Political and terrorism in Southern Africa

Anneli Botha Institute for Security Studies

ISS Paper 90 • August 2004

Price: R10.00

INTRODUCTION rily aimed at the colonial power, a ‘foreign enemy’. Since the end of colonialism governments and their The post-Cold War period has witnessed an increase citizens have been confronted by new forms of legiti- in conflicts within a number of African countries along mate as well as illegitimate dissent, often fuelled by a ethnic, religious or tribal lines. The continent has been desire for control over political power or ideological, undergoing a process of political transition from colo- ethnic and religious movements. nial, totalitarian and authoritarian rule to more demo- cratic political systems, often accompanied by consid- A better understanding needs to be developed about erable turmoil. Religious dissent, mainly in the north the nature of religious dissent and how it impacts on and the east of the continent, has sometimes contrib- stability and state security. In addition, more attention uted to the instability experienced during these peri- needs to be focused on state terrorism and on the often- ods of transition. It has increasingly also undermining impact that counter- become an important vehicle for voic- terrorism measures undertaken by states ing political grievances, something which have on human rights. In Africa, the has led to governments stepping up their State terrorism threat of transnational terrorism is a real- monitoring of religious dissent. In the and the ity, but state terrorism and the implemen- Southern African sub-region the difficult tation of democratic principles present relationship between mainland Tanzania implementation even greater challenges. In other words, and Zanzibar serves as an interesting ex- of democratic state terrorism, associated with a disre- ample of how political dissent can indi- gard for human rights and with the op- rectly contribute to acts of terrorism: sus- principles are pression of ethnic and tribal groups, pre- pects implicated in the US Embassy greater sents a much bigger threat than bombing in Dar es Salaam are said to transnational terrorism. Misconceived originate from Zanzibar. challenges in counter-terrorism measures can instead Africa than result in fuelling terrorism and providing Political and religious grievances within justification for the involvement of those a country tend to arise from authoritar- transnational associated with transnational terrorism. ian rule and repression, maldistribution terrorism. of resources, inequity and the absence Dissent has often led to violence and to of representation in the political system. acts associated with terrorism. This pa- The role of pressure and interest groups per aims to contribute towards a better in openly articulating political issues is a relatively new understanding of dissent and its role in democracy. The one in many emerging democracies. Such groups have challenge for governments is to manage dissent in such sometimes been regarded as a threat to state security, a way that it remains within levels that are regarded as especially when they are based on tribal, ethnic or re- legitimate and normal for healthy democracies and to ligious grounds. Many governments and security forces prevent it from developing into violence and terror- in Africa are attempting to develop an understanding ism. In addition to considering the Tanzanian example, of the nature and role of dissent and to develop best this paper also briefly looks at Pagad in South Africa practices that could effectively address it. and at the political situation in Zimbabwe, Swaziland and Mauritius. It concludes with observations on why The liberation struggles that were fought against colo- states react differently to dissent and points to some nialism constituted a form of dissent and were prima- pitfalls that ought to be avoided.

Botha • page 1 Paper 90 • August 2004 UNDERSTANDING POLITICAL but regard dissent as either illegal or unjustified and DISSENT usually both. Citizens engage in dissenting behaviour for a variety of It is important to differentiate between levels of dis- reasons involving both the nature of the cause and the sent, thus enabling researchers and governments to nature of the government.=History has shown that dis- distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate forms sent has evolved especially against authoritarian or of dissent. This is significant especially since countries semi-authoritarian governments that refuse their popu- in both Asia and Africa are experiencing a period of lace access to political power or the space within which rapid political development. In the aftermath of 9/11 to voice their dissatisfaction with government policies there have been attempts to curb dissent because it and practices.=Dissent also forms when the position of has been equated with terrorism. The all-out protec- the dissenters is so far from established political norms tion of political power raises serious questions about that there is little possibility, if any, that society will adapt the right to govern. This recalls the philosophical rela- to and accept their values.=No action of the govern- tionship between government and the populace, the ment will deter them from pursuing dissent. Anarchists ‘social contract’ or the belief that political structures and religious extremists, for example, are likely to be and the legitimacy of the state derive from an (explicit dissenters in almost any society. Those involved in dis- or implicit) agreement by individual human beings to sent may wish to change policy or leadership, or to surrender (some or all of) their private rights in order change the existing political order. to secure the protection and stability of an effective social organisation or government. Although Hobbes, Most political dissenters aim their actions at a desired Locke, Rousseau, Hume and Hegel presented differ- outcome, but others may wish only to dissent, viewing ent versions of the contract and its terms,1 in philo- any existing order as wrong. The latter may be highly sophical terms it offers a background to alienated from their society, choose dis- the relationship between those in power sent as an expression of this and remain and the populace and thus to when re- dissatisfied with any outcome that brings bellion or dissent can be considered le- Governments’ stability. Such dissenters are so extreme gitimate. The basic principles of the ‘so- that governments rarely respond posi- cial contract’ can be summarised thus: challenge is tively to their actions. Governments were formed for only one to manage Types or categories of dissent include:4 reason—to protect individual rights to dissent in life, property and liberty. When a gov- • Indiscriminate pathological dissent: ernment fails to preserve these rights (not such a way This includes violent /assassi- honouring its part of the contract), citi- that it does nation/bombing campaigns, motivated as zens have the right to overthrow it. Ac- much by hatred, revenge, or similar emo- cording to Locke: not develop tions as by a purposeful campaign to change government policy or actors. Re- whenever the legislators endeavour to into violence venge killings carried out for no other take away and destroy the rights of purpose fall into this category. people they put themselves into a and state of war with the people, who are terrorism. • Discriminate violent dissent: This in- thereupon absolved from any further cludes violent actions directed at chang- obedience and have a right to resume ing either a regime or its policy, such as their original liberty, and by the establishment the assassination of government officials, bombings of a new legislature provide for their own safety of government facilities and disruption of govern- and security, which is the end for which they ment public functions such as official public are in society.2 speeches. Dissent can be defined as an action to “express dis- • Passive dissent: Included in this type of dissent are agreement with a prevailing or official view”.3 It is a non-violent , labour and student strikes, broad term, covering a variety of political behaviours, marches, pressures or campaigns against a regime, including objectives and behaviour involving the use directed at changing its leaders or policy. of non-governmental channels to register opposition • Systemic dissent: This encompasses civil society to government decisions or government inaction. The opposition, the formation of illegal opposition par- question could, however, be asked: does dissent in- ties or groups, letter writing campaigns, etc. Such clude opposition? Although opposition is often associ- dissent may couple with semi-legal or legal opposi- ated with political opposition (challenges to the exist- tion and those engaged in it may move from oppo- ing order through legitimatised political channels, such sition to dissent. as creating a legal opposition party, running for politi- cal office against the ruling leader/party, or other legal Civil society is the aggregate of independent interest activity), opposition is a form of dissent. The difference groups existing within a country who may organise by is that regimes accept, or even encourage, opposition, affinity (women’s groups, labour unions, professional

