The Medvedev Presidency – a Wasted Effort
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October 2011 THE EU-RUSSIA CENTRE REVIEW The Medvedev Presidency – A Wasted Effort Issue Nineteen CONTENTS Introduction 3 Fraser Cameron, Director, EU-Russia Centre Medvedev‟s Presidency: Russia Marks Time 5 Sir Tony Brenton, Former British ambassador to Russia Managing Russian Business through the Criminal Code 9 Yana Yakovleva, Once-Jailed Russian Executive The realities of the Russian judicial system 14 The Media in Russia – Freedom of Expression 22 under Conditions of Political Monopoly Maria Lipman, Moscow Carnegie Centre Russia‟s „Partnerships for Modernisation‟: 31 Origins, Content and Prospects Hannes Adomeit, Professor, College of Europe Map of Russian Media Business 52 2 Introduction Dmitri Medvedev assumed the Presidency in May 2008 with high hopes resting on his youthful shoulders. He began by challenging the absence of the rule of law and an independent judiciary in Russia. It was vital, he argued, to move away from „legal nihilism‟ and tackle the all-pervading corruption that was having such a negative impact on Russia. It was also important, he argued, that Russia should diversify its economy away from its over-reliance on mineral exports. Nearly four years later how should we assess the Medvedev Presidency? The articles in this Review will not make pleasant reading for President Medvedev or all those hoping for a more liberal, democratic, less corrupt Russia. Tony Brenton reviews Medvedev period in office and suggests his core failure was an inability to deliver on the correct analysis of what was undermining Russia from becoming a successful modern state and society. Medvedev came to office ready to try and tackle some of the major problems facing Russia but he was soon blown off course by the Georgian conflict and the impact of the global financial crisis. He never managed to secure an independent power base and was always beholden to his master, Mr Putin. Brenton correctly assumed that Putin would return to the Kremlin. But his conclusion is that while personalities matter the question of who precisely becomes President is a great deal less important than the capacity of whoever it is to deal more effectively with the country‟s very visible problems than the regime has managed so far. Yana Yakovleva, a once-jailed Russian business woman, recounts how the state and its various agencies use the criminal code for their own purposes. While giving Medvedev credit for introducing some changes, she argues that the entire judicial hierarchy needs reform. It is „a monolithic structure closely entwined with the offices for investigation and prosecution. That was the situation in the Soviet period and it remains the case today.‟ In the total absence of independent judicial examination falsified evidence is widely and successfully used by the prosecution. As a rule, judges at all levels take the side of the State representative (prosecution) and it is most often advantageous for defence attorneys to only make a pretence of defending their clients. Running an independent business in Russia, she concludes, is a dangerous and never predictable activity. Three distinguished legal experts (Tamara Morshchakova, Mara Polyakova and Olga Kudeshkina) then analyse the realities of the Russian judicial system. They talk of a „crisis of confidence‟ in the judicial system with no one believing in the independence of the courts. Judges routinely side with the prosecution. Evidence is often obtained by dubious means, including torture. There is often no proper appeals procedure, and sentencing is unduly harsh. The experts suggest that a fundamental change in the judicial system to promote real independence requires more than nice speeches or even legislation. It demands a change in personnel. The success in implementing the latest stage of judicial reform therefore depends on what practical measures the regime is ready to take, to enforce in deed not just in word the independence of the judiciary. 3 Maria Lipman casts her eye over the media landscape in Russia She notes that the Kremlin does not aim to keep everyone quiet and force the entire population to adopt a single view on all issues. The present regime perceives its task more as „the preservation of its monopoly over the running of the State.