The Initiation and Effectiveness of Multi-Coalition Peace Operations

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The Initiation and Eﬀectiveness of Multi-Coalition Peace Operations

Dissertation

Presented in Partial Fulﬁllment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University

Caitlin B. Clary, M.A.

Graduate Program in Political Science

The Ohio State University

2019

Dissertation Committee:

Alexander Thompson, Advisor

Amanda Robinson

Bear Braumoeller Copyright by

Caitlin B. Clary

2019 ...

Abstract

After the end of the Cold War, the international peacekeeping environment changed dramatically. Among the changes was the development of a new model of peace operations, in which multiple multilateral coalitions intervene to manage a conflict. Nearly half of the peace operations conducted in recent years have taken this multi-coalition form, but we know little about why interventions of this type are created, and whether these operations effectively reduce violence and provide lasting peace. This dissertation presents data on the 22 cases of multi-coalition, or “hyperlateral,” peace operations that have occurred between 1990 and 2018. I present a new theory of the drivers of hyperlateral cooperation in peace operations, and the effectiveness of such efforts. I argue that states and intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) are interested in efficiently dividing the labor of peace operations when operational needs exceed what a single coalition is able and willing to provide. Additionally, I argue that motivations beyond operational effectiveness can drive multi-coalition involvement, including a logic of path dependence, and state and IGO interests in securing power and reputation. Dif- ferent types of peace operation providers have distinct comparative advantages, creating potential for intervenors to efficiently specialize based on their advantages. I argue that hyperlateral interventions are more likely to be effective when intervenors have complementary comparative advantages. Furthermore, I argue that operational effectiveness depends on the level of communication and coordination among intervening parties. Ab- sent such coordination, intervenors may inadvertently act inefficiently, or even at cross purposes. To examine these arguments, I analyze a series of cases of hyperlateral intervention, tracing how involved coalitions came to intervene, how international actors influenced one another as interventions were established, and security outcomes both during and after intervention in each case.

i Evidence from the case studies provides preliminary support for the argument that interests in the efficient provision of peace and factors related to intervenors’ egoistic interests motivate hyperlateral interventions. Evidence on the effectiveness of hyperlateralism is mixed. Complementarity and coordination of intervenor efforts are associated with the short-term provision of peace in several cases, but not uniformly. Furthermore, examination of these case studies suggests no clear link between complementarity or coordination and the long-term prospects for peace in target states. This research, by examining how providers of peace operations influence and interact with one another, sheds new light on the politics of contemporary conflict management.

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Acknowledgments

Writing a dissertation often feels like a solitary undertaking. In reality, though, the endeavor is characterized by interdependence. I am indebted to a great many supportive, smart, and kind people, whose influence has improved my work and my life in ways large and small. Each of my dissertation committee members – Alex Thompson, Amanda Robin- son, and Bear Braumoeller – has been a consistent source of constructive, kind, and thought-provoking feedback. I am particularly grateful to Alex, who has been making my work better for over six years, with characteristic patience, good humor, and all- around brilliance. In classes, workshops, offices, and hallways, the faculty and graduate students in the political science department have given me a great deal of feedback and moral support. I must particularly thank Aisha Bradshaw, Dan Wollrich, and Kyle Larson, who have been outstanding colleagues and steadfast friends. I am grateful to Zachary Peskowitz and Irfan Nooruddin for introducing me to the world of quantitative methods and to Janet Box-Steffensmeier for hiring me as a PRISM fellow. Thanks are also due to Skyler Cranmer and the rest of the NISS Lab, who have been excellent collaborators on a series of network analysis projects. The Department of Political Science at OSU funded my field work at the African Union, which gave me valuable insight into the real-world activity of that institution. I am grateful to the officials and consultants at the AU and the professors at Addis Ababa University who graciously answered my many questions, and to Chedza Molefe and Stephen Mayega at the AU Commission archive, who fielded my incessant records requests.

iii My undergraduate education at the University of West Georgia made me a better student and a more rigorous thinker and writer. Among others at UWG, I am indebted to Greg Dixon, Greg Fraser, Mike Hester, Melanie Hildebrandt, Sooho Lee, Margaret Mitchell, Bob Schaefer, and the late, great Don Wagner. Greg Dixon in particular was generous with his time and encouragement, and deserves credit for sparking my interest in international relations with his brilliant and engaging lectures. I have been aided and encouraged by an extraordinary community of friends and family. I am especially indebted to Kait White Baer and Megan Bell, my conﬁdantes and kindred spirits. My grandparents and extended family have supported and cheered me through years of academic pursuits, for which I am very grateful. I am also thankful to my generous and loving future in-laws, Kim and Scott, and to the extended Hamilton and Holmes clans. My partner, Luke, is an anchor and a light – his patience and support through these years of writing have been an incredible gift. Sharing life with him is a joy, an honor, and an adventure. Finally, I dedicate this dissertation to my siblings, for the jokes and unconditional love, and to my parents, who fostered in me the curiosity and determination that made this work possible.

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Vita

2011 ...... B.S. Political Science, University of West Georgia

2014 ...... M.A. Political Science, The Ohio State University

2014-present ...... Ph.D. Candidate, The Ohio State University

Publications

Li, Weihua, Aisha E. Bradshaw, Caitlin B. Clary and Skyler J. Cranmer. 2017. “A Three-Degree Horizon of Peace in the Military Alliance Network.” Science Advances 3(3):e1601895.

Fields of Study

Major Field: Political Science

Studies in: International Relations Quantitative Methodology

v Table of Contents

Abstract ...... i

Acknowledgments ...... iii

Vita...... v

List of Tables ...... viii

List of Figures ...... ix

1 Introduction ...... 1 1.1 Organization of the Dissertation ...... 4

2 The Origins and Forms of Hyperlateral Intervention ...... 9 2.1 Deﬁnitions ...... 10 2.2 Historical Context ...... 14 2.3 Hyperlateral Cases and Intervenors ...... 31 2.4 Conclusion ...... 39

3 Theorizing Hyperlateral Intervention ...... 41 3.1 Introduction to Literature ...... 42 3.2 The Eﬃciency Framework ...... 59 3.3 The Limits of the Eﬃciency Argument ...... 72 3.4 Conclusion ...... 79

4 Cˆoted’Ivoire Case Study ...... 81 4.1 Conﬂict Background & International Responses ...... 83

vi 4.2 ECOWAS Intervention ...... 91 4.3 Transition to United Nations Intervention ...... 94 4.4 Conﬂict Developments, 2005-2017 ...... 100 4.5 Conclusions ...... 105

5 Cases in Comparison ...... 112 5.1 Central African Republic, 1997-2000 ...... 114 5.2 Macedonia, 2001-2003 ...... 124 5.3 East Timor, 1999-2005 ...... 134 5.4 Chad/Central African Republic, 2007-2010 ...... 144 5.5 Conclusions ...... 156

6 Conclusion ...... 164 6.1 Overview and Findings ...... 164 6.2 Considering the Typology ...... 167 6.3 Future Directions ...... 173

Bibliography ...... 178

vii List of Tables

2.1 Hyperlateral Interventions 1990-2018 ...... 29 2.2 IGO Participants in Hyperlateral Intervention ...... 33 2.3 Ad-Hoc Coalition Participants in Hyperlateral Intervention ...... 33 2.4 Types of Hyperlateral Intervention ...... 36

3.1 Comparative Advantages of Intervenors ...... 62 3.2 Classiﬁcation of Hyperlateral Intervenors ...... 65

4.1 Observable Implications ...... 84

5.1 Chapter 5 Cases ...... 113 5.2 Summary of Case Study Findings ...... 157

viii List of Figures

2.1 Frequency: single-coalition vs. hyperlateral operations over time ...... 13 2.2 Proportion of hyperlateral interventions, 1946-2014 ...... 14 2.3 Hyperlateral intervention locations, 1990-2018 ...... 32 2.4 Sequential hyperlateral intervention ...... 35 2.5 Parallel hyperlateral intervention ...... 35

4.1 Côted’Ivoire case timeline ...... 82 4.2 Côted’Ivoire ceasefire line and zone of confidence ...... 95

ix Chapter 1

Introduction

A new cooperative model of peace operations was created when the Cold War ended. In this model, two or more separate multilateral coalitions intervene in the same conflict environment, either concurrently or sequentially, each deploying substantial numbers of troops or police with the aim of providing peace and security. I refer to these multi-coalition operations as hyperlateral interventions. No hyperlateral interventions occurred prior to 1990, but in the intervening decades the model has become commonplace. In the present day, close to half of peace operations see the participation of multiple multilateral coalitions, but we still know little about why interventions of this type are created and whether they effectively provide peace. This dissertation sets out to address those questions. The international peacekeeping landscape changed dramatically when the Cold War ended. Multilateral peace operations have come to be established more frequently, to be fielded by a greater number of intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) and ad- hoc coalitions, to have broader and more variable mandates, and to be deployed in a wider range of conflict and post-conflict environments. The literature on peacekeeping has explored all of these developments1 but has tended to neglect another important

1For just a few examples, MacQueen (2011) explores the post-Cold War peacekeeping boom; Morris and McCoubrey (1999), Diehl and Lepgold (2003), and Bellamy and Williams (2005) examine the regionalization of peace operations and the growing diversity of intervention providers; and Sens (2004), Talentino (2005), and Mingst and Karns (2012) consider the changing targets and mandates of peace

1 evolution: the fact that it has become substantially less likely for interventions to be carried out by a single multilateral coalition. To illustrate this phenomenon, it is useful to briefly outline the most recent case of hyperlateral intervention. In early 2012, a number of armed groups occupied northern Mali, and the Malian government was unable to regain control of the territory. Then, in March of the same year, the Malian military carried out a coup d’état, unseating the country’s president (Boutellis, 2015; Guéhenno, 2016). Two separate multilateral coalitions intervened in response to this security crisis. The first intervention was regionally-led, initially planned by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) – a regional IGO to which Mali belongs. Eventually the African Union (AU) assumed the leading role in planning and executing the regional intervention (United Nations Security Council, 2013b, par. 32; World Peace Foundation, 2017).2 In January 2013, a year after the crisis began, rebels launched an offensive which prompted both unilateral intervention from France (at the request of Malian regime) and the deployment of the planned regional operation, the African-led International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA). Then, only a few months after AFISMA deployed, the UN Security Council authorized its own peace operation in Mali to take over from AFISMA (United Nations Security Council, 2013a). The AU and ECOWAS expressed their conditional support for the UN assuming peacekeeping responsibilities in Mali, but as preparations for the UN intervention continued, those regional bodies complained of being shut out of the planning process (Théroux-Bénoni,2014). Despite these inter-organizational tensions, the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) deployed in July 2013. MINUSMA absorbed most of AFISMA’s personnel, who were re-hatted as UN troops (United Nations, 2017). At the time of writing, MI-

operations including the rise of intervention in civil wars and in ongoing conflicts, and the growth of multidimensional mandates and enforcement activities. 2Both practical and political reasons motivated this shift to AU leadership. First, ECOWAS had serious resource constraints, and key parties believed the AU was better equipped to generate the needed funding and material resources for the intervention. Second, some key regional powers – particularly Algeria – were not members of ECOWAS, and working through the AU allowed those states more direct input in the intervention process (Théroux-Bénoni,2014).

2 NUSMA is still operating in Mali, and is authorized to continue through at least June 30, 2019 (United Nations Security Council, 2018). Even this cursory look at the Malian case raises interesting questions about the behavior of and interactions between intervenors. Why did ECOWAS and the AU pursue a regional intervention in the crisis? Was the regional effort effective in providing peace? Why did the UN authorize its own intervention in Mali only months after it authorized AFISMA? What parties’ interests were served by this double-barreled intervention? Did disagreements among the intervenors decrease operational effectiveness? Did the multi- coalition peace operation effectively provide peace in the country? These questions are particularized versions of the key questions driving this dissertation: what motivates states and IGOs to create hyperlateral interventions? And under what conditions are these interventions effective? The existing literature on peace operations offers little systematic insight into complex intervention efforts like the one in Mali. This is despite the fact that interventions by multiple actors have become the norm in the international system (Welz, 2016). Any coalition’s decision to initiate a peace operation does not take place in a vacuum. Model- ing interventions as if they were independent events misses important aspects of conflict management processes in the present day. In the realm of peace operations, as in many other aspects of international relations, it is useful to “think of international cooperation as a complex system” (Alter and Meunier, 2009, 13). In this complex system, actors interested in the provision of peace affect one another’s decision sets and behaviors in meaningful ways. Interactions among intervenors help determine whether and how peace operations are established in a given crisis. Furthermore, if we conceptualize interventions as a type of ‘treatment’ that can affect conflict outcomes, then hyperlateral operations involve multiple, interacting treatments taking place concurrently or sequentially. Devel- oping a full apprehension of the initiation and effects of peace operations requires taking this complexity seriously. Peace operations are an important strategy for conflict management in the con-

3 temporary world. Working through IGOs and ad-hoc coalitions, states commit tens or hundreds of thousands of troops and billions of dollars every year on peace operations.3 These substantial investments are made with the aim of creating a more secure world. Ex- isting research does not fully grasp the complexity and interdependence that characterize this important aspect of international relations.

1.1 Organization of the Dissertation

Because little has been written about the phenomenon of multi-coalition interventions, an important analytical first step is identifying and describing these cases. As King, Keohane, and Verba note, in some cases “the state of knowledge in a field is such that much fact-finding and description is needed before we can take on the challenge of explanation” (1994, 15). Part of this dissertation’s contribution is in defining, identifying, and describing the hyperlateral interventions that have taken place. Chapter 2 defines hyperlateral intervention as temporally connected peace operations carried out by multiple coalitions, deploying substantial numbers of military or police personnel. Chapter 2 then discusses the development of the hyperlateral intervention model after the end of the Cold War. The emergence of this model was enabled by the end of great power competition, high demand for peace operations in the context of a boom in civil conflict, and increased interest in regional conflict management fueled by disillusionment with the UN’s capability to provide peace. There have been 22 cases of hyperlateral intervention, occurring from 1990 through the present day. Chapter 2 presents a list of these cases, and the multilateral coalitions that fielded each component intervention, along with summary information about the location and duration of these operations. Finally, the chapter introduces a four-part typology of hyperlateral intervention, based on the temporal and functional relationships

3Exact ﬁgures on global peace operation deployments and budgets, across all IGOs and ad-hoc coalitions, are not available. However, the United Nations alone had over 85,000 troops and police deployed as of August 2018, and a peacekeeping budget of over 6 billion dollars for the period from July 1, 2018 through June 30, 2019 (United Nations Peacekeeping, 2018).

4 between component operations. Chapter 3 builds on this descriptive foundation, developing theoretical explanations for the initiation and effects of hyperlateral intervention. The chapter first considers what existing literature tells us about why coalitions intervene in conflicts, and the determinants of intervention effectiveness. Then the chapter develop a baseline framework for considering hyperlateral intervention, building from the assumptions that state and IGO actors are rational, motivated by their interest in providing peace and security, and interested in maximizing the efficiency of their conflict management efforts. Multilateral intervenors have different comparative advantages, in areas such as resources, response time, and legitimacy. Because those comparative advantages exist, there is potential for intervenors to establish an efficient division of labor based on those advantages, and thereby increase operational effectiveness. After introducing this efficiency logic and deriving a set of observable implications, the chapter expands on and complicates this framework. Self-interested states and organizational actors have a host of motivations for favoring peace operations, including reputation management, increasing power and influence, and path dependence. Furthermore, even with shared interests and complementary advantages, intervenors may fail to efficiently coordinate their efforts. Chapter 3 introduces the argument that operational efficacy depends on the level of communication and coordination among intervening parties. Chapters 4 and 5 explore the arguments introduced in Chapter 3 by analyzing a number of cases of hyperlateral intervention. As noted above, 22 hyperlateral interventions have been formed. While these cases constitute a substantial proportion of peace operations in the post-Cold War era, a sample this small is challenging to analyze using quantitative methods. Furthermore, there is interesting and important heterogeneity within this group of cases. Case studies allow for a rich exploration of the nuances of each case, and a consideration of involved parties’ interests, actions, and impacts at many points throughout an intervention effort. Quantitatively considering the differences among hyperlateral interventions would require working with even smaller subsets of the

5 data. Models based on these data would likely be underpowered, making it difficult to draw reliable conclusions. These considerations informed my selection of a qualitative, case-oriented approach in this dissertation. Across Chapters 4 and 5 of this dissertation I examine five cases of hyperlateral intervention over time, from the pre-intervention context, through the series of interventions, and into the post-intervention period. Chapter 4 considers one hyperlateral case in depth, and then Chapter 5 more briefly investigates four additional cases. These case studies consider when and why the involved coalitions intervened, how the coalitions influenced one another, how each crisis evolved over time as conflict management approaches developed, and the security outcomes both during and after intervention in each case. The facts of each case are considered alongside the predictions that each argument presented in Chapter 3 would make about intervention initiation and outcomes. Based on these comparisons I explore how useful the proposed theoretical arguments are as predictors of intervention behavior and effects. Chapter 4 presents case-level evidence from the hyperlateral intervention in Côte d’Ivoire, which lasted from 2002 to 2017. ECOWAS and the UN established sequential interventions in the country, attempting to resolve a conflict that divided Côte d’Ivoire into a government-controlled south and a rebel-held north. ECOWAS intervened first, providing a relatively rapid conflict response, informed by local knowledge and bolstered by local legitimacy. The UN’s operation took over from ECOWAS later in the case, providing a larger multidimensional intervention that worked to address underlying political grievances as well as providing security in the country. Hyperlateral intervention in the Ivorian case is partially attributable to actors’ interests in the efficient provision of peace. In this case, we observe key states and organizations taking a problem-solving approach to conflict resolution, particularly in establishing a more extensive, multidimensional UN operation to take over from ECOWAS, which did not have the capability to resolve the Ivorian crisis. The facts of this case suggest that actors were motivated by reputation interests and path dependence in addition

6 to efficiency concerns. Evidence from this case provides some support for the argument that when intervenors divide labor according to comparative advantages, and coordinate their intervention efforts, their operations are more likely to effectively provide peace. ECOWAS and the UN worked closely to coordinate the hand-off between intervention efforts, and no major security setbacks occurred in this crucial period. However, even complementary and well-coordinated efforts can still face substantial difficulties, and the peace process in Côted’Ivoire was not without setbacks, as the chapter explores. Chapter 5 analyzes four additional cases of hyperlateral intervention. These are the 1997-2000 intervention in the Central African Republic (CAR), the 2001-2003 intervention in Macedonia, the 1999-2005 intervention in East Timor, and the 2007-2010 intervention in Chad and CAR. These shorter explorations of additional cases build on the Chapter 4 case study by introducing more variation on key variables. The cases examined in Chapter 5 differ in terms of the actors intervening, the motivations and interactions of those actors, and the effectiveness of the interventions. The cases in Chapter 5 also represent each of the four types of hyperlateral intervention identified in Chapter 2. Consideration of these cases allows both for some preliminary cross-case comparisons as well as inductive theory-building about the initiation and effects of the different types of hyperlateral intervention. Evidence from the case studies suggests that hyperlateral intervention is motivated both by a desire to effectively resolve crises and by self-interested behavior by states and IGOs concerned with enhancing their influence and reputation. Specific combinations of motivations for hyperlateralism differ across cases. Evidence from these cases on the determinants of hyperlateral intervention effectiveness is mixed. In some cases, complementarity and coordination appear linked to operational efficacy in the short term, the long term, or both. However, these effects are not uniform. Overall, the case studies neither obviously refute nor clearly support this dissertation’s arguments about hyperlateral intervention’s efficacy. Chapter 6 concludes by summarizing the findings of this dissertation and considering potential directions for further research. Chapter 6 also revisits the typology of

7 hyperlateral intervention introduced in Chapter 2. Drawing on observations from the cases examined in Chapters 4 and 5, this concluding chapter presents preliminary arguments about the selection of diﬀerent hyperlateral intervention structures, and the implications of intervention structure for operational eﬀectiveness.

8 Chapter 2

The Origins and Forms of Hyperlateral Intervention

As the introductory chapter argues, hyperlateral interventions – peace operations carried out by multiple multilateral coalitions – have become an important feature of international responses to conflict. This dissertation is concerned with the origins and the effects of this conflict management approach. In this chapter I describe the characteristics of hyperlateral intervention and put this model’s emergence in historical context, in order to lay a foundation for later chapters’ theoretical and empirical exploration of the two principal questions motivating the project. Those questions are: first, why, and under what conditions, do multiple IGOs and/or ad-hoc coalitions intervene in a given crisis? Second, under what conditions are hyperlateral interventions effective in providing peace? This chapter first sets out a more detailed definition of hyperlateral intervention and notes some types of multi-actor intervention that do not qualify under my rubric. Next, I note important changes in the landscape of peace operations since the end of World War II, including the changing role of regional institutions over time. This historical section also specifically establishes the context surrounding the birth of hyperlateral intervention in the post-Cold War era. The following section provides summary information on the 22 cases of hyperlateral intervention I identify, including the organizations

9 and coalitions involved in executing such interventions, and regional variation in the establishment of hyperlateral operations. This descriptive work clarifies the phenomenon this dissertation is concerned with and introduces the organizations and states that play pivotal roles in the process of authorizing and carrying out hyperlateral interventions. The penultimate section defines four primary types of hyperlateral interventions, based on how the component operations are related functionally and temporally, and a final section concludes.

2.1 Deﬁnitions

Multilateral1 conflict management activities can be usefully sorted as falling into three categories: multilateral diplomacy, peacekeeping, and peace enforcement (Lepgold 2003, 12). The operations of primary interest in this project fall into the two latter categories, of peacekeeping and peace enforcement. Hyperlateral interventions are peace operations carried out by two or more multilateral coalitions deploying substantial military or police contingents,2 where those operations are not divided temporally, and the interventions are not part of an interstate war effort. I elaborate further on the components of this definition below. The intervening coalitions in a hyperlateral intervention can be organized under the auspices of an IGO, or can be ad-hoc groups unaffiliated with an IGO; I use the term “coalition” generically to refer to both IGO-led and ad-hoc groups of intervening states. The set of multilateral interventions in a given crisis, occurring in a continuous span of time, constitutes a single case of hyperlateral intervention. For instance, an early case of hyperlateral intervention took place in Somalia in the early 1990s, involving multilateral interventions by the United Nations and by the U.S.-led Unified Task Force (UNITAF). The UN and UNITAF operations each had a mandate to restore peace in Somalia, each

1In this project “multilateral” institutions, coalitions, or activities are those established or carried out by three or more states (in contrast to “unilateral” and “bilateral”). 2I set the cut-oﬀ for inclusion at > 50 military or police personnel deployed; staﬀ or other civilian personnel are not counted.

10 involved the deployment of substantial numbers of military personnel, and the operations were temporally continuous: from April 1992 until March 1995, at least one coalition had an active peace operation in Somalia. The establishment of two or more multilateral peace operations in a given conflict is the key feature of hyperlateralism. Those interventions entail the commitment of large numbers of military or police personnel to a conflict or post-conflict environment to carry out peacekeeping or peace enforcement tasks. This project considers the roles of two main types of multilateral actors: IGOs, such as the United Nations or the African Union; and ad-hoc coalitions, such as UNITAF in Somalia. IGOs have a relatively stable membership, and institutionalized procedures for making policy decisions. Ad-hoc coalitions, by contrast, are temporary partnerships among states working toward a shared goal. Tables 2.2 and 2.3 later in this chapter list the organizations and ad-hoc coalitions that have been participants in hyperlateral interventions. Among the functions these intervenors may perform are: disarming belligerents, monitoring or enforcing a ceasefire, protecting civilians, deterring renewed fighting, supplementing the government’s military and police capabilities, and providing security in particular regions. Peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations are potential components of hyperlateral interventions. Peace enforcement involves intervention in ongoing conflicts with the aim of stopping hostilities and moving parties toward a settlement, whereas peacekeeping operations enter a post-conflict environment with the goal of preventing a resump- tion of hostilities. In practice, peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations are not always easily distinguishable. The hyperlateral interventions I consider in this dissertation frequently involve both peace enforcement and peacekeeping activities. Throughout this dissertation I use “peace operations” as an umbrella term. My analytical framework excludes operations that do not have a principal component of using military or police personnel to prevent conflict. Among the excluded operations are diplomatic missions that seek to assist in crisis resolution through mediation and negotiation. Also excluded are small observer operations and training missions,

11 which are “not designed to have a large-scale impact on security” (Brosig and Sempijja, 2018, 4). These smaller diplomatic and civilian operations are less costly and less risky than peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations. I expect that the data generating process that underlies these operations is meaningfully different from that underlying the more extensive and ambitious operations with conflict management mandates with which this dissertation is concerned. However, it is worth noting that these excluded categories of missions can also be carried out by multiple coalitions, much like the peace operations that this dissertation considers. In later chapters, when considering cases of hyperlateralism in depth, I will periodically note the roles of diplomatic and civilian operations. To qualify as a hyperlateral case, the multiple interventions must occur either simultaneously or immediately sequentially. If one coalition intervenes in a crisis and then withdraws, and then after a period of time a different intervention occurs, that case would not qualify as a hyperlateral intervention because of the temporal gap between the multilateral operations. My definition also makes a distinction between peace operations, which have a mandate to prevent or end a conflict, and conflictual interventions. Warlike interventions to further the interests of the intervenor(s) at the expense of the target state do not qualify as peace operations, and therefore are not part of the universe of hyperlateral cases. For instance, the U.S.-led coalition efforts in the Gulf War, the War in Iraq, and the War in Afghanistan would not qualify as components of a hyperlateral case under my definition.3 It is not always straightforward to parse the motivations of intervening groups, distinguishing between interventions that are established to further the interests of the intervenors by forcing regime change or other concessions, and interventions with more altruistic motivations of stopping violence, protecting civilians, and supporting equitable

3Howard (2008) notes that in the Iraq and Afghanistan cases, international intervention began as essentially unilateral interventions led by the United States. While some of the post-war reconstruction tasks undertaken by the U.S., its allies, and IGOs resemble the activities of peace operations, encompassing functions like institution-building, training, election monitoring, and policing, the way international involvement began in these cases puts them in a separate category from the peace operations considered herein (Howard, 2008, 342).

12 peace agreements. I am not the ﬁrst to make this distinction, however. For instance, Beardsley excludes “such interventions as the U.S.-led UN force in the Korean War and humanitarian interventions that did not involve the consent of the host countries” from his analysis of peacekeeping operations (2011, 1057).4

Figure 2.1: Relative frequency of single-coalition vs. hyperlateral operations over time. Hyperlateral operations are coded as beginning once the second intervening party has entered. Single-coalition intervention data from version 3.1 of Mark J. Mullenbach’s Third Party Peacekeeping Missions Data Set, 1946-2014 (Mullenbach, 2013).

Since the end of the Cold War, there has been a dramatic shift in how peace operations are executed, with hyperlateral intervention becoming established as a common model for conﬂict management. Figure 2.1 compares the frequency of hyperlateral interventions and single-coalition multilateral interventions, counting the number of ongoing

4This principle of excluding non-consensual interventions is a useful starting place for distinguishing between peace operations and conﬂictual interventions. However, it is possible to conceive of legitimate non-consensual peace operations. For instance, the Responsibility to Protect doctrine provides for an international right and responsibility to intervene in humanitarian catastrophes even without the consent of a target state’s government, which is particularly important when those humanitarian emergencies are the result of actions taken by the target government, e.g. state-sponsored genocide. Because these edge cases exist, I do not use the principle of consent in my deﬁnition of peace operations.

13 Figure 2.2: Proportion of ongoing interventions that are hyperlateral, 1946-2014. The proportion is calculated as the number of ongoing hyperlateral interventions per year divided by the total number of ongoing interventions that year.

interventions of each type in each year, starting in 1946.5 As Figure 2.2 further illustrates, in recent years between 40 percent and 50 percent of ongoing peace operations are hyperlateral. Interventions of this type are clearly an important feature of the peace operations landscape.

2.2 Historical Context

Multilateral peace operations are a relatively modern creation, emerging only after World War II as a policy option for responding to conﬂict. In the aftermath of World War

5In Figure 2.1 and Figure 2.2, data on single-coalition interventions is drawn from version 3.1 of the Third Party Peacekeeping Missions Data Set, 1946-2014 (Mullenbach, 2013), available online at http://uca.edu/politicalscience/dadm-project/dadm-data-sets/. To derive the single-coalition series from Mullenbach’s data, I plot all interventions that (a) consist of 50 or more military or police personnel, (b) are multilateral, and (c) are not components of a hyperlateral intervention case. While the single-coalition data ends in 2014, I plot the hyperlateral series through 2017 in Figure 2.1.

14 II, international concern with avoiding further global conflict helped motivate the creation of the United Nations. The UN’s principal objective was the maintenance of international peace and security (United Nations, 1945, Ch. 1, Art. 1). These developments created the necessary conditions for the first multilateral missions with the goal of preserving peace. Early forays into collective conflict management included the establishment of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO), which was deployed in 1948 to supervise a cease-fire in Palestine, and the creation of the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) in 1949, to monitor the cease-fire after the Indo-Pakistani War of 1947-48. The first realization of the UN peacekeeping model, distinct from the earlier observer missions, was the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF I), which was created in 1956 as an armed operation to bring an end to the Suez crisis and maintain peace between Egypt and Israel. Early peace operations, including UNEF I, tended to focus on conflicts or crises with important geostrategic implications, and to follow the priorities of powerful states (Finnemore, 2003, 55). Reflected in these priorities was the conviction that “maintaining inviolable national borders was essential for international security,” hence early operations’ focus on maintaining ceasefire lines (Paris, 2014, 503). The principal concern with international conflict is an important feature of this era of peacekeeping, and stands in contrast to the more civil conflict-oriented peace operations landscape of the post-Cold War era (Fortna, 2004). The intense Cold War rivalry between the U.S. and the Soviet Union put a damper on the ambitious objectives of the United Nations in providing global peace. Both major powers possessed a veto in the UN Security Council – the body which mandates UN peace operations – and so the Soviet Union was able to block Security Council proposals seen as benefiting the United States, and vice versa. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Secretary-General of the UN from 1992 to 1996, cited the Security Council deadlock during the Cold War as “a vivid expression of the divisions” of the era, and as the reason the UN was unable to respond to many of the conflicts that erupted between 1945 and 1989 (Boutros-Ghali,

15 1992a, par. 14). While the UN was substantially limited during the Cold War, no other organization supplanted the UN as the dominant body in the realm of multilateral security provision; other IGOs were similarly constrained by great power politics. Some regional organizations fielded peace operations during this period – Diehl (2007) counts nine such regional peacekeeping missions before 1989 – but these efforts were limited and sporadic. As Lepgold notes, “regional security mechanisms were typically suppressed unless they served Soviet or U.S. purposes” (2003, 10). The relative infrequency of multilateral peace operations in this period does not imply that third party intervention in conflict was rare during the Cold War. Unilateral intervention in conflict was quite common. Talentino attributes the prevalence of unilateralism to the intense ideological conflict between capitalism and communism, and the notion that any spread of the opposing ideology, no matter where in the world, was a critical national security concern (2005, 26). Unilateral intervention in conflict became much less common after the Cold War. Outside that zero-sum security environment, the geostrategic incentives for unilateral interventions were substantially lessened (Regan, 2000, 52). In addition to states seeing unilateral intervention as less valuable in the post- Cold War era, unilateralism has also become more costly “in social and political terms,” as a normative preference for multilateralism has evolved (Finnemore, 2003, 75). When the Soviet Union collapsed, the United States became the dominant power in a unipolar international system, but even in that unrivaled position the U.S. continued to support and expand a multilateral international order (Ikenberry, 2003). An early example of security multilateralism in the unipolar era is the U.S. leading a multinational coalition against Iraq in the First Gulf War instead of acting unilaterally. Another notable instance is the U.S.-led multilateral intervention in Haiti in 1994, which departed from “a century- old practice of unilateralism in that country specifically and the Western hemisphere more generally” (Kreps, 2007, 455).

16 Beyond the shift away from unilateral intervention, the end of the Cold War had other transformative consequences for international responses to conflict. Representatives of organizations and states saw the changed international environment as a remarkable second chance to achieve the vision of global cooperation and peace that motivated the creation of the UN in the 1940s (Boutros-Ghali, 1992a). The remainder of this section discusses the increased frequency of interventions, the changed conceptualization of the types of crises ripe for international intervention, and the expanded security provision roles of multilateral actors other than the UN, all of which developed in this period of important geopolitical change. There was a boom in peace operations once the Cold War ended. As Fortna and Howard note, more peace operations “deployed from 1988 through 1993 than had in the previous four decades” (2008, 284). Figure 2.1, introduced in the previous section, de- picts this post-Cold War spike. Beyond the change in the number of peace operations established, the purposes of those operations shifted as well. Peacekeeping missions during the Cold War were most commonly established to maintain peace between sovereign states (Fortna, 2003, 2004). Since the end of the Cold War, peace operations in internal conflicts have become much more common. This change was partially driven by a substantial increase in the number of civil conflicts in this period, as well as growing numbers of weak or failed states that are particularly susceptible to intrastate conflict (Sens, 2004). Sens characterizes the rise of intrastate conflict as “the central conflict management challenge confronting the UN system” in the wake of the Cold War (2004, 143). As Fortna notes, attempts to resolve civil conflicts face distinct difficulties like dealing with unclearly-defined belligerent parties, the need to disarm and reintegrate combatants, and the need to establish and/or strengthen domestic institutions to prevent the re-emergence of conflict (Fortna, 2003). These challenges required changes to the standard operating procedures for peace operations developed in the first four decades of UN peacekeeping. In the Cold War period, the UN mostly intervened in cases where peace agreements had already been reached, and the interventions in those cases “mostly had traditional

17 ceasefire-monitoring mandates and no direct peacebuilding responsibilities” (Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, 2000, par. 17). It is useful to understand the immediate post-Cold War period as an era of experimentation, where the potential targets and potential functions of peace operations expanded dramatically (Richmond, 2014). This expansion included the emergence of interventions into ongoing conflicts where there is ‘no peace to keep.’ Peace operations in this context attempt to provide security in contexts where the conflict has not actually come to an end, and have to deal with combatant groups that may not be committed to ending the fighting. For the UN, this shift toward authorizing more peace enforcement operations began in the early 1990s (Guéhenno, 2016, 373). There also was an important shift in rhetoric about how sovereignty should be understood in relation to the effort to provide international peace. In remarks at the Jan- uary 1992 UN Security Council Summit, then-Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali remarked on the evolving meaning of sovereignty, which he argued should be understood not only as a right of states, but also as a “dimension of responsibility, both internal and external” (Boutros-Ghali, 1992b, 8-9). This concept of conditional sovereignty holds that there are circumstances in which it is acceptable (or even mandatory) to intervene in a sovereign state for certain important purposes, including protecting vulnerable people from gross abuses by a government. Activities of the UN in the 1990s both illustrated and reified this shift in norms about sovereignty. As Malone argues, the organization’s “willingness to intervene extensively in inter-communal and civil conflicts called into question the absolute nature of sovereignty” in this period (1998, 20-21). On the heels of the post-Cold War boom in peacekeeping came a trio of important peacekeeping failures, in Somalia, Rwanda, and Bosnia. It is useful to briefly discuss those three cases and their consequences for international approaches to peacekeeping. Those consequences include a normative shift about the purposes for which force could be used in peace operations, and a recognition of the limitations of the UN leading to a

18 turn to regional coalitions as providers of security. The international intervention in Somalia saw a U.S.-led multinational coalition, the United Task Force (UNITAF), intervening alongside a UN peace operation. The Somali state had collapsed by the time peace operations were launched, and attempts at a peace process had to contend with at least fifteen factions, not all of which saw international intervention as legitimate (Howard, 2008, 21-23).6 The critical turning point for international involvement in the conflict was the Battle of Mogadishu in October 1993, The United States ended its involvement in Somalia a few months after that battle, a clash between U.S. forces and a major combatant militia led by Mohamad Farah Aideed. During the battle, 18 U.S. Army Rangers were killed, and one Ranger was dragged through the streets of Mogadishu. The U.S. had fielded the majority of the UNITAF coalition troops, and when the UN’s operation (UNOSOM II) took over peacekeeping responsibilities from UNITAF in May 1993, nearly 18,000 U.S. troops remained in Somalia to support UNOSOM II.7 The U.S.’s withdrawal substantially changed the strength of the international presence (United Nations Peacekeeping, 1997b). In 1994 the U.S. withdrew its troops from Somalia, as did several other states, and UNOSOM II’s authorized strength was downsized. The UN withdrew from Somalia in March 1995 without securing peace in the country, and the intervention is generally assessed as a failure, with a possible silver lining of having provided some humanitarian relief. The UN authorized its intervention in Rwanda (UNAMIR) the same month as the Battle of Mogadishu, and we can draw a direct line from the difficulties in Somalia to the international community’s “failure to adequately invest in UNAMIR, in terms of force strength, funding, and mandate” (Howard, 2008, 30). After Somalia, carrying out another intervention in the same part of the world was an unattractive prospect to many key stakeholders, including the United States. The UN fielded an inadequate number of troops, with a mandate that was both expansive and poorly tailored to the evolving

6Fifteen political leaders representing separate, named factions in the civil war signed the Addis Ababa Agreement in March 1993, at the Conference on National Reconciliation. 7The U.S. troops supporting UNOSOM II were under United States command, rather than serving as UN peacekeepers (United Nations Peacekeeping, 1997b).

