sommer stated that Engling received no training, as this practice

had not been initiated yet.611 Engling arrived with an unknown amount of money to help

Becker and Lange. Engling remained active until his arrest by the Brazilian police in

1942, which also netted Engels. Becker also obtained the services of a radio operator on

the German ship Windhuk, which was at anchor in Sao Paulo harbor.612 The SD

continued to send agents to Brazil and South America. Another agent Carl Ernst

Freiherr von Merck (codename: “Rosa”) was sent to Brazil as a correspondent for the

Völkischer Beobachter. Sommer later related that Merck worked for Amt VI without the

knowledge of the Völkischer Beobachter and had been recruited by Geppert.613

610 “Report of Interview of Hedwig Elisabeth Weigelmayer Sommer,” NARA, RG 65, 65-56221, p. 16. 611 Ibid. 612 When the Windhuk, was interned by Brazilian authorities, the so-called “Apfel Sabotage Group” hatched a plot to set fire to the ship rather than have it turned over to the U.S. See History of the SIS Division, Vol. 2. Accomplishments, Argentina-Japan, declassified 8/10/04, pp. 302-303. I am grateful to Larry Valero for bringing this report to my attention and generously providing me with a copy. 613 “Report of Interview of Hedwig Elisabeth Weigelmayer Sommer,” NARA, RG 65, 65-56221, p. 19. In his postwar interrogation, Theodor Paeffgen stated that German press correspondents and press attaché’s had been forbidden from working for Amt VI, however it seems that like most of its other agreements Amt 241

In the middle of 1941 Becker went to Santiago, Chile either to recruit more agents or check on existing networks.614 By August 1941 Becker and Lange were penniless and

asked SD headquarters for more money. Receiving no satisfactory reply to his requests

for money and radios, Becker decided to return to Germany and request assistance in

person. Another motive might have caused Becker’s return. Engling had sent an

unflattering report on Becker to SD headquarters. It detailed Becker’s sexual liaisons and

numerous blunders. The report was taken seriously enough that someone from SD

headquarters supposedly phoned Becker over an open phone line and demanded his

return.615 Becker probably returned on his own initiative.616 Another reason for his return

was conflict between him and Ambassadors Thermann and Prüfer.617 Unable to obtain a

seat on LATI on his own, Becker sheepishly went to Prüfer and asked him to obtain

credentials as a diplomatic courier and a seat back to Germany. Prüfer happily obliged.

As Becker journeyed home, Luther was brought up to date on his activities. D II

prepared a memo for Luther on Becker’s complete with his aborted sabotage attempt.

The memo cautioned about anti-Nazi agitation in Argentina and arrests by the

Argentinean police of suspected Nazi sympathizers and agents. Sabotage in South

VI got around this rule when it thought it could. For Paeffgen’s denial see “Interrogation Report of Theodor Paeffgen,” 29 December 1945, CI-IIR/40, NARA, RG 263, Records of the Central Intelligence Agency, Name Files, Box 39: Theodor Paeffgen, p. 20 and “Final Interrogation Report of Theodor Paeffgen,” 27 February 1946, CI-FIR/97, NARA, RG 65, Box 183, 65-56036 Sec. 1, p. 20. 614 “Memorandum re: Johannes Siegfried Becker,” 5 August 1944, NARA, RG65, 64-27116-56. 615 Rout and Bratzel, The Shadow War, p. 354. See also “Interrogation of Karl Gustav Arnold,” NARA, RG 65, 64-24854-Sec. 1, p. 11. 616 “Report of Interview of Hedwig Elisabeth Weigelmayer Sommer,” NARA, RG 65, 65-56221, p. 21. 617 Rout and Bratzel, The Shadow War, p. 354, see also Interrogation of Karl Gustav Arnold, NARA, RG 65, 64-24854-Sec. 1, p. 11. 242

America was “undesirable.”618 The German embassy in Rio issued Becker with another

diplomatic passport and exit visa on 12 September 1941. On 14 October Luther agreed to

issue Becker courier identification for his return trip to Berlin.619 Becker departed Brazil

on 21 October and arrived back in Berlin on 4 November 1941.620

The day after Becker’s arrival in Berlin Geppert telephoned D II asking for

courier identification and a Portuguese transit visa for Becker. Geppert telephoned in

order to speed up the process since “it is intended to send Becker back to South America

soon.”621 Geppert promised to keep the Foreign Ministry informed about when the trip

would take place. Becker, Daufeldt, and Schellenberg then went into a series of

conferences. Hedwig Sommer later related her impression that Schellenberg and

Daufeldt were “very satisfied with Becker’s work and were quick to listen to his

suggestions.”622 It seems Amt VI’s previous investigation of Becker’s conduct was

sufficient for Schellenberg and Daufeldt. While in Berlin, his intelligence networks in

Brazil were closed down by the local police. This required a thorough revamping of his

networks. Amt VI had envisaged Brazil as Becker’s primary base of operations.623

Becker was officially put in charge of all SD operations in South America, thus neutralizing Lange’s insubordination and clarifying Becker’s position once and for all. In

618 “Pusch to Luther,” 10 October 1941, Beauftragen Becker nach Südamerika, NARA, RG 242/T120/228/225006. 619 “Luther to Rio de Janeiro Embassy,” 14 October 1941, Beauftragen Becker nach Südamerika, NARA RG 242/T120/228/225007. 620 “Memo 5 November 1941,” Beauftragen Becker nach Südamerika, NARA RG 242/T120/228/225008 and “Memorandum re: Johannes Siegfried Becker,” 5 August 1944, NARA, RG65, 64-27116-56, p. 3. 621 Ibid. 622 “Report of Interview of Hedwig Elisabeth Weigelmayer Sommer,” p. 21 and “Arnold Interrogation,” p. 11. 623 Due to atmospheric conditions radio transmission were more effective on a north-south axis rather than an east-west axis. Thus reports from the U.S. and other countries were to be relayed to Brazil for transmission to Germany. See Newton, The ‘Nazi Menace’, pp. 440-41, n. 24. 243

fact, while Becker was in Berlin Lange and Gustav Utzinger sent a message stating that

they did not want to work with Becker any longer. Sommer later stated that this message

was not given much consideration by either Daufeldt or Schellenberg.624 It seems Becker

was difficult work for. Despite Lange and Utzinger’s complaints, Schellenberg, Daufeldt

and Becker decided that Lange was to be in charge of intelligence operations in Chile,

and Utzinger was to control the radio network. Buenos Aires would be the master station

and take messages from other networks for transmission to Berlin.625

On 19 November 1941 Daufeldt again requested courier identification for Becker

to return to South America since the 5 November request had not been fulfilled.626

Daufeldt also asked the Foreign Ministry to secure transport to South America on LATI, and further informed D II that Becker would return in early December.627 The next day

Luther sent a telegram to the Rio embassy informing it of the request and telling them of

Becker’s return. He requested an “immediate reply on whether there is agreement on

Becker’s return trip.”628 This request was in keeping with Ribbentrop’s order of 19 June

1941 which stated that ambassadors had to give their consent to any intelligence

activities.629 The Rio embassy replied that the situation in Brazil was not good, but it did

624 “Report of Interview of Hedwig Elisabeth Weigelmayer Sommer,” p. 34. 625 Ibid, p. 21. While Utzinger’s real name was Wolf Franczok, I have used his alias of Gustav Utzinger since this is how he is referred to in most of the correspondence. Only in his interrogation in 1947 following his repatriation to Germany is he referred to by his given name. 626 Amt VI D was responsible for Scandinavia, Latin America, Great Britain and the United States. Prior to June 1941 Amt VI-B was responsible for these areas and VI-B/4 was the Latin American desk. 627 “Daufeldt to Pusch,” 19 November 1941, Beauftragen Becker nach Südamerika, NARA, RG 242/T120/228/225009. 628 “Luther to Rio Embassy,” 20 November 1941, Beauftragen Becker nach Südamerika, NARA RG 242/T120/228/225010. 629 “Ribbentrop Order,” 19 June 1941, NARA RG242/T120/366/291266 244

not forbid Becker’s return. D II asked Amt VI if Becker was still to return on 8

December and to reply as soon as possible.630

However, Becker was not to return to South America on that date. By mid

December he was still in Berlin awaiting the identification he needed. Amt VI was impatient and on 16 December 1941 Daufeldt complained to Rolf Pusch, a member of

Luther’s office. Pusch apologized for the delay, but Daufeldt was not satisfied. The next

day Becker and Daufeldt visited Luther’s second in command, Werner Picot, and Pusch to inquire about the identification. Becker complained about waiting to get back to

Berlin and the delay in sending him back to South America. He believed the delays were

because of the complaints lodged against him by Prüfer and Thermann. Picot defended

Prüfer stating that everything which could have been done was done, but that he would

check on Becker’s allegations. Picot told Becker that the delay was the fault of Amt VI

and that D II wished to cooperate fully with the SD.631

On 18 December 1941 D II explained that the fault lay with the SD. In a

telephone conversation with Schellenberg on 19 November 1941 Luther discussed the

Rio telegram concerning the situation in Brazil. Luther further told Schellenberg that 26

November 1941 was the deadline for requesting identification for Becker’s return. A memo of that conversation was prepared and sent to Amt VI. However, it seems that the last sentence regarding the 8 December 1941 return of Becker and the deadline of 26

630 “D II to Amt VI-D/4,” 25 November 1941, Beauftragen Becker nach Südamerika, NARA RG 242/T120/228/225013. 631 “Picot Memo”, 18 December 1941, Beauftragen Becker nach Südamerika, NARA RG 242/T120/228/225018. 245

November was missing from the memo. D II stated that the failure to issue Becker his

identification in time resulted from the absence of this sentence.632

Picot set about securing Becker’s identification and tried to come to an

accommodation with the SD. Picot referred to Prüfer’s report on Becker’s transgressions

and charged that Becker was brought back to consult with Berlin concerning these

allegations. Picot stated that only after settling the allegations against Becker could

discussions begin regarding a return trip to South America. It was important for the AA

to address these issues given the sensitive diplomatic situation there. Picot acknowledged

that the embassy in Rio had agreed to Becker’s return but that the entry of the U.S. into

the war against Germany on 12 December had complicated the situation. He stated that

he was awaiting a telegram from the Rio embassy regarding the situation there. Instead

of owning up to its mistake D II decided to use Becker’s transgressions and the situation

in South America as reasons for the delay. Picot must have been confident that the

matter would be cleared up quickly. He stated that Becker’s return to South America was scheduled for 5 January 1942, but that given the short time period for preparing 12

January was more likely.633

Picot also explained the process needed to acquire a Brazilian entry visa, which

was the major stumbling block at this point. These visas were given out by the Brazilian

authorities only to holders of diplomatic passports. Consequently, Becker had to have one if he were to get a visa. Additionally, a Portuguese transit visa was contingent on

632 “Memo D II,” 18 December 1941, Beauftragen Becker nach Südamerika, NARA RG 242/T120/228/225015. 633 “Luther Memo,” 18 December 1941, Beauftragen Becker nach Südamerika, NARA RG 242/T120/228/225019 246

Becker’s diplomatic status as signified by a diplomatic passport. Picot proposed that

Heydrich write to Ribbentrop formally requesting a diplomatic passport for Becker. He felt that a formal request by Heydrich, with Ribbentrop’s approval, would speed the process. D II was also receiving resistance from the Political Department and

Staatssekretär Weizsäcker regarding the issuance of the passport since Weizsäcker knew of Becker’s past transgressions. Weizsäcker was probably acting in what he thought were the best interests of the Political Department and his ambassadors. A formal order from Ribbentrop would clear this bottleneck and solve the problem.634

Luther outlined the situation for Ribbentrop regarding Becker’s return to South

America. He informed Ribbentrop on who Becker was and the tentative plans for his

return. The key part is that Heydrich would formally ask Ribbentrop for a diplomatic

passport for Becker and that the AA should give him one unless there were objections

from Prüfer. Luther emphasized that Heydrich and the SD were very anxious for Becker

to return and the short amount of time before Becker’s planned departure made a speedy

decision essential. Luther suggested that the passport only be made valid for Becker’s entry into Brazil where he would surrender it to the ambassador. Becker would then have to travel on a foreign passport.635 A temporary diplomatic passport was Luther’s way of protecting the AA against any future actions by Becker that could reflect badly on the AA and Germany’s delicate diplomatic situation in South America. This also provided plausible deniability to the AA since without a diplomatic passport Becker was just another person whose existence could be denied by German diplomats. By involving

634 Ibid, frame 225020. 635 Ibid, frame 225021-22. 247

Heydrich, Luther ensured that should Becker negatively affect Germany’s diplomatic

position in Brazil then blame would be assigned either to Heydrich’s subordinates or to

Heydrich himself.

On 19 December, Heydrich formally asked Ribbentrop to issue Becker a diplomatic passport, stating that the Brazilian government would not issue Becker a visa

without it. He informed Ribbentrop that Becker had been reserved a seat on the LATI

flight leaving Rome on 5 January 1942 and impressed upon Ribbentrop the urgency of

the situation in light of American entry into the war and the fear that air service to South

America might be terminated. The neutral nations of South America would provide a staging area for intelligence-gathering activities against the U.S. Heydrich assured

Ribbentrop that Becker, most likely at Luther’s suggestion, would hand over his diplomatic passport as soon as he reported to the embassy. He further assured

Ribbentrop that Becker would only be in Brazil a few days before moving on.636

Heydrich understood the possible consequences of any adverse actions on Becker’s part, hence the assurance of Becker’s swift departure.

On 22 December 1941 Luther informed the German embassy in Rio of Becker’s planned arrival on 12 January 1942. He assured Prüfer that Becker would only be in

Brazil a few days. He also told Prüfer that Becker would report to him on arrival to surrender his diplomatic passport and brief the ambassador on his tasks. Luther instructed Prüfer to acquire a Portuguese transit visa and a Brazilian entry permit for

636 “Memo Heydrich to Ribbentrop,” 19 December 1941, Beauftragen Becker nach Südamerika, NARA RG 242/T120/228/225027-28. 248

Becker since he would be traveling as a diplomatic courier. He further asked whether

Becker’s return was agreeable given the changed diplomatic situation.637

However, events had begun to overtake Becker’s planned return. On 18

December the Italian Foreign Ministry announced that air traffic to South America would

be suspended and that LATI would only be allowed to fly three of its airplanes back to

Europe owing to gasoline shortages. A message from the Political Department informing

the other departments of this development was issued and a copy sent to Luther. The SD

would have to find another way to get Becker to South America. Prüfer, apparently haven

given his approval for Becker’s return, was told to await the determination of D II and the

SD regarding Becker.638

On 23 December 1941 Prüfer told Luther that LATI’s landing rights in northern

Brazil had been suspended and that Becker’s return was questionable. LATI’s rights had

probably been suspended on the orders of Brazilian President Vargas who was deciding

on his country’s diplomatic course. Suspending LATI’s landing rights would allow

Vargas to come to a decision. If Vargas decided to side with Germany and Italy then

landing rights could be restored. Prüfer was also concerned the Americans and Brazilians

might terminate LATI’s landing rights in all of Brazil. If Becker somehow managed to

get to the first stop in northern Brazil, he would have to travel overland to Rio de Janeiro,

a trip of approximately three weeks. Prüfer informed Berlin that if Becker were to get to

Rio he could then get to Paraguay via Condor Air, a German-controlled airline in

637 “Luther to Prüfer,” 22 December 1941, Beauftragen Becker nach Südamerika, NARA, RG 242/T120/228/225023. 638 Memo, author unknown, undated, Beauftragen Becker nach Südamerika, NARA, RG 242/T120/228/225025. 249

Paraguay.639 On 27 December 1941 Picot telephoned Schellenberg to inform him of this

development. On 3 January 1942 Picot formally announced the termination of LATI’s

landing rights and stated “SS Hauptsturmführer Becker is not able to return to Brazil.

The matter [Becker’s return to Brazil] is therefore settled.”640

Becker remained in Berlin until March 1942.641 Thereafter he spent the majority of his time in Spain setting up a smuggling and communications network using seamen

who worked on ships that docked in Spain. Spain was an important conduit for German

activities. Like Ortiz of Argentina, the Spanish leader General declared

that Spain would observe “the strictest neutrality” on 4 September 1939. Unlike

Argentina Spain made it perfectly clear where its sympathies lay. In June 1939, Ramon

Serrano Suñer, Franco’s brother-in-law and future minister of foreign affairs, told Italian

dictator Benito Mussolini and his foreign minister “Spain will be at the

side of the Axis because she will be guided by feeling and reason. A neutral Spain would

be destined to a future of poverty and humiliation.”642 Spain, unlike Brazil and

Argentina, joined the Anti-Comintern Pact on 27 March 1939. It also allowed its ports to

be used to resupply and refuel German submarines.643 From the beginning of the war

639 “Prüfer to Foreign Ministry,” 23 December 1941, Beauftragen Becker nach Südamerika, NARA, RG 242/T120/228/225030. 640 “Memo of Picot, carbon copied to Schellenberg,” 3 January 1942, Beauftragen Becker nach Südamerika, NARA, RG 242/T120/228/225031. 641 “Arnold Interrogation,” NARA, RG 65, 64-24854-Sec. 1, p. 13-14. 642 Christian Leitz, Sympathy for the Devil: Neutral Europe and Nazi Germany in World War II (New York: New York University Press, 2001), p. 119. 643 Charles B. Burdick, “’Moro’: the Resupply of German Submarines in Spain 1939-1942,” Central European History, Volume 3, (1970), 256-284. 250

Spain energetically supported Nazi intelligence efforts and played an active role assisting

in the smuggling of materials from Argentina.644

Spain had the largest number of German intelligence personnel outside of

German-occupied territory. Walter Schellenberg told his postwar interrogators of Spain’s importance as a base for intelligence-gathering activities. Germany’s embassy was the largest German embassy in the world with over 500 members in Madrid with 180 more

scattered throughout its thirty consulates in Spain.645 Germany constructed eleven

observation posts along the coast of Southern Spain and Spanish Morocco. In late 1941 nine new posts were constructed along the north coast of Spain and five along the southern coast. This brought the total number of observation posts to twenty-five. All

were constructed with Franco’s approval.646

Spain also assisted Nazi Germany by carrying German diplomatic correspondence and intelligence reports across the Atlantic. For most of the war this correspondence was

transported in the Spanish diplomatic pouch. This gave German intelligence agents a

somewhat risk-free way to transport intelligence reports.647 Spanish flagged ships were

also used to transport escaped crewmembers from the German warship Graf Spee.648

Nazi Germany also attempted to co-opt the Spanish news agency Efe. It was hoped that

644 See especially, U.S. and Allied Wartime and Postwar Relations and Negotiations with Argentina, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and Turkey on Looted Gold and German External Assets and U.S. Concerns About the Fate of the Wartime Ustasha Treasury, Supplement to preliminary study on U.S. and Allied Efforts to Recover and Restore Gold and Other Assets Stolen or Hidden by Germany during World War II, coordinated by Stuart E. Eizenstat (Washington D.C., June 1998) and Christian Leitz, Sympathy for the Devil, pp. 114-143. While Eizenstat’s report is concerned primarily with postwar issues, it provides valuable background information on the wartime activities of neutral countries in support of Nazi Germany. 645 Stanley G. Payne, Franco and Hitler: Spain, Germany and World War II (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008), p. 115. 646 Ibid. 647 Ibid, p. 117. 648 Ibid, p. 118. 251

Efe would act as a conduit for Nazi propaganda in Latin America. The effort came to

naught when Vincente Gállego, the head of Efe, refused to be bribed. The Germans

asked Gállego be removed as head of Efe and replaced with someone more amenable, but

Franco refused.649 However, Franco did allow Nazi Germany to supply funding for Efe to

setup more offices in Latin America. Efe also sent four pro-German employees, out of a

planned thirty, to Latin America to work for German propaganda and intelligence, but

their effectiveness was limited.650 Spain’s also attempted to set up a joint intelligence

service in Latin America with Nazi Germany. The idea was never implemented.

While interpretations of Spanish actions in Latin America are sound, there is one

argument that is debatable. Stanley Payne claims that Nazi leaders believed Latin

America was sympathetic to Nazi propaganda.651 But Thermann’s and Meynen’s reports claimed that the majority of Argentines were not pro-German.652 While Meynen noted

that anti-German feelings were the result of enemy propaganda he stressed another factor:

the “general failure to understand Germany’s policy.”653 It could be argued that this was

the crux of the problem and anti-German propaganda was aggravating it. This is

supported by Thermann’s message of 24 February 1939 in which he stressed that

Germany should push anti-U.S. themes to make Argentine public opinion more pro-

German.654 This begs the question: If Argentina and Latin America were already sympathetic to Nazi propaganda, why forcefully push anti-U.S. themes? It would seem

649 Ibid, p. 122. 650 Ibid, pp. 122-123. 651 Ibid, p. 122. 652 See chapter 3 for this discussion. 653 “Politische Bericht: Deutsch-argentinische Beziehungen,” 27 September 1939, Büro des Staatssekretärs: Argentinien Band 1, NARA, RG 242/Serial T-120/Roll 25/Frame 26622. 654 “Politische Bericht: Deutsch-argentinische Beziehungen,” 24 Februar 1939, Pol. IX, Akten betreffend: Politische Beziehungen Argentiniens zu Deutschland, April 1936-Mai 1939, TNA, File: GFM 33810. 252

that Nazi Germany was expending a lot of time and effort on an issue that was already

decided in their favor. While Latin American sympathies may have been up for grabs,

Spain’s were quite clear. The aid Becker received there from pro-German Spaniards

made his job easier.

One individual Becker befriended was Jose Luschnig, a veteran of the Spanish

Blue Division who had lost an arm in Russia. The Blue Division was raised by the

Falange Española to fight in Russia. It was a way to show their support for an anti-

communist crusade. According to Stanley Payne, it was also Franco’s way of thanking

Hitler for his support during the Spanish Civil War.655 Although Luschnig served in the

Spanish army, he was an Argentine citizen and held an . Becker later stated that he stole Luschnig’s passport and identity papers for himself without Luschnig being aware.656 Sometime in 1942, he later claimed he returned to Berlin where the

Argentine Consul extended the expiration date for his passport. While in Berlin he was also given $20,000 and $5,000 worth of Swiss francs. He was also told that the German

embassy in Buenos Aires would be holding the equivalent of $284,000 in Argentine

pesos to finance his network. Becker later stated that he was ordered not to have contact

with the German embassy in Buenos Aires and that he was to “use good discretion so as

not to compromise his country.”657 This was Amt VI’s way of telling him not to repeat his earlier sexual indiscretions or his problems with Ambassadors Thermann and Prüfer.

655 For a discussion of the Blue Division see Payne, Franco and Hitler, chapter 8. 656 While this is possible, more than likely Luschnig was paid for them. 657 “Johannes Siegfried Becker Statement to the Federal Police in Argentina,” NARA, RG 65, 64-27116, Box 20. 253

Later in 1942 Becker returned to Spain awaiting his opportunity to return to

Argentina. Franco’s support for Germany made it easier to obtain passage on a neutral

ship. While in Spain he renewed his acquaintance with Karl Arnold who had been named

Amt VI/D’s representative in Spain. One of Arnold’s tasks was to set up a reliable

courier system between Spain and Argentina. This had been a problem for Amt VI/D

after LATI had ceased to operate between South America and Europe in early 1942.

Prior to Arnold’s arrival, reports were forwarded in an inconsistent manner which

resulted in reports being lost or delivered to German consulates which did not know what

to do with them. Arnold set up cover as an employee of Compañía General de Lanas and

contacted Becker about setting up a reliable communications system.

Becker was finally able leave Spain for Argentina in December 1942 stowing

away onboard the SS Rita García with the assistance of the then first officer Marcelino

Diaz (codename: “Camus”).658 Becker was discovered a few days out to sea, but

convinced the captain to let him stay for cash and work as a crewmember for the duration

of the voyage to Buenos Aires.659 Becker arrived in Buenos Aires in January 1943 and

immediately started to recruit intermediaries. He obtained the services of two Spaniards,

Esteban Jesus Amorín and Manolo de Miguel Arrastia who would recruit couriers among

658 “Memorandum re. Marcelino Diaz,” 13 June 1946, TNA, KV 2/89. Diaz eventually was promoted to captain of the Rita García and continued to work for Becker and Arnold. He was subsequently arrested by the Argentine police in March 1944 in the of German spies following Argentina’s break in relations, but was released shortly thereafter for “lack of evidence.” Following Becker’s arrest in 1945 the police acquired more evidence against Diaz, but were unable to re-arrest him. 659 “Memorandum re: Johannes Siegfried Becker with aliases,” 5 August 1944, NARA, RG 65, 64-27116 Sec.2, Box 19, p. 10. 254

seamen in Buenos Aires and Rosario. By March 1943 the courier system was up and

running.660

The system was similar to that set up by Niebuhr. Arnold received mail from

Berlin through Heinz Singer in the office of the police attaché in the embassy. After

receiving the material Singer called Arnold, who picked it up. Arnold then let members

of his organization know that he had correspondence for Becker. When a courier was

available and picked up the envelope Arnold notified Berlin so they could cable Becker

and notify him that correspondence was on its way. When a ship carrying material

arrived in Buenos Aries, Amorín or Arrastia would go aboard and contact the courier.

They would say “Saludos de José” or “Saludos de Pepe” (Greetings from “José” or

“Pepe,” both cover names for Becker) and then ask “Have you brought something from

over there?” If the couriers were not met in Buenos Aires they had two alternate

addresses for exchanges. One was a church where the priest, Padre Luis Fernandez,

assisted Becker. Couriers arriving from Buenos Aires would go to Arnold’s office to drop their packages there.661

In his postwar interrogation Karl Arnold estimated that there were between fifteen

and eighteen Spanish seamen carrying reports between Madrid and Buenos Aires. Most were members of the Falange or had served in the Spanish Blue Division on the eastern front. Becker and Arnold must have been good judges of character since very few of the seamen took money for their services. The Spaniards co-operated because of their anti-

660 “Arnold Interrogation,” NARA, RG 65, 64-24854-Sec. 1, p. 18. 661 Ibid, pp. 18-19. 255

communist views.662 The main fear among the crewmen was arrest by the British at

Trinidad or Gibraltar or, if discovered by their employers, losing their jobs. Rumors

circulated that the British were hanging couriers who refused to cooperate. 663 The rumors show how effective British efforts against couriers and smuggling were perceived by the Germans and merchant seamen.

Becker’s activities in Argentina during 1940-41 were a mixed success. He recruited agents, but his most successful ones, such as Engels and Seidlitz, had already been recruited by the Abwehr. Most of the agents he recruited on his own, such as Ganter were failures. His major successes were in Brazil where Niebuhr had already set up a burgeoning intelligence-gathering network. Like the Abwehr, the SD spent money to gather useful intelligence. Becker’s indiscretions hampered him. Drawing the ire of two ambassadors in different countries is no mean accomplishment. Despite the evidence against him, he was allowed to continue his mission, when common sense dictated the

SD should have cut its losses. The fact that the SD did not unload Becker probably speaks to the issue of finding qualified personnel in the SS to carry out intelligence- gathering activities, as well as its desperation to have some sort of success vis-à-vis the

Abwehr. Jost, Paeffgen and Schellenberg bemoaned the issue in their postwar interrogations.

From its formation the SD and Amt VI faced twin rivals in the AA and Abwehr.

As early as 1936 Canaris and his organization attempted to put a brake on SD attempts to

662 Ibid, p. 19 and “Sommer Interview,” NARA, RG 65, 65-56221, p. 2. Sommer stated “… an impressive number of Spanish crewmembers for the courier system, which was all the more remarkable for the fact that few of them were paid for their efforts…” 663 “Arnold Interrogation,” p. 19. 256

forge an intelligence service. In October 1939 the AA attempted to delineate the

relationship between itself and the SD. Though agreement was reached, the SD

attempted to set its own agenda regarding what was permissible. How else does one

explain the explosives in Becker’s luggage? The evidence suggests that Luther was

aware of them, but if he was, then why order an investigation? Why not tell Thermann

what he told Ribbentrop and Weizsäcker about the use of the explosives? Given Luther’s

reputation as a bureaucratic infighter he probably saw this as an opportunity to curb some

of the excesses of the SD and give the AA more of a voice in Amt VI’s operations.

SD intrigues in Romania certainly affected Amt VI operations in Argentina. The record suggests that Becker’s instructions, along with operations in Romania, were part

of a larger pattern of deceit in an attempt to bypass the AA. However, the AA and Luther

were loathe to concede anything to Heydrich, Jost and Schellenberg. Such is borne out

by Ribbentrop’s order of 19 June 1941 which expressly delineated SD responsibility

regarding intelligence operations in foreign countries. Amt VI leaders were also well

aware that the SD was dependent on AA support for intelligence operations, which gave

the AA leverage in any disputes with the Amt VI. Supporting these assertions is the fact

that Becker superiors did not punish for any of his transgressions against the AA.

Instead, they praised his work and officially made him head of SD intelligence for South

America. There was never any serious consideration given to replacing him especially given the dearth of qualified personnel. However, Becker would learn from his mistakes.

When he returned to Argentina in January 1943 he attempted to supplant the AA as the

primary instrument of Nazi foreign policy. He came very close to succeeding. 257

Chapter 6

The Illusion of Control

In January 1943 Johannes Siegfried Becker returned to Argentina and set about reestablishing contact with agents he previously recruited. Becker returned to a different situation than the one he left in 1941. Thermann had departed and Niebuhr was about to leave. This removed two dominant personalities who could have obstructed his work.

This chapter looks at his attempts to create an anti-U.S. ‘Andes bloc’ with the cooperation of pro-German elements in the Argentine government and the Abwehr. It will argue that Becker’s cooperation with the Abwehr was simply a means to an end.

Without this cooperation Becker would have had to limit his activities to Argentina. This cooperation facilitated the help Becker and his network received from high-level government officials in the governments of Argentina, Paraguay, and Bolivia. While these contacts superficially admired the Nazis and enthusiastically embraced the support

Becker and Argentina gave them; the SD fundamentally misunderstood the nature of

Latin American .

Despite this misunderstanding, Schellenberg, Paeffgen and Amt VI went forward with their plans. These plans included overthrowing the pro-Allied governments of

Paraguay, Brazil and Chile and replacing them with governments more amenable to Nazi

Germany. Previously Becker and Amt VI had confined itself to political intelligence gathering. Now it had moved into more ambitious and dangerous territory. If Amt VI’s coup plots succeeded, that along with the Hellmuth affair (discussed below) would place it in a powerful position to replace the AA as the primary instrument of Nazi foreign 258

policy. Since none of the nations in the Southern Cone of South America had relations with Nazi Germany, Schellenberg, Paeffgen and Becker did not have to worry about offending the AA. This minimized any potential blowback if their scheme should fail.

However, if it succeeded then Schellenberg would be able to achieve his goal of becoming Foreign Minister. Thus, Schellenberg placed the collection of information below his personal ambition.

Becker’s efforts to obtain information on the U.S. were a failure. He never managed to place an agent inside the U.S. As Richard Breitman points out, Becker’s intelligence reports on Allied intentions and capabilities “bore little correspondence to

reality.”664 Despite this, Becker and his agents worried the FBI with their activities. J.

Edgar Hoover, head of the FBI, set up the Special Intelligence Service to specifically combat German intelligence activities in Latin America. Additionally, FBI legal attachés were assigned to every U.S. embassy in Central and South America. The FBI diverted

manpower that could have been used elsewhere.

Becker arrived in Buenos Aires on 2 January 1943. Following his arrival Becker

told the Argentine Federal Police in 1945 that he reestablished contact with Wilhelm von

Seidlitz. Seidlitz brought Becker up to date on the wayward members of his network.

Seidlitz told Becker that Heinz Lange was in Mendoza attempting to return to Chile and continue his work there. He also told Becker of Niebuhr’s and Utzinger’s arrangement

regarding the radio facilities. This arrangement left Utzinger in charge of all incoming

and outgoing radio traffic from the Abwehr and SD networks. It also divided the cost of

664 Richard Breitman, “Nazi Intelligence: The Abwehr and SD Foreign Intelligence,” in Richard Breitman et.al., U.S. Intelligence and the Nazis (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 106. 259 supporting the network between the German embassy in Buenos Aires, Abwehr, and SD.

Becker contacted Utzinger, Lange and other members of his network. He asserted his authority as head of SD operations for South America. Becker told Lange to return to

Chile and set-up another network. He promised Lange that he would receive help once operations in Argentina were running smoothly. Becker was vague regarding money for

Lange’s operation and only gave him $500. As Leslie Rout and John Bratzel point out, apparently “the insubordination of 1940 had not been forgotten.”665

It was through Utzinger that Becker obtained an introduction to Hans Harnisch.666

Harnisch was the head of the Abwehr’s “Nest Cologne” in South America. Harnisch claimed in his postwar interrogation that he met Becker only once when Becker visited his business office. He further claimed that he never had “anything resembling a partnership or working arrangement with either the SD chief [Becker] or the German embassy” prior to the Hellmuth affair. But these statements were false.667 What was discussed between Becker and Harnisch is unknown, but decrypted German messages

(Ultra) make it almost certain Harnisch agreed to collaborate with Becker. Harnisch also

665 Ibid, p. 17 and Leslie Rout Jr. and John Bratzel, The Shadow War: German Espionage and United States Counterespionage in Latin America during World War II (Fredrick, MD: University Publications of America, 1986), p. 356. 666 “Hoover to Lyons, Subject: Johannes Siegfried Becker,” 5 September 1945, NARA, RG 165, File: Johannes Siegfried Becker, Box 967, p. 17. 667 “Report of Interrogation of Hans Rudolf Leo Harnisch (hereafter Harnisch interrogation),” July- September 1947, NARA, RG 84, Records of the Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State, Buenos Aires Political Reports (hereafter BAPR), File 862.20235/10-3147, Box 102, pp. 13-14. While it is not known when exactly Harnisch met Becker, there is strong evidence that Harnisch and Becker were cooperating. The FBI had put wiretaps on the German embassy in Buenos Aires. On 8 , the FBI reported that Becker had called Harnisch at the embassy to set up the delivery of two photographs. They also talked about Becker’s vacation and the fact that Becker chided Harnisch over the fact he received no mail from him, “Memorandum re: Johannes Siegfried Becker with aliases,” 5 August 1944, NARA, RG 65, 64-27116 Sec.2, Box 19, p. 33. For the wiretap transcript see, “Memorandum, Re: Technical Surveillance,” 11 May 1943, NARA, RG 65, 64-21889-Sec. 1, Box 6, no page number. This document also shows Harnisch had an office in the German embassy. 260

appointed his business partner Carlos Enrique Neiling (codename: “Charlie”) as liaison

between himself and Becker.668 That there was some sort of cooperation is attested to by

the later interrogations of Schellenberg and Paeffgen, and by Ultra decrypts.

Both Schellenberg and Paeffgen stated in postwar interrogations that the SD and

Abwehr in Argentina cooperated. Schellenberg admitted that such cooperation was

unusual.669 On 26 January, Becker informed his superiors of his cooperation with

Harnisch and gave an update on the status of his organization. He stated that Harnisch

would represent the Abwehr and at the same time supervise political reporting.670 Given

Harnisch’s contacts in the Argentine government, this was a wise move. What Gross,

Paeffgen and Schellenberg thought of this cooperation is unknown. The SD was generally suspicious in cooperating with its rival. These suspicions were probably made known to Becker. On 2-3 February he told Amt VI:

Have expected suspicion. Because there is no possibility of lengthy explanation. I assure upon my word of honor of the following: As is considered the place of SS leader I worked here exclusively in our interests. I will never lose sight of that. The contrary of your suspicion is the case…Köln [Harnisch’s Nest Cologne network] is completely in our hands…Great difficulties and enormous expenses of our work on a large scale demand this coordination of the matter of which we have absolute control. We request therefore, regardless of appearances, your complete confidence in us as unconditional agents of our “SS” true to our slogan.671

Becker’s protestations of loyalty were, however reluctantly, accepted by his superiors.

