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CSS Analyses in Security Policy CSS ETH Zurich Vol. 2 • No. 25 • December 2007 AFTER AnnapOLIS: A FRAGILE PEACE PROCESS IN THE MIDDLE EasT The Middle East Conference in Annapolis brought together a coalition of the besieged. The increasing clout of Islamist movements and Iran has brought about a rapprochement between the US, Israel, and the Sunni Arab regimes. As far as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is concerned, the common interest is limited to resuscitating a vague peace process, however. The chances of resolving the conflict are slim. The US reassessment of the Iranian nuclear program will make no difference in this regard. A failure of the peace negotiations threatens to further strengthen radical forces in the region. Much process, little substance However, there is also reason for much skep- ticism regarding Annapolis. The conference clearly fell short of the desired outcome as originally defined by US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice. Unlike in previous nego- tiation rounds, the US aimed this time to bring about some Israeli-Palestinian rap- prochement in the core contentious issues – borders, Jerusalem, Palestinian refugees, and Israeli security – already before the begin- ning of the conference. These efforts failed in spite of intense pre-negotiations. Instead of being able to present the international community with a basic document laying out substantial compromises on final-status questions, the US struggled until the last President Mahmoud Abbas at the Annapolis conference, 27 November 2007. Jim Young/Reuters minute to persuade Israelis and Palestinians even to commit to a joint statement. The Annapolis peace conference of late and international organizations were re- November 2007 has left an ambivalent im- presented. Especially important was the The conference was thus reduced to a large- pression. On the positive side, Israelis and attendance of 16 Arab states, which ly ceremonial affair at which the parties to Palestinians decided to resume negotiations – apart from Egypt and Jordan – do not the conflict merely stated their willingness for the first time after years of violence. The maintain diplomatic relations with Israel. to engage in new peace talks. While Ehud conference also signaled a more active poli- A final notable factor was the improved Olmert and Mahmoud Abbas committed cy of the Bush administration vis-à-vis the methodology of the peace negotiations. themselves to dealing with all core issues, a Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which it had long While the Road Map of the Middle East specification of the latter was notably lack- ignored. Furthermore, the declared goal of Quartet remains the basis of peace ef- ing in the statement. Instead, the focus was elaborating a peace treaty by December forts, the controversial provisions for on the definition of the negotiation pro- 2008 gives George W. Bush a broader time- phased implementation were dropped. cess. However, a steering group that remains frame than the one available to President Instead of confidence-building measures in session continuously, the establishment Bill Clinton at the Camp David and Taba ne- – defined as effective Palestinian meas- of topical negotiation teams, and biweekly gotiations in 2000. ures to stop terrorism and an end of meetings between Olmert and Abbas will Israeli settlement activities – being pre- not be sufficient to bring about peace. It is also worth noting that the resump- conditions for final status negotiations, tion of the peace process enjoys remark- both processes will now take place in par- It is questionable whether all actors ably broad support. Annapolis was the allel. Furthermore, the US will in the fu- involved have the will and capabil- first major international Middle East ture serve as an arbitrator concerning the ity to commit themselves to the outlines conference since 1991. Around 50 states implementation of the Road Map. of a Palestinian state and to bring about a © 2007 Center for Security Studies (CSS), ETH Zurich CSS Analyses in Security Policy Vol. 2 • No. 25 • December 2007 corresponding two-state solution. Olm- Flashpoint Middle East ert, Abbas, and Bush – the key actors in the TURKEY peace talks – are weakened by domestic political factors. Moreover, the common Hizbollah motivation of the new round of negotia- GOLAN SYRIA tions is not so much the desire to resolve the conflict as the wish to counter the re- ISRAEL LEBANON IRAN gional power shifts in favor of Iran as well WEST BANK IRAQ as Islamist movements such as Hamas and Fatah ISRAEL Hizbollah. The consensus of the participants JORDAN is thus largely confined to the resuscitation of a vague peace process. GAZA Hamas EGYPT From Baghdad to Annapolis SAUDI ARABIA For a long time, Bush displayed no interest in continuing Clinton’s mediation efforts. © ETH Zürich, Frank Haydon The attention of his administration was largely devoted to Iraq, the democratization