1 1
71-27,1+89
JANUS, Glenn Alfred, 1940- THE POLISH KOLO, THE RUSSIAN DUMA, AND THE QUESTION OF POLISH AUTONOMY.
The Ohio State University, Ph.D., 1971 History, m o d e m
,
University Microfilms, A XEROX Company, Ann Arbor. Michigan
THIS DISSERTATION HAS BEEN'MICROFILMED EXACTLY AS RECEIVED THE POLISH KO&O, THE RUSSIAN DUT.Ll, AND
THE QUESTION OF POLISH AUTONOMY
DISSERTATION
Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for .the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University
By
Glenn Alfred Janus, B.A., I*'i.A.
The Ohio State University 1971
Approved by
Advisor Department of History PLEASE NOTE:
Some pages have indistinct print. Filmed as received.
UNIVERSITY MICROFILMS. TABLE OF CONTENTS "
INTRODUCTION
Chapter
I. THE RISE OF THE E N D E C J A ...... 9
II. CONGRESS POLAND AND THE I9O5 REVOLUTION . . 35
III. THE POLISH KOLO IN THE FIRST DUMA: THE TACTICS OF A "FREE HAND" ...... 55
The Elections to the First Duma The Organization and Tactics of the Polish ‘ Kolo The Polish Kolo and the Autonomy Question The Polish Kolo and the Agrarian Ques üion Summary
IV. THE POLISH KOLO IN THE SECOND DUMA: THE "THIRD A G E N T " ...... Ill
The Elections to the Second Duma The Tactics of the Polish Kolo The Polish Kolo and the Agrarian Question The Polish Kolo and the Autonomy Question The School Bill, the Budget, and the Dissolution of the Duma Summary
V. THE POLISH KOLO IN THE THIRD DUMA; THE TACTICS OF C O N C I L I A T I O N ...... 1?3
The Elections to the Third Duma The Shift to the Right The Polish Kolo and the Neo-Slav Movement The Failure of Conciliation
VI. CONCLUSION...... 236
APPENDIX...... 243
BIBLIOGRAPHY...... '...... 246
u INTRODUCTION
The Polish parliamentary clubs that emerged in each of the partitioning powers — Austria, Germany, and
Russia — during the latter nineteenth and early twentieth centuries played a significant role in the struggle for
Polish national rights. Although the numerical strength, influence, social composition, political views, and tactics of the Polish clubs (Kola Polskie) in Vienna, Berlin, and
St. Petersburg differed considerably, each strove to defend and promote the interests of the Polish nation.
But the degree to which these clubs succeeded in attaining their objectives was contingent upon the internal political conditions and the political structure of the partitioning empires. The Polish Kolo in Vienna was by far the most successful in the struggle for national rights; Polish politicians in the Reichsrat exerted considerable influence and as early as 1867, they obtained broad autonomy for
Polish Galicia. In Berlin and St. Petersburg, however, the Polish Kola were far less influential and successful.
Parliamentary systems of government had existed in
Austria and Germany for many decades prior to the establish ment of a constitutional system in Tsarist Russia during the 1905 Revolution. Although the Russian Duma was not 1 2 a real parliament in the western European sense, Roman
Dmowski and the National Democratic Party in Congress
Poland welcomed the establishment of the Duma with considerable enthusiasm.^ Dmowski and the Endecja viewed the Duma as an instrument whereby the Poles in Russia could acquire autonomy on the Galician model through constitutional and legal means. When the Polish deputies in the first Duma organized a Ko3ro Polskie in 1 9 0 6, their primary aim was to win autonomy for the Congress Kingdom.
The purpose of this paper is to examine the struggle for autonomy by the Ko3to in the Russian Duma and to account for the failure of the Kolo to achieve this objective. From the opening of the first Duma in I9 0 6, until the beginning of the third session of the third Duma late in I9 0 9, the autonomy issue dominated the politics of the Kol’o. But by the end of 19091 the Endecja, whose deputies were a majority in the Kol'o, had abandoned the struggle for autonomy and adopted a policy of conciliatory and "constructive work" within the framework of the existing political system. From this time until the outbreak of World War I, the crucial issues facing the Kolo centered around the anti-Polish legislation initiated by the Stolypin ministry, chiefly the western zemstvos, the Chelm question, and the introduction of urban self-government into the Congress Kingdom. The
1 The more common term Endecja is generally used when referring to the Polish National Democratic Party and. movement (Demokrac.ia Narodowa). For the sake of convenience, the abbreviated and colloquial form will be used throughout this paper. failure of the Koto on the autonomy issue can be attributed to the shortsighted and anti-Polish policies of the Tsarist government, the nationalistic and conservative views of the
Russian political parties, and the fact that the Russian constitutional system prevented the Duma from functioning as an independent legislative body and permitted the
Tsarist regime to rule in an arbitrary fashion.
A second reason for this study is to evaluate the impact of Polish politics in the Duma on the Russian con stitutional system. The Polish Kolro emerged as a powerful political force in the second Duma where the creation of a stable bloc of center parties and the passage of legislative measures depended chiefly upon Polish support and votes.
The Kolo attempted to exploit these favorable political conditions in order to obtain concessions from the govern ment and the Russian parties on the autonomy question.
These tactics failed completely and the consequences were disastrous not only for the Poles, but for the Russian constitutional system as well. The Poles were a contrib uting factor in the dissolution of the second Duma and the promulgation of a new electoral law in I9 0 7, The latter drastically reduced the Polish representation in the Duma and ensured the election of an overwhelmingly conservative and nationalistic Duma, thereby eliminating the Poles as a factor in Russian politics and removing the possibility of any concessions on the autonomy question. As a frame of reference, this study will focus upon the tactics of the Polish Kolo in the Duma. In the evolution of its tactics, the Kolo had to consider both the attitude of the Tsarist government and the reaction of the Russian political^parties to the question of Polish autonomy. In addition, the international situation as well as political conditions and public opinion in Poland had a direct bearing on the tactics of the Kolo. Finally, there existed a direct relationship between the ideology and program of the Endecja and the politics of the Kolo. While the Kolo claimed to represent all of Polish society, most of its members belonged to the Endecja; consequently, the Kolo and its politics reflected the views of this party. The first chapter of this paper attempts to describe the rise of the Endecja and the chief ideological principles upon which the party based its program.
The published and unpublished source materials on the Polish Kolo are diverse and widely scattered. This study has utilized Polish and Russian primary sources available in the United States and in Poland, Among the published documents available, the most important are
Gosudarstvennaia duma; stenograficheskie otchetv (State
DumaI Stenographic Reports). These documents contain the speeches of the deputies and government ministers, the votes on the various legislative bills, and in brief they provide a documentary account of the activities of the Duma. The Index to the Stenographic Reports also
provides a useful listing of the Duma parties and factions
and background information on the deputies.
The published works of Polish and Russian politicians
of this period, also, constitute a valuable collection
of primary source materials. Among the most important
are the writings of the Endecja politicians and the
deputies in the Polish Koioj Roman Dmowski, who served
as president of the Polish Kolo in the second and third
DumasÎ Jan Stecki; and Wladyslaw Grabski. The unpublished
documents of Jan Stecki and Stanislaw Kozicki, both
important political figures in the Endecja, were essential
for this study. The Stecki papers are located at the
Biblioteka Katolickiego Uniwersytetu Lubelskiego (Library
of the Catholic University of Lublin) and the Kozicki
papers are at the Biblioteka Jagiellonska (Jagiellonian
Library) in Krakôw. Although Aleksander Lednicki was not
a deputy in the Kolo, his unpublished papers were
essential for the chapter on the first Duma; the Lednicki
papers are located at the Archiwa Polskie j Akademii Nauk
(Archives of the Polish Academy of Science) in Warsaw.
The works of Russian politicians give relatively little
information on the Kolo, but they do provide general
information on the Russian political parties and the actual
functioning of the Duma and for these reasons they were
quite useful. A final but important category of source materials were the Polish and Russian newspapers for this period.
Among the Polish newspapers utilized in this study were
Gazeta Polska (The Polish Gazette), the official paper of
the Endecja, and Slowo (The Word), the influential and conservative Warsaw paper of the Party of Realnolitik.
The Russian newspaper Rech (Speech). which was the official organ of the liberal Constitutional Democratic Party, provides excellent coverage of the Kolo and the Duma,
Unfortunately, the archives of the Polish Kolo, which are essential for a definitive study of this subject, are not available. Prior to the Russian revolution in 1917t
the archives of the Kolo were kept in St. Petersburg.
During the revolutionary upheaval, the Polish deputy Jan
Haruszewicz deposited the archives in the Roman Catholic
Ecclesiastical Academy in the Russian capital. At the present time, there is no available information on the location of these archives or if they are still in
existence.
With the exception of two recent works by the Polish historians, Zygmunt lukawski and Miroslaw Wierzchowski,
there are relatively few worthwhile secondary materials
on the subject of the Kolo. The lukawski monograph is
the most important secondary work available and it examines all aspects of Polish politics in the first, second, and part of the third Dumas. Although lukawski approaches his his subject from a Marxist viewpoint, this does not detract
from the usefulness of his study. The Wierzchowski work
examines the Polish question as a political issue in
Russian politics during the third and fourth Dumas;
Wierzchowski deals only indirectly with the Polish Koio,
since his chief concern is the attitude of the Russian
parties toward the Polish question. The iukawski and
Wierzchowski works remain the best secondary sources
available on the politics of the Koto in the Duma.
There also exist a number of general secondary works
which cover various aspects of Polish politics during the period under consideration. There are several histories
of the Endecja which provide very general information
on the Koto; these include the works by Stanisiaw Kozicki,
Wtadystaw Pobog-Malinowski, and Stanisiaw Kalabinski.
The best study still available on Polish political thought remains the two volume Dzie je •polskie.i mvëli politvczne .i
(History of Polish Political Thought) by Wilhelm von
Feldman. This work is essential for any study of Polish political life and it contains a comprehensive and well documented analysis of the ideology of the Endecja.
Among the most useful general works on Polish political history during this period are those by H. Wereszycki and
Wladysîaw Pobog-Malinowski.
At the present time there exists a real need for serious monographs on the Polish parliamentary clubs. 8 which would emphasize not only their role in Polish political life during the period of the partitions, but also evaluate the impact of the Polish clubs upon the political life and structure of the partitioning empires. Another area where there has been a serious lack of research is the
Russian constitutional period, especially with regard to the political parties and factions in the Duma. It is hoped that this paper will be a contribution to future studies in these neglected areas of Polish and Russian political history. CHAPTER I
THE RISE OF THE ENDECJA
The failure and collapse of the I863 insurrection
in Russian Poland had a profound impact upon all aspects
of Polish society. In the decades that followed, which
are collectively referred to as the period of "organic
work," Congress Poland underwent a political, social,
economic, and psychological transformation which drastically
altered the structure of Polish society. Out of these new conditions there emerged the National Democratic and
socialist movements, which by the turn of the century
struggled to control the political life of the Congress
Kingdom.
Political repression and Russification were the
immediate consequences of the I863 uprising. The last
vestiges of political and administrative autonomy in the
Congress Kingdom disappeared; a Russian Governor-General
in Warsaw exercised complete civil and military power
and the political administration of Congress Poland
became identical with the rest of the Russian Empire.
The Tsarist government also embarked upon a harsh policy
of Russification, which excluded Poles from service in
the government and administration and provided for the
9 10 the exclusive use of the Russian language in the administra tion, courts, and schools• The authorities applied partic ularly repressive measures against those classes and groups which had supported the insurrectionary movement: the aristocracy, the gentry, and the Catholic clergy. Large- scale confiscations of landholdings and deportations dealt a heavy blow to the gentry and precipitated its decline as a social class. On the other hand, the government sought to win the support of the Polish peasantry at the expense of the aristocracy and gentry.
Under the agrarian reform of 1864, the Polish peasants received larger and more viable allotments and under more favorable terms than their Russian counterparts.
Thus, while political repression and land reform hastened the impoverishment and decline of the gentry class, they contributed to the material improvement of the peasantry.
The policies of the Tsarist regime as well as in dustrialization also contributed to the emergence of several new social classes in the Congress Kingdom.
Deprived of their landholdings, many of the gentry drifted to the cities where they entered the professions, business, and commerce, which long had been dominated by the Jews.
Thus, the dispossessed gentry formed the core of a new
Polish middle class. Among the peasantry, the favorable
^Alexander Gieysztor, et al.. History of Poland (Warsaw, 1 9 6), 8 pp. 531-536. 11 agrarian reform law led to the emergence of a stable class of peasant freeholders; both the new class of free holders and the middle class provided a degree of social stability that was lacking in other parts of the Russian
Empire. Not only did industrialization, which began to develop in Congress Poland in the decades prior to the uprising, provide an outlet for the energies of the gentry but it contributed to the emergence of an urban industrial proletariat. In 18?0, factory workers in the
Congress Kingdom numbered about 6^,000, but by 1897, their number had risen to nearly 24^,000. These classes— the Polish middle class, the peasant freeholders, and the industrial proletariat— played an important role in the rise of the National Democratic and socialist movements.
The disastrous consequences of the I863 uprising also had a decided impact upon the national psyche, espe cially among the aristocracy and the declassed gentry.
After 1864, the era of political romanticism and the
insurrectionary tradition of the gentry came to an end.
Russian Poland sank into political apathy <:nd on the part
of the upper classes there was an abandonment of politics.
The international situation reinforced this negative attitude toward politics. The defeat of France and the emergence of Germany as the dominant power on the continent after I8 7O, eliminated any hope of active French support
2 Wilhelm von Feldman, Dzieie polskie i mvsi i politvczne.i od konca XIX wieku do 1914 (Warsaw, 1920), Vol. II, p. 10. 12
on behalf of the Poles, At the same time, the Dreikaiserbund
established a close accord between Berlin, Vienna, and St.
Petersburg and the three partitioning powers could be expected to act in unison on matters relating to the Polish question. In reality, the Polish question ceased to be an international issue during the two decades following the
1863 uprising. Both internal developments and the interna tional situation, thus, contributed to the emergence of two new trends of thought— Triple Loyalism and positivism— which were dominant among Polish educated circles until
1 6 8. 5
The politics of Triple Loyalism, which gained many adherents in the Congress Kingdom, developed in Austrian
Galicia around I869» and shortly after Vienna had granted considerable autonomy to her Polish subjects. Formulated in Krakow by the Stanczyk circle, a group of Galician conservatives, the basic assumption underlying the concept of Triple Loyalism was that through political moderation and compromise the Poles in each of the partitioned areas could obtain a considerable degree of autonomy. The Triple
Loyalists argued that Poles should reconcile themselves with the existing regimes and work for conciliation, since this afforded the best means of preserving Polish culture and promoting the best interests of the nation.^
^In Russia, Wlrodzimierz Spasowicz (1829-1906) was a leading advocate of conciliation with the Tsarist regime. A lawyer, literary critic, and editor, Spasowicz resided 13
Positivism, however, had a far greater impact upon
Polish educated circles for it provided an intellectual framework peculiarly suited to a society characterized on the one hand by political disillusionment and on the other hand by rapid economic growth and prosperity. The Warsaw positivists, centered around Aleksander Swi^tochowski
(1849-1 9 3 8), derived their inspiration from the works of
Comte, Huxley, and Darwin. Swi%tochowski and his followers, with their emphasis upon science and reason, preached a gospel of progress which came to be known as "organic work."
In their approach to national and social problems, the
Warsaw positivists asserted that national survival depended upon economic progress and education. They urged Poles to recognize the reality of existing conditions, shun in volvement in politics, abandon aspirations for independence, and direct their energies toward material development.
Along with the accumulation of material wealth, the positivists placed special emphasis upon education, which they regarded not only as necessary for material develop ment, but as a means of instilling a national consciousness among all classes and preserving Polish culture. This positivist philosophy remained the dominant ideology among the Polish intelligentsia until about 1 8 8 5.^ in St. Petersburg where he edited the Polish newspaper Kra.1 (The Homeland) through which he expressed his views.
^William Rose, The Rise of Polish Democracy (London, 1 9 4), 4 pp. 38-41. 14
The political passivism and apathy which prevailed in the Congress Kingdom came to an end around I885 due to a number of internal and external developments. By this time, it was evident that Triple Loyalism had not brought about any noticeable improvement or change in
Tsarist policies in Poland. On the contrary, under
Governor General Hurko (1883-1894), Russification and repression became more intense. The most threatening measure was the Statute of I8 8 5, which provided for the complete Russification of the school system; Poles regarded this measure as a direct threat to the very existence of Polish cultural life. At the same time, a more serious danger to the nation came from Germany.
In 18 8 5, the German government began large-scale expulsions of Poles from the Prussian eastern marches and in the following year Berlin established a government fund to purchase Polish lands in Poznan for the purpose of colonizing the area with Germans.
On the international scene, the Bulgarian crisis of I8 8 5, and the mounting Austro-Russian tension in the
Balkans marked the gradual disintegration of the
Dreikaiserbund. which had bound the partitioning powers together. Collaboration among the partitioning powers finally came to an end in 1894, with the conclusion of the Franco-Russian alliance. For many Poles, the Franco-
Russian accord signified that once again the Polish 15 question had become an international issue, since Russia no longer was linked in a close alliance with Berlin and Vienna. Thus, the internal pressures of Russification and Germanisation combined with a falling out among the partitioning powers contributed to a political reawakening in Russian Poland,
The first indication of a return to active politics came in 1886, when Colonel Zygmunt Milkowski (182^-1915) founded the Polish League in Geneva. The League called for political activism and it aimed to coordinate Polish political activities in all the partitioned areas. The
League established a fund to support the national cause and it focused upon preparing Poles for a future European conflict, which would lead to the restoration of an independent Polish state. While the League did not openly advocate insurrection, it, nevertheless, did not entirely dismiss this idea should favorable conditions arise.
Initially an emigre organization, the League soon spread to the Congress Kingdom where it attracted a large following chiefly among students. Although the primary aims of the early League were political, its social program was generally democratic in nature. In brief, however, the
Polish League called for political activism to restore
Polish independence and support of a national treasury to finance its activities in Poland and abroad.^
^Feldman, Dzie je polskie .1 mvsli politvczne.i. pp. 59-61. 16
Although the League attracted a .following in Russian
Poland, its ideology developed alopg different lines than that of the emifcres, Among the first advocates of national liberation in the Congress Kingdom was Jan
Popîav.’ski (185^-1 9 0 8), who in 1887» established the political and literary weekly G3ros (The Voice.). Popiav/ski had spent a number of years in exile in Russia where he had come into contact with the ideas of the Russian
Narodniks and socialism.^ Popiav/ski propagated a populist ideology which condemned the selfish class interests of the aristocracy and gentry; for Popiawski, the most important element in society was the common man— the peasants and workers— who embodied the most positive traits in the Polish national character and preserved the best of traditional values. In Glos. Popiav/ski called upon Poles to place the national interest above those of any group or class and direct their energies toward material improvement; he particularly stressed the needs of the peasants, the workers, and the petty bourgeoisie.
Popiawski maintained that in order for the national movement to develop, it first was necessary to instill 9 a national and social consciousness among the masses.'
Closely connected with C3ros and close associates of Poplawski were Jozef Potocki and Jozef Hiasko. Like Poplawski, they had belonged to early socialist organiza tions and they were influenced by Russian populism.
Feldman, Dzie.ie polskie^ mvsli politvcznei. pp. .52-53' 17
There were additional elements in the ideology of
Popîawski that had an impact upon the emerging national movement. Popiawski urged Poles to abandon the idea of regaining the former Lithuanian, Belorussian, and Ukrainian lands in the east, which were lost during the partitions.
Instead, he argued that Poles should look westward and north to the Polish lands that .were undergoing Germanisation.
Popiawski believed that a future independent Poland could only be a viable state if it possessed the mouth of the
Vistula, the western Polish provinces, and the lands along the Baltic. These ideas contained the seeds for a future anti-German and pro-Russian orientation. Finally,
Poplawski was among the first to remove the stigma attached to emigration and he underscored the contributions that
Polish emigrants could make to the national cause. In some respects, Poplawski continued in the positivist tradition, but many of his populist views, his interest in the emigrant, and his desire to abandon Polish claims to the eastern territories mark a decided break with the past.®
Zygmunt Balicki (I858-I9 1 6) was another leading figure in the early national movement and a close associate of
Poplawski. A former socialist and a sociologist by profession, Balicki founded the Union of Polish Youth
Û Rose, The Rise of Polish Democracy, pp. 72-73. 18
(Zwiazek Mlodziezv Polskie.i) in I89I, for university
students in Poland and abroad. Under the direction of
the Polish League, the Union of Polish Youth gained many adherents in Congress Poland, particularly among the sons
of the intelligentsia and middle class. It exerted a strong influence not only among university students, but also in the secondary schools where it propagated nationalist ideas and the goal of an independent Poland.
Finally, the Union of Polish Youth was instrumental in establishing secret self-education circles in schools and among all classes of society.^
In addition to establishing the Union of Polish
Youth, Balicki played a considerable role in formulating — H±s-nnosirnsTgrrif'^= icant ideas appeared in I8 9 2, in his pamphlet, Egolzm narodowv wobec etyki (National Egoism in Relation to
Ethics)3^^ In this work, Balicki raised nationalism or national egoism to the level of a religion. For
Balicki, national egoism was the highest ethical standard and the basis of all human behavior. He further asserted that the rights of the individual or any group or class in society were subordinate to the national ego and he rejected outright any type of universal humanitarianism.
This ideology laid the foundations for a crude and
^Feldman, pp. 62-63»
^^Zygmunt Balicki, Egoizm narodowv wobec etyki (Lwow, 1903. ) 19 racially tinged nationalism and it exerted a powerful influence on the younger generation of Poles,
While Poplawski and Balicki laid the ideological and organizational foundations, the national movement was most closely associated with Roman Dmowski (1864-1939). Born in Praga, a suburb of Warsaw, Dmowski grew up in the at mosphere of a petty bourgeois family of gentry origin.
His father instilled in him at an early age the ideal of an independent Poland and he was influenced by his Polish schoolteachers and the positivist spirit of the period.
In the gymnasium. Dmowski developed an interest in history, geography, and literature, but he also read extensively the works of Darwin and the positivists— Comte, Buckle, and Spencer. In addition, Dmowski participated in secret self-education circles which gathered to discuss politics,
Polish literature, and history. During his years in the gymnasium and in the self-education circles, Dmowski came to belieye that Poles could only resist Russification and preserve their national identity through the study of the Polish language, literature, and history. During this period, Dmowski also came into contact with socialist ideas and he developed an aversion to Marxism with its international connotations and doctrine of class struggle.
Polski Sarownik Biograficzny (Krakow: Polska Akademia Umiejetnosci, 1939-19^6), Vol. V, pp. 213-226. All biographical data on Dmowski has been taken from this source; in the absence of biographies of Dmowski, this 20
In 1886, Dmowski entered the University of Warsaw, where he specialized in biology and his education in the natural sciences was to have a profound impact upon his later political thinking. Dmowski received his degree in morphology in 1 8 9 1* and by this time he had developed a close friendship with Poplawski, whom in later life he referred to as his "great friend and teacher." In the same year and on his way to continue his studies in Prance,
Dmowski stopped in Geneva where he met Balicki and joined the Union of Polish Youth. Recognizing his intellectual capabilities, Balicki urged Dmowski to enter the field of active politics. Dmowski then returned to Warsaw, where he and Poplawski worked together and by 1 8 9 2, they had succeeded in gaining control of the Polish League from the older generation of democratic revolutionaries. This led to the merging of the Polish League and the Union of
Polish Youth in I8 9 3, to form the National League (Liga
Narodowa). In the same year, however, the Tsarist police arrested Dmowski for illegal political activities and he was sentenced to three years exile in Mitau. This period of exile was relatively brief, for in I8 9 4, Dmowski fled to Lwow where Poplawski later joined him.
In Lwow and the relative freedom of Galicia, Dmowski and Poplawski began publishing Przeglad Wszechpolski (The article provides the most detailed and objective treatment of his life and work. 21
All-Polish Review). s. fortnightly for the intelligentsia, which became the official organ of the National League.
In 1 8 9 5 1 Przeglad Wszechpolski published a manifesto, setting forth the program of the National League. Anti-
Russian in tone, the manifesto called upon Poles to work for the restoration of an independent Polish state, but left the means for achieving this goal somewhat vague.
While the manifesto stressed revolutionary tactics, it did not call for. open insurrection; however, it did not entirely dismiss the idea of an insurrection in the event that favorable conditions emerged at a future time. The immediate aim of the League was to foster a national, political, and social consciousness among the masses.
The manifesto advocated the use of legal and non-legal means to attain this goal; these included the creation of an underground press, illegal and clandestine schools, self- study circles, and numerous societies to promote the 12 material and cultural improvement of the common people.
In 1 8 9 7» Dmowski, Popiawski, and Balicki transformed the National League into the National Democratic Party.
The program of the party at this time remained basically the same as that set forth in the 1695 manifesto. Operating out of Galicia, the Endecja published numerous periodicals and newspapers, which aimed to reach every class in society, especially the peasants and the working class. In addition,
1 ? Rose, The Rise of Polish Democracy, pp. 7^-75* 22
the Endecja established numerous social, economic self- help, educational, and gymnastic organizations and it encouraged its supporters among the peasantry to play an active political role in the rural gmina.^^ Although illegal in Congress Poland, the Endecja achieved a consid erable degree of success in propagating its ideas. In many instances. Endecja members and supporters succeeded in gaining control of legal societies and organizations and this, too, enabled the party to spread its influence in the decade prior to the revolution of I9 0 5.
Between I898 and 1 9 0 0, Dmowski broadened his political views during his travels to Great Britain, France, the
United States, and Brazil. The British parliamentary system particularly impressed Dmowski and he became convinced that this system provided stability, since it enabled the nation to solve political, social, and economic problems within the framework of traditional institutions Ik and cultural values. Visiting Polish communities in
^The gminv were the rural administrative units estab lished by the Russians after the I863 uprising. The peas ants were given a dominant voice in managing the affairs of the gmina by the Tsarist authorities, in order to undermine the position and reduce the influence of the gentry and aristocracy, Ik There is little doubt that Dmowski was impressed by the role that Parnell and the Irish Nationalist Party had played in Parliament nearly a decade earlier. Parnell and the Irish Nationalists attempted to obtain a "balance of power" between the Liberal and Conservative parties in order to extort concessions from the government on the Irish question. In the second Duma, Dmowski envisioned a position for the Polish Kolo similar to that held by the Irish Nationa lists. 23
the United States and Brazil likewise reinforced his
conviction that the emigrant was a vital asset and could render valuable services to the national cause.
The political ideology of Dmowski crystallized in the
brief decade after his entrance into active politics. The publication in 1 9 0 3t of his first important work, Mysli nov/oczesnego Polaka (Thoughts of a Modern Pole), had a profound impact upon the intelligentsia and the middle class and it soon became the catechism of the National
Democratic movement.In this work, Dmowski provided a sober and realistic evaluation of the problems that confronted the Polish nation and he set forth the methods to solve them. Dmowski called upon Poles to abandon the romantic idealism and insurrectionary traditions of the past; the new nationalism that Dmowski preached required a radical transformation of the Polish national character.
The political ideology that Dmowski set forth in
Mysli nowoczesnego Polaka was that of realoolitik or the politics of realism. He argued that the political idealism and romanticism which had characterized Polish politics during the nineteenth century had to be abandoned. Dmowski extolled the politics of power and force and he pointed to recent history to show that realnolitik had proved its worth. For Dmowski, Prussia was the model of successful
^^Roman Dmowski, Mysli nowoczesnego Polaka (Lwow, I9O3 ),
^^Feldman, Dzie.ie polskie.i myëli politycznei. pp. 108-11$. ZUr
realpolitik; the Bismarcklan politics of "Blood and Iron"
had enabled the Iron Chancellor to unify the German nation
and forge a powerful German Empire. Similarly, the Germans, believing in the superiority of their own culture, had
employed force in an effort to impose German culture upon the Poles in the eastern marches. Dmowski urged
Poles to take the Germans as their model for only by
adopting the methods of hated Germans could the Polish nation become strong, insure its national survival, and ultimately achieve national liberation. It was this new nationalism— a nationalism of force and power politics— 17 that Dmowski sought to spread among the masses.
As a biologist and social Darwinian, Dmowski conceived
of the nation as a living organism and he believed in the
incessant struggle for survival between the strong and
the weak. For Dmowski, the nation took precedence over any individual, class, or group in society. "The nation," he asserted, "being a living organism has the moral right to grow; whether at the cost of passive, thoughtless, and shapeless groups or even at the cost of other nations.
, . . Thus, realpolitik and the politics of force complemented his conception of the nation and its task.
Like Balicki, Dmowski believed that Poles had to raise nationalism or patriotism to the level of a religion in
^"^Ibid.
^^Feldman, Dzie.ie polskiei mv3li politvcznei. p. 118. 25 order to make the nation strong. This philosophy bred not only a belief in the superiority of Polish culture and an exaggerated chauvinism, but also a belief in the inevitability of struggle and conflict with weaker nations.
Thus, Dmowski argued that the struggle for national survival had to be waged not only against the Germans and Russians, but against weaker nationalities such as the Lithuanians and Ukrainians, whose national interests conflicted with those of the Poles.
In a similar fashion, Dmowski voiced his opposition to socialists and Jews within Poland. Because of their cosmopolitanism and international connections, Dmowski believed that socialists and Jews did not give priority to the interests of the Polish nation. Socialism, with its emphasis upon revolution and class struggle, was a disruptive force and destroyed the "living organism" of the nation. He also regarded the Jews as a divisive and alien element in the midst of society; as an ethnic and religious group they were difficult to assimilate and by their control of business, commerce, and the professions they were harmful to the national interest.
Dmowski conceived of nationalism as the sum total of language, historical traditions, and religion; this nationalism was reinforced and expressed through national institutions. In the past, nationalism had been the prerogative of the gentry and the aristocracy, but the new 26 nationalism of Dmowski called for instilling a national consciousness among Poles of all classes, especially the common people. Dmowski regarded this task as not only necessary for the survival of the nation, but as a precondition for national liberation in the future. This explains the emphasis that the Endecja placed upon news papers, societies, education, and material improvement.
In this respect, the Endecja continued in the tradition of the positivists, but it also went further than the positivists for it strove to become a national and mass movement.
The ideology of Dmowski and the Endecja appealed to a broad spectrum of Polish society in the Congress Kingdom.
Emphasis upon realpolitik and opposition to violent in surrection reassured the upper and middle classes, who were imbued with the spirit of positivism and feared a repetition of the disastrous I863 uprising; these same classes also feared the excesses of revolutionary socialism and class struggle and thus they tended to give at least nominal support to the Endecja. The anti-Semitic aspects in the ideology of the Endecja particularly appealed to the growing Polish middle class, which resented the dominant position of the Jews in business, finance, and the professions. By working to promote the material improvement of the common people, spreading education, and emphasizing traditional cultural values, the Endecja • 27
attracted a broad following among the peasants and some
support among the urban working class. In a country that
was conservative, traditional, and Catholic, the ideology
and program of the Endecja had considerable appeal.
Realpolitik as propagated by Dmowski had implications
both for domestic politics as well as for relationships
with the partitioning powers. In the realm of domestic
politics, Dmowski urged the Endecja to build its program
upon the reality of existing conditions rather than
abstract and idealistic principles. The chief aim of
the party was to weigh the interests and aspirations of
the nation and then unite as many people as possible behind
a common goal, without damaging the interests of any
class or group in society. Since Dmowski maintained that
there was no room in politics for abstract and idealistic
principles, it was entirely possible and even desirable
to diverge in principles and in action in order to achieve
a common goal. In essence, these were the politics of
opportunism and realism,
In a similar fashion, Dmowski applied the principles
of realpolitik to relationships with the partitioning
powers. In 1899t Dmowski had written that liberation
would be achieved through "Blood and Iron,” implying
that at this time he had not dismissed entirely the idea
^Rech, April 25, 1907* All dates in this paper, including those for issues of Russian newspapers, are- given according to the New Style, 28 of insurrection. By I9OI, however, Dmowski approached the problem of national liberation in more realistic terms. He dismissed an Austrian orientation as unrealistic, since he regarded the Habsburg monarchy as a weak multi national state, which had become simply an instrument of German foreign policy. In the same year, Dmowski wrote :
There is only one answer— either with the Germans or with the Russians; no third possibility exists. The most fitting and purely Polish answer, i.e. without Germany and without Russia or rather alone and by our ov/n strength against them both, does not exclude in certain circumstances the necessity of declaring ourselves for one com bination or the other.^
Although Dmowski hated and feared the Germans and regarded the Russians as culturally inferior to the Poles, he realized that the nation lacked the strength and resources necessary to achieve national liberation without the support of either Germany or Russia.
By 1 9 0 3, it v/as apparent to the leaders of the
Endecja and many Poles that the Germans posed the greatest danger to national survival. In the preceding decade the Germanization policies of Berlin in the eastern marches had proceeded at an alarming rate. Government sponsored colonization schemes, Reichstag legislation to drive the Poles off the land, and the elimination of the Polish language in the schools made it evident that
20 Feldman, Dzie.ie polskie.i mvëli politvczne.i. p. 121. 29 the anti-Polish policies of Berlin were far more ruthless, efficient and better financed than those of St. Petersburg.
At the same time, the Tsarist system was undergoing internal strain and there were increasing demands for reform from a growing and influential Russian liberal movement.
These internal pressures on the Tsarist regime indicated that there was some possibility of internal liberalization in the near future. Thus, by 1 9 0 3, the Endecja, which until this time had been anti-Russian and an advocate of independence, made an abrupt shift in its political strategy and tactics.
At its 1903 party congress, the Endecja abandoned independence as an immediate goal, although it continued to promote nationalism and the ideal of an independent
Poland, More significant, however, the Endecja declared
Germany to be the chief enemy of the Polish nation and it adopted a policy of conciliation toward Russia with the aim of achieving autonomy within the Russian Empire.
