LIGHTING THE SHADOWS: AN EVALUATION OF THEORY AND PRACTICE IN CANADIAN DEFENCE INTELLIGENCE

FAffiE DE LA LUMIERE: UNE EVALUATION DE LA THEORIE ET DE LA PRATIQUE DU RENSEIGNEMENT DE DEFENSE AU CANADA

A Thesis Submitted

to the Division of Graduate Studies of the Royal Military College of Canada

by

James Samuel Cox, OMM, CD, MA Brigadier General (Retired)

In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

May 2011

© This thesis may be used within the Department of National Defence but copyright for open publication remains the property of the author.

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1*1 Canada ROYAL MILITARY COLLEGE OF CANADA COLLEGE MILITAIRE ROYAL DU CANADA

DIVISION OF GRADUATE STUDIES AND RESEARCH DIVISION DES ETUDES SUPERIEURES ET DE LA RECHERCHE

This is to certify that the thesis prepared by / Ceci certifie que la these redigee par

JAMES SAMUEL COX

entitled / intitulee LIGHTING THE SHADOWS: AN EVALUATION OF THEORY AND PRACTICE IN CANADIAN DEFENCE INTELLIGENCE / FAHIE DE LA LUMIERE: UNE EVALUATION DE LA THEOREE ET DE LA PRATIQUE DU RENSEIGNEMENT DE DEFENSE AU CANADA

Complies with the Royal Military College regulations and that it meets the accepted standards of the Graduate School with respect to quality, and, in the case of a doctoral thesis, originality / satisfait aux reglements du College militaire royal du Canada et quelle respecte les normes acceptees par la Faculte des etudes superieures quant a la qualite et, dans le cas d'une these doctorat, Foriginalite,

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Main Supervisor / Directeur de these principal

n The research involving human subjects that is reported in this thesis was conducted with the approval of the Royal Military College of Canada General Research Ethics Board.

in This dissertation is dedicated to the men and women of Canadian defence intelligence. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I have gained great benefit from the gracious guidance and direction of my two co- supervisors, Dr. Michael Hennessy of the Royal Military College of Canada and Dr. Barbara Falk of the Canadian Forces College. I thank them sincerely for allowing me room to manoeuvre and for giving a good pull on the reins when it was needed.

I also wish to acknowledge the valuable help provided by the many serving and retired Canadian Forces personnel who helped me in the conduct of research for this dissertation. Many were old friends like Lieutenant-Colonel Greg Jensen and Mr. Gudmund Thompson. Lieutenant-General Mike Gauthier (Retired), a former Chief of Defence Intelligence, was of particular help in reviewing one of my final drafts in its entirety.

Dr. Stuart Farson, Dr. Kurt Jensen and Ms. Margaret Purdy reviewed a number of my working drafts along the way and pulled me back onto an appropriately academic path when I started to wander astray.

Most importantly, I fondly highlight the tolerance and understanding (sometimes more apparent than others) of my wife Tricia. The years I have spent on this academic journey have denied her the 'retired' husband she had expected in 2001. I now intend to spend more time with her.

v ABSTRACT

Cox, James Samuel; Ph.D.; Royal Military College of Canada; September 2010; Lighting the Shadows: An Evaluation of Theory and Practice in Canadian Defence Intelligence; Dr. M.A. Hennessy, Dr. B.J. Falk.

Analysis of expert literature on intelligence studies could contribute to the optimization of intelligence practices. While learned opinion is open to question and debate, such views should be considered and accepted or discarded with reason, rather than simply ignored. This thesis identifies the degree to which the Canadian defence intelligence organization and its activities have been informed by expert academic views found in the literature on intelligence. Findings are provided in three categories that reflect six conceptual components of intelligence: 1) Policy and Governance; 2) Organization and People; and 3) Process, Product and Action. Within each category I derive theoretical best practices from expert literature. Then, using a case study of Canadian defence intelligence, I identify relevant current practices that are subsequently compared to the theoretical best practices. After identifying gaps or anomalies, this thesis both evaluates Canadian defence intelligence on the basis of the degree to which theoretical best practices are reflected in current practices and makes recommendations to close gaps and eliminate anomalies, to enhance the alignment of current and theoretical practices. My findings demonstrate that of the thirty theoretical best practices identified, seventeen are reflected in current Canadian defence intelligence practices. Of those seventeen theoretical best practices, ten have fully aligned current practices. Seven current practices are only partially aligned with theoretical best practices. The remaining thirteen theoretical best practices have no aligned current practices. In particular, I demonstrate that defence intelligence deficiencies exist in legislation, overall intelligence policy, human resource development and procedural efficiency. A process of formal review and evaluation is also absent. Given the significance of these gaps, I evaluate Canadian defence intelligence organization and activity to be less than optimally informed by expert academic opinion. My principal recommendations call for a legislated basis for defence intelligence; a national defence intelligence policy; a departmental intelligence human resource strategy; a larger, more widely experienced and better educated strategic analytical cadre; and more rigorous leadership and stewardship of the intelligence function on the part of senior civilian defence officials. The Department of National Defence should also establish and lead a Canadian Defence Institute of Intelligence Studies as a centre of excellence for the study and practice of intelligence within the Canadian government.

Keywords: intelligence; defence; analysis; government; strategic,

VI EXTRAIT

Cox, James Samuel; Ph.D.; College militaire royal du Canada; Septembre 2010; Faire de la lumiere: Une evaluation de la theorie de la pratique du renseignement de defense au Canada; Dr. M.A. Hennessy, Dr. B.J. Falk.

Une analyse de la litterature experte pourrait contribuer a l'optimisation des pratiques en matiere de-renseignement. Certes, les opinions des experts peuvent susciter le scepticisme ou la controverse, mais elles devraient neanmoins etre examinees et acceptees - ou rejetees - avec juste raison, plutot que simplement laissees de cote. La these dont il est ici question determine dans quelle mesure l'organisation et les pratiques du renseignement de la defense au Canada ont ete influeneees par les opinions des experts. Les resultats sont regroupes en trois categories, qui refletent six volets conceptuels du renseignement: categorie 1, Politique et gouvernance; categorie 2, Organisation et personnel; et categorie 3, Processus, produit et marehe a suivre. Pour chaque categorie, je recense les pratiques theoriques exemplaires a partir d'ouvrages specialises. Par la suite, en faisant du renseignement de defense au Canada une etude de cas, j'identifie les pratiques actuelles et je les compare aux pratiques theoriques exemplaires. Apres avoir repere les lacunes ou les anomalies, je determine dans quelle mesure les pratiques actuelles de renseignement de defense au pays refletent les pratiques theoriques exemplaires, puis je formule des recommandations pour combler ces lacunes et eliminer ces anomalies afin de rapprocherle plus possible les pratiques actuelles des pratiques theoriques. Les resultats demontrent que seulement dix-sept des trente pratiques theoriques exemplaires recensees sont refletees dans les pratiques actuelles. De ces pratiques actuelles alignees sur les pratiques theoriques, dix le sont pleinement, tandis que les sept autres ne le sont que partiellement. Quant aux treize autres pratiques theoriques exemplaires, elles ne trouvent nul echo dans les pratiques actuelles. Plus precisement, je demontre l'existence de lacunes en matiere de renseignement de defense sur le plan des lois, d'une politique de renseignement globale, de la mise en valeur des ressources humaines et de l'efficacite des procedures. II manque egalement un processus formel de revision et devaluation. Etant donne l'importance de ces lacunes, je propose un certain nombre de recommandations pour les combler. Dans ces recommandations visant a ameliorer le secteur du renseignement de defense au Canada, je reclame un fondement juridique pour le renseignement de defense; une politique nationale; une politique des ressources humaines au Ministere pour le renseignement; une equipe d'analyse strategique renforcee, plus experimentee et plus instruite; et pour la fonction du renseignement, plus de direction et d'intendance de la part des hauts fonctionnaires civils au Ministere. Le ministere de la Defense nationale devrait egalement etablir, a titre de centre d'excellence au sein de la communaute du renseignement du gouvernement canadien, un institut canadien pour l'etude du renseignement de defense, dont il dirigerait egalement les travaux. Mots cles: renseignement; defense; analyse; gouvernement; strategic,

vn TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER 1 Introduction 1 CHAPTER 2 Review of Expert Literature 29 CHAPTER 3 Method 70 CHAPTER4 Policy and Governance 88 CHAPTER 5 Organization and People 126 CHAPTER 6 Process, Product and Action 184 CHAPTER 7 Overall Findings, Evaluation and Recommendations 225 BIBLIOGRAPHY 256

Appendices ix List of Figures x List of Tables xi List of Acronyms xii Vita 311

Vlll APPENDICES

Appendix A Comparative alignment of theoretical best practices and

current practices in Canadian defence intelligence 295

Appendix B Sample interview questionnaire 304

Appendix C Sample interview record 307

Appendix D Sample focus group instructions 308

IX LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1 -1: Best Intelligence 7 Figure 1 -2: The conceptual positioning of Canadian defence intelligence 10 Figure 3-1: The initial analytical framework 72 Figure 3-2: The full analytical framework 75

Figure 5-1: The government intelligence community 142 Figure 5-2: Government intelligence coordination structure 143 Figure 5-3: Defence intelligence at the strategic level 146 Figure 5-4: CDI placement among senior leadership/management 146 Figure 5-5: Outline CDI organization 147 Figure 5-6: CF commands and formations with a defence intelligence role 149

x LIST OF TABLES

Table 2-1: ABCA Intelligence-related inquiries consulted 49-52

Table 3-1: Sample recording of a theoretical best practice and an associated current practice 72 Table 3-2: ABCA Inquiry recommended practices 83-85

Table 4-1: ABCA Inquiry recommended practices dealing with Policy and Governance issues 90 Table 4-2: Theoretical best and current practices - Policy and Governance (PG) 112-113

Table 5-1: ABCA Inquiry recommended practices dealing with Organization 129 Table 5-2: Theoretical best and current practices - Organization (O) 136 Table 5-3: ABCA Inquiry recommended practices relating to People 155 Table 5-4: Theoretical best and current practices - People (P) 168-170

Table 6-1: ABCA Inquiry recommended practices relating to Process, Product and Action 186 Table 6-2: Theoretical best and current practices - Process, Product and Action (PPA) 208-210 Table 6-3: Canadian defence intelligence products 218

Table 7-1: General alignment of current practices with theoretical best practice 226 Table 7-2: Aligned practices 227-229 Table 7-3: Partially aligned practices 230-233 Table 7-4: Practices not aligned 235-238

XI LIST OF ACRONYMS

ABCA America, Britain, Canada, Australia ACINT Acoustic Intelligence ADM Assistant Deputy Minister ASIO Australian Security Intelligence Organization ASIS Australian Secret Intelligence Service Bint Best Intelligence CAE Center of Academic Excellence CANADACOM Canada Command CANOSCOM Canadian Operational Support Command CANSOFCOM Canadian Special Operations Forces Command CAS Chief of the Air Staff CCIRM Collection Coordination Information Requirements Management CDI Chief of Defence Intelligence CDS Chief of the Defence Staff CEFCOM Canadian Expeditionary Force Command CFDS Canada First Defence Strategy CFTSG Canadian Forces Training Support Group CIA Central Intelligence Agency (US) CIDA Canadian International Development Agency CLS Chief of the Land Staff CMP Chief of Military Personnel CMS Chief of the Maritime Staff COS Chief of Staff CSEC Communications Security Establishment Canada CSIS Canadian Security Intelligence Service DA Departmental Authority DCAF Democratic Control of Armed Forces (Switzerland) DCI Director of Central Intelligence DIA Defense Intelligence Agency DIO Defence Intelligence Organization DIR Defence Intelligence Review DM Deputy Minister DNI Director of National Intelligence DND Department of National Defence DSD Defence Signals Directorate (Australia) FA Functional Authority FAA Financial Administration Act FICC Foreign Intelligence Coordination Committee FINTRAC Financial Transaction and Reports Analysis Centre HUMINT Human Intelligence IACC Interdepartmental Analysis Coordination Committee IAFIE International Association for Intelligence Education IG Inspector General

xn IM Information Management IMTNT Imagery Intelligence IPS International Policy Statement IRTPA Intelligence Reform and Terrorist Prevention Act (US) ISC Intelligence and Security Committee (UK) IT Information Technology J2 Joint Staff 2 (Intelligence) J2X Joint Staff 2 Human Intelligence JIC Joint Intelligence Committee (UK) JTF Joint Task Force JTF-AFG Joint Task Force Afghanistan LI Level 1 MA Management Authority MC Military Committee (NATO) MASINT Measurement and Signals Intelligence MES Military Employment Specialty MOC Military Occupational Code NAC North Atlantic Council NSA/PM National Security Advisor to the Prime Minister NSP National Security Policy NZ New Zealand ODNI Office of the Director of National Intelligence PSEA Public Service Employment Act RA Requirements Authority RCMP Royal Canadian Mounted Police SIGINT Signals Intelligence TA Training Authority TB Treasury Board TBS Treasury Board Secretariat UK United Kingdom US United States UKUSA United Kingdom/United States of America VCDS Vice Chief of the Defence Staff WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction

xin 1

CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter lays out the academic parameters of this study, which evaluates the theory and practice of Canadian defence intelligence, based on a survey of expert literature. It begins with the development of a working definition of Canadian defence intelligence. The second section outlines the historical development of Canadian defence intelligence and raises questions as to whether its early twenty-first century adaptation has been adequately informed by expert literature in the field. The central research question of this study, which asks: to what extent has expert intelligence literature informed the practice of twenty-first century Canadian defence intelligence; is elaborated upon in the third section. The fourth section offers an evaluation of Canadian defence intelligence based on findings. Research strategy and thesis design follow in the fifth and sixth sections respectively. The reader may find Appendix A, which compares theoretical best practices with Canadian defence intelligence current practices, a useful reference throughout.

