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Going Political: Labor, Institutions and Democratic Unrest in North Africa

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Going Political: Labor, Institutions and Democratic Unrest in North Africa Going Political: Labor, Institutions and Democratic Unrest in North Africa The Harvard community has made this article openly available. Please share how this access benefits you. Your story matters Citation Anderson, Ashley A. 2016. Going Political: Labor, Institutions and Democratic Unrest in North Africa. Doctoral dissertation, Harvard University, Graduate School of Arts & Sciences. Citable link http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:33840671 Terms of Use This article was downloaded from Harvard University’s DASH repository, and is made available under the terms and conditions applicable to Other Posted Material, as set forth at http:// nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of- use#LAA GOING POLITICAL?: LABOR, INSTITUTIONS, AND DEMOCRATIC UNREST IN NORTH AFRICA A DISSERTATION PRESENTED BY ASHLEY ANDERSON TO THE DEPARTMENT OF GOVERNMENT IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN THE SUBJECT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE HARVARD UNIVERSITY CAMBRIDGE , MASSACHUSETTS JUNE 2016! © 2016 Ashley Anderson All rights reserved. Dissertation Advisor: Grzegorz Ekiert Ashley Anderson Going Political: Labor, Institutions and Democratic Unrest in North Africa Abstract Since the industrial revolution first united workers and politics, union activism has been a key driver of not only economic progress but also of political change. Where unions have engaged in significant political mobilization, their activism has been critical to the success of anti-authoritarian protests — as cases like South Africa, Poland, South Korea, Brazil and most recently, Tunisia, attest. Where they have remained on the sidelines, however, anti-regime opposition has often been weaker and less successful. What explains variation in labor movements’ decisions to engage in politically-motivated protest within authoritarian regimes? Drawing upon evidence from the Middle East/North Africa, my dissertation attempts to explain this puzzling heterogeneity from an institutional perspective. Challenging the assumption that labor opposition is contingent upon the material benefits offered to trade unions, I highlight the impact that authoritarian institutions, particularly those which structure popular representation and contestation in the regime, have on union decisions to express political demands. I argue that differences in unions’ political mobilization stem from variation in autocrats’ methods of labor incorporation. Where autocrats incorporate labor into representative institutions, coalition building between unions and established parties undermine political activism by coopting the interests of union elites and diminishing vertical accountability between union leaders and the rank- and-file. Conversely, where unions were alienated from formal institutions, the development of “outsider alliances” between union elites, marginalized parties, and rank-and-file members facilitate political mobilization by radicalizing labor agendas and promoting internal democracy within union structures. To make the case, I engage in a comparative analysis of labor protest in Tunisia and Morocco since the inauguration of neoliberal reforms in the 1970s. Using original data on labor protest drawn from English, Arabic and French news sources, I show that despite facing common economic crises and organizational constraints, unions in these two regimes have adopted dramatically different modes of mobilization — from militant political opposition in Tunisia to limited economic protest in Morocco. In the empirical chapters of the dissertation, I trace this divergence to differences in unions’ incorporation within workplace and political institutions, using novel data on legislative and union elections as evidence. Finally, drawing upon archival research and over 100 interviews conducted with labor militants, I supplement these empirical data with case study evidence, which illustrates the way in which formal institutions channel labor demands away from the street, making it less likely for unions to engage in militancy and politically oppose the regime.! iii CONTENTS List of Tables and Figures v List of Abbreviations vi Acknowledgements viii PART I: FRAMEWORK 1 Introduction 2 2 Labor Protest in North Africa: Explanations, Predictions and Realities 22 PART II: INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT 3 Authoritarian Control and Political Coalitions: Comparing Morocco and Tunisia 77 PART III: CASES 4 Workers in an Era of Change: Labor Responses to Early Neo-liberal Reforms 5 Workers in an Age of Adjustment: Labor Reactions to Structural Adjustment Programs 6 Workers in the Shadow of Reform: Labor Protest in the Autumn of Autocracy 7 Conclusion iv TABLES AND