2017 Annual Report About This Report
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
Load more
Recommended publications
-
Testimony: the Russian Economy: More Than Just Energy?
The Russian Economy: More than Just Energy? Anders Åslund, Peterson Institute for International Economics Testimony for the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the European Parliament April 2009 1 Introduction Russia has enjoyed a decade of high economic growth because of the eventually successful market reforms of the 1990s as well as an oil boom. For the last six years, however, the Russian economy has become increasingly dysfunctional because the authorities have done nothing to impede corruption. The energy sector has been a generator of corrupt revenues, and its renationalization has concentrated these corrupt incomes in the hands of the security police elite. Russia depends on the European Union for most of its exports and imports, but no free trade agreement is even on the horizon. Investments, by contrast, are relatively well secured through international conventions. In global governance, Russia has changed its attitude from being a joiner to becoming a spoiler. The disruption of supplies of Russian gas to Europe in January 2009 displayed all the shortfalls both of the Russian and Ukrainian gas sectors and of EU policy. The European Union needs to play a more active role. It should monitor gas supplies, production, and storage. It should demand the exclusion of corrupt intermediaries in its gas trade. It should demand that Russia and Ukraine conclude a long- term transit and supply agreement. The European Union should form a proper energy policy, with energy conservation, diversification, unbundling, and increased storage. This is a good time to persuade Russia to ratify the Energy Charter. The European Union should also demand that Ukraine undertake a market-oriented and transparent energy-sector reform. -
Russian M&A Review 2017
Russian M&A review 2017 March 2018 KPMG in Russia and the CIS kpmg.ru 2 Russian M&A review 2017 Contents page 3 page 6 page 10 page 13 page 28 page 29 KEY M&A 2017 OUTLOOK DRIVERS OVERVIEW IN REVIEW FOR 2018 IN 2017 METHODOLOGY APPENDICES — Oil and gas — Macro trends and medium-term — Financing – forecasts sanctions-related implications — Appetite and capacity for M&A — Debt sales market — Cross-border M&A highlights — Sector highlights © 2018 KPMG. All rights reserved. Russian M&A review 2017 3 Overview Although deal activity increased by 13% in 2017, the value of Russian M&A Deal was 12% lower than the previous activity 13% year, at USD66.9 billion, mainly due to an absence of larger deals. This was in particular reflected in the oil and gas sector, which in 2016 was characterised by three large deals with a combined value exceeding USD28 billion. The good news is that investors have adjusted to the realities of sanctions and lower oil prices, and sought opportunities brought by both the economic recovery and governmental efforts to create a new industrial strategy. 2017 saw a significant rise in the number and value of deals outside the Deal more traditional extractive industries value 37% and utility sectors, which have historically driven Russian M&A. Oil and gas sector is excluded If the oil and gas sector is excluded, then the value of deals rose by 37%, from USD35.5 billion in 2016 to USD48.5 billion in 2017. USD48.5bln USD35.5bln 2016 2017 © 2018 KPMG. -
Russland- Analysen
NR. 322 07.10.2016 russland- analysen http://www.laender-analysen.de/russland/ BEWEGUNG IN DER RUSSISCHEN POLITIK? ■■ ANALYSE ■■ DOKUMENTATION Russland im Herbst 2016. Dumawahlen und Ein Meinungsforschungsinstitut als Regimeumbau 2 »ausländischer Agent«. Reaktionen auf die Hans-Henning Schröder, Bremen Einstufung des Lewada-Zentrums durch das ■■ TABELLEN ZUM TEXT russische Justizministerium 25 Wahlbeteiligung 6 Stellungnahme des Direktors des Levada-Zentrums Lev Gudkov 25 ■■ UMFRAGE Chronik der Ereignisse 27 Fairness bei den Dumawahlen 10 Erklärung der deutschen Osteuropaforschung 29 Alltagssorgen der Russen 11 ■■ ANALYSE ■■ RANKING Ordnung der Macht Russen auf der Forbesliste der Milliardäre im Die Generation Anton Wainos und Russlands September 2016 30 techno-bürokratischer Autoritarismus 13 ■■ CHRONIK Fabian Burkhardt, München 21. September – 6. Oktober 2016 33 ■■ AUS RUSSISCHEN BLOGS Wahlmanipulation ohne Folgen? 