DEFENCE INTELLIGENCE There are three prominent fields of intelligence study. First, biological intelligence research seeks to understand links between the brain and intelligent behaviour.1 Second, 'artificial intelligence' describes the science and engineering of making intelligent machines.2 This thesis focuses on the third field of intelligence study; the practice of intelligence within military forces and governments, because this is the field in which defence intelligence resides.3

1. For example, see the Beckman Institute for Advanced Science and Technology, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, at http://www.beckman.iIlinois.edu/biointel/index.aspx (accessed 19 January 2010). 2. For example, see the Artificial Intelligence (AI) Group at the University of Toronto, at http://web.cs.toronto.edu/research/groups/ai.htm (accessed 12 November 2009). 3. Actually, this field might be considered more broadly and extend to the study of intelligence in organizations generally. For instance, commercial corporations concern themselves with business intelligence and competitive intelligence, but the commercial sector is not directly relevant to this thesis. 2

A working definition of intelligence The development of a working definition of defence intelligence must start by examining the word intelligence itself. Beyond the fact that intelligence comes from the Latin verb intelligere, to understand, there is no universal agreement on a more contemporary or comprehensive definition of intelligence.4 In the military or government sense, intelligence has been a topic of study for thousands of years, but no one definition has satisfied everyone and at least one academic opinion suggests intelligence is "the least understood and most under-theorized (sic) area of international relations."5 As early as the fifth century B.C. we see an interest in analyzed information used to gain advantage over opponents in war. The first chapter in Sun Tzu's The Art of War, entitled "Appraisals," might be the earliest recorded formal work on intelligence; or it might be his last chapter, called "Spies," because it contains a passage dealing with "foreknowledge."6

4. According to the Oxford English Dictionary Online, "intelligence" is "1. The faculty of understanding; intellect. 2. Understanding as a quality of admitting degree; spec, superior understanding; quickness of mental apprehension, sagacity. ... 3.a. the action or fact of mentally apprehending something; understanding, knowledge, cognizance, comprehension {of something). ... 5.b. esp. applied to the communication of spies, secret or private agents, etc. ... 7.a. Knowledge as to events, communicated by or obtained from another; information, news, tidings; spec information of military value. ... c. the obtaining of information; the agency for obtaining secret information; the staff of persons so employed, secret service. ... d. Comb, (sense 7c) intelligence agency, corps, officer, operator, service, intelligence department, a department of state organization or of a military or naval service whose object is to obtain information (esp. by means of secret service officers or a system of spies) ...." At http://dictionary.oed.com.proxy.bib.uottawa.ca/cgi/entry/50118615?query_type=word&querywor d=intelligence&first= 1 &max_to_show= 1 O&sort_type=alpha&result_place= 1 &search_id=QeDf- tfjehD-3474&hilite=50118615 (accessed 31 July 2010). Also, the etymology of "intelligence" in Online Etymology Dictionary "Intelligence, late 14c., 'faculty of understanding,' from O.Fr. intelligence (12c), from L. intelligentia 'understanding,' from intelligentem (nom. intelligens) 'discerning,' prp. of intelligere 'to understand, comprehend,' from inter- 'between' + legere 'choose, pick out, read.' Meaning superior understanding, 'sagacity is from early 15c. Sense of 'information, news' first recorded mid-15c, especially 'secret information from spies' (1580s)." At http://www.etymonline.com/index.php?search=intelligence&searchmode=none (accessed 31 July 2010). 5. J. Der Derian, Antidiplomacy: Spies, Terror, Speed, and War (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992), 19, cited in Michael Herman, Intelligence in Peace and War (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge International Press, 1996), 3. 6. Sun Tzu, The Art of War, Chapter 13, The Denma Translation (Boston: Shambhala, 2002), 59. 3

Throughout history, intelligence has been central to statecraft.7 Garrett Mattingly notes that the shape and structure of the diplomatic system which emerged in Europe after the Renaissance was essentially built around the state's need for information on foreign countries.8 'Scoutmasters' in the English armies of that period were responsible for collecting intelligence in the field.9 Later, in the eighteenth century, this type of 'military' intelligence was a responsibility of Quartermasters General, while political and strategic intelligence remained in the hands of the Commanding General's secretaries.10 Later, in the nineteenth century, Karl von Clausewitz implied intelligence was important for reducing the "friction" of military operations and thought that intelligence was simply "every sort of information about the enemy and his country."11 His contemporary, Baron Antoine Henri de Jomini, went further in capturing the essence of intelligence in "Article XLII" of his The Art of War. When discussing four means of obtaining information on the enemy's operations, de Jomini noted the importance of generals being adept at "forming hypotheses of probabilities," which would enable the formulation of "a plan, which will provide in advance for the probable contingencies of the future."12 In the first half of the twentieth century, intelligence matured significantly during the two world wars. In the lead up to and throughout the First World War, mail and radio interception provided most of the British strategic and military intelligence. Some could be gained from aerial over-flights of German positions, but generally, intelligence activity

7. John Keegan, The Mask of Command (London: Penguin, 1987), 325. 8. Garrett Mattingly, Renaissance Diplomacy (London: Cape Publishing, 1955), 242-244. Cited in Julian Richards, The Art and Science of Intelligence Analysis (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2010), 6. 9. B.A.H. Parritt, The Intelligencers: the Story of British Military Intelligence up to 1914, 2nd ed. (Ashford, Kent: Intelligence Corps Association, 1983), 1-12. Cited in Michael Herman, Intelligence in Peace and War (Cambridge (UK: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 9. 10. Martin Van Creveld, Command in War (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1985), 35-8. Cited in Herman, Intelligence in Peace and War, 9. 11. Michael Howard and Peter Paret, eds., Karl von Clausewitz: On War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), 117. Clausewitz did not have a very high opinion of intelligence, variously describing it as unreliable, erroneous and generally of no use. This is not surprising if one considers his view would have been formed from battlefield experiences of the time, when, at the tactical level of battles, events often unfolded faster than information could move. It is interesting to note that at a higher operational level, intelligence was effectively applied by Clausewitz's contemporary, Napoleon Bonaparte. 12. Baron Antoine Henri de Jomini, The Art of War (London: Greenhill, 1992), 271. 4 remained somewhat unsophisticated throughout the war.13 By the eve of the Second World War, intelligence gathering had become much more 'industrialized' and more central to British security activities. During the conflict, covert and technical intelligence collection techniques took a huge step forward and, as Richards notes, "became central to tactical and strategic success ,..."14 As one who benefitted from effective intelligence, Field Marshal Montgomery of Alamein argued that intelligence enables a commander to "anticipate enemy reactions to his own moves, and to take quick steps to prevent enemy interference with his own plans."15 Whereas early definitions tended to equate intelligence with information, the views of de Jomini and Montgomery promote the notion of using that information to make decisions about future advantageous action. After the Second World War, distinct American and British approaches to intelligence became apparent. In 1949, Sherman Kent, the reputed 'father' of American intelligence analysis, suggested that intelligence was three things: "a kind of knowledge ...; the type of organization which produces the knowledge ...; and the activity pursued by the intelligence organization."16 He further argued that intelligence consists of three 'substantive' elements: first, descriptive background information; second, reportorial current information and threats, the "most complicated element of strategic intelligence;" and third, the substantive-evaluative analytical process of evaluation and extrapolation."17 In current United States (US) vocabulary, intelligence tends to refer to 'finished' intelligence that has been put through a process of all-source analysis and turned into a product that provides predictive advice for decision-makers.18 On the other hand, in the United Kingdom (UK), 'raw' intelligence moves straight into departmental policy­ making circles without passing through a separate analytical stage.19 As a result, intelligence tends to refer more narrowly to those kinds of information not available from

13. Richards, The Art and Science of Intelligence Analysis, 51. 14. Ibid., 52. 15. Field Marshal Viscount Montgomery of Alamein, A History of Warfare (Cleveland: The World Publishing Company, 1968), 16. 16. Sherman Kent, Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy, rev. ed. (Hamden, Connecticut: Archon Books, 1965), xxiii . 17. Philip Davies, "Ideas of Intelligence: Divergent National Concepts and Institutions," in Secret Intelligence: A Reader, edited by Christopher Andrew, Richard J. Aldrich, and Wesley K. Wark, (London and New York: Routledge, 2009), 13. 18. Ibid. 19. Ibid. 5 the 'normal product' of departmental activity. In British terms, intelligence means collected raw secret information.20 Despite these apparent differences within the military and government context, there remains essentially only one fundamental form of intelligence practiced, but a commonly accepted definition remains elusive. The absence of a universally agreed definition is no small thing. In addition to inhibiting theoretical study, it permits the use of somewhat circular definitions of apparently 'different' forms of intelligence. For example, an updated draft of Canadian Forces (CF) joint intelligence doctrine describes 'signals intelligence' (SIGINT) as "intelligence derived ... from communications intelligence, electronic intelligence and foreign instrumentation signals intelligence ...."21 Furthermore, without a common definition of intelligence it would seem that imagery intelligence (IMINT) is substantially different from foreign intelligence, which, fundamentally, it is not. 'Imagery' is an adjective describing the source of information from which intelligence can been derived. Similarly, 'foreign' refers to the general subject area of the intelligence product, to differentiate it from 'domestic' or 'security' intelligence. Both examples feature intelligence products derived in fundamentally the same way. In the end, in government and in military forces, no matter the adjective used, or the specialist practices followed, the essential nature of intelligence, the noun, informs decision-making by providing warning and predictive assessments of threats.22 The recently updated draft of CF joint intelligence doctrine contains a "Definition of Intelligence" from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO): ... the product resulting from the processing of information concerning foreign nations, hostile or potentially hostile forces or elements, or areas of actual or potential operations. The term also applies to the activity which results in the product and to the organizations engaged in such activity.23

The draft CF joint intelligence doctrine deems this definition to be insufficient because it fails to address the purpose of intelligence. The "defining doctrinal purpose of

20. Ibid. 21. Department of National Defence, Canadian Forces Joint Publication (CFJP) 2.0, Draft Study 1, Joint Intelligence (31 March 2010), 1-10. 22. Herman, Intelligence in Peace and War, 2. 23. NATO Allied Administrative Publication (AAP)-6, Glossary of Terms and Definitions, 2010, at http://www.nato.int/docu/stanag/aap006/aap-6-2010.pdf (accessed 16 May 2010). 6 intelligence," according to the draft doctrine, is to "inform decision-makers."24 With the purpose of intelligence apparently clarified, the draft doctrine promptly forgets about it and states that: ... intelligence is thus defined as the product resulting from the collection, processing, analysis, integration and interpretation of available information concerning foreign nations, hostile or potentially hostile forces or elements, or the geography and the culture that contributes to the understanding of an actual or potential operations environment. The term is also applied to the process and activity which results in the product and to the organizations dedicated to such activity.25

This definition ignores the "defining doctrinal purpose of intelligence" and looks to be all too similar, if more wordy, to the NATO definition. In any event, even if "informing decision-makers" is the "defining" doctrinal purpose of intelligence, it is not, in any way, unique. Many disciplines and activities inform decision-makers. Therefore, more questions must be asked to determine exactly what it is that makes intelligence different from, say, logistics. What is it that commanders expect of intelligence that they do not necessarily get from any other discipline? The answer lies in the traditional intelligence task of determining "what is at the other side of the hill."26 First and foremost, commanders are seeking to know what is not known. Second, they seek prediction of "what will be," or more commonly, "what will the enemy do?" However, commanders do not want a full range of all possibilities; they need a tailored range of probabilities, or more precisely, "what will the enemy probably do?" We might then ask, why are commanders interested in what the enemy will probably do? Intuitively, the answer is, "so they can do something about it," but inherent in that simple reply is the idea that commanders really seek, not simple prediction, but an assessment of probabilities that leads to advantage over an adversary. Therefore, unlike other decision-

24. DND, CFJP 2.0 Joint Intelligence, 1-2. 25. Ibid. 26. Christopher Hibbert, Wellington: A Personal History (Reading, MA: Perseus Publishing, 1997), 396. At the age of 83, while attending a dinner party in Dover, Wellington is reputed to have said, "All the business of war, and indeed all the business of life, is to endeavour to find out what you don't know by what you do; that's what I call 'guessing what is at the other side of the hill.'" 7

support disciplines, the unique purpose of intelligence is to assess an adversary's probable actions, to gain advantage. However, the notion of advantage deserves further attention because beyond a simple application of an assessment of probabilities, it implies relevance to operations being conducted. Furthermore, while an assessment of probabilities and relevance are necessary ingredients of intelligence, they are not sufficient without a certain timeliness that allows the relevant assessment of probabilities to be acted upon with advantage. The more there is of each element, the better the intelligence will be. The best intelligence is therefore found at the nexus of an assessment of probabilities, relevance and timeliness. A graphical representation of Best Intelligence is shown in Figure 1-1 below.

Best \ _. Intelligence I) Timeliness j

—• ->

This model of Best Intelligence (Bint) is explicitly outlined in the draft CF joint intelligence doctrine, which states that, in informing decision-makers, intelligence is expected to provide them with "advantage and predictive, actionable [researcher's emphasis] insights."28 For the purposes of this study then, intelligence is defined as the relevant, timely assessment of an adversary's probable action that aims for advantage over that adversary. Intelligence is composed of six conceptual components: 1) the policy and governance

27.1 developed this construct in separate research. See an earlier version by Jim Cox, Intelligence: Definitions, Concepts and Governance (Ottawa: Library of Parliament publication PRB 09-22E, 21 December 2009), at http://www2.parl.gc.ca/Content/LOP/ResearchPublications/prb0922-e.htm (accessed 31 July 2010). 28. DND, CFJP 2.0 Joint Intelligence, 1-3. 8

context in which it must work; 2) organizations that work as part of the intelligence process; 3) people who work to produce intelligence; 4) the intelligence process; 5) the intelligence product; and 6) advantageous action resulting from the application of intelligence. Canadian defence intelligence is a specific brand of intelligence. It is discussed in the following paragraphs.