Furthermore, the I903 program called for continued efforts to promote the moral and material development of the nation along with instilling a national consciousness among all classes of society. Special emphasis v/as placed upon education, the promotion of the Polish language and culture, and the establishment of societies for social and economic improvement. The program of the party also called for isolating the masses from the "decaying 30 influences" of socialism and a campaign either to assimilate the Jews or to reduce their influence on the economic life of the nation. In addition, the Endecja gave official recognition to the Roman Catholic Church as a national institution, since the Church had traditionally defended and preserved Polish culture. Support of the Church increased the influence of the Endecja, especially in rural areas; in this sense the Endecja was a Catholic party even though it never became clerically controlled or dominated and its ideology hardly was based upon Chris tian principles. The 1903 program of the Endecja re mained basically unchanged until the outbreak of World
War 1.21
Brief reference must be made to the rise of the Polish
socialist movement. The emergence of an urban proletariat, which accompanied industrialization, and the support
that Marx and Engels had given to Polish independence
contributed to the emergence of a socialist movement in
the Congress Kingdom. Ludwik Warynski (I856-I8 8 9)
established Proletariat in 1882, the first Marxian so
cialist organization in Congress Poland. Warynski stressed
class struggle and the international solidarity of the
proletariat, rather than the national issue. After
organizing a series of strikes and demonstrations in I8 8 3,
21 Zygmunt Wasilewski, Demokrac ja Narodowa w dwudziestolecie programu stronnictwa: 1897-1917. (St. Petersburg, 1917)» pp. 33-^4. 31 the Tsarist police arrested the leaders of the movement and by I8 8 5, the organization and morale of the party 22 had been shattered.
But the real founder of the modern socialist movement
in Poland was Boiesiaw Limanowski (1835-1935)* Unlike
Warynski, Limanowski believed that Polish independence was a necessary precondition for the liberation of the working class. It was over the question of independence
that Limanowski broKe with Warynski and the early members
of Proletariat, In I8 9 2, Limanowski, along with other
leaders of the socialist movement, met in Paris and
founded the Polish Socialist Party (Polska Partia
Soc ialistvczna),
The PPS differed from its predecessor in that it
gave priority to national liberation and the establishment
of an independent Polish socialist republic. According
to Limanowski, this goal would be achieved through the
revolutionary struggle of the working class. The PPS
was opposed to close collaboration with the Russian Social
Democrats and it endorsed the use of strikes and limited
terror in order to achieve its objectives. The social
program of the PPS was moderate and democratic, but it
was oriented chiefly toward the needs of the working class;
22 Feldman, Dzie.ie polskie.i myêli politvczne.i. p, 24,
^^ereafter cited by the Polish abbreviated form PPS, 32 there was little in the program which would attract a following among other classes in the Congress Kingdom.
However, the emphasis that the PPS placed upon revolution and the struggle for independence did attract many Poles to the party who still believed in the necessity of violent revolution against Russia. Among those who joined the PPS for this reason was Jozef Pilsudski (1867-
1935)» By 1 9 0 5» Pilsudski had risen to the highest ranks in the party and as the leading spokesman for insurrection against Russia, he had organized and commanded the
"Fighting Organization" of the PPS.
In less than a year after the founding of the PPS. there arose a serious split in the party over the national issue. The left-wing minority in the party led by Rosa
Luxemburg (I8 7O-I9 1 9) and Julian Marchlewski (I866-I9 2 5) opposed the independence program as unrealistic and econom ically unsound. The Luxemburg faction argued that the party should give priority to social revolution, the overthrow of the Tsarist regime, and the establishment of a Russian socialist republic; once these goals were achieved, the national question would be solved for
Congress Poland would be granted broad autonomy within a Russian socialist republic. As a result of the dif ferences that emerged on the national issue, the PPS expelled the left-wing from the party late in 1893»
Feldman, Dzie ie polskie .1 mvsli politvczne .1. pp. 32-^2 33
Rosa Luxemburg and the left-wing then established a separate party— the Social Democratic Party of the
Kingdom of Poland (SDKP)T h e program of the SDKP called for social revolution and the overthrow of the
Tsarist regime ; broad territorial and cultural autonomy for Congress Poland; and collaboration with the Russian
Social Democratic movement. The chief weakness of the
SDKP. however, was its opposition to Polish independence; consequently, the party attracted little support among the Polish working class. The leadership of the SDKP was comprised mainly of Jewish intelligentsia and the party drew its support largely from the Jewish proletariat in Warsaw, Lodz, and other industrial centers.
By 1 9 0 5, the PPS was the largest and most important socialist party in Congress Poland. The PPS was a nationalist, revolutionary, and anti-Russian party and its immediate aim was revolution and the establishment of an independent Polish socialist republic. Although the leadership in the party came chiefly from the Polish intelligentsia, the PPS was essentially a class party, which drew its strength from the Polish working class.
The PPS had practically no following in the rural areas or among other social classes.
^In 1 9 0 0, the SDKP merged with the Social Democratic Party of Lithuania. At this time the new party adopted as its official name the Social Democratic Party of the Kingdom of Poland and Lithuania (Soc.ialdemokrac ia Krolestwa Polskiego i Litwv). In the following chapters the abbreviated form SDKPiL will be used when referring to this party. 3U
It was the Endecja, however, that by I905 had emerged
as the most powerful political force in Congress Poland
and it came closest to what might be termed a mass party.
Under the leadership of Dmowski, Popiawski, and Balicki,
the Endecja was a well organized national party with a
program and ideology which attracted a following among
all social classes. . It was particularly strong among the
intelligentsia, the middle class, and the peasantry, and
it had made some inroads among the working class. In brief, the Endecja was a nationalist, conservative.
Catholic, anti-Semitic, and anti-German party. The
immediate political aims of the party were a rapprochement with Russia and political and cultural autonomy for the
Congress Kingdom within the Russian Empire. The Endecja was committed to Polish independence, but this remained a goal to be attained in the distant future. The differences between the Endecja and the PPS crystallized not so much over ideology, but rather on the issue of national liberation and the tactics to be used in achieving this goal: the
tactics of realpolitik as set forth by the Endecja versus the violent revolutionary tactics of the PPS. The almost
inevitable clash between the Endecja and the PPS came with the outbreak of the revolution of I905 in Tsarist Russia. CHAPTER II
CONGRESS POLAND AND THE I9O5 REVOLUTION
The revolution of 1905 in Congress Poland was characterized by a three-way struggle between the Tsarist government, the socialist parties, and the Endecja to control the political destiny of the Congress Kingdom.
The Tsarist government sought to prevent the outbreak of a violent insurrection in Poland at a time when Russia was involved in a disastrous war with Japan in the Far
East and the revolutionary movement in Russia was gaining momentum. The Polish socialist parties— the PPS and the
SDKPiL— viewed the war with Japan and internal instability as an opportunity to attain their own revolutionary goals.
The PPS considered the moment opportune to launch an insurrection and rid the country of Russian control, while the SDKPiL sought to coordinate its efforts with those of the Russian revolutionaries in order to overthrow the Tsarist regime and establish a socialist republic.
The Endecja faced the twofold task of preventing the spread of disorder and the outbreak of revolution, while at the same time exploiting Russia's internal and external troubles in order to obtain autonomy. The fact that a
35 36 full scale national insurrection never materialized in
Congress Poland can be attributed to the organizational strength, tactics, and program of the Endecja; the internal dissension within the ranks of the PPS; and the timely, but limited concessions the Tsarist government granted the Poles and the much larger concessions to the Russian liberal and revolutionary movements.
The outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War in 190^, precipitated a clash between the Endecja and the PPS on the question of national liberation. Dmowski was convinced that despite the disastrous war with Japan,
Russia remained powerful enough to crush a national uprising in Poland. He believed that the Poles could ^hcnhat revolution would lead to a fruitless exhaustion of the national resources, more oppressive Russification policies, and the destruction^ of the national organization of the
Endecja. Dmowski felt that the war and the internal crisis and pressures would force the government to lib eralize and that Poland could profit from these changes and possibly obtain autonomy within the Empire.^
On the other hand, Piisudski and the revolutionaries in the PPS regarded the moment as opportune to bring an end to Russian rule by means of violent revolution and
^Stanisîaw Kozicki, "Roman Dmowski," Slavonic Review, XVIII (July, 1939). p. 121. 37
to establish an independent Poland. This viewpoint
dominated the PPS throughout 1904 and the greater part
of 1905» In the autumn of 1904, the PPS organized a
series of strikes and demonstrations to protest the mobilization of Polish troops for the war against Japan and in October, PPS terrorists fired the first shots at the Russian police in Warsaw, The following month,
Piîsudski and Tytus Pilipowicz traveled to Tokyo to enlist
Japanese support for open insurrection in Poland in
conjunction with the Japanese war effort in the Far
East, The Piisudski mission, however, failed to produce any results. Alarmed by the revolutionary tactics of
the PPS and the spectre of armed insurrection, Dmowski went to Tokyo and convinced the Japanese of the futility 2 of lending support to the Polish revolutionaries.
The failure to obtain Japanese support did not dissuade the PPS from continuing to foment an insurrection.
In fact, the hopes of the PPS rose following Bloody
Sunday (January 22, 190$), and the outbreak of revolution
in Russia, In late January 190$, the PPS called for a general strike, which was supported by the SDKPiL and the Jewish Bund, This was followed by a school strike to force che government to permit the use of Polish in the school system; the school strike was initiated and
^D.R. Gillie, ed,, Joseph Piisudskit The Memoirs of a Polish Revolutionary and Soldier (London, 1931) »' pp. 1$3-1$7. 38 supported by both the Endecja and the socialist parties.
Throughout the greater part of 1905» the PPS organized a series of strikes and demonstrations which paralyzed the Congress Kingdom and resulted in a breakdown in the civil administration of the cities and led to violent clashes between workers and Tsarist police and troops.
The worst disorders occurred during the May Day demonstra tions in Warsaw and in June, when workers in -Lodz erected barricades and battled troops for three days. Under the leadership of Piisudski, the Military Organization of the PPS carried out a campaign of terror against the authorities. The political assasinations, bombings, and skirmishes with troops by the fighting units of the
PPS became an everyday occurrence and led to reprisals and repression by the Russian authorities. In brief, the strikes and terrorism of the PPS created a situation which bordered on anarchy and brought the Congress Kingdom to the brink of revolution.
Early in 1905* Dmowski and Balicki returned to Warsaw to take command of the Endecja and forestall the outbreak of a revolution. The Endecja threw the full weight of its organization into the struggle against "revolution, socialism, and anarchism." In addition to the regular party organizations, the Endecja mobilized its auxiliary organizations--the National League, the Peasants Union, and the Union of Sokols— to combat the socialists. The 39
rural areas remained relatively calm despite sporadic
outbursts by landless peasants. In reality, the Endecja
was strongest in the rural areas where it had worked
among the peasants for over a decade and through its peasant members and supporters controlled the rural gmina. It was chiefly because the Endecja controlled
the rural areas that the disorders and terrorism were confined to the cities.
Through its numerous newspapers and publications, the Endecja also sought to combat revolutionary ideas and influence public opinion. The most important of these was Polak (The Pole). which Popiawski published and edited from Krakow. With its heavy clerical overtones and emphasis upon the educational and material improvement of the peasant, Polak had a wide reading public in the rural areas. The Endecja, however, did not neglect other social classes. Gazeta Polska (The Polish Gazette) and Przeglad
Wszechoolski (The All-Polish Review) catered chiefly to the intelligentsia and the middle class, while Kilinski and Pochodnia (The Torch) attempted to reach the working class. Thus, a well organized and widely circulated press enabled the Endecja to influence public opinion and oppose the revolutionary tactics of the PPS.
In contrast to the call for revolution and independence by the PPS. the Endecja propagated its political program under the slogan of "autonomy.” In April 1905* the Endecja ko published a manifesto which set forth autonomy as the first
objective of the party. The manifesto called upon Poles
to work for the establishment of an autonomous Congress
Poland, which would possess its own constituent Se.im
(parliament), administration, budget, and the use of Polish as the official language in the courts, schools, and administration. The manifesto further emphasized that
Congress Poland would remain an integral part of the
Russian Empire and continue to be ruled by the Tsar. It
stressed that an autonomous Poland and Russia would retain a common foreign policy, army, coinage, railroads,
and telegraph and that Polish deputies would participate
in a joint parliament. The manifesto also enunciated the
tactics the Endecja would employ to obtain autonomy.
These included persuading the Tsarist government that
autonomy was politically expedient and in the best
interests of the Russian Empire; gaining the support of
the Russian liberal opposition; organizing all classes
in Polish society behind the demand for autonomy; and
organizing volunteers and self-governing forces to main- O tain order where Russian authority collapsed.^
The April manifesto reflected the political realism
and the opportunism of the Endecja. The autonomy program
set forth at this time sought to rally all spectrums of
^J. Martov, P. Maslov, and A. Potresov, eds., Obshchestvennoe dvizhenie y Rossii y nachale XX veka.• (St. Petersburg, 1910), Vol. IV, p. 232. 41
Polish opinion behind the autonomy slogan and there was no mention of radical social or economic change or of altering the structure of Polish society. By demanding political and cultural autonomy, the Endecja hoped to undercut the appeal of the PPS, The manifesto was conciliatory toward the Tsarist government for Dmowski and the Endecja realized that acceptance of any autonomy scheme rested in the hands of the Tsar and his ministers.
The Endecja disavowed any separatist intentions and demanded autonomy only for the Congress Kingdom. There was no reference to incorporating the nine western prov inces into an autonomous Poland; this demand had been one of the chief obstacles to Russo-Polish reconciliation throughout the nineteenth century.^ In order to appease
the Russian liberals the Endecja called for the creation of a constituent Sejm and a common parliament. In brief,
the April manifesto attempted to satisfy the minimum demands of most Poles and at the same time allay fears among Russian conservatives, nationalists, and liberals
that the Endecja entertained any separatist intentions.
The Endecja also sought to consolidate public opinion
by posing as the party of law and order. In numerous
speeches and editorials, Dmowski repeatedly warned that
The Russian western provinces consisted of the six Lithuanian and. Belorussian provinces of Kovno, Vilna, Grodno, Vitebsk, Minsk, and Moghilev, in addition to the three Ukrainian provinces of Volhynia, Podolia, and Kiev, 42
the struggle against socialists and revolutionaries was
a "battle against anarchism.This slogan appealed not
only to the middle class, but also to the large landowners
and industrialists, v/ho feared the terrorist acts of the
PPS, strikes, and social upheaval. Dmowski argued that
social revolution and insurrection would lead only to more
oppressive Russification policies and wreck any chance
of obtaining autonomy.
In an effort to make the Endecja policy of conciliation
toward Russia more acceptable to Poles, Dmowski skillfully
exploited both real and latent anti-German sentiment.
Repeatedly he raised the spectre of German intervention
in the event of revolution in Poland; he further warned
that the revolutionary movement in Poland and Russia was part of a German conspiracy to create disorder and weaken the Russian Empire, Dmowski portrayed the Germans as the common enemy of Poles and Russians and he maintained
that the real threat to national survival came not from
St, Petersburg, but from Berlin,^
The Endecja also expended considerable effort in winning over the working class, which was the chief source
of support for the PPS, Early in 1905» the Endecja formed the National Workers Union (Narodowv Zwiazek Robotniczv
^Martov, Maslov, and Potresov, Obshchestvennoe dvizhenie, p, 234,
^Ibid,. p, 234. 43
or NZR). which emerged as the chief instrument to win control of the workers from the PPS. The NZR created
its own para-military organizations to combat socialist terrorism and break up strikes and demonstrations. When persuasion failed, the NZR resorted to strong-armed methods and even terror against its opponents; however, the NZR always was careful never to collaborate with the Tsarist officials and policeBy the end of 1 9 0 5, the NZR had made considerable inroads among the working class and it succeeded to some extent in breaking the grip of the
PPS on the workers. Despite the success of the NZR. the
PPS still retained a strong following and throughout 19^5 and 1 9 0 6, a virtual civil war between the NZR and the PPS raged in the large urban industrial centers.
In addition to its autonomy program, the social and economic program of the Endecja aimed to attract the support of all social classes. The Endecja came out with this program in November, 1905» and it reflected a desire to improve conditions among the masses. With regard to the peasant, the program advocated the establishment of minimum plots, the organization of agricultural cooperatives, an increase in wages for agricultural laborers, and cheap amortization of credit. In order to attract the working
7 'Although strongly anti-Endecja, a good account of the strong-armed tactics of the National Democrats during the 1905 Revolution can be found in Antvnarodowa politvka endec.ii w rewoluc:ii 1905-1907 by Stanislaw Kalabinski; 44
class, the Endecja pledged to work for increased wages,
a shorter working day, reform of factory inspection,
legalization of workers unions, improvement of hygenic
conditions in factories and workshops, and low cost
apartments for workers. Other points in the Endecja
program aimed to benefit all classes: the introduction
of mortgages; laws restricting monopolies; the creation
of industria] associations to deal directly with workers
unions; aid to emigrants; and free and compulsory primary O education.
The social and economic program of the Endecja was
basically realistic and conservative. Although the party
was not controlled by large landowners and big industrial
ists, the program respected the rights of private property
and there was no reference to expropriation of large land
holdings or nationalization of industry and natural re
sources. Respect for private property, however, did
ensure the support of the middle class and also won the
Endecja some support among the landowners and industrial
ists. At the same time, the Endecja did take into considera
tion the needs of the peasants and workers, but these re
forms and improvements were to be carried out within the
existing social and economic framework of society. The pro
gram of the Endecja was perfectly consistent with the ideo
logy of the party; it gave priority to the national interest.
O Martov, Maslov, and Potresov, Obshchestvennoe dvizhenie. p. 2 3 2. 45 attempted to create national unity, and sought to avoid anything that would create class antagonism and conflict.
The Endecja also regarded its program as an exclusively
Polish affair, for social and economic reforms were to be enacted by a Se.im sitting in Warsaw only after autonomy had been granted to the Congress Kingdom.
As early as 190^, the Endecja had shown a desire to obtain the support of Russian liberals. In November,
1 9 0 4, delegates of the Endecja and PPS met in Paris with representatives of the Russian liberal movement and the national minorities. The Paris conference drew up a program calling for an end to autocracy, the establishment
of a constitutional government, and the removal of restric
tions and the right to self-determination for all minorities.
This marked the first direct contact between the Endecja and the Russian liberal movement,^
More significant, however, was the Zemstvo Congress held in Moscow in April of 1 9 0 5, Through the initiative
of Aleksander Lednicki, a prominent Polish lawyer from
Moscow and a leading figure in the Russian liberal movement,
the Congress invited representatives from the Congress
Kingdom in order to obtain Polish support for reform.
Among the Polish groups represented were the Endecja,
the Realists connected with Spasowicz and Kraj, and the
^Feldman, Dzie.ie polskie.i mysli politvczne.i, p. 154, 46
Progressives or Polish liberals of Aleksander Swiç,tochowski.^*^
The Progressives supported the demands of the Polish liberals, Lednicki and Sieroszewski, who called for an end for autocratic rule and the granting of a constitution.
Balicki, however, insisted that the Russian and Polish liberals accept the principle of autonomy for Congress
Poland in return for Polish support in working for a constitutional system. There was considerable opposition to Polish autonomy from the right-wing of the Russian liberals led by Aleksander Guchkov, The right-wing opposed Polish autonomy on the grounds that such a scheme would weaken the state and lead to similar separatist demands from the other national minorities. After consid erable debate, however, the Congress passed a resolution supporting Polish autonomy in return for Polish support in achieving a constitutional government. Thus, by the middle of 1905* the Endecja had the backing of the Russian liberal movement on the autonomy issue.
The internal dissension within the ranks of the PPS over strategy and tactics also enabled the Endecja to strengthen its position in Congress Poland. At the
At the Moscow Conference, the Endecja was repre sented by Zygmunt Balicki, Jan Haruszewicz, Z, Paderewski, Z. Makowiecki, and H. Radziszewski. The chief delegates of the Realists were Adam Krasinski, Ludwik Straszewicz, and Stanislaw Wydzga, while the representatives of the Progressives were Stanislaw Kempner and A. Wierzchlejski. 11 Feldman, Dzie .ie nolskie.i mvsli politvczne .i. p.- 155» 47 outbreak of the revolution of 1905» both the right-wing and the left-wing of the PPS were in basic agreement on the question of revolution, national liberation, and non-cooperation with the Russian Social Democrats. But as the revolution in Russia progressed, the left-wing of the PPS came to believe that more could be gained through cooperation with the Russian revolutionary movement and that the party was waging a losing battle in its struggle against the Tsarist regime and the Endecja. At the Seventh Party Congress of the PPS in June, 1905» the left-wing succeeded in gaining control of the party organization, although Pilsudski and the old guard still 12 retained control of the Military Organization. The left-wing, which favored cooperation with the Russian revolutionaries and denounced the old insurrectionist ideas, then adopted a more realistic program that called for social revolution and a constituent Seim. At this time, both wings of the PPS sought to avoid a split in the party. The Pilsudski faction accepted the party declaration, but it conceived of the Se im simply as an instrument for the separation of Poland from Russia. The left-wing, however, began to abandon the idea of independ ence as an immediate goal; it was willing to accept an
12 The leading figures in the left-wing at this time were M. Koszutska, J, Ciszewski, M. Horwitz- Walecki, and M. Bielecki. The right-wing was led by Jozef Piisudski, Boleslaw J^drzejowski, Leon Wasilewski, and Witold Jodko- Narkiewicz. 48
autonomous Congress Poland in the hopes that independence
would he achieved at a later time. Despite the declaration
of the party, Piisudski and his supporters in the Military
Organization continued to carry out armed resistance
against the Russians.
At the^Eighth Party Congress in February, I9 0 6, the
left-wing succeeded in passing a resolution condemning
armed insurrection to attain independence and proclaimed
social revolution as the immediate goal of the party.
Piisudski and the right-wing refused to adhere to this
decision. The final rupture between the left and right
wings of the PPS came at the Vienna Congress in June, I9O6,
when the left-wing reaffirmed that social revolution in
Russia was a necessary precondition for national liberation.
Piisudski and the right-wing were expelled from the party
and the PPS thus split into two separate parties: the
PPS-Left and the PPS-Right. The PPS-Right continued to wage a guerrilla war against the Russians until I9 0 8,
when Piisudski led his armed units across the frontier
to the safety of Austrian Galicia.
Initially the rank and file of the PPS supported
the left-wing of the PPS leadership, although in tactics
and strategy the PPS drifted closer to the position of
the SDKPiL. The PPS, however, gradually began to lose
influence among the working class in the latter part of
1 9 0 5, due to internal dissension, the gradual abandonment of the independence program, and the failure of the party
to achieve any noticeable concessions from the Tsarist
authorities. As a result, many workers either became
indifferent or affiliated with the NZR. which enabled the
Endecja to expand its influence among the working class
at the expense of the PPS,
Although the PPS failed to foment a national uprising
during the revolution of 190 5» it was chiefly the strikes,
demonstrations, and terrorist acts of the socialists, rather than the conciliatory policies of the Endecja,
that frightened the Tsarist regime into making limited
concessions to the Poles, In February, 1 9 0 5, both the
Endecja and the PPS participated in a massive school
strike to force the government to introduce the use of
Polish at all levels of instruction in the state school
system. The school strike brought no immediate results and it was only the violent Warsaw and -fcddz disorders
in the spring, I9 0 5, that forced the government to make limited concessions on the school question.
Under the decrees of June 19 and October l4, I9 0 5»
the Tsarist government permitted the use of Polish in
the state secondary schools in two subjects: Catholic religious instruction and the Polish language. The same decrees also allowed the Poles to establish from private funds elementary and secondary schools in which all
instruction would be in Polish, In the autumn of I9 0 5, 50 the Endecja established the Macierz Szkolna Polska (The
Polish School Union) for the purpose of raising funds to create a private Polish school system. However, these concessions by the regime really failed to solve the school question and they were little more than half measures. The government still forbade the use of Polish as the sole language of instruction in the state schools and it placed the financial burden of creating a system of private schools on the Poles.
Another concession by the government affected chiefly the Poles in the nine western provinces. Under the
December Ukase of I8 6 5, Poles or persons of Polish origin were forbidden to purchase land in the western provinces; those Poles who were forced to sell their estates were bound by law to sell their holdings only to Orthodox
Russians,The decree of May I6, I9 0 5» however, permitted
Poles once again to purchase land in the western provinces.
Thus, many Polish landowners were able to sell their encumbered estates to the prosperous Polish bourgeoisie in this area and from the Congress Kingdom. This decree went a long way toward conciliating the conservative
^The Russification policies initiated by the Tsarist government following the I863 uprising were harsher in the western provinces than in the Congress Kingdom, In the western provinces the Poles were a minority, but they dominated the social and economic life of this region and in the I8 3O and I863 uprisings, the Poles had laid claim to these provinces. As a result, the Tsarist government attempted to reduce Polish influence in this area through its Russification policies. 51
Polish landowners in the western provinces, but even more important, it enabled the Polish minority in the area to retain its dominant social and economic position at the expense of the Lithuanian, Belorussian, and Ukrainian peasantry.
The concessions made by the government to the Russian liberal and revolutionary movements also had a direct affect on the Congress Kingdom, The Decree of Religious
Toleration, which the government granted on April ]0, I9 0 5, removed minor but irritating restrictions on Polish Roman
Catholics. However, the decree had a significant impact upon the former Uniates (or Greek Catholics) in the Cheim district of the Congress Kingdom and in the western provinces.While the decree legally permitted members of the Russian Orthodox Church to leave the official church, it did not give juridical recognition to the
Uniates. Consequently, those former Uniates who left the Orthodox Church and embraced Catholicism became
Catholics of the Latin rite. As a result, the half million Belorussian and Ukrainians in the western provinces and the Chelm district who returned to the Catholic Church in effect came under Polish cultural domination.
^^Adam Èoltowski, Border of Europe t A Study of the Polish Eastern Provinces (London. 19S0). p. I3 6.
■■^The Chelm area comprised the easternmost districts of Siedlce and Lublin provinces.
^^Éoltowski, Border of Europe. p. I3 6. 52
Throughout 1 9 0 5, Dmowski and the Endecja skillfully exploited the limited concessions made to the Poles and the larger concessions to the Russian liberals and rev olutionaries. To many Poles, the moderation and concil iatory politics of the Endecja seemed the safest course to follow. The turning point in the revolutionary struggle came in October, 1905» when Tsar Nicholas II promulgated the October Manifesto, which granted basic civil liberties and created a legislative Duma. The Endecja viewed the
Duma as an important gain for it afforded an opportunity to obtain autonomy through legal and legislative means.
Only the socialist parties in the Congress Kingdom were unwilling to accept the October Manifesto and strikes and terrorist acts continued. In November, 1905» the government imposed martial law on Congress Poland; this led to greater repression, which was characterized by numerous arrests and executions. By the end of I9 0 5,
there were 250,000 Tsarist troops in the Congress Kingdom 17 to prevent the outbreak of further disorders.
Fearing that martial law and repression would create
a dangerous situation, which would only benefit the PPS.
Dmowski led a delegation to St. Petersburg in a desperate
effort to obtain autonomy. Conferring with Count Witte,
the newly appointed Chairman of the Council of Ministers,
17 'Sidney Harcave, First Blood ; The Russian Revolu tion of I9O6 (New York, 1964), p. 108. 53
Dmowski proposed that the government grant autonomy to
Congress Poland and in return the Endecja would suppress the revolutionary movement. Although Witte was impressed by this conciliatory overture, he rejected the proposal because of the continuing disorders in the Congress
Kingdom and also out of fear of alienating conservative 1 A and nationalist elements in government circles. The proposal to Witte, however, reflected the political opportunism of the Endecja and the willingness on the part of Dmowski to collaborate with the Tsarist regime in order to achieve autonomy.
The policy of the Tsarist government throughout the revolution of 19^5 in Poland aimed at little more than preventing the outbreak of an open insurrection while at the same time perpetuating the existing political system in the Congress Kingdom. Despite the conciliatory policies of the Endecja, there were no noticeable changes or improvements in Tsarist policies in Poland. The minor concessions that were made to the Poles were little more than half-measures designed to avert an uprising and both the autonomy issue and the school question remained unresolved. The major gains of the revolution of 1905 were a direct result of the revolutionary settlement in
Russia, although the Poles also benefited from these changes.
1 R Sir Bernard Pares, Russian Memoirs (London, 1938), p. 1 3 8; S. Witte, Vospominaniia (Moscow, i9 6 0), Vol. Ill, pp. I62-I6 5. 5^
The revolution of I9 0 5» however, did have major
repercussions on political life in the Congress Kingdom.
Despite continued repression and only minor concessions
to the Poles, the Endecja— the party of conciliation with
Russia— emerged as the dominant political force in Congress
Poland, By the end of 1905t the Endecja enjoyed a fairly
broad base of support; it even made some gains among the
large landowners and big industrialists, who came to regard the Endecja as the only alternative to social upheaval and anarchy. The revolution also witnessed the
decline of the PPS due to internal dissension, the
failure of its revolutionary tactics, and defections to
the NZR. Despite its tactics and crass political op portunism, the Endecja proved to be a stabilizing element
in Polish politics and this prevented the outbreak of a violent insurrection against Russia. Although the
Endecja had achieved none of its objectives by the end
of 1 9 0 5» the creation of the Duma afforded another op portunity to work for autonomy and conciliation with
Russia. CHAPTER III
THE POLISH KOSO IN THE FIRST DUMA: THE TACTICS OP A "FREE HAND"
The Elections To The First Duma
The October Manifesto and the creation of a legisla tive Duma inaugurated the constitutional era in Tsarist
Russia, but it was the electoral law for the Bulygin
Duma which remained operative and established the basic machinery for the election of deputies to the Imperial
Duma. The Bulygin electoral lav/ provided for indirect elections and it created four electoral curiae: the curia of large and medium landowners; the urban curia; the peasants' curia; and the workers' curia. Eligible voters then elected candidates from their respective curia to provincial and urban assemblies, which in turn elected deputies to the Duma. The Bulygin electoral lav/ did not provide for universal suffrage and its high property qualifications discriminated against the urban professional class and the workers. The lav/ drew sharp criticism from the Russian liberals and socialists, who demanded direct, equal, and secret voting based upon universal
In August, 1905f the Tsar issued a decree which provided for a consultative Duma based upon a limited franchise. This body commonly was referred to as the Bulygin Duma. 55 56
suffrage. To appease the opposition, Count Witte attached
an amendment to the electoral law in December, 1905»
which reduced the high property qualifications and allowed
for a greater representation of workers and urban middle
class voters. Despite the amendment, the electoral law
was basically conservative and weighted in favor of the
propertied classes in order to ensure the election of a
pliable and non-revolutionary Duma.
The electoral law in Congress Poland operated on the
same principles as in other parts of the Empire. The
law allotted the Congress Kingdom a representation of
thirty-six deputies in the Duma and it also.provided
for the election of an additional deputy by the Orthodox
population of Lublin and Siedlce provinces (i.e., the
Chelm district). Of the thirty-six deputies, the city
of Warsaw was allotted two deputies and Lodz one repre
sentative. As in the rest of the Empire, the elections
were indirect and weighted in favor of property owners.
This is best illustrated by the fact that of a total of
850 electors in the Congress Kingdom, the curia of large
■and medium landowners elected 286 electors and the urban
curia was represented by 3^1 electors. On the other
hand, the peasants, who comprised the majority of the
2 The ten provinces that comprised the Congress Kingdom had a population of about 10,000,000. 57 population, had only 1$4 electors and the workers were entitled to only, twenty-nine electors. In effect, the large and medium landowners and the peasant freeholders, who were a small minority of the population, elected over half of the electors. Thus, the electoral law discriminated against urban workers and landless agricul tural laborers.3 A closer examination of the distribution of curia electors reflects the dominance of property owners. Warsaw province, for example, was permitted to elect a total of 104 electors: forty-eight were from the curia of large and medium landowners; twenty-eight from the peasants' curia; twenty-four from the urban curia; and four from the workers' curia. Likewise, the city of Warsaw, which had eighty-two electors, eighty were elected by the urban curia, but only three of the electors represented the workers' curia. The situation was basically the same in the rest of the provinces and the workers were permitted to vote for electors in
only three provinces and the cities of Warsaw and ■Lodz.
The urban curia, however, did allow for an adequate representation of the Polish middle class. In reality,
the electoral law operated in favor of the very classes
from which the Endecja drew its support— the landowners,
the peasant freeholders, and the Polish middle class.
^E. Grabowski, Ustro.i oanstwowy Ros .ii : Zarvs obowiazu.iacego nrawodav/stwa (Warsaw, 1914), p. ?4. 58
While the Endecja reacted favorably to the October
Manifesto and the establishment of the Duma, the socialist
parties viewed the concessions by the government with
mistrust and hostility. The PPS and the SDKPiL. along
with Proletariat and the Jewish Bund, refused to accept
the new political order and they continued to foment
strikes and disorders as well as agitate for social
revolution and the election of a constituent assembly.
As a result of their continued opposition to the regime,
the socialist parties decided to boycott the elections
to the first Duma.
Two new parties, however, did emerge which unsuccess
fully attempted to challenge the political dominance of
the Endecja: the Party of Realnolitik and the Progressive
Democratic Party. The Party of Realoolitik was chiefly
the party of large landowners and the big industrialists
and it continued in the tradition of the Triple Loyalists.
Led by Wlodomierz Spasowicz, Ludwik Straszewicz, and
Erazm Piltz, the Realists advocated conciliation with
Russia and working within the framework of the October
Manifesto. Essentially conservative and lacking a
constructive social and economic program, the political
program of the Party of Realpolitik called for cultural
autonomy for Congress Poland, chiefly the use of Polish
in the schools, courts, and administration, and government
support for the Catholic Church. With the exception .of 59
the upper class, the party had little popular appeal and
although the Party of Realoolitik participated in the
elections, none of its candidates were elected to the
Duma.^
The second party to emerge late in I905, was the
Progressive Democratic Party. Organized by Aleksander
Swigtochowski and Henryk Konic, the Progressive Democrats constituted the liberal element in Polish politics and it was the only party to compete with the Endecja for the support of the Polish middle class. Like their Russian counterpart, the Constitutional Democratic Party, the
Progressive Democrats favored the establishment of a constitutional monarchy in Russia, political autonomy for Congress Poland, a.nd a liberal program of agrarian reform. The Progressive Democrats violently opposed the national chauvinism, political opportunism, and anti-
Semitism of the Endecja. The leadership and support for the party came primarily from the Polish and Jewish middle class.^
On February 2 2, I906, the Endecja published its electoral appeal, which outlined the course of action that the Polish deputies would follow in the Duma. This appeal provided the basic structure and program for the
h . Martov, Maslov, and Potresov, Obshchestvennoe dvizhenie. pp. 260-26].
^Ibid.. pp. 264-265. 60
Polish Koîo, which the Endecja viewed as an instrument
of Polish national policy. The chief political point
in the electoral appeal called upon Polish deputies to
work for an autonomous Congress Poland with its own Sejm,
which would possess legislative authority in internal
affairs 5 this was considered to be the maximum program.
But in view of the opposition of the Tsarist government
and Russian nationalist and conservative groups, the
Endecja also set forth an alternate or minimum program.
This minimum program called for the introduction of Polish
in the schools, courts, and administration as well as
greater local autonomy consisting of the establishment
of local institutions of self government. The purpose
of the electoral appeal was to establish a basis for
solidarity among the Polish deputies in the Duma and it
called upon the deputies to form a Kolo Polskie which
would act on all matters affecting Polish national interests.
