Zarstvo and Communism

Zarstvo and Communism:

Italian Diplomacy in in the Age of Soviet Communism

By Francesco Randazzo

Zarstvo and Communism: Italian Diplomacy in Russia in the Age of Soviet Communism

By Francesco Randazzo

This book first published 2018

Cambridge Scholars Publishing

Lady Stephenson Library, Newcastle upon Tyne, NE6 2PA, UK

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library

Copyright © 2018 by Francesco Randazzo

All rights for this book reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the copyright owner.

ISBN (10): 1-5275-0899-4 ISBN (13): 978-1-5275-0899-6 TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction ...... 1 Emilio Cassese

Chapter One ...... 5 Italian Diplomacy and Russia in the Late Nineteenth Century

Chapter Two ...... 29 Italian Diplomacy between Russia and the Central Empires during the First World War

Chapter Three ...... 41 , the Revolution, and Civil War in Russia

Chapter Four ...... 75 From the Bolshevik Revolution to the United Soviet Socialist Republic

Chapter Five ...... 91 The Russian Civil War, the Polish Question, and Peace Talks in Italian Military Documents from 1917 to 1921

Chapter Six ...... 109 Ten Years of Conflictual Politics between Fascist Italy and Soviet Russia (1922–33)

Documentary Appendix ...... 139

Bibliography ...... 153

Index of Names...... 161

INTRODUCTION

The centenary of the Russian Revolution in Italy has stimulated a moment of great critical reflection on the diplomatic relations between the and the along with a historical review of the event from which an epoch-making phenomenon—Soviet communism— was generated. In this context, this long essay by Francesco Randazzo, Zarstvo and Communism: Italian Diplomacy in Russia in the Age of Soviet Communism, undoubtedly represents a satisfactory point of arrival. It is a summary report of Italian and partly foreign archival sources that takes note of recent historiographic contributions on the subject and does not renounce significant documentary acquisitions and further elements of knowledge. The history of relations between post-unification Italy and Tsarist Russia has been based for a long time on the exhaustive studies dedicated to the theme by Giorgio Petracchi, a well-known specialist in Italian diplomatic relations with Tsarist Russia and the . Over the years, the historiographical debate has been further enriched by research on the various aspects of the revolution, focusing on the political, military, and social context, thus helping its greater contextualization. It is no coincidence that contemporary historiography has repeatedly underlined the importance of linking the 1917 revolution to the 1905 revolution, the first true bourgeois revolution in its history. The economic and military defeat of Tsarist Russia against Japan shook the Empire, generating a series of nationalist protests and demonstrations, giving rise, on the initiative of the Social Democrats, to the “Soviets,” the revolutionary organisms directly expressed by the workers. Relying on these historiographical bases and the amount of research carried out in recent years, several scholars, including Francesco Randazzo, have ventured into numerous studies on Italian-Russian diplomatic history starting in 1905 by leveraging the large documentation left by Giulio Melegari, plenipotentiary minister of the Kingdom of Italy in between 1905 and 1912. The October Manifesto, issued by the tsar, seemed to be an imperial turnaround through the new constitutional conquests, so much so that Melegari put many hopes in the Russian reform movement. The idyll was not followed, with Nicholas II’s choice to dissolve the first Duma, dominated by the Cadet party, in 1906 showing the fragility of the tsarist in the eyes of the Italian diplomat. 2 Introduction

When even the second Duma was dissolved, the tsar and minister P. Stolypin decided to change the electoral system by introducing martial law. Randazzo's essay then retraces the main stages of the events before and after the Bolshevik revolution, as well as the evolution of diplomatic relations between the Kingdom of Italy and the tsarist empire. The Racconigi Agreement, for example, was the Russian and Italian response to the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina to the Austro-Hungarian Empire in 1908. With this agreement, Italy received the green light from Russia, which it lacked at the moment of the occupation of , generating two Balkan wars which further destabilized the geopolitical area, and from which the First World War took inspiration. There is no doubt that the Racconigi Agreement came about during the crisis of the Belle Époque, slipping between the dismemberment of the and the creation of the Balkan States, the Italian military campaign in the Aegean, and the possibility of reaching the Straits, proceeding towards the world explosion of 1914. After Racconigi and the parenthesis of San Giuliano as Foreign Minister and the appointment of as his successor, Italian-Russian relations began to creak, so much so that after the outbreak of the First World War, despite the Italian neutrality called into question with the Pact of April 26, 1915, Russia represented an interlocutor holding off a disappointing ally. The crisis of the Tsarist empire and its subsequent collapse under the blows of the caught several diplomats of the time unawares, such as ambassador Andrea Carlotti di Riparbella, who completely underestimated the role of the masses as well as the strength of the Soviets. In the following weeks, as Randazzo points out, fragmentary news items followed one another, out of fear that the revolution could bring distrust to Russia's holding in the conflict. The contemporary defeat of Caporetto pushed the Italian government, terrified of a possible social crisis, to strengthen the censorship of war and create strong anti-revolutionary propaganda. Meanwhile, Carlotti was recalled on October 25, 1917 (November 7) by virtue of his numerous erroneous predictions, and for the returning Tomasi della Torretta things did not go any better when he was forced to move from Saint Petersburg up to Archangel'sk, while the Bolshevik government moved to . The intervention policy of the Entente led to the departure of all the foreign and military diplomatic personnel still present in the territory controlled by the Soviets and the only direct news on Russia came from the areas where the Italian military missions were located, in Siberia, the Caucasus, and North Russia. The missions flanked the counter-revolutionary of the whites against the reds, and the Italians participated militarily in the operations of control and defence Zarstvo and Communism 3 of the territories under the counter-revolutionary government of Admiral Kolčak in southern Siberia. In fact, it is crucial to understand how the whites were about to prevail over the Red Army of Trotsky, pushing until the conquest of Moscow through the Urals and acting in cooperation with the other “white” armies, first of all the voluntary army of General Denikin who, from the region to the north of the Caucasus, was threatening both the Volga and Ukraine. That decisive moment, in which the fate of the Russian civil war was in the balance and which would have been enough for the Bolsheviks to receive an irreparable blow, took shape in the spring of 1919, particularly in the month of April. Until then, the army troops of Kolčak had made a large advance on three fronts: to the north, under the command of General Gajda, in the direction of Archangel'sk, starting from Perm, conquered on Christmas Eve of 1918; in the centre, under the command of General M. V. Chanžin, towards Ufa, which fell in March; and to the south, under the command of General A. Dutov, in the direction of Samara, Kazan, and the Volga River. The historic sliding doors, however, did not occur and passed the Urals, while the Reds took Celjabinsk on July 25, 1918 and reached the Tobol River where, after a pause of several months, they resumed the offensive and swept the last defences, conquering Omsk, the capital of the Siberian government, with the white army in full dissolution.