19 security situation. The consequences of those decisions, along with a failure to respond to warning signs of the impending genocide, were disastrous. Over about 100 days in the summer of 1994 approximately 800,000 Rwandans – mostly from the Tutsi ethnic group – were killed. A third high-profile failure of international peacekeeping came in July 1995, in the context of the Bosnian War. Bosnia and Herzegovina, a republic of Yugoslavia, held elections in late 1990 and a coalition government made up of representatives of Bosnian Muslim, Bosnian Serb, and Bosnian Croat communities was elected in 1991. Bosnia and Herzegovina’s declaration of independence in 1992 was followed by fighting among these three principal parties, along with their allies, over issues of partition and territorial control. The UN Security Council decided in 1993 to establish a handful of “safe areas” – internationally-protected zones in Bosnia, housing mostly internally- displaced people. The establishment of these safe areas was controversial, with critics both inside and outside of the UN arguing that no mechanism had been established to provide real security for these areas (Malone, 1998, 14). The fears of critics were realized in July 1995, when between 7,000 and 8,000 Bosnian Muslims were killed by Bosnian Serb forces in Srebrenica, one of the designated safe areas. This event, the Srebrenica Massacre, “[c]ombined with the genocide in Rwanda in 1994...came to symbolize the failure of the international community to prevent or stop the most gruesome atrocities committed against civilians” (Ryngaert and Schrijver, 2015). These failures to provide peace and protect civilians motivated “scathing, self- critical reports on the UN’s failures,” notably the Millennium Report (2000) and a report on the Responsibility to Protect (2001) (Howard, 2008, 338). The reflections and recommendations of these reports and others reflect a broader shift in the international approach to conflict management, toward placing civilian protection higher on the international priority list, and developing a deeper commitment to preventing mass atrocities. The 2001 report on the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) defines the doctrine as

“the idea that sovereign states have a responsibility to protect their own citi-

20 zens from avoidable catastrophe – from mass murder and rape, from starvation – but that when they are unwilling or unable to do so, that responsibility must be borne by the broader community of states” (International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, 2001).

R2P is the product both of the idea that a state’s sovereignty is not absolute, as discussed earlier in this section, and of realizations following the disasters in Bosnia and Rwanda that existing approaches to peacekeeping were insufficient to prevent atrocities in many cases.8 The use of force in self defense has long been held as acceptable in peacekeeping. The expansion of the concept of defense to include the use of force on behalf of others – as civilian protection mandates call for – has had a transformative effect on how peace operation personnel engage on the ground (Guéhenno,2016, 376). The Brahimi Re- port (formally the report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations) stated that “United Nations peacekeepers – troops or police – who witness violence against civilians should be presumed to be authorized to stop it, within their means, in support of basic United Nations principles” (2000, x). The United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UN- AMSIL), authorized in 1999, was the first UN operation to include a civilian protection component in the mandate, and Guéhennofinds that most UN peacekeeping missions since then have also included such a mandate (2016, 376). Howard attributes the increased involvement and leadership of states and organizations other than the UN in part to these evolving ideas about the use of force in conflict management and the importance of civilian protection. As the meaning of ‘providing international peace and security’ grew in scope, the UN began delegating rapid

8In the Millennium Report, Secretary-General Annan synthesizes these ideas: “if humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how should we respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica – to gross and systematic violations of human rights that affect every precept of our common humanity? We confront a real dilemma. Few would disagree that both the defence of humanity and the defence of sovereignty are principles that must be supported. Alas, that does not tell us which principle should prevail when they are in conflict. Humanitarian intervention is a sensitive issue, fraught with political difficulty and not susceptible to easy answers. But surely no legal principle – not even sovereignty – can ever shield crimes against humanity” (Annan, 2000, 48).

21 response and use of force to entities “inherently better equipped to use force,” spreading the costs of international intervention (Howard, 2008, 339). With this context in mind, the following section turns to consider the conﬂict management roles of regional actors, and how those roles have evolved over time.

The Rise of Regionalism

Many regional IGOs with a mandate to provide peace and security are currently operating in the international system, including organizations like the European Union and the African Union. Regional bodies “were conceded a role in the maintenance of peace and security in the UN system from the outset,” with Chapter VIII of the UN Charter establishing the legitimacy of regional arrangements taking action to provide peace and security (Morris and McCoubrey, 1999, 134; United Nations, 1945, Art. 52). Articles 52(1) and 53(1) of the Charter provide that the activity of regional institutions should be consistent with the UN’s purposes and principles, and that enforcement activity undertaken by regional bodies should be authorized by the UN Security Council, which is consistent with the Charter’s position that the Security Council holds the “primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security” (United Nations, 1945, Art. 24). As discussed in the previous section, the role of regional IGOs was limited during the Cold War, but these organizations have taken on a more robust role in collective conflict management in the years since the collapse of the Soviet Union (United Nations General Assembly, 2011, 6). This shift toward more regionalism in the realm of conflict management is an important contributor to the emergence and prevalence of hyperlateral intervention. In the cases of multi-coalition intervention studied in this dissertation, operations are frequently carried out by regional organizations in partnership with one another or with the UN. In the remainder of this section I discuss the shift in UN doctrine regarding the role of regional IGOs in conflict management, along with some of the motivators of increased peace operation activity at the regional level.

22 In the early 1990s, Boutros-Ghali’s An Agenda for Peace called for greater cooperation between the UN and regional bodies, in an early signal that, at least from the UN’s perspective, an enhanced role for regional organizations in security provision was desirable. An Agenda For Peace did not prescribe a particular division of labor, but stated that regional organizations possessed “a potential that should be utilized in serving...preventive diplomacy, peace-keeping, peacemaking and post-conflict peace-building” (Boutros-Ghali, 1992a, par. 64). The UN had an ambitious agenda for establishing global peace, and Boutros-Ghali held the opinion that cooperation between the UN and other organizations would be beneficial in the pursuit of that agenda (Schaper, 2016, 399). Regional institutions, in this view, could lighten the workload of the UN and encourage regional investment in conflict resolution (United Nations General Assembly, 2011, 7). In the immediate aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union, at a time when the UN’s approach to collective security was in flux, this emphasis on the role of regional organizations is notable. While the end of the Cold War sparked a great deal of optimism about global peace – articulated, for instance, by An Agenda for Peace noting the collapse of an “immense ideological barrier” that had stood in the way of security provision – that optimism eroded as the 1990s wore on (Boutros-Ghali, 1992a, par. 11; Schaper, 2016, 397-98). As Schaper notes, the Cold War coming to an end did not “suddenly create a firm base of shared interests and common values on which to build a system of collective security” (2016, 398). In particular, the aforementioned failures in Somalia, Bosnia, and Rwanda were sobering setbacks for the agenda of global peace provision, which had important consequences for how the UN and other organizations approached peace operations. At the UN level, part of the organization’s reorientation of its peace operations approach was a further turn toward regional bodies, both in reports on peacekeeping doctrine and directions for the future, and in Security Council resolutions. As Ugarte notes, “[a]s its capacity to keep the peace dwindled, the Security Council turned to outsourc- ing or subcontracting operations to willing partners, including regional and subregional

23 organizations,” (Ugarte, 2016, 483). The UN’s capacity to provide peace was limited both by resource constraints and by a lack of political will within the Security Council, motivating the turn to other actors. At the regional institutional level, disillusionment with the UN’s ability to provide peace contributed to a wave of changes in regional security complexes, as institutions reimagined their security roles. Investment in and expansion of regional security institutions often follows perceptions that the UN is either unable or unwilling to provide meaningful security guarantees. One notable example of this is the Organization of African Unity (OAU) being re-established as the African Union (AU) in 2002, with new security institutions and a broader mandate to provide peace and security on the continent. Ernst Haas argues that regional security arrangements “grow in direct proportion to disappointment with the efficiency of the UN collective security system” (Haas, 1969, 93), and that pattern is borne out in the late 1990s and into the millennium. While I argue that the post-Cold War rise of regionalism is an important trend, regions differ in the extent to which multilateral security institutions have been created and adopted. Regional organizations with some sort of security mandate exist in every region, but those institutions vary substantially in their density, strength and the functions they were created to perform. Europe and Africa both have many regional organizations that have a security provision mandate, and organizations from both regions frequently establish peace operations. The most prominent security IGOs in Europe are the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).9 The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe also plays an important role in security provision, though it has not fielded any major peace operations (International Peace Institute, 2014). It is also worth mentioning the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), whose membership comprises Russia and several former Soviet republics. The CIS Charter provides for

9NATO’s membership is not strictly European. Canada and the United States are members outside the region, and Turkey – which is not always included in deﬁnitions of the European region – is also a NATO member.

24 the creation of peacekeeping and peace-making operations to protect regional security, and the organization has established a handful of peace operations (Commonwealth of Independent States, 1993). In Africa, the continent-spanning African Union has an extensive mandate to provide peace, and is active in peace operations. There also are many subregional bodies, including eight Regional Economic Communities, or RECs. Particularly notable among the RECs are the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the Intergovernmental Authority on Develop- ment (IGAD), the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD), and the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), all of which have security mandates that include the possibility of intervention. The RECs are recognized by the African Union, and are part of the African Peace and Security Architecture – a vision for comprehensive, continent-wide security provision enshrined in the African Union’s founding documents (African Union, 2015). Africa’s subregional organizations vary in their institutional strength and independence, but all of the organizations listed in this paragraph have established at least one peace operation. The regional institutional environment on the Asian continent is quite diﬀerent from that in Europe or Africa. There are several organizations in the Middle East, South Asia, and East Asia with a commitment to promoting regional security. These include the League of Arab States (LAS), the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). In practice, these organizations have been delegated little to no authority by their member states. While some institutions in Asia can function as forums for dialogue about security issues, organizations in this region generally play only a minor role in promoting peace. Finally, the regional security environment in the Americas has been shaped by the outsized inﬂuence of the United States. In North America, the United States and Canada both belong to NATO, which plays a global role in security provision. With the exception

25 of NATO, regional institutions in the Americas tend to focus on nontraditional security threats, like transnational crime and threats to democracy (Tavares, 2014). The Organi- zation of American States (OAS) is the region-spanning organization, whose membership includes all the independent states in the Americas. The OAS is particularly active in international diplomacy, with tasks including fielding monitoring missions, acting as a mediator, and carrying out post-conflict reconstruction. There are five other organizations in Latin America and the Caribbean which “have a mandate to conduct activities related to peace and security” and have a history of acting on that mandate: the Andean Community of Nations (CAN), the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), the Commu- nity of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC), the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR), and the Ibero-American Summit (Tavares, 2014, 177). Aside from NATO, though, organizations in the Americas do not have a history of carrying out major peace operations. The drivers of this variation in regional security environments are many, including regional distributions of power (Nathan, 2010), the presence and intensity of inter-state rivalries in the region (Ibrahim, 2016), the types of security challenges faced (Lepgold, 2003), and state willingness to give authority to supranational institutions (Herz, 2003; Weber, 2010). The development of an approach to international security that is more inclusive of regional bodies and the increased institutional activity in at least some regions laid the groundwork for cooperation among global and regional coalitions. A prerequisite for hyperlateral intervention is the existence of multiple multilateral coalitions that have the potential to intervene in a conflict. The rise of regionalism expanded the list of such potential intervenors. The next section discusses how the hyperlateral model of peace operations has grown out of the conditions discussed so far.

26 Development of Hyperlateralism

“It has long been recognized that the United Nations is not equipped to handle every crisis in the world on its own. It is acknowledged that a partnership between the United Nations and regional and other intergovernmental organizations should be developed if peace and security are to be maintained” (United Nations, 2006, Par. 6).

While the geopolitical shift at the end of the Cold War clearly set the stage for the dramatic increase in peace operation activity, the emergence of hyperlateral intervention as a common mode of collective conflict management is not an obvious outgrowth of those changes in the global balance of power. In addition to the end of U.S.-Soviet competition, there was also an important shift in the attitudes toward and activities of regional institutions, which enabled the growth of hyperlateralism. Regional organizations began to play a more pronounced role in conflict management in the 1990s, particularly following concerns about the UN’s shortcomings in providing international peace. After its failures in Somalia, Rwanda, and Bosnia, the UN reoriented its approach to peace operations. I have already noted that part of this shift was a further turn toward regional bodies in UN doctrine and Security Council resolutions. In this environment, somewhat unrealistic expectations about the ability of regional bodies to provide peace emerged (Malone, 1998). While regional organizations did increase their activities in the mid-1990s (Dijkstra, 2012), these bodies also have important limitations in terms of resources, political will, and legitimacy. The increased activity of non-UN coalitions was therefore not a panacea for the difficulties of collective conflict management (Malone, 1998, 17). The limitations of global and regional institutions in providing international security produced incentives for combining efforts. We observe the first instances of hyperlateral intervention in the early 1990s, and uses of this approach increased substantially in the late 1990s and early 2000s. The resurgence of UN peace operations, beginning

27 around 1999 after the period of re-assessment and regrouping discussed earlier, took a different form than the earlier large-scale blue helmet missions. In particular, the UN’s involvement in Kosovo relied on partnerships with NATO, the EU, and the OSCE; UN peacekeeping in East Timor built off of a regional ad-hoc intervention led by Australia; and the UN’s operation in Sierra Leone was designed to function in partnership with ECOWAS (Gowan, 2016, 752-53). The UN is a participant in nearly all the cases of hyperlateral intervention this dissertation identifies, so the organization’s deliberate pursuit of partnerships with other coalitions is an important factor in the growth of this operational model. Identification of the first case of hyperlateral intervention depends on whether one counts a hyperlateral case as beginning with the intervention of the first involved coalition, or beginning once a second intervenor joins the fray. By the first definition, the first case of hyperlateral intervention began in 1990 in Liberia, when the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) began its intervention. ECOMOG would later be joined by a United Nations operation beginning in 1993. By the second definition, the first hyperlateral case began in late 1992 when a U.S.-led ad-hoc coalition (UNITAF) intervened alongside the United Nations in Somalia. The following section of this chapter provides summary information on all 22 observed cases of hyperlateral intervention from the end of the Cold War through 2018. Changed geopolitical conditions, the growing role of regional organizations, the evolving orientation of the UN toward regional actors in peace and security, and the various advantages and limitations of individual organizations all enabled the emergence of multi-coalition intervention in the 1990s. Chapter 3 discusses the combinations of incentives that produce hyperlateral intervention in more detail. In the following section, information about all of the cases of hyperlateral intervention observed from 1990 to 2018 is presented, along with summary information about the locations of, and participants in, those operations.

28 Table 2.1: Hyperlateral Interventions 1990-2018

Case Years Stages Description Type

Liberia 1990-1999 one 1. ECOWAS (ECOMOG Liberia) + UN (UNOMIL) Extended Parallel

Somalia 1992-1995 one 1. Coalition (UNITAF) + UN (UNOSOM I/II) Limited Parallel

Georgia 1992-2009 one 1. CIS + UN (UNOMIG) Extended Parallel

Bosnia and Herzegovina 1992-present two 1. UN (UNPROFOR/UNMIBH) + NATO (IFOR/SFOR) Extended Parallel 2. NATO (SFOR) → EU (EUFOR Althea) Planned Sequential

Rwanda 1993-1996 one 1. OAU (NMOG II) → UN (UNAMIR) Planned Sequential

Tajikistan 1993-2000 one 1. CIS + UN (UNMOT) Extended Parallel

Haiti 1993-1997 one 1. UN (UNMIH/UNSMIH/UNTMIH) + coalition (MNF) Limited Parallel 29 Central African Republic 1997-2000 one 1. Coalition (MISAB) → UN (MINURCA) Unplanned Sequential

Sierra Leone 1997-2005 one 1. ECOWAS (ECOMOG Sierra Leone) + UN (UNAM- Extended Parallel SIL)

Democratic Republic of Congo 1998-present two 1. SADC + UN (MONUC) Extended Parallel 2. UN (MONUC) + EU (Operation Artemis) Limited Parallel

Kosovo 1999-present one 1. NATO (KFOR) + UN (UNMIK) Extended Parallel

East Timor 1999-2005 one 1. UN (UNAMET/UNTAET/UNMISET) + coalition Limited Parallel (INTERFET)

F.Y.R. Macedonia 2001-2005 one 1. NATO → EU (EUFOR Concordia/EUPOL Proxima) Planned Sequential

Central African Republic 2001-present ﬁve 1. CEN-SAD → CEMAC (FOMUC) Unplanned Sequential 2. CEMAC (FOMUC) → ECCAS (MICOPAX) Planned Sequential 3. ECCAS (MICOPAX) → AU (MISCA) Unplanned Sequential 4. EU (EUFOR RCA) + AU (MISCA), UN (MINUSCA) Limited Parallel 5. AU (MISCA) → UN (MINUSCA) Planned Sequential

Liberia 2003-present one 1. ECOWAS (ECOMIL) → UN (UNMIL) Planned Sequential

Ivory Coast 2003-2017 one 1. ECOWAS (ECOMICI) → UN (UNOCI) Unplanned Sequential

Burundi 2003-2006 one 1. AU (AMIB) → UN (ONUB) Planned Sequential

Haiti 2004-present one 1. Coalition (MIF) → UN (MINUSTAH) Planned Sequential

Sudan (Darfur) 2004-present one 1. AU (AMIS) + joint UN-AU (UNAMID) Extended Parallel

East Timor 2006-2013 one 1. Coalition (ISF) + UN (UNMIT) Extended Parallel

Chad/Central African Republic 2007-2010 one 1. UN (MINURCAT) + EU (EUFOR Tchad/RCA) Extended Parallel

Mali 2013-present one 1. AU/ECOWAS (AFISMA) → UN (MINUSMA) Unplanned Sequential 30 2.3 Hyperlateral Cases and Intervenors

In Table 2.1, I identify 22 cases of hyperlateral intervention between 1990 and 2018. There are a total of ten IGOs (see Table 2.2) and six ad-hoc coalitions (see Table 2.3) that have provided component interventions in these cases. Predictably, given the organization’s pioneering role in peace operations and its self-definition as the leading body in international peace and security issues, the United Nations is the IGO most frequently engaged in hyperlateral intervention. In fact, the UN is a participant in all but one hyperlateral case so far observed (see Table 2.1). Regional and subregional organizations in Africa constitute over half the organizational participants in hyperlateral interventions, with the African Union (formerly Organization of African Unity) and the Economic Community of West African States being the most involved regional organizations, each having participated in five hyperlateral interventions. Four other regional IGOs in Africa have participated in one intervention each, as indicated in Table 2.2. This demonstrates a regional imbalance in participation in hyperlateral peace operations: many more regional organizations in Africa are represented in these cases than IGOs from any other region. The other regional organizations that have been parties in hyperlateral interventions are the European Union (four cases), NATO (three cases), and the Commonwealth of Independent States (two cases). There are no IGOs in Latin America, in the Middle East, or in the Asia-Pacific region that have participated in hyperlateral intervention. That regional imbalance is also seen in where multi-coalition operations are deployed. Thirteen of the 22 hyperlateral interventions (∼ 59 percent) had an African target state. Outside Africa, I record three cases of hyperlateral intervention in the former Yugoslavia (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, and Kosovo), two in East Timor, two in Haiti, one in Georgia, and one in Tajikistan (see Figure 2.3). For comparison, in the single-coalition interventions plotted in Figure 2.1, 23 of the 80 operations had an

31 African state as a target (∼ 29 percent). The other peace operations carried out by a single intervenor were located in: the Asia-Paciﬁc region (20 cases), Europe and post-Soviet states (16 cases), the Middle East (16 cases), and Latin America and the Caribbean (5 cases). The locations of single-coalition interventions are therefore more regionally varied than those of hyperlateral interventions, though African states are still the most common target of single-coalition operations.

Figure 2.3: Marker size scaled to total number of intervention-years in that location.

Among the 22 cases of hyperlateral intervention, there are three multi-stage cases (Bosnia and Herzegovina 1992-present, D.R.C. 1998-present, and Central African Repub- lic 2001-present), each of which has seen the involvement of three or more intervenors. The remaining 19 cases involve just two intervening coalitions.

32 Table 2.2: IGO Participants in Hyperlateral Intervention

Intergovernmental Organization Abbr. # Year of 1st Hyperlateral Op. 1. United Nations UN 21 1992 (Somalia) 2. Organization of African Unity / African Union OAU/AU 5 1993 (Rwanda) 3. Economic Community of West African States ECOWAS 5 1990 (Liberia) 4. European Union EU 4 2003 (Macedonia) 5. North Atlantic Treaty Organization NATO 3 1999 (Kosovo) 6. Commonwealth of Independent States CIS 2 1992 (Georgia) 7. Central African Economic and Monetary Community CEMAC 1 2002 (Central African Republic) 8. Community of Sahel-Saharan States CEN-SAD 1 2002 (Central African Republic) 9. Economic Community of Central African States ECCAS 1 2008 (Central African Republic)

33 10. Southern African Development Community SADC 1 1998 (Democratic Republic of Congo)

Table 2.3: Ad-Hoc Coalition Participants in Hyperlateral Intervention

Coalition Case Lead State # States 1. Unified Task Force (UNITAF) Somalia 1992-1995 United States 24 2. Multinational Force (MNF/Op. Uphold Democracy) Haiti 1993-1997 United States 28 3. Inter-African Force in the Central African Republic Central African Republic 1997-2000 N/A 6 (MISAB) 4. International Force East Timor (INTERFET) East Timor 1999-2005 Australia 22 5. Multinational Interim Force/ Combined Joint Task Haiti 2004-present United States 4 Force – Haiti 6. International Stabilization Force (Op. Astute) East Timor 2006-2013 Australia 4 Because only six ad-hoc coalitions have participated in hyperlateral intervention, it is difficult to clearly identify patterns or trends in those efforts. However, it is notable that in each of these six cases the ad-hoc coalition and the United Nations are the two parties carrying out the intervention. The centrality of a global or regional power in leading five of the six ad-hoc coalition efforts is also worth noting, as is the fact that there are two repeat interventions among this handful of cases: the United States has led two ad-hoc coalition interventions in Haiti as part of a hyperlateral intervention, and Australia has led two ad-hoc coalitions intervening in East Timor. The mean duration of a hyperlateral intervention case (from the initiation of the first operation until the end of the final operation) is 114 months, or about 9.5 years.10 The median duration is 92.5 months, or about 7.7 years.

Typology

Hyperlateral interventions differ from one another on many dimensions. These cases see many different combinations of organizations and ad-hoc coalitions, establishing operations of varying size, composition, and mandate, intervening to address conflict situations that differ in their causes, intensity, complexity, and progression. In construct- ing the following typology, I restrict my focus to variation that is unique to the set of multi-coalition interventions, considering how the multiple component interventions are related to one another temporally and functionally. Other authors, in writing about partnerships in peace operations, have distin- guished between sequential and parallel multi-party interventions (Bah and Jones, 2008; Gleason-Roberts and Kugel, 2014; Brosig, 2015). In sequential interventions, one coalition takes over from another (Figure 2.4). In parallel interventions, the coalitions intervene simultaneously for at least part of the intervention (Figure 2.5).

10This tally includes ongoing interventions, whose length is calculated through February 2018. The operations that make up each hyperlateral case are identiﬁed in Table 2.1.

34 Figure 2.4: Sequential Hyperlateral Intervention

Figure 2.5: Parallel Hyperlateral Intervention

The typology outlined below builds on this distinction between sequential and parallel interventions by identifying two variants of each depending on how the intervening parties relate to one another. Some sequential operations see substantial inter-coalition planning for the handover from one coalition to another, while other intervention se- quences are more improvisatory. My typology makes a distinction between “planned sequential” and “unplanned sequential” operations. Among parallel interventions, in some cases the intervenors plan for a long-term parallel deployment, while in other cases there is one coalition leading the primary, long-term effort and a secondary coalition intervenes to provide limited-term support to the primary operation. These different types of parallel intervention are referred to as “limited parallel” and “extended parallel” operations in my typology. A basic question about the initiation of hyperlateral interventions is why, given that a multilateral intervention is already taking place in a particular conflict, another organization or ad-hoc coalition elects to intervene. In hyperlateral interventions involving three or more parties, the context of the entrance of the second intervenor may be different than the context for the third, fourth, etc. intervenors. Therefore, in setting out this typology, I seek to categorize the different ways that each additional coalition

35 becomes involved. Because of this, it is possible for a single case to contain interventions of multiple types.

Consider a hypothetical conﬂict in which one party, IGOA, establishes an initial

intervention, then becomes unable to sustain its operation, motivating IGOB to replace

A’s intervention. Then, later, a third intervenor, IGOC , establishes a short-term support

mission alongside IGOB. This would be a hyperlateral intervention with two stages, the ﬁrst stage being an unplanned sequential intervention, and the second stage a limited parallel intervention. Most of the cases of hyperlateral intervention I identify have only one stage; Table 2.1 lists the number of stages in each hyperlateral case and notes the involved parties in each stage of the intervention.

1. Planned Sequential

2. Unplanned Sequential Sequential

3. Limited Parallel

Parallel 4. Extended Parallel

Table 2.4: Types of Hyperlateral Intervention

Type 1: Planned Sequential

In planned sequential interventions, the involved parties plan well in advance for the initial intervention to be replaced by an operation launched later by a different coalition. In some cases the planned sequence of operations is outlined in the resolution(s) authorizing the initial intervention, or in other official communications from intervening parties. For instance, UN Security Council Resolution 1497 authorized a regional intervention in the conflict in Liberia, and simultaneously stated the UN’s intention to “establish...a follow-on United Nations stabilization force” to succeed the West African

36 intervention (United Nations Security Council, 2003d, par. 2). In other cases the hand- off is not anticipated from the very outset of the intervention case, but the succession is preceded by a prolonged period of planning. An example of this is the transition from NATO’s Stabilization Force (SFOR) to the European Union’s EUFOR Althea operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Planning for that transition, which ultimately took place in late 2004, began in 2002 (Kim, 2006). The hyperlateral intervention in Burundi from 2003 to 2006 is another example of a planned sequential intervention. In this case, the government and rebel factions in Burundi signed a cease-fire agreement in December 2002, following which the African Union established a peacekeeping presence to support the peace process (Mays, 2010, 67- 68). In addition to typical peace operation objectives such as overseeing the negotiated ceasefire, the African Mission in Burundi (AMIB) had an explicit mandate to establish conditions for a UN peacekeeping mission (Agoagye, 2004; Mays, 2010). The AU’s intervention was established with the expectation of a forthcoming UN operation (Boshoff, 2003), and the UN’s later involvement was contingent on AMIB’s effort in paving the way for a traditional peacekeeping mission by reducing violence in Burundi.

Type 2: Unplanned Sequential

Unplanned sequential interventions are cases in which the initial intervention is intended to, but ultimately fails to, lead the conflict management process until peace is established. In these cases, that initial intervention is replaced by a different party’s intervention, while the conflict or crisis is ongoing, without a concerted and extended period of planning for the handover. An example case is the 1997-2000 hyperlateral intervention in the Central African Republic (CAR). The first intervenor in CAR was the Inter-African Force in the Central African Republic (MISAB), an ad-hoc coalition of French and African troops. That regional intervention was called for by the Bangui peace agreement (Mays, 2010, 136). MISAB was short-lived, largely because the operation was financially and logistically

37 dependent on France, and France became unwilling to bear the weight of fielding the operation in the long term. The impending end of France’s participation, and the inability of MISAB’s African partners to maintain the operation without French support, set the stage for the United Nations’ establishment of the successor intervention MINURCA (the UN Mission in the Central African Republic) (Mays, 2010, 70). In practice it is not always easy to divine the extent to which an operational succession was planned. In some cases, as noted in the description of Type 1, official documents clearly record the intentions of intervening organizations. However, the absence of such public signaling does not necessarily imply the absence of pre-planning for the sequence of interventions. In categorizing the sequential cases in this dataset, I have drawn on official records, news reports, and academic analyses to assess whether the operational baton-passing was foreseen well in advance by the intervenors.

Type 3: Limited Parallel

In limited parallel operations, a primary intervenor leads the conflict management effort, and plans to continue holding that principal role. Alongside that primary operation, another IGO or ad-hoc coalition intervenes in a time- and scope-limited manner, with its operation intended to support the existing intervention by meeting a particular expressed need. One example of this type of hyperlateralism is the involvement of the EU in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The UN Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC) was established in the DRC in 1999, and led the international conflict management effort in that state. MONUC faced many challenges in its deployment in the country, including a massacre of civilians in the northeastern region of Ituri in 2003 (Guéhenno,2016). While a MONUC unit was sent to Ituri to attempt to stop the violence, the peacekeepers were overwhelmed, and the UN called for European assistance (Guéhenno,2016, 378-79). The EU deployed the Interim Emergency Multi- national Force in Bunia (Ituri), also known as Operation Artemis, to attempt to restore

38 peace. Andrzej Sitkowski frames this intervention as one in which the UN’s operation was “rescued” by the EU (2006, 75).

Type 4: Extended Parallel

In extended parallel operations, two or more IGOs or ad-hoc coalitions establish a peace operation, with both parties intending to remain involved in the conflict management effort for an extended period of time. In these cases it is not necessarily clear whether one of the intervenors has a primary role in leading the intervention effort. One example of long-term parallel involvement is the African Union-United Na- tions Mission in Darfur (UNAMID), a joint operation planned and carried out by both IGOs. It is unusual to observe fully hybrid operations like UNAMID, however; most cases of extended parallel operations involve two or more independent missions. One such example is the hyperlateral intervention in East Timor (2006-12), in which the International Stabilisation Force (ISF), a multinational ad-hoc coalition, operated alongside the UN operation in East Timor. These operations did not have a unified command structure, but did coordinate aspects of their approaches to the crisis, with part of the ISF’s role being to provide security for the UN operation.

2.4 Conclusion

Hyperlateral interventions are cases in which multiple multilateral coalitions establish peace operations in a particular conflict environment, with each coalition deploying substantial numbers of police or military personnel in operations that overlap temporally. Twenty-two such intervention cases are identified in this chapter, and presented along with summary information about the intervenors, locations of intervention, regional variation, and duration. Geopolitical changes after the end of the Cold War, growing interest in and ac- ceptance of regional conflict management efforts, and the limitations of individual or-

39 ganizations all contributed to the attractiveness of hyperlateral peace operations. It is notable that multi-coalition interventions occur in different forms. This chapter identifies four distinct types of hyperlateral intervention: planned and unplanned sequential operations, and limited and extended parallel operations. While this dissertation’s principal focus is on understanding the initiation and effectiveness of hyperlateral operations in general, given that these operations take different forms we could also usefully consider what factors determine the choice between those forms. Similarly, it would be reasonable to examine the effectiveness of these different types of interventions. In this dissertation I use the case studies presented in Chapters 4 and 5 to inductively build arguments in answer to these questions. The following chapter develops a theoretical framework for understanding the initiation and effectiveness of hyperlateral interventions. The interests of the actors involved in initiating and carrying out peace operations are explored, and arguments about when and why hyperlateral operations are initiated are developed. The theory chapter also develops arguments about the conditions under which hyperlateral interventions are successful in providing peace.

40 Chapter 3

Theorizing Hyperlateral Intervention

The multi-coalition model of intervention has grown in popularity over the last three decades and is now a prominent feature of the peacekeeping landscape. Nearly fifty percent of peace operations in recent years have been part of a hyperlateral intervention. The previous chapter discussed the historical context for the emergence of this model and presented data on the universe of hyperlateral cases. In this chapter I build on the descriptive foundation laid in Chapter 2 by developing theoretical explanations for the initiation and effectiveness of hyperlateral peace operations. This chapter begins with a review of the literature on what motivates intervention in conflict and on whether and when peace operations effectively provide peace. Section 3.2 introduces an argument that the involvement of multiple coalition actors in peace operations improves the efficiency and effectiveness of interventions, and that intervenors are motivated by those benefits to create hyperlateral operations. Section 3.3 notes the limitations of this efficiency framework, and expands on it by introducing a wider range of motivations for multi-coalition intervention, and by noting cooperation problems that can stand in the way of effective hyperlateralism. A final section concludes, and discusses how the observable implications generated in this chapter will be considered in the empirical chapters of this dissertation.

41 3.1 Introduction to Literature

This section reviews existing knowledge on the drivers of intervention, and on the determinants of peace operation success. After surveying those bodies of work, I consider what this literature misses in failing to consider how multilateral bodies interact and aﬀect one another. Considering this complexity and interdependence sheds new light on the politics of intervention in the contemporary world.

Literature on Initiation

One of the key puzzles this dissertation addresses is why multiple multilateral actors decide to intervene in a conflict. Before tackling this question, it is useful to have a grounding in the literature on the initiation of peace operations in general. Much of the literature on this question focuses on the decisions that individual states make about supporting intervention in conflict, and the incentives – both material and normative – that drive those decisions. This section first discusses those state-level determinants of intervention, then makes a case for considering intergovernmental organizations themselves as actors with agency in the intervention process and considers the IGO-level interests that can drive intervention decisions. Conflicts can produce a host of negative externalities that motivate affected third parties to work to promote the resolution of the conflict. States proximate to a conflict tend to experience these negative effects more intensely (Adebajo, 2002, 3). For instance, refugees fleeing an embattled country often settle in neighboring states, which can be costly to those receiving states, and in some instances provoke domestic political backlash (Salehyan and Gleditsch, 2006). In some cases, conflict environments fuel the development of transnational criminal or terrorist organizations, which can pose a threat outside the conflicted country (Williams and Godson, 2002; Piazza, 2008; Kis-Katos, Liebert and Schulze, 2011). Studies also find that a state’s risk of conflict onset is higher when there is a conflict in a neighboring state (Gleditsch, 2007; Kathman, 2010). The potential

42 for regional destabilization means that “even for third parties that have no interest in the civil war state, intervention may be an attractive option in an effort to contain the violence from infecting its surrounding region” (Kathman, 2011, 848). States farther away from the country experiencing conflict can also have security interests implicated. States allied with the conflicted state could see their security decrease if the conflicted state becomes unable to fulfill its international obligations as a result of domestic turmoil. Allied states might also see those alliance ties threatened if the outcome of the civil conflict is a change of government. Lemke and Regan (2004) find that states allied to an embattled state are indeed more likely to intervene in the civil conflict. The potential for the emergence or growth of transnational criminal or terrorist organizations may also be a concern for farther-flung states. For instance, Dowd and Raleigh (2013) cite fears about a global Islamic terrorist threat to Western interests as an important motivator of international intervention in Mali. Conflict also frequently disrupts important economic relationships. Bayer and Rupert (2004) and Long (2008), among others, find that civil wars substantially decrease bilateral trade with the conflicted state. In addition to disrupting trade, conflict can also cause a decrease in the state’s production and export of natural resources, which can affect global markets, and can threaten important business and investment relationships with other states. Stojek and Tir (2014) find that trade ties are a key motivator of UN peacekeeping in particular, and that the economic interests of the Security Council’s five permanent members strongly motivate the establishment of peace operations. Moving beyond security and economic concerns, third-party states may have an interest in building a reputation as a provider of peace. Participating in – or even better, leading – a multilateral intervention can help a state develop a reputation for regional leadership. Paris contends that states, particularly rising powers, see participating in peace operations as a tool for “demonstrating their status as global players and regional leaders” (2014, 503). As an example, Adebajo (2002) argues that Nigeria’s response to the Liberian conflict in the 1990s was driven largely by the state’s desire to cement a

43 reputation as a regional hegemon. Finally, self-interest does not appear to fully explain intervention behavior, as peace operations are often conducted in target states with “negligible geostrategic or economic importance to the intervenors” (Finnemore, 2003, 52). The degree of human suffering in a conflict can be an important motivator of intervention. International norms about humanitarian intervention have developed in recent decades, and states face a diffuse pressure to not ignore humanitarian disasters (Finnemore, 2003; Weiss, 2016). Those normative pressures can come from domestic coalitions and from international advocacy networks (Keck and Sikkink, 1998). Authors like Fortna (2004) and Gilligan and Stedman (2003) have found that more deadly conflicts are more likely to receive intervention, which further supports the argument that the degree of suffering caused by a conflict is a motivator of third-party response. Jakobsen (1996) argues that human suffering on a large scale is a necessary condition – though not an individually sufficient condition – for international intervention. Material and normative motivations for intervention are not mutually exclusive, and I argue that both are important drivers of third-party conflict management activity. Mason and Wheeler argue that neither self-interest nor humanitarianism may be sufficient to motivate intervention in some cases, but that the combination of those motives can be “jointly sufficient” to lead to intervention (1996, 95). Other scholars, like Lyon and Dolan (2007) and Binder (2015) similarly argue that material, normative, and institutional incentives interact to produce interventions. Having discussed motivators for intervention in conflict, it is also worth briefly considering factors that make intervention in a given conflict less likely. Some reasons for non-intervention follow logically from the variables already discussed; for instance, if more intense conflicts are more likely to receive a peace operation, it follows that intervention is less likely in less intense crises. There are a handful of conditions not yet discussed that can block the formation of peace operations, however. One such condition has to do with the strength of the potential target state. States

44 with strong militaries and high economic capacity are less likely to need or want third party involvement in the conflict (Fortna, 2004; Binder, 2015). A related factor is that many peace operations rely on the principle of consent, respecting the sovereignty of a state’s government rather than imposing an intervention. While norms on the necessity of target consent have somewhat shifted over time with the advent of concepts like the Responsibility to Protect, a target government’s resistance to intervention is still an important deterrent. Intervention can also be made less likely if opposed by particularly strong global or regional powers. In some instances, a state can act to prevent intervention by an IGO to which it belongs. In the UN Security Council, for example, the Council’s five permanent members have the ability to veto authorizations of UN peace operations. States can also express their opposition to intervention outside of IGOs. For instance, Russia’s strong opposition to external “interference” in its sphere of influence makes intervention by organizations like NATO or the EU – which Russia is not a member of – less likely in post-Soviet states. The literature discussed thus far centers state interests and agency. States, however, have formed many multilateral organizations with mandates to provide security, including by establishing peace operations. These IGOs can develop authority and preferences of their own, allowing organizations to meaningfully affect intervention decisions, as the following section discusses.