It further invited the Polish deputies from the western
provinces to attach themselves to the Kolo. The electoral
appeal was strongly nationalistic in character and it virtually ignored matters affecting the rest of the Empire.
During the electoral campaign the Endecja utilized
tactics similar to those it employed at the peak of the
1905 Revolution. Through its numerous educational,
cultural and fraternal societies and unions,the Endecja
^Gazeta Polska, February 2?., I906. 61 capitalized upon its autonomy program, appealed to national sentiment, and warned of the danger of anarchy in order to win support for its candidates. The NZR. using persuasion, intimidation, and frequently violence, attempted to lure the workers away from the socialist parties. In the rural areas where the influence of the Endecja was strongest, the Society for Popular‘Education worked among the peasants, and Wîadys3raw Grabski and the Union of
Labor sought to enlist the support of the gentry to combat disorders by landless peasants. The Endecja also dominated the powerful Central Agricultural Society, whose chairman,
Stanislaw Cheichowski, played an active role in Endecja politics. Finally, the Endecja appealed to national unity and pledged to support "national" as well as party candidates on the condition that the former support. the Endecja autonomy program.
During the electoral campaign, the Endecja encountered little opposition since both the socialists and the
Progressive Democrats boycotted the elections with the latter refusing to participate in the elections as long as Poland remained under martial law. The only serious threat to the Endecja came from the Jewish population, which was concentrated in the cities. Early in I906, the League for the Attainment of Full Rights for the Jews
7 Stanislaw Kozicki, Historia Ligi Narodowei (Krakow, Biblioteka Jagiellonska), I, p, 271, 62 of Russia urged Jews to vote only for those parties which supported a democratic and constitutional order. Due to the anti-Semitism of the Endecja and the lack of other political alternatives, the Jews in the Congress Kingdom decided to run their own candidates. Dmowski and the
Endecja skillfully exploited the refusal of the Jews to support the "national" candidates of the Endecja and by appealing to real and latent anti-Semitism, the Endecja unleashed a campaign of slander and intimidation against 8 the Jews. Accusing the Jews of opposing autonomy and the national interest, the Endecja warned that Jewish deputies would be elected in Warsaw and iodz unless all Poles supported national candidates.
The elections to the Duma in Congress Poland took place in April, 1906, and resulted in an overwhelming victory for the candidates of the Endecja. Although the
Endecja was unchallenged in the rural areas, the margin of victory was smaller in the cities due to the large
Jewish vote. However, the Endecja succeeded in electing thirty-four of the thirty-six deputies in the Congress
Kingdom; the remaining two deputies were Lithuanians from
Suwa^ki province.^ In the western provinces, where the
O Sidney Harcave, "Jev/s and the First Russian National Election," American Slavic Review. IX (February, 1950» P* 37»
^Gosudarstvennai.a Duma ; Ukaza tel k stenograf icheskim otchetam, 1906 god,, Sessiia !_ (St, Petersburg, I9O6-I907), pp. 5-17, Hereafter cited as CD : Ukazatel k stenograficheskim otchetam. 63
Poles associated themselves with the Russian liberal parties, eighteen of the forty-two deputies elected from these provinces were Poles; these figures reflect the social and economic dominance of the Polish minority in the Lithuanian, Belorussian, and Ukrainian provinces.
In the Congress Kingdom, Dmowski, Balicki, and
Popiawski were not among the deputies elected to the
Duma since under the electoral law they were ineligible to be candidates at this time.^^ However, other Endecja politicians who also were influential in the social and economic life of the nation, did secure election to the
Duma. Among these were Stanislaw Cheichowski, J. Haruszewicz,
W. Jaronski, M, Kiniorski, Z. Paderewski, A. Rz%d, J.
Stecki, and J. ^wieSynskiOf the thirty-four deputies, twenty-six were members of the Endec ja; one v/as from the
NZR; three were from the National Union of Labor; one
According to the 1897 census, Poles in the six Lithuanian provinces numbered 1,612,31? (or l6.3%) of a total population of 9,9l6,6l?. The percentages of Poles in each province were as follows; Kovno (11.3%); Vilna (4l,8^); Grodno (24.9%): Vitebsk (9*3%): Minsk (10,2%); Moghilev (2.?%). In the Ukrainian provinces of Volhynia, Podolia, and Kiev, Poles numbered 656,000 (or 6.95%) in a total population of 9,^5I»000*
^^Although Dmowski, Balicki, and Popiawski were Russian citizens, they had carried on their illegal political activities from the safety of Austrian Galicia prior to returning to Warsaw in I905. As a result, they failed to meet the electoral law residency requirements and they were not eligible to become electoral candidates. 12 Appendix I contains a complete list of the deputies from Congress Poland, who were members of the Polish Kolo in the first Duma. 6i|.
was from the National Union; and three deputies were non-
party nationalists who supported the program and objectives
of the Endecja.^^ Thus, all of the deputies were either
members of the Endecja or Endecja dominated societies
and unions. The Central Committee of the Endecja was
represented in the Duma by Teofil Waligorski,
While the Endecja claimed that the Polish deputies
represented all classes of society and the nation, the majority of the deputies were from either the landowning
class or the intelligentsia (doctors, lawyers, etc.):
thirteen of the deputies were landowners with sizeable liL holdings and ten of the deputies were from the intelligentsia
Only five of the deputies were peasants and there was but one deputy from the working class.Among the remaining deputies two were priests, two were industrialists, and one was a craftsman. In addition, fourteen of the deputies listed their social class as the nobility.
The social and economic background of the deputies reflects the solid landowning and middle class leadership and
^^Kozicki, Historia Ligi Narodowej. I, pp. 276-277. iZj, The deputies who belonged to the landowning class were^Grabski, Cheichowski, Florkowski, Kiniorski, Stecki, Swiezynski, Swiqtopelk-Czetwertynski, Tyszkiewicz, Walicki, Waligorski, Zalev/ski, and Zamoyski.
^^The peasant deputies included Biyskosz, Manterys, Nakonieczny, Ostrowski, and Wasilewski, The sole deputy from the working class was Grabianski.
^^GD: Ukazatel k stenograf icheskim otchetam. 19-06 god., Sessiia %, pp. 3-17• 65 support of the Endecja. Thus, it could be expected that the deputies in the Kolo would identify their ovm class interests with those of the nation.
In general, the Polish deputies to the first Duma represented the most articulate elements in Polish society; they were well educated and they had been active in the
Endecja and in the social and economic life of the nation.
A number of them were specialists on problems of crucial importance to the Kolo. Jan Stecki and Franciszek
Nowodworski were familiar with the legal and political aspects of the autonomy question, while Wiadysiaw Grabski was an expert on agriculture and the problem of agrarian reform. On the school question. Father Gralewski was competent on matters relating to educational reform and the problems involved in introducing Polish into the state school system.
The socio-economic background of the Polish deputies from the western provinces was similar to that of the deputies from the Congress Kingdom. Of the eighteen
Polish deputies from these provinces, seven were members of the intelligentsia, four were peasants, two were priests, and the remainder were large landowners. In the western provinces, as in the Congress Kingdom, many of the deputies who came from the intelligentsia also owned moderately sized estates. The most prominent 66
Polish deputies from the western provinces were Aleksander
Lednicki and Monsignor Ropp, the Archbishop of Wilno.^?
In summary, the success of the Endecja in the elections to the first Duma was due to the organization, tactics, and program of the party and the lack of a unified and effective opposition, since the socialists and Progressive
Democrats had boycotted the elections. Although the
Endecja maintained that the Polish deputies represented the entire nation, in reality, they represented and reflected the views of the National Democratic Party as well as their own social class. Thus, the Polish Kolo became little more than an instrument of the Endecja to be used to attain the political objectives of the party, although the Endecja conceived of its objectives as being identical with those of the nation.
The Organization and Tactics of the Polish Kolo
On the eve of the opening of the first Duma, the government promulgated the Fundamental Laws which provided the framework for the new constitutional system, but also crippled the Duma as an effective legislative body.
Under the Fundamental Laws, the Tsar still possessed enormous powers; he continued as the chief executive and he retained complete control over foreign policy, the armed forces, the church, and the imperial court
l?Ibid, 67 and domains. Furthermore, the Tsar had the power to appoint and dismiss ministers, summon and dissolve the
Duma, veto power over all legislation, and the right to rule by decree when the Duma was not in session, although
Imperial decrees were subject to the approval of the
Duma no later than two months after its opening. Thus, the Fundamental Laws simply placed certain limitations 1 Q upon the autocratic powers of the Tsar,
The Fundamental Laws, on the other hand, severely limited the legislative prerogatives of the Duma. Certain areas of the budget which related to the army, navy, the court, and state loans remained beyond the scope of the
Duma and the remainder of the budget when rejected by the Duma could be reenacted in the amounts of the pre ceding year. Furthermore, the Fundamental Laws made no provision for ministerial responsibility; ministers were responsible solely to the Tsar and although the Laws made complicated provisions for censure and interpellations, ministers were under no obligation to resign unless requested by the Tsar. Finally, the Laws established
the State Council which was equal in rights to the Duma.
The State Council was designed to serve as a conservative
counterweight to the Duma; half of its members were
appointed by the Tsar, while the zemstvos, clergy, nobility.
^^.Paul Miliukov e_t al., History of Russia (New York, 1968), 11, pp. 234-235. 68
Academy of Sciences, universities, and Finnish Diet elected the remaining members. Although the Duma possessed legislative initiative, both the State Council and the
Tsar exercised veto power over Duma legislation. In brief, the Fundamental Lav/s created a limited autocracy rather than a constitutional system on the western European model.
The first Duma, which opened on May 1 0, I9O6, was essentially an opposition Duma and it was dominated by the liberal Constitutional Democratic Party or Cadets.
Under the articulate leadership of Paul Miliukov, F.
Rodichev, S. Muromtsev, and I. Petrunkevich, the Cadets numbered 184 deputies out of a total of 497 members of 20 the first Duma. The Cadets were opposed to the existing political structure as set forth under the Fundamental
Laws and favored a constitutional monarchy on the British model; they also advocated an immediate solution to the agrarian question based upon expropriation with compensa tion of large estates, imperial and state domains, and church lands. To the left of the Cadets were the
Trudoviki (or Labor Group) which numbered 124 deputies.
l^ibid. 20 The Index to the Stenographic Reports for the first Duma does not list the party affiliations of the deputies. The figures on the number of deputies belonging to each faction in the first Duma vary slightly, depending upon the source. The figures given above are taken from the following sources Warren B. Walsh, "Political Parties in the Russian Duma," Journal of Modern History. XXII (June, 1950)» pp. 144-150. 69 Like the Cadets, the Trudoviki opposed the existing
political order, but their chief demand was for a radical
solution to the agrarian question on the basis of ex propriation without compensation; the leading politicians
in this group were S. Anikin and A. Zhilkin. The "No
Party" block numbered about 112 deputies who remained unaffiliated with other factions. This group was comprised chiefly of peasants, whose principle demand was agrarian reform. The Cadets, Trudoviki. and "No Party" group comprised the majority of the Duma, opposed the system created by the Fundamental Laws, and advocated broad social and economic reform, chiefly with regard to the agrarian question.
There was a notable absence of deputies from the extreme left in the Duma due to the fact that the leading leftist parties— the Social Democrats and the Social
Revolutionaries— boycotted the elections. However, seventeen of the deputies did belong to the Social Democrat- 21 ic Party. Although the extreme right was not represented, there were about forty-four deputies who belonged to the conservative moderate right. Under the leadership of
Alexander Guchkov, M. Strakhovich and Count Heyden, the moderate right advocated cooperation with the government and working within the framework of the October Manifesto
Z^lbid. 70 22 and the Fundamental Laws. The Autonomist faction v/as
a loose organization of representatives of the national
and religious minorities who belonged chiefly to the
Cadet, Trudoviki and "No Party" groups. The Autonomists were committed to a solution to the nationality question based upon autonomy within the Empire and social and
economic reform.
A clash between the government and the Russian
opposition parties was almost inevitable. The government, clearly intended for the Duma to occupy a subordinate position and it vehemently opposed the changes envisioned by the Cadets, which would further limit the powers of the Tsar and his ministers and create a constitutional monarchy. The chief obstacle, however, preventing cooperation between the government and the opposition was the agrarian question. The regime v/as bitterly opposed to expropriation of any type and it remained solidly on the side of the land owners. Indicative of the uncompromising attitude of the government was the dismissal of the moderate Witte ministry prior to the opening of the first Duma and the appointment of a bureaucratic ministry loyal to the Tsar and the principles of autocracy. Ivan Goremykin, an aging and unimaginative bureaucrat, replaced Witte as Chairman
Miliukov et al., History of Russia, II, pp. 238- 2 39. According to Miliukov, the moderate right v/as made up of the Party of Peaceful Renewal with twenty-six deputies; the Progressives who numbered twelve deputies; and the Party of Democratic Reform with six deputies. 71 oc the Council of Ministers while other members of the new ministry included V.N. Kokovtsov, the Minister of
Finance; Peter A. Stolypin, the Minister of Interior; and the reactionaries I. Shcheglovitov and Schwanebach respectively as Ministers of Justice and State Auditor.
In general, the nev/ ministry was loyal to the Tsar, unsympathetic to the demands of the opposition, and unwilling even to consider autonomy for the Poles or the other national minorities as a solution to the nationality question.
In contrast to the loosely organized Russian parties, the Poles constituted a single political faction with the clearly defined objective of obtaining autonomy for the Congress Kingdom. Like their counterparts in Vienna and Berlin, the Poles immediately formed a Kolo Polskie to represent Polish national interests in the Duma.
Polish deputies in the first Duma numbered fifty-five: thirty-four were from Congress Poland; eighteen were from the western provinces; and the remaining three deputies were from St. Petersburg and the provinces of Kazan and
Kishenev.^^ The conviction of the Endecja and the deputies from Congress Poland was that all the Polish deputies had common interests, which were political as well as
^Franciszek Nowodworski and Wladyslaw Tyszkiewicz, Kolo Polskie v/ pierv/szej Izbie Panstwowe.1 rosyjskie.i (Warsaw, 19067, pp. ^ - 6 , Professor L. Petrazycki, a prominent Polish lawyer connected with Russian liberal circles, was elected to the Duma in St. Petersburg. 72 cultural and historical. The Endecja v/as particularly anxious to achieve the political solidarity of all the
•Polish deputies in the Duma and during the elections the
Endecja had called upon the Poles from the western provinces to join in forming a Polish Kolo in St, Peters burg ,
The political situation in Russia, however, made it inexpedient for all the Polish deputies to form a single faction in the Duma. At a meeting of all the Polish deputies on May 9» 190&, the Poles from the western provinces declared that they could not join the Koto since they represented the interests of the Lithuanian, Belo russian, and Ukrainian majority as well as the Polish minority in the western provinces.Although this was the official reason for not affiliating with the Kolo, the Poles from the western provinces were motivated chiefly by other factors. By joining the Polish Koio the deputies from the western provinces, no doubt, felt that they would arouse suspicion in government and Russian nationalist circles as well as among the Russian parties that the Poles entertained separatist intentions and desired to attach these provinces to an autonomous Congress
Poland. On this point, their fears were correct for the
^^Ibid.. p. 7*
^ ^ Ar-cMm P.olskigj A]ra£3_gmjj^ Hauk. Pokumentv Lednickiego, folder 4. p. 12, 73 government rarely distinguished between the deputies from the Congress Kingdom and those from the western provinces, but there also were social and economic considerations which made the western deputies hesitant about joining the Koto. The majority of the Polish deputies from the western provinces were large landowners, while the Lithuanian, Belorussian and Ukrainian deputies from these regions represented chiefly peasant interests and they were hostile to the Polish landowners. ' Due to these conflicting national, social, and economic interests, the Polish deputies believed they could serve their own interests best by forming a separate faction.
As a result, the Polish deputies from the western provinces officially formed their ovm. faction in the Duma which was known as the Polish Ko3ro from Lithuania, Belorussia, and. the Ukraine. This Territorial Ko4o agreed to maintain contact with the Polish Kolo as well as hold common meetings and act jointly on matters of interest to both groups.
The internal structure and organization of the St.
Petersburg Kolo were modelled on the Polish Koio in
Vienna. The statute of the Koio aimed to establish the rules governing the political actions of the Polish deputies in St, Petersburg and the basic principle upon which the statute rested was the political solidarity
^^Gosudarstvennaia Duma; Ukazatel k stenograficheskim otchetam. 1906 god.. Sessiia J^, pp. 3-17. 7^ of the Polish deputies in the Duma. The statute speci fically prohibited members of the Koto from negotiating with other factions or simultaneously belonging to other parliamentary groups. The sessions of the Koto were to be secret and closed; the members of the Koio were obligated to maintain secrecy on all questions that the
Koio considered to be confidential and only after decisions had been reached could the position of the Koio be pre sented to the other political factions. Furthermore, the internal differences within the Koio could only be made public after the position of the Koio had teen disclosed in the Duma; this provision was designed to isolate and protect the deputies from the pressures of Polish public opinion. In addition- the Koio maintained complete control over the following matters: the speeches and voting of the Polish deputies in the Duma; motions and interpellations introduced into the Duma in the name of the Polish Koio; the signing of petitions, declarations and the interpellations of other parliamentary factions; and the selection of the deputies which the Koio would support in the election to the Duma commissions. Finally, when voting in the Duma, the Koio would vote solidly as a bloc. The statute of the Koio clearly aimed to insure the political solidarity of its members and isolate 27 them from external pressures.
27 Bi.blioteka Katolickiego Uniwersytetu Lubelskiogo. Pokumentv Jana Steokiego, no. 551» 75
The internal organization of the Koio consisted of
three "bodies: the General Assembly; the Parliamentary
Commission; and the Delegation, The General Assembly,
which comprised all the deputies of the Koio, was respon
sible primarily for electing the Parliamentary Commission p Q of seven members and the president of the Koio, It
was the Parliamentary Commission, after hearing the views
of the General Assembly, that made the decisions regarding
political tactics and the relations of the Koio with other
parliamentary factions. The Parliamentary Commission also
elected from its own membership the three member Delega
tion,^^ It was the Delegation that represented the Koio
to the Duma factions, the Duma president, and the Tsarist
government. The General Assembly of the Koio elected
Franciszek Nowodworski, a prominent Warsaw lawyer, as
president of the Ko-io in the first Duma,
A frequent charge leveled against the Koi'o by the
Russian factions was that the Koi'o was an instrument of
the Endecja. In reality, there was considerable truth
in this charge for virtually all of the deputies of the
Koio were members of the Endecja or Endecja sponsored
organizations. Furthermore, some of the most prominent
pO The members of the Parliamentary Commission in the first Duma were Prince Czetwertynski, Haruszewicz, Nowodworski, Stecki, Waligorski, Parczewski, and Cheichowski, Nowodworski and Tyszkiewicz; Koio Polskie. p. 8,
^^Haruszewicz, Stecki, and Parczewski formed the- Delegation of the Koio in the first Duma, Ibid. 76 politicians in the party held key positions on the
Parliamentary Commission, the decision making body of the Koio. Although he v/as not a deputy in the first
Duma, Dmowski served as an advisor to the Koio on matters supposedly relating to foreign affairs, taut in reality, he acted as unofficial president of the Kolo.^^
The Koio entered the first Duma with a tarnished image. In addition to being regarded as little more than a political arm of the Endecja, many of the Cadet,
Trudoviki. and peasant deputies, although sympathetic to Polish autonomy, considered the Poles to be little more than unscrupulous political opportunists, clericals, and anti-Semites.Many of the opposition deputies also regarded the Koio as being unrepresentative of the nation and merely the representative of narrow upper class and landed interests. Due to the demand for autonomy and the nationalism and chauvinism of the Endecja, many
Russian deputies, particularly among the moderate right, the representatives of the national minorities, and the peasant deputies from the western provinces, suspected the Poles of separatist intentions; this view also was held by the Tsarist government,^ Thus the Koio created
30 Roman Dmowski, Polityka pel ska ji odbudov/anie panstwa polskiego (Warsaw, 192517 PP« BO-81.
^Ipech. April 25, I907.
^^Zygmunt lukawski, "Rosyjskie ugrupowanie polityczne wobec sprav/y autonom.ii Krolestwa Polskiego w okresie 77 an unfavorable image in the eyes of the opposition parties as well as the government.
The attitude of the Endecja and the Polish deputies toward the Duma largely determined the tactics of the
Polish Koi'o, The Endec ja considered the Polish deputies as ambassadors who represented the interests of the Polish nation in a foreign parliament; for this reason alone, political solidarity was essential. On the basis of this assumption, the Koio decided to act independently and avoid entangling political alliances which would neces sitate making commitments to other groups in the Duma.^^
At the same time, the internal political situation in
Russia also determined the tactics the Koio would adopt in the Duma. On the eve of the opening of the first
Duma, it v/as unclear whether an opposition Duma would force the regime to make further political concessions or whether the government would withdraw the concessions it had made and crush the Duma, In brief, the internal situation was unstable and fluid. As a result, the Koio decided to avoid committing itself either to the Duma opposition or to the government and to await the outcome
1905-1917»" Zeszvtv Naukowe Uniwersytetu Ja^iellonskieao. Prace historyc%ne. IX (1962), pp. 145-iyO. This article presents the most comprehensive study of the attitudes of the Russian parties and the Tsarist regime on the autonomy question and toward the Koio in general,
^"Zygmunt lukawski, Koio Polskie w rosyjskie.1 dumie pans tv/owe j w latach 1906-1909 (Warsaw, I967)» p. 4o , . 78 of the struggle between the Duma, and the government. These tactics were known as the tactics of a "free hand" and they were reflected in the parliamentary activities of the Koio.
From the very beginning, the Koio made it clear that it was concerned exclusively with representing the interests of the Polish nation and that it was unwilling to become involved in purely Russian affairs or those issues which affected the rest of the Empire. This position became evident at one of the early sittings of the Duma when the Koi’o refused to participate in the
Presidium of the Duma after the Cadets had proposed that the position of subsecretary be offered to a member of the Koio.This negative attitude was reflected further with the resignation of Tyszkiewicz from the Duma delegation to the parliamentary congress in London,The unwillingness of the Koio to become involved in Russian affairs drew sharp criticism from the opposition and simply reinforced the attitude of the government and many Russian deputies that the Poles entertained separatist intentions.
The first Duma, opened on May 10, I906, with an address from the throne in which the Tsar upheld the Fundamental
Laws and the existing constitutional structure. Greeting
^ Nowodworski and Tyszkiewicz, Koio Polskie. pp. 18-20.
35ibid. 79 the address with hostility and silence, the Duma then adjourned to the Tauride Palace where Goremykin outlined the legislative program of the government. Both the Tsar and Goremykin upheld the limitations placed upon the Duma and made no reference to the immediate demands of the opposition— a general amnesty and abolition of the death penalty. In addition, neither the Tsar nor Goremykin raised the question of Polish autonomy or a solution to the nationality question. Dissatisfied with the uncom promising attitude of the government, the Cadet president of the Duma, S. Muromtsev, called for a full debate on the amnesty question and the formulation of an address to the throne listing the grievances and legislative demands of the Duma.
During the .first sitting and the debates on the amnesty question, the Koio supported the demand of the
Cadet deputy, Petrunkevich, for a general amnesty.
Speaking on behalf of the Koio, Nowodworski deplored the
"horrors and atrocities" committed by Russian police and troops in the Congress Kingdom. Nowodworski called for an end to martial law in Poland and a general amnesty on the grounds that these concessions would weaken the revolutionary movement and serve as a step toward Russo-
Polish conciliation.^^ During the course of the remaining
^^Rech. May 13, 1906. 80
debates on the address to the throne, the Koto acted
with considerable restraint; only on one occasion did
it call upon the Duma to recognize the necessity of '
autonomy for the Congress Kingdom, Kven during the
closing debates on the address when the Duma demanded
the resignation of the Goremykin ministry, the Koto remained silent although it would have been justified
in raising its voice in opposition since the government had completely ignored the question of Polish autonomy.
In addition to refraining from criticizing the government, the Koto did not participate in the election
of the thirty-three member Duma commission to draft an address to the throne.The Koto justified its non participation in the election of the commission on the grounds that this was a purely Russian affair and con sequently of no concern to the Poles. In reality, however, the Koto v/as unwilling to commit itself to the opposition and it sought to disassociate itself from what the govern ment viewed to be the revolutionary demands of the Duma.
These included a general amnesty; universal and direct suffrage; abolition of the State Council in its existing form; a ministry selected from a Duma majority; ministerial responsibility; and compulsory expropriation as a solution to the agrarian question. Furthermore, the Koio v/as convinced that the Cadets would play a dominant role in
^"^Ibjd .. May l4, I9O6. 81 the commission thereby insuring that the question of
Polish autonomy would be included in the address. Despite the refusal of the Koio to participate in the election, the Duma elected three Poles to the commission; Stecki and Tyszkiewicz represented the deputies from the Congress
Kingdom and Drucki-Lubecki represented the Territorial
Koio on the commission.
Another instance of the tactics of a "free hand" came when the government rejected the proposal of the
Duma for the abolition of the death penalty. Under the
Fundamental Laws, the Duma had to allow a month to elapse and then consult with government ministers before it could begin a debate on a new bill. The Cadets were willing to compromise on the time limit, but the Trudoviki demanded an immediate debate and vote on the rejected bill. Although the Koio had opposed the death penalty because of its rigorous enforcement in Congress Poland, it remained silent on this issue and failed even to support the more moderate proposal of the Cadets.
On less important issues, the Koio could play the tactics of a "free hand," but on the central issue facing the Duma--the agrarian quest.1 on--the Koio was forced to take a position. Initially the position of the Koio was the same as that of the government; namely, opposition to expropriation under any conditions. However, on July 6,
1906, the Koio reversed its position and endorsed the' 82 principle of expropriation, but with reservations. The inevitable clash between the government and the Duma on the agrarian issue came when the government stated its position on July 17, I906, in an official communique which opposed expropriation under any form.
The immediate response of the Duma to the agrarian scheme of the government was the drafting of an address to the nation by the Duma agrarian commission, which presented the position of the Duma opposition parties.
When the vote on reading the draft address before the
Duma was taken, the Koio and the moderate right voted against the reading.The address, however, was read and followed by debates on its contents. On July 19,
Gralewski spoke on behalf of the Koio and proposed an amendment to the address stipulating that expropriation should only be carried out in an area in accordance with the wishes of the population.The Cadets, however, opposed the amendment and in the final vote on the address the Koio and a large number of the Trudoviki abstained.
In the end, 124 votes were for the address, fifty-three were against it, and there were 101 abstentions.^^ by abstaining the Koio sought to convince the government that it opposed the address, but at the same time it
^^Siowo. July 24, I906.
39çGazeta Polska. July 22, 1906. 40, llbid.. July 21, 1906. 83 hoped to indicate to the Cadets that it really approved of the address, but not in its existing form. The Polish vote also served as a warning to the Cadets and indicated that in the event of a Cadet-Trudoviki rift the votes of the Koio would be an important political factor.
Likewise, when a quorum of I50 deputies was required to forward the address to the Ministry of the Interior for publication, the Trudoviki and the Koio failed to appear at the Tauride Palace thereby depriving the Cadets of a quorum and preventing the publication of the address.
In its contacts with the Russian factions outside the Duma, the Koio also pursued the same tactics of a
"free hand." The sessions of the Koio remained closed and secret and the Koio rarely attended the separate and
joint sittings of the Russian factions. On May 13» however, the Delegation of the Koio did attend a session of the Trudoviki in order to obtain support on the autonomy question and explore the possibility of a Polish-Trudovlki understanding.^^ The Koio proposed that the Trudoviki support the Polish demand for autonomy. In return, however, the Trudoviki demanded Polish support for their agrarian program and also an alliance directed against the Cadets,
The Koio rejected this proposal and refused to make any commitments to the Trudoviki. These ill-conceived overtures
*'^Gazeta Polska, May 1 8, 1906, 84 produced no results and eliminated at that time any coop eration between the Ko3:o and the Trudoviki.
The Polish overtures to the Trudoviki drew sharp criticism from the Cadets and produced strained relations between the Cadets and the Koio during the remainder of the first Duma. In a front page article in Rech. Miliukov warned that unless the Koio cooperated with the Cadets and abandoned its scheme of an alliance with the Trudoviki. the Poles could not expect Cadet support on the autonomy ^*2 question. The Koio heeded this warning and realized that it must cooperate with the Cadets to some extent.
But while the Poles recognized that Cadet support was essential in order to obtain autonomy, the Koio refused to enter into any permanent political alliance with the
Cadets.
The only alternatives to an understanding with the
Cadets or Trudoviki consisted of cooperation with either the moderate conservatives or the autonomists. At the same time the Koio also recognized that the support of these two factions would be desirable on the autonomy question. In the middle of May, several Polish deputies from the western provinces suggested the formation of a parliamentary bloc comprising the Polish Koio, the
Territorial Koio, and the moderate conservatives. Such a bloc obviously would have been directed against the
4? Rech. May 17, 1906. 84
Cadets and Trudoviki. Although the Endecja press showed
some interest in the idea, this course of action never materialized since the moderate conservatives were not numerous in the Duma and they were opposed to making ij.-a concessions to the Poles on the autonomy question,
The logical allies of the Koio should have been the
Autonomist faction, but once again the Koi’o acted with reserve and aloofness. Composed of deputies from the national and religious minorities— Lithuanians, Ukrainians,
Letts, Belorussians, Estonians, Moslems, and Armenians— the Autonomists were committed to the principle of autonomy as the solution to the nationality question. The deputies of the faction were a loose group and belonged simulta neously to other factions. The Poles decided against close cooperation or a political alliance with the
Autonomist faction since the Koio was concerned only with autonomy for Congress Poland and it did not want to compromise itself or become involved in the demands of other nationalities.
The conflict between the government and the Duma centered about the issues of the constitutional system and the agrarian question. The Tsar and his ministers were alarmed over the unwillingness of the Duma to work with the government and by the uncompromising position that the Duma took on the agrarian question. These fears
^^■lukawski, Koio Polskie. p. 44. 86
were heightened by the outbreak of violent agrarian
disorders in late June and early July of 1 9O6. In a last
effort to arrive at a working solution with the Duma,
Stolypin initiated talks with Miliukov and the leaders
of the Cadet Party to form a coalition government and arrive at a compromise on the agrarian question. The
Cadets, however, stubbornly demanded an all-Cadet ministry responsible to the Duma and refused to abandon the prin ciple of expropriation.^^ As a consequence, the negotia tions failed and upon the advice of the ministry, re actionary court circles, and General Trepov, the Tsar dissolved the first Duma on July 21, 19O6. . Accepting the advice of Goremykin as well as his resignation, the
Tsar appointed Stolypin as chairman of the Council of
Ministers the day before announcing the dissolution of the Duma.
During the negotiations between the Cadets and the ministry, the Koi’o initiated a strong gesture of re conciliation with the Cadets in the form of an address delivered at the Cadet Club by Jan Haruszewicz. In an effort to dispel the unfavorable image of the Koio that was held by many of the deputies, Haruszewicz maintained that while the Polish deputies belonged to the Endecja, the Koio was neither controlled by the party nor
LlLi. R.L. Tuck, "Paul Miliukov and Negotiations for a Duma Ministry, I9O6," American Slavic Review. X (April, 1951)» pp. 117-129. 87 responsible to the Central Committee of the Endecja. He further asserted that the Koio was representative of the nation and that it determined its own tactics in the Duma.
In a final conciliatory gesture, Haruszewicz concluded
that in reality there was little difference between the program of the Cadets and the Koio and that the only
issue on which they disagreed was the agrarian question.
The timing of Haruszewicz* speech indicates that the Koio
clearly desired improved relations and cooperation with
the Cadets in the event that the latter formed a ministry
that would work with the government.
But the real intentions of the Koio toward the
Cadets and the Duma came after the decree of dissolution.
At that time, nearly two hundred opposition deputies, chiefly Cadets, journeyed to Viborg in Finland to protest
the dissolution of the Duma and to issue a manifesto
encouraging the nation to passive resistance against the
government. The Koio initially opposed the Viborg meeting
and with the exception of the peasant deputy Nakonieczny
voted against sending an official delegation to Viborg. In
the end, however, the Koio decided to send an unofficial
five-member delegation. The Polish delegation refused to sign
the Viborg Manifesto, but instead issued its own declaration.
The carefully worded Polish declaration stated that while
the Koio sympathized with the position of the Russian
^^Gazeta Polska. July 18, I9 0 6. 88 deputies, the Poles had no desire to interfere in purely
Russian affairs; it concluded by stating that it was not
in the best interests of the Polish nation to support the passive resistance encouraged by the Russian deputies
at Viborg.The Koio thus offered its sympathy to the
Russian deputies but at the same time clearly disassociated
itself from what the Tsarist regime considered to be the
treasonous actions of the Russian opposition parties.
In summary, the Koio adopted the tactics of a "free
hand" and noncommitment in order to obtain political
support on the autonomy question. Since the leaders of
the Endecja and the Koio were uncertain as to the outcome
of the struggle between the government and the Duma, the
most realistic course appeared to be avoiding an open
commitment to either the Duma opposition or the government.
At the same time, the Koio realized that to obtain any
concessions on the autonomy question, the Poles would
need the support of both a Duma majority as well as the
Tsarist government. In view of the Russian constitutional
structure and the internal political situation, the
tactics of the Koio in the first Duma were quite realistic
and even consistent with the ideology of the Endecja.
^^Rech. August 1 , I906. 89
The Polish Kojro and the Autonomy Question
The tactics of a "free hand" were subordinated to the primary political objective of the Koio— the attainment of autonomy for Congress Poland. The Endecja had exploited the autonomy slogan to rally Polish opinion behind its program, but by the opening of the first Duma, the autonomy issue had an important part in the programs of all the
Polish parties. Thus, it became a matter of urgency for the Koio to declare its position and demands on the autonomy question during the early sittings of the Duma.
Despite the poor image and criticism of the Koio, there was considerable sympathy for the Poles among the
Russian factions on the autonomy question. The Koio hoped that by remaining uncommitted it could v/in the support of the Russian factions which in turn could exert pressure on the Tsarist regime for Polish autonomy. On the autonomy question, the Cadets were the most favorably disposed toward the Poles. Section twenty-five of the Cadet program committed the party to work for the establishment of an autonomous Congress Poland, but only after a constitutional and democratic government had been attained for the whole
Empire. On the nationality question in general, the
^7 Section 25 of the Cadet program declared that "after the establishment of a democratic, representative government, with constitutional rights, for the whole Empire, an autonomous regime shall be granted to the Kingdom of Poland, with a Sejm elected on the same basis as the central legislature--this not to affect the maintenance of State unity and participation in the central legislature...." Sidney Harcave, First blood : The Russian Revolution of 1905 (New York, 19^4), p. 2 9 6. 90
Cadets advocated cultural self-determination for all national minorities. Among the other factions— the
Trudoviki. the Party of Democratic Reform, the Social
Democrats, and the Autonomist faction— the Koio could count upon sympathy and support for its autonomy program.