A working definition of Canadian defence intelligence Using the working definition of intelligence above, a working definition of Canadian defence intelligence can be developed with some confidence. The term 'defence' is simply an adjective used to describe certain unique characteristics of the intelligence being discussed, to distinguish it from, for example, 'criminal' intelligence. Accordingly, the draft CF joint intelligence doctrine correctly provides this clear, if rather lean, definition of Canadian defence intelligence as "the umbrella term which encompasses all intelligence activity within the DND [Department of National Defence] and CF."29 Implicit in the simplicity of this definition is the idea that defence intelligence has two elements - one in the CF and the other in DND. We know the CF, as the embodiment of the profession of arms in Canada, practices military intelligence. In addition to military-to-military ties, CF military intelligence works through DND with other domestic and foreign intelligence partners. However, apart from the definition of defence intelligence above, the draft CF joint intelligence doctrine is silent on intelligence practiced in DND. This is a curious omission because it is DND, a department of government, that acts on behalf of the Minister of National Defence (MND) in the Canadian government intelligence community. Nonetheless, despite not being discussed in detail in the CF joint intelligence doctrine, defence intelligence is neither entirely separate from military intelligence, nor fully encompassed by it. Although its roots are found in military intelligence, Canadian defence intelligence is broader and usually, but not always, operates at higher levels. It supports the DND role

29. Ibid., 1-1. 9 within government. The Canadian Security and Intelligence Community suggests that DND: ... provides defence intelligence on issues involving the use or potential use of the Canadian Forces abroad. It assesses foreign political and military information as well as scientific and technical information.... [And] provides the government with an around-the-clock intelligence watch on developments abroad that could affect Canada or Canadians.30

In a similar vein, Canada's former National Security Policy (NSP) describes defence intelligence as an important component of the integrated government intelligence community.31 In this role, according to the NSP, defence intelligence must establish effective cooperative links with domestic and allied intelligence community members, as well as internal processes to enable DND to serve and be served by those communities.32 For the purposes of this study then, and considering all of the elements above, the following definition of Canadian defence intelligence is assumed: Canadian defence intelligence is rooted in military intelligence and is produced within DND for the MND, and through him or on his behalf, provided to Cabinet and other government departments and officials as directed, to support national planning and decision-making. Defence intelligence may also be provided to allies or other states as directed by the Minister.

From the foregoing, a graphical representation of the conceptual positioning of Canadian defence intelligence is shown below in Figure 1-2. Note that defence

30. Privy Council Office (PCO), The Canadian Security and Intelligence Community: Helping Keep Canada and Canadians Secure (2001), at http://www.pco- bcp.gc.(^default.asp?Language=E&Page=InformationResources&Sub=Publications&doc=si/si_t oc_e.htm (accessed 3 June 2010). This document was originally published before 9/11. Subsequently, after the reorganization of the Canadian security and intelligence apparatus in December 2003, there were some efforts to re-write it, to reflect changes made. Since then, there has been no agreement on new content across the security and intelligence community. Nonetheless, the PCO website states that this document is currently under review. Research has confirmed that the document is being re-written, as a secondary duty, by an analyst in the International Assessments Staff (IAS) of the Privy Council Office (PCO). 31. PCO, Securing an Open Society: Canada's National Security Policy (Ottawa, 2004), 18. 32. Ibid., 15-20. 10 intelligence works with all levels of military intelligence - strategic, operational and tactical.33

A government Another government An international intelligence partner intelligence partner intelligence partner DEFENCE INTELLIGENCE

Strategic Military \ Operational ^ Intelligence Military Intelligence

Tactical Military Intelligence

Figure 1-2: The conceptual positioning of defence intelligence

Over time, as the international security environment evolved, Canadian defence intelligence adapted to meet the requirements of the MND and government. However, there are questions as to whether this adaptation has been as fully informed by theoretical best practices as it might have been.

INFORMED ADAPTATION OF DEFENCE INTELLIGENCE The events of 9/11 had profound effects on Canada; some immediate, others in due course. It took until April 2004, for the Canadian government to publish its first national security policy, a major element of which was an enhanced national intelligence capability, including defence intelligence.34 A month later, DND completed a detailed

33. The levels of intelligence are explained in National Defence, Joint Intelligence Doctrine (Ottawa: Canadian Forces, 21 May 2003), 2-1. They are discussed further in the section dealing with the focus of research. 34. PCO, Securing an Open Society: Canada's National Security Policy, vii, viii, and 15- 20. The first of several measures mentioned is the establishment of the Integrated Threat 11

Defence Intelligence Review (DIR). DIR recommendations began to be implemented in 2005. Given the primacy of national security in the life of the country, one might expect all principal state sectors would be consulted and their intellectual powers harnessed in the development of such important documents. While many were consulted, there is little evidence that academia generally, and Canadian academia in particular, was involved to any measurable degree. In the case of the DIR, formal academic support appears to have been shut out. Within academia there is a burgeoning field of intelligence studies fuelled by an expanding repertoire of literature.36 It is not the only source of knowledge about intelligence but, like other academic fields of study, it is an important one, populated as it is by scholars who think about and analyze intelligence activity in an effort to understand its underlying principles, concepts and theories. Being a repository of learned thought, intelligence studies contribute to learning and learning is the basis of effective adaptation. It seems that defence intelligence, to some degree, has ignored academic intelligence studies and has failed to learn from the theoretical knowledge found therein. Learning, by definition, is theoretical and based on generalizations, theories and lessons drawn from one's own experience or that of others. The practice of intelligence in the contemporary security environment, like the practice of medicine in a hospital operating room, should not be the beginning of learning, but rather its culmination.37 But the practice of medicine, as with other significant endeavours, does not rely entirely on experience to teach after-the-fact lessons. We know doctors work hard to avoid unpleasant experiences, such as having a patient die on the operating table. If that does happen, lessons will surely be learned, but at a sometimes terrible cost. Both intelligence and medicine have experienced significant failures from time to time, yet while post factum lessons provide some value, it is preferable that necessary lessons are learned and applied in advance, to avoid those failures.

Assessment Centre, which includes representation from DND. Intelligence also receives first mention among key measures highlighted in the policy. Finally, an entire chapter is devoted to intelligence. 35. DND, Report to the DCDS: Defence Intelligence Review, 20 May 2004, (Released under the Access to Information Act). 36. Literature of intelligence relevant to this study is reviewed in Chapter 2. 37. Michael I. Handel, War, Strategy and Intelligence (London: Frank Cass, 1986), 6. 12

The study of academic literature can provide the basis for pro factum learning that reflects on and analyses events and experiences of others, both good and bad, and applies theoretical lessons learned. However, many useful concepts cannot be readily derived from experience alone, particularly if drawn from a single case or a narrow statistical sample. Their conceptualization requires analysis and theoretical construction.38 Analysis of expert theoretical literature on intelligence and related expert opinion may contribute not only to the enhancement of intelligence practices, but it also has potential to shape public perceptions of how intelligence agencies actually function and influence policy choices about how to make intelligence agencies work better.39 However, expert opinion and theory are not infallible and must remain open to question and debate. Critical views should be considered and accepted or discarded with reason, rather than simply ignored. Gaps and anomalies that exist between recommended and actual practices should result from reflection and decision, not as a consequence of apathy or ignorance. Moreover, while it is acknowledged that field expert literature is not monolithic and that its general and specific applicability is naturally open to question, informed debate and weighing of expert opinion is impossible if expert opinion and theory are ignored. Clausewitz promoted the value of theory in his distinction between studying war in the abstract and war in practice, a distinction that is analogous to intelligence.40 There is value in the theoretical study of intelligence, despite the fact that intelligence, in the abstract, is an artificial intellectual concept. It is an ideal type that cannot exist in reality because practice is inevitably inhibited by uncertainty; the 'fog of war'; psychological factors; and inherent differences between policies, strategies and tactical considerations. Those factors notwithstanding, the study of intelligence in the abstract is not a frivolous academic exercise. On the contrary, according to Handel the analysis of intelligence in

38. Ibid., 7. 39. Zegart, in Secret Intelligence: A Reader, 28. In explaining why academic views should matter to the intelligence community, Zegart notes that public perceptions of intelligence organizations might diverge so far from reality that the gap between public perceptions and policy-making imperatives may become impassable. The public might believe that intelligence agencies are omnipotent and should be restrained, but policy makers might believe they are incompetent and must be strengthened. Academic research and teaching are vital for bridging this gap- 40. Von Clausewitz, On War, 127-132. 13 the abstract is "a powerful heuristic tool for grasping the logic and dynamic character of intelligence."41 Moreover, such an ideal type represents a standard against which performance in the real world can be measured.42 Handel also reminds us that, "[tjheory and practice are not only inseparable, they are in fact complementary," but its [theory] value is sometimes lost on military minds.43 Handel further remarked that the theoretical study of war may not appeal to the pragmatic nature of military professionals, who sometimes fail to see its relevance to their world of action and who often dismiss theoretical work as "irrelevant academic pilpul."44 And so it might be with busy Canadian defence intelligence practitioners, who apparently have no time for theoretical intelligence study. In Canada, there is little public evidence that defence intelligence adaptation has been informed by serious academic analysis of expert literature in the field of intelligence studies, particularly works published by Canada's closest intelligence allies - Australia, New Zealand (NZ), the UK and the US.45 It can be argued that it is important for Canadian defence intelligence to reflect best practices pursued by principal intelligence allies for three reasons. First, in order to remain a trusted partner with whom close allies can share sensitive and important information, Canadian intelligence practices must earn the respect and confidence of those allies. This is best done by ensuring allies understand and agree with measures taken. Second, intelligence cooperation and interoperability demand complementary systems and practices for efficiency and effectiveness. Third, if Canada and its closest intelligence allies pursue common, or at least complementary, intelligence methods, it allows for a degree of synergy in the future development of intelligence practices. Pooled resources may well produce leading edge research and enhanced practices to be used by

41. Handel, War, Strategy and Intelligence, 189 42. Ibid. 43. Ibid. 44. Ibid., 5. 45. This is not only a Canadian problem. Zegart points out that there is a major disconnect between academic scholarship and those who make decisions in Washington, London and other capitals around the world. See Amy Zegart, "Cloaks, Daggers and Ivory Towers: Why Academics Don't Study U.S. Intelligence," in Strategic Intelligence, ed.. Loch K. Johnson (Westport, Connecticut and London: Praeger Security International, 2007), 21-34. Zegart is an Associate Professor of Public Policy at the University of California, Los Angeles and a former member of the US National Security Council staff. 14 all. Conversely, if Canadian defence intelligence developments and practices diverge from commonly accepted, and provable effective, allied routines, Canada might lose the trust and confidence of those allies, which could have indirect adverse effects on Canada's national security.46 By the time of the al Qaeda attacks on the US, on 11 September 2001 (9/11), DND had already started a formal examination of Canadian defence intelligence and the need for reform. An internal DND Chief of Review Services (CRS) program review of the defence intelligence establishment started months before 9/11 and concluded in June 2002.47 It turned out to be a preliminary exercise that confirmed defence intelligence needed remedial remodeling. As a result of the CRS findings, a full-fledged Defence Intelligence Review (DIR) was initiated to examine defence intelligence in National Defence Headquarters (NDHQ).48 The DIR final report, submitted in May 2004, recommended a number of substantial changes, many of which were authorized for implementation, beginning in 2005. However, as DIR changes began to be implemented, the entire program of defence intelligence adaptation was swept up in the tsunami of CF transformation begun shortly after General Richard J. Hillier became Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS) in February 2005.49 In all the attention given to Canadian defence intelligence adaptation, it appears little or no heed was paid to academic opinion, as found in expert literature. Specifically, the nearly one hundred and fifty pages of the public version of the 2004 DIR contain only three minor references to relevant academic literature.50 It should be noted too, that for all

46. Mutual trust and confidence are two of the most important conditions of any intelligence relationship, particularly those among allied nations. A more detailed discussion of this issue comes in later chapters. 47. This report is unavailable to the public. The researcher was consulted in the course of the CRS program review and reviewed a draft copy of the final report. The DND CRS conducts review services on behalf of the Deputy Minister (DM) and CDS to promote improvements in DND and CF policies, programs, operations and activities, and to enhance the abilities of members and employees to perform their duties to the highest ethical standards. See the CRS website at http://www.forces.gc.ca/crs/pages/home_e.htm (accessed 23 May 2009). 48. DND, DIR, 2004. 49. Lieutenant-General (Retired) Mike Jeffery, "Inside Canadian Forces Transformation," Canadian Military Journal, vol. 10, no. 2 (Kingston: Canadian Defence Academy, 2010): 9-18, at http://www.journal.dnd.ca/voll0/no2/doc/04-jeffery-eng.pdf (accessed 20 April 2010). 50. One reference is to a chapter from David S. Alberts and Richard E. Hayes, Understanding Information Age Warfare (Washington D. C: Command and Control Research 15 the work that went into the DIR, the final report includes no bibliography of any academic or other expert literature examined in the course of the review. Without revealing what literature, if any, was consulted in the course of DIR research, it leads one to wonder if Canadian defence intelligence is at all cognizant of expert views found in academic literature. It also appears there was limited academic participation during the DIR study phase. Among the seven members of the DIR Team guiding the study and the fifty-four members of the DIR Advisory Group that supported the DIR Team, only two held doctorate degrees - one, an intelligence analyst with CSIS and the other a strategic analyst in DND.51 One member of the Advisory Group, who occupied a central position from which he reviewed all DIR work, does not recall seeing or hearing any direct references to expert intelligence literature.52

Sources underpinning the DIR seem to be limited too. The DIR frequently refers to the outdated 1994 White Paper on Defence as an authority for action.53 Nowhere in the DIR is there any mention of significant changes to the national security apparatus made by the Paul Martin government in December 2003; the National Security Policy published in April 2004; or the omnibus International Policy Statement of March 2005. ^ DND and CF public websites provide no indication that any academic material has been considered in the transformation of Canadian defence intelligence.55 Academic discussion of intelligence is absent from the considerable collection of learned papers and

Program, 2001). A second reference recommends the reader seek a more complete discussion of the blurring between intelligence and 'combat information' in Herman's, Intelligence Power in Peace and War. Herman is referred to again later in the DIR. 51. DIR, i. Dr. Tim Smith was the CSIS representative and Dr. Roman Jakubow was the Director of Strategic Analysis in NDHQ. 52. Lieutenant-Colonel G. W. Jensen was the Senior Defence Intelligence Advisor to the Associate Deputy Minister. 53. DND, The 1994 White Paper on Defence, Ottawa, 1994, at http://www.forces.gc.ca/admpol/newsite/downloads/1994%20White%20Paper%20on%20Defenc e.pdf/ (accessed 2 April 2009). The 1994 White Paper on Defence was superseded by the March 2005 Defence Policy Statement, which in turn has been succeeded by de facto policy developments and the promulgation of the 2008 Canada First Defence Strategy. All are available on the DND Policy Group website. 54. The 2005 International Policy Statement was written after the publication of the 2004 DIR. 55. Specifically the Chief of Defence Intelligence (CDI) website, at http://www.edi- crd.forces.gc.ca/sites/page-eng.asp?page=1410 (accessed 24 November 2010). 16 professional publications found on the Canadian Defence Academy website. There are however, three graduate level courses in intelligence conducted by The Royal Military College of Canada (RMCC), but they are not specifically aimed at defence intelligence personnel.57 Finally, a senior military officer on the Chief of Defence Intelligence (CDI) staff confirmed that little or no truly academic research has been conducted in the course of developing the draft CF joint intelligence doctrine discussed earlier.58 Moreover, within DND and the CF, there is no formal defence intelligence bibliography available for any kind of formal academic study of Canadian defence intelligence.59 The overall lack of academic linkage raises a number of questions. Has Canadian defence intelligence been supported by any serious academic theoretical study? Has the Canadian defence intelligence establishment given any substantial consideration to expert academic literature at any time? Was the wide range of expert literature available purposely ignored? Does Canadian defence intelligence have any academic foundation? There are broader implications too. If government systematically ignores expert literature in the public domain, how will any non-government expert opinion contribute to the government policy process? Without reference to theoretical academic literature, how can government agencies become proactive learning organizations? This study attempts to shed light on these issues by exploring the extent and nature of the effect, if any, that the academic field of intelligence studies might have had on the organization and practices of Canadian defence intelligence. It specifically probes the degree to which expert intelligence literature may have been considered in the course of the 'transformation' of defence intelligence during the early years of this twenty-first century. Furthermore, as the study unfolds, it incidentally scrutinizes some related issues in the government intelligence community more generally. Collectively, these activities provide context for this study and serve to illuminate background issues of fundamental importance to the more specific research question developed in the next section.

