• Abstract and Figures
• Public Full-text

30 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN NEW EVIDENCE ON NEW RUSSIAN DOCUMENTS ON THE KOREAN WAR Introduction and Translations significant first months of the conflict. (Un- Vasilevsky on February 23 (document #4) fortunately, some key materials from this supports accounts given by former DPRK by Kathryn Weathersby period, particularly the months immediately military officers that Stalin began taking preceding the war, have not yet become steps to strengthen the North Korean mili- In the previous issue of the Cold War available; for key documents from mid-Sep- tary forces even before Kim Il Sung’s secret International History Project Bulletin (Issue tember to mid-October 1950, covering events trip to Moscow in April, by appointing Ma- 5, Spring 1995 pp. 1, 2-9), I described the from the Inchon landing to China’s decision jor-General Vasiliev, a Hero of the Soviet collection of high-level documents on the to intervene in the war, see the article by Union and section chief for War Experience Korean War that Russian President Boris Alexandre Y. Mansourov elsewhere in this Analysis in the Soviet General Staff, to re- Yeltsin presented to President Kim Young issue of the CWIHP Bulletin.) It then offers place Shtykov as principal military adviser Sam of South Korea in June 1994. I also a more selective sample of documents from to the Korean People’s Army (KPA).3 presented translations of six key documents spring 1951 through the end of the war, From Shtykov’s telegram to Foreign from that collection that illuminate the deci- focusing primarily on Stalin’s approach to Minister Andrei Vyshinsky on February 7 sion-making behind the outbreak of full- the armistice negotiations. As the reader will (document #2), we see how closely Stalin scale war in Korea in June 1950. Since the quickly discover, these documents of high- supervised events in North Korea, deciding publication of the Spring 1995 Bulletin, the level decision-making within the Soviet gov- whether the DPRK could issue a bond, form base of documentary evidence on the Ko- ernment and within the Moscow-Beijing- an additional three infantry divisions, con- rean War has been enriched even more by Pyongyang alliance shed light on many ques- vene the Supreme People’s Assembly, or the release of virtually the entire collection tions about the Korean War, the Sino-Soviet send textile workers to the Soviet Union for of high-level documents on the war declas- alliance, Soviet relations with North Korea training. Documents #5-9 indicate the rea- sified by the Presidential Archive in Mos- (the Democratic People’s Republic of Ko- son why the highly nationalistic Korean cow, which numbers approximately 1,200 rea, or DPRK), Soviet attitudes toward the communists allowed such interference in pages. Through a joint project of the Center United States, and the making of Soviet their country’s affairs. As I discussed in the for Korean Research of Columbia Univer- foreign policy in general in the last years of previous Bulletin, prior to the Korean War, sity and the Cold War International History Stalin’s life. In this brief commentary I will North Korea was dependent on the Soviet Project, these documents are now available therefore not attempt to provide a close ex- Union for the substantial quantities of goods to all interested researchers.1 amination of these documents, as I have in and the broad range of expertise needed to The Presidential Archive (known offi- two previous Bulletin articles (and a related construct a new socialist state out of an cially as the Archive of the President, Rus- article in The Journal of American-East Asian abruptly truncated portion of the former sian Federation, or APRF) is the repository Relations).2 Instead, I will point out some of Japanese empire. From 1945-1950, the only to which, during the Soviet era, the Kremlin the most important questions these new place to which the DPRK could turn for this leadership sent its most sensitive records for sources address, provide additional back- support was the Soviet Union. Though many safekeeping and ready access. Its holdings ground information drawn from my research North Korean communists had close ties to are therefore more selective than those of in other Soviet archives, and offer some the Chinese communist party, the latter was the archives of the Soviet Foreign Ministry, preliminary conclusions. not in a position to aid its Korean comrades. the Central Committee of the Communist The documents presented below begin In early 1950, the new People’s Republic of Party (CC CPSU), and the General Staff of where the records published in the previous China (PRC) government in Beijing led by the Soviet Armed Forces, the other major Bulletin left off, with Stalin’s telegram to the Mao Zedong was itself forced