All of these factions, however, gave precedence to constitu tional reform and the most pressing problems confronting the entire Empire and they were unwilling to separate the Polish question from the larger question of the national minorities.
In the Duma, only Guchkov and his followers among the moderate right officially opposed Polish autonomy.
The Party of Peaceful Renewal, however, left its members a free hand on the autonomy question, although most of the deputies in the party opposed Polish autonomy. The government, on the other hand, strongly opposed concessions to the national minorities and particularly to the Poles.
This view was held by Goremykin, Stolypin, and Kokovtsov and there was a general fear in government circles that concessions to the nationalities and decentralization could only lead to the weakening and ultimately the kg disintegration of the Empire.
Zygmunt -iiukawski, "Rosyjskie ugrupowanie polityczne wobec sprawy autonomii Krolestwa Polskiego w okresie 1905" 1 9 1 7." Zeszyty Naukowe Uniwersytetu Jagiellohskiego, Prace Historyczne, IX (I9 6 2), pp. IE9-I5 2. 91
Since the Fundamental Laws and the address from the throne failed to consider the question of Polish autonomy, the Ko&o stated its formal position during the debates on the Duma address to the throne. The intention of the
Koio was to force the Duma Commission to include a demand for Polish autonomy in the address. On May 13, 1906, the Koto circulated a declaration on Polish autonomy among all the deputies.The declaration of the Koio based the Polish claim to autonomy on "historic right" and it had a strong legal foundation. In brief, the declaration maintained that the "historic right" to autonomy could be found in the Treaty of Vienna (I8 1 5) which had transferred the Duchy of Warsaw (i.e. Congress Poland) to Russia, but as a constitutional Kingdom with the Tsar as "King of
Poland." The constitution, which Tsar Alexander I had granted to the Poles, stipulated that with the exception of foreign relations, the Congress Kingdom would enjoy broad autonomy with its own legislative Seim and army as well as the right to use the Polish language in the administration, courts and schools.The declaration thus inferred that the present policies of the regime were in direct legal contradiction to the commitments made by Russia under the Treaty of Vienna.
^^Rech. May I6, I9O6.
^^Rech. May I6, I9O6. 92
The declaration carried this legal argument still further by asserting that the I815 constitution was still operative despite the Organic Statute of I832, which had not abrogated, the constitution but merely superseded it.
Although the provisions of the Organic Statute had been disregarded after I8 3 2, it provided for considerable autonomy by guaranteeing basic civil liberties, a separate criminal code, local self-government, and the use of Polish in the schools, courts, and administration. In effect, the autonomy declaration offered the I815 constitution and the Organic Statute as the bases for negotiations on the autonomy issue.
Although the autonomy declaration v/as written largely by Dmowski and Nowodworski, the idea of basing the autonomy program on "historic right" was originally developed by
Jan Popiawski and it was the dominant viewpoint held by the Central Committee of the Endecja.^^ Thus, "historic right" and the legal approach ignored the Duma and implied that the granting of autonomous institutions to Congress
Poland would be brought about by direct negotiations between the Poles and the Tsarist regime. In effect the
Koio was requesting a restoration of the rights granted to the Poles by Alexander I. The "historic right" approach not only gave legality to the demand for autonomy and disassociated the Poles from any revolutionary intentions
^^•bukawski, Koio Polskie. p. ^5» 93 in the eyes of the government, but it also separated the
Polish autonomy demand from the demands of the other nationalities.
The primary purpose of the declaration was to clarify the
Polish position on autonomy and provide the material for an amendment to be incorporated into the address to the throne by the Duma Commission. The deputies of the Koto on the
Duma Commission, Stecki and Tyszkiewicz, proposed attaching an amendment on Polish autonomy to the address but the commission rejected their proposals; only Stecki, Tyszkiewicz and the representative of the Territorial Koto, Drucki-
Lubecki, voted for the amendment.Thus the final draft of the address contained no reference to Polish autonomy.
The failure of the Koio to have its amendment attached to the address can be attributed chiefly to the opposition of the Cadets. In a front page article in Rech. Miliukov criticized the autonomy declaration as unfortunate and ill-timed.He particularly rejected the "historic right" approach and reference to the Treaty of Vienna presumably because this placed the Polish question outside the scope of the Duma and also made it an international issue.
Furthermore, Miliukov asserted that although the Cadets still were committed to Polish autonomy, they opposed the
^^Ibid.
■^^Rech, May l6, I9 0 6. 94- contents of the declaration and were unwilling to take up Polish autonomy at this time.
Viktor Maklakov, a leading figure in the Cadet Party and a deputy in the Duma, maintained that the Cadets felt that the inclusion of the autonomy question in the address would have encountered considerable opposition within the Cadet Party as well as among other political factions.
Many Cadets hoped that their party would reach an under standing with the regime and in view of government opposition to Polish autonomy, they were reluctant to raise the Polish question at this time. The Cadets also feared that by separating Polish autonomy from the larger nationality question they might encounter opposition from the deputies who represented the national and religious minorities.
The Cadets had to take into consideration the attitude of the Jewish deputies such as Vinaver, v/ho disliked the anti-Semitism of the Koio. Furthermore, the prevalent view among the Cadets and other factions was that the primary task of the Duma was to deal first with matters affecting the entire Empire— reform of the constitutional system and agrarian reform— and only later consider Polish autonomy within the context of the larger nationality question. Many deputies felt that the Poles could hardly expect to obtain constitutional and autonomous rights when the rest of the Empire did not enjoy the same privileges,
Finally, the Cadets hesitated to alienate Guchkov and the 95 moderate right who were opposed to Polish autonomy. In brief, Polish autonomy might have created dissension within the ranks of the Duma opposition as well as strong opposition from the government.
The failure to attach the amendment to the address and the Cadet criticism of the autonomy declaration forced the Koio to reevaluate its position and work out a more concrete program, which would serve as the basis of nego tiations with the other parties and factions. The autonomy commission of the Koio invited Stanisiaw Grabski, a professor at the University of Lw5w and a specialist on state law, to St. Petersburg to advise the Koio on drawing up an autonomy bill to introduce into the Duma.^^ Grabski proposed both a maximum and a minimum autonomy program and after considerable debate, the Koio decided upon the maximum program.But before the autonomy bill could be drafted and introduced into the Duma, the Tsar dissolved the first Duma.
In view of the opposition to the autonomy declaration the Koio sought to prepare the ground and obtain support on the autonomy question among the parties and factions
^^V.A. Maklakov, The First State Duma: Contemporary Reminescences (Bloomington, 196^), pp. 110-111.
^^Dokumentv Jana Steckiego. no. 551» pp. 80-82.
^^Nowodworski and Tyszkiewicz, Koio Polskie. p. 21, The maximum and minimum autonomy programs will be treated in the next chapter, since they formed the basis for the ' autonomy program of the Koio in the second Duma. 96 in the Duma. Although the Koio directed its efforts chiefly toward the Cadets and the Trudoviki. it did not overlook the Autonomist faction.In the first Duma the deputies of the national and religious minorities numbered about 149 deputies and the Koio recognised that an autonomy bill would require their support in the Duma.-' On the initiative of Aleksander Lednicki, Ludwik Kulczycki, and
Baudouin de Courtenay, the deputies of the national and religious minorities— Poles from the western provinces,
Lithuanians, Ukrainians, Letts, Estonians, Cossacks,
Tartars and Moslems— organized the Autonomist faction on
May 24, I9 0 6, and elected Aleksander Lednicki to serve as president; the faction v/as fluid and numbered between
125 and 1 3 5 The deputies in the Autonomist faction were drawn chiefly from the Cadets, the Trudoviki. and the Territorial Kolro.
The requirement for membership in the Autonomist faction was recognition of the principle of autonomy as a solution to the nationality question in Russia; it v/as solely agreement on this point that held the faction together. On political and social issues the deputies
^ The efforts of the Koio to secure the support of the Cadets and the Trudoviki are dealt with in the preceding section, "The Organization and Tactics of the Polish Koio."
58.This figure excludes the thirty-four deputies from the Congress Kingdom, but includes the Territorial Koio.
•^^lukav/ski, Koio Polskie. p. 55* 97 were permitted to vote as they chose and they could belong simultaneously to other factions.The principle points in the Autonomist program were recognition of the rights of national minorities; abolition of privileges based upon nationality and religion; decentralization of state power and federalization of the Empire; and recognition of the unity and indivisibility of the Russian Empire.
The relationship between the Autonomist faction and the Polish Kolo was extremely ambiguous. On the one hand,
Lednicki was anxious to have all of the Polish deputies affiliate with the faction since this would provide added numerical strength and because the Poles were the most politically advanced of the national minorities. The
Kolro, on the other hand, was anxious to maintain contact with the Autonomists and even secure influence in the faction, but at the same time it was unwilling to submit to the discipline of the faction and make any open commit ments. Consequently, the Ko3ro proposed that it affiliate with the Autonomists as a collective unit and be represented ^ O by the Delegation of the Kolo at meetings of the faction.
The Autonomists only reluctantly accepted these conditions
An example of this v/as Lednicki, who belonged to three parliamentary factions: the Cadet Party, the Territorial Kolo, and the Autonomist faction.
^^Dokumentv Aleksandra Lednickiego (III-123), folder 9» p. 2 0. 62 Nowodworski and Tyszkiewicz, Kolo Polski. p. 12. 98 and only because they desired the support of the Kolo.
This ambiguous relationship between the two factions enabled the Kolo to retain its independence and to avoid making any commitments to the Autonomists, but at the same time maintain contacts with the Autonomist faction. This connection with the Autonomist faction further enabled the Kolo to refute charges that it entertained separatist intentions or that it sought to separate the Polish question from the nationality question.
The connection between the Kolo and the Autonomists was based upon little more than political and tactical expediency. The Endecja and the Kolo were interested exclusively in Polish autonomy and they cared very little about a solution to the nationality question in Russia.
In reality, the Kolo adamantly opposed the granting of autonomy to the Lithuanians, Ukrainians, and Belorussians for in the event that these areas received autonomy, the
Polish minority in the western provinces would lose its dominant social and economic position.The Endecja justified its position on the grounds that the Poles were entitled to autonomy since they were politically, culturally, and economically more advanced than other nationalities in the Empire. Furthermore, the Kolo felt that the government would agree sooner to Polish autonomy as an
*3&lowo. July 21, 1 9 0 6.
° Rech. April 25, 1907. 99 exception for the entire Empire. The Poles were unwilling to concede the same rights to the other nationalities that they demanded for themselves.
The Kolo refrained from making public its attitude toward the nationalities and the Autonomists, but in its contacts with the latter, the Kolo acted with considerable reserve. However, the Kolo desired to maintain its connection with the Autonomists chiefly because of the agrarian question. The Kolo viewed with alarm a radical solution to the agrarian question and the introduction of a Russian agrarian reform program into the Congress Kingdom.
As an alternative, the Kolo wanted an autonomous solution to the agrarian question and the only deputies who might support the Poles on this position were the Autonomists.
The Polish Kolo and the Agrarian Question
The agrarian question dominated the politics of the first Duma and as the chief source of conflict between the Duma and the government, this issue ultimately contributed to the dissolution of the first Duma. The position of the Polish Kolo on the agrarian question was determined not only by the tactics of a "free hand," but also by internal events in Poland. Although the tactics of a "free hand" could be applied successfully on issues of minor importance, they proved unworkable on the agrarian question— the major issue confronting the
Duma. 100
Initially, the Kolo adhered to the principle that it was unnecessary to formulate a position on the agrarian question and that it was only necessary to set forth the view that in Congress Poland this problem could be solved by an autonomous Sejm. During the debates on the address to the throne, the Koto drew up a declaration which the peasant deputy, Nakonieczny, presented to the Duma.
Nakonieczny requested that the Duma place the agrarian question in Congress Poland outside the competence of the Duma and leave the solution to this problem to autonomous institutions.^^ The initial Polish statement on the agrarian question drew sharp criticism from the
Russian deputies, who suggested that the Koto was unwilling to support the principle of expropriation and that the
Koto was dominated by conservative landowners.Parczev/ski attempted to refute these allegations but only repeated what Nakonieczny had stated earlier.
The unwillingness of the Koto to commit itself to expropriation reflected not only the tactics of a "free hand," but the actual opposition of the Koto to the principle of expropriation. With regard to tactics, the
^Gosudarstvennaia Duma: Stenograficheskic- otchetv. 1906 god.. Sessiia I Cst. Petersburg, I9 0 6), Ï, p. 131. Throughout the rest of this paper, this source will be cited as GDSO.
*^Ibid.. p. 208.
^^Ibid.. p. 209. 101
Kolo was unwilling to antagonize the Tsarist regime by endorsing a radical solution to the agrarian question that was opposed by the government. But in refusing to openly oppose the principle of expropriation, the Kolo hoped that it would not alienate the Cadets and the
Trudoviki whose support it would need on the autonomy question. By remaining uncommitted on the principle of expropriation, the Kolo also considered opinion in the
Congress Kingdom. Opposition to agrarian reform and expropriation might cause the Endecja to lose support among the peasantry, but endorsement of this principle would alienate the landowners. Thus the most desirable position was to advocate an autonomous solution to the agrarian question.
In reality, the Kolo was opposed to the principle of expropriation. The agrarian problem in Congress Poland was not as acute as it was in the rest of the Empire and the Endecja maintained that the reforms of 1864 had solved this problem ir the Congress Kingdom.The Endecja also feared that the agrarian question would divide opinion in Poland at a time when national solidarity was necessary in order to achieve autonomy. Finally, many of the deputies in the Kolo as well as the deputies from the western provinces held sizeable landholdings; consequently, self- interest was a motive for the opposition of the Kolo to
'^^Rech, May 17, I9O6. 102 expropriation. The Endecja and the Kolo believed that the solution to the agrarian problem in Poland could be carried out best by an autonomous S e .im and on the basis of the program set forth by the Endecja in I9 0 5.
But the situation in Russia and in Congress Poland dictated that the Kolo take a formal stand on expropriation.
The Kolo came to realize that the support of the Cadets and the Trudoviki on the autonomy question and on an autonomous solution to the agrarian question was dependent upon what position the Kolo took on the agrarian question.
The Russian factions, chiefly the Cadets and the Trudoviki. pressured the Kolo to give at least formal recognition to the principle of compulsory expropriation.
Although the agrarian problem in the Congress Kingdom was not acute, the Kolo also was forced to take peasant pressure into consideration, particularly that of the landless peasants and agricultural proletariat. Dis satisfied that many of the Polish deputies were landowners and did not represent peasant interests, the peasant sponsored Polish Peoples Union sent a peasant delegation to St. Petersburg late in May, I9 0 6, in order to contact
Russian peasant deputies and members of the All-Russian
Peasants Union. The Trudoviki cordially received the
Polish delegation and while in St. Petersburg, the delegates also held discussions with the Russian Peasants Union.
Upon their return to Poland, the peasant delegates reported 103 favorably on the agrarian reform program of the Russian
Peasants' Union and the Russian deputies.
The Russian factions skillfully exploited the activities of the peasant delegation to embarrass the Kolro into supporting expropriation and to reinforce the view that the K o i o was reactionary and unrepresentative of the Polish nation. The Endecja criticized the peasant delegation for not depending upon the Kolo to represent peasant interests and also for discrediting the Polish deputies in the eyes of the Russian parliamentary factions.
By early June, the Kolo feared that unless it took a formal position on expropriation it would lose Duma support on the autonomy question and an autonomous solution to the agrarian question and also that the agrarian question would become a disruptive factor in Polish political and social life.
On the initiative of Wladyslaw Grabski and after considerable debate, the Kolo formally adopted the principle 70 of expropriation.' However, the Kolo endorsed the principle of expropriation with reservations. The necessity of compulsory expropriation and the extent to which this would be carried out would be determined in accordance with the wishes of the local population represented by
^^iukawski, Kolo Polskie, pp. 59-60. 70 Wladyslaw Grabski, Kolo Polskie. sprawa aararna i ruch v/olno5ciowy w Ros.ii, (Warsaw, 190?), p. 18. 1 Oil- autonomous institutions; in the case of Congress Poland, 71 a legislative Se .im in Warsaw. The position of the
Kolo on expropriation was presented to the Duma on June 6.72
The majority of the Kolo opposed the principle of expropriation, but in regard to taking a formal position on this question there were two factions within the Kolo.
Dmowski and those who supported his position opposed endorsing the principle of compulsory expropriation and argued that this would contribute to the outburst of agrarian disorders in Poland and be a divisive factor in
Polish society.Grabski, himself a specialist on the agrarian question, maintained that the reverse would be true and that acceptance of expropriation would reduce nh, peasant discontent. Furthermore, Grabski argued that an autonomous Se im in Warsaw would certainly reject the principle of expropriation. Grabski and his supporters no doubt were confident that the Endecja would be the dominant political force in a future autonomous Se .im.
The Kolo adopted the principle of compulsory expro priation simply as a matter of political expediency.
T^lbid.. p. 18.
^^GDSO, 1906 f o d.. Sessiia 1 , I, pp. 6O9-6 1 8. 73 Kiniorski, Z czterd%iestu pieciu lat wspomnien o Remanie Dmowskim (Warsaw, 1939)» p. 1 6.
' Grabski, Kolo Polskie. sprawa agrarna i ruch v/olnoSciowy, p. I9. 105
It was a tactical move designed to obtain the support of the Trudoviki and the Cadets for an autonomous solution to the agrarian question as well as for their autonomy 7 4 scheme for Congress Poland.'^ Furthermore, the endorsement of compulsory expropriation would conciliate those in
Poland--chiefly the Progressive Democrats and the landless peasants— and in Russia, who favored expropriation and it would improve the image of the Kolo as being representa tive of the entire nation.
Although the Kolo formally adopted compulsory expropriation, it continued to present to the Polish public the program for agrarian reform outlined by the
Endecja in I9 0 5. For this purpose the Koto utilized its peasant deputies— Nakonieczny, Blyskosz, Ostrowski and
Manterys— who presented the agrarian program of the Koio in letters to the Endecja press. All argued that autonomy was a necessary precondition for agrarian reform after which the following agrarian reform measures could be taken; the granting of long term credits to peasants seeking to purchase land; establishment of minimum plots; organization of agricultural cooperatives; higher wages for agricultural laborers; industrialization to reduce rural unemployment; and improvement of the educational and cultural level of rural areas. These deputies also
^Wladyslaw Grabski, Wywlaszczenie folwarkow _i program reform rolnych w Krdlestwie Polskim (Warsaw, 1907), p. 21. 106
propagated the idea that a Russian agrarian reform scheme
would result in nationalization of the land and this was opposed by the majority of the Polish peasants.
In the Duma the Kolo also continued to criticize the agrarian reform program of the Russian parties. Stecki
in particular argued that political, economic, and cultural reforms were necessary preconditions for a solution to
the agrarian question; by political reform he had in mind decentralization and autonomy.In the Duma Agrarian
Commission, the Kolo delayed submitting a report to the commission on the agrarian question and it finally v/as spared this task only by the dissolution of the Duma.
The agrarian question was linked directly to the autonomy question. When it became evident that the Duma would act on a solution to the agrarian problem prior to considering the question of Polish autonomy, the Kolo advocated an autonomous solution to the agrarian question.
In order to v/in support among the Duma factions for an autonomous solution as well as to prevent the agrarian question from becoming a divisive issue in Polish politics, the Kolo was forced, at least officially, to endorse the principle of compulsory expropriation. On the agrarian question, the Kolo committed itself to the Duma in order
^^lukawski, Kolo Polskie. pp. 61-62.
??GDSO. 1906 god.. Sessiia I. I, pp. 609-618. 107
to prevent the introduction of a radical agrarian reform
program into the Congress Kingdom. In reality, however,
the Kolo was opposed to expropriation and on agrarian
reform in general, the position of the Kolo was almost
identical to that of the government.
Summary
Although the first Duma enabled the Polish deputies
to acquire practical experience in parliamentary work
and a better understanding of Russian politics, the Kolo
emerged without any noticeable gains. On the autonomy
question, the Polish declaration encountered opposition
from the parliamentary factions and its contents were
unacceptable to the government. The Duma factions, chiefly
the Cadets, were unwilling to consider the question of
Polish autonomy until it had solved the most pressing
problems confronting the Empire. Furthermore, the brief
duration of the first Duma prevented the Kolo from drafting
and introducing an autonomy bill into the Duma.
The only practical gain made by the Kolo came as
a result of an interpellation introduced by Grabski and
Rz%d concerning the dismissal and punishment of teachers
convicted of secretly teaching Polish in the Congress 78 Kingdom and the western provinces.' As a result of
this interpellation the authorities reinstated a significant
'^^GDSO. 1906 god.. Sessiia I. II, pp. IO25-IO3 O. 108 number of teachers who had been convicted for this of- 79 fonse. The Kolo also introduced an interpellation calling for an end to martial law in Congress Poland, but this interpellation v/as never referred to a Duma commission or debated in the Duma.
The tactics and position taken by the Kolo on key issues drew sharp criticism from virtually all political quarters in Congress Poland. The Progressive Democrats criticized the Kolo for failing to conclude a close alliance with the Cadets and cooperate with the opposition parties; this, the Progressive Democrats argued, prevented the Kolo from obtaining the support of the Duma for Polish autonomy. On the other hand, the Party of Realnolitik condemned, the Kolo for identifying itself too closely with the Cadets and not pursuing a more conciliatory policy toward the regime. The Party of Realnolitik was even more critical of the Kolo for endorsing the principle of compulsory expropriation and it viewed this as a shift toward the parties of the left. Among the socialists— both factions of the PPS and the SDKPiL— the view was held that the Koto merely represented re actionary landed interests and that the Polish deputies had identified themselves with the Tsarist regime and the right wing in the Duma.
90 On September 6, I9O6, the government issued a decree under Article 87 of the Fundamental Laws removing all penalties for the secret teaching of Polish. 109
With the exception of the Endecja, all of the Polish parties criticized the autonomy declaration as a tactical error. The Progressive Democrats asserted that the Kolo had placed too much reliance upon the goodwill of the government and ignored the Duma. On the other hand, the
Party of Realnolitik maintained that the autonomy declara tion v/as excessive and merely alienated the government.
The socialists likewise condemned the autonomy declaration.
They argued that the Koto could only realize its autonomy program hy cooperating with the opposition and working first for the establishment of a democratic and constitu tional political order and social reform in Russia.
Within the ranks of the Endecja there also was disappointment over the failure of the Koto to obtain any concessions and with its tactics in the Duma, Since virtually all of the deputies were affiliated with the
Endecja, the burden for the failure of the Koto and the criticism of other parties fell squarely on the Endecja.
Although the Koto reflected the views of the party and both the Central Committee of the party and Dmowski had moderated the activities of the Koto, the Endecja had
placed no clearly defined limitations on the political
activities and tactics of the Koto. In the opinion of
Dmowski, the Koto had identified itself too closely with
the Cadets and in the eyes of the government it had 110
On compromised itself with the opposition parties. Dmowski
was determined that the Kolo would not repeat these
mistakes in the second Duma.
In view of the unresolved struggle between the govern
ment and the Duma and the nature of the Russian constitutional
system, the tactics of a "free hand" and non-commitment
were realistic, but produced no concrete results. By
remaining uncommitted, the Kolo satisfied neither the
government nor the Duma, but rather intensified suspicions
as to the real intentions of the Kolo. These suspicions
were reinforced among the Duma factions and in government
circles by the fact that the Kolo gave priority to Polish national interests rather than to those of the Empire and
by the excessive and unrealistic contents of the autonomy
declaration. The Poles came to be viewed as separatists by
the government and right-wing circles and as little more
than unscrupulous political opportunists by the Duma
opposition. The Poles carried this image of the Kolo with them into the second Duma.
^^Roman Dmowski, Politvka polska j. odbudowanie panstwa (Warsaw, I9 2 5)» p. CHAPTER IV
THE POLISH KOtO IN THE SECOND DUMA: THE "THIRD AGENT"
The Elections to the Second Duma
Despite the failure of the Koto to attain any real
concessions in the first Duma, the Endecja remained
committed to the autonomy program, which it regarded as
a necessary precondition for a Russo-Polish accommodation.
Within the Central Committee of the Endecja, the conviction
prevailed that autonomy remained a realistic goal and
that in the next Duma the Koiro must continue to strive
for an understanding with Russia on the Austro-Polish
or Galician model. At this time, the only opposition
to this viewpoint within the Endecja came from Wiadysiaw
Studnicki, who argued that the autonomy program and a
Russo-Polish understanding were unrealistic goals.
Studnicki maintained that the political situation in
Russia at that time was closer to that of Germany and
differed considerably from Austrian conditions. Studnicki,
however, represented a minority viewpoint and he and his
supporters had no impact on the Endecja and the course it
had marked for the Kolro in the next Duma.
In the Congress Kingdom and throughout the Empire, electoral conditions differed considerably from those
111 112 during- the elections to the first Duma. In Russia, both
the extreme left and the extreme right participated in
the elections; the Social Democrats and the Social
Revolutionaries represented the former while the latter, which enjoyed the support of the government, was represented by ultra-conservatives and the reactionary Union of Russian
People. The government threw the full weight of the
Tsarist bureaucracy and the electoral machinery behind the conservative and rightist candidates.
In the Congress Kingdom, the sharp criticism of the
Koio in the first Duma by the Russian factions and by the opposition in Poland along with the decision of the
SDKPiL to participate in the elections forced the Endecja to alter its electoral tactics. Although both wings of the PPS boycotted the elections, the Jewish vote and the
SDKPiL posed a threat to Endecja control in the cities.
In view of these difficulties, Balicki in November, I9 0 6, argued that it was necessary to create a new image of the
Kolo, but at the same time to retain the political solidarity of the Polish deputies. Balicki argued that the Kofo must appear to represent a number of political views and all social classes in Congress Poland and he added that it was to the advantage of the Endecja to include the best political talent from Congress Poland in the next Koio.^
^lukawski, Kolo Polskie, p. ?0. 113
In view of these new circumstances, the Kndecja
initiated negotiations to conclude electoral alliances
with the Progressive Democrats and the Party of Kealoolitik
in order to create an electoral union. Agreement on the
autonomy program and the political solidarity of the Polish
deputies served as the basis for an understanding to
form a central electoral committee. The Endecja, however,
made virtually no concessions other than offering the Party
of Realpolitik and the Progressive Democrats each four
seats in the Kolo and the publicity that would come from
an electoral union and participation in the Kolo. The
Party of Realpolitik readily accepted the electoral union,
but the Progressive Democrats were reluctant to compromise
themselves with the Endecja in such an electoral union
due chiefly to their fear of losing liberal Jewish votes
and the anti-Semitism of the Endecja. This unwillingness
of the party to join the electoral union caused an open
split in the Progressive Democratic Party. A faction
■ led by Henryk Konic, who favored collaboration with the
Endecja, left the party and established a new political
organization--the Polish Progressive Party (PPP). which
agreed to an electoral union with the Endecja. On December
11, 1906, a communique announced the formation of the
National Concentration (Koncentracja Narodowa)--an electoral
union of the Endecja, the Party of Realpolitik. and the 114 2 Polish Progressive Party, The task of thp National
Concentration was to promote national unity and draw the best political talent from the allied parties into the
Kolo.
In addition to the National Concentration, there
were two additional electoral committees. After the
Progressive Democrats rejected the offer to join the
National Concentration, they sought to form an alliance
with the SDKPiL, but the latter rejected the proposal.^
The Progressive Democrats then formed a separate electoral
committee with the Jewish committee. This coalition posed
a serious threat to the Endecja in the cities with their
large Jewish population and where a considerable segment
of the Polish middle class supported the Progressive Demo
crats. The SDKPiL formed a separate electoral alliance
with the Jewish Bund, but this was a threat to the Endecja
only in the working class curia.
The electoral tactics of the National Concentration
were similar to those adopted by the Endecja during the
elections to the first Duma. As in the previous campaign,
the National Concentration made the autonomy issue the
chief point in its program, but it neither clearly defined
what it meant by autonomy nor set forth the tactics it
would adopt to attain this goal. To undermine the
^S-lov/ot December 11, I9O6,
^Sitowo, January 1, 19^7. 115
influence of the Progressive Democrats in the cities—
particularly Warsaw and Lodz— the Endecja resorted to
anti-Semitism hy asserting that the Jews opposed the
national interest and by warning that Warsaw was in ij, danger of being controlled by Jews. In the working
class curia, the Endecja encountered considerable opposi
tion from the SDKPiL. which defeated the Endecja in the
first stage of the election. In this instance, the
Endecja utilized the NZR and through threats, intimidation,
strong-armed methods, and manipulation of the electoral
machinery finally managed to win a narrow margin of
victory in the final stage of the elections.. In addition,
the Tsarist authorities unofficially supported the
Endecja by allowing the National Concentration to hold
public pre-electoral meetings while at the same time
denying this right to the SDKPiL.
The elections to the second Duma were held in February,
1907, throughout the Congress Kingdom. In the rural
areas, the National Concentration encountered little
opposition and the overwhelming majority of its candidates
were elected. In the urban and working class curiae,
however, the Endecja encountered considerable opposition
and indifference. In Warsaw, the candidates of the Endecja
received 30,700 votes (or 53î^) out of a total of 58,128
The Progressive Demoçratic-Jev/ish Committee candidates in Warsaw were Aleksander Swigtochowski and Ludwik Krzywicki, neither of whom were Jewish. 116 votes; however, there were 80,989 eligible voters in the city of Warsaw,5 In the working class curia the electoral boycott by the PPS and the electoral tactics of the
Endecja enabled the National Concentration to elect its candidates by only a very narrow majority. But despite the greater opposition to the Endecja in the elections to the second Duma, the National Concentration succeeded in having all of its candidates elected, the only exception being Suwaiki province, where Lithuanian candidates were elected to the Duma.^
Of the thirty-four deputies elected in Congress 7 Poland, twenty-nine were affiliated with the Endecja.
In addition to Dmowski, who was elected from the city of
Warsaw, some of the leading Endecja politicians and the most prominent men in Congress Poland were elected to the
Duma: Stecki, Grabski, Haruszewicz, JaroAski, Nowodworski, and Parczewski. A valuable addition to the Kolro was
Wladyslaw Zukowski, who was an engineer by profession but had important connections with Polish and Russian industrial circles. Three of the deputies— Henry Konic,
Aleksander Babicki, and Stanislaw Sunderland--belonged to the Polish Progressive Party and another two
^Gazeta Polska. February 21, 190?• 6. Gazeta Polska. February 20, I907. n Gosudarstvennaia Duma: Ukazatel k stenoftraficheskim otchetam. 1907 #od. Tst. Petersburg, I907), pp. 3-26, 117
deputies— Henryk Dembinski and Henryk Potocki— were
members of the Party of Realpolitik.
A brief glance at the social and economic background
of the deputies shows that the majority were from the
professional (i.e.,middle-class) and landowning classes. Of
the thirty-four deputies, sixteen were professional men
(doctors, lawyers, journalists, etc.) while eight of the Q deputies listed their occupation as landowners. In
order to create the impression that the Polish deputies
represented every social class, six of the deputies were
peasants and two belonged to the working class, while
the remaining two deputies were Catholic priests.
Indicative of the landed interests among the deputies
is the fact that fifteen deputies possessed sizeable
landholdings; five of these deputies possessed landholdings
of over 1000 dessiatins^ and the remaining ten deputies
owned more than 100 dessj.atins. In brief, the Polish
deputies from the Congress Kingdom represented chiefly
the professional and landowning classes although the
Endec ja hoped to create the impression that the Ko«to represented all social classes as well as political view
points.^^
^Ibid.
^One dessiatin is equal to 2.7 acres.
^^Gosudarstvennaia Duma.: Ukazatel k stenovraficheskim otchetam, 190? mod.. pp. 3-26. 118
Despite the pressure of the Tsarist authorities to secure the election of conservative Russians in the western provinces, twelve Polish deputies were elected to the second Duma from this region. These deputies were chiefly landowners, who were sympathetic to the Endecja because of its position on the agrarian question.Aleksander
Lednicki and those Polish deputies who were associated with the Cadets in the first Duma were ineligible for reelection, since they had participated in the events at Viborg following the dissolution of the first Duma.
Consequently, the Polish deputies from Lithuania, Belo- russia, and the Ukraine represented chiefly the conservative landowning Polish gentry.
In summary, a number of factors contributed to the success of the National Concentration in the elections to the second Duma. Foremost among these v/as the lack of an effective and unified opposition. The Endecja succeeded in undermining the Progressive Democrats by appealing to anti-Semitism and it further removed another source of opposition through the formation of an electoral alliance with the Party of Realpolitik and the Polish
Progressive Party. Finally, the autonomy slogan still appeared to be a realistic goal and this solidified public opinion behind the Endecja dominated National Concentration.
Thus, the Polish deputies entered the second Duma
l^lbid. 119 determined once again to obtain concessions on the autonomy question.
The Tactics of the Polish Kolo
The leadership of the Endecja realized that failure of the Kolo to attain any concessions in the first Duma and the continuing conflict between the Duma opposition and the government necessitated a revision in tactics.
Balicki argued for a continuation of the tactics of a
"free hand," but he asserted that it was necessary for the Kolo to disassociate itself completely from the left and to avoid adopting a position of dependence upon the 12 Cadets. Dmowski, on the other hand, proposed a variation of the tactics of a "free hand." He analyzed the political situation in Russia essentially in terms of a struggle between the government and those forces in the Duma which opposed the policies of the regime, but at the same time were committed to constitutionalism and the preservation of the Duma. The role of the Kolo, according to Dmowski, should be that of a "third agent," which would maintain an independent position and avoid direct involvment in the conflict between the government and the Duma until , such time when the Kolo could play a direct part in resolving this struggle. As a "third agent," both the government and the Cadets would be indebted to the Poles
^^lukawski, Kolo Polskie. p. 74. 120 and. more willing to make concessions on the autonomy question.This evaluation of the Russian political situation proved accurate and in the second Duma, the Ko2ro did emerge as the "third agent."
Although autonomy remained the political goal of the
Endecja, differences in the party emerged prior to the elections over the nature and contents of the autonomy program. Dmowski, Pop3rav;ski, and Balicki continued to adhere to an autonomy project based upon "historic right" and the Treaty of Vienna. This approach would have granted the Congress Kingdom broad political autonomy and created a Russo-Polish union based chiefly upon a common ruler.
Dmowski, however, was not adverse to modifying this program in the event that new conditions made this type of autonomy unrealistic.