56. DND, CDA Publications, at http://www.cda.forces.gc.ca/pub/index-eng.asp (accessed 7 January 2010). 57. See courses WS 537, 538 and 539 on the Royal Military College of Canada War Studies website, http://www.rmcc.forces.gc.ca/aca/ac-pe/gsc-adc/au-ua/fa/ipws-piecg-eng.asp (accessed 08 January 2010). 58. Captain(N) Josh Barber, Interview, 27 April 2010. 59. Ibid. 17

RESEARCH QUESTION Amid continuing post-9/11 security environment challenges, an extant CF transformation agenda and a perceived lack of academic consultation, it simply is not known with any certainty, if, or to what extent, academic theory and expert literature have influenced Canadian defence intelligence practices. At a time when threats to Canadian security have moved beyond the clarity of one central adversary and now must be addressed by more sophisticated and complex intelligence work requiring new thinking, it seems the academic community is being shut out of discussions of Canadian defence intelligence adaptation. One wonders why this might be so, given the importance of defence intelligence within the government intelligence community and the broader mosaic of Canadian national security programs. Failing to even consider the growing strength of intelligence studies runs counter to the conventional habit of welcoming academic contributions in other sectors of national interest such as agriculture, business, law, public policy and governance more generally. At the departmental level, DND and the CF engage academia in a variety of areas related to administration, law, logistics, engineering, force development, medicine, military science, operational research and personnel development. However, it seems there is less DND and CF enthusiasm for engaging academics in the field of intelligence studies. This is not to say that all expert academic opinion should be followed in every case. Gaps between expert views and actual defence intelligence practices may purposely exist for good and valid reasons, in the view of expert practitioners. However, while the existence of such gaps might pose some risk, the point is that such decisions are hopefully a product of informed choice. It is difficult to make fully informed choices if there is no substantial relationship with academia.60 It was noted earlier that there is a lack of evidence in defence intelligence documents pointing to a clear and strong link between defence intelligence development studies and academia. Interviews of defence intelligence practitioners also uncovered no evidence of such links. Consequently, I chose to evaluate the degree to which Canadian

60.1 thank Dr. Michael Hennessy for his discussion on this issue and for helping me bring out this point. 18

defence intelligence organization and activity have been informed by expert views by comparing current practices with theoretical best practices derived from expert literature. Therefore, the central research question, asked and answered by this study, is: to what extent has expert intelligence literature informed the practice of twenty-first century Canadian defence intelligence? This question reflects the thesis that organization and practices of the Canadian defence intelligence organization are less than optimally informed by expert academic opinion. Moreover, a survey of expert literature suggests that current Canadian defence intelligence organization and practices are at variance with theoretical best practices. Answering the research question will illustrate the strength and extent of alignment between current Canadian defence intelligence organization and practice and expert academic opinion. Gaps and anomalies that may be identified can then be analysed further to determine their nature and the reasons for their existence. When this objective, empirical work is completed, a more subjective exercise is undertaken to offer proposals for the mitigation of those gaps and anomalies and provide recommendations on what might be done to strengthen overall alignment. This study will also answer two subsidiary questions. First, as derived from the expert intelligence literature, what are the theoretical best practices relevant to a government intelligence organization at the national strategic level? Second, what are the criteria forjudging expert intelligence literature?

THEORY AND PRACTICE IN CANADIAN DEFENCE INTELLIGENCE Following this introduction, the study proceeds by analyzing relevant expert literature and extracting and categorizing principal suggestions found therein. Contributions are compartmentalized into three administrative categories that reflect the six conceptual components of intelligence (categories and components are explained in more detail below). Each category is examined later, in a separate chapter, in which current Canadian defence intelligence practices and theoretical best practices within that category are compared; gaps and/or anomalies identified; and an evaluation made as to the degree to which current Canadian defence intelligence practices are aligned with theoretical best practices derived from expert literature. The final chapter presents overall 19 findings; an evaluation of the alignment between current Canadian defence intelligence practices and theoretical best practices; and recommendations for the enhancement of that alignment. A full tabular comparison of theoretical best practices and Canadian defence intelligence current practices is found at Appendix A. Findings show that of thirty theoretical best practices derived from expert literature, seventeen are, in some way, reflected in current Canadian defence intelligence practices. Of that number, only ten current practices are fully aligned with theoretical best practices. The remaining seven current practices are only partially aligned with theoretical best practices. The remaining thirteen of the thirty theoretical best practices have no aligned current practice. Given the extent of non-alignment, it was concluded that significant gaps and anomalies exist in areas of intelligence policy, human resource development and procedural efficiency. These results indicate that Canadian defence intelligence organization and activity have been less than optimally informed by academic opinion found in the expert literature. A principal recommendation aimed at enhancing the alignment of current and theoretical practices argues for a legislated basis for Canadian defence intelligence, from which an overarching Canadian defence intelligence policy and a subordinate departmental defence intelligence human resource strategy could be drawn. Other recommendations suggest measures be taken to build a larger, more widely experienced and better educated strategic-level analytical cadre in order to sustain a true strategic defence intelligence capability. Finally, it is also recommended that senior civilian defence intelligence officials undertake further professional development in the intelligence field, to enable more engaged leadership and stewardship of Canadian defence intelligence.

RESEARCH STRATEGY This section addresses the broad approach to research. It begins by explaining why qualitative research methods were chosen, followed by a brief description of the main assumption underpinning this study. The positioning of this research is then discussed, 20 before examination of the research focus and limitations is undertaken. An outline of the thesis design concludes this presentation of the research strategy.

Qualitative Research Methods While acknowledging continuing academic debate on the merits of qualitative research methods, this study seems tailor-made for them. The field of intelligence is generally under-theorized and, in this case, qualitative methods were helpful in aiding the development of a more comprehensive theory of intelligence, rather than testing an existing one.61 Qualitative methods were required to tease subtle patterns from varied narrative data. Moreover, qualitative research techniques allowed the researcher to remain alert to the presence of competing explanations and concepts.62 Admittedly, the comparative analysis of essentially two major variables - theoretical best practices and current practices - would seem to call for quantitative measures, but even in their operationalized form, data within the two variables were hardly precise enough to be measured quantitatively.63 It was also noted that this entire study is essentially a single-case study and not an examination of numerous, statistically precise cases that might produce meaningful quantitative results. Quantitative data collection methods were therefore deemed inappropriate.64 For the specific review of Canadian defence intelligence, a case study seemed an appropriate strategy to follow, using empirical research that "investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident."65 To that end, a significant portion of the research took place by interviewing and capturing the opinions of real practitioners.

61. Alan Bryman, Quality and Quantity in Social Research (London: Allen and Unwin, 1988), 64; cited in Norman Blaikie, Designing Social Research: The Logic of Anticipation (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000), 253. 62. Ibid. 63. Here and in similar contexts throughout this thesis, 'operationalize' is intended to describe the expression of conceptual activity in empirical form suitable for measurement and comparison. 64. Blaikie, Designing Social Research, 242. Blaikie is clear that quantitative data collection methods are best used when the researcher is likely to have little or no contact with the subject being studied, which is not the case in this study. 65. R.K. Yin, "The case study crisis: some answers," in Case Study Research: Design and Methods, 3rd ed. (London: Sage Publications, 2003), 13. 21

Assumption It is assumed that Canadian defence intelligence will continue to work within the context of the United Kingdom-United States of America (UKUSA) Agreement and the Australia-Britain-Canada-America (ABCA) Quadripartite arrangement.66 Consequently, mutual professional trust, community best practices and an awareness of commonly perceived threats will remain fundamental concerns for Canadian defence intelligence.

Positioning the Research The study of intelligence is an inter-disciplinary endeavour. Some of it is history, but there are also elements of military studies, organizational theory, political science, public policy and psychology. Much of the intelligence literature links empirical study to normative theory, but the latter, as will be observed in Chapter 2, remains largely under­ developed. The conceptual positioning of defence intelligence was outlined earlier. In a more practical sense, defence intelligence should be seen as a principal partner within the Canadian government intelligence community. The structure and coordination mechanism of this community is discussed in more detail in Chapter 5, but here is it helpful to note that national security intelligence is the highest level of all-source intelligence produced for the Prime Minister and Cabinet.67 There are three principal components of national security intelligence: foreign intelligence; domestic security intelligence; and defence intelligence. In Canada, each is associated with a major department of government. The Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) produces foreign intelligence, assisted by specialist intelligence agencies such as the Communications Security Establishment Canada (CSEC).68 Domestic security

66. The UKUSA Agreement and the ABCA Quadripartite arrangement are the two primary intelligence alliances in which Canada participates. They are described in more detail in Chapter 2 and touched upon again in Chapter 5. 67. National security intelligence is produced by the International Assessments Staff in the PCO. 68. Foreign intelligence is defined in the National Defence Act (NDA) as "information or intelligence about the capabilities, intentions or activities of a foreign individual, state, organization or terrorist group, as they relate to international affairs, defence or security." Department of Justice Canada, National Defence Act, Part V. 1 "Communications Security Establishment," S. 273.61, at http://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/en/N-5/FullText.html (accessed 16 22 intelligence (commonly referred to as 'security intelligence') is largely produced within the Department of Public Safety, by the Integrated Threat Assessment Centre (ITAC).69 Specialist intelligence agencies and staffs within the Department of Public Safety portfolio, such as the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), the Criminal Intelligence Service Canada (CISC), and the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA), contribute to the production of security intelligence. Defence intelligence was defined earlier and while it focuses on foreign defence and military threats to Canada, it is inherently capable of contributing to foreign and security intelligence. I found no other examination of current Canadian defence intelligence practices, nor indeed, of any Canadian intelligence activity, equivalent to that conducted here.70 This thesis therefore offers an original contribution in a number of areas. First, it augments Canadian intelligence literature by providing an evaluation of current defence intelligence practices, as they exist today. However, this is more than a mere conventional contribution because this study is one of a very few that link intelligence theory with experience-based practice, an approach that enriches both. Second, it offers the first theoretical examination of defence intelligence in the larger context of Canadian government intelligence activity. In doing so, it presents a third contribution in that the research model and methodology used here are generalizable across the government intelligence community. They can therefore be used to conduct similar evaluations of other government intelligence organizations to the same end.

August 2010). A Foreign Intelligence Division is located within the Security and Intelligence Bureau of DFAIT. 69. The ITAC role is to help prevent and reduce the effects of terrorist incidents on Canada and its people, both at home and abroad. ITAC analyzes security intelligence to produce threat assessments that are then distributed to members of the Canadian security intelligence community, provincial emergency authorities, first responders, and the private sector. See the ITAC website at http://www.itac-ciem.gc.ca/index-eng.asp (accessed 22 July 2010). It should be noted that Transport Canada and Citizenship and Immigration Canada also provide important contributions to the Canadian government intelligence community. 70. Dr. David Mandel, Defence Research and Development Canada (DRDC) Toronto, is a senior defence scientist and Group Leader of the Thinking, Risk, and Intelligence Group (TRIG) in the Adversarial Intent Section. He and his staff have been investigating the human dimension of defence intelligence, largely focused on ways to improve intelligence analysis. Stephane Lefebvre, a veteran government intelligence analyst is currently a Section Head with the DRDC Centre for Operational Research and Analysis. His work has also frequently addressed intelligence analysis issues, but not the intelligence enterprise as a whole. Both have reviewed drafts of this study and agree that there is no equivalent study known to them. 23

Nonetheless, it is necessary to see these contributions in context. This study is only a beginning. It does not profess to capture all theoretical best practices or current defence intelligence practices, nor does it claim that the form and detail of the derived theoretical best practices are sacrosanct. Future studies may find more and better theoretical best practices. Moreover, current defence intelligence practices will likely evolve in the meantime and thereby require new judgments as to the impact of expert academic opinion. Such possibilities serve to highlight what might be the most important contribution of this study, which is its role as a start point for other critical studies that aim to support the improvement of Canadian defence intelligence. The best compliment will come from those who take issue with this study and author a better one.