Botha • page 2 Paper 90 • August 2004 associations, religious societies), or merely temporarily The second level is the ‘comfort zone’ of usual activity, come together, as in a public demonstration or private involving legitimate dissent and protest, both within gathering in pursuit of common ends. The level of de- and outside parliament. According to Wilkinson6 pro- velopment of civil society is often regarded as an indi- test is more than just a safety valve: it should be re- cator of how democratic a country is. Authoritarian garded as a valuable mode of political communication, regimes often attempt to give the illusion of a thriving criticism and democratic consultation in its own right. civil society by creating their own official organisations In a liberal democratic government, peaceful protest specifically to mobilise the population in public sup- and agitation should be regarded as a legitimate and port of regime-formulated goals.5 vital part of the engine of social reform. According to Franks7 there is a tension between the forces for change Categorising acts associated with terrorism in this way and the desire for change. Among the most important could separate them from emotional or sentimental forces for change is dissent by individuals and groups reactions, enabling both students in this field and se- who disagree with government either because they curity agencies to deal with the impact of the acts rather want more change, or because they want less. But there than focusing on issues of who is right or wrong. How- are limits in all states on what those in power consider ever, most campaigns of dissent do not lend themselves to be acceptable dissent. These limits vary from coun- to easy categorisation and most involve elements of try to country. Modes of conflict exist which are essen- both legitimate and illegitimate forms of dissent. His- tially non-violent, un-institutionalised and spontaneous tory offers many examples of groups structured around and which can provide even the most disadvantaged specific objectives that have resorted to a dual strategy groups in society with powerful levers of political, moral including both a covert and violent campaign (associ- and even economic pressure on government leaders ated with the first two categories above) and an overt and elite groups. Such means include, for example, or peaceful strategy (referring to the last two categories). and go-slows. Time-honoured and pow- erful modes of political and moral pressure include the DEVELOPMENT OF DISSENT: mass campaign of marches, processions, demonstra- LEGITIMATE AND ILLEGITIMATE tions and mass meetings, inevitably coupled with me- dia publicity and pressure on government personnel Figure 1 serves as a relatively uncomplicated depiction and political parties. of the different ‘zones’ in the development of dissent. As mentioned, a pressure group can be defined as “any In the first zone, ‘constitutional order’, elections, as an organised group, which attempts to influence govern- expression of democracy, can act as an effective tool ment decisions without itself exercising the formal pow- for conflict management. However, at the same time, ers of government”. The latter part of the definition is they can also deepen the degree of dissent and insta- usually intended to distinguish a pressure group from a bility if not properly managed. The threat of intimida- political party or conspiratorial group, while the em- tion and political violence in protecting political power phasis on organisations distinguishes it from a mob or serves as an example. other spontaneous collections of individuals.8 Open

Figure 1: Levels of dissent

Internalisation of 'domestic' conflict/dissent

MILITARISATION ANARCHY SOCIAL DISINTEGRATION

Terrorism Criminal violence Violence Extremism Organised crime Inter-communal conflict Covertly organised threats Socio-economic destabilisation

SUBVERSION CRIME SOCIAL CONFLICT

Disorderly conflict ZONE OF AMBIGUITY

Legitimate dissent COMFORT ZONE Social advocacy and change

Parliamentary democracy CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER Civil society

Botha • page 3 Paper 90 • August 2004 action includes, first of all, the demand for the fulfilment tion but may be, in a large part, a function of changing of promises made by candidates during election cam- ideologies, beliefs and historical conditions, which paigns. These actions include the sending of delega- materially affect social conceptions of justice and le- tions to parliamentary groups, to government commis- gitimacy. A sense of suddenly worsening deprivation, sions and to ministers of state, as the most open, most injustice or oppression is often a major precursor to public manner of exerting pressure at the level of political violence. power.9 For example the initial Pagad campaign in the Western Cape was directed through protest marches EXAMPLES OF DISSENT IN SOUTHERN against the lack of government’s response to crime in the province. When this concern was not sufficiently AFRICA addressed, this strategy was replaced by a more vio- Colonial administrations in Africa created highly au- lent approach. thoritarian and repressive systems of government. According to Moodie & Studdert-Kennedy,10 the bet- Authoritarianism can be defined as a political system: ter the group is organised, the more effective it is likely with limited, non-responsible, political plural- to be, whatever its membership or purpose. The greater ism, without elaborate and guiding ideology, proportion of the population the group represents, the without intensive or extensive political mobili- greater its impact. With respect to ideas and beliefs, it zation and in which the leader exercises politi- has an effect in three different ways: cal power within formally ill-defined limits, but 14 Certain groups are organized around a particu- actually quite predictable ones. lar set of beliefs. Secondly, any group gains in After independence, many of those in power in Afri- cohesion and hence in strength, where there is can countries failed to introduce more representative a sense of mission, a distinctive rationale or a political systems and retained many au- strong sense of commitment on the thoritarian powers. The situation was ex- part of the members exists. Thirdly, a acerbated when new ruling elites group will be stronger or weaker de- The better wanted to prolong their stay in power pending on whether it is swimming because of the benefits that it offered, with or against the tide of socially ac- the group is including wealth, prestige and employ- ceptable standards and beliefs. organised, ment opportunities for relatives and The third zone of public action is the ‘zone the more friends. The possible formation of com- of ambiguity’. This can be regarded as a effective it is peting political parties represented a ‘grey’ area where contentious issues in threat and the potential for loss of all society and the behaviour of individuals likely to be, these benefits. To avert this possibility and groups result in disorderly conduct whatever its governments were prepared to repress and acts of civil disobedience and con- opposition and dissent. Many govern- scientious objection, although the initial membership ments in Africa used their coercive pow- objective does not involve a comprehen- or purpose. ers to deny political opponents the op- sive rejection of legal authority. Although portunity for opposition. The suppres- it is a non-violent means of individual re- sion of political dissent through state sistance to authority it may, on occasion, power can ultimately lead to the gov- stimulate a repressive response by the authorities or by ernment in question relying on totalitarianism to gov- members of the community hostile to the objectors’ ern and remain in power. position.11 Totalitarianism can be identified by the presence of six 15 Peaceful acts of civil disobedience may on occasion be interrelated traits: infiltrated or even taken over by those who have no i) an official ideology to which everyone is supposed inhibitions about the use of violence, or who have an to adhere, especially passive adherence; ulterior motive. In other cases the demonstration, how- ii) a single mass party, led by one strong leader; ever peaceful in intent, may provoke a violent response. A peaceful campaign of civil disobedience can thus iii) a system of terror, through party and/or police con- result in violent confrontation, especially if one bears trol; in mind that protesters may be swept into more dan- iv) a monopoly or near-monopoly of control over the gerous and destructive emotions and actions. There is media; a tendency for such demonstrations to become more aggressive, partly because of the rising threshold of v) a monopolistic control over the armed forces; and shock needed to attract media attention and partly vi) a monopolistic control over the economy. because, when peaceful demonstrations fail to achieve results, frustration usually leads to more violence.12 Limiting access to political power has led people to According to Wilkinson13 collective rage and violence realise that the only way to win political concessions is are not necessarily a summation of individual frustra- not through peaceful negotiations but rather through