This ushered in an unprecedented period of cooperation between the Abwehr and SD.

668 Rout and Bratzel, The Shadow War, p. 358. 669 “Interrogation of Dr. Theodor Paeffgen,” 19 October 1945, NARA, RG 59, M679, Roll 3, Frame 944 and “Interrogation of Walter Schellenberg,” 24 November 1945, NARA, RG 263, Records of the Central Intelligence Agency, Name Files: Walter Schellenberg, p. 4. 670 “Argentina to Berlin,” 26 January 1943, NARA, RG 226, Records of the OSS, OSS Communication Office Records, Ultra Decrypts, Entry 188. 671 “Argentina to Berlin,” 2-3 February 1943, Ibid. 261

This cooperation would last until February 1944 when the SD and AA laid the blame for

Argentina’s breaking relations with Germany on the Abwehr.

Prior to Niebuhr’s departure the attaché had a meeting with Becker. Both men

agreed that General Friedrich Wolf, the newly appointed military attaché following

Niebuhr’s expulsion, would have no contact with Becker. Becker reported that “OKW

(possibly Wolf) does not know me at all. The chief representative of “OKW” has

completely subordinated himself to me because he has already been ordered to do so by

“RSHA” in Berlin. Niebuhr asked me to attach him to our plants [networks?]. For that

purpose he places everything he has at our disposal.”672 This message suggests that

neither Niebuhr nor Becker had much confidence in Wolf’s abilities. Niebuhr probably

assented to Becker’s request since Harnisch would represent the interests of the Abwehr.

Becker also requested that OKW and OKM (Oberkommando der Marine/Naval High

Command) not be informed of his cooperation with Harnisch.673 It was one thing to

cooperate with the embassy and Abwehr regarding “Bolivar,” the codename of the radio

network. It was another to allow the Abwehr to encroach on the SD’s areas of responsibility. Becker suspected the Abwehr would take the same dim view that Gross,

Paeffgen and Schellenberg had regarding cooperation. By not informing the high command structures Becker and the SD could simply present the Abwehr with a fait

accompli at a later date. And Harnisch’s superior (first name unknown) Kramer apparently had no problem with Harnisch working on political matters as long as he continued performing his primary duties. By the end of February 1943 Becker managed

672 Ibid. “RSHA” might have been garbled in transmission and Becker meant either the Attaché Abteilung in the AA or the Abwehr. 673 Ibid. 262

to gain a measure of control over the “Bolivar” radio net, obtain the cooperation of the

Abwehr network and marginalize Wolf. Amt VI had good reason to be satisfied with

Becker’s performance. If Becker’s cooperation with Harnisch needed to be kept secret,

then “Bolivar” was one area where permission was needed.

When Niebuhr returned to Germany he informed his superiors of his cooperation

regarding “Bolivar.” This cooperation was even more important since on 30 December

1942 the Argentine government limited the German embassy to the dispatch of one hundred coded word groups per day.674 This limited the ability of German intelligence to

report on events using the embassy code. It also made the “Bolivar” network more

important since it was now the primary means of communicating with Germany. On 16

March 1943 a conference was held between the Abwehr and SD to discuss the particulars

regarding cooperation. Amt VI informed Utzinger and Becker that both organizations

had approved Niebuhr’s proposal. However, there were areas of concern. Amt VI

wanted to make sure that the Abwehr could not read any messages intended for the SD.

They cautioned Utzinger about making absolutely sure his messages used the correct

cipher to avoid possible compromises. They told Becker that he should take care in his

dealings with the Abwehr. Under no circumstances should he do anything to compromise

the collaborative effort between the two organizations. Amt VI also told Becker not to

allow the Abwehr inside his organization. In their opinion the Abwehr was “much too

light-minded in their work.”675 Amt VI also congratulated Becker on taking over

leadership of all intelligence-gathering activities. They hoped that Becker would work to

674 Rout and Bratzel, The Shadow War, p. 345. 675 “Berlin to Argentina,” 12 May 1943, NARA, RG 226, Records of the OSS, OSS Communication Office Records, Ultra Decrypts, Entry 188. 263

retain his control.676 Paeffgen, Gross and Schellenberg were well aware of the magnitude

of Becker’s accomplishment. While the Abwehr was aware of these events it could do little except hope Harnisch kept his allegiance to Canaris’s organization. While

Harnisch’s actions alarmed, or should have alarmed, those in Canaris’s organization with responsibility for Latin America they allowed him to cooperate with Becker as long as he fulfilled his main duty, economic reporting.

However, Harnisch’s political reporting was causing problems between the SD and Abwehr. The Abwehr was alarmed by his focus on political reporting. Kramer,

Harnisch’s superior, warned him to stay in the background so he and his network would not be compromised. Kramer told Harnisch that he needed to concentrate on his primary purpose: economic reporting. Eventually, the Abwehr or SD complained about the blurring of responsibility between the two organizations. As a result it was decided to reemphasize Becker’s and Harnisch’s areas of responsibility. Berlin stressed that

Harnisch was responsible for economic information. He was forbidden from transmitting

any reports “of political and military character” or indeed, anything collected by the SD.

Becker was reminded that he was responsible for important political reports. Becker and

Harnisch were admonished that their reports needed to be more detailed “because nothing

can be done with 3 lines of text.” Both were reminded of their duties and Berlin insisted

“upon prompt answer to our assigned tasks and inquiries, because otherwise your

presence there is aimless.”677 However, Harnisch continued plotting with Becker.

676 “Berlin to Argentina,” 18/19 May 1943, Ibid. The meeting took place on 16 March, but its results were not transmitted to Utzinger and Becker until 18/19 May. 677 “Berlin to Argentina,” 30 July 1943, Ibid. It is unclear who the message was meant for since no names were used. It also carried the codename of “Inca” at the top which was a codename for Utzinger. 264

Kramer grew irritated with Harnisch and had to constantly remind him what his main task

was.678

The brevity of reports was an ongoing issue and produced a crisis in Becker’s

network. In August, Harnisch was again admonished over the vagueness of his

reports.679 He was told to provide more detail and told that the radio was a means for

extensive reporting. Utzinger argued against longer messages. In March, he had been

warned by Argentine police about radio direction finders being used to try and locate his

position. As a result, he had to abandon a radio broadcasting site.680 Utzinger understood

that overly lengthy messages would compromise his network’s transmitting sites.

Evidently his superiors in Berlin were not sympathetic to these problems. Berlin told

Harnisch that Becker would not want him to be influenced by “Luna” [Utzinger] in

regard to the brevity of radio reporting. Evidently Utzinger had been told the same thing.

While Utzinger was willing to take risks, he was not willing to tempt arrest through the

incompetence of others. On 19 August he requested permission to return to Germany and

active military service.681 Gross and Paeffgen were dumbstruck by Utzinger’s request.

They attempted to mollify him by telling him how valuable his service was. He was told

that his employment in Argentina as head of the radio network was “indispensible” and his request was refused. However, Paeffgen and Gross suspected something was wrong

678 “Germany to Argentina,” 21 July 1943 & “Berlin to Argentina, 23 October 1943, show Kramer chastising Harnisch for not furnishing economic reports. Also TNA, KV 2/1487. 679 “Berlin to Argentina,” 23 August 1943, NARA, RG 226, Records of the OSS, OSS Communication Office Records, Ultra Decrypts, Entry 188. 680 Rout and Bratzel, The Shadow War, p. 362. 681 “Argentina to Berlin,” 19 August 1943, NARA, RG 226, Records of the OSS, OSS Communication Office Records, Ultra Decrypts, Entry 188. 265

and asked Utzinger if there were any problems regarding his work.682 In 1941 Utzinger

and Lange had requested that they no longer work with Becker.683 Presumably Paeffgen

and Gross knew of this, hence their suspicion that old problems had reemerged. On 28

August Utzinger told Paeffgen and Gross that all was well. He stated that his request

came from the desire to participate in action which the Navy had denied him.684 Most likely Becker and Harnisch learned of Utzinger’s discontent and quickly set about placating him. Despite the potential discord, Becker needed both Utzinger and Harnisch.

Becker especially needed Harnisch. Harnisch provided Becker with access to top levels of the Argentine government.685 Harnisch was friends with two officers who

became influential following Castillo’s removal, Captain Eduardo Aumann (codenames:

“Moreno” and “Heini”), chief of the presidential chancellery in Castillo’s government,

and Major Mario Bernard. Harnisch’s friendship with Aumann and Bernard contradicts

Osmar Hellmuth’s later assertions to the British that Harnisch told him he had no contacts

inside the government following the 4 June coup.686 Both Aumann and Bernard also

occupied prominent positions after the overthrow of Castillo on 4 June. Following the

coup Aumann was assigned to the Argentine Foreign Ministry and Bernard became the

private secretary to Minister of War Edelmiro Farrell.687 Aumann and Bernard were also

members of the G.O.U. (Colonel’s Lodge). The G.O.U. was composed of mid-level staff

682 “Berlin to Argentina,” 26 August 1943, Ibid. 683 See chapter 5. 684 “Argentina to Berlin, 28 August 1943, NARA, RG 226, Records of the OSS, OSS Communication Office Records, Ultra Decrypts, Entry 188. 685 “Affidavit of Hedwig Sommer,” 4 March 1946, NARA, RG 59, 862.2035/4-4646, ABB, Box 6740, p. 3. 686 “Report on the Case of Osmar Alberto Hellmuth,” NARA, RG 65, File 64-27116-EBF 51, Box 19, p. 5. 687 Robert Potash, The Army and Politics in Argentina 1928-1945: Yrigoyen to Perón (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1969), pp. 208-209; “Affidavit of Theodor Paeffgen,” 4 February 1946, NARA, RG 59, 862.20235/4-2646, ABB, Box 6740, p. 7. 266

officers in the Argentine army. Members were nationalist in outlook. Most had trained

in Italy or Germany. They looked to fascist Italy, Nazi Germany, and Franco’s Spain for

inspiration on how to restructure Argentine politics and society. They wanted to end

civilian rule and impose a military regime.688 Not all officers in the G.O.U. were inclined

towards fascism. However, by 1943 the pro-German faction of the G.O.U. held the upper-hand because of German victories in Western Europe and Russia.

In Berlin, the SD received assistance from Commander Eduardo Ceballos,

Argentine naval attaché, who was pro-German. He facilitated cooperation between the

SD and Argentine military. Schellenberg stated to his postwar interrogators that Ceballos

allowed German agents to use Argentine diplomatic courier facilities in sending secret

material to Berlin.689 Harnisch and Aumann began intriguing early in 1943. One of the

main topics of conversation was cooperation between the German intelligence services and Argentina. By May the discussions had reached the point where Harnisch and

Becker had to inform their superiors. Becker reported that Harnisch had established a relationship with Aumann.690 The contact with Aumann was for the “furthering of

mutual interests.” Allegedly, Aumann offered to provide SD agents with jobs in the

Argentine secret service as cover for their activities. Hedwig Sommer recalled that Gross

exclaimed Aumann “was a marvelous worker.”691 Becker related that Naval Minister

688 As Robert Potash points out there is considerable controversy regarding its origins and especially Perón’s role in the organization. There are also various interpretations as to what G.O.U. stood for. For this discussion see, Potash, The Army and Politics in Argentina, pp. 184-190. 689 “Affidavit of Walter Schellenberg,” 6 February 1946, NARA, RG 59, 862.20235/4-4646, ABB, Box 6740, p. 2. 690 “Sargo to Berlin,” 12 May 1943, NARA, RG 226, Records of the OSS, OSS Communications Office Records, Ultra Decrypts, Entry 188. 691 “Affidavit of Hedwig Sommer,” 4 March 1946, NARA, RG 59, 862.2035/4-4646, ABB, Box 6740, p. 2. 267

Mario Fincatti (codename: “Defetsa”) was also prepared to lend assistance to the SD.692

In his postwar interrogation Paeffgen recalled that his impression was that Argentina would provide protection for German agents. He stated that this was not formally codified, but only implied.693

The gist of the proposal was that SD agents would receive information about the

U.S., England, and Brazil from Argentina. In return, the SD would give Argentina

information on European events. It was likely not a formal agreement, but Schellenberg,

Paeffgen and Sommer acknowledged in their postwar interrogations that some sort of

agreement had been reached. Schellenberg stated that the agreement specified Germany

would share intelligence with Argentina. Sommer related that Gross hoped the

agreement would produce “hot stuff” from the Argentines.694 Paeffgen denied the SD

would furnish Argentina with any information on Europe. He called any such proposal

“ridiculous” and that the SD would never have committed itself to any such endeavor.695

Fincatti also inquired if Germany would accept 16 Argentine personnel for

military and economic training in Germany. Reinebeck stated after the war that the SD

did nothing with the proposal since it would have interfered with the Foreign Office’s

692 “Sargo to Berlin,” 12 May 1943, NARA, RG 226, Records of the OSS, OSS Communications Office Records, Ultra Decrypts, Entry 188. Fincatti’s codename could have been misspelled as noted by the translation. Reinebeck stated to his postwar interrogators that he believed the SD had approved the negotiations. 693 “Notes on the Interrogation of Theodor Paeffgen,” 4 February 1946, NARA, RG 59, 862.20235/4-2646, ABB, Box 6740, p. 8. Reinebeck stated that he understood the protection of Becker’s network to have been explicit. “Affidavit of Otto Reinebeck,” 4 Feb 46, NARA RG 59, 862.20235, ABB, p. 8. 694 “Notes on the Interrogation of Theodor Paeffgen,” 4 February 1946, NARA, RG 59, 862.20235/4-2646, ABB, Box 6740, p. 7. 695 “Notes on the Interrogation of Theodor Paeffgen,” 4 February 1946, NARA, RG 59, 862.20235/4-2646, ABB, Box 6740, p. 8, “Affidavit of Walter Schellenberg,” 6 February 1946, NARA, RG 59, 862.20235/4- 4646, ABB, Box 6740, p. 2 and “Notes on the Interrogation of Walter Schellenberg,” 6 February 1946, NARA, RG 59, 862.20235/4-4646, ABB, Box 6740, p. 3. W. Wendell Blancke, Schellenberg and Paeffgen’s interrogator, doubted whether there was a specific agreement to furnish information. Both Paeffgen and Schellenberg were vague on that point. 268

control of foreign policy. He further said that the AA opposed the contacts between the

SD and Argentine government. Reinebeck was clear that the AA demanded the SD limit

its activity in Argentina and not in get in contact with individual statesman.696 After the war Harnisch claimed that the offer was a fabrication of Becker’s and Werner

Könnecke’s. Könnecke was the son of Harnisch’s employer as well as the son-in-law of

Ludwig Freude. He was unscrupulous and had no problem acting as paymaster for

Becker’s organization while at the same time passing information to the U.S. Sometime in 1944 he went to the U.S. embassy in Buenos Aires and offered information on German activities. In return, the U.S. would remove two of his families companies from the

“black list.” This would allow them to do business with the Allies and other Latin

American nations.697 Harnisch stated he was friends with Aumann and had never heard

of any such proposal.698 Either Aumann did not tell him, Becker had another subordinate make the deal, or Harnisch was lying. Most likely the latter was true. However,

Paeffgen and Harnisch’s categorical denials of any intelligence-sharing agreement are telling.

Given the conflicting evidence, the following explanation is probable. There was an informal agreement reached between Becker, Harnisch, Aumann, and Fincatti. Becker

passed this on to Gross, who immediately approved it and hoped Schellenberg and

Paeffgen would go along. Schellenberg’s approval would have been needed to

696 “Affidavit of Otto Reinebeck,” 4 Feb 46, NARA RG 59, 862.20235, ABB, Box 6740, pp. 7-8. 697 Ronald C. Newton, The ‘Nazi Menace’ in Argentina, 1931-1947 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1991), pp. 258-259. Könnecke had such a poor reputation as a ne’er do well that Harnisch’s postwar interrogator readily accepted Harnisch’s assertions that Könnecke was the primary scoundrel in the Hellmuth affair. See, “Affidavit of Hans Harnisch,” 9 September 1947, NARA, RG 84, BAPR, File 862.20235/10-3147, Box 102, pp. 1-2. 698 “Harnisch Interrogation,” Ibid, p. 2. 269

consummate any deal, especially a deal involving intelligence-sharing. When he learned

of the deal Paeffgen went to Schellenberg and argued against entering into any such

agreement with the Argentines. Instead they agreed to provide the Argentines with

material from OKW and propaganda broadcasts and present it as authentic intelligence.699

Following the 4 June 1943 coup which overthrew President Ramón Castillo

Becker and the SD were in a position to assist Argentina in its chief foreign policy goal.

According to Paeffgen, Reinebeck and Schellenberg, that goal, was the creation of a bloc of South American states who opposed the U.S.700 Whatever the foreign policy desires of

the Argentine military, the coup was the result of the military being unhappy with the

choice of Robustiano Patrón Costas as Castillo’s successor. However, the evidence

suggests that foreign policy considerations played a role in the coup. The so-called

“Andes bloc” was to be created by overthrowing the current governments of Paraguay,

Brazil, and Bolivia. According to Reinebeck this would created a closer political union

between those countries and Argentina.701 Becker had his own ambitions and

enthusiastically supported the endeavor. As Rout and Bratzel point out, “Becker believed

699 Paeffgen suggested this as a possibility in his interrogation on 4 February 1946. Given SD double- dealings with anyone who came into contact with it, Paeffgen’s suggestion rings true. He probably did not want to admit that the SD had hoodwinked the Argentines since it would conflict with his attempts to present himself as an honest individual in a difficult job. See “Notes on the Interrogation of Theodor Paeffgen,” 4 February 1946, NARA, RG 59, 862.20235/4-2646, ABB, Box 6740, p. 8. The fact that Becker acted on his own initiative should not be discounted. Becker was very clever and could have deceived the Argentines on his own. However, that would not account for Paeffgen’s hypothesis that Becker was passing information of no value to the Argentines. How would he know this was the case if he rejected any deal? 700 “Notes on Interrogation of Theodor Paeffgen,” 18 January 1946, Ibid, p. 1, “Affidavit of Otto Reinebeck,” 24 January 1946, Ibid, p. 9 and “Notes on the Interrogation of Walter Schellenberg,” 6 February 1946, Ibid, p. 2. 701 “Affidavit of Otto Reinebeck,” 24 January 1946, NARA, RG 59, 862.20235/4-2646, ABB, Box 6740, p. 9. Potash dates Argentine involvement in the Bolivian coup from October 1943, but new evidence from the Ultra decrypts points to much earlier. 270

his organization to be incomplete so long as it was limited to Argentina.”702 Following

his assumption of control Becker set about realizing his plans. Harnisch and Utzinger

placed their high-level connections in Paraguay at the disposal of Becker. His first

contact was with Pablo Stagni, chief of staff of the Paraguayan air force, who was

introduced to Becker by either Harnisch or Utzinger. The question is: why Stagni and

others would cooperate with the SD?

Historian Michael Grow in his study of Paraguay during World War II suggests there was an ideological kinship between Latin American authoritarians and Nazi

Germany.703 The U.S. particularly felt that Nazi Germany would manipulate this so-

called kinship and create a bloc of anti-U.S. states which would facilitate German

expansion in Latin America. Prior to the war Germany had cultivated authoritarian nationalists in Latin America through propaganda and bribery. In Paraguay the authoritarian nationalists were represented by the Febrerista Party and the Frente de

Guerra (Military Front/War Front). The Febrerista’s were followers of Colonel Rafael

Franco who had ruled Paraguay in 1936-37 before being overthrown. They were a party which favored a National-Socialist/Falangist ideology.704 At the same time right-wing

officers in the Paraguayan armed forces formed the Frente de Guerra. The Frente de

Guerra was a secret lodge of military officers who were militant, authoritarian and nationalistic. In 1940 Higinio Morínigo (codename: “Moro”) assumed the presidency of

702 Rout and Bratzel, The Shadow War, p. 356. 703 Michael Grow, The Good Neighbor Policy and Authoritarianism in Paraguay: United States Economic Expansion and Great Power Rivalry in Latin America during World War II (Lawrence, KS: The Regents Press of Kansas, 1981), p. 3. 704 See Paul H. Lewis, The Politics of Exile: Paraguay's Febrerista Party (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1968). I would like to thank Michael Grow for bringing this book to my attention. 271

Paraguay. His most staunch supporters were members of the Frente de Guerra, including Stagni.705

Morínigo was no liberal democrat. His supporters in the Frente de Guerra openly

advocated for a permanent in Paraguay. They charged that “the

liberal system of government has been the principal cause of the political anarchy, of the

economic misery, and the material backwardness of the Nation.”706 Morínigo supported

such statements. He would give the Paraguayan people “a new civic mentality based on

the ideas of duty and responsibility. The ranking place of national interest over the

selfish and sordid interest of individuals constitutes a fundamental political principle of

the Paraguayan Nationalist Revolution.” The revolution’s motto would be “Discipline,

Hierarchy, Order.”707 Morínigo’s statements caused the U.S. and Nazi Germany to

fundamentally misunderstand the nature of Latin American authoritarianism. Both

nations believed the government of Paraguay was totalitarian when it was authoritarian along the lines of Franco’s Spain or Vargas’s Brazil.

Given the Frente de Guerra’s antipathy towards it should be no

surprise that its members along with other members of the Paraguayan armed services

had no affinity for the Allies. Roosevelt and Churchill’s Atlantic Charter which called

for democracy and freedom was antithetical to their beliefs. Like their military

counterparts in other South American countries, most Paraguayan military officers were

admirers of the German military. Other members of Morínigo’s government were pro-

Axis as well. Captain Rolando degli Uberti, director of the academy, was

705 Grow, The Good Neighbor Policy and Authoritarianism in Paraguay, p. 61. 706 Quoted in Ibid, p. 62. 707 Ibid, p. 63. 272

active in the Italian Fascist party. The head of the secret police, Marcos Fuster, was

friends with leading Nazi agents. Additionally, Fuster and Uberti were members of a

secret Nazi group, the Ring of Sacrifice. None went as far as Colonel Mutshuito

Villasboa, chief of the national police force. He was so pro-Axis he named his son

Adolfo Hirohito.708 In his statement to the Argentine police Becker admitted knowing

Stagni, Villasboa, and Benitez Vera, Chief of Paraguayan Cavalry.709

At a meeting held in early 1942 to discuss who Paraguay would support, Germany or the United States, General Juan Ayala pronounced himself “one hundred percent sympathetic to the Axis cause.” The foreign minister, Luis Argaña, allegedly responded that Ayala’s views:

expressed the sentiments of those present…The know full well what Paraguay’s real sentiments are and will take that into consideration when they finally triumph. But in the meanwhile it is imperative that Paraguay play along with the United States for urgent reasons of national self-interest.710

Argaña was not above helping those he believed in. According to Hedwig Sommer,

Argaña had passed information on the U.S. to Johnny Hartmuth, a member of Becker’s

organization in Paraguay, who passed it on to Becker.711 Morínigo supported his

followers by refusing to recognize the U.S.’s “proclaimed list” and the British “black

list.” Both were meant to stop the business dealings of Axis firms in Latin America.

Theoretically, the nations of Latin America who supported the U.S. at the Rio Conference

708 Ibid, p. 65. 709 “Hoover to Lyons, Subject: Johannes Siegfried Becker,” 5 September 1945, NARA, RG 65, File: Johannes Siegfried Becker, Box 967, p. 17. 710 Grow, The Good Neighbor Policy and Authoritarianism in Paraguay, p. 70. 711 “Report of Interview of Elizabeth Hedwig Weigelmayer Sommer,” 25 January 1946, NARA, RG 65, 65-56221, Box 211, p. 26. Sommer did not remember the date this occurred. She recollected it happened following a trip to the U.S. by Argaña and that Hartmuth was given “a considerable amount of information.” 273

agreed to adhere to the lists. Morínigo also continued to do business with German firms

in Paraguay much to the consternation of the U.S. American protests were brusquely

rejected as interfering in Paraguay’s internal affairs. Nazi sympathizers in Morínigo’s

secret police and the German-owned telephone company also tapped the phones of the

U.S. and British embassies. Stagni and his cohorts also helped Germany smuggle

strategic materials to Argentina for transport to Germany.712

The evidence suggests that Harnisch, Aumann, and Becker had established

contact with Stagni as early as January 1943. Stagni sent Becker reports on events in

Paraguay which Becker relayed to Berlin.713 By late February Becker reported that

Stagni was “completely in our camp” and that Aumann had also established contact with

him through “military airmail.”714 In his postwar interrogation Harnisch freely admitted he had close relations with the Paraguayan military. He claimed that the government of

Paraguay had been a business client of Böker y CIA for many years. During a meeting

with Aumann at Harnisch’s home two Paraguayan officers mentioned Stagni’s name.

Harnisch claimed these officers told him and Aumann that Stagni was a close confidant

of Paraguayan President Morínigo. They stated Stagni wanted to establish closer ties

between Paraguay and Argentina. Later, when Aumann brought the issue to Argentine

President Castillo, he rejected the overture. Harnisch claimed Castillo distrusted the

Paraguayans. Aumann persisted and eventually received Castillo’s approval for a meeting between Aumann and Stagni. Harnisch told his postwar interrogators that

712 Grow, The Good Neighbor Policy and Authoritarianism in Paraguay, p. 99. 713 “Berlin to Argentina,” 24 January 1943, NARA, RG 226, Records of the OSS, OSS Communication Office Records, Ultra Decrypts, Entry 188. It is unclear if these were relayed through Harnisch or Utzinger. 714 “Argentina to Berlin,” 28 February 1943, Ibid. 274

Castillo invited him to accompany Aumann to the meeting and discuss economic

issues.715 The meeting took place sometime in April 1943.

Harnisch alleged that the participants only discussed economic and cultural

relations between the two countries. He omitted that the discussions were initiated by

Becker.716 He also omitted the fact that a military alliance between Argentina and

Paraguay was discussed. Stagni proposed a trip by Morínigo to Argentina which would

take place following Morínigo’s tour of South America and trip to the U.S. Harnisch

claimed Stagni also wanted his old friend Utzinger to install a transmitting station for the

purpose of facilitating discussions between Buenos Aires and Asunción. It seems no

concrete decisions were reached at the meeting since Amt VI told Becker in early May

that “It is hoped that “Hermann” (Stagni) connection is bringing (will bring?) good

results.”717

On 14 May, Aumann and Harnisch traveled to Paraguay on an Argentine military aircraft to meet Stagni.718 The meeting was a success. A report of the meeting related

that Paraguay and Argentina had agreed to support each other in the event of war, as well

as agreeing to the other points Harnisch mentioned to his interrogators. Harnisch stated

that Morínigo and Castillo agreed in principle with the results of the meeting.719 Amt VI

suggested to Becker that he discuss with Stagni the possibility of Paraguay establishing a

715 “Harnisch interrogation,” July-September 1947, NARA, RG 84, BAPR, File 862.20235/10-3147, Box 102, p. 11, “Affidavit of Hans Harnisch,” 9 September 1947, Ibid, pp. 1-2. 716 “Argentina to Berlin,” 5 June 1943, NARA, RG 226, Records of the OSS, OSS Communication Office Records, Ultra Decrypts, Entry 188. 717 “Berlin to Argentina,” 9 May 1943, Ibid. 718 Argentina to Berlin,” 22 May 1943, Ibid. Reinebeck stated that he knew of at least one trip Aumann had taken to Paraguay with an SD agent. “Affidavit of Otto Reinebeck,” 4 Feb 46, NARA, RG 59, 862.20235, ABB, Box 6740, p. 9. 719 “Argentina to Berlin,” 5 June 1943, NARA, RG 226, Records of the OSS, OSS Communication Office Records, Ultra Decrypts, Entry 188. 275

diplomatic presence in Portugal. This would allow Germany to expand its presence in

Portugal and counteract U.S. and British influence. It would also give Becker more ports

for his courier network instead of relying solely on Spain.720 It is unknown whether this

conversation occurred or not. Also unknown is whether Castillo and Morínigo knew of

German involvement in the negotiations. Given Castillo’s and Morínigo’s close

relationships with their subordinates, it would be surprising if they did not.

By July Aumann’s negotiations were complete. At a meeting with President

Ramírez of Argentina (codename: “Hoden”), Harnisch, Lt. Col. González, Ramírez’s

secretary, Maj. Bernard and Capt. Francisco Filippi, it was confirmed Paraguay would

come to Argentina’s assistance in case of war.721 In late July Harnisch held another meeting with Ramírez. Harnisch crowed about how his Argentine contacts had

established close contacts with nationalist groups in Chile, Bolivia, Paraguay and Brazil.

He admonished his superiors for their timidity stating that they misunderstood present

conditions in Argentina. He also told Kramer to pass his reports along to the SD and

AA.722 Stagni was also assisting the SD in obtaining information from the U.S.723 In

September or October a plan was conceived to send an agent to the U.S. This agent would take an introductory letter from Stagni to, Colonel (fnu) Santiviago, the

Paraguayan military attaché in Washington. Santiviago was described as a

Germanophile.724 Presumably the agent or Santiviago would collect information and

720 “Berlin to Argentina,” 25 June 1943, Ibid. 721 “Argentina to Berlin,” 7 July 1943, Ibid. 722 “Argentina to Berlin,” 24 July 1943, Ibid. 723 “Argentina to Berlin,” 23 August 1943, Ibid. 724 “Argentina to Berlin,” 14 October 1943, Ibid. 276

transmit it to Paraguay where it would be given to the SD. However, there is a paucity of

information regarding the details or outcome of this venture.

By 1944, the cooperation from Morínigo became noticeably cooler. It was becoming clear to most people in South America that if Germany did not lose the war, neither would it win. In June 1944 Becker met with an aide to Colonel Rafael Franco to discuss a possible coup against Morínigo. Becker wanted to determine the ideological motives of the revolution and assess its chances for success. The aide had received instructions in Montevideo to help prepare for a revolution in Asunción. The aide told

Becker that the army in the Chaco area of Paraguay, along with the majority of the

Paraguayan population was for Franco. Becker determined that Franco’s political platform was nationalist in character. He also determined that Franco’s rebellion had little chance of success. However, he would maintain contact for intelligence purposes without involving Stagni since he did not want to endanger such a valuable asset.725

From this assessment of Franco, it appears Becker began to understand what

Schellenberg, Paeffgen and Gross did not, namely that Latin American authoritarianism was not fascism. The archival record is clear regarding the cooperation of high-ranking

Paraguayan officials with the SD. It shows the SD was able to facilitate these contacts and use them to their advantage through the ideological kinship of high-ranking members of the Paraguayan military and government. The record also shows how Argentina’s and

Paraguay’s foreign policy goals fit in neatly with German goals. Even though Morínigo would not be overthrown, the SD continued its efforts in Brazil and Bolivia.

725 “Argentina to Berlin,” 10 June 1944, Ibid. 277

In Brazil, the Integralistas were an anti-semitic, anti-democratic party hostile to

the U.S., Great Britain and France. Following their aborted coup in 1938, Plínio Salgado,

the leader of the Integralistas, was exiled to Lisbon. The AA maintained contact with

Salgado in Lisbon since they felt he would be influential in Brazilian politics following

the war. Sometime in 1941 Erich Schröder, the SD police attaché in the German

embassy in Lisbon, was introduced to Salgado. Schröder told his postwar interrogators

that Salgado wanted to make contact with high officials in Berlin.726 On a trip back to

Berlin Schröder told Schellenberg about Salgado’s request. In his postwar interrogation

Schellenberg claimed credit for the contact with Salgado stating it was achieved with the

help of the Portuguese police. He appointed Sturmbannführer Adolf Nassenstein as his contact with Salgado.727 Schellenberg subsequently soured on Salgado. He told his

postwar interrogators that “Salgado was not worth a damn from an intelligence

viewpoint; he was interested only in intriguing to get back into power.”728

Schellenberg however was clever enough to realize that the more help he

provided the more control he would ostensibly have over Salgado if he came to power in

Brazil. After the war Paeffgen told his interrogators that he believed Salgado would have

participated in the “Andes bloc” if he had come to power.729 Whatever Schellenberg’s

misgivings about Salgado, he charged Becker with establishing contact with him before

leaving for Argentina. Sometime in 1942 a meeting between Salgado and Becker took

726 Stanley Hilton, Hitler's Secret War in South America, 1939-1945: German Military Espionage and Allied Counterespionage in Brazil (New York: Ballantine Books, 1982), 266. 727 “Affidavit of Walter Schellenberg,” 6 February 1946, NARA, RG 59, 862.20235/4-4646, ABB, Box 6740, p. 4. 728 “Notes on the Interrogation of Walter Schellenberg,” 6 February 1946, Ibid, p. 4. 729 “Affidavit of Theodor Paeffgen,” 4 February 1946, NARA, RG 59, 862.20235/4-2646, ABB, Box 6740, p. 4. 278

place in Spain. According to Hedwig Sommer Becker concluded an agreement between

Amt VI and Salgado. The agreement stipulated Germany would provide Salgado with

financial support and in return he would supply information on Brazil to Amt VI.

Salgado would also make contact with his sympathizers in Brazil who would prevent or

delay the embarkation of the Força Expeditionária Brasileira (Brazilian Expeditionary

Force or FEB) to Europe.730 The FEB consisted of an infantry division and fighter

squadron. With the invasion of North Africa in November 1942, northwest Brazil

decreased in strategic importance. Vargas saw the FEB as a way for continued U.S. aid.

The FEB eventually numbered 25,000 troops and fought in Italy from September 1944 to

May 1945.731

Salgado also offered to place his secret courier service at the disposal of the

SD.732 Despite this cooperation Schellenberg and Paeffgen were smart enough not to rely solely on Salgado. Two prominent members of the Integralistas, Jayr Tavares and Major

Jaime Ferreira da Silva were exiled in Buenos Aires. Sometime in 1943 Becker

established contact with the two men. Aware of the antipathy between Salgado, Tavares

and Ferreira da Silva, Becker stated that he would deal only with Tavares and Ferreira da

Silva. Becker told Gross that it was safer for him and his network to be in contact with

the Integralistas in Buenos rather than Salgado in Lisbon. He told Gross that Tavares

730 “Affidavit of Hedwig Sommer,” 28 February 1946, NARA, RG 59, 862.2035/4-4646, ABB, Box 6740, pp. 7-8 731 Joseph Smith, “Brazil: Benefits of Cooperation,” in Thomas M. Leonard and John F. Bratzel eds., Latin America during World War II (New York: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2007), pp. 144-161. 732 “Affidavit of Hedwig Sommer,” 28 February 1946, NARA, RG 59, 862.2035/4-4646, ABB, Box 6740, pp. 7-8 and German Espionage in Latin America (hereafter GELA) (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1946), p. 178, NARA, RG 319, Records of the Army Staff, Records of the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Military Intelligence Division. The source material for this section of GELA is undoubtedly Ultra given the account is similar to the one here. 279

distrusted Salgado and felt he was not active enough in attempting to remove Vargas. He

also placed Ferreira da Silva in contact with Perón and Gonzales. A meeting between the

three men was arranged and took place on 17 January 1944. The discussion centered on

cooperation between Argentina and Integralistas. Becker reported that Perón, president

of the National Labor Department, characterized the as continental,

with the “first fruit” in Bolivia. Plans for a second meeting were cancelled after the first

meeting became known to the U.S. and Brazil.733 Thus, Germany’s plans for Brazil came

to naught. Becker and the SD would have more luck in Bolivia.