The second viewpoint in the Endecja was represented by Jan Stecki and his supporters. Stecki argued that not only v/as the "historic right" approach unrealistic, but it failed to take into consideration Polish interests in
Lithuania, Belorussia and the Ukraine. Instead, Stecki argued that the Koi'o should strive to obtain regional autonomy for the Congress Kingdom based upon the Galician model. In his view, the government would be more willing to accept regional autonomy than it would the excessive demands contained in the autonomy project set forth in
^^Gazeta Polska. February 15, 190?. 121 the first Duma. At the same time, Stecki maintained that the future Polish state could not exist apart from the
Lithuanian, Belorussian and Ukrainian provinces. On the basis of this assumption, Stecki argued that it v?as vital to protect Polish interests in these regions and to press for regional or provincial autonomy for the western provinces as well; autonomy of this type would guarantee the continued dominance of the Polish minority in the
Lithuanian, Belorussian and Ukrainian provinces.Although
Gazeta Polska labelled Stecki's ideas as "politically dangerous," it was essentially the viewpoint of Stecki that prevailed in the Koto during the second Duma.^^
Both viewpoints represented the maximum autonomy program of the Endecja, but the Central Committee of the party endorsed the first view. With regard to the Duma, the Endecja decided that it would propagate the maximum program and strive to obtain full political autonomy.
But in the event that the maximum program could not be obtained at once, the Koto then v/ould introduce legislation enabling it to realize parts of the maximum program, such as the introduction of Polish in the schools and local and municipal autonomy. In this manner, the Koto could win acceptance of various parts of its program and
12), Stecki's views on autonomy can be found in the following work: Jan Stecki, W sprawie autonomii Krolestwa Polskieeo (Krakow, I907). 1<; ^Gazeta Polska. January 10, I907. 122 gradually vfork toward full autonomy for Congress Poland.
Another reason for seeking to obtain the maximum program first v/as to provide a basis for compromise with the govern ment and the Duma in the event that full autonomy could not be attained.
In order to insure that the Koto carried out the program of the Endecja, effective control of the Koto was entrusted to Dmowski. Prior to the opening of second
Duma, the deputies elected Dmowski as president of the
Koto and they also created a presidium which was headed by the president of the Koto and possessed broad decision making powers. By virtue of his leading position in the party and membership in the Central Committee of the
Endecja, Dmowski was directly responsible for the manage ment of the Koto in the second Duma and this guaranteed that the Koto would be exclusively an instrument for the 1 A execution of the policies of the Endecja.
In addition to strengthening its internal organization, the Koto secured the support of the twelve Polish deputies from the western provinces (i.e., the Territorial Koto).
The factions agreed to hold common sittings and decisions were binding on the deputies of both factions, thereby insuring political solidarity.Although the terms of
^^Dmowski, Polityka polska. p. ?6.
^'^Gazeta Polska. March 8, 190?• 123 the agreement remained secret, this alliance probably was motivated by basic agreement on the agrarian question and support by the deputies from the Congress Kingdom for provincial autonomy in the western provinces. In reality, the two factions formed a single Kolro and in the Duma, this was a formidable political force which had at its disposal forty-six votes.
In its composition and attitude toward the regime the second Duma differed considerably from its predecessor.
As a result of the elections, the political extremes— the left and the right— gained at the expense of the center.
The center bloc numbered 193 deputies: ninety-nine deputies were Cadets; thirty belonged to the Moslem faction; eighteen belonged to the Cossack faction; and the remaining 1 O forty-six deputies comprised the Polish Ko3ro. The
Cadets no longer sought an immediate change in the political system and entered the second Duma determined to avoid a clash with the government which would lead to the dissolution of the Duma. The Cadets also were committed to maintaining the constitutional system as it was established within the framework of the Fundamental
Laws.
The left was comprised of four major parties: the
Trudoviki— ninety-eight deputies; the Social Revolutionaries-
1 A CD: Ukazatel k stenograficheskim otchetam. IQQ? god., pp. 3-26. izh thirty-seven deputies; the Social Democrats--sixty-six deputies; the Peoples Socialists--fifteen deputies.
Out of a total of 418 deputies in the Duma, the left could muster 216 votes. The Social Democrats, who came to dominate the left in the second Duma, were led by I.
Tseriteli and G. Alexinsky, The Mensheviks were the dominant element among the Social Democratic deputies and although they were willing to cooperate to some extent with the center, they fully intended to use the Duma as a propaganda forum and as an instrument to enact radical social and economic legislation.
The right wing of the Duma counted about fifty-two deputies; nineteen deputies belonged to the Octobrist
Party which was led by Alexander Guchkov; the Nationalists or moderate right numbered twenty-three deputies; and on the extreme right ten deputies belonged to the re- 20 actionary Union of Russian People. The Octobrists and moderate right were willing to cooperate with the govern ment and accepted the existing political, social,.and economic status quo. The extreme right Union of Russian
People led by V, Puriskevich sought to bring about the dissolution of the Duma and had considerable influence in court circles. In addition, there were fifty-two deputies, chiefly peasants, who formed a "No Party"
l^Ibid.
Z^Ibid. 125 bloc and those deputies were sympathetic to the Cadets and the Octobrists. Finally, seven deputies belonged to 21 insignificant and miscellaneous factions.
The new ministry headed by Peter Stolypin v/as not opposed to the existing constitutional system, but it aimed to form a Duma majority loyally disposed to the
Tsar and one that would work with the ministers. As prime minister, Stolypin overshadowed the proceedings of the second and third Dumas until his assassination in
1911. A strict constitutionalist whose views were shaped by his aristocratic background and long association with the bureaucracy, Stolypin sought to work within the framework of the Fundamental Daws. However, he believed that the government acted on behalf of Tsar and that it was the role of the government to take the initiative in legislation. An advocate of conservative reform and intensely loyal to the Tsar, Stolypin sought to strengthen the Russian Empire by working in cooperation with the traditional ruling classes. The chief weakness in the character of Stolypin was his inability to discern between opposition parties which advocated change within the existing political framework and those parties which ? 2 advocated violent and revolutionary upheaval.
Z^Ibid. 2? A. Levin, "Peter Arakad'evich Stolypin: A Polit ical Appraisal," Journal of IViodorn History, XXXVIl (December, I965), pp. 456-58. 126
The appointment of Stolypin as prime minister was in reality a setback for the Endecja. An ardent nationalist,
Stolypin v/as committed to maintaining the unity of the state and consequently he opposed decentralization or any concessions to the national minorities wnich would weaken Russian control of the Empire. Stolypin particularly had a negative attitude toward the Poles, As Marshall of the Nobility in Kovno Province and Governor of Grodno, he had come into contact with the Polish landowning class and he had witnessed the subordinate socio-economic position of the Russian and Belorussian peasantry in the western provinces. As a Russian and a nationalist, Stolypin developed an aversion to Polish social and cultural dominance in the western provinces and toward Poles in general.
Prior to the elections to the second Duma, there was talk in some government circles of putting together a oh. coalition of Russian rightist parties and the Poles.
The Polish position on the agrarian question made the Koto a natural ally of the conservative Russian landowners; but the results of the elections cancelled this possibility.
Before the opening of the Duma, the government also considered the possibility of a Cadet-Octobrist-Koto
Z^ibid. ph. -tukawski, Koto Polskie. p. 83. 127 majority which would work with the governmentDuring the elections to the second Duma, Miluilrov had stressed that the first priority of the Cadet party was the pres ervation of the Duma and about the same time Dmowski had expressed similar views.” Thus, Stolypin was con vinced that since the Cadets aimed to preserve the Duma, they would modify their position on the agrarian question and reach an understanding with the government,The
Cadets, however, were unwilling to compromise themselves with the right and proposed instead a Cadet-Trudoviki-
Koi’o center which might cooperate with the government, but the Stolypin ministry v/as unwilling to consent to Trudoviki 28 participation* The important fact was that all of these proposals included the Koio and Polish votes were considered to be crucial for a stable center majority in the Duma.
The position of the Endecja on the formation of a center came just prior to the opening of the Duma. The
Endecja maintained that the Cadets would be the leading political force in the Duma and that it would be the task of the Cadets to form a center majority. In the view of the Endecja, however, the formation of a center necessitated
^^Paul Miliukov, Vtoraia Duma (St. Petersburg, I9O8), p. 6 5. ^^Cazeta Polska. February 18, 190?.
^'"^•fcukawski, Kolfo Polskie. p. 8 3.
^^Miliukov, Vtoraia Duma, p. 20. 128 consensus only on questions of a political nature— namely preservation of the Duma--and not on issues of a social 2 9 or economic nature. On the basis of this assumption, the Endec ja concluded that only a Cadet-Kol’o-Octobrist coalition could form a center majority. In spite of the proposals of the Cadets and the government, a center majority was not formed.Furthermore, the Koio remained aloof and refused to commit itself to the Cadets or any other party.
When the second Duma opened in March, the K o i o adhered to its independent position. Initially, it appeared that the Trudoviki would support the Cadets and that possibly the Social Democrats also would collaborate with the center against the right. The Koto was unwilling to attach itself to a Cadet-left bloc, but at the same time, it sought to avoid being annexed to the right. The
Kolo feared both the left and the right; the former because of its revolutionary social and economic program and the latter because of its opposition to Polish autonomy. At the same time, the Kolro was aware of its own advantageous position, for in the event of a breach between the Cadets and the left, a center majority could only be formed with
Polish support. Unless the Poles then participated in a center, the Duma would be paralyzed and the government
^^Gazeta Polska. March 20, 190?.
3°Ibid. 129 would be forced to dissolve the Duma. Dmowski saw that a breach between the Cadets and the left could be exploited to the advantage of the Koto and the Poles then could secure concessions on the autonomy question.Thus, the Koto would emerge as the "third agent" to which both the Cadets and the government would be indebted.
An indication of the initial ties between the Cadets and the left appeared during the election of the Duma president on March 5» 1907* On this occasion, the Cadets,
Trudoviki. Social Democrats and the Kolro agreed to support the Cadet candidate and elected P.A. Golovin as president of the Duma.^^ During the election of the Duma vice- president, however, the Cadets agreed to support leftist candidates. In order to prove that it was in no way bound to the Cadets, the Kolro voted with the right although this did not prevent the election of the leftist candidate.
The first indications of a rift between the Cadets and the left came in the latter part of March. On the question of the famine relief bill, the Social Democrats proposed a solution which differed from that of the Cadets.
On this issue, the entire left voted for the bill of the
Social Democrats, but it was defeated by the combined
^^Ga?.eta Polska. May 11, 190?• 32 'Godudarstvennaia Duma : S ten oara.fi cheskie o to he tv. 1907 god., Sessiia II (St. Petersburg, 1907), T7 pp. 5-6. 130 votea of the Cadets, the right and the Kcio.^^ It was only the votes of the KoŸo that prevented the passage of a famine relief hill opposed hy the government.
Another issue which reflected the antagonism between the Cadets and the left came at the end of March over a
Cadet resolution for a bill to relieve unemployed workers.
The Social Democrats demanded that the Duma attach an amendment providing unemployed workers not only with relief but employment as well. Stolypin supported the
Cadet bill and criticized the amendment of the Social
Democrats, but the Duma adopted the Social Democratic amendment by a vote of 223 to 202. The bill acceptable to the government was defeated by the Koi’o, which voted Qij, with the left against the Cadets and the right.^
The vote by the Kolro served a twofold purpose. It was a notice to the Cadets that the Koi'o remained an independent political force which could not be taken for granted. At the same time, it was a direct response to a recent legislative proposal by Stolypin which called for the introduction of local self-government in Congress
Poland, the western provinces, and the Baltic regions.
This proposal aimed to give these areas the same admin istrative system that existed in other parts of the Empire and it was especially designed to protect the rights
33lb1d.. pp. 331 and 335.
3^Rech. March 29, 190?. 131 and special interests of the Russian element in these regions.' ^ The Stolypin proposal was in essence anti-
Polish, There was no reference to Polish autonomy or a solution to the school question and Stolypin announced a government project for the administrative separation of the Che3rm district from the Congress Kingdom. In effect hy voting with the left, the Kolro warned Stolypin that unless the government took Polish interests into consideration, the Koi'o could block government legislation and paralyze the Duma.
On minor issues such as famine relief and relief to unemployed workers, the Koto could exploit the differences between the Cadets and the left without jeopardizing the existence of the Duma. But on major issues and vital government legislation the Kolro found itself tied to the
Cadets; the Poles were unable to move to the left on such issues for this would bring about the dissolution of the Duma. In the second Duma the Cadets and the left clashed on three issues upon which the very existence of the Duma hinged: the agrarian question; the army bill; and the budget. It was these issues that afforded the
Koi'o with an opportunity to emerge as the "third agent," thereby preventing the dissolution of the Duma. In return for support on these issues, the Koi'o assumed that both
^^Gazeta Polska. IViarch 24, 190?, 132
the Cadets and the Stolypin ministry would then be willing
to make concessions on the autonomy question.
The Polish Kolro and the Agrarian Question
As in the first Duma, the agrarian question remained
the chief source of conflict between the government and
the Duma. Among the factions in the Duma, the Cadets
and the parties of the left— the Trudoviki. the Social
Revolutionaries, and the Social Democrats— urged the adoption of compulsory expropriation of private holdings as a solution to the agrarian question in Russia and the
Social Revolutionaries even went so far as to advocate
the nationalization of all landholdings. The government, however, was opposed to expropriation under any conditions.
Prior to the convening of the second Duma it had enacted a series of agrarian reform decrees under Article 8? of the Fundamental Laws in an effort to force the Duma either to accept the government agrarian program or reject it and thereby bring about the dissolution of the Duma.
The Stolypin agrarian reform decrees were conservative in nature and aimed not only to preserve the interests of the large landowners and quell further agrarian unrest but to create a new class of peasant freeholders. Stolypin hoped that in time this nev/ class of peasant proprietors would constitute a conservative bulwark of the regime.
In brief, the Stolypin agrarian decrees enabled the peasant to leave the commune, secure personal ownership of his 133 property, and consolidate his holdings into a single plot. In addition to encouraging the dissolution of the commune, the government also created a Peasant Land bank as a means of providing cheap credit for the peasant; provided for the sale of state and imperial lands to landless peasants; encouraged and aided internal immigra tion; and granted the peasants legal equality with other classes. Stolypin was determined that the Duma, should approve his agrarian decrees or face the threat of dis solution.
For the Polish deputies, the agrarian question was no longer a serious threat. The Koi’o realized that the government would never tolerate the passage of a revolu tionary agrarian reform hill hy the Duma and at the same time the Stolypin decrees posed no threat to the interests of the Polish landowners either in Congress Poland or the western provinces. Thus, the position of the Koio on the principle of compulsory expropriation was simply a matter of tactics and political expediency.
The debates on the agrarian question in the second
Duma began on April 8, I907. The position of the Koto on agrarian reform was in essence identical to that set forth in the first Duma. Speaking before the Duma, Dmowski stated that "the agrarian question and other social reforms which are necessary for the Congress Kingdom belong . . . within the sphere of the activities of the Se ;im as a local 13^
3é legislative institution. For Dmowski, agrarian reform in the Congress Kingdom was purely a Polish matter and he urged an autonomous solution to this crucial issue.
The main thrust of Dmowski's speech, however, was directed toward defending the interests of the Polish landowners in Lithuania, Belorussia, and the Ukraine.
Dmowski assorted that in these regions the agrarian question could only be solved by local autonomous institutions of self-government in conformity with the wishes of the pop ulation. In view of the peculiar historical development of these provinces and the ethnic and religious diversity in the area, Dmowski declared that the introduction of local self-government and. the removal of all restrictions on the Polish minority in the western provinces were necessary preconditions for agrarian reform. Dmowski concluded his speech by stating that the solution to the agrarian question in these regions was beyond the scope of the Duma.^^
The address by Dmowski clearly indicates that the
Koio was committed not only to obtaining autonomy for
Congress Poland, but also to securing local autonomy and institutions of self-government for the western provinces.
This v/as due chiefly to the influence of the Polish deputies
3^GDS0, 1907 god.. Sessiia II, I, p. 7^7.
3?lbid. 135 from the western provinces who sought to use the Koto as an instrument to preserve their own landed interests.
The deputies from the western provinces believed that the creation of local institutions of self-government would
enable the Polish minority to retain its dominant social
and economic position. The defense of Polish interests
in Lithuania, Belorussia and the Ukraine, however, aroused
suspicions in Russian political circles as to the real
intentions of the Poles: autonomy for Congress Poland
could be viewed as a legitimate concern, but Polish
intentions in the western provinces were an entirely
different matter.
The Polish position on the agrarian question in the
western provinces drew sharp criticism from the peasant
deputies from this region as well as the extreme right.
The Belorussian and Ukrainian peasant deputies challenged
Dmowski and claimed that he had no right to speak on
behalf of the western provinces.Both the moderate
right and the extreme right, however, attempted to exploit
the position of the Koi'o to their own advantage. One
rightist deputy openly suggested that it would not be a
bad idea to compensate the Russian peasant at the expense
of the Polish landownersPurishkevich, speaking for
^^Ibid.. pp. I3LI, 1511, 1812.
39lbid.. pp. 1509-1510. 136 the extreme right, claimed that the Russian government was the protector of both the Russian and Polish peasants and portrayed the Polish landowners as oppressors
Bishop Rulogius, who represented the Orthodox population from the Cheî’m district, asserted that Polish chauvinism and pretenses could not be tolerated in the Duma.^*’^
The apparent aim of the right was to exploit Russian nationalist sentiment particularly among the Russian peasant deputies against the Poles and thereby divert attention from the Russian landowners and the agrarian question in central Russia. In general, the views of the right were supported by Rossiia. the semi-official organ of the Stolypin ministry and this signified the hostility of the government as well to the proposals of
Dmowski and the Koio regarding the western provinces.
The activities of the Polish deputies on the Duma agrarian commission indicates that there was some division within the Koio concerning tactics on the agrarian question.
Of the ninety-nine deputies on the agrarian commission, ten belonged to the Polish Koi’o. Stecki, Potocki, Grabski,
Biyskosz and Zak represented the Congress Kingdom, while
Wankowicz, Chominski, Dymsza, Lisov/ski and Pilejka rep- h p resented the western provinces. The Polish deputies
^^Ibid.. p. 1531.
^^Ibid.. pp. 1937-1939. 4% tukawski, Koio Polski e. p. 96. 137 from the western provinces were extremely hostile to the left and violently opposed to the principle of expropriation.
The agrarian commission concerned itself with the necessity of accepting the principle of compulsory expropriation; the formation of a State Land Fund; and whether or not all expropriated land would go into the
State Fund, When the commission took up the question of compulsory expropriation, Dymsza voiced his opposition to this principle claiming that it would only lead to revolutionary upheaval. Stecki, however, did not commit himself either for or against the principle of expropriation, hut simply pointed out that those landowners with medium sized holdings played a vital cultural and social role which contributed to social stability. When the commission finally proceeded to closing the discussion on expropriation and voting, the Poles from the western provinces along with Potocki from the Koi’o walked out of the commission in protest. The remaining deputies from the Koi’o, however, voted with the majority of the commission for compulsory ... 44 expropriation.
Although the Koio was opposed to the principle of expropriation, the actions of the Polish deputies in the agrarian commission indicates that there were differences concerning tactics between the deputies from the Congress
^^ibid,. p, 97,
^^Ibid, 138
Kingdom and those from the western provinces. Potocki,
however, denied that there was any rift among the deputies
from the Congress Kingdom and asserted that the principle
of solidarity had not been broken since the Ko2ro had never
reached a decision on the expropriation issue.The•
fact remains that Potocki did walk out in protest and this
would indicate that there was an element among the deputies
from the Congress Kingdom v/ho opposed endorsing expro priation even as a matter of tactical expediency.
The Endecja maintained that the Koio only had endorsed
the principle of expropriation with regard to agrarian reform in Russia and that it opposed expropriation in
Congress Poland,In reality, the Koio only voted for the principle of expropriation in the commission for tactical reasons. The Koio hoped that this would ensure
the support of the Cadets and the left in the Duma on the autonomy question. Finally, the Koio had no scruples about voting for compulsory expropriation since it viewed the threat of radical agrarian reform as an imaginary
fear; the Poles realized that the Stolypin ministry would never tolerate the passage of an agrarian reform program
other than its own.
When the Duma closed the discussion on the agrarian question on June 8, the Cadets were anxious to avoid
^^Ibid. 46 Gazeta Polska. May 23» 1907. 139 voting on a formula for agrarian reform. The Cadets sought to delay a decision on the agrarian question in order not to provoke the government into dissolving the
Duma and also to show the government that the Cadets had not dismissed entirely the possibility of a compromise with the government on the agrarian question. In the
Duma each faction read its formula for agrarian reform with the Trudoviki. Social Democrats, and Social Revolution aries advocating an immediate vote on their proposals.
Although the Cadets endorsed expropriation they proposed that the Duma vote on none of the solutions and simply pass to the order of the day. The Duma passed the Cadet resolution by a narrow majority and this v/as accomplished
only with the support of the Koio. Thus, the Koio
supported, the Cadets in order to delay the agrarian question and prevent the dissolution of the Duma.
The position of the Koio on the agrarian question
during the second Duma was almost identical with its
position during the first Duma. The Poles argued for an
autonomous solution to agrarian reform in the Congress
Kingdom. In reality the Koio continued to be opposed
to expropriation but as a matter of tactical expediency
the Koio endorsed the principle of expropriation in order
to retain the support of the Cadets and the left for its
autonomy program. In the second Duma, the Koio also
^^GDSO, 1907 mod.. Sessiia II. II, p. 1246. 140 utilized the agrarian question to promote provincial and regional autonomy for the western provinces in order to preserve the dominant position of the Polish minority in
Lithuania, Belorussia and the Ukraine. Finally, in the struggle "between the Cadets and the left on the issue of agrarian reform, the Koio cast its lot with the Cadets in order to prevent the dissolution of the Duma and to leave room for a compromise with the Stolypin ministry on agrarian reform.
The Polish Koio and the Autonomy Question
The debates on the agrarian question made it apparent to the Poles that the Duma was divided into two opposing factions. As the Trudoviki drifted further to the left, it became less likely that the Cadets could, depend upon them for support in forming a stable center majority.
The widening breach between the left and the Cadets also v;as apparent during the discussions on the budget, which were carried on simultaneously with the debates on the agrarian question. It was this growing conflict between the Cadets and the left on these crucial issues, upon which the survival of the Duma depended, that induced the Koio to define and introduce its autonomy program.
The Koio viewed the budget as the most suitable issue on which to exploit the differences between the opposing camps in the Duma and its ovm favorable position between the
Cadets and the loft. Although the survival of the Duma 141 hinged upon the acceptance of the budget, the government was particularly anxious to have the Duma approve its fiscal policies. At this time, the Tsarist regime was negotiating with British and French financial circles in an effort to secure large long-term credits and loans.
Consequently, the approval of the budget by the Duma would create an impression in Paris and London of political stability and confidence by the Duma in the fiscal and political policies of the regime. To the K o i o , it appeared that the budget might be the one issue on which the government would possibly compromise in order to secure its passage by the Duma.
When Kokovtsov presented the budget to the Duma, an immediate disagreement between the Cadets and the left arose as to which course of action the Duma would follow. The
Cadets sought to avoid injecting political issues into the budget debates and instead enumerated a number of fiscal recommendations to be incorporated into a single formula and referred to the Duma budget commission. On the initiative of the Social Democrats, the left sought a full scale debate on each section of the budget and then the complete rejection of the entire government project without referring it to a commission. Thus, on
April 1907, the Socia]. Democratic deputy, Alexinsky, ij.R introduced a motion to reject the budget. ‘ The Duma
^^GPSO. 1QQ7 god., Sessiia II, I, p. 959. 142
rejected the Social Democratic motion, but at the same
time the Koio took advantage of the budget debates to set
forth its political program.
Stecki and Zukov/ski presented the position of the Koio
on the government budget project. Stecki examined the
budget in relation to the financial needs of the Congress
Kingdom and he strongly criticized the political and
economic policies of the government in the Congress
Kingdom.^/ He maintained that even a highly centralized
government could not manipulate every political, social,
and economic aspect in the life of the nation. The solution
to the current fiscal crisis, Stecki argued, was political
decentralization and only when this had been accomplished
could an effective program of social and economic reform be undertaken. Stecki stressed the necessity of political
autonomy for the Congress Ki.ngdom and repeating the contents
of the earlier speech by Dmowski he called for regional self-government for the western provinces. Furthermore,
Stecki drew a distinction between the Russian state and
the Russian government. He professed complete Polish loyalty to the state, but went on to point out that if the KolTo was in opposition to the government, this was because the regime pursued policies which were not in the best interests of the Russian state.
^ ' Ihid.. pp. 9OO-9O7 .
^^Ibid. 14-3
Socking to defend the policies of the government,
Kokovtsov then attempted to refute the charges made hy
Stecki that the state exploited the wealth of the Polish provinces and that Poland v/as a revenue-producing area.
In addition, Kokovtsov clearly indicated the'position
of the government on Polish autonomy: under no conditions would the government support an autonomy bill or the introduction of such a hill into the Dum.a.^^ Zukov/ski then delivered a speech in which he rejected the charges of the finance minister by citing numerous statistics which proved that the fiscal policies of the regime were ruinous to the Polish economy and that the annual income of the government from the Polish provinces exceeded expenditures by 22,000,000 rubles. Like Stecki, Zukov/ski called for political reform and decentralization and the granting of autonomy to Congress Poland. The speeches of both deputies clearly were designed to pave the v/ay for the introduction of an autonomy project into the Duma despite the opposition of the government.-^
During the first weeks of the second Duma, the Koio set to work revising the autonomy program it had inherited from the first Duma. By early April, the autonomy commission submitted a project to an editorial board composed of
Stecki, Nov/odv/orski, and Konic. In the following secret
^•^'Ibid.. pp. 909-910.
^^Ibid.. pp. 910-928. 144 sessions of the Koio, the autonomy project underwent a number of revisions which brought it more in line with the autonomy scheme proposed by Stecki, rather than the earlier program of Popiawski, which based the Polish claim to autonomy on historic right.By April 19, the autonomy project had been completed and on April 23, the Koio distributed copies of the project to the deputies in the Duma. The forty-six deputies of the Koi'o signed the proposal which also contained, an annex setting forth the motives of the Koio and the basic principles underlying the
4. project.-"• <4
The autonomy project was based upon the earlier proposal of Stecki and it was more moderate and realistic than the project of the Koio in the first Duma. The autonomy proposal set forth in twenty-four points the projected laws, which would grant political autonomy to the Congress Kingdom on the Galician model. It emphasized that the territory of an autonomous Poland would comprise the territory set forth by the Treaty of Vienna in 181$ and that Poland would remain "an indivisible part of the
Russian Empire." The project called for the establishment of an autonomous regional Seim, which would deal exclusively with the internal affairs of the Congress Kingdom. This autonomous government would retain control over a separate
^^2ukawski, Kolro Polskie, pp. 101-102.
^^Rech. April 24, 190?. 1^5
treasury, administration, and legal institutions and Polish would be recognized as the official language of the
administration, courts and schools. The project further
stipulated that Polish deputies would continue to sit
in the Imperial Duma and that a state secretary would
represent the Congress Kingdom in the State Gouncil^^
Since an autonomy project required the approval of
the conservative and nationalist State Council and ultimately
the Tsar, the Koio sought to allay suspicion and fear in
these quarters about Polish separatism. Thus, a number
of points in the project attempted to appease Russian nationalist and conservative sentiment. The project
reserved the conduct of foreign policy to the Russian
government and it provided for a common army, communications,
and currency. Furthermore, the Tsar retained the right to
appoint members of an autonomous Polish government and the
Polish ministers were responsible directly to the Tsar.
The Tsar also possessed veto power over all legislation
enacted by the Se im and all matters relating to the Tsarist
court and the Orthodox Church in the Congress Kingdom were
placed outside the competence of the Sejm. Finally, the
project recognized the existing electoral law for elections
to the first Sejm, thereby insuring a Se m dominated by
conservative and propertied classes.The Koio hoped that
^^Ibid.
^^Ibid. 146 these points would eliminate any reservations that the government might have toward regional autonomy for Congress
Poland,
The Koio based the project neither on "historic right" nor the Treaty of Vienna, but on the October Manifesto,
In the annex to the project the Koio argued that the October
Manifesto had simplified government and reduced its functions only to those matters which were of common con cern to the entire empire; thus, local administration could be handled on a regional basis. The Poles, however, did not concede the same right to regional autonomy to other nationalities, but emphasized that regional self- government should be proportional only to the level of national self-consciousness and cultural development.
Thus, autonomy for the Congress Kingdom v/as dictated by the fact that Poland possessed a strong national con- siousness and a high level of cultural development; a law code based upon the Code Nanoleon which differed from that of the rest of the Empire; a separate system of local administration (i.e. the gmina); and a high level of industrial production and economic development. The Poles also emphasized their loyalty to the state and at the same time argued that decentralization was not inconsistent with the best interests of the Russian state. On the contrary, the Koio maintained that the revolutionary situation in Poland was due to excessive centralization and 1 4 ?
bureaucratization and that only autonomy would restore
the confidence of the Polish nation in the Tsarist govern
ment.
The autonomy project v/as not only the maximum program
of the Koto but it also was a calculated effort to prove
to the regime that the government had the support of the
Poles, that Polish autonomy was in the best interest of
tPie state, and that the demands of the Koio could not be
viewed as separatism, Moreover, the Kolro had a tactical motive for introducing the autonomy project at this time,
for Dmowski maintained that it y/as necessary to clearly
define the autonomy program so that the aims of the Koto
and its behavior in the Duma would be evident to the government and the Russian parliamentary factions.^
Furthermore, Dmowski believed, that once the Koto had set
forth its aims, it could then prove its loyalty to the
state and disavow charges of separatism when it came to voting on key issues such as the army bill.^9 But as
Dmowski later admitted, the timing for the introduction
of the autonomy bill into the Duma was most inopportune.
The Koio sought first to raise the autonomy question
for discussion in the Duma and then have the project referred to a Duma commission for further study. However,
5?Ibid.
^^Dmowski, Po]itvka polska. pp. 81-82.
-^^Gazeto Polska. May 11, I907. 148 when the President of the Duma, Golovin, communicated the Polish motion for a discussion of the autonomy project to the Duma, he encountered only silence from the deputies except for the initial shouts and hisses from the extreme right. The Kol'o had expected to receive support in the
Duma from the Cadets, but they failed to support the motion which would have introduced the autonomy project into the Duma for discussion.
The chief opposition to the motion of the Koio came from the Cadets who raised their objections to the Polish autonomy project in a front page article by Miliukov in
Rech on April 2$,^^ Miliukov readily conceded that the contents of the autonomy project were realistic and that the Koto had acted wisely in basing its claim on state interest rather than the "historic right" concept. But at the same time, Miliukov maintained that the political structure demanded by the Koio for the Congress Kingdom was still too broad, and that the Poles were asking for greater freedom and political rights than the rest of the
Empire enjoyed under the existing political system.
Furthermore, he argued that Polish autonomy belonged within the framework of a much broader program dealing with the national minorities question. Finally, Miliukov concluded that the timing for the introduction of the project was poor. Although Miliukov assorted that the majority of
60j, ech. April 2,5» 190?. 149 the Duma did support the Kolro, he went on to state that
Polish autonomy would create further divisions in the Duma and antagonize the government which opposed granting autonomy to the Poles. In addition to internal political considerations which prevented a discussion of the autonomy project I'v'iiliukov also made reference to the deterioration in Russo-German relations. In view of the anti-Polish policies of Germany at this time, Miliukov felt that talk of concessions to the Poles would be interpreted as further provocation in Berlin and also strengthen the hand of reactionary pro-German elements in government circles.
The chief criticism of the parties of the left was that the project of the Kolro ignored the claims and rights of other nationalities to autonomy within the Empire.
Like the Cadets, the left maintained the autonomy must be incorporated within the framework of an overall solution to the nationality question.It is apparent, too, that the left was unwilling to become involved in the
Polish question at a time when it sought to use the Duma as a forum and instrument for revolutionary social change.
The reaction of the conservative and nationalist right and the government, however, was particularly hostile and should have served as a warning to the Koiro, This attitude was reflected in the conservative St. Petersburg
^^Mbid .. April 26, 190?. 150 daily, Nov oc Vrcrria, and in Rossiia which reflected the views of the Stolypin ministry, both papers stated that
the Poles had learned little from history and that the government had no intentions of presiding over the dis
integration of the Russian state of which the first stop would be Polish autonomy. Novoe Vrerr.ia concluded that
Russia would "not permit the establishment of a second
Carthage on the banks of the Vistula.The conservative
and nationalist right viewed the autonomy project as
little more than separatism and the Poles as a treasonous
element despite the repeated pledges of loyalty to the
state by the Kolro.
In spite of the rumors that circulated in St. Peters
burg that a breach between the Poles and the Cadets was
imminent, the Kolro had no intention of jeopardizing the
existence of the Duma. But the Koio was determined to
serve notice to the government and the Cadets that it
could play a decisive role in the Duma and that neither
could afford to ignore Polish national interests if they
wanted to preserve the Duma. Such an opportunity presented
itself on April 25, when the Social Democrats introduced
an interpellation condemning the government for abuse of
power in quelling a recent strike and labor disorder. On
this occasion, the Cadets and the right opposed the
^^Stowo. April 29, 1907.
^^Rech, April 28, I907. 151 interpellation of the Social Democrats. The Koio deserted the Cadets and voted not only for the acceptance of the motion, hut also for the interpellation.' This inter pellation v/as a minor issue and hy voting with the left, the Koito simply intended to warn the Cadets and the govern ment. In reality, the Koio had no desire to see control of the Duma pass to the left and there is no evidence that it ever considered an alliance with the left. Not only was
the Koio opposed to the left on ideological grounds, hut control of the Duma hy the left would bring about dis
solution by the government.
The time for the Koio to prove itself to the government
and the right as well as to show the Cadets that the Duma
could not function without Polish support came with the bill fixing the annual contingent of army conscripts.
The number of conscripts requested by the Minister of
War was considerably larger than usual and the government
hinted that failure of the Duma to support the army bill
would bring about dissolution. On the army conscript
bill, the gulf between the Cadets and the left became
even more apparent. At a secret sitting of the Duma on
April 29, only the Cadets, the Moslem faction, and the
right supported the government measure.The entire
left, on the other hand, urged the rejection of the army
^ * G a 7, eta Polska. April 2f>, 190? •
^^•ifcukav/ski, Kofo Pol skie, p. 108. 152 bill on the grounds that the regime utilized the Tsarist army as an instrument of terror and oppression in order
to suppress the legitimate demands of the people. In the view of the left, those v/ho supported the measure would
be endorsing the policies of the government. It was apparent at once that the votes of the Koio would be decisive for the Duma could not pass the bill without Polish votes. Although the Koio had decided earlier that it would vote for the army bill, it did not announce its position until the actual day of the voting.