Botha • page 4 Paper 90 • August 2004 more violent forms of dissent. The possibility of one causes or may cause damage to public or regime peacefully succeeding the previous one is lim- private property, natural resources, environ- ited. It comes as no surprise that regimes that have mental or cultural heritage and is calculated themselves seized power often make sure that politi- or intended to: cal challenges from any quarter are prevented. Auto- (i) intimidate, put in fear, force, coerce or cratic presidents have often installed submissive legis- induce any government, body, institution, latures and ensured submissiveness by personally ap- the general public or any segment thereof, pointing the legislative candidates. Although one-party to do or abstain from doing any act, or to rule has become less acceptable, such parties have at- adopt or abandon a particular standpoint, tempted to remain in power by rigging elections. In or to act according to certain principles; such situations, independent civil society organisations or have often proved to be ineffective as a counterweight (ii) disrupt any public service, the delivery to the power of the political elite. They have some- of any essential service to the public or times been banned, forced underground, or carefully to create a public emergency; or monitored to ensure that they do not enter the politi- (iii)create general insurrection in a State. cal arena. (b) any promotion, sponsoring, contribution to, Legislation command, aid, incitement, encouragement, attempt, threat, conspiracy, organizing, or Legislation provides the first indication of the extent to procurement of any person, with the intent which a state will allow legitimate dissent as a funda- to commit any act referred to in paragraph mental right before regarding such dissent as terror- (a) (i) to(iii). ism. For example, Mozambican legislation defines terrorism as follows: This definition made provisions for indi- viduals, groups and states to be regarded (a) To place, or cause to be placed, on Independent as agents of terrorism. any ship or aircraft, in public or private places or premises, as well civil society In Zimbabwe the Public Order and Safety as inside equipment for public or organisations Act (January 22, 2002) defines an act of private use, any artefact or device insurgency, banditry, sabotage or terrorism capable of destroying or damaging have often as an act “committed for the purpose of them, putting at risk the safety of proved an causing or furthering an insurrection in property, places and human or ani- Zimbabwe or causing the forcible resis- mal lives, with the purpose of cre- ineffective tance to the government or procuring by ating social insecurity, terror or counterweight force the alteration of any law or policy of panic among the population, or of the government”. Included in the Act are pressuring the state or any to the killing or injuring a person, damaging or organisation of an economic, social power of destroying property, inflicting financial loss or political character to undertake on another person, obstructing the free or not to undertake certain activi- political movement of traffic in Zimbabwe and dis- ties; elites. rupting or interfering with an essential ser- vice. The following acts are banned: (b) To adulterate foodstuffs or other i) training a person to be a terrorist, as products intended for human or animal con- defined in the Act; sumption, or for socio-economic units, in order to cause death or serious damage to ii) training as a terrorist; health or to economic life, with the purpose iii) supplying weapons to terrorists, as defined; of creating social insecurity, terror or panic. iv) possessing weaponry for purposes of terrorism; and Clearly rioting and insurrection do not fall into the above definition and so the Renamo members arrested in v) harbouring, concealing or failing to report a terrorist. connection with the 9 November 2000 bloodshed in Also criminalised is the publishing and communication Montepuez were charged with ‘armed ’. of false statements prejudicial to the state. The same In the Algiers Convention on the Prevention and Com- relates to any act that undermines the authority of, or bating of Terrorism, 1999, a terrorist act is defined as: insults, the President. Part (iii) of the Act—which deals with public violence and undermining police author- (a) any act which is a violation of the criminal ity—and part (iv)— dealing with public gatherings and laws of a State Party and which may endan- demonstrations—do not address the issue of terrorism. ger the life, physical integrity or freedom of, Part (v) makes it mandatory for a person to carry iden- or cause serious injury or death to, any per- tity documents and gives the police powers of stop- son, any number or group of persons or ping and searching. Section 35 of the Act gives the

Botha • page 5 Paper 90 • August 2004 police the power to enter any aircraft that has landed independent broadcasting organisations, Voice of in Zimbabwe and search both the inside of the aircraft the People, was petrol-bombed. In addition the sale itself and any persons within. Any person at the aero- of independent newspapers has been banned alto- drome or airstrip can also be searched without a war- gether in many rural areas. The government’s de rant. Property used in the commission of an offence facto monopoly on radio broadcasting has enabled under this Act is also subject to seizure. total government control of the form of communi- cation most commonly used in Zimbabwe’s rural It is clear, therefore, that the Public Order and Safety areas, where the majority of the population lives.16 Act is geared primarily at preserving the Zimbabwean government. Even though it uses the term ‘terrorism,’ • A controversial land reform programme, which often it has nothing to do with combating global terrorism. It sparked illegal occupations of commercial farms and makes no mention of the various conventions against resulted in, among other things, the forced eviction of terrorism and it makes no attempt to consolidate the thousands of farm workers, farmers and their families. various segments of relevant provisions in earlier Acts Zimbabwean authorities have employed a range of into one all-encompassing anti-terrorism Act. techniques to cover up state involvement in politically motivated violence and to prevent perpetrators of hu- Zimbabwe man rights violations from being brought to justice. The government of Robert Mugabe is currently threat- These include: ened by both legitimacy and authority crises. Legiti- • the use of state-sponsored ‘militia’ to obscure the macy broadly means that a government is generally identification of the state’s agents as the perpetra- recognised as being the legitimate authority and as tors of human rights violations; having the authority for its actions. Recognition could come from its own citizens and/or from the interna- • preventing human rights defenders and the inde- tional community. Being recognised as pendent media from investigating and the legitimate authority provides it with publishing accounts of human rights vio- the necessary authority for its actions. In Zimbabwean lations; Zimbabwe both could be questioned. As • politically manipulating the police; a result of a crisis of legitimacy, which authorities presented a serious challenge to the con- have used a • manipulating the judicial system tinuity of the rule of ZANU(PF), it began through restrictive legislation designed to to refer to the opposition as ‘terrorists’, range of suppress dissent and threaten the rights therefore legitimising the use of counter- techniques of freedom of expression, association and terrorism legislation. The Zimbabwe peaceful assembly. The most commonly government’s reaction, rooted in its fear to cover up used pieces of legislation include, in the of losing power, took two forms: state order in which they were introduced, the Broadcasting Services Act, the Public • Political state-sponsored intimidation: involvement Order and Security Act 2002, the Access Parliamentary and presidential elec- in politically to Information and Protection of Privacy tions held in 2000 and 2002 respec- Act 2002, the Private Voluntary tively were marred by politically mo- motivated Organisations Act 1967 and the Labour tivated violence, intimidation and at- violence. Relations Amendment Act. Many provi- tacks, largely on members of the po- sions of these and other Acts directly con- litical opposition. This strategy in- travene Zimbabwe’s national Constitu- cluded unlawful arrests and torture perpetrated by tion and international human rights standards, which the police, ruling party supporters, youth ‘militia’ enshrine and guarantee the rights of Zimbabweans and other state agents. The main targets for repres- to the freedoms of expression, association and as- sion were those most vocal and critical of the sembly. For example: government’s human rights record, namely the in- dependent media, the opposition Movement for • The Emerging Powers Act Chapter 11:04 makes Democratic Change (MDC) and civil society exceptional provision for the protection of the organisations attempting to protect human rights. community in cases where a declaration of emer- In 2002 alone, approximately 44 media workers gency has been made. The President makes such were arrested while five were physically attacked. a declaration for purposes of public safety, main- Two media houses were petrol-bombed in 2002, tenance of public order, maintenance of any bringing the total number of bomb attacks on the essential service or the preservation of the peace. physical infrastructure of the independent press to Further, the President may make regulations for four since 2001. In February 2002 the Bulawayo preventive detention. offices of the Daily News were petrol-bombed, the • The Foreign Subversive Organisations Act Chap- third occasion in two years that the offices of this ter 11:05 provides for the punishment of cer- independent daily paper had been bombed. In tain acts hostile to other states or territories. Any August 2002, the office of one of Zimbabwe’s two person who organises or sets up or advocates