IGO Agency and Interests

The states whose interests are discussed above clearly have agency in responding to conﬂicts. States make decisions about acting unilaterally;1 voting in multilateral bodies on responses like sanctions or interventions; using powers of persuasion to inﬂuence other

1As noted in Chapter 2, I do not make unilateral intervention a focus in this dissertation. In the modern international system, unilateral intervention is relatively rare and is not preferred normatively (Finnemore, 2003). This does not mean that unilateral intervention never occurs, but studying the motivations for unilateral versus multilateral intervention, and systematically considering how unilateral eﬀorts interact with multilateral operations, is beyond the scope of this dissertation.

45 actors’ policy choices; and contributing money, troops, or equipment to a peace operation. I argue that states are not the only actors with agency in decision-making about establishing interventions, however; intergovernmental organizations should be understood as actors as well. I conceptualize IGOs as “strategic actors with agency” (Hawkins and Jacoby, 2006, 200) and as “semi-autonomous actors of crisis management” (Koops and Tardy, 2015, 69). As this section will discuss, IGOs have interests and take actions that are not reducible to the preferences of their constitutive states. States shape the behavior of IGOs in important ways, but as long as organizations have some degree of autonomy, I argue that it is sensible to consider them as strategic actors. While state principals create IGOs to achieve common goals, and so the creation of IGOs is generally rooted in state interests, scholars have long argued that IGOs can and do “exercise power autonomously in ways unintended and unanticipated by states at their creation” (Barnett and Finnemore, 1999, 699). A common framing of the relationship between states and the organizations they create is to understand states as principals and organizational bureaucrats as agents. States contract to their IGO agents to act on their behalf, carrying out particular specialized functions. For states, the principal benefit of this relationship is that delegation results in efficiency gains. Working through IGOs allows collective activities to be centralized and routinized, and assisted by a dedicated bureaucracy, which helps “increase the efficiency of collective activities and enhance the organization’s ability to affect the understandings, environment, and interests of states” (Abbott and Snidal, 1998, 4-5). State principals can also find it beneficial to create organizations with meaningful independence, because independence can be powerfully associated with neutrality, giving an organization more legitimacy than individual states in some circumstances (Abbott and Snidal, 1998, 5). States have limited resources, and are therefore unable to completely monitor their organizational agents, or to create mechanisms that completely control agent behavior (Hawkins et al., 2006b, 30-31). The consequences of this are that when any meaningful

46 responsibilities are delegated, agents gain autonomy. As a result, daylight can emerge between state preferences and the actions that organizational agents take. Principals face a trade off between the benefits of contracting to IGOs and the costs of delegation. If the gains from delegation are high enough, then states are more likely to be willing to suffer limitations to their own agency (Hawkins et al., 2006b; Dijkstra, 2012).2 One useful definition of the costs that states bear as a result of delegation is “the distance between the policy that a country would implement if it were not a member of the international organization and of the policy that it enacts once it has joined” (Epstein and O’Halloran, 2008, 82). IGOs can also expand their agency in order to pursue organizational goals by using a number of strategies. Organizations can develop institutional expertise and specialized information (Barnett and Finnemore, 1999) and then use their specialized knowledge and resources to shape states’ “preferences and strategies” (Hawkins et al., 2006b, 31). IGOs can act to expand their own agency using tactics like selective interpretations of state mandates and resistance to comprehensive monitoring (Hawkins and Jacoby, 2006). IGOs also can work through intermediaries – including other IGOs, nongovernmental organizations, and other international networks – to influence the preferences and actions of states and important non-state actors (Abbott et al., 2015). In the realm of peace operations in particular, IGOs can act by manufacturing objectives, setting agendas, developing and influencing norms, and by establishing and replicating particular models of international action. For instance, planning a peace operation requires considering different operational mandates along with costs and potential effects of each; when IGO bureaucracies create those operational plans, they exercise important agenda-setting power, and can also develop specialized expertise that can influence state preferences (Dijkstra, 2012). It is worth noting, though, that IGO agency varies both across organizations (Hawkins et al., 2006a) and over time (Dijkstra, 2012). States can delegate more or less

2These limitations on state agency are also sometimes referred to as ‘sovereignty costs’ in the literature.

47 authority to the institutions they form at the outset, and can change the degree to which control is exercised as circumstances change (Barnett and Finnemore, 1999). Because of these differences in state control, some organizations play larger and more independent roles in peace operation decisions than others. I noted in Chapter 2 that the activities of regional IGOs vary substantially across regions. Some regions have many strong security- oriented organizations, while other regions have not empowered institutions to take an active role in conflict management. Building on this understanding of IGO agency, we can consider what motivates organizations to favor establishing peace operations. One factor is organizational reputation. Organizations require the support of their constituent states – and of external supporters, in some cases – in order to carry out their functions. In the absence of that support, IGOs can become unused, under-resourced, and ineffectual (what Gray refers to a “zombie” organizations), or in some cases die altogether (Gray, 2018). An IGO’s external credibility – its reputation – is a valuable asset, and organizations are incentivized to project an image of effectiveness and competence (Gutner and Thompson, 2010; Weaver, 2010). In an increasingly crowded institutional space, IGOs with a security mandate may favor establishing peace operations in order to receive attention, support, and investment from various audiences. Another motivator for IGOs is fulfilling the organizational mission. This motivation arises from organizational culture. If an institution is founded with a particular purpose, such as providing peace in a region, activities inside the organization are pointed toward that goal. Actors inside international bureaucracies often have the “resources and authority” to pursue their own interests, including furthering the mission of the organization (Johnson, 2014, 32-33). This combination of interests and ability can allow IGOs to effectively push for peace operations to be established. Finally, once an actor has made an investment in resolving a particular conflict, it can be motivated to continue its involvement in conflict management to ensure its earlier investments pay off. Loss aversion, concern about redeeming sunk costs, and

48 commitment bias can all contribute to this tendency. I use the term “path dependence” in this dissertation to refer generically to these motivations to persist in a particular course of action once begun.3 Within institutions, path dependence can motivate a continuation of ongoing conflict management activities, or an escalation of the crisis response, such as an IGO moving from a lower-level response like imposing sanctions or sending a political mission to a larger investment like establishing a peace operation (Binder, 2015). In summary, when states delegate authority to IGOs, those organizations can develop expertise, specialized knowledge, and bureaucratic procedures that shape organizational agendas and affect the actions that the IGO takes. IGO agency varies depending on institutional design and the resources states expend on monitoring and controlling the organization. For IGOs that conduct peace operations, important organizational interests include building or maintaining the institution’s reputation, fulfilling the organization’s mission, and following through on investments in the peace process.

Literature on Eﬀectiveness

Since peace operations have been a commonly used conflict management strategy for decades, it is unsurprising that many scholars have considered whether these operations are actually effective in providing peace. In this section I first provide an overview of different concepts of peace operation success, and then consider what the existing literature tells us about the determinants of effectiveness. There are wide-ranging perspectives on how the success or failure of peace operations should be measured. At a basic level, peace operations are intended to prevent conflict from emerging, stop an ongoing conflict and/or establish lasting peace. Tradi- tional measures of effectiveness, particularly in quantitative studies, are whether a war comes to an end, as measured by an absence of battle deaths (Doyle and Sambanis, 2000),

3This concept of path dependence holds that a particular action or decision can trigger a self- reinforcing process that narrows the range of acceptable future actions. As an institution continues along its particular path of action, “it becomes progressively diﬃcult to reverse the central pattern of action” (Schrey¨ogg and Sydow, 2011, 324).

49 and the duration of peace in the state (Fortna, 2004, 2008). Some scholars argue that reduction of violence as measured by civilian killings is also a useful measure of effectiveness (Hultman, Kathman and Shannon, 2013). Brosig and Sempijja argue that the existing studies of peacekeeping effectiveness have focused too heavily on battle-related deaths as the outcome of interest, and that a more comprehensive measure of peace is warranted (Brosig and Sempijja, 2018, 3). They propose an array of other indicators for assessing peacekeeping effectiveness, including the number of conflict events, instances of domestic unrest, refugee flows as a result of conflict, violence against civilians, and measures of political stability and good governance (Brosig and Sempijja, 2018, 5-6).4 Also calling for more fine-grained measures of effectiveness, Autesserre argues that state-level measures can miss important local dynamics, and that “peacebuilding outcomes may differ at the micro- and macro-levels” (2014, 492). Some authors also consider factors related to governance in their assessment of effectiveness. Howard uses the institutional capacity of the target state after the intervention as a measure of success (2008, 6-8), and Doyle and Sambanis craft their “stricter” measure of success to include democratization. Finally, several scholars argue that an intervention’s specific goals should be taken into account when assessing effectiveness. For instance, it might be unreasonable to judge an intervention as ineffective if it fails to promote democracy in a target state if democracy promotion was not part of the operation’s mandate. Howard (2008) and Martin-Brûlé(2016) both include mandate accomplishment in their measures of operational success. It is useful to make a distinction between an operation’s success in providing peace while the intervention force is deployed (short-term effectiveness) and its success in creating conditions for lasting peace even after peacekeepers withdraw (long-term effectiveness). Outcomes that indicate short-term effectiveness include reduced levels of

4We could also consider human security outcomes, like individuals’ freedom from want and freedom from fear. Freedom from want is connected to development, economic security, and health outcomes. Freedom from fear is connected to human rights protections and personal security (Peou, 2002; De Waal, 2009). These measures of eﬀectiveness shift our focus from the security of the state to the security and well-being of individuals.

50 violence, higher rates of refugee return, and the operation’s accomplishment of its mandate. Long-term effectiveness can primarily be assessed in terms of the duration of peace after an intervention has ended. When considering cases of hyperlateral intervention in Chapters 4 and 5 of this dissertation, I will evaluate effectiveness in both the short- and long-term. In this dissertation, I adopt a relatively broad concept of effectiveness. Nuanced and multi-faceted measures of effectiveness are useful for evaluating the success of multidimensional operations, whose purposes and mandates vary substantially (Druckman and Diehl, 2010). In the empirical chapters of this dissertation I pay particular attention to the following outcomes: changes in a conflict’s intensity over the course of an intervention; whether major outbreaks of violence against belligerents or civilians occur while an intervention is ongoing; the number of internally-displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees displaced as a result of conflict and the number of those people able to return home as the security situation changes; whether conflict re-emerges after an intervention ends; the duration of peace if conflict does recur; and whether an operation’s mandate was accomplished. I do not specifically consider governance outcomes or the wider set of human security outcomes, unless such outcomes are part of an operational mandate. All of these outcomes are influenced both by how an intervention is carried out – including an operation’s size, mandate, resources, and activities – and by conflict-level variables. The remainder of this section reviews the literature on how peace operation effectiveness is shaped by both sets of factors. Conflict-specific factors like complexity and intensity can make it more difficult for intervenors to effectively provide peace. When there are many conflicting parties in a conflict, that can make negotiations over peace more difficult since more parties have to be satisfied by the agreement, and the multiplicity of conflict actors also increases the risk of spoilers causing setbacks in the peace process (Stedman, 1997). Howard (2008) finds that belligerents consenting to a peace operation is particularly important for intervention success. When there are more parties to a conflict, it can be more difficult for a peace

51 operation to to maintain credibility in the eyes of all the involved parties. The intensity of a conflict has a complicated effect on prospects for peace. On one hand, wars that are particularly intense are also quite costly, and may make peace agreements more attractive to the conflicting factions, especially if prospects for victory seem limited. On the other hand, those same conflicts may both reflect and exacerbate deep societal divisions that make it difficult to arrive at a durable peace (Hartzell, Hoddie and Rothchild, 2001). Sambanis argues that in these situations, when conflicting parties do not trust one another and “local capacities [are] depleted,” the involvement of external parties to provide mediation and monitoring may be crucial for establishing peace (2008, 10). As noted earlier in this chapter, factors like conflict deadliness and intensity have been shown to be strong motivators of intervention (Gilligan and Stedman, 2003; Fortna, 2004). If the international community is more likely to intervene in more deadly and intractable conflicts, and those conflicts are also more difficult to resolve and more likely to recur, then a simple comparison of conflicts might lead us to wrongly conclude that multilateral interventions cause more deadly and persistent conflict. Because peace operations are not “applied to cases of [conflict] at random” it is well understood that in order to identify the actual effects of intervention, it is necessary to account for this selection stage (Fortna, 2004, 273; see also Doyle and Sambanis, 2007, and Gilligan and Sergenti, 2008). The role of traditional peacekeeping operations is to maintain peace in post-conflict environments, whereas peace enforcement operations seek to provide peace and security in the midst of fighting. Doyle and Sambanis (2000), Fortna (2004, 2008), and Gilligan and Sergenti (2008) all find that traditional peacekeeping operations make conflicts less likely to recur. Fortna also finds that peace enforcement operations are effective; her conclusion overall about the effectiveness of interventions is that “any way you slice the data, peacekeeping works” (2008, 116).5 The analysis by Gilligan and Sergenti (2008)

5Also speaking to the general effectiveness of peace operations, in studies about the effects of intervention on the geographic spread of violence, Beardsley and Gleditsch (2015) find that peace operations

52 disagrees, finding that while post-conflict operations are effective, peace operations in the midst of conflict do not effectively provide post-conflict peace, and do not shorten the length of conflicts. Hultman, Kathman and Shannon (2013, 2014) suggest the effectiveness of enforcement operations might be conditional on operation size. They find that enforcement operations effectively prevent civilian deaths and reduce violence in the midst of civil wars in cases where large numbers of peacekeeping troops are deployed. In addition to size, interventions also importantly vary in their composition and mandates. Hegre, Hultman and Nyg˚ard(2018) find that the effectiveness of UN peace operations in the midst of major civil conflicts is somewhat conditional on mandate. They find these operations are particularly effective at reducing violence and shortening the conflict when they have a broad mandate (e.g. including enforcement, or encompassing institutional or economic development goals alongside security goals), rather than the limited mandates of observer missions and traditional peacekeeping operations (Hegre, Hultman and Nyg˚ard,2018, 8, 14-15).6 Operations’ size and budget are frequently cited as influencing effectiveness in reducing violence and in setting conditions for lasting peace (Collier, Hoeffler and Söderbom, 2008; Hultman, Kathman and Shannon, 2014). Those aspects of operations are determined not only by operational mandates, but also by the political will of intervenors, which can also be a determinant of success (Boutros-Ghali, 1992a; Howard, 2008, 11-13). Finally, a peace operation’s legitimacy can affect its success. As already noted, the consent and buy-in of combatant parties helps interventions succeed (Howard, 2008). Strong communication ties between intervenors and conflicting parties can importantly enhance a peace operation’s legitimacy, and increase the likelihood of success (Martin- limit the spatial scope of episodes of violence within the target state, and Beardsley (2011) finds that peace operations prevent conflict contagion to neighboring states. 6Brosig and Sempijja (2018) also seek to assess the effectiveness of peacekeeping overall, using their broad conception of effectiveness (including governance, violence short of killing, conflict and uprising events, and refugee flows). The authors have a much dimmer view of the effectiveness of peace operations than other studies cited here. I appreciate this study for its advocacy of a nuanced measure of effectiveness, but am unconvinced by the methodology used, which is to examine trend lines of their outcome variables in ten cases, looking for patterns over time from two years before intervention until five years after intervention.

53 Brûlé,2016). The perceptions of civilians, other states, and NGOs can also influence an operation’s effectiveness (Williams, 2010). Operations perceived as legitimate are more likely to receive assistance from parties on the ground in the target state, and from external sources of “personnel, funds, and political support” (Williams, 2010, 6). Overall, the literature suggests that conflict outcomes tend to be worse in the absence of peacekeeping, but that how interventions are constituted and perceived has an important impact on their success. While a useful starting point, the existing literature on effectiveness tends to overlook important features of the contemporary peace operations landscape.

What the Literature Misses

The literature on peace operations often fails to consider the multiplicity of actors that carry out interventions, the heterogeneity of those actors and the interventions they carry out, and the ways that multilateral coalitions influence one another. I argue that accounting for this complexity and interdependence enhances our understanding of the initiation and effectiveness of peace operations. The dominant approach to studying peace operations treats third-party interventions in conflict as independent events. Studies in this vein consider conflict-specific factors that motivate the initiation of peace operations, such as severity, spillover, and target state strength, and model whether an intervention, once established, is effective in producing peace in the target state. This approach frames intervention decisions as involving a single international actor – the actor deciding whether to establish a peace operation, whether a state actor or a corporate actor like an IGO – responding to a target crisis. But, as earlier chapters have established, there are many potential multilateral intervenors in the international system, and a substantial proportion of peace operations are carried out by multiple intervening coalitions. Potential intervenors do not make decisions in a vacuum, isolated from the preferences and activities of other international actors. Rather, there is a fundamental interdependence between intervenors that the

54 literature has rarely considered. Peacekeeping is also frequently treated as a binary condition – a conflict either receives a peace operation or does not. A somewhat more nuanced approach categorizes peace operations as falling into distinct functional categories such as observer missions, traditional peacekeeping operations, and peace enforcement operations.7 In response to this status quo, some scholars have argued for a further disaggregation of peace operations based on factors like force size and mandate (Hultman, Kathman and Shannon, 2014; Hegre, Hultman and Nyg˚ard,2018). This dissertation introduces another important way that intervention efforts differ. Peace operations vary with respect to the number of coalitions participating in the intervention, as well the temporal and functional relationships between multiple intervenors when two or more coalitions do intervene. Studies of peace operations also are prone to focusing narrowly on the activities of the United Nations. While the UN has a longstanding central role in this area, the organization “has never had a monopoly on peacekeeping” (Fortna and Howard, 2008, 291). Diehl (2014) attributes the overwhelming focus on UN operations to data availability. While ad-hoc coalitions and regional organizations now carry out a majority of peacekeeping operations, he says, data on non-UN operations is scarcer and harder to obtain than data on UN missions (Diehl, 2014, 486). The empirical convenience of using UN data sometimes produces an incentive to narrowly theorize about just the UN’s activities, as many scholars do.8 While theorizing strictly about UN peace operations is a legitimate endeavor, the prominence of this approach is notable. In other instances there is a mismatch between theory and model. Doyle and Sambanis, for example, theorize broadly about peace operations while testing that theory on UN data only, arguing in a footnote that their “conclusions are likely to apply to other multilateral initiatives” (2000, 783). Mukherjee (2006) similarly theorizes

7Fortna (2004) uses both the binary and categorical iterations of the peacekeeping variable, as do Doyle and Sambanis (2007). Mullenbach (2005) uses a set of binary variables to capture peacekeeping operations established by the UN, regional organizations, or states. 8For instance, see Hultman, Kathman and Shannon (2013), Hultman, Kathman and Shannon (2014), Gilligan and Stedman (2003), and Gilligan and Sergenti (2008).

55 widely, but tests using information on only UN operations. Disproportionate focus on a single intervenor has important consequences for the development of knowledge about peace operations. For instance, an examination of just the UN’s activities in Liberia in the 1990s might miss the ways the UN’s involvement was intertwined with the activities of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). ECOWAS began an intervention in Liberia in 1990, well in advance of the establishment of UNOMIL in 1993. In fact, the UN observed the activities of, and responses to, the ECOWAS forces in Liberia, and those observations were important factors in deliberations over whether to intervene (United Nations Security Council, 1993). ECOWAS and the UN established an extended parallel operation, where ECOWAS continued to provide the majority of peacekeeping personnel on the ground even after the UN operation was established. The Secretary-General of the UN reported to the Security Council that the UN’s success in Liberia and willingness to continue intervening in the country depended on the continuing presence of ECOWAS (United Nations Peacekeep- ing, 1997a). Furthermore, any analysis of the effectiveness of the operation should take into account both the total size of the peacekeeping presence on the ground (UN and ECOWAS forces) as well as the fact that while the UN’s intervention ended in 1997, the ECOWAS operation did not withdraw until 1999. An empirical analysis of this peace operation using only data on the UN’s operation could easily mischaracterize the size and duration of third-party involvement in the conflict, could miss important aspects of the UN’s cost/benefit analysis on the question of engagement in Liberia, and could draw inaccurate conclusions about the relationship between intervention and outcomes in this conflict. Multilateral intervenors can also have importantly different motivations, strengths, and weaknesses. That heterogeneity means that theory and findings about one intervenor, or class of intervenors, do not necessarily translate across all types. Later sections of this chapter consider how comparative advantages and disadvantages vary for different types of multilateral intervenors, which affects actors’ incentives to form cooperative

56 interventions. Interventions and conflict dynamics change over time, and interact in interesting ways. Those factors can influence the intervention decisions of other actors. Because intervention is not a binary condition, conflicts that have been “treated” (received an intervention) can be intervened in again, and the first “treatment” can affect both the likelihood of future treatment (further interventions) and the effectiveness of the treatment overall. An actor considering whether to intervene in a conflict where another group’s intervention is ongoing faces different incentives and considerations than an actor contemplating carrying out the first intervention in a conflict. Potential intervenors in an already-treated conflict can observe how belligerent parties reacted to the first intervention, which can affect deliberations about intervention. An initial intervention reveals information about the conflict to other actors. The first intervenor’s operation can also lower the costs of intervention for other coalitions in the future. For instance, in a parallel operation, the intervenors can benefit from burden sharing, lowering the cost of conflict management for each involved party. In a sequential operation, a second intervenor may be able to reach full force more quickly by re-hatting troops from the first intervention, and otherwise build on any progress made by the initial intervention. The existing literature generally does not consider that a coalition’s decision to intervene in a conflict that has not yet been intervened in is distinct from a decision to intervene in a conflict which is currently experiencing an external intervention. This is an important omission, because a substantial proportion of interventions in the post-Cold War era take place in a context of multi-coalition involvement. Using data from Mul- lenbach (2005), I identify 56 individual single-coalition interventions beginning between 1990 and 2014. For comparison, there are 60 individual interventions beginning between 1990 and 2014 that are part of hyperlateral cases. The initiation and effects of those 60 interventions cannot be understood in isolation from the activities of other multilateral bodies.9 9While not the focus of this dissertation, I would argue that our understanding of the initiation of single-coalition interventions would also often be enhanced by considering the influence of other

57 Within the peace operations literature there are a handful of studies that describe aspects of hyperlateral intervention. For instance, Tardy (2014) notes that international responses to conflict are increasingly likely to involve multiple institutions, operating in parallel or sequentially. Tardy outlines a rationale for the development of these operations, namely that international actors seek to share the burden of intervention and employ their comparative advantages to more effectively provide peace. I elaborate further on this perspective on multi-coalition interventions in the following section of this chapter. Balas (2011) also identifies this phenomenon, referring to these interventions as “multiple simultaneous peace operations” (MSPOs) and providing a definition of the concept along with a host of examples.10 While studies like these usefully bring the complexity of contemporary peace operations into focus, there is a paucity of theory about why this model has emerged, the roles and incentives of various actors involved, and the consequences of the use of hyperlateral operations for intervention effectiveness. Additionally, some studies of regional security environments focus on the connec- tions between and mutual influence among IGOs. Brosig’s work on regime complexity in African security, for instance, identifies and explores cooperation among IGOs as a critical feature of peacekeeping on the continent (Brosig, 2010, 2015). Indeed, scholars of peacekeeping and international organization in Africa in particular have more frequently explored the implications of overlapping security institutions and peacekeeping partnerships in that regional context. As I discussed in Chapter 2, hyperlateral interventions do occur disproportionately in African states – 59 percent of these operations had an African target state. Finally, various explorations of particular conflicts and particular peace operations identify interactions among intervenors as an important factor in the establishment and effects of the operation. For instance, Gelot (2012) examines the hybrid United Nations- African Union operation in Darfur; Plank (2017) analyzes European Union-African Union

multilateral bodies. 10Balas’s deﬁnition of MSPOs is broader than my deﬁnition of hyperlateral interventions – encompassing smaller international missions, for example – but he has the same basic area of interest as I do in this dissertation (Balas, 2011, 387).

58 engagement in the Central African Republic; and Welz (2014, 2016) considers how EC- CAS, the African Union, the European Union, and the UN interacted with one another in interventions in the Central African Republic. These studies oﬀer interesting insights into the motivations of intervenors in particular cases, and the impacts of these operations on conﬂict outcomes, but do not focus on theorizing broadly about the phenomenon of hyperlateral intervention.

3.2 The Eﬃciency Framework

A 2011 report by the UN’s Oﬃce of Internal Oversight Services evaluated the UN’s cooperation with other intergovernmental organizations in peace operations. That report succinctly frames, from the UN’s perspective, an important argument in favor of the involvement of multiple coalitions in conﬂict management:

“[C]ooperation between the United Nations and regional organizations in peacekeeping would improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the [UN] in responding to threats to peace and security. The outcome of such cooperation would be more effective peacekeeping, which would lead to peacebuilding, and, ultimately, to a sustained peace” (United Nations General Assembly, 2011, Par. 6).

In this section I develop the argument that coalition actors establish hyperlateral interventions in order to more efficiently respond to conflict. This efficiency logic for hyperlateral intervention is consistent with other arguments in the literature that frame cooperation among states and among IGOs as the result of collectively rational decision- making in pursuit of common aims. By synthesizing insights from the existing literature, I generate a set of baseline expectations about how rational, problem-solving actors create hyperlateral interventions, and how those interventions function. As a starting point for this argument, it is useful to consider that no institution involved in providing peace is able to individually satisfy global demand for peace op-

59 erations. Organizations with a security provision mandate face practical and political limitations on the actions they can take in pursuit of that mandate. Not every crisis that is a candidate for a peace operation receives such an operation, because resources, manpower, and political will do not exist to sustain that degree of involvement. When interventions are established, they are limited in their size, budget, and duration. It is generally accepted that demand for peacekeeping is increasingly high, and outpaces supply of peace operations personnel (Fetterly, 2006).11 Because no organization on its own is able to satisfy demand for peace operations, parties interested in the provision of international security face incentives to encourage the involvement of other coalitions, and to cooperate with those other actors to share the burden of peace operations. Koops and Tardy argue that as “the demand for UN peacekeepers continues to rise and core Western member states are only cautiously committing directly to UN peacekeeping missions, indirect support mechanisms through regional organizations will continue to grow in importance” (2015, 67). The UN Secretary-General’s 2011 report on peacebuilding argued along the same lines that “[p]artnerships and coordination among the main regional and international actors is essential since no single actor has the capacity to meet the needs in any of the priority areas of peacebuilding” (United Nations, 2009, par. 5). Multilateral actors also have different comparative advantages in the realm of conflict management. Those different strengths and weaknesses mean that cooperation is useful not only for pooling resources and burden-sharing, but also allows intervenors to more efficiently divide labor. Intervenors with different combinations of strengths and weaknesses can form complementary partnerships. For instance, a coalition that has a good deal of knowledge about a particular conflict environment and whose intervention

11Jean-Marie Gu´ehenno,the United Nations’ Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, noted the “huge demand for peacekeeping operations” in his 2008 remarks before the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (Gu´ehenno,2008). The International Peace Institute project “Providing for Peacekeeping” states that the “demand for UN Peacekeeping is at an all time high. Member States and civil society continue to call on UN Peacekeeping to do more in increasingly inhospitable, volatile and dangerous environments. Today’s UN Peacekeeping missions are unprecedented in both the scale and scope of their mandates, facing increasingly dangerous situations where peacekeepers are being deployed where there is no peace to keep and face regular attack” (Providing for Peacekeeping, 2017).

60 would be perceived as legitimate by local stakeholders may form a partnership with another coalition that lacks local knowledge and legitimacy, but which can provide material resources that the first coalition is short of. These coalitions have distinct advantages that complement one another. Cooperation can allow actors to gain “access to resources, information, or legitimacy that they were short of” and thereby create more effective peace operations (Tardy, 2014, 100). Important dimensions of comparative advantage include material resources, responsiveness, legitimacy, and specialized knowledge, which the following section will discuss in more detail. The efficiency argument about hyperlateralism can be understood as an extension of a fundamental argument about the efficiency gains that result from specialization and division of labor. Some actors are able to produce a desired “good” more efficiently (at a lower cost) than others. In simple terms, then, the logic of this model dictates that a system works most efficiently when the actor with the comparative advantage in producing Good A specializes in producing Good A, and other actors in the system similarly specialize in producing the goods that their comparative advantages suit them for. If differences in comparative advantages are present for conflict management actors, as the following section argues, then “a system of predictable partnerships based on comparative advantage would seem to be the most sensible and the most cost-effective approach” to carrying out peace operations (Bah and Jones, 2008, 27).

Comparative Advantages

To discuss the strengths and weaknesses of different participants in peace operations, I first simplify matters by identifying four main types of coalition actors: global, regional, Western, and ad-hoc coalitions. Those actor types are defined and discussed below. Each type of coalition actor has a different set of relative advantages and disadvantages. I identify material resources, ability to respond quickly to a crisis, global legitimacy, local legitimacy, and local knowledge as important dimensions of difference between these types of intervenors.

61 Table 3.1 summarizes the comparative advantages and disadvantages of each type of actor. This is a rough overview of advantages and disadvantages, as many of these factors are context-dependent. Table 3.1: Comparative Advantages of Intervenors

Global (UN) Regional Western Ad-Hoc Material resources high low high variable Responsiveness low high medium medium/high Broad legitimacy high medium variable low/medium Local legitimacy medium high low∗ medium Local knowledge low/medium high low∗ medium/high

∗ Low when out-of-area; high otherwise

The United Nations is the only organization with global membership and reach that also conducts peace operations, so it is alone in its “Global” category. The UN has an advantage in access to material resources due to its large membership and experience in generating contributions from member states. The UN also has a uniquely broad base of potential troop contributors (Martin-Brûlé,2016, 9-11). When it comes to responsiveness, the UN is relatively slow to establish operations (Spearin, 2011, 203). Due to its global membership and long experience as a peace provider, UN operations tend to have a high degree of broad, international legitimacy. However, the UN is not always seen as legitimate by local stakeholders, and the organization does not have the advantage in local knowledge that regional bodies do (Sabrow, 2017; Tardy, 2014, 99). Lepgold highlights several of these points, arguing that “global mechanisms...may provide a certain broad legitimacy for action. What they often lack is a sensitivity to the regional context at hand (including a feeling that global efforts led by the major powers often smack of imperialism) and the incentives to act that often accompany nearby problems” (2003, 10). Regional organizations are IGOs with region-limited membership which operate strictly in their area. Most IGOs with a strictly regional security mandate are in less

62 affluent areas, and are constituted by member states that are limited in the funding and equipment they can provide. Because these organizations tend to have relatively limited resources, they are likely to depend on financial and logistical support provided by non-members (Alagappa, 1998, 4). Regional bodies also tend to have a high degree of investment in conflict resolution; “[a]ll else equal, the closer a problem is to home the more there is at stake in solving it” (Lepgold, 2003, 10). That urgency, combined with the geographic closeness of regional organizations, gives these institutions an advantage in responsiveness (Hardt, 2009). A high level of interest in the conflict has some downsides, however. The impartiality of regional interventions is often in question, given regional states’ histories and relationships with a nearby target state (Martin-Brûlé, 2016, 9-11). Regional organizations or particular member states may be biased (or perceived as biased) toward a particular party to the conflict, and that position may additionally be seen as self-interested. A rebel group having cross-border ties to another country’s government, for instance, or an embattled government having a close alliance with a regional power, can substantially complicate regional interventions. As Adebajo argues, regional intervenors can act in ways that are unhelpful for the resolution of a conflict by pursuing “parochial and self-interested goals that sometimes lead to partisanship and a lack of neutrality” (Adebajo, 2002, 3). Despite these concerns over bias, states and institutions in many regions advocate for “regional solutions to regional problems,” speaking to a preference many actors hold for locally-led conflict management approaches (Leifer, 2000). That interest can give regional organizations an edge in local legitimacy in some circumstances, as can the advantage that regional bodies have when it comes to local knowledge (United Nations Security Council, 2008a, pg. 1). It is common for scholars to make a distinction between global and regional institutions when discussing organizational comparative advantages. I argue that an additional distinction is appropriate, differentiating between IGOs with region-limited membership which conduct peace operations only in their own area, and those which also conduct peace operations outside their region. In my data, the European Union and NATO are

63 the regional bodies that fall in this category of out-of-area intervenors, and so I refer to this category of intervenors as “Western” coalitions. These organizations have substantial financial resources and strong organizational capacity, due to their member states’ relative affluence and possession of valuable resources like military equipment. These organizations are able to respond more quickly than the UN in many situations, but can be slowed by their bureaucracies, which tend to be larger and more unwieldy in these organizations than in their non-Western counterparts. Hardt (2009) finds for instance that the European Union takes substantially longer on average to respond to peace operation demands than the African Union, and argues that bureaucratic dysfunction is a key determinant of response times. The international legitimacy of Western IGO interventions is variable, often depending on whether the intervention is seen as humanitarian or as self-serving, and whether local stakeholders view the operation as legitimate. When operating in-region these organizations have an advantage in local knowledge and local legitimacy, just as regional organizations more broadly do. But when operating out-of- area (outside of Europe and North America), Western IGOs tend to have a disadvantage when it comes to local knowledge and legitimacy. Finally, ad-hoc coalitions are not organized under the auspices of any intergovernmental organization, by definition. These coalitions tend to be regional groupings, usually led by a regional power. The material resources of ad-hoc coalitions vary; coalitions can be resource-rich when conducted and supported by at least one powerful and affluent state, but are likely have fewer resources in other circumstances. Because ad-hoc coalitions are not constrained by existing IGO bureaucracies, their response time can be relatively quick, particularly when the coalition is led by a powerful state that can quickly muster the bulk of the resources required to establish the intervention. Mem- bers of ad-hoc coalitions select into the coalition because they have similar preferences on a particular intervention question. Because of this, ad-hoc coalitions are unlikely to impose substantial constraints, and multilateralism through ad-hoc coalitions therefore does not confer the same legitimacy benefits that working through pre-existing IGOs

64 does (Thompson, 2009, 25-26). Ad-hoc coalitions’ local legitimacy tends to be low – these coalitions are particularly likely to be viewed as partial, serving the interests of a lead state. The international legitimacy of ad-hoc coalition interventions is often higher than local legitimacy, because the intervening states have made some eﬀort at multilateralism (Bellamy and Williams, 2005, 169), and because when a coalition is operating in-area, local coalitions are perceived as being sensitive to local dynamics. That said, the legitimacy of ad-hoc coalition interventions can be damaged by perceptions that the intervention is biased, or serving intervenors’ national interests rather than higher aims of peace and humanitarianism. Like regional organizations, local ad-hoc coalitions have an edge in local knowledge, and have a high degree of investment in crisis resolution. That level of investment is particularly evidenced by these coalitions bearing the coordination costs of organizing outside an existing framework for security cooperation.

Table 3.2: Classiﬁcation of Hyperlateral Intervenors

Global United Nations (UN) Regional African Union (AU) (prev. Organization of African Unity/OAU) Central African Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC) Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD) Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Southern African Development Community (SADC) Western European Union (EU) North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Ad-Hoc Inter-African Force in the Central African Republic (MISAB) International Force East Timor (INTERFET) International Stabilization Force (Op. Astute) Multinational Force (MNF)/Op. Uphold Democracy Multinational Interim Force/Combined Joint Task Force Haiti United Task Force (UNITAF)

65 Initiation in the Eﬃciency Framework

The literature review in section 3.1 provided an overview of actors’ motivations for initiating interventions. At the state level, the potential for regional destabilization, disruptive effects on alliances and trade, reputation-building, and humanitarian concern can all make intervention in a conflict more likely. Organizational actors are influenced by the interests of their constituent states, but also have their own objectives. IGO-level motivations for intervention include pursuing the organization’s mandate, solidifying the organization’s reputation, and following through on peace support efforts once begun. Finally, target state opposition, target state strength, and opposition by regional powers are all cited as factors that make intervention less likely. Given this grounding in the material, normative, and institutional factors that contribute to intervention decisions, how should we understand the decision to initiate multiple such interventions in a given conflict? This section discusses what the efficiency framework implies about the motivators of hyperlateral intervention. The efficiency logic suggests that cooperation benefits intervenors by increasing the likelihood of success while decreasing the costs of intervention. If actors’ decisions are driven by weighing the costs of intervention against the expected value of intervening, then hyperlateralism should be an attractive model because it has the potential to decrease costs and provide efficiency gains that make operational success more likely. Hyperlateral intervention has two important effects on the cost side of the equation. One of these is the prospect of sharing the costs of intervention. For a stylized example, if there is ‘demand’ for 10,000 peacekeeping troops in a given crisis, organizations A and B may each be wary of shouldering that burden alone, but willing to intervene if the troop contribution requirement can be spread between them. Hyperlateralism can allow coalitions to get involved in conflict management without having to take on sole responsibility for shepherding the parties through the peace process. Spreading costs without diluting the potential peace-related benefits of intervention is attractive. The second effect on cost is harder to directly observe, but the argument is that when labor is

66 divided according to comparative advantage, the overall costs of an intervention should decrease (compared to the counterfactual where labor is not efficiently divided) because resources are being used efficiently to produce peace operation “goods.” If one intervenor can relatively easily bear the costs of intervention, and there is no clear operational need for the involvement of multiple coalitions to carry out different tasks, these cost-sharing benefits should be less likely to motivate hyperlateralism. Coordinating efforts with another coalition can impose some costs for both parties. In circumstances where an individual coalition has little difficulty fielding a peace operation, those coordination costs may make hyperlateralism even less likely. When intervention costs are expected to be high, however, or when operational needs are otherwise acute, the cost-reduction and cost-sharing consequences of cooperation should become even more salient, and more likely to outweigh any coordination costs. In these more demanding conflicts, individual coalitions are less likely to succeed alone, because there exist more opportunities for the coalition’s disadvantages stand in the way of effective conflict management. In these circumstances, there are more likely to be specific operational needs – for resources, for personnel, for provision of particular conflict management programs, for better relations with belligerent parties – that a single coalition cannot provide. Conflicts that are more difficult cases at the outset of international involvement or conflicts that substantially increase in intensity or complexity, should be more likely to see the intervention of multiple coalitions to meet operational demands. In summary, the efficiency argument implies that unless coalitions have opposing interests and would therefore work at cross purposes, coalitions should cooperate in order to meet operational needs. This is because partnership can bring more resources to bear, can lower the costs borne by any individual intervenor, and can take advantage of different specializations of the involved parties to efficiently divide labor as discussed in a previous section (Gehring and Faude, 2013). “Like-minded” coalitions, in other words, should be motivated to cooperate when they (a) anticipate lower costs as a result of burden-sharing

67 in the operation, (b) anticipate greater benefits because the operation is more likely to be effective, or (c) both (Gehring and Faude, 2013; Tardy, 2014). This leads to a first observable implication related to the initiation of hyperlateral interventions:

I1: Based on the needs of the operation, intervening parties should seek the involvement of other coalitions to provide needed resources or operational functions.

