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Rossiya Bank | Банки.Ру 6/3/2016 Rossiya bank | Банки.ру Москва EN Наши проекты 3 июня, 18:11 Вход Регистрация Поиск по banki.ru 36% последнее предложение Рейтинг рублевых вкладов Инвестируй в МФО Мани Фанни! от 1 500 Эксклюзивное исследование 000р — осталось 19 дней Банки.ру — май, 2016 БАНКИ СТРАХОВАНИЕ МОБИЛЬНАЯ СВЯЗЬ И ИНТЕРНЕТ НОВОСТИ БАНКИ И КОМПАНИИ ПРОДУКТЫ И УСЛУГИ РЕЙТИНГИ ОБЩЕНИЕ СЕРВИСЫ Все события дня Банки Москвы Вклады Народный рейтинг Форум Кредитные истории Лента новостей Банки России Потребительские кредиты Финансовые Отзывы о банках Перевод с карты на Обзор прессы Микрофинансовые Специальные предложения показатели Вопрос — ответ карту Видео организации Дебетовые карты Кредитные рейтинги «Банк года» 2015 Мои вклады Звезды в банке Национальная система Кредитные карты Служебный рейтинг Друзья банков Денежные переводы платежных карт показать все меню Главная • Банки России Rossiya bank По-русски Name Rossiya Full name Open Joint Stock Company "Bank "Rossiya" Licence 328 | Summary on the Central Bank of Russia Site Ranking Net assets 584 544 280 RUR, tnd, 16th place in Russia, 2nd place in regions on 01.05.2016 г. Net prot 1 010 533 RUR, tnd, 24th place in Russia, 3rd place in regions All indicators ► Headquarter 191124, Saint Petersburg, Rastrelli square, 2, lit. A URL www.abr.ru Banki.ru reference Shared commercial bank Rossiya, which was registered by the State Bank of the USSR, was founded in 1990 with the participation of the Leningrad Regional Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The bank has been named Joint Stock Bank Rossiya since 1997. The bank has been close to the political elite not only of St. Petersburg, but of the whole country until now. http://www.banki.ru/banks/engbanks/bank/?id=68683 1/3 6/3/2016 Rossiya bank | Банки.ру In August 2010, the takeover of Gazenergobank (see the Memory Book) wrapped up, and its assets (including Sobinbank’s network of branches and shares) and liabilities were assigned to Bank Rossiya. It was initially announced that retail business would be rolled out on the basis of Sobinbank, but despite a government bailout the under-rehabilitation bank suffered a record loss (Rub 2.98 bln) in 2010, and news leaked in June 2011 that there were plans to fold Sobinbank into Bank Rossiya. At the end of 2011 news broke that the takeover was rolled back for several years. Apart from Sobinbank, Bank Rossiya Group comprises Sogaz OJSC, National Media Group CJSC (Ren TV, Channel 5 and Channel One), and leasing group Zest. ABR Management was set up in the summer of 2012 for the strategic management of the banking group’s assets. On March 20, 2014 the United States imposed sanctions against Bank Rossiya by freezing its assets being under US jurisdiction, and also by banning the bank to strike deals in US territory or with American citizens. As a result of the actions taken by the United States, international payment systems Visa and MasterCard ceased the service of bank cards issued by Bank Rossiya. At present, Yury Kovalchuk, former Bank Rossiya board chairman and big Russian businessman (a co-owner of Sogaz Insurance Group, Tele2 Russia, National Media Group, and CTC Media), controls 42.28% of the bank’s shares directly, and also through ABR Management CJSC and a stake held by his spouse, Tatiana Kovalchuk. Gennady Timchenko, a renowned businessman who is on the Forbes List (Top 10 Russian Billionaires — 2015), and a Finnish citizen, holds 10.421% of the bank’s shares. Nikolai Shamalov controls 10.247% via ABR Management CJSC. Via Akcept LLC and Platinum LLC, Mikhail Shelomov controls in the aggregate a 8.404% stake, and a 6.001% interest is held by Ivan Mironov through Oberon Estate. Alexei Mordashov, the major owner of metals giant Severstal, controls 5.825% of the bank through Severgroup LLC. Tatiana Svitova holds 5.358% of the bank’s shares indirectly via Overpass-Invest LLC. Sergei Roldugin’s interest is 3.223%, and Relaks LLC (the benecial owner is Svetlana Krivonogikh) owns 2.95%. Gazprom investgazikatsia LLC owns 2.207%, and a 1.144% interest is owned by Gazprom mezhregiongaz Belgorod LLC. The remaining shares (1.94%) are distributed among minority shareholders. View all News 11.04.2016 14:57 1Q net prot at Bank Rossiya jumps 13% to Rub 986.6 mln • 200 09.03.2016 16:43 DIA gives Rub 10.7 bln OFZ to Bank Rossiya • 442 12.01.2016 14:06 RAEX conrms Bank Rossiya at A++ • 246 27.04.2015 14:55 Bank Rossiya Group doubles FY14 net prot • 464 12.09.2014 12:21 Sobinbank could merge with Bank Rossiya • 166 04.08.2014 15:29 Billionaire Gennady Timchenko says he is ready to give all assets to the government • 307 12.05.2014 08:07 Bank Rossiya launches business in Crimea • 308 18.04.2014 16:39 Bank Rossiya sees assets slide Rub 33 bln in March • 370 11.04.2014 16:09 Sobinbank ceases external currency settlements • 375 27.03.2014 06:32 S&P cuts Bank Rossiya rating outlook to negative and withdraws ratings • 558 1 2 3 ← back to the banks list Watched 402 times since 01.04.2010 http://www.banki.ru/banks/engbanks/bank/?id=68683 2/3 6/3/2016 Rossiya bank | Банки.ру МЫ В СОЦИАЛЬНЫХ СЕТЯХ © 2005—2016 ИА «Банки.ру» При использовании материалов гиперссылка на Banki.ru обязательна. Вся правда о банках ® О проекте Реклама Контакты Служба поддержки Пользовательское соглашение Политика обработки персональных данных Карта сайта http://www.banki.ru/banks/engbanks/bank/?id=68683 3/3.
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