Henryk Konic presented the position of the Koio on the army bill before the Duma.^^ The purpose of Konic's speech was to clarify the attitude of the Koio vis a vis the government and the Russian state and to dispel the notion in government and rightist circles that the Poles were a disloyal and treasonous element. Konic drew a clear distinction between the policies of the government and the Russian state. Despite the fact that Russian
Poland was under martial law and in effect under military occupation, Konic stated that the Koio would vote for the army bill. He argued that although the Poles were in opposition to the policies of the government, it was necessary for the Russian state to have a large and strong army to protect the Empire from a neighboring monarchy and to prevent this "neighboring power" from securing influence
^^‘Rech. May 1, 190?. 153 in the internal affairs of the state. It v/as quite obvious that Konic v/as alluding to Germany, for he cited a letter from the government of this same power to Tsar Alexander III warning of the dangers inherent in establishing a constitu tional system in Russia. Konic further asserted that a strong army was essential in order to preserve the present constitutional system of government. Drawing from Polish history to illustrate his point, Konic stated that when the Poles had adopted their constitution in the late eighteenth century, it was the lack of a strong army which enabled foreign powers to intervene and destroy the state.
When the vote was taken on the army bill, the Koio voted with the Cadets and the right for the bill; there were 193 6? votes for the bill and 129 against.
The Koio had saved the army bill for the government and thereby prevented the dissolution of the Duma. But at the same time, this v/as a purely political move in which the Koio sought to play the role of the "third agent" to which the Duma and the government would be in debted, Thus, the army bill and the autonomy question were closely related. By voting for the army bill, the Koto attempted to show the government that Polish demands were not inconsistent with the best interests of the state. In effect, the Koio was telling the Stolypin ministry that in return for concessions that were vital to the national
6?Ibid. 15^
and political life of the Polish nation, the government
could count upon Polish support on matters of state necessity. Likewise the strong anti-German overtones in
the speech hy Konic attempted to exploit real and latent
anti-German sentiment in government and nationalist circles
and also to generate support for the Poles in France and
Great Britain. In this manner, the Koio hoped to prove
that in the face of the German danger the Poles stood with Russia and. her allies.
In the Congress Kingdom, the Endecja attempted to
justify the vote for the army hill with similar arguments.
The Endecja press explained that while the Koio was in
opposition to the policies of the government, the Koio had voted for the army hill as a matter of state necessity.
Furthermore, the Endecja argued that the German danger necessitated a strong Russia and that this was in the interests of the Polish nation. To counteract the pos sibility of criticism in Poland and to prove that it drew a distinction between the government and the state, the
Koio introduced two interpellations on the same day as the vote on the army bill. The first dealt with the
Siedlce pogrom which the military authorities had instigated and the second interpellation called for an end to martial law in the Congress Kingdom. Despite those efforts, the first symptons of opposition to the tactics of the Koio
^^Gaseta Polska. May 3» 190?• 155
emerged in the Kndecja. A email group connected with
Wiadyelrav/ Studnicki and the newspaper Goniee (The Courier)
criticized the Koio for its vote on the army bill and
argued that the present policies of the government were
contrary to Polish national interests. Studnicki and the
Goniec circle stated that the only alternative open to
the Koio was to join the ranks of the opposition.
In general, the passage of the army bill widened the
breach between the Cadets and the left. During the debate
on the bill, the Social Democratic deputy Zurabov strongly
criticized the Tsarist army for allowing itself to be used
as an instrument of terror and oppression by the government.
In government and rightist circles this v/as viewed as
being an insult to the army and Stolypin demanded that the 70 Duma censure Zurabov.' To avoid antagonizing the ministry
and the right, Golovin publically censured Zurabov. The
left never forgave the Cadets for their role in the
Zurabov affair and this broadened the gulf between the
Cadets and the left, but the Kolro also compromised itself
in the eyes of the government and the right for during
the debate on the public censure of Zurabov, the Koio
walked out of the Duma. Later, Dmowski publically remarked
that it v/as not the business of the Poles to defend the
honor of the Russian army.^^ ^Ibid., May k, I9O7. '^^Siowo, May 6 , I907.
?llbid. 156
The most fatal consequence of the army bill for the
Poles v/as not so much that they had supported the army bill, but the fact that Polish votes had been decisive and necessary to pass the bill in the Duma. The Koio had believed that support for the army would remove the stigma that the Poles were a treasonous and separatist element. At the same time, the Koio felt that both the government and the Cadets would be indebted to the Poles and more willing to make concessions. Stolypin, however, viewed the tactics of the Koio in an entirely different light. For Stolypin, the fact that passage of the army bill had depended upon Polish votes was a blot on Russian honor. But even more disturbing to Stolypin v/as the fact that the Poles had become the arbiters of the
Empire and matters which he conceived to be exclusively 72 Russian were decided, by Polish votes.' Thus, cooperation between the government and the Duma and the passage of
initial government legislation depended upon the Polish
Ko3To. This situation and dependence upon the Koio v/as
an important consideration in Stolypin's decision to
dissolve the Iltitma and change the electoral law.^^
After the passage of the army bill and the Zurabov
affair, relations between the Cadets and the left steadily
72 V.A. Maklakov, Vtoraia ansudarstvennaia duma (Paris, 1946), pp. 178-179. ?3lbid. 157
deteriorated. Any chance of cooperation or compromise
between them came to an end as a result of the Fifth
Congress of the Social Democratic Party which v/as held
in London from May 13 to June 1, 1907. At the Congress,
the Bolshevik wing in the party condemned the Mensheviks,
who comprised the majority of the Social Democratic deputies
in the Duma, for collaborating with the Cadets and other
bourgeois parties. With the support of the Polish SDKPiL.
the Congress passed a resolution stating that the Social
Democratic faction in the Duma would no longer cooperate
with the Cadets and that it would work with the other
parties of the left to make the Duma an instrument for
radical social reform and revolution. This declaration made the breach between the Cadets and the left final
and it was even more necessary than before to establish
a center majority if the Cadets were to retain control
of the Duma.^^
The Social Democratic Congress also had harsh words
for the Endecja and the Koÿo. The Bolsheviks and the
SDKPiL in particular opposed any type of cooperation with
the Koio, The Congress even went so far as to pass a
resolution condemning the Endecja as a reactionary and
counterrevolutionary party and stated that the Kolro was
7^-1' Alfred Levin, "Fifth Social Democratic Congress and the Duma," Journal of Modern History. XI (December, 19^4), pp. 484-308. 158 dominated by landowners and bourgeois elements hostile yc; to the interests of the working class. ^ Thus, the
Social Democratic Congress removed any possibility of an understanding between the Ko3To and the left in the
Duma.
At the same time that the Social Democrats were condemning the Koio, the Octobrist party v/as holding its congress in Ivtoscov/. During the congress, the leader of the Octobrist faction, Alexander Guchkov, reiterated his opposition to Polish autonomy. On Kay 23, 1907, the Octobrist party passed a resolution stating that the party would oppose any project to grant autonomy to the
Congress Kingdom.This declaration v/as significant for it meant that the Cadets would be even less willing to support the Poles on the autonomy issue since it was becoming more apparent that Octobrist support would be necessary to form a center majority. Kore significant v/as the fact that even if the Duma approved an autonomy bill, it would have no chance of getting through the State
Council where the Octobrists formed a majority.
The breach between the Cadets and the left as well as the opposition of the Octobrists to Polish autonomy greatly reduced the maneuverability of the Koio and made it even more dependent upon the Cadets. Although the Koio
"^-^iukawski, Koio Pol skie. p. 107.
^ ^ R e c h , i'iay 2 4 , 1907• 159 recognized ite predicament, it atill hoped to play the role of the "third agent" between the Cadets and the government, Dmowski continued to believe that the Koio could negotiate with the Stolypin ministry and the Cadets from a position of strength.
The fact that the Koio could move neither to the right nor the left in the Duma raises the question as to real objective of the Koio. The autonomy project that the Poles attempted to introduce into the Duma represented the maximum program of the Koio or the most that the
Poles could expect to obtain by way of concessions from the government. The abortive attempt to introduce the autonomy project into the Duma had brought a negative response to the project from the government, the right, and the Cadets. Shortly after the failure to introduce the autonomy project, the Koio discussed a legislative project for the reform of the school system in Congress
Poland and Father Gralewslci returned to Warsaw to consult with experts on the school question.On April 28,
Gazeta Polska declared that while autonomy was the ultimate goal of the Koio, a compromise was not only necessary, 78 but indeed highly desirable. Thus, when it appeared that there was no chance of obtaining the maximum autonomy
^^nukawski, Koio Pol.skie, p. J.13*
^ " Gazeta P o l s k a . April 28, 190?. 160 program, the immediate goal of the Ko-i'o v/as to obtain concessions on the school question.
The School Bill. the Bud ret . and the Dissolution of the Duma
The adoption of school reform in the place of full autonomy as the immediate goal of the Koio v/as not an unrealistic political program. In view of the opposition of the Stolypin ministry and the Cadets to the autonomy project, the Koio believed that both would be more willing to make concessions on the school question. Furthermore; the reform and polonization of the schools would serve as an important step in the direction of obtaining complete autonomy; meanwhile, it would guarantee the nation a maximum degree of cultural autonomy which the Endecja considered to be essential for strengthening the nation and. creating a national consciousness among all classes
of society. Finally, the K o i o could still play an important role in the Duma and in the government, since Polish
support was essential for a center majority which could
cooperate v/ith the government.
On kay 21, 190?» the Koio presented the school 7 o reform bill to the Duma. ' The school bill provided
for the introduction of the Polish language at all levels
of instruction in the state school system in the Congress
Kingdom. In regard to higher education, the bill made
?9Rcch. May 22, 190?; Siown. Kay 23, 190?. I6l provision for the reestablishment of the University of
Warsaw as a Polish institution. The bill also took into consideration the preservation of Polish culture in the western provinces; it provided for the right of Poles in these areas to establish their own schools and for the use of Polish in the state schools in areas where Poles RO formed a majority of the population.
On the school question, the Koio demanded immediate action and refused to make any concessions. At a meeting of the parliamentary factions and the Duma presidium on ■ iv.ay 26, Dmowski flatly declared that unless the Duma ' considered the school bill, the Koio would abstain from voting on all further legislation.^^ This posed a consid erable threat to the Cadets, since they needed the support of the Koio in order to prevent the left from the controlling the Duma.
In the Duma, a new conflict between the Cadets and
the left emerged over the order of deliberation. The
left demanded immediate discussion of such matters as
liquidation of the state of siege, abolition of the death
penalty, a general amnesty, and the rights of citizens,
but the Cadets were anxious to avoid political issues
and urged discussion of government legislation enacted
under Article 8?. Dmowski and Haruszewicz demanded that
^^Rech. May 22, 1907.
^^ the school hill he given first place on the order of discussion and that the autonomy project be referred to a Duma commission. The Cadets, however, placed the school bill and the autonomy project respectively in ninth and 82 tenth places on the order of discussion. ' Despite the threatening tone of the Ko>o, the Duma approved the Cadet order of discussion and this was passed with Polish support. The Cadets undoubtedly felt they could ignore the wishes of the Koto since the Koto needed the support of the Cadets on the school bill. An indication of what the reaction of the government and the Duma would be on the Polish school bill came with the discussion of the law of September 6, I906, which eliminated punishment for the secret teaching of Polish in the Congress Kingdom. Henry Konic, who headed the Duma commission examining the decree, urged immediate discussion and acceptance of the law. The right maintained that the law hardly could be considered urgent. Speaking for the extreme right. Bishop Eulogius made the motion that the bill be referred to a commission and the anti- Polish faction within the Octobrist party supported this miOtion. Although the Cadets supported the Poles on this issue, they were unwilling to urge the immediate acceptance of the bill in fear of alienating the right. G^Ibid. 163 The attitude of the government on the pending school bill became evident in the speech of the Minister of Education, 0, Gerasimov, v/ho pointed out that the Koio had stated on a number of occasions that the Poles could not be compared to other nationalities and that the school question had to be treated as a separate issue. It was apparent that the government sought to generate anti-Polish sentiment among the other nationalities in an attempt to forestall the introduction of the school bill in the Duma. The position of the ministry became evident when Gerasimov stated that the government did not approve of the school bill since it placed the Polish question in a category separate from the nationality question. However, Gerasimov concluded that the government would not hinder the introduction of the bill into the Duma. At this point, it was quite evident that the regime had no intentions of compromising on the school question and it attempted to use this issue to inflame anti-Polish sentiment in the Duma. In view of the opposition of the government and the right in the Duma to the school bill, the Koio decided to act decisively on the one remaining issue where it could exploit its position between the Cadets and the left. This issue was the discussion and the passage of the budget in the Duma. Rumor circulated in St. Petersburg ^^GDSO. 1907 god.. Sessiia II, II, p. 912. 164 that the government was anxious to have the budget passed by the Duma in order to create a strong impression of political and fiscal stability in Paris and London. But it also v/as known that Stolypin was prepared to dissolve the Duma, in the event that the Duma rejected the budget. The budget commission reflected the division on this key issue in the Duma. The left advocated that the budget be introduced into the Duma and discussed in its entirety. The aim of the left was to discredit the government during the discussions and then reject the entire budget. Like wise, the extreme right also advocated the introduction of the entire budget for discussion but for different reasons; the extreme right hoped that rejection of the budget would discredit the Duma and bring about its dissolution. On the other hand, the Cadets and the moderate right sought to discuss and vote separately on each section of the budget since this would enable the Duma to approve the sections containing indispensable government expenses and thereby the dissolution of the Duma could be avoided. The position of the Ko3:o on the introduction of the budget v/as basically the same as that of the left. The Koio favored an examination and vote by the Duma on the entire budget since this would enhance its bargaining position with the government and the Cadets. The differences between the Cadets and the moderate right on the one hand 165 and the left and the extreme right on the other hand made it evident that the votes of the Koio once again would be decisive. By voting on the budget in its entirety, the fate of the budget and the Duma would depend upon how the Koio voted on this issue. During the first week in June, the budget commission had prepared its report and the commission approved the submitting of the entire budget to the Duma for examination. Initially, it appeared that the government was anxious to obtain Polish support for the budget. Reports began to circulate that an unnamed rightist deputy had. indi cated that Stolypin was willing to make concessions to the Poles in return for support on the budget. The Cadets also attempted to arrange a meeting between members of the budget commission, the Koio, and the ministry, including Stolypin. But Stolypin refused to appear and the meeting failed to produce any noticeable results. On June ^1-, 1907, the Koio publically announced its position on the budget. In an interview with Novove Vremia. Dmowski flatly declared that the position of the Koio on the budget depended solely upon the attitude of the government toward Polish national demands. Dmowski stated that the Poles would vote for the budget only if the government publicly announced its support for ^*'Sipwo, October 2 , I9 O8 . l66 tho school The government, however, made no reply to this proposal. On the same day that Dmowski announced the position of the Koto, the Cadets and the government opened nego tiations concerning the formation of a center majority. The Cadets simultaneously were carrying on discussions with the Moslem faction, the Cossack faction, the Koio, and the Octobrists in order to reach a basic understanding on a center coalition. On June ?, Golovin reported to Stolypin that a center could be formed but that it would have to include the Koio and this required concessions to the Poles on the school question,On June 9» Rossiia. which reflected the views of ministry, asserted that the formation of a center majority willing to cooperate with the government must be based upon the Russian na tional idea and could not depend upon the votes of na- 87 tional minorities."' This eliminated the possibility of forming a center which included the Kolro and the Moslem and Cossack factions. On the following day, the govern ment rejected the Cadet proposal for a center coalition. The plan to dissolve the second Duma was by no means an immediate decision. While plotting the dissolution of the second Duma, Stolypin had not entirely dismissed ^•^Gaseta Polska. June 6, 390?. ^^F e c h . June 8, 190?. ^'^Gaseta Polska. June 11, I9O7 . lé? the idea of reaching a working agreement with the Duma, but on hi s own terms. Those included support for such vital issues as his agrarian reform program and the passage of the budget. But after the Duma agrarian commission had endorsed the principle of compulsory expropriation on June 8 and the Cadets had failed to form a center majority acceptable to the government, Stolypin decided that the only alternative was dissolution and the promulgation of a new electoral law. The pretext for the dissolution of the Duma was an alleged conspiracy against the government by the Social Democrats. Early in April, I90?, the government announced the discovery of a plot to assassinate the Tsar and on &iay 17, 1907» the government claimed that the police had uncovered evidence implicating a number of Social Democratic deputies in a plot to incite a mutiny in the army. It v/as this conspiracy, the so-called Shornikcva affair, that Stolypin used, to bring about the dissolution qp of the second Duma.^ On June l4, Stolypin presented police evidence to the Duma implicating the Social Democratic deputies in a plot against the government. Stolypin demanded that the Duma waive tho parliamentary immunity of the Social Democratic deputies and turn them over to the police. pP ' A].frod Levin, "Shornikova Affair," S ] av on i 0 H oview, XXI (November, 19^'3), pp. 1-8. 168 In facing the threat of dissolution, the Duma did not reject outright this ultimatum, hut after debating the issue referred the charges to a Duma commission for further study. Stolypin viewed the action of the Duma as completely unacceptable and on June l6, I907, the government issued a decree dissolving the Duma and promulgated a nev/ electoral law. The nev/ electoral lav/ directly violated the Fundamental Daws for the government had enacted changes in the electoral system without the consent of the Duma or the State Council. Stolypin obviously had anticipated a conflict with the second Duma for the law had been drafted in the autumn of I906 by S. Kryzhanovsky, the Undersecretary of the Interior. The purpose of the new law v/as to ensure the election of a dominantly Russian, conservative, and nationalist Duma. The lav/ v/as weighted heavily in favor of the conservative landowners and discriminated against the peasants, the urban middle class, the working class, and the national minorities. The lav/ dealt a particularly heavy blow to the Poles for it reduced the number of deputies from the Congress Kingdom from thirty-six to twelve. The dissolution manifesto clearly indicates that the decisive role that the Poles had played in the second Duma was a major reason for dissolution and the promulgation ^"Pech. June 17, 1907. 169 of the new electoral lav/. Without naming the Poles directly the manifesto stated that: "the Duma summoned to strengthen the Russian state ought to he Russian in spirit. The other nationalities forming a part of our Empire ought to have representation for their needs in the Duma, hut they ought not to appear, and shall not appear in numbers which make it possible for them to be the arbiters on questions which are purely Russian.' The above passage v/as an obvious reference to the decisive role that the Kolro had played in the Duma. Summary The K o i o entered the second Duma v/ith a concrete and realistic political program. The Poles, were committed to constitutionalism and the preservation of the Duma and. they realized that among the parliamentary factions the best hope of the Duma lay with the Cadets. Further more, the objectives of the Ko3ro were not unrealistic and the Poles showed a willingness to compromise, with the Cadets and the government. The autonomy program was considerably more moderate than its predecessor in the first Duma. When it became evident that autonomy as an immediate goal could not be realized, the Koio reduced its demands and introduced the school bill in an attempt to obtain concessions on this issue. In brief, the objectives of the Koio were not unrealistic and the Poles showed a readiness to compromise with the government. 9°Ibid. 170 Due to distribution of political forces in the Duma and the differences between the left and Cadets on tactics and political objectives, the Poles emerged in the second Duma as a powerful and decisive political force which the government and the Cadets had to take into consideration. On crucial issues upon which fho survival of the Duma depended, both the government and the Cadets had to depend upon Polish votes. The Koto sought to play the role of the "third agent" to which the government and the Cadets would be indebted and in this manner obtain concessions. In regard to the government and the Cadets, the Koto did indeed emerge as the "third agent." But in. the Duma itself, the Koto had little room to maneuver between the Cadets and the left. Since the Koto was committed to the preservation of the Duma, it was bound to the Cadets. The Poles could ignore the Cadets and the government on minor issues, but on crucial legislation there was no alternative but to support the Cadets and the government. The fatal mistake of the Kolro in the second Duma was its failure to take into consideration the character of Stolypin and the uncompromising attitude of the govern ment on concessions to the Poles. Initially, it appeared that Stolypin was not unwilling to consider the participation of the Poles in a center majority. But after the Duma had passed the army bill only with the support of the Koio and when the Poles demanded concessions on the school- 171 question in return for support of tho huclqet, Stolypin found à center majority dependent upon Polish votes unacceptable. Despite the repeated declarations of loyalty hy the Koio to the Pussian state, Stolypin was convinced that the Poles would always place their own national interests above those of the state. It was inconceivable to Stolypin that the course and direction of the Fussian empire would be determined by the Poles, In order to prevent this from happening, he was prepared to violate the Fundamental Laws by dissolving the Duma and promulgating a new electoral law. It would be wrong to attribute the failure of the second Duma entirely to the role of the Koio, for there were other reasons as well. The failure of the Cadets to abandon their program of compulsory expropriation as a solution to the agrarian question and the unwillingness of the Duma to discuss and approve the Stolypin agrarian reform decrees were also other considerations. Stolypin viewed his agrarian reform program with a sense of urgency and he was determined to have his program approved and implemented as soon as possible. Finally, the inability of the Cadets to form a stable center majority, which would cooperate with the government, contributed to the dissolution of the Duma. After Stolypin had found a center coalition which included the Koio as unacceptable, the position of the Cadets became quite hopeless. To form a 172 center which excluded the Poles, the Cadets had to turn to the left for support, namely the Trudoviki. This alternative also would have been unacceptable to the govern ment due to the Trudoviki position on the agrarian question and the general disdain that Stolypin had for the left. Thus, it was virtually impossible for the Cadets to form a center majority acceptable to the Stolypin ministry. Although the Poles emerged as the most skillful politicians in the second Duma, the Koîo failed to take into consideration the peculiarities of the Russian political system and they had underestimated the intense nationalism of Stolypin. Dmowski failed to realize that St. Petersburg was not Vienna and that neither Stolypin nor the Tsar found the Poles to be indispensable. The emergence of the Koîo as the "third agent" simply contributed to the decision to dissolve the Duma and deprived the Koîo of any future role or influence in the political life of the Russian Empire. CHAPTER V THE POLISH KOi.0 IN THE THIRD DUMA: THE TACTICS OF CONCILIATION The Elections to the .Third Duma The purpose of the new electoral law was to prevent the national minorities from playing a decisive role in the Duma and to reduce the strength of the radical and moderate opposition. The government aimed to insure the election of a Duma which would be "Russian in spirit" and dominated by conservative and nationalist landowners, who would cooperate with the Stolypin ministry. To achieve such a Duma, the new electoral law drastically reduced the representation from the peasant and workers' curiae, which had elected radical and revolutionary deputies to the second Duma. At the same time, the law strengthened the curia of landowners which would elect 50.3 per cent of the electoral delegates as opposed to electing 31*5 per cent of the delegates under the old law. In this manner, the government insured that the majority of the deputies would be politically and socially conservative. The new electoral law, which had made an obvious reference to the decisive role of the Kolo in the second ^Rech. June 17, 190?» 173 17^ Duma, drastically reduced the Polish representation in the third Duma. The new law allotted the Congress Kingdom only fourteen deputies instead of the previous thirty- six deputies. Furthermore, the law permitted hoth the Russian population of Warsaw and the Orthodox population in the Cheim district each to elect one deputy to the Duma and at the very most the Poles could expect to send only twelve deputies to the Duma from the Congress Kingdom. Thus, the new electoral law effectively eliminated the Poles as a political force in any future Duma. In the Congress Kingdom, there v/as widespread talk among all political groups of an electoral boycott. The Kndecja, however, stressed that under the new conditions national solidarity was even more important than before and that only the socialists, Jews, and revolutionaries would profit by a boycott of the elections. In an effort to blunt the opposition and to revive the old National Concentration, the Endecja invited the Progressive Democrats, the Party of Fiealnolit.ik, and the Polish Progressive Party to form, an electoral union. The Progres sive Democrats rejected the offer while the Party of Healnolitik and the Polish Progressive Party demanded a heavy price for participation in the electoral union: representation in the Presidium of the Koto; abandonment of the autonomy program; and adoption of a conciliatory 175 9 policy toward the Tsarist regime. Unwilling to abandon its program and share control of the Koio with other parties, the Endecja rejected these conditions and the formation of a new National Concentration never materialized. The electoral program of the Endecja remained essentially the same as that set forth during the elections to the first and second Dumas, The Endecja once again pledged to work for autonomy for Congress Poland and it stressed the necessity for the political solidarity of the Polish deputies in the Duma. Despite the setbacks of the Koto in the second Duma and the failure to obtain any con cessions either from the Duma or from the government, the Endecja maintained that the Koto would follow the same political course it had pursued in the first and second Dumas. Thus, the new Koto would refrain from making political alliances or committments with the Russian parties, it would continue to oppose the policies of the government in Poland as well as strive to obtain autonomy for the Congress Kingdom. The elections to the third Duma took place in October, 1907» and in Congress Poland each party formed a separate electoral committee. The PPS-Ri^ht was the only political group which boycotted the elections. The Endecja continued to draw its strength from those classes which had tradi tionally supported the party in the past. In the rural ^Sfowot October 3> IfC?. 176 areas, the Endecja encountered virtually no opposition, but in the urban centers there was considerable public apathy. An indication of urban public indifference to the Duma elections can be seen in the electoral returns from Warsaw where of the 69,924 eligible voters in the capital, only 17,995 voted in the election.^ In the workers curia, the Endecja did encounter some opposition from the PPS-Left and the SDKPiL but by resorting to anti- Semitism and the use of strong-armed tactics the Endecja managed to obtain a narrow margin of victory in the final stages of the election. As in the previous Duma elections, the. Endecja secured an electoral victory due to the lack of an effective and unified opposition, strong support in the rural areas, and voter apathy in the urban centers. Of the twelve deputies elected to the Duma, eleven were affiliated with the Endecja. The single remaining deputy from Suwaîki province v/as Andrzej Buiat, a Lithuanian. The Russian population of Warsaw, elected S.M. Alekseev, a member of the Union of Russian People and editor of the government subsidized paper, Polos Rusi. The Orthodox population in Cheim district again elected Eulogius, the Orthodox bishop of Che^rn, to the Duma.^ Alekseev and Bishop Eulogius were ^Siowo, October l6, 1907. 4-^GDCD ;: UkazatelUkaza tel k stenoas tenoaraf icheskim otchetam, 1907 red ., Ses si. i a I, pp. 5I“3 H * 177 political reactionaries, ultra-nationalists and vehemently opposed to any concessions to the Poles. The Polish deputies elected to the third Duir.a were active in the Endecja and played a prominent role in the social and economic life of the Congress Kingdom. With the exception of the peasant deputy Nakoniecsr.y, all of the deputies were well educated and came from the professional and landowning classes. Dmowski secured reelection in Warsaw and once again the deputies elected him. president of the Koto. Among those deputies reelected to the third Duma were Haruszewicz, Parczewski, Jaronski, Grabski, Rz%d, Nakonieczfiy, and Zukowski. The three new members of the Kolo were Hipolit V/^sowicz, Jozef Swiezynski, and Dudom.ir Dymsza.^ Although Dym.sza was not an active member of the Endecja, he sympathized with the aims of the party and his election represented an important addition to the Koto. A lawyer by profession, a member of the law faculty at the University of St. Petersburg, and Vice President of the St. Petersburg City Council, Dym.sza had important connections in government circles in the Hussian capital. In the western provinces, only six Poles secured election to the Duma. The reduction in the number of Polish deputies from these provinces was due chiefly to official manipulation of electoral machinery and government support for Russian nationalist and conservative candidates. -^1 bid. 178 Like their counterparts from the Congress: Kingdom, the Polish deputies from the western provinces came chiefly from the landowning and professional classes; the one exception v/as the Catholic priest, Stanisfaw i-'acii e jev/icz.^ In the third Duma, the Polish deputies from the western provinces formed a separate faction known as the Polish-Lithuanian-iielorussian Koio. Although this ter ritorial Koio represented chiefly Polish interests in Lithuania, Belorussia and the Ukraine, the Lithuanian peasant deputy, K. Ciunelis, also joined this Kolo. The deputies elected Stanislav; V/ankowicz president of the faction. Although the deputies from the Congress Kingdom and the western provinces did not form a single Kolo as they had in the second Duma, the two factions agreed to cooperate on matters of common interest and to hold joint sessions. The Territorial ..Kolo, however, refused to agree to the principle of political solidarity with the deputies from the Congress Kingdom in fear that this would arouse suspicion in government circles that the Poles from the western provinces entertained separatist intentions. The Shift to the Pimht As a result of the now electoral lav; and government support of nationalist and conservative candidates, the Octobrists and the parties of the right dominated the ^Ihid. 179 third Duma. The Octobrists although ret forming a. majority emerged as the largest single faction with one hundred and forty-eight deputies and formed the political center of the Duma. The Octobrist group, however, was about equally divided between a liberal wing and a more conservative faction. The leading Octobrist politicians in the third Duma were Alexander Guchkov, who remained the official leader of the party, W, von Anrep, K . Kapustin, baron Meyendorf, N.A. Khomiakov, and V/. Rodzianko. To the right of the Octobrists stood the government-sponsored parties— the Moderate Right and the Nationalists. The combined, strength of the government parties was ninety- five deputies and V. Bobrynsky served as the unofficial spokesman of this bloc. The extreme right, which numbered forty-nine deputies, was composed of the Union of Russian People led by V. Purishkevich and other reactionary political groups. The overwhelming preponderance of the Octobrists and the rightists, who were willing to support the government, insured the Stolypin ministry of the *7 working majority that had been lacking in the second. Duma.' In contrast to the Octobrist-Moderate Right-Nationalist coalition, the opposition parties in the third Duma were a disorganized, and ineffective political force. The Cadets, who were led by Paul Miliukov, formed the largest opposition party with fifty-three deputies. In addition to the Cadets ?Ibid. 180 the opposition also included the Progressives v/ith twenty- five deputies; the Koslem faction with nine deputies; and on the far left the Social Democrats and the Trudoviki p respectively with nineteen and fourteen deputies.' During the third Duma the opposition remained an ineffective force due to its numerical weakness and the hostility of Stolypin, who identified any opposition to his program of conservative reform as disloyalty to the state. Further more, the stigma that the government attached to even the moderate opposition parties made the Octobrists entirely dependent upon the Moderate Right and the Nationalists in order to form a Duma majority. At the opening of the thi^d Duma, the Polish Ko-fo, along with the Polish-Lithuania-Belorussian faction, maintained an independent position between the government bloc and the opposition parties. The Ko3ro found itself in an unfavorable position in the Duma with no opportunity to play an active political ro].e as it had in the preceding Duma. This was due not only to the numerical insignificance of the Kolo, but primarily to the domination of the Duma by the Octobrists-ltoderate Right-Nationalist bloc, which opposed Polish autonomy or any concessions of a. political nature which would weaken the unity of the Russian state. This new situation in the Duma, made the tactics of a "free hand" or those of a "third agent" obsolete. ^Ibld. 181 In reality the situation necessitated a revision in tactics and the Koio was confronted with two alternatives: to join the ranks of the opposition openly or to pursue a policy of uvoda or conciliation with government and pro-government parties in the Duma. Dmowski realized that hy joining the opposition the Poles could expect no concessions from the government or support from the government bloc in the Duma. As an opposition party, the Kolo would preclude any possibility of a Russo-Polish accommodation and concessions either on the autonomy question or on school reform. Under the existing conditions, the second alternative appeared to be the most realistic course. The tactics of conciliation, which formed the ideologi cal foundation of the Party of Realnolitik, would pave the way for an understanding with the Octobrists, v/ho controlled the Duma and the State Council, and enable the Poles to prove their loyalty to the Stolypin ministry. But at the same time, the tactics of conciliation posed serious problems for the Endecja, Such a course meant abandoning the autonomy program and. an accompanying loss of popular support in Poland, In addition, conciliation also might precipitate open dissension within the Kolo and the Endecja. The basic assumption upon which a policy of conciliation rested was that the government and the Octobrists would rcsoond in a positive manner to these tactics and be • 182 willing to make moderate concessions to the Poles. In regard to the Octobrists, this assumption was not unrealistic Although the Octobrist Party was opposed to Polish autonomy, the more liberal wing of the party was not averse to concessions on matters of cultural nationalism and equality of rights for the Poles. This group included the leader of the party, Guchkov, as well as von Anrep, Ivi. Kapustin, and Count A. Uvarov. In the event that the tactics of conciliation failed, however, the entire program of the Endecja, which rested upon a Russo-Polish accommodation, would be bankrupt. When the third Duma opened on November lE, 1907, the Kolro, at least on the surface, continued to maintain an independent position with regard to the Russian govern ment and opposition parties. As in the first and second Dumas, the Koto v/as an opposition party only in the sense that it opposed the present policies of the regime in Congress Kingdom. Evidence of this opposition appeared during the election of Khomiakov as president of the Duma when the Koto abstained from voting. Likewise, Dmowski raised the Polish question during the discussion on the Duma address to the throne. On November 26, 1907, he proposed the incorporation of an amendment to the address calling upon the government to satisfy "the fair demands of the nationalities residing in the Russian state." The 183 Duma rejected this proposal and the Kol'o abstained a^ain in the final voting on the address to the throne.*^ On November 29» 1907, Dmowski again raised the dolish question following an address In which Stolypin set forth his legislative program which made reference to a govern ment plan to introduce institutions of loca.1 sel^-govern- ment in the border areas.Dmowski spoke of the necessity for decentralization, but his speech contained no specific reference to granting autonomy to Congress Poland. Dmowski once again emphasized the loyalty of the Poles to the Russian state and to those policies of the government which aimed to strengthen the state and suppress the revolutionary movement. However, Dmowski asserted that those methods which opposed the vital interests of the non-Russian nationalities did not serve the best interests of the government,’ but rather weakened the state and strengthened the revolutionary movement. In the case of Poland, Dmowski added that "the Poles will never agree to the position of citizens of a second-class category in a state which has marked them for such.a role.