Having laid out various motivations for hyperlateral intervention, it is worth considering why multiple coalitions don’t intervene in every conﬂict. One important factor is a lack of available intervenors. Hyperlateral intervention requires the existence of multiple multilateral coalitions who are able and willing to conduct peace operations. In a discussion of how IGOs identify partners for orchestration, Abbott et al. note that the availability of such actors “may be either actual or potential” – that is, some available actors already exist as institutions, while others must be created (2015, 22-23). This holds true in the realm of peace operations, where some potential intervenors exist already as IGOs with a security mandate, and other potential intervenors are ad hoc coalitions which must be convened by interested states. I focus on actual availability – the presence of already-existing institutions with a mandate to provide security in the relevant state or region – in this section. Some regions have a high density of regional security IGOs, meaning there are many potential intervenors on an ongoing basis. Intervenor availability in such regions is high. Regions with fewer security institutions have a lower level of intervenor availability, making establishing a hyperlateral intervention more diﬃcult. Low regional availability does not rule out hyperlateral intervention; ad-hoc coalitions can emerge as intervenors in areas that lack security IGOs (see for instance the Australia-led coalitions in two hyperlateral cases in East Timor), and Western organizations operating out-of-area can intervene in areas with less regional availability. However, ad hoc coalition intervention requires states to pay the costs of organizing, coordinating their actions, and agreeing

68 on goals and procedures. That reality can create frictions that make ad-hoc coalition intervention more diﬃcult and costly than IGO coalition intervention.12 In order for Western organizations to agree to intervene out of area, members have to be convinced that such an intervention is in the organization’s purview and interests. Again, this adds friction to the hyperlateral intervention process. Because of these factors, I suggest that hyperlateral intervention is more likely to emerge in regions where there is a higher density of regional organizations with an interest in and/or history of intervention, like Africa and Europe, and less likely to emerge in regions like Asia and South America which lack these institutions.

I2: Hyperlateral intervention is more likely to occur when many security IGOs are available.

Outcomes in the Eﬃciency Framework

As discussed in the literature review in section 3.1, peace operation effectiveness is a function of characteristics of the intervention and of conflict-specific factors. In this section I discuss the operational characteristics of hyperlateral interventions that should be associated with effectiveness, under the efficiency framework. In a nutshell, this section’s argument about effectiveness is that when multiple parties with different comparative advantages intervene in a conflict, that multi-coalition intervention should be more effective than the intervenors acting alone could have been. The baseline implication of the efficiency framework for peace operation outcomes is that hyperlateral operations should be comparatively effective at producing peace. The involvement of multiple coalitions can allow for more resources to be directed toward the conflict management effort. Well-resourced operations have been linked to better conflict outcomes (Collier, Hoeffler and Söderbom, 2008; Hultman, Kathman and Shannon, 2014; Hegre, Hultman and Nyg˚ard,2018). To the extent that hyperlateral interventions have

12Ad-hoc coalitions participated in six of the 22 hyperlateral cases I identify. Among multi-coalition interventions, operations carried out by multiple IGOs are the norm.

69 the potential to employ more resources for the conflict management effort, that increased capacity should produce more effective intervention. Furthermore, coalitions with different comparative advantages have the potential to divide their labor accordingly, allowing for more cost-effective and better-executed provision of peace operation resources, tasks, and programs. If more resources are brought to bear in a conflict management effort, and the resources of peace providers can be used more efficiently, the supposition is that missions will be stronger, better specialized, and perhaps more legitimate. Those characteristics of a mission make it more likely that an operation will succeed in providing stable peace. This leads to an initial observable implication about the outcomes of hyperlateral interventions:

O1: Interventions carried out by multiple coalitions should be more eﬀective.

Peace operation tasks are wide ranging. Some tasks are related to resource provision, e.g. providing large numbers of personnel, providing funding, providing equipment, or establishing particular programs that require specialized knowledge and personnel. Quick response to conflicts that break out, or to developments on the ground in ongoing conflicts, is another important function. Tasks also can be related to planning and intelligence, like making plans that build on local knowledge to achieve better outcomes. Further tasks are related to legitimacy, such as establishing cooperation and rapport with key parties, or attracting material or moral support from other third parties. The efficiency logic suggests that when intervenors have different strengths and weaknesses, they can better divide labor according to their relative advantages, and therefore achieve a more efficient operation. Some IGO discussions of operational partnerships stress this point. For instance UN Security Council Resolution 1809 “[s]tresses that common and coordinated efforts undertaken by the United Nations and regional organizations...should be based on their complimentary [sic] capacities, making full use of their experience” (United Nations Security Council, 2008a, par. 9). The comparative advantage argument builds on earlier observations about the distinct strengths and weaknesses of different types of multilateral coalitions, and the notion

70 that when actors specialize based on their advantages, better outcomes result. For example, a regional coalition that is able to respond to a conflict quickly and enjoys a relatively high level of local legitimacy, but which lacks the resources for long-term deployment, would more productively partner with a well-resourced but slower-moving organization than with another regional coalition with the same disadvantages. This principle implies that the United Nations can form effective partnerships with coalitions that fill in areas of weakness for the UN, like local knowledge and quick response time. Or, coalitions that are perceived as less legitimate can usefully combine forces with organizations whose legitimacy is higher. Conflict situations that demand intervention frequently warrant large and multi- faceted responses, which can include military and police components, civilian and military observers, monitors, negotiators, staff, and volunteers. Intervening coalitions may organize and oversee peace talks, enforce ceasefires, provide security in particular areas, provide training and capacity-building assistance for the state, or oversee post-conflict disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR), among many other activities. Because hyperlateral operations involve two or more coalitions, the range of functions performed by those operations has the potential to be broader than the average mandate of single-coalition operations. Furthermore, if each intervenor manages aspects of the operation which its advantages best suit it for, the end result is that the operation as a whole may more effectively act in more areas than a single coalition would be able to. These arguments lead to a second observable implication about intervention outcomes in the efficiency framework:

O2: When multiple intervenors have more complementary comparative advantages their interventions should be more eﬀective.

71 3.3 The Limits of the Eﬃciency Argument

While the efficiency logic introduced in the previous section is a useful starting point for considering the incentives underlying hyperlateral intervention as well as the effectiveness of the model, it is also a simplistic framework. We can complicate and expand on the efficiency logic in useful ways by considering a wider range of actor incentives as well as potential difficulties with cooperation. A good deal of scholarship on international organization in general, and regime complexity in particular, notes that efficiency is not always the outcome of institutional interactions. In the area of peace operations, as in many others, “even where common interests exist, cooperation often fails” (Keohane, 1984, 6). Even when multiple coalitions have similar interests in resolving a conflict, the groups will not necessarily act in harmony. The efficiency logic focuses on cost-sharing and the prospect of better outcomes through division of labor as motivators of partnership. However, intervenors have varied motivations that drive decisions about intervention, some of which fall outside the efficiency framework. Interested parties may decline to participate in a hyperlateral operation when their involvement would be beneficial, due to incentives to free ride. The presence of other available intervenors may, rather than incentivizing actors to burden-share, actually incentivize offloading the burden altogether by waiting for a different coalition to intervene. Alternatively, driven by forum-shopping behavior, path dependence, or reputational interests, actors may intervene in a crisis even when the value added of their participation is low. Instead of being motivated by the needs of an operation, actors might be motivated principally by self-interest unrelated to conflict outcomes. The efficiency framework suggests that hyperlateral intervention should be an effective conflict management model. However, there are a number of reasons why multi- coalition interventions might not live up to this potential. In some instances, coalitions can may compete with one another for resources, authority, or credit. Intervenors also may disagree about how best to achieve the aims of the operation, clashing over priori-

72 ties and strategies. Even in the absence of outright clashes, coalitions may simply fail to communicate effectively, and thereby act in ways that are inefficient, or even counterproductive. While the efficiency argument provides an interesting logic for the establishment of hyperlateral peace operations, it is not clear that those potential gains are enough to motivate state and organizational actors to establish these multi-coalition interventions. Furthermore, the possible efficiency gains of organizational cooperation are not guaranteed. This section builds on the arguments already introduced about division of labor and comparative advantage to provide a more complete understanding of the causes and effects of hyperlateral intervention.

Initiation Beyond the Eﬃciency Framework

The efficiency argument on initiation focuses on intervenor motivations that are directly related to the outcome of a given conflict. Intervenors may seek to bring about peace for humanitarian reasons, for self-interested reasons, or both, but the potential benefits of intervention are understood as deriving from the ultimate outcome of the conflict management attempt. Efficiently resolving the conflict, in other words, is presumed to be the key motivation for this set of actors. However, even if we assume that actors involved in conflict management act rationally – that they make decisions in an effort to maximize their utility – we should not assume that conflict outcomes are the strict focus of actors’ cost-benefit calculations. Building on earlier observations about the role reputational concerns play for IGOs, I argue that an interest in reputation-building can drive the creation of hyperlateral interventions. Even when one intervention in a conflict is underway or imminent, organizational actors may seek to bolster their reputations by participating in the conflict management effort. The salient point here is that a reputation-driven intervention decision is not strictly motivated by the needs of the conflict and a perception that multi-coalition intervention is the most effective approach. In these cases, part of the

73 beneﬁt being sought is a change in observers’ perceptions about the intervenor’s rele- vance, character, or power. Concerns about institutional reputation are unlikely to be a factor in ad-hoc coalition intervention, given that these coalitions are not standing bodies with reputations that persist. From these arguments, I derive the following observable implication about hyperlateral initiation:

I3: Organizations are more likely to participate in a hyperlateral intervention when they are seeking to develop a reputation as a security provider.

Individual states can also play an important role in creating the conditions for hyperlateral intervention. By lobbying for intervention by particular IGOs, or by organizing and leading ad-hoc coalition efforts, key states can make hyperlateral operations more likely. To effectively push for intervention, key states need to have both a strong interest in resolving the target crisis and sufficient influence to affect the actions of other states and institutions. Global powers, regional powers, and strong states with particularly close ties to the (potential) target state are particularly well positioned to play such a role. Sometimes key states favor the involvement of a coalition in which the state plays a prominent or decisive role. Working through such a body can enhance the key state’s influence over the conflict management approach. Rather than participating in a larger organization’s effort, the state may favor working through a coalition in which the state is particularly visible and pivotal. For instance, Nigeria might lobby for ECOWAS to intervene in a regional conflict, even if the UN is likely to establish a more extensive operation, because Nigeria has substantially more sway in ECOWAS than in the UN Security Council. We can think of this as a type of forum shopping, in which the key state selectively works through a particular multilateral body in order to pursue its particular individual interests. Key states may also exercise their influence by organizing an ad hoc coalition to carry out an intervention. Particularly powerful and influential states can make coalition

74 formation more likely by disproportionately bearing the costs of intervention (including material costs and coordination costs) and by drawing on relationships with other states to secure intervention partners. The motivations and potential roles of these key states inform the following argument:

I4: Key states interested in conﬂict resolution should seek the involvement of particular coalitions to further state interests.

A different type of forum-shopping behavior is undertaken by target states. Gov- ernments engaged in civil conflict can seek or agree to the involvement of particular coalitions in a conflict management effort. For instance, during the Darfur crisis, Sudan opposed a UN-only peacekeeping operation, but conceded to a hybrid UN-African Union operation in the country (Gelot, 2012). The UN was poised to intervene on its own when Sudan registered its objection to the single-coalition intervention, motivating the UN to partner with the African Union, an organization which Sudan was more favorable toward. Sudan’s forum-shopping was therefore a key motivator of hyperlateralism in this case. Target states can also appeal for follow-on interventions when an early operation is unsuccessful or likely to withdraw, and the target favors a stronger or more long-lasting international presence. Further, in some cases a party to a conflict loses confidence in the efforts, or the motivations, of one intervenor and requests that a different coalition assist with conflict management. In a variety of circumstances, the preferences of target states can drive hyperlateral intervention.

I5: Target state preferences for a particular coalition’s intervention should make hyperlateral intervention more likely.

An earlier section on the predictors of intervention discussed the role of path dependence in motivating particular organizations’ peace operations. Binder usefully deﬁnes path dependence as “self-reinforcing (or ‘positive’) feedback processes” which can

75 result “from material and immaterial investments in an existing institution or policy that actors have made and are reluctant to abandon” (2015, 715). While existing literature has considered how path dependence operates within institutions, I innovate by arguing that security regimes as a whole can be similarly motivated to continue international interventions once begun, until a favorable end state is reached. Path dependence across institutions may be driven by the interests of influential states, senses of community and solidarity among actors involved in security provision, and perceptions that building on other actors’ investments can be a cost effective strategy for providing peace. Once a peace operation is established, I argue that both the initial intervenor and other coalitions and organizations experience incentives to follow through on that investment in peace. If an initial intervention is unable to provide peace because crisis developments outstrip the operation’s capabilities, or if the initial intervenor plans to withdraw before peace is secured, this argument holds that actors other than the initial intervenor experience incentives to sustain or increase investments in peace provision. Path dependence has several possible sources. Actors’ interests in justifying or recouping sunk costs, even when a course of action has become more costly than originally anticipated are one source (Staw, 1981, 579). Actors that see a “possibility of achieving better outcomes by investing further time, money, or effort” may make new commitments to costly projects as a result (Dietz-Uhler, 1996, 612). A disproportionate aversion to losses, and actor tendencies to be more risk-acceptant when facing potential losses, may also contribute to path dependence (Levy, 1996). Consistency bias – a normative pressure to stay the course rather than abandoning an original policy and admitting defeat – can also motivate path dependence. Staw argues that these preferences for consistency exist in many societal settings, such that steadfastness is rewarded and inconsistency punished (1981, 581). Self-interested actors may continue an established course of action in order to secure a reputation for consistency. Any or all of these factors can produce path dependence within or across coalitions. With respect to hyperlateral interventions, unplanned sequential and limited par-

76 allel operations in particular tend to involve a coalition entering a crisis to help secure the investments of an original intervenor. In some cases, persistence in a conflict management effort can be based on a rational calculation that staying the course is likely to maximize future gains. Maintaining course is therefore not necessarily an indicator of irrationality or bias. However, the existence of these several incentives for maintaining commitment to a course of action once begun makes path dependence a likely outcome in many cases, even when the costs of intervention rise. The argument that hyperlateral intervention can be driven by path dependence leads to a final observable implication about initiation:

I6: Hyperlateral intervention is more likely when an existing intervention faces a substantial setback or threatens to end without providing peace.

Outcomes Beyond the Eﬃciency Framework

Earlier in this chapter I introduced an argument that the complementarity of the comparative advantages of intervenors is an important predictor of intervention success. That argument suggests that when intervening coalitions have different strengths and weaknesses, their partnerships can take advantage of the benefits of specialization and therefore be more effective in responding to conflict. In this section, I expand on the efficiency argument by introducing coordination as another important driver of effectiveness. I argue that close communication and coordination among intervenors allows the entire operation to better realize the benefits of partnership. Even when an intervention is carried out by multiple coalitions with complementary sets of comparative advantages, having similar interests in resolving a conflict, those coalitions will not necessarily act in harmony. As discussed earlier in this section, effective coordination is not automatic even when incentives and intentions are aligned. I argue that deliberate, consistent communication among intervenors plays a critical role in the effectiveness of hyperlateral intervention. Absent that coordination, organizations may inefficiently duplicate each other’s efforts, and misallocate resources best spent else-

77 where. Where efficiency could have resulted from coalition cooperation, instead waste and inefficiencies can enter the process as a consequence of this lack of communication.13 Operations also can become less efficient when involved parties pursue the same goal but with strategies which conflict, causing tension and confusion. An example of this strategic disconnect is seen in the relationship between the UN and NATO in the intervention in Bosnia, which became “tense and possibly counterproductive” (Malone, 1998, 17). The organizations differed in their approaches to securing peace, with the UN placing a high value on using minimal force and NATO preferring “projection of overwhelming strength” (Malone, 1998, 17). Martin sees this dysfunction extending beyond the NATO-UN security relationship, to encompass also the involvement of the OSCE and civilian intervention components; he argues that “strong, integrated management” was clearly needed in Bosnia, but the involved parties’ unwillingness to cede authority meant that such centralized coordination was impossible (Martin, 2003, 49). There are a number of reasons why coalitions may fail to coordinate and communicate well. Poor communication between intervening coalitions may reflect important disagreements or incompatibilities among those groups (Hofmann, 2009). Coalitions may have different preferences about the outcome of a peace process, for instance. Intervenors may also see themselves as in competition for “resources, attention, and influence,” which can disincentivize effective cooperation (Kelley, 2009, 62). While a lack of cooperation may be a proxy for goal incompatibility, there is good reason to believe that even coalitions fundamentally on the same page may not meet their potential for an effective division of labor. Organizations may lack standard procedures and channels for communication, they may fear other coalitions will interfere in their intervention, or they may not see

13In the conflict in Darfur, for instance, NATO and the EU both conducted operations supporting the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS). The two IGOs conducted very similar operations, and as Biscop argues “it is unnecessary, inefficient, and probably even less effective to divide [these functions] between two organizations, even if effective staff-to-staff contacts have been established. But for political reasons, key players in each organization wanted both of them to be visible through a mission of its own” (Biscop, 2006, 7). Either of those Western organizations individually could have provided a useful complement to the AU intervention. But intervening together, NATO and the EU duplicated effort in a suboptimal way (Hofmann, 2009). (It is worth noting that these support activities were not boots-on-the-ground interventions in Darfur, and so do not fall under my definition of hyperlateral intervention participation.)

78 communication as important or worth the additional cost and effort (Harsch, 2015). In his assessment of hyperlateral intervention in the Central African Republic, Plank argues that when coalitions provide resources that are “complementary and accordingly coordinated” this produces an increase in joint capacity, which “then leads to an increased likelihood that the partners are able to respond effectively in a crisis” (2017, 490). Plank’s identification of complementarity and coordination as jointly important for operational effectiveness mirrors my own argument. When coalitions take care to coordinate their efforts, and allow participating groups to exploit their comparative advantages, better outcomes are more likely to result. These arguments about the importance of coordination lead to a final observable implication related to operational outcomes:

O3: Better coordination and communication among intervenors should produce more eﬀective interventions.

The efficiency framework is a helpful starting point for identifying the potential benefits of hyperlateral cooperation, but that approach misses other important aspects of the politics underlying hyperlateral initiation and effectiveness. Actors involved in providing peace operations face incentives outside the rational provision of peace – interests beyond the resolution of a conflict. Furthermore, actors involved in peace operations will not necessarily operate together effectively just because shared interests and even complementary advantages exist. Competition, miscommunication, disagreements about means and ends, and even an unwillingness to invest in creating communication channels and procedures can all stand in the way of efficient cooperation.

3.4 Conclusion

The existing literature on peace operations misses important aspects of how multilateral coalitions aﬀect one another, and how interactions among coalitions shape conﬂict

79 outcomes. This chapter explores theoretical explanations for the initiation of hyperlateral interventions in some conflicts, and the determinants of the outcomes of those operations. The efficiency logic of hyperlateral intervention suggests that states and organizations create multi-coalition operations in order to more effectively address conflicts. The involvement of multiple coalitions allows participating actors to share the burden of intervention, lowering their costs and in some cases allowing for more resources in aggregate to be directed toward providing peace. Different types of security actors have different comparative advantages, and hyperlateral interventions can allow intervening coalitions to specialize according to their strengths. Intervention efforts are expected to be more efficient when multiple intervenors establish a division of labor based on comparative advantage. In this framework, the efficiency gains from hyperlateralism are expected to produce better conflict outcomes. While a useful basis for considering hyperlateralism, the efficiency framework does not consider the whole range of motivations for intervention, nor the obstacles that stand in the way of effective cooperation among intervenors. In addition to an interest in peace provision, actors can also be motivated to intervene by reputation concerns, forum- shopping on the part of key participating states or target states, and path dependence. While the efficiency logic suggests that multiple actors with similar interests can effectively divide labor and provide peace, there are a number of reasons why this effective cooperation may not emerge. Intervenors may fail to act in harmony when their strategic preferences differ, and whey they compete for resources or power. Even absent such clashes, failure to jointly plan can result in inefficiencies like duplication of effort. In the absence of effective communication and coordination among intervenors, hyperlateral interventions are less likely to provide peace. The following chapters use evidence from case studies to investigate the observable implications introduced in this chapter. Chapter 4 considers the hyperlateral intervention in Côted’Ivoire in detail. Chapter 5 presents a comparative analysis of four cases, one from each category in my typology of hyperlateral intervention.

80 Chapter 4

Cˆoted’Ivoire Case Study

The previous chapter presented a theoretical framework for considering the initiation and effects of hyperlateral intervention. International actors seeking to efficiently respond to a conflict may seek the involvement of multiple coalitions in order to divide labor and maximize effectiveness. Because different coalitions have different comparative advantages, the potential exists for multiple intervenors to specialize according to their advantages and thereby more effectively provide peace. However, Chapter 3 also argues that this logic of efficiency is not the only driver of the initiation and effects of hyperlateral intervention. Intervenors may be motivated by power and reputation concerns to seek the involvement of particular coalitions. Intervenors may also be motivated by path dependence to continue investing in a conflict management effort. Furthermore, target states are not strictly motivated by an interest in the provision of peace. Target states may lobby for the involvement of particular intervenors to further state interests rather than to maximize the effectiveness of peacekeeping. Finally, even when multiple coalitions with distinct comparative advantages intervene in a conflict, their effective cooperation is not guaranteed. Strong communication and coordination among intervenors should make hyperlateral interventions more effective. These arguments are summarized in Table 4.1.

81 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017

Jan. 2003 – Linas Marcoussis Agreement Jan. 2003 – ECOWAS op. begins Apr. 2011 – Gbagbo ousted ECOMICI UNOCI

CONFLICT June 2017 – UN op. ends Apr. 2004 – UN op. begins Nov. 2010 – electoral crisis Sept. 2002 – conflict begins Mar. 2007 – Ouagadougou Agreement

Figure 4.1: Cˆoted’Ivoire Case Timeline

This chapter probes these arguments by examining the sequential involvement of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the United Nations (UN) in Côted’Ivoire. In discussing this case, I consider whether case outcomes, such as intervention by particular coalitions and operational effectiveness, are consistent with what each observable implication would predict the outcome to be. As George and Bennett note, “mere consistency between a theory’s predictions and case outcomes may not be significant,” but can provide preliminary evidence for the usefulness of a theoretical explanation (2005, ch. 9).1 The series of interventions in Côted’Ivoire lasted from 2003 until 2017, as illustrated in Figure 4.1. This chapter starts by discussing the roots of the Ivorian conflict and the key issues at stake, as well as early international reactions to the crisis which reveal some of the key motivations for the states and organizations involved in the intervention. Then the chapter considers the initiation of ECOWAS’s intervention, and argues that intervention was motivated chiefly by ECOWAS’s reputational interests and France’s role as a facilitator of regional intervention. The ECOWAS operation was successful in reducing violence, but not in ending the conflict or addressing underlying grievances. The following section discusses the UN’s takeover from ECOWAS and the motivators of that transition, arguing that the needs of the conflict, target state appeals, and path dependence, as well as France’s continuing facilitation of the conflict management effort, were

1This approach is what George and Bennett (2005) refer to as the “congruence method” of theory development from case studies.

82 the key drivers. ECOWAS and the UN had complementary comparative advantages and coordinated their operations well, contributing to a smooth transition period. The UN’s operation in Cˆoted’Ivoire lasted until 2017, and its eﬀectiveness in providing peace varied over its years of involvement, as section 4.4 discusses. Finally, this chapter ends with a discussion of what this case study tells us about each of the observable implications considered.

4.1 Conﬂict Background & International Responses

President FélixHouphouët-Boigny ruled in Côte d’Ivoire from 1960, when the country became independent from France, until his death in 1993. Houphouët-Boigny presided over a relatively peaceful and prosperous state, but his death was the trigger for a destabilizing power struggle. Henri Konan Bédié,the speaker of the National Assembly, became president in 1993. His principal rival for the presidency, prime minister Alassane Ouattara, left the country when Bédiébecame president, but has gone on to play an important role as an opposition leader and politician in Côted’Ivoire (Mitter, 2003, 44-46).2 As president, Bédiéthrough rhetoric and policy fueled the rise of Ivoirité:an exclu- sionary and xenophobic concept of Ivorian identity that “disenfranchised long-standing migrant workers, ethnic groups from across West Africa, and Ivorians of foreign heritage” (Hunt, 2016, 694). Under Houphouët-Boigny’s presidency, immigration from other West African states had been encouraged, as a valuable source of labor for Côted’Ivoire’s growing economy (Gberie and Addo, 2004, 18). Decades of immigration had helped created strong cross-border links between Côted’Ivoire and other West African states, which contributed to regional interest in Côted’Ivoire’s stability. Bédiéand his allies sought to build a coalition by turning the question of what

2Ouattara became the president of Cˆoted’Ivoire after winning election in 2010, and re-election in 2015. His term is set to expire in 2020.

83 Table 4.1: Observable Implications

Eﬃciency Beyond Eﬃciency

Initiation I1: Operational needs. Based on I3: Organizational reputation. Or- the needs of the operation, inter- ganizations are more likely to par- vening parties should seek the in- ticipate in a hyperlateral interven- volvement of other coalitions to tion when they are seeking to de- provide needed resources or oper- velop a reputation as a security ational functions. provider.

I2: Availability. Hyperlateral in- I4: Key states. Key states inter- tervention is more likely to oc- ested in conﬂict resolution should cur when many security IGOs are seek the involvement of particular available. coalitions to further state interests.

I5: Target requests. Target state preferences for a particular coalition’s intervention should make hyperlateral intervention more likely.

I6: Path dependence. Hyperlateral intervention is more likely when an existing intervention faces a substantial setback or threatens to end without providing peace.

Outcomes O1: Effective hyperlateralism. In- O3: Coordination. Better coordi- terventions carried out by multiple nation and communication among coalitions should be more effective. intervenors should produce more effective interventions.

O2: Complementarity. When multiple intervenors have more complementary comparative advantages their interventions should be more eﬀective.

84 it meant to be truly Ivorian into a critical political issue and a lever against political opponents, producing a backlash against immigration policies of the past (Akindès,2003, 23). Because immigrants and their descendants in Côte d’Ivoire are more concentrated in the north of the country, and are majority-Muslim – while southerners are more likely to be descended from native Ivorians and to practice Christianity – geography and religion became entangled with concepts of “foreignness” (BBC World Service, 2002; Akindès, 2003; Bovcon, 2009). These social fissures set the stage for civil war, and the geographic aspect of the divide came to play an important role in the conflict. Bédié’sgovernment compounded prejudicial rhetoric with policies requiring Ivorian residents to prove their citizenship in order to access passports and identity cards. This burdened northern Ivo- rians particularly, who were less likely to have access to the sort of documentation of ancestral origin that the government insisted upon. The marginalization of northern Ivorians in the 1990s, along with pre-existing grievances arising from the relative impov- erishment of the north, contributed to the outbreak and intractability of the eventual conflict (Bah, 2010; Bellamy and Williams, 2013). In late December 1999, General Robert Gué¨ı’scoup – the first in Côted’Ivoire’s history – overthrew president Bédié,precipitating a political crisis in the country (Tavares, 2011, 157). Gué¨ısought to solidify his control of the country by standing for election in September 2000 and attempted to secure his victory in that election by implementing policies disqualifying many of his potential opponents. Ultimately, only Laurent Gbagbo – the longtime leader of the Front Populaire Ivoirien (FPI) political party – challenged Gué¨ıin the election. Gbagbo won over 59 percent of the vote and became president even as Gué¨ıclaimed electoral fraud in an attempt to hold on to power (El-Khawas and Anyu, 2014). The legitimacy of the 2000 election was substantially damaged by the inequities in the electoral process. The calculated exclusion of many potential candidates damaged the election’s legitimacy and meant that, whether Gbagbo or Gué¨ıwon, either candidate’s presidency was bound to be controversial. Objections to the electoral process produced calls for Gbagbo to hold new, fair elections, which Gbagbo ignored (The Economist,

85 2000). The Ivorian civil war broke out in September 2002, as rebels launched attacks in the capital, Abidjan, as well as Bouake and Korhogo, ultimately seizing control of the latter two towns (Mitter, 2003, 50-51; Bovcon, 2009; Tavares, 2011). The mutiny in Abidjan did not win the rebels any power or concessions, but the rebels “retreated to their bases in the North...[and] regrouped into a new movement called the Forces Nouvelles (FN) under the leadership of Guillaume Soro” (Bah, 2010, 604). The perpetrators of the initial September attacks were soldiers who had been ejected from the army under Gbagbo’s government, and who were apparently seeking compensation and reinstatement. As the rebellion evolved, however, so did the demands of the rebels. Gbagbo’s resignation, new elections, and the end of Ivoirit´e-linked discriminatory policies rose to the top of the opposition’s agenda (Bovcon, 2009, 6). The period following the uprising was marked by a wave of increased violence and prejudice against immigrants, their descendants, and native Ivorians perceived as too foreign (BBC World Service, 2002). This September crisis was the catalyst for international intervention, which began with France unilaterally intervening only a few days after the war broke out, and would continue with ECOWAS and UN interventions in following years.

Early Responses to the Conﬂict

With this background in mind, it is useful to consider how notable states and IGOs reacted to the Ivorian crisis at its outset. International responses to the Ivorian rebellion came quickly, and observers were nearly unanimous in condemning the uprising as an illegitimate attempt to seize power.3 Other early responses by actors like France, ECOWAS, and the UN can usefully illuminate the interests and interactions of these

3See e.g. the UN’s condemnation in S/PV/4680 (United Nations Security Council, 2002a); the African Union’s report on the situation in Cˆoted’Ivoire (African Union, 2002); and ECOWAS’s condemnations as referenced in the Final Communique of the 26th Session of the Authority (Economic Community of West African States, 2003).

86 players, and offer insight about eventual decisions to establish multilateral interventions in Côted’Ivoire. France, the former colonial power and a close ally, played a pivotal role in the international response in Côted’Ivoire. Throughout this chapter I will note France’s actions as examples of the sort of key state influence that observable implication I4 predicts. Those actions included unilateral intervention, advocating for and helping to fund the eventual ECOWAS intervention, and lobbying for UN involvement. With respect to early reactions to the Ivorian crisis, France was the first responder in Côted’Ivoire, intervening at Gbagbo’s request only a few days after the coup attempt (Boutellis and Novosseloff, 2016, 682). France’s intervention, Opération Licorne, began as a contingent of about 700 soldiers in September 2002, and grew to its full size of approximately 4,000 troops by July 2003 (Novosseloff, 2018, 6). While this French intervention was not multilateral, France’s early involvement in this crisis is crucial for understanding the multilateral international responses that followed. France’s quick response in Côted’Ivoire is revelatory of its degree of interest in the conflict. The country’s foreign policy has long conceptualized former French colonies in Africa as important to France’s national interests. Additionally, at the time of the September uprising, around 15,000 French nationals were living in Côted’Ivoire, contributing to French concern (Novosseloff, 2018, 6). In addition to establishing Opération Licorne, France also hosted a round table in January 2003, which brought together many of the conflicting parties in Côte d’Ivoire for talks facilitated by the UN, African Union (AU), and ECOWAS, and culminated in the signing of the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement (Linas-Marcoussis Agreement, 2003; Hara and Yabi, 2013, 145-46). Tavares notes that France facilitated ECOWAS’s involvement in peace talks in 2002 and 2003, and actively supported the establishment of an ECOWAS intervention (2011, 158). These activities again speak to France’s key role in setting the agenda on conflict management in Côte d’Ivoire and pushing forward conversations about multilateral intervention. ECOWAS, the regional security organization in the area, also responded quickly to

87 the Ivorian crisis with a flurry of diplomatic activity. The organization held an emergency meeting on September 29, and decided to form a contact group of West African leaders to assist in resolving the Ivorian crisis (African Union, 2002). That contact group was created immediately, and met separately with both President Gbagbo and rebel leaders within days of the emergency meeting (United Nations, 2004a). Soon after, ECOWAS facilitated a ceasefire agreement, signed by the rebels on October 17, 2002 and later agreed to by the Ivorian government (Carroll, 2002).4 This ceasefire effectively split the country into a government-held south, and a north friendly to the rebels (Mitter, 2003, 51; Bellamy and Williams, 2013, 59). West African states also quickly began planning for a regional intervention. ECOWAS members held meetings in Paris and in Abidjan in October and November, with intervention options on the agenda (Hara and Yabi, 2013, 152). A meeting of ECOWAS’s Côted’Ivoire contact group on October 23, 2002 agreed that there was an “urgent need for deployment of a West African force to replace the French troops” intervening in Côte d’Ivoire (Wax, 2002). At this stage of planning, both ECOWAS and France signaled a preference that a regional intervention take over from France’s operation, and this appears to have been the focus of planning in late 2002 (Hara and Ero, 2002).5 Ultimately, though, ECOWAS peacekeepers would operate alongside French troops rather than replacing them. That reality is indicative of ECOWAS’s limitations and particularly the degree to which the organization relied on French support in carrying out its intervention. France and ECOWAS both called on the UN to provide diplomatic and material support for resolving the Ivorian crisis. The final declaration of ECOWAS’s extraordinary summit at the end of 2002 requested “the United Nations to assist in finding solutions to the crisis” and asked that the UN also support ECOWAS’s attempts to resolve the conflict

4The Mouvement Patriotique de Cˆoted’Ivoire (MPCI), the primary rebel group in Cˆoted’Ivoire, signed this agreement. MPCI and two other rebel factions united as the Forces Nouvelles a few months after this agreement was signed (Hazen, 2013). 5Another indicator of this direction of planning is a December 2002 statement from the President of the Security Council, referring to French peace provision activities as taking place “on a provisional basis pending the deployment of the [ECOWAS Monitoring Group] force” (United Nations Security Council, 2002d).

