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Electoral Accountability and Particularistic Legislation: Evidence from an Electoral Reform in Mexico”

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Electoral Accountability and Particularistic Legislation: Evidence from an Electoral Reform in Mexico” Online Appendix \Electoral Accountability and Particularistic Legislation: Evidence from an Electoral Reform in Mexico" Lucia Motolinia∗ ∗Department of Politics, New York University. Contact: [email protected] 1 Variation in reelection incentives for legislators facing elections in 2018 Term limits 2 Terms 3 Terms 4 Terms First year of possible reelection 2017 2018 2019 2021 Figure A1: Distribution of states by the maximum number of terms local legislators can stay in office if reelected (Top). Distribution of states with respect of the first year local legislators can run for reelection (Bottom). 2 Legislators by Election Tier Table A1: Number of Legislators and their Election Tier per state in 2018. State Total Number Legislators elected Legislators of Legislators by FPP in SMD elected by PR Aguascalientes 27 18 9 Baja California 25 16 9 Baja California Sur 21 16 5 Campeche 35 21 14 Chiapas 40 24 16 Chihuahua 33 22 11 Ciudad de Mexico 66 33 33 Coahuila 25 16 9 Colima 25 16 9 Durango 25 15 10 Estado de Mexico 75 45 30 Guanajuato 36 22 14 Guerrero 46 28 18 Hidalgo 30 18 12 Jalisco 39 20 19 Michoacan 40 24 16 Morelos 20 12 8 Nayarit 30 18 12 Nuevo Leon 42 26 16 Oaxaca 42 25 17 Puebla 41 26 15 Queretaro 25 15 10 Quintana Roo 25 15 10 San Luis Potosi 27 15 12 Sinaloa 40 24 16 Sonora 33 21 12 Tabasco 35 21 14 Tamaulipas 36 22 14 Tlaxcala 25 15 10 Veracruz 50 30 20 Yucatan 25 15 10 Zacatecas 30 18 12 Sources: Data is drawn from the state's constitutions. 3 Electoral Returns in 2015/16 of legislators who ran for Reelection in 2018 Table A2: Difference in means test of the electoral returns in 2015/16 of legislators who ran for Reelection in 2018, compared with legislators not renominated by their parties. Did not run for Ran for Reelection Difference P-value Reelection in 2018 in 2018 Vote Share in the 35.022 37.294 -2.272 0.016 2015/16 Election (297) (100) Number of observations in parenthesis. The sample includes only legislators elected in SSD in states where they could run for reelection in 2018. 4 Example snapshots of transcripts in different states (a) Hidalgo (b) Guanajuato (c) Tlaxcala (d) Aguascalientes Figure A2: Examples of the differences in format and quality of the transcripts in Hidalgo, Aguascalientes, Tlaxcala and Guanajuato. 5 Number of sessions and electoral years per State Table A3: Distribution of sessions and electoral years per State, election years corresponds to the timing of treatment assignment State Number of Sessions Electoral years (documents) Aguascalientes 142 2013, 2016, 2018 Campeche 514 2012, 2015, 2018 Chiapas 458 2012, 2015, 2018 Chihuahua 390 2013, 2016, 2018 Ciudad de Mexico 392 2012, 2015, 2018 Colima 467 2012, 2015, 2018 Durango 485 2013, 2016, 2018 Estado de Mexico 402 2012, 2015, 2018 Guanajuato 249 2012, 2015, 2018 Guerrero 589 2012, 2015, 2018 Hidalgo 197 2013, 2016, 2018 Jalisco 168 2012, 2015, 2018 Oaxaca 107 2013, 2016, 2018 Puebla 433 2010, 2013, 2018 Queretaro 82 2012, 2015, 2018 Sinaloa 252 2013, 2016, 2018 Tabasco 303 2012, 2015, 2018 Tlaxcala 352 2013, 2016, 2018 Veracruz 224 2013, 2016, 2018 Zacatecas 687 2013, 2016, 2018 6 Descriptive Statistics: Proportion of discussion allocated to types of leg- islation by State Table A4: Proportion of discussion allocated to different types of legislation by State. State Particularistic General Procedural Aguascalientes 0.036 0.289 0.675 Campeche 0.070 0.335 0.595 Ciudad de Mexico 0.091 0.465 0.444 Chiapas 0.054 0.575 0.371 Chihuahua 0.090 0.449 0.461 Colima 0.098 0.502 0.400 Durango 0.067 0.531 0.402 Guanajuato 0.055 0.696 0.249 Guerrero 0.078 0.504 0.418 Hidalgo 0.100 0.463 0.437 Jalisco 0.076 0.486 0.438 Mexico 0.079 0.379 0.543 Oaxaca 0.065 0.387 0.548 Puebla 0.063 0.391 0.545 Queretaro 0.094 0.412 0.494 Sinaloa 0.099 0.476 0.424 Tabasco 0.066 0.495 0.439 Tlaxcala 0.062 0.508 0.429 Veracruz 0.128 0.509 0.363 Zacatecas 0.069 0.325 0.606 7 Descriptive Statistics: Proportion of discussion allocated to each policy type Table A5: Summary Statistics for all proportion of sessions allocated to each type of policy. Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. Observations Particularistic 0.076 0.096 0.000 0.900 6890 General 0.457 0.213 0.016 0.974 6890 Procedural 0.467 0.225 0.011 0.983 6890 8 Difference in means comparing legislators in different electoral cycles Table A6: Difference in means comparing legislators who ran in 2012/13 and those who ran 2015/16 Elected in Elected in Difference P-value 2012/13 2015/16 Education Years 7.649 7.444 0.205 0.177 (439) (464) Years of Political 8.142 8.349 -0.207 0.603 Experience (Any) (450) (470) Years of Political 5.982 6.220 -0.237 0.504 Experience (Appointed) (448) (469) Years of Political 2.196 2.143 0.054 0.784 Experience (Elected) (448) (470) Number of observations in parenthesis. The sample includes legislators with Long-Term Reelection Incentives and those with No Reelection in 2018. 9 Robustness for the Difference-in-differences estimators testing H1 and H3 Table A7: Difference-in-differences estimator for H1 controlling for the 2018 Gubernatorial Elections. Dependent Variable: Proportion of Discussion allocated to Particularistic Legislation Legislative Period 0.01437** X Long-Term Reelection Incentives [0.00581] Legislative Period 0.01462 X 2018 Gubernatorial Elections [0.00955] State Fixed Effects Yes Month-Year Fixed Effects Yes Observations 4,899 R-squared 0.08184 Robust standard errors clustered on the State level in brackets *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 10 Table A8: Difference-in-differences estimator for H1 controlling for a battery of State characteristics. Dependent Variable: Proportion of Discussion allocated to Particularistic Legislation L. Period 0.01387** 0.01460* 0.01302* 0.01383* 0.01608** 0.01374* 0.01416* 0.01413* 0.01447* 0.01683** 0.01464** X Long-Term Reelection Incentives [0.00631] [0.00703] [0.00690] [0.00650] [0.00675] [0.00704] [0.00702] [0.00692] [0.00691] [0.00732] [0.00622] L. Period X Pop in Poverty 1.34813*** (Income) [0.27460] L. Period X Pop in Poverty 0.13102 (Social) [0.25343] L. Period X Exports 0.00003 [0.00003] L. Period X Inmigration 0.00032*** [0.00007] L. Period X Emigration 0.00013 [0.00015] 11 L. Period X Homicides 6.01086 [14.46308] L. Period X Population 0.00006 [0.00007] L. Period X Pop with 0.00010 Social Security [0.00012] L. Period X State Income 0.00004 [0.00006] L. Period X State Income 0.00111 from Taxes [0.00082] L. Period X Federal 0.00020 Transfers [0.00011] State Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Month-Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Observations 4,899 4,899 4,899 4,899 4,899 4,899 4,899 4,899 4,899 4,899 4,899 R-squared 0.08108 0.08062 0.08071 0.08112 0.08061 0.08059 0.08068 0.08068 0.08065 0.08119 0.08084 Robust standard errors clustered on the State level in brackets *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Table A9: Difference-in-differences estimator for H3 controlling for PRI Governors. Dependent Variable: Proportion of Discussion allocated to Particularistic Legislation Legislative Period 0.02601*** X Expected Term Lengths [0.00506] Legislative Period 0.00190 X PRI Governors [0.00306] State Fixed Effects Yes Month-Year Fixed Effects Yes Observations 6,062 R-squared 0.08138 Robust standard errors clustered on the State level in brackets *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Table A10: Difference-in-differences estimator for H3 controlling for Legislator Covariates. Dependent Variable: Proportion of Discussion allocated to Particularistic Legislation Legislative Period 0.02641*** 0.02443*** 0.02452*** 0.02624*** X Expected Term Lengths [0.00803] [0.00772] [0.00711] [0.00593] L. Period X Education Years -0.00005 [0.00129] L. Period X Years of Pol. 0.00060 Experience (Any) [0.00144] L. Period X Years of Pol. 0.00085 Experience (Appointed) [0.00169] L. Period X Years of Pol. -0.00001 Experience (Elected) [0.00236] State Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Month-Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Observations 6,062 6,062 6,062 6,062 R-squared 0.08135 0.08149 0.08156 0.08135 Robust standard errors clustered on the State level in brackets *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 12 Table A11: Difference-in-differences estimator for H3 controlling for a battery of State characteristics. Dependent Variable: Proportion of Discussion allocated to Particularistic Legislation L. Period 0.02499*** 0.02684*** 0.02650*** 0.02440*** 0.03469*** 0.02648*** 0.02645*** 0.02658*** 0.02696*** 0.02646*** 0.02600*** X Long-Term Reel. Incent. [0.00510] [0.00527] [0.00520] [0.00509] [0.01035] [0.00523] [0.00549] [0.00540] [0.00585] [0.00604] [0.00563] L. Period X Pop in Poverty 0.72703 (Income) [0.84247] L. Period X Pop in Poverty -0.06412 (Social) [0.47651] L. Period X Exports -0.00001 [0.00002] L. Period X Inmigration 0.00027** [0.00011] L. Period X Emigration -0.00225 [0.00210] 13 L.
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