Focus of Research This thesis focuses on Canadian defence intelligence, as it is practiced within the Canadian government intelligence community. There are three dimensions to that focus. First, to enable a clear, detailed concentration on the subject, the primary focus was purposefully placed on intelligence qua intelligence. Intelligence is traditionally considered in tandem with security, so much so that the phrase "security and intelligence," so often found in organizational titles, chapter headings and conference themes, tends to hint that the two subjects are irrevocably linked. Such is not the case here. This research focuses on intelligence itself and avoids references to security, except where absolutely necessary to support points being made about intelligence. The reason for such ruthless focus is simply to give intelligence as clear a profile as possible, uncluttered by other influences. In a second dimension of focus, this project confined itself to the context of modern, liberal democratic states like Canada and its allies. Analysis of the nature of intelligence functions practiced by totalitarian regimes on one hand, or as may be attempted by weak governments in fragile or failed states on the other, is theoretically interesting, but it holds little relevance to an evaluation of Canadian defence intelligence. Throughout this project, frequent reference is made to Canada's closest intelligence allies - Australia, NZ, the UK and the US - with occasional use being made of intelligence 24

functional models found in other NATO allies (e.g. Netherlands) or democratic non- NATO partners (e.g. Brazil). Finally, this study focuses on government intelligence at the strategic level. Canadian military doctrine disciplines the translation of government policy goals into appropriate activity by categorizing defence activity in three levels - strategic, operational and tactical.71 The strategic level involves the application and coordination of all elements of national power in pursuit of national political objectives. Strategic level defence intelligence contributes to the formulation of policy objectives and military plans at the national level. It is the highest level of DND intelligence derived from information gathered over the widest possible area in response to intelligence requirements dealing with national and international defence issues, as defined by government.72 Reference is made to the lower operational and tactical levels only when required to complement or explain strategic issues, because it is at the strategic level that defence intelligence is, or should be, principally active.73

Limitations Five important limitations bounded this research. First, this study suffers from less than full access to material, as does any study of intelligence. Research was based entirely on open, unclassified or de-classified sources, so findings and recommendations may not be as substantial or as rich as they might have been, if classified information had been available and used. In-depth academic research of government intelligence issues is still an immature activity in Canada and it is liable to be constrained by traditional intelligence community hesitation to accept or tolerate outside examination. Research was impeded by a general culture of secrecy among practitioners and the classification of documents within

71. DND, Canadian Forces Operations (Ottawa, 18 December 2000), 1-4/1-5. 72. Ibid. 73. It is acknowledged that some defence intelligence, in order to be effective at the strategic level, must consider tactical and operational level intelligence. In fact, the contemporary security environment virtually imposes upon defence intelligence the requirement to operate at all three levels of conflict where necessary (See the conceptual positioning of Canadian defence intelligence in Figure 1-2). 25 government. 4 In some cases, where sufficient openness existed, it came at the price of keeping the identity of some sources confidential. In meeting this condition, a private list of confidential sources has been retained, to be shared with my thesis supervisors when requested, to verify contributions. DND and the CF were asked to review drafts of this study, to determine if any classified material had been inadvertently included.75 However, neither DND nor the CF was asked, or expected, to offer any academic judgment of the work. This is a normal procedure, voluntarily undertaken by those who write about intelligence matters, having had the benefit of their own practitioner experience and the support of serving intelligence appointments.76 It should not be mistaken for any kind of 'vetting' procedure. In addition to being restricted to unclassified documentation, literature consulted in this study was limited to English language material, a limitation thought to be reasonable for three reasons. First, not only is English a global language, it is particularly so for such topics such as international relations, security studies and intelligence. Second, English is the working language of intelligence used by ABCA countries, among which the UK and US produce what is likely the overwhelming majority of expert intelligence literature in the western world. Third, some of Canada's non-English speaking NATO allies and some non-NATO, non-English speaking countries are beginning to produce intelligence literature in English.77

74. For example, the Deputy Minister of the Department of National Defence (DM DND) and the Director General Intelligence Production (DGIP) in the CDI organization did not respond to formal, written requests for an interview. Finally, after a year and a half and various letters and e-mails, the DM DND formally declined. The DGIP never did respond. 75. In NDHQ, the CDI delegated a senior officer to review an early draft. Major-General Gosselin, the Commander of the Canadian Defence Academy (CDA) and Dr. A.J. Barrett, Director of Learning Management at the CDA, also reviewed drafts. 76. A recent example of this practice is found in Richard L. Russell, Sharpening Strategic Intelligence: Why the CIA Gets It Wrong and What Needs to be Done to Get It Right (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007). In his "Acknowledgments" Russell explains,"... the reader, in the interests of fair disclosure, should be aware that this book was submitted to pre-publication reviews at the CIA and Department of Defense. The reviews were conducted to ensure that I had not inadvertently disclosed any classified information gained during my former career at the CIA or in my current position as a professor at the National Defense Intelligence University." 77. For example, Cees Wiebes, Intelligence and the War in Bosnia, 1992-1995 (Amsterdam: Netherlands Institute for War Documentation, 2002). Also Andres Villamizar, La Reforma de la Inteligencia: Un Imperativo Democrdtico (Colombia: Editorial Kimpres Ltda.. 2004). Reviewed by Manuel A. Orellana Jr., Studies in Intelligence, vol. 50, no. 4 (Center for 26

Those concerned or curious about the breadth and depth of English intelligence literature might scan Ransom Clark's extensive annotated bibliography of intelligence literature maintained on the Internet, entitled The Literature of Intelligence: A Bibliography of Materials, with Essays, Reviews, and Comments, which contains thousands of titles, commentary and reviews.78 Although somewhat US-centric, Clark's bibliography contains a good deal of non-US material. Third, this research is based on a survey of expert literature, the criteria for which are developed in Chapter 2. The theoretical best practices derived from that expert literature are just that - derived only from the expert literature consulted. Benchmarking of theoretical best practices was not based on any other non-expert source. This could present something of an analytical risk, a kind of 'tunnel vision,' and for this reason, this study should not be considered a complete or exhaustive study of Canadian defence intelligence. Conversely, this approach serves to identify the gaps in expert intelligence literature and indicate important areas of research that require further attention. Fourth, a considerable challenge exists in the fact that so much of the expert literature in the intelligence field comes from the US. Throughout research, efforts were made to identify and use the widest range possible of other relevant international sources. However, the preponderance of US expert literature represents an inherent bias, typical of research in social sciences generally, where American expertise predominates in both scholarly literature and at the practitioner level. Finally, this study is necessarily centered on the CDI organization in NDHQ, because it is the centre of gravity of strategic level defence intelligence in Canada. Research extended beyond the CDI only so far as it had to, to determine the extent of defence intelligence activity. For example, it examined subordinate links to the intelligence staff in Canadian Expeditionary Forces Command (CEFCOM). Going up the national hierarchy, CDI links with the Privy Council Office (PCO) and the National Security Advisor to the Prime Minister (NSA/PM) were also explored. Defence

Intelligence Studies), at https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi- publications/csi-studies/studies/vol50no4/index.html (accessed October, 2009). 78. J. Ransom Clark, The Literature of Intelligence: A Bibliography of Materials, with Essays, Reviews, and Comments (Muskingum College), at http://intellit.muskingum.edu/index.html. (accessed 2 February 2009). I 27 intelligence links to international intelligence allies were studied too. Research also moved laterally to examine CDI relationships with other government departments (OGDs), allied defence intelligence organizations and non-governmental bodies. The application of these limitations shaped the design of this thesis, as outlined below.

THESIS DESIGN There are seven chapters in all. This first chapter introduces Canadian defence intelligence, poses the research question and outlines the overall research strategy and thesis design. A literature review follows in Chapter 2. Chapter 3 describes detailed research, the analytical framework and evaluation methods. The six conceptual components of intelligence were grouped in administrative categories to facilitate formatting and reporting. Each of chapters 4, 5 and 6 therefore respectively cover selected components compartmentalized in three categories: 1) Policy and Governance (for convenience, coded PG); 2) Organization (coded O) and People (coded P); and 3) Process, Product and Action (coded PPA).79 In each category, current defence intelligence practices are compared with theoretical best practices derived from expert literature and an evaluation offered of the degree to which Canadian defence intelligence organization and activity has been informed by expert literature. Explanations of gaps or anomalies are also provided. Chapter 4 addresses the policy and governance context of defence intelligence. Findings show that current practices are aligned with half of the theoretical best practices and that both a legislated basis and national policy for Canadian defence intelligence are absent. A similar format, dealing with organization and people, is followed in Chapter 5. Analysis of defence intelligence organization indicates that current practices are fully aligned with theoretical best practices. However, in the people component, no current practices are fully aligned with theoretical best practices. Significant deficiencies exist, such as a failure to adequately appreciate the full

79. These categories are described as 'administrative' because they do not affect analysis per se, which is focused on the components themselves. Administrative categories were adopted only for organizational reasons and were decided on the basis of component similarity. This categorization has not eliminated all duplication, but it has certainly helped to reduce it. It has also helped to shorten the final thesis considerably. Early drafts ran over 400 pages. Other component groupings might work equally well. 28 professional nature of intelligence activity and the lack of a comprehensive human resource strategy. Process, product and action are addressed together in Chapter 6 because all three are so interlinked that it is difficult to analyse each one separately. In this category, analysis indicates that over two-thirds of the theoretical best practices have an aligned current practice. Significant non-alignment is found in the lack of professionally prepared civilian leadership and the absence of an effective review and evaluation process. Concluding material is found in Chapter 7, with overall findings, evaluation and recommendations to close gaps, remedy anomalies and enhance alignment of current Canadian defence intelligence practices with theoretical best practices derived from expert literature.

SUMMARY This chapter developed a working definition of Canadian defence intelligence. It also suggested that serious study of expert intelligence literature can contribute to enhanced intelligence practices, but noted that there is no public evidence that Canadian defence intelligence adaptation, initiated by the 2004 DIR, has any such academic foundation. Consequently, this study sets about to evaluate the extent to which Canadian defence intelligence organization and activity is informed by expert opinion found in the literature on intelligence. Theoretical best practices derived from expert literature will be compared with current Canadian defence intelligence practices; gaps and anomalies explained; and recommendations made to enhance the alignment of current and theoretical best practices. The chapter also outlined the academic parameters of this study, which highlighted a focus on the strategic level and assumed that Canadian defence intelligence will continue to operate as part of the UKUSA and ABCA intelligence communities. Among the limitations identified, the most notable were the facts that research confined itself to English language material and, as with much of the research conducted in the field of intelligence studies, no classified material was reported upon. A review of principal expert literature now follows in Chapter 2. 29

CHAPTER 2 REVIEW OF EXPERT LITERATURE

INTRODUCTION The last chapter introduced this study, which evaluates Canadian defence intelligence by comparing current practices with theoretical best practices derived from expert literature. This chapter identifies and reviews that expert literature. For the purposes of this study, expert literature is defined as that which is written by an intelligence expert. The next section considers what is meant by the term intelligence expert and develops criteria to be used when designating someone as such. The third section traces the evolution of contemporary intelligence literature, followed by a fourth section that outlines the role and impact of ABCA government intelligence inquiries. A review of other expert intelligence literature associated with this study is provided in the fifth section.

EXPERT INTELLIGENCE LITERATURE Before initiating a detailed review of the literature that underpins this study, it is necessary, for two reasons, to define criteria used to designate intelligence experts and their expert literature. First, it is important to establish the professional and academic credibility of authors and their works upon which this study is based. While all are not of equal grade, all are expected to meet respectable, advanced academic standards. Second, intelligence is a multi-faceted field and the nature of associated experts and expert literature is equally varied. To ensure an adequate range of intelligence experts was consulted and their expert literature analyzed, criteria were defined in such a way as to include a variety of relevant experts and appropriate material. If included, authors and literature can be analyzed and subsequently heeded or discarded. On the other hand, authors or literature excluded by criteria too narrowly drawn will not be consulted or analyzed and their value left unknown. Therefore, the criteria for designating intelligence experts and their expert literature are intentionally generous rather than artificially exclusive. Paragraphs that follow develop criteria used to designate intelligence experts who write expert intelligence literature. First, the nature of expertise is reviewed to identify the 30

main characteristics of someone who could be dubbed an expert. Second, these expert characteristics are synthesized with practical aspects of intelligence activity, to produce criteria used to identify intelligence experts.

Expertise The initial development of criteria for being designated an expert is challenged by the fact that there are differing views on what 'expert' means. A specific judgment as to who is an intelligence expert and consequently whose work could be considered expert literature, is therefore subjective and relative. This is not unique to intelligence. Many universities list faculty 'experts' on their website but none describe any formal process or criteria used to evaluate such 'expertness.'80 As well, a review of the Criminal Code of Canada and a variety of judgments of the Supreme Court of Canada indicates that presiding judges are the final authority for deciding who is an expert witness or a court expert, on a case-by-case basis and on the strength of applications submitted by counsel.81 Interviews of people knowledgeable in the intelligence field suggest there are at least two types of intelligence experts - practitioner and academic. Wesley Wark, one of Canada's foremost intelligence scholars, produced a third.82 He felt there was a group of prominent journalists, mainly American, who had established themselves as bona fide

80. Royal Military College of Canada list of experts is at http://www.rmc.ca/pa- ap/med/index-eng.asp (accessed 3 January 2010). No accompanying criteria are shown. 81. Justice Canada, "Evidence on Trial," Criminal Code of Canada, Part XX, Procedure in Injury Trials and General Provisions, at http://laws.justice.gc.ca/en/showdoc/cs/C-46/bo- ga:l_XX-gb:s_655//en?noCookie (accessed August 2010). Also, Supreme Court of Canada, "R. v. Mohan, [1994] 2 S.C.R. 9 Date: May 5, 1994," Judgments of the Supreme Court of Canada, at http://scc.lexum.umontreal.ca/en/1994/1994rcs2-9/1994rcs2-9.html (accessed August 2008). The following criteria of expert testimony are found in the judgment: 1) Relevance; "Relevance is a threshold requirement for the admission of expert evidence as with all other evidence. Relevance is a matter to be decided by a judge as question of law"; 2) Necessity in Assisting the Trier of Fact; "With respect to matters calling for special knowledge, an expert in the field may draw inferences and state his opinion. An expert's function is precisely this: to provide the judge and jury with a ready-made inference which the judge and jury, due to the technical nature of the facts, are unable to formulate"; 3) The Absence of any Exclusionary Rule; "Compliance with [other] criteria will not ensure the admissibility of expert evidence if it falls afoul of an exclusionary rule of evidence separate and apart from the opinion rule itself; and 4) A Properly Qualified Expert; "Finally the evidence must be given by a witness who is shown to have acquired special or peculiar knowledge through study or experience in respect of the matters on which he or she undertakes to testify." I am also indebted to Mr. Tom Quiggan for his advice in this regard, based on his experience as a court appointed expert witness on terrorism. 82. Wesley Wark, Interview, 22 October 2007, and subsequent conversations. 31 expert media commentators on matters of intelligence. Some, he thought, might even have influence on public opinion.83 Furthermore, most of the academics and intelligence practitioners interviewed generally agreed that those who had achieved 'crossover' - people who had experience as both an intelligence practitioner and an academic - could be considered an intelligence expert. Such cases are almost always found to include those who first served as an intelligence practitioner and then moved into academia. Most left their intelligence service after significant accomplishment, but their public claim to the status of intelligence expert came only after doctoral or post-doctoral study and/or appointment to an established academic faculty at the university level.84 In rendering their judgment as to who they thought was an expert, participants offered a variety of views on the nature of the expertise demonstrated by that expert.