20 Sergey Medvedev, Berlin/Moskau ■■ NOTIZEN AUS MOSKAU Dumawahlennachlese 22 Jens Siegert, Moskau ► Deutsche Gesellschaft Forschungsstelle Osteuropa Zentrum für Osteuropa- und internationale Studien Centre for East European and International Studies für Osteuropakunde e.V. an der Universität Bremen in Gründung Die Russland-Analysen werden unterstützt von RUSSLAND-ANALYSEN NR. 322, 07.10.2016 2 ANALYSE Russland im Herbst 2016 Dumawahlen und Regimeumbau Hans-Henning Schröder, Bremen Zusammenfassung Die Dumawahlen im September 2016 haben gezeigt, dass die »Machtvertikale« funktioniert und die Füh- rung den politischen Prozess im Lande unter Kontrolle hat. Allerdings sind die Finanz- und Wirtschafts- probleme ungelöst. Dementsprechend kann die Führung der Bevölkerung auf lange Sicht die soziale Sta- bilität nicht garantieren. In dieser Situation, in der die Administration den politischen Prozess kontrolliert, aber befürchtet, dass die ökonomischen und sozialen Probleme überhand nehmen, beginnt das Putinsche Zentrum den Apparat umzubauen. -
Annual Report
2014 ANNUAL REPORT TABLE OF CONTENTS Sistema today 2 Corporate governance system 91 History timeline 4 Corporate governance principles 92 Company structure 8 General Meeting of shareholders 94 President’s speech 10 Board of Directors 96 Strategic Review 11 Commitees of the Board of Directors 99 Strategy 12 President and the Management Board 101 Sistema’s financial results 20 Internal control and audit 103 Shareholder capital and securities 24 Development of the corporate 104 governance system in 2014 Our investments 27 Remuneration 105 MTS 28 Risks 106 Detsky Mir 34 Sustainable development 113 Medsi Group 38 Responsible investor 114 Lesinvest Group (Segezha) 44 Social investment 115 Bashkirian Power Grid Company 52 Education, science, innovation 115 RTI 56 Culture 117 SG-trans 60 Environment 119 MTS Bank 64 Society 121 RZ Agro Holding 68 Appendices 124 Targin 72 Binnopharm 76 Real estate 80 Sistema Shyam TeleServices 84 Sistema Mass Media 88 1 SISTEMA TODAY Established in 1993, today Sistema including telecommunications, companies. Sistema’s competencies is a large private investor operating utilities, retail, high tech, pulp and focus on improvement of the in the real sector of the Russian paper, pharmaceuticals, healthcare, operational efficiency of acquired economy. Sistema’s investment railway transportation, agriculture, assets through restructuring and portfolio comprises stakes in finance, mass media, tourism, attracting industry partners to predominantly Russian companies etc. Sistema is the controlling enhance expertise and reduce -
The Siloviki in Putin's Russia
Ian Bremmer and Samuel Charap The Siloviki in Putin’s Russia: Who They Are and What They Want The July 2006 meeting of the Group of Eight (G-8) major indus- trialized nations in St. Petersburg focused the attention of the international media on Russia. On issues ranging from Middle East conflict to energy se- curity, President Vladimir Putin sought to demonstrate that his increasingly self-confident government has earned its seat at the G-8 table. Coverage of the summit focused squarely on Putin—his international priorities, control over domestic politics, personal relationships with other heads of state, and leadership style. These stories created the impression that Putin is Russian politics, reinforcing the view that to understand Putin himself is to under- stand Kremlin policy. Since Putin was named acting president on December 31, 1999, ana- lysts have poured over his personal history, public statements, and writings, confidently forecasting political and economic trends based largely on their interpretations of what they found. Those who portray him as an autocrat underline his KGB background. Others point to his tutelage under former St. Petersburg mayor and liberal reformer Anatoly Sobchak or his preference for pragmatism over ideology. Recently, Western scholars unearthed his doc- toral thesis and used it to explain Russian state involvement in the energy sector.1 President George W. Bush famously contributed to this line of analysis by implying in 2001 that his “sense of the man’s soul” provided a reliable foun- dation for U.S.-Russian relations. Despite its parsimony and popularity, this approach to understanding Kremlin policy, which some have called “Putinol- ogy,” creates a misleading impression of how Russia is ruled. -