^^ In reply to Dmowski, Stolypin treated the rights of the non-Russian nationalities in a casual manner. He '^GD50, 1Q07-1Ç0B rr, , Sessiia ]_ (St. Petersburg, 1^08), 1, pp. 149-1 5 1, 162-1 6 3. ’^-^Ibid. . p. 311. •^’•^Ibid . . pp. 338-343, 184 stated, however, that the Poles must first prove their loyalty to Russia and that the government did plan to introduce in the near future a project for urban and local self-government in the non-Russian areas of the Empire and that this project would be in conformity with the unity and best interests of the Russian state. Dmowski replied that the highest honor was to be a citizen of the Russian state and that this was comparable to the rights of citizenship in ancient Rome; this remark obviously was intended to refute the accusations of V. Purishkevich, N, Markov, and G. Zamyslovsky concerning the questionable loyalty of the Poles. But when asked by several deputies of the extreme right whether he was referring to autonomy or local self-government when he spoke of decentralization, Dmowski refused to reply. These speeches by Dmowski during the early weeks of the first session of the Duma mark a decided and noticeable shift in the tactics of the KolTo. Not only were these speeches characterized by lofty professions of loyalty to the state, but even more important they were lacking in any specific demand for autonomy. Early in December, the Octobrist deputy Uvarov delivered a speech in which he stated the attitude of his party toward the non-Russian nationalities. Uvarov asserted that the Octobrists were not opposed to the granting of ^^Ibid.. pp. 352-353. 185 institutions of local and municipal self-government to the border areas. The only condition that Uvarov attached to this proposal was that the national minorities did not ask for greater political rights than the rest of the Empire enjoyed. Concerning the Poles, Uvarov stated that the Octobrists "v/ish to see them as first-class citizens; but I must say that we citizens of Russia cannot give them any other rights than the rights of first-class Russian citizens . . . ."^3 Koio interpreted this speech by Uvarov to mean that the Octobrists could be counted upon to support the introduction of local institutions of self-government and the introduction of Polish into the state schools in the Congress Kingdom. Despite the hostility of the government to Polish national aspirations, the Koio still had not abandoned entirely the idea of an understanding with the Stolypin ministry. In December, 19^7, Dmowski conferred with the Minister of Education, Kauffman, in an effort to arrive at a solution to the school question. These talks proved fruitless for in the middle of the discussions the govern ment abolished the Macierz Pol ska Szkolna. This v/as a severe blow to the Koio and it should have indicated that the government had no real intentions of meeting snecific Polish demands on the school issue or making ^^Ibid.. pp. hpO-21. 186 :xiy concessions which would grant the Polos even a degree of cultural autonomy. Not only was the abolition of the i.acierz Polska Sskolna a blow to Polish cultural life, but it was directed specifically against the Endecja which controlled the society. During its brief existence, membership in the Mac 1erz had reached 1X6,000 and the society had established 781 private schools with an enrollment of 76,000 students; in addition it had founded nearly $00 libraries with over 221,000 volumes.'^ The apparent motive for the dissolution of the Macierz v/as the rapid success of the union and the fear that in time the state school system would bo replaced by a network of prJ.vate Polish schools. The response of the Ko>o to this measure was to make a public protest of this government action, but in the Duma the Koio made no effort whatsoever to criticize the government or to introduce an interpellation. In addition to opposition from the Tsarist regime, it also became evident early in the first session that the Polos could expect little support even on limited concessions from the government parties in the Duma. During the second Duma, the government had introduced a bill for the teaching of Polish as a subject in two teachers colleges and the appointment of permanent teachers ^ Feldman, Dzieje nolskie j mysli no] ityczne .1. pp. ]8^-92. 187 to teach thit: subject in an additional four rvnma?;ia. On November l4, IPO7 , this bill v/an referred to a Duma commission. The Octobrists on the commission modified, the bill so that the teaching of Polish in the p-ymnasia would hot be compulsory but rather be available only for those students desiring it.~^ The bill provoked a violent reaction from the extreme right and from Purishkevich and Bishop Nulogius in particular. The Moderate Right and the Nationalists also objected and demanded that the bill stipulate that it could be implemented only in the event that "there should be those students desiring" the teaching of Polish.Guchkov and von Anrep supported the bill in its existing form and on February 251 1908, the Duma passed the bill. Although this bill was of minor significance, it clearly indicated the Poles could expect very little by way of minor concessions from the Duma and especially since the Octobrists had to rely upon the Moderate Right and the Nationalists for support. During the early months of looB, the Xo>o found itself in an extremely av/kv/ard position in the Duma. The Kobo clearly was unwilling to commit itself to the opposition but at the same time it continued to show that it opposed the policies of the regime in Congress Poland. l^GDSO. 10 07-.] o OR r-fc. Sessiia I. I, pp. 15^1-8-1551. I'lbid, 188 In February, I908, for example, the Koio refused to join the government parties in sending a Duma delegation to Tsarskoe Tselo to pay honor to the Tsar. But in the Duma the Koio eontinued to make a distinction between the government and the state. As it had in the previous Duma, the Koio voted for the annual army contingent, but simply because it viewed this as a matter of state necessity. On the other hand, the Koio voiced its strong opposition to the section of the budget allocating funds for the Holy Synod and the Ministry of Education. Dymsza criticized the Holy Synod for pursuing policies which were opposed to the religious and cultural interests of the Polish 1 7 nation. Likewise, Antoni Rzr^d accused the Ministry of Education of failing to meet the educational needs of the Congress Kingdom. As a result, during the debates on both of these sections of the budget the Koio abstained from voting in order to show its opposition to government policies. The fact that the Koio continued to hope for some type of an accommodation with the regime and the government parties was due chiefly to external events. Among these was the steady deterioration of relations between St. Petersburg and Germany and Austria-Hungary in the struggle for influence in the Balkans; consequently, it appeared to the Endecja that it would be to the advantage of Hussia •’-'^Ibid.. pp. 835-41. 189 to arrive at an understanding with the Poles and obtain their support. At the same time, Russia was drawing closer to France and England. Russia and France were bound by the alliance concluded in 1894 and in the summer of 1907» Great Britain and Russia had resolved their differences and concluded an Anglo-Russian entente. The Poles hoped that pro-Polish circles and opinion in France and Great Britain in time would force St. Petersburg to make some concessions to the Poles, But it was the continuous anti-Polish policies of Berlin which made Dmowski and the Endecja leadership even more determined than ever to reach an understanding with the Tsarist government. In late I907, the Prussian Landtag brought up for discussion a bill providing for the expropriation of Polish landed estates in Poznan province and on February 20, I9O8 , the Landtag passed its anti- T Q Polish expropriation bill. This new anti-Polish measure permitted the German government to expropriate Polish landholdings for the purpose of colonizing the area with German settlers and completely Germanizing the Polish provinces of Prussia, The Endecja viewed this measure with alarm for it feared that the very existence of the Polish nation in Prussia was at stake; in time Prussian Poland would be completely Germanized and a future Polish state would lose all claims to these western provinces. 1 o Gieysztor, ejt al.. History of Poland. pp. 6OO-6OI, 190 The expropriation lav/ v/as followed by another anti-Polish measure passed hy the Relohsta^ in April, IpOp. This v/as a clause in the German Association Law which prohibited the use of any lan^ua^e except German at public meetings. Thus, by the spring of 1909, it became even more necessary in the view of the Endecja to reach an understanding with Russia for the German danger had assumed alarming pro portions . Evidence of a shift in tactics by the Koio and a new willingness by the Poles, to reach an understanding with Russia came in April, I9O8 . During the discussion of several of the Stolypin agrarian reform bills, Grabski stated the Polish position on the agrarian policies of the government. Grabski commended the agrarian program of the Stolypin ministry and stated that the Koio supported its aims, which were to undermine the revolutionary movement and create a stable class of peasant freeholders. Although Grabski criticized the regime for having neglected the Polish peasant in the past, he expressed the desire of the Kolo to see the Stolypin agrarian legislation implemented in the Congress Kingdom.. The speech by Grabski marks a significant shift in the tactics of the Kolo for a number of reasons. By announcing its support for the government agrarian reform program, the Kolo indirectly endorsed the political program ^- C O G O . 10Q7-.10Q3 '^'v., Sessiia 1. I, p. IO5A. 191 of the Stolypin ministry as well. Secondly, while the Poles in the first and second Durias had opposed the radical ayrarian programs of the left, the i'C>c had not taken a public position on the government program. Instead the Koÿo had argued for' a solution to the agrarian question through autonomous institutions. Consequently, the endorsement of the Stolypin agrarian program, by the Koto and the implementation of the agrarian legislation in Congress Poland signified that the Koto v/as willing to po abandon its autonomy program..'' The position of the Koto on the agrarian question clearly indicated that by April, 1908, the Koto was ready to embark upon a policy of conciliation toward the regime. It further indicated that the Koto recognized t?iat a policy of conciliation toward the government necessitated an abandonment of the autonomy project. Final evidence of the shift to the tactics of conciliation came in the middle of kay, 1908, during the debates on the budget. Dmowski hoped to utilize the ■ budget in order to clarify the new conciliatory position of the Kolo. Dmowski opened his speech by stating that he v/ould examine the budget from, the vantage point of the political well-being of the Fussian state rather than Kolish national interests. This statement in itself v/as ^^lukawski, Knjro Pol skie. pp. I39-IA0. 192 remarkable o inc e the Kolo had a] v/aye yiven priority to the Polish national interests on all legislative matters. He maintained that Russia ruled Poland by means of military force and court martials v/ith the aim of destroying the revolutionary movement. Dmowski went on to state that while he supported the policies of the regime toward the revolutionary movement, he was opposed to the methods used by the government in Congress Poland. The repressive measures employed by the Tsarist authorities had simply alienated all classes of Polish society and thereby helped the revolutionaries. The solution to political and social instability in Poland depended upon the concil iation of the Polish "enlightened" classes, who like the government were opposed to revolution and in reality needed the support of the government. In effect, Dmowski declared that the government and the Polish "enlightened" class (i.e., the intelligentsia and the bourrreois'i e ) must cooperate to suppress the revolution. The present policies of the government in Poland prevented such cooperation and thus the government should make some concessions to secure the support of this class. In effect, Dmowski was telling the government that in return for limited concessions, the government could count upon the support and. cooperation of the upper and middle classes in suppressing the revolutionary movement in the Congress 193 Kingdom. In response to Dmov/ski, Bobrynsky spoke on behalf of the Moderate Right and the Nationalists. Ho criticized the Koio for what he termed its uncompromising attitude and he noted that in the past the Koio had been unwilling to consider anything less than full autonomy. Bobrynsky, however, did remark that he viewed the Polish question as unfortunate and. he spoke of the necessity of ending the differences that divided Russians and boles."' But it was the speech by the Octobrist deputy, Uvarov, which the Koio interpreted as paving the way for conciliation with the Octobrist party. Uvarov maintained that the Octobrists never had based their program exclusively upon nationalist appeal and he stated that the Octobrists were not unwilling to consider meeting the just demands of the border nationalities and making concessions to them. Dmowski then replied to both Bobrynsky and Uvarov and he set forth the future course that the Ko2ro would pursue in the Duma. Refuting the charges that the Poles were a disloyal element and that they opposed the state, Dmowski argued that the Poles simply were opposed to the present anti-Polish oolicies of the government, He stated ^-GDSO, 19 07-1908 ?g.. Sessiia I. 1, pp. . ^^Ibid.. p. 2506. 5% ^^Ibid . . p. 19^ that a inc e tho government had found Polish autonomy not to be in the best interests of the state, it must have another Polish program in mind. Dm.ov/ski declared that the government merely had to define its Polish program and the Poles v/ould support it. Finally, Dmowski rejected the contention of the Moderate Right that the Poles supported the Cadets and. that the Koio v/as an opposition party. Maintaining that the Koio had pursued, an independent political course, Dmowski concluded that the Koio only had supported those parties which were concerned with the best interests of the Polish nation and if these parties were in the ranks of the opposition it was due to no oh, fault on the part of the Poles." The position taken by Dmowski indicates that by the end of the first session of the third Duma, the Koio clearly intended to embark upon a course of conciliation with the Tsarist government a.nd the Octobrists in the Duma. For such a political course to be effective, Dmowski abandoned the. autonomy program of the Endecja and completel.y separated the Koio from the opposition parties in the Duma, chiefly the Cadets. It is difficult to ascertain what immediate results the Koio hoped to attain by adopting the tactics of conciliation. Concessions on the school question were unlikely for when Dmowski approached the Octobrists on this subject they informed him that such a ^^'Ibid. . pp. 2708-2709. 195 bill would encounter opposition within the Octobrist party and from the moderate and extreme right, west likely, the Koî'o hoped to obtain local and municipal self-government for the Congress Kingdom, for Stolypin had stated earlier that he intended to introduce such a project into the Duma and the Octobrists had stated their intention to support a hill introducing local and urban institutions of self-government in the western borderlands, When the first session of the third Duma ended in June, I9O8 , the Kolro had not obtained any concessions on the autonomy program, the school question, or the establishment of local institutions of self-government. The Koifo, however, had laid the foundations for a policy of conciliation with the Tsarist regime and the Octobrists by unofficially abandoning the autonomy program and separating itself from the opposition parties. Although the Koÿo had obtained virtually nothing from the govern ment or the Duma, Dmowski and the Endecja wore convinced tho.t the adoption of tactics of conciliation offered the best course of political action. This conviction was reinforced by the emergence of the Neo-Slav movement during the latter part of I907 and early I9O8. 196 Tho Po3 ieh Ko>o an^ the Nqq-SInv The impetus for the Neo-Slav movement, which emerged in early 1908, came from the Austrian Slavs--chiefly the Czechs— and some Russian nationalist, conservative, and literal politicians. Supporters of Neo-Slavism among the Austrian Slavs, such as Thomas Kasaryk and Karol Kram.ar, were anxious to promote cooperation in the fields of cultural and economic development among all Slavs in the face of the rising tide of Gorman nationalism and the anti-Slav policies in the Magyar half of the Dual itonarchy. At the same time, the idea of Slav solidarity underwent a revival in Tsarist Russia. After the disastrous defeat in the Far East during the Russo-Japanese war, St. Petersburg once again turned its attention toward the Balkans. As a result of the earlier Franco-Russian alliance and the entente concluded with Great Britain i.n the summer of 1907, Russia found herself allied with those powers opposed to Germany and Austria-Hungary. In some Russian political circles there was a strong desire to secure influence among the Austrian and Balkan Slavs in the face of Austro- German penetration of the Balkans. Thus, the Neo-Slav movement afforded an opportunity to spread Russian in fluence among the Austrian and Balkan Slavs at the expense of Germany and Austria-Hungary. The Neo-Slavism of the early twentieth century differed considerably from the Pan-Slav ideology of the 197 nineteenth century. The latter ?iaO directed itc efforts toward the liberation of the Orthodox Slavs of the Balkans v;ho were ruled by the Ottoman Turks. The Pan- Slavs of the nineteenth century stressed the unification of all the Slavs under Russian leadership and they empha sized the superiority of Russian culture and the Orthodox Church. Consequently, Pan-Slavism had little direct appeal among the largely Roman Catholic western and Austrian Slavs. The Neo-Slavs, however, stressed common cultural and economic collaboration among all Slav nationalities. The underlying principle of the Neo-Slav movement was a respect for the rights of all Slav nation alities regardless of religious or cultural differences. The Neo-Slavs also emphasized the loyalty of the Slavs to the state in which each Slav nationality resided."' In Russia the leading architect of Neo-Slavism was Prince Eugene Trubetskoy, the editor of a leading Moscow Slavophile paper and a professor at the University of Moscow. The idea of Slav solidarity gained momentum in Russia during the first half of I9O8 , in the wake of further Austrian penetration in the Balkans and the German expropriation lav/s directed against the Poles. Nationalist, conservative, and liberal Russian political circles as 2 < 'The most extensive and detailed treatment of the Neo-Slav movement can be found in the following works; Hans Kohn, Pan-Sle vi sm ; I ts Hi storv and Ideolof^'v (New York, 1961), pp. 23] -29^1- ; Alfred Pi schol, Per Panslav/i smus i)i s znm '.Voltkrier (Stuttgart, 1919) i p p . ^■'•39- 381. 198 well as many adherents of the old Pan-Slav idea believed that a new Slav movement could be directed against Germany and Austria and utilized to the advantage of Russia.' Thus, in early April, I908, a group of prominent Russian politi cians formed the Slavic Benevolent Society and in June, 1908, they worked out a statute and the society obtained official recognition. The Slavic Benevolent Society included within its ranks a. number of leading Russian politicians; the Cadets Kiliukoy, Maklakoy, and Struve; the Octobrists Guchkov, N. Khomiakov, and Kaspustin; a number of nationalist politicians, as well as a fev/ members of the extreme right. Among the Poles, however, Pan-Slavism and the idea of Slav solidarity had never attracted any support or following. This was due primarily to a long tradition as an independent state, political and cultural repression at the hands of Orthodox and Slav Russia, and the fact that Poles regarded themselves as belonging within the European and Roman Catholic cultural orbit. At the turn of the century, however, Ui. Zdziechov/ski and Professor Soko-bowski founded a Slavic Club in Krakow, where they began to publish a monthly, ^wiat S.bowi.anski. In Sv/iat S-bov.'ianski, Zdziechowski and his followers preached the concept of Slavic brotherhood and the affinity of the western and south Slavs ; they also believed in the affinity " ^"b'Ukawski, 0^ o Polskie, pp. 1 8 -49 . 199 between the Polish messianlsm of the 1830's and the later Slavophilism of Khomiahov, The Krakow Slavic Club, however, gained little influence and few adherents in Russian Poland due to the Russification policies of the Tsarist ? 7 regime."' The Endecja was aware of the political advantages that could be obtained by adopting a Neo-Slav course of action. Even after the disastrous consequences of the second Duma and the continuing anti-Polish policies of the Tsarist regime, the basic assumption of the Endecja remained that Germany was the chief danger and that Polish- Russian reconciliation was necessary. The .loading advocates of a Russian orientation in the Endecja were Dmowski, Balicki, and Grabski and as early as the summer of 1 9 0 7» the Central Committee of the Endecja had supported a motion by Dmowski concerning the desirability of supporting a broad Slavic front directed against Germany.^' Although the principles of Noo-Slavism and Slav solidarity were diametrically opposed to the ideology of Dmowski and the Endecja, the National Democrats quickly saw that Neo-Slavism could be utilised to achieve political objectives and the emerging Neo-Slav movement provided the Endec ja with a good opportunity to work for a F.usso- ^^Kohn, ban-Slavism, pp. -5• Dir;0w s k.i , i'-o]. i t.yko P o ls k a, p . 1 0 0 -1 0.1. 2 0 0 Polish accord. The main thrust of the Neo-Slav movement was directed toward the western Slavs and against the German danger; consequently, a solution to the Polish question in Russia would hold a respectable place in the program of the movement. As a western bastion of Russia against the Germans, Polish support was not only vital to St. Petersburg, but it also made a Polish-Russian understanding essential for the success of the Neo-Slav movement. The Endecja believed that Polish support for the Neo- Slav movement would enable the Poles to obtain support in Russian nationalist and conservative circles. At the same time, the Endecja expected that the Austrian and Balkan Slavs would exert pressure on Russia to grant concessions to the Poles, thereby forcing St. Petersburg to arrive at a solution to the Polish question in Russia. Dmowski believed that Russia hardly could champion the cause of Slav solidarity and gain influence among the other Slav nationalities while continuing to carry out anti- Polish policies in Congress Poland and the western provinces. Thus, the Neo-Slav movement could be used by the Poles to lead a broad Slav front against Germany and to bring about a change in the policies of the Tsarist government toward the Poles. Dmowski already had evolved his anti-German policy and a pro-Russian orientation, which the Endecja had • 2 0 1 pursued sinoe I903 and would continue to pursue down to 1917» prior to the emergence of the Neo-Slav movement, The key to the brief flirtation by the Endecja with the Neo-Slav movement can be found in Dmowski's book, Niemcv. R osia, i Kwestia Polska, which was first published in 1908.3^ In this work, Dmowski restated the necessity for Russo-Polish reconciliation in the face of the German danger and he called upon Russians to recognize the importance of Poland as a western bulwark against Germany. As the basis for a Russo-Polish rapprochement. Dmowski abandoned the Jagiellonian concept of Polish history and instead he urged Poles to build the future Polish state on the Piast conception and the recovery of the western marches lost to the Germans in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. Furthermore, Dmowski announced the end of the era of armed struggles to attain an independent state. Instead, he urged Poles to make the Polish question the most important European diplomatic issue. In the view of Dmowski, the Polish question had emerged once again as an international question. This was a result of the splitting of the great powers into two antagonistic camps with Russia and her allies, France and Great Britain, standing opposed to the Triple Alliance of ^^Marian Kiniorski, Z czterdziestu pieciu lat wspomnien o Romania Dmowskim (Warsaw, 1939), pp. 20-21. ^^See Roman Dmowski, Niemcv. Ros.ia. i Kwestia Polska (Czestochowa, 1938)» 2 0 2 Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy. Dmowski opted for Russia and her allies since he believed that Germany gra^feat-^threat-^^-^oland-,— Ultimately:,— the ---- antagonism between these opposing camps would erupt into a major European conflagration in which Russia and her allies would be victorious. It is here that Dmowski set forth the main postulate of his thesis. The victory of Russia over Germany and Austria-Hungary would lead to the integration of all the Polish lands under Tsarist Russia. Only when this had occurred would Poles be able to work from a position of strength for the creation of an independent Polish state. On the basis of Dmowski's assumptions, the adoption of a Neo-Slav course of action becomes quite logical and realistic. The initiative for a Slav conference and movement, however, carne not from the Poles but from the Russian Neo-Slavs. In May, I9O8, Russian politicians dispatched General Volodomirov, a staunch supporter of Slavic brother hood and solidarity to Vienna to consult with Czech, ■ Ukrainian, and Slovene politicians about a future Slav conference. The Austrian Slavs viewed a Slav conference favorably and on his return to St, Petersburg, Volodomirov stopped in Warsaw to enlist the support of Polish politi cians for the future congress. Volodomirov received a favorable response from the leaders of the Endecja, the 203 Party of Pnalmlitik. and the Po.lirjh Proyrnasivo Party concerning a Slav conference.- In Pay, 1908, a. delegation of Austrian Slava headed hy the Czech deputy Karol Krarrar and the Slovene Ivan Hrihar arrived in St. Petersburg to consult with Russian politicians and to make plans for a Slav congress. The Polish Koio served as one of the official hosts to the delegation and Dymsza acted as the chief representative of the Koÿo during the conference, in the conference sessions both the Austrian Slavs and the Russians empha sized the necessity for closer ties and cooperation among all Slav nationalities. On the second day of the conference, Kramaîr informed the delegates that a Polish-Russian understanding was a necessary condition for Slav cooperation and the success of the movement. Rut the most startling event of the entire conference came during an address by Umowski in which he assured the delegates that they could count upon Polish support in organizing a Slav conference, liven more important, however, was the statement by bmpwski that the Poles would support the Neo-Slav movement "unconditionally," and he hoped that all of the delegates would recognize the value of Polish support for the Neo- Slav movement. i“olish support for the movement evoked a positive response from the Russian delegates. Guchkov, Trubetskoy ^^‘^'Ukawski., i'o^r--, Prlrtkie. pp. 2 0 4 and oth.ori; expressed their satir;feetion and stated their willingness to remove all obstacles which hindered the cultural and economic development of the Polish nation. On the other hand, the response to the Polish declaration in the Russian press was somewhat reserved, 'there was considerable astonishment that the boles wore willing to commit themselves wholeheartedly to the %eo-Slav cause without stipulating any conditions. The rightist press stated that the boles still had to prove their loyalty to the Russian state and the government before they could be taken seriously, hnssiia. which reflected the views of the S-fcolypin ministry, received the b d ish declaration without any noticeable enthusiasm, bnrjsi ia pointed out that while the boles spoke of Slav solidarity, they continued to oppress the Ukrainians in Galicia and that the leader of the Austrian Endec ja, Stanislav; Gÿr^binski, opposed the Heo-Slav movement. Furthermore, fossii a maintained that the boles must give further evidence of their loyalty to hussia and the Tsar. The St. betersburg conference ended in a spirit of optimism. 'To distinguish the movement from the earlier ^an-Slav movement, the delegates coined the term "heo- Slav" to designate the movement. The delegates also decided to hold a Slav congress in braguo in July, 1^08, to coordinate efforts for cultural and economic coop eration among all Slav nationalities. Finally, the • -^Ibid., p. 1 5 3. 205 delegates concluded the conference by calling; for the freedom, brotherhood, and equality of all Slav peoples on the basis of mutual cooperation and respect for cultural diversity. On their return to Vienne, Oymsza and Volodomirov accompanied the Austrian delegates to Vvarsa"/ v.'here they were enthusiastically received by the leaders of the bndecja. The Slav congress took place in Prague and lasted from July 12 to July 18, IpoB. Attending the congress were the representatives of seven Slav nationalities and. next to the Russian deilegates, who numbered twenty-three, the Poles formed the second largest group with nineteen representatives. The leading Polish delegates were Dmowski, Stecki, Balicki, and Swiesyorski from the dndecja; Konic and i-ypacewicz from the Polish Progressive Party; and Strassewicz and Potocki, who represented the Party of fealnolittk. T h e leader of the Austrian Bndecia and president of the Polish Kolo in Vienna, Stanislav; Gl::^binski, opposed a Neo-Slav course and refused to attend the congress About one-third of the Russian delegates belonged to the Cadet, Progressive and Octobrist parties. The remaining delegates belonged to the Moderate Right, the Nationalist, and extreme right pa»"ties and many of these delegates adhered to Pan-Slav rather than Neo-Slav views. No 33S-bnwo.g, July 1908. 206 representatives of the Prussien Poles, the Slovaks, the Lusatians and the Galioiar Ukrainians attended the congress. On the eve of the congress the chief delegate of the Czechs, Kranar, arranged a secret meeting between the Polish and Russian delegates with the aim of reaching an understanding before the opening of the congress. Dmowski demanded that the Russians mak.e an official public declaration which would guarantee cultural and. economic development to the Poles in Russian and grant Poles full equality of rights with Russians, On the other hand, the Russ'lans demanded an official statement of Polish loyalty to Russia and respect for the interests of the Russian • • nation, bobrynsky added that the Poles in exchange for. Russian recognition of equal rights should guarantee to respect the rights and national interests of Russians in Congress Poland and the Ukrainian population in Austrian Galicia. Those talks, however, did not result in any decision by either side to make an official statement of policy. Although the congress sought to avoid political issues, reference to the Polish question and a Russo-Polish under standing could not be avoided. Rramar emerged as the chief spokesman and advocate of conciliation between the Russians and the Poles. On several occasions, Krarnar stipulated that for the Reo-Slav movement to succeed and for Slavic cooperation to become a •-^ea.l ity, a Polish-' .. ■ 207 huüsian understanding v/aa essential. Concerning the Hnlish question, the Russian delegates l-irriited themselves to endorsing an understanding and merely stating that impediments to an accord would be eliminated when the roles in Russia had obtained equality rights. As the chief spokesman for the Polish delegation, Dmowski committed the Poles to Neo-Slavism, and he repeatedly professed Polish loyalty to the Hussian state.but in order to conciliate the whole spectrum of Polish political opinion, Dmowski maintained that neither he nor the other Polish delegates recognized the Polish question exclusively in terms of Slav affairs or the Neo-Slav movement. This commitment to Neo-Slavism on the one hand, but separation of the Polish question from exclusively Sj.av matters on the other, was an attempt to blunt the opposition of the Austrian Dndecja and critics o-^ a Neo-Slav policy in Congress Poland to participation in the Neo-Slav movement. When the Prague Conference ended, Dmowski returned to Warsaw convinced that Polish-Russian accommodation could be reached in the near future. At the end of the first session of the third Duma, Dmowski had paved the way for a shift to the tactics of conciliation in the Duma N o h n, Pan-S].a\n.sm. pp. 2^1-8-2^19 . ^-^*Ua.wski., !Col*n Pol s^i'-', p . 15 '5 • 208 and he had unconditionally committed the Poles to the Neo- Slav cause. In return, the Russian parties had merely talked about the necessity of a Russo-Polish accommodation on the basis of granting the Poles in Russia equality of rights, but they had not made any specific pledges or commitments. Dmowski, however, interpreted equality of rights to mean concessions on the language and school question and the introduction into the Congress Kingdom of local institutions of self-government. The risks involved in pursuing a conciliatory and Neo-Slav course were considerable and the success of such a course depended upon a positive response from the government parties in the Duma as well as from • the Stolypin ministry. The Failure of Conciliation By the summer of I908, there remained only two courses of action open to the Koto in the Duma. The first was recognition by the Koto that it could neither expect any concessions from the government nor could it count upon the support of the Octobrists in the Duma. This meant that the Koto would be forced to join the ranks of the''Duma opposition parties. The alternative to becoming an opposition party was to pursue a policy of conciliation with the government and with the Octobrists in the Duma. This second course meant adopting the tactics of conciliation, which long had been advocated by the Party of Realoolitik. Dmowski was aware that there would be opposition to 209 conciliation in the Endecja, but he realized that the Kolo was not in a strong bargaining position in the Duma and that little could be gained by going into opposition. In view of the German danger and the potentialities of the Neo-Slav movement, a conciliatory policy toward the regime and the Octobrists appeared to be the only realistic course of political action for the Kolo. The Kolo had prepared the v/ay for conciliation in the first session of the third Duma and by openly committing itself to the Neo-Slav movement. The second session of the third Duma which opened on November 1, I9O8 , afforded an opportunity to put into practice the tactics of conciliation. As Dmowski viewed the Russian political scene, he came to believe even more in the expedience of conciliation. The dissolution of the second Duma had proved that the struggle to alter the constitutional system had come to an end and that the opposition parties were no longer of any significance. A Duma majority consisting of the Octobrists, the Moderate Right, and the Nationalists controlled the Duma and this bloc aimed to stem the tide of revolution; on this point, the Endecja was in full agreement with the government and the Cctobrist-Rightist bloc in the Duma. However, Dmowski assumed that in time there would emerge a breach between the Octobrists on the one hand and the extreme right and the Nationalists on the other hand over the future course of political action. 2 1 0 He lolioved that the Octobricîtrj would strive to consolidate the gains wen between 19^5 and IpO?, but that the Nationalists and the extreme right would attempt to revert to the old pre-190< political order. On the basis of this assumption, the Octobrists, who did not enjoy an absolute majority in the Duma, would be forced to move to the left in order to acquire a majority. Ac a result the Octobrists would welcome the support of the Koio and be willing to make moderate concessions to the boles. Thus, the tactics of conciliation would enable the Kolo to prove its loyalty to the existing system and at the same time obtain the support and sympathy of the Octobrists, who' dominated the Duma and the State Council.-''' In the summer of 1908, the ^ndecja drew up a nev/ political program for the Kolo. This program was largely the work of ^ladyslaw Grabski who like Dmowski and Balicki v/as a firm advocate of adopting the tactics of conciliation. On August 15, I9O8, the Central Committee of the kndecja presented the new program to the deputies of the t'-oiroi According to the Grabski program, the basis for all future political action in the Duma was to be conciliation with the government and with the pro-government parties. The program then outlined the very most that the boles could hope to obtain in the third Duma : an end to discrimination ^ ^i'U k a w s k. i , Ko>o PnlsVjo, pp. 15 5 - 15 6 . 2 1 1 and full legal equality for folcy in Russia; the intro duction of local and n'.unicipal self-governrr.ent in Congress Poland and the western provinces; the use of Polish in local institutions of self-gcvernnient, the lower judicial institutions, and the school system; an equal scale of expenditures for purposes of educate on and culture in Russia and Poland; and a realizable land, reform, program. This new program also urged, the Roÿo to play an active role in the work of the Duma and legislation which affected the entire Empire. In the future legislative work of the Duma, the Koio was to uphold the principles of constitutionalism, promote educational and economic progress, work for decentralization, and support legislation to n? improve the conditions of the peasants and workers." Considering the political situation in Russia and in the Duma at the time, the Grabski program, was quite realistic. hut at the same time, it marked a decided break with the former objectives and tactics of the Kolro. The acceptance of this new program by the Endecja and the Koio meant the abandonment of political autonomy for Congress Poland, which up to this time had been the primary objective of the Koio and the chief point in the Endec ja program.. At the very most the ^-cio now hoped to obtain local self-government and a degree of cultural ^ Vv'iadysiaw Grad ski, Pori ad nn. r,ol i tv^e X. orooe oa'-] a m n t n rng npslow •oolr;ki ch w I 1 ! -c jo ,i 1 zbie I'arstw'ow-^ .1 ^or,\r •if-;Vio i (. ‘./ar'saw, 1909*7, pp. 1-16. 2 1 2 autonomy. Furthermore, the Ko-üro committed itself to playing an active role in the work of the &uma on issues which were of concern to the h'mpire. The Endec ja hoped that its new program would prove the loyalty of the Foies to Russia and in this manner pave the way for Russo-Polish reconciliation and broader concessions at a later date. In view of the attitude of the Russian government, the program of conciliation and. the Neo-Slav policies of the Endec ja were bound to cause dissension v;ithin the ranks of the Endecja. The first sign of dissatisfaction came following the dissolution of the second Duma with the defection of N'tadyskaw Studnicki. Arguing that there was no chance for the Koio to pursue a realistic political course in the Duma, Studnicki broke with the Endecja in the latter part of I907. Establishing his own paper, Voturn Separatum, in St. Petersburg, Studnicki criticized the policies of Dmowski and the Koio and called for an Austro-Hungarian orientation as opposed to conciliation with Russia. But criticism of the Endecja and the Koio erupted even before the end of the first session of the third Duma. by this time, it became apparent that the Koio was drifting toward the Octobrists and laying the groundwork for a future policy of conciliation and that it was embarking upon a policy of flirtation with the Neo-Slav movement. The chief opposition came from the daily 0-on i ec. 213 in April, I9O8 , the leading hndecja politicians connected with Gnni — Aleksander Zawadzki, 2 . iviakowiecki , and T, Crruzewski--oponly broke 'vith the Andecja and organized the !''ro^da. The Fronda opposed the pro-hussian policies of Dmowski and like Studnicki, it orged the adoption of an Austro-Hungarian political course. Still others who broke with the Kndecja at this time over the policy of conciliation with Russia gathered afound the Krakow paper, I' vsl Wszechnolski (The All-Poli sh idea). A far more serious defection from the Fndecja, however, occurred in September, I9O8 . At its annual Congress in Krakow, the harodowy Zwiazek 1 obotniczv openly condemned the new political program of the Kolo and broke with Kndecja. The NZR formed an separate independent faction which endorsed insurrection against Russia and drifted toward Pilsudski and the PPS-Right.