to turn to repositories used by historians of the Cold Soviet ambassador in Pyongyang on 30 Janu- Moscow for economic and military aid. As War. The release of a large portion of the ary 1950 informing Kim Il Sung that he documents #11 and #13 indicate, in the spring APRF’s documents on the Korean War con- would “assist” him in the matter of reunify- of 1950 Mao Zedong and Kim Il Sung were sequently provides a critical addition to ing Korea by military means. Document #1 both interested in the possibility of develop- available evidence on the high-level deci- reveals that Kim Il Sung and Soviet Ambas- ing wider trade and closer communications sions and deliberations of the communist sador T.F. Shtykov interpreted Stalin’s mes- between the PRC and the DPRK. Close side during this pivotal conflict. sage as approval to plan an offensive cam- economic and military ties between This article presents translations of and paign against South Korea. The North Ko- Pyongyang and Beijing developed after the commentary on a sizable portion of this rean leader received Stalin’s telegram with Chinese entered the Korean War; they were recently-released APRF collection on the “great satisfaction” and informed Shtykov not in place prior to October 1950.4 Korean War. It begins with most of the that he would begin preparations for a meet- At Stalin’s insistence, after secretly re- released documents covering February 1950 ing with Stalin at which the details of the ceiving the Soviet leader’s conditional green through January 1951, providing a close campaign would be worked out. Shtykov’s light for an attack against South Korea dur- look at the Soviet role in Korea during the telegram to Soviet Defense Minister A.M. ing a secret summit in Moscow in April (for COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 31 THE KOREAN WAR which records still, alas, remain unavail- prescribed in the General Staff’s plan, and Stalin’s rather rude message to Mao able), Kim Il Sung traveled to Beijing in that Soviet advisers participated in recon- Zedong on July 8 (document #21) appears to May 1950 in order to secure Mao Zedong’s naissance and in planning the operation at have been a further attempt to prod the approval for the planned offensive. Docu- the divisional level. However, Soviet advis- Chinese to move toward entering the war. ments #11 and #13 show that in his discus- ers were apparently withdrawn from the Stalin was also quite brusque in his message sions with Kim Il Sung, Mao Zedong was front line before the attack began, with nega- to Mao on July 13, indicating that he had not considerably less worried about the possi- tive consequences for the efficiency of the been informed whether the Chinese had de- bility of military conflict with the United operation. This accords with Khrushchev’s cided to deploy troops on the Korean border States than was the Soviet leadership, argu- recollection that Stalin pulled back Soviet and offering again to provide air cover. He ing that “the Americans will not enter a third advisers from the front at the last minute, out also informed Beijing that he intended to world war for such a small territory.” It also of fear that they might be taken prisoner and train Chinese pilots in two to three months appears that in May 1950 Kim Il Sung, thus expose Soviet participation in the op- and to transfer the necessary equipment to perhaps to counter the oppressive Soviet eration.6 them, presumably for use in Korea. On influence in North Korea, took a tentative Consistent with his withdrawal of So- August 27, Stalin informed PRC Foreign step toward the strategy he later used so viet advisers from the front, Stalin’s queries Minister Zhou Enlai (document #26) that he extensively of playing China and the Soviet to Shtykov on July 1 (document #15) indi- would send 38 air force and air defense Union against one another. He reported to cate that he was agitated and nervous about specialists to China. These advisers and the Soviet Ambassador Shtykov that he had at the situation in Korea following the Ameri- large amounts of equipment that accompa- first intended to ask Mao for ammunition for can entry into the war. Shtykov’s reply nied them were the first installment of what the Korean troops that had recently been (document #16) cautiously raises the ques- became massive Soviet support in construct- transferred from China to North Korea tion that was at the root of the Soviet leader’s ing an air force for the PRC, a process which (whose weapons were of Japanese and anxiety, namely the possibility that a disas- continued throughout the Korean War. American manufacture rather than Soviet) ter in Korea might draw Soviet troops into Stalin’s message to Kim Il Sung on 28 but he decided not to raise the issue after all, combat against American armed forces.

Load more

  96

Copy Link