Botha • page 6 Paper 90 • August 2004 the setting up of a body with a view to over- Emergency and called for the creation of an interim throwing a government by unlawful means or government. In April 2001 Mario Masuku, President conducting a campaign against the lawfully es- of the outlawed People’s United Democratic Move- tablished government of any state is covered by ment, was arrested under the Political Order Act on a the operation of this Act. charge of sedition after allegedly uttering seditious state- ments at an unauthorised rally in Mbabane. In addi- • The Law and Order (Maintenance) Act Chapter tion, labour unions have joined Masuku’s party in the 11:07 1971 makes further provision for the Swaziland Democratic Alliance, an umbrella maintenance of law and order in Zimbabwe, to organisation that resorted to activities in stimu- provide for the prohibition, in the public inter- lating political reform. Royal Decree No. 2, promul- est, of the printing, publication, dissemination gated on June 24, gave the King the power to ban any and possession of certain publications. The his- book, magazine or newspaper, prohibit anyone from tory of this Act is that it was used for the sup- impersonating or ridiculing the King, prevent legal chal- pression of national liberation movements dur- lenges to any of the monarch’s executive decisions and ing the War for Independence. The Act did not eliminate bail for a range of crimes, including holding exclude the operations of such movements from illegal public demonstrations. the ambit of terrorism in general. • The Unlawful Organisations Act Chapter 11:13 Dissent is permitted in Swaziland, but not on an 1980 makes provision, in the interest of defence, organised scale. Political rallies and marches may not public safety or public order, for certain be held without permission from the Commissioner of organisations to be declared unlawful. In terms Police, who routinely denies such requests under the of the Act the President may declare any State of Emergency promulgated in King Sobhuza’s organisation to be unlawful if it appears to the 1973 royal decree, through which King Mswati’s fa- President that the activities of that ther endowed the Swazi monarchy with organisation, or of any of the ultimate executive, legislative and judi- 17 members of that organisation, are cial power. In the proclamation issued likely to endanger, disturb or in- Dissent is on 12 April 1973, subsection 11 dissolves terfere with defence, public safety permitted in and prohibits all political parties and simi- or public order in Zimbabwe. In lar bodies that “cultivate and bring about reality this Act has been used in Swaziland disturbances and ill feelings within the the past by government in its po- but not on Nations”. No meetings of a political na- litical battles against perceived po- ture and no processions or demonstra- litical enemies. There has been no an organised tions may be held or take place in any focus whatsoever on global terror- scale. public place unless with the prior written ism. In any case, as the preamble consent of the Commissioner of Police. clearly states it is geared towards Consent will not be given if the Commis- preserving public order in Zimbabwe and thus sioner has reason to believe that such meeting, pro- bears very little relevance to other countries. cession or demonstration is directly or indirectly re- lated to political movements or other riotous assem- • The Post and Telecommunication Services Act blies which may disturb the peace or otherwise disturb Chapter 12:02 1988 criminalises the unlawful the maintenance of law and order (subsection 12). Any interception of communications and at the same person who forms or attempts or conspires to form a time provides for by-laws, legalising certain in- political party or who organises or participates in any terceptions, particularly for purposes of national way in any meeting, procession or demonstration in security, as a diversion by the President. The Act contravention of this decree is guilty of an offence un- has extra-territorial application. Experience has der subsection 13.18 Under the Public Order Act, a shown that such powers are open to abuse, par- public gathering is described as “a public meeting, a ticularly when a state uses them in monitoring public procession or any other meeting, gathering or perceived political opponents. concourse of ten or more persons in a public place”. The onus is on the accused to prove that the public The constriction or abolition of civil society is a grave 19 violation of civil and political rights in itself, but official meeting concerned did not fall within this category. abuse may worsen if people step forward to disrupt Subsection 13(1) prohibits political dissent in the form the deceptively calm atmosphere that can be engen- of , especially under the following conditions: dered by effective repression. The Zimbabwe example (a) bringing into hatred or contempt, exciting proves that some governments will take whatever mea- disaffection against or undermining the law- sures they deem necessary to protect themselves. ful authority of the Government or a local Swaziland authority, or of persuading such body to al- ter any law or by-law, to appoint a commis- In Swaziland the opposition demanded an end to the sion or committee or to take any action which 27-year ban on political parties and to the State of it is not by law required to take; or

Botha • page 7 Paper 90 • August 2004 (b) endangering public order; or to them to stop their illegal activities or to face (c) endangering the economic life of Swaziland; the consequences in the form of shooting inci- or dents, pipe- and petrol-bombs and hand gre- (d) raising discontent or disaffection amongst His nade attacks. Majesty’s subjects or the inhabitants of 2. Dissatisfaction with the way government dealt with Swaziland, or engendering feelings of ill-will crime, with special reference to gangsterism and or hostility between different classes or dif- drug trafficking. As a pressure group Pagad intended ferent races of the population. to induce the authorities to rid the Western Cape Subsection 9(1) limits freedom of speech and associa- of gangsters, drugs and crime. tion: Between May 1996 and December 1997 Pagad sup- No person shall display, at a public meeting, or porters marched twice to Parliament and issued sus- at a public procession or at a school, any flag, pected drug-dealers with ultimatums as mentioned banner or other emblem signifying association above. Though there is probable justification for this with a political organization or with the promo- campaign, vigilantism is disorderly and unpredictable. tion of a political object. Vigilante punishment has the potential to be worse than the crime itself, with vigilantes becoming criminals Subsection 13(3) also limits these rights: themselves. Ironically, the original motive or objective of vigilante action is to strengthen state institutions. Any person, with intent to further a designated However, it often has the opposite effect: “the further who by word of mouth publicly, or by weakening and undermining of official criminal justice making a publication, advises, induces or per- channels and the creation of alternative centres of suades or attempts to advise, induce or persuade power—and by definition, coercion—outside State se- any person or class of persons to take curity apparatus”.20 any action which has been specified in relation to such boycott, shall be Pagad’s activities from December 1997 guilty of an offence. Pagad argued through 1998 can be divided into overt that its actions and covert actions. The argument can be South Africa made that Pagad crossed the border from were a natural legitimate dissent into the ‘zone of am- In South Africa, an organisation known response of biguity’ and the ‘security zone,’ espe- as People Against Gangsterism and Drugs cially on the covert level, with the estab- (Pagad) came to the fore during 1996 in citizens feeling lishment of the G-Force and cell struc- a campaign against gangs and drugs in the brunt of tures that were responsible for attacks on the Western Cape. Although Pagad re- alleged drug lords and gangsters. On the garded itself as a pressure/vigilante group, the state’s other hand, on the overt level the Pagad there was clear evidence that some of its failure to structure gradually moved away, past the later activities could, in the conventional limits of acceptable protest, to the status sense, be classified as acts of terrorism. protect them. of a vigilante group. Pagad never hesi- The high crime rate, moral decline and tated to use violence against gangsters inadequate legal system opened the way and drug dealers and its supporters also for Pagad as an anti-crime structure (a regarded the police as fair game, as shown by several form of vigilantism), concentrating on the following: clashes between them. After the shooting of five po- 1. Initiatives to combat crime: Pagad argued that its licemen during a battle at the Bellville court the then- actions were a natural response of citizens feeling Acting National Commissioner, Zoli Lavisa, said: the brunt of the state’s failure to protect them, a fundamental right in any society and upon which a Pagad’s aggression, especially against the police, state’s legitimacy depended. Initially Pagad had a shows quite clearly that it has embarked on a policy two-pronged strategy in this respect: of deliberate criminality. As far as the South Afri- can Police Service is concerned, Pagad has degen- • Confrontation against government incompetence: erated into just another gang and is now firmly if a government does not fulfil the mandate of the part of the crime problem in the Western Cape.21 people and is unwilling to be challenged or criticised, people have a moral right and obliga- Lavisa further commented that it was clear that Pagad tion to defend their own lives and their property. had distanced itself from its original goal of combating crime. Its aggression, especially towards South African • Confrontation against those who perpetrate Police Service members, indicated that it had openly crime: Pagad’s leadership believed that pressure embarked on a policy of deliberate criminality. on the government was insufficient and decided they should deal with the crime situation in the Its conduct, especially its violent campaign (often re- Western Cape themselves. They began to visit ferred to as a campaign of urban terror) could be clas- drug dealers and gang lords, issuing ultimatums sified within the category of illegitimate dissent.