Like other nations in Latin America Bolivia had long-standing, deep-seated ties with Germany. German nationals controlled local airlines in Bolivia and many Bolivian elites were educated in local German schools.734 Like its counterparts in Chile, Paraguay

and Argentina, the Bolivian military had been trained by German military missions.

These ties were so close that a German general, Hans von Kundt, served as commander-

in-chief of the Bolivian army during the first year of the Chaco War between Paraguay

and Bolivia (1932-1935). Many military officers and civilian elites were sympathetic to

Nazism. They saw Hitler’s methods as a solution to the corruption and divisions in

Bolivian society. There was also an element of since these methods would be

directed at the majority of the population which was composed of illiterate Indians.735

733 Ibid and “Argentina to Berlin,” 17 January 1944, NARA, RG 226, Records of the OSS, OSS Communication Office Records, Ultra Decrypts, Entry 188. 734 Cole Blasier, “The United States, Germany, and the Bolivian Revolutionaries (1941-1946), The Hispanic American Historical Review, 52/1, (February 1972): 27. Blasier’s article is outstanding. He understood that many of the records he needed to reach definite conclusions, including interrogations and the records of German intelligence, were still classified. However, he only draws definite conclusions based on hard documentary evidence. 735 Ibid, p. 28. 280

This racism was not directed at removing or eliminating these Indians, rather it was used

to keep darker-skinned Indians from achieving any social mobility.

In 1939 the presidency was seized by Germán Busch. Busch was an unpopular

president who sought to ‘purify’ and ‘rejuvenate’ his country. His program was similar

to Morínigo’s in Paraguay. It included the end of democracy and the establishment of a

permanent dictatorship. To achieve his goals Busch sought German assistance. On 9

April 1939 he held an audience with the German Minister to Bolivia, Ernst Wendler.

Busch told Wendler that he wanted German support “to establish order and authority in

the state through a complete change in the system and the transition to a totalitarian

state.”736 Wendler enthusiastically embraced Busch’s proposals and set about planning

economic collaboration and the formation of an anti-communist bloc composed of

Argentina, Bolivia and Peru.737 Wendler also passed along Busch’s request for advisors

to help assist with constitutional, administrative, financial, economic, social and

educational questions. State Secretary Ernst von Weizsäcker was not as enthusiastic. He

told Wendler that he needed to be more reserved and ordered him to cease giving advice

to Busch.738

At the time Weizsäcker was dealing with events in Europe, as well as the

“Patagonia Plot” in Argentina, so he waited two weeks before replying to Wendler in any detail. He told Wendler that overt German support for any transition to a totalitarian form of government in Bolivia would probably harm relations between the two countries.

736 “Wendler to AA,” 9 April 1939, Büro des Staatssekretärs: Bolivien, NARA, RG 242/T-120/179/141600 and Ibid, p. 28. 737 “Wendler to AA,” 11 April 1939, Büro des Staatssekretärs, Bolivien, NARA, RG 242/T- 120/179/141601. 738 “Weizsäcker to Wendler,” 13 April 1939, Ibid, Frame 141602. 281

Weizsäcker told Wendler that the question of advisors could be discussed later after the

change in government systems had taken place. He also ordered Wendler not to address

any future cables to Hitler.739 As historian Cole Blasier points out the exchange between

Wendler and Busch was indicative of Germany’s limited capacity to meet Bolivia’s

needs.740 Weizsäcker was also mindful of the events in Brazil in 1938 and those in

Argentina which were occurring. Weizsäcker did not rule out the possibility of

assistance, only that such support not be conspicuous. It should only occur following the

imposition of a totalitarian form of government.

In 1941 Germany was forced to deal with yet another forgery meant to harm

relations between Nazi Germany and Latin American states. On 18 July, the American

Minister to Bolivia, Douglas Jenkins, gave the Bolivian Foreign Minister Alberto Ostria

Gutiérrez a letter purportedly from the Bolivian military attaché in Berlin, Major Elías

Belmonte (codename: “Bernasconi”) to Wendler. Belmonte was an influential officer

who had participated in the military coups of the 1930s. He also served as Minister of

Government during Busch’s rule.741 The letter stated that a coup had been planned for

the middle of July to overthrow the government of President Enrique Peñaranda (1940-

1943) and “strike our blow to liberate my poor country from a weak government of

completely capitalistic tendencies.”742 In his postwar interrogation Schellenberg admitted

that a coup had been planned. However, he probably confused dates and remembered the

739 “Weizsäcker to Wendler,” 22 April 1939, Ibid, Frames 141605-141606. 740 Blasier, “The United States, Germany, and the Bolivian Revolutionaries,” p. 29. 741 Ibid, p. 32. 742 R.A. Humphreys, Latin America and the Second World War, Volume One 1939-1942 (London: Athlone, 1981), p. 130. 282

December 1943 coup in Bolivia.743 The Bolivian government acted quickly instituting a

state of siege on 19 July. It also declared Wendler persona non grata and ordered him to leave Bolivia as soon as possible. Wendler moved to Santiago until the issue was resolved. Belmonte was dismissed from the army for .

Like the “Patagonia Plot” of 1939 in Argentina, the AA adamantly denied the letter was authentic. On 20-21 July Wendler told the AA that “The charges against the legation are pure fabrications.” He denied knowing Belmonte and stated he had never received any letter or message from any Bolivian, locally or abroad.744 Woermann was

not sure and cabled Wendler to inquire if there was any evidence to support the charges

against him. He ordered Wendler to conduct an investigation and report his findings.745

On 27 July Wendler denied knowing about or assisting in any coup against the current

Bolivian government. Wendler stated that the denunciations against him were the result of the United States and “Jewish and political émigrés.”746 Woermann then questioned

Belmonte regarding the letter. Belmonte claimed the letter was an “obvious falsification.” Following his investigation Woermann concluded that neither Wendler nor

Belmonte was involved in any attempt to overthrow the government of Bolivia.747 The

743 While Becker had been to Bolivia and other countries during 1941, there is no evidence he or Nazi Germany was involved in any sort of plan to overthrow the Bolivian government. He did add that the December 1943 coup was carried out with the cooperation of the Argentine government. Following his dismissal Belmonte kept in close contact with Amt VI and was a regular visitor to its offices. See “Affidavit of Walter Schellenberg,” 2 February 1946, NARA RG 59, 862.20235/4-2646, Box 6740, p. 3. 744 “Wendler to AA,” 20-21 July 1941, Büro des Staatssekretärs, Bolivien, NARA, RG 242/T- 120/179/140898-99 & 141644. 745 “Woermann to Wendler,” 24 July 1941, Ibid, Frame 141660. 746 “Wendler to Ribbentrop,” 27 July 1941, Ibid, Frame 141672. 747 “Woermann Memorandum,” 26 July 1941, Ibid, Frames 140876-140880. 283

AA denounced the letter as a forgery and held a press conference with Belmonte.748

Given the accusations in Argentina, along with the consistent rumors that Germany was seeking control over Latin America, the AA’s denials rang hollow. The letter was indeed a forgery. It was fabricated by H. Montgomery Hyde of the British Security

Coordination, with the assistance of the FBI.749 However, the damage had been done.

Wendler returned to Germany and Belmonte remained in Berlin, enjoying close contact with the Amt VI and the AA.

Belmonte’s relations with both organizations were quite close. In 1942 the

Cultural Political Department of the AA financed and published Belmonte’s version of

Mein Kampf titled Neustra Revolucion. In it, he opined about the nationalistic history of

Bolivia along with plans for the future.750 He also broadcast a radio show in Spanish on

Reichsrundfunk (German Radio), a division of Joseph Goebbels Propaganda Ministry. In

addition he was probably paid to provide political intelligence on Bolivia.751 Belmonte’s

personality was grating. Hedwig Sommer stated that she “rather disliked Belmonte” and

that Gross treated Belmonte as a “nuisance…to be humored” because of his

748 “The Director of the News Service and Press Department to Various Missions,” 27 July 1941, Doc. 158, Documents on German Foreign Policy, Series D, Volume 13, (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1949-1983), pp. 224-225. 749 H. Montgomery Hyde, The Quiet Canadian: The Secret Service Story Of Sir William Stephenson (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1962), pp. 139-140 and Humphreys, Latin America and the Second World War, p. 131. 750 “Affidavit of Otto Reinebeck,” 4 February 46, NARA, RG 59, 862.20235, ABB, Box 6740, p. 18. “Affidavit of Otto Reinebeck,” 4 February 46, NARA, RG 59, 862.20235, ABB, Box 6740, p. 10. 751 “Interrogation of Walter Schellenberg,” 24 November 1945, NARA, RG 263, Records of the Central Intelligence Agency, Name Files: Walter Schellenberg, p. 2. Schellenberg’s testimony that Belmonte was paid is directly contradicted by Paeffgen’s. Paeffgen stated that such money would only have been paid for political reports and that Belmonte had not written any such reports. See “Interrogation of Dr. Theodor Paeffgen,” 19 October 1945, NARA, RG 59, M679/3/944. 284

connections.752 It was his connections that kept him in the good graces of Paeffgen and

Gross.

It is unclear when plans to overthrow Peñaranda began, but Belmonte had the support of members of Peñaranda’s government. Belmonte’s most prominent supporters were Senator Victor Paz Estenssoro and Dionisio Foianini Banzer (codename:

“Heriberto” and “Geco”), who had served as Busch’s Minister of Mines and Petroleum.

Paz Estenssoro was a founding father of the Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario

(M.N.R.). The M.N.R. was extremely nationalistic, anti-U.S. and pro-German. It was described by one historian as ‘national-socialist’ in its politics.753 Paz Estenssoro

eventually allied himself with a secret lodge called Razón de Patria (RADEPA). It was

composed of idealistic officers who had served in the Chaco War, including Major

Gualberto Villaroel (codename: “Laura”) who assumed the presidency following the 20

December 1943 coup. This alliance should not be surprising since RADEPA and the

M.N.R. shared similar political views.

The earliest evidence of a plot against Peñaranda was June 22, 1942 in Buenos

Aires. On that day Foianini had an interview with Meynen to discuss overthrowing

Peñaranda. He asked for German support and told Meynen that Belmonte should not

lead the government. Since Belmonte was in Berlin he would be unable to lead any

revolt against Peñaranda. There was also the question of Belmonte being charged with

treason for his alleged role in the Wendler affair. Instead of Belmonte a more acceptable

candidate would be General Angel Rodriguez (codename: “Alfredo”), Bolivian military

752 “Affidavit of Hedwig Sommer,” 4 March 1946, NARA, RG 59, 862.2035/4-4646, ABB, Box 6740, p. 4. 753 R.A. Humphreys, Latin America and the Second World War, Volume Two 1942-1945 (London: Athlone, 1982), p. 88. 285

attaché in Santiago. Foianini stated that Rodriguez was a of the Chaco war and had

participated in the peace talks to end the war. Rodriguez enjoyed a good reputation.

Following the war he had been offered the presidency and turned it down. He also had

refused to hold any high position in government for the past seven years. This partly

contributed to his posting to Santiago.

Foianini told Meynen that Rodriguez was interested but Belmonte would have to

approve his appointment. Foianini’s statement to Meynen about Belmonte shows that

Belmonte was still very influential despite having been exiled. Foianini told Meynen that

a coup against Peñaranda could take place as early as August. Following the coup the

government would re-orient its foreign policy along the lines of Argentina and Chile and

declare neutrality. If Belmonte balked at supporting Rodriguez, Foianini intimated that

Germany should pressure Belmonte into supporting Rodriguez since he would give them a neutral Bolivia with a foreign policy similar to Argentina and Chile. As for Belmonte he would be allowed to return as soon as the “general political situation permits.” In the meantime he would be offered a posting as military attaché to Madrid until he could return to Bolivia. Not surprisingly Meynen was cool to the idea. He told the AA that given “Latin American indiscretions” Germany’s participation could not be kept secret and suggested it refrain from involvement.754 It seems the AA took Meynen’s advice, but

the SD did not.

754 “Meynen to AA,” 22 June 1942, Auswärtiges Amt Politische Archiv, Inland IIG Südamerika: SD- Meldungen aus Südamerika. I would like to thank Katrin Paehler for making this file available to me. Cole Blasier interprets the document and Belmonte’s actions in Berlin differently; however he did not have access to the still classified interrogations of Schellenberg et. al. For Blasier’s interpretation see “The United States, Germany, and the Bolivian Revolutionaries,” p. 48. 286

By May 1943 Belmonte was pressuring Amt VI to allow him to get rid of

Peñaranda. Paeffgen and Gross asked Becker to assess the outcome of a coup and

whether or not the SD should continue working with Belmonte.755 Belmonte also wanted

to return to Bolivia, but Peñaranda opposed this. Foianini reported that Peñaranda

offered Belmonte any diplomatic post he desired in a foreign country. Peñaranda

promised Belmonte he would be completely rehabilitated following the war.756

Peñaranda must have seen Belmonte as a significant threat to offer him complete rehabilitation and the diplomatic post of his choice. Belmonte probably knew his coup attempt had a good chance of success. In June, Becker told Amt VI that Belmonte should nominate a candidate for the presidential elections in Bolivia scheduled for December

1943. Becker also noted that he did not inform Meynen of his machinations in Bolivia.757

Given that Bolivia had declared war on the Axis on 7 April 1943 Bolivia was no longer the provenance of the AA. Therefore the AA did not need to know of Becker’s plans.

At the same time planning for a coup must have been in progress. Belmonte asked his half-brother Ruben Sardon Pabon to pass on a message to Foianini. Pabon was residing in Bilbao and acted as an intermediary between Belmonte and Foianini.

Belmonte requested that Foianini suspend the current plans for a coup in order “to have in hand projects which could go wrong.”758 What is meant by this is unclear. At the same

time Harnisch reported that he had put his Argentine contacts and Belmonte’s co-

755 “Berlin to Argentina,” 9 May 1943, NARA, RG 226, Records of the OSS, OSS Communication Office Records, Ultra Decrypts, Entry 188. For a quick summary of the following account see, GELA, pp. 182- 183, NARA, RG 319, Records of the Army Staff, Records of the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G- 2, Military Intelligence Division. 756 “Argentina to Berlin,” 22 May 1943, Ibid. 757 “Argentina to Berlin,” 19 June 1943, Ibid. 758 “Berlin to Argentina,” 14 July 1943, NARA, RG 226, Records of the OSS, OSS Communication Office Records, Ultra Decrypts, Entry 188. 287

conspirators together and that negotiations were ongoing. Paz Estenssoro and General

Rodriguez were scheduled to arrive in Buenos Aires to discuss plans. Rodriguez was

waiting for Belmonte’s answer regarding his support so that planning could proceed.759

Rodriguez arrived in Buenos Aires on 18 July to attend a conference with Harnisch,

Ramírez, and other leading members of the Argentine government.760 At the conference

Ramírez promised economic aid if the new Bolivian government would join the “Andes

bloc.” He asked Paz Estenssoro about a timeline for the change in government. Paz

Estenssoro replied that it would take place between September and December. Ramírez

told him that this was too late. Rodriguez told him that he and Paz Estenssoro would see

what they could do to speed up preparations.761

Rodriguez departed Buenos Aires on 29 July having achieved an agreement with

Ramírez.762 Whatever agreement was reached it probably did not include a prominent

role for Belmonte in the new government. Belmonte told Foianini that if his presence

would endanger the new government he would “give up all future political aspirations.”

He said that he would collaborate willingly in the new government “provided always that

they concur in political principles, which I will plan in a work which I will send soon.”

Paeffgen and Gross must have been worried about loose tongues since Belmonte told

Foianini that “it is imperative not to implicate Germany by the friendly service with you

do for us.”763 Belmonte soon had second thoughts about Rodriguez and told Foianini not

to rush the revolution. Belmonte feared that Rodriguez did not have sufficient support

759 “Argentina to Berlin,” 14 July 1943, Ibid. “Berlin to Argentina,” 8 August 1943, Ibid. 760 “Argentina to Berlin,” 14 July 1943, Ibid and “Argentina to Berlin, 22 July 1943, Ibid. 761 “Argentina to Berlin,” 24 July 1943, Ibid. 762 “Argentina to Berlin,” 5 August 1943, Ibid. 763 “Berlin to Argentina,” 8 August 1943, Ibid. 288

among army officers to keep the coup a secret. He was aware that if he remained in

Berlin he would lose out on any prominent position in a new government. Belmonte told

Foianini that he would try to return to Bolivia to lead the movement.764 Belmonte suggested that Foianini spread the news that he was withdrawing from politics. This would disarm their opponents and give Belmonte’s supporters time to act. Foianini told

Belmonte that he could count on the full support of Argentina when he took up residence there.765

There were other issues that needed to be resolved before their plans could

proceed. Through its own code-breaking operation Amt VI learned that Polish

intelligence managed to place an agent named Paciokowski with Ruben Sardon in Bilbao.

Amt VI informed Foianini that Paciokowski knew all of the details regarding Sardon’s

mission in Bilbao and that Polish intelligence had gained access to his correspondence

and code. They asked Foianini to get in contact with Sardon and find out how much

Paciokowski knew of the negotiations between Bolivia, Argentina and Germany. They

also suggested that Sardon tell the Paciokowski that Belmonte was withdrawing from

politics, had no interest in overthrowing Peñaranda, and had broken off negotiations. As

soon as the Pole passed along this information he was to be killed as soon as it was safe

to do so. Amt VI wanted the killing to serve as a warning about restricting

information.766

It appears Foianini and his co-conspirators were squeamish about murder.

Foianini told Amt VI that Paciokowski actually knew little of their plans and it was

764 “Berlin to Argentina,” 10 August 1943, Ibid. 765 “Argentina to Berlin,” 15 August 1943, Ibid. 766 “Berlin to Argentina,” 20 August 1943, Ibid. 289

subsequently decided not to eliminate Paciokowski. Foianini planned to use Paciokowski

to feed the Allies false information. At some point Paciokowski was to be lured to

Argentina. In Argentina Foianini was to give him a letter ostensibly from Sardon which

allegedly renounced Belmonte’s political ambition and his dissatisfaction with his

treatment by the Germans. Once they were sure Paciokowski had passed the information

on he would be denounced to the Argentine police. Since Ramírez and his government

were deeply involved in the plot to overthrow Peñaranda it would be in their interests to

arrest Paciokowski, thus neutralizing the threat.767 Given the reputation of the Argentine

police, it would not have been surprising if Paciokowski “disappeared” “died in custody”

or “died while trying to escape.” Belmonte recommended passing the false information

orally since he felt it was inadvisable to write a fake letter in Sardon’s name.768 However,

a letter had been prepared, read to Paciokowski and then destroyed.769 For the moment

the danger of exposure had been averted. Instead of being killed Paciokowski remained free. Interestingly, the following year Belmonte attempted to use Foianini’s contacts with the Pole to discredit him.770

The other issue was money. Foianini told Belmonte that he was having difficulty

raising money to support the coup. He estimated that he needed approximately $70,000

to carry out his plan. Foianini told him that he refused financing from either Becker or

the Argentines and that he could raise the money by selling some property. He requested

767 “Argentina to Berlin,” 27 August 1943, Ibid. 768 “Berlin to Argentina,” 3 September 1943, Ibid. 769 “Argentina to Berlin,” 8 September 1943, Ibid. 770 “Berlin to Argentina,” 5 & 9 August 1944, Ibid. 290

Belmonte’s opinion regarding funding.771 While Paeffgen and Gross were willing to

provide the support of their intelligence networks, money was more difficult. Belmonte

told Foianini not to worry about money. He told him that his cooperation with

sympathetic army officers was sufficient and that they would carry out the plans for

“patriotic reasons.”772

In the meantime Peñaranda had learned of Rodriguez’s participation in planning

the coup. Given Rodriguez’s stature in the Bolivian military Peñaranda could not remove

him. Instead, he offered Rodriguez the ambassadorship to Panama. Belmonte advised

Rodriguez to accept the position in principle, but not to go to Panama. Rodriguez would travel to La Paz to find out Peñaranda’s intentions along with the intentions of the

military and political parties in relation to a coup.773 Foianini informed Belmonte that

Rodriguez would officially decline the offer and make the final preparations for the coup.

Before Rodriguez’s departure for La Paz Foianini would give him his final

instructions.774 Belmonte’s other conspirator Paz Estenssoro submitted a proposal in the

Bolivian parliament to allow Belmonte to return. The measure was defeated 43 to 39.775

On 3 December Rodriguez arrived in La Paz. Foianini reported that preparations for the coup were well underway and it would take place within 60 days. Foianini, Paz

Estenssoro and Rodriguez also requested that German radio and press communiqués be correctly phrased to implicate the U.S. The communiqués should state that Peñaranda and his supporters be denounced as paid agents of the U.S. who want Bolivia to be a U.S.

771 “Argentina to Berlin,” 14 August 1943, Ibid. 772 “Berlin to Argentina,” 3 September 1943, Ibid. 773 “Berlin to Argentina,” 30 September 1943, Ibid. 774 “Argentina to Berlin,” 13 November 1943, Ibid. 775 “Argentina to Berlin,” 28 November 1943, Ibid. 291

colony.776 This was brilliant on their part. Given the anti-American sentiments in Bolivia

such a message would arouse the masses. Then the new government could proceed with

Belmonte’s political program which was nationalist in orientation.

On 20 December 1943 Peñaranda was overthrown and Villaroel installed as president. If the elevation of Villaroel as President of Bolivia was a surprise to Amt VI, it is not reflected in the surviving archival record. This is surprising since the decrypted

Ultra messages specifically state that Rodriguez was to become president. Villaroel’s name does not appear in any correspondence between South America and Germany concerning the coup. Perhaps Villaroel was a compromise candidate between competing factions or he obtained the position through political maneuvering among his fellow conspirators. The lack of response is somewhat baffling. However, Villaroel was a member of RADEPA and thus ideologically inclined towards Belmonte’s political views.

The U.S. reacted quickly and refused recognition of the new government.

Through Ultra, U.S. Secretary of State Cordell Hull and the State Department knew of

Paz Estenssoro’s and Foianini’s involvement with German intelligence. Hull intimated

as much when he cryptically stated “whether outside influence unfriendly to the Allied cause played any part” in the coup.777 The U.S. turned up the pressure when Hull explicitly stated that the M.N.R. was pro-Nazi and that Paz Estenssoro was known to have contact with Nazi groups in Germany and Argentina. Villaroel removed two

M.N.R. ministers, Augusto Céspedes and Carlos Montenegro, in the hopes of achieving

recognition. However, Hull would accept nothing less than the removal of all M.N.R.

776 “Argentina to Berlin,” 3 December 1943, Ibid. 777 Blasier, “The United States, Germany, and the Bolivian Revolutionaries,” p. 40. 292

members from Villaroel’s government. Villaroel’s Foreign Minister, José Tamayo,

sought to stave off U.S. pressure by completing the “Andes bloc” but Chile balked. As a result Tamayo was forced to resign in March 1944.778

The reaction of the U.S. surprised Belmonte and Amt VI. On 31 December,

Belmonte cautioned Villaroel to make sure the pro-German sympathies of the government were carefully guarded until such a time “in which great transformations would be possible.”779 Realizing the danger U.S. pressure meant to Bolivia he further cautioned Villaroel about making RAPEDA’s sympathies public. Belmonte felt that the

pressure was enough to cause Villaroel’s government to fall. In that event, RAPEDA

must remain in control of the army no matter the situation. If Villaroel lost control then

RAPEDA must ensure that the Ministry of War and Chief of the General Staff remain in

its hands. Then RAPEDA could take power when the moment was right.780 Belmonte

also sent Villaroel a copy of his book Justificativos de Neustra rebellion.781 In it, he outlined the political program Villaroel and RAPEDA implement as soon as the timing was right.782 Belmonte also requested money for Villaroel. Amt VI approved payment

for an undisclosed amount from the Banco Aleman to the Villaroel government.783

Again fearing he would lose out on any influence he had in Villaroel’s government Belmonte lobbied to return to Bolivia. Schellenberg confirmed this to his postwar interrogators. He stated that Belmonte wanted to use Becker’s smuggling

778 Ibid, pp. 42 & 46-47. 779 “Berlin to Argentina,” 2 January 1944, NARA, RG 226, Records of the OSS, OSS Communication Office Records, Ultra Decrypts, Entry 188. 780 “Berlin to Argentina,” 4 January 1944, Ibid. 781 Elias Belmonte Pabon, Justificativos de Neustra rebellion (Berlin: unknown publisher, 1942). 782 “Berlin to Argentina,” 5 January 1944, NARA, RG 226, Records of the OSS, OSS Communication Office Records, Ultra Decrypts, Entry 188. 783 “Berlin to Argentina,” 7 January 1944, Ibid. 293

network to return to Bolivia and traveled to Spain to discuss this with Karl Arnold.784 If his return was not desired Belmonte requested Villaroel appoint him as military attaché in

Madrid. Belmonte also asked that his brother Ruben be placed in charge of a legation or consulate as thanks for his work.785 In early April 1944 Villaroel acquiesced to Hull’s

demand and removed the three remaining M.N.R. members, Paz Estenssoro, Rafael

Otazo and Walter Guevara Arze, from the government. When recognition was slow in

coming Villaroel detained and expelled German nationals from the country and sent them

to the U.S. for internment.786 The U.S. also threatened to expose Argentine intrigues and

its cooperation with German agents in fomenting the rebellion in Bolivia. This combined

with the failure of the Hellmuth affair caused Argentina to break relations with Nazi

Germany in January 1944.

Despite all he had done Belmonte’s status with Villaroel was questionable. In response to his demands he be made the military attaché in Lisbon, Villaroel was vague.

Becker informed Amt VI that no decision on Belmonte would be made until elections for president, scheduled for 2 July 1944, were held. By May, Belmonte was frustrated at

Villaroel’s policies. He wanted to return to Bolivia, but was prevented from doing so by

Peñaranda. Belmonte chastised Villaroel for taking “military youth” into the government without asking his advice. Belmonte noted that he would have disapproved any such

784 “Interrogation of Walter Schellenberg,” 24 November 1945, NARA, RG 263, Name Files: Walter Schellenberg, p. 2. 785 “Berlin to Argentina,” 11 February 1944, NARA, RG 226, Records of the OSS, OSS Communication Office Records, Ultra Decrypts, Entry 188. 786 Blasier, “The United States, Germany, and the Bolivian Revolutionaries,” p. 43. For the internment of Germans from Latin America in the U.S. see Max Paul Friedman, Nazis and Good Neighbors: The United States Campaign against the Germans of Latin America in World War II (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003). Friedman concentrates on Central America and the northern half of South America and is quite critical of the U.S. 294

request.787 It was clear to Belmonte and Amt VI that they had lost control of events in

Bolivia. Amt VI informed Becker that neither it nor Belmonte agreed with Villaroel’s

decisions. Belmonte also feared the consequences should Foianini’s contacts with

Becker become known. Given that his usefulness was at an end Amt VI distanced itself from Belmonte. It also suspected he was intriguing with the AA against the SD.788

SD contacts with pro-Nazi elements in Paraguay, Brazil and Bolivia began with

promise but collapsed under U.S. pressure, acrimony and mistrust. The archival record

shows that Nazi ideology played a major role in German subversion of governments in

the Southern cone. While groups such as the Ring of Sacrifice, Razón de Patria, and the

G.O.U. were pro-Fascist, there is still a question of how strong that ideology was.

Schellenberg admitted to his interrogators that he felt the Bolivian revolution was

oriented in the “same direction” as National Socialism.789 Whether this was true or not is

open to interpretation. Schellenberg’s statement shows Amt VI was willing to believe

whatever fit its preconceived notions regarding ideology. The groups in Paraguay,

Bolivia and Argentina were certainly willing to solicit support from the SD when it

appeared Germany might win the war. However, when the outcome of the war was in

doubt, they shed their national-socialist tendencies and reverted to pure nationalism. The

fact that they turned to nationalism rather quickly suggests their admiration of Nazi

787 “Berlin to Argentina,” 23 May 1944, NARA, RG 226, Records of the OSS, OSS Communication Office Records, Ultra Decrypts, Entry 188. 788 “Berlin to Argentina,” 23 May 1944, Ibid. 789 “Interrogation of Walter Schellenberg,” 24 November 1945, NARA, RG 263, Name Files: Walter Schellenberg, p. 2.

295

Germany was somewhat superficial. There is also the question of how much anti-U.S.

sentiments played in their beliefs.

Certainly, the AA was almost as ideological as the SD. Wendler’s enthusiastic support in 1939 of Busch’s proposal to push Bolivia along totalitarian lines bears this out.

What is also interesting is that Weizsäcker was not opposed to a “national-socialist”

Bolivian government, only that German involvement with it be kept secret. Additionally,

Wendler’s attempts to blame his problems on the Jews echo Meynen and Thermann.

While the AA was minimally involved in the SD’s intrigues in Paraguay, Brazil and

Bolivia, it was involved in Argentina. At the same time Becker and Harnisch were helping the Ramírez government form the “Andes bloc” they were also involved in planning the so-called “Hellmuth Affair.” This along with machinations in Bolivia finally caused Argentina to break relations with Nazi Germany.

296

Chapter 7

The Case of Osmar Hellmuth

On 30 October 1943, a 35 year old Argentine national named Osmar Hellmuth

was detained by British authorities shortly after midnight at Port-of-Spain, Trinidad.

Hellmuth was scheduled to travel to Barcelona and then to Berlin.790 Hellmuth was in

possession of an Argentine diplomatic passport and was accredited as a consul for the

Argentine consulate in Barcelona. He vigorously protested his detention, but the next

day Hellmuth was whisked to by plane and then transported on the cruiser HMS

Ajax to England arriving on 12 November. Hellmuth’s name was not unknown to the

British authorities who, in a bit of exaggeration, identified him in 1942 as “one of the

principal agents of the German Secret Police in Buenos Aires.”791 While this is a bit of

hyperbole on the part of the British, Osmar Hellmuth was well connected in Argentine

society.

Hellmuth’s mission is one of more complex and controversial episodes of the

Second World War. It highlights the rivalry between the SD and AA for control of

foreign policy. It shows the extent to which the SD interfered with German diplomacy

towards Argentina. This was an ongoing problem that Ribbentrop and the Foreign Office

had been fighting with the SD since the beginning of the war. This rivalry was as

contentious in Argentina as it was in Berlin. This chapter argues that the Hellmuth affair

was an attempt by the SD to supplant the AA as the primary instrument of Nazi foreign

790 “Ladd to Hoover,” 16 December 43, National Archives and Records Administration (hereafter NARA) Record Group 65, Records of the Federal Bureau of Investigations, File 64-27116, Box 18. 791 “Report on the Case of Osmar Alberto Hellmuth,” NARA, RG 65, File 64-27116-EBF 51, Box 19. 297

policy. Martin Luther, head of Abteilung Deutschland, with the help of the SS had tried

and failed to remove Ribbentrop in February 1943.792 The Hellmuth affair was an

extension of that effort. It afforded the SS an opportunity to shape German policy towards Argentina, without the interference of the AA. It also shows the connivance

between high-ranking Argentine government officials and members of the SD in

Argentina.

Osmar Hellmuth was born in Buenos Aires in 1908. His father was a

Volksdeutsche and his mother a criollo from a family that had settled in Argentina in the

1840s. Hellmuth completed his schooling and through the influence of an uncle was

granted an appointment to the Argentine naval academy. While he passed the entrance

exam he flunked out after two years when he failed to pass the mathematics exam. In

1927 Hellmuth first met Hans Harnisch the man who made him infamous. They crossed

paths on several occasions before he was recruited for his fateful mission.793 Hellmuth

moved from job to job in subsequent years eventually becoming an insurance salesman.

He became affluent enough that he joined the Hispano-Argentine Rowing Club, the

Canottieri Italiani and the exclusive Argentine Yacht Club as well as the German Club in

Calle Córdoba. He also owned a car and could take vacations to exotic locales in Brazil

and elsewhere in South America.794

792 See Katrin Paehler, “Espionage, Ideology and Personal Politics: The Making and Unmaking of a Nazi Foreign Intelligence Service” (Washington D.C.: American University, Ph.D. diss, 2002), chapter IX. 793 “Chronology in the Case of Hellmuth.” NARA, RG 65, File 64-27116-EBF 51, Box 19, Appendix IV. Also, See “Report of Interrogation of Hans Rudolf Leo Harnisch” (Hereafter Harnisch Interrogation), July- September 1947, NARA, RG 84, Records of Foreign Service Posts, Buenos Aires Political Reports (hereafter BAPR), File 862.20235/10-3147, Box 102, p. 9. 794 “Chronology in the Case of Hellmuth.” NARA, RG 65, File 64-27116-EBF 51, Box 19, Appendix IV. 298

Hellmuth told his interrogators that he only took a casual interest in the war, but

did admit to socializing with prominent Nazis in Buenos Aires and elsewhere. He

claimed that his association with this group caused problems with his employers. He

stated that in 1940 he had to leave his job at the Franco-Argentina Company and joined the firm of Sud-America Maritima Y Terrestre, an English company, because local Nazis spread rumors about him. Hellmuth said that the rumors were the result of him and his friends speaking Spanish on the premises of the German Club where this was frowned upon.795 The rumors persisted until 1942 when Hellmuth learned his former boss, Dr.

Humberto Terracini, was spreading more rumors about him. Hellmuth managed to squelch these stories, but only with considerable difficulty. However, some rumors seemed to be true. The FBI subsequently reported that Hellmuth had participated in helping Graf Spee internees to escape back to Germany. It is unknown if Hellmuth participated. His business partner Charlie Neiling did participate and it would be highly unlikely Hellmuth knew nothing of his activities.796

1942 proved to be a fateful year for Hellmuth. During Easter week of that year

Hellmuth and a friend took a business trip to Neuquén in Southern Argentina. On the

train he and a friend met General Pedro Ramírez. Ramírez was commander of the

Argentine Army’s Cavalry Brigade and traveling on an inspection trip. Hellmuth became quick friends with the general and was invited to join his group. He also became acquainted with three of Ramirez’s subordinates, Captain Francisco Filippi, Major Mario

795 Hellmuth claimed he did not speak German well and took lessons in German and English in the 1930s. See Newton, The ‘Nazi Menace’ p. 292. 796 “Axis Espionage and Propaganda in Latin America,” NARA, RG 319, Records of the Army Staff, Records of the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Military Intelligence Division, p. 51. Newton, ‘Nazi Menace’, p. 292. 299

Bernard and Lieutenant Colonel Enrique González (codename: “Boss”). All three would hold prominent positions in the Argentine government following the coup of 4 June

1943.797 Coincidentally, these men were also acquainted with Harnisch.

Hellmuth’s trip to Germany ostensibly revolved around an oil tanker Argentina had purchased and was languishing in Sweden, unable to sail. The tanker Buenos Aires

had been ordered in 1939 from Götawerken Shipbuilders in Gothenburg Sweden in 1939.

The tanker was purchased by an unknown company in Argentina in 1942 but was unable to leave since it had not been granted safe passage by the German Navy or the British.

