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RUSSIAN ELECTION WATCH Vol.3, No.4

RUSSIAN ELECTION WATCH Vol.3, No.4

Harvard University (Belfer Center for Science & International Affairs, Davis Center for Russian & Eurasian Studies) and Indiana University-Bloomington

RUSSIAN ELECTION WATCH Editor: Henry E. Hale Associate Editor: Danielle Lussier Vol.3, No.4, January 2004

TOP NEWS TRACKING THE POLLS: • Putin unchallenged as presidential frontrunner How the Presidential Race Now Stands: • Pro-Putin United wins Duma supermajority • Pro-Western liberal parties lose nearly all Duma seats • Communist Duma delegation cut by more than half • Communists allege fraud hurt , not selves • Main parties skip presidential race or run unknowns • Communists nominate Kharitonov, not Zyuganov • and SPS nominate no one for president; Khakamada launches independent bid Putin 75% Zhirinovsky 7% • UR leader Gryzlov tapped as Duma speaker Zyuganov 4%

Glaziev 2% SEE INSIDE Yavlinsky 1% P.3: Was the Duma race free and fair? Other/ P.5: Who are Putin’s rivals, why are they running? Undecided 11% P.7: Insider Information: Top Russian analysts from different party camps interpret the campaign PLUS in-the-know analysis of a key regional election.

On the Campaign Trail Figures were obtained from polling agency VTsIOM-A’s survey of 3,200 RUSSIA: A ONE-MAN SHOW adult citizens nationwide conducted between November 18 and December Russia’s December 2003 parliamentary elections consoli- 23, 2003. The numbers represent the percentage who, given a list of dated a political system more completely dominated by a names, say they would cast their ballot for a given candidate if the presi- single individual than any since Soviet times. This single dential election were held the following Sunday, counting only those who intend to vote. individual, President (below), is now virtually unchallenged in the presidential race, with all major parties either declining to nominate anyone or tapping DATES TO REMEMBER political Lilliputians for the race. The party defined by its January 28, 2004: Last day for presidential unswerving loyalty to this single individual, , candidates to submit signatures now controls over 300 March 14, 2004: Presidential election seats in the Duma, more than enough to pass con- stitutional amendments. are, respectively, a nationalist and a populist cabal, gen- The most powerful re- erally supportive of, if not creatures of, Putin’s administra- gional leaders in Russia tion. In short, what Putin says, goes. have almost all fallen into line, either joining The analogy with Soviet times is far from exact, however. United Russia or allying For one thing, Putin’s popularity is genuine, even enthusias- with it. The liberal op- tic. The fact that it is reinforced and cultivated by carefully position, Yabloko and controlled and biased television coverage makes it no less the Union of Right real. One of the most reputable independent survey agen- Forces, have all but dis- cies, VTsIOM-A, thus finds that Putin is currently polling an appeared from the Duma. amazing 75% in the presidential race and that even his most The leftist opposition, the promising rivals trail by nearly 60%; no wonder they pulled of the out of the contest in droves. Putin’s endorsement of United Russian Federation Russia sent that party’s ratings skyward during the Duma (KPRF), was virtually decimated in the election, with its campaign. Other parties, even the liberally minded Yabloko delegation cut by more than half. The only other political and the hard-left Communists, foundered on the paradox organizations with Duma representation to speak of, the that many of their own voters approved of Putin. Had Putin Liberal of Russia (LDPR) and Motherland, himself not been so appealing to the mass public, he would not have been able to dominate so completely. PARTY-LIST RACE RESULTS (% of vote) tention, he granted an interview to the three main television networks in which he waxed eloquent about his preference United Russia 37.6 for the party and praised its work in the Duma. United Rus- KPRF 12.6 sia’s ratings soared above 30% for the first time, paving the LDPR 11.5 way to its final total of 38%. Slanted news programs, whose Motherland 9.0 editorial motto could have been “all Putin, all the time,” ------buttressed the party’s position and ruled out virtually all criticism. Only in the officially allocated “debate” time did Yabloko 4.3 United Russia’s opponents have a chance to attack it on ma- SPS 4.0 jor nationwide television. But United Russia simply skipped Agrarian Party 3.6 these debates, forcing opponents to squabble among them- Pensioners/Social Justice 3.1 selves more than with Putin’s favorite party. United Russia Speakers’ Bloc 1.9 candidates in the districts had not only these advantages but, in most cases, the active backing of powerful regional po- People’s Party 1.2 litical machines as well. Unification 1.1 Other Parties 3.8 The United Russia deputies can be expected to back Putin in Against All 4.7 almost everything he does, but it may be a mistake to view Bold = parties clearing 5% and thus winning official fraction in Duma. them as a monolithic bloc that will back the President mind- Figures are from Russia’s Central Election Commission. lessly. For one thing, since the Kremlin relied heavily on regional bosses to win the election, many of the new depu- ties are almost purely products of these very political ma- THE NEW DUMA chines and owe little to Putin himself. Therefore, should UNITED RUSSIA achieved a landslide victory on Putin policies infringe on the power of these machines, one December 7, 2003. Whereas no party had previously can expect this “regional bloc” within United Russia to at- garnered even a quarter of the ballots in the party-list tempt to quietly alter legislation in ways that benefit them. voting since the Duma was founded in 1993, On major issues for which the Kremlin is willing to apply Putin’s favorite netted 38%. Since many parties got a intense pressure to regional leaders, however, the President significant number of votes but failed to clear the critical is almost certain to get his way. 5% threshold (for examples, see pp.3-4), these “wasted” votes were redistributed to the parties that did reach 5%. As a result, United Russia wound up with 120 of the 225 SEAT DISTRIBUTION IN THE NEW DUMA seats that were allocated in the party-list competition. As impressive as this was, United Russia won an even more stunning victory in the districts, effectively captur- ing some 180 of the 225 seats available. While not all of these were UR nominees, many were members running United Russia, 300 as independents and others hitched themselves to the Empty, 3 party’s Duma delegation (“fraction”) after the election. For example, pro-Kremlin People’s Party members won over 20 seats, and most opted to join United Russia’s fraction. Thus, at its first meeting in late December, the new Duma registered an impressive 300 deputies for Independent, 23 United Russia, and party leaders claimed they were win- ning still more. The party easily got its leader, Boris LDPR, 36 Gryzlov (below), elected as Duma speaker.

The most obvious reasons for Motherland, 36 KPRF, 52 United Russia’s success were Putin’s endorsement, biased state-controlled media, and the support of powerful gov- ernors. Putin generally avoided any public involve- THE COMMUNIST PARTY (KPRF) had not won ment in the Duma campaign, less than 20% in any federal election since 1993, which but when he did intervene, his makes its 2003 collapse to just 13% in the party-list Duma words had powerful effects. contest stunning indeed. Even more crushing was its per- First, at the party’s September formance in the district elections. Whereas its nominees had 20 convention, he declared that he had voted for it in won 46 district seats in 1999, it netted only a dozen in 2003. 1999 and had done the right thing. Pollsters estimated Towering party figures fell in droves, even in districts long that this gave the party a 5% boost, helping put it ahead considered safely “red.” Gone was Anatoly Lukianov, re- of the Communists for good. Second, in the final week puted mastermind of the August 1991 coup attempt and of the campaign, when voters were paying the most at- former head of the USSR’s Supreme Soviet. Outside look-