88 (United Nations Security Council, 2002c). Hara and Yabi say this “call by ECOWAS for direct involvement of the Security Council was strongly encouraged by France” (Hara and Yabi, 2013, 153). The Security Council considered the communique from the ECOWAS summit in its meeting on December 20, 2002 (United Nations Security Council, 2002a). The President of the Security Council issued a statement in response, expressing concern about the Ivorian crisis, and stating the Security Council’s support for ECOWAS activity, including a possible ECOWAS Monitoring Group deployment, “as called for in the Final Communique of the Dakar Summit” (United Nations Security Council, 2002d, 2). The Security Council officially authorized ECOWAS’s operation in Côted’Ivoire in February 2003 with UNSCR 1464 (United Nations Security Council, 2003b). The UN’s resolution authorizing the ECOWAS Mission in Côted’Ivoire (ECOMICI) also called for the Secretary-General to submit recommendations on how the UN could support the Ivorian peace process (United Nations Security Council, 2003b). The Secretary- General’s answering report in March 2003 provided a range of possible UN responses, including establishing a military liaison group to work with and advise French and ECOWAS forces, deploying military observers, and establishing a peacekeeping operation (United Nations Security Council, 2003f, par. 71). The report indicated that UN peacekeeping should be considered only in the event of changes on the ground in Côte d’Ivoire or if the commitments of France and ECOWAS changed (United Nations Security Council, 2003f, par. 78). That recommendation helps indicate that the UN’s conflict response was sensitive to the needs of the operation, consistent with observable implication

I1. Developments on the ground and changes in France and ECOWAS’s commitments did eventually occur, which contributed to the UN’s decision to create a peace operation. In May 2003 the UN passed Security Council Resolution 1479, establishing a political mission in Cˆoted’Ivoire (MINUCI) mandated to help implement the Linas- Marcoussis Agreement, provide advice on military matters, and monitor the security situation (United Nations Security Council, 2003c). France in particular lobbied for the

89 creation of a UN peacekeeping force at this time, but other Security Council members, including the U.S. and United Kingdom, were opposed (Bellamy and Williams, 2013, 60; Boutellis and Novosseloff, 2016, 681). As we consider these early activities of ECOWAS and the UN, a brief discussion of where this case falls in this dissertation’s typology of hyperlateral intervention is warranted. As noted earlier, ECOWAS and the UN intervened sequentially in Côted’Ivoire. My typology distinguishes between planned and unplanned sequential operations, and the early actions and statements of involved parties determine how sequential cases are categorized. As discussed in Chapter 2, there are some cases of hyperlateral intervention in which the first coalition to intervene in a conflict knows from the outset that a secondary intervention will be established to take over the operation. This was not the case in Côted’Ivoire. When the UN authorized ECOWAS’s intervention, neither its resolution nor any other communications indicated that the UN planned to intervene at a later date. While in early 2003 the Security Council was not committed to eventually conducting peacekeeping in Côted’Ivoire, the Secretariat did consider plans for a possible takeover from ECOMICI, as discussed above (Novosseloff, 2018, 8). France’s early advocacy of UN intervention is also notable. ECOWAS decision-makers may have anticipated early on that the UN would undertake peacekeeping in Côte d’Ivoire given the strong preference of at least one permanent member of the Security Council. However, other members of the Security Council, particularly the United States, were wary of establishing an intervention (Boutellis and Novosseloff, 2016). One of the UN’s own lessons-learned reports notes that it was “not a foregone conclusion” that the UN would establish a peace operation (United Nations Peacekeeping, 2005, 4). The separation of planned and unplanned sequential operations in my typology depends on the existence of concrete plans for a secondary intervention well in advance of the transition between operations. The replacement of ECOMICI by another multilateral operation was not anticipated in this way. Rather, the international response in Côted’Ivoire was “an evolutionary response

90 to emerging requirements,” not a process governed by early, joint planning (United Na- tions Peacekeeping, 2005, 4). For these reasons, I characterize this case as an unplanned sequential operation.

4.2 ECOWAS Intervention

“Peace in Cˆoted’Ivoire is inextricably linked to lasting peace in...all of West Africa” – Mohamed Ibn Chambas, Executive Secretary of ECOWAS.6

ECOWAS was the first multilateral intervenor in Côted’Ivoire. This section discusses ECOWAS’s involvement and the material incentives that West African states had to resolve this crisis. This section also considers how ECOWAS’s reputation interests and France’s role as driver of regional intervention importantly motivated this intervention. ECOWAS had some success in reducing violence in Côted’Ivoire, but was unable to bring about durable peace between the conflicting parties. The conflict’s persistence would contribute to ECOWAS’s eventual replacement. ECOWAS began planning to deploy a subregional peacekeeping force in December 2002, following the organization’s Extraordinary Summit in Dakar (Boutellis and Novos- seloff, 2016, 682). The ECOWAS Mission in Côted’Ivoire (ECOMICI) began deploying in January 2003. By March, around 1,250 troops had deployed, constituting nearly the full authorized force for the mission (Novosseloff, 2018, 8). ECOWAS decided in April 2003 to increase the mandated force size by an additional 2,000 troops. The organization had difficulties reaching that higher target, though; by December 2003, almost a year after deployment began, only about 1,500 troops of the planned 3,200 were deployed (United Nations, 2004b, par. 48-50; Bellamy and Williams, 2013, 60). While ECOWAS was able to establish its initial presence on the ground relatively quickly, its slowness to increase its deployment size illustrates the organization’s weakness when it comes to material and logistical capacity. 6Remarks at United Nations Security Council Meeting 4873, November 24, 2003 (United Nations Security Council, 2003a).

91 ECOWAS faced important material incentives to promote peace and stability in Côted’Ivoire. The organization’s members were concerned about the regional security consequences of turmoil in Côted’Ivoire, and particularly the prospect of conflict spillover (Hara and Ero, 2002; Tavares, 2011). Given that the Ivorian conflict involved the targeting of (actual and suspected) immigrants and foreign workers, other states in the region were also concerned about refugee flows (Tavares, 2011, 157). In 2003, a representative from ECOWAS emphasized in a meeting of the UN Security Council that conflict in Côted’Ivoire had the potential to hurt economies across West Africa. These economic consequences were anticipated because Côted’Ivoire is a key regional trade partner, an important “transit corridor for goods and travellers within the West African subregion,” and a source of substantial remittances sent by foreign workers in Côted’Ivoire to their home countries (United Nations Security Council, 2003a, 5-6). ECOWAS has also sought to build a reputation as a provider of regional security through policy and through peacekeeping activities. The organization has developed an ambitious security agenda and has the most sophisticated conflict management mechanisms of any subregional organization in Africa (Tavares, 2009). At the time of the Ivorian crisis ECOWAS had accumulated experience carrying out regional peace operations in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea-Bissau (Olonisakin, 2011). Chapter 3 argued that organizations have an incentive to develop reputations as active and successful, in order to win the continued support of their member states and other backers. Implica- tion I3 suggests that these incentives motivate multi-coalition intervention. ECOWAS’s interests and security activities are consistent with this implication. ECOWAS is particularly dependent on the support of states and organizations outside of West Africa, and assisting with regional conflict management through diplomacy and intervention has earned ECOWAS substantial praise and material support from external states and IGOs. Senegal, Ghana, Niger, Togo, and Benin were the main troop contributors for ECOMICI (Yearbook of the United Nations, 2002, 181; Obi, 2009, 129). It is interesting to note that Nigeria – the regional hegemon in West Africa and frequently the driving force

92 behind ECOWAS action – was not heavily involved in ECOMICI. Instead it was France that played the critical role in pushing for the establishment of the regional intervention, even though France is not an ECOWAS member. France’s willingness to provide substantial material support to the ECOWAS operation, the presence of OpérationLicorne on the ground, and France’s close relationships with many West African states7 were all important components of France’s influence. These dynamics speak to France’s position as a key state in this hyperlateral effort, congruent with implication I4. As discussed in Chapter 3, regional IGOs like ECOWAS are expected to have comparative advantages in rapid response, local knowledge, and local legitimacy, and disadvantages in resources and global legitimacy. The Ivorian case largely bears out these expectations. While ECOWAS was faster to respond to the crisis in Côted’Ivoire than other international bodies, it had limited resources for managing the conflict. The organization has underdeveloped planning and logistical capabilities, deficiencies in staffing, and limited sources of equipment and funds (Novosseloff, 2018, 8). For these reasons, ECOWAS relied heavily on France for material and logistical support (Hara and Yabi, 2013). ECOWAS’s intervention was welcomed by parties on the ground, as indicated in the Linas Marcoussis Agreement, speaking to the operation’s relatively high local legitimacy (Linas-Marcoussis Agreement, 2003). ECOWAS’s knowledge of local conflict dynamics was similarly high, by virtue of long experience with Côted’Ivoire’s politics. The Uppsala Conflict Data Project, which collects data on armed conflicts globally, indicates that there was an active armed conflict in Côted’Ivoire in 2002, 2003, and 2004 (Gleditsch et al., 2002; Pettersson and Eck, 2018).8 The persistence of conflict indicates that France and ECOWAS were unable to bring the conflict to an end, but their interventions did help contain the crisis and reduce violence (Bellamy and Williams,

7Of the main troop contributors to ECOMICI, all the contributing states save Ghana were formerly French colonies. France has long pursued a policy of maintaining close relationships with former colonies (Staniland, 1987), and France’s close relationship with this bloc of ECOWAS states seems likely to have helped motivate this intervention’s establishment. 8UCDP defines an armed conflict as ongoing when “the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths in a calendar year” (Uppsala Conflict Data Program, 2018, 1).

93 2013, 60). France’s initial intervention focused on holding the ceasefire line between the north and south, freezing the positions of the belligerents on the ground (Hara and Yabi, 2013, 150-51). Once deployed, ECOMICI forces focused their efforts on providing security around the ceasefire line and emerging “zone of confidence” across central Côted’Ivoire (see Figure 4.2). ECOWAS worked in this area to monitor the ceasefire and facilitate the free movement of people and the delivery of aid (United Nations, 2004b, par. 49). While the international presence did suppress conflict in some areas, Côted’Ivoire remained divided and the key issues in the crisis remained unresolved. ECOWAS’s limitations and the persistence of conflict in the country helped motivate calls for the UN to intervene, as discussed in the following section.

4.3 Transition to United Nations Intervention

Continuing turmoil in Côted’Ivoire despite multiple peace processes, and despite the efforts of France and the overstretched ECOWAS, intensified interest in finding a different approach to managing the conflict. This section discusses the role of operational needs, key state advocacy, target state appeals, and path dependence in motivating the UN’s intervention in this conflict. This section also begins to evaluate the effectiveness of the hyperlateral operation, noting that ECOWAS and the UN had complementary comparative advantages and coordinated their efforts well. Operational effectiveness was high around the transition period, but more variable in following years. Beginning in late 2003, ECOWAS, France, and the government of Côted’Ivoire intensified their calls for a UN intervention. In November an ECOWAS delegation vis- ited the Security Council in New York to make the case for UN peacekeeping in Côte d’Ivoire (United Nations Security Council, 2003a). The delegation specifically noted that ECOWAS did not have the capacity to provide security throughout all of Côted’Ivoire (United Nations Security Council, 2003a). ECOWAS’s recognition that it could not sustain a force sufficient to meet the needs of the operation was the basis for its appeal for

94 Figure 4.2: Ceaseﬁre Line and Zone of Conﬁdence (United Nations, 2004b)

95 a better-resourced UN operation, consistent with implication I1 (United Nations, 2004b; Hara and Yabi, 2013). ECOWAS emphasized that there was still a keen regional interest in Côted’Ivoire’s stability. From the regional body’s perspective, a UN operation had the potential to further those goals and to relieve some of the burden of intervention. Specif- ically, while ECOWAS states would continue to provide manpower for the UN operation, the burden of providing financial and logistical resources would pass to the UN. It is worth briefly considering how ECOWAS’s appeal for UN assistance relates to the organization’s reputation interests as discussed in the previous section. While ECOMICI came to an end in 2004, ECOWAS remained involved in the conflict management effort. ECOWAS continued to participate in diplomatic efforts, and ECOMICI contingents stayed on in the country as UN peacekeepers. Security Council statements and resolutions on Côted’Ivoire, both before and after the UN intervened, repeatedly com- mended ECOWAS’s efforts to secure peace in the country. Transforming ECOMICI into a UN operation did not appear to have negative reputational consequences for ECOWAS. Rather, the organization’s willingness to intervene early in the crisis, member states’ willingness to provide troops for the UN’s intervention, and ECOWAS’s continuing engagement at the diplomatic level all had positive reputational consequences. The UN’s decision to intervene was also importantly motivated by France’s investment in, and preferences regarding, conflict management in Côted’Ivoire, speaking again to the argument that key states can drive hyperlateral intervention. As already noted, France began advocating for UN intervention in 2003. Once ECOMICI began, France was bearing the costs not only of its own intervention but also most of ECOWAS’s intervention. This financial burden gave the state a clear motivation for seeking a UN intervention where the costs of peacekeeping could be spread more widely. Within Côted’Ivoire, anti-French rhetoric and demonstrations by Gbagbo’s supporters increased through 2003, which also contributed to France seeking “greater burden sharing and the ‘multilateral- ization’ of its involvement in Côted’Ivoire through the Security Council” (Novosseloff, 2018, 8). France’s status as a veto power within the Security Council should not be

96 overlooked; from its position of strength in the UN, France had substantial influence on Security Council decisions on Côted’Ivoire. On several levels, then, the UN’s involvement in Côted’Ivoire served French interests. France’s lobbying for UN intervention is therefore consistent with implication I4.

Implication I5 suggests that target state appeals for intervention can prompt hyperlateral intervention. Consistent with this argument, Côted’Ivoire did request that the UN take over from ECOWAS. The Ivorian government’s position was conveyed in a letter to the Security Council in November 2003 (United Nations Security Council, 2003e). This letter emphasized the limitations of both ECOMICI and OpérationLicorne in providing peace, noting that the ECOWAS mission was severely limited by its capacity issues, and that the French forces “find it difficult to spread out without authorization from the Forces Nouvelles” (United Nations Security Council, 2003e). This letter clearly communicated the Ivorian government’s preference for the establishment of a UN peacekeeping operation to absorb ECOMICI, and for an expansion of the international conflict management effort. The UN intervention sought to prevent backsliding in Côted’Ivoire by doubling down on the investments already made in managing the crisis, in an effort consistent with implication I6 on path dependence. The earlier investments in conflict management included the interventions by ECOWAS and France, the UN’s political mission in the country (MINUCI), and many organizations’ and states’ diplomatic efforts. Furthermore, by the time the UN’s intervention in Côted’Ivoire was planned for and authorized, other UN peace operations were ongoing in nearby Sierra Leone and Liberia. The spread of conflict and instability in West Africa was an important international concern. The UN’s decision to intervene in Côted’Ivoire was an extension of its ongoing efforts to provide peace in the region. Indeed, the Security Council Resolution authorizing UNOCI specifically recognized the interconnected security challenges that Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Côted’Ivoire faced (United Nations Security Council, 2004, par. 4, 6(f)). The UN sent an assessment mission to Côted’Ivoire in December 2003 which

97 “concluded that it was essential to give serious consideration to the ECOWAS pro- posal to deploy a United Nations peacekeeping force in Côted’Ivoire and to reassign the ECOMICI contingents to that force” (United Nations, 2004b, par. 61). In January 2004, the Secretary-General recommended to the Security Council that – contingent on Ivorian parties demonstrating progress in the peace process – a multidimensional UN peacekeeping operation be established. This operation would take over the functions being performed by ECOMICI, including maintaining the ceasefire line and zone of confidence in central Côted’Ivoire. UNOCI would also take on an array of new functions, including implementing a disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) program, carrying out policing, and supporting national elections planned for 2005 (United Nations, 2004b, par. 61-82). The Security Council authorized the UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI) in February 2004, and in doing so specifically took note of the requests from Côted’Ivoire’s president and ECOWAS for a UN intervention (United Nations Se- curity Council, 2004). UNOCI officially began on April 4, 2004, replacing both ECOMICI and MINUCI (Mays, 2010, 323). The ECOWAS troops on the ground in Côted’Ivoire were rehatted as the first UNOCI contingent (Mays, 2010, 323; Hara and Yabi, 2013, 156). UNOCI’s initial authorized strength was over 6,000 military personnel – about twice as large as ECOMICI’s contingent at its peak (United Nations Security Council, 2004). The UN brought its broader experience and greater resources to bear in its response to the persistent Ivorian crisis, establishing a larger operation with a more comprehensive mandate. The differences between ECOMICI and UNOCI speak to the different comparative advantages of the intervening organizations. These organizations’ advantages are complementary, which is relevant to observable implication O2. I have already noted ECOWAS’s advantages in response time, local legitimacy, and local knowledge. The UN has an edge in resources and global legitimacy9 – two areas in which ECOWAS is at a disadvantage. UNOCI’s size and scope made use of the UN’s greater resources. As Hara and Yabi note,

9A report of the Secretary-General on the UN’s role in Cˆoted’Ivoire noted the “unique legitimacy, impartiality, and capabilities” the UN possesses (United Nations, 2004b, par. 51).

98 the UN’s broad legitimacy and reputation for impartiality gave intervening parties more insulation from accusations of bias (Hara and Yabi, 2013, 156). As intervenors sought to resolve political issues underlying the conflict, including sensitive questions of citizenship and immigration, this legitimacy was particularly beneficial (United Nations, 2004b, par. 51). From early stages of planning for the establishment of a UN peacekeeping operation, the involved organizations envisioned the rehatting of ECOMICI troops as part of the UN force. This is one indicator of strong communication and coordination among the intervenors. ECOMICI’s force commander was also appointed to stay on as UNOCI’s force commander as well, and that plan was made months in advance of the handover between operations. This leadership continuity allowed for information sharing about “issues related to logistic needs” between the organizations (United Nations Peacekeep- ing, 2005, 11). These factors are relevant to implication O3, which predicts that better coordinated hyperlateral operations are more effective. Rehatting makes it easier for the succeeding intervention to establish itself; troops with relevant experience in the environment benefit the succeeding operation with their expertise, and the provision of the rehatted troops makes it easier for the operation to raise and deploy its full complement of personnel. These factors make the secondary party’s intervention less costly (Bah and Jones, 2008). The handover from ECOMICI to UNOCI was relatively smooth, though a UN report on rehatting argued that a more extended joint planning process would have been to the operation’s benefit (United Nations Peacekeeping, 2005, 4). The peace process in Côted’Ivoire had advanced in the first half of 2004, and the government and rebels signed an additional agreement on citizenship issues and other matters in July (Novosseloff, 2018, 7). The operational effectiveness observed in spring and summer 2004 is plausibly related to the complementarity and coordination of the ECOWAS and UN operations, which would provide some support for implications O2 and O3. However, this period of relative peace was short-lived.

99 In October 2004, about six months after the handover from ECOWAS to the UN, the Ivorian peace process began to break down. The backslide was precipitated by Gbagbo’s insistence on rebel disarmament before his government would follow through on a commitment to amend the Ivorian constitution, and rebel parties’ refusal to com- ply with Gbagbo’s deadline (Novosseloff, 2018, 10). Conflict in the country escalated in November 2004, as the government began bombing rebel positions (Boutellis and Novos- seloff, 2016, 685). UNOCI was unable to either persuade the rebels to disarm or prevent the government’s attacks on the Forces Nouvelles (Bellamy and Williams, 2013, 61). The security situation in Côted’Ivoire further “deteriorated as government forces... inadvertently hit French military bases in November 2004” (Bah, 2010, 608). Several French peacekeepers were killed in that government bombing, and France “retaliated with air strikes and a land incursion” against Gbagbo’s government. France’s retaliatory actions spurred large anti-French protests, and eroded the legitimacy of OpérationLicorne in the eyes of Gbagbo supporters, though the UN Security Council strongly supported France (Bah, 2010, 608; Boutellis and Novosseloff, 2016, 685). The UN implemented targeted sanctions and an arms embargo in response to the outbreak of violence, but the security situation in Côted’Ivoire remained unstable through 2004 and into 2005 (Boutellis and Novosseloff, 2016, 685-86). In this period, the international intervention was relatively ineffective, unable to prevent this eruption of conflict. That observed inefficacy is not congruent with implications O2 and O3. The following section considers how the Ivorian crisis evolved, and how intervention effectiveness varied, in the remaining years of UN intervention.

4.4 Conﬂict Developments, 2005-2017

Having considered the factors that motivated the ECOWAS intervention in Côte d’Ivoire and the subsequent handover to the UN, as well as the effectiveness of these operations in 2003 and 2004, this section now turns to consider UNOCI’s effectiveness in

100 the remaining years of its operation as well as outcomes in the post-intervention period. The UN’s intervention ended in 2017, well over a decade after UNOCI took over from ECOMICI. To fully consider outcomes in this hyperlateral case, it is necessary to discuss these longer term conflict developments and the long-run effectiveness of this operation. After the resurgence of violence in Côted’Ivoire in late 2004, involved parties took a number of promising steps toward resolution. The AU facilitated a new peace agreement which was signed in April 2005, national elections were scheduled for later that year, and the Security Council expanded UNOCI’s size and mandate to provide additional support for the peace process. Despite these steps, “political progress stagnated” in the country in 2005 and 2006 (Bellamy and Williams, 2013, 61-62). No electoral process was actually initiated, and Gbagbo remained in office after his presidential term expired at the end of October 2005 (Hunt, 2016). IGO-led attempts to spur the election process on were unsuccessful, at least partially because Gbagbo had little incentive to support elections being held (Boutellis and Novosseloff, 2016, 686-87). Postponements allowed Gbagbo to remain in power indefinitely, while agreeing to hold elections would have put his position in jeopardy. As the new deadline for elections in October 2006 approached, with no practical possibility of those elections being held, the African Union and the Security Council authorized Gbagbo’s continued tenure in office (United Nations Security Council, 2006b). Crucially, though, the Security Council Resolution on this matter also moved to increase the power of the Prime Minister relative to that of the President (Bellamy and Williams, 2013, 62; United Nations Security Council, 2006b). In UNSCR 1721 the UN also established a role for itself in arbitrating any election issues and in certifying elections once they took place (Boutellis and Novosseloff, 2016, 687). Gbagbo rejected this resolution, but interpreted the Security Council’s action as a signal of waning UN support for his presidency, which motivated Gbagbo to push the peace process along on his own terms by establishing direct dialogue with Guillaume Soro, the head of the Forces Nouvelles (Hazen, 2013, 141; Boutellis and Novosseloff, 2016, 687-88).

101 In 2007, Burkina Faso’s president, Blaise Compaoré,facilitated that dialogue between Gbagbo and Soro.10 These talks ultimately produced the Ouagadougou Agree- ment, signed in March 2007, which unlike previous peace agreements directly dealt with the question of Ivorian citizenship (a fundamental issue in the conflict) and created specific provisions for handling issues like citizenship disputes and how Ivorians would access identity documents in the future (Bah, 2010). The new agreement helped produce a relatively peaceful environment in Côted’Ivoire from 2007 until late 2010, and even as elections continued to be postponed, preparations such as voter registration and the distribution of identity cards did take place (Hara and Yabi, 2013, 162). The zone of confidence cutting through the middle of Côted’Ivoire around the ceasefire line, which had been in place since 2002, was dismantled in 2007 and 2008 after the Ouagadougou agreement was signed, in an important move toward reunification of the country (Center on International Cooperation, 2009, 90). Gbagbo finally agreed to an election schedule in 2010 (Novosseloff, 2018, 15). Gbagbo and Alassane Ouattara won the highest shares of votes in the first round election on October 31, 2010. In the run-off election on November 28, Ouattara won 54.1 percent of the vote,11 as certified by UNOCI and the Independent Electoral Commission (CEI) but Gbagbo refused to step down (Bekoe, 2018). The pro-Gbagbo Constitutional Council rejected the results as presented by the CEI, and released its own tally, which excluded votes from several northern departments of Côted’Ivoire where the Constitutional Council alleged that voter suppression and irregularities had taken place. The result of the Constitutional Council vote count was that Gbagbo had won the election with 51.45

10Compaoréwas in a unique position as facilitator. Burkina Faso was influential with and generally supportive of the rebels in Côte d’Ivoire. Immigration flows from Burkina Faso into Côted’Ivoire have historically been high, and immigration hardliners in Côted’Ivoire had expelled many people with origins in Burkina Faso and had spread rumors about opposition politicians like Alassane Ouattara being secretly Burkinabé(Bah, 2010; Hara and Yabi, 2013; Boutellis and Novosseloff, 2016). These factors informed Burkina Faso’s favorability toward the Ivorian rebels, which in turn gave Compaoréimportant credibility with the FN as a mediator. Compaoréalso became the Chairman of ECOWAS in January 2007, and had ECOWAS’s support in facilitating the Ouagadougou talks (Hara and Yabi, 2013). 11After the first round election, former president Bédié– who had come in third in the first round – endorsed Ouattara, which helped unify the parties opposing Gbagbo (Boutellis and Novosseloff, 2016, 688).

102 percent of the vote (United Nations Security Council, 2011d; Bekoe, 2018). Gbagbo and Ouattara both took the presidential oath of office on December 4, 2010, before different witnesses. The contested election threw Côted’Ivoire once more into civil conflict. Around 3,000 people were killed in this new round of violence, and hundreds of thousands of Ivorians became internally displaced or became refugees (Hunt, 2016, 696; Novosseloff, 2018, 18). Again, UNOCI was unable to prevent or quickly stop this outbreak of violence. While international observers were near-unanimous in their support of Ouattara, positions differed on how to best address the crisis (Boutellis and Novosseloff, 2016, 692; Hunt, 2016, 697). The AU, for instance, favored a new peace process in Côted’Ivoire with the goal of arriving at a power-sharing deal, while ECOWAS and the UN opposed any deal that would allow Gbagbo a continued role in Ivorian politics (Novosseloff, 2018, 18-19). In January, the UN authorized the deployment of an additional 2,000 troops in Côted’Ivoire to manage the post-election crisis (United Nations Security Council, 2011b, par. 1), but violence continued to escalate through February and March (United Nations Security Council, 2011a, 2; Hara and Yabi, 2013, 166). Disarmament and demobilization of combatants is often required before new elections are held in a post-conflict environment. UNOCI was mandated to assist with DDR, but that process was nowhere near completed by the time the 2010 elections occurred. The fact that many militia members were still active and armed at the time of the election enabled the quick escalation and spread of violence in the post-electoral environment (Bekoe, 2018). The fact that failure to complete DDR fueled the conflict further speaks to the UN’s ineffectiveness in this period. In March 2011, ECOWAS passed resolution A/RES.1/03/11, which called on the UN to strengthen UNOCI’s mandate in order to prevent future loss of life and allow Ouattara to take power as president (United Nations Security Council, 2011a, 5). The UN had certified the results of the election, stating that Ouattara had won and was the rightful president of Côted’Ivoire. The organization was not therefore in a position to be

103 impartial with respect to the power struggle between Gbagbo and Ouattara; it was clear that from the UN’s perspective, Ouattara had the legitimate claim to power and Gbagbo did not (Novosseloff, 2018, 18). Gbagbo’s unwillingness to concede created a situation where the legitimate winner of the election would need to seize power by force – the sort of action that is usually a hallmark of illegitimate regime change. Security Council Resolution 1975, adopted on March 30, 2011, urged Ivorian parties to “respect the will of the people and the election of Alassane Dramane Ouattara” and indicated that UNOCI was authorized to use all necessary means to protect civilians under threat, including threat from the use of heavy weapons (United Nations Security Council, 2011c).12 On April 3, the UN Secretary-General requested French assistance in moving against strongholds of Gbagbo’s forces (Boutellis and Novosseloff, 2016, 692). France and the UN carried out these strikes in the following days, justifying these actions against Gbagbo as preventive strikes, intended to protect civilians from the use of heavy weapons, as called for in UNSCR 1975 (Boutellis and Novosseloff, 2016, 692; Daddieh, 2016, lxxv). Gbagbo was arrested on April 11, and subsequently taken into custody by the International Criminal Court to be prosecuted for war crimes and crimes against humanity (Novosseloff, 2018, 19). After the 2010-11 crisis, security in Côted’Ivoire substantially improved, through “pockets of insecurity, especially in the west, lasted about a year’ (Novosseloff, 2018, 19-20). In 2013 UNOCI began a slow reduction of its force in the country, and the operation ultimately came to an end on June 30, 2017 (United Nations Peacekeeping, 2017; Novosseloff, 2018, 20-23). In addition to seeing improvements in stability and reconciliation, Côted’Ivoire successfully held elections in 2015 and 2016. Since UNOCI’s withdrawal, Côted’Ivoire has remained relatively peaceful, though important political divisions remain. Local and municipal elections were held on schedule in October 2018. The elections were relatively free and fair, but took place in a tense political climate and

12There is no single deﬁnition of heavy weapons, but the category generally includes artillery, tanks, other large combat vehicles, missile launchers, and other conventional arms operated by multiple personnel (United Nations Register of Conventional Arms, n.d. ).

104 were marred by a few outbreaks of violence (Hoije and de Bassompierre, 2018). The first presidential election since the end of UNOCI is scheduled to take place in 2020, and that election will be another important test of the durability of peace and stability in the country. Assessments of UNOCI’s success are variable. During UNOCI’s deployment Côte d’Ivoire made meaningful progress toward reunification, and violence was suppressed during most of UNOCI’s tenure. The operation also helped oversee democratic elections, and the eventual seating of an elected president. However, the operation saw substantial setbacks in its first year, and it took over six years for elections to be organized in Côted’Ivoire. Furthermore, when elections were held, the country collapsed back into violence which UNOCI was unprepared to respond to. Hunt characterizes this as a “failure of prevention” for which the UN bears some responsibility (Hunt, 2016, 695- 96). The merits of the UN’s use of force against Gbagbo are debated, with the UN’s action hailed by supporters as a decisive response to Gbagbo’s desperate attempt to stay in power, and derided by critics as illegitimate interference that went beyond UNOCI’s mandate (Boutellis and Novosseloff, 2016). Critics have also argued that the UN pushed for elections to be held prematurely, before necessary security conditions were met (Mbeki, 2011; Bekoe, 2018). After the electoral crisis, though, political and security conditions substantially improved, and when UNOCI withdrew it left Côted’Ivoire in a position of relative stability.

4.5 Conclusions

This section summarizes the ﬁndings from this chapter’s analysis of the hyperlateral intervention in Cˆoted’Ivoire. The facts of this case are consistent with each of the implications about hyperlateral initiation introduced in Chapter 3. ECOWAS’s resource constraints created an operational need for a larger follow-up intervention, which was then supplied as implication I1 would predict. Several regional security organizations

105 were available as intervenors, enabling intervention per implication I2. ECOWAS’s involvement appears to have been partially motivated by reputation concerns, consistent

with I3. France played a key role in motivating the ECOWAS and UN interventions in this case, enabling hyperlateralism while pursuing state interests in a manner consistent

with I4. Cˆoted’Ivoire’s government appealed for intervention, and particularly for the replacement of ECOMICI with a UN operation, which bears out the prediction of impli-

cation I5. Finally, concerns over not wasting earlier investments in conﬂict management

are also a plausible motivator of hyperlateralism in this case, consistent with I6. With respect to predictions about intervention outcomes, ECOWAS and the UN had complementary comparative advantages and executed a relatively well-coordinated hyperlateral

operation. Implications O2 and O3 would predict that effective intervention should result from those realities. In practice, intervention effectiveness varied substantially over time in Côted’Ivoire. In the earlier stages of the intervention, ECOWAS effectively provided peace and the handover to the UN’s operation was executed smoothly, but major setbacks in 2004 and 2010-11 marred the international intervention’s record. Since the intervention ended in 2017, Côted’Ivoire has remained relatively peaceful, though tensions around elections have raised concerns about future stability. Overall, the evidence in this case is

only partly congruent with implications O2 and O3. The rest of this section elaborates on each of these points.

With respect to observable implication I1, this case lends some support to the argument that operational needs drive the involvement of multiple coalitions. ECOWAS’s intervention in Côte d’Ivoire was not able to resolve the Ivorian crisis, though the operation did have some success in reducing violence. In particular, ECOWAS’s limited resources diminished the organization’s capacity to provide security throughout the country, or to address deeper social and political issues contributing to the conflict. ECOWAS, Côted’Ivoire, and France were unanimous in their call for the UN to provide a larger and broader intervention to more effectively address the crisis. The UN’s multidimensional presence was better suited than the ECOWAS operation to pursue resolution of

106 the underlying issues in the conﬂict, and to assist the country toward reintegration.

Implication I2 holds that the presence of multiple security IGOs whose area of operation covers a target state makes hyperlateral intervention more likely. This argument would be best investigated in a larger analysis, comparing rates of hyperlateral intervention, single-coalition intervention, and non-intervention across regions with different levels of availability. That said, we can consider how the presence of potential intervening organizations might affect intervention decisions in particular cases. In Côte d’Ivoire, multiple intervenors were available. In addition to ECOWAS and the UN, the two organizations which ultimately intervened, the African Union also had the potential to provide peacekeeping.13 It is plausible that relatively high availability in this region helped enable hyperlateral intervention in Côted’Ivoire.

The evidence from this case is also consistent with implication I3, which suggests that regional IGOs with an interest in developing a reputation for conflict management are particularly likely to participate in hyperlateral intervention. In this case, ECOWAS – which has sought to build such a reputation, and which relies on external support that is in part dependent on that reputation – became involved quickly in the conflict management effort in Côted’Ivoire. Its intervention served to further develop ECOWAS’s reputation as a security provider, as illustrated by numerous actors’ praise for the organization’s efforts. Another argument about initiation is that individual states can increase the likelihood of hyperlateral intervention by seeking the involvement of particular coalitions whose involvement would serve state interests. Tavares argues that “more than any other intervention by ECOWAS, the involvement in Côted’Ivoire was driven by strong extrare- gional influences – namely those originating from France” (2011, 158). While France is not an ECOWAS member, its substantial financial and logistical support of ECOMICI enabled that regional intervention to take place. France also successfully lobbied for

UN intervention. France’s activities are consistent with implication I4; France sought

13The AU’s ﬁrst peace operation was in Burundi in 2003. While an intervention in Cˆoted’Ivoire would have been an early one for the AU, the organization’s involvement was not out of the question.

107 ECOWAS’s involvement initially to supplement France’s unilateral intervention in Cˆote d’Ivoire. Then, as France’s willingness to bear the ﬁnancial and logistical costs of intervention diminished, the country sought to share the burden by enlisting the UN as an intervenor.

Another observable implication under consideration, I5, stipulates that target states can engage in forum shopping that motivates multi-coalition intervention. Gbagbo’s advocacy of a UN operation to take over from ECOWAS likely played some role in motivating the creation of UNOCI, and therefore the intervention of multiple coalitions in Côted’Ivoire. At the least, Gbagbo’s consent was an important precondition for UN intervention. A final observable implication regarding initiation holds that path dependence motivates actors to create follow-on operations when earlier investments in the crisis have not been successful. In the Ivorian case, the facts that ECOWAS’s intervention was unsustainable and the crisis in Côted’Ivoire was unresolved did appear to importantly motivate the UN’s intervention. France, Côted’Ivoire, and ECOWAS raised those issues when appealing to the Security Council for assistance, and the UN’s assessments of the crisis echoed the same concerns. In this case the UN appears to have had an interest in continuing the international effort in Côted’Ivoire and building on the investments France, MINUCI, and ECOMICI had made in the country’s stability, which is consistent with implication I6.

Implication O1, which suggests that hyperlateral interventions should be more effective than interventions that take other forms, would be best considered in a broader comparative analysis. Attempting to assess this argument in any individual case requires speculating about the counterfactual. For this reason, I do not emphasize this observable implication in discussing any of the case studies in this dissertation, but for the sake of argument I will briefly consider the counterfactual here. It is not clear how long the ECOWAS intervention in Côted’Ivoire could have been sustained had the UN opted not to replace it, but it seems likely that the operation would have ended relatively quickly.

108 The Ivorian conflict seemed to call for a large and multidimensional operation which ECOWAS did not have the capacity to provide. Because of this, it does not seem likely that ECOWAS would have been able to provide lasting peace in Côted’Ivoire on its own. The UN’s larger and more comprehensive peace operation was more effective than ECOWAS in stabilizing Côted’Ivoire. In this respect, the UN’s takeover from ECOWAS appears to have been an effective strategy. If ECOWAS had not intervened in early 2003, conflict might have persisted at a higher level for longer in Côted’Ivoire, in which case ECOWAS’s ability to intervene more quickly than the UN may have made for a more effective conflict management attempt overall. However, ECOWAS’s intervention may also have given cover for the Security Council to take longer to debate action in Côte d’Ivoire. If no multilateral intervention had been established before UNOCI, perhaps France or Côted’Ivoire would have pressured the UN to launch its multidimensional operation sooner. It is not obvious from this case whether a single-coalition intervention would have been more or less effective in addressing the conflict.

With respect to implication O2 on the connection between complementary comparative advantages and operational success, this case provides mixed evidence. ECOWAS and the UN did have complementary advantages, but effectiveness varied substantially over the course of this case. ECOWAS, the first multilateral intervenor in Côted’Ivoire, had a comparative advantage in response time and local knowledge. ECOWAS’s principal disadvantage was its lack of resources. The UN’s comparative advantages and disadvantages were the mirror image of ECOWAS’s: the UN tends to be slow to respond and often lacks local expertise, but has ample resources. In this case, ECOWAS and the UN fielded interventions that complemented one another.

Implication O3 holds that operational effectiveness is driven by the degree of communication and coordination among intervenors. Coordination between the UN and ECOWAS was relatively high. The rehatting of ECOWAS troops as UN peacekeepers smoothed the transition and also allowed for some transfer of local knowledge in the hand-off. This is one indicator of effective communication and coordination among the

109 intervenors. France also played an important role as a facilitator of the international response. As an independent intervenor, an influential supporter of ECOMICI, and a pivotal member of the Security Council, France was uniquely positioned to coordinate the international effort in Côted’Ivoire. While a longer joint planning process might have produced an even more coordinated hand-off, the transition from ECOMICI to UNOCI was smooth. While UNOCI faced difficulties in its first year of operation, the outbreak of conflict in late 2004 does not appear to have been enabled or exacerbated by deficiencies in communication or coordination between the UN and ECOWAS. Implication O3 would predict that strong coordination leads to operational effectiveness; because effectiveness was so variable in this case, evidence for this implication is also mixed. Finally, I will briefly consider this intervention in the context of the hyperlateral typology introduced in Chapter 2. As discussed in section 4.1 herein, the interventions in Côted’Ivoire constituted an unplanned sequential operation. When the ECOWAS intervention began, UN Security Council members were divided on the desirability of a UN intervention in the crisis. It was only after observing the persistence of the crisis despite French and ECOWAS efforts and receiving multiple requests for UN action that the Security Council came to support the establishment of a peace operation. Perhaps planned hyperlateral interventions are more likely when a conflict’s salience and perceived severity are high for multiple coalitions at the time of the first intervention, and unplanned interventions more likely otherwise. As far as I can determine, parallel ECOWAS and UN intervention was not considered as an approach in Côted’Ivoire. ECOWAS was not in a position to share the costs of intervention with the UN, except by providing troops, which ECOWAS could do through rehatting. Furthermore, ECOMICI was not performing any tasks that the UN was not able or willing to carry out. From these observations I postulate that in the absence of specific burden-sharing or functional reasons for parallel operations, actors should prefer sequential intervention. In summary, I argue that the hyperlateral intervention in Côted’Ivoire was principally driven by ECOWAS’s reputational concerns, France’s pivotal role, the needs of

110 the operation, and path dependency. Hyperlateralism was enabled by the availability of multiple intervenors, and the amenability of the target state to several interventions. The intervention’s effectiveness was variable, but ECOWAS made use of its advantages in response time and local knowledge to effectively intervene early, and the UN’s advantage in resources was useful in the creation of a larger successor operation, which eventually helped address key political issues and provide the potential for lasting stability. Finally, ECOWAS and the UN communicated and coordinated their efforts well, which helped produce a smooth transition between the interventions. The next chapter continues to explore arguments about the initiation and effectiveness of hyperlateral intervention by evaluating four additional cases.