The AA wanted it released since it would alleviate Argentina’s oil problems. The

German Navy refused since the British had refused to grant similar passage to neutral ships from other countries. The German embassy in Buenos Aires argued that Argentina needed the fuel, but this failed to convince the German Navy to release the ship.798 The

German Navy could not have failed to appreciate that the tanker could be requisitioned for the Pan American Tanker Pool, which the U.S. controlled. Thus releasing the tanker could aid their enemies.799

The Argentines were desperate for fuel. The U.S. had blocked Argentina’s oil

purchases along with an attempt to charter Spanish-flag tankers.800 In February 1943 the

U.S. told the Argentines it would not allow the tanker to leave Sweden unless the

Argentines made it available to the Pan-American Tanker Pool. The Argentine

797 “Hellmuth Interrogation,” NARA RG 65, 64-27116-EBF-51, Box 19, p.2 and Rout and Bratzel, The Shadow War, p. 390. See also “Camp 020 Report,” 4 February 1944, The National Archives, Kew (hereafter TNA), KV2/1723. 798 “Meynen to Auswärtiges Amt,” 2 June 43, NARA, RG 242/T120/762/356254-55. 799 Newton, The ‘Nazi Menace’, p. 294. 800 Buenos Aires Chancery to FO, 9 Jan 1942, 12 Jan, 15 Mar and 19 Apr 1943, TNA, FO371/33537, and Newton, The ‘Nazi Menace’, p. 294. 300

Government dithered until Castillo’s removal in June. The new government then tried to bluff the Allies and relieve some of the diplomatic pressure.801 On 21 June, Admiral

Segundo V. Storni, new foreign minister of the junta that had taken power on 4 June,

informed British Ambassador that if the Germans did not release the tanker

Argentina would break diplomatic relations.802 Storni was being disingenuous. Harnisch

informed the Abwehr that a break in relations would not happen for five months if then

and then a break “is to be expected only after previous understanding with us.”803 He

stated that “direct contact with the president established. Atmosphere excellent.”804

General Friedrich Wolf, the German military attaché in Argentina, told his postwar interrogators that as far as Germany was concerned the matter of the tanker had been settled. He suspected that the release of the tanker was simply a cover for another mission.805 Wolf’s suspicions were correct.

Hellmuth claimed that in March 1943 he renewed his acquaintance with Harnisch

at a dinner held at the Argentine Yacht Club. According to Hellmuth they met on several more occasions over the next few months. It was at one of these meetings that Hellmuth claimed he was introduced to Harnisch’s friend Aumann.806 Harnisch told his postwar interrogators that sometime following the revolution of 4 June he was approached by

Bernard, who was the Adjutant to the Minister of War Edelmiro Farrell. Bernard lamented the failure of Argentina to get needed material from the U.S. and suggested

801 “Buenos Aires Chancery to FO,” 10 February 1943, TNA, FO371/33537. 802 “Kelly to FO,” 21 June 43, TNA, FO371/33507. No record of any ultimatum is in the German records. 803 “Boss 8 to Berlin,” 19 June 1943, NARA, RG 226, Records of the OSS, OSS Communications Office Records, Ultra Decrypts. All of the O.S.S. messages are also in BNA, KV2/1724. 804 “Boss 13 to Berlin,” 19 June 1943, Ibid. 805 “Second Progress Report in the Case of General Friedrich Wolf” June 15, 1945, TNA, KV3/80, p. 25. 806 “Hellmuth Interrogation,” NARA RG 65, 64-27116-EBF-51, Box 19, p. 5. 301

Harnisch participate in a meeting with Lieutenant Colonel Enrique González, who was

the presidential secretary in the new government.807 Hellmuth claimed that it was he who

put Harnisch in contact with Lt. Col. González since Harnisch claimed not to know

anyone in the new government.808 According to Ultra Harnisch had been in touch with

González earlier than March. Hellmuth was either mistaken regarding the date or he was

lying. Despite this contradictory testimony both men claimed to have high-level contacts

in the new government. Hellmuth’s assertion contrasts with General Friedrich Wolf’s

description of him as “an innocent abroad, badly informed and very trusting.”809

Hellmuth further offered that Harnisch did a great deal of bragging about his relationship with Walter Schellenberg, head of Amt VI, SD Foreign Intelligence, and other influential people in the Nazi Party as well as the embassy. As Rout and Bratzel state, these claims did not seem improbable. In February 1943 Harnisch had allegedly secured the release of some Swedish newsprint which Nazi Germany had refused to grant an export license for.

810

Whatever the case, at the beginning of July 1943 a conference was held with

Harnisch, General Ramírez, Lt. Col. González, Maj. Bernard and Capt. Filippi in

attendance.811 Why Hellmuth was not invited is unknown since he knew all of the

principals. Ramírez stated that on 27 June Norman Armour, U.S. ambassador to

807 “Affidavit of Hans Harnisch,” 9 September 1947, NARA, RG 84, BAPR, File 862.20235/10-3147, Box 102, p. 1. 808 “Hellmuth Interrogation,” NARA RG 65, 64-27116-EBF-51, Box 19, p. 5. 809 “Camp 020 Interim Report on the Case of General Friedrich Wolf,” no date, NARA, RG 59, ABB, Miscellaneous Intelligence Reports and Affidavits, Box 26, Entry 1088, Appendix C, p, vii. 810 “Report on the Case of Osmar Alberto Hellmuth,” NARA, RG 65, File 64-27116-EBF 51, Box 19, p. 5 and Rout and Bratzel, The Shadow War, p. 391. 811 “Argentina to Berlin,” 7 July 1943, NARA, RG 226, Records of the OSS, OSS Ultra Decrypts, Entry 188. 302

Argentina, with the support of the Brazilian Ambassador, had met with him demanding

that Argentina break relations with Nazi Germany before 15 August.812 Ramírez tried to

stall until he could find a way to resolve this issue. He was angry and concerned at

Armour’s demand.813 Ramírez interpreted it as a threat of war and wanted some way of

restoring the balance of power with Brazil. While Ramírez was skeptical of Argentina’s

ability to stop a Brazilian attack, he counted on the support of Paraguay, Chile, Bolivia

and possibly Peru if an attack were to occur. What Argentina needed was weapons. The

only place to secure those weapons was from the Axis powers. Ramírez wanted the

tanker released and for Germany to ship arms to Argentina to fend off a possible attack by the U.S. and Brazil.

At the meeting Harnisch was told of Argentina’s military needs. How Argentina would pay was not mentioned, but the Argentine naval attaché in Berlin had access to

700,000 RM in an account for military purchases.814 Ramírez also assured Harnisch that

he would deal with Allied agents in Argentina and keep them from interfering with any

activity.815 Filippi would be the intermediary. In his postwar interrogation, Harnisch

claimed his participation had been minimal and that Hellmuth was the principle.816 This could have been true. In his interrogation Hellmuth related details about meetings to

812 Argentina to Berlin, 7 July 1943, NARA, RG 226, Records of the OSS, OSS Ultra Decrypts, Entry 188. 813 Newton, The ‘Nazi Menace’, p. 297. 814Newton, The ‘Nazi Menace,’ p. 297. 815 “Affidavit of Otto Reinebeck,” 4 February 1946, NARA RG 59, 862.20235, ABB, Box 6740, p. 9. Paeffgen recalled that his impression was that Argentina would provide protection for German agents. He stated that this was impression was not formally codified, but simply implied. “Notes on the Interrogation of Theodor Paeffgen,” 4 February 1946, NARA, RG 59, 862.20235/4-2646, ABB, Box 6740, p. 8. 816 “Affidavit of Hans Harnisch,” 9 September 1947, NARA, RG 84, BAPR, File 862.20235/10-3147, Box 102, p. 1. In his postwar interrogation Schellenberg stated that contact with Ramírez and others was made through Hellmuth. “Interrogation of Walter Schellenberg,” 24 November 1945, NARA, RG 263, Records of the Central Intelligence Agency, Name Files: Walter Schellenberg, p. 3. 303

which he claimed not to have attended. What is certain is that Harnisch was deeply

involved. Either Harnisch thoroughly briefed him on the discussions that were held or

Hellmuth was a participant.

Argentina had been concerned about the balance of power following the Rio

Conference and Brazil’s entry into the war on the side of the Allies. In July 1942,

General Domingo Martinez, chief of police of Buenos Aires Province, had relayed a

proposal to Meynen concerning an arms deal. Martinez stated that Argentina could

obtain German arms by smuggling them through Spain and Sweden or using blockade

runners. Spain would provide the necessary weaponry and Germany would replace

them.817 While General Ramírez had been scheduled to go to Spain to conduct the

necessary negotiations, nothing came of them. The only weapons Argentina received

were some antiaircraft guns and optical equipment that arrived in early 1943.818

Harnisch requested military support for Argentina and gave the first indications of

Hellmuth’s mission.819 The reply is illustrative of how little Berlin knew of activities in

Argentina.820 They wanted to know who González, Philippi and Bernard were. Berlin

expressed concern that these contacts would become known to the Argentine Chamber of

Deputies and expose German infiltration. They also requested that Harnisch or Becker

817 See chapter 3 for details. 818 “Steengracht to Sonnleithner,” 27 Jan 44, Angelegenheit Hellmuth, NARA RG 242/T120/351/259848. See also “Affidavit of Otto Reinebeck,” 24 Jan 46, NARA RG 59, ABB, Box 6740, p. 10. Angelegenheit Hellmuth contains all correspondence from the SD and AA dealing with the Hellmuth affair. For details regarding earlier overtures on the arms deal see chapter three. 819 “Argentina to Berlin,” 14 July 1943, NARA, RG 226, Records of the OSS, OSS Ultra Decrypts, Entry 188. 820 In some cases I have used the generic “Berlin” as the author of some messages. Given that Harnisch was cooperating with both the SD and Abwehr, it is difficult to establish authorship of some messages. Additionally, the code-breakers used Berlin as the authorship of most messages making their origin more difficult. 304

furnish a detailed report of the readiness of the Argentine military. Berlin further told

them to transmit the report using his radio network and not to rely on the Argentines

since in Berlin “general representative (the Argentine chargé Luis Luti) hates ERICH

FISCHER” a codename for Nazi Germany. They cautioned Becker and Harnisch that the

negotiations should not in any way endanger their organizations if there was a change of

government.821 What is interesting is neither Paeffgen, Gross nor the Abwehr questioned

the wisdom of such a deal, only that it be kept secret. No questions were asked regarding

the embassy’s opinion or any objections it might have raised. If any discussions did take

place, then they were either lost or destroyed at the war’s end.

Becker replied with the requested information on González, Philippi and

Bernhard. He informed Gross and Paeffgen that neither he nor Utzinger was known to

the Argentine government. Only Harnisch (and possibly Hellmuth) was known. If a

break in relations or change in government did occur then he would be in danger. Becker

and his organization would be safe.822 Like a master chess-player Becker was not above

sacrificing those he saw as pawns in pursuit of his goals. Also, Harnisch was an Abwehr

agent and Becker could have offered him as a sacrificial lamb without rebuke since

Harnisch was not a member of the SS.

However, Amt VI was unsure of Becker’s reports. Amt VI informed Becker that

it believed Argentina would soon break relations with Germany and was concerned about

the intelligence network that had been built up. He told him to maintain the network at

any cost and not to become too involved in any dealings since it could accelerate any

821 “Berlin to Argentina,” 17 July 1943, NARA, RG 226, Records of the OSS, OSS Ultra Decrypts, Entry 188. 822 “Argentina to Berlin,” 22 July 1943, Ibid. 305

decisions made by the Argentine government. Paeffgen and Gross were worried that the

overtures Ramírez and his government were making could be provocations designed to

provide a reason for breaking relations.823 The SD was encroaching on territory

previously the provenance of the Abwehr and AA. Harnisch met again with Ramírez in

mid-July which, he claimed to his postwar interrogators, was merely social.824 However

business was discussed since a record was sent to the SD. It was reported that Ramírez

was still an energetic supporter of collaborating with Germany to obtain armaments.

Harnisch stated that the president decided to use his son in law, Captain Lerche, as a “go- between and confidant.”825 Harnisch further offered that an agent would be arriving in

Germany soon and that details would follow. He admonished Berlin for its caution

arguing that they misunderstood the situation in Argentina. He told the Abwehr that they should inform the SD and AA of this fact. Harnisch also claimed that Meynen knew and approved of his machinations, which seemed to be partly true.826

Ramírez was a cagey politician and was not content to bet his country’s future on

Harnisch, Becker and the SD. In July 1943 Ramírez also met with Meynen to discuss

arms purchases. Meynen consented to pursuing negotiations with Argentina through

Colonel Santillana, military attaché in Berlin. What Meynen did not know was that

Santillana was in the pay of Amt VI. He provided them with political information in

823 “Berlin to Argentina,” 20 July 1943, Ibid. 824 “Affidavit of Hans Harnisch,” 9 September 1947, NARA, RG 84, BAPR, File 862.20235/10-3147, Box 102, p. 2. 825 “Boss 33 to Berlin,” 24 July 1943, NARA, RG 226, Records of the OSS, OSS Ultra Decrypts, Entry 188. 826 Ibid. See also “Affidavit of Otto Reinebeck,” 4 February 1946, NARA RG 59, 862.20235, ABB, Box 6740, p. 9. Reinebeck confirms that he and the Foreign Office were told of the conditions inside Argentina. However, Reinebeck seemed to doubt the information, or doubted it at the time. Reinebeck also talked about the Argentine government’s cooperation with Nazi Germany and its protection of German agents in Argentina. 306

return for luxury items.827 In August, Meynen and Wolf met with the War Minister,

Edelmiro Farrell, and Interior Minister, Alberto Gilbert, to inquire about progress. They

were informed that Santillana was not being used since it was felt that he was not sufficiently pro-German. Instead, Colonel Carlos Alberto Vélez, newly appointed

military attaché to Madrid, was to conduct negotiations in Berlin. It seems that Vélez had been Storni’s candidate. According to Otto Reinebeck, Vélez was also nominated by

Ludwig Freude, a wealthy German-Argentine businessman who was close to Meynen and the embassy.828 With Storni’s resignation in August, Ramírez turned to Becker and

Harnisch to secure the needed weapons and the interned tanker. Becker reported that

Ramírez informed Meynen of his contacts with Harnisch and that Meynen approved of

the negotiations taking place between the SD and the Argentine government.829 Given

Meynen and Wolf’s subsequent behavior Becker’s assertion is highly doubtful. More than likely, Meynen knew an arms deal was to take place but thought that the embassy would maintain the lead.

Both Schellenberg and Reinebeck were aware that the Argentines were playing off Amt VI and the AA against one another. In his postwar interrogation Schellenberg stated that Becker reported the Argentine government used two channels in promoting its relationship with Germany. The SD was to be used to secure weapons and the AA used

827 “Interrogation of Walter Schellenberg,” 24 November 1945, NARA, RG 263, Name Files: Walter Schellenberg, p. 2. 828 “Affidavit of Otto Reinebeck,” 24 January 1946, NARA RG 59, ABB, Box 6740, p. 6 829 “Second Progress Report in the Case of General Friedrich Wolf,” 15 June 45, TNA, KV3/80, p. 25. “Affidavit of Otto Reinebeck,” 4 February 1946, NARA RG 59, ABB, Box 6740, p.7. Wolf claims he and Meynen were left in the dark regarding the Hellmuth mission after August. Reinebeck also claims that the meeting took place in August, but I have not been able to corroborate this. For Becker’s report see Argentina to Berlin, 24 July 1943, NARA, RG 226, Records of the OSS, OSS Ultra Decrypts, Entry 188. 307

to demonstrate Argentina’s commitment to neutrality.830 Reinebeck confirmed

Schellenberg’s statement, but his answer to his interrogators implied the AA only became aware of Argentine double-dealing following Hellmuth’s arrest.831 While the AA was

disquieted by the situation Schellenberg was content to allow the Argentines to pursue

their aims through both organizations. He saw opportunity where the AA saw danger.

Schellenberg was determined to bring the AA under his control. Even though he was forced to back away from supporting Luther in February, the Hellmuth affair gave him another chance to unseat Ribbentrop. Schellenberg realized the consequences of failure and played a high-stakes game. For him, this was not about German relations with

Argentina; it was about controlling foreign policy. Success meant removing his rival

Ribbentrop and having Amt VI assume the AA’s duties.

Wolf and Meynen were aware something was amiss. Following his meeting with

Ramírez, Harnisch claimed that he was summoned to the German embassy where he was told to abstain from any further contacts with the Argentine government. Harnisch stated that if he disobeyed this order certain “consequences” awaited him and his family in

Germany.832 Wolf partly corroborated Harnisch’s assertions. He told his interrogators

that he had met Hellmuth at a dinner party and gathered that he was going to Europe. It

was not until an official of the Argentine government told him that Hellmuth was going

to Germany that he and Meynen realized something was wrong. While Wolf and

Meynen were puzzling out the reason for Hellmuth’s trip, they learned that Harnisch was

830 “Affidavit of Walter Schellenberg,” 6 February 1946, NARA, RG 59, ABB, Box 6740, p. 5. 831 “Affidavit of Otto Reinebeck,” 4 February 1946, NARA RG 59, ABB, Box 6740, p. 6. 832 “Affidavit of Hans Harnisch,” 9 September 1947, NARA, RG 84, BAPR, File 862.20235/10-3147, Box 102, p. 2. 308

telling people that he a “special representative of the German government.” Wolf stated

that Hellmuth’s mission was confirmed by Freude, yet they still did not know the details.

It was at this point that Wolf claimed he warned Harnisch off, telling him that he was

undermining the position of the embassy and exposing himself too much. Wolf later told

Meynen of the conversation after Wolf learned Harnisch had told his co-conspirators of

the warning using Wolf’s name. Meynen then informed the Wilhelmstrasse of

Harnisch’s indiscretion as well as Harnisch’s claim of being a “special representative of

the German government.”833 Harnisch later claimed he took Wolf’s warning seriously and decided to take a vacation with his wife.834

The AA warned the SD not to meddle in diplomatic affairs. In late July the SD

informed Harnisch and Becker that they should practice the “greatest reserve” in their

dealings with the Argentine government. They further told them that “In the interest of

maintaining your personal collaboration we therefore request adoption of role restricted

to that of cool observer as much as possible.”835 It would seem that Amt VI was as much

in the dark concerning the Hellmuth mission at this point as the Foreign Ministry was.

While neither knew the particulars, the AA did not want anything to jeopardize Nazi

Germany’s relations with Argentina. As Wolf points out, the embassy did not pursue the

matter since it is difficult to oppose something you know nothing about. Becker

interpreted his order liberally, seizing on the phrase “as much as possible” to go ahead

833 “Second Progress Report in the Case of General Friedrich Wolf,” 15 June 45, TNA KV3/80, p. 25. 834 “Affidavit of Hans Harnisch,” 9 September 1947, NARA, RG 84, BAPR, File 862.20235/10-3147, Box 102, p. 2. 835 “Berlin to Argentina,” 20 July 1943, NARA, RG 226, Records of the OSS, OSS Ultra Decrypts, Entry 188. 309

with the operation since he had already secured contact with prominent members of the

Argentine government.

Hellmuth claimed that he waited all of August for Ramírez to approve his appointment. By September events gathered momentum. In his interrogation to the

British, Hellmuth claimed that González told him that the Argentines were not inclined to trust Harnisch too much. González told Hellmuth that Harnisch would have to prove himself first. It was at that moment that Hellmuth claimed he realized the importance of his mission. If it succeeded then Harnisch would be in a very powerful position vis-à-vis

the Argentine government.836 If Harnisch took a vacation as he claimed, it appears that

he returned to Buenos Aires during the first week of September.837 Harnisch stated that

upon his return he was surprised to find that Hellmuth had taken up with Becker who

Hellmuth allegedly met through Wilhelm Seidlitz, a member of Becker’s organization. It

was at this point he learned that Hellmuth had been named consul to Barcelona and

entrusted with undertaking negotiations regarding the arms deal and the tanker. Harnisch

claimed that the original developments precluded any possibility of Becker selecting

Hellmuth for the mission.838 Harnisch was lying he was involved all along.

In late September Hellmuth claimed he was called to a meeting with the new

foreign minister Gilbert who told him that Ramírez was impatient with any delays. Since

regular diplomatic channels were too slow Ramírez decided to dispense with them.

Gilbert proposed to send Hellmuth to Germany to meet with the SD and resolve the

836 “Report on the Case of Osmar Alberto Hellmuth,” NARA, RG 65, File 64-27116-EBF 51, Box 19, p. 7. 837 It is only on September 9, 1943 that messages from Harnisch resume a gap of more than a month. 838 “Affidavit of Hans Harnisch,” 9 September 1947, NARA, RG 84, BAPR, File 862.20235/10-3147, Box 102, pp. 2 and 4. 310

tanker issue and other matters under discussion. Gilbert informed Hellmuth that

Harnisch had promised that he would see Hitler as soon as he arrived and that a decision

regarding the tanker would be given soon after his arrival in Berlin. The foreign minister

also informed Hellmuth that he would be given a consular post in Germany. After

Hellmuth expressed concern about Allied bombing in Germany, Barcelona was chosen

instead. His salary was to be 900 pesos a month for six months, his transit paid for and

he would be provided with 5,000 pesos for expenses. On 24 September 1943 the

Argentine government issued Osmar Hellmuth with diplomatic passport 0151.839

However, there was a complication that would have repercussions all around.

Gilbert informed Hellmuth that he had spoken to Wolf and Meynen regarding his mission. Gilbert stated that Meynen assured him that Hellmuth was an acceptable person for the mission and that the matter would be settled.840 However, the evidence suggests

that Gilbert was either lying or under a very mistaken impression. Meynen and the AA

wanted Vélez to undertake the mission, not Hellmuth. Since there is no confirmation of

this meeting other than Hellmuth’s statement, Gilbert’s assertions are doubtful.

Somehow Meynen and Wolf learned of the mission and at the last moment attempted to

stop Hellmuth’s mission or make sure their objections were on the record in case

Hellmuth’s mission failed.

It was at this point Hellmuth claimed that he learned Harnisch was only an

intermediary. In a meeting at Harnisch’s house he learned of Becker and his position in

the SD. Becker instructed Hellmuth that when he arrived in Spain he was to go to the

839 See “Report on the Case of Osmar Alberto Hellmuth,” NARA, RG 65, File 64-27116-EBF 51, Box 19, p. 7. Newton, The ‘Nazi Menace’, p 301. 840 Ibid. 311

Hotel Carlton in Bilbao where contact would be made with an SD agent. The agent

would approach him and say “Greetings from Señor Siegfried Becker” and Hellmuth

would reply “Ah yes! The Hauptsturmführer!”841 Becker told Hellmuth that if the

rendezvous did not take place he should go to the German embassy in Madrid and ask for

“the police attaché.” He would then travel onto Berlin where Schellenberg would

supposedly meet him and arrange meetings with Himmler and Hitler.842 As the date of his

departure approached Hellmuth began to learn of the rift between the embassy and his SD sponsors.

Hellmuth told his interrogators that he learned some disturbing news at a dinner

attended by Hellmuth, Gilbert, González and the newly appointed military attaché,

Colonel Vélez. Gilbert asked Hellmuth if he knew “what was going on among the

Germans?” Gilbert told Hellmuth that Freude, who claimed to be a personal friend of

Hitler’s, had offered to solve the tanker issue through Colonel Vélez. Not only that, he also claimed Meynen wanted to send Vélez instead of Hellmuth. Hellmuth claimed that

Gilbert was not happy with this last minute change and intended to ignore it. When

Hellmuth saw Harnisch later, he asked him about Freude’s intentions and supposed influence. Harnisch said that somehow the embassy, where Freude was always “hanging about,” had learned of Hellmuth’s mission. Harnisch told Hellmuth that Freude wanted to get the credit for something brought about by others. Freude and Harnisch had known

841 “Report on the Case of Osmar Alberto Hellmuth,” NARA, RG 65, File 64-27116-EBF 51, Box 19, p. 7. Also, “South America to Germany,” 10-7-43, NARA RG 65, File 64-27116-77, Box 18. Other decrypts of messages concerning the Hellmuth Affair are contained in a memorandum from Ladd to Hoover dated 16 December 43. 842 “Report on the Case of Osmar Alberto Hellmuth,” NARA, RG 65, File 64-27116-EBF 51, Box 19, pp. 8-9. 312

each other since 1925 and their relationship was contentious. Harnisch’s relationship with Meynen was tense as well. Given the antipathy between the three, it was obvious to

Harnisch. Meynen was encouraging Freude to discredit Hellmuth and Harnisch and showing how unpatriotic and obstructive he really was.843 While this statement rings of

truth, the question is: If the embassy already knew of the mission as Becker had claimed,

why wait until the last minute to derail it? It would seem that Wolf and Meynen knew

something was going on, but not the details. When they found out, they exerted every

effort to stop Hellmuth’s mission.

Hellmuth’s trip was booked on the Cabo de Hornos, where two of his traveling

companions would be Prince Schumburg-Lippe, and Freiherr Wilhelm von Schön,

respectively German consul and ambassador in Chile, who were returning to Germany.

According to Reinebeck, Prince Schumburg-Lippe and Schön were asked by Freude to

make sure that Hellmuth did not receive any sort of audience upon his arrival in Berlin.844

Becker learned of this duplicity from William Wieland, secretary in the AO

Landesgruppe in Argentina. Wieland claimed to his postwar interrogators that he learned of the mission through Freude who held a very low opinion of Harnisch. Freude intimated to Wieland that Harnisch could be the one sabotaging the mission. In any case

Hellmuth was totally unsuited for the mission. Wieland told Becker that Meynen, Schön, and Wolf were opposed to the mission. Also, the mission had become common knowledge among the diplomats transiting through Buenos Aires which increased the risk of exposure. Wieland claimed that Freude asked him to explain the situation to

843 “Report on the Case of Osmar Alberto Hellmuth,” NARA, RG 65, File 64-27116-EBF 51, Box 19, p. 9. 844 “Affidavit of Otto Reinebeck,” 4 Feb 46, NARA RG 59, ABB, Box 6740, p. 11. 313

Schumburg-Lippe and have him watch Hellmuth on the voyage to Spain.845 Becker was worried. He feared that if the Argentine government found out about the leak and

Freude’s role with the embassy, it could affect the SD’s position in Argentina. He informed Paeffgen and Gross that he had avoided any discussion of this issue with the embassy, contrary to earlier assertions that the embassy knew of this.846 However

Harnisch told Berlin he had kept the embassy informed via Wolf.847 Surprisingly, no one

caught these contradictions, or they were ignored.

Hellmuth had a final meeting with Becker and Harnisch prior to his departure.848

Becker showed Hellmuth a letter being prepared that described him has having the full confidence of the Argentine Government and of the Harnisch/Becker Group. Hellmuth was also to inform Berlin of Meynen’s “reprehensible conduct” and explain the obstruction of the embassy regarding his mission. Becker informed Hellmuth that his authority could result in an agreement being reached between Argentina and Germany regarding the eventual exchange of information. Hellmuth was encouraged to remove

Luis Luti, the insufficiently pro-German Argentine charge d’Affaires in Berlin, and place

Commander Ceballos, the Argentine naval attaché in Berlin, in charge. Hellmuth also had a last minute meeting with González who confirmed that Hellmuth was to deal with

Ceballos not Luti. He further informed Hellmuth that he would pass any new instructions through the Argentine embassy in Madrid. González asked that Hellmuth obtain some

845 “Interrogation of William Wieland,” 22 March 1946, NARA, RG 59, ABB, Box 26, p. 6, see also “South America to Germany,” 7 October 1943, NARA RG 65, File 64-27116-77, Box 18. 846 “Argentina to Berlin,” 7 and 8 October 1943, NARA, RG 226, Records of the OSS, OSS Ultra Decrypts, Entry 188. 847 “Argentina to Berlin,” 17 October 1943, TNA, KV2/1487. 848 Hellmuth was unclear about the dates of his meetings with Becker, stating only that they took place a week before his departure. 314

publications on air warfare and “a machine for removing hairs from the nose.”849 He also gave Hellmuth a letter of introduction to Ceballos, which described Hellmuth’s mission in very discreet terms. Hellmuth was also given Admiral Sueyro’s visiting card and asked to convey greetings to a friend of the Admiral’s in Barcelona. Upon completion of his mission to Germany Hellmuth was instructed to report to the Consulate in Barcelona, but with no real intention of taking up his nominal position there.850

Meynen continued frantically to try and stop Hellmuth’s mission in the days

leading to his departure. He spoke to Schön and asked him to watch Hellmuth while on

the ship and once he was back in Berlin to report his objections to the AA.851 Meynen

also called on Vice-President General Edelmiro Farrell and Gilbert at the Foreign

Ministry to protest Hellmuth’s mission.852 He pointed out to Farrell that Hellmuth was

entirely unsuited for the mission and hinted ominously that Hellmuth might be an agent

for the U.S. though he could provide no proof of this fact. Perhaps it is indicative of how desperate Meynen and the AA were to stop Hellmuth’s mission. Meynen expressed

regret that Vélez was not charged with this mission since he enjoyed the full confidence

of the embassy. Farrell feigned ignorance and told Meynen that he needed to confer with

Ramírez. Meynen told Farrell that speaking with González would probably be better.

Instead of conferring with Ramírez, Gilbert turned to his subordinate Juan Domingo

Perón who decided that a compromise was in order.

849 “Report on the Case of Osmar Alberto Hellmuth,” NARA, RG 65, 64-27116-EBF-51, Box 19, p. 12. 850 Ibid. 851 “Affidavit of Freiherr Wilhelm Albrecht von Schön, 24 January 1946, NARA, RG 59, 862.20235/4- 2646, ABB, Box 6740, pp. 3-4. 852 “Meynen to AA,” 30 September 1943, Angelegenheit Hellmuth, NARA, RG 242/T-120/351/259818- 819. 315

Perón summoned Hellmuth to his office and gave him a piece of cardboard that had been cut in half. One half would be placed in an envelope that had Hellmuth’s name

on it. The envelope, along with the required documentation to complete the arms deal

would then be placed in the diplomatic pouch and sent to Madrid ahead of Hellmuth.

The other half would bear the name of Colonel Vélez on the envelope. When they both

arrived in Madrid and presented their respective halves of the card, the contents of the

diplomatic pouch would be given to them.853 A conference was also scheduled to be held

on 30 Oct almost a month following Hellmuth’s departure. If Meynen accepted this date,

he either did not know when Hellmuth was scheduled to leave, or more likely, decided to

try a different way to sabotage Hellmuth’s mission. What is clear is that the Argentina’s

patience had ended regarding the embassy’s promises. Meynen and Niebuhr had strung

Argentina along for almost three years regarding an arms deal. In some ways, the AA

was as much responsible for the Hellmuth mission as the SD since they had created the

conditions which made it possible.

Harnisch and Becker were not sure what Meynen was up to, but they were afraid

that he would wreck everything with his constant meddling and intriguing.854 Bernard informed Harnisch of the meeting between Farrell and Meynen.855 Following his meeting with Farrell, Meynen outlined his objections to the Hellmuth mission. In the first, he informed Berlin that Vélez was the negotiator for the arms deal and that the AA give

853 “Major Andrew Fuller to Colonel Walton Cox, Memo, Re. Osmar Alberto Hellmuth,” 14 February 1944, NARA, RG 319, Records of the Army Staff, Records of the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G- 2, Intelligence Records of the Investigative Records Repository (hereafter IRR), Personal Name File X8370813 Osmar A. Hellmuth, Box 80B, p. 3. 854 “Argentina to Berlin,” 30 October 1943, NARA, RG 226, OSS Ultra Decrypts, Entry 188. See also TNA, KV2/1487. 855 “Argentina to Germany,” 30 October 1943, TNA, KV2/1487. 316

Vélez “the greatest possible receptivity, as perhaps of decisive importance for the

maintenance of neutrality.” He described Hellmuth as someone who “bragged about

being an intimate friend of the Führer’s and the latter’s personal representative here”

Meynen stated that Hellmuth further claimed that “thanks to his connections in Germany

… he will be able to resolve the arms delivery and tanker Buenos Aires affairs within four

days of arrival and will be received personally by the Führer.” Meynen further cast doubt

on Hellmuth stating that he served “our enemies, which I hope is improbable and for

which in any case no evidence is present.” He also stated that the Argentines themselves

had doubts about Hellmuth’s loyalty, which was not true.856

Freude had also learned of the meeting between Harnisch and Bernard. He passed this information on to Meynen. Freude told Meynen that Harnisch and the SD were undermining the position of the embassy. An unnamed Argentine government official claimed that Harnisch had told Bernard that the SD was the real representative of the

German government in Argentina and that the embassy was a “completely insignificant institution.” The official then inquired whether the embassy continued to be Germany’s official representative in Argentina. Harnisch’s answer is unknown, but the fact that the question was even asked was telling. Meynen demanded those in Berlin responsible for this transgression be reprimanded.857 Reinebeck stated that SD meddling in foreign

affairs had been a thorn in the Auswärtiges Amt’s flesh for a long time. Despite repeated

warnings to the SD this meddling continued and Reinebeck suggested to Ribbentrop that

856 “Meynen to AA,” 30 September 1943, Geiger to Paeffgen, 26 October 1943 & Reinebeck to Wagner 23 October 1943, Angelegenheit Hellmuth, NARA, RG 242/T-120/351/259818-823, and Newton, The ‘Nazi Menace’ p. 306-307. 857 “Berlin to Argentina,” 3 November 1943, TNA, KV2/1724. 317

he express his “extraordinary dissatisfaction with the Hellmuth affair to the RSHA in a

particularly impressive manner.”858 While Ronald Newton sees Meynen’s objections as treachery more than likely Meynen and Wolf were protecting their areas of responsibility.

The SD had gone behind their back in violation of agreements. The professional diplomats of the AA were smart enough to anticipate the fallout if Hellmuth’s mission failed. However, Becker would argue that the Hellmuth mission was in fact within

“assigned directives.”859

The SD informed Becker of Meynen’s messages to Berlin. Berlin told him that

he and his organization were to present a united front with the embassy regarding foreign

policy “even if the embassy members behaved negatively.”860 Becker defended himself.

He told Amt VI that Hellmuth was their representative and that Meynen and the embassy

had been informed of this fact. Becker claimed that Meynen had agreed on Hellmuth as

their intermediary and that Meynen had gone behind their back and attempted to sabotage

the mission.861 Of course Becker and Harnisch claimed earlier that neither had informed

the embassy of Hellmuth’s mission. Again, this contradiction was not caught or ignored.

Left unasked was the question: If Meynen knew and approved of Hellmuth and his

mission, why sabotage it?