2 ing in was Yegor Ligachev, the erstwhile number-two WERE THE ELECTIONS FREE AND FAIR? man in the under . De- The OSCE, which deployed both long- and short-term ob- feated was the colorful “working man” Vasily Shandy- servers throughout Russia for the Duma elections, found bin (below), long a favorite target of journalists’ humor. that they “failed to meet many OSCE and All three, along with many others, lost to United Russia commitments for democratic elections” (see challengers. Overall, the KPRF can claim only 52 of the http://www.osce.org/documents/odihr/2003/12/1629_en.pdf). The 450 seats in the new Duma. This group is likely to op- main problem was found to be not in actual voting and pose Putin vocally from the political left, but its numbers counting procedures, where no large-scale fraud was de- give it no power whatsoever to influence Duma out- tected, but in the way that the state created unfair cam- comes whenever United Russia is truly united. (Is the paigning conditions that favored United Russia. The two KPRF dead? See Nikonov on p.11.) most reliable exit polls that were conducted concur. One The Communist defeat in part was by the reputable Public Opinion Foundation (POF) and simply reaffirms the power of the other by ROMIR, working with American financier negative campaigning. Virtu- George Soros, the politically independent Times, ally every day, the main net- and the firm Renaissance Capital with the express aim of works’ news programs bat- detecting or preventing fraud. Both produced findings al- tered the KPRF with accusa- most exactly in line with official vote counts. There was one tions of incompetence and exception, however. Both the POF and Soros polls put corruption. The most deadly Yabloko between 5% and 6%, findings leading some to sug- attacks, broadcast day after gest Yabloko was essentially robbed of its Duma fraction. day, pointed out that several The Soros pollsters, however, admitted that they did not “millionaires” or “oligarchs” cover certain areas (such as remote rural precincts) where had appeared on the Commu- Yabloko and SPS get very few votes; thus they probably nists’ list of candidates and overestimated the liberal parties’ real votes, suggesting the implied that the party had betrayed its ideals and suc- official count was accurate. All of these exit polls, however, cumbed to corruption. While its ratings stayed above are ultimately inconclusive on whether the liberals were 20% into November, they plummeted in the last week of defrauded: the fraud is argued to be only the difference the campaign as voters made their final voting decisions. between 4 and 6% of the vote, well within both polls’ mar- gin of error of about 3.5%. More worrying are the results While it was clearly victimized by unfair campaigning of the Communist Party’s effort to collect the hand-counts of practices, the KPRF’s own strategy was also partly to votes taken by observers at each precinct and to compare blame. As one Russian political analyst put it, if the them with the official tallies. Remarkably, the KPRF admit- party were going to accept oligarchs’ money, it should ted that its own miserable result (13%) was accurate but have used it to run a well financed, energetic, and high- that the official count of its ideological opponents (Yabloko profile campaign, even if only at the grass-roots level. If and SPS) had been artificially reduced, costing both of them it were not going to do the latter, it should have steered their Duma fractions. clear of putting people on its list who would obviously invite attacks. Instead, the KPRF got the worst of both Why would the Kremlin want the liberals out of the Duma? worlds: it put millionaires on its party list but ran only a One theory is that Putin simply did not like the liberals, but limp campaign. Reports from many districts testified this does not explain why he would have given a tacit bless- that promising Communist candidates in historically red ing to Yabloko on prime-time news in the final week of the regions were taking their votes for granted, putting little campaign and why he keeps so many SPS allies in his gov- energy into their campaigns. The central leadership also ernment (such as the finance minister Aleksei Kudrin and failed to take advantage of those few opportunities that economics minister German Gref). Another theory is that a were available for them to appear on nationwide televi- decision to sink the liberals was made only on election sion. Most surprisingly, the party declined to participate night; as results were coming in, the theory goes, Kremlin in the most visible debates of the election season, those analysts realized that United Russia could gain a coveted shown every Friday during prime time on the NTV net- constitutional majority(300 seats) if the liberals failed to work. While such a strategy can work for a party like clear the 5% threshold since these liberal votes would then United Russia that is already getting massive free and be redistributed to the parties that did hurdle 5%, with most positive coverage on the nightly news, the Communists going to United Russia. In the end, it is hard to know just wound up yielding the floor to a rival leftist organi- whether such calculated fraud took place, but we do know zation, Motherland, which then stole much of their thun- that the liberal parties performed poorly enough to make der (see p.4). themselves vulnerable to such a strategy and that it would not have taken much (in numerical terms, at least) to sink their Duma hopes in 2003. THE “LIBERALS”, notably Yabloko and the (SPS), suffered the most bitter defeat, both failing to clear the 5% threshold necessary to win at 4.3% and SPS at 4.0%. In the districts, the two parties seats in the party-list contest (Was this the result of Kremlin netted just four and three seats respectively. Moreover, all fraud? See Michaleva on p.9.) The final count put Yabloko three elected SPS deputies (, Aleksei Likhachev, and Arsen Fadzaev) and one of Yabloko’s (Mikhail Yemelianov) promptly joined the United Russia

3 fraction. The three remaining Yabloko deputies (Mik- charges others were eager to make. SPS, on the other hand, hail Zadornov, Galina Khovanskaia, and Sergei had long staked its reputation on defending the Popov) became an extremely isolated group, joining just policies that had produced ; it three or four well-known liberal allies outside of United thus had no real choice but to oppose Russia in the Duma (Vladimir Ryzhkov, Viktor Pok- Putin on this issue. Thus when Chu- hmelkin, Oksana Dmitrieva, and perhaps Viktor bais (left) lashed out at prosecutors, Cherepkov). The liberals, then, are not even close to he provoked Putin’s reproach and the 35 deputies required to officially register a “deputy effectively lost the favorable treat- group” in the Duma. As if to add insult to injury, almost ment he had been receiving from immediately after the new Duma convened, United Rus- Kremlin structures, including the sia raised this threshold to 55. United Russia has thus media. Since this Kremlin favor had effectively become the most liberal fraction in Russia’s been one of the key reasons why SPS had gambled on put- parliament. ting the highly unpopular Chubais among its top candidates, Chubais was transformed into a major liability, drawing fire To be sure, Putin’s Russia has from all sides. While Chubais is a renowned debater and made it difficult for the liberals: may well have been able to defend himself effectively, for television dominated by Putin and some reason SPS rarely featured Chubais in televised de- United Russia, restrictive election bates, usually opting instead for party-list number-one Boris laws stifling the campaign, a Nemtsov or party-list number-two . SPS Kremlin grip on major sources of thus got most of the negatives from nominating Chubais funding. But things are not so without the potential positives. clear cut. Both SPS and Yabloko initially put their ability to work MOTHERLAND (or Rodina) far surpassed the 5% hur- with Putin at the center of their dle in what was probably the biggest surprise of this election campaigns. Both also got some positive media coverage season, netting an impressive 9% of the vote. When this on prime-time state-controlled television, especially SPS combined with several district victories, the party wound up leader in the first half of the campaign with a Duma delegation of 36 deputies. While completely and Yabloko leader (above) in its marginal in the new last week. Chubais himself, head of Russia’s partially Duma, the bloc has state-owned electricity monopoly Unified Energy Sys- touched off a debate tems, became a symbol of SPS’s cooperative stance on over what its success Putin when he was tapped for the number-three slot on means for Russian poli- its party list. Yavlinsky got an even more prized presi- tics. On one hand, it dential blessing, appearing with the President on the represents a minor in- most-watched news program just days before the vote. flux of nationalist voices The core problem, then, was not that the liberals opposed into the Duma. While Putin but that Putin’s power and popularity present them Motherland’s number-two man (above, on with a conundrum: to oppose the popular President right) has long represented a district in the parliament, other completely would be to alienate many of their own vot- noted nationalists such as General Valentin Varennikov are ers and to risk financial and media suffocation at the Duma novices. On the other hand, while there was certainly hands of the Kremlin, but to show total support would a nationalist undertone to Motherland’s effort, its most lead people to wonder why they should not just go ahead prominent campaign themes stressed economic redistribu- and vote for United Russia. tion and revival, the issues most closely identified with bloc leader Sergei Glaziev (above, on left). In fact, its strategists Neither party navigated this saw that blatantly chauvinistic appeals would alienate vot- tricky terrain well. The big- ers, leading it to stress more moderate or economic themes. gest blunder appears to have Strikingly, this strategy enabled it to gain large numbers of been SPS’s decision to de- votes in major cities not usually regarded as bastions of na- vote a large share of its cam- tionalism; Motherland even came in second in Moscow. paign to negative attacks not on United Russia but on Overall, Motherland resembled a bucket strategically placed Yabloko. Over the objec- under piñatas that might have been labeled “KPRF,” tions of many within SPS, “Yabloko,” and “SPS.” When the Kremlin whacked the the aim was essentially to weaken Yabloko so that SPS Communist piñata, some of its candy (notably pensioners) could take over the liberal wing of politics in Russia. landed in this bucket. When leaders struck But Yabloko was not a completely innocent victim, hav- their own piñatas, Motherland also collected some of their ing made its opposition to SPS leader Chubais’ eco- candy, that is, voters who in 1999 had bought into SPS’s nomic reforms a centerpiece of its own election effort. liberal nationalism or who earlier had voted for Yabloko as Both campaigns completely fell apart, however, after the closest thing to a moderate socialist alternative to the prosecutors dramatically arrested oil giant Yukos chief KPRF and the incumbent regime. (Why was Motherland so (above). Since Khodorkovsky effective in grabbing KPRF votes? See Peshkov on p.12.) was Yabloko’s major sponsor, that party’s anti-oligarch stands were rendered vulnerable to charges of hypocrisy,

