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Russia to “Launder” Warpath the Inf Treaty Iranian Oil?

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Russia to “Launder” Warpath the Inf Treaty Iranian Oil? MONTHLY October 2018 MONTHLY AugustOctober 2018 2018 The publication prepared exclusively for PERN S.A. Date of publication in the public domain: 19th17th NovemberSeptember 2018. 2018. CONTENTS 12 19 28 PUTIN AGAIN ON THE GREAT GAME OVER RUSSIA TO “LAUNDER” WARPATH THE INF TREATY IRANIAN OIL? U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR PUTIN’S ANOTHER BODYGUARD JOHN BOLTON GLADDENED 3 TO BE APPOINTED GOVERNOR 18 MOSCOW’S “PARTY OF WAR” RUSSIAN ARMY TO ADD MORE GREAT GAME OVER THE INF 4 FIREPOWER IN KALININGRAD 19 TREATY PURGE IN RUSSIA’S REGIONS AS RUSSIA AND PAKISTAN TO HOLD PUTIN GETS RID OF POLITICAL JOINT MILITARY DRILLS IN THE 6 VETERANS 21 PAKISTANI MOUNTAINS SECHIN LOSES BATTLE FOR ITALY TO WITHDRAW FROM 7 RUSSIA’S STRATEGIC OIL PORT 22 ROSNEFT PROJECT SPETSNAZ, FLEET AND NUCLEAR GAS GAMES: POLISH-RUSSIANS FORCES: RUSSIA’S INTENSE 24 TENSIONS OVER A NEW LNG DEAL 9 MILITARY DRILLS RUSSIA GETS NEW ALLY AS SHOIGU GAZPROM TO RESUME IMPORTS 25 PAYS VISIT TO MONGOLIA 10 OF TURKMEN GAS MORE TENSIONS IN THE SEA 12 PUTIN AGAIN ON THE WARPATH OF AZOV: RUSSIA TO SCARE ON 27 EASTERN FLANK NOVATEK DISCOVERS NEW 13 PROFITABLE GAS DEPOSITS 28 RUSSIA TO “LAUNDER” IRANIAN OIL? NOT ONLY BALTIC LNG PLANT: MOSCOW HOPES FOR IRAQ’S CLOSE TIES BETWEEN SHELL 29 NEW GOVERNMENT 15 AND GAZPROM GAZPROM AND UKRAINE FACE PUTIN VISITS INDIA TO MARK ANOTHER LITIGATION OVER 16 PURCHASE OF RUSSIA’S MISSILES 31 GAS SUPPLIES www.warsawinstitute.org 2 SOURCE: KREMLIN.RU 8 October 2018 PUTIN’S ANOTHER BODYGUARD TO BE APPOINTED GOVERNOR According to the autumn tradition, Russia’s President Vladimir Putin dismisses some governors while appointing new ones. Nonetheless, this year’s reshuffles appear particularly important due to the fact that recent regional elections have clearly depicted problems of many of the Kremlin-backed nominees. It was only lately that President Putin dismissed the incumbents in such regions as Astrakhan, Kurgan, Lipetsk, Primorye as well as governors of the North Caucasus republic of Kabardino-Balkaria and St. Petersburg. Much attention should be paid to recent changes in Astrakhan, as the region’s new governor is Putin’s former bodyguard. And this is not the first such case. ormer governor, Alexander Zhilkin, was until recently employed in Russia’s custom Fdismissed from his function that he had service; previously, he had worked in Defense correctly performed since 2004. Nevertheless, Ministry and he had ensured some functions he has recently got involved in some disputes in security services. For instance, he served with Putin’s siloviki while a number of in the Presidential Security Service (SBP), an his associates were charged of corruption. organization being a secret protective service Thus, it does not come as a surprise that his of the Federal Protective Service (FSO). resignation has been expected by everyone. Morozov is yet another member of Putin’s Nonetheless, he won last elections, which personal security to be promoted to such gave him certain advantage over other Putin- a high position, after the incumbent governor endorsed candidates. However, even such of Yaroslav Region, Dmitry Mironov, and success could not guarantee him that he would current Minister of Emergency Situations, be still able to serve as a governor. Instead, Yevgeny Zinichev. Needless to say that the he was replaced by Sergey Morozov who was incumbent governor of the Tula Region, www.warsawinstitute.org 3 Alexey Dyumin, also belongs to Putin’s inner Seryshev. As for the latter, in 2018, he circle. became the presidential aide for human resources, which seems to explain the fact As for Morozov, he originates from the that he was probably responsible for lobbying so-called group of “piterskie”. In the late for Morozov’s candidacy. Nonetheless, it 1990s, he was responsible for protecting is not known how Morozov, who actually Vladimir Yakovlev, the then-governor of lacks political experience, is supposed to Saint Petersburg. In 2003, he settled in assume his position whereas other former Moscow, where he assumed the position of FSO officers have previously carried out or Putin’s security officer. He quickly managed are currently carrying out functions of the to become a member of President’s personal governors, however, not all of them manage to bodyguard as well as he was promoted to successfully fulfil their tasks. While Dyumin is the rank of General of the Federal Protective doing quite well in the Tula Region, Zinichev Service. Transferred to the Ministry of is much less powerful as the incumbent Defense, he carried out duties of an adviser to governor of Kaliningrad. He managed to work Minister Shoigu until 2017; interestingly, also there only for three months; then, he was Dyumin needed to pass a similar path before transferred to the FSB. Finally, he assumed assuming position of the governor. Then a position in Russia’s Ministry of Emergency Morozov became the deputy head of Russia’s Situations. Thus, one should expect further Federal Tax