Emilio Cassese

CHAPTER ONE

ITALIAN DIPLOMACY AND RUSSIA IN THE LATE NINETEENTH CENTURY

In the nineteenth century, relations between the European and Asian worlds played an important role in the international relationship studies of frequent European protagonists present in geographic areas, which were affected by deep and unexpected social and political changes. According to Pierre Milza;

aucun pays, pas même les vieux Empires, chinois ou ottoman, ne sont en mesure d’opposer une résistance sérieuse au conquérant européen. Un autre facteur favorable est l’absence de toute concurrence aux entreprises des Européens jusqu’aux toutes dernières années du XIX siècle. Ni les Etats-Unis, ni le Japon, qui sont appelés à devenir au début du XX siècle les rivaux de l’Europe, ne songent encore sérieusement à jouer un rôle dans la compétition.1

In light of such a premise, it would therefore be interesting to investigate the reasons why countries like and Japan exited the period of isolation to become new protagonists in world history. After a period of the commercial monopoly of the East India Company with China that ended in 1834, a period of strong tension for the commerce of opium began which, along with cotton, represented one of the most sought-after products by the Chinese.2 The was granted special status

1 P. Milza, Les relations internationales de 1871 à 1914 (: Armand Colin, 1990), 65–6. On this subject see: Lévy Roger, Rélations de la Chine et du Japon (Paris: Hartmann, 1938); G. L. Barnes, China, and Japan: the Rise of Civilization in East Asia (London: Thames and Hudson, 1993); Kenneth G. Henshall, Storia del Giappone [History of Japan] (Roma-Bari: Laterza, 2013); E. von Hesse-Wartegg, Cina-Giappone, Il celeste impero e l’Impero del sol nascente [The Celestial Empire and that of the Rising Sun] (: Ulrico Hoepli, 1900). 2 It deals with the first Anglo-Chinese war that ended with the overwhelming victory of the British, who imposed the peace of Nanchino on the Chinese (1842), completed with that of Bogue (1843). The British Crown had the monopoly on the 6 Chapter One as a favoured country, and other states that were also determined to protect the interests of markets in Asian territories came forward; firstly, the Americans signed the Treaty of Wanghia (1843) with the Chinese government, and then the French signed the Treaty of Whampoa (1844). The tolerance of the Catholic religion in China was guaranteed as well as other things, and then with the Swedish and the Norwegians (1847). Ugo Bassi asserts that, “thanks to England, China has emerged from the isolation in which it found itself after having closed its ports to foreign vessels, all this led to the so-called opium war, when China, after having seen all its efforts useless in order to prevent the commerce of this drug that threw its subjects into a condition of disastrous degradation, in 1839 had all English living in Canton imprisoned, which included the commander of the British forces Elliot, who was also the representative of the English government.”3 With the Peace Treaty of Nanking (1842), China was forced to come to terms with the aggressive European nations. The opening of the harbours of Amoy, Canton, Fuciau, Ningpo, and Shanghai preceded the phase of land concessions in Hong Kong to the British. The massacre of Catholic opening of the trade in the ports of Canton, Amoy, Foochow, Ningpo, and Shangai; the transfer of Hong Kong in the form of an ongoing lease; the abolition of the Co-hong (a company of Chinese merchants who had the trade monopoly in the port of Canton from 1760); the payment of a Chinese allowance; the rank equalization of the Chinese and British officers; and mutually agreed customs. Moreover, the United Kingdom was granted the rank of “the most favored country,” criminal jurisdiction on its subjects in open ports, and the free movement of British war fleets in the Pacific Ocean. See G. Borsa, I problemi estremo- orientali 1870–1941 [Problems of the Far-East 1870–1941] (Milan: Ispi, 1959), 4. See also H. Schmidt-Glintzer, Storia della Cina [History of China] (Milan: Mondadori, 2011), 226–36. 3 U. Bassi, Italia e Cina, cenni storici sui rapporti diplomatici e commerciali [Italia and China, Historical Hints at Diplomatic and Commercial Relationships] (Modena: Publishing House Bassi and Nipoti, 1929), 12–13. For a more expert reader, the following readings on Russian-Chinese relationships in the modern age are recommended: M. Mancall, Russia and China: their Diplomatic Relations to 1728 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971); Lo-Shu Fu, A Documentary Chronicle of Sino-Western Relations 1644–1820, I–II (Tucson: The University of Arizona Press, 1966); G. A. Lensen, The Russian Push Toward Japan. Russo-Japanese Relations 1697–1875 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1959); I. B. Strižova, Russkoe-japonskie otnosheniya XVIII-načala XIX vv. [Russian-Japanese Relations in the Eighteenth to early Nineteenth Centuries] (Saransk: Dissertatsija naso iskanie uchenoj stepeni kandidata istoricheskich nauk, 2003); E. Ja. Fajnberg, Russko-japonskie otnosheniya v 1697–1875 [Russian- Japanese relationships 1697–1875] (Moskva: Izd.vo Vostochnoj Literatury, 1960). Italian Diplomacy and Russia in the Late Nineteenth Century 7 missionaries in 1858 brought about the joint Anglo-French intervention, which Russia took advantage of with the granting of new territories, and with the recognition of its claims on Tonkin. In 1895, China, after a period of inner riots, was forced to give the rich island of Formosa to Japan, while Germany, albeit under the veil of rent, got large territorial grants. Count Cavour, who had long since turned his attention to the seas of the East (the being an example), started to form relations with China in an attempt to join the to the threads of international politics. “By a letter dated 24th November 1858, he wrote to a British subject living in Shanghai asking him if he was willing to take the title and the office of honorary consul of the King of Sardinia, hinting in this letter at the desire to enter into official relationships with Celestial Empire and get news about trade and about the maritime movement of Shanghai port and the navigation on the Yang-tse.”4 In 1869, the honorary representative was replaced with a career consul, but until the Boxer Rebellion (1900) the relations between the two states were never such as to allow Italy to exploit the huge market at the far edge of Asia to its advantage, as other European nations already did. While the partition of China was being played out in the Asian continent, the Italian peninsula was divided between the Savoy and Bourbon monarchs. It was caught in the grip of foreign powers who muzzled its fate, and therefore did not initially take part in the atmosphere of neo-colonialism that other European countries had already started. The unity of Italy required a colossal effort in support of which there had to firstly be a broad agreement with foreign powers that implemented anti-Austrian foreign policies. First of all, the France of III, and later the Russian “liberal” Tsar Alexander II, focused on protecting the Orthodox Slavs in the Balkans from the strong influence of Vienna. The year 1861 was important for both Italians and Russians. Upon completion of the Renaissance Movement, under the Savoy leadership the Romanov Empire responded by emancipating approximately forty million peasants.5 The historic harmony embraced unanimous sympathies in Italy but there were clashes against Minister Aleksandr Michaylovich Gorchakov (1798–1883) as a resistance to recognizing the new kingdom in which territorial limits were not established and where embracing it could have