4 THE LIBERAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF running Kharitonov was that he could demonstratively with- RUSSIA (LDPR), by win- draw from the race to protest its undemocratic character. ning 11% of the vote in the Overall, only ten filed the necessary papers in time to be- party-list competition, regained come candidates, and this list is almost certain to shrink support that it had lost in 1999, since they must collect two million signatures nationwide in when the party was disqualified order to get on the ballot (only Kharitonov and Malyshkin, and restored to the ballot only at nominated by parties with full-fledged Duma fractions, are the last moment. As in previous exempt from this requirement). elections, however, it failed to win a single district seat. This Of the ten candidates, just three put the party’s new Duma dele- appear ready to run serious cam- gation at 36 of the 450 seats. In paigns. Perhaps the most inter- part, the LDPR did well in the esting is Motherland leader Gla- party-list competition for many of the same reasons it ziev, who is competing as an cleared 10% in both 1993 and 1995: Party leader independent. Flush with his ’s (above) no-holds-barred cam- bloc’s Duma success, he hopes paign genius and a well-conceived electoral strategy to to cement a reputation as the tap into a significant protest vote. He also enjoyed a Left’s rising star and eventually great deal of television exposure, in part because he to outflank Zyuganov in the con- wasted no opportunity to appear and in part, many test for Communist voters. speculate, because despite his outrageous rhetoric his While many regard Glaziev as deputies almost always vote the Kremlin’s way. The having sold out to the Kremlin, he has a strong independent campaign involved one other significant strategic wrin- streak, a great deal of ambition, and a better chance to ap- kle in 2003. Anticipating that the Communists would peal to moderate leftists than Zyuganov ever did. If the race attract the strongest Kremlin attacks, the LDPR aggres- gets interesting, it is likely to be due to Glaziev. The other sively courted the red electorate by stressing economic candidates with serious campaigns are Irina Khakamada redistribution and support for the “poor” alongside its (above) and (below). Khakamada was the more traditional nationalistic rhetoric. Nevertheless, number-two person on SPS’s failed party list; after her analysts expect the LDPR to back the Kremlin on all party then declined to nominate anyone, major issues where its votes are needed. But more than she decided to launch a bid as an inde- likely, United Russia’s supermajority means the LDPR pendent. Part of SPS’s anti-Putin wing will simply be irrelevant. and the only pedigreed liberal in the race, she may have a chance to clear 10% of the vote, but few give her a chance at much THE PRESIDENTIAL RACE more. Rybkin has wended a bizarre path in life: once leader With polls indicating that 75% of voters would choose of the Communists in Russia’s 1990-93 parliament, he was Putin over his closest rivals, few observers expect any elected to the Duma in 1993 as an Agrarian, became Duma drama in the March 14 presidential election. Putin has speaker, then joined the anticommunist Yeltsin Administra- declared that he will run as an independent so as to rep- tion as Security Council chief, and, finally, became the most resent all the people rather than just one party. With the prominent political tool of self-exiled “oligarch” Boris Kremlin’s lock on mass media, regional political ma- Berezovsky, with whom he once worked on the Security chines, and other means of influencing the elections, Council. While few give Rybkin any chance to win more rivals understand perfectly well that they will not be than a percentage point or two, he is likely to be well fi- allowed to run the kind of campaign that could put a dent nanced by Berezovsky’s millions and could become the in the Putin juggernaut. main source of anti-Putin campaigning come March if he makes it on the ballot. As a result, Russia’s most popular poli- ticians have pulled the plug on their The remaining candidates are a motley crew. presidential ambitions for 2004. Federation Council Speaker Sergei Mironov Communist leader Gennady (right) effectively campaigns for Putin at the Zyuganov, Yabloko chief Grigory same time that he is throwing his own hat into Yavlinsky, SPS head , the ring. In approving his candidacy, the and LDPR captain Vladimir Zhiri- Kremlin ensures that at least one “alternative” novsky all declared that they would to Putin is on paper (as required by Russian law) and that not run. While Yabloko and SPS there is a “backup” in the race should something unfortunate resolved not to nominate anyone, the happen to the President prior to voting day. Putin has an- Communists nominated the lackluster other backup in Vladimir Bryntsalov, a pharmaceutical and little-known agriculturalist Niko- magnate-cum-Duma deputy who is in United Russia’s par- lai Kharitonov (above left) and the liamentary delegation. Viktor Gerashchenko, a Motherland LDPR tapped Zhirinovsky’s chief bodyguard, Oleg Ma- leader and Russia’s former Central Bank chairman, is run- lyshkin (above right), best known for helping start a ning as a backup for Glaziev. Last, but not least, Anzori fistfight after a debate during the Duma campaign. One Aksentev-Kikalishvili, a businessman who has been linked top Communist leader hinted that the rationale behind