In their 1988 overview of papers by leading scholars interested in the nature of expertise, Michelene Chi and Robert Glaser highlighted seven key characteristics of expert performance.85 They argued that experts excel mainly in their own domains; perceive large meaningful patterns in their domain; are faster than novices at performing skills within their domain; have superior short- and long-term memory; see and represent

83. One example provided by Wark was David Ignatius, a columnist for the New York Times. Another is Seymour Hersh, a Pulitzer Prize winning investigative journalist and regular contributor to New Yorker magazine. 84. There are many examples of 'cross-over' experts among American intelligence authors; Bruce Berkowitz, Loch Johnson, Mark Lowenthal, Gregory Treverton, Jennifer Sims and James Wirtz to name a few. Michael Herman is a premier British 'cross-over' intelligence expert. Perhaps the most well known Canadian example is found in Anthony Campbell, a former Executive Director of the International Assessment Secretariat in the Privy Council Office. Since leaving government in 2000, Campbell, who does not hold a doctorate degree, has run his own private intelligence consulting firm, served as adjunct faculty to three Canadian Universities and presides over a blog devoted to the practice and organization of intelligence on the Global Future Forum website, https://www.globalfuturesforum.org/Home.php (restricted access, by invitation only) (accessed 2 December 2009). Another relatively unknown, but respected Canadian example is Stephane Lefebvre, currently an operational analysis section head with DRDC. Lefebvre does not hold a Ph.D. but has concluded some doctorate course work and has done some part-time instructional work at the university level. He has been relatively prolific in writing about intelligence issues, compared with other Canadian intelligence experts 85. Michelene T. H. Chi, Robert Glaser and Marshall J. Farr, eds., "Overview," in The Nature of Expertise (Hillsdale, New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1988), xxi. Chi is a Professor in the Department of Psychology at the University of Pittsburgh and a frequently cited author of books and papers on psychology. Glaser is a Professor Emeritus in the Department of Psychology, University of Pittsburgh. He received an Honourary Doctor of Science from McGill University in 2001. Farr was the Director, Personnel and Training Research Programs, Psychological Sciences Division, Office of Naval Research, US Navy. 32 a problem in their domain at a deeper (more principled) level than novices; have strong self-monitoring skills; and finally, experts spend a great deal of time analyzing a problem qualitatively.86 Another eminent psychologist, Harald A. Miege, argued that there are two approaches to understanding expertise.87 The first presents expertise as a socially constructed community of practice, connected to qualifications and social status. Here Miege suggests that if one accepts that chess masters become expert only by playing other chess masters, it seems to follow that expertise is a fundamentally social activity and that experts can only acquire and exercise their expertise in the course of social interaction. In the second approach, according to Miege, experts are defined by intrinsic characteristics such as the possession of special knowledge or capabilities, but not necessarily special practical skills.88 Where the first approach sees expertise-by-experience producing an expert in a field, the second approach, expertise-by-knowledge, produces an expert about a field, but lacking personal experience in the field.89 Both approaches apply to this study because intelligence is a field that can be experienced from the inside and studied from the outside. Among the various academic approaches to expertise and expert criteria, I found one that allowed me to reduce, but not eliminate, the degree of subjectivity in developing and defining criteria for designating an intelligence expert. Harry Collins and Robert Evans produced a 'Periodic Table of Expertises' upon which I based my determination of intelligence expert criteria.90 Collins and Evans narrow the field of expert candidates to those who exhibit specialist tacit knowledge, as distinct from those in the rest of society

86. Ibid., xv-xxviii. 87. Harald A. Miege, "Preface," in The Social Psychology of Expertise: Case Studies in Research, Professional Domains, and Expert Roles (Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 2001), ix. This work resulted from Miege's work at the Swiss Federal Institute in Zurich, where he interacted with engineers and scholars (experts) from natural sciences and economics. The book's early chapters dealing specifically with the characteristics of an expert are the most relevant to this research 88. Ibid. 89. Ibid., 4. 90. Harry Collins and Robert Evans, Rethinking Expertise (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007), 14. 33 who possess ubiquitous tacit knowledge.91 They welcome the apparent shift in the understanding of expertise from seeing knowledge as "quasi-logical or mathematical," toward a more "wisdom-based or competence-based model."92 In their view, attaining a high level of expertise in a "specialism" ought to be like "something attained by interactive immersion in the way of life of the culture rather than by extended study of dictionaries and grammars or their equivalents."93 "'Enculturation' is the only way to master an expertise which is deeply laden with tacit knowledge because it is only through common practice with others that the rules that cannot be written down can come to be understood."94 This expert status is achieved when: ... complete contexts are unselfconsciously recognized and performance is related to them in a fluid way using cues that is (sic) impossible to articulate and that if articulated would usually not correspond, or might even contradict, the rules explained to novices. Hence the common experience of driving a familiar journey to work and being unable to remember anything about it when one arrives; something else was occupying the mind during the journey and the unselfconsciou s self was left to cope with controlling the car just as it normally copes with walking or chewing (again activities about which we know nothing in a self-conscious way). It is also the case that when experts attempt to revert to a more self-conscious way of tackling a task they do it less well - like the mythical centipede that would trip over its legs it if thought about where it was putting them. In sum, skills practiced by individuals have to be 'internalized' if they are to be practiced efficiently.95

Collins and Evans further divide specialist tacit knowledge expertise into two categories - contributory expertise and interactional expertise. Contributory expertise enables those who have acquired it to contribute to the domain of that expertise. That is, they have the ability to do things in the domain.96 On the other hand, interactional expertise is mastery of the language of a domain, and mastery of any language requires enculturation within a linguistic community. Interactional expertise is gained by engaging

91. Ibid. According to Collins and Evans, ubiquitous tacit knowledge generally held by all involving the understanding of rules that cannot be expressed. For example, most of us know that a flame dances as it burns, but we do not know, nor can we explain, why. In another case, we note that almost all children can learn and use a language without being able to explain the rules of discourse. 92. Ibid., 23. 93. Ibid. 94. Ibid., 24. 95. Ibid., 25. 96. Ibid., 24. 34 in conversation with other experts. However, those attaining even the highest level of interactional expertise may be able to understand domain activity, and to discuss domain activity, but they will not be able to do domain things.97 It would seem then that both intelligence practitioners and non-practitioners can be expert in the field of intelligence, with the former having contributory expertise and the latter having interactional expertise. It should also be noted that it takes considerable time and training to become an expert. In 1996, K.A. Ericsson and A.C. Lehmann suggested that systematic differences between experts and less proficient individuals nearly always reflect attributes acquired by experts during lengthy training.98 This finding reflected earlier work by William Chase and Herbert Simon who reasoned that masters level chess players have spent 10,000 to 20,000 hours staring at chess positions.99 Intriguingly, the time required to become an expert is remarkably consistent across domains of activity - about ten years, approximately the same time it takes to win a Ph.D. and gain some post-doctoral experience.100 Theoretically speaking then, an expert is a person with extensive knowledge or ability in a particular domain of study, gained over about a decade of experience and training. These general characteristics will now be interpreted more practically and precisely.

97. Ibid., 35. 98. K. A. Ericsson and A. C. Lehmann, "Expert and exceptional performance: Evidence of maximal adaptation to task constraints," Annual Review of Psychology, vol. 47 (1996): 273- 305. Ericsson is the Conradi Eminent Scholar and Professor of Psychology at Florida State University. His research has focused on the structure and acquisition of expert performance and in particular how expert performers acquire and maintain their superior performance by extended deliberate practice. Lehmann has been Professor for Systematic Musicology and Music Psychology at the Hochschule fur Musik Wiirzburg (School of Music), Germany, since 2000. During an extended post-doctoral stay with Anders Ericsson in the psychology department of the Florida State University, he became interested in questions on skill acquisition and expertise. 99. W. G. Chase and H. A. Simon, "Perception in chess," Cognitive Psychology, vol. 4 (1973): 62. Chase was professor of psychology at Carnegie-Mellon University, noted for his experiments demonstrating that good memory is an acquired skill. Simon was also a professor at Carnegie-Mellon University. He was awarded the 1978 Nobel Prize in economics. 100. K. A. Ericsson, ed., The Road to Excellence: The Acquisition of Expert Performance in the Arts and Sciences, Sports and Games (Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1996), 10-11. Consider a four-year Honours undergraduate degree, followed by a two-year Masters degree (with thesis) and, optimistically, a three-year Doctoral degree. That leaves one-year of a post-doctoral fellowship to elevate one to the status of 'expert'. 35

Intelligence experts Given the analysis of expertise above, it was decided that intelligence practitioners with more than ten years experience in senior intelligence positions could safely be designated as intelligence experts, by virtue of their contributory expertise. In practice this includes military intelligence officers in the rank of Colonel and above (and some Lieutenant-Colonels of long service), and selected civilian intelligence practitioners with ten or more years intelligence experience at the level of Director and above. As for academic candidates that might be judged 'expert,' it was decided that, in keeping with their expected interactional expertise, they had to have a minimum of a decade of peer-recognized experience or study in the field of, or a field directly associated with, intelligence and have achieved at least one (preferably all) of the following specific accomplishments: a. authored a respected book dealing with intelligence, or published in academically credible, intelligence-related (preferably peer-reviewed) journals; b. widely cited by their peers; and c. provided judgments sought by others. In practice, these criteria resulted in the selection of academics having, or aspiring to, a relevant Ph.D. with specialization in the field of intelligence, or an established related field such as political science. The core of this group of intelligence experts, whose works were the first to be analyzed in an initial survey of expert literature, were drawn from members of the editorial boards of the two principal journals in the field of intelligence studies - Intelligence and National Security and International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence.101 Field bibliographies highlighted other authors who might be intelligence experts. As the survey of expert literature progressed, additional intelligence experts were identified by virtue of their being cited in footnotes and endnotes. Interviews were another important method used to identify intelligence experts and expert literature. Participants were asked who they thought were experts and what works they considered

101. Intelligence and National Security (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge). International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintellligence (Philadelphia, PA: Taylor and Francis). 36

to be expert. And so it went; continuing analysis identified additional intelligence experts. Of course it was not always so clear and precise an exercise, because the background of many authors had to be examined before a final judgment as to their 'expertness' could be made. There was some circularity too. One author would cite another, who would cite the first author. In the end, given the background knowledge of the researcher and the fact that the field of intelligence studies is not as large as other fields of study, principal intelligence experts and key works of expert intelligence literature were identified relatively quickly and easily. Nonetheless, along the way, it was found that some expert intelligence literature was produced by sources that did not fit neatly into either the practitioner or academic category. Institutional producers of expert intelligence literature, such as government- sponsored think tanks (e.g. RAND) or independent academic institutions (e.g. the Inter- University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society) occasionally author collaborative, peer-reviewed papers that rate expert status. Other notable examples of this type of source are government Commissions of Inquiry. They will be discussed in more detail, in later paragraphs. Having decided on the criteria for designating intelligence experts who produce the expert literature, this chapter moves on to outline the evolution of modern expert intelligence literature.

EVOLUTION OF MODERN EXPERT INTELLIGENCE LITERATURE Post-Second World War public interest in intelligence issues was aroused in Ottawa, Canada, in 1946, after Igor Gouzenko, a Soviet cipher clerk, defected to Canadian authorities, bringing with him a substantial collection of documents indicating the presence of an extensive Soviet spy network infesting western governments.102 A subsequent Canadian Royal Commission examined the degree to which these Soviet spies had penetrated Canada.103 Concern over the screening of government officials and the

102. Amy Knight, How the Cold War Began: The Igor Gouzenko Affair and the Hunt for Soviet Spies (New York: Carroll and Graf Publishers, 2006). 103. Robert Taschereau and R. L. Kellock, The Report of the Royal Commission to Investigate the Facts Relating to and the Circumstances Surrounding the Communication, by Public Officials and Other Persons in Positions of Trust of Secret and Confidential Information to Agents of a Foreign Power (Ottawa: Edmond Cloutier, 1946), at http://epe.lac- 37

handling of classified documents percolated inside the Canadian government during the Cold War, so much so that the issue eventually became a subject of another Royal Commission. The Royal Commission on Security (The Mackenzie Commission) presented a report in 1968, after a "full and confidential inquiry into the operation of Canadian security methods and procedures."104 Neither report addressed intelligence practices per se, but intelligence certainly formed a backdrop to both inquiries. However, any public interest in intelligence aroused in Canada did not linger very long. A more sustained interest took root in the US. A 1947 study of American intelligence failures in the period before the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, on 7 December 1941, concluded that there had indeed been some hints of impending Japanese activity, but crucial information - 'signals' - had not been culled from the 'noise' of unimportant traffic, nor sufficiently analyzed to warn of a specific attack. The report led to an extensive re-organization of the US national security machinery and the establishment of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in 1948.105 It would become an American habit to address perceived intelligence weaknesses by organizational change. By the mid-1970s, public interest in US intelligence issues was blooming. In 1974 American newspaper columnist Seymour Hersh wrote a series of articles in the New York Times revealing how the CIA had violated its Congressional charter by spying on Americans.106 Many critical observers consider the next year, 1975, as the Year of Intelligence (also known as the Year of Inquiry). It was a watershed year for intelligence literature in the US, in which four Congressional or executive branch studies relating to

bac. gc.ca/100/200/301 /pco-bcp/commi ssions-ef/taschereau 1946ii-eng/taschereau 1946ii-eng.htm (accessed 4 October 2010). 104. M. W. Mackenzie, Report on the Royal Commission on Security (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1969), 1, at http://epe.lac-bac.gc.ca/100/200/301/pco-bcp/commissions- ef/mackenziel969-eng/mackenziel969-eng.pdf (accessed 24 April 2010). 105. Roberta Wohlstetter, Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1962). For a critical account of the checkered history of the CIA see also Tim Weiner, Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA (New York: Doubleday, 2007). 106. The series of articles began on 22 December 1974 and ran almost daily until year's end. They accused the CIA of "massive" domestic spying. According to Loch Johnson in A Season of Inquiry: The Senate Intelligence Investigations (Lexington, Kentucky: University Press of Kentucky, 1985), 9, over 10,000 files on American citizens were opened. Hersh first gained worldwide recognition in 1969 for exposing the My Lai Massacre and its cover-up during the Vietnam War, for which he received the 1970 Pulitzer Prize for International Reporting. More recently, his 2004 reports on the US military's mistreatment of detainees at Abu Ghraib, in Iraq, prison gained much attention. 38

government intelligence were completed.107 The American investigations acted as catalysts for wider academic study of intelligence, but there were also other reasons for this 'awakening.' With the 1974 revelation of the existence of ULTRA intelligence during the Second World War and other previously classified post-war material becoming available, there was now hard data to analyze.108 Alleged strategic intelligence failures, such as the failure to foresee revolution in Iran and the overthrow of the Shah by religious extremists (1979); the failure to anticipate the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (1979); and the failure to predict the Argentine occupation of the Falkland Islands (1982) fed the growing appetite for more study of intelligence. Moreover, in the 1970s, government inquiries in Canada and Australia uncovered a myriad of intelligence service abuses, wrongdoings and failures.109