111 Chapter 5

Cases in Comparison

The analysis of the hyperlateral intervention in Côted’Ivoire in the previous chapter supports the arguments that the needs of the conflict, IGO reputation-seeking, key state advocacy, and path dependence motivate hyperlateral responses to conflict. ECOWAS and the UN, the intervenors in Côted’Ivoire, had complementary comparative advantages that contributed to a useful division of labor in the conflict response. The coalitions communicated and coordinated their efforts relatively well, particularly around the point of transition. The intervenors’ success in providing peace varied substantially over time, but the final years of the UN’s intervention in particular saw important security gains. The international intervention in Côted’Ivoire ended in 2017, leaving behind a largely stable and peaceful environment. By the end of the conflict, the UN had been the only multilateral intervenor in the country for well over a decade, so it is difficult to determine what effect the involvement of multiple coalitions had on the apparent success of this operation at its close. This chapter discusses four additional cases of hyperlateral intervention, listed in Table 5.1: the operations in the Central African Republic (1997-2000), Macedonia (2001- 2003), East Timor (1999-2005), and Chad and the Central African Republic (2007-2010). By analyzing and comparing these cases, this chapter further considers the observable

112 implications introduced in Chapter 3.1 As discussed in Chapter 3, there are multiple potential determinants of hyperlateral intervention initiation, which can occur in many combinations. Similarly, many factors work together to determine the outcomes of hyperlateral interventions. By examining multiple cases which diﬀer from one another on important dimensions, I seek to begin evaluating the usefulness of the arguments introduced in Chapter 3 as explanations of intervention behavior and outcomes. The interventions in all four of the cases considered in this chapter have concluded, and all are relatively short – between two and six years long. Selecting shorter hyperlateral cases makes it somewhat easier to connect case outcomes to variables related to hyperlateralism. The selected cases also vary in their geographic location2 and in the combinations of intervenors involved.3 Finally, each of the four types of hyperlateral intervention identiﬁed in Chapter 2 is represented here: the Central African Republic case is an unplanned sequential operation; the Macedonia case is a planned sequential operation; the East Timor case is a limited parallel operation, and the Chad and Central African Republic case is an extended parallel operation.

Table 5.1: Chapter 5 Cases

Case Years Type Participants Central African Republic 1997-2000 Unplanned Sequential MISAB coalition & UN Macedonia 2001-2003 Planned Sequential NATO & EU East Timor 1999-2005 Limited Parallel INTERFET coalition & UN Chad/CAR 2007-2010 Extended Parallel EU & UN

The following sections address each of these cases in turn, providing brief historical context for the crisis being addressed, considering the factors that contributed to the initiation of the multiple interventions, and then assessing the eﬀectiveness of the

1The observable implications are summarized in Table 4.1 in the previous chapter. 2Two of these cases take place in central Africa, one in southeastern Europe, and one in the Pacific. 3A regional ad hoc coalition and the UN in the first and third cases, two regional organizations in the second case, and an out-of-area regional organization and the UN in the fourth case. All these combinations are different from the Côted’Ivoire combination of a regional in-area organization plus the UN.

113 intervention effort. A final section concludes, summarizing the lessons learned from the Côted’Ivoire case and the four cases considered in this chapter.

5.1 Central African Republic, 1997-2000

The Central African Republic (CAR) held its first democratic elections in 1993, and Ange-FélixPatasséwas elected president. Patassé’srule was troubled: parts of the military mutinied against his government on three occasions in 1996 alone, motivated by grievances including unpaid wages and ethnic bias in military appointments (Welz, 2014; Olin, 2015). France provided the first international response to these threats to CAR’s government by unilaterally intervening to support the government. France’s intervention fulfilled the state’s treaty obligation to assist CAR in maintaining domestic order (Brosig, 2015, 204). Despite France’s assistance, fighting and unrest in CAR persisted. An ad-hoc coalition of African states – the Inter-African Mission to Monitor Im- plementation of the Bangui Agreements (MISAB) – intervened in CAR in February 1997. This operation heavily relied on French financial and material support to maintain its conflict management activities. When France’s willingness to continue funding the coalition intervention waned, states and organizational actors worked to create a replacement peace operation. That operation was fielded by the UN, which took over from MISAB in March 1998. This series of interventions constituted an unplanned sequential operation in CAR. Hyperlateral involvement in CAR was catalyzed by France, which functioned as a key state in this case. France intervened unilaterally in CAR, then facilitated and funded the regional coalition intervention, and finally pushed for the creation of the UN’s peacekeeping mission. In the first phases of international involvement, France bore most of the burden of intervention. By late 1997, France’s political will to bear those costs had dwindled. The security situation in CAR at the time France threatened to withdraw was still tenuous, creating a conflict-level need for another intervention to be

114 established. Involved actors expressed concerns that security gains in CAR would be lost unless another intervention was created. The UN’s secondary intervention in CAR was partially motivated by this path dependence. MISAB and the UN had complementary comparative advantages. MISAB had an edge in responsiveness and local knowledge, while the UN had an advantage in resources and global legitimacy. The coalitions also had strong communication and coordination. The arguments introduced in Chapter 3 predict that those factors should lead to more effective peace operations. The interventions in CAR were indeed effective in providing security in the short term, while the operations were on the ground in the country. Long- term peace in CAR did not result from the intervention, however; the country slipped back into conflict shortly after the UN’s withdrawal.

Interventions

Examining the initiation of hyperlateral intervention in CAR provides particular support for three observable implications introduced in Chapter 3: I4 on key state advocacy, I1 on operational needs, and I6 on path dependence. This section elaborates on each of these arguments. France functioned as the key state motivating hyperlateral intervention in CAR. As already noted, France’s early involvement in the crisis was unilateral. France ﬁrst put boots on the ground in spring 1996 and helped to facilitate peace agreements between the government and the military in subsequent months. When the outbreak of a third mutiny in November made clear that those agreements were not suﬃcient to provide peace, France increased its force on the ground in CAR to 1,750 soldiers. However, France viewed this level of unilateral involvement as untenable, and began to seek local partners with which the intervention burden could be shared (Brosig, 2015, 204; Olin, 2015, 198). Pushing for the establishment of a regional operation, even one that would be dependent on France for funding and logistics, was a way for France to reduce its presence in CAR while avoiding a deterioration of the security situation (Carayannis and

115 Fowlis, 2017, 222). In December 1996, France offered to provide financial and logistical support for a regional intervention in CAR. France’s advocacy of and support for regional intervention, in order to pursue state interests, is consistent with implication I4. France consulted on solutions to the crisis with regional actors at the Nineteenth Summit Meeting of the Heads of States and Governments of France and Africa (Mbadinga, 2001, 22; Olin, 2015, 198-99). The result of the consultations between African states and France was a plan to create a regional intervention, carried out by an ad hoc coalition. The conflicting parties in CAR signed the Bangui peace accords on January 25, 1997, and shortly thereafter a group of African heads of state authorized MISAB, which deployed in February of the same year (Mbadinga, 2001, 26). By driving conversations on regional intervention and by offering material support, France played a key role in motivating the creation and deployment of MISAB. Because French support was necessary for MISAB’s functioning, France was able to maintain a good deal of control over the international effort in CAR, while also pursuing its other interest in scaling back French troop commitments in CAR. It is also notable that France had close ties – stemming from former colonial relationships – to all the states which contributed troops to MISAB: Burkina Faso, Chad, Gabon, Mali, Senegal, and Togo.4 These relationships gave France unique leverage as an motivator of intervention. MISAB participants also had an interest in setting a precedent for this sort of international intervention to protect governments from armed rebellion. Because similar uprisings could threaten governments anywhere in the region, these states were incentivized to support this model of French-funded regional support for embattled regimes (Mbadinga, 2001, 24).

Intervenor availability in this region was low in the late 1990s. Implication I2 suggests that hyperlateral interventions should be less likely to emerge in such a context. In this case the absence of regional organizations as potential intervenors helped motivate

4Of these contributors, only Chad shares a border with CAR. The potential spillover eﬀects of con- ﬂict in CAR seem unlikely to have been a particularly important motivator for most of the MISAB participants.

116 the creation of an ad-hoc coalition to intervene in CAR. In 1997, the only strong, active regional security organization in CAR’s area was ECOWAS, which CAR did not belong to. Other potentially relevant regional organizations like ECCAS and CEN-SAD had not at this point developed functionality as security actors. The African continental organization in 1997 was the Organization of African Unity (OAU), which was not an active participant in peace operations.5 The regional security environment therefore made the establishment of an ad-hoc coalition a preferable way forward for regional action. Approximately 800 African troops were deployed under MISAB, supported on the ground by approximately 1,000 French forces who remained deployed in CAR (Mays, 2010, 136-37). MISAB’s broad mandate included assisting the formation of a new government of national unity and promoting national reconciliation along with disengagement and disarmament. In practice, MISAB was occupied mostly with stabilizing the capital, Bangui, and preventing clashes between government and rebel forces (Olin, 2015, 199). Concern about the MISAB intervention ending before peace was secured in CAR helped motivate the UN’s takeover of the peace operation in the country. This motivation is consistent with implication I6. Beginning in late 1997 France began seeking to further reduce its involvement in conﬂict management in CAR. France’s interest in disengagement was part of a broader foreign policy shift in the state toward noninterference in Africa (Meyer, 2009, 160). Because MISAB was entirely dependent on French support, that initial intervention was poised to end if France disengaged. To avoid the premature end of peacekeeping in CAR, France lobbied the UN Security Council to establish a peace operation to take over from MISAB (Meyer, 2009). CAR’s president also appealed to the Security Council to take over peacekeeping responsibilities in the country (United

Nations Security Council, 1998c). Those appeals are again consistent with I6, as well as

I4 and I5 on the inﬂuence of key states and target states, respectively. Observers argued that France’s pending disengagement would precipitate a re-

5In 2002, the OAU would be reconstituted as the African Union and take on a broader mandate for security provision, becoming a relevant security actor throughout the continent. In 1997, though, the continental organization did not play this role as a security provider.

117 newed security crisis in CAR, and that another coalition’s intervention was required to prevent such an outcome. These claims, as motivators of the UN’s intervention, are con-

sistent with implication I1. In February 1998, Secretary-General Kofi Annan’s report to the Security Council on CAR affirmed that MISAB would collapse without substantial external support, and that without an international peacekeeping presence the security situation in CAR was likely to quickly deteriorate (United Nations Security Council, 1998b, par. 20). If CAR was to continue along the path to peace, the report argued, “the only viable option remains the establishment of a United Nations peacekeeping operation to take over from MISAB” (United Nations Security Council, 1998b, par. 21).6 The assessment of the intervening parties was that if peace was to be provided in the Central African Republic, the continued deployment of a peace operation was required; in this sense, this case offers support for the argument that the needs of the operation motivated hyperlateralism (I1). Intertwined with this perception about operational needs was a concern with not wasting the investments that France and MISAB had made in CAR’s peace; the impact of that concern on the UN’s intervention decision is consistent with implication I6 on path dependence. The Security Council had shown little independent interest in addressing the CAR crisis, but was motivated by France’s lobbying and by the MISAB operation’s activities, which smoothed the way for a UN deployment. That France’s advocacy and MISAB’s presence on the ground were crucial motivators for the UN’s intervention lends further support for implications I4 on the role of key states and I6 on path dependence. Absent France’s and MISAB’s engagement in CAR, the Security Council “would have very likely not considered the deployment of a UN operation” (Brosig, 2015, 207). MISAB forces were amenable to being re-hatted as UN peacekeepers, and France was prepared to continue participating in an international intervention, albeit at a lower level. These factors lowered the costs of UN intervention, making a continuation of the international conflict

6If France, the most interested external power, was unwilling to bear the cost of supporting MISAB, it is hard to imagine another state sponsor stepping up to the plate. This factor in combination with the already-discussed absence of available IGO intervenors meant that the UN was indeed the only party reasonably available to replace MISAB.

118 management effort more attractive. In combination with the UN’s expressed concern with avoiding a security backslide in CAR, the ability to build on previous investments motivated the UN operation. The United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic (MINURCA) was authorized by Security Council Resolution 1159 on March 27, 1998 and took over from MISAB shortly thereafter, on April 15, 1998. MINURCA did not substantially differ from MISAB in either its size or its ambitions (Brosig, 2015, 207).7 The operation was mostly concerned with providing stability in the capital and with moving CAR toward holding elections. MINURCA had little activity outside Bangui and little ability to address the grievances underlying the CAR conflict. Finally, a brief note on the typology is warranted. This hyperlateral intervention in CAR was an unplanned sequential operation. When MISAB initially intervened in CAR, the UN had no plans to establish a follow-on force. It would be months after MISAB’s establishment before the Security Council even adopted a resolution authorizing French and African intervention in the country (United Nations Security Council, 1997).8 France’s clear interest in disengaging was the catalyst for the UN to begin considering and planning a takeover of the intervention. There is no indication that a parallel intervention, with the UN supplementing MISAB rather than replacing it, was considered. MISAB was unable to operate independently, so the continued engagement of that coalition would have required external support, likely from the UN. MISAB would not have been able to share the financial or logistical burden of intervention with the UN, operating parallel interventions would have posed difficulties of coordinating operation under different commands, and MISAB was not performing any functions that needed to be carried out outside the UN framework. These factors seem likely to have motivated the choice of a sequential operation.

7MINURCA’s mandated maximum force size was 1,350 (United Nations Security Council, 1998a). MISAB’s approximately 800 troops along with 300 French troops served as MINURCA peacekeepers, while hundreds of other French troops departed the country (Brosig, 2015, 207). 8MISAB was a consensual operation, acting at the invitation of the target state. UN approval was not sought ahead of time because it was seen as irrelevant. It was not until the security situation in CAR worsened that MISAB sought the UN’s explicit endorsement of its activities in CAR (Mbadinga, 2001).

119 Outcomes

This section assesses the short-term and long-term effectiveness of the hyperlateral operation in CAR, with reference to the arguments about operational effectiveness introduced in Chapter 3. In brief, complementarity and coordination were both relatively high in this case. While international intervention in CAR was successful in providing stability while the operations were ongoing, peace in CAR did not endure after the end of intervention. The initial intervention in CAR was limited in scope, but MISAB was relatively successful in providing stability in the capital, and helping Patassé’sgovernment remain in power (Brosig, 2015, 205; Olin, 2015, 199-200). The stability of the peace under MISAB is attributable to the international military presence dissuading conflict, but is not an indication that the issues underlying the conflict had been resolved. Concerns with government reform and economic well-being went unaddressed. The MISAB coalition and the UN had complementary comparative advantages. MISAB had the flexibility to intervene relatively quickly in the crisis, exercising a comparative advantage often held by ad-hoc coalitions. MISAB’s resources and capabilities were limited, and the coalition was not capable of sustaining itself without external support. By contrast, the UN has a substantial advantage in resources. As a global organization with institutionalized rules and constraints, the UN was well positioned to be perceived, at both global and local levels, as more legitimate than an ad hoc coalition. In practice, since MISAB’s intervention was at the invitation of CAR, and in response to uprisings broadly perceived as illegitimate, MISAB did not face any substantial legitimacy issues. Overall, this operation reflects a complementary division of labor, with a more flexible and responsive local coalition intervening first, and a larger, better-resourced operation coming after. However, as previously noted, MINURCA’s mandate and approach in CAR was largely similar to MISAB’s – the UN did not opt to expand the international intervention effort, with the exception of mandating MINURCA to facilitate elections in CAR. The

120 UN was capable of fielding a larger and more robust operation in CAR, but within the Security Council there was little political will to do so. MINURCA was authorized in the late 1990s, a period in which the UN was scaling back its peacekeeping commitments following the failures in Somalia and Rwanda a few years prior (Esmenjaud, 2015). In this context, the UN did not make use of its greater resources to produce a stronger and more robust effort, and MINURCA did not further MISAB’s gains by addressing the core causes of conflict. Leaving those grievances unaddressed made it more likely that conflict would reemerge after the international presence in CAR ended (Carayannis and Fowlis, 2017). With respect to communication and coordination, the re-hatting of MISAB troops as MINURCA personnel is an indicator of valuable coordination between the intervenors. France’s role as both the funder of MISAB and an important motivator of MINURCA put the state in a position to facilitate communication between the intervenors. Furthermore, the continuity in French support for the interventions smoothed the transition process. The Security Council Resolution authorizing MINURCA emphasized the importance of a smooth transition, and authorized any necessary measures for securing that transition and fully deploying MINURCA on deadline (United Nations Security Council, 1998a). MINURCA successfully maintained a reasonable level of security in Bangui and helped CAR prepare to hold legislative elections in late 1998, and presidential elections in September 1999 (United Nations Security Council, 1999c,e). Holding elections was MIN- URCA’s exit strategy, and despite indications of the fragility of peace in CAR,9 plans for MINURCA’s withdrawal were implemented once those elections were held (Hirschmann, 2012, 176-77). MINURCA withdrew in April 2000, replaced by a small peacebuilding office (BONUCA) with no military component (Carayannis and Fowlis, 2017, 222). The security situation in CAR deteriorated quickly after the UN’s departure, as evidenced by

9For instance, a report of the Secretary-General in 2000 noted that planned “restructuring of security and armed forces” would not be completed by the time MINURCA withdrew (United Nations Security Council, 2000a, par. 34). Given that military mutinies sparked the 1997 crisis in CAR, the failure to complete these planned reforms did not bode well for CAR’s stability. The report also noted that CAR and the OAU had requested an extension of the UN’s operation for at least a few more months to allow for further consolidation of peace in the country (United Nations Security Council, 2000a, par. 32-33).

121 opposition demands in late 2000 that President Patasséstep down, an attempted coup in May 2001, and a successful overthrow of Patasséin March 2003, with General Francois Bozizétaking power as a result. The tumult in the early 2000s attracted a series of interventions by regional and global coalitions; at least one multilateral intervention has operated in CAR at all times between 2001 and the present day.

Support for implications O2 and O3 is therefore mixed in this case. High complementarity and strong communication and coordination were present in this case, which likely helped the short term efficacy of the international interventions. Despite those factors in the hyperlateral effort’s favor, CAR did not remain peaceful. This is perhaps partially attributable to intervenors’ failure to address underlying issues in the conflict. In particular, while the UN had experience and capacity which could have helped set the stage for lasting peace – such as completion of security sector reform – those UN advantages were not taken advantage of. The UN also withdrew relatively quickly after its operation began, with elections as the operation’s exit condition. In retrospect, this withdrawal was premature.

Summary

France played a key role in the creation of a hyperlateral intervention in CAR. France’s efforts to organize and fund the MISAB coalition were a crucial motivator of that regional intervention, and France’s later appeals for the UN’s follow-on operation were similarly influential. France’s decision to disengage from CAR in 1998 posed an existential threat to MISAB, and meant that the international intervention in CAR would come to an end if another coalition did not step in. Conflict in CAR seemed very likely to recur in the absence of an intervention, meaning that if the peace process in CAR was to continue, there was an operational need for a follow-on intervention. The government of CAR expressed concern about the re-emergence of conflict, and lobbied for UN intervention to avoid this outcome. The UN’s decision to intervene appears to also have been motivated both by French and CAR appeals, and by an interest in securing the investments in peace

122 made by France and MISAB. While the Security Council had relatively low interest in the CAR crisis, interest in not abandoning these earlier conflict management attempts appears to have motivated UN action. Ad-hoc coalitions and the UN have complementary comparative advantages in principle, with coalitions having an edge in responsiveness and local knowledge, and the UN an advantage in resources and legitimacy. Communication and coordination during the transition period were sufficient, and no major setbacks resulted from any deficit in coordination when MINURCA took over from MISAB. Implications O2 and O3 would predict that when complementarity and coordination are relatively high, hyperlateral intervention should be effective in providing peace. MISAB and MINURCA both effectively provided security in the short term in CAR, consistent with O2 and O3. However, long term efficacy was low. The hyperlateral intervention did not effectively provide conditions for long term stability in CAR, and conflict in the country quickly re-emerged once the

UN’s intervention ended. Evidence from this case for implications O2 and O3 is therefore mixed. Finally, this hyperlateral case raises a few interesting points about the initiation and effectiveness of unplanned sequential operations in particular. The international intervention in CAR was clearly driven by France, which first worked to pull together the MISAB coalition, and later lobbied for the establishment of the UN operation. The unplanned character of this sequence of interventions may be attributable to the absence of pre-existing interest by multiple coalitions in intervening. When strong interest exists for two or more coalitions, planning partnerships may be more easily formulated and contingency plans adopted. In the absence of broad interest in the crisis, however, well- planned sequential interventions seem quite unlikely to emerge. From this case I also postulate that parallel operations are unlikely to be selected unless the coalitions have meaningfully separate sources of financial and logistical capability. Further, if there are no reasons related to legitimacy or mandate formulation that make having separate command structures valuable, then a sequential operation structure may be preferable.

123 5.2 Macedonia, 2001-2003

The Republic of Macedonia became independent from Yugoslavia in 1991.10 Yu- goslavia’s dissolution was the catalyst for many conflicts over the formation of new states. The UN deployed the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in 1992 to manage two of those conflicts, first in Croatia and then in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Mays, 2010, 338-342). Macedonia’s then-president, Kiro Gligorov, requested that the UN also assist Macedonia in remaining stable and peaceful in its early years as an independent republic. Gligorov’s particular concern was with conflict spilling over from elsewhere in the region (Bellamy and Williams, 2010, 161). The UN responded by creating an offshoot of UN- PROFOR to preventively deploy in Macedonia beginning in December 1992. In March 1995, a new UN Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP) replaced the UNPROFOR Macedonia Command. The UN missions in Macedonia comprised troops from Scandi- navia and an Army task force from the United States (United Nations Peacekeeping, 1999; Bellamy and Williams, 2010, 163). The UN’s presence in Macedonia was effective in preventing conflict, but UN- PREDEP unexpectedly ended as the result of a diplomatic dispute. Macedonia formed a recognition and trade agreement with Taiwan in 1998, which led China to retaliate in February 1999 by vetoing the Security Council Resolution that would have renewed UN- PREDEP’s mandate in Macedonia (United Nations Security Council, 1999a; Mays, 2010, 337).11 The UN’s withdrawal from Macedonia took place while war raged in neighboring Kosovo. In the context of the Kosovo War, a separatist group of Kosovar Albanians (the Kosovo Liberation Army) began operating out of Macedonian territory and seeking the support of Macedonian Albanians. Furthermore, about 225,000 ethnic Albanian refugees fled to Macedonia from Kosovo (Bellamy and Williams, 2010, 164). Those spillover effects

10When the state declared its independence and adopted the name “Republic of Macedonia,” Greece – which itself has a region called Macedonia – objected. Within the UN, the newly formed state was provisionally called the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. In summer 2018, Greece and the state of Macedonia ﬁnally reached an agreement that the country’s name change to “Republic of North Macedonia” (BBC World Service, 2018). For simplicity, I refer to the republic as “Macedonia” throughout this section. 11The resolution that China vetoed was Security Council Draft Resolution S/1999/201.

124 of the Kosovo War, along with economic malaise in the country and political grievances among the Albanian population in Macedonia, led to violent uprisings in Macedonia beginning in early 2001. In August 2001, the EU and the United States facilitated the signing of the Ohrid Peace Agreement between the Macedonian government and Alba- nian rebels (Peace Accords Matrix, 2001). Offers of NATO peacekeeping and EU aid helped push the parties toward this agreement (Bellamy and Williams, 2010, 164). NATO intervened in Macedonia beginning in August 2001. NATO’s operation took place in three stages: an initial large intervention to quickly disarm rebel fighters, a smaller follow-up operation to provide security while a peace plan was implemented, and a final bridging operation to maintain an international presence in the country until a planned EU operation could deploy. The EU’s intervention, Operation Concordia, began in March 2003 and lasted through December of the same year. The NATO and EU operations constitute a case of planned sequential intervention. The interventions in Macedonia were motivated by operational needs and path dependence, as intervening parties sought to make good on international investments in regional peace. The UN’s unceremonious withdrawal in the midst of regional turmoil was not a desired outcome for many important actors in this case; the emergence of conflict in Macedonia created a clear need for external stabilization assistance. Hyperlateralism was enabled by the presence of multiple organizations with an interest in and mandate for peacekeeping. Even with the UN unable to intervene, multiple other intervenors were available. The EU’s follow-on operation was importantly motivated by the organization’s interest in building its reputation as a security actor. France also played a key role as an advocate of hyperlateral involvement, lobbying for the EU to test its peacekeeping capabilities in the Macedonian case. NATO and the EU do not have complementary comparative advantages as I define them in this dissertation. Both organizations are Western regional IGOs, who operated in-area in the Macedonian case, and therefore had very similar advantage profiles with respect to legitimacy, resources, responsiveness, and local knowledge. The bodies did have

125 a high degree of coordination and communication; with respect to both planning and executing the interventions in Macedonia, NATO and the EU worked together closely. That degree of cooperation may have contributed to short-term and long-term operational eﬀectiveness. The interventions succeeded in providing peace while on the ground, and relative stability has persisted in Macedonia in the years since the hyperlateral intervention ended.

Interventions

Examination of multi-coalition intervention in Macedonia lends particular support to the arguments that path dependence (I6), operational needs (I1), organizational reputation seeking (I3), and key state advocacy (I4). The case also presents some evidence consistent with implications I5 on the eﬀects of target state appeals and I2 on the enabling eﬀect of higher intervenor availability. This section elaborates on each of these points. Macedonia’s president Boris Trajkovski requested in June 2001 that NATO assist the government in demobilizing and disarming rebels in the country. Macedonia’s eagerness to see renewed international intervention is consistent with argument I5, that target state requests for intervention can motivate the constitutive operations in a hyperlateral case. NATO responded by signaling the organization’s willingness to intervene, provided that the Macedonian parties successfully conclude peace talks (North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 2001b). Those peace talks ultimately produced the Ohrid Agree- ment in August 2001, mentioned in the previous section. Once the Ohrid Agreement was signed, NATO deployed Operation Essential Harvest, a thirty-day mission in August and September, to carry out disarmament. Residual interest in Macedonian peace after the end of UNPREDEP appears to have played an important role in motivating intervention in 2001. Scandinavian states and the U.S. were the primary troop contributors to UNPREDEP, and when the UN operation was terminated, representatives from the U.S. and the European Union expressed concern about the operation’s premature closure (United Nations Security Council, 1999a, 5-

126 8). I argue that European and Atlantic states’ previous investments in Macedonian peace, and in peace in the region more broadly, contributed to increased favorability toward renewed intervention. Such motivations would be consistent with the logic of path dependence as articulated in implication I6. It is also worth noting that NATO had ongoing operations in Kosovo and Bosnia at the time of the 2001 crisis in Macedonia, such that the establishment of Operation Essential Harvest can be understood as an extension of NATO’s ongoing effort to stabilize the region, rather than a wholly new operation. Essential Harvest was replaced by a smaller NATO force, Operation Amber Fox, on September 26, 2001. Soon after Amber Fox began, NATO and the EU began planning in earnest for a European Union operation to replace NATO. This takeover was initially scheduled to take place at the end of 2002. NATO argued that after Amber Fox completed its mandated tasks, there would still be a “requirement for a follow-on international military presence” in Macedonia to further stabilize the country (North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 2003). This argument essentially held that, if lasting peace was to be secured in Macedonia, there was an operational need for a subsequent intervention. This interest in a follow-on force to build on NATO’s investments in Macedonia’s stability motivated planning for the EU to intervene. This sequence of events is consistent with argument I1 on the motivating role of operational needs. It is notable that NATO both identified a need for continued peacekeeping in Macedonia and signaled that such an operation would need to be carried out by a different coalition. Part of NATO’s motivation in favoring an EU takeover in Macedonia was the United States’ interest in a “scaling down of US commitments in the Balkans,” which was part of the foreign policy agenda of the recently-elected Bush administration (Mace, 2004, 480). This situation has echoes of France’s decision to scale back its involvement in Central African Republic, as discussed in the previous case. When a powerful state involved in intervention pulls back, this can put pressure on other states and organizations to continue the international effort. This phenomenon speaks to implication I6 on path dependence as a motivator of hyperlateralism.

127 At the time that NATO sought to scale back its involvement in Macedonia, the European Union was in the midst of an important institutional evolution. The European Security and Defense Protocol (ESDP) had been formed in 1999, putting the EU on the path to developing an institutional capacity to carry out peace operations, though the EU had not conducted any such missions by this point. The EU therefore had an interest in demonstrating its capacity as a security actor to build its institutional reputation.

Implication I4 predicts that organizations with such reputational interests are more likely to participate in interventions. In 1999, when the ESDP was formed, “11 out of 15 EU member states also belonged to NATO,” meaning that a sizable group of NATO’s member states had an interest in developing the EU’s role as a peacekeeping actor (Koops, 2012, 161). When the EU took over from NATO in March 2003, its Operation Concordia was the organization’s first military operation (Mace, 2004; Koops, 2012). Engaging in Macedonia allowed the EU to prove itself as a conflict management actor, boosting its legitimacy and reputation. The European Security Strategy – the EU’s “conceptual framework” for its security provision activities, adopted in December 2003 – emphasized the importance of the Balkans for the EU, stating that the “credibility of [the EU’s] foreign policy depends on the consolidation of our achievements there” (European Council, 2003, 8). Again, these factors are consistent with the argument that reputation concerns motivate intervention. In Macedonia, hyperlateral involvement in partnership with NATO was particularly beneficial for the EU’s reputation. As already noted, the EU was an unproven security actor at this point, which made it to the EU’s benefit to “cooperate closely with NATO in order to gain legitimacy” both in Macedonia and before a global audience (Koops, 2012, 166). Close NATO-EU coordination, discussed further in the next section, not only enabled a smooth transition between the operations, but also served to reassure audiences which doubted the EU’s capability to provide peace. It is also worth noting that France played an early and key role in lobbying for an

128 EU takeover from NATO in Macedonia, including proposing the idea at an EU ministerial meeting in October 2001 (Reichard, 2006, 247). France’s position in this case bolsters the argument that key states are likely to seek the involvement of coalitions in which they play a more prominent role (I4). At this time, France was not a participant in NATO’s military command structure, having withdrawn its participation in 1966.12 France’s interest in working through the EU in Macedonia – and developing the EU’s capacity and autonomy in the realm of peace operations – can be usefully understood as an instance of key state forum shopping, consistent with implication I4. France sought a more active role for the EU, an institution in which France had more power and more inﬂuence over security policy (Koops, 2012). Intervention by multiple IGOs in Macedonia was enabled by the high availability of intervenors in Europe. The recent creation of the ESDP meant that the EU was a newly available security actor in the region, alongside the longer-operating NATO. Even with the UN Security Council deadlocked on the Macedonia question, there were still multiple security IGOs in the region capable of intervening. Consistent with implication

I2, hyperlateralism was made easier by the presence of these several organizations with a security mandate. This set of interventions in Macedonia constituted a planned sequential operation. While the handover to the EU was not anticipated from the outset of NATO’s involvement in the country, the degree of joint planning leads me to this classiﬁcation. The EU and NATO worked together on the succession plan for over 15 months, from the end of 2001 until Operation Concordia took over in March 2003.

Outcomes

This section discusses complementarity, coordination, and operational success in Macedonia. NATO and the EU, as Western regional organizations, have non-complementary

12France resumed its participation in the NATO Integrated Military Command Structures in 2009 (France Diplomatie, 2018).

129 sets of comparative advantages as defined in this dissertation. The organizations did col- laborate closely on this sequential intervention; communication and coordination were at high levels in this case. In both the short term and long term, the hyperlateral intervention in Macedonia was quite successful. This case is therefore not consistent with the argument that more effective operations are likely to be carried out by coalitions with complementary comparative advantages (O2). The case does support the implication that operations and more effective when intervenors coordinate their efforts well (O3). NATO and the EU are Western regional organizations which have very similar profiles of advantages and disadvantages on the dimensions of comparative advantage that I identify in this dissertation. Observable implication O2 suggests that hyperlateral interventions carried out by sets of coalitions with non-complementary advantages should be less effective. In the Macedonian case, we observe the opposite: NATO and the EU were quite effective in providing peace. Why might this be? One possible explanation is that neither NATO nor the EU had serious comparative disadvantages in this context. Both organizations have substantial resources and are relatively responsive, and in this case were operating in a regional context where both organizations could make use of local knowledge and local legitimacy. It is also worth noting that NATO and the EU did establish a useful division of labor based on different organizational approaches to peacekeeping. In general, NATO has a predominantly military approach while the EU’s approach is more comprehensive and inclusive of civilian aspects (Tardy, 2006, 28-30). Unsurprisingly, NATO’s operations in Macedonia had a military focus, including managing disarmament programs, while the EU’s later operation had a stronger focus on civilian aspects (Mace, 2004, 480). While outside this dissertation’s framing of the dimensions of comparative advantage, we could conceive of these different areas of institutional expertise as the areas of advantage that NATO and the EU exploited to establish their division of labor. The level of communication and coordination between the intervenors in this case was high. In 2001 and 2002, NATO and the EU were in the midst of negotiating the Berlin

130 Plus arrangements, which established a framework for the EU to make use of NATO assets in carrying out military operations (Mace, 2004, 480-82). This ongoing joint planning is one indicator of the high level of security cooperation between the EU and NATO in this period. In addition to the EU using NATO “planning and command resources” as enabled by Berlin Plus once Operation Concordia was established, the organizations also installed liaisons for communicating on military operation issues, and many of the European troops serving under NATO command were re-hatted as participants in Concordia (Koops, 2012, 163). The EU and NATO also coordinated closely on the handover to Operation Concor- dia. The organizations worked together to set the schedule for Concordia’s deployment. The EU’s operation was initially scheduled to deploy in December 2002. Delays in finaliz- ing the Berlin Plus arrangements led the organizations to postpone the transition (Mace, 2004, 481). NATO authorized its third operation in Macedonia, Operation Allied Har- mony, to provide security until March 31, 2003, just in time for Concordia’s deployment (North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 2004). With respect to short-term effectiveness, NATO’s initial intervention in Macedonia – the month-long Operation Essential Harvest – effectively disarmed opposition groups and disposed of the weapons and ammunition collected (Gilmore, 2001; Mace, 2004). Around 3,500 NATO troops deployed to carry out this disarmament program (North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 2001a). In the next phase of NATO involvement about 800 troops remained in the country as part of Operation Amber Fox, which lasted from September 2001 to December 2002 (Mace, 2004; Mays, 2010). Macedonia did not face any substantive security setbacks during this period. Operation Allied Harmony, the bridging operation between Amber Fox and the EU’s operation, was similarly effective in maintaining security. Operation Concordia consisted of about 400 troops, and operated from the end of March 2003 until December 15, 2003 (Mays, 2010, 110).13 NATO’s operations in

13When Operation Concordia concluded, it was replaced by an EU police mission (EUPOL Proxima) at Macedonia’s request. EUPOL Proxima operated for two years, withdrawing in December 2005. The

131 Macedonia had effectively managed the security crisis in the first stage of intervention, creating “a safe and secure environment for the EU to take over” (Koops, 2012, 170). The EU operation continued to preside over a relatively stable security environment. While on the ground in Macedonia, both the EU and NATO effectively provided peace. The hyperlateral intervention in Macedonia was also a success in the long term. Since EU peacekeepers departed at the end of 2003, Macedonia has faced sporadic incidents of violence and some continuing concerns about insurgency. However, these low- level incidents have been managed by Macedonian institutions, and have certainly not risen to the level of threat of civil war. The evidence from this case does not support the argument that effective hyperlateralism depends on intervenors having complementary comparative advantages. On the other hand, implication O3 is supported by this analysis. Strong communication and coordination were characteristic of NATO-EU interactions in this case. It is plausible that robust coordination contributed to operational success in providing security in the short term and in the long term.

Summary

The hyperlateral intervention in Macedonia was enabled by the target state’s continued appeals for international assistance, and the availability of several IGOs with security mandates, including the EU with its new Security and Defense Protocol. The EU’s takeover from NATO was also motivated by France’s advocacy of an EU role in conﬂict management in this case. For EU members and the EU bureaucracy, organizational reputation was also a factor. Intervening in Macedonia was desirable way to raise the EU’s proﬁle as a security actor and demonstrate the functionality of the new ESDP. Finally, path dependence played a notable role in this case. NATO’s intervention police mission’s mandate was to monitor and advise Macedonian police forces and to assist Macedonia in moving toward integration in the EU (Mays, 2010, 116). Because EUPOL Proxima was a training operation, I do not classify the mission as a continuation of the hyperlateral intervention in Macedo- nia. Proxima’s focus was not on carrying out law enforcement in order to directly provide security in Macedonia, but rather to support and advise Macedonian police.