5 by some to organized crime and is barred from entry into leaves powerful regional political machines in place that the , has declared his candidacy. could one day turn against the Kremlin. Moscow sought to deal with this risk in part by making an example of one of REGIONAL ELECTIONS the most powerful machine politicians of all, the “president” Eleven regions held elections for their chief executives of , Murtaza Rakhimov (left). Putin’s men (usually called “governors”) on the same day as the thus publicly backed Rakhimov but also provided crucial Duma balloting, December 7. The support to a major challenger, banker Sergei Veremeenko. Kremlin generally came out well Along with a third major candidate, oil millionaire Ralif here too. In , the Putin Ad- Safin, the two scraped together enough votes to keep Ra- ministration effectively installed its khimov from getting the 50% he needed to win in the first own man, defeating an incumbent round. He then found himself in a humiliating runoff with whom it considered weak. Veremeenko. With Rakhimov now weakened, the Kremlin In Kirov and Sakhalin, where the called off the proverbial dogs and Veremeenko actually shut incumbents were not running, the down his campaign headquarters for the final week of the presidentially sanctioned candidates also won. In most runoff campaign. Rakhimov won in the end, but his ma- cases, such as Moscow and Bashkortostan, the Admini- chine had been tamed. (On how this was done in Bashkortostan, see Galliamov and Gabdrafikov, p.7.) stration chose to co-opt rather than oppose powerful in- cumbents. Co-optation, however, is very risky since it — Henry Hale, Indiana University

Russian Election Watch can be found online at http://daviscenter.fas.harvard.edu/publications/rew.html

Russian Election Watch is produced with support from the Carnegie Corporation of New York and is a joint publication of

The Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University Graham T. Allison, Director The Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies, Harvard University Timothy J. Colton, Director and Lisbeth Tarlow, Associate Director Indiana University - Bloomington

The views expressed in Russian Election Watch are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of any sponsoring organization. The editors welcome feedback of all kinds. Please direct comments to

Henry E. Hale (Editor) Danielle Lussier (Associate Editor) Assistant Professor Research Associate Department of Political Science Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs and Russian & East European Institute John F. Kennedy School of Government Indiana University Harvard University [email protected] [email protected]

Special thanks to Isabelle Kaplan for translation, layout, and editing and to Mara Zepeda for logistical support. The editor is also grateful to the Carnegie Moscow Center for Visiting Scholar status during the Duma campaign season.

SOURCES FOR IMAGES USED IN RUSSIAN ELECTION WATCH, Vol.3, No.4: All accessed January 14, 2003: president.kremlin.ru (Putin); edinros.ru (Gryzlov); aif.ru (Shandybin); yabloko.ru (Yav- linsky); lenta.ru/russia-2003 (Khodorkovsky); chubais.ru (Chubais); gazeta.ru/elections2003 (Glaziev and Rogozin); ldpr.ru (Zhirinovsky, Malyshkin); kprf.ru (Kharitonov); khakamada.ru (Khakamada); grani.ru (Rybkin); mironov.ru (Mi- ronov); vbogomolov.ru (Rakhimov)

6

INSIDER INFORMATION: CAMPAIGN ANALYSIS BY LEADING RUSSIAN PRACTITIONERS

PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS IN BASHKORTOSTAN: A Regional Example of Managed Democracy in Russia Rushan Galliamov, Chair, Philosophy and Sociology Department, Bashkir State Agrarian University Ildar Gabdrafikov, Senior Researcher, Center for Ethnology, Russian Academy of Sciences, Ufa ______

SOME KEY POINTS: strategy developed and implemented Second, the , *Putin reforms create basis for by Putin’s circle, a strategy that the “curbed” by local authorities but de- political competition in one of Russian president himself very elo- veloping inevitably, allowed new fi- Russia’s most autocratic regions quently and volubly called “managed nancial-industrial groups that were *For first time in a decade, in- democracy.” Putin brilliantly orches- independent of the government to cumbent faces real challenge trated the parliamentary version of infiltrate the republic. These included *Kremlin candidate gets incum- this strategy during the campaign for Gazprom, Mezhprombank, Alfa- bent on the ropes, then quits just Duma elections at the end of 2003. group, Lukoil, and Wimm-Bill-Dann, days before the vote However, if the campaign strategies among others. *What was the price that let the of the Duma election were rather Third, many years of authoritarian- incumbent survive? Sell assets to transparent and their results easily ism spawned a number of negative major Moscow companies predictable (for example, the elimina- social and administrative develop- December 2003 saw elections for tion of financial support for opposi- ments, including an exclusive admin- president of Bashkortostan, one of tion candidates through the “battle istrative-economic elite, the absence Russia’s most economically powerful with the oligarchs”, the unprecedented of real freedom of expression with and politically influential ethnic re- mobilization of administrative re- incessant praise for the government’s gions (or republics). This event has sources, total and unconditional con- accomplishments in its place, and the the greatest significance not only on trol over any and all electronic mass ethnocratization of the ruling elite and the regional level but also for the po- media, etc.), in Bashkortostan the re- extremes in ethnic policy (including litical process in the Russian Federa- gional version of “managed democ- treatment of the Tatar ethnic group). tion as a whole for at least three rea- racy” took a more intricate and, in the Rakhimov and his group also under- sons. early stages, latent form. estimated the emergence of two en- First, throughout the 1990s, Bash- At the start, when a special decision tirely new actors with significant fi- kortostan’s political elite, together by Bashkortostan’s legislature delayed nancial and administrative resources with counterparts in Tatarstan and the presidential election from July to on the republic’s political stage: Ser- Sakha-Yakutia, helped lead a process December, the ruling political elite gei Veremeenko, a successful man- of “sovereignization” that gained them felt assured of victory. It did not ager and co-owner of one of Russia’s a great deal of independence. Second, bother to develop any effective cam- largest banks (Mezhprombank), and by the end of the decade, Bashkor- paign strategies, counting only on oil magnate Ralif Safin, one of the tostan’s ruling political circle, headed stepping up administrative methods founders and a former first vice- by the republic’s president, Murtaza and , which had served president of Lukoil. Both these politi- Rakhimov, had created its own form them so well in the past (stuffing bal- cians were born, grew up, and began of government, replete with the hall- lot boxes, falsifying vote counts, etc.). their rapidly rising careers in Bashkor- marks of strict . But Rakhimov’s political advisers tostan and therefore had legal and Third, the 2003 presidential elections made a tactical and strategic mistake, moral legitimacy in the eyes of the in Bashkortostan were the first to be stubbornly refusing to see that by the republic’s population to run in the held since wide-ranging reforms of end of 2000 there were signs of “fa- elections. the federal system began in 2000 and tigue” with the authoritarian regime Thus, unlike the largely fake rival- since Russian president Vladimir and a potential for pluralism in Bash- ries in the 1993 and 1998 presidential Putin rose to power. kortostan for at least three reasons. elections, there was an atmosphere of Thus, elections for president of the First, Putin’s federal reforms real competition even before the offi- republic, an office that gives its holder spawned independent elements in the cial announcement of the 2003 presi- absolute control over the political judiciary and in the legal system as a dential race. process in Bashkortostan, have be- whole (including the power agencies). At first, 20 challengers announced come a sui generis “regional compo- plans to run for president of the repub- nent” of a completely new political