Botha • page 8 Paper 90 • August 2004 The problem with a system that relies on popular jus- 26/6/98 A pipe bomb exploded outside the Mowbray tice is the fact that structures such as Pagad are formed police station—no-one was injured. without differentiated roles. There is also a lack of rules 6/8/98 A street vendor died and another was injured in (violence is not ruled out), norm dissent, no focus on a blast in Bellville outside the building housing the past (in terms of the law) or the future (in terms of the special police task team probing Pagad. mediation for problem solving) and nor is there a con- 25/8/98 A bomb exploded in the Planet Hollywood cept of the restructuring of social structures (whether Restaurant in Cape Town, killing one person of formal authority or public opinion). This situation and injuring at least 24 others—including nine can lead to anarchy: such structures are preoccupied British citizens —and causing major damage. with maintaining control and thus ‘forget’ about indi- The Muslims Against Global Oppression vidual freedom (including the right to a fair trial). Within (MAGO) claimed responsibility in a phone call the notion of popular justice there are no safeguards— to a local radio station, stating that the bomb was in retaliation for the US missile attacks on such structures may legitimise penalties that are more terrorist facilities in Sudan and Afghanistan. severe than necessary, on the basis that the crime was more serious or that the offenders are unrepentant. 1/1/99 A car bomb injured two at the Waterfront. 8/1/99 Five unidentified assailants firebombed a Using Figure 1 in relation to Pagad, the organisation Kentucky Fried Chicken restaurant in Cape can be located in different zones. Its overt activities fall Town, causing major damage but no injuries. within the framework of a pressure group. Through No-one claimed responsibility. protest marches, the issuing of ultimatums to the gov- 28/1/99 A bomb injured 11 outside Caledon Square ernment and the South African Police Service, Pagad’s police headquarters. aim of was to put pressure on government to take a 30/1/99 A woman was injured and a police car harder approach to crime and drugs in South Africa, in destroyed in a blast at the Woodstock police particular in the Western Cape. However, the covert station. activities of the Pagad cell structures (the G-Force) were 9/5/99 A car bomb exploded outside Athlone police not limited to issuing warnings to drug dealers as re- station. flected in the incidents that took place between June 6/11/99 Nine people were injured in a blast at Blah Bar, 1998 and October 2000 (see table at right). These in- a gay nightspot, in Somerset Road in central cidents were attributed to the G-Force by the police: Cape Town. 28/11/99 48 people were injured in a blast at St Elmo's The public is naturally averse to organisations that are restaurant in Camps Bay. seen to promote chaos on the streets. Peace is a uni- 24/12/99 Seven police officers were injured by a bomb versal aspiration and in normal circumstances the bran- planted in a refuse bin outside Mano's dishing of guns and flaunting of masks is almost guar- restaurant in Main Road, Greenpoint. A cellular anteed to rob an organisation of support. The fact that phone detonated the device remotely. Pagad continued to flourish reflected a deep-rooted 12/1/00 A bomb attached to a motorbike exploded in frustration with the then state of affairs. In turn, Pagad’s front of the Wynberg magistrate's court, injuring operations were divided between overt actions within one person. the ‘zone of legitimate dissent’, such as public meet- 10/6/00 Three people were slightly injured when a ings and the issuing of ultimatums and covert actions bomb, placed inside a Toyota Corolla, (within the zones of ‘ambiguity’ and ‘security’), for ex- detonated outside the New York Bagels ample, the formation of covert cell structures and at- restaurant. tacks on alleged drug dealers. This strategy was con- 18/7/00 A small explosive device planted in a dustbin at firmed in an article in The Cape Argus:22 Cape Town International airport caused minor damage. They marched on the homes of dozens of known 11/8/00 Two people, including a 10-year-old boy, were drug dealers, and staged at the city’s injured when a bomb planted in a Toyota points of entry, saying there were not sufficient Conquest, detonated at the Constantia Village control mechanisms in place to stop drugs from shopping centre in Cape Town. entering the country. Later the police alleged that 19/8/00 The doorman of the Bronx nightclub in smaller Pagad units were bombing and shooting Greenpoint suffered minor injuries when a car up drug dealers’ homes. bomb detonated outside the club. 29/8/00 Seven people were injured when a car bomb Each area had its own Pagad cell structure and these were exploded in Adderley Street in central Cape responsible for acts of violence, each under the leader- Town during the afternoon rush hour. ship of an Amir who reported to a broader structure. 8/9/00 A car bomb detonated outside the Obz Cafe, a student bar in Observatory. Mauritius 14/10/00 Demonstrators vandalised a McDonald's restaurant in Cape Town. No-one was injured, Mauritius experienced the development of groups with but significant damage was caused to the some similarities. During the 1990’s extremist ethnic restaurant and to customers' vehicles. groups began to exploit social tension, which had been

Botha • page 9 Paper 90 • August 2004 fuelled by a general feeling that the police were not Figure 2 able to deal with the growing threat presented by organised and violent crime. Inability to express The Hezbollah (Party of God) was founded in 1991 by opinion = violent Mohammad Fakeemeeah (alias Meeah), a Muslim who dissent Democracy Excessive had studied in Saudi Arabia. First, he recruited thou- countermeasures sands of militants through the establishment of an Is- Political lamic students’ organisation in Plaine Verte, in the capi- reaction tal city of Port Louis. This had as its objective the provi- sion of clothes, food, shelter and Islamic education to the poor. The social organisation then turned into a pressure group to fight for social change in the Port Political agenda Louis suburbs and throughout the whole country, but concentrated on areas where young Muslims were most exposed to drugs. After this process, Meeah’s group Semi-religious ideology became an openly sectarian political party, which took the name of Hezbollah. Meeah ran for a by-election in Unsatisfactory conditions 1992 and was narrowly defeated by the government party’s candidate.