Becker denounced Freude in the strongest terms using language that would have

resonated in Berlin. Becker stated that Freude’s machinations were underhanded and that

he and his Jewish partner were known to the government. Becker decried Freude and

858 “Affidavit of Otto Reinebeck,” 4 Feb 1946, NARA, RG 59, 862.20235, ABB, 6740, pp. 11-12. 859 “Argentina to Berlin,” 1 November 1944, NARA, RG 226, OSS Ultra Decrypts, Entry 188. 860 “Berlin to Argentina,” 3 November 1943, TNA, KV2/1724. 861 “Argentina to Berlin,” 1 November 1944, NARA, RG 226, OSS Ultra Decrypts, Entry 188. 318

Meynen’s assertions that Hellmuth could possibly be a spy. He reiterated that Hellmuth

enjoyed the complete confidence of the Argentine government and stated that Hellmuth

carried letters from González and Sueyro, but a letter from Ramírez to Hitler was

withheld for security reasons. The embassy was excluded from any part of the mission

because the Argentine government demanded the greatest security.862 Gross agreed and

told Becker not to have any dealings with the embassy regarding Hellmuth.863 Becker

described Hellmuth’s plans and security procedures in detail. This allowed the

Americans and British to lay a trap for Hellmuth. It also gave them leverage when he

was captured. The message also exposed the connivance of high-ranking members of the

Argentine government. The Americans and British would use this to their advantage

once the plot became known.864

Hellmuth departed Buenos Aires on 2 October 1943 aboard the ship Cabo de

Hornos. The ship stopped at Montevideo with engine trouble until October 11 and then

headed to Rio de Janeiro where Hellmuth disembarked and contacted friends.865

Hellmuth’s activities in Rio were monitored by the U.S. naval attaché and Brazilian police who noted that Hellmuth was contacted by the Argentine military attaché and the

Spanish ambassador. He also visited Emilio Schupp & Co., a firm suspected of dealing

862 “Germany to South America,” 26 October 1943, NARA, RG 65, 64-27116-77, Box 18. 863 “Germany to Argentina,” 23 October 1943, TNA, KV2/1724. 864 “South American to Germany,” 7 October 1943, NARA, RG 65, 64-27116-77, Box 18. Harnisch later told Berlin not to send any messages except for administrative ones through the embassy. See “Argentina to Germany,” 17 October 1943, and South America to Germany, 30 October 1943, NARA, RG 226, OSS Ultra Decrypts, Entry 188. 865 Meynen reported to Berlin that Hellmuth had met German agents in both ports “Meynen to AA,” 24 January 1944, Angelegenheit Hellmuth, NARA, RG 242/T120/351/25952. This could be another attempt by Meynen to cast doubt on Hellmuth’s mission, since no record of Hellmuth making contact with German agents could be found. 319 in contraband materials.866 On board the ship Hellmuth did not associate with the

German diplomats, but spent most of his time with the diplomatic courier Alfredo

Cipriano Pons and his family. Hellmuth claimed that he and Vélez got along well, but

Schön stated that Hellmuth and Vélez avoided each other.867

The ship arrived in Port of Spain on 29 October and Hellmuth was removed from the ship despite the protests of the diplomats on board. However, it seems Hellmuth managed to get off a telegram to González stating that the he was being detained and begging González to intervene.868 Dário Quiroga, the Argentine Consul in Trinidad, also attempted to send a telegram on 30 October concerning Hellmuth’s detention, but this was held up by the British until 4 November and arrived in Buenos Aires the same day.869

When the Ajax docked in the Azores, Hellmuth requested to see a consul, which was denied.870 The British understood the potential fallout from Hellmuth’s detention and prepared accordingly. They hoped that Hellmuth would reveal all he knew under interrogation since the reasons for Hellmuth’s detention had been provided by Ultra. If

Hellmuth did not spill his guts, then the British feared there could be a larger fallout that

866 “Facts Known About Osmar Alberto Hellmuth from Our Sources,” TNA, KV 2/1722. 867 “Report on the Case of Osmar Alberto Hellmuth,” NARA, RG 65, 64-27116-EBF-51, Box 19, p. 12, “Affidavit of Freiherr Wilhelm Albrecht von Schön,” 24 Jan 1946, NARA, RG 59, ABB, Box 6740, p. 8. 868 Rout and Bratzel, The Shadow War, p. 398. Rout and Bratzel found the telegram in the Argentine archives. The telegram is dated 8 November over a week after Hellmuth was detained. They are rightfully skeptical that Hellmuth sent it, but González might not have told anyone in an attempt at damage control. Conversely, it could have been a plant by the British to show the Argentines that they had Hellmuth and as a warning of future fallout of which the Argentine government could not have been ignorant. The British could have also held up the telegram as they did with the Argentine Consul’s. In their first protest to the British on 15 November the Argentine Ambassador to London intimated that an Argentine diplomat being posted to Lisbon, Edgardo Pérez Quesada had sent a telegram from Trinidad informing Buenos Aires of Hellmuth’s detention. There is no record of such a telegram from Trinidad only Quesada’s telegram from Spain which arrived in Buenos Aires on 17 November. See “Foreign Office to Buenos Aires,” 17 November 1943, TNA, KV 2/1722 and Rout and Bratzel, op cit. 869 See Noakes to unknown recipient, 25 November 1943, BNA, KV 2/1722. 870 “Memo re. Osmar Hellmuth, Captain S.H. Noakes to unknown recipient,” 25 November 1943, TNA, KV 2/1722. 320

could affect Allied relations. British Intelligence wanted to make sure that Hellmuth

could be put in Camp 020 for interrogation, that the Foreign Office would support that

decision and refuse to release Hellmuth in the face of Argentine protests.871 If Hellmuth

were put in Camp 020 it was understood that he would not be allowed any visitors or

access to the Argentine Embassy and that he would be kept there for the duration of the

war.872

Hellmuth arrived at Portsmouth on 12 November and was transferred to Camp

020 for interrogation. When he arrived Hellmuth was described as “possessed, almost

arrogant.”873 In the meantime his interrogators searched his papers for some evidence that

could be used against him and could justify his detention. The only thing they found was

Harnisch’s letter asking Hellmuth to provide precision instruments. Hellmuth was left to

stew for a few days and then called before his interrogators. Hellmuth was made to stand

in front of his interrogators where they informed him that they were speaking with the

full authority of the British government. They informed him that he was a prisoner of the

British Secret Service and that he was being held under a warrant signed by the Home

Secretary alleging the smuggling of contraband in war. This was a violation of

Argentina’s neutrality and the reason for his detention.

The interrogators did a good job of impressing on Hellmuth the gravity of his

situation. They told Hellmuth that they knew all about his activities and that it was no

871 “Liddell to unknown recipient,” 7 November 1943 and “unknown author to Loxley (Foreign Office),” 7 November 1943, TNA, KV 2/1722. 872 “Stamp to unknown recipient,” 3 November 1943, TNA, KV 2/1722. 873 Oliver Hoare ed., Camp 020: MI5 and the Nazi Spies (London: Public Record Office, 2000), p. 267. This is a reprint of Lt. Col. Stephens’ history of Camp 020 originally titled A Digest of Ham. The original is in TNA KV 4/13, KV 4/14 and KV 4/15. 321

accident that the cruiser Ajax had ferried him to England since it was one of the ships that

had sunk the Graf Spee in 1939. The interrogators informed Hellmuth that it pleased

them that the “great ship [Ajax] has struck a blow at the unreal Argentine Republic

controlled by this General Ramírez.” Hellmuth was told that Ramírez had been informed

of his arrest and had done nothing to secure his release. Instead they cowered afraid of

exposure, betraying him and told him of the futility of attempting to contact his

embassy.874

The interrogators alternately sympathized and bullied Hellmuth telling him, “I am

somewhat sorry for him. He has been sold by his President. He has been sold by the

German Secret Service.”875 He was called a fool for engaging in matters that he knew

little or nothing about and that he was groveling to the Germans with gifts in his hand.876

They told him that he was being held incommunicado and that he would have no access to his embassy. He was told that he would be interrogated and that if he did not reveal all he knew then he would suffer. It was implied that he could be hanged for his activities if he did not cooperate. If he did cooperate this would be taken into consideration in determining his fate. Hellmuth was then sent back to his cell and told that his fate lay in his own hands.877

874 “Memorandum on Osmar Alberto Hellmuth,” 18 December 1943, NARA, RG 65, 64-27116. Newton argues that Hellmuth talked freely following his detention; this is contradicted by his interrogation reports. Hellmuth, to his credit, did all he could to mislead his interrogators until faced with the fact that his interrogators knew everything. See Newton, ‘The Nazi Menace’ p. 287. For other summaries of Hellmuth’s interrogation see “Report on the Case of Osmar Alberto Hellmuth,” RG65, 64-27116-EBF-51 and Hellmuth’s files in The National Archives, Kew, KV 2/1722 and 1723. Inexplicably one file concerning Hellmuth and Ernesto Hoppe is still unavailable to researchers. 875 “Report on the Case of Osmar Alberto Hellmuth,” RG65, 64-27116-EBF-51. 876 This was revealed in “South America to Germany,” 10 October 1943, NARA, RG 65, 64-27116. 877 “Report on the Case of Osmar Alberto Hellmuth,” RG65, 64-27116-EBF-51. 322

Hellmuth’s interrogations began the next day and he vainly attempted to throw off

his interrogators and minimize his involvement. Hellmuth portrayed himself as a pawn in

a power struggle between competing factions in Argentina. He described himself as a

patriot simply interested in “having done my duty without prejudicing anybody.”878

Hellmuth declared himself the victim of a plot and the Argentine government as not wishing to harm Great Britain at all. The acquisition of the precision instruments was done as a favor for Harnisch and that he was “morally bound to obtain those instruments for him.” Hellmuth pleaded that he was an Argentine citizen and that he was not an enemy of Germany or Great Britain, but simply a neutral citizen doing his patriotic duty.

As for the seven trunks of foodstuffs he carried, they were given to him by Harnisch, he was to keep half and the other half was to go to Harnisch’s mother in Germany. He reiterated that he was the victim of political intrigue intimating that it was Meynen and

Freude who betrayed him.

Hellmuth claimed that his mission involved the tanker and nothing more. He knew nothing about any arms deals, but stated that if the tanker issue was dealt with successfully then Vélez would place himself at Hellmuth’s disposal and he would introduce Vélez to the proper people and complete the arms transaction. However the deck was stacked against him. Ultra decrypts revealed that the British and Americans knew all about Hellmuth’s mission and the machinations between the competing German factions. But the interrogators were not ready to reveal all they knew. Instead they bided

878 Ibid. The British were remarkably well informed about the S.D./Foreign Ministry rivalry thanks to Ultra. See “Hart to unknown recipient,” 9 November 1943, TNA, KV 2/1722. 323

their time and forced Hellmuth to reveal all he knew. For the moment, the interrogators

continued their “friendly method of interrogation.”

Hellmuth was next questioned about his knowledge of the SD of which he feigned

ignorance. His interrogators returned to the particulars of his mission, deliberately

mixing up topics to keep him off balance. When they showed him evidence that they

knew of his mission Hellmuth stated that he was in fact traveling to Germany on a secret

mission involving the Argentine government and prominent Germans in Argentina.879

Hellmuth admitted that when he landed in Bilbao he was to be approached by an individual who would say, “Greetings from Señor Siegfried Becker” Hellmuth would reply, “Yes, the Hauptsturmführer.”880 He agreed that the man he was meeting was in all likelihood a member of the SD from Madrid, exposing yet another lie on Hellmuth’s part.

If the contact failed to materialize Hellmuth was to go to the German Embassy in Madrid where travel would be arranged for him.

Hellmuth next tried to throw his interrogators off by mixing the truth and lies.

He stated that his actual mission concerned the Wehrmacht. Hellmuth said that most of his contact had been with Wolf and that he had also [italics mine] been instructed to contact the SD but, probably correctly, maintained he knew little about the organization.

Hellmuth further stated that he would meet with someone named Schellenberg who would put him in contact with Himmler and probably Hitler. He maintained that his primary mission concerned the tanker Buenos Aires; then he was to negotiate an arms

879 “Report on the Case of Osmar Alberto Hellmuth,” RG65, 64-27116-EBF-51. 880 Ibid. This was exposed to the interrogators in a long message sent to Germany, see note 48. 324

deal between Germany and Argentina and finally as a personal favor to Harnisch attempt

to obtain certain precision instruments which would benefit his country.

While providing the general outlines of his mission, details were not forthcoming.

His interrogators let him know that he needed to provide more. They were particularly

interested in his contacts with the SD and their relationship to his mission. Hellmuth

protested that he had told them all he knew, but vaguely alluded to a trump card that

former President Castillo had been reluctant to use, but now was being played with

Hellmuth as the principle. His interrogators continued to press him for information

regarding the SD in Buenos Aires. Hellmuth averred, and provided inconsequential

details regarding Harnisch, Heinrich Volberg and Ludwig Freude. In fact, Hellmuth

posited that it was Freude who had betrayed him given their dislike of each other.881

When asked about any meetings with Becker, Hellmuth lied and said that he had never met the man. At this point his interrogators ratcheted up the pressure telling him, “The time that could be spared for these friendly interrogations was nearly at an end and that unless he produced the information which he knew we required in the course of the next few days, his treatment in this camp must necessarily deteriorate.”882 In short, if Hellmuth

did not tell all he knew then torture was the next option.883

At his next interrogation Hellmuth admitted that he had met Becker who was first

introduced to him as “the assistant of Col. Wolf.” It was only in a subsequent meeting

881 Ibid. In his interrogation Hellmuth refers to Volberg as Vollenberg. See also “Sworn Statement of Theodor Paeffgen,” 29 December 1945, NARA, RG 59, 862.20235/4-2646. Paeffgen also fingers Freude as the one who betrayed the mission. 882 “Report on the Case of Osmar Alberto Hellmuth,” RG65, 64-27116-EBF-51. 883 This was in fact an idle threat since Stephens the commandant of Camp 020 did not believe in physical torture, stating, “Violence is taboo, for not only does it produce answers to please, but it lowers the standard of information.” Hoare ed., Camp 020: MI5 and the Nazi Spies, p. 19. 325

that Hellmuth learned he was a Hauptsturmführer and member of the SD. Hellmuth’s

recollection of the topics discussed at his meetings with Becker and Harnisch are

corroborated by Ultra. Meynen was to be denounced for his interference and Hellmuth

was to ask for his removal. Hellmuth was to explain to Schellenberg that any suppression

of German groups was forced on the Argentine government by public opinion,

reinforcing Becker and Harnisch’s messages to Berlin. Hellmuth admitted that he had the

full confidence of not only the Argentine government, but of Harnisch and Becker as

well. His mission was as follows:

1. The release of the tanker by the German authorities.

2. The removal of the Argentine Chargé d’ Affaires was to be a quid pro quo in

connection with the tanker and that he was to give assurances to Schellenberg

that he would be transferred.

3. To conclude an arms deal, but details on shipment were to be worked out

later.

4. To press for the transfer of Meynen, but he did not have the authority to

suggest a replacement.

5. To submit a report on the situation in Argentina.

While Hellmuth admitted that he received instructions from Ramírez and González, he

categorically refused to implicate them in any dealings with the SD maintaining his

loyalty to his country.884 According to his interrogators Hellmuth had the frustrating

habit of not giving direct answers to questions continually using the adverb

‘probablemente.’ When he didn’t use that word, he would resort to ‘it is logical to

884 “Report on the Case of Osmar Alberto Hellmuth,” RG65, 64-27116-EBF-51. 326

suppose.’ This drove his interrogators mad and he was eventually forbidden from using

either term in Camp 020.885 Hellmuth was not the “innocent abroad” described by Rout

and Bratzel nor the sinister figure portrayed by Newton.886 He was someone in over his

head and a pawn in a game with very high stakes. However, his covering for Becker

raises questions about how much he really knew and the depth of his involvement.

Despite Quiroga’s telegram of 4 November describing Hellmuth’s detention,

nothing was heard from the Argentine Government until 15 November. Miguel Carcano,

the Argentine Ambassador in London called on Sir Alexander Cadogan, Permanent

Under-Secretary of Foreign Affairs, to inquire the reasons for Hellmuth’s detention along

with the reasons for the delay in transmitting Quiroga’s and Quesada’s telegrams.887

Cadogan cagily replied that the Foreign Office knew nothing about the affair.888 The

Foreign Office informed Ambassador Kelly in Buenos Aires that if the Argentine

Government made a protest regarding Hellmuth’s detention they were to tell them that using a diplomat for subversive activities was an excellent example of the injury

Argentina inflicted upon the Allied cause by her failure to break relations with the Axis.

The British decided that the best defense was a good offense.889

On the German/Argentine side, they had known of Hellmuth’s arrest since 5

November. Becker reported that González and Perón had told him of Hellmuth’s arrest

885 Hoare ed., Camp 020: MI5 and the Nazi Spies, p. 269. The British did not think Hellmuth was being disingenuous, but simply had a “vague Argentine nature.” 886 See Rout and Bratzel, The Shadow War, p. 397 and Newton, The ‘Nazi Menace’, pp. 285-314. 887 “Foreign Office to Buenos Aires,” 17 November 1943, TNA, KV 2/1722 888 Rout and Bratzel, The Shadow War, p. 399. 889 “Liddell to unknown recipient,” 7 November 1943 and “Foreign Office to Buenos Aires,” 16 November 1943, TNA, KV 2/1722. 327

which they learned from the Argentine ambassador in Caracas, Venezuela.890 Becker

rushed to confirm this information and obtained it from Colonel Brinkmann, Chief of

Staff of the First Division and head of the G.O.U.891 On 14 November Gilbert sent a

telegram to England demanding that they release Hellmuth and “explain their insolent

attitude.”892 Berlin had requested a report on 5 November asking for exact details on

Hellmuth’s knowledge of the German organization and personnel in Argentina so they

could negotiate with him. On 19 November they again requested the report noting

ominously of “possible consequences.”893 Gross and Paeffgen started to panic since on

the next day they sent two messages asking Becker if Hellmuth’s arrest endangered the

organization at all.894 González and Gilbert saw that their scheme going down in flames

and needed a triumph, any triumph, in order to salvage this diplomatic disaster. The

Argentines wanted to try and salvage the mission by sending another emissary to

Germany! They informed Becker that the release of the tanker would be “very

advantageous for future relations.” Becker also noted a cooler attitude by the Argentines

toward him and his organization.895

On the 25 November following Hellmuth’s interrogation the British dropped their

bombshell on Argentina. Cadogan called in Carcano and told him that Hellmuth was

indeed a British prisoner. When Carcano pressed Cadogan on Hellmuth’s condition and

890 “Argentina to Berlin,” 6 November 1943, NARA RG 226, O.S.S. Ultra Decrypts, Entry 188. 891 “South America to Germany,” 7 November 1943, NARA, RG 65, 64-27116. 892 Rout and Bratzel, The Shadow War, p. 399. 893 “Germany to South America,” 5 November 1943, NARA, RG 65, 64-27116, and “Berlin to Argentina,” 19 November 1943, NARA RG 226, O.S.S. Ultra Decrypts, Entry 188. 894 “Germany to Argentina,” 20 November 1943 and “Germany to Argentina,” 20 November 1943, BNA, KV2/1724. 895 “Argentina to Berlin,” 20 November 1943, NARA, RG 226, O.S.S. Ultra Decrypts, Entry 188. 328

his location, Cadogan demurred.896 Becker was informed that the Argentine Government

would not press for the continuation of Hellmuth’s mission, but would be satisfied with

his release and return to Buenos Aires.897 On 10 December , British

Foreign Secretary, summoned Carcano to deny that his government had delayed

Quiroga’s cables from Trinidad. While he refused to disclose Hellmuth’s location or his

condition he stated that he believed Hellmuth was the “secret representative of a

subversive German organization in Argentina.” Eden also sowed the seeds of mistrust amongst the Germans in Argentina by stating that Hellmuth had been betrayed by “a prominent member of the German colony in Buenos Aires.”898 Carcano, shocked by these revelations, cabled Buenos Aires for instructions.899

On 17 December Gilbert audaciously proposed that the British release Hellmuth

and turn over to the Argentine government any evidence that Hellmuth was a German

spy. The Argentines “would then be inclined to cancel Hellmuth’s appointment” and

make him available for interrogation later. Not surprisingly, the proposal was summarily

rejected by the British.900 On 26 December the Argentines made another offer: The

British would release Hellmuth from his detention, but he would have to remain in

England. Argentina would “discover” that Hellmuth was indeed a Germany spy, his

diplomatic credentials would be cancelled and Argentina would agree to Hellmuth’s return to British custody.901 Again the British rejected this offer. What is interesting is

896 Rout and Bratzel, The Shadow War, p. 399. 897 “Argentina to Berlin,” 4 December 1943, NARA, RG 226, O.S.S. Ultra Decrypts, Entry 188. 898 Rout and Bratzel, The Shadow War, p. 399. 899 Ibid, p. 440, note, 109. 900 Rout and Bratzel, The Shadow War, p. 400. 901 “J.V. Perowne, Minutes,” AS126/4/2, 5 January, 1944, TNA, FO 371/37666 see also “Argentina to Berlin,” 4 December 1943, NARA, RG 226, O.S.S. Ultra Decrypts, Entry 188. 329 how informed the German intelligence services were about the negotiations between the

British and Argentine governments concerning Hellmuth.

Harnisch attempted to mollify Berlin with news that Ramirez and Sueyro had assigned Aumann as a liaison officer to him and that Aumann had been appointed Chief of the Navy’s information service.902 Thus, the Argentines were attempting to construct an intelligence service with the cooperation Becker per their supposed previous agreement. Berlin however was not mollified and informed them Hellmuth was apparently betrayed. In their postwar interrogations Schellenberg and Paeffgen blamed the failure of Hellmuth’s mission on Freude.

Though Argentina and Germany knew only the vaguest details of Hellmuth’s incarceration and relations between the two were still generally good. However, Becker did not panic. On 10 December Harnisch informed Berlin that “the incident concerns neither me nor the Green [Abwehr] organization. I am still considered confidential agent by the government.” Harnisch told Berlin that Ceballos was transporting a report in the

Argentine diplomatic bag which would clarify their understanding of the nature and extent of his organization in Argentina.903 Harnisch and Becker were kept well informed of events as they unfolded. However, events began to drastically turn against Harnisch and Becker.

On 23 December Harnisch was called to a meeting with Bernard and González.

They denounced Meynen and Freude, blaming them for Hellmuth’s capture and vowed that those responsible would be dealt with. The real reason for the meeting was to inform

902 “Argentina to Berlin,” 11 December 1943, NARA, RG 226, O.S.S. Ultra Decrypts, Entry 188. 903 “Argentina to Berlin,” 10 December 1943, Ibid. 330

Harnisch that the fallout from the Hellmuth affair required “drastic steps” (i.e. a break in

relations) and that Harnisch should stay out of sight. González assured Harnisch that he

would be protected.904 Harnisch gathered up his and any other

incriminating evidence and deposited them with Wolf’s assistant, Lt. Martin Müller.

Harnisch’s caution was justified since he would not maintain his freedom for long.905 On

15 January 1944 Meynen met with a member of the Argentine foreign ministry and shown documents implicating Hellmuth and Harnisch as German agents. Meynen considered it possible that only now were Ramírez and his confederates regretting their involvement. In his opinion the Argentines would be happy if the Germans eliminated both men.906 The next day Harnisch was secretly arrested but no incriminating evidence was found. Also arrested were Müller, Franz Mammen, Friedrich Grimm, Franz

Schumann, who were working in the embassy and Wilhelm Seidlitz and his associates.

On 26 January General Ramírez expressed feigned indignation that Hellmuth was a spy.

He also railed about the “systematic espionage activity” going on in Argentina and that he would abandon Argentina’s previous position and break diplomatic relations with

Nazi Germany.907 There would be many casualties resulting from the Hellmuth affair.

Not the least was González and Gilbert, who were forced to resign on 15 February. On

the 24th Ramírez delegated power to Farrell and resigned on 9 March.908

904 “Affidavit of Hans Harnisch,” 9 September 1947, NARA, RG 84, BAPR, File 862.20235/10-3147, Box 102, p. 3. Reinebeck Interrogation, 4 February 1946, RG 59, 862.20235/4-2646, ABB. Reinebeck states that Harnisch also received assurance from Ramirez, Sueyro and Perón that he would be protected. 905 Harnisch claimed later that he turned in his equipment only as a precaution. NARA, RG 242/T- 120/366/291163. 906 “Buenos Aires to Berlin,” 15 January 1944, NARA, RG 226, O.S.S. Ultra Decrypts, Entry 188. 907 Rout and Bratzel, The Shadow War, p. 403. 908 The ostensible reason for Ramírez’s resignation was that he had failed to inform his cabinet (in reality Farrell and Perón) of his intention to break relations with Germany. Newton, The ‘Nazi Menace.’ p. 309. 331

Perón and Farrell were not the only ones angered at the events of the previous

months. On 14 January 1944 Jaime Fernandez Mansilla, a member of Manuel Fresco’s

nationalists, appeared at the U.S. embassy in Buenos Aires to inform them of a threat

against the embassy and its personnel. Fresco was governor of Buenos Aires Province

from 1934-1939 when he was removed by the Ortiz government. According to Newton

he was an ardent admirer of and allegedly close to the German

embassy.909 There had been previous threats against the embassy and ambassador

Armour, including one to tar and feather him. Mansilla told Francis Crosby, the FBI’s

legal attaché that nationalists in Argentina had prepared a bomb which Mansilla was to

place in the embassy chancery. The next day Mansilla appeared at the embassy with the

bomb which was taken by Crosby and other embassy personnel to a secluded spot and

disarmed. Mansilla claimed that he was going to place the bomb at the instigation of

Cipriano Pons Lezica, who managed Fresco’s organization, and a German captain named

Schiller who had allegedly arrived in Argentina by submarine in December.910 The matter

was eventually turned over to the Argentine police who were told of Fresco’s, Cipriano

Pons and Schiller’s alleged involvement. Instead of following up, the Argentine police

subsequently dismissed the matter as attempted blackmail on the part of Mansilla and

dropped the matter.911

909 See Newton, The ‘Nazi Menace,’ p. 119. 910 It is unknown if Cipriano Pons Lezica was related to Alfredo Cipriano Pons, the diplomatic courier on the Cabo des Hornes. 911 “Crosby to Reed,” 18 January 1943, “Memorandum, re: Cipriano Pons Lezica,” 21 January 1944, “Hugh Millard to Hull,” 22 January 1944, “Hugh Millard to Hull,” 29 January 1944, NARA, RG 84, Buenos Aires Embassy Confidential File, 820.02, Box 51. 332

In Berlin, Hellmuth’s detention created a firestorm of recriminations among the

SD and AA. On 29 October Schellenberg told Wagner, head of Abteilung Inland II,

about Freude’s conversation with Wieland. Schellenberg was particularly angry that

Freude told Wieland that Hellmuth was unreliable. Schellenberg intimated that Freude

and the embassy interfered in the legitimate activities of the SD.912 Following Hellmuth’s

arrest Reinebeck held several conferences concerning with Paeffgen. Reinebeck

impressed upon Paeffgen the inability to support Argentina with the materials it desired.

Germany could scarcely fulfill her own war needs. Reinebeck stated that Paeffgen

agreed with his interpretation of events, but that the Hellmuth mission had been forced

upon the SD by the Argentines. However, that was not the issue: the issue was the SD

sending its own Argentine representative to Germany. In a surprising statement Paeffgen admitted that the current problems could have been avoided had the SD asked the AA to weigh in on the foreign policy repercussions of Hellmuth’s mission.913 Paeffgen told

Reinebeck that since they could not fulfill Argentina’s demands, they should give the

impression that they were doing what they could so as not to endanger the intelligence

networks and the “close and confidential cooperation with the Argentine government.”914

While Paeffgen had a point, his admission to Reinebeck concerning the armaments purchase is revealing. Either he deluded himself into thinking that in December 1943 following the disasters at Stalingrad, Kursk and North Africa that Germany would still be able to supply arms or he realized the SD had been caught in blatant violation of

912 “Schellenberg to Wagner,” 29 October 1943, Abteilung Gruppe Inland II G, Akten betreffend: Angelegenheit Hellmuth, TNA, GFM 33398. 913 “Reinebeck Memorandum,” 5 November 1943, 5 November 1943, Ibid. 914 “Affidavit of Otto Reinebeck,” 4 Feb 1946, NARA, RG 59, 862.20235, ABB, Box 6740, pp. 11-12. 333

numerous agreements and decided to put the best face possible on it. Given the evidence,

the latter is more likely.

Paeffgen promised to tell the agents in Argentina that they should distance

themselves in case the current government was replaced with one less amenable to

German designs. Reinebeck stated that this request was a bit late since he later learned

that the SD was cooperating too closely with the Argentine government to distance

themselves.915 Reinebeck’s meetings with Paeffgen must have had some effect since

Becker and Harnisch were told that “there is good collaboration here with Foreign Office,

which recognizes your activity absolutely, but that any interference in politics must be

completely avoided.” However, they averred that “often this is not easy. In such cases

the embassy must maintain the lead.” They were admonished to play the role of mediator

and that Meynen had been told to calm down. This information was not to be given to

the embassy and should be used to guide future actions.916

Despite Paeffgen’s promises, the AA was worried. Reinebeck realized the

implications should Hellmuth tell all he knew. He also accepted that the mission had

been betrayed to Allied intelligence agents by unknown persons. Reinebeck was

concerned it would increase tensions between Argentina, the U.S. and Great Britain to the detriment of German-Argentine relations. If any incriminating documents or a confession from Hellmuth went into Allied hands, then Argentina would be forced to

915 “Betrifft: Festnahme eines Argentinischen Marineoffiziers in Trinidad,” 17 November 1943, Abteilung Gruppe Inland II G, Akten betreffend: Angelegenheit Hellmuth, TNA, GFM 33398. 916 “Berlin to Argentina,” 1 November 1943, NARA, RG 226, OSS Ultra Decrypts, Entry 188. 334

abandon its current policy.917 Schellenberg tried to placate the AA and told them that

Becker and Harnisch had informed him that any incriminating documents had been

passed to Quiroga from Hellmuth in Trinidad. He stated that the Argentine government

placed great emphasis on the release of the tanker. Releasing it would contribute to closer relations between Argentina and Germany.918 Schellenberg was apparently

suffered from myopia if he believed the situation could be salvaged. While it would

reinforce Amt VI’s connections to the Ramírez government, the AA would be

marginalized. Apparently Paeffgen and Schellenberg were unable to grasp the larger

implications of Hellmuth’s arrest.

By January the situation was unfolding as the AA feared. Following the break

with Argentina an investigation was ordered, possibly by Hitler, into who was

responsible. Gustav Steengracht von Moyland, Weizsäcker’s replacement as

Staatssekretär in the AA, placed the blame directly on the SD. He told Franz von

Sonnleithner, the AA’s representative at Hitler’s headquarters, that the SD had deceived

the AA about the existence of Hellmuth’s mission. After the AA had learned about

Hellmuth, the SD ignored AA warnings to limit its interference in politics. He did aver

somewhat and acknowledged that Harnisch was an Abwehr agent and deeply involved.

Thus, the Abwehr could be at fault as well. In Steengracht’s opinion the fundamental

question was whether the Hellmuth affair took place at the instigation of the Argentines

or German agents. Steengracht requested that the SD and Abwehr turn over all relevant

documentation so this question could be answered. He also chastised the SD for using a

917 “Betrifft: Festnahme eines Argentinischen Marineoffiziers in Trinidad,” 17 November 1943, Abteilung Gruppe Inland II G, Akten betreffend: Angelegenheit Hellmuth, TNA, GFM 33398. 918 “Schellenberg to AA,” 2 December 1943, Ibid. 335

dubious character like Hellmuth for such a delicate mission. It was probably through

Hellmuth that the mission was compromised.919 Interestingly, in his report to Hitler

Ribbentrop downplayed the SD’s role in the affair. He placed the blame for Argentina’s break in relations on the Abwehr. Given Harnisch’s role in planning and executing the mission, the conclusion was obvious.920 Ribbentrop was also seeing the larger picture. At

the same time the Hellmuth affair was taking place the Abwehr found itself in the center

of a perfect storm.

The Abwehr existence had been tenuous since 1943 when members of an anti-

Hitler group in the Abwehr were arrested by the Gestapo. The Wehrmacht was barely

able to contain the damage and keep the Abwehr as a separate intelligence organization.

In early 1944 another group of anti-Hitler plotters was arrested including another member

of the Abwehr. Additionally, an Abwehr agent in Turkey, Kurt Vermehren, and his wife

defected to the Allies. Ernst Kaltenbrunner, Heydrich’s replacement as head of the

RSHA, reported that Vermehren had worked as a double-agent for some time. The issue

that decided the fate of the Abwehr happened in Spain. Similar to the situation in

Argentina, the AA had argued that acts of sabotage in Spain would be detrimental to

relations between the nations. Despite strict orders prohibiting sabotage in Spain, the

Abwehr placed a bomb on a British ship carrying oranges. When Hitler learned of the

bombing, he flew into a rage and decided to dissolve the Abwehr.921

Ribbentrop was certainly aware of what was going on. It is possible he conversed with Himmler about the situation and they decided the time was ripe to remove Canaris

919 “Steengracht to Sonnleithner,” 27 January 1944, Ibid. 920 “Notiz für dem Führer,” 30 January 1944, Ibid. 921 Paehler, “Espionage, Ideology and Personal Politics,” pp. 294-295. 336

and his meddlesome organization. Perhaps Ribbentrop even managed to convince

himself that the Abwehr was solely to blame for the failure of Hellmuth’s mission. He

was certainly in tune with Hitler’s desires. How else could such an incompetent person

have survived almost six years of intrigues against him by various organizations?

Ribbentrop was also well aware that should he try to blame the SS for its failure, they

could point to Harnisch, an Abwehr agent, and produce evidence that he was the main

instigator. While Becker was not farsighted enough to see the endgame of his

collaboration with Harnisch and the Abwehr he had placed the SD in a win-win situation.

If the mission succeeded then the SD could take the credit, if it failed it had a ready scapegoat at hand. After the Abwehr had been dissolved Ribbentrop turned his attention back to the SD.

In his postwar interrogation, Wagner stated that several months following the break in relations with Argentina Ribbentrop sent a strongly worded letter to Himmler.

Ribbentrop accused the SD of being the direct cause of the break. He stated that since he had not received any reports on Argentina from the SD, its activities were not worth the risk to relations between Germany and Argentina. Ribbentrop told Himmler that in the future all SD activity in foreign countries should be communicated to the AA.

Otherwise, he could no longer assume responsibility for the AA and German foreign

policy.922 The evidence suggests that it was only later that Ribbentrop learned the true

extent of SD involvement, but by then it was too late. Given that the Abwehr had been

given full responsibility for the Hellmuth affair, he could hardly turn around and place

922 “Affidavit of Horst Wagner,” 20 January 1946, RG 59, 862.20235/4-2626, ABB, Box 6740. 337

the blame on the SS. He could make sure that there was a written record supporting the

AA should the SS embark on another ill-advised venture.

The Hellmuth affair fully demonstrated the lengths to which the SD would go to usurp power from the Auswärtiges Amt. Becker’s willingness to sacrifice Harnisch is indeed telling if he was a highly important agent, why would he sacrifice him if events turned against them? As for Hellmuth himself, his involvement is much deeper than what he claimed. His covering for Becker and trying to throw his interrogators off is not the sign of an “innocent abroad.” It is sign of someone deeply involved and who is

interested in protecting himself and his superiors. His refusal to implicate Ramírez,

González and Gilbert could be construed as “patriotic” but his refusal to name Becker

until forced suggests something else. He freely implicated Harnisch, Wolf, Freude, and

others in the embassy and Abwehr groups, but held off implicating Becker until he had no

choice. It is possible that Becker and Hellmuth agreed on a story to tell if he was caught.

He was to implicate everyone except Becker and it is only when Hellmuth realized the

British knew everything that he gave up Becker. Why he protected Becker until forced to

reveal his name is a question with no firm answer and must remain conjecture.