7 lic, but only eight emerged from the 2.98%, Shugurov 1.3%, and Idiatullin At almost the same time, the deputy grueling registration process with of- 0.54%. The top two — Rakhimov and head of the President’s administration, ficial candidacies. The final candidate, Veremeenko — advanced to the sec- , and the presidential Veremeenko, received validation only ond round. envoy to the Volga region, Sergei on November 26 — after two denials Local voting patterns make clear the Kirienko, arrived in Ufa, trumpeting by Bashkortostan’s election commis- importance of two basic factors in the “Bashkortostan’s distinguished ac- sion, a ruling against him by the re- anti-Rakhimov vote. First, the youth complishments in social and economic public’s Supreme Court, and finally a and well-run campaigns of the alterna- development” under Rakhimov’s favorable verdict by the Supreme tive candidates attracted the support of leadership. The federal mass media Court of the Russian Federation. many voters. The propaganda of other rushed to begin an intensive propa- Right up to the end of the first round candidates (especially Veremeenko) ganda campaign about the successes of elections on December 7, the three was effective in exposing the misuse of Bashkortostan’s current regime. main candidates — Rakhimov, Vere- and corruption of power. At the same Amid all this, Veremeenko, Rakhi- meenko, and Safin — waged a literal time, a significant portion of the popu- mov’s fundamental and only legal “propaganda war” of the bitterest lation voted in “protest” — not for competitor in the second round, en- kind. Another three candidates anyone but against Rakhimov. tirely reversed all his campaign ef- (Communist Rasul Shugurov, well- Second, never before in Bashkor- forts, stopping his negative campaign- known opposition figure Aleksandr tostan’s history has the ethnicity fac- ing and publicly announcing his deci- Arinin, and Khasan Idiatullin, a tor, which Veremeenko exploited very sion to halt his electoral campaign, farmer running as an independent) effectively through criticism of although he did not officially with- were practically invi-sible, while two “Bashkir ethnocracy” and by resur- draw his candidacy. The vain attempts more withdrew from the race two days recting the so-called “Tatar question”, of third-place candidate Safin to get before the vote. played such a large role. Comparison Veremeenko to join forces with him in Rakhimov’s campaign strategy of voters’ choices in areas and cities disputing the results of the first round amounted to, first, utter propaganda in populated predominantly by one or of voting in the Supreme Court of the republic’s mass media; second, an another ethnic group shows that, with Bashkortostan were unsuccessful (ac- unprecedented smear campaign a few nuances, Tatars and Tatar- cording to a vote count by his own against his main opponents (“evil is speaking in agricultural areas team, Safin actually came in second descending upon the republic” is one voted for Safin, Russians and some with around 28%). of Rakhimov’s traditional clichés); urban Tatars for Veremeenko, and The runoff proceeded in complete third, the strongest administrative Bashkirs along with “loyal” Tatars accordance with the electoral tradi- (even physical) pressure applied to and Russians for Rakhimov. tions that have developed in Bashkor- voters at all levels; fourth, a variety of The first-round results literally tostan in recent years: 78% voted for ways to falsify election results. The stunned Rakhimov’s team. Immedi- Rakhimov, 14.8% for Veremeenko. height of the fraud was an event un- ately after the first round, his entire So, oddly enough, in the second round precedented in post-Soviet Russia: campaign staff was assembled, and the republic’s voters turned out in the discovery of 800,000 false election the rank-and-file workers were told droves — more than 70% of eligible ballots in a printing house under the that without Moscow’s intervention, voters came to the polls. Naturally, administration’s jurisdiction, prompt- the probability of a Rakhimov victory this time around there was no talk of ing a criminal case. The ballots were in the second round was very low. observers from the Veremeenko cam- reportedly printed by order of Radi But here Moscow, in the form of paign, not one complaint or report of Khabirov, the head of Rakhimov’s Putin himself, actively joined the violation of the law was registered, government. game. On December 11, while on while in the first round more than two This time, however, the famous re- campaign leave, Rakhimov urgently hundred complaints were registered publican maxim that “it is not impor- flew to Moscow, where he had a five- and around 700 violations recorded. tant how they voted but how they hour meeting with the Russian presi- In this way, the regional practice of counted” did not apply because elec- dent. Putin’s spokespeople said prac- the political doctrine of “managed tion observers representing the other tically nothing about the meeting, democracy” developed by Vladimir candidates showed up at nearly all of which has become the most mysteri- Putin was successfully proven in the Bashkortostan’s 3,449 polling stations ous development of the entire election Republic of Bashkortostan. Incumbent with sophisticated means of monitor- campaign. President Rakhimov couldn’t help but ing. The fact that the office of the re- Right after Rakhimov’s return from win. █ public’s general prosecutor came out Moscow, news emerged that man- on the side of the law played a key agement of two of Europe’s largest oil role in curtailing fraud. But even un- companies, which are headquartered der these circumstances, Rakhimov’s in Ufa, would be transferred to Gaz- strategists managed to pad the per- prom (a few months before the elec- centage of “their supporters” a bit, tion, four of the republic’s largest oil- although they didn’t make the 50% chemical and gas companies had been plus one vote necessary to avoid a similarly transferred to Gazprom runoff. In the first round, Rakhimov management “with a subsequent got 42.8% of the vote, Veremeenko transfer into property”). received 25.3%, Safin 23.3%, Arinin

8

ELECTION RESULTS 2003: Another Step Towards Autocracy Galina Michaleva Head of the Yabloko Party’s Analytical Center ______

SOME KEY POINTS: the two-term limit on that office and perceived by the public as a call to *Clear fraud in elections, but Krem- curtailing federalism, local self- take property from the rich and divide lin did not mean for it to hurt the government, or even the rights and it, and their nationalistic sentiment liberals freedoms of citizens. The utter lack of differed from Zhirinovsky’s open na- *Lack of checks and balances wor- a division of power through a system tionalism only in degree. risome for future of democracy in of checks and balances, the want of All remaining issues went unheard Russia mechanisms for citizens’ control un- by the population. The underlying *Kremlin set tone of campaign, in- dermine the very institution of parlia- thematic orientation of this campaign cluding envy and xenophobia ment. was set not by its participants but by *Election determined by access to Along with the absence of an inde- the Kremlin. The reprisals against administrative resources pendent judiciary and mass media, the Yukos and the arrest of Khodork- *Winner of presidential race not in absence of publicly discussed alterna- ovsky allowed the Kremlin to exploit doubt but impact is tives to the political course plotted by the envy and xenophobia that have the power elite signifies one more step always existed in the mass conscious- The Bottom Line in the consolidation of authoritarian- ness but were never realized to the The 2003 Duma elections yielded a ism. Political decision making has degree they were in this campaign. parliament entirely under Kremlin moved out of popular reach, and the The president himself unleashed these control. This is the primary outcome opportunities for tyranny are widen- sentiments. of the election and brings into focus ing. For the first time, the the essence of the current political The groups who strengthened their minced no words in plainly telling the regime as a corrupt police state in positions in the elections can now candidates and the public that the which democratic institutions and accomplish their main goals – the re- rules apply to everyone except United processes have been replaced by pale distribution of property for their own Russia. The top names on the party’s imitations. Because the winning par- benefit, the consolidation of power – list made no bones about the fact that ties are not institutions that foster co- at less expense and to greater effect. most of them had no plans to actually operation between society and organs serve in the Duma. United Russia’s of power, they therefore cannot fulfill The Specifics of the 2003 Campaign refusal to participate in televised de- the basic functions of parties — to The 2003 campaign bore little re- bates with other parties showed not represent the interests of different semblance to a democratic or even just that the party of power had noth- social groups and formulate political semi-democratic election, a game ing to say but that it didn’t even con- alternatives. whose unknown outcome is deter- sider it necessary to talk to citizens United Russia is a bureaucratic or- mined by voters in the course of the and engage in substantive discussion ganization, representing a self- private, free, and honest expression of of the issues with other participants in proclaimed “executive vertical” solely public will known as voting. the political process. for campaign purposes. Motherland – In comparison with previous elec- Zhirinovsky used a strategy of open a Kremlin PR-project – successfully tions, this one was distinguished by provocation and blatant violation of mobilized nationalistic sentiments. unprecedented use of administrative the law, offending his opponents and The Liberal Democratic Party (LDPR) resources, a lack of free access to the starting fights on live television or is a puppet organization that since mass media, and a large number of scattering ruble bills from train win- 1991 has succeeded in tapping the “PR projects” (Kremlin-created dows during trips. radical nationalist and protest vote, pseudo-parties). For the first time The “innovations” – the Kremlin impersonating a genuine opposition since the semi-democratic elections in pseudo-parties – were not intended for party. The Communist Party (KPRF) 1989, the ruling elite has shied away meaningful conversation with voters. is the only exception, but its 12.65% from using democratic rhetoric in fa- A theatrical performance, a circus, a of the vote – 52 parliamentary seats – vor of leveling statist and nationalist set of entertaining acts, aimed at con- is not enough to influence voting or to slogans. LDPR leader Vladimir Zhiri- fusing the voter while distracting him change the political picture. novsky focused on Russia’s need for with increasingly primitive ploys – With a constitutional majority, this authoritarianism and the rejection of this was the atmosphere consistently parliament will not only permit the the idea of federalism (in other words, and deliberately created by political automatic passage of all legislation rejection of the fundamental constitu- strategists with the help of the media proposed by the President and his tional principles of the Russian state) during these elections. All the media administration, but also – and more as the main themes of his party’s outlets played a role in this, but the worryingly – allow changes to basic campaign. two state channels contributed with constitutional norms such as lengthen- Appeals by Motherland leaders Ser- particular success. ing the presidential term or removing gei Glaziev and Dmitry Rogozin were