Russian Withholding Tax Refund
Russian withholding tax refund Tax & Legal If you or your clients invested in Russian securities and are entitled to a substantial dividend or interest income, there is a chance that you overpaid your taxes and may qualify for a tax refund © 2018 Deloitte Consulting LLC Background Investors may apply a According to the The Russian The tax refund reduced tax rate for Russian tax withholding tax rate is practice in Russia is their interest and/or authorities, they are set at 15% on not well-developed: dividend income, ready to reimburse dividends and 20 the tax legislation depending on the overpaid taxes, if a percent on interest. does not provide for a conditions set by the full package of Effective from 1 specific list of Russian Tax Code or documents confirming January 2014, the documents to be applicable Double Tax the income payment duties of the tax collected and Treaties. Calculations chain and the agent for WHT requirements to be of a standard Russian investor’s rights to purposes were met. For these rate or the standard the income is transferred to the reasons, the process reduced Double Tax submitted. local Russian can be lengthy and Treaty rate, as well as custodian or, in a sometimes fruitless. submission of claims limited number of However, the trend is on tax can be cases, to the reassuring: the refunded, should be fiduciary, broker or number of successful made by investors issuer. refund claims and themselves within positive court three calendar years, decisions is growing. following the year in which it was withheld. -
25022014 DMG FY 2013 Operating Results ENG Final Clean
OJSC DETSKY MIR INCREASED NET INCOME BY 7.2% TO RUB 657 MLN FOR 9 MONTHS 2015 18 November 2015. Russia, Moscow. OJSC Detsky Mir (hereinafter referred to as "Detsky Mir" or "the Company"), Russia's largest children's goods retailer, announces its unaudited financial results under US GAAP for 9M 2015 ended on 30 September 2015. KEY UNAUDITED FINANCIAL AND OPERATING RESULTS FOR 9M 2015 1 o OIBDA increased from RUB 2 263 mln in the first 9 months of 2014 to RUB 2 940 mln in 9 months of 2015, and OIBDA margin amounted to 7.4% o Revenue grew by 34.1% compared to 9M 2014, and reached RUB 40.0bn o The Company opened 49 new stores, including 48 Detsky Mir stores and 1 ELC store o Selling space reached 435,000 sq m in 9M 2015 2 o Like-for-like sales gained 13.8% (with the number of checks growing by 4.3%, and the average check growing by 9.1%) o Gross profit grew by 26.7% in 9M 2015 to RUB 13.8bn; gross margin amounted to 34.6% o Selling, general and administrative expenses to revenue ratio fell from 29.1% to 27.3% due to increased operating efficiency and measures taken to reduce costs o Net income grew by 7.2% to RUB 657 mln compared to the same period of the last year o The Company’s net debt totaled RUB 16.5 bn as of 30 September 2015. The increase in net debt from the beginning of 2015 is due to the active development of the company's retail chain, the construction of a new distribution center and other investment projects KEY UNAUDITED RESULTS FOR THE 12 MONTHS ENDED SEPTEMBER 2015. -
Emerging Index - QSR