132 was in some ways a follow-up to the prematurely withdrawn UNPREDEP, and the EU’s follow-on operation was understood as a way to deepen the security gains made under NATO. The EU and NATO did not have complementary comparative advantage profiles, but their sequential involvement in Macedonia was quite effective in providing security both during and after the interventions. The intervenors did have notably strong communication and coordination, enabled by overlapping membership, institutionalized channels of communication, and the creation of mechanisms like Berlin Plus to deepen security cooperation between the organizations. Coalition non-complementarity may have been unimportant in this instance because the EU and NATO possessed local knowledge and legitimacy in this region, as well as Western organizations’ usual advantages in responsiveness and resources. Further, any deficit in the EU’s legitimacy, arising from the EU’s lack of experience as an intervenor, was offset by close coordination with the more experienced NATO. NATO and the EU carried out a planned sequential operation in Macedonia. One of the key motivators of the EU’s takeover in Macedonia was NATO’s interest in disengaging. That factor made a parallel operation an unattractive option for NATO. Given the similar comparative advantages of the EU and NATO, and the fact that under the Berlin Plus arrangement the EU could field an independent operation while making use of NATO resources, there may have been little reason from an efficiency perspective for a parallel operation to be established. The high degree of cooperative planning for the handover may have been facilitated by the substantial overlap in organizational membership and the pre-existing lines of communication between the organizations on security issues.

133 5.3 East Timor, 1999-2005

The conﬂict in East Timor has its roots in the territory’s struggles for independence. In the mid-1970s, as Portugal’s colonial control of East Timor came to an end, factions within the territory disagreed on whether East Timor should become an independent state or be incorporated as part of Indonesia (Martin, 2001, 15-16; Mays, 2010, 134). Conﬂict over that question prompted Indonesia to unilaterally invade East Timor in late 1975, and annex the territory in July 1976 (Dee, 2001, 3). Indonesia’s invasion was followed by broad international condemnation,14 but Indonesia’s control of East Timor – which was often exceptionally brutal – persisted for over two decades (Martin, 2001, 16-18). Human rights abuses in East Timor began to attract more international attention in the 1990s (Martin, 2001; Dee, 2001). When Indonesia’s longtime autocratic leader, Suharto, resigned from the presidency under pressure in 1998, pro-independence factions in East Timor seized the opportunity to renew their calls for separation from Indonesia. Suharto’s successor, president B.J. Habibie, agreed to allow a UN-administered ballot in East Timor on whether the territory would become independent or remain part of Indonesia with an agreement granting the territory additional autonomy (Martin, 2001, 19).15 The UN Mission in East Timor (UNAMET) registered hundreds of thousands of voters in only three months and administered the ballot on August 30, 1999.16 Substantial violence in the lead-up to the vote had worried international observers, but the UN opted to proceed with vote anyway out of a concern that the window of opportunity for holding this ballot would pass if it were further delayed (Martin, 2001, 49-50).17

14See, for example, UN General Assembly Resolution 3485 (12 December 1975) and UN Security Council Resolution 384 (22 December 1975). 15Indonesia proposed a “special autonomy” for East Timor, under which Indonesia would continue to determine policy on foreign affairs, defense, and “some aspects of monetary and fiscal policy,” and East Timor would gain authority over other policy areas (Martin, 2001, 19). The 1999 ballot gave East Timorese voters the choice between this special autonomy and outright independence. 16This election administration operation was not a peace operation and did not have security provision responsibilities. UNAMET is an important aspect of the UN’s activity in East Timor, but does not count as a component of hyperlateral intervention under my definition. 17Habibie only held office as president until October 1999, and the end of his presidency was not a surprise to international observers. A prevailing concern was that Habibie’s successor would change

134 The result of the ballot was announced on September 4, 1999. Over 78 percent of voters had opted for independence, with 98.6 percent turnout among registered voters (Martin, 2001, 90). After the ballot outcome was made public, militias opposed to independence escalated violent attacks on civilians and international personnel and engaged in widespread property destruction. About 70 percent of the physical infrastructure in East Timor was destroyed, and over half the population displaced, as a result of the post-ballot violence (Dee, 2001, 4; Martin and Mayer-Rieckh, 2005, 134). In response to this conflict an ad-hoc coalition led by Australia intervened on September 20. Shortly thereafter, the UN created a new operation in East Timor tasked with building state institutions, providing security, and administering the territory until an independent East Timorese government could assume that responsibility. The Australia-led coalition – the International Force East Timor (INTERFET) – operated alongside the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) for about four months. INTERFET withdrew in February 2000, once the UN operation was able to assume the security provision role. The UN’s peace operation in East Timor took place in two phases: first, UNTAET, which ended in May 2002 when East Timor declared independence; second, the United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMISET), which took over from UNTAET and operated until May 2005. The hyperlateral intervention in East Timor was partly motivated by the needs of the operation. The massive outbreak of violence in the territory after the 1999 ballot created a clear need for some party to step in to reestablish order. Indonesian security forces were nominally committed to providing security in East Timor, but those forces did not act to prevent the destruction that pro-Indonesia militias were carrying out. The UN was willing to provide peacekeeping, but required significant lead time to establish an operation. The urgency of the crisis and the need for rapid deployment of peacekeepers therefore motivated INTERFET’s intervention alongside the UN. The UN had committed course on the East Timor question and withdraw Indonesia’s consent for the ballot process, and ballot organizers therefore saw proceeding with the vote as a matter of urgency (Martin and Mayer-Rieckh, 2005, 129).

135 to support East Timor through the process of becoming independent, and was particularly motivated to follow through on that commitment and to escalate its involvement in the face of post-ballot violence. These factors are indicative of path dependence motivating intervention. Finally, the creation of a hyperlateral operation was particularly enabled by Australia, which can be understood as a key state forwarding the intervention effort. The INTERFET coalition and the UN had complementary comparative advantages. Particularly notable are INTERFET’s advantage in quick response time and the UN’s advantage in capacity, particularly capacity relevant to fielding multidimensional operations. The two intervenors had a high degree of communication and coordination. The intervention was quite successful in providing security during the period of deployment. After peacekeepers departed in 2005, however, a new security crisis quickly emerged in East Timor which necessitated the redeployment of international peacekeepers in 2006. The post-intervention effectiveness of this hyperlateral operation was therefore low.

Interventions

Considering the interventions in East Timor produces support for observable implications I1 on operational needs, I6 on path dependence, and I4 on the role of key states.

The case also provides evidence that contradicts implication I5 on target state induce- ment of hyperlateral intervention. This section ﬁrst considers the role of the target state in this case, then examines the eﬀects of operational needs, path dependence, and key state advocacy. Indonesia, which continued to assert its responsibility to administer East Timor after the ballot results were announced, initially refused to accept international security assistance (Dee, 2001, 4). A coordinated international campaign put substantial pressure on Indonesia to concede to intervention. That pressure ultimately led Indonesia to formally request UN assistance on September 12, after about one week of violence raging in East Timor (Martin and Mayer-Rieckh, 2005, 131).18 Because East Timor had not yet

18Martin and Mayer-Rieckh refer to the international eﬀort to persuade Indonesia to consent to in-

136 become formally independent, and because Indonesia’s consent was a prerequisite for the authorization of intervention, Indonesia was the clearest target state in this case. Target state interests were therefore an obstacle to hyperlateralism. Implication I5 suggests that target state requests for intervention make hyperlateral operations more likely to occur; the fact that multi-coalition operations were established in this case despite Indonesia’s stonewalling is not congruent with I5. The UN was caught off guard by the rapid emergence of conflict in East Timor. The UN had planned to deploy a follow-on force as a new phase of UNAMET after the vote on independence was held. However, the UN had not planned for the possibility of a large outbreak of violence following the ballot, and was not prepared to rapidly deploy peacekeepers to manage the crisis that erupted. The UN’s unpreparedness and the lack of regional security organizations in this part of the world made it clear that in order to meet the needs of the conflict “the only effective means of rapid intervention would be a UN-mandated ‘coalition of the willing’ ” (Martin and Mayer-Rieckh, 2005, 131). The

UN seeking and supporting such a coalition partner is consistent with I1’s prediction that operational needs drive deployment. One week after the ballot results were announced, in a Security Council debate on the situation in East Timor, the representative from Portugal argued strongly for UN action to end the violence. He argued: “[t]he United Nations cannot afford to – and it must not – once again intervene in a conflict only to stand by helplessly while the process then loses its way” (United Nations Security Council, 1999b, 4). This argument expressed a widely held position that the UN had a responsibility to continue its involvement in East Timor, in the interest of humanitarian protection and out of respect for the will of the East Timorese people as expressed in the ballot on independence. The UN’s escalation of involvement in East Timor and its interest in hyperlateralism to more effectively address the conflict is consistent with the argument that path dependence tervention as “an extraordinary crescendo of diplomatic pressure” (2005, 131). The effort involved diplomatic pressure from the UN and Australia – a crucial ally of Indonesia – as well as warnings of sanctions, and threats from the IMF and World Bank regarding the withdrawal of economic support (Dee, 2001; Martin and Mayer-Rieckh, 2005).

137 motivates multi-coalition intervention (I6). Australia played a key role both in pushing Indonesia to accept international intervention, and in organizing and supporting the ad-hoc INTERFET coalition (Dee, 2001).

Australia’s actions enabled hyperlateralism, consistent with implication I4. Australia communicated its willingness to lead a coalition intervention as soon as the post-ballot violence broke out. Planning for the ad-hoc operation began even while Indonesia’s consent for intervention was still being sought (Dee, 2001; Martin, 2001). The East Timor question had become an important issue in Australian domestic politics, and large public demonstrations in Australia helped motivate the state to take action (Dee, 2001, 6; Howard, 2008, 267). Howard (2008) argues that there was a sense of “moral debt” to East Timor felt in Australia, after Australia’s history of turning a blind eye to Indonesia’s violent rule in the territory. Seeking to work through a multilateral coalition was important for the state because unilateral Australian intervention in East Timor would have been vigorously opposed by Indonesia, which raised objections even to Australian command of INTERFET (Martin and Mayer-Rieckh, 2005, 132). Furthermore, Australia perceived that intervening without the approval and participation of other Asian states would be politically costly and perceived as illegitimate (Dee, 2001, 8). INTERFET’s deployment in East Timor began on September 20, 1999 (Martin, 2001, 113-15). Australia provided about half of INTERFET’s 9,500 peacekeepers. A group of 21 other states provided the remainder (Mays, 2010, 143-44). Australia’s willingness to bear most of the cost of organizing and ﬁelding INTERFET importantly enabled the creation of the coalition. Australia remained involved in the intervention eﬀort after INTERFET ended, becoming the largest contributor of personnel for UNTAET (Martin and Mayer-Rieckh, 2005, 139). The hyperlateral intervention in East Timor was a limited parallel operation. The Security Council mandated INTERFET to support the UN’s operations and provide peace until the coalition could be “replaced as soon as possible by a United Nations peacekeeping operation” (United Nations Security Council, 1999d, par. 3). From the outset, therefore, INTERFET was intended to work alongside the UN for a limited period

138 of time until the UN established its own security provision capability. INTERFET’s role was secondary to, and somewhat subordinate to, the UN’s intervention, which is again consistent with the deﬁnition of limited parallel operations in this dissertation.

Outcomes

The comparative advantages of the intervenors in East Timor were complementary, and INTERFET and the UN coordinated their conﬂict management activities closely.

Implications O2 and O3 predict that complementarity and coordination, respectively, should produce more effective interventions. Evidence for these implications are mixed in this case: the peace operations were quite successful in the short term, but were less effective in the long run, as East Timor faced a security crisis shortly after intervention ended. This section explores these arguments in more depth. INTERFET and the UN had complementary comparative advantages. As discussed in Chapter 3, ad hoc coalitions tend to have an edge in quick reaction times and local knowledge. INTERFET’s ability to intervene quickly in East Timor was particularly important in this case. But INTERFET – and particularly Australia, as the coalition’s leader and largest contributor – faced regional criticism for its intervention, illustrating a local legitimacy deficit that ad hoc coalitions often face (Dee, 2001). The UN had an edge in local legitimacy in this situation, as the Chapter 2 discussion of comparative advantages would predict. The UN also has comparative advantages in resources and global legitimacy. INTERFET and the UN made use of their comparative advantages in establishing a division of labor. This is most notable in the INTERFET coalition using its responsiveness advantage to deploy large numbers of troops quickly. While INTERFET troops managed the security situation in East Timor, UNTAET focused its early attention on humanitarian issues, policing, and establishing an administrative apparatus. The UN took responsibility for governance in East Timor for over two years, as it helped lay the groundwork for the creation of a new East Timorese state in the long term. This division

139 of labor allowed the UN to use its broader resources, experience, and legitimacy to focus on political aspects of intervention. For the purposes of evaluating implication O2, it is useful to establish that complementarity of intervenor advantages was high in this case. There was also a high degree of communication and coordination between the UN and INTERFET. The coalitions worked closely both in the lead-up to intervention and during the period of parallel deployment. The UN provided INTERFET with important information about the territory when the coalition first deployed (Martin and Mayer- Rieckh, 2005, 132). In close consultation with the UN, the INTERFET operation helped bridge the gap between UNAMET and UNTAET. The coalition also worked closely with the UN to meet UNTAET’s security needs and to plan and implement the gradual handover of responsibilities from INTERFET to the UN operation (United Nations Security Council, 2000b). INTERFET withdrew in February 2000, handing off the military component of international intervention to UNTAET (Center on International Cooperation, 2006, 62). This transfer was made easier by the rehatting of 70 percent of INTERFET’s contingent as UN peacekeepers (Howard, 2008, 285). The clear, mutually agreed upon roles of each intervenor, along with transition-smoothing programs like re-hatting, speak to the strong coordination of the UN and INTERFET efforts. INTERFET carried out its security provision mandate effectively during its deployment (Dee, 2001, 5; Center on International Cooperation, 2006, 62). During its deployment, INTERFET secured a crucial border with West Timor (an Indonesian territory and a base for the operations of pro-Indonesia militias), helped substantially reduce the level of violence and destruction in East Timor, and enabled the return of displaced people. By the time UNTAET was established, Martin and Mayer-Rieckh state that “East Timor was free of serious internal conflict,” and while substantial work remained to rebuild destroyed infrastructure and create a government, the security situation was radically improved (2005, 134). The UN’s operations in East Timor also effectively provided security in the short

140 term. UNTAET, established in late October 1999, had an ambitious and complicated mandate, including administrative functions that UN peace operations had not previously taken on (United Nations Security Council, 1999f). The operation’s governance responsibility had initially been envisioned in the 5 May Agreements, prior to East Timor’s vote on independence, providing for the UN to take over from Indonesia in administering the territory until an East Timorese government could be established and begin to operate independently (Martin and Mayer-Rieckh, 2005, 132). In East Timor, UNTAET effectively served as the government of the state for over two years. The UN reformulated and renamed its operation in East Timor when the country became independent in May 2002, following elections held in 2001 and 2002. The UN Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMISET) took over from UNTAET on May 20, 2002 (United Nations Security Council, 2002b). UNMISET was mandated to support the newly independent administration, assist with law enforcement, and continue to provide peacekeepers to maintain security (United Nations Security Council, 2002b). During its deployment, the UN intervention carried out some of its mandated functions more effectively than others. In terms of maintaining peace in the country by deterring militia violence, the UN was quite successful. The operation also effectively coordinated programs to deliver humanitarian aid and emergency relief, and enabled the return of the substantial majority of the refugees who had fled East Timor in 1999 (Howard, 2008, 297-98). The operation was less successful in building and training a police force or in rapidly building state institutions that could be self-sufficient (Martin and Mayer-Rieckh, 2005, 136; Howard, 2008, 298). UNMISET withdrew in May 2005, and was succeeded by a small political mission (UNOTIL). Less than a year later, East Timor faced substantial military and police defec- tions, which led the government to appeal for international assistance. An Australia-led coalition intervened alongside the UN in summer 2006, and the two coalitions remained involved in East Timor until 2012. The fact that East Timor faced a security crisis so quickly after UNMISET’s withdrawal in 2005 speaks to the weakness of the country’s

141 institutions, and a failure of the intervenors to provide lasting stability.

With respect to implications O2 and O3, then, evidence is mixed. Those implications predict that when intervenors have complementary comparative advantages and coordinate their eﬀorts well, then better intervention outcomes should result. INTER- FET and the UN improved the security situation in East Timor dramatically, helped enable the return of some 200,000 refugees,19 maintained a relatively stable environment during deployment, and assisted East Timor in building the apparatus of an independent state. However, the intervention did not leave East Timor capable of maintaining its own stability, in a mark against the long-term eﬀectiveness of the intervention.

Summary

The extent of violence in East Timor after the ballot on independence created a demand for rapid intervention. This operational need appears to have been an important motivator of the parallel INTERFET and UN deployments, in which INTERFET provided security in the crucial early period of the intervention. The UN’s previous investments in enabling the ballot on independence and its planning for continued involvement also motivated the substantial international effort to stabilize East Timor after the unexpected outbreak of violence, speaking to the role of path dependence in this conflict management effort. Finally, Australia’s willingness to lead an ad-hoc coalition intervention was a third key factor enabling hyperlateral intervention in this case. The INTERFET coalition and the UN had complementary comparative advantages, which the intervening bodies made use of in establishing a division of labor. The UN has a disadvantage when it comes to rapid response, while ad-hoc coalitions are generally able to establish operations much more quickly. With Australia ready to bear most of the costs of INTERFET’s intervention, that coalition deployed only weeks after the post-ballot violence in East Timor broke out. INTERFET had the chief responsibility for security in the early months of the international intervention. The coalition’s focus

19See Janowski (2002) and Martin and Mayer-Rieckh (2005) on refugee return ﬁgures.

142 on security provision allowed the UN to focus its efforts on non-military functions, like administering the territory, setting up police and judicial systems, and delivering aid. The UN and INTERFET also communicated well and effectively coordinated their efforts, contributing to operational success in the short term. The intervention was less successful in providing long-term stability in East Timor. The re-emergence of turmoil in 2006 after the end of the intervention is attributable to state weakness in East Timor, which the UN intervention did not overcome before its termination.20 The 2006 crisis did not result from any particular deficiency in the UN-INTERFET partnership, but is attributable rather to the difficulties UNTAET and UNMISET faced in building and strengthening an entire government administration in East Timor. Overall, the parallel operation in this case seems to have enabled a quicker intervention to stop the post-ballot violence, and contributed to the success of conflict management while the intervention was ongoing. With respect to intervention type, the limited parallel intervention in this case appears to have served operational needs and the interests of the intervening parties. The UN was willing to provide all the components of a peacekeeping operation in East Timor, but in the short run was not able to provide a large security force. The short term deployment of an ad-hoc coalition was an effective measure for providing security until the UN was capable of managing the security component of the intervention. The parties to INTERFET, and particularly Australia, had an interest in East Timor’s stability, but did not have a motivation to provide security or administration in the long term in the country. Handing over to the UN after a few months of operation therefore appears to have served the interests of all parties.

20One factor in the UN’s perhaps premature withdrawal was that the UN’s extensive mandate in East Timor was at odds with its interest in scaling down its operation in relatively short order. Gowan notes that this disconnect between ambitious goals and a preference for limited commitments manifested in a number of UN operations in the late 1990s and early 2000s, including in the East Timor mission (2016, 754).

143 5.4 Chad/Central African Republic, 2007-2010

The crises in Eastern Chad and northern Central African Republic (CAR) and the international responses thereto are part of a complex system of conflicts and interventions in Sudan, Chad, and CAR. Chad and CAR both border western Sudan, where a major conflict between Sudan’s government and rebel groups broke out in 2003.21 The conflict in Darfur led many Sudanese people to flee to neighboring states. Between 2003 and 2010 around 240,000 Sudanese refugees settled in Chad, and another 3,000 settled in CAR (United Nations, 2010; Bellamy and Williams, 2010, 151). Additionally, war in the Central African Republic led around 45,000 of that country’s citizens to seek refuge in Chad (United Nations, 2010). This multidirectional refugee crisis is both a cause and consequence of unrest in the region, and indicates that conflict in Chad and CAR is more complicated than a spillover of conflict from Darfur (Boutellis, 2013). Alongside the refugee influx, both Chad and CAR faced domestic threats to their sitting governments throughout the 2000s, and turmoil in both states led to the internal displacement of large numbers of people. Further complicating the security situation, Chad and Sudan contributed to one another’s instability by engaging in a proxy war in the mid-2000s, with leaders of each state supporting anti-government rebels in the other (Boutellis, 2013, 125). Regional security deteriorated as the years wore on, attracting increasing international attention. A statement from the President of the UN Security Council in April 2006 expressed “deep concerns over the political and security situation and the instability along Chad’s borders with Sudan, as well as over the possible spillover effects of these crises on neighbouring countries and the entire region” (United Nations Security Council, 2006c). The UN authorized a peacekeeping operation in Darfur in August 2006 by passing Security Council Resolution 1706, which included a mandate for the intervention to provide security along Sudan’s borders with Chad and the Central African Republic (United

21The principal rebel organizations were the Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM).

144 Nations Security Council, 2006a). Sudan, however, rejected this resolution and refused to allow the UN to intervene. That refusal redirected the Security Council’s attention to the states neighboring Darfur (Novosseloﬀ and Gowan, 2012, 10; Boutellis, 2013, 128). Ad- vocacy networks and domestic political audiences, particularly in Western states, were putting increasing pressure on international bodies to address the Darfur crisis (Lanz, 2011). With Sudan blocking a direct UN intervention, establishing a peacekeeping operation in bordering regions became a favored alternative. It was in this context that the UN began planning to intervene in Chad and CAR. Here again the UN hit a roadblock: Chad’s government was adamantly opposed to a UN peace operation with a military component. Chad was willing, however, to entertain a European Union military intervention. The EU and UN created a plan to intervene in parallel in Chad and CAR, with the EU providing military peacekeepers for one year and the UN providing police as well as personnel to train local security forces. The EU and UN began deploying personnel in late 2007, but security concerns delayed full deployment until spring 2008. The EU’s operation lasted until March 2009, at which point the UN took over the military component of international intervention and became the sole coalition involved in Chad and CAR. Then in early 2010 Chad unexpectedly rescinded its consent for the UN’s operation, and the UN consequently withdrew its operation in December of that year. The hyperlateral intervention in this case was particularly motivated by the preferences of one of the target states. Chad’s unwillingness to approve the UN’s proposed peace operation led interested parties to create a plan for the EU to intervene alongside the UN, as a compromise to win Chad’s consent. The inﬂuence of a key state was also an important factor. France was a strong advocate for the UN’s intervention and also a key driver of the EU’s intervention alongside the UN. Finally, within the EU an interest in developing the organization’s reputation as a security actor played an important role in motivating the EU’s involvement. In principle, the EU and UN have complementary comparative advantages on a few

145 dimensions. In particular, Western organizations like the EU are expected to be more responsive than the UN, while the UN generally has an advantage in both global and local legitimacy over Western IGOs operating outside of Europe. On other dimensions of advantage the organizations have similar profiles: both types of IGOs have substantial material resources at their disposal, and both tend to be at a disadvantage when it comes to local knowledge. With respect to communication and coordination in Chad and CAR, the intervenors faced notable difficulties. The hyperlateral intervention in this case was not particularly effective in either the short term or the long term. Conflict level factors including the complexity of the conflict and the Chadian government’s strict limits on peacekeeping activity played a part in producing disappointing operational outcomes. Operation level factors including issues of miscommunication and poor coordination may also have contributed to ineffectiveness.

Interventions

Examination of the interventions in Chad and CAR oﬀers particular support for the argument that target state preferences can drive hyperlateralism (I5). Chad rejected the idea of UN intervention with a military component, but was willing to accept an EU military intervention. That target state preference was a key driver of multi-coalition involvement in this case. Operational needs, as discussed in implication I1, can be considered to be a motivator if we conceptualize the EU’s involvement as compensating for the UN’s deﬁcit of legitimacy with Chad. Key state advocacy from France (I4), and organizational reputation-seeking on the part of the EU (I3) also motivated hyperlateral intervention in this case. This section considers each of those factors in turn. A 2006 report of the Secretary-General making recommendations on UN action noted the positions of the would-be host states of UN intervention: while CAR strongly favored a UN peacekeeping presence, Chad was less amenable. In particular, Chad insisted that any UN presence be a strictly civilian operation, and that the intervention focus solely on humanitarian protection rather than any political issues in Chad. Chad’s

146 reluctance to authorize UN peacekeeping would play a key role in shaping the eventual hyperlateral intervention. This is consistent with implication I5, which holds that target state requests about the involvement and roles of particular coalitions can motivate hyperlateralism. In continued discussions in early 2007, Chad and the UN could not come to an agreement on the nature of a UN peacekeeping presence in Chad. Chad refused to approve a UN intervention with any military component, and the UN was unwilling to deploy a strictly civilian operation into a volatile security environment (Boutellis, 2013, 130). Chad also opposed intervention by any African coalition (Novosseloff and Gowan, 2012, 9).22 To break this deadlock, the EU and UN decided to field parallel interventions in Chad and CAR, where the EU would provide a military component tasked in part with providing security for UN personnel, and the UN would provide a civilian operation acceptable to the Chadian government. Security Council Resolution 1778 authorized the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT) and the European Union Force Chad/CAR (EUFOR Tchad/RCA) on September 25, 2007 (United Nations Security Council, 2007a). MINURCAT was to consist of a police presence and contingents of civilian observers and staff. EUFOR was mandated to provide security for the UN operation, protect civilians, and facilitate humanitarian support in its area of operation (European External Action Service, 2015). The EU’s operation was limited to a one-year deployment.

Implication I1 suggests that hyperlateral intervention is likely to be pursued when the involvement of multiple coalitions meets operational needs. Throughout this dissertation I have discussed operational needs arising from particularities of the crisis environment, such as sudden spikes in violence creating a need for rapid response, or thorny political issues creating a need for intervention by a party with a reputation for impartiality. In this case we could conceive of Chad’s unwillingness to host UN peacekeeping

22Sudan’s objection to UN intervention in the Darfur crisis led a compromise deal, whereby the African Union and the UN would ﬁeld a joint operation in Darfur (the United Nations-African Union Hybrid Operation in Darfur, or UNAMID). Such a strategy could not be pursued in Chad, because the Chadian government was no more amenable to an African military force than to the UN sending troops.

147 troops as creating a need for a different party’s intervention. If the definition of operational needs is somewhat stretched to encompass such target state preferences, the evidence from this case can be read as congruent with implication I1. The interests and advocacy of a key state – France – was crucial in producing the parallel intervention in Chad and CAR, which is consistent with implication I4. Out of both humanitarian concern and an interest in the political stability of former colonies, France was eager to have an international presence deployed in Chad and CAR (Boutellis, 2013, 130). Within the Security Council, France was a key voice pushing for the UN to intervene in Chad, its former colony (Dijkstra, 2010, 397; Novosseloff and Gowan, 2012, 6). Furthermore, it was France which, in spring 2007, introduced the idea of establishing a European Union operation in Chad (Center on International Cooperation, 2008, 101- 102; Boutellis, 2013, 130).23 France had a close relationship with Chad, which it used to push Chad to an EU military intervention (Bellamy and Williams, 2010, 151). As already noted, it was this promise of a parallel EU military force that led the UN to become open to establishing a strictly civilian operation. As plans for parallel EU and UN interventions proceeded, France played an important role both in drafting the relevant Security Council resolution and planning the EU’s operation (Mattelaer, 2008, 16-17). The EU’s bureaucracy was also in favor of the organization carrying out more peace operations. This is in line with implication I3, which suggests that organizational interests in building a reputation for activity in peace operations motivate participation in interventions. Dijkstra characterizes the EU’s Council Secretariat as “as ambitious as France” in that regard, noting strong “bureaucratic interest in launching further operations” (Dijkstra, 2010, 398). Mattelaer also notes this institutional interest, stating that actors within the EU “felt it was time for a new military operation to foster the development of the ESDP as a crisis management tool” (2008, 15). Also notable is France’s similar interest in expanding the EU’s role as a conflict management actor, which is

23Per Mattelaer (2008), “the very ﬁrst mentioning of the idea of conducting an ESDP operation in Chad can be found in a diplomatic cable the French ministry of foreign aﬀairs sent to all other EU foreign ministries on 21 May 2007.”

148 consistent with implications I3 and I4. (Dijkstra, 2010; Boutellis, 2013). While the EU bureaucracy and France advocated strongly for intervention, other EU member states were more hesitant to get involved in Chad and CAR (Novosseloff and Gowan, 2012, 17). Some states, including Germany and the UK, perceived peacekeeping in France’s former colonies as more in service of France’s geopolitical interests than the interests of the EU (Brosig, 2015, 215). The EU operation was ultimately authorized to last just one year, with a “guaranteed transfer to a UN mission” when the EU mission expired (Novosseloff and Gowan, 2012, 15). A clear and non-negotiable time limit to the EU’s involvement and the UN’s commitment helped assuage the concerns of EU members other than France. As discussed in the next section, though, this inflexible timeline contributed to tensions between the UN and EU. I classify this case as an extended parallel operation. I define limited parallel operations as cases in which a primary intervention is supported in the short term by a secondary force. While in some ways the Chad and CAR case is on the border between the extended and limited categories, I argue that in terms of both the length and purpose of the EU’s operation, the case better resembles an extended parallel operation. EUFOR troops were engaged in Chad and CAR for a full year in large numbers, and closer to 15 months if we count the early period of low-level deployment before initial operating capacity was declared. Furthermore, while the UN conceptualized the EU’s operation as a support system for the UN’s primary intervention effort, the EU conceived of the two operations as coequal and independent (Boutellis, 2013). That coequal framing is more characteristic of extended parallel missions.

Outcomes

This section evaluates evidence for this dissertation’s arguments about hyperlateral intervention effectiveness. The EU and UN have complementary comparative advantages as defined in this dissertation. Their operations in Chad and CAR were not optimally coordinated, and issues with miscommunication and inflexibility attended this hyperlat-

149 eral intervention. The peace operations in Chad and CAR had only limited success in the short term, and did not effectively provide peace in the long term. Implication O2 is therefore not borne out in this case; that argument would have predicted that EU and UN complementarity would likely result in more effective intervention. The evidence from this case is consistent with implication O3, which would predict that poor coordination and complementarity should be associated with less effective intervention. The EU and UN have complementary comparative advantages in theory. As laid out in Chapter 3, Western regional organizations often have an edge over the UN when it comes to quick reaction to conflicts. Western IGOs can also quickly bring substantial resources to bear in many cases. The UN generally has an advantage in global legitimacy, and is often more legitimate to local audiences than Western organizations are. However, it is worth noting that some idiosyncrasies of this case stood in the way of an efficient use of these comparative advantages. From Chad’s perspective, the UN was not a more legitimate intervenor than the EU. In fact, the EU’s principal advantage over the UN in this instance was that the EU could legitimately intervene militarily, without going against the Chadian government’s wishes, whereas the UN could not. There is a useful comparison to be made to the East Timorese case, where the INTERFET coalition provided military capabilities alongside an initially non-military UN presence. In East Timor this allowed the UN operation necessary time to plan for and authorize a military intervention. By contrast, in Chad and CAR the UN’s inability to assume military capabilities right away was not a function of the UN’s slower-moving bureaucracy, but rather an issue of target state consent. Furthermore, quick response in this case was not an important factor – the regional crisis had persisted for years by the time of intervention. The EU did not make use of its advantage over the UN in responsiveness; the EU and UN launched their interventions around the same time. The division of labor between the EU and UN was driven by Chad’s unwillingness to accept UN military action, not by operational necessities (Brosig, 2015, 213). The EU does not have a particular advantage as a provider of military security, and the UN does

150 not have a clear advantage in the areas of training and policing. There are circumstances in which the EU and UN could effectively divide labor based on their relative strengths, but such a division did not emerge in this case. Because the EU and UN do in principle have comparative advantages that complement one another, the relative ineffectiveness of intervention in Chad and CAR is not consistent with what implication O2 would predict. EUFOR and MINURCAT had meaningful difficulties with effectively communicating about and coordinating their interventions. An early indicator of lack of harmony was a disconnect in how the involved organizations conceived of the operations’ relative roles (Dijkstra, 2010, 398). While the EU regarded MINURCAT and EUFOR as “two discrete, if complementary, missions,” the UN considered EUFOR to be essentially a sub- sidiary, the military support component of a UN-led international effort (Boutellis, 2013, 132). Other issues with coordination surrounded preparations for the EU intervention’s departure. EUFOR had a hard deadline for its withdrawal after one year of operation. The necessity of handing over the military component of the intervention from EUFOR to MINURCAT became a major point of contention between the EU and UN. From the UN’s perspective, the EUFOR timetable was unnecessarily rigid, especially given the delays the UN had experienced in training local police to take on security responsibilities (Dijkstra, 2010, 402-03). The EU, on the other hand, was frustrated with the UN’s postponements of planning for the takeover. The Security Council did not pass a resolution requesting a report on options for the UN takeover from EUFOR until September 2008, less than six months before EUFOR was scheduled to withdraw (United Nations Security Council, 2008b). These delays meant there was “little time for the UN to do the planning and to raise sufficient forces for its operation” (Dijkstra, 2010, 402). Ultimately the UN’s Department of Peacekeeping Operations requested that EU- FOR troop contributors rehat their troops as UN peacekeepers, which the EU had not initially planned for (Novosseloff and Gowan, 2012, 21; Brosig, 2015, 215). EUFOR contributors “had little leeway to reject this request as it would have undermined the overall

151 usefulness of the EU mission” and potentially would have created a serious security gap in Chad and CAR (Brosig, 2015, 215). Over 1,800 EUFOR troops were rehatted as UN personnel when the EU operation ended (Boutellis, 2013; Brosig, 2015). In the end, the EU rehatting many of its troops and providing logistical support for the transition allowed EUFOR to end its official involvement on schedule, but the handover process caused con- siderable tension between the organizations (Dijkstra, 2010, 403-04). Brosig argues the transition process revealed a “lack of effective and realistic coordination” between the EU and the UN (Brosig, 2015, 215). During the intervention period, the EU and UN had limited success in providing security. The hyperlateral intervention started off on the wrong foot with a series of delays in deployment. First of all, the EU had substantial difficulty generating the necessary force to deploy in Chad and CAR. Ultimately, the burden fell on France to provide the majority of the troops for the operation, along with much of the needed equipment, to avoid further delays in deployment (Seibert, 2010, 16-17).24 Because MINURCAT was reliant on the EU for security provision in Chad and CAR, EUFOR’s delayed deployment affected the UN operation’s timetable as well. In December 2007, a report of the Secretary-General indicated that only about 100 MINURCAT staff members and police offers had deployed (United Nations Security Council, 2007b). EUFOR eventually settled on deploying in January 2008 (Seibert, 2010, 17). That plan was disrupted by attacks in Chad’s capital in late January and early February, which caused the EU and UN to further delay their operations (Bellamy and Williams, 2010, 151; Boutellis, 2013, 131). EUFOR Tchad/RCA finally declared initial operating capacity on March 15, 2008, starting the 12-month clock for the EU’s operation (Novosseloff and Gowan, 2012, 19). Even once intervention forces were fully deployed, operational effectiveness was limited. This inefficacy is partially attributable to the ways the intervention’s activities were circumscribed by the Chadian government’s requirements. As a report of the

24Many EU members were unwilling to contribute troops and equipment for EUFOR Tchad/RCA, including key states like Germany and the UK (Dijkstra, 2010, 400; Seibert, 2010, 16). The slow force generation and deployment process reﬂected these persistent divisions among EU member states about establishing this intervention (Novosseloﬀ and Gowan, 2012, 17).

