The Annapolis Conference: the Historic Context

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The Annapolis Conference: the Historic Context The Annapolis Conference: The Historic Context By Yossi Olmert The upcoming Annapolis conference marks another stage in the long and as yet elusive pursuit of lasting peace between Israel and the Palestinians. Until the Camp David Accords in 1977, the conflicts between Israel and Egypt, and the Palestinian Authority and Israel, were characterized by violence and total lack of recognition. Since the Accords, the conflicts have become multi- dimensional – violence and terrorism are followed by negotiations and agreements. The Annapolis Conference is not an historic event; rather it is another stepping stone along the road that began in 1977 and continued at the Madrid conference, the Oslo accords and the Camp David talks. Conflicts as complicated as the Palestinian-Israeli one take time to resolve; it may take many years, perhaps a generation or more. We should therefore not have unrealistic expectations as we approach the conference so as to avoid unrealistic euphoria in the case of some success, or desperation in the case of failure. The Participants Secretary Rice is working hard to bolster Abbas. As a part of It is Israel’s and America’s hope that as many Arab states as that effort, the administration’s dramatic increase of financial possible attend the conference, alongside the Palestinian assistance to Abbas (to $410 million dollars) is delegation headed by chairman Abbas, or his representative. unprecedented and ground-breaking. It is widely assumed that both Jordan and Egypt – the two Arab states that have formal peace treaties with Israel – will The Israelis participate, but the big question mark is about the possible Due to the high volatility of the Palestinian issue in Israeli participation of Saudi Arabia. politics, Prime Minister Olmert has to navigate very carefully The Saudis, as usual, blow hot and cold, and it is very between conflicting pressures. On record, the Prime Minister is likely, that even if they will participate, they will not announce committed to talks with Abbas. The two have established good this decision until the very last moment. Should they personal rapport as can be seen from their frequent and friendly participate, it would definitely be a boost to the entire process meetings. Yet the Prime Minister is under mounting pressure to and would serve as an incentive to other Arab states, react strongly to the ongoing rocket attacks on southern Israel, particularly in the gulf and North Africa. particularly S’derot, which could lead to a major military As for Syria’s participation, while it’s not to be ruled out, operation in Gaza. Even Defense Minister Barak, the elected the likelihood of that happening is slim. The Syrians leader of the Labor party is getting increasingly impatient with participated at the Madrid Peace Conference, so their the situation in the south. possible participation at Annapolis will not be a major He is also being pressured by hawkish ministers in his own breakthrough, though it could enhance the legitimacy of the Kadima party – most notably, Minister Dichter, former head of conference in the Arab world. On the other hand, they will the security service – and other political parties who are to the surely demand a discussion of the Golan Heights issue, right of the Kadima party. Against all this, the Prime Minister something that will not be welcomed stands his ground, as can be seen by by the Israelis or for that matter by the his decision to release Palestinian Americans and Palestinians. prisoners held in Israel, despite calls The participation of other actors from within and without the from outside of the Middle East, such government, to condition any such as the EU, Britain, France, and Russia release on the release of Gilad Shalit, is to be expected and welcome. the Israeli soldier held in Gaza. The Palestinians Subjects on the Agenda The Palestinian delegation will It seems reasonable that if the represent those elements of the conference stands any chance of Palestinian people who are loyal to success, it will have to set realistic the leadership of Mahmud Abbas and the Fatah movement. goals. It follows that issues such as Jerusalem, refugees, and Left-wing Palestinian organizations, whose influence is the final demarcation of borders cannot be decided in a marginal, and the very powerful Islamic wing of the conference lasting a few days. However, these issues should Palestinian people, headed by Hamas and Islamic Jihad, not be ignored either. The parties would do well to confine aided from the outside by Syria and Iran, will boycott the themselves to the publication of a declaration of principles conference and are likely to express their opposition by and a discussion on some issues of everyday life in Judea indulging, or trying to indulge in a campaign of terrorism. and Samaria (the West Bank). This is clearly the preference of Clearly, Abbas comes to Annapolis much weakened the Olmert government. and with his wings clipped as a result of the Hamas Sometimes, and surely, in the context of Israeli- takeover in Gaza. However, he is the internationally Palestinian talks, the desire to achieve too much is a sure recognized Palestinian leader, and in the world of recipe for disaster. The pro-Israel community should be aware international diplomacy, weakness is sometimes a strength, of the fact that the number one issue for Israel now and in the as all the other actors participating at the process seem to near future is the question of Iran, which casts a huge shadow bend over backwards to help Abbas consolidate his over the entire Middle East, and in particular, Israel. This position. That includes, the Olmert government in Israel, and question is not on the agenda of Annapolis, and that fact the Bush administration, which under the guidance of should put the Annapolis conference in its proper context. www.caravanfordemocracy.org www.jnf.org.
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