‟ The state controlled TV channels create the image of a regime to which there is no alternative. No one criticises the country‟s leadership, and no one casts doubts on its decisions. Lipman says her own fellow citizens are partly to blame for this state of affairs. The relationship between the regime and Russia‟s citizens is akin to a „no-participation pact‟. The State does not want citizens to intervene in State affairs and citizens do not intervene, having learned that nothing depends on them. In return the State does not interfere in the private life of its citizens, so long as their personal goals do not come into conflict with the interests of the powers that be. Hannes Adomeit reviews the prospects for the new EU-Russia Partnership for Modernisation. He asks whether this project constitutes something new which could revive the stagnating relationship between the two actors or whether it is just another piece of paper high on vision and symbolism but devoid of practical significance? Adomeit notes that it was Putin who first spoke of the need for modernisation but it was only when Medvedev took office that it gained a new urgency. But Medvedev has failed to deliver and Adomeit lists the numerous barriers to modernisation. These include excessive centralisation and administrative pressure; the constant interference of corrupt bureaucrats; the increased role of the siloviki in political and economic decision-making; and collusion of the courts, prosecutors and the police with organised crime for mutual benefit. For comprehensive modernisation to become a successful endeavour, many of the features of the existing system would have to be dismantled. But for this to occur, hard political decisions would be necessary and too many vested interests would be affected. Thus, given the current domestic political constellations, these tough decisions are unlikely to be taken. These articles provide an important contribution to the on-going debate about the future of Russia and the future of the EU-Russia relationship. Fraser Cameron Director, EU-Russia Centre 4 Medvedev‟s Presidency: Russia Marks Time by Sir Tony Brenton Former British ambassador to Russia We are in the closing months of Dmitri Medvedev‟s first, and perhaps only, Presidential term. This week he announced December 4 as the date for Duma elections, which will be followed by Presidential elections next March. As we enter the political season which will set the shape of Russia‟s government for the next six years it is worth looking back at how the country has done with Medvedev in the President‟s chair. Crucial to understanding the last three and a half years is the situation that Medvedev inherited and how he inherited it. His predecessor as President was of course Vladimir Putin who became President in 2000 and was reelected in 2004. In the eyes of the vast majority of Russians Putin‟s rule was spectacularly successful. Aided by high oil and gas prices the economy more than doubled in size. Personal prosperity improved almost everywhere. Putin brought order where Yeltsinian chaos had prevailed before. He imposed discipline (often by dubiously democratic or legal means) on wayward oligarchs, self willed governors, the obstructive Duma, an unhelpful press, and insurrectionary Chechnya. He stood up for Russian interests against a “unipolar” US in a way Yeltsin had never been in a position to do. The blots on Putin‟s record – fast rising corruption, official (and particularly security sector) impunity, increasingly manipulated electoral and legal processes – seemed small to the ordinary Russian by comparison with his successes. He could easily have altered the two term Presidential limit in the Constitution to stay on for a third if he had chosen to do so. To his credit he made it clear he would not do this. As a result Russian politics were transfixed, and riven, from about 2005 by the question of whom he would nominate as his successor (his personal popularity and grip on the electoral system virtually guaranteeing that his nominee would in fact succeed). Via a sort of “beauty contest” with another senior official the thitherto obscure Dmitri Medvedev, a long serving and loyal subordinate of Putin‟s, emerged as the chosen name, and was duly elected President in March. But the circumstances surrounding the election made it very clear that Putin had decided, even while laying down the Presidency, to maintain a lock on most of the key sources of power. He graciously accepted Medvedev‟s invitation to become Prime Minister. He also took over as Head of the ruling party, with a huge majority in the Duma (and thus the power to impeach the President). Most of Medvedev‟s aides and ministers (in particular his Chief of Staff) were Putin‟s placemen. And Putin‟s crucial network of “Siloviki” (former Security Agency officers, including of course Putin himself) remained intact and the backbone of Government. In the new administration, rapidly dubbed the “Tandem”, Medvedev may have held the title of President, but all the key decisions were plainly subject to Putin‟s views. 5 Nevertheless there was reason to hope that Medvedev‟s arrival might, after the authoritarian drift of Putin‟s last years in office, mark the resumption of Russian progress towards European “normality”. In a way that Putin had not, Medvedev inherited a functioning, governable state with a booming economy. Medvedev himself spoke the language of modernity and reform. In the electoral campaign and his early months in office he made clear his determination to take on the stifling combination of an untouchable and unresponsive elite, corrupt bureaucracy and subservient legal system which were doing so much to hold Russia back.