What is not in question is the role the Argentine government played in Hellmuth’s

mission. The multiple messages from German agents along with the interrogation reports

of Walter Schellenberg, Theodor Paeffgen and others betray their involvement. While it

is possible Becker overstated his contacts within the government, the evidence indicates

otherwise. The Hellmuth affair was a desperate gamble on the part of desperate

government that felt it had no choice. While Juan Perón’s role in the affair is obscured it 338

is almost certain he played some role in it. Hellmuth confirmed Perón’s involvement

regarding the arms dossier he and Vélez were to take to Germany.923 The fallout from

Hellmuth also brought down some of the major figures in the junta ruling Argentina, the reaction in Berlin brought down Canaris and the Abwehr.

923 “Hellmuth Interrogation,” RG 319, X8370183. 339

Chapter 8

The Jewish Question

In 1946 Walter Schellenberg, head of Amt VI SD Foreign Intelligence, was asked his opinion concerning Argentina’s extremely friendly relationship with Nazi Germany.

“Politically speaking,” he replied, “the reason was that one could see a government based

upon a world view similar to ours.”924 However, Schellenberg was a cagey prisoner who obfuscated when he could and he wanted to present himself in the best possible light.

Historians have noted Schellenberg’s attempts to give his interrogators information he thought they wanted.925 Given the methodological problems inherent in using interrogations: Wherein does the truth lie? The abundance of evidence from the AA’s archives makes it possible to answer this question with a degree of certainty.926 This

chapter examines the relationship between Nazi Germany and Argentina regarding the

Jewish Question. It will argue that despite numerous opportunities to save its Jewish

citizens in Europe Argentina left them to their fate. This issue will be explored within the

context of the SS and Auswärtiges Amt rivalry over the fate of Jews of neutral citizenship

in Europe.

924 “Interrogation of Walter Schellenberg,” 6 February 1946, NARA, RG 59, 862.20235/4-2646, Argentine Blue Book (hereafter ABB), Box 6740, p. 2 and Uki Goñi, The Real Odessa: Smuggling the Nazis to Perón’s Argentina (London: Granta, 2002) p. 17. 925 See, Katrin Paehler, “Espionage, Ideology and Personal Politics: The Making and Unmaking of a Nazi Foreign Intelligence Service” (Washington D.C.: American University, PhD diss., 2002) and “Notes on the Interrogation of Walter Schellenberg,” no date (probably 6 February), RG 59, 862.20235/4-2646, ABB, Box 6740. 926 There are two files from Inland II/G “Judenfrage in Argentinien, 1938-1944” British National Archives, Kew (hereafter BNA), GFM 332450 and a smaller one “Juden in Argentinien, 1943,” BNA, GFM 332517. For the secondary literature Haim Avni’s, Argentina and the Jews: A History of Jewish Immigration, trans. Gila Brand (Tuscaloosa, Alabama: The University of Alabama Press, 1991) and Goñi, The Real Odessa are two of the best discussions of this issue despite Goñi’s argument being overdrawn and too focused on his agenda against Perón. 340

Argentina, like other countries around the world, experienced its share of anti- semitism in the 20th century. By the 1920s Argentina’s immigration policy was not as strict as the U.S. and other countries, but was directed at criminals, revolutionaries and other vague categories. This immigration policy was the result of strident anti- communism on the part of the Argentine government. The only restriction directed at any particular group was the restriction on Gypsies.927 However, the onset of the Great

Depression produced a of Catholic-Hispanic nationalism in Argentina and calls for more restrictive immigration policies from . Like its European counterparts, the right in Argentina, increasingly equated Bolshevism, and with Jews.

As David Rock points out, “… Jews [in Argentina] became identified with the hidden instigators of the various movements that the right rejected.”928 When Hitler came to power in January 1933, his anti-Jewish policies were overwhelmingly supported by the

Argentine right. The right-wing press in Argentina published articles attacking members of the Socialist party such as Enrique Dickmann who were Jews. Like the Nazis who claimed Jews could never be fully German, the Argentine right claimed that Jews could never be fully Argentine. Journals such as Criterio, which was an unofficial, but highly influential, mouthpiece of the Catholic Church in Argentina, espoused a militant

Catholicism. They denounced labor unions, democracy, egalitarianism, materialism, science, the emancipation of women, socialism and Marxism. All of these issues were equated with the Jews.

927 Avni, Argentina and the Jews, p. 104. 928 David Rock, “Antecedents of the Argentine Right,” The Argentine Right: Its History and Intellectual Origins, 1910 to the Present, Sandra McGee Deutsch and Ronald H. Dolkart eds. (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources Inc., 1993), p. 9. 341

The political right also argued for a greater role for the Catholic Church in

Argentina.929 It was given a greater role in education with unsettling results. One study

of the Catholic educational system in Argentina has found numerous examples of anti- semitism in textbooks used to educate young children.930 The National Council on

Education also undertook a campaign to remove Jewish professors and teachers from

public schools and universities.931 While Argentine and Nazi anti-semitism superficially

resembled each other, there was one important difference. The Argentine right drew on

the Catholic Church for inspiration unlike the Nazis who rejected Christianity.932 While

Argentine anti-semites wanted Jews removed from public life, they stopped short of Nazi

racial views. They argued immigrants (including Jews) should assimilate. Ronald

Newton argues that the Argentine right modeled itself on Franco’s Spain and Mussolini’s

Italy instead of Nazi Germany.933 The publication of Mit brennender Sorge in March

1937 only increased the divide between Argentine and Nazi anti-Semitism. This

encyclical by Pope Pius XI dealt with the condition of the Catholic Church in Nazi

Germany and attacked Nazism as atheistic.

During the 1930s the Nazis were bent on making all Jews leave Germany. The

problem was: Where would they go? While immigration by Jews to Argentina was not

929 Dolkart, “The Right in the Década Infame,” in Deutsch and Dolkart eds., The Argentine Right, pp. 80- 81. 930 Graciela Ben-Dror, “Catholic Teachings about Jews in Spain Compared with Argentina during the Holocaust Era, 1933-1945,” Kirchliche Zeitgeschichte, 16/1, (2003), pp. 92-112. 931 Ronald C. Newton, The ‘Nazi Menace’ in Argentina, 1931-1947 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992), pp. 134-135. 932 Ronald H. Dolkart, “The Right in the Década Infame,” in Deutsch and Dolkart eds., The Argentine Right, pp. 79-80. For the Nazi views on Christianity see, John S. Conway, The Nazi Persecution of the Churches 1933-45 (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1968) and Gunther Lewy, The Catholic Church and Nazi Germany (London: McGraw-Hill, 1964). A contrary view is provided by Richard Steigmann-Gall, The Holy Reich: Nazi Conceptions of Christianity, 1919-1945 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004). 933 Newton, The ‘Nazi Menace,’ p. 134. 342

specifically forbidden by the Argentine government, neither was it encouraged. In

Europe and North America, the situations were similar. Jews fleeing Nazi Germany

needed a place to immigrate, but their options were limited. France and the Netherlands

took in some, along with Great Britain. Great Britain had also restricted immigration to

Palestine in the White Paper of 1939 which further reduced the number of places Jews

could go. However, the U.S. and Canada adamantly tried to keep as many Jews out as

they could. In passing more restrictive immigration laws Argentina was in step with a

wider world opinion among governments that wanted the Jewish problem to disappear.934

In 1934, the Argentine government passed a law to close loopholes that had

previously existed in the immigration laws. The law established quotas similar to those

passed in the United States. The U.S. law stated that immigrants let in from any country depended on the proportion of settlers from that country at the beginning of the 20th century.935 However, the problem of settling Jews forced out of Germany needed to be

solved. In 1935 the League of Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, James G.

McDonald, visited Argentina in hopes of finding a permanent home for thirty thousand

refugees from Nazi Germany, including numerous Jews. The Argentines offered only

vague assurances regarding Jews. They were more receptive when McDonald pointed

934 The literature on this topic is vast and I have listed several of the major works. For the U.S. see David S. Wyman, Paper Walls: America and the Refugee Crisis, 1938-1941 (Amherst, MA: University of Massachusetts Press, 1968) and David S. Wyman, The Abandonment of the Jews: America and the Holocaust, 1941-1945 (New York: Pantheon Books, 1984). For Great Britain see: Louise London, Whitehall and the Jews, 1933-1948: British Immigration policy, Jewish Refugees, and the Holocaust (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000). For The Netherlands see Emmy Werner, A Conspiracy Of Decency: The Rescue Of The Danish Jews During World War II (New York: Basic Books, 2004). 935 Gordon Thomas and Max Morgan Witts, The Voyage of the Damned (Old Saybrook, CT: Konecky & Konecky, 1974), p. 17 and Avni, Argentina and the Jews, p. 100. 343

out to Dr. Domingo Brebbia, the deputy minister of agriculture, that there were a large

number of Catholics among the refugees.936

Argentina eventually demurred on the question of immigration for two reasons.

First, nationalism was running high with the effects of the Great Depression still being

felt. It was felt that new immigrants would only add to Argentina’s unemployment

problems. Building on this, the right argued that liberalizing immigration would bring in

undesirables despite the law passed the previous year. While officials in the Argentine

Catholic Church told McDonald that Jews had a right to settle in Argentina, the Catholic press was vehemently opposed. Father Gustavo Franceschi, the editor of Criterio and

notorious anti-semite, called on the Argentine Congress to further tighten immigration

restrictions, especially for Jews. While he declared, “I do not support neo-German

racism or Nazi theories in any form,” he continued espousing anti-semitic diatribes at

every opportunity.937 Another Catholic priest, Virgilio Filippo, went further and declared

that Karl Marx was the “socialist manifesto of the Jew.”938

Adding to anti-Jewish sentiment was the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War in

July 1936. The Spanish Civil War produced large numbers of refugees, some of whom were communists and wanted to immigrate. Argentina reacted by further restricting immigration and promulgated a law on 17 October 1936 that denied entry to any person,

“liable to pose a danger to the physical or moral health of our population or conspire against the stability of the institutions created by the National Constitution.”939

936 Avni, Argentina and the Jews, pp. 133-134. 937 Ibid, pp. 134-135. 938 Dolkart, “The Right in the Década Infame,” The Argentine Right, eds. Deutsch and Dolkart, p. 81. 939 Avni, Argentina and the Jews, pp. 139-140. 344

Argentina’s foreign minister, Carlos Saaverda Lamas, also concluded immigration pacts

with Switzerland, Denmark and the Netherlands the following year. While ultimately

insignificant, Saaverda Lamas was proud of these agreements stating that Argentina

wanted immigrants from the Nordic countries since they were “especially appropriate.”940

Haim Avni argues that while these agreements indicated that Argentina was receptive to non-Catholic immigrants in general, there was an underlying bias against Jews in particular.941 While the laws and agreements did not specifically mention Jews, it should be remembered that the Nazis, the Argentine right, and those in power in Argentina, tended to equate Jews and Communists.

The election of Roberto Ortiz was greeted with optimism by those who hoped

Argentina would allow more Jewish immigration. These hopes were dashed at the Évian

Conference on refugee issues held in Évian, France in July 1938. The conference had been called by U.S. President Franklin Roosevelt to discuss the German and Austrian

refugee problem. On 6 July, the first day of the conference, Argentina’s ambassador to

France, Tomás Le Breton, announced that Argentina had absorbed more Jews per capita

than the U.S. and other Latin American nations. Le Breton argued that Argentina could

not take in any more refugees. Most of the refugees, Le Breton claimed, were urban

dwellers or industrial workers. Since Argentina was an agricultural nation, it could not

use them. How he knew the social status of these workers is unknown and the meaning

of his statement was ambiguous. He implied that the conference was impinging upon

Argentina’s sovereignty by attempting to dictate which nations should take in refugees.

940 Ibid, p. 140. 941 Ibid. 345

Le Breton defiantly announced to the conference that Argentina retained the right to make its own immigration laws.942 During the conference Argentina forcefully asserted its sovereignty regarding immigration issues.

Argentina had no interest in participating constructively at the conference, since it was working on revisions to its immigration laws before the conference convened. On 12

July Argentine Foreign Minister, José María Cantilo, signed a decree titled Directive 11 tightening Argentina’s immigration laws still further. The same day the Argentine delegation informed the conference of the new law. The law stated that all future immigrants would have to have a special landing permit issued by the Central

Immigration Office in Buenos Aires. The permit would only be issued if the Ministry of

Foreign Relations, Ministry of Agriculture and Interior Ministry agreed that the individuals wanting entry were “desirable” immigrants.943 Argentina feared an influx of refugees fleeing Nazi persecution and decided to close any loopholes in existing immigration laws. This was the second revision in four years regarding immigration statutes. Consuls were ordered to deny any visas, even tourist and transit visas, to any person deemed as having abandoned their country of residence. The consuls were also instructed to provide detailed personal data on each person desiring entry to Argentina and their opinion regarding the suitability of those persons to immigrate. If the person had relatives in Argentina they had to be residents for at least two years and had to bear the cost for processing the paperwork and resettling their relatives. An addendum to the law, Directive 8972, closed the exemption granted to first-class passengers arriving in

942 Ibid, p. 143. 943 Ibid, p. 141 and Goñi, The Real Odessa, chapter 3. 346

Argentina. Previously first-class passengers were exempt from visa requirements since it

was believed that immigrants only traveled second or third-class. Just in case there

should be a soft-hearted consul the directive stated that the consul’s suitability for their

post would be tied to the rigor in which they applied Directive 11.944

Consuls were informed of Directive 11 on 12 July, but the Directive was not

made public until 30 July. Though Directive 11 was not due to go into effect until 1

October consuls were secretly instructed once the law was signed to “act immediately to

enforce strictly all the selection procedures to prevent the flow of immigration to our land

from becoming disorderly and preemptive of the plans being finalized by the

government.”945 The Argentine Ministry of Foreign Affairs had foreseen its consulates

becoming inundated by refugees seeking asylum prior to the public deadline of 1

October. Even this did not stop the flood of applications and Argentina took the unusual

step of closing its consulates doors to the public. Criterio hailed the measure as “A fine

immigration policy! ... for such a worthy government.”946

Uki Goñi in his book, The Real Odessa, stated that the law was aimed directly at

Jews and that it was the equivalent of a death warrant.947 This sweeping statement

implied that Argentina was responsible for the deaths of millions of Jews in not allowing them to immigrate to Argentina. However, Jews were not specifically mentioned in

Directive 11. Goñi also ignores the fact that many countries around the world refused to

accept refugees, Jewish or not. Britain and the United States were two countries that

944 Avni, Argentina and the Jews, p. 144 and Goñi, The Real Odessa, p. 29. 945 Avni, Argentina and the Jews, p. 148. 946 Ibid. 947 Goñi, The Real Odessa, p. 28. His only corroboration that Directive 11 was directed toward Jews is the statements of his grandfather. 347

restricted immigration to their territories.948 Goñi tenuously connects the law to a

statement made by Reinhard Heydrich on 20 January 1942 at the Wannsee Conference.949

At the conference Heydrich stated that since immigration of Jews was no longer viable

Hitler had decided on a “Final Solution to the Jewish Question.” Left unsaid was the fact that immigration was no longer viable because Nazi Germany was at war. Goñi’s statement assumes that in 1938 the leaders of countries could somehow look into the future and see genocide as the end result of Nazi policy. Nazi Germany pursued immigration as policy until 1941 and Hitler himself did not decide on the Final Solution until the summer or fall of 1941.950

How did the Germans view Argentine anti-semitism? As early as 1936 the

German embassy in Buenos Aires tracked Jewish refugees in Argentina. A report

prepared by Ambassador Edmund von Thermann dated 1 discussed Jewish

refugees in Argentina and reported how German employees were discriminated against,

even by German firms. Thermann used the example of Jew named Hans Richard

Mendelsohn who arrived in Buenos Aires on 19 June 1936 and was employed by

Thyssen Lametal on a one year contract. Thermann complained that Mendelsohn was

being paid 300 pesos a month while a German employee who had been employed there

948 For the U.S. see: Wyman, Paper Walls and Wyman, The Abandonment of the Jews. For Great Britain see: London, Whitehall and the Jews. 949 Ibid, pp. 28-29. 950 For discussions concerning the timing of Hitler’s decision for the Holocaust see Christopher R. Browning and Jürgen Matthaus, The Origins of the Final Solution: The Evolution of Nazi Jewish Policy, September 1939-March 1942 (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 2004) and Christopher R. Browning, Fateful Months: Essays on the Emergence of the Final Solution, Revised ed. (Chicago: Holmes & Meier, 1991). For a contrary view see Christian Gerlach, "The Wannsee Conference, the Fate of German Jews, and Hitler's Decision in Principle to Exterminate All European Jews," Journal of Modern History, 70/4, (1998): 759-812. Browning argues for a decision in mid to late summer 1941 while Gerlach argues for the late fall of 1941. 348

for years and had two children only received 250 pesos a month. Thermann also

complained about a dental technician who was denied a job in favor of a Jewish

worker.951 One can infer that the Jewish question was of concern to the Auswärtiges Amt even in countries outside of Europe.

In November 1937 the AA asked the embassies in Buenos Aires, Santiago and

Caracas for input regarding Jewish immigration in South America. The February 1938 report stated that Argentina was very slow to recognize the Jewish danger. It estimated

that there were approximately 500,000 Jews in Argentina with 400,000 residing in

Buenos Aires comprising 5% of the total population. The report noted that this total did

not include mischlinge (persons who had one or two Jewish grandparents) so the total

could be higher.952 Thermann told the AA not to expect any action for the foreseeable

future on Jewish immigration unless it involved communists. The Argentine government

had resisted any mass action against the Jews and he did not expect their attitude to change. However the Argentine government did pass a law earlier in the year controlling

immigration by communists and anarchists, which the right equated with Jews. Given his connections with the Argentine right, it is probable Thermann knew and understood that the law was directed against Jews. So while the Argentine government could not

951 “Aufnahme juedischer Fluechtlinge in Argentinien,” 1 August 1936, Po. 36, Argentinien, Die Judenfrage, Band 1, August 1936-March 1943, NARA, RG 242, Serial T-120, Roll 2679, Frames E411924- E411925 (hereafter RG/Serial/Roll No./Frame). The same file is also in The National Archives, Kew (hereafter TNA), File GFM 332450. 952 Mischlinge were a racial category created by the Nazis to include those who were not fully Jewish (i.e. two Jewish parents). 349

politically act against Jews in particular, it could act against communists, which was

virtually the same thing in their minds.953

On 10 the German Embassy in Buenos Aires sent the AA a report

titled “Die Judenfrage in Argentinien.”954 The lengthy, detailed report discussed Jewish

immigration to Argentina and its historical antecedents going back to King Phillip II of

Spain. It also discussed the numbers of Jews who immigrated to Argentina using the

most recently available statistics from 1936. The German embassy estimated that in 1937

Jews in Argentina numbered 700,000 inhabitants (they overestimated by 200-300,000)

out of a total population of 15 million, with the majority (400,000) living in Buenos Aires

province.955 Of this a total of 131,000 lived in Buenos Aires proper comprising 5.87% of

the population. The detail of the report is remarkable listing the number of Jews living in

each major city and area of Argentina and breaking those number down further into

Sephardic and Ashkenazi categories.956 In the section detailing the history of anti- semitism in Argentina Thermann noted the stance of the Catholic Church from 1930-

1933 describing it as “benevolently neutral.” While the church had disapproved of

Germany’s measures against the Jews, he argued it was slowly drifting into line.

However, he was pessimistic about the future of anti-Jewish measures since Argentina can easily change its attitude overnight.957 Interestingly there is no comment or analysis

of Directive 11.

953 “(fnu) Rödiger to unknown recipients,” 16 February 1938, NARA, RG 242/T-120/2679/E411927- E411929. 954 “Die Judenfrage in Argentinien,” 10 January 1939, NARA, RG 242/T-120/2679/E411930-E411957. 955 “Die Judenfrage in Argentinien,” 10 January 1939, RG 242/T-120/2679/E411939. 956 Ibid, Frames E411940-E411941. 957 Ibid, Frame E411957. 350

German consuls in other nations also provided information on the Jewish

Question during this period. A good example of this was the consul general for South

Africa, Emil Wiehl. He reported extensively on the role of Jews in public life in South

Africa. As Robert Citino points out, there is extensive documentation on this topic in the

AA’s files and that discussions of Jews in South Africa “dominate the German diplomatic

files on South Africa from 1936-1939.”958 In May 1936 Wiehl authored a report on

Jewish immigration in South Africa. Wiehl, like Thermann, documented the increase in

Jewish immigration and noted the anti-semitic attitudes of the German-language press.

Wiehl went further than Thermann providing South African officials with copies of Nazi anti-Jewish legislation, such as the Law for the Restoration of the Civil Service (Gesetz zur Wiederherstellung des Berufsbeamtentums) and the Law on Admission to the Legal

Practice (Gesetz über die Zulassung zur Rechtsanwaltschaft). Like Thermann, he viewed the anti-German press as Jewish controlled since in the Nazi world-view it was only Jews or those under Jewish control who opposed Nazi racial policies.959 Emil Wiehl in South

Africa provides good corroboration regarding the attitudes of the AA towards the Jewish

Question. In discussing the anti-semitic attitudes of the AA Thermann and Wiehl are

instructive. Both men had left Germany at the beginning of the Nazi seizure of power, which would suggest they would be less influenced by the pervasive anti-semitism of the

Nazis. However, Wiehl’s and Thermann’s comments regarding Jews are excellent evidence that anti-semitic attitudes were pervasive in the AA.

958 Robert Citino, Germany and the Union of South Africa in the Nazi Period (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1991), p. 61. 959 “Thermann to Auswartiges Amt, Political Report, Subject: Anti German Sentiment in Argentina,” 18 May 1938, Doc. 615, DGFP, series D. (1937-1945), volume 2, (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1949-83), pp. 848-852. 351

In Argentina Directive 11 produced an unintended consequence, namely

corruption on a massive scale. In November 1939 Foreign Minister Cantilo issued a

directive to all Argentine consuls instructing them not to send any immigration

applications to Buenos Aires. Cantilo also reiterated his previous instructions that

immigrants were not even to receive tourist visas. Cantilo’s directive was in response to

allegations that consuls were selling visas in direct violation of his orders.960 In his report

Thermann noted the rampant corruption of the courts and police in

matters involving Jews. He alleged that Jews could bribe any official with the exception

of the president.961 Goñi argues that the selling of visas became systematic on the part of

some consuls and that the going price for an Argentine visa in Hamburg was RM 5,000.

Some ambassadors, such as Eduardo Labougle, apparently had a difficult time convincing their subordinates to follow Directive 11 to the letter. Others turned a blind eye to their subordinates extorting money from people desperately seeking asylum.962

Corruption was so rampant it became commonplace. In 1943 the U.S. embassy in

Buenos Aires knew that Argentine diplomatic personnel were selling visas for approximately 1,000 pesos while their colleagues at the Argentine Foreign Ministry got larger amounts. A 6 February 1943 report from the U.S. embassy titled “Extortion

Practices of the Axis Governments” noted that “Among consular officers in Europe such

960 Goñi, The Real Odessa, p. 32. Goñi argues that this was directed solely at Jews. However, Jews were not the only group fleeing Nazi Germany. While Directive 11 certainly included Jews, they were not specifically mentioned or it would have been noted. 961 “Die Judenfrage in Argentinien,” 10 January 1939, RG 242/T-120/2679/E411955. 962 Goñi, The Real Odessa, pp. 32-35 and Avni, Argentina and the Jews, p. 167. Goñi uses the example of his grandfather Santos Goñi who was Argentine consul in La Paz, Bolivia and apparently incorruptible. Goñi is also sympathetic to Labougle while Avni implies he could have done more to help the Jews given his criticism of Nazism and open support of the Allies. 352

graft was the rule rather than the exception.”963 The British ambassador to Argentina, Sir

David Kelly, also noted corruption regarding illegal border-crossers and those who

overstayed their tourist visas. “This traffic,” Kelly wrote, “which has enriched many with

influence in Argentine political circles from the President’s immediate entourage to lesser

officials in the Ministry of Agriculture, the police and port authorities, has helped those

only whose relatives were ready and able to pay bribes varying from $1,000 to

$5,000.”964

Despite its corruption and exclusionary immigration policies, Argentina was in a

more powerful position than it either realized or acknowledged. It was the only country

in Central and South America which maintained full diplomatic relations with Nazi

Germany for most of the war. Nazi Germany needed Argentina, not only as a base to

launch intelligence-gathering operations, but also to safeguard its economic interests in

the region.965 As Joachim von Ribbentrop told Otto Reinbeck, head of Pol. IX from 1942-

45, “Argentina is the last German bridgehead in the Western Hemisphere, the

maintenance and development of which are of the greatest significance later on.”966 This

gave Argentina leverage to help Jewish refugees especially in 1942-43 when the killing

was at its height. Instead, consuls used their positions to line their pockets or Argentina’s

government refused to help.

963 “Extortion Practices of the Axis Governments,” 6 February 1943, NARA, Record Group 59, Records of the Department of State, Buenos Aires Embassy Confidential File, Box 5609 and Goñi, The Real Odessa, p. 36. 964 “Kelly to FO,” 19 April 1943, TNA, FO 371/3670 and Avni, Argentina and the Jews, p. 157. 965 Avni, Argentina and the Jews, p. 159. 966 “Affidavit of Otto Reinebeck,” 4 February 1946, NARA RG 59, 862.20235, ABB, Box 6740, p. 7. 353

There seemed to be moments of decency on the part of Argentina’s government.

Under pressure from Jewish groups in Argentina Vice-President Ramón Castillo signed an order on 27 July 1940 allowing very limited immigration. The order allowed consuls in belligerent nations to allow temporary visits by children under fourteen if their parents, guardians or a recognized committee applied on their behalf. The only problem with the decree is that it required the cooperation of foreign consuls in Buenos Aires. Thermann refused to help so any Jewish children in Germany were effectively stranded. This could not have escaped the notice of Argentine government officials in Buenos Aires given

Germany’s increasingly restrictive immigration policies regarding Jews. The emptiness of this gesture is illustrated in the fact that the Jewish Colonization Association only applied on behalf of twenty German Jewish children in England in 1941.967 From this

one can infer that Castillo or his subordinates knew, or should have known, of the

obstacles regarding Jewish immigration from Germany and he signed the order to

appease public opinion.

In August 1941 the British government asked Argentina to allow 20 German-

Jewish children to join their relatives in Argentina. Tomás Le Breton, now Argentine

ambassador to Great Britain, refused. Lord Winterton, a friend of Le Breton’s and head

of Britain’s delegation to the Évian Conference, attempted to get Le Breton to reverse his

decision. Not only did Le Breton refuse, he surprised his friend and colleague with his

comments. Le Breton charged that “the vast majority of the refugees [to Argentina] were

Jews and that there were already too many Jews in the Argentine, their number having

increased by immigration very largely during the past two or three years.” Le Breton

967 Avni, Argentina and the Jews, p. 154. 354 stated that much of this immigration was illegal and inexplicably argued that “the

permanent resident Jewish population was much alarmed at the increase in the general

Jewish population, because they fear that it may create a serious amount of anti-

semitism.” Winterton attempted to explain that the persons in question were minors who

would be taken care of by their relatives. Le Breton argued “that these were exactly the people whom the Argentine government did not want to have in the country, as they would eventually grow up and would help to increase the Jewish population by propagation.” He then added that “he would only grant visas to them if we (the British) were prepared to have them sterilized before they went there.” Winterton replied that this was out of the question and “quite beyond our powers to effect.”968 Le Breton’s statements would have found approval with the Nazis.

If Le Breton’s attitude was not bad enough, Argentina’s immigration policies were enforced with renewed vigor. In October 1941 the ship SS Cabo des Hornos returned to Europe after stopping in Buenos Aires. Onboard were 106 passengers, eighty-six of them Jewish, who were refused entry to Argentina. All of the passengers

968 “Memorandum of Conversation with Tomás Le Breton,” 5 August 1941, BNA, FO/371/29210; Avni, Argentina and the Jews, pp. 168-169; Goñi, The Real Odessa, pp. 35-36; Ronald C. Newton, The ‘Nazi Menace’ in Argentina, 1931-1947 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992), p. 153. Newton’s study is in some ways a masterful study utilizing numerous archives in Argentina, the U.S. and Great Britain. However, he tends to be selective in his use of documents. For example, in the conversation between Winterton and Le Breton he leaves out the passage regarding sterilization of the Jewish children. Newton also inserts a passage concerning Jewish monopolization of certain industries and that Jewish girls should not be allowed to enter Argentina since “they might become prostitutes or –worse – mothers.” The latter passage does not appear in the original document. His selective use of quotations downplays Le Breton’s anti-semitism and implies that the Jewish community in Argentina did not want any more immigration, which was certainly not the case. In discussing Argentine anti-semitism he also does not utilize any files on the Jewish Question from the following departments: Inland II/G “Judenfrage in Argentinien, 1938- 1944,” TNA, GFM/ 332450, “Juden in Argentinien, 1943,” BNA, GFM 332517, and Abt. Pol. IX PO 36 “Argentinien Judenfrage,” NARA RG 242/T-120/2679/411922-965. These files were readily available in Berlin where he conducted some of his research or in Britain and the U.S. He utilized the files from Abteilung Inland in chapter 16 on Osmar Hellmuth. His omission of these files concerning the Jewish question is inexplicable. 355

held visas from Brazil and other countries which were declared invalid by Argentine

immigration officials. No reason was given and on its face was inexplicable. Brazil

eventually allowed the non-Jewish passengers to land. The U.S. put pressure on the

Dutch to allow the Jewish passengers to disembark in the Dutch

Antilles.969

On 31 October 1941 Heinrich Himmler banned Jewish emigration from Germany

and German occupied territories. The reasons stated were the war and “possibilities in

the East.” Replacing immigration was “evacuation of Jews to the East in accordance with

the prior approval of the Führer.”970 Evacuation equaled death. By the end of 1941 the

first death camp at Chelmno in Poland was in operation. In the spring of 1942, the other

death camps at Belzec, Treblinka, Sobibor, and the massive industrial/death camp at

Auschwitz were open and running. The first victims were Polish Jews held in in

Lódz, Lwow and Lublin by July 1942 from the Netherlands, France and

other Western European countries were underway.971 Hitler and Himmler had given

Heydrich carte blanche in July 1941 to effect a “final solution to the Jewish Question,” which, in theory, meant all Jews. For Jews of neutral citizenship residing in Germany and German occupied territories the reality was different.

969 Avni, Argentina and the Jews, p. 157. Argentina was not the only nation to deny Jewish immigrants the right to land. On 13 May 1939 the Cuban government denied entry to 937 Jews on the liner SS St. Louis whereupon they were sent back to Germany. See, Thomas and Witts, The Voyage of the Damned. 970 Robert S. Wistrich, Hitler and the Holocaust (New York: The Modern Library, 2001), p. 103. 971 The literature on the Holocaust is vast and varied in quality. For the technical and bureaucratic aspects of the Final Solution along with a breakdown by country see , The Destruction of the European Jews, 3 vols., revised and expanded edition, (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1985). For questions of timing see Browning note 30 above. For France see Michael Marrus and , and the Jews (New York: Basic Books, 1981). 356

Nazi Germany had put in place a policy to exchange Jews from Britain, the U.S.,

Latin America and the British dominions for Germans in Palestine or the U.S.972 Hitler

felt that these Germans would be good settlers for the conquered areas of the Soviet

Union. While the SS was the lead agency for solving the Jewish Question, the AA demanded it approve any measures against foreign Jews. The AA also approved of the idea of exchanging foreign Jews for German citizens. For this reason that Jews of neutral countries should be kept alive. Ribbentrop stated that Germany could not afford to offend neutral countries, such as Argentina or Spain, which provided material support and bases of operations for German intelligence. However, Himmler and Eichmann wanted German-occupied Europe free of Jews.

Thousands of Jews from various neutral countries were in Germany, and German- occupied Europe. The question of what to do with them was a thorny issue. Neutral countries such as Sweden, Spain, Switzerland, and Turkey took an interest in the fate of their Jewish nationals. Nazi Germany could not afford to offend these nations too much since they supplied vital raw materials and outlets for foreign currency. Sweden provided iron ore, Spain supplied wolfram and Switzerland had banking facilities which provided

Germany with much needed hard currency. As Richard Breitman points out, Himmler was not averse to sparing some Jews if Germany could get something for doing so such as earning money.973 However, his subordinates such as Adolf Eichmann, head of Amt

IV B/4 which handled Jewish affairs for the RSHA, were not so magnanimous even when

972 Raul Hilberg, The Destruction of the European Jews, Vol. II, p. 445. 973 “Himmler to Ribbentrop,” (day unknown) Jan 1943, NARA, RG 242/T-175/R 65/25806-43 quoted in Richard Breitman, Official Secrets: What the Nazis Planned, What the British and Americans Knew (New York: Hill and Wang, 1998), p. 169. 357

it came to Jews from neutral countries. Ironically, it was Ribbentrop and the AA which

fought the SS over the fate of Argentina’s Jews in Europe, even in the face of Argentine

indifference. The fate of these Jews was a small skirmish in a larger battle between

Himmler’s SS and Ribbentrop’s AA. Argentina proved not to be so accommodating.

In August 1942 U.S. relief personnel working in Vichy France attempted to save

one thousand Jewish children. The relief personnel asked the U.S. government to take in

the Jewish children along with five thousand orphans. They also requested that several

Latin American countries, including Argentina, take in some of the refugees. Germany also wanted the Latin American Jews in Vichy gone. On 12 September the Germans told

neutral representatives that it had until 31 January 1943 to evacuate its Jewish citizens

from German-occupied territory. If they failed to remove them they would be subject to

deportation.974 On 2 November Jewish groups in Argentina petitioned President Castillo

to admit the children, promising to support them and cover any and all expenses related

to their repatriation. The same day the British government approached Argentine

ambassador Miguel Ángel Cárcano and asked him to help. Stories of massive atrocities

against Jews had become public in Great Britain and the British government was

receiving pressure from prominent individuals, such as the Archbishop of Canterbury, to

do something. Sensing the public mood Cárcano recommended to his government that it

acquiesce. On 20 November Castillo ordered that Argentine consuls vet all children

under fourteen to ascertain whether or not they met Argentina’s health requirements.

One thousand children who met the requirements were to be selected and allowed to

974 Stanford J. Shaw, : Turkey’s Role in Rescuing Turkish and European Jewry from Nazi Persecution, 1933-1945 (New York: New York University Press, 1993), pp. 149-150. Shaw quotes from a document signed by Luther dated 19 September 1942. 358

immigrate to Argentina. The German subsidized newspaper Pampero and the right-wing paper El Crisol in Buenos Aires shrieked about the deal involving the Jewish children. In editorials the papers stated that the children would be the vanguard of that would enslave true Argentines.975 However, events had overtaken this initiative. On 3

November the Germans occupied Vichy in response to allied landings in North Africa.

While the offer to accept the children was probably genuine, it was overtaken by events.

By January 1943, the Final Solution was well underway at the killing centers in

Poland. It was at this point that Argentina’s Jews became a point of contention between the SS and AA. Ribbentrop and the AA were concerned about Argentina’s neutrality and decided to give Argentina another opportunity to remove its Jews from Europe. The same month Ricardo Olivera, the Argentine ambassador to Vichy France, was asked by the Germans to open discussions concerning the repatriation of fifteen Argentine Jews in

France. The Germans told Olivera that Argentine Jews were free to go if Olivera arranged their travel out of Europe. Understanding the difficulties of travelling out of war torn Europe, they gave Olivera three months to make arrangements. The extension resulted from difficulties other neutrals were having in evacuating their Jewish citizens.

