The Annapolis Peace Conference: Cloudy Prospects for Success James Phillips

22 WebMemo Published by The Heritage Foundation No. 1708 November 21, 2007 The Annapolis Peace Conference: Cloudy Prospects for Success James Phillips The long-delayed Annapolis conference, pro- threat to peace, the radical Islamic Hamas move- posed by the Bush Administration to revive the dor- ment, not only rejects negotiations with Israel but mant Israeli–Palestinian peace negotiations, is also continues to actively seek its destruction. slated to be convened on November 27. But the After months of negotiations, Israel and the Pales- countries that will attend; the issues that will be tinian Authority still have not been able to hammer addressed; and what, if anything, can be achieved at out a joint statement. The Palestinians want the con- the conference all remain obscured by a thick dip- ference to produce a detailed blueprint for a final set- lomatic fog. The conference was originally con- tlement with a well-defined timetable for Palestinian ceived as an international forum to reach agreement statehood, to be established in as little as six months. on a “political horizon” for a two-state solution to Israel seeks a less ambitious agreement on a state- the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. Lately, however, it ment of principles that will guide future negotia- has been downgraded to a ceremonial diplomatic tions. Progress reportedly has been blocked because kickoff for final status negotiations due to the failure Israel wants a Palestinian acknowledgement of Israel’s of Israeli and Palestinian diplomats to negotiate a right to exist as a Jewish state, while Palestinians common vision of the horizon. The continuing have refused, insisting that such a statement would threat posed by Hamas, backed by Iran and Syria, infringe on the “right of return” of Palestinian refu- also makes a sustainable peace agreement unattain- gees to Israel rather than to the proposed Palestinian able for the foreseeable future. Approaching the state. As long as Palestinians cling to this unrealistic final year of its tenure, the Bush Administration demand, little progress is possible. must bear this in mind as it presses for realistic step- by-step negotiations to mitigate, rather than overly Neither side presently trusts the other to deliver ambitious efforts to quickly resolve, the intractable on its promises. And neither Israeli Prime Minister Israeli–Palestinian conflict. Ehud Olmert nor Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas have enough domestic political Prospects for Success. The diplomatic uncer- support to actually fulfill the terms of a final status tainties surrounding the Annapolis conference agreement, if one could be reached. Olmert has reflect the tremendous difficulties inherent in reach- ing an agreement on thorny questions related to final status issues, including security arrangements, the delineation of borders, Jerusalem, Israeli settle- This paper, in its entirety, can be found at: ments in the West Bank, the fate of Palestinian refu- www.heritage.org/Research/MiddleEast/wm1708.cfm Produced by the Douglas and Sarah Allison gees, and water rights. Moreover, the glacial pace of Center for Foreign Policy Studies bilateral negotiations reflects the fact that the situa- Published by The Heritage Foundation 214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE tion is not ripe for a diplomatic solution. The chief Washington, DC 20002–4999 (202) 546-4400 • heritage.org Nothing written here is to be construed as necessarily reflecting the views of The Heritage Foundation or as an attempt to aid or hinder the passage of any bill before Congress. No. 1708 November 21, 2007 WebMemo been undermined by the disastrous results of his Washington has tried to finesse this situation by government’s unilateral withdrawal from Gaza in broadening the conference to include as many 2005, the failure to decisively defeat Hezbollah in countries and international organizations as possi- the 2006 war in Lebanon, and ongoing criminal ble, highlighting the fact that Hamas is isolated in investigations into his past. Even if Olmert could its rejection of negotiations with Israel. The State strike a deal with the Palestinians, his weak coali- Department has invited Syria to participate, despite tion government would likely implode and be the fact that Damascus continues to support Hamas replaced if it sacrificed continued Israeli control and other radical Palestinian groups dedicated to over Jerusalem. Israel’s destruction. Saudi Arabia has also been Abbas, a protégé of Yasser Arafat who broke with invited to attend, but its participation remains the Palestinian leader in the final years of his cor- uncertain. The cautious Saudis reportedly have rupt and thuggish rule, suffers from a lack of per- engaged in secret talks with Israel in the past but sonal charisma, his failure to reform the Palestinian are reluctant to publicly sit down with Israel until a Authority, and the defeat of his followers by Hamas diplomatic deal has already been consummated. in Gaza in 2006. Abbas