^“ The defections from the Hndocja during I9O8 were due to the support that Dmowski gave to the Npo-^lav movement and the new program of conciliation with Tsarist regime» 'ihore was widespread criticism among all political groups in the Congress Kingdom, with the exception of the Party of 1 oalnoliti> . to the policies of Dmowski. In addition to criticism within Congress foland, the Austrian wing of the i'-'ndecja 3 ed by Stanislaw Cl^lrinshi, the president of the Folish Kolo in Vienna, opposed cooperation with ^^Feldman, Dzi e in nolski ei n'vs 1 i nnl jtyozrev. pp. 326-8, 214 the Neo-Slav nioveinont. The crisis over Neo-Slavism and the politics of conciliation not only weakened the k’ndecja, hut it also narrowed the generally broad base of popular support the Endecja had enjoyed previously. In spite of the crisis in the party, Dmowski continued to adhere to a course of conciliation with the government and the Octo brists as well as to pursue a Neo-Slav policy, Dmowski remained convinced that Germany was still the chief danger and that the only hope for koland lay in cooperation with Russia. The final decision to adopt the tactics of conciliation was taken at a meeting of the Central Committee of the Endecja on September 25-26, I9O8 . The deputies of the Kolo also were present at the meeting and according to Dmov.'ski the majority of the deputies agreed to the program of conciliation outlined by Grabski. There was no publi.c evidence of dissent within the Kolro at this time, but it may be assumed that there was a faction in the Ko-ko which entertained doubts as to the feasibility cf a conciliatory policy. The second session of the third Duma opened on November 1, I'^OB, and the Koto actively participated in the election of the Duma presidium and voted for all of the Octobrist candidates, Similo.rly, the Koio took part in the election of the various Duma commissions, but the First evidence of the conciliatory policies of the Koto 215 came on November 25, l^n8 , when the Duma voted on a government hill enacted under article 8? of the Fundamental Laws which provided for the exclusion from the army of any person under either direct or indirect police super vision. It had been defeated by Folish votes in the second Duma, where it was originally introduced, but at the opening of the second session, the Koto voted with the Octobrists and the entire right for the passage of the bill.^/ The obvious aim of the Koto was to disassociate itself from the opposition, prove its loyalty to the government, and dispel the notion that the Koto was a disloyal and opposition party. During the elections to the State Defense Commission, which dealt chiefly with army budgetary matters, the Octobrists had passed a resolution barring the election of opposition party deputies to the commission. The Octobrists classified the Koÿo, the holish-Lithuanian- Belorussian Kolro, and the Social Democrats as disloyal elements and opposition parties and the Poles were anxious to remove this stigma. On November 24, the Kolro also voted for the annual army recruit bill, but the uncondi tional support given by the Koio for these two bills failed to draw a favorable response from either the Octobrists or the government. The government press even och. November 2 6 , 1 9 0 9 . 2 1 6 commented that Polish support for both bills did not mark any noticeable shift in the tactics of the Koÿo. Among the most important legislative acts of the , third Duma was the passage o:^ the Stolypin agrarian reform. biJ.ls, promulgated under Article 8? in November, I906. The Kolfo was aware that the debates on the agrarian reform bills afforded it with a unique opportunity to prove its loyalty to the government. The discussion of the agrarian bills opened on November 5» 1908, when the Octobrist dominated agrarian commission submitted its recommendations to the Duma. The Koio supported the proposal by the commission to limit each deputy to a ten minute speech on the agrarian bill. During the debates on the agrarian bills, Stanisiaw ■ Wankov.'icz, the president of the Polish-Lithuanian-Delo- russian Koio set forth the position of his faction and that of the Polish Koio. Wankowicz stated that the Poles from the Congress Kingdom and the western provinces were committed to the Stolypin agrarian reform decrees. Further more, Wankowicz maintained that the Poles viewed the government agrarian reform as necessary not only to stem agrarian unrest, but also as vital for the social and economic evolution and progress of the Russian Empire. Ün these grounds, the Poles would support the government agrarian reform program. Ao ' ^GDSO, ioQR-1 oQQ £gr., Se run, 1 a 11 (St. Petersburg, I9O8 ), .L, pp. 1224-1225. 217 The Koÿo hoped that a etronr; endorsement of the Stolypin agrarian reform legislation would prove the loyalty of the Poles to the state and the government. • The Stolypin agrarian reform program was not only social and economic in content, but it served as the basis for the political program of the government as well. Thus, Polish support for this legislation amounted to an open endorsement of the regime and its program of conservative reform, but at the same time, support of this legislation amounted, to little more than sheer political opportunism. There was nothing in the agrarian reform program detrimental to the interests of the Polish landowners in the Congress Kingdom or the western provinces. In the Congress Kingdom, there was considerable public opposition toward the Koio for supporting the regime and moving further toward the Octobrists and the right. The Endecja sought' to counteract this criticism by explaining the support of the Koio for the government agrarian reform, program, simply as a tactical maneuver. The Kndecja argued that it was necessary to divorce the Koio entirely from the opposition parties, which opposed the government and the agrarian reform program. Furthermore, the Endecja vehemently denied, that the Koio sought to conclude a por.manent alliance wj th the Octobrists and the f ight. Nevertheless, it v/as Vecoming more ovid«^-nt to the Endec ja k e '.vs hi, Koio Pol.'j^^i e , p , 15 9 • 2 1 8 that in vicv; of the abuence of government concessions to the Poles, opposition to conciliation would continue to mount in Poland. In the Duma, the tactics of conciliation and the sup port that the K o ÿ o had given the Octobrists, the Moderate Right, and the Nationalists on all major issues resulted in no positive pro-Polish action by either the government, the Octobrists, or the parties of the right. In the Duma, Khomiakov praised the political realism of the Poles and emphasized that Polish conciliation with Russia would aid in the struggle against the Germans. Likewise, Guchkov expressed his satisfaction with the new tactics of the KoIto and he stated that urban and local self- government ought to be introduced into Congress Poland, However, on December 1, I9O8 , the Octobrists set forth a project for the introduction of local self-government in the western provinces, but made no mention of intro ducing these institutions into Congress Poland. The V.oio remained silent for fear of alienating the Octobrists and it hoped that in time the Octobrists would introduce a separate project for the introduction of local self- government into the Congress Kingdom. Put by the end of 1908, it v/as apparent that the Octobrists were unwilling to create dissension within their own ranks or lose the support of the Moderate Right and the Nationalists by making any concessions to the Poles. The Octobrists . 219 felt that the Koto could ’oe kept in lino hy underscoring the German danger and holding he fore the doles trie possibility of concessions at some future time. The doles, however, had no other alternative but to continue on s. realistic course and seek an accommodation on the terms set forth hy the Octobrists. By the end of 1909, the hopes that Dmowski had placed in t’olish. adherence to the Kco-Slav movement also had been shattered. The Austrian annexation of Bosnia-Hersegovina in October, 1909, precipitated an extended diplomatic crisis between Russia on the one hand and Austria and her ally' Germany on the other hand. The Bosnian crisis in affect marked the beginning of the disintegration of the Reo-Slav movement. In the Viennese F eichsrat. the Slav deputies as well as the Polish Po^o supported both the annexation and Austrian policies in the Balkans. In the Duma, however, there v/as a strong reaction to the humiliation of Russia at the hands of Germany and Austria-Hungary as well as resentment of the Austrian Slavs for failing to support Russia. The Octobrists and all of the rightist parties along with the opposition Cadets strongly supported the government and. the traditional policies of Russia in the L'alkans. In view of the loyalty o<^ the Austrian Slavs to Vienna during the Bosnian crisis and the diplomatic humiliation of Russia By Austria and Germany, the Ko-bb 220 hoped thdt the c;upportera of Meo-Slavion in the Dura 'A'ould raise the question of a ÎMisso-i’olish accenrodation. hut only Belrynsky raised the question of a lusso-dolish raonrocher0nt during the foreign policy delates in the Dura in Decerher, I9O8 . hohrynsky, however, maintained that before such an accord could be i-eached the Poles would have to accept two conditions: an end to Polish discrimination against the Ukrainian population in Galicia and recognition of the Galician Ukrainians as a separate Russian people; the delimiting of Polish and Ukrainian go territories in Galicia and. Congress Poland. Dmowski maintained a discreet silence and did not speak on foreign affairs in the Duma. He was well aware that acceptance of such conditions would lead to mass defections from the Endecja in Congress Poland and result in the secession- of G>^binski and the Galician Endecja from the party. The Bosnian crisis seriously weakened the Neo-Slav move ment and during the foreign policy debates in the Duma, it was apparent that the Russian Meo-Slavs were unwilling to take up the cause of Russo-Polish reconciliation. The failure of the government and the Octobrists to respond to the conciliatory politics of the Ko^o, the public dissatisfaction in Congress Poland over the now tactics of the Koio, and disintegration of the Neo-Slav movement forced Dmowski to turn to the conservative Party " I b:t d . . n. ] 6^1-. 2 2 1 of Rpalnolifik for support. The Realists long had advocated the tactics of conciliation and L. Strasaev/ics and »■', Piltz had been the only non-Rndocja politicians to defend Dnowski and the politics of conciliation in the buma. In December, I9O8 , Dmowslci initiated negotiations with the Party of Realnolitik concerning the possibility of bringing the Realists into the Koio and the apparent reason for undertaking these negotiations was the failure of the Koio to obtain any concessions froin the government. Dmowski believed that since the Realists had consistently supported conciliation and that they bore no responsibility for the previous politics of the Koio, the .government and the Octobrists might be more willing to negotiate with the Poles and. make concessions if the Realists were brought into the Koio. The results of the negotiations between the kndecja and the Realists were not made public, but it v.'as the Rndecja which abandoned the talks. The chief obstacle to including the Realists in the Koio was the Duma electoral law. In order for the Realists to enter the Koio, either several of the deputies would have to renounce their mandates or the entire Koio would have to resign so that new elections could be held. In view of the mounting opposition in Congress Poland and dissension within the Pndecja, Dmowski decided to abandon this scheme as unrealistic. The Realists enjoyed little oublie • 222 support and there v.’a n no possibility that thoir candidates would bo elected. The Endecja believed that new elections at this time only would benefit the socialists and the -brorressivo Eerocrats and thus shatter the political solidarity of the bolish deputies in the Euma. ^'-ut the talks with the Realists reflect a shift to the political right by the Endecja. Furthermore, the negotiations also indicate that there may have been opposition to Fmowski in the boio and that he contemplated replacement of those opposition deputies with politicians from the Party of Rcptrolitik, In early January, 19OS', shortly after .the Duma had adjourned for the Christmas recess, Dmowski suddenly announced his resignation from the Kobo for reasons of poor health.There were, however, other and more important reasons for his resignation. As the leader of national politics in Congress Poland, Dmowski hoped that the crisis that emerged from his resignation would rally public opinion behind his program of conciliation with Russia. Furthermore, the Endecja press speculated that his presence in Warsaw was necessary in order to restore unity in the Endecja and gain support for his program. During the Duma recess, the Endecja also held its annual party congress at which it became evident that not only was there disunity vrithin the party over the program /to, ''"^%. o . " ' o , January 18, 190Q. 223 of conciliation with Russia, but also that opposition existed in the Kolo as well. The first public manifestation of differences in the Koto over the tactics of conciliation came in January, 1 9 0 9, The opposition centered around Parczewski and Haruszewicz. Both deputies were opposed to ties with the Neo-Slav movement and close collaboration in the Duma with the Octobrists. On January 21, I9 0 9, Parczewski stated at a meeting of the deputies of the Koio in Kalisz that neither the Stolypin ministry nor the Duma seriously intended to change the existing system in Congress Poland. In view of the attitude of the regime and the Duma toward the Poles, Parczewski maintained that the Koio should avoid collaborating with the Octobrists, and abstain on the budget and the agrarian bills. In addition, Parczewski argued against continued Polish support for the Neo-Slav movement and he asserted that he did not foresee the possibility of the Austrian and Balkan Slavs influencing Russian policies toward Poland. Like Parczewski, Haruszewicz also opposed Polish support of the Neo-Slav movement and drawing closer to the Octobrists in the Duma. Haruszewicz voiced his opposition to the tactics of conciliation at the party congress of the Endecja held in late January, I909. Speaking before the congress, Haruszewicz maintained that ^^Slowo. January 23» 1909. 224 there was no common basis for a compromise or under standing between the Ko3ro and the Octobrists, He argued that the only honorable course open to the Koio was to adopt the tactics of moderate opposition and vote on issues in accordance with Polish national interests. The opposition of Parczewski and Haruszewicz was the first public manifestation of differences that existed among the deputies since the formation of the Polish Koio in 1 9 0 6, Dmowski, however, intended to use the congress to secure approval of the tactics of conciliation and to endorse his program for closer collaboration and a compromise with the Octobrists, In spite of the opposition in the Endecja, the congress endorsed the program of Dmowski and the politics of the Koio and then voted against accepting Dmowski's resignation, Dmowski refused to accept this vote of confidence and publically declared that his decision was irrevocable. Since the Koio was without a president, the Central Committee of the Endecja met with the deputies in order to define the political course of the Koio during the remainder of the second session and to eliminate differences within the Koio, At the close of the meeting, the Central Committee and the deputies issued a communique calling for common work with the Octobrists with the ultimate goal of reaching a compromise with the Octobrists and the government, ' 225 Another motive for the determination of the Endecja to continue upon a course of conciliation with the Octobrists was the mounting friction between the Octobrists and the parties of the right. Early in the second session, Guchkov and the Octobrists had called for a thorough exposure and investigation of the inadequacies in the Russian military system. The parties of the right— the Moderate Right, the Nationalists and the extreme right— strongly opposed the attempt by the Octobrists to scrutinize the activities of the military and they maintained that these matters were outside the scope of the Duma. At the same time, Stolypin was under sharp attack by the extreme right and reactionary court circles for his firm adherence to working with the Octobrists and within the framework of the constitutional system.These developments caused the Koio to speculate that in the event of a rupture between the Octobrists and the parties of the right, the former would seek support on the left and welcome the support of the Poles. By the end of January, I9 0 9, the Koio was considering the formation of a left-of-center bloc comprising the Koio, the Polish-Lithuanian-Belorussian faction, the Progressives, and the Moslem faction. This proposed bloc would constitute about sixty votes, thereby enabling the Octobrists to maintain a Duma majority. The Koio deliberately excluded ^^Edward Chmielewski, "Stolypin and the Russian ' Ministerial Crisis of 1909." California Slavic Studies," IV (1 9 6), 7 pp. 1-3 8. 226 the Cadets from the proposed left-of-center bloc in the belief that including the Cadets would be unacceptable to the Octobrists and the government. The Cadets, however, countered with a similar proposal to form a bloc which would include both the Cadets and the KoSro. But a left- of-center bloc during the remainder of the second session of the third Duma never materialized. The difference between the Octobrists and the Moderate Right and the Nationalists were too insignificant to force the Octobrists ii>6 to seek support on the left. The real test of the intentions of the ministry and the Octobrists came in March, 1909» during the debates on the preliminary expenses of the Ministry of Justice. When the debates opened on March 15» 1909» Dymsza spoke for the Poles and demanded an end to discrimination against Poles in"the judiciary of the Congress Kingdom and he proposed an amendment which would remove obstacles pre venting the appointment of Poles to judiciary positions. This demand, however, produced a violent reaction from the extreme right and the Minister of Justice, Shcheglovitov. Shcheglovitov asserted that it was indeed fortunate that the regular courts were in the hands of Russians. Further more, he argued that the appointment of Poles to such positions would not only prevent the courts from fulfilling their proper functions, but contribute to separatist ^^tukawski, Koio Polskie. pp. 171-172. 227 tendencies and weaken Russian control in Poland. Through out the debates, the Octobrists made no effort to support the Polish amendment and N, Shubinsky, who represented the Octobrist right-wing, sharply criticized the speech h,n of Dymsza. The Duma rejected the amendment and the Octobrists voted with the rightist bloc. On March J l , I9 0 9, the Duma debated a proposal for the introduction of sworn aldermen into those provinces deprived of them. During the debate the Octobrists passed a motion that such aldermen be introduced into the Congress Kingdom. On this occasion, Shcheglovitov vehemently criticized the Octobrist motion, stating that Ji| Q the government strongly opposed this idea. Under pressure from the government and the right, the Octobrists abandoned this scheme. In spite of che defeat of the amendment to remove restrictions upon Poles holding positions in the regular courts and the withdrawal of the motion to introduce sworn aldermen into the Congress Kingdom, the Poles voted for the budget of the Ministry of Justice. However, the defeat of these two measures clearly indicated that the government was opposed to even minor concessions to the Poles and that the Octobrists could not be counted upon to support measures which would grant the Poles even .equality of rights. 47GDS0. 1908-1909 gg.. Sessiia II. II, pp. 2913-2918. ^^Ibid.. Ill, 1140-1142. 228 These events precipitated a new crisis in the Koio and in the Endecja which took the form of outspoken criticism of conciliation by the deputies of the Koio. Late in March, 1909» the Progressive Democratic newspaper Dzien published an open letter by Parczewski strongly criticizing the tactics of conciliation and quite bluntly criticizing the Koio for voting for the budget for the Ministry of Justice. Likewise, Parczewski argued that the strongly anti-Polish speech of the Minister of Justice should have made it perfectly clear that the Poles could neither expect any concessions from the government nor could the Koio count upon the Octobrists to obtain even modest reforms in the Congress Kingdom. Parczewski argued for a radical change in tactics with the Koio going over hq to the opposition. ^ In the Congress Kingdom, there was widespread criticism among all political groups with the exception of the Realists over the tactics of conciliation and collaboration with the Octobrists. The failure of the Koio to obtain any concessions from either the government or the Duma, the defections from the Endecja in the preceding year, and evidence that the regime would continue to pursue essentially anti-Polish policies in the future caused the prestige of the Endecja to decline and a loss of popular support. Further evidence of the declining ^^Siowo. March 29» 1909» 229 fortunes of the Endecja emerged when three prominent Endecja politicians--?, Nowodworski, A, Pepiowski and Wladyslaw Smolenski— declined offers to fill the seat in the Koio vacated by Dmowski. W, Jabionowski finally accepted Dmowski's seat in the Koio although he did not assume the position of president of the Koio.^^ Recognizing that the base of popular support of the Endecja had contracted and that political opinion was opposed to conciliation, Dmowski turned to the Realists for support with the aim of creating an inter-party organization which would share responsibility for the direction of the Koio. The only party willing to work with the Endecja was the Party of Realnolitik and in February, 1909, Dmowski proposed to Straszewicz, Piltz, and Grendyszynski the creation of an inter-party organiza tion to direct the politics of the Koio and be responsible to public opinion. In April, 1909» Dmowski and the Realists announced the formation of the Citizens Delegation. The function of the Citizens Delegation was to advise the Koio on issues which pertained to matters of Polish national interest and make decisions that the Koio could not make on its own initiative. The Delegation had a membership of fifty-one and it was composed of the leading Endecja and Party of Realnolitik politicians including ^^Wiadysiaw Jabionowski, ^ biegriem lat: Wsoommienia 2 Romania Dmowskim (Czi^stochowa, 1939 ), pp. 26-27. 230 Dmowski, Balicki, Straszewicz, and Piltz. The large majority of the Delegation's members came from the land owning and middle classes and there were few delegates who represented either the peasants or the urban working class. Thus, the direct control and responsibility for the Koio rested with the Citizens Delegation, the Endecja, and the Party of Realnolitik. In reality, the Citizens Delegation was unrepresentative of Polish society and the diverse political views in the Congress Kingdom. The agreement with the Realists and the creation of the Citizens Delegation clearly indicated that Dmowski and the Endecja did not entertain any serious intentions of abandoning the tactics of conciliation. By the end of the second session of the third Duma, the function of the Koio was not to work out a solution to the Polish question on the basis of autonomy or even equality of rights, but simply to work within the framework of the existing system and participate fully in the work of the Duma. The Koio in fact pursued this course through out the remaining sessions of the third Duma and into the fourth Duma until the outbreak of World War I. Dmowski and the Endecja remained committed to reconciliation with Russia and the chief motive for this political course was fear of Germany. Dmowski hoped that by continuing to follow a course of conciliation and actively participating ^^tukawski, Koio Polskie. pp. 177-178. 231 in the work of the Duma, the Poles would he able to prove their loyalty to Russia. In time Dmowski believed that the Russian government would realize the absurdity of its anti-Polish policies, recognize Polish loyalty to Russia, and finally make limited concessions which would grant local institutions of self-government and cultural autonomy to the Congress Kingdom. But these expectations failed to be realized in either the third or fourth Dumas. During the remainder of the third Duma and the first two sessions of the fourth Duma, the position of the Koio became more precarious. In order to counteract pressure from the extreme right in the Duma and reactionaries in the State Council and at court, Stolypin placed even greater emphasis upon nationalism, which always had been a basic tenet of his program. During the first and second sessions of the third Duma, Stolypin had relied chiefly upon the Octobrists and the Moderate Right to support his legislative program. But with the opening of the third session, the Stolypin ministry shifted its support to the newly formed Russian National Party. This party was a result of a union of the Moderate Right and the Nationalists and it also included nearly thirty right-wing Octobrist deputies who had defected to the Moderate Right and Nationalists in May, 1909. The Russian National Party and its allies on the extreme right were strongly nationalis tic and opposed even moderate concessions to the Poles or 232 other national minorities. As a result, Stolypin and his successor Kokovtsov used nationalistic legislation directed against the national minorities as an instrument to retain the allegiance of the right. Consequently, even the moderate Octobrists were placed in the awkward position of having to support strongly nationalistic legislation which down until 1914 was directed chiefly against the Poles. During the remaining sessions of the third Duma and during the fourth Duma until the outbreak of the war, the government initiated a number of anti-Polish legislative projects aimed at reducing the influence of the Poles in the western provinces and continuing the Russification policies in the Congress Kingdom. Prior to the closing of the second session of the third Duma, Stolypin introduced legislation changing the procedures for the election of members to the State Council from the western provinces. The purpose of the measure was to prevent the election of Polish landowners in these provinces to the State Council. This was followed by another legislative bill to introduce the zemstvos into the western provinces. The western zemstvo electoral curiae, however, discriminated against the Polish landowners and insured that the zemstvos would be controlled by the Russian element in these provinces. The western zemstvos bill precipitated a major legislative crisis in 1911» but the bill finally 233 was passed by the Duma and the State Council. The most controversial and anti-Polish measure in the third Duma was the government project to separate the Cheim district from the Congress Kingdom. Introduced into the Duma in July, I9 0 9, the bill was debated by a Duma commission and finally approved by the Duma in April, 1 9 1 2. In order to silence Polish opposition to the separation of Cheim, the government introduced a bill in 1 9 1 0 providing for the introduction of municipal self- government in the Congress Kingdom. This measure, however, hardly amounted to a concession on the part of the regime for it prescribed the exclusive use of the Russian language in the work of the municipal councils and it provided for a disproportionately large representation for the Russian minority. Although the bill was passed by the Duma, it was vetoed by the State Council and never implemented in Congress Poland prior to the outbreak of the war. The final piece of anti-Polish legislation came during the fifth session of the third Duma (1911-1912) with passage by the Duma of a bill for the nationalization of the Warsaw-Vienna railway line. In summary, down until the outbreak of World War I, the Russian government introduced legislation which was basically anti-Polish and these measures were passed by a nationalist and conservative Duma. 2;4 In view of the anti-Polish policies of the Tsarist government and the hostility of the right in the Duma, Polish adherence to the Neo-Slav movement became meaning less. In May, 1909» and again in February, 1910, delegates of the movement gathered in St, Petersburg to plan the next congress. On both occasions, Dmowski and Kramar emphasized the necessity for Polish-Russian reconciliation. The Russian delegates also expressed a desire to normalize relations, but maintained that the separation of Cheim was a necessary precondition for Russo-Polish reconciliation. Since it was quite evident that Polish support for the Neo- Slav movement would not bring about any significant changes in Russian policies toward Poland, the Poles boycotted the Slav congress held in Sofia in July, I9 1 0. Russian and Polish nationalism proved to be far stronger than the vague ideals of Slav solidarity and cooperation, Dy the opening of the third session of the third Duma late in 1909» the Koio had failed to realize either its maximum or minimum autonomy programs; the former would have given the Congress Kingdom broad political autonomy, while the latter would have guaranteed at least cultural autonomy and local institutions of self-government. With the anti-Polish legislation by the government, the continued predominance of nationalist and conservative elements in the Duma, and the disintegration of the Neo- Slav movement, the struggle for autonomy had ended and 235 the Endecja politics of autonomy and Russo-Polish concilia tion were bankrupt. Yet the Koio under the direction of the Endec ja and the Realists, continued t Congress Poland would benefit as well. The Endecja hoped that by continuing the politics of conciliation the Poles would prove their loyalty to Russia and that in the future the political climate in Russia would improve and the government and the Duma would more readily grant concessions to the Poles. CHAPTER VI CONCLUSION Dmowski and the National Democrats believed that the establishment of a constitutional system in Russia afforded the Poles an opportunity to obtain broad political autonomy for Congress Poland and thereby make Russo- Polish reconciliation a reality. The quest for autonomy dominated the politics of the Koio down until the middle of 1 9 0 9* By that time, however, the Koio had failed to obtain either political autonomy for the Congress Kingdom or reforms which would have granted the Poles a degree of cultural autonomy and institutions of local self- government, The failure of the Koio to realize either of these autonomy programs can be attributed to the attitude of the Russian political parties and factions toward Polish autonomy, the hostility of the Stolypin ministry toward the Poles, the inherent weaknesses in the Russian constitutional structure, and the tactics of the Koio itself. The diversity of Russian political parties resulted in a variety of views on the question of Polish autonomy. The first and second Dumas were dominated largely by the Cadets, who should have been the natural allies of the 236 237 Poles since the Cadet program provided for the creation of an autonomous Congress Poland. But the Cadet attitude toward the Poles was quite ambivalent. The Cadets re sented the conservatism of the Poles on social and economic issues and they entertained suspicions as to the ultimate consequences of Polish national aspirations should the Congress Kingdom be granted autonomy. Finally, the Cadets relegated Polish autonomy to a position of secondary impor tance and they were unwilling to separate the autonomy question from the larger issue of the national minorities. Conservative and nationalist political elements, which were opposed to political autonomy for Congress Poland, controlled the third Duma, thus making it impos sible for the Koio to obtain autonomy. The Octobrists were not averse to making moderate concessions to the Poles on cultural matters and local self-government. However, there existed a strong anti-Polish faction within the Octobrist party. As the government came to rely more upon the Nationalist-Rightist bloc which opposed even moderate concessions to the national minorities the Octobrists were pushed further to the right and placed in a position where it was politically inexpedient to endorse wholeheartedly even moderate concessions to the Poles. Control of the third Duma by elements which were essentially anti-Polish made it impossible for the Koio to obtain even moderate concessions. 238 ' A further obstacle to the national aspirations of the Koio v/as the Stolypin ministry. Not only v/as Stolypin an ardent Russian nationalist, but nationalism, was an important element in his political program. Stolypin was consciously anti-Polish, particularly in regard to the western provinces, and at the same time he was un willing to make any concessions to the national minorities which would jeopardize the dominant position of the Russian element in the.Empire. When it became evident in the second Duma that the passage of important government legislation depended upon Polish support, Stolypin was uncompromising and refused to accept a situation where the Poles would be the arbiters of what he considered to be purely Russian affairs. Finally, in the third Duma, Stolypin utilized nationalism as an instrument to retain the support of the Nationalist-Rightist bloc in the Duma and to undermine reactionary elements in the State Council and at court. The very nature of the Russian constitutional system likewise prevented the Poles from realizing their autonomy program for Russian' constitutionalisim rested upon a very weak foundation. There were powerful elements at court, in the ministry, and in the Duma which aimed to prevent the Duma from functioning as a truly legislative body and who sought to relegate the Duma to a position subordi nate to the government. Even Stolypin, who considered 239 himself to be a constitutionalist, v/as quite willing to resort to non-constitutional methods to secure the elec tion of a Duma which would support the legislative program of the government. The fate of the second Duma and the promulgation of the new electoral law attest to the unwillingness of the government to permit the Duma to function as an independent legislative body. The weakness of the Russian constitutional system proved to be especially detrimental to the Koio. Duma legislation which might have granted the Poles political autonomy or other concessions would have been subject to obstruction in the State Council and ultimately vetoed by the Tsar. The Koio certainly was aware of the political obstacles involved in realizing its goals. In the second Duma, where the Poles were in an exceptionally strong position, they attempted to work entirely within the framework of the constitutional system and reach a compro mise with the government. The Poles learned too late that Russian constitutionalism did not function on the same principles as western European parliamentary democracy. Finally, the Poles also shared in the responsibility for the failure of their autonomy program. The Koio claimed to represent the entire nation in the Duma and it gave priority to Polish national interests. As a national party, the Koio generated suspicion as to the real intentions of Polish national aspirations and it 240 revived fears in Tsarist government circles and among Russian politicians of Polish separatism. Likewise, ty separating the Polish question from the national minorities question, the Kolro lost the sympathy of many Russian liberals, the parties of the left, and the other national minorities in the Duma. In reality, the Koio was a national faction and this simply reinforced the widely held opinions in the government and among Russian nationalists and conservatives that the Poles were a disloyal and separatist element. The fact that the Poles pursued an independent polit ical course in the Duma by avoiding entangling alliances with and commitments to the Russian parties while professing complete loyalty to the state further undermined the position of the Koïo. This v/as especially the case in the first and second Dumas where the Koio did enjoy a degree of tactical flexibility. But in spite of the realism of its tactics, the long term consequences were disastrous. By the end of the second Duma, the Poles had a reputation of being little more than political opportunists. Consequently, when the Koio embarked upon a course of conciliation with the Octobrists and the government in the third Duma, neither the Stolypin ministry nor the government parties in the Duma took the Koio seriously. Finally, Dmowski and the Endecja completely under estimated the strength of Russian nationalism. Dmowski 241 had calculated that internal pressure for liberalization and reform combined with such external factors as the German danger, the Neo-Slav movement and opinion in France and Great Britain, would result in the Tsarist regime making concessions to the Poles. However, the Stolypin ministry was unwilling to respond to either internal or external pressures. In fact, the government quite skillfully exploited Russian nationalism to its ov/n advantage and directed it against the Poles and other national minorities. Nationalism served as a useful instrument to strengthen the state and perpetuate the predominance of the Russian element. It is quite easy to exaggerate the importance of any single faction in the Duma in a study of this type. Nevertheless, the Polish struggle for autonomy and the politics of the Ko2ro had an impact on the Russian constitu tional system. In the second Duma, the tactics of the Polish Koto were an important consideration in the decision to dissolve the Duma and promulgate a new electoral law. These decisions paved the way for the election of the conservative and nationalist third and fourth Dumas, which cooperated with the government. Furthermore, the role of the Koio in the second Duma was exploited quite skillfully to deprive the Poles and the other national minorities of any role in the political life of the Empire and used as a pretext to strengthen the unity of 2 4 2 the state and to enact nationalist legislation which perpetuated the Russification policies of the regime. In the struggle hy the Kolro to obtain autonomy for Congress Poland, the forces of Russian nationalism triumphed over Polish nationalism. It is ironic that Dmowski and the Endecja had viewed the establishment of constitutionalism in Russia as an opportunity to obtain autonomy and arrive at an understanding with Russia. By 1909*1 however, the Duma had become simply an instrument to perpetuate the Russification policies which had been carried out in the Congress Kingdom prior to the I905 Revolution. In the final analysis, the failure of the Koio to obtain either political autonomy or cultural autonomy as well as a Russo-Polish rannrochement rests largely on the shoulders of the Tsarist regime. The Tsarist government lacked a positive and clearly defined policy with regard to Poland. In the decade prior to World War I, the Tsarist government might have solved the Polish question to its own advantage and even attracted the support of the Prussian and Austrian Poles. The shortsighted policies of the Stolypin ministry and its strongly nationalistic domestic program prevented the Poles from obtaining autonomy within the Empire and the Endecja from realizing its program of conciliation with Russia. APPENDIX I THE FIRST DUlViA; DEPUTIES OF THE POLISH KOiO vVARSZA¥/A (city) — vViadyaiaw Tyszkiewicz, Franciazek Nowodv/orski iiODZ (city) — Antoni Rz%d KALISZ — Alfons Parczewski, Jozef Oiowinkov/ski, Jozef Suchorzewski KIELCE -- Teofil Waligorski, Kateusz î/lanterys, Wiktor Jaronski LUBLIN -- Maurycy Zamoyski, Jan Stecki, Julian Florkowski, Bronisiaw Malev/ski, Jozef Nakonieczny ■ - aOhiZA -- Jan Haruszewicz, StanisLaw Chrystowski PIOTRKOW — Marian Fulman, Bronisiaw Grabianski, Hieronym Kondratowicz, Zbigniew Paderewski, Tadeusz Walicki FLOCK — Aleksander Maciesza,' Stanislaw Cheicbowski RADOM — Jozef Swiezynski, Jan Waligora, Jozef Ostrowski SIEDLCE -- Jozafat Biyskosz, Bogdan Zalewski, Sev/eryn Sv/igtopeik-Gzetwertynski WARSZAWA — Wiadysiaw Grabski, Jan Gralewski, Pawel Wasilewski, Marian Kiniorski, Jan Zagleniczny 243 /APPENDIX II THE SECOND DUMA; DEPUTIES OF THE POLISH KOBO FROM THE CONGRESS KINGDOM WARSZAWA (city) — Roman Dmowski, Franciszek Nov/odworski EODZ (city) — Aleksander Babicki KALISZ — Jozef Suchorzewski, Alfons Parczewski, Stanislaw Wesoiowski KIELCE — Jan Bielawski, Wiktor Jaronski, Henryk Potocki ■LOMZA — Jan Haruszewicz, Mieczysiaw Skarzynski LUBLIN — Antoni Hempel, Stefan Plewinski, Stanislaw ^liwinski, Jan Stecki, Piotr Zak PIOTRKOW — Mateusz Dziurzynski, Stanislaw Jutyna, Felicjan Otocki, Edward Peplowski, Wiadyslaw Zukowski BLOCK — Michal Bojanowski, Henryk Konic RADOM — Antoni Bielinski, Henryk Dembinski, Jozef Ostrowski SIEDLCE — Jozaphat Blyskosz, Ludwik Bryndza-Nacki, Stanislaw Sunderland WARSZAWA — Wiadyslaw Grabski, Jan Gralewski, Jozef Glowacki, Wiadyslaw Nowca, Kajetan Piechowski 2kk APPENDIX III THE THIRD DUKA; DEPUTIES OP THE POLISH KO&O WARSZAWA (city) - - Roman Dmowski tdbz (city) - Antoni KALISZ - Alfons Parczewski KIELCE - Wiktor Jaronski •LOMZA - Jan Haruszewicz LUBLIN - Jozef Nakonieczny PIOTRKOW - WZadyslaw Zukowski PLOGK - Hipolit W%sowicz RADOM - Jozef Swiezynski SIEDLCE - Ludomir Dymsza WARSZAWA - Wiadyslaw Grabski ?Â5 BIBLIOGRAPHY PRIMARY SOURCES Manuscript Collections Archiwa Polskiej Akademii Nauk. 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