9 The two ways to get on nationwide The formal increase in the power of of a liberal party in numbers too small TV, administrative resources and the Central Election Commission to have any influence would be more money, were used simultaneously. (CEC) had a result that is characteris- useful than harmful to the Administra- Thus, with the exception of Kremlin- tic of the current political system: a tion. However, from a technical point backed parties, even unofficial pay- false image of strength by ensuring of view, a redistribution of votes to ments by candidates did not guarantee fair elections. In a CEC initiative, this reflect the actual proportion is a tech- coverage if they were not approved by summer all the electoral participants, nically unrealistic task in the short- the Putin Administration. The other including both professional journal- term, especially considering the skill branches of the media, including re- ists’ unions and well-known political levels of the officials in local election gional newspapers, used the elections consulting firms as well as the main commissions who actually “increased as a chance to make money. Starting television networks, signed an agree- voter turnout.” as far back as the summer, newspa- ment obligating themselves to “play pers didn’t carry a single story that fair” and not use dirty campaign tac- The Start of the Presidential Cam- was not paid for in advance. tics. Yabloko refused to sign the paign These elections saw the proliferation agreement, while the KPRF signed The outcome of the parliamentary of another media strategy known as only after stipulating certain condi- election has put Putin in a difficult “blocks” – the payment of large sums tions. During the campaign, after nu- position. By law, parties not repre- of money by a party so as to be spared merous complaints by the Commu- sented in parliament must collect two negative coverage. However, even nists about violation of the principle million signatures by January 28. after paying a large sum, any “block” of equal access to the mass media With the Russian Christmas and New could still be removed. The blackmail with no reaction from either the jour- Year’s holiday season stretching to of parties with threats of compromise nalistic community or the CEC to mid-January and with the cost of col- from newspapers, television, and radio these obvious violations, the Commu- lecting so many signatures reaching stations was indeed a widespread nists withdrew from the agreement. $1.5 million at minimum, a candidate practice. without access to administrative re- At the same time, United Russia How the Votes Were Counted sources has little chance of assem- appeared daily on all sorts of shows, The widespread notion that the elec- bling the necessary support in time. including entertainment programming. tion results do not entirely coincide Moreover, given the current political Such a formula for work by the with the actual voting is now corrobo- alignment, these elections are turning mass media stimulated the widespread rated by a parallel vote count con- into a referendum on confidence in propagation of dirty strategies – a ro- ducted by the losing parties (Yabloko, Putin. The other candidates are play- tation of the same articles with mate- SPS, KPRF) on the basis of the re- ing the role of extras on the set. Not rial compromising parties and leaders cords of election observers. This co- even “second string” politicians con- appearing simultaneously in a large ordination of efforts in concert with sidered it necessary to run. The most number of regions. These strategies social organizations involved in elec- honest move was that of Zhirinovsky, were used most actively against tion oversight to bring the dispute to who nominated his bodyguard Oleg Yabloko, the KPRF, and the Union of the Supreme Court can set an impor- Malyshkin, made famous by his fist Right Forces (SPS). The rare refer- tant precedent. The parties have al- fights during Duma campaign debates, ences to the KPRF on nationwide sta- ready taken the first steps towards to represent the LDPR. tions were almost exclusively nega- collaboration. The main mystery in the presidential tive. In addition, Yabloko was the In any event, vote counts by SPS elections will be voter turnout, al- target of “special projects” such as and Yabloko (each party has already though the experience of the Duma specially created movements reviewed about 10,000 vote tallies elections has taught us that it is not (Yabloko without Yavlinsky) and from local election commissions) in- too hard to “add” 5-6% to this num- even parties (SLON – the Union of dicate that in approximately 20% of ber. People for Science and Education), the cases the data from these tallies do No one has any doubts that Putin the sole aim of which was to discredit not agree with the official data from will emerge the absolute victor in one Yabloko. the CEC. Among these, the most round, but an election with such chal- The administrative vertical was sig- common discrepancy is the number of lengers will hardly augment his le- nificantly more active this time those participating in the voting. In gitimacy and popularity. █ around than in previous elections in other words, voter turnout was in- that now leaders were required not flated (overstated), and because of this only to deliver the vote for United Yabloko’s and SPS’s results were Russia but to deliver voter turnout lowered to under 5%. The data from itself. For example, during Soviet- the Communists (who reviewed over style agitprop door-to-door campaign- 94,000 local vote counts) also show ing in Chuvashia, there were threats of that Yabloko should have received sanctions if people did not come out 5.09% and SPS 4.52% of the vote. to vote and vote in the proper way. It is doubtful that the Kremlin had The detainment of Yabloko and KPRF the particular goal of excluding campaigners and signature collectors Yabloko from the list of parties quali- by police was widely practiced. fying for the Duma, since the presence

