After Annapolis: a Fragile Peace Process in the Middle East the Middle East Conference in Annapolis Brought Together a Coalition of the Besieged

CSS Analyses in Security Policy CSS ETH Zurich Vol. 2 • No. 25 • December 2007

After Annapolis: A Fragile Peace Process in the Middle East The Middle East Conference in Annapolis brought together a coalition of the besieged. The increasing clout of Islamist movements and Iran has brought about a rapprochement between the US, Israel, and the Sunni Arab regimes. As far as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is concerned, the common interest is limited to resuscitating a vague peace process, however. The chances of resolving the conflict are slim. The US reassessment of the Iranian nuclear program will make no difference in this regard. A failure of the peace negotiations threatens to further strengthen radical forces in the region.

Much process, little substance However, there is also reason for much skep- ticism regarding Annapolis. The conference clearly fell short of the desired outcome as originally defined by US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice. Unlike in previous negotiation rounds, the US aimed this time to bring about some Israeli-Palestinian rapprochement in the core contentious issues – borders, Jerusalem, Palestinian refugees, and Israeli security – already before the beginning of the conference. These efforts failed in spite of intense pre-negotiations. Instead of being able to present the international community with a basic document laying out substantial compromises on final-status questions, the US struggled until the last President Mahmoud Abbas at the Annapolis conference, 27 November 2007. Jim Young/Reuters minute to persuade Israelis and Palestinians even to commit to a joint statement. The Annapolis peace conference of late and international organizations were re- November 2007 has left an ambivalent im- presented. Especially important was the The conference was thus reduced to a large- pression. On the positive side, Israelis and attendance of 16 Arab states, which ly ceremonial affair at which the parties to Palestinians decided to resume negotiations – apart from Egypt and Jordan – do not the conflict merely stated their willingness for the first time after years of violence. The maintain diplomatic relations with Israel. to engage in new peace talks. While Ehud conference also signaled a more active poli- A final notable factor was the improved Olmert and Mahmoud Abbas committed cy of the Bush administration vis-à-vis the methodology of the peace negotiations. themselves to dealing with all core issues, a Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which it had long While the Road Map of the Middle East specification of the latter was notably lack- ignored. Furthermore, the declared goal of Quartet remains the basis of peace ef- ing in the statement. Instead, the focus was elaborating a peace treaty by December forts, the controversial provisions for on the definition of the negotiation pro- 2008 gives George W. Bush a broader time- phased implementation were dropped. cess. However, a steering group that remains frame than the one available to President Instead of confidence-building measures in session continuously, the establishment Bill Clinton at the Camp David and Taba ne- – defined as effective Palestinian meas- of topical negotiation teams, and biweekly gotiations in 2000. ures to stop terrorism and an end of meetings between Olmert and Abbas will Israeli settlement activities – being pre- not be sufficient to bring about peace. It is also worth noting that the resump- conditions for final status negotiations, tion of the peace process enjoys remark- both processes will now take place in par- It is questionable whether all actors ably broad support. Annapolis was the allel. Furthermore, the US will in the fu- involved have the will and capabil- first major international Middle East ture serve as an arbitrator concerning the ity to commit themselves to the outlines conference since 1991. Around 50 states implementation of the Road Map. of a Palestinian state and to bring about a

corresponding two-state solution. Olm- Flashpoint Middle East ert, Abbas, and Bush – the key actors in the TURKEY peace talks – are weakened by domestic political factors. Moreover, the common Hizbollah motivation of the new round of negotia- GOLAN SYRIA tions is not so much the desire to resolve the conflict as the wish to counter the re- ISRAEL LEBANON IRAN gional power shifts in favor of Iran as well WEST BANK IRAQ as Islamist movements such as Hamas and Fatah ISRAEL Hizbollah. The consensus of the participants JORDAN is thus largely confined to the resuscitation of a vague peace process. GAZA Hamas EGYPT