2 FTSE Russell Publications 19 August 2021 FTSE RAFI Emerging Index - QSR Indicative Index Weight Data as at Closing on 30 June 2021 Index Index Index Constituent Country Constituent Country Constituent Country weight (%) weight (%) weight (%) Absa Group Limited 0.29 SOUTH BRF S.A. 0.21 BRAZIL China Taiping Insurance Holdings (Red 0.16 CHINA AFRICA BTG Pactual Participations UNT11 0.09 BRAZIL Chip) Acer 0.07 TAIWAN BYD (A) (SC SZ) 0.03 CHINA China Tower (H) 0.17 CHINA Adaro Energy PT 0.04 INDONESIA BYD (H) 0.12 CHINA China Vanke (A) (SC SZ) 0.09 CHINA ADVANCED INFO SERVICE 0.16 THAILAND Canadian Solar (N Shares) 0.08 CHINA China Vanke (H) 0.2 CHINA Aeroflot Russian Airlines 0.09 RUSSIA Capitec Bank Hldgs Ltd 0.05 SOUTH Chongqing Rural Commercial Bank (A) (SC 0.01 CHINA Agile Group Holdings (P Chip) 0.04 CHINA AFRICA SH) Agricultural Bank of China (A) (SC SH) 0.27 CHINA Catcher Technology 0.2 TAIWAN Chongqing Rural Commercial Bank (H) 0.04 CHINA Agricultural Bank of China (H) 0.66 CHINA Cathay Financial Holding 0.29 TAIWAN Chunghwa Telecom 0.32 TAIWAN Air China (A) (SC SH) 0.02 CHINA CCR SA 0.14 BRAZIL Cia Paranaense de Energia 0.01 BRAZIL Air China (H) 0.06 CHINA Cemex Sa Cpo Line 0.7 MEXICO Cia Paranaense de Energia (B) 0.07 BRAZIL Airports of Thailand 0.04 THAILAND Cemig ON 0.03 BRAZIL Cielo SA 0.13 BRAZIL Akbank 0.18 TURKEY Cemig PN 0.18 BRAZIL CIFI Holdings (Group) (P Chip) 0.03 CHINA Al Rajhi Banking & Investment Corp 0.52 SAUDI Cencosud 0.04 CHILE CIMB Group Holdings 0.11 MALAYSIA ARABIA Centrais Eletricas Brasileiras S.A. -
Detsky Mir Group Adjusted EBITDA Increased by 15.2% Yoy in 2020
Detsky Mir Group Adjusted EBITDA Increased by 15.2% YoY in 2020 Moscow, Russia, 1 March 2021 – Detsky Mir Group (the “Group”, “Detsky Mir” or the “Company”, MOEX: DSKY), the largest children’s goods retailer in Russia and Kazakhstan, announces its audited financial results in accordance with International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) for the fourth quarter and twelve months ended 31 December 2020. Q4 2020 Financial Highlights1 . Group consolidated revenue increased by 14.3% year-on-year to RUB 44.5 bn, compared to RUB 38.9 bn in Q4 2019. Online revenue2 increased 2.2x year-on-year to RUB 12.7 bn. o The share of online sales in total revenue of Detsky Mir in Russia increased 1.9x year-on-year to 29.7%. o The share of in-store pick-up service amounted to 83.4%. Revenue in Kazakhstan increased by 21.0% year-on-year to RUB 1.4 bn. Like-for-like sales3 at Detsky Mir stores in Russia and Kazakhstan grew by 5.9%. The number of tickets increased by 1.2%, while the average ticket grew 4.7%. Like-for-like sales at Detsky Mir stores in Russia grew by 5.7%. The number of tickets increased by 1.4%, while the average ticket grew by 4.3%. Detsky Mir opened 41 new branded stores4 in Q4 2020, as well as 11 new Detmir Pickup stores and 7 new Zoozavr stores. The Group had 868 stores5 as of 31 December 2020. Total selling space increased by 6.4% year-on-year to approximately 897,000 sq. -
Market News Company News SECURITIES MARKET NEWS
SSEECCUURRIIITTIIIEESS MMAARRKKEETT NNEEWWSSLLEETTTTEERR weekly Presented by: VTB Bank, Custody January 21, 2021 Issue No. 2021/02 Market News Finance Ministry fully places RUB 20 bln OFZ bonds On January 20, 2021 Russia’s Finance Ministry said in a statement that it hd fully placed RUB 20 bln of OFZ 26234 bonds with a fixed coupon maturing in July 2025 at an auction on January 20. The cut-off rate amounted to 96.0801% and the weighted average rate stood at 96.162%. The cut-off yield stood at 5.57% and the weighted average yield at 5.55%. Demand for the bonds totaled RUB 38.97 bln. Company News Rosseti terminates CEO Livinsky, appoints Lenenergo CEO Ryumin On January 16, 2021 it was disclosed by reporters that Russian state power grid holding Rosseti had terminated powers of CEO Pavel Livinsky ahead of schedule, and appointed Andrei Ryumin, CEO of the company’s subsidiary Rosseti Lenenergo, as the company’s acting CEO. In its turn, the board of directors of Rosseti Lenenergo has terminated the powers of Ryumin ahead of schedule and appointed Chief Engineer Igor Kyuzmin as the company’s acting CEO. Livinsky was elected as the CEO of Rosseti in September 2017. Earlier in January, Kommersant business daily reported quoting sources that the government may appoint Livinsky as a head of an energy department that would be created in the framework of an administrative reform. Cherkizovo Group board again approves offering of 10.3 mln shares On January 17, 2021 it was stated that the board of directors of Russian meat producer Cherkizovo Group had again approved a public offering of 10.262 mln additional shares at a meeting that had took place on January 16. -