is not in a position to effec- The Olmert government recently has made con- tively fight terrorism, which is the chief obstacle to fidence-building concessions to attract Saudi and peace. If Israeli forces withdraw from the West other participants, including the release of 441 Pal- Bank, there is a considerable risk that Abbas and his estinian prisoners, a pledge to dismantle unautho- Fatah followers would be defeated by Hamas, as rized settlement outposts in the West Bank, and the they were in Gaza. removal of some security checkpoints that have Moreover, Abbas has not established full control restricted Palestinian movement. But this may not over the Palestinian Authority’s unreliable security be enough for President Abbas, who fears being crit- services, which would be called upon to enforce any icized as being soft on Israel by Hamas and by hard- agreement. Last summer, Israeli intelligence foiled a liners within his own fractious Fatah movement. Palestinian assassination plot against Prime Minister Some Palestinian sources have indicated that the Olmert that included members of the Palestinian Palestinian Authority may not participate in the security services. The plotters were arrested by the conference unless it obtains the blessings of the Palestinian Authority but subsequently released Arab League, which has scheduled a meeting of from jail, apparently without the knowledge of Pres- Arab foreign ministers in Egypt for later this week. ident Abbas. The continuation of Arafat’s “revolving Avoiding a Rush to Failure. The Bush Adminis- door” detention policy for Palestinians plotting to tration must be careful not to try to do too much too kill Israelis is only the latest reminder that Israeli fast at the Annapolis conference. This will only feed negotiators cannot count on their Palestinian coun- unrealistic expectations that could boil over into terparts to fulfill all their commitments under previ- another burst of violence, as happened after the ous peace agreements, let alone new ones. Clinton Administration’s failed Camp David sum- The Problem of Hamas. Hamas, which contin- mit in 2000. ues to rain rockets down on Israeli civilians living The Administration should adhere to a more near the border with Gaza, is in a position to incremental strategy that takes into account the les- explode the chances for a genuine peace. Backed by sons of the failed Oslo peace process in the 1990s. Iran and Syria, it is fortifying its Gaza stronghold As that experience showed, the chief barrier to and preparing for war, bolstered by tons of weapons peace is Palestinian terrorism, which understand- smuggled across the border with Egypt. Sooner or ably erodes the willingness of Israelis to make con- later, Israel will be compelled to defend itself by cessions that entail considerable security risks. invading Gaza, which will further cloud the pros- Proceeding on a step-by-step basis, with strict mon- pects for peace. But as long as Hamas retains its itoring of performance-based compliance before the stranglehold over Gaza, no stable peace is possible. next step is undertaken, would build confidence on both sides over time. page 2 No. 1708 November 21, 2007 WebMemo President Abbas currently does not have the treaty with Jordan. Multilateral conferences, such as capability to effectively crack down on terrorism. the 1991 Madrid Conference, can provide impor- He needs the support of Arab states and the West to tant symbolic international support for negotia- isolate and weaken Hamas. As long as Hamas tions, but are cumbersome affairs that often lead to remains a potent threat to a genuine and sustainable diplomatic dead ends. peace, only conflict mitigation and management, Conclusion. The Annapolis conference, if it is not conflict resolution, is possible. Therefore, successful, will only be the first step in a long, gruel- Washington should not push for a rushed agree- ing negotiation. Washington should not rush these ment that would result in a flawed and unstable negotiations, as it is more important to get them cease-fire, not a durable permanent settlement. right than to get them done quickly. As long as Also, the Administration should not impose Hamas is free to continue its terror campaign, it is unrealistic deadlines for negotiations. Peace will virtually impossible for Israel to reach a final status take a generation to build. It is highly improbable agreement with the Palestinian Authority. The that a lame duck Israeli government and a shaky Annapolis conference ultimately will be seen as a Palestinian Authority can conclude a final settle- success only to the extent that it helps reduce the ment in the last months of the Bush Administration. power and potential threat of Hamas and other rad- Washington also should seek to avoid excessive ical Palestinian factions that continue to seek the American intervention, which leads both sides to destruction of Israel. negotiate with Washington rather than each other, —James Phillips is Research Fellow for Middle East- as the Clinton Administration quickly discovered.

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