From Baghdad to Annapolis SAUDI ARABIA For a long time, Bush displayed no interest in continuing Clinton’s mediation efforts. © ETH Zürich, Frank Haydon The attention of his administration was largely devoted to Iraq, the democratization Tehran’s growing influence after the over- lah from Southern Lebanon and by Ha- of which was to serve as a starting point throw of Saddam Hussein, they are hardly mas from Gaza have demonstrated to the for a regional realignment. In the Middle able to engage in close cooperation with Israeli public that a unilateral demarcation East conflict, the US pursued a course that the US against the Shi’ite theocracy with- of borders without consultations with the was biased towards Israel. For example, out substantial progress regarding the Pal- Arab neighbors offers no security. Olmert Washington supported Israel’s rejection of estinian question. Washington has simply is also likely to expect a new peace process Yasser Arafat as a negotiating partner. After lost too much credibility in the Arab world to yield a popularity boost for Israel, which Hamas’ victory at the polls in the spring of since its invasion of Iraq. has attracted much criticism in recent 2006, the US boycotted the new Palestin- years – including from Europe – with con- ian government, despite having previously A coalition of the besieged troversial measures such as the construc- pushed for elections. During the war in The Annapolis Process, initiated by the US, tion of a security barrier. Lebanon in 2006, the Bush administration serves the interests of both Abbas and Ol- attracted the ire of many Arabs by delaying mert, both of whom are under a great deal The coalition of the besieged also includes the call for a ceasefire. In the controversial of domestic pressure. For the Palestinian the Arab states attending the Annapo- final-status issues, Bush also adopted an leader, the peace talks have become a mat- lis conference. In addition to the growing unusually partisan stance. He assured then- ter of political survival. His emergency gov- external threat of the Shi’ite resurgence, Israeli prime minister Ariel Sharon in 2004 ernment has no control over the almost the secular Sunni rulers are increasingly that Israel would be permitted to retain the 1.5 million Palestinians living in the Gaza confronted by challenges from religious large settlement blocs in the occupied West Strip, has only limited freedom of action extremists on the domestic front. They be- Bank and that Palestinian refugees would in the West Bank, and suffers from a lack lieve the decline of Arab nationalism is due have no claim to a right of return to Israel. of legitimacy. His Fatah party is ineffective to a considerable extent to the Israeli-Pal- and owes its remaining influence in the estinian conflict, which remains unresolved Two factors persuaded the US administra- West Bank largely to the suppression of after six decades of violence. They have tion to at least partially abandon its pas- Hamas by the Israeli security forces. Since therefore stepped up their negotiation ef- sive stance vis-à-vis the Israeli-Palestin- the failure of the national unity govern- forts in recent years. The members of the ian conflict in the summer of 2007. First ment in June 2007, Abbas has consistently Arab League in their peace initiative of of all, Washington perceived the grab for supported the forced division of the Pales- 2002 offered Israel a comprehensive peace power by Hamas in the Gaza Strip and tinians by the US, the EU, and Israel. He has settlement in return for Israel’s withdrawal the resulting Palestinian schism as an op- thus made himself conspicuously depend- from all areas it has occupied since 1967. portunity to isolate the Muslim extremists ent on Olmert and Bush, in a move that he and to strengthen the secular Fatah move- will only be able to justify on the domestic Limited capacity to make peace ment under Abbas. It is hoped that a new front through progress in the peace talks. The domestic weakness of the actors in- peace process and economic support for volved is not only an important factor con- the emergency government in the West Olmert, for his part, requires a new vision tributing to the revitalization of the peace Bank will demonstrate to the Palestinian of peace in order to be able to offer new process. It is simultaneously a key obstacle population that only support for moderate perspectives to the Israeli population af- to achieving and implementing a lasting forces will improve their living conditions. ter the unsettling experience of the 2006 peace settlement. Abbas cannot negotiate Secondly, the US administration came to Lebanon conflict. Charges of incompetence on behalf of the entire population, which realize that the Europeans and especially in the conduct of the war and domestic means that any concessions he may make, the Arab countries could only be persua- scandals have caused his approval rates in for example in terms of the right of return ded to embark on a tough course vis-à-vis Israel to plummet dramatically. His elec- for Palestinian refugees, are highly quali- Iran in return for US engagement for peace tion promise to continue Sharon’s strategy fied. The implementation of any potential in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. While the of unilateral conflict management through agreements may fail due to the resistance Sunni rulers in the region, like the US, are a partial withdrawal from the West Bank is of Hamas, which does not acknowledge increasingly on the defensive as a result of obsolete today. Rocket attacks by Hizbol- Israel’s right to exist and has threatened