Service (FTS), serving as the nominations of that kind; thanks to such deputy of the former FSB general and the head a strategy, Putin seeks to manage regions with of the FTS, Vladimir Bulavin. his endorsed siloviki who have no links with local elites and are capable of implementing While working at the FTS, Morozov gained even a very oppressive policy. the support of another FSB general, Anatoly 9 October 2018 RUSSIAN ARMY TO ADD MORE FIREPOWER IN KALININGRAD The shore artillery of the Baltic Fleet will aim to significantly increase its range of fire while the naval aviation has been already reinforced following the introduction of upgraded helicopters designed to fight submarines. In addition, thanks to the newly modernized Chkalovsky Airport, this military facility will be able to receive all types of heavy aircraft. Recent decision of Russia’s army command made it possible to boost its combat potential in the Kaliningrad Region in such a powerful way. Nonetheless, all aforementioned steps may eventually translate into an increase in the military threat to neighbouring NATO member states, including Poland and Lithuania, as well as to allied ships in the Baltic Sea. he Russian navy is currently launcher systems as well as their upgraded Treconstructing its artillery subunits version Uragan 1-M, which should eventually both in the Crimean Peninsula and in the strengthen the firepower of the Russian army Kaliningrad Region. The exclave is to be in the region. Following the very first delivery equipped with the Uragan multiple rocket of the Uragan (220 mm) self-propelled www.warsawinstitute.org 4 SOURCE: WIKIMEDIA.ORG multiple rocket launcher system to the Baltic adapted to winter operation regime. The Fleet, its artillery carried out first tests of helicopters are equipped with on-board radio the new military equipment. The next stage instrumentation, radio acoustic instruments, of the army’s modernization will involve as well as a brand-new search system, enabling replacing the hitherto systems by the Uragan- to target and attack submarines. The Russians 1M rocket launchers, which will enable to have also terminated the reconstruction of increase their range of fire up to 70 kilometres. the Chkalovsky Airport. Such comprehensive Current systems Tornado-G and Grad have modernization of the Baltic Fleet air base was a maximum range of 40 and 20 kilometres, initiated at the end of 2013; nonetheless, it respectively. The Uragan-1M is adapted for has been completed only recently. The airport new types of ammunition, including cluster has already started receiving aircraft of the munitions and guided missiles. The Baltic 72th Air Base aviation of the Baltic Fleet Fleet artillery constitutes part of the coast that had been temporarily transferred to the defense forces. Their goal is to destroy any Chernyakhov Airport. Following the works, kinds of light ships as well as to defend the the Chkalovsky Airport may receive coast from landing and to support all actions a large number of aircraft at the same time. performed by the Fleet’s own units. The runway was changed and extended while new buildings were built, communication Russia’s Defense Ministry has also informed lines were installed as well as the entire that the Fleet’s naval aviation forces had transport infrastructure was renovated, received upgrades version of Ka-27M making the airport apt to receive all types of helicopters that had previously been heavy aircraft. www.warsawinstitute.org 5 SOURCE: KREMLIN.RU 12 October 2018 PURGE IN RUSSIA’S REGIONS AS PUTIN GETS RID OF POLITICAL VETERANS It was only during one day (October 11) that three heads of Russian regions (Kursk Region, Zabaykalsky Krai and Republic of Bashkortostan) handed in their resignations. In two cases, the Kremlin decided to replace the incumbent with younger politicians who were supposed to achieve much better election result. For instance, governor of the Zabaykalsky Krai stepped down only after two years of office, thus paying dearly for weak results of the United Russia ruling party in the September regional elections as well as her own worsening popularity rates. Since the end of September, a total of nine governors officially decided to dismiss. uch unprecedented wave of dismissals Federation, as well as the country’s further Sbegan already on September 26 when the areas such as Ural, Siberia, the Far East and Kremlin-endorsed candidates failed to win the Caucasus. President Vladimir Putin the legislative assembly race in four Russian dismissed the incumbents in such oblasts as regions. Inhabitants of the Khakassia Region Astrakhan, Kurgan, Lipetsk, Primorye as well will vote in the second tour while election as governors in St. Petersburg and the North results in the Primorye were eventually Caucasus Republic of Kabardino-Balkaria. cancelled; interestingly enough, in both Further dismissals came on October 11 when Khabarovsk Region and Vladimir Region, the head of Zabaykalsky Krai, the governor the second tour appeared successful for the of the Kursk Region and the president of nationalist Liberal Democratic Party (LDPR) the Bashkortostan Republic were removed candidates.
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