The main sticking point was securing transit visas from countries over which the

Germans had no direct control.976 In February the AA stated its position concerning

Argentine Jews in Europe. Ribbentrop stated that “It is desirable that all Argentine

citizens belonging to the Jewish race leave German territories…The Foreign Ministry

would consider it as an act of special courtesy if the Argentine embassy would cause all

975 Avni, Argentina and the Jews, p. 160. 976 Shaw, Turkey and the Holocaust, p. 150. The countries were Croatia, Rumania, Serbia and Bulgaria. 359

Argentine Jews to return to their homeland.”977 Olivera let the matter languish and hoped

it would go away.978

By March Olivera had not replied to the AA’s offer and it turned to the Argentine

embassy in Berlin. Instead of enthusiastically offering to rescue his countrymen, Chargé

Irigoyen was reticent. This confused the AA which concluded that “in Buenos Aires there was absolutely no understanding on this matter.” Despite Argentine intransigence,

Germany did not want to be seen as unnecessarily antagonizing Argentina lest it reverse its policy on neutrality. With this in mind, Eichmann was told to leave all Jews from neutral countries alone for the time being.979 For its part, the AA kept trying to get

Argentina to repatriate its Jewish citizens.

On 29 April the AA asked Irigoyen if he could arrange travel out of Europe for

six Argentine Jews residing in Salonika, Greece. Eberhardt von Thadden, Luther’s replacement in Abteilung Deutschland, told Irigoyen that it was inconceivable that they be allowed to remain when the rest of Greece had been cleansed of all Jews. He inquired if seven Argentine Jews in the Netherlands as well as an unspecified number in Belgium could be repatriated as well? Von Thadden mentioned that Germany had exercised great caution in dealing with Argentina’s Jews and were prepared to assist in their departure provided it was done quickly.980 Again, nothing was done. The Germans were baffled

977 “Ribbentrop Memorandum,” 26 February 1943, Inland II A/B, NARA RG 242/T-120/4352/211028- 211034; Goñi, The Real Odessa, pp. 46-47. 978 “Schleier to Luther,” 28 January 1943, Inland II A/B, NARA, RG 242/T-120/4352/211035, Avni, Argentina and the Jews, p. 165, and Goñi, The Real Odessa, pp. 46-47. 979 “Referat D III to Amt IV B/4,” March 1943, Inland II A/B, NARA, RG 242/T-120/4352/211078; Goñi, The Real Odessa, pp. 46-47 and Avni, Argentina and the Jews, p. 164. 980 “Von Thadden, Memorandum of Conversation,” 29 April 1943, Inland II A/B, NARA, RG 242/T- 120/4352/211079. 360

by Argentina’s attitude regarding the Jews. The Argentines also had a good idea of how

Germany was solving the Jewish Question.

A partially decoded message from the Argentine Minister in , Bulgaria

illustrates this point. On 5 June 1943, the minister sent a message to the Ministry for

Foreign Affairs in Buenos Aires. The minister asked that two Argentine Jewish couples,

possibly with children, residing in Sofia be repatriated. The garbled message stated, “The

situation of [? Jews] of every nationality including Argentine is [? tragic] as they are [?

Now] threatened with deportation to Poland [in spite of efforts] made by the Legations [?

against these new] measures.” As Stephen Tyas points out, the message illustrates that

neutral diplomats in Europe understood that deportation to Poland was the equivalent of a

death sentence.981 The message revealed that Himmler’s three month time-limit for Jews of neutral countries to leave Europe had expired and that Eichmann was willing to deport

them. It also showed that Eichmann was determined to deal with all Jews of neutral

countries despite the efforts of the AA and foreign legations throughout Europe. The

attitude of Irigoyen in Berlin and Olivera in France were certainly a factor in Eichmann’s

attitude towards neutral Jews. While previously Olivera and Irigoyen had simply stalled,

soon Irigoyen would personally threaten the lives of fifty-nine Jews residing in Poland.

In 1943 the largest concentration of Argentine Jews was in Kraków, Poland.982

By July, fifty-nine Argentine Jews were still left in the decimated . Eichmann wanted to deport the Jews to the East and liquidate the ghetto. He sent documents for

981 Stephen Tyas, “Adolf Eichmann: New Information from British ,” in David Bankier ed. Secret Intelligence and the Holocaust (New York: Enigma Books, 2006), p. 233. The original message is in “Sofia to Buenos Aires,” 1 June 1943, TNA, HW 12/289. 982 “Ribbentrop Memorandum,” 26 February 1943, Inland II Geheim, Juden in Argentinien, NARA RG 242/T-120/4352/211028. 361

sixteen of them to Berlin for verification. Eichmann’s patience was at an end. On 5 July

he told the AA that the final deadline for neutral Jews was extended to 3 August,

whereupon Germany would deal with them (the method was left unsaid). Eichmann

added that Von Thadden should, “put aside any possible scruples in the interest of finally

solving the Jewish Problem since in this matter the Reich has met the foreign

governments halfway in the most generous manner.”983 Von Thadden asked Irigoyen to

come and verify that these people were indeed Argentine citizens. According to von

Thadden, Irigoyen looked at the documents and declared them forgeries. In a cold- blooded statement, Irigoyen told him that “the Argentine embassy has of course no interest in the bearers of these fake documents.”984 With a few words Irigoyen

condemned the Argentine Jews in Kraków to death. If the minister in Sofia knew what

deportation meant, then Irigoyen was probably aware as well. In an ironic turn of events

Irigoyen and eleven other Argentine diplomats were honored in 2001 by the Argentine

Foreign Ministry for rescuing Jews during the war.985

However, there were some, such as Chargé d’Affaires, Luis Luti, who understood

German policy toward the Jews and were willing to help. In February 1943 Luti

petitioned Ribbentrop to exempt Argentina’s Jews from ‘Jewish rations.’ Luti

understood what ‘Jewish rations’ meant. He described it to Buenos Aires as the “near

total suppression of food.” Ribbentrop wanted to mollify Argentina and agreed to Luti’s

983 Hilberg, The Destruction of the European Jews, p. 447 and Shaw, Turkey and the Holocaust, p. 152. 984 “Memorandum of Conversation,” 29 July 1943, Inland II A/B, NARA RG 242/T-120/4352/211078; Avni, Argentina and the Jews, p. 165 and Goñi, The Real Odessa, p. 47. 985 “Homage To A ‘Hero’ Who Left 100 Jews to Their Own Devices,” 10 May 2005, http://www.raoulwallenberg.net/?en/holocaust/argentina/homage-quot-hero-quot-left-100.2332.htm, accessed 26 June 2008. Following protests by Jewish groups, the plaque was removed. 362

request. He told the SS that “This arrangement, which is a complete diversion from legal

regulations, has been made only to please the Argentine embassy.”986

Himmler and Eichmann ignored Ribbentrop’s requests concerning Argentine

Jews. In March Ribbentrop appealed to the SS to exempt Argentina’s Jews from Nazi

Germany’s anti-semitic policies.987 Ribbentrop was determined to support Argentina’s neutrality even if it meant sparing a small number of Jews. However, Ribbentrop and the

AA soon had to deal with a new government in Argentina. On 4 June 1943 Castillo was overthrown in a coup by the Argentine military and replaced by General Pedro Pablo

Ramírez.988 Despite the change in government, the military junta seemed amenable to honoring the Ortiz government’s request regarding the Jewish children in Vichy. On 24

June the Argentine government formally requested that one thousand Jewish children in various concentration camps throughout Europe be freed. Soon thereafter another request was made, both of which the Germans ignored. The reason for the German request was that Nazi Germany had received other requests to free Jewish children, most notably from the British through Swiss intermediaries who wanted the children to go to Palestine.

Since most of them concerned immigration to Palestine, Ribbentrop ordered that they be dealt with as a unit. Hitler was sensitive to Arab anti-semitism and pro-German sentiments; these had to be taken into consideration before any decision was made.

The AA acted quickly and made its decision on 21 July 1943. Ribbentrop and the

AA rejected any deal involving immigration to Palestine. The Nazis considered Palestine

986 “Von Thadden to Amt IV B/4,” 2 February 1943, NARA, RG 242/T-120/2679/E411958; Goñi, The Real Odessa, pp. 47-48. 987 “Dr. Ganow to Reinebeck,” 12 March 1943, NARA, RG 242/T-120/2679/E411961-411965; 988 Robert A. Potash, The Army& Politics in Argentina 1928-1945: Yrigoyen to Perón (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1969), chapter 7. 363

to be Arab territory, “the government of the Reich cannot lend a hand in allowing a people as noble and courageous as the to be forced from their homeland, Palestine, by the Jews.”989 The Nazis offered to release the children only if the British allowed them

to settle in Great Britain proper. In their warped worldview the Nazis figured that settling

more Jews in Great Britain would increase anti-semitism there. A similar offer was made

to Argentina. The children would have to settle in Argentina and not be allowed to settle

in Palestine. In return, Argentina would ask the Allies to allow Reichsdeutschen

(German citizens) and Volksdeutschen (ethnic Germans) in Latin America who wanted to

return to Germany to be allowed to do so. The AA also reminded the SS that the Jewish

children not be deported to the East since they would be needed to exchange. At the end

of October Himmler approved the AA’s proposal. 990

While Argentina made the request to accept the Jewish children in June, by

September it had again changed its mind, at least regarding some Jews. In September

Olivera cabled the Ministry of Foreign Affairs asking whether he should continue efforts

to arrange exit visas for Jews. The ministry replied no. It was up to individual Jews to

secure the visas for themselves.991 Since there is no record of why the Argentine Ministry

of Foreign Affairs refused to allow a small number of Argentine Jews in France to

emigrate, but was willing to accept a thousand Jewish children, the original offer could

have been a sham. The Argentine government was sensitive to internal and external

989 “Wagner Memorandum,” 21 July 1943, Inland II A/B, NARA RG 242/T-120/4352/210721; Avni, Argentina and the Jews, p. 163. 990 Avni, Argentina and the Jews, p. 163. 991 Goñi, The Real Odessa, p. 48. 364

pressures regarding Jewish issues and could have made the offer to mollify public

opinions inside and outside Argentina.

In January 1944 Ribbentrop once again offered to let Argentine Jews in Europe

leave. Argentina was close to breaking relations with Nazi Germany as a result of the

Hellmuth Affair and SD support for a coup in Bolivia. Ribbentrop’s offer was

inexplicable given the past actions of the Argentine government regarding its Jewish

citizens. Perhaps he deluded himself into thinking that somehow Argentine attitudes

would change or it was a measure of his desperation to maintain diplomatic relations with

Argentina. Most likely, the answer is both. Sometime in January he formally extended another invitation to Argentina to removes its Jewish citizens in the Netherlands from

Europe.992 However, Himmler had ordered the arrest of all Jews from neutral countries

including Argentina. Ribbentrop redoubled his efforts to prevent this and the head of

Abteilung Inland, Eberhardt von Thadden, phoned the SS asking that Argentine Jews be

excluded from this order. On 26 January 1944 Argentina formally broke diplomatic

relations with Nazi Germany. Hitler was outraged and demanded an investigation.

Taking advantage of this Ernst Kaltenbrunner, head of the RSHA, ordered that all Jews from neutral countries, including Argentina, be arrested. “All Jews and Jewesses of

Argentine citizenship are to be arrested at once. The assets of the arrested must be secured. These Jews must be taken immediately, under guard, to Bergen-Belsen

992 “Von Thadden to unknown recipients,” January 1944, Betreff: Juden in Niederlanden, Inland II A/B, NARA, RG 242/T-120/2679/E411969. 365

internment camp.”993 Von Thadden made sure they were given courteous treatment while

they were there.994

The Nazis used Bergen-Belsen concentration camp as a collection point for Jews

of neutral citizenship, such as Spanish Jews, who were awaiting news of their status.

Unlike Argentina, by the second half of 1943 Spain had begun to take an interest in the

fate of its Jews. However, Franco did not want to these Jews to take up permanent

residence in Spain. The Spanish government was also cognizant of its international

image. The Spanish consul in Greece, Sebastián Romero Radigales, informed Madrid

that its behavior towards Spanish Jews was creating a negative opinion among

governments who had aided their own Jews. As a result on 4 August 1943 Madrid

decided on a compromise solution. Spain would repatriate all Spanish Jews from

German-occupied Europe, but only 25 at a time. They would be allowed into Spain only

for transit to another country. No new group would be allowed in until the previous

group had left Spanish soil. Under German pressure the number in each group was

increased to 150.995

As unsatisfactory as Spain’s response to its Jews was, Argentina continued to

express indifference. Despite this total lack of concern for its Jews Ribbentrop feared that Argentina would retaliate against German citizens in Argentina as well as extensive the German business assets located there. Ribbentrop’s office telephoned the RHSA inquiring whether Himmler would waive the internment of Argentine Jews or treat them

993 Quoted in Goñi, The Real Odessa, pp. 48-49. 994 “Von Thadden memorandum,” 4 February 1944, Betr. Internierung argentinischen Juden, Inland II A/B, NARA, RG 242/T-120/2679/E411974. 995 Stanley G. Payne, Franco and Hitler: Spain, Germany and World War II (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008), pp. 226-227. 366

the same as Jews of other South American nations. His office also reminded the RSHA

that 80,000 German citizens were in Argentina and the possibility of retaliation against

them had to be considered.996

The ‘Aryanization’ of Argentine property also became an issue. One such

discussion concerning ‘Aryanization’ revolved around a group of industrial

manufacturing companies called ETAM located throughout France and Belgium and

under the ownership of Max Lindemann. Lindemann was a German Jew who acquired

Argentine citizenship in 1936. The German authorities in Paris wanted to know if they

could seize the properties despite Lindeman’s Argentine citizenship. The discussion of

whether or not ETAM could be seized revolved around whether or not Lindemann was

considered a German Jew or Argentine Jew. This discussion had been ongoing since

May 1943. While the military and economic authorities wanted to seize the company

von Thadden told them that while the Belgian subsidiaries of ETAM could be seized, the

French component should be left alone.997 The break in relations with Argentina lent new

urgency to the seizure of ETAM. On 15 February the German authorities in Paris again

requested permission to seize ETAM in light of the new situation.998 Ribbentrop again

recommended against this fearing retaliation against German companies in Argentina.

996 “Wagner to RSHA,” 4 February 1944, Vortragsnotiz zur telefonischen Durchgabe nach Westfalen, Inland II A/B, NARA, RG 242/T-120/2679/E411975. See also two other memorandum on this issue dated 5 February 1944 in Inland II A/B, NARA, RG 242/T-120/2679/E411976-E411977. 997 See the series of messages between Paris, Brussels and Berlin 27 May 1943, 8 June 1943 and 10 July 1943 in Betrifft: Arisierung der französischen Etam-Gesellschaften, Inland II A/B, NARA, RG 242/T- 120/2679/E411979-E411984. 998 “Der Delegierte der Reichsregierung für Wirtschafts und Finanzfragen bei der Französischen Regierung to AA,” 15 February 1944, Betr. Arisierung der französischen Etam-gesellschaften, Inland II A/B, NARA, RG 242/T-120/2679/E411987. 367

On 4 March von Thadden estimated there were a total of one hundred Argentine

Jews in Europe. Fifty-one were identified by name and arrested. He received no reply

from Greece or Italy regarding Argentine Jews in those countries. Thus, the number of

Argentine Jews under arrest could rise above fifty-one. Overall, Von Thadden was

pessimistic that their release could be secured. He suggested Nazi Germany make one

last offer to Argentina regarding its Jewish citizens. Given that Argentine diplomats were

still in Europe awaiting repatriation, he suggested using Swedish and Swiss

intermediaries to present the offer. Argentine interests in Germany following the break

were handled through the Swedes and German interests in Buenos Aires were taken care

of by the Swiss. Von Thadden noted that other countries had repatriated their Jews and

that the process had gone well. According to von Thadden Argentina was “the only

state” which had failed to take custody of its Jews.999

There has been ongoing controversy concerning the rescue of Jews from the

Holocaust.1000 While the rescue of Polish, Dutch, French and other Jews in Nazi-

occupied Europe was problematic, rescuing Jews of neutral countries is less so. The

archival record is clear that Germany was fully prepared to release the Jews of neutral

countries. As von Thadden stated, other neutrals had repatriated their Jews, with

Argentina being the lone holdout. Neutrals, such as Spain, Sweden and Turkey went to

great lengths to protect their Jewish citizens. In the case of Spain Franco only acted

999 “von Thadden Memorandum,” 4 March 1944, Inland II A/B, NARA, RG 242/T-120/2679/E411972. 1000 The scholarship on this topic is extensive and contentious. Several major works are: W.D. Rubenstein, The Myth of Rescue: Why the Could Not Have Saved More Jews from the Nazis (New York: Routledge, 1999), Shlomo Aronson, Hitler, the Allies and the Jews (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), David S. Wyman, The Abandonment of the Jews: America and the Holocaust, 1941-1945 (New York: Pantheon Press, 1984) and Yehuda Bauer, Jews for Sale?: Nazi-Jewish Negotiations, 1933- 1945 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996). 368

when it was apparent that Germany would not win the war.1001 By contrast, Sweden and

Turkey actively intervened to protect their Jewish citizens and other neutral Jews.1002

Sweden and Turkey both allowed Jews to immigrate to their countries. Sweden also went further than most countries in protecting Jews. It gave refuge to the Jews of

Denmark when they were threatened with deportation.1003 Individual Swedes also

actively participated in rescuing Jews from the Holocaust. The most prominent of these

was Raoul Wallenberg who, with the consent of his government, gave thousands of visas

and passports to Hungarian Jews.

The AA found itself in the unusual position of protecting Jews when state policy

dictated they should be put to death. This brought it into conflict with the SS. The AA

recognized that there were larger issues that needed to be considered regarding Jews from neutral countries. Adolf Eichmann and the SS held a myopic world-view that dictated the Jews had to be removed. While it is certain the AA did not care about Jews in general even a hardcore anti-semite like Ribbentrop could subordinate ideology to foreign policy

considerations. This was the crux of the matter. Controlling policies and areas of

responsibility were important issues to Nazi leaders. Conceding the slightest control over an issue was anathema. While the record shows that Himmler could be pragmatic regarding neutral Jews, he made sure that the AA understood the SS was the lead agency regarding the Jewish Question. Even where there was agreement on the overall general

1001 Stanley G. Payne, Franco and Hitler: Spain, Germany, and World War II (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008), chapters 12 and 13. 1002 Paul A. Levine, From Indifference to Activism: Swedish Diplomacy and the Holocaust 1938-44, 2nd Rev. ed. (Uppsala: Almquiest & Wiksell Intl, 1998) and Shaw, Turkey and the Holocaust. 1003 Emmy Werner, A Conspiracy Of Decency: The Rescue Of The Danish Jews During World War II (New York: Basic Books, 2004). 369 policy, minor points regarding that policy could produce tension. This is evident in the argument over Argentina’s Jews.

Argentina could have protected its Jewish citizens in Europe if it desired. Instead, the archival record reveals indifference and hostility to the fate of Argentine Jews.

Argentina was given ample opportunity by Nazi Germany to repatriate its Jewish citizens in Europe. Every effort Argentina made to protect Jews was overtaken by events.

Whether this was by accident or design is difficult to discern. The timing of Argentina’s efforts points to the latter but the evidence is vague. Its refusal to act on German offers is a shameful episode. Argentine intransigence even confused the AA which normally allowed the SS to take the lead in Jewish matters. This was no mean accomplishment.

Despite rejecting Nazi racial views, the archival record shows Argentine anti-semitism at its worst. In some ways the differences between the views of Argentina and Germany is immaterial. The indifference of Olivera and the hostility of Irigoyen almost produced the same result, the death of its Jewish citizens at the hands of the Nazis. Ironically, it was only the efforts of Ribbentrop and the AA which saved Argentina’s Jews from certain death.

370

Chapter 9

Aftermath

By January 1944 the worst fears of the AA and SD had been realized. Following

Harnisch’s arrest the embassy and SD made preparations should Argentina break relations. On 18 January, the AA instructed the embassy in Buenos Aires to give

“Bolivar” 150,000 RM.1004 This payment was probably made to keep the money from being seized if Argentina broke relations. Harnisch and Becker’s superiors were also wondering if Harnisch’s arrest was connected to Hellmuth and Ludwig Freude, the wealthy German-Argentine businessman. Schellenberg believed that the failure of the

Hellmuth mission was due to Freude’s treachery. He told his postwar interrogators that

Freude worked for Ribbentrop’s Information Bureau (Informationstelle III, the so-called

Henke Dienst named after its head Andor Henke). In Schellenberg’s opinion, Freude betrayed Hellmuth and probably Harnisch so Freude’s choice Vélez could be used instead. Andor Henke denied to his postwar interrogators that Freude had ever worked for the AA or Information Bureau III since it had no collaborators in North or South

America. He stated that he had never heard of Freude, but posited that he may have worked the Ribbentrop Bureau (Dienststelle Ribbentrop) which had some personnel in

Latin America and other places.1005 On 24 January Becker and Meynen confirmed

1004 “Berlin to Argentina,” 18 January 1944, NARA, RG 226, Records of the OSS, OSS Communication Office Records, Ultra Decrypts, Entry 188. 1005 “Memorandum: Interrogations of Walter Schellenberg, Theodor Paeffgen, Dietrich Niebuhr and Andor Henke regarding the ‘Argentina Project,’” 8 January 1946, pp. 4-5 and “Affidavit of Walter Schellenberg,” 16 December 1945, NARA, RG 59, 862.20235/4-2646, ABB, Box 6740. 371

Schellenberg’s suspicions by stating that Harnisch’s arrest was connected with

Hellmuth’s.1006 Becker naturally blamed Freude.

When Ramírez decided to break relations, he made the announcement through the

press. Paeffgen asked Becker to confirm the announcement and whether he still had

contact with González and other members of the government. Becker had supposedly

separated himself from Harnisch’s organization for security purposes. Believing

Becker’s fib, Paeffgen wanted operations against Brazil, Paraguay, Chile and other countries to continue. He asked Becker to transmit a report on the internal situation in

Argentina and whether operations could continue.1007 The tone of this message indicated

that while Paeffgen was concerned over recent developments, he was not overly worried.

He understood that Argentina had limited room for maneuver lest it expose its own

cooperation with German agents along with its support of the Bolivian revolution.

Becker replied that while the Hellmuth affair was the reason publicly announced for the break in relations, the real reason was U.S. and British pressure on Argentina. He told Paeffgen that Perón and other members of the G.O.U. were against the break in relations. They were angry that Ramírez had unilaterally decided on the course of action

without consulting them. Presciently, Becker reported that changes in the government

must be anticipated. However, he was reluctant to predict what those changes were.

Becker also told Paeffgen that while more members of Harnisch’s network had been

arrested, his network was unaffected.1008 Technically, this was true. The Becker and

1006 “Argentina to Berlin,” 24 January 1944, and “Buenos Aires to Berlin,” 24 January 1944, NARA, RG 226, Records of the OSS, OSS Communication Office Records, Ultra Decrypts, Entry 188. 1007 “Berlin to Argentina,” 26 January 1944, Ibid. 1008 “Argentina to Berlin,” 28 January 1944, Ibid. 372

Harnisch networks had never been officially consolidated despite their close working

relationship. Becker’s reports must have indicated the situation in Argentina was still

favorable for Becker and his organization. Schellenberg told his postwar interrogators that it was Becker’s connections with Ramírez and his subordinates that allowed him to keep his network in operation. Schellenberg believed that it was Perón and Farrell who were primarily responsible for the continued operation of the SD intelligence networks.

Schellenberg stated that Becker reported that Perón and Vice-President Farrell were receptive to the idea of re-establishing relations between Argentina and Germany. From

Becker’s reports Amt VI deduced that Perón “stood on the bedrock of ‘National

Socialism’” and that “on the basis of his political orientation, Perón was always ready to effect a collaboration with Germany.”1009

Schellenberg and Paeffgen had confidence that Perón and his henchman would

protect their intelligence networks at all costs. One key piece of evidence was the

creation of Argentina’s counterespionage unit, the Coordinación Federal, on 9 January

1944. Its first commander was Ramírez’s son-in-law, Major Francisco Filippi. While it did arrest members of the German intelligence services, it went after the FBI/SIS with a vengeance. On 11 January the Coordinación Federal began to arrest agents and informants who worked for the U.S. and British embassies. The situation was so dire that

Francis Crosby, the FBI’s legal attaché in the embassy, had to organize the escape of his

agents and informants to Uruguay. Between February and June 1944 the Coordinación

1009 “Affidavit of Walter Schellenberg, 6 February 1946, NARA, RG 59, 862.20235/4-2646, ABB, Box 6740, p. 6. There is some doubt regarding the reliability of this statement since Schellenberg’s interrogator admitted that he steered the information was suggested by him and that Schellenberg quickly picked up on what they wanted him to say. He added that they should not press him for details. 373

Federal arrested thirty-six agents employed by the military attaché’s office and SIS.

Crosby and embassy also suspected that Filippi’s men were opening unaccompanied U.S.

diplomatic pouches. Crosby’s situation became so tenuous that in November 1944

Hoover ordered him to return to the U.S. lest he be arrested.1010 Becker and Utzinger still

remained free.

With Becker and Utzinger free and the FBI’s legal attaché forced to leave the

country, the situation in Argentina must have looked favorable to the SD. By the middle of February Amt VI had decided that “Bolivar” would become Germany’s

“ambassadorial representative” in Argentina. Paeffgen informed Becker that he continue

to assist Argentina with its plans to create an “Andes bloc.” He also told Becker that

should any members of his organization be arrested he should work to prevent their

surrender to Great Britain and the U.S. This included Harnisch as well since he knew too

much to allow him to fall into the hands of either country.1011 At almost the same time the

State Department was queried by the U.S. Justice Department about whether Harnisch

and others in Argentine custody could be brought to the U.S. for questioning and

internment. Ambassador Armour replied that he was convinced Argentine authorities

would respond negatively to any such request.1012 This was an interesting coincidence

since there is no record Ambassador Armour ever asked the opinion of Argentine

1010 Leslie B. Rout Jr. and John Bratzel, The Shadow War: German Espionage and United States Counterespionage in Latin America during World War II (Frederick: University Publications of America, 1986), pp. 408-409. 1011 “Berlin to Argentina,” 14 February 1944, NARA, RG 226, Records of the OSS, OSS Communication Office Records, Ultra Decrypts, Entry 188. 1012 “The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Argentina,” 14 February 1944 and “The Ambassador in Argentina to the Secretary of State,” 15 February 1944, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1944 (hereafter, FRUS), Vol. VII: The American Republics (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1967), pp. 385-386. 374

government officials regarding such a question. There are several explanations for this

coincidence. First, Armour asked unofficially and word got back to Becker who passed it

to Paeffgen. Second, there was a leak in the U.S. embassy or State Department. Third,

Paeffgen and Gross were clever enough to anticipate the U.S. would attempt to remove

Harnisch and his confederates. Most likely Paeffgen knew of the hundreds of Germans

who been deported from other parts of Latin America as suspected spies and sent to the

U.S. Paeffgen probably assumed the U.S. would attempt the same thing in Argentina.1013

After Paeffgen had confirmed “Bolivar” as Germany’s ambassadorial representative in Argentina, this information was probably passed along to the Argentine authorities. Becker probably used this to show his Argentine contacts that his previous statements designating the SD as Germany’s official representative in Argentina were true. However, his statements might have gone too far. Sometime in March Amt VI was informed by an unknown individual that Becker and his organization were “gossiping like old women.” They told Becker that “for the last time we forbid any compromising of

German embassy there…In the Hellmuth matter you have to abstain from any criticism of German embassy.”1014 This was prudent advice. Even though the Abwehr had been incorporated into the SD in February 1944, the AA was still trying to lay the blame for the Hellmuth fiasco at the SD’s door with the outcome uncertain. If Argentina re- established relations with Germany then the AA would take the lead. Paeffgen and

1013 For a discussion of this see, Max Paul Friedman, Nazis and Good Neighbors: The United States Campaign against the Germans of Latin America in World War II (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003). 1014 “Berlin to Argentina,” 21 March 1944, Ibid. 375

Schellenberg probably wanted to make sure there would be no reason for the AA to marginalize the SD should this occur.

Amt VI was so confident the situation could be salvaged that it went ahead with plans to send Becker money, men and pharmaceuticals to sell for funds. The value of the

money and pharmaceuticals together has been estimated at approximately $350,000.1015

However, the German navy was unwilling to risk a U-boat to transport the men and money. The freighter Santa Barbara was used instead. The Santa Barbara was originally part of the Abwehr’s fleet of vessels used to smuggle men and equipment.

With the Abwehr’s abolition the vessels came under the control of the SD. The vessel was commanded by Hans Garbers and had several successful missions ferrying agents and equipment to South Africa, Angola and Brazil.1016 For this mission the vessel was to

carry two men, Walter Burckhardt (real name: Waldemar Boettger, codename: “Cobija”)

and Alphonse Chantrain (real name: Josef Schröll, codename: “Valiente”).

Burckhardt had previously lived in South America for twenty years and spoke fluent Spanish. Chantrain was a native of Luxembourg and spoke fluent English.1017

According to Ronald Newton, Chantrain was a “crook and first-class swindler.” He had also lived an adventurous life. Chantrain served for a time in the Belgian merchant marine and in 1933 joined the French Foreign Legion. Following his discharge in 1938 he allegedly joined Amt VI working as a spy in France. He was arrested by French

1015 Using FBI documents Rout and Bratzel state that Burckhardt and Chantrain had $60-100,000 mostly in English pound notes and that pharmaceuticals were worth approximately $238,000. Rout and Bratzel, The Shadow War, p. 415. 1016 Ronald C. Newton, The ‘Nazi Menace’ in Argentina, 1931-1947 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992), pp. 260-261. 1017 Hedwig Sommer gives Burckhardt’s name as Hansen, see “Report of Interview of Hedwig Elizabeth Weigelmayer Sommer,” NARA, RG 65, Box 211, File 65-56221, pp. 28-29. 376

police in February 1940, tried and sentenced to death, but his sentence was commuted to

life in prison. Following Germany’s victory over France, Chantrain was released from

jail where he allegedly led a quiet life until Kurt Gross offered him the opportunity to go

to Argentina.1018 As the case of Heinz Lange and others show, the SD had no qualms about recruiting persons of dubious character, provided they were ideologically reliable.

If Chantrain had previously worked for Amt VI, then he had proved himself.

There are two different versions as to the purpose Burckhardt’s and Chantrain’s

mission. Hedwig Sommer told her postwar interrogators that both men were to deliver

the money and drugs to Becker and then make their way north. Burckhardt was supposed

to settle in Mexico and set up an intelligence-gathering network there. Chantrain would travel to the U.S. and attempt to obtain employment in a war plant. Chantrain would pass any information onto Burckhardt who would relay it to Germany. The two would also recruit agents and attempt to establish a network covering the U.S. and Central

America.1019 According to Paeffgen, Becker had been pleading for trained men to replace

those who were arrested. He also stated that Burckhardt was also to replace Becker who

had presence was too well-known. Both men were to assist Utzinger in reinvigorating

the “Bolivar” network.1020

The ship left Bordeaux, France on 16 April 1944. After a 75 day voyage, they

landed at Punta Mogotes, Argentina on the night of 2-3 July. The money and

pharmaceuticals were turned over to Gustav Utzinger for his use and were seized the

1018 Newton, The ‘Nazi Menace,’ p. 261. 1019 Ibid. 1020 “Interrogation of Theodor Paeffgen,” 19 October 1945, 19 October 1945, NARA, RG 59, M679, Roll 3, Frames 945-946. 377

following month when Burckhardt, Chantrain and Utzinger were arrested. Following

their arrest all three languished in jail until repatriated to Germany in 1947 with Harnisch

and other members of German intelligence. Some of the seized money was later divided

among officers of the Coordinación Federal. According to Rout and Bratzel, the

pharmaceuticals were sold by the Coordinación Federal in early 1945 for $36,200.1021

The money to fund “Bolivar” soon became a source of contention between Utzinger and

Becker.

The Santa Barbara returned to Europe with Heinz Lange, Felipe Imhoff, and

Werner Sievers, all members of Becker’s organization. According to Rout and Bratzel,

Lange had become tired of Becker’s shabby treatment, which was related to his and

Becker’s falling out in 1940. Given that he had previously requested in 1941 that he no longer wanted to work with Becker, Rout and Bratzel’s claim is plausible. With the police on his trail, Lange radioed that he wanted to return to Germany and join a combat unit. Lange’s request was approved and he, Imhoff and Sievers returned to Europe.

Instead of being sent to a combat unit Lange was assigned to work as Gross’s assistant in

Amt VI D/4. While the SD had been optimistic regarding its networks following the break in relations, by mid-1944 those hopes were soon dashed. By August, most members of Becker’s and Harnisch’s networks were under arrest, with the notable exception of Becker who remained free until April 1945.

The question of Harnisch and the other arrested men was a particularly vexing one. While Becker reported on 24 January that Harnisch was being treated decently, the

1021 Rout and Bratzel, The Shadow War, p. 421 and “Report of Interrogation of Wolf Emil Franczok Alias Gustav Utzinger,” July-September 1947, NARA, RG 65, 64-22460-13, Box 14, p. 15. 378 opposite was occurring.1022 Harnisch told his postwar interrogators that following his arrest he was placed in solitary confinement. This was because he had made a declaration that not only implicated Becker and Utzinger, but also prominent figures in the Argentine government. Harnisch was angry at his arrest, particularly following the promises of protection Ramírez had made to him in July. As a result, he was given little

food or water and awakened every ten minutes. After almost three days of this treatment,

a prison doctor examined Harnisch and halted the “vigorous interrogation.” Harnisch

stated that he was removed to another prison where he was treated correctly and accorded

every comfort.1023 Herbert Jurmann was not so lucky.

According to Utzinger, Jurmann was a caretaker on a farm where a transmitter was located and knew little about “Bolivar.”1024 However, that did not stop the Argentine police who used electric prodding irons to elicit information. On 18 February Jurmann committed suicide by throwing himself out of a window.1025 Interestingly, Schellenberg claimed to his postwar interrogators that Becker had reported that three German agents had committed suicide. When his interrogator pointed out the discrepancy, Schellenberg

1022 “Argentina to Berlin,” 24 January 1944, NARA, RG 226, Records of the OSS, OSS Communication Office Records, Ultra Decrypts, Entry 188. 1023 See “Affidavit of Hans Rudolf Leo Harnisch,” 15 August 1947, NARA, RG 84, BAPR, 862.20235/10- 3147, Box 102, pp. 1-2. The techniques used on Harnisch are eerily similar to those currently used by the CIA and other intelligence organizations at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba and in Abu Ghraib Prison in Iraq. For Abu Ghraib see the book by investigative journalist Seymour Hersh, Chain of Command: The Road from 9/11 to Abu Ghraib (New York: Harper Collins, 2004) and the collection of documents at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-sv/world/iraq/abughraib/timeline.html, accessed 30 August 2008. For Guantanamo see, The Schmidt Report, Investigations into FBI Allegations of Detainee Abuse at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba Detention Facility, published 9 June 2005, http://www.cfr.org/publication/9804/schmidt_report.html. 1024 When Becker reported the suicide, he stated that Jurmann was a candidate for admission to the SS and recommended him for the , first class. See “Argentina to Berlin,” 22 March 1944, NARA, RG 226, Records of the OSS, OSS Communication Office Records, Ultra Decrypts, Entry 188. 1025 “Affidavit of Wolf Emil Franczok, alias Gustav Utzinger,” 24 October 1947, NARA, RG 65, 64-22460- 13, Box 14, p. 1. 379

stated that it was possible that “Becker was trying to magnify his troubles in order to

impress his superiors with the dangers of his mission.”1026 Berlin replied that Jurmann’s

sacrifice filled them with “high esteem.” They also approved a previous request by

Becker that numerous members of his and Harnisch’s groups be decorated with the War

Service Cross, first and second class.1027 Whether Becker thought these decorations

would strengthen the resolve of the remaining members of his network is unknown.