By the early 1980s, there was growing recognition that intelligence had played a major role in twentieth century international affairs. Burgeoning academic interest led to the founding of the British Study Group on Intelligence and the Canadian Association of Security and Intelligence Studies (CASIS) in 1984. Others organized the Intelligence

107. Stuart Farson, "Schools of Thought," Conflict Quarterly, vol. 9, no. 2 (Spring 1989): 56. Farson is one of Canada's most prolific and enduring intelligence academics. The most prominent American investigation in 1975 was the United States Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities (Church Committee), composed of fourteen reports, in 1976. All reports can be found at Assassination Archives and Research Center, at http://www.aarclibrary.org/publib/contents/contents_church.htm (accessed 3 July 2008). Church Committee reports eventually resulted in stronger legislated Congressional oversight of US intelligence agencies. 108. Sir F. H. Hinsley, Codebreakers: The Inside Story ofBletchley Park (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001). ULTRA was the codename given to the intelligence derived from the interception of German signals traffic after the Allies broke the German ENIGMA machine codes. 109. In Canada, see "Commissions of Inquiry" on the Privy Council website, at http://www.pco-bcp.gc.ca/index.asp?lang=eng&page=information&sub=commissions (accessed 2 February 2009). The Report of the Royal Commission to Investigate the Facts Relating to and the Circumstances Surrounding the Communication, by Public Officials and Other Persons in Positions of Trust of Secret and Confidential Information to Agents of a Foreign Power (Ottawa: Edmond Cloutier, 1946); The Report on the Royal Commission on Security (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1969) and The Commission of Inquiry Concerning Certain Activities of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, First Report. In Australia, see the Royal Commission on Intelligence and Security (RCIS) (Canberra, 1977). Portions of this classified report were released in 2008. Information can be found in the National Archives of Australia at http://www.naa.gov.au/whats- on/records-releases/rcis.aspx (accessed 23 July 2008). In the US see United States Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities (Church Committee), 14 Reports, 1976. At Assassination Archives and Research Center, at http://www.aarclibrary.org/publib/contents/contents_church.htm (accessed 10 July 2008). 39

Studies Section of the International Studies Association that same year.110 Intelligence literature subsequently featured enhanced sophistication and took on a more philosophical tone to deal with the morality of intelligence activity, accountability structures, intelligence theory and tradecraft.111 By the 1990s, intelligence authors began to reorient their attention to the now predominant threat of terrorism.112 ABCA intelligence literature grew and matured throughout this period, in which the US became and remains the literary 'superpower.' In the wake of post-9/11 inquiries, American attention has shifted to the effectiveness and organization of the overall intelligence 'community.'113 British intelligence literature ranks second in quantity in the English language, but much of it has been historical, inspired largely by increasing releases of intelligence files from public archives and windfalls from former Soviet agents.114 Australia and Canada stand third with surprisingly substantial contributions that come principally from government inquiries and a small group of interested academics.115

110. Roy Godson, ed., Comparing Foreign Intelligence: The U.S., the USSR, the U.K. and the Third World (Washington, New York and London: Pergamon-Brassey's International Defense Publishers, Inc., 1988), ix. 111. See Michael Handel, Leaders and Intelligence (London: Frank Cass, 1989); and War, Strategy and Intelligence (London: Frank Cass, 1989). Also, Walter Laqueur, A World of Secrets: The Uses and Limits of Intelligence (New York, N.Y.: Basic Books, 1985); and Ariel Levite, Intelligence and Strategic Surprises (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987). Perhaps the most comprehensive account of the period is provided by Jeffrey T. Richelson and Desmond Ball, The Ties that Bind: Intelligence Cooperation between the UKUSA Countries (Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1985). See also a study by Lawrence Freedman who argued that external threats are as much determined by existing bureaucratic culture as they are by the provision of intelligence estimates. Lawrence Freedman, U.S. Intelligence and the Soviet Strategic Threat (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1977). 112. Terrorism began to receive significant attention from intelligence scholars in the late 1980s. See " Part III. Terrorism and the Intelligence Process," in Intelligence and Intelligence Policy in a Democratic Society, ed. Stephen J. Cimbala (Dobbs Ferry, New York: Transnational Publishers, Inc.,1987), 145-196. 113. For example, Gregory Treverton, Intelligence for an Age of Terror (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2009); and Reshaping National Intelligence for an Age of Information (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2003). 114. Christopher Andrew, an eminent British intelligence historian at Oxford University, is perhaps the most prominent and prolific author benefiting from access to former Soviet agents and documents after the end of the Cold War. With Vasili Mitrokhin, a former KGB officer and archivist, Andrew wrote The Mitrokhin Archive: The KGB in Europe and the West, vol. 1 (London: Penguin Books, 2000); and The Mitrokhin Archive: The KGB and the World, vol. 2 (London: Penguin Books, 2005). 115. The 'core' group of Canadian academics include David Charters (University of New Brunswick), Stuart Farson (Simon Fraser University), John Ferris (University of Calgary), Martin 40

Elsewhere, an emerging strain of literature is found in material dealing with the 'democratization' of intelligence in Europe, Latin America, Africa and Asia.116 For some reason, Canadian practitioners have been less prolific than their allied colleagues. To be sure, there have been some practitioner products over the years, but these have tended not to be based on advanced academic work.117 A recent exception is Kurt Jensen's examination of Canada's foreign intelligence effort during the period 1939- 1951.u8 Particularly noticeable by their absence are contributions by Canadian defence intelligence practitioners. Considering that the CF has been continuously engaged in conflicts around the world for most of the twentieth century, one might expect the burgeoning field of intelligence studies to be enriched by academic examinations of defence intelligence activity in conventional warfighting, counter-insurgency, peace support and humanitarian missions abroad. It seems however, that Canadian defence intelligence and related academic interest have been like two ships that pass in the night, each oblivious to the other's existence.

Nonetheless, there is an abundance of expert intelligence literature to be examined. In fact, there is so much that I decided to conduct an initial survey of selected works, to get a sense of the field, to detect the primary issues garnering attention and to identify the principal authors who lead intelligence studies.

Rudner (Professor Emeritus, Carleton University), Kevin O'Brien (Director of Alesia PSI Consultants Ltd.), Wesley Wark (University of Toronto) and Reg Whitaker (Distinguished Research Professor Emeritus at York University and Adjunct Professor of Political Science at the University of Victoria). Unlike many American intelligence scholars, none have professional intelligence experience. 116. For example, see the work of the Geneva Center for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF). Their publications are found at http://www.dcaf.ch/publications/kms/index.cfm (accessed 24 September 2008). Also see Stefania Ducci, Italian Intelligence Services and Accountability, a paper published by the Research Institute for American and European Studies, http://www.rieas.gr/ (accessed 7 July 2009). 117. One example is John Starnes, Closely Guarded: A Life in Canadian Security and Intelligence (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1998). This book focuses on the minutiae of the author's career and is not a particularly lively read. Jack Granatstein, an eminent Canadian historian, described the book, in a 1999 review, as "ultimately unsatisfying." 118. Kurt F. Jensen, Cautious Beginnings: Canadian Foreign Intelligence 1939-1951 (Toronto: University of British Columbia Press, 2008). This book is based on Jensen's doctoral thesis. It recounts the early days of Canada's foreign intelligence program and shows clearly that Canada was an important, but not leading, player. 41

INITIAL SURVEY EXPERT INTELLIGENCE LITERATURE I began with an initial survey of on-line intelligence-oriented bibliographies and two prominent journals that provided early identification of the most prolific intelligence authors and the topics that received most attention. J. Ransom Clark's annotated on-line bibliography is the best in this regard. It divides the thousands of works covered into categories by author, by subject and by historical event.119 The Taylor Collection (US) includes a variety of foreign volumes among its approximately eight hundred and forty eight largely historical entries.120 Glenda Armstrong maintains another substantial US intelligence bibliography at the US Air Force Air University Library.121 I found no equivalent Canadian intelligence bibliographies.122

Two prominent intelligence-oriented journals are central to the study of intelligence; one, a peer-reviewed journal published in the UK - Intelligence and National Security; and the other, a non-peer reviewed journal published in the US - International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence.11* They are managed by executive editors and editorial boards that include over two dozen prominent academics and former senior intelligence practitioners, many of whom are identified as respected authors in the field of

119. J. Ransom Clark, The Literature of Intelligence, at http://intellit.muskingum.edu/index.html. (accessed 2 December 2010). The US Library of Congress is another substantial source of intelligence literature, but it requires considerable effort to search all entries ranging from principal works used in this study to historical material such as intelligence notes written to General George Washington. See http://www.l0c.g0v/fedsearch/metasearch/?cclquery=intelligence&search_button=GO#query=(int elligence)&filter=pz:id=lcweblammemlcataloglppoclthomas (accessed 29 September 2010). 120. See the John E. Taylor Collection, at http://www.archives.gov/research/alic/special- collections/taylor-collection.html (accessed 6 March 2010). John E. Taylor, who worked as an archivist in the US National Archives for sixty-three years. 121. See the bibliography at http://www.au.af.mil/au/aul/bibs/mi.htm (accessed 21 April 2009). 122. Although note that Clark's on-line bibliography does contain a 'Canada' segment. Defence Research and Development Canada conducts intelligence research, but its work is not made public. 123. Intelligence and National Security (Abingdon, Oxon, UK: Routledge), at http://www.tandf.co.uk/journals/fint (accessed 25 May 2010). International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence (Philadelphia, PA: Routledge), at http://www.tandf.co.uk/journals/ujic (accessed 25 May 2010). 42 intelligence studies in the bibliographies. Journal contents run the gamut from historical material to contemporary commentary on modern intelligence issues. Other substantive articles and papers are produced by the CIA Center for the Study of Intelligence (CSI).125 Each CSI issue contains a rich mixture of intelligence material, including historical, comparative, theoretical and empirical studies. Also included in almost every issue is a section called "Intelligence Officer's Bookshelf," in which long­ time editor Hay den B. Peake identifies and reviews a number of intelligence publications new to the market.126 CSI monographs and reviews point to the most frequently cited authors. Furthermore, academic papers on intelligence studies found in the Intelligence Studies Section of the International Studies Association (ISA/ISS) provided a third source of information on principal authors and issues.127 My initial survey of field literature continued with an examination of selected works chosen arbitrarily for their focus on contemporary intelligence issues and their apparent breadth of view. Loch K. Johnson's edited five volume set Strategic Intelligence provided wide coverage of intelligence issues and a valuable mixture of works by older and newer intelligence scholars.128 Volume One imparts a sense of the state of the discipline and

124. In April 2011, the two editorial boards had a total membership of 91 {Intelligence and National Security, 45 members; and International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, 46 members). Of the 91, only six are members of both editorial boards: David M. Barrett, Michael Goodman, Loch K. Johnson, Robert Jervis, David Kahn and Mark M. Lowenthal. 125. The CSI website is at https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of- intelligence/index.html (accessed 4 January 2010). Of particular note is the CSI series Studies in Intelligence an in-house electronic journal that offers unclassified editions dating back to 1992. There is also a classified dimension available only to qualified US personnel. 126. See a recent version of Peake's contribution at https://www.cia.gov/library/center- for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/vol.-54-no.-3/pdfs/Extract- Bookshelf%20Number%2032-September-2010.pdf (accessed 22 December 2010). 127. The ISA/ISS website is at http://iss.loyola.edu/ (accessed 2 May 2010). See the 2010 ISA Annual Conference papers 128. Loch K. Johnson, Strategic Intelligence, five vols. (Westport, Connecticut and London: Praeger Security International, 2007). Johnson is Regents Professor of Political Science at the University of Georgia and one of the pre-eminent American intelligence scholars. He is editor of the journal Intelligence and National Security and has written numerous books on American foreign policy. Johnson was special assistant to the chair of the Senate Select Committee House Subcommittee on Intelligence Oversight (Church Committee) from 1975 to 1976, and subsequently served as staff director of the House Subcommittee on Intelligence Oversight from 1977 to 1979. In 1995 and 1996, Johnson worked with the chair of the Aspin Brown Commission on Intelligence. In his five-volume set, there are forty-nine chapters in total, 43 provides a review of major authors and foundation works in the field. In the second volume, focus shifts to a more detailed examination of the so-called intelligence cycle; perceived recent failures of that process and their implications; the roles of oversight; imagery and signals intelligence; the value of espionage; the contributions of intelligence to globalization; the intelligence-policy nexus; and the value of intelligence post mortems. Volume Three is devoted to perhaps the most controversial component of American intelligence - covert action. Volume Four is concerned with counterintelligence and counterterrorism.129 Volume Five gives detailed attention to the problems of accountability and safeguards against abuse of power. Each volume includes extensive appendices that add documentary support and suggestions for additional study. Analysis of the material in these five volumes confirmed, in my mind, what I see as the six components of contemporary intelligence practice - policy and governance, organization, people, process, product and action. Three books provided twentieth century historical context. Jeffery T. Richelson examined British and American intelligence efforts against the Germans in the First World War, against the Nazis in the Second World War and subsequently against the Soviet Union throughout the Cold War. He demonstrated the maturing of military intelligence from its initial tactical focus to a strategic-level, global-interest government activity.130 Given its success in the 1991 Gulf War, the dominating influence of US intelligence capability at the end of the twentieth century was clear, and the value of the ABCA and UKUSA agreements unmistakable, especially for Canada. His principal point is that in an era of post-Cold War geo-strategic instability and emerging transnational threats such as terrorism, governments will continue to need formidable intelligence capabilities to avoid war, or win those that cannot be avoided. The ABCA and UKUSA intelligence alliances, both of which Canada is a member, are examined more closely by Richard Aldrich, in a detailed history of the ABCA alliance written by fifty-one authors - thirty-eight from the US, eight from the UK, and two from each of Canada and Germany. There is one Israeli author. 129. Although covert action and counterintelligence are purposely not included in this study, I nonetheless continued to examine these activities when they came up, principally to confirm, in my own mind, that I was justified in excluding them. 130. Jeffrey T. Richelson, A Century of Spies: Intelligence in the Twentieth Century (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995). 44 and Cold War secret intelligence relations between principal western allies.131 Aldrich reveals a number of US/UK covert operations against the Soviet bloc in Europe, Asia and Latin America during the Cold War and in doing so demonstrates how such aggressive action is considered by the Americans to be an integral part of intelligence activity. The British and American predilection for direct, covert action was not shared by Canada or Australia, both of whom tended to play supporting roles, avoiding 'official' direct engagement, so far as we know. Expanding on these historical studies, Roy Godson provides additional background in his comparative study of US, UK, USSR and Third World foreign intelligence establishments. He compares various approaches to intelligence practiced by parliamentary and republican style governments, as well as the more dramatic differences between democratic and security-state intelligence organizations.132 Godson's work convinced me that my study should focus on liberal democratic regimes such as Canada because the intelligence processes in non-liberal, non-democratic states are so fundamentally different from democratic practices, mainly in the way they tend to shun objective analysis and remain subservient to perceptions of a ruling elite. Notions of 'best practices' and open benchmarking are absent in totalitarian states. Such habits hold little or no relevance to any study of Canadian defence intelligence. Nine additional volumes examined various intelligence issues of interest from 1945 until the present. First, a preview of Post-Second World War intelligence analysis in the US, by Sherman Kent, in 1947, gave intelligence analysis its historical and social science pedigree, which has influenced western analytical cadres ever since.133 Kent introduces

