Harvard University (Belfer Center for Science & International Affairs, Davis Center for Russian & Eurasian Studies) and Indiana University-Bloomington RUSSIAN ELECTION WATCH Editor: Henry E. Hale Associate Editor: Danielle Lussier Vol.3, No.4, January 2004 TOP NEWS TRACKING THE POLLS: • Putin unchallenged as presidential frontrunner How the Presidential Race Now Stands: • Pro-Putin United Russia wins Duma supermajority • Pro-Western liberal parties lose nearly all Duma seats • Communist Duma delegation cut by more than half • Communists allege fraud hurt liberals, not selves • Main parties skip presidential race or run unknowns • Communists nominate Kharitonov, not Zyuganov • Yabloko and SPS nominate no one for president; Khakamada launches independent bid Putin 75% Zhirinovsky 7% • UR leader Gryzlov tapped as Duma speaker Zyuganov 4% Glaziev 2% SEE INSIDE Yavlinsky 1% P.3: Was the Duma race free and fair? Other/ P.5: Who are Putin’s rivals, why are they running? Undecided 11% P.7: Insider Information: Top Russian analysts from different party camps interpret the campaign PLUS in-the-know analysis of a key regional election. On the Campaign Trail Figures were obtained from polling agency VTsIOM-A’s survey of 3,200 RUSSIA: A ONE-MAN SHOW adult citizens nationwide conducted between November 18 and December Russia’s December 2003 parliamentary elections consoli- 23, 2003. The numbers represent the percentage who, given a list of dated a political system more completely dominated by a names, say they would cast their ballot for a given candidate if the presi- single individual than any since Soviet times. This single dential election were held the following Sunday, counting only those who intend to vote. individual, President Vladimir Putin (below), is now virtually unchallenged in the presidential race, with all major parties either declining to nominate anyone or tapping DATES TO REMEMBER political Lilliputians for the race. The party defined by its January 28, 2004: Last day for presidential unswerving loyalty to this single individual, United Russia, candidates to submit signatures now controls over 300 March 14, 2004: Presidential election seats in the Duma, more than enough to pass con- stitutional amendments. are, respectively, a nationalist and a populist cabal, gen- The most powerful re- erally supportive of, if not creatures of, Putin’s administra- gional leaders in Russia tion. In short, what Putin says, goes. have almost all fallen into line, either joining The analogy with Soviet times is far from exact, however. United Russia or allying For one thing, Putin’s popularity is genuine, even enthusias- with it. The liberal op- tic. The fact that it is reinforced and cultivated by carefully position, Yabloko and controlled and biased television coverage makes it no less the Union of Right real. One of the most reputable independent survey agen- Forces, have all but dis- cies, VTsIOM-A, thus finds that Putin is currently polling an appeared from the Duma. amazing 75% in the presidential race and that even his most The leftist opposition, the promising rivals trail by nearly 60%; no wonder they pulled Communist Party of the out of the contest in droves. Putin’s endorsement of United Russian Federation Russia sent that party’s ratings skyward during the Duma (KPRF), was virtually decimated in the election, with its campaign. Other parties, even the liberally minded Yabloko delegation cut by more than half. The only other political and the hard-left Communists, foundered on the paradox organizations with Duma representation to speak of, the that many of their own voters approved of Putin. Had Putin Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR) and Motherland, himself not been so appealing to the mass public, he would not have been able to dominate so completely. PARTY-LIST RACE RESULTS (% of vote) tention, he granted an interview to the three main television networks in which he waxed eloquent about his preference United Russia 37.6 for the party and praised its work in the Duma. United Rus- KPRF 12.6 sia’s ratings soared above 30% for the first time, paving the LDPR 11.5 way to its final total of 38%. Slanted news programs, whose Motherland 9.0 editorial motto could have been “all Putin, all the time,” ----------------------------------------- buttressed the party’s position and ruled out virtually all criticism. Only in the officially allocated “debate” time did Yabloko 4.3 United Russia’s opponents have a chance to attack it on ma- SPS 4.0 jor nationwide television. But United Russia simply skipped Agrarian Party 3.6 these debates, forcing opponents to squabble among them- Pensioners/Social Justice 3.1 selves more than with Putin’s favorite party. United Russia Speakers’ Bloc 1.9 candidates in the districts had not only these advantages but, in most cases, the active backing of