Hezbollah established a Death Squadron as a covert/ Like Pagad, Hezbollah’s initial aim appears to have been para-military wing of the political party. After a raid on fighting drug gangs in the name of God and religion, the residence of Kadhafi Oozeer in Port Lois on 22 but only in Muslim areas and also using violent meth- November 2000, investigations revealed that extrem- ods. Its first strategy was to invest extensively in social ist movements in Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Qatar were and sustainable economic development in the poorest responsible for training Mauritians for the Death Squad- areas. ron. Its members were allegedly responsible for six murders, seven hold-ups against individuals and banks, Tanzania two acts of arson and an attempt to kill Prime Minister Navin Ramgoolam in December 1995. Through the Dissent in Tanzania manifested itself after the Baraza bank robberies and hold-ups, Hezbollah was estimated Kuu za Waislam wa Tanzania (National Association of to have collected about three million Mauritian Ru- Koran Readers in Tanzania, or Balukta) was founded in pees. According to his former lieutenants, this sum was the late 1980s. Its primary aim was to spread Islam allegedly given directly to Meeah. The money, added through concentrating on education and religious af- to funds received from foreign organisations, was used fairs. Its activities also included the building of mosques to buy real estate and to finance the party’s activities.23 and schools, developing health services (clinics) and providing financial assistance to Muslims in need.24 All Meeah’s singular philosophy has given birth to even this was in co-operation with the government. Balukta more radical splinter fundamentalists groups, such as especially excelled in its efforts to foster fluent reading Zam Zam, Al Mujahiroun and Grey Wolves. These of the Qur’an in Arabic. It then began to adopt a more organisations are deeply rooted in the impoverished extremist position and called for the establishment of area of Port Louis, which is a fertile ground for radical an Islamic state in Tanzania. Among other things, it: ideas and are in contact with sister groups in London 25 and Pakistan. Members are suspected to have engaged • developed clandestine ties with Iran, which of- in a terror campaign against restaurant and bar keep- fered financial assistance, and with Sudan. In 1993, ers in the Muslim area of the capital city, wanting to the Tanzanian government investigated reports that force them to close because they served pork and al- youths received military training at an Iranian- cohol. In April 1999, in the wake of a following a funded rice project at Ikwiriri, approximately 26 football match in which a Muslim-based team lost a 100 km south of Dar es Salaam. Sudan was ac- final, a mob burned down the oldest traditional Chi- cused of being involved in giving military training to nese gambling house on the island. Five adults and two Tanzanians to topple the government. In the aftermath babies died in the attack. Seven young Muslims were of the in April 1993 three Sudanese nationals 27 sentenced to 45 years imprisonment on conviction. were expelled for their alleged involvement; Evidence against them showed that they wanted to ‘pu- • demanded that only Muslims serve in key positions rify‘ that part of Port Louis, where a gambling house in the government and its apparatuses—Balukta neighbours a mosque. claims that Tanzania Muslims, who make up 33% percent of the country’s population, are The following graphical presentation indicates the de- marginalised by Christians, who constitute 34%;28 velopment of social based organisations into extremist groups and, eventually, into groups that resort to ter- • called for a jihad against the government when it rorism: did not grant these demands, arguing that the gov-

Botha • page 10 Paper 90 • August 2004 ernment discriminated against Muslims and that it ruary 2000. Police blocked a demonstration by oppo- planned to task the Catholic Church with the re- sition supporters against the much-criticised 2000 elec- sponsibility for health and education services in the tions, which were marred by serious violence and were country, as a means of reducing government ex- described by the Commonwealth as a “shambles”. A penses; and climate of harassment and repression of political activ- • participated in riots in April 1993 in the streets of ity continued for the better part of the year. On Octo- Dar es Salaam, where butcheries selling pork were ber 9, 2001, the Zanzibar authorities and the opposi- attacked. Over 50 Muslims were arrested and tion signed a deal on tension-reducing measures, in- charged with inciting religious conflict between cluding electoral reform, provision of equal access by Christians and Muslims.29 all parties to the state media and the holding of by- elections for seats that remained vacant after the dis- Against this background, Balukta members were sus- puted 2000 elections. This deal served as a preventive pected and accused of plotting through the mosques measure for illegitimate dissent. to topple the government by force,30 of inciting against it, of trying to stir up riots between Christians and Mus- During January 2001 violent clashes between Tanza- lims by disseminating cassettes and of intending to de- nian police and demonstrators disrupted on Zanzibar, stroy churches. It was leaked to the media that Balukta leaving 20 dead, including a security force member in 34 had recruited at least 500 young volunteers to join an Pemba. Members of the police fired repeatedly at Islamic army, which was to mount a jihad. Countering supporters of the Civic United Front (CUF), who de- this threat, the government banned Balukta, using the manded a re-run of the 2000 elections. In one inci- directives governing its registration as an association in dent on Pemba, a policeman was decapitated with a justification of this move.31 According to the Depart- machete. Violence appeared to have started when the ment of Information, Balukta failed to adhere to a reg- police tried to prevent the demonstrations from taking istration directive that it should involve it- place. After demonstrators threw stones self only with the propagation of the read- and petrol bombs, members of the po- ing of the Qur’an. Its activities extended lice returned fire, which included the use 35 beyond this framework.32 Tanzania’s of teargas and live rounds. As a result 300 people were arrested on charges Before the presidential elections of Octo- image was ranging from murder to unlawful assem- ber 1995, the organisation demanded that badly bly and the destruction of property.36 In only a Muslim should be allowed to be- addition to violent clashes between dem- come president. Balukta supported Mus- tarnished by onstrators and authorities, a series of ex- lim candidates in the elections. Political serious abuse plosions was also recorded. Nine bomb- tension and human rights violations in ings were recorded for the period be- Zanzibar increased in the build-up to elec- on Zanzibar tween October 2000 and February 2001. tions scheduled for 29 October 2000 for and Pemba The ninth detonated at the office of the the Presidents of Tanzania and Zanzibar. ruling Chama Cha Mapinduzi Party in the After the wakening of Islamic conscious- in 2000. Chakechake area in northern Pemba.37 ness, sporadic clashes between govern- ment forces and Muslims, particularly on In February 2002 a civilian and a police- Zanzibar and Pemba, became more frequent and vio- man died in riots in Dar es Salaam. Several others were lent. Eight policemen and six civilians were wounded injured when rival groups of Muslims held running in Dar es Salaam.33 battles with armed riot police, over use of a mosque. The conflict dated back to religious riots between the Although one might speculate on the reason for this authorities and the local Muslim community in 1998, development, the reality was that resentment was on sparked by the arrest of a popular Muslim leader for the increase, which not only contributed to sporadic allegedly violating a law that prohibited incitement clashes but also raised the possibility of acts of terror- against other religions through preaching. Following the ism. Although a direct relationship between these de- unrest, a faction that became the Ponda group moved velopments and the subsequent bombing of the US away from the area, refusing to recognise the new Embassy in Dar es Salaam in August 1998 cannot be government-appointed mosque administration. The proved, one can safely assume that without polarisation latest confrontation arose from the group’s refusal to between the Muslim community in Zanzibar and the gov- ask the Mwembechai mosque leaders for permission ernment on the mainland, the foundations for dissent to hold special prayers in commemoration of two Mus- might not have existed. This is especially so since those lims who died in the 1998 riots.38 implicated in the bombing all came from Zanzibar. Although different from the South African example, the Political violence during elections activities in Tanzania share some similar trends:

Tanzania’s image was badly tarnished by serious abuses • both started from a broad community support base, that took place on the semi-autonomous islands of later narrowed down to covert, violent activities that Zanzibar and Pemba during late January and early Feb- included a few individuals; and