10

WITHOUT COMMUNISTS AND LIBERALS President, POLITY Foundation

SOME KEY POINTS: bers are lobbyists for regional inter- strengthen his control over the Com- *UR’s variety will create some checks ests or financial and industrial groups. munists. As to Communist “funda- on its parliamentary power, but party These interests have never passed a mentalists” and their electorate, they is here to stay law without some changes. will turn into a very marginal political *KPRF defeat points to leadership As to the long-term situation, there movement. problem is only one question: Will United Rus- The success of the LDPR is a phe- *Motherland faces rocky future sia actually become the party of power nomenon of Zhirinovsky’s personality *Low turnout hurt liberals and will it remain so after Putin’s term as well as yet another outstanding *Putin, West also to blame is over after 2008? At this point, my campaign. He was the only politician *Putin espoused liberal agenda, mak- answer to this question is positive. who actually carried out an election ing liberal parties redundant None of the previous so-called presi- campaign, while all of the others par- dential parties have survived two elec- ticipated in some sort of a talk-show. There has been much commentary tion cycles. Now United Russia has On the one hand, his speeches reso- about how the Russian people would survived through two elections while nated with the emotions of disap- wake up in a different country after having greatly increased its electorate. pointed, apathetic citizens and, on the December 7th. I checked for myself Its great worth during the next elec- other, with those who were anticipat- by looking out the window, but found tion will derive from its being institu- ing some kind of entertainment from the same country. However, the po- tionalized as one of the influential the debates. The LDPR has a future as litical landscape has entered a new forces in Russian politics. It is very long as Zhirinovsky remains in top era. likely that United Russia is here to form and has access to the mass media Since the end of the 1980s, the main stay. sources; there are plenty of apathetic content of Russian politics was the A few months ago many political individuals in Russia, as well as those confrontation between and analysts believed that aggressive ac- for whom politics is simply another . The Duma elections tions against the KPRF were not de- form of amusement. delivered a triumphant victory to sirable because it would motivate the The Motherland party is a very suc- Putin, relative success to the national- Communist electorate to become more cessful PR bubble. This project of the ists from the LDPR and Motherland active. In fact, nothing of the sort Family, purporting to break up the parties, and dramatic failure to the transpired. All the Kremlin-produced KPRF electorate, was executed very Communists and liberals from hybrids that worked against the Fa- well. But at one point another re- Yabloko and the Union of Right therland–All-Russia party in 1999 source was also connected to this pro- Forces (SPS). The liberals have virtu- have also worked very well against ject – the security agencies. Because ally lost all parliamentary representa- the Communists – and with much less all of their initial projects, such as the tion, while the Communists have only effort. The Communist Party simply Party of Life and the People’s Party, half of the votes they secured in 1999. fell apart; it turned out to be an easy were not successful, they opted for a How can we explain the successes target. transition into the much more promis- and failures of the different parties; The defeat of the Communists is ing Motherland. furthermore, what are their long- and also a manifestation of a deep crisis in The prospects for the Motherland short-term prospects for success? its leadership. The only hope lies in party remain very unclear – they can United Russia’s victory can be ex- the younger activists within the party. either become spectacular or trivial. plained by factors that have already Yes, they will likely fail in the presi- They will not be able to influence been mentioned over the course of the dential race, but at least they will cre- legislation any time soon – nobody past few months: the merger between ate the impression that the party still will let them. Nevertheless, they will the Fatherland–All-Russia party and has a future. However, the governing be one of the most vivacious Duma United Russia’s electorates from body of the KPRF is not ready for representatives, and they will be in the 1999; the tremendous support of such drastic decisions. With Nikolai spotlight. Besides Zhirinovsky, they Putin, who remains very popular; the Kharitonov as its presidential candi- are the most passionate legislative refusal to have debates with weaker date, the KPRF is doomed. officials. opponents; and finally, its mass media In the long run, the chase for the However, the Motherland party also capabilities. Communist electorate will be taken by has its problems, which are connected In a short-term perspective the the Motherland faction, led by Sergei with its birth, not to mention its birth Duma will be totally controlled by Glaziev. Observers noticed that during defects. Its relationship with the United Russia. This arrangement is and after this election Glaziev did not Kremlin will remain very difficult. positive for Putin’s reform agenda. utter a single negative word about the This fact will manifest itself in the However, laws are not going to be Communist party, but he did criticize upcoming presidential election, where passed automatically, since a consid- Zyuganov. I anticipate that the Krem- I do not foresee any favorable options erable portion of United Russia mem- lin will assist Glaziev in his efforts to for Motherland. They cannot partici-

11 pate in the election due to their sup- Yabloko parties on the liberal front, 1990s) has rapidly diminished after port for Putin. At the same time, they there were five other political parties such events as NATO expansion, the cannot afford not to participate in the fighting for the vote. Each one finally bombing of Yugoslavia, the second elections since that will guarantee received a small fraction of one per- wave of NATO expansion, and fi- them a place in the shadows. cent of the votes: New Course- nally, the war in . Furthermore, there are many internal Automotive Russia (approximately The Kremlin is not happy with the problems which plague this young and 1%), SLON, the Constitutional De- shortfall of the liberals in the election. quickly-built political party. The party mocrats, the Development of Entre- It was not greeted well by the market, is very diverse and consists of both preneurship Party, and the Green nor did it improve Russia’s image right- and left-wing supporters. The Party. As it turned out, there simply abroad. Moreover, it is undesirable unity of this party will at some point were not enough voters to give 5% to from the point of view of Putin’s po- become a source of contention – there either Yabloko (4.3%) or SPS (4%). litical maneuverability – he will con- are too many people who will want to The deeper reasons for the failure of tinue to be held responsible for every- play their own political games. the liberals to attract more of the elec- thing that happens in the country to a Finally, there is the defeat of the torate are to be found in the social much greater degree. A significant Union of Right Forces and Yabloko to structure itself. People supporting part of the electorate – the part that is consider. For convenience, I will label SPS (well-to-do citizens) and Yabloko prosperous and educated – still re- them both as liberal parties, although (liberal intelligentsia) make up an mains without worthy representation. in reality the liberals are SPS, while obvious minority. There are as many This may eventually cause them to Yabloko is more of a social- successful, liberal, well-educated in- challenge the status quo. I do not wish democratic party. dividuals as liberal reformers of the to overestimate this possibility, but it The immediate reason for the defeat 1990s were able to create, and in that is there. of the liberal parties was low voter they can only blame themselves. As for the future of Russian liberal- participation. All forecasts were based An important cause for the failure of ism, it is clearly connected with these on the assumption that electoral turn- the liberal movement lies with Putin. parties being able to work together. out would be 62-65%; had this range He carried out many economic re- There are too many liberal parties in been achieved, both parties would forms that the liberals have suggested comparison with the size of their elec- have reached the necessary 5% of the in the past, which made their ideo- torate. If they want to be a success votes. But the turnout only reached logical base somewhat redundant. they should find new leadership. I am 56%. The liberal supporters, as usual, This could satisfy neither the human certain that they can survive only by decided to spend this snowy day at rights activists, who are in opposition throwing away all of the old symbols their country houses, or on the sunny to the President, nor the economic of the 1990s: Chubais, Nemtsov, Yav- beaches of the Canary Islands. Unfor- liberals who support Putin. linsky and others. They need new tunately, this is a problem with the Part of the blame for the defeat of faces that are not associated with the young Russian democracy. The usual the liberals should be shouldered by robbery-privatization of the past dec- electorate of the liberals is 15%, but the West. My research shows that the ade. with a low turnout, it is around 10- liberal, pro-Western electorate (it had The Yeltsin era of parliamentary 11%. And in addition to the SPS and reached 30% in the beginning of the representation is over. █

THE COMMUNISTS IN THE 2003 DUMA ELECTIONS Viktor Peshkov Secretary of the Communist Party Central Committee

SOME KEY POINTS: dented use of media propaganda and against the Communist Party (KPRF). *The Communist campaign was slow political-psychological strategies, the At certain stages of the campaign, the to start, ineffective ruling authorities’ exploitation of the anti-Communist aspect openly domi- *KPRF lost “party vote,” kept only “leader factor” in a way far more skill- nated. Waves of media, whipping the “Zyuganov vote” ful than previously seen — all these themselves up one after another, car- * Motherland took most votes from endowed Russia’s socio-political ried in dozens more stratagems, all KPRF by being “more Communist situation with a qualitatively new with the same goals – the “extinction” than the Communists,” but also won character. of the KPRF’s image, which had some from United Russia and Yabloko served as a moral and political com- * There are still a lot of reds out Media Counter-Strategies of the pass for tens of millions of Commu- there, the movement is not dead 2003 Kind nist Party voters, and the exaltation of The 2003 Duma elections have in a The 2003 election campaign was United Russia. certain way drawn the so-called “post- characterized by record exploitation of The indicators of “quality” — that Soviet” era of Russian social devel- the media on behalf of United Russia is, the emotional tone of reports virtu- opment to a close. A measure of (UR), as well as of Motherland and ally throughout the campaign period socio-economic stability, the unprece- the Liberal Democratic Party of Rus- about the KPRF on the one hand and sia (LDPR), and in equal measure United Russia and Motherland on the