Tehran’s growing influence after the over- lah from Southern Lebanon and by Ha- of which was to serve as a starting point throw of Saddam Hussein, they are hardly mas from Gaza have demonstrated to the for a regional realignment. In the Middle able to engage in close cooperation with Israeli public that a unilateral demarcation East conflict, the US pursued a course that the US against the Shi’ite theocracy with- of borders without consultations with the was biased towards Israel. For example, out substantial progress regarding the Pal- Arab neighbors offers no security. Olmert Washington supported Israel’s rejection of estinian question. Washington has simply is also likely to expect a new peace process Yasser Arafat as a negotiating partner. After lost too much credibility in the Arab world to yield a popularity boost for Israel, which Hamas’ victory at the polls in the spring of since its invasion of Iraq. has attracted much criticism in recent 2006, the US boycotted the new Palestin- years – including from Europe – with con- ian government, despite having previously A coalition of the besieged troversial measures such as the construc- pushed for elections. During the war in The Annapolis Process, initiated by the US, tion of a security barrier. Lebanon in 2006, the Bush administration serves the interests of both Abbas and Ol- attracted the ire of many Arabs by delaying mert, both of whom are under a great deal The coalition of the besieged also includes the call for a ceasefire. In the controversial of domestic pressure. For the Palestinian the Arab states attending the Annapo- final-status issues, Bush also adopted an leader, the peace talks have become a mat- lis conference. In addition to the growing unusually partisan stance. He assured then- ter of political survival. His emergency gov- external threat of the Shi’ite resurgence, Israeli prime minister Ariel Sharon in 2004 ernment has no control over the almost the secular Sunni rulers are increasingly that Israel would be permitted to retain the 1.5 million Palestinians living in the Gaza confronted by challenges from religious large settlement blocs in the occupied West Strip, has only limited freedom of action extremists on the domestic front. They be- Bank and that Palestinian refugees would in the West Bank, and suffers from a lack lieve the decline of Arab nationalism is due have no claim to a right of return to Israel. of legitimacy. His Fatah party is ineffective to a considerable extent to the Israeli-Pal- and owes its remaining influence in the estinian conflict, which remains unresolved Two factors persuaded the US administra- West Bank largely to the suppression of after six decades of violence. They have tion to at least partially abandon its pas- Hamas by the Israeli security forces. Since therefore stepped up their negotiation ef- sive stance vis-à-vis the Israeli-Palestin- the failure of the national unity govern- forts in recent years. The members of the ian conflict in the summer of 2007. First ment in June 2007, Abbas has consistently Arab League in their peace initiative of of all, Washington perceived the grab for supported the forced division of the Pales- 2002 offered Israel a comprehensive peace power by Hamas in the Gaza Strip and tinians by the US, the EU, and Israel. He has settlement in return for Israel’s withdrawal the resulting Palestinian schism as an op- thus made himself conspicuously depend- from all areas it has occupied since 1967. portunity to isolate the Muslim extremists ent on Olmert and Bush, in a move that he and to strengthen the secular Fatah move- will only be able to justify on the domestic Limited capacity to make peace ment under Abbas. It is hoped that a new front through progress in the peace talks. The domestic weakness of the actors in- peace process and economic support for volved is not only an important factor con- the emergency government in the West Olmert, for his part, requires a new vision tributing to the revitalization of the peace Bank will demonstrate to the Palestinian of peace in order to be able to offer new process. It is simultaneously a key obstacle population that only support for moderate perspectives to the Israeli population af- to achieving and implementing a lasting forces will improve their living conditions. ter the unsettling experience of the 2006 peace settlement. Abbas cannot negotiate Secondly, the US administration came to Lebanon conflict. Charges of incompetence on behalf of the entire population, which realize that the Europeans and especially in the conduct of the war and domestic means that any concessions he may make, the Arab countries could only be persua- scandals have caused his approval rates in for example in terms of the right of return ded to embark on a tough course vis-à-vis Israel to plummet dramatically. His elec- for Palestinian refugees, are highly quali- Iran in return for US engagement for peace tion promise to continue Sharon’s strategy fied.

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