Botha • page 11 Paper 90 • August 2004 • domestic conditions were easily manipulated as a The term ‘enemy of the state’ is often used, for ex- recruitment ground for extremism, with the possi- ample. The government of Zimbabwe went even bility that this might lead to acts of terrorism. further, using counter-terrorism legislation against political opponents. The purpose is to isolate dis- REACTING TO DISSENT senters from other members of society and to cause potential supporters to fear the strictest punishment Government reaction to dissent varies in relation to for joining them. Countries in Southern Africa stand both the type of dissent and the type of regime. How- a great risk of being manipulated by dissent, com- ever, governments’ responses may be determined by fac- ing as it does after periods of brutal dictatorships tors outside of the type of dissent. These factors include: which left a lot of people in these countries disillu- sioned with police brutality, with war, corruption • The security of regime continuance. Dissent is more and political intolerance and with the widening gap likely to be directed against intolerant regimes that between rich and poor. Though change is seeping repress or restrict certain groups or persons because into the political structures in the sub-region, it is of their identity.=Toleration involves both accept- not moving fast enough to satisfy public opinion. ing and protecting divergent practices and valuing These conditions are made worse by high unem- the rights and contributions of persons regardless ployment, poor socio-economic conditions and of inherent characteristics. Tolerance may vary with populations fragmented on religious, ethnic, tribal the homogeneity of the society, with more homo- and regional grounds. geneous societies either more tolerant because mi- norities pose little threat, or less tolerant because • Societal perceptions of regime legitimacy. Regime there is little threat involved in repressing minori- legitimacy normally springs from democratically ties.39 Regimes established through military coups chosen leaders.=However, war heroes, resistance are particularly vulnerable to being figures, or popular figures in society may also be ousted, either by a rival coup, or by granted popular legitimacy. Regimes or demands for open elections.=The Ni- leaders enjoying such legitimacy may be gerian coup of October 1993 is an ex- Regimes vary able to tolerate dissent more than those ample, where leaders found themselves regimes led by weak or unpopular constantly under pressure, particularly in their figures.=There is a reverse argument here, from citizens who were angered that the ability to though. Some regimes or leaders may coup had derailed the results of a demo- enhance their popularity by crushing dis- cratic election.=Consequently, the coup adapt to sent in the name of the state or by claim- leaders cracked down hard on dissent, dissent. ing that what portrays itself as domestic fearing that it would further weaken dissent is fomented by ‘foreign powers’. their position. This offers a very im- Saddam Hussein suppressed Kurdish dis- portant lesson in understanding the relationship be- sent and claimed that it was in fact orchestrated by tween government strategy and communal dissent the US and Israel. At the same time, he crushed Shi’ia and eventually terrorism—the greater the necessity dissent in southern Iraq by arguing that Iran instigated to control through imposing strict measures, the it and thus took credit for saving Iraq from Iran. higher the risk of escalation. In other words, de- • The underpinning value structure of the regime. mocracies might be more lenient towards dissent Regime value structures determine, to some extent, than totalitarian or autocratic regimes, accepting it how they react to dissent.=These values include tol- as part of the political process. However, dissent erance both for diversity and for dissent, assump- might be more likely in authoritarian countries tions of loyalty between ruler and subject and re- where governments generally close other avenues gime assumptions about civil rights and liberties re- to legitimate opposition.= stricting regime power to curb or lessen dissent.= • The ability of the regime to adapt to pressures from As presented in Figure 2, government reaction to dis- dissent. Regimes vary in their ability to adapt to sent can either further democracy or stimulate violence dissent.=Regimes installed through popular mandate or illegitimate dissent, including acts of terrorism. This are much more likely to tolerate non-violent dis- raises the question: how should dissent be dealt with? sent, at least, than non-accountable regimes. Inclu- Most governments wish to deter dissent, if possible, sive regimes are also more likely to tolerate non- and quash it if deterrence fails.=The range of policies avail- violent dissent than exclusive regimes dominated able to achieve either deterrence or dissuasion from fur- by a single group.=Social and economic transfor- ther dissent, should it occur, is wide, including: mation makes it increasingly difficult for local gov- ernments to either control their populations or to • compromise, which the regime can accept as an mobilise them in support of social and economic option without weakening either its basic principles development, which leads to several cultural and or its viability to rule; behavioural problems. Governments facing dissent frequently accuse dissenters of weakening the state • anticipation, by adopting policies that fend off dis- in the face of either internal or external opposition. sent, or channel dissent into opposition;

Botha • page 12 Paper 90 • August 2004 • redirection of dissent by targeting groups unpopu- CONCLUSION lar with dissenters; Insufficient attention has been given to the role played • selective repression of the most extreme dissenters in by many of the post-independence political dissent hopes that other may reconsider choosing dissent; and movements in Africa. It remains a challenge for gov- • thorough repression of all dissent. ernments and analysts to develop a better understand- ing of their role and of the preferred options that are It was mentioned above that the type of regime deter- available to governments when engaging with them. mines government reaction. From a Southern African Many dissident organisations represent powerful forces perspective, dissent has proved difficult for some coun- that have a critical role in the political and social land- tries to deal with. In general, the protection of the scape of their countries. The inability of states to effec- following rights during public demonstrations by govern- tively manage and respond to dissent movements has ment and law enforcement agencies can significantly con- contributed to many conflicts and led to national and 40 tribute towards preventing the escalation of dissent: regional instability. A better understanding of the role • the right of demonstrators to speak freely and to that dissent organisations play is therefore likely to lead assemble peacefully; to better management of crises in Africa and reduce the number of oppressive government responses aimed • the right of other people, not part of the demon- at repressing such organisations. There is a need to re- stration, to freedom of movement and to privacy; visit and question the conventional dichotomy of the and ‘legitimate state vs and terrorists’. • the right of all people to be free from violence to property or person. Legitimate dissent is an inevitable element of a healthy political system and is often seen as a hallmark of po- It is essential that security forces responsible litical maturity. This does not mean that for maintaining political order be fair and dissent does not continuously throw up objective in minimising confrontation. The new challenges to governments and so- same treatment should be applied to all dem- The role of cial analysts. Even long-established de- onstrations, irrespective of the cause. the vast mocracies know that the appearance of Despite these factors, government reaction majority of of radical dissent groups, especially when to dissent is often the deciding factor be- they express their opposition in a violent tween legitimate and illegitimate dissent post- or destructive manner, serve as a serious and the decision to resort to a violent cam- independence warning to governments and their secu- paign. Tolerance for dissent means, ulti- rity forces that the issues raised by such mately, the willingness of officials to per- political groups, as well as the underlying causes, mit non-violent activities, even when they dissent need to be considered and addressed in are designed to bring about a peaceful a balanced and constructive manner. This transition of power to replace the govern- movements cannot always mean that demands made ment. It also means restraint in the face of in Africa has by dissenting groups are acceded to by offensive expressions of opinion. Tolerance the state but it requires that at least a bal- also implies the willingness of an opposi- largely been anced approach is applied in addressing tion to permit others to choose between ignored. their issues. Governments should appre- groups in presenting their opinions. In ciate that each tactical initiative or strat- other words, a society in which there is a egy will have consequences and that from search for true consensus and tolerance government’s perspective a key objective for dissent is one in which fundamental human rights should be to minimise the support base for individuals are respected by all. and groups who resort to unlawful dissent. For dissent groups one objective, among others, will be to maximise If community members are able to voice their concern the space within which they can freely express their and opposition through legitimate dissent, the possi- dissenting views. bility of violence is likely to be limited. Conversely, the more government limits freedom of speech and legiti- There is often a fine line between countering terrorism mate dissent, the greater is the possibility of violence and creating the justification for future terrorism. A and, consequently, acts of terrorism. If one applies this proper understanding of dissent and how to deal with theory to Tanzania, in areas with a large Muslim con- it will enable governments to better recognise such fine centration government actions are interpreted as be- dividing lines and therefore enhance the chances that ing anti-Islamic, which creates a ‘need’ for defence of corrective steps will in fact reduce the risk of terrorism identity and religion against an ‘international conspiracy’. rather than enhance it.

Botha • page 13 Paper 90 • August 2004 Notes 21 Ibid.