12 other — are laid completely bare here erland – came to monopolize the use ideological “property” to “sell” him- (see Table 1 and Graph 1 on p. 14). of the “leader factor” in the campaign. self politically. In a certain way, It is obvious that not only United Therefore, instead of combining two Motherland was able to present itself Russia but also Glaziev’s bloc were KPRF electorates – the Party’s elec- as a greater Communist than the given a green light with solely posi- torate and the Party leader’s electorate Communist Party. It also actively util- tive and increasingly large amounts of – they were effectively separated: by ized the principle of party loyalty. As media coverage. December 7 the KPRF’s election re- a result, half of Motherland’s elector- The mass media did not cast any sult had been reduced virtually to the ate was created at the expense of positive light whatsoever on the personal rating of its leader, Gennady KPRF voters from 1999. Another Communist Party. On the contrary, Zyuganov. In other words, the leader- quarter was made up of those who the KPRF’s “media oxygen” was lit- oriented segment of the Communist until now did not have a clear party erally cut off with an iron persistence Party’s voters were the last bastion of orientation or did not vote at all. both on TV and in print, reaching the KPRF’s electoral strength, show- Those pulled in from the Unity elec- negative levels that turned the KPRF’s ing the greatest stability and keeping torate gave Motherland only 13% of image into a completely black and the Party from complete electoral dis- its votes, and defectors from Yabloko hideous inkblot. aster. It is significant that a rather account for 8% of Motherland’s sup- weighty share of voters were aware of porters. In other words, Motherland The KPRF and United Russia: Two this – 47% to 38% of respondents – was quite a powerful force in the de- Campaign Strategies who, a week after the elections, said struction of the Communist move- Over the course of the campaign with more or less certainty that “with- ment’s socio-political base. struggle, which continued for virtually out the active presence of Zyuganov The Communist Party missed the all of 2003, the KPRF only partially on television in the last week of the “oligarch” factor on the one hand and sporadically used the conceptual campaign, the KPRF would have got- and the Russian factor on the other. and programmatic positions that de- ten even fewer votes.” However, this Even though as far back as January fine its behavior in the elections. In was not enough for success. United 2003 the KPRF realized the danger of contrast, United Russia’s campaign Russia staked everything on the au- falling into the wave of association was characterized by strict consis- thority of Vladimir Putin. And al- with the oligarchs and of staying out tency and logic. though its practical result (37.6%) was of the Russian problem, the Party The KPRF started its campaign late approximately equivalent to half the failed to take many serious steps re- despite the fact that United Russia had President’s rating, this strategy com- quired to address these risks. The invested everything in a single politi- pletely justified itself. KPRF almost demonstratively set cal-propagandistic push. Instead of Unlike the “United Russians”, the itself up for accusations of ties to the beginning a real electoral fight even Communists did not uphold the prin- oligarchs. At that point, Gennady six months before the election (and ciple of party loyalty. United Russia Zyuganov remained the only one in even earlier would have been better) immediately and firmly adopted a the Communist Party who was devel- as the Communist Party’s campaign path of touting itself and only itself. oping the Russian issue. But the Party documents recommended, real cam- The slogans of “the party of the ma- did not stress its leader, and so the paigning did not even begin right after jority of Russians” and “the party of Russian theme, which he so persis- the formal opening of the campaign Putin” permeated its entire campaign. tently raised, did not become a Party season on November 7. As the Strict party discipline was the back- issue. As a result, the LDPR and KPRF’s campaign wore on, the more bone of all United Russia’s campaign Motherland forces dealt the KPRF a ground it lost to United Russia in efforts. In contrast, from 2002 until blow from precisely this direction. terms of its vitality in campaigning in the first half of 2003, the KPRF fo- United Russia also skirted the ethnic the regions. Thus, by the eve of the cused its electoral efforts on Sergei Russian question but was able to elections (December 3-4), only 10% Glaziev, the co-chair of another party avoid the blow of pro-oligarch accusa- of voters said that the Communist and a man with very controversial tions. All of that stayed out of the Party had run the most active cam- motives behind his with the United Russia campaign — the oppo- paign in this sphere, while 28% put KPRF and its leader. Once the danger sition didn’t even come up with any United Russia in first place and 15% of dwindling support became clear, it indicting arguments. One could say put Yabloko in the lead. In the end, was too late for the KPRF to fix the that United Russia’s decision, which the KPRF’s 2-3 months of campaign- situation. seemed dubious at first, to skip the ing fell far short of what was neces- A significant part of the Communist televised debates – with the party of sary for electoral success.1 Party’s electorate voted for Mother- power’s complete control over the The Communist Party could not land with full conviction that in so media — effectively protected its im- master the “leader game.” As a re- doing they had fulfilled one of the age from challengers’ attacks. Under sult, the KPRF’s main opponents – main goals of the KPRF. In this way, these circumstances, the Communist United Russia, the LDPR, and Moth- party loyalty in the mindset of KPRF Party’s attempts to conduct a sporadic followers ended up hurting the Party dialogue with United Russia from a 1 This article uses electoral poll monitoring data itself. forced distance did not have any real collected by the Center for Research Into the Glaziev’s bloc, on the contrary, success. Political Culture of Russia from January to acted on the principle of “being more It’s true that sociological measure- December 2003 on the basis of a random repre- sentative sampling of 1500 respondents in 42 Catholic than the Pope” — he used ments taken after the elections give regions of the Russian Federation. much of the Communist Party’s main reason to say that the situation de-

13 scribed here is not absolutely stable. the nascent presidential campaign less Table 1 Approximately half of voters emerged doomed to unequivocal predetermina- Positive Television Media Coverage from the electoral campaign with both tion. █ of United Russia, KPRF, and Mother- great and small doubts about their land Campaign Activities, September voting choices (see Graph 2). In turn, 1 - December 5, 2003 a relaxation of the media has relieved Party Index of Number of some of the pressure negative accusa- positive/ TV stories tions have put on the KPRF. As a re- negative TV during sult, the electoral field that is theoreti- coverage campaign cally accessible to the Communist during cam- paign Party – that is, its core electorate plus KPRF -3436.45 688 those who, in principle, are willing to United 2757.29 1039 vote for the Communists – has once Russia again grown to approximately half the population. All this, despite the fact Mother- 518.84 196 that up to two out of every three Rus- land (Table prepared with the assistance of Medialo- sians is satisfied with the outcome of gia’s analysis and monitoring of the mass me- the elections, leaves an opportunity dia.) for further changes in Russia’s politi- cal and electoral situation and makes

Graph 1 Positive Media Coverage of United Russia, the KPRF, and Motherland Campaign Activities, September 1 - December 5, 2003

150 100 30.29 31.92 67.85 50 0 -50 Sep-03 Oct-03 Nov-03 -100 KPRF -56.6 -150 Motherland -200 -123.15 United Russia -250 -220.17

(prepared with the assistance of Medialogia’s analysis and monitoring of the mass media)

Graph 2 Are you absolutely sure that you support the party most able to improve people’s lives?

Different opinion, no response 14%

I did not support that party 1%

Certainly not, but there was no 12% alternative

Not completely, but I have hope 38%

Yes, entirely 35%

0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 35% 40%

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