By this time Utzinger was becoming disgruntled again. Following Jurmann’s

suicide, Becker had requested to return to Germany. Berlin replied that this was

impossible at the present time. With Becker in hiding, they stated that “liaison-agent

with the Jurmann spirit is to be used meanwhile to unburden Luna (Utzinger) who will

now be in complete charge until SARGO (Becker) returns.” They did not rule out

Becker’s return at a later date and told Utzinger they were looking for a “worthy

substitute.” Utzinger replied that he and other members of the group did not need the

“” (decorations). He stated further that “There is here no longer any rush to collaborate for such a career as Jurmann had…So much the more true loyalty has a right to recognition.”1028 Utzinger probably interpreted Becker’s request to leave as the

proverbial rat deserting the sinking ship. By being placed in charge Utzinger probably

saw himself being offered up as a scapegoat, similar to Harnisch. Jurmann’s suicide was

the straw that broke the camel’s back. Berlin apparently ignored Utzinger’s

1026 “Notes on the Interrogation of Walter Schellenberg,” 6 February 1946, NARA, RG 59, 862.20235/4- 2646, Argentine Blue Book, Box 6740, p. 8. No such message was sent; Becker simply reported Jurmann’s suicide. 1027 “Argentina to Berlin,” 22 March 1944 and “Berlin to Argentina,” 26 March 1944, NARA, RG 226, Records of the OSS, OSS Communication Office Records, Ultra Decrypts, Entry 188. 1028 “Berlin to Argentina,” 29 March 1944 and “Argentina to Berlin, 9 April 1944, Ibid. 380

disgruntlement again and instead awarded, him, Becker, and other members of their

network the Iron Crosses, first and second class, probably in an attempt to placate

them.1029

Harnisch, Utzinger and the other prisoner’s knowledge of Argentine complicity with German agents remained a problem. Given the deep involvement of Ramírez,

González, Perón and others in cooperating with German agents, something had to be

done to conceal Argentine involvement with Nazi Germany. Utzinger told his postwar

interrogators that following his arrest in August 1944 Perón paid a visit to the prison where he was being held. According to Utzinger, Perón told Major Oscar Contal, the new head of the Coordinación Federal, how to proceed with getting statements from

Utzinger and the other prisoners. Perón allegedly told Contal that under no circumstances were any contacts between Ramírez, González, and other political and military personalities to be mentioned. Two days after Perón’s visit Utzinger stated he was called into Contal’s office. Utzinger told his postwar interrogators that Contal explained Perón’s instructions in detail and made him promise not to mention specific individuals in any statement he made. These included Ramírez, González, Pablo Stagni,

Dionisio Foianini, and Victor Paz Estenssoro among others.1030 Interestingly, Utzinger’s

interrogator never followed up on why Contal explained the situation in detail, including

mentioning Perón. He also never followed up on why Utzinger entered into a

“gentleman’s agreement” with Contal. Contal could have simply told him what he

wanted without a long-winded explanation. Given the treatment meted out earlier to

1029 For a list of the awards and their recipients see “Berlin to Argentina,” 28 April 1944, Ibid. 1030 “Report of Interrogation of Wolf Emil Franczok, alias Gustav Utzinger,” July-September 1947, NARA, RG 65, 64-22460-13, Box 14, p. 13. 381

Harnisch and Jurmann, Utzinger would have been under no illusions as to what awaited him should he refuse to cooperate. This suggests that Contal and Utzinger had more than a passing relationship.

Contal further informed Utzinger that he should inform his fellow prisoners about what was expected of them. If they cooperated and abided by Perón’s “request” they would be well treated. Utzinger stated that Contal gave him a list of points which were not to be discussed in any statement made by the prisoners. These were:

1. Contacts with Argentine or South American personalities or military people. 2. Contacts with intelligence groups. 3. Monetary connections. 4. Contact with German firms. 5. Landing of agents. 6. Chemicals and microdot photography. 7. Contents of wireless messages. 8. Transmitting experiments, wave-lengths, codes.1031

Utzinger claimed that over the next several months, the prisoners were made to give statements which were continually re-touched until they said what the Argentines wanted them to say. Despite this apparent success, one person remained free: Johannes Siegfried

Becker.

Following Utzinger’s arrest Becker dyed his hair and moustache and moved constantly to avoid the Argentine police. Becker also took up with Heinz Lange’s former mistress, Melitta Tietz. Evidently, Becker supplied her with money for food and rent.

She told her neighbors that she and her “husband” lived in their various apartments.

However, since none of her neighbors ever saw her “husband” one of them eventually

1031 Ibid. 382

grew suspicious and informed the police. On 16 April 1945, Becker was arrested.1032

According to Utzinger, Becker was particularly angry at being caught. When asked to provide a statement, Utzinger told his postwar interrogators that Becker was extremely forthcoming. Utzinger alleged that Becker’s first statement was over 300 pages long.

This was reduced to 100 after Becker was persuaded to censor his testimony. This forced the other prisoners to rework their testimony so that they reflected Becker’s version of events.1033 Becker also apparently made his peace with Ludwig Freude. The recriminations from this reconciliation between Becker and Freude were one reason relations between Harnisch and Becker became strained. Utzinger had never thought very highly of Freude. In a meeting with the German military attaché to Argentine

General Friedrich Wolf in mid-1943, Wolf had suggested Freude as a suitable person to be the intermediary for “Bolivar.” Utzinger objected and told him that Freude was an

“opportunistic pig” (Konvenienzschwein). Word of this apparently got back to Freude

and their relationship was strained.1034

Freude’s relationship with Meynen and the embassy and his subsequent friendship

with Becker and Perón remain enigmatic. Becker blamed Freude for the failure of the

Hellmuth mission. Becker’s assertions were accepted by Schellenberg and Paeffgen,

who also blamed Freude for the mission’s failure. In December 1943 González had

vowed revenge on Freude for his suspected treachery. Following the creation of the

Coordinación Federal González ordered Filippi to arrest Freude. However, Freude had

1032 “Memorandum, re. Johannes Siegfried Becker,” 18 January 1946, NARA, RG 165, Office of Director of Intelligence, G-2, Box 967, pp. 43-44. 1033 “Report of Interrogation of Wolf Emil Franczok, alias Gustav Utzinger,” July-September 1947, NARA, RG 65, 64-22460-13, Box 14, p. 14. 1034 Ibid, p. 7. 383

powerful friends including General Juan Pistarini, Minister of Public Works. Pistarini

threatened to resign if Freude was arrested. As a result, the order was countermanded.

Apparently, Pistarini brought Freude and Perón together as well.1035 Perón probably

recognized that it would be better to have Freude as a friend rather than an enemy.

Perón quickly proved his loyalty to Freude by ordering Contal to bring Freude’s

son-in-law, Werner Könnecke to his office. Könnecke had been in custody since 29

August 1944 in the same roundup that netted Utzinger, Burckhardt and Chantrain. In

Perón’s office Könnecke was asked about his connections with German intelligence.

Könnecke denied that he had any such connections. Apparently satisfied with this

answer Perón ordered Contal to release him. Contal refused and kept him in custody. In

early 1945 when Contal was away from his post Perón managed to obtain his release.1036

Utzinger told his postwar interrogators that sometime after April 1945 Becker and Freude reconciled. He stated that during their time in prison Becker received regular visits from

Freude and others connected with Perón. Despite this reconciliation Becker, Harnisch,

Utzinger and other members of German intelligence languished in jail until June 1946.

Freude was also a target of the U.S. On 6 September 1945 almost four months after the end of the war in Europe, U.S. ambassador Spruille Braden requested a meeting with the Argentine Foreign Minister, Juan J. Cooke. Braden told Cooke that he wanted

Freude arrested, interrogated and deported to Germany or the U.S. for his involvement with German intelligence. Cooke assented to Braden’s request, but quickly realized this was easier said than done. On 19 September Cooke told Braden that Freude had too

1035 Rout and Bratzel, The Shadow War, p. 420. 1036 Ibid, pp. 420-421. 384

many influential friends to be either arrested or deported. When Freude learned of

Braden’s demand he acted quickly to prevent any deportation proceedings. On 21

September he petitioned the Argentine courts to allow him to take the oath of citizenship.

Freude claimed to have filed for citizenship in 1935 and wanted to complete the process.

The U.S. and British informed the judge that Freude had obtained a and

taken an oath of allegiance to Nazi Germany on 20 November 1937. The judge rejected

Freude’s request. The judge stated that by waiting for more than a decade to take the

oath of citizenship Freude had demonstrated contempt for the nation. He also cited

Executive decree No. 6005 of 27 November 1943. This decree suspended granting

until the war was over. Freude appealed the judge’s decision to a higher

court.1037

Freude’s efforts to avoid deportation were almost thwarted the following month.

In October 1945 Perón had become embroiled in a power struggle and was removed from office. Perón’s opponents issued an arrest warrant and a deportation order for Perón.

According to Rout and Bratzel, Freude offered Perón a place to hide and allegedly managed to have his deportation order destroyed. Perón repaid this show of support by having the appeals court overturn the lower court’s decision and approve Freude’s petition of citizenship. According to Newton, the appeals court concluded that Freude had merely “neglected” to complete the formalities and take the oath. It was simply “a regrettable oversight.” There was widespread suspicion that Perón had pressured the courts into approving Freude’s application. An investigation was ordered and the results

1037 Rout and Bratzel, The Shadow War, p. 422 and Newton, The ‘Nazi Menace,’ p. 370. 385

were predictable. In October 1946, the government announced that the investigation had cleared Freude.1038

Following his return to power, Perón declared himself a candidate for the

presidential elections scheduled for 24 February 1946. Just before the election the U.S. released Consultation among the American Republics with Respect to the Argentine

Situation more commonly known as the ‘Blue Book.’1039 It contained sensational charges

against Perón and other members of the ruling junta who had taken power on 4 June

1943. The ‘Blue Book’ was a blatant attempt by the U.S. to influence the Argentine

presidential elections. Because of the motives behind it the ‘Blue Book’ was dismissed

by most Latin American governments as propaganda.1040 The attempt was unsuccessful

and on 24 February Perón became Argentina’s president-elect. Freude’s son Rodolfo

accompanied Perón during the campaign and was appointed his presidential secretary in

April 1946. In May, the elder Freude threw an ostentatious party for Perón’s

wife, Eva. Freude had acquired a powerful patron who protected him from deportation.

However, there was still the issue of Becker, Utzinger and the other German spies

languishing in Argentine jails.

Becker’s friendship with Freude finally began to pay off. In June 1946 Freude

went to the jail where Becker, Utzinger and the others were being held. According to

Utzinger, Freude offered to provide financial help to those in jail. Utzinger was not

1038 Rout and Bratzel, The Shadow War, p. p. 422-423 and Newton, The ‘Nazi Menace,’ p. 370. 1039 U.S. Department of State, Consultation among the American Republics with Respect to the Argentine Situation (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1946). The U.S. ambassador to Argentina, Spruille Braden had a contentious relationship with Perón. On one notable occasion Braden and Perón engaged in a shouting match. For Braden’s version of this meeting see, Spruille Braden, Diplomats and Demagogues: The Memoirs of Spruille Braden (New Rochelle, NY: Arlington House, 1971), pp. 328-329. Braden stated that he and Perón “were going at it like a couple of small boys…” 1040 For this see Gary Frank, Juan Perón versus Spruille Braden (New York: Rowan & Littlefield, 1982). 386

included in this offer because of the enmity between him and Freude. Utzinger felt that

Freude wanted to take away his financial independence to make him more

“amenable.”1041 In his interrogation Harnisch made no mention of a financial offer from

Freude. Perhaps he was excluded as well. Whatever the case Harnisch and Utzinger

were released in June. Becker was released later in the month. Following his release,

Utzinger petitioned the Argentine courts to return the money seized from him at the time

of his arrest.1042

The seized money became another source of contention between Utzinger and

Becker. Utzinger told his postwar interrogators that he had met Becker by chance at the

offices of the Coordinación Federal following their release. Utzinger claimed that

Becker told him he was going to attempt to have the 172,000 pesos that was seized

returned to him. Becker stated that after legal expense etc. there was only about 60,000

pesos left. Utzinger told him that many members of the organization were indigent and

asked for an account of the money. He claimed that Becker then stated he only had 4,000

pesos left. Becker claimed that the rest of the money had gone to bribes and unexplained

expenses. Utzinger believed that Becker claimed the lower amount to “relieve him of all

obligations.”1043 Utzinger and Harnisch soon had another, more pressing, issue to worry about. Ludwig Freude was about to have his revenge on both men.

1041 “Report of Interrogation of Wolf Emil Franczok, alias Gustav Utzinger,” July-September 1947, NARA, RG 65, 64-22460-13, Box 14, p. 20. 1042 “Affidavit of Wolf Emil Franczok, alias Gustav Utzinger,” 10 September 1947, NARA, RG 65, 64- 22460-13, Box 14, pp. 2-3. 1043 Ibid, p. 3. Utzinger made a long moral statement about Becker enriching himself at the expense of others. While Utzinger had numerous problems with Becker in past, it would appear he simply wanted his share of the money. 387

Throughout 1945 and 1946 the U.S was pressuring Argentina to deport any

German nationals who had been involved in intelligence-gathering. On 15 November

1946 Perón signed Executive Decree No. 18480/946. This decree stated that fifty-three

individuals who had been arrested in the roundups of 1944 were now subject to arrest and

deportation.1044 Both Utzinger and Harnisch claimed that they were warned in advance

of the decree and told to go into hiding. According to Newton, Rodolfo Freude had a

hand in drawing up the list of those to be deported.1045 If true, then his father certainly

had a hand as well. Given the long-standing enmity between Harnisch, Utzinger and

Freude, it was not surprising to either man that they were slated to be arrested and deported.

Utzinger and Harnisch went into hiding. Harnisch claimed that he intended to turn himself in but was convinced to go into hiding by Rodolfo Freude’s secretary,

Eduardo Bravo Casares. Casares informed Harnisch that he would only have to remain in hiding until U.S. pressure to deport him had slackened. Harnisch stated that he was under the impression he was doing the government a favor given Casares’s position.

More than likely Freude and his father were making sure that should Harnisch need to be sacrificed he was in a readily accessible place. Harnisch suspected that this was the case following a conversation with Casares who informed him that Rodolfo Freude had ordered his arrest.1046 Certainly, the situation favored just such an approach. Freude

would be rid of a long-time antagonist and Perón’s government could point to Harnisch’s

1044 Rout and Bratzel, The Shadow War, p. 426. 1045 Newton, The ‘Nazi Menace,’ p. 371. 1046 “Affidavit of Hans Rudolf Leo Harnisch,” 15 August 1947, RG 84, BAPR, 862.20235/10-3147, Box 102, p. 1. 388

deportation as sign of their cooperation. On 4 February 1947 Harnisch was arrested by

the Coordinación Federal and slated for deportation.

Utzinger went into hiding as well, but was not offered the use of a house. Instead,

he decided to strike out on his own. Following the warning to flee he went underground

with his mistress, Anna Assmann, and neighbor Albert Treusch, a minor member of

“Bolivar.” Between November 1946 and February 1947, they moved around in an

attempt to avoid the police. In March, he was betrayed by an unknown German national,

but managed to avoid arrest. He and Assmann then moved to the mountains relying on

friendly villagers to give them shelter. On 1 April 1947 with his funds down to 30 pesos

and tired of running Utzinger turned himself in to the police.1047 Like Harnisch, Utzinger

was jailed and scheduled for deportation. Excluded from the deportation order was

Johannes Siegfried Becker.

On 22 May 1947 Utzinger, Harnisch and six other men were placed aboard the

Río Teuco and deported to Germany. Once there all three were immediately arrested and

placed into the Wannsee Internment camp. Between July and September Harnisch and

Utzinger were extensively interrogated by the Americans regarding their activities. Both men downplayed their roles though Utzinger was more forthcoming than Harnisch.

Harnisch admitted involvement, but claimed it was minimal. A comparison of

Harnisch’s and Utzinger’s interrogations suggests that both men made sure that their stories matched on major points. Both men placed the blame for their predicament on the

1047 “Report of Interrogation of Wolf Emil Franczok, alias Gustav Utzinger,” July-September 1947, NARA, RG 65, 64-22460-13, Box 14, pp. 22-23. 389

shoulders of Becker and Freude. Harnisch’s interrogator swallowed his story almost

completely and stated:

If Hans Harnisch is looked upon as having been an unsatisfactory source of information on Argentina, it should be considered that possibly too much was expected of him. His name has become almost legendary…Harnisch’s patrons— González and other identified with the Ramírez regime—also came to grief, and Harnisch was made a whipping boy.1048

In many ways, this could serve as a fitting epitaph to German attempts to construct an

effective intelligence-gathering network in Latin America.

In some ways it is surprising Harnisch and Utzinger were interrogated by the

Americans at all. By 1947 Perón was comfortably ensconced in the Argentine presidential palace, where he would stay until his overthrow in 1955. During his time

Perón made the Argentine nation wealthy for a time by selling its beef at high prices to feed war-torn Europe. As the wartime alliance between the Allied powers broke down, the world moved towards the Cold War. Both the U.S. and Argentina recognized the new political landscape.1049 Perón was an ardent anti-communist who began to align

Argentina with the U.S. Both countries tried to move beyond the antagonism of the war

years. Argentina and the U.S. both began to allow former Nazis and war-criminals to

settle in their respective nations.1050 It is the secrecy of surrounding the U.S. and

Argentine legacy of using former Nazis and war-criminals to further their own ends that fostered the lies and exaggerations that were prominent in the public’s perception of

1048 “Report of Interrogation of Hans Rudolf Leo Harnisch,” July-September 1947, RG 84, BAPR, 862.20235/10-3147, Box 102, p. 30. 1049 See Leslie Bethell and Ian Roxborough eds., Latin America between the Second World War and Cold War, 1944-1948 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997) and David Rock ed., Latin America in the : War and Postwar Transitions (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994). 1050 Most recent and prominent are Uki Goñi, The Real Odessa: Smuggling the Nazis to Perón’s Argentina (London: Granta, 2002) and Richard Breitman et. al., U.S. Intelligence and the Nazis (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005). 390

Latin America following the war. Like most lies, those surrounding the Nazis and

Argentina do have some basis in fact. However, with the passing of time and secrecy

surrounding German actions in Argentina those facts have been distorted beyond all recognition. It is the author’s hope that this study has set the record straight on some

level

391

Conclusion

“It may be said that I fear too much. Surely, considering the state we stand in, I think it less dangerous to fear too much than too little.”

— Sir Francis Walsingham1051

Over the course of six years, the Germans spent over a million dollars and

expended numerous man-hours in pursuit of a fantasy. The fact that German intelligence

and the AA succeeded to the extent they did was more of a testament to the cooperation

they received from sympathetic members of various Latin American governments than of

any skill on their parts. Despite long-standing ties in Latin America Nazi policy-makers

fundamentally misunderstood why Argentina favored Nazi Germany. They equated anti-

Americanism with being pro-German. From the beginning of Hitler’s reign in 1933

German diplomacy towards Argentina was lacking in design and execution. There was

no long-range policy drawn up in the Wilhelmstrasse to address this deficiency.

Additionally, Argentina was on the periphery of German diplomacy. Unlike Great

Britain, Hitler had little interest in Latin America. Even though Argentina was an

important supplier of vital raw materials the diplomatic staff in Berlin took little notice

and had little involvement in policy. Thermann’s lamentations about the lack of any

coherent policy and the documentary record supporting his statements are powerful

evidence.

The bureaucratic infighting in the 1930s between the AO and AA contributed substantially to the friction between Germany and Argentina. Hitler’s unwillingness to

1051 Quoted in Stephen Budiansky, Her Majesty’s Spymaster: Elizabeth I, Sir Francis Walsingham, and the Birth of Modern Espionage (New York: Viking, 2005), p. 27. 392

intervene in this struggle meant that German diplomacy would suffer. The events

between 1937 and 1939 serve to illustrate this point. Despite its best efforts, the AA was

unable to bring the AO to heel. All AO could do was offer assurances that its actions

were not hostile in the face of evidence to the contrary. This explains why forgeries such

as the Patagonia document and the Wendler forgery in Bolivia were accepted as genuine.

Following the outbreak of the war, a new enemy in the form of Heinrich Himmler’s SS

appeared. Its continual attempts to undermine the AA were detrimental in the long-run.

Even when circumstances appeared to be in working in its favor, events were being

directed by forces outside the control of either Argentina or Germany. The U.S. and

Great Britain used Ultra as a tool to try and turn Argentina away from Nazi Germany.

However, the U.S. was not the innocent it appeared. Like Germany, the U.S.

fundamentally misunderstood Argentina’s fervent desire to maintain neutrality. This was

one reason why Argentina turned to Germany for weapons. Unlike Argentina, the U.S.

had a greater appreciation for the threat Nazi Germany posed. As early as 1941 the

British and Americans were aware of the atrocities committed against Jews in Europe.

Britain was also well aware that the U.S. was positioning itself economically in Latin

America with the intention of supplanting the British. The records of the British Foreign

Office are full of memoranda addressing this subject. The U.S. continued to pressure

Argentina into the post-war period to close and confiscate German-owned businesses.1052

The U.S. was convinced as early as 1937-38 that Germany posed a threat to the

Western Hemisphere. These fears were reinforced after Germany undermined the

1052 Ronald Newton ably discusses the economic aspects of U.S. and British policy regarding Argentina. Ronald C. Newton, The ‘Nazi Menace’ in Argentina, 1933-1947 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992). 393

governments of Austria and Czechoslovakia. German agitation and demonstrations in

Argentina and Brazil paralleled those in Europe. Additionally, the Germans in these and

other countries never really assimilated into the general population. They had their own

German-language schools, associations and clubs where they congregated. If one accepts

Newton’s contention that the U.S. deluded itself into believing there was a threat, then

one also has to accept that Getúlio Vargas of Brazil and Roberto Ortiz of Argentina were

deluded as well. Both men took serious measures to contain a group of people they

viewed as a threat to their nation’s sovereignty. Whether German intrigues posed a

significant threat to either country is, in some ways, moot. Given German actions in

Europe regarding Austria and Czechoslovakia, neither Vargas nor Ortiz could allow the

NSDAP and other German organizations to become a threat.

It was this view of German actions that allowed Vargas to believe German’s in

Brazil had participated in a coup against him. German actions in Argentina also

confirmed Ortiz’s suspicions that the German community was conspiring against his

government. Ortiz’s fears figured prominently in the so-called “Patagonia Plot” of 1939.

In some ways, the fact that the Patagonia document was a forgery was immaterial. It

confirmed Ortiz’s suspicions and that was enough for him to accept it at face value.

History is replete with instances of individuals who have done the same. For example,

Hitler believed the Allies would land at the Pas de Calais instead of Normandy.1053 More

1053 See especially, Thaddeus Holt, The Deceivers: Allied Military Deception in the Second World War (London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 2004). 394

recently, this charge has been leveled at U.S. President George W. Bush regarding the

intelligence surrounding the case for the invasion of Iraq.1054

Amt VI’s views of Argentina allowed Schellenberg, Paeffgen and their

subordinates to believe what they wanted to believe about Argentine cooperation.

Thermann’s warnings regarding Argentine beliefs reflected the reality of the situation.

He understood that pro-German sentiments in Latin America were more the product of anti-Americanism than any sympathy towards Nazism. That is not to say that some prominent figures were not pro-Nazi. There were elements of Nazism and Fascism that attracted military officers and politicians. However, they were nationalist’s first and ideological sympathizers second. When it became obvious Germany was going to lose

the war these governments had no qualms about cutting their ties. The AA understood

the situation, but their policy of prudence was continually undermined by the AO and SD.

Through Ultra, the U.S. and British were well aware of these divisions and used them to

their advantage. This was particularly true in the Hellmuth affair. This caused the AA

and SD to blame each other for the break in relations, with the ultimate casualty being the

Abwehr.

With its extensive examination of the records of the German Foreign Ministry,

this study hopes to start a new paradigm regarding Argentina’s actions during the war and

U.S. policy towards Argentina. Previous studies, most prominently, Randall Bennett

Woods and Alfred P. Vannucci have argued that U.S. policy towards Argentina during

1054 There is little scholarly literature on this subject mainly due to the classification of material. Most of the books on this subject are polemical with little to no value. However, two books by journalists Bob Woodward and Ron Suskind seem to be the most balanced. See Bob Woodward, State of Denial: Bush at War, Part III (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2006) and Ron Suskind, The One Percent Doctrine: Deep Inside America’s Pursuit of Its Enemies Since 9/11 (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2006). 395

World War II was the result of confused policymaking and rivalries between

policymakers.1055 Both arguments were based extensively on the records of the U.S. State

Department and have influenced subsequent scholarship regarding U.S.-Argentine relations. There is abundant material that shows U.S. policy was based on sound evidence. While their interpretation of evidence could be overdrawn or exaggerated, it was reliable. Regarding major points of German policy, the Ultra material, the German- language records of the AA and postwar interrogations support each other. The evidence presented here argues against Ronald Newton’s interpretation of U.S. actions.

The declassified Ultra material reveals extensive cooperation between prominent governmental officials in Argentina, Paraguay, Brazil and Bolivia. This evidence was also available to U.S. and British policymakers as well and probably influenced their actions. The material on German and Argentine complicity in the Bolivian coup has never been revealed before. While historians of Bolivia, such as Cole Blasier, Kenneth

Lehman and Waltraud Morales, had suspected involvement, the proof was lacking at the time their studies were completed.1056 The declassified Ultra material should allow

historians to reexamine U.S. reactions to the Bolivian coup of December 1943. The Ultra

material also forms the documentary base for Consultation among the American

1055 Randall Bennett Woods, The Roosevelt Foreign Policy Establishment and the “Good Neighbor”: The United States and Argentina, 1941-1945 (Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Regents Press, 1979) and Albert P. Vannucci, “United States-Argentine Relations from 1943-1948: A Case in Confused Foreign Policy Making” (New York: New School, Ph.D diss., 1978). 1056 Cole Blasier, “The United States, Germany, and the Bolivian Revolutionaries (1941-1946), The Hispanic American Historical Review, 52/1, (February 1972) Kenneth D Lehman, Bolivia and the United States: A Limited Partnership (Athens, GA: The University of Georgia Press, 1999) and Waltraud Morales, A Brief History of Bolivia (New York: Facts on File, Inc., 2003). 396

Republics with Respect to the Argentine Situation, the so-called ‘Blue Book.’1057

Historians have viewed the ‘Blue Book’ skeptically, seeing it as a product of U.S. imperialism in Latin America. This, along with the lack of sources made a compelling case. However, a comparison of the records of the AA, the Ultra material and postwar interrogation argues that the ‘Blue Book’ should be taken seriously as a historical source, despite some overdrawn conclusions regarding the ideological bent of Perón and his confederates.

The question of ideology is somewhat vexing. Without a doubt, Thermann,

Meynen, Becker and others were inclined towards Nazism. Thermann and Meynen had oriented themselves to the Nazi regime, as early as 1933 in Thermann’s case and as early as 1936 for Meynen. Becker had joined the NSDAP in 1930 and SS in 1931 and the evidence suggests he had worked for Amt VI as early as 1938. There is little doubt about where Becker’s sympathies lay. The same goes for Schellenberg and Paeffgen. Katrin

Paehler’s study of Schellenberg and Amt VI shows that Schellenberg was an ardent Nazi despite his postwar statements to the contrary.1058 The evidence and arguments presented

in this study support her conclusions that Amt VI was first and foremost an ideological

organization.

The ideology of the German community in Argentina is more problematic. The

research of Holger Meding and others argues that Nazi ideology was not very deep.1059

1057 U.S. Department of State, Consultation among the American Republics with Respect to the Argentine Situation (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1946). 1058 Katrin Paehler, “Espionage, Ideology and Personal Politics: The Making and Unmaking of a Nazi Foreign Intelligence Service” (Washington D.C.: American University, Ph.D diss., 2002), 1059 Olaf Gaudig and Peter Veit, Der Widerschein des Nazismus : das Bild des Nationalsozialismus in der deutschsprachigen Presse Argentiniens, Brasiliens und Chiles 1932-1945 (Berlin: Wissenschaftlicher Verlag, 1997); Olaf Gaudig and Peter Veit, Hakenkreuz über Südamerika : Ideologie, Politik, Militär 397

While this may be true, in some ways it is immaterial. German intelligence received extensive support from prominent members of the German-Argentine community. The assistance Niebuhr, Becker and Utzinger received from Antonio Delfino, Ludwig Freude is borne out in the archival record. Looking at it from that perspective, it did not matter whether the masses were sympathetic to Nazism. As long as those with money and influence assisted Nazi Germany, that was enough for the time being. Without the assistance of Delfino, Freude and others, Niebuhr and Becker would have had a much harder time funding their operations. Once Germany won the war then the rest could be

“coordinated.”

The ideological bent of Latin American military officers and politicians is also problematic. Certainly, Ramón Castillo was pro-German, but there is no evidence he was pro-Nazi. The same cannot be said for the members of the Argentine military who overthrew him particularly Juan Domingo Perón. The ‘Blue Book’ states unequivocally that Perón was at best a Nazi sympathizer. There is evidence to support this view.

Perón’s name is prominently mentioned in numerous messages between Argentina and

Berlin. Based on Becker’s reports Schellenberg and Paeffgen believed that Perón was sympathetic to Nazism. Schellenberg’s postwar interrogators asked him a hypothetical question: “If you were still maintaining Department VI and Perón were head of the

Argentine government would you consider him a most favorable possibility from your point of view?” Schellenberg replied, “Yes.” When he was asked “Would you consider

(Berlin: Wissenschaftlicher Verlag, 2004); Holger Meding ed. Nationalsozialismus und Argentinien: Beziehungen, Einflüsse und Nachwirkungen (Frankfurt: Lang, 1995). 398

that he would double-cross you?” Schellenberg stated, “Not according to his original

aims. Otherwise he would have had to undergo a change in the meantime.”1060

The interrogations of not only Schellenberg, but Paeffgen, Harnisch and Utzinger

mention Perón as playing a major role in supporting and protecting their operations. The

Ultra decrypts corroborate their statements. However, Perón was a nationalist first,

however much he admired certain aspects of Italian fascism and Nazism. The Argentine

government only turned to Germany for weapons after the U.S. refused to provide them.

Ramirez, González and Perón understood there would a quid pro quo for providing the

weapons they needed. This is one of many instances where Amt VI fundamentally

misunderstood Argentine motives. Following the failure of the Hellmuth mission certain

individuals were rounded up by the Argentine police, but Becker and Utzinger remained

free. Ramirez and Perón probably understood that they could not expose the full extent

of German intelligence operations in Argentina lest they be accused of either incompetence or collaboration. Thus, the need for Becker and Utzinger to remain free for

a time until U.S. pressure on Argentina slackened. They also manipulated the

interrogations of Utzinger, Harnisch and others to reflect the story they wanted told.

However compelling the evidence against Perón is, it is based on second and third-hand

accounts. There is no direct evidence linking Perón to German intelligence. Despite the

lack of direct evidence against Perón, the fact remains that the Argentines collaborated

willingly with German intelligence.

1060 “Interrogation of Walter Schellenberg,” 6 February 1946, NARA, RG 59, 862.20235/4-2646, Argentine Blue Book, Box 6740, p. 2 and Uki Goñi, The Real Odessa: Smuggling the Nazis to Perón’s Argentina (London: Granta, 2002) p. 17. 399

The creation of the so-called ‘Andes bloc’ and Argentina’s response to the

Holocaust raises the question of ideology. The evidence suggests that the ‘Andes bloc’

was more anti-U.S. than pro-German. Schellenberg, Paeffgen and Gross were willing to overlook this in pursuit of larger goals. They also fundamentally misread the nature of

Latin American authoritarianism. While groups such as the Frente de Guerra in

Paraguay and Razón de Patria in Bolivia were inclined to fascism, that did not make them fascist. Their ideology was more akin to Franco’s and Mussolini’s rather than

Hitler’s. They were authoritarian nationalists first and ideologues second. The Argentine government’s response to the Holocaust is certainly one of the more sordid episodes in its history. Chargé Luis Luti and others had continually informed their government of what

“deportation” meant. Argentina was in a very powerful position to save its Jews, much more than other countries in some cases. Even when the Nazis offered to assist

Argentina in repatriating its Jews, instead of accepting the offer, the record is one of obfuscation and obstruction. From that perspective, it did not matter if Argentina shared

Nazi Germany’s views of the Jews. The end result would be the same: deportation and death.

Regarding German aims in Argentina and Latin America, the evidence is more clear-cut. Germany’s aims rested on the policies of the past. Argentina would have probably assumed the role it traditionally played in the world economy: exporter of raw materials and importer of finished goods. German diplomatic policy from 1939-1942 stressed trade agreements that would commence once Germany had won the war.

However, there is another possibility. Norman J.W. Goda’s study of Hitler’s global 400

ambitions argues that there was going to be a battle for supremacy of the Atlantic world

between Germany and the U.S.1061 If Germany emerged victorious, Argentina could have

either become a vassal state or ally, along the lines of or Romania. Germany

could also have attempted to conquer Argentina by force. In the absence of solid

information, this must remain speculative. Goda’s study is powerful evidence that this

theory could have become reality.

The success or failure of German intelligence is a bit more nebulous since these

are vague terms. If success is defined as Germany acquiring solid, reliable, information on U.S. capabilities and intentions, then it can be said definitively that German intelligence failed in its task. German intelligence activities did cause the U.S. to devote extensive resources to combating German influence and intelligence-gathering in Latin

America. If this was an aim of Amt VI and the Abwehr, then they succeeded. By 1944, the F.B.I. had over three hundred agents in Latin America guarding against potential

German actions.1062 This does not count the numerous members of the Military

Intelligence Division of the U.S. Army, Naval Intelligence and military attaché’s who kept track of German agents. This was a massive effort to quell any potential threats to

Latin American countries and U.S. interests. The U.S. had the resources to devote to such an endeavor without compromising security elsewhere.

Historians who judge U.S. actions towards Argentina harshly should keep several things in mind. First, Nazi Germany was directly or indirectly responsible for the deaths of over 40 million people. This includes three million German soldiers who fell on the

1061 Norman J.W. Goda, Tomorrow the World: Hitler, Northwest Africa and the Path Toward America (College Station: Texas A&M Press, 1998). 1062 History of the SIS, 3 vols. declassified 8/10/04. 401

various battlefields in Europe, the Atlantic and North Africa. It also includes almost

200,000 of its own citizens who were deemed ‘’ and put to death in

the so-called euthanasia program. Also, almost 100,000 German Jews perished in the various death camps the Nazis constructed throughout Europe.1063 By 1943, the

Argentine government certainly knew of the Holocaust yet it drew even closer to Nazi

Germany. When judging U.S. policy towards Argentina during World War II historians would do well to keep in this chapter’s epigraph in mind. The alternative is too horrible to contemplate.

1063 For these figures see, Raul Hilberg, The Destruction of the European Jews, 3 vols., revised and expanded edition, (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1985), and , The Origins of Nazi Genocide: From Euthanasia to the Final Solution (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1995). 402

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