1 J O Urmson, The concise encyclopaedia of western phi- 22 J Aranes, Drug war seethes across Cape suburbs: Pagad losophy and philosophers, Hutchinson Group, and gangsters struggle for mastery of the streets, The Cape Johannesburg, 1975, p 267. Argus, 30 July 1997, p 10. 2 J Locke, Two treatises of civil government, J M Dent & 23 H Marimootoo, Report on criminality in Mauritius, un- Sons, London, 1924, p 180. published paper presented to the Institute for Security Studies. 2003 3 C Soanes, The Oxford compact English dictionary, Ox- ford University Press, Oxford, 2000, p 314. 24 P G Forster, Religion and the state in Tanzania and Malawi, Journal of Asian and African Studies Vol 32, No. 3-4, 1 4 DS Sorenson, ‘Dynamics of political dissent in Egypt’, December 1997. presentation to the meeting of the International Studies Association, Hong Kong, July 2001. 25 Reuters News, Tanzania outlaws Muslim fundamentalist 5 D Bricker & L Leatherbee, Consensus and dissent in the group, 29 April 1993. Horn of Africa, The Fund for Peace, New York, 1994, p 26 P Chintowa, Tanzania-religion: Government aims to stem 2. fundamentalism, 1 August 1994. 6 P Wilkinson, Terrorism and the liberal state, 2nd edition, Macmillan, London, 1986, p 29. 27 Inter Press Service Global Information Network, Tanza- nia: Government orders Sudanese nationals to leave, 26 7 C E S Franks, Dissent and the state, Oxford University April 1993. Press, Toronto, 1989, p 6. 28 Ibid. 8 G Moodie & G C Studdert-Kennedy, Opinions, publics and pressure groups: An essay on vox populi and repre- 29 Ibid. sentative government, George Allen & Unwin Ltd., Lon- don, 1970, p 60-61. 30 A Lusekelo, Tanzania outlaws Muslim fundamentalist group, Reuters News, 29 April 1993. 9 Ibid. 31 Agence France-Presse, Tanzania bans Muslim organiza- 10 Moodie & Studdert-Kennedy, op cit, p 67-68. tion, 29 April 1993. 11 Wilkinson, op cit, p 26-27. 32 BBC Monitoring News: Africa, Government disbands 12 R Clutterbuck, The future of political violence: Destabili- Council for the Propagation of the Koran, 18 June 1993. zation, disorder and terrorism, St. Martin’s Press, New York, 1986, p 41. 33 Agence France-Presse, 14 wounded in clashes at Tanza- nia opposition rally: police, 28 October 2000. 13 Wilkinson, op cit, p 35. 34 Reuters News, Twenty-one feared dead in Zanzibar vio- 14 J Maravall, Dictatorship and political dissent: Workers and lence, 27 January 2001. students in Franco’s Spain, Tavistock Publications, Lon- don, 1978, p 2-3. 35 Ibid.

15 C J Friedrich & Z K Brezezinski, Totalitarian dictatorship 36 A England, Official death toll in Zanzibar violence rises and autocracy, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, to 23, Associated Press, 30 January 2001. 1956, p 22. 37 PanAfrican News Agency, Panic engulfs Island as another 16 Amnesty International, Zimbabwe rights under siege, 2 bomb explodes, 5 February 2001. May 2003, p 3-4. 38 BBC Monitoring News: Africa, Two die in Muslim riot in 17 J Mwiinga, Clampdown on political dissent continues, 16 Tanzania, 14 February 2002. February 2002. 39 Sorenson, op cit, p 3. 18 Proclamation by His Majesty King Sobhuza II, Swaziland, 12 April 1973, p 5. 40 J W Sterling, R J Bostick & D C Dilworth, Protecting dis- 19 Police and Public Order Act 17 of 1963, Swaziland. sent policing disorder: An evaluation and documentation of the National Political Convention Law Enforcement 20 M Shaw, Buying time?: Vigilante action, crime control Project, US Department of Justice, Law Enforcement As- and state responses, Crime and Conflict 7, 1996, p 5-8. sistance Administration, 1974, p 379-380.

Botha • page 14 Paper 90 • August 2004 ○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○ ✁○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○

Subscription to ISS Papers

If you would like to subscribe to the ISS Papers series, please complete the form below, and return it together with a cheque made payable to the Institute for Security Studies (marked not transferable) or a postal/money order for the correct amount. ISS Publication Subscriptions, P O Box 1787, Brooklyn Square, 0075, Pretoria, South Africa

PERSONAL DETAILS Title: ...... Surname: ...... Initials: ...... Organisation: ...... Position: ...... Postal address: ...... Postal code: ...... Country: ...... Tel: ...... Fax: ...... Email: ......

ISS PAPERS SUBSCRIPTION 2003 – MIN 8 PER YEAR

SOUTH AFRICA AFRICAN COUNTRIES* INTERNATIONAL R120.00 US $24.00 US $32.00

* Angola, Botswana, Burundi, Comores, Congo-Brazzaville, Democratic Rep. of Congo, Gabon, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Reunion, Rwanda, Seychelles, Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe (formerly African Postal Union countries)

Details of subscription rates for the African Security Review, ISS Monographs, the Nedbank ISS Crime Index or other ISS publications are available from: ISS Publication Subscriptions, P O Box 1787, Brooklyn Square, 0075, Pretoria, South Africa Tel: +27-12-346-9500/2 • Fax: +27-12-460-0998 • Email: [email protected] • www.iss.co.za/Publications/Main.html

Botha • page 15 Paper 90 • August 2004 The ISS mission

The vision of the Institute for Security Studies is one of a stable and peaceful Africa characterised by human rights, the rule of law, democracy and collaborative security. As an applied policy research institute with a mission to conceptualise, inform and enhance the security debate in Africa, the Institute supports this vision statement by undertaking independent applied research and analysis, facilitating and supporting policy formulation; raising the awareness of decision makers and the public; monitoring trends and policy implementation; collecting, interpreting and disseminating information; networking on national, regional and international levels; and capacity-building.

About this paper About the author

Political dissent manifests itself through expressions of Anneli Botha is a senior researcher on political opposition in ways that can either be terrorism at the Institute for Security regarded as legitimate and lawful, or as unlawful Studies (ISS) in Cape Town. Before because they contravene the laws of the state. The joining the ISS in March 2003 she was a potentially most destructive form of political dissent is member of the South African Police that which is expressed through acts of violence by Service: Crime Intelligence for ten years. supporters of a particular political cause. The dividing She holds an MA in Political Studies line between legitimate forms of political dissent and from the Rand-Afrikaans University. Her interests in those violent acts of political dissent that are regarded Islamic studies and trends in, and the development as unacceptable and unlawful is often difficult to of, terrorism led to a thesis on Pagad’s structure and identify because of legal uncertainty and because activities and government reaction to the governments use arbitrary criteria to draw such organisation. distinction. Why do political groups that initially employ legitimate expressions of political dissent ultimately resort to strategies of violence and terror? This paper aims to contribute to a better About the funders understanding of the nature and role of political dissent in a democracy and of how the state should The publication of this paper was supported by the respond to its various manifestations. Norwegian Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

© 2003, Institute for Security Studies • ISSN: 1026-0404 The opinions expressed in this paper do not necessarily reflect those of the Institute, its Trustees, members of the Advisory Board or donors. Authors contribute to ISS publications in their personal capacity. Published by the Institute for Security Studies • P O Box 1787 • Brooklyn Square • 0075 • Pretoria • SOUTH AFRICA Tel: +27-12-346-9500/2 • Fax: +27-12-460-0998 Email: [email protected] • http://www.iss.co.za 67 Roeland Square • Drury Lane • Gardens • Cape Town • 8001 • SOUTH AFRICA Tel: +27-21-461-7211 • Fax: +27-21-461-7213 Email: [email protected]