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The Professional Journal of the United States Air Force

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The Professional Journal of the United States Air Force III The Professional Journal of the United States Air Force AIRreview U N I VE R S ITY from the editor's aerie One of the grand old men of military letters, Lieutenant General Sir John Winthrop Hackett, once suggested that “...as a society of men grows more orderly the application of force tends to become better ordered.” That there has been no direct confrontation among the major powers since World War II would seem to support his thesis. The division of power has been perceived to be too uncertain and the consequences of using nuclear weapons too catastrophic to permit the use of unlimited force. It is a primary mission of the military to ensure the latter perception. Three of our authors, Colonel Robert Rasmussen, Lieutenant Colonel Richard Stachurski. and Wing Commander Hans Roser, focus on different facets of the ordered application of force in the traditional terrestrial arena. Lieutenant Colonel Charles MacGregor and Major Lee Livingston, on the other hand, direct our attention to "Air Force Objectives in Space,” pointing out that we cannot become so earthbound in our thinking that we overlook the limitless advantages of “taking the high ground.” A topic that has drawn increasing attention from our NCO academies concerns the application of the term "professional.” Last year the USAF Chief of Staff convened a study group, Impact 77, to consider recent sociological theories that the service is becoming less a calling and more an occupation—that the old idealistic motivators are fading and are being replaced by “eight-to-five” considerations. One element of this subject that has been arousing the ire of the NCOs for many years is the tendency of sociologists to exclude the enlisted force from the ranks of professionals. Two articles by Senior Master Sergeants Roger Schneider and George Day address this issue from differing viewpoints. Our review article “Prescriptions for Professionalism” considers yet another aspect of the larger subject and may give us some new perspectives, coming as they do from the U.S. Army’s Major William Dollar. Our cover, by illustrator William DePaola, symbolizes the consequences of failing to adjust doctrine to the capabilities of the machine gun in World War I. In the lead article, Colonel Rasmussen warns that we must continually examine the potential of the “new machine guns” to keep doctrine abreast with technology. The pictured RPK light machine gun is currently in service with Soviet forces. As always, we welcome your response to all subjects within. July-August 1978 Vol. X X IX No. 5 articles 2 The Central Europe Battlefield: Col. Robert D. Rasmussen, USAF Doctrinal Implications for Counterair-Interdiction 21 The Nunn-Bartlett Report: Lt. Col. Richard A Realistic Prescription for NATO? J. Stachurski, USAF 26 Defense Suppression: Mission or Tactic? Wing Commander Hans F. Roser, RAAF 31 The Ever-Changing Fleet William G. Holder 49 The Air Force Chaplain's Role Chap. (Col.) Functioning in Two Institutions Mack C. Branham, Jr., USAF 54 Up-or-Out: A Perspective Lt. Col. Robert 0. Heavner, USAF departments AIR FORCE REVIEW 43 Operations Research and the Air Base Maj. Charles E. Ebeling, USAF IN MY OPINION 59 Air Force Objectives in Space Lt. Col. Charles H. MacGregor, USAFvFF Maj. Lee H. Livingston, USAF 63 The Danger of Civilianizing Military Pay Capt. George T. Naddra, USAF POINT COUNTER POINT 66 Nonsense, Common Sense, and the Professional NCO SMSgt. George H. Day, ANG 73 NCO Professionalism—A Straw Man SMSgt. Roger P. Schneider, USAF BOOKS AND IDEAS 77 Prescriptions for Professionalism Maj. William M. Dollar, USA 86 Air War at Sea in World War II Dr. Paolo E. Coletta 90 Potpourri 94 THE CONTRIBUTORS THE CENTRAL EUROPE BATTLEFIELD doctrinal implications for counterair- interdiction C olonel Robert D. Rasmussen n the annals of war there are numer- United States once led in their technology ous instances of technological and production. We tasted the flavor of progress upsetting the previous bal- their potential, on the pointed end, over Iance of forces: gunpowder, the machine North Vietnam, but it was only a taste. A gun, the tank, aircraft. But these innova- better sample for full digestion was made tions were not necessarily technological available in the course of the 1973 Middle surprises. When the French underesti- East War. mated the effect of the machine gun on The lowly machine gun has been with us their offensive doctrine of elan, it was not since before World War I. Its larger caliber due to technological surprise—the weapon offspring, the automatic cannon, has been had been around a long time, and the around for more than 20 years. The threat French had it also. Their failure in the case of modern