152 Secretary-General in July 2008 highlighted, MINURCAT and EUFOR had no political mandate, at Chad’s insistence (United Nations Security Council, 2008c). The interventions were limited to managing the symptoms of the regional crisis, and were not able to address any of the underlying causes of violence. The report warned that this approach was likely to be ineffective, and a waste of “the resources invested by the international community” (United Nations Security Council, 2008c, par. 52). As EUFOR prepared to withdraw, Chad agreed to allow the UN to take over the military component of the international intervention. Chad’s consent to this change, despite its earlier opposition to the presence of UN troops, was partly the result of international pressure, and partly attributable to Chad seeking to improve relations with the UN in a period when Chad’s sense of security was diminished due to growing tensions between Chad and Sudan (Boutellis, 2013, 134). The new authorization for MINURCAT, as established in UNSCR 1861, provided for an increased force size, but did not make substantial changes to the UN’s mandate in Chad and CAR (United Nations Security Council, 2009a; Boutellis, 2013, 135). Importantly, Chad continued to reject any proposals to give the operation a political mandate. MINURCAT officially took over from EUFOR in March 2009. Throughout 2009, the UN sought to raise troop contributions to meet MINUR- CAT’s new authorized strength. By September, about six months after the transition, only 2,665 troops were deployed – slightly over half the authorized force (United Na- tions Security Council, 2009b). The effectiveness of the international intervention did not change noticeably in this period. Then, in January 2010, the Chadian government requested that MINURCAT exit Chad, catching the UN by surprise (Novosseloff and Gowan, 2012, 25). The UN and Chad had a series of discussions in 2010 on the timetable for MINURCAT’s withdrawal, and to consider possible compromises to maintain the intervention. In a reprise of 2007 discussions on a UN presence in Chad, the Chadian government indicated its willingness to allow a civilian operation to remain, and the DPKO made clear that it would not field an operation without a sizeable military component

153 (Novosseloff and Gowan, 2012; Boutellis, 2013). Chad’s withdrawal of consent for the UN operation was the result of two principal factors. First, Chad had an underlying mistrust of the UN peacekeeping presence, which was only exacerbated when MINURCAT took on a military role in 2009. Second, Chad had reduced its internal and external security risks by winning important victo- ries against rebel groups in 2009 and by improving relations with longtime rival Sudan (Boutellis, 2013, 136). While security conditions had convinced Chad to accept MIN- URCAT’s takeover from EUFOR in early 2009, Chad’s improved circumstances in the intervening months changed the government’s approach. For its part, the Central African Republic was opposed to the withdrawal of MINURCAT (Boutellis, 2013, 137-38). But Chad’s preferences, not CAR’s, drove the UN’s decision about ending the operation. The UN established a small peacebuilding office in the Central African Republic (BINUCA), but did not continue its peacekeeping presence in the country. MINURCAT finished its withdrawal from Chad and CAR by the end of December 2010. The hyperlateral intervention in Chad and CAR was not very successful, particularly when post-intervention outcomes are considered. During the intervention, the EU and UN did contribute to some increased stability in the region. However, with no mandate to address underlying causes of conflict, the intervenors did not promote lasting peace in Chad and CAR (Brosig, 2015, 217). At the time of MINURCAT’s departure, hundreds of thousands of refugees from Sudan and CAR were still living in Chad (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 2009; IRIN, 2012). In CAR, MINURCAT troops had particularly focused on securing the northern town of Birao. When MINURCAT withdrew, it took just “two weeks for rebel forces to seize the town” (Boutellis, 2013, 137-38). Chad had fewer security issues than CAR in the wake of the UN’s departure. Chad’s improved relations with Sudan allowed those states to cooperate on securing their border, which helped prevent a deterioration of security in that area after the UN’s withdrawal (Novosseloff and Gowan, 2012, 28; Boutellis, 2013, 138).

Observable implication O2 ties the complementarity of intervenor advantages to

154 more eﬀective outcomes. Evidence from this case does not support that implication; the EU and UN’s complementarity did not result in eﬀective intervention. Implication

O3 holds that operational eﬀectiveness is connected to the degree of communication and

coordination among intervenors. O3 would predict that the deﬁcits in coordination in this case would produce a less eﬀective outcome; evidence from this case is consistent with that prediction.

Summary

Hyperlateral intervention in Chad and CAR was sparked by forum shopping on the part of a target state. Chad’s willingness to accept an EU military intervention, but only a civilian UN operation, was the impetus for those organizations to intervene in parallel. There was strong international interest in intervening in the region, and a parallel operation met the legitimacy and capacity requirements for establishing an intervention. Hyperlateralism was further enabled by France’s positions in both the UN and EU. France used its influence in both IGOs to strongly advocate for the EU’s participation in the intervention. Interest within the EU’s bureaucracy in solidifying the organization’s reputation as a security actor was a further impetus for the EU’s involvement. While the EU and UN have complementary comparative advantages in theory, those advantages were not used to determine a division of labor in this case. The benefits of complementarity did not emerge in this case, and the poor operational outcomes observed contradict implication O2’s contention that effectiveness follows complementarity. The intervenors in this case also faced substantial difficulties with communication and coordination. As discussed above, these issues ranged from the EU and UN having different understandings of the relationship between their interventions, to major difficulties in planning for the handover of military responsibilities to MINURCAT. Observing poor coordination in a relatively ineffective intervention is congruent with implication

O3. Given the poorly-employed comparative advantages, along with the coordination

155 problems the UN and EU faced, it is not surprising to find that this hyperlateral intervention was rather unsuccessful. The operational issues were compounded by the impact of a recalcitrant target state which did not permit the intervenors a mandate to address underlying causes of conflict, and which then withdrew its consent for the intervention after only three years. This hyperlateral operation was a case of extended parallel intervention. The UN’s strong interest in intervening in this region was an important driver of the parallel intervention structure. The EU’s willingness to intervene – as motivated by France and the interests of the EU’s bureaucracy – allowed the UN to pursue its operation in Chad and CAR at the same time. One of the UN’s principal interests was in being seen to take some action in response to the Darfur crisis and its spillover effects in the region, so the UN had a particular preference for a parallel, rather than a sequential, form of intervention. The length of the EU’s deployment alongside MINURCAT was also driven by UN interests. Most EU members were concerned with limiting the organization’s involvement in Chad and CAR, particularly by setting a time limit on the EU operation. The EU proposed an operation three to six months in length, but the Department of Peacekeeping Operations argued for a deployment of at least one year (Novosseloff and Gowan, 2012, 15). The extended parallel form of this operation seems to have been largely driven by the UN’s preferences, alongside France and the EU bureaucracy pushing for robust EU involvement.

5.5 Conclusions

This section summarizes the ﬁndings from the examination of the ﬁve case studies considered in Chapters 4 and 5. The case-level support for each of the observable implications introduced in Chapter 3 is summarized in Table 5.2.

Observable implication I1 suggests that the needs of the operation should motivate hyperlateral intervention. This expectation holds true for the cases in Cˆoted’Ivoire and

156 Table 5.2: Summary of Case Study Findings

Cˆoted’Ivoire CAR Macedonia East Timor Chad/CAR

Initiation

I1: Operational needs X X X X ∼ I2: Availability XX I3: Org. reputation X X X I4: Key state XXXXX I5: Target interests X X X – X I6: Path dependence XXXX

Eﬀectiveness

O2: Complementarity ∼ ∼ – ∼ –

O3: Coordination ∼ ∼ X ∼ X

Factors related to eﬀectiveness arguments

Short-term eﬀective? mixed yes yes yes mixed Long-term eﬀective? yes/TBD no yes no no Complementary comp. adv.? yes yes no yes yes Strong comm./coord.? yes yes yes yes no

XSupports argument ∼ Mixed evidence – Contradicts argument

157 the Central African Republic, where a regional effort could not be sustained for long enough to provide peace, and a secondary intervention was initiated to continue the peace operation. In East Timor, a sudden outbreak of violence necessitated a quick response, which motivated the INTERFET coalition’s intervention. In Chad and the Central African Republic, Chad’s resistance to a UN operation with a military component created a “need” for the EU to step in, but that need did not arise from features of the crisis. In Macedonia, intervening parties argued that in order to ensure the country’s stability there was a need for further intervention after NATO’s departure; this appears to have played some role in the decision to create a hyperlateral intervention. The availability of intervenors is expected to enable hyperlateral intervention according to implication I2. The link between availability and hyperlateralism would be best investigated in a large-N analysis that also considers cases where hyperlateral intervention was not initiated. A few observations can nevertheless be drawn from the cases examined in this dissertation. Multiple IGOs were available to intervene in the Côte d’Ivoire and Macedonia cases. In Macedonia it is particularly notable that even when China’s veto made the UN Security Council unable to intervene, both NATO and the EU were still available to conduct peacekeeping. An absence of regional organizations with a security mandate made the formation of an ad-hoc coalition in East Timor the best option for quickly responding to the outbreak of conflict. From the limited data we have, hyperlateral interventions conducted by an ad-hoc coalition and the UN do appear more common in regions with low availability. This is borne out in the early Central African Republic case, where neither the continental organization (the Organization of African Unity) nor regional bodies were acting as intervenors at the time. As a result, when France sought regional partners to intervene in CAR, a group of states in the area formed an ad-hoc coalition. A decade later, regional availability was much higher for Chad and CAR, with organizations like CEN-SAD, ECCAS, and the AU all available as potential intervenors. The somewhat unexpected involvement of the EU rather than a local organization was driven by Chad’s rejection of African-led interventions.

158 Implication I3 holds that regional organizations are more likely to intervene when the body is interested in developing a reputation as a security provider. This motivation is not expected to be present for ad-hoc coalitions, which do not have an institutional reputation to build. IGO reputation concerns are therefore not a factor in the CAR and East Timor cases. In Cˆoted’Ivoire, ECOWAS’s involvement is plausibly tied to the organization’s desire to be perceived as an important and active regional security actor. Similarly, the EU had an important interest in developing its experience and reputation after the European Security and Defense Protocol (ESDP) was created in 1999. The EU’s participation in interventions in Chad and CAR and in Macedonia furthered that organizational interest.

Observable implication I4 argues that key states, such as regional powers, are likely to selectively seek the involvement of coalitions in order to further state interests. This argument is borne out in Chad and CAR and Macedonia, where France pushed specifically for the European Union’s involvement, alongside the UN in the intervention in Chad and CAR and following NATO in Macedonia. In the interventions in Côte d’Ivoire and CAR, France – the former colonial power in each case – played a notable role in motivating regional intervention and in lobbying for UN intervention. Australia played an important role in organizing and leading the INTERFET coalition intervention in East Timor, and thereby enabling hyperlateral intervention. Australia’s interest in a coalition intervention did not appear to be driven by a particular preference for working within a coalition rather than through the UN, however. Operational needs played a more important role in motivating the use of a coalition. The influence of target states on the creation of interventions is highlighted in observable implication I5. Target state interests played a particularly important role in the Chad and CAR case. In that case, if the Chadian government had been amenable to a UN operation with a military component, a single-IGO intervention would have likely been established. It was Chad’s insistence that the UN’s operation be strictly civilian that motivated the European Union to field peacekeeping troops. In each of the sequential

159 interventions considered (the operations in Cˆoted’Ivoire, Central African Republic, and Macedonia), the target state clearly indicated a preference for continued peacekeeping after an initial intervention was due to depart. It is not clear in any of those cases whether the target’s appeals were a critical factor in the decision to establish a second intervention. Perhaps a target state’s interest in the continuation of international peacekeeping is be a necessary but insuﬃcient factor motivating sequential interventions. Finally, the question of target interests in the East Timorese case is complicated by the fact that East Timor was not an independent entity at the time of intervention. It was Indonesia’s consent that the international community sought in the lead-up to the intervention, even though Indonesia’s control of East Timor was not internationally recognized as legitimate. The fact that hyperlateral intervention was initiated in this case despite Indonesia’s opposition to international intervention in general contradicts implication I5.

A final implication about initiation (I6) suggests that coalitions are motivated by path dependence to establish peace operations that build on the investments of an initial intervention. In the sequential operations in Côted’Ivoire and CAR, the UN’s secondary intervention served to “rescue” a regional effort that was poised to collapse due to a lack of resources. In Macedonia, U.S. and European interests in providing peace in the country may have been heightened by the investment made in conflict prevention under UNPROFOR/UNPREDEP. The UN’s operation in Macedonia came to a premature end thanks to China’s veto, and when conflict broke out in the country a few years later, supporters of the UN’s earlier preventive deployment acted to field the NATO and EU responses. This is plausibly path dependence at work. In East Timor, the UN’s previous investment in supporting the vote on independence, as well as the organization’s stated commitment to helping East Timor build state institutions if independence was chosen, seem to have motivated the UN’s strong interest in providing a peace operation. This concern with consistency and securing previous investments is consistent with implication

I6. Path dependence did not appear to play a meaningful role in the Chad and CAR intervention.

160 The first observable implication proposed about the effects of hyperlateral intervention argues that operations carried out by multiple coalitions are more effective in providing peace than non-intervention or single-coalition intervention. As I noted in the conclusion of Chapter 4, this argument would be best examined in a larger study comparing outcomes for cases in each of those three treatment categories. Here I offer few tentative observations from the cases considered in this chapter. It does seem likely that outcomes in East Timor would have been substantially worse if INTERFET had not intervened quickly to provide security and enable the UN’s work in governance and institution-building. In Chad and CAR, the UN’s attempts to create a single-coalition operation were stymied, and so the hyperlateral partnership with the EU was a key factor in enabling intervention to take place at all in those states. It is more difficult to speculate on potential outcomes in the CAR and Macedonia cases if the hyperlateral partnerships in those cases had not taken place. Intervenors in the crises in Côted’Ivoire, CAR, East Timor, and Chad and CAR had complementary comparative advantages. Each of those cases saw the United Na- tions, with its global reach and legitimacy, working together with smaller coalitions with theoretical advantages in areas like local knowledge, local legitimacy, and quick response time. Implication O2 argues that intervenors with complementary comparative advantages should be more effective in providing peace. In Côte d’Ivoire and East Timor, intervenors made use of their comparative advantages in establishing a division of labor – in both cases a regional coalition intervened relatively quickly, and was then followed by a better-resourced UN operation. The East Timor intervention was successful in providing security in the short term, but less successful in the long term. The intervention in Côted’Ivoire had variable success in the short term, but long term success has thus far been high. Outcomes in both of these cases are somewhat, but not entirely, consistent with implication O2. In the CAR case, the MISAB coalition intervention and the UN’s operation were quite similar in size and function. The UN did not make use of its greater resources to provide a more comprehensive follow-on operation. While both operations

161 provided some security in the short run, long run outcomes in CAR were poor; evidence

for O2 in this case is mixed. In the Chad and CAR case, while the EU and the UN did have complementary comparative advantages, their division of labor in the parallel intervention was not driven by those relative strengths. Rather, Chad’s idiosyncratic preferences determined the division of labor. The hyperlateral intervention in this case

was not successful, meaning that implication O2 is not borne out here. The Macedo- nian intervention is a notable outlier. The EU and NATO have very similar comparative

advantages, but contrary to what O2 would predict, these coalitions intervened quite eﬀectively in the Macedonian crisis, contributing to stability both during and after the hyperlateral intervention.

Finally, observable implication O3 holds that the strength of communication and coordination between intervenors determines the eﬀectiveness of intervention. The EU and NATO coordinated closely in establishing their interventions in Macedonia, and peacekeeping in that case was a notable success in both the short term and long term,

which is consistent with O3. The intervenors in Chad and CAR had substantial diﬃculties with coordination, particularly in planning the handover of security responsibilities to the UN in the months before the EU operation came to an end. Evidence from this

case is also consistent with what O3 would predict, though intervention failure in this

25 case was perhaps overdetermined. Support for O3 is mixed in the other three cases considered. In East Timor the UN and INTERFET communicated and coordinated well, and their hyperlateral intervention was quite eﬀective in providing security in the short term, but less so in the long run. In that case the UN was less successful in fulﬁlling its state-building mandate than in providing security, and state weakness in East Timor precipitated another crisis in the country only a year after the hyperlateral intervention ended. The MISAB and UN interventions in CAR coordinated on the handover process between the operations, which may have contributed to successful security provision

25The scale and complexity of the conﬂict, Chad’s lack of cooperation, and the fact that the EU and UN did not have a mandate to address underlying causes of conﬂict are other key factors behind intervention failure in this case.

162 while the interventions were ongoing. This intervention was ineffective in the long term. The intervenors in Côted’Ivoire coordinated their efforts relatively well, but experienced difficulties maintaining peace over the course of the intervention. Since international involvement ended in 2017, however, Côted’Ivoire has remained relatively peaceful. In sum, there is a case to be made that communication and coordination help intervenors maintain security while interventions are ongoing, but this factor is less clearly linked to long-term outcomes. Analysis of these five cases of hyperlateral intervention offers some support for the arguments that operational needs, IGO reputation concerns, the preferences and actions of key states, and path dependence drive the initiation of hyperlateral intervention. The availability of multiple organizations with a security mandate may enable hyperlateral intervention in some cases, but is not a necessary condition. Target state interests play an important role in some cases. Target states may have the most dramatic impact when opposing intervention, either by particular coalitions or in general. The outcomes of peace operations are importantly shaped by conflict-level variables outside the control of international intervenors. This reality makes it difficult to clearly identify the impact of interventions. Complementarity of comparative advantages in combination with strong communication and coordination may have contributed to short-term success in CAR and East Timor. The hyperlateral intervention in Macedonia was quite successful, possibly due to the strong coordination between NATO and the EU, though those organizations did not have complementary comparative advantages. In Côted’Ivoire, complementarity and coordination were both relatively strong, but the intervention’s success varied substantially over the course of intervention. Finally, an unusual division of labor and coordination difficulties in the Chad and CAR case may have contributed to that intervention’s failure. Overall, implications O2 and O3 are neither strongly supported nor clearly refuted by evidence from these five case studies.

163 Chapter 6

Conclusion

6.1 Overview and Findings

This dissertation began by noting how frequently multi-coalition interventions are undertaken in the present day, and how little we know about the determinants and effects of interventions of this type. Two primary questions were presented: what leads states and organizations to create hyperlateral interventions? And under what circumstances do these operations effectively provide peace? This section reviews the dissertation’s approach to answering those questions, and gives an overview of the arguments proposed and conclusions reached. Chapter 2 of this dissertation discussed the emergence of hyperlateral intervention in the post-Cold War context. The end of great power competition, growing demand for peace operations, and the rise of regionalism in security affairs enabled this model’s creation. The limitations of both global and regional institutions in providing international security produced incentives for states and organizations to create multi-coalition efforts. There have been 22 cases of hyperlateral intervention, all occurring since the end of the Cold War. African conflicts have been the most frequent targets of hyperlateral interventions, with nearly 60 percent of these cases taking place in an African target state. The United Nations has been a participant in nearly all of the hyperlateral operations

164 observed so far, but nine other IGOs and six ad-hoc coalitions have also participated. Finally, Chapter 2 identified four types of hyperlateral intervention, differentiated by the temporal and functional relationships between the constituent interventions. Chapter 3 introduced a theoretical framework for understanding the initiation and effectiveness of hyperlateral interventions. The chapter first reviewed the existing literature on peace operations, then discussed what that literature misses: a full accounting for the multiplicity of actors involved in providing peace operations, the heterogeneity of those actors and the operations they create, and the interdependence among security actors. The chapter introduced a set of basic expectations about multi-coalition intervention, building from the assumption that states and IGOs function as rational, problem-solving actors which have an interest in managing conflicts in order to reduce the negative externalities of conflict and prevent human suffering. In this framework, actors create hyperlateral interventions in order to more efficiently respond to conflicts. Because intervenors have different sets of comparative advantages – with respect to resources, responsiveness, legitimacy, and knowledge – there exists a possibility for efficient specialization and division of labor to produce more effective interventions. Conflict-level needs create an incentive for actors to share the burden of intervention and specialize according to comparative advantage. Under this logic, hyperlateral interventions are expected to be effective at resolving conflict, particularly when intervenors have complementary comparative advantages. Then Chapter 3 complicated this efficiency logic of intervention. States and organizations have interests and motivations unrelated to conflict outcomes that nevertheless can drive intervention decisions. State and IGOs are interested in growing their power and influence and securing their reputations, and these interests can motivate interventions. Security actors can also be motivated by consistency bias and loss aversion to continue investing in conflict management attempts. Furthermore, target states can selectively seek the intervention of particular coalitions, which can influence the structure of peace operations. All of these factors can lead coalitions to intervene even when such

165 an intervention may not be particularly efficient according to logics of burden sharing and comparative advantage. This expanded theoretical framework also suggests that intervenors, even when they share interests and possess complementary advantages, will not necessarily cooperate efficiently. Efficiency does not always emerge organically. Rather, this argument suggests that efficient and effective cooperation depends on the degree of coordination and communication between intervening coalitions. Chapters 4 and 5 explored the observable implications presented in Chapter 3 using evidence from a series of cases of hyperlateral intervention. Chapter 4 considered international intervention in Côted’Ivoire in depth, and then Chapter 5 introduced more variation by presenting shorter studies of cases in the Central African Republic (CAR), Macedonia, East Timor, and Chad and CAR. At a basic level, analysis of these cases affirms this dissertation’s assertions that intervening parties are influenced by one another – that multiple interventions in a given conflict are not independent of one another, and that a full accounting of the initiation and effects of intervention requires considering this complexity and interdependence. With respect to the creation of hyperlateral interventions, Chapter 3 pointed to operational needs, intervenor availability, organizational reputation, key state interests, target state preferences, and path dependence as potential motivators of hyperlateralism. Each of these factors found support in some, but not all, of the cases considered in Chap- ters 4 and 5. The potential motivations for multi-coalition intervention are numerous, and occur in different combinations. Evidence from the case studies suggests that each of this dissertation’s arguments about initiation have promise as explanations of intervenor behavior. Chapter 3 also presented the arguments that the complementarity of intervenors’ comparative advantages, and the extent to which intervenors communicate and coordinate their efforts, influence how successful a hyperlateral intervention is in providing peace. Evidence from the case studies neither strongly supports nor clearly refutes these arguments. Because the determinants of intervention success are so varied – including

166 characteristics of the conflict, the mandates and functions of peace operations, and the ways intervenors interact with one another – it is difficult to identify the precise effects of a peace operation. With respect to the cases considered in Chapters 4 and 5, we can say that intervenors with complementary comparative advantages were quite effective in providing peace in the short term in two of the five cases considered, with mixed success in two further cases, though long term effectiveness was more variable. Intervenors who coordinated their interventions well saw long term effectiveness in two of the five cases, and short term effectiveness in three of five. Particularly close coordination between the EU and NATO in Macedonia was plausibly connected to the effective intervention effort in that case, and comparatively poor coordination between the EU and UN in Chad and CAR may have contributed to the ineffective intervention in that case. There is substantial variation in the structure of hyperlateral interventions – how component interventions are related temporally and in terms of the functions each per- forms. Based on these differences, Chapter 2 introduced a four-part typology of hyperlateral intervention. The specific factors leading actors to create operations of different types, and the particular effects of these various types of intervention, were not a part of the theoretical framework laid out in Chapter 3, however. Instead of deductively developing hypotheses related to the typology, I have opted to take an inductive approach, building theoretical explanations for the initiation and effects of different hyperlateral types based on analysis of the cases discussed in Chapters 4 and 5. The following section discusses the arguments I propose based on observations from these cases.

6.2 Considering the Typology

Why are particular structures of hyperlateral intervention chosen in particular conflict management efforts? How does intervention structure affect prospects for operational success? In this section I propose some possible answers to those questions, based on observations from the case studies presented in this dissertation. The arguments sug-

167 gested here could be usefully investigated in further research. At a basic level, this section proposes that different types of hyperlateral intervention do have different processes of initiation, and different effects on conflict outcomes. This section presents six arguments about how different hyperlateral intervention structures may be chosen and how their effectiveness may vary. Each argument begins with observations from cases discussed in this dissertation, then proposes a generalization from those observations. I have taken an inductive approach to considering the typology because of the paucity of research and theory on multi-coalition interventions. Some scholars, including Bah and Jones (2008), Gleason-Roberts and Kugel (2014), and Brosig (2015), have noted that multi-party interventions can take parallel or sequential forms. However, such discussions tend to be descriptive, rather than seeking to explain the causes and effects of these different intervention types. The typology I propose in this dissertation also identifies differences in structure within the parallel and sequential categories, which previous research has not done. This dissertation has focused on developing theory about the initiation and effectiveness of hyperlateral intervention in general, leaving a more comprehensive investigation of the types of hyperlateralism to future research. As a starting point, however, I have drawn on the case studies in this dissertation to begin inductively developing theory related to the typology (George and Bennett, 2005, ch. 11; Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007). Before proceeding to the six arguments I suggest, it is useful to briefly re-introduce the four types of hyperlateral intervention defined in Chapter 2. These are: planned sequential, unplanned sequential, limited parallel, and extended parallel.1 Sequential operations see one intervention in a conflict replaced by another, while parallel operations see multiple interventions operating on the ground at the same time. I divide sequential operations based on whether the intervenors conducted extensive advance planning for the transition between interventions. Planned sequential operations have transitions

1Among the hyperlateral cases identified in Table 2.1, there are ten instances of extended parallel intervention, eight instances of planned sequential intervention, five instances of unplanned sequential intervention, and five instances of limited parallel intervention.

168 preceded by long periods of joint planning, whereas unplanned sequential operations are more improvisatory. I divide parallel operations based on the relative roles of the intervenors. When one coalition intervenes to provide limited, short-term support to an existing primary intervention, I categorize the effort as a limited parallel operation. When the interventions are intended to operate together in the long term, I categorize the operation as an extended parallel intervention. The first set of arguments I derive from the case studies in this dissertation have to do with cost sharing. In the Côted’Ivoire case, the first multilateral intervention – which was carried out by ECOWAS – was not a self-sufficient operation, but rather was dependent on other parties for material support. That ECOWAS intervention was ultimately replaced by a UN peacekeeping mission. In the CAR case, the MISAB coalition was similarly not self-sufficient, and was also replaced by a UN operation. In both of these unplanned sequential interventions, an external supporter (France) provided most of the financial and logistical support for the regional operations, and then sought to reduce its contributions, leading to a second intervention taking over. On the other hand, in the two parallel cases considered in this dissertation, the intervening parties were each self- sufficient and therefore able to share the material costs of intervention. The INTERFET coalition and the UN shared costs in East Timor, and the EU and UN shared costs in Chad and CAR. From these observations I postulate that if a first intervention is not self-sufficient,2 then the first intervention is likely to be replaced, rather than stay engaged as one partner in a parallel operation. If the first intervenor could not effectively share the costs of intervention with another intervenor in a parallel operation, then I suggest that the secondary intervenor has little incentive to favor a parallel rather than a sequential intervention structure.3 On the other hand, when intervening parties are largely self-sufficient, paral-

2I am conceptualizing self-sufficiency as the ability of IGO members or ad-hoc coalition members to provide all of the material resources needed to field the peace operation, rather than needing to rely on non-member support. 3A potential exception to this argument would be a case in which the first intervenor is performing functions that the second intervenor is not capable of performing effectively, or at all. The first intervenor could have a particular legitimacy advantage with a key party to the conflict, for instance, or could have

169 lel intervention structures can enable ﬁnancial burden-sharing, which may lead them to be preferred.

T1: Sequential intervention structures are more likely to be chosen when the initial intervenor is not materially self-suﬃcient.

In the Macedonian case considered in Chapter 5, NATO and the EU conducted a planned sequential operation. NATO and the EU were both able to provide their own material resources. The argument just proposed, T1, suggests that parallel intervention structures should be more likely in such a case, but NATO and the EU chose a sequential structure. This choice points to another factor that can inﬂuence intervention structure: intervenor willingness to sustain an operation. In Macedonia, NATO’s interest in disengaging eﬀectively ruled out a parallel intervention structure. From this observation I derive the fairly obvious argument that, if a hyperlateral intervention occurs in a context where the initial intervenor is set on withdrawing, that intervention will almost certainly be sequential.

T2: Parallel intervention structures are unlikely to be chosen when the initial intervenor has a strong preference for ending its operation.

In two of the cases examined in this dissertation, one intervenor had a strong interest in carrying out a peace operation, and would have likely pursued single-coalition intervention if circumstances had not made that impracticable. In East Timor, the UN’s intervention plans were stymied by a surge in violence that outpaced the UN’s ability to respond. In that case, the UN sought a coalition partner – the Australia-led INTERFET – to provide needed assistance in a parallel operation. In the intervention in Chad and CAR, the UN proposed a single-coalition operation, but its plans were rebuffed by the Chadian government, which opposed any UN military presence. To make a UN intervention possible, the EU was recruited to provide a military operation, tasked partly with particular mandated functions that are outside of the secondary intervenor’s mandate. In such cases, there could be benefits to intervening in parallel so that the intervention effort can carry out a wider range of tasks more efficiently.

170 providing security for a parallel deployment of civilian UN peacekeepers. In each of these cases, a parallel operational structure was chosen. In cases such as these, where one intervenor is determined to establish an operation despite difficulties that call for another party’s involvement, I suggest that a parallel operation structure is more likely to be chosen. In this argument I assume that the coalition with particularly strong interests in conflict management prefers to to take an active role in the intervention effort as soon as possible. Because of these incentives, even when another coalition’s participation is secured, the highly interested coalition may prefer parallel interventions in order to establish its presence on the ground quickly.

T3: When a highly interested potential intervenor appeals to another coalition for assistance to meet an acute operational need, those coalitions are more likely to intervene in parallel rather than sequentially.

In each of the two unplanned sequential operations considered in this dissertation, the cases in Côted’Ivoire and CAR, we observe a situation in which the first coalition to intervene had a high degree of interest in the conflict. The second coalition to intervene – the United Nations in both of these cases – by contrast did not initially have a strong interest in establishing a peace operation. From these cases I posit that unplanned sequential interventions are more likely when one coalition’s interest in conflict management is much stronger than other coalitions’ interests. However, when a crisis is of high concern for more coalitions, planned sequential operations may be more likely to evolve. This argument is again a fairly basic one: in order for a planned sequential intervention to emerge, multiple coalitions must be sufficiently interested in the conflict to invest in that planning process.

T4: Unplanned sequential operations are more likely to emerge when only one coalition has a strong interest in a crisis.

These arguments regarding the initiation of diﬀerent types of hyperlateral intervention have focused on the preferences and characteristics of intervening parties as potential

171 determinants of structure. Future research could focus instead on how characteristics of conflicts affect intervention type. This dissertation has argued that hyperlateral intervention in general can be driven by the needs of a conflict. This line of inquiry could be followed further to investigate which specific aspects of conflict environments create demand for particular intervention functions, mandates, and structures. In the remainder of this section I turn to a discussion of the potential effects of different intervention types, beginning with a consideration of the three sequential interventions examined in this dissertation. Two of those interventions – in CAR and Côted’Ivoire – were unplanned sequential operations. The other intervention, consisting of the NATO and EU operations in Macedonia, was a planned sequential intervention. Of these cases, the planned sequential operation was the most effective.4 The extended planning period in that case allowed the EU and NATO to share information and resources and to jointly prepare for the transition between operations. From this observation, I posit that the extent of planning for a sequential intervention is a determinant of operational success. When coalitions jointly plan for longer periods of time, the first intervenor is able to allocate its resources with a transition plan in mind, which could produce a more efficient intervention effort overall. Longer planning processes can also allow intervenors to better coordinate the handover of operations and assets in the transition period, contributing to higher effectiveness.

T5: Planned sequential operations are more likely to be eﬀective than unplanned sequential operations.

Among the hyperlateral interventions considered in this dissertation’s case studies, the extended parallel operation in Chad and CAR was the least effective in providing peace. That operation faced numerous difficulties, including a complicated conflict environment, a mandate that excluded any political involvement, and a target state reluctant

4Of course, it is possible that this eﬀectiveness is attributable not to intervenor behavior, but to characteristics of the conﬂict. Nevertheless, it is worth considering the argument that the degree of planning has an impact on operational success.

172 to accept intervention. However, this intervention was also marked by the intervenors’ difficulties with effective cooperation. In the other four hyperlateral cases considered, the intervenors communicated and coordinated fairly well. Building from this point, I suggest that differently structured hyperlateral operations face distinct coordination problems. Specifically, when multiple intervenors operate together for longer periods of time, those actors face prolonged coordination challenges. I suggest that when actors work in parallel for longer, more opportunities emerge for miscommunication, competition, and divergences in preferences. This argument would imply that coordination problems are most intense in extended parallel operations, that limited parallel interventions face fewer coordination problems, and that sequential operations of both types have the fewest challenges with coordination. From this argument I suggest that extended parallel operations are less likely to be effective than limited parallel operations, and that parallel interventions in general may be less effective than sequential operation, due to the negative effects of coordination problems.

T6: Extended parallel operations are less likely to eﬀectively provide peace than other types of hyperlateral operation.

These preliminary arguments about the determinants and effects of different types of hyperlateral intervention are based on a comparison of a small number of cases. Future research could more systematically explore the differences across these cases to develop a more complete theoretical framework. The arguments suggested in this section are only a first attempt at theorizing the typology.

6.3 Future Directions

The body of research on multi-coalition peace operations is young and underdeveloped. This dissertation has contributed to knowledge about this phenomenon by presenting data on hyperlateral interventions, proposing theoretical explanations for the initiation and eﬀects of these operations, and exploring those theoretical arguments through

173 a consideration of five cases of hyperlateral intervention. While these steps are valuable, many questions – and therefore many opportunities for further research – remain. In the previous section I proposed one such area for further study: the determinants and effects of different structures of hyperlateral intervention. Here I suggest a number of other avenues for future research. First, this dissertation focused narrowly on conflicts and crises that have received interventions by multiple multilateral coalitions. A productive next step would be to systematically compare cases of hyperlateral intervention to cases in which only one coalition intervened, and cases in which no peace operation was established. To investigate what sorts of conflicts are more likely to receive hyperlateral intervention, and to fully consider the effects hyperlateral operations have on their target crises, a broader comparative approach will be useful. Along these lines, structured case comparisons of instances of multi-coalition intervention, single-coalition intervention, and non-intervention could be illuminating.5 Quantitative approaches to answering these questions may also be fruit- ful, despite data limitations due to the relatively small number of cases of hyperlateral intervention. Further research could also usefully consider the evolution of hyperlateral interventions over time, across cases. Multi-coalition interventions have been carried out for almost thirty years, and many IGOs have participated in several such operations. Has organizational learning in the past decades played a role in how these operations are carried out? Research could investigate whether particular modes of hyperlateral intervention are more or less likely to be selected as time goes on. We could also consider the effects of repeated partnership. Some pairs of organizations, such as the UN and ECOWAS or the UN and the EU, have carried out hyperlateral interventions together on multiple occasions. Research could evaluate whether these partnerships become more

5For instance, it would be interesting to investigate a case like the ongoing African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). The AU has repeatedly appealed for the UN to establish a peace operation to replace AMISOM, but the UN remains unwilling to intervene (Tardy, 2014, 105; African Union, 2017). What are the factors that prevent hyperlateral intervention in cases like this, where both opportunity and appeals for multi-coalition involvement exist?

174 routinized or more effective as operational experience increases. It would also be interesting to consider whether and how IGOs have developed particular structures and standard operating procedures for managing peace operation partnerships. Those structures and procedures may be created and modified by staff working within IGOs; the particular activities of those staff could also be investigated in future work. This dissertation has suggested that IGO bureaucracies can meaningfully influence intervention decisions. In addition to examining the activities of IGO personnel, variation in staff influence owing to factors like bureaucracy size, member state control, institutional resources, and rates of staff turnover could also be considered. The efficiency logic of hyperlateral intervention suggests that intervenors may develop specializations according to comparative advantage as time goes on. Further research could investigate whether there is institutional evidence of such differentiation occurring, and consider the motivators of, and obstacles to, specialization. With respect to differences among intervenors, further research could also consider the unique role of the United Nations. The UN has participated in nearly all the cases of hyperlateral intervention observed, and in addition to establishing its own interventions also authorizes many of the interventions undertaken by other coalitions. Further research could explore the UN’s role in motivating and shaping hyperlateral operations, both historically and in the present day.6 Are the UN’s activities categorically different from those of other coalitions? If so, how do the UN’s particular interests and functions shape the provision, forms, and effectiveness of intervention efforts? Other interesting lines of inquiry involve prospects for the evolution of peacekeeping. The past decades have seen a substantial increase in the number of regional organizations with a security mandate, as new organizations have been created and older

6Chapter 2 of this dissertation noted that the UN’s shortcomings as a provider of peace in the post- Cold War era helped motivate the rise of regional conflict management efforts, enabling the creation of hyperlateral operations. Further research could more closely examine this period of history, elaborating on the UN’s efforts to seek peacekeeping partnerships and the motivations underlying those actions. This research could also consider how the UN weighed its interest in maintaining the primary role in international peace provision against the organization’s need for state and coalition partners to share the burden of conflict management in the face of rising demand for peacekeeping.

175 organizations have taken on security functions. Further research could examine both how regional security environments have evolved and whether particular regions or organizations seem likely to become more involved in peacekeeping and operational partnerships in the future.7 It would also be interesting to consider whether the UN is likely to maintain its central, dominant role in global security provision, or whether there is a likelihood that authority, responsibility, and legitimacy will become more distributed. If peace operation partnerships continue to occur frequently and increasing numbers of coalitions participate in interventions, the potential effects of this growing complexity could be examined. Are interventions involving three or more coalitions more likely to occur as complexity increases? Will incentives to shirk or free ride become more salient? Some IGOs in the past decades have ceased participating in hyperlateral interventions; do particular coalitions get abandoned or replaced as new security actors enter the system? Will IGO personnel become more influential as states seek to offload the burden of navigating this complex system? Finally, the framework used in this dissertation for considering multi-coalition interactions could be applied to consider cooperative efforts other than peace operations. For instance, this dissertation excluded diplomatic and mediation efforts from consideration, but these lower-level conflict management activities are also often carried out by multiple institutions. Future research could consider the drivers and effects of these approaches. Are mediation attempts, for example, more effective in moving a peace process along when multiple institutions participate? In what circumstances might multi-party involvement in conflict management efforts be counterproductive, and why? The prominence of multi-coalition intervention speaks to growing complexity and

7For instance, several subregional organizations in Africa have committed to work in partnership with the African Union on conflict management through the African Peace and Security Architecture, but these organizations vary in their progress toward operational goals (African Union, 2015). The Americas are dense with regional organizations, which tend to avoid major interventions in conflict, though many are active in other areas of conflict management including diplomacy and mediation (Tavares, 2014). Regional institutions throughout Asia are relatively inactive on security matters, though cooperation on other issues can be robust. Research could consider how factors like regional norms, relations between states, prevalence of civil and international conflicts, and access to resources may impact the future development of peacekeeping mandates and functions across different regions and IGOs, and the prospects for hyperlateral intervention in different areas.

176 interdependence in the international security regime in particular. The complex interactions that characterize hyperlateral interventions are not unique to the area of peace operations, however – growing institutional density in many areas of international relations changes and complicates how states and organizations behave and interact. It beneﬁts our understanding of international politics to take this interdependence seriously.

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