4 U. Bassi, Italia e Cina, cenni storici sui rapporti diplomatici e commerciali [Italia and China, op. Cit, p, 21. The transfer of Tientsin took place after the military occupation of the area on January 21, 1901, in which Italy was granted an ongoing lease of an area of a few km2 situated on the left bank of the Pi-ho River 5 See T. V. Zonova, Rossiya i Italiya: istoriya diplomaticheskikh otnosheniy [Russia and Italy: the History of Diplomatic Relations] (Moskva: MGU, 1998). 8 Chapter One disturbed the peace in Europe, especially in the hot areas like the Balkans.6 Such diplomatic perplexities were testified by Ministers Filippo Oldoini and Gioacchino Pepoli, both Envoy Extraordinary of the Kingdom of Italy in Russia.7 Talks between Consul Pepoli and Minister Gorchakov were famous for being related to problems of the principal of the liberty and nationality of the people, too risky for the security of Europe according to the Russian statesman, and rich in virtue for the Italian diplomat.8 In fact, recognizing the struggle for Italian liberation would have aroused the recognition of Polish problems that were in turmoil following the insurrections of 1863. After the exit from the Pepoli scenario, Italian- Russian relations improved thanks to Edoardo De Launay’s fervent work and the fact that he knew how to mend and fortify these relations, supporting authoritarian and conservative Russian ideas and expansionistic goals with regards to central Asia and the Ottoman territories. Savoyard was by birth “resolute, relentless, insistent to the point of monotony in supporting the need for an alliance with Prussia.”9 The De Launay ministry would have preferred to abandon foreign policy in favour of France and instead look to Germany “à la quelle l’avenir appartient” without those collective phenomena of the fear of pan-Germanism and pan-Slavism, terms that, in his opinion, evoked only “des grands mots.” Italian foreign policy, after its unification, initially focused on linking the country’s destiny to that of other European powers in order to complete a reunification, to be achieved in stages. The crisis of the Ottoman Empire following defeat to the Russians and the subsequent Congress of in 1878 momentarily reanimated interest regarding the fate of Italians in Trento, Trieste, and Dalmatia, “with the typical idea of Mazzini; Mazzini wanted to draw on the power of the Slav Risorgimento to dissolve the Habsburg monarchy and promote the full realization of Italian unity while weakening Austria.”10 Germany’s Chancellor Bismarck was undoubtedly a strong ally, able to avert the danger of a France intent on declaring war on Italy because of the famous “clerical affair” which destabilized not only

6 Italian Diplomatic Documents (IDD), s. I, (1861–70), vol. II, (December 31, 1861–July 31, 1862), no. 87 (February 11, 1862), 127. 7 G. Petracchi, La Diplomazia Italiana in Russia (1861–1941) [Italian Diplomacy in Russia (1861–1941)] (Roma: Bonacci Editore, 1993), 26. 8 IDD, s. I, 1861–1870, vol. III (August 1, 1862–July 9, 1863), no. 525 (April 19, 1963), 471. 9 F. Chabod, History of Italian Foreign Policy from 1870 to 1896 (Bari: Laterza, 1965), 27. 10 Ibid., 530–45. These issues are well examined in M. Grillandi, (: UTET, 1969), 289–301. Italian Diplomacy and Russia in the Late Nineteenth Century 9

Italian domestic politics but gave rise to a heated debate between different schools of thought.11 Francesco Crispi, the protagonist of politics between 1870 and 1890, though ousted from the Depretis cabinet, chose Nicotera, Amedeo Melegari, Zanardelli, Mancini, Mezzacapo, Coppino, Brin, and Majorana as companions to lead Italy towards the neo-colonial adventure, for several years diverting away from its main mission—the expansion of universal suffrage, the underdevelopment of many southern areas, and the combination that, according to the historian Ghisalberti, still existed between the “rigid centralized government with which the Kingdom of Sardinia was ruled until 1861 and … modern liberalism.”12 Crispi’s solution was not the ideal route to take, and as such, towards the mid- 1890s with Antonio di Rudini, Italy partially abandoned the venture and proceeded with the intent to consolidate foreign affairs and improve internal conditions. Italy and Russia experienced different stages of evolution and progress; it was only after the intervention of in the Crimean War that interest from Russian liberal groups grew in the Italian Renaissance, which became the ideal common theme through which ideologues and intellectuals of the time constantly confronted one another. On the eve of the twentieth century, Russia was experiencing a time of intense economic and social transformation. This process was not widely supported by the Tsarist regime, resulting in a slow and cumbersome maturation process under the pressure of innovative ideas from the Decembrist Revolt of 1825, which from that point forward would accompany a phase of modernization. The social transformations that were in progress, as evidenced by the copious and fascinating literary and cultural activity of the time, in addition to rapid industrialization, led to a modest growth of capitalism and two social groups—the bourgeoisie and the urban proletariat—which nevertheless represented a small percentage compared to the mass of the peasantry that still mainly lived within the traditional community structure in Russia—the obshina. This change did not go unnoticed in the eyes of the Europeans, most notably many Italians, who had left during the time of the Crimean War, which marked a setback in relations between Russia on one side and the Kingdom of Savoy, ally of the Ottoman Empire, France, and the United Kingdom, on the other. The

11 Regarding Italian membership to the (May 20, 1882) and the consequences of international politics, see: D. Reichel, Italia e Svizzera durante la triplice alleanza: Politica militare e politica estera [Italy and Switzerland during the Triple Alliance: Military Policy and Foreign Policy] (Roma: SME, 1991). 12 C. Ghisalberti, The Age the Right-wing in Italy and the Problems of Unification in “La Storia”: The Big Problems of the Contemporary Age, vol. III, From the Restoration to the First World War (Milano: Garzanti, 1993), 590. 10 Chapter One review of that judgement is clear through books published in Italy during those years.13 Among the aspects most highlighted by the new literary production are the reformist force of Tsarism, the latent energies of the Russian people, and reforms in the social field. Tomaso Carletti, a young employee of the embassy of Saint Petersburg, emphasized the parallels between mir and the way of UK self-government. Meanwhile, strikes, riots, and student protests were increasingly common in a country that was headed towards a mixed phase of revolution and reform that had never been seen in its imperial history. Even the resounding defeat of the Tsarist Empire in against the emerging Japan took a back seat to the Bloody Sunday of January 1905 that, for the first time, was driving the Romanov Dynasty to accept the compromise of a constitutional monarchy. The theory of a liberal model took off; this model occurs cyclically in a country and steers its history towards an inescapable need for individual freedom and parliamentary . Relations were renewed between Italy and Russia, especially thanks to the diplomatic actions of Giulio Melegari who, replacing Count Roberto Morra of Lavriano, knew how to build a diplomatic structure that tended to favour a rapprochement between the two countries, culminating in the meeting of Racconigi—a truly important success of his diplomatic actions. Giulio Melegari, born in Turin on December 11, 1854, was the son of Luigi Amedeo Melegari14 (1805–81), a well-known politician and state