Templeton Eastern Europe Fund Equity LU0078277505 31 August 2021
Franklin Templeton Investment Funds Emerging Markets Templeton Eastern Europe Fund Equity LU0078277505 31 August 2021 Fund Fact Sheet For professional use only. Not for distribution to the public. Fund Overview Performance Base Currency for Fund EUR Performance over 5 Years in Share Class Currency (%) Templeton Eastern Europe Fund A (acc) EUR MSCI EM Europe Index-NR Total Net Assets (EUR) 231 million Fund Inception Date 10.11.1997 160 Number of Issuers 45 Benchmark MSCI EM Europe 140 Index-NR Investment Style Blend Morningstar Category™ Emerging Europe Equity 120 Summary of Investment Objective 100 The Fund aims to achieve long-term capital appreciation by investing primarily in listed equity securities of issuers organised under the laws of or having their principal activities within the countries of Eastern Europe, as well as 80 08/16 02/17 08/17 02/18 08/18 02/19 08/19 02/20 08/20 02/21 08/21 the New Independent States, i.e. the countries in Europe and Asia that were formerly part of or under the influence of Performance in Share Class Currency (%) the Soviet Union. Cumulative Annualised Since Since Fund Management 1 Mth 3 Mths 6 Mths YTD 1 Yr 3 Yrs 5 Yrs 10 Yrs Incept Incept A (acc) EUR 6.42 11.11 26.64 33.63 51.24 53.18 56.89 34.32 260.58 5.54 Krzysztof Musialik, CFA: Poland A (acc) USD 5.94 7.30 23.95 29.16 49.67 55.85 66.03 10.37 25.43 1.44 Ratings - A (acc) EUR B (acc) USD 5.87 6.92 23.29 28.09 47.85 50.20 56.08 -2.95 -24.30 -1.84 Benchmark in EUR 5.12 10.50 24.75 24.42 37.82 37.48 54.51 30.76 271.45 5.67 Overall Morningstar Rating™: Calendar Year Performance in Share Class Currency (%) Asset Allocation 2020 2019 2018 2017 2016 2015 2014 2013 2012 2011 A (acc) EUR -15.33 36.67 -21.23 17.61 20.37 4.84 -19.49 -3.97 17.37 -40.02 A (acc) USD -7.78 33.81 -24.78 34.11 16.61 -5.88 -29.18 0.07 19.63 -41.94 B (acc) USD -8.80 31.98 -25.72 32.46 14.98 -7.07 -30.09 -1.33 18.15 -42.70 Benchmark in EUR -19.73 34.75 -7.46 5.88 29.27 -5.03 -20.28 -8.61 22.37 -21.10 % Past performance is not an indicator or a guarantee of future performance. -
US Sanctions on Russia
U.S. Sanctions on Russia Updated January 17, 2020 Congressional Research Service https://crsreports.congress.gov R45415 SUMMARY R45415 U.S. Sanctions on Russia January 17, 2020 Sanctions are a central element of U.S. policy to counter and deter malign Russian behavior. The United States has imposed sanctions on Russia mainly in response to Russia’s 2014 invasion of Cory Welt, Coordinator Ukraine, to reverse and deter further Russian aggression in Ukraine, and to deter Russian Specialist in European aggression against other countries. The United States also has imposed sanctions on Russia in Affairs response to (and to deter) election interference and other malicious cyber-enabled activities, human rights abuses, the use of a chemical weapon, weapons proliferation, illicit trade with North Korea, and support to Syria and Venezuela. Most Members of Congress support a robust Kristin Archick Specialist in European use of sanctions amid concerns about Russia’s international behavior and geostrategic intentions. Affairs Sanctions related to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine are based mainly on four executive orders (EOs) that President Obama issued in 2014. That year, Congress also passed and President Rebecca M. Nelson Obama signed into law two acts establishing sanctions in response to Russia’s invasion of Specialist in International Ukraine: the Support for the Sovereignty, Integrity, Democracy, and Economic Stability of Trade and Finance Ukraine Act of 2014 (SSIDES; P.L. 113-95/H.R. 4152) and the Ukraine Freedom Support Act of 2014 (UFSA; P.L. 113-272/H.R. 5859). Dianne E. Rennack Specialist in Foreign Policy In 2017, Congress passed and President Trump signed into law the Countering Russian Influence Legislation in Europe and Eurasia Act of 2017 (CRIEEA; P.L.