radar-controlled, rapid-fire of the machine gun was a failure to fully antiaircraft (AA) cannons has been digest its impact and, as a result, the recognized by our side for over 10 years. failure to take advantage of it, develop a Yet the superior Israeli Air Force, employ- counter to it, or adjust their doctrine in ing primarily U.S. equipment, was faced in light of it. This article will address the 1973 with the loss of air superiority over battlefield in Central Europe, in an effort the battlefield—not due to enemy air power to ensure that we do not fail to digest the but to ground force mobile air defenses. impact df or adjust to the adversary’s And the effectiveness of the SAM was “machine gun.” exceeded only by that of the AA cannon. The effectiveness of the mobile SAM and the new “machine gun” self-propelled (SP) antiaircraft artillery Surface-to-air missile (SAM) air defense (AAA) combination in the 1973 war was systems have been with us a long time. The immediately recognized, but its digestion CENTRA L EUROPE BA TTLEFIELD 3 has taken a long time—and may not yet be the completion of actions that are possibly complete. necessary to adjust our doctrine and There were actually two separate events hardware. In any event, it is apparent that of potentially revolutionary significance those potential adjustments have not been to military arms to come out of the 1973 served well by any open dialogue of war: (1) the temporary achievement of “innovative thinking” in the pages of the local air superiority by ground forces and Air Force’s professional journal. The fault (2) the defeat of an Israeli tank offensive here, of course—if there is one—is not with by Arab infantry armed with antitank our journal; its function is to publish, not missiles (ATM). The latter event and its write. The dearth of dialogue on the vital implications for strategy, tactics, and issue is cited as one reason for doubting the doctrine have been widely discussed in a completion of the digestive process. continuing dialogue in the professional journals of the U.S. Army. A major entry in this dialogue, entitled “ Is the Soviet implications for doctrine Army Obsolete?” was published in May Air superiority is generally considered to 1974.1 be that degree of control of the air that A review of past issues of Air University enables effective air operations by friendly Review, the Air Force’s professional forces and prevents prohibitive inter- journal, searching for a dialogue similar to ference by the enemy with those opera- that within the Army, is revealing. The tions. NATO doctrine on the subject holds Review “ serves as an open forum for that exploratory discussion,” and exists “to present innovative thinking and stimulate The degree of control of the air required dialogue concerning Air Force doctrine, will depend on the tactical situation; however, NATO air forces must be strategy [and] tactics.. .”2 The first article capable of achieving such control when- on the 1973 war in A U Review appeared in ever and wherever it is required___ the July-August 1974 issue. Although Counter air operations do not necessarily authored by an Air Force officer, Captain relate to specific friendly surface opera- Bard E. O’Neill, “ The October War” was tions. However,... the outcome of coun- terair operations exercises a direct devoted to the political-psychological influence on all other operations. There- aspects of the conflict; one sentence briefly fore, counterair operations may demand referred to the “effective use” of AAA, the highest priority of all air operations SAM, and ATM. Not until the November- whenever enemy air power presents a December 1976 issue of the Review, over significant threat.4 three years after the war, does one find the General Chaim Herzog, in his book on first article on the 1973 war that addresses the 1973 war, reported: directly the implications of that conflict for the “hardware and doctrine” of the In the first phase of the fighting—the U.S. Air Force. The title of the article, holding phase—the Israeli Air Force was unable to attack as planned and was appropriately, is “ A Call from the Wilder- obliged to throw caution to the winds and ness.”3 give close support (a good proportion of The present author knows, from first- the sorties were made in close support of hand knowledge, that much has been done ground forces), without dealing ade- in the field in terms of adjusting tactics quately with the missile threat and achieving complete air superiority. Con- and training to the newly perceived threat. sequently, losses were comparatively But there is a lower level of confidence in heavy.5 4 AIR UNI VERSITY RE VIE W The reported Israeli losses were 102 in a timely manner, not because of enemy planes shot down, but only five of those air forces but enemy ground force air were lost in air-to-air combat, the balance defenses.
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