13 The idea of a young Tsar ascending to the throne in 1894 was received with enthusiasm by young European liberals who had seen the reactionary Alexander III as a dangerous obstacle to the liberation of the people. With regards to this see: T. Carletti, La Russia Contemporanea (Milano: Treves, 1894); G. Modrich, La Russia. Note e ricordi di viaggio [Russia. Notes and Travel Memories] (Torino: Le Roux e C., 1892); R. Barbiera, “La Russia d’oggi veduta da un diplomatico italiano” [“The Russia of Today Seen by an Italian Diplomat”], in Illustrazione italiana (Gennaio-giugno, 1894). 14 The son of Pietro and Maria Simonazzi, was born on February 19, 1805 in Meletole di Castelnovo di Sotto in the province of Reggio Emilia. After having obtained a degree in law in , he was appointed professor of constitutional law at the University of Turin during the turbulent year of 1848. He spent several years in Lausanne, where he would find himself an exile patriot along with Mazzini, of whom he became a friend, and many others. As a Member of Parliament from the II to the VIII legislature for the electoral constituencies of Bricherasio, Bosco di Alessandria, Correggio, and Montecchio, he would be appointed state councillor in 1859, while the following year he was assigned to the section of the Ministry of Justice. In 1862 he was appointed senator. He would for Italian Diplomacy and Russia in the Late Nineteenth Century 11 counsellor of the Kingdom of Italy and Maria Carolina Mandrot (called Magdalene). He graduated in law from the University of Pisa in 1877. On August 10 of the same year he was admitted to the ministry as honorary officer of legation. Two years later he was effectively admitted to the diplomatic service. Dispatched to Bern, where his father resided as Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary, he was also appointed as attaché to the Bern Embassy (May 7, 1879). For three subsequent years from May 20, 1879 he worked in a family business as a result of exposure to his father’s profession. After several months in the Swiss capital he was appointed second secretary of legation (Royal Decree of December 25, 1880). In this regard, given the esteem granted to him at high levels, on January 14, 1880 he wrote to , president of the council and minister of foreign affairs, the following words of appreciation:

Dear Sir, with the revered letter of the 3rd that with Decree of 25th last Your Majesty deemed me worthy to confer the role of secretary of legation second class. I feel I owe in particular such honor and all the benefit that could derive from this in future for me to Your Excellency, hence my life remains bound to you in an everlasting debt of gratitude that in any event I shall try to repay whenever the opportunity arises. Please accept, Honorable Minister, with my most sincere heartfelt thanks the expression of my deep respect.15

several years hold the office of Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary in Berna, while a highlight of his career was in the employ of the Cabinet Depretis, where he would hold the office of Foreign Minister from March 25, 1876 to December 26, 1877. His correspondence with was well known and published by D. Melegari in a series of works (Lettres intimes de Joseph Mazzini, Paris, 1895; La Giovine Italia and la Giovine Europa. From the Unpublished Correspondence of Giuseppe Mazzini and Luigi Amedeo Melegari, Milan, 1906). He died in Berna on May 22, 1881. News taken from the volume of La formazione della diplomazia internazionale (1861–1915). Repertorio bio- bibliografico dei funzionari del Ministero degli Affari Esteri (Rome: Polygraphic Institute and State Mint, 1987), 486–7. With regards to the relationships of Mazzini with Melegari, see also the contribution of Giovanni Ferretti, Luigi Amedeo Melegari a Losanna (Rome: Vittoriano, 1942), XLX, 368, in 8*. l. 45. 15 MFA, Personal Archives, Series VII, Collection M 5, “Giulio Melegari.” From the Legation of Berna, Letter of Giulio Melegari to Mr. Benedetto Cairoli, Prime Minister, Foreign Service Officer on January 14, 1880. Together with this document there is a letter from the preceding day written by Luigi Amedeo Melegari, father of Giulio, in which, besides thanking the minister for the kindness shown towards his son, the former old minister invoked for his son the position of “Member of Congress in our diplomatic corps.” 12 Chapter One

In July 1881, two months after the death of her husband Luigi Amedeo, Maria, wife of the former state senator, wrote a letter to Cairoli from Bern for her son Giulio, referencing the position of first secretary in Rome, to where the family hoped to relocate (letter in French from Bern on July 11, 1881). Almost a year later, on May 27, 1882, Giulio Melegari returned to serve in the ministry (where the minister of foreign affairs had in the meantime been Mancini), but only for a short period because, in place of Cavalier Riva, he temporarily returned to serve in Bern in August 1882 (Ministerial Decree of July 19). In February 1883, Melegari went to Florence where his sister Dora had called for him due to their mother’s health problems. He then asked for three months leave, which was granted. Upon return from leave he was relocated from Bern to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Rome.16 With the Ministerial Decree of May 5, 1885 he was called to serve in the Royal Legation of Rio de Janeiro as first secretary. Melegari arrived in the capital on September 6. There is not a great deal of information with regards to this period, only that Melegari requested a period of leave through Ambassador Ernesto Martuscelli for the summer of 1887 in order to tend to “domestic interests.”17 From Rome, on January 19, 1888, Melegari addressed a letter to the ministry in which he criticized his colleague Giulio Silvestrelli, second-class secretary of the legation, for the length of his career, even though there were several non- operational years. Above all, the reason that pushed the diplomat into a career was the actual length of occupational time as an honorary officer, which was not valid for seniority. He wrote:

it is not, in the writer’s opinion, right or fair, without taking into consideration the four and a half years Silvestrelli was out of service (half of his career), to reinstate him in the same position as occupied before, that in spite of which, having almost the same seniority, served without interruption for 10 years of which in part in America.18

16 MFA, Personal Archives, Series VII, Collection M 5, “Giulio Melegari.” Letter of the Minister Mancini to the Honourable Giulio Melegari on February 11, 1883. 17 MFA, Personal Archives, Series VII, Collection M 5, “Giulio Melegari.” Letter of the Ambassador Martuscelli to the Honourable Depretis, Prime Minister and Foreign Service Officer on April 24, 1887. Depretis would grant the re-entry permit to Italy to the first secretary; therefore, Melegari would have been able to use it from August 14. 18 MFA, Personal Archives, Series VII, Collection M 5, “Giulio Melegari.” Personal Letter of Giulio Melegari to the Foreign Ministry of Rome on January 19, 1888. Italian Diplomacy and Russia in the Late Nineteenth Century 13

Melegari’s “observations” would yield some results; after a few months, on April 20, 1888, he was invited to the Royal Legation in Berne with the duties of first secretary, rendering “diligent and intelligent work”; the Italian Ambassador to Switzerland praised and affirmed this in his letter to the Ministry on July 5, 1888. He replaced Cav. Vigoni for a short period, after which, by Royal Decree, on June 18 he was dispatched to Monaco of Bavaria where Baron Enrico Cova was acting as ambassador. The promotion to first-class secretary of legation took place on November 14, 1888, with the effective date of December 1 and an “annual salary of 4000 lire.” During these years he came into contact with the German- Prussian mentality and followed the evolution of the Bismarckian policy without leaving any particular sign. In 1888, Wilhelm II came to power in a German state dominated by a military caste and a parliament which submitted to the government, though elected by universal suffrage. Within a few years, the Kaiser, who had an impulsive temperament, had shattered the Bismarck project aimed at creating a network of diplomatic relations in favour of Germany. The new address, briefed to foreign affairs in the belief of being able to act without the contribution of the Tsarist Empire against its rivals the United Kingdom and France, brought about the following in a short time: a rapprochement between the courts of Saint Petersburg and Paris (1892), the discharge of the old Chancellor Bismarck, and active economic cooperation with the Sublime Porte with an enormous capital for the construction of the Baghdad Railroad that connected Constantinople to the Persian Gulf. In the summer of 1890, because of a poorly treated case of diphtheria caught in May, Melegari was forced to ask for two months’ leave from work. Two years later, on February 15, 1892, with Ministerial Dispatch n. 5607/121 he received the decoration Officer of the Crown of Italy. In a letter to the Marquis of Rudini, then president of the council, he expressed his gratitude for “the precious gesture of kindness towards me which I will always try, within the limits of my feeble strength, to make myself worthy of, even in the future.”19 In January 1893, Melegari was offered a transfer to the Embassy in Lisbon, which he refused. On June 14, 1894 he was assigned for duty at the Royal Legation in Bucharest, headed by Count Curtopassi, where he found a very different situation from the previous location. He definitively left Monaco of Bavaria on August 7. The Balkan world was still troubled by lively that reanimated after the Congress of Berlin in 1878. The various kingdoms and principalities of the Balkan Peninsula were