a new Intifada in case the Palestinian side Key dates: Occupied territories and peace negotiations since 1967 should make concessions. 1967: Israel occupies East Jerusalem, the Golan Heights, the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, and Sinai Olmert is similarly constrained when it 1978: Peace treaty with Egypt, Israel returns the Sinai peninsula comes to making peace. Resistance from 1980: Israel declares Jerusalem “whole and united”, to be “the eternal capital of Israel” within his coalition was instrumental in 1991: International Middle East conference in Madrid ensuring that the Annapolis Declaration 1993: Oslo Peace Process: Mutual recognition of PLO and Israel, limited Palestinian remained largely devoid of substance. It autonomy in West Bank and Gaza is questionable whether he would be able 1994: Peace treaty with Jordan to win the elections that would inevitably follow any major concessions he might 2000–01: Negotiations between Arafat and Barak in Camp David and Taba make. The resistance of the influential set- 2002: Peace initiative of Arab League, Road Map of the Quartet (US, EU, UN, and Russia) tler lobby and of other nationalist and reli- 2005: Unilateral withdrawal from Gaza gious circles against territorial concessions 2007: International Middle East conference in Annapolis is very strong. Olmert’s policies will most likely also be opposed from within his own Furthermore, one may question whether a the peace talks. It is true that the assess- Kadima party, which was founded in 2005 majority of Israelis would accept the desig- ment, according to which Tehran prob- on the strength of Sharon’s personality and nation of East Jerusalem as the capital of ably already ended the military part of his strategy of unilateral withdrawal and Palestine. As far as the right of return for its program as early as 2003, raises new which is now internally divided. The fact more than four million Palestinian refu- questions concerning the reliability of the that Binyamin Netanyahu, the leader of gees to Israel is concerned, it is probably intelligence services and the credibility of the national-conservative Likud party, cur- the Palestinians who will have to make the Bush government. However, while this rently has the best approval ratings reflects most concessions. Since this question is, appraisal excludes the option of military a widespread desire for security among however, their strongest bargaining chip, strikes for the time being, it does not yet the Israeli population. Netanyahu not only they will not make compromises before imply a more active involvement of Bush stands for a policy of the iron fist and set- reaching a package deal as the result of in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Although tlement expansion, but also contributed negotiations. By making the recognition of deescalation with Iran gives the US new to the failure of the Oslo Process in the Israel as the “State of the Jews” a precon- options in the Palestine question, it also second half of the 1990s. There is nothing dition for final-status negotiations after diminishes the pressure to make peace. to indicate that he is more favorably dis- Annapolis, Olmert has narrowed down the posed towards the Annapolis Process. scope for diplomacy at an early stage. This A failure of the Annapolis Process would is very much in accordance with the wish- further strengthen the radical forces in the Diverging priorities es of the numerous Israeli decisionmakers region. On the other hand, a peace process There is also reason for pessimism in view and analysts who believe that contain- that gambles on an even deeper division of the disparate interests regarding the ing Iran is more important than a historic among Palestinians is not helpful with a purpose of the new peace process. Ab- compromise with the Palestinians. view to the declared goal of creating a Pal- bas is crucially dependent on the peace estinian state. A rapprochement between talks bringing forth rapid and substantial Washington’s reassessment of Iran Fatah and Hamas seems indispensable for progress. International economic assist- Another reason why the peace talks are achieving sustainable progress in the reso- ance alone will not be sufficient to shore unlikely to return substantial results is that lution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The up his position. A failure of the talks would Bush, like Olmert, seems to be mainly in- US alone is unlikely to facilitate such a move, be a triumph for the radical forces within terested in sustaining the process. The US however. Switzerland, which was the only Palestinian society. For Olmert, on the other president has issued a clear signal that he Western country to bank on dialog with the hand, the process itself is more important will not be directly involved in the negotia- Islamists and intra-Palestinian reconciliation than the rapid realization of a two-state tions and that it is up to the parties to the after the Hamas election victory in 2006, solution. Many Israelis believe that even a conflict to find a solution. It is also worth was visibly absent from the list of invitees dismantling of roadblocks in the West Bank noting that he again adopted pro-Israeli to Annapolis. Even if an independent policy means a deterioration of their personal se- positions in Annapolis by referring to Israel of peace promotion in the Middle East has curity. It is also questionable whether Israel explicitly as the “State of the Jews” and only become more difficult in the context of the has the political determination to make the calling for an end to settlement expansion. US “War on Terror”, efforts to mediate the concessions necessary for creating a con- The Arab side was further disillusioned by formation of a new Palestinian unity govern- tiguous Palestinian state entity. Through the fact that the US returned immediately ment still deserve to be given high priority. its continuous settlement construction in after the conference to its traditional poli- recent decades, Israel has created facts in cy towards Syria and made a peace track Author: Daniel Möckli the occupied territories that make it enor- with Damascus conditional on a change of [email protected] mously difficult to implement a solution Syria’s policies towards Iran and Lebanon. translated from German: that is acceptable for the Palestinian side. Christopher Findlay Since the beginning of the Oslo Process in The fundamental reassessment of Iran’s 1993, the number of settlers has risen from nuclear program by the US intelligence other CSS Analyses / Mailinglist: 281,000 to more than 460,000, which has agencies, which was published in early www.isn.ethz.ch caused a high degree of geographic frag- December 2007, is unlikely to make any german and French versions: mentation in Palestinian society. difference to the limited role of the US in www.ssn.ethz.ch