powerful regional po- People’s Party 1.2 litical machines as well. Unification 1.1 Other Parties 3.8 The United Russia deputies can be expected to back Putin in Against All 4.7 almost everything he does, but it may be a mistake to view Bold = parties clearing 5% and thus winning official fraction in Duma. them as a monolithic bloc that will back the President mind- Figures are from Russia’s Central Election Commission. lessly. For one thing, since the Kremlin relied heavily on regional bosses to win the election, many of the new depu- ties are almost purely products of these very political ma- THE NEW DUMA chines and owe little to Putin himself. Therefore, should UNITED RUSSIA achieved a landslide victory on Putin policies infringe on the power of these machines, one December 7, 2003. Whereas no party had previously can expect this “regional bloc” within United Russia to at- garnered even a quarter of the ballots in the party-list tempt to quietly alter legislation in ways that benefit them. voting since the modern Duma was founded in 1993, On major issues for which the Kremlin is willing to apply Putin’s favorite netted 38%. Since many parties got a intense pressure to regional leaders, however, the President significant number of votes but failed to clear the critical is almost certain to get his way. 5% threshold (for examples, see pp.3-4), these “wasted” votes were redistributed to the parties that did reach 5%. As a result, United Russia wound up with 120 of the 225 SEAT DISTRIBUTION IN THE NEW DUMA seats that were allocated in the party-list competition. As impressive as this was, United Russia won an even more stunning victory in the districts, effectively captur- ing some 180 of the 225 seats available. While not all of these were UR nominees, many were members running United Russia, 300 as independents and others hitched themselves to the Empty, 3 party’s Duma delegation (“fraction”) after the election. For example, pro-Kremlin People’s Party members won over 20 seats, and most opted to join United Russia’s fraction. Thus, at its first meeting in late December, the new Duma registered an impressive 300 deputies for Independent, 23 United Russia, and party leaders claimed they were win- ning still more. The party easily got its leader, Boris LDPR, 36 Gryzlov (below), elected as Duma speaker. The most obvious reasons for Motherland, 36 KPRF, 52 United Russia’s success were Putin’s endorsement, biased state-controlled media, and the support of powerful gov- ernors. Putin generally avoided any public involve- THE COMMUNIST PARTY (KPRF) had not won ment in the Duma campaign, less than 20% in any federal election since 1993, which but when he did intervene, his makes its 2003 collapse to just 13% in the party-list Duma words had powerful effects. contest stunning indeed. Even more crushing was its per- First, at the party’s September formance in the district elections. Whereas its nominees had 20 convention, he declared that he had voted for it in won 46 district seats in 1999, it netted only a dozen in 2003. 1999 and had done the right thing. Pollsters estimated Towering party figures fell in droves, even in districts long that this gave the party a 5% boost, helping put it ahead considered safely “red.” Gone was Anatoly Lukianov, re- of the Communists for good. Second, in the final week puted mastermind of the August 1991 coup attempt and of the campaign, when voters were paying the most at- former head of the USSR’s Supreme Soviet. Outside look- 2 ing in was Yegor Ligachev, the erstwhile number-two WERE THE ELECTIONS FREE AND FAIR? man in the Soviet Union under Mikhail Gorbachev. De- The OSCE, which deployed both long- and short-term ob- feated was the colorful “working man” Vasily Shandy- servers throughout Russia for the Duma elections, found bin (below), long a favorite target of journalists’ humor. that they “failed to meet many OSCE and Council of Europe All three, along with many others, lost to United Russia commitments for democratic elections” (see challengers. Overall, the KPRF can claim only 52 of the http://www.osce.org/documents/odihr/2003/12/1629_en.pdf). The 450 seats in the new Duma. This group is likely to op- main problem was found to be not in actual voting and pose Putin vocally from the political left, but its numbers counting procedures, where no large-scale fraud was de- give it no power whatsoever to influence Duma out- tected, but in the way that the state created unfair cam- comes whenever United Russia is truly united. (Is the paigning conditions that favored United Russia. The two KPRF dead? See Nikonov on p.11.) most reliable exit polls that were conducted concur. One The Communist defeat in part was by the reputable Public Opinion Foundation (POF) and simply reaffirms the power of the other by ROMIR, working with American financier negative campaigning.