19 MFA, Personal Archives, Series VII, Collection M 5, “Giulio Melegari.” Letter by the Royal Legation of Italy to Monaco of Giulio Melegari to the Marquis of Rudinì, February 18, 1892. 14 Chapter One experiencing a very critical domestic situation due to the constant contrast between the conservative nobles, pro-Austrians, and small peasant proprietors. In particular, Charles I of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen’s (1866– 1914) Romania was in a state of agitation because of the sale of Bessarabia to Russia in 1878. This implied the nearing of a dual monarchy, even if there was deep resentment towards the magyarization policy initiated by the Hungarians against the Romanian population of Transylvania. In Bucharest on February 11, 1895, Melegari received news of having been awarded the Officer of the Order of Saints Maurie and Lazarus, by a decree of January 20, 1895. Two years after his arrival in the Romanian capital, in April 1896 he was transferred for the first time to Saint Petersburg, where in the summer of that same year he worked at the embassy pro tempore. His resistance to accepting the assignment was overcome by the insistence of the ministry, and with a letter simply dated “Sunday night” he surrendered and accepted the assignment. It was a Russia that looked with suspicion upon the neo-colonization initiated by Western countries, to the detriment of the African territories due to the limited navigability of the Suez Canal, vital for its Asian interests. The Tsar, in the meantime, paid attention to newspaper propaganda, which at the time deemed the attitude of those kingdoms that had “invaded” the African regions to be completely inappropriate. One of these pamphlets, entitled “Abessincy, v’ bor’bje za svobodu” [“Abyssinia, at War for Liberty”],20 strongly condemned the Italian adventure in Abyssinia, citing a Latin phrase: “concordia parvae res crescunt, discordia maximae dilabuntur” [“in harmony, even small things grow, in contrast even the big ones vanish”]. It was with great enthusiasm that Russia embraced the announcement of the new government run by Rudini. The Italian ambassador in Saint Petersburg, Maffei, after hearing about the change of management, responded in this manner: “it’s not necessary for me to state how hostile Russian public opinion is to the Italian policy of expansion in Abyssinia,” and attached excerpts and translations of articles extracted from the Journal de St. Petersbourg, the official agency of the state, and Novosti and Novoe Vremya, which, in unison, applauded the entrance of the new staff of men such as Colombo and Branca, who were not partisans of the triple alliance. With Rudini’s new staff there was the perception of a change of course in Italian foreign policy, previously guided by Crispi, and the feeling of archiving the disastrous experience in

20 The authors of the pamphlet are anonymous and sign with “A. T. e V. L., Abessincy, v’ bor’bje za svobodu,” S.-Peterburg’, Ekonomič. Type-Lithography (1896), 1–43. In MFA, Political series “P,” Russia 1896–1898, File 342, C. 66. Italian Diplomacy and Russia in the Late Nineteenth Century 15

Abyssinia (even though Russian newspapers, like Novoe Vremya, continued until the end of May to condemn the Italian government’s behaviour for not letting convoys of the Red Cross transit Abyssinia). The Marquis, Carlo Alberto Maffei of Boglio, a former ambassador in Madrid and appointed to the seat in Saint Petersburg, wrote from Saint Petersburg on June 11, 1896 to Foreign Minister the Duke of Sermoneta that the Tsarist controlled official media “Il Journal de S. Petersbourg,” and devoted several pages to the Anglo-Italian question of “African things,” highlighting how l’affaire was being strongly felt among Russian public opinion and the Tsarist court.21 Maffei, in his last reports from the Russian capital, before the reign of Melegari, openly blamed Nicholas II, saying that it was not a hazard to already affirm that whoever expects great things from today’s Emperor will experience bitter disappointment, despite the fact that he had already provided proof of irresolution and weakness of character. These types of defects were always serious for anyone who was called to lead the destiny of a nation. They became fatal to the one who wore the crown of the Tsar and who had the appearance of physically crushing Nicholas II on the day he took office in the historic Church of the Assumption.22 Melegari held the embassy position throughout the summer of 1896, and subsequently returned to the post a few days before Maffei’s death on May 15 the following year. Here, Melegari came into contact with the Russian world for the first time, which he observed with curiosity and interest. Russia was no longer a distant and unknown power but a partner with which to establish new social and political relations for the Italian government, which tended to have free rein in neo-political colonial Mediterranean Africa. They welcomed the work of containment pursued

21 MFA, Political Series “P,” Russia 1896–1898, Envelope 342, sheet 66. Maffei’s Letter to the Minister of Foreign Affairs had as its object “La politica Anglo- Italiana nell’Africa, giudicata in Russia” [“The Anglo-Italian politics in Africa, judged in Russia”], rep. n. 328/199 of June 11, 1896. 22 MFA, Political Series “P,” Russia 1896–1898, File 342, sheet 66, rep. no. 384/227 of June 24, 1896. having as its object “Il nuovo Czar e la politica nazionale di Alessandro III” [“The new Tsar and the national politics of Alexander III”]. In this letter, addressed by Maffei to the Duke of Sermoneta, Foreign Minister, the Italian Ambassador makes a digression on the “Russification” carried out during the years of Tsar Alexander III towards all public administrations. If, with Alexander II, the German element had in fact “dominated supreme on all public administrations,” with the following king this trend was widely abandoned in favour of the so-called “national awareness” that would have condemned the ancient nihilistic propaganda, “more or less supported by noble people, disgusted at the liberal reforms of Alexander II.” 16 Chapter One by the Tsarist regime in the Balkans as an anti-Austrian function. Melegari’s first report from Saint Petersburg was dated June 30, 1896 and was report n. 405/241. In it, the ambassador spoke of the immense carnage in Moscow during the celebrations of the coronation and the strikes by the government factory workers of Saint Petersburg. He underlined how these events had impacted heavily on the “good-hearted Nicholas II,” who would become ill with jaundice, a “disease that easily takes its origin from moral causes.” The Italian diplomat was convinced that these disturbances were due to progress made in Russia by socialist ideas and the Tsar. To defeat them, he had a choice: take into account suggestions from the influential Attorney General of the Holy Synod, Pobedonostsev, which wanted strict enforcement measures, or listen to various advisers and ministers who would opt for milder solutions.23 In subsequent reports, Melegari dealt with a variety of different issues, including: Russian- Chinese relations with regards to the construction of the Trans-Siberian railway; new loans to Russia by French capitalists24; the resignation of Baron Voruntsov-Daskov as Minister of the Imperial Household (which was directly responsible for the massacre in Moscow); and the possible trip of the Tsar and Tsarina to visit various European courts, not only Berlin so as not to offend the French sensibility. With regards to the latter issue, Melegari wrote:

I’m told that the mother Empress raised many issues against the planned visit. The widow of Alexander III, determined to see her son persevere against the attitude of reserve, which was a constant trait of the late Emperor, in her relation with foreign courts openly demonstrated her opposition (being particularly against the trips to England25) and insisted that the Imperial trip be limited to the usual visit to the Danish Court.26

23 MFA, Political Series “P,” Russia 1896–1898, File 342, sheet 66, rep.. no. 405/241 of June 30, 1896 entitled “Return to Petersburg of your Majesty. Strikes in Petersburg.” 24 With regards to this, a report of the Italian Ambassador to Berlin, Giorgio Calvi Di Bergolo (1852–1924), of August 6, 1896, reported to the new Foreign Minister, marquis Visconte Venosta, that German bankers were to rush through the granting of new loans to the Russian government that in fact required more money than the amount requested from the Minister Sergey Witte. In MFA, Political Series “P,” Russia 1896–1898, File 342, f. 66, rep. no. 1080/361 of August 6, 1896 entitled “Russian loan.” 25 The controversy of Russia and the United Kingdom was solved with the institution of a Commission for the delimitation of the Russian-Afghan borders that from March 11 to July 28, 1895 worked for the drawing up of a Memorandum of Understanding. The final stipulation, containing ten protocols, the last of which Italian Diplomacy and Russia in the Late Nineteenth Century 17

In another communication to the Italian government, Melegari complained of the tight-knit Tsarist group’s level of cooperation, which was little to none and created a scarcity of information. Russia, despite the large influx of foreign capital that was in part going to finance projects such as the construction of the Trans-Siberian railway that linked Saint Petersburg to Vladivostok (on the Pacific Ocean), remained an empire with semi-feudal features and a despotic and reactionary regime, poorly tolerated by the vast majority of Russian people, who were ready to revolt. Despite this fact, Russia was unwilling to give up the influential Asian area; on the contrary, it initiated a campaign for the colonization of the East in which it clashed with the United Kingdom for control of the Pamir region. In March 1896, Ambassador Maffei in Saint Petersburg reported that the new imperial project had created “two new army groups, assigned to the eastern frontier of the empire” (private rep. no. 137/90 del 3 Marzo 1896) and the reinforcement of the naval squad of the Pacific, commanded by Rear Admiral Alekseev. After an interlude in Berlin of a few years (1898–1901), on April 18, 1901 he was transferred to with minister credentials. There, on May 2, 1901, he was granted the license for Consul General. In the same year, he was promoted to Envoy Extraordinary and Second-Class Minister Plenipotentiary. His diplomatic career was now at a turning point. Having gained years of experience, Melegari was mature enough to hold the fate of a prestigious embassy. In Tokyo, he experienced the extraordinary accession of the “Rising Sun Empire,” which, after defeating China, on which it imposed the Treaty of Shimonoseki (known to China as the Treaty of Maguan), was determined to challenge Russia on land. In this was prepared on September 10, 1895, took place in the presence of two delegates of the Afghan Emir, Ghulam Mohi-ud-din Khan and Mufti Ashoor Muhammad Khan, Major General A. Povalo-Tchveykovsky, State Councilor P. Ponafidin, and Major Colonel of State A. Galkin, representing Russia, and, for the British side, Major General Montagu G. Gerard, C. B. From these agreements, Russia ascertained that the United Kingdom was committing not to annexing or establishing military ports or fortification works between the Russian frontier and the territory of the Indo-Kush, officially belonging to . The documents on the agreement are contained in MFA, Rome, Archive of Diplomatic Affairs, Political Series “P,” Russia, 1896–1898, File 342, sheet 66, rep. no. 57/20 from London on January 26, 1897, entitled “Pamiro” and addressed to the Foreign Minister the Marquis Viscount-Venosta from the Italian Ambassador in London A. Ferreri. 26 MFA, Political Series “P,” Russia 1896–1898, File 342, sheet 66, rep. n. 455/268 of August 1896 entitled “Journey abroad of your Imperial Majesties.” 18 Chapter One the United Kingdom favoured Japan, and in an attempt to counteract Russian expansionism in central Asia, Korea, and Manchuria concluded a treaty of alliance27 with the Japanese Emperor Meiji, whose reign lasted for more than forty years from 1868 to 1912. During this period, contemporaneously to what was happening in Italy, the unitary Japanese state was formed, unlike Italy where the Albertine statute would create the basis on which to build the new political reality, devoid of a constitution that only came to light in 1889.28 The Italian diplomat wrote in his reports from the Japanese capital that, despite its basic political problems, Japan had begun to broaden its horizons into the international political scene with an army and naval fleet. He also stated that their military was well equipped and able to thwart the ambitions of Russia against Korea and the East Asian regions.29 In those years, an extensive correspondence on the policy of rearmament implemented by the Japanese government occurred between the Italian ambassador and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Italy. Giulio Melegari witnessed the preparatory phase of the Russian- Japanese war, and in some of his reports he analysed in detail the internal situation in Japan, highlighting the features of Emperor Meiji’s policy and diplomacy. In a letter sent from Tokyo on August 7, 1901 to G. Prinetti,30 the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Melegari referred to multinational force commander British General Alfred Gaselee’s trip to Japan. Gaselee set off from Tientsin for the liberation of Beijing in the summer of 1900, and Melegari described the British officer’s reception as being particularly warm, adding that, “the more than flattering way that the major British newspapers corresponding from China have consistently spoken of the Japanese troops, has greatly contributed to increasing in these populations this undoubted wave of acceptance towards England and its army.” The

27 The Treaty was signed on January 30, 1902 in London and was structured into six points with a five-year validity. The anti-Russian agreement would prompt Tsar Nicholas II to draw up a new alliance with France and the United Kingdom in 1904 and in 1907, respectively. 28 On this subject there is a fairly complete study of the first Italian-Japanese Convention of Historical Studies that took place in 1985 on “Lo Stato liberale italiano e l’età Meiji.” The substantial points of the convention were taken up again by Hatsushi Kitahara in his essay Dal Giappone in an edition edited by Filippo Mazzonis, L’Italia contemporanea e la storiografia internazionale (Marsilio: Venezia, 1995), 269–81. 29 An enormous quantity of diplomatic reports evidence the rush by Japan to supply the naval material during the years that preceded the war against Russia, and Melegari provides documentary evidence of such mobilization. 30 MFA, Rome, Letter of G. Melegari to the Foreign Minister of August 7, 1901, from Tokyo, rep. no. 144/50. Italian Diplomacy and Russia in the Late Nineteenth Century 19 actions of the government in London that aimed to promote Japan in the Far East to contain aspirations and preserve their colonies were therefore clear. The Italian diplomat, speaking of tensions between Russia and Japan for control of Manchuria, stated that the official newspaper of the empire had published the text of the agreement, which stipulated the concession of a large area of land in Musampò as a settlement between the Japanese and Korean governments. This granting was undoubtedly a new success for Japan in its dispute to win influence over Russia, which had longed for many years to make that important strategic point overlooking the coast of Japan a formidable naval base, where it had also ventured an attempt at settlement that had almost entirely failed. Within a few years, the forts, arsenals, and Russian battleships at Musampò would be replaced by the chimneys of factories and farms as part of a thriving Japanese settlement, forming a new ring in the solid chain embracing the economic industriousness of the subjects of the Mikado. Within the space of a few years, the entire southern coast of Korea, from Chunulpo to Fusan, would establish an unchallenged supremacy of that empire on the nearby peninsula.31 These were the years in which Russia and Japan took advantage of China’s weaknesses and planned an expansion of their economic interests in Korea and Manchuria. The intervention in the Chinese Boxer Rebellion highlighted the quality of the Japanese military contingent, which consisted of more than seven thousand units, representing by far the largest international coalition. Included were: Russians (3,480), British (2,232), Americans (1,825), and, to a lesser extent, French, Germans, Austrians, and Italians.32 The Russian political action was undoubtedly hampered by the difficult times the monarchy was experiencing, struggling with stagnant economic problems and peasant uprisings, in contrast to Japan, which was internally strong and stable. As well as the positive notes reserved for the Japanese ruler’s actions, Melegari did not hesitate to praise the prestige that a politician such as