FIGURES Figure 1.1: Comparison between labor protests collected in MENALC, CNTS, and SCAD 15 Figure 2.1: Protest events (aggregate) Tunisia and Morocco, 1970-2011 24 Figure 2.2: Striker intensity, various countries, 1999-2011 25 Figure 2.3: Workdays lost due to strikes (aggregate) in Tunisia and Morocco 26 Figure 2.4: Political labor mobilization in Tunisia and Morocco 28 Figure 2.5: Union organization in Tunisia and Morocco 33 Figure 2.6: Annual wage growth (nominal terms) in Tunisia and Morocco, 1980-2011 38 Figure 2.7: De jure and de facto labor rights in the MENA region, 2006 39 Table 2.1: Organizational features of unions in Tunisia and Morocco 40 Figure 2.8: Growth in wages and labor productivity in the MENA region, 1999-2011 (%) 49 Figure 3.1: Party and union development in Morocco 110 Table 4.1: Average annual salaries in Tunisia (in real terms), 1970-1977 124 Figure 4.1: Strike activity in Tunisia, 1961-1986 126 Table 4.2: Number of labor actions, 1970-1986 129 Figure 4.2: Labor mobilization in Tunisia, 1970-1986 132 Table 4.3: Wage disparities between categories of workers (1975-1985) 138 Figure 4.3: Labor mobilization in Morocco, 1977-1982 159 Figure 4.4: Strike activity by sector in Morocco (1977-1982) 160 Figure 5.1: Annual wage growth in Tunisia (minimum-wage workers) 183 Table 5.1: Unemployment and job vacancies in Tunisia 186 Figure 5.2: Labor mobilization in Tunisia, 1987-1997 189 Figure 5.3: Labor actions in Tunisia by demand Type, 1987-1997 190 Table 5.2: Delegates to the 1989 UGTT Congress 195 Figure 5.4: Unemployment rate (% of total labor force) in Morocco, 1991-1997 211 Table 5.3: Employment in privatized manufacturing enterprises 214 Figure 5.5: Strike activity in Morocco, 1983-1997 217 Figure 5.6: Labor mobilization in Morocco, 1989-1997 218 Figure 5.7: Labor actions in Morocco by actor, 1989-1997 219 Table 5.4: Labor representation in regional councils, 1997 235 Figure 6.1: Labor mobilization in Tunisia, 1998-2011 244 Figure 6.2: Approved labor actions in Tunisia, 1998-2011 245 Figure 6.3: Strike activity in Morocco, 1998-2011 269 Figure 6.4: Labor mobilization in Morocco, 1998-2011 270 Figure 6.5: Labor actions in Morocco by actor, 1998-2010 271 Figure 6.6: Labor mobilization in Morocco, 2011 280 Table 6.3: Parliamentary elections in Morocco, 1997 283 Table 6.4: Participation in the February 20th Movement by branch, UMT 288 v LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AFL-CIO American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations CDT Democratic Confederation of Labor (Confédération Démocratique du Travail) CGT General Confederation of Labor (Confédération Générale du Travail) CGTT General Confederation of Tunisian Workers (Confédération Générale des Travailleurs Tunisiens) CNI National Union Congress (Congrès National Ittihadi) FDT Democratic Federation of Labor (Fédération Démocratique du Travail) ICFTU International Confederation of Free Trade Unions IMF International Monetary Fund OADP Organization of Popular Democratic Action (Organisation de l’Action Démocratique Populaire) ODT Democratic Organization of Labor (Organisation Démocratique du Travail) ONCF National Office of Moroccan Railways (Office National des Chemins de Fer du Maroc) PADS Party of the Socialist Democratic Avant Garde (Parti de l’Avant Garde Démocratique Socialiste) PI Istiqlal Party (Parti de l’Istiqlal) PJD Justice and Development Party (Parti du Justice et du Développment) PND Neo-Destour Party (Parti Neo-Destour) PPS Party of Progress and Socialism (Parti du Progrès et du Socialisme) PSD Socialist Destour Party (Parti Socialiste Destour) RCD Constitutional Democratic Rally (Rassemblement Constitutionel Démocratique) SAP Structural adjustment plan UD-CGT Departmental Union of the General Confederation of Labor (Union Departementale du ConfédérationGénérale du Travail) UGAT General Union of Tunisian Farmers (Union Générale des Agriculteurs Tunisiens) UGSCM General Union of Confederated Moroccan Syndicates (Union Générale des Syndicats du Maroc) UGTM General Union of Moroccan Workers (Union Générale des Travailleurs Marocaines) UGTT General Union of Tunisian Labor (Union Générale Tunisien du Travail) UMT Moroccan Union of Labor (Union Marocaine du Travail) UNTM National Union of Moroccan Workers (Union Nationale des Travailleurs Marocaines) UNFP National Union of Popular Forces (Union Nationale des Forces Populaires) USFP Socialist Union of Popular Forces (Union Socialiste des Forces Populaires) USTT UNTT National Union of Tunisian Workers (Union National des Travailleurs Tunisiens) vi UTAC Tunisian Union of Artisanry and Commerce (Union Tunisenne de l’Artisanat et du Commerce) UTICA Tunisian Union of Industry, Commerce, and Artisanry (Union Tunisenne de l’Industrie, du Commerce, et de l’Artisanat) UTT Tunisian Union of Labor (Union Tunisien du Travail)! vii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I can say, without reservation, that if left
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