31 MFA, Rome, political Series “P,” Japan, years 1902–1909, File 299, Letter of the Italian Ambassador to Tokyo Giulio Melegari to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, on June 7, 1902, entitled “Japan Settlement in Ma Sampò.” 32 L. de Courten-G. Sargeri, Le regie truppe in Estremo Oriente 1900–1901 [The Royal Troops in the Far East, 1900–1901] (Roma: AUSSME, 2005), 225–6. With regards to this see: P. Renouvin, La question d’Extreme-Orient, 1840–1940 (Paris: Hachette, 1946); G. Bertuccioli, F. Masini, Italia e Cina [Italy and China] (Roma: Laterza, 1996); A. Vagnini-S. Gyun Cho, La Memoria della Cina. Fonti archivistiche italiane sulla storia della Cina [The Memory of China: Italian Archival Sources on the History of China] (Roma: E. Nuova Cultura, 2008). 20 Chapter One

Alexander Izvolsky enjoyed or the authority that surrounded Sergey Witte, Ambassador in Monaco and Minister of Russian Finances:

Mr. Izvolsky, like his predecessors, right or wrong, became one of the main manipulators of Russian policy, very efficiently assisted in this task by the renowned Mr. Oloshevo … upon the direct orders of the all- powerful Finance Minister Mr. Witte. He administered, as had been well known in Asia for some time, a successful policy, at times more active and effective than the official one … The challenge was now to see through which trends and by which means this new plan of action would unfold. If, while remaining strictly within the limits established by existing Russian- Japanese agreements, the policy of the government of the Tsar was to be solely directed at a pacific growth of the Russian influence in Korea, especially on the economic side, Japan would have nothing to complain about, much less than had been the case for some time … convinced that in this land there would be little to fear from the Russian competition. If, on the other hand, it had been decided to take a more aggressive stance, and especially if the attempts at purchasing a naval station along the coast facing Japan were to be repeated, things might have taken a more threatening course, and we would have found ourselves again faced with another acute period of the Korea matter.33

In a subsequent letter, Melegari compared the struggle of influence which had been fought for the past five years in Korea to the similar one Russia was fighting with the Austro-Hungarian influence on the Baltic States and, in particular, in Serbia. The ambassador hit the mark throughout 1903 in that conflictual relations between the two empires intensified to the point where war was imminent. Referring to the news of the death of General Tamura, Deputy Chief of Staff of the Italian Army, Melegari spoke of a man in whom the Japanese had their hopes in the event of war between Russia and Japan, which, according to the diplomat, “was becoming more and more probable.”34 A few months later, Melegari spoke of the dissolution of the Japanese Elective Chamber. He justified such an act by saying that it could more easily render diplomatic negotiations with the Tsar, because “a chamber with a majority hostile towards Russia and animated by an aggressive attitude would surely be a source of new stirrings and arguments for the

33 MFA, Rome, Political Series “P,” Japan, 1902–1909, file 299, letter of the Italian Ambassador to Tokyo Giulio Melegari to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on August 9, 1902, entitled “Russia and Japan in Korea.” 34 MFA, Rome, Political Series “P,” Japan, 1902–1909, file 299, letter of the Italian Ambassador to Tokyo Giulio Melegari to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on October 7, 1903 entitled “Death of the General Tamura.” Italian Diplomacy and Russia in the Late Nineteenth Century 21 negotiators as well as a serious embarrassment.”35 Therefore, in admitting state reasons superior to any action, Melegari was defending Kabura’s Cabinet actions, even though, as he would later say about the dissolution of the second Duma by the Tsar and , the act “is legally quite questionable and the crown would probably not have succumbed if the critical international conditions had not absolutely advised against a government mutation, for now.” The following year, on January 8, he communicated the rigid application of article 22 of the “Law on the Press” that forbade the publishing of any news regarding military movements or strategic plans and war operations.36 On February 11, referring to the annual commemoration of the dynasty foundation, Melegari referred to a sovereign that, with regret, communicated to his guests, all of whom were ambassadors, the fracture in diplomatic relations with a foreign power, and that they were on the eve of a conflict with Russia. The Italian ambassador, who had widely foreseen this, prepared to give an account of the choices of the Rising Sun’s government, even though there was an almost total absence of detailed information on the sovereign’s actions. Meanwhile, the ultimatum imposed by Japan was followed by a surprise attack on Port Arthur by the Japanese naval fleet led by Admiral Tōgō Heihachirō.37 In a letter from the ministry, approximately one month after the beginning of hostilities, Melegari outlined a first assessment of the war by communicating to the ministry the numbers presented from the imperial government to the newly established cabinet,38 which was far different from the previous one, being less resentful and more willing to collaborate with the government. From such documents, the overall amount destined to the war was evident, with 108 million Yen going to the War Ministry and 47 million to the Navy. Besides such an action, there was a stronger

35 MFA, Rome, Political Series “P,” Japan, 1902–1909, file 299, rep. no. 391/177, letter of the Italian Ambassador to Tokyo Giulio Melegari to the Foreign Minister Tittoni, on December 12, 1903, entitled “Dissolution of the Elective Committee.” 36 MFA, Rome, Political Series “P,” Japan, 1902–1909, file 299, rep. no. 11/4, letter of the Italian Ambassador to Tokyo Giulio Melegari to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Tittoni, on January 8, 1904, entitled “Ministerial Decree.” 37 The excellent volume is a historical memory of the war from the point of view of military leader Paolo Ruggeri Laderchi in Saint Petersburg. This careful observer during the three years in Russia provides interesting reports about problems in the Far East. Regarding the of that period see also the excellent and accurate work P. Milza, Les relations internationales de 1871 à 1914 (Paris: Armand Colin, 1990), 165–78. 38 MFA, Rome, Political Series “P,” Japan, 1902–1909, file 299, rep. no. 152/69, letter of the Italian Ambassador to Tokyo Giulio Melegari to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Tittoni, on March 17, 1904, entitled “War Budget.” 22 Chapter One tax implementation which started with land ownership (twenty-five million), income (five million), sugar consumption (seven million), salt (almost three million), and silk (four million), etc. It was a detailed account, followed by explicative charts that gave a clear picture of the Japanese economic situation at the time. The losses Japan suffered during the first few months of war were considerable; the Russians simply defended themselves without actually responding because they were awaiting help from Saint Petersburg through the Trans-Siberian, a majestic railway project designed in the last decade of the nineteenth century due to the massive Russian colonization of eastern Siberia, through the Suez Canal and circumnavigation of Africa. A few months after the defeat of Russia at Port Arthur (February 9, 1904), while Melegari tended to his job as diplomat in the Japanese capital, on June 30, 1904 the Italian state sent him to his new destination in Saint Petersburg with credentials of Ambassador Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary. Upon communication of a change in post, Melegari expressed his perplexity; the letter sent from the Tokyo post on July 15, 1904 started with these observations:

As soon as my destination to St. Petersburg was here known to all with whom I have official or private relations, I received the most cordial and warm manifestation of affection, without myself or any member of this legation being able to recognize, from their words, any allusion to indicate that such a destination, in the present moment, would be politically judged inopportune or in any way interpreted as a not-so-friendly act of the Italian government towards Japan. Even the local press, in giving the news of my nomination, refrained indistinctly from any unfavorable comments.39

Melegari then followed the whole process of belligerence between the two nations with the privileged insight of someone who knew first one then the other fighting faction. He analysed many aspects of the Russian- Japanese conflict—from the influence on Korea to the contestation of Sakhalin, and from the occupation of the Kuril Islands to the defence of the commercial ports of the Pacific—without leaving out considerations in the order of politics and economics. He therefore left Japan to go to the Russian capital where he had already been eight years before at a very delicate time for international relations because of the African neo- colonization started by several European states, of which one was Italy. The Russia before him was undoubtedly different from the one he had left

39 MFA, Rome, Political Series “P,” Japan, 1902–1909, file 299, rep. no. 11/4, letter of the Italian Ambassador to Tokyo Giulio Melegari to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Tittoni, on July 15, 1904, entitled “My transfer to Petersburg.” Italian Diplomacy and Russia in the Late Nineteenth Century 23 at the end of the 1890s. The vast industrialization, the arrival of huge amounts of foreign capital, and the new authoritative political men that were emerging from those social classes that had been betrayed by the Tsarist politics contributed to the diffusion of liberal ideas. These were new elements that were becoming part of a political scene that was being devastated by errors in foreign affairs, the misery of the farmers, the revolts in the factories, the famine at the beginning of the century, and a monarch who was as weak and retrograde as Nicholas II. All of this was laid out before Melegari’s eyes when he reached Saint Petersburg in the pre-revolutionary era, during a typical periodic acceleration of its history and in the clash between conservation and modernization. This stimulated the intellectual interest and passion for the Russian situation in the attempt to answer the question of its future evolution in international relations. At the beginning of 1905, two closely related events put the Tsarist policy in crisis: the fall of Port Arthur after a long and bloody siege, and the Saint Petersburg workers’ revolt, better known as the Small Russian Revolution. Melegari analysed the Russian subversive process on the Western revolutionary model, in particular with the stages of the French one. The diplomat saw in the Zemsky Sobor the national assembly, the expression of requests, opinions, and representation in equal proportions to the Russian social classes, and a reproduction of the French General States of 1788.40 Meanwhile, the Japanese army defeated the Russians in Mukden, and in the Sea of Japan Admiral Zinovy Rogestvensky’s naval fleet arrived, but was of no use. Rogestvensky’s naval fleet had left the Kronstadt Naval Base in August 1904 after many hardships and diplomatic incidents it was forced to overcome, but was completely defeated on May 27–28, 1905 during the decisive battle of Tsushima. The Portsmouth (New Hampshire) Treaty of the following September, wanted and mediated by the American President , reinforced the prestige of Japan while confirming it as a great Asian world power. The obtainment of territorial advantages in Korea was annexed five years later in the Sakhalin Island and Manchuria. These were losses that took away the remaining prestige the Tsar had enjoyed and so a “hot” autumn began, made up of strikes and official contestations. Despite the work of Count Witte for the peace agreement (which was greatly appreciated by important Russian politicians such as Kokovzov, who, in his memoires, exalted the Russian minister),41 the social protests that stemmed from the people’s discontentment after

40 MFA, Rome, Political Series “P” (1891–1916), Russia, envelope 343, rep. no. 68/28, Petersburg, February 2/15, 1905. 41 V. N. Kokovtsov, Iz moego proshlogo. Vospominaniya 1911–1919 [From My Past: Memories 1911–1919], t. I, (Paris: Ed. de Seuil, 1933). 24 Chapter One

“Bloody Sunday” at the beginning of the year did not stop. The strike in autumn 1905 brought about the first “Soviet” assembly, which ensued the signing of the historic October Manifesto. For Ambassador Melegari this represented a point of arrival in the revolutionary process, the institutional way out that would bring the Duma to become a real and true national assembly. The fundamental laws of May 1906 caused the Tsar’s monarchic prejudices to emerge, and he agreed to the constitution as an ideological simulation. According to Max Weber, the l’ukaz of October 21, 1905 was the decree with which the neo-president Sergey Witte created a cabinet and a prime minister with the function of director. This represented the end of the classic and the consolidation of the centralized dominium of modern bureaucracy.42 The social and constitutional structures of the old order, such as the king’s power and aristocratic supremacy, were preserved based on the Bismarck style. In a punctilious manner, Melegari took note of all Witte’s steps to remove the promises in the October Manifesto. In July 1906, Pyotr Stolypin was appointed prime minister in place of the dubious Ivan Goremykin. The Tsar decided to dissolve the Duma, which, for Melegari, was an act representing a true coup d’état.43 The Russian revolution did not follow in the French revolutionary footsteps, and the dissemblance of the Tsar brought the man, more than the diplomat, to a sort of discouragement and disillusion. Worthy of note in today’s argumentations on the economic field is his detailed analysis of the business-political duo, with regards to international loans and reforms during the Witte-Durnovo period. According to Melegari, the Russian Empire was obliged to take foreign opinion into consideration because it depended on the financial markets and the state improvements that came from European banks, the latter in order to accept huge loans, securing themselves with the liberal guarantees offered by the October Manifesto.44 Incomplete and distorted information arrived in Italy and entered public opinion, mainly with regards to strikes, pogroms, and stories relating to mutinies. After 1907, when the revolution was surely at its end and a Western-style definitive parliament was being waited for in vain, the revolution seemed a distant memory, and not only did it not seep into Italy but it actually left Europeans indifferent, they being too busy with more important national issues derived from the implosion of the multinational empires.

42 G. Petracchi, La Diplomazia Italiana in Russia 1861–1941, 80. 43 MFA, Political Series “P” (1891–1916), Russia envelope 344, Rep. no. 542/222, Petersburg, July 26, 1906. 44 MFA, Political Series “P” (1891–1916), Russia envelope 344, Rep. no. 543/223, Petersburg, July 15/28, 1906.