131. Richard Aldrich, The Hidden Hand: Britain, America and Cold War Secret Intelligence (Woodstock and New York: The Overlook Press, 2001). 132. Roy Godson, ed., Comparing Foreign Intelligence: The U.S., the USSR, the U.K. and the Third World (Washington, New York and London: Pergamon-Brassey's International Defense Publishers, Inc., 1988). 133. Sherman Kent, Strategic Intelligence for American Foreign Policy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1949). In an earlier book, written while he was still a professor of history at Yale University, Kent enunciated certain principles of the historian's calling that paralleled his later theory and practice of professional intelligence. In many of its passages one need only substitute the words "intelligence officer" for "historian." For example: "When the evidence seems to force a single and immediate conclusion, then that is the time to worry about one's bigotry and to do a little conscientious introspection into why this particular conclusion stands out. Was it in the material or was it in you? The command of Socrates, "know thyself," never gave richer rewards than in the world of what we've been calling systematic study. Sherman 45 the theoretical necessity for the separation of intelligence analysis and policy making, to ensure analysis remains objective and free from 'politicization.' This separation of 'church and state' remained a popular tenet - perhaps dogma - throughout the Cold War period. However, there is more to intelligence than analysis. In 1959 Harry Howe Ransom was the first scholar to publicly explore the entire US intelligence apparatus and its role within government.134 While acknowledging the traditional distrust shown by Americans toward secret organizations, Ransom went on to argue that the US needs to maintain as large and expensive an intelligence organization in peacetime as was needed during war. The Soviet nuclear threat demanded no less. In a preview of intelligence producer/consumer relationship issues to come, Ransom cautioned against expecting more from intelligence than it can realistically give, but insisted that policy- and other decision-makers could do more to understand and use intelligence effectively. Both pieces of advice have enjoyed mixed success in western governments, in the years since. Ransom's concerns continued to be echoed in the intelligence literature of the mid-1980s, which saw a trend of formalized intelligence studies in academia. Eleven prominent American scholars contributed to a book edited by Stephen Cimbala, in which they discussed the enduring risk of having intelligence politicized and examined the evolving role of intelligence in addressing the growing terrorist threat.135 Fifth, in the latter half of the 1990s detailed commentary on intelligence tradecraft started to appear. Additional perspectives of intelligence issues, particularly those associated with intelligence analysis, came in a volume edited by Stuart Farson, David Stafford and Wesley Wark, which forecasted many intelligence issues that remain with us

Kent, Writing History, 2nd (rev.) ed. (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1967), 5. Cited in Harold P. Ford, A Tribute to Sherman Kent, Center for the Study of Intelligence at https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publicatipns/books-and- monographs/sherman-kent-and-the-board-of-national-estimates-collected- essays/ltribute.html#rft4 (accessed 1 August 2010). I owe thanks to Dr. Michael Hennessy of the Royal Military College of Canada for steering me to this source. 134. Harry Howe Ransom, Central Intelligence and National Security (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1959). 135. Stephen J. Cimbala, ed., Intelligence and Intelligence Policy in a Democratic Society (Dobbs Ferry, New York: Transnational Publishers, Inc., 1987). 46 today.136 Britain's Michael Herman authored a profound and articulate discussion of the government intelligence function, in which he examined UK and allied intelligence organizations and processes as they looked at the end of the Cold War period. In Intelligence in Peace and War he challenged traditional views of the intelligence process and pointed out how untidy and imperfect intelligence activity can be.137 American-centric perspectives of post-Cold War intelligence development can be found in the Handbook of Intelligence Studies, edited by Loch Johnson in 2007.138 They convinced me that, together, Policy and Governance together form one of the six components of intelligence practice in government. The continuing impact of the 'Year of Inquiry' (1975) is felt throughout this volume and it continues to drive American oversight and accountability measures today. Added to accountability concerns are contemporary issues of intelligence effectiveness raised by 9/11 and Iraq WMD inquiries. Seventh, in 2008, Peter Gill, Stephen Marrin and Mark Phythian edited Intelligence Theory: Key questions and debates, a diverse collection of essays by scholars centrally involved in the debate about the role and the utility of theory in intelligence studies.139 In the end, it was all somewhat unfulfilling because the debate promised in the title never really took place. Authors essentially talked past each other. Various recommendations contradicted others without explaining why one approach might be better than another. In their chapters, Richard Betts, Glenn Hastedt, and Douglas Skelley argued for an organizational theory approach to the subject. Principal editor Mark Phythian wrote that the field of intelligence studies needs to "establish itself as a distinct subject area," but went on to say that traditional international relations (IR) theory on "structural realism" provided a "theoretical basis for addressing key [intelligence] questions."140 James Sheptycki then suggested sociology can serve as an alternative

136. Stuart Farson, David Stafford, and Wesley Wark, eds., Security and Intelligence in a Changing World: New Perspectives for the 1990s (London: Frank Cass, 1991). 137. Herman, "The Production Process," in Intelligence in Peace and War, 283-304. 138. Loch K. Johnson, Handbook of Intelligence Studies (London and New York: Routledge, 2007). 139. Peter Gill, Stephen Marrin, and Mark Phythian, eds., Intelligence Theory: Key questions and debates (London and New York: Routledge, 2008). 140. Ibid., 61. 47 theoretical base for intelligence studies.141 In all this, not only was real dialectic debate absent, American authors did not offer much evidence beyond US examples to support their views. A panorama of other academic views of intelligence were found in a compendium of works edited by Andrew, Aldrich and Wark, which runs a gamut from the intelligence cycle through counter-terrorism; ethics, accountability and control; to new warfare.142 The volume brings together both classic literature and writings on new developments that, in my mind, confirmed people, process and product as components of intelligence. Finally, I concluded this initial literature survey by studying the structure, functioning and development of thirty-one national intelligence organizations, based on presentations in the two volumes of Handbook of Global Security and. Intelligence, edited by Farson, Gill, Phythian and Shlomo Shpiro.143 The chapters outline changes to intelligence organizations of new and established democracies (and some arguably non- democracies - i.e. Cuba) that reflect the nature of modern threats to national security and the impact of contemporary democratic accountability requirements. Taken together they confirm the status of policy and governance, organization, people and process as components of intelligence. To complement all this academic material, I sought out government intelligence literature that would provide practitioner perspectives on issues related to the six components of intelligence (e.g. doctrines, directives, briefing scripts etc.). Within that body of government intelligence literature, the reports of twenty-six ABCA government inquiries related to security and intelligence stand out. The next section reviews those

141. James Sheptycki, "Policing, intelligence theory and the new human security paradigm: some lessons from the field," in Intelligence Theory: Key questions and debates, eds. Peter Gill, Stephen Marrin, and Mark Phythian (London and New York: Routledge, 2008), 166- 185. 142. Christopher Andrew, Richard J. Aldrich, and Wesley K. Wark, eds., Secret Intelligence: A Reader (London and New York: Routledge, 2009). 143. Stuart Farson, Peter Gill, Mark Phythian, and Shlomo Shpiro, eds., PSI Handbook of Global Security and Intelligence, two vols. (Westport, Connecticut and London: Praeger Security International, 2008). 48

inquiries and highlights the central role they played in guiding further data collection and analysis.

THE ABCA INTELLIGENCE INQUIRIES ABCA governments have conducted at least twenty-six major government inquiries into national intelligence affairs since 1946. They were invariably led by notable government members or distinguished jurists, supported by an academically qualified staff, many of whom had previous government intelligence experience. Most inquiries resulted from, and addressed issues related to, a specific incident that was usually classed as an 'intelligence failure.' In later chapters, theoretical best practices are principally based on ABCA inquiries because they highlight important issues and usually provide a set of prescriptive recommendations. These recommendations were also used to guide research involving other expert literature. However, as helpful as they have been, the major ABCA inquiries, shown in Table 2-1 below, rate a word of caution. All were promulgated, at least in part, as a result of perceived intelligence failure and within contexts of politically sensitive times. It was therefore necessary to remain cognizant of the possibility that some recommended remedies might have been offered because they were the most politically acceptable at the time, not necessarily because they were truly a 'better' idea. 49

Year Country and Inquiry Canada: The Report of the Royal Commission to Investigate the Facts Relating to and the Circumstances Surrounding the Communication by Public Officials and Other Persons in Positions of Trust of Secret and Confidential Information to 1946 Agents of a Foreign Power (Kellock Taschereau Commission), at http://epe.lac-bac.gc.ca/100/200/301/pco- bcp/commissions-ef/taschereaul946ii-eng/taschereaul946ii- eng.htm (accessed 19 February 2009). Australia: The Royal Commission on Espionage, at http://recordsearch.naa.gov.au/SearchNRetrieve/Interface/DetailsRepor 1957 ts/AgencyDetail.aspx?reg_no=CA%201882&singleRecord=T (accessed 6 May 2009). Canada: The Report of the Royal Commission on Security (Mackenzie Commission), at http://epe.lac-bac.gc.ca/100/200/301/pco- 1969 bcp/commi ssions-ef/mackenzie 1969-eng/mackenzie 1969-eng.pdf (accessed 21 February 2009). US: President's Commission on CIA Activities Within the US (Rockefeller Commission), at 1975 http://www.aarclibrary.org/publib/contents/church/contents_church_re ports_rockcomm.htm (accessed 24 August 2008). US: US Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities (Church Committee), at 1976 http://www.aarclibrary.org/publib/contents/church/contents_church_re ports.htm (accessed 18 October 2009). Australia: Royal Commission on Intelligence and Security (Hope Commission), at http://www.naa.gov.aU/collection/explore/security/rcis/index.aspx#sect ion3 (accessed 2 January 2009).

1977 US: US House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (Pike Committee - unpublished). See article by Gerald K. Haines, "Looking for a Rogue Elephant, The Pike Committee Investigations of the CIA," at https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi- publications/csi-studies/studies/winter98_99/art07.html (accessed 3 March 2009). Canada: Commission of Inquiry concerning Certain Activities of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (McDonald Commission - three reports), at http://epe.lac-bac.gc.ca/100/200/301/pco-bcp/commissions- 1981 ef/mcdonaldl979-81-eng/mcdonaldl979-81-eng.htm (accessed 23 February 2009). The inquiry started in 1977, but the third and final report was published in 1981. Australia: Royal Commission on Australia's Security and Intelligence 1985 Agencies (Third Hope Commission), available from the Australian National Library at 50

http://catalogue.nla.gov.au/Record/5831071ookfor=author:%22Royal% 20Commission%20on%20Australia's%20Security%20and%20Intellig ence%20Agencies%22&offset=5&max=10 (accessed 11 August 2010). Australia: Commission of Inquiry into the Australian Security and Intelligence Agencies (Samuels Codd Commission). The Commission report was never made public, but its initial introduction in the Australian Senate is covered at 1995 http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;page=0; query=samuels%20commission%20Decade%3A%221990s%22%20Y ear%3A%221995%22%20Month%3A%2206%22%20Day%3A%2201 %22;rec=2;resCount=Default (accessed 11 September 2010). US: US Commission on the Roles and Capabilities of the US Intelligence 1996 Community Report (Aspin Brown Commission), at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/int/index.html (accessed 23 February 2009). US: US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the US House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence Report - Joint Inquiry Into Intelligence Community Activities Before and After the Terrorist 2002 Attacks of September 11, 2001, at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/serialset/creports/pdf/fullreport_errata.pdf (accessed 13 March 2009). Australia: Intelligence on Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction (Permanent Joint Committee on ASIO, ASIS and DSD Inquiry), at http://www.aph.gov.aU/house/committee/pjcaad/WMD/report.htm#full report (accessed 19 April 2009).

UK • Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction: Intelligence and Assessments (Intelligence and Security Committee Report (ISC)), at https://3228332972681721251-a-independent-gov-uk-s- sites.googlegroups.com/a/independent.gov.uk/isc/files/200309_ISC_ WMD_Report.pdf?attachauth=ANoY7crKx3vZu9wFs4-288- 2003 K6M4L_zKsQelJ46- WPs0dl7VIUodRLrs5EQfgH6TVhUiwJn2BaSUP0eA9ghDg_q_Rprl iUOXN- OgGWOzkxHYiD9yK6UNAVOocW4vXuDIGrEA8aUwgvk4YDjRe lmBFW3tIPBwVkWRLLpUlGY_WC5opcbiU5XsRVsEom5WhMQ5 u2khTB7uoLLu89ijUoNp2K3SlnpEF3UgHSw%3D%3D&attredirect s=0 (accessed 5 June 2008). • The Decision to go to War in Iraq. Ninth Report of Session 2002-03, Volume 1 (House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee Report), at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200203/cmselect/cmfaff/ 813/813.pdf (accessed 21 April 2009). Canada 2004 • Defence Intelligence Review (unpublished) • Commission of Inquiry into the Action of Canadian Officials in 51

Relation to Maher Arar (O'Connor Commission - two reports), at http://epe.lac-bac.gc.ca/100/206/301/pco- bcp/commissions/maher_arar/07-09- 13/www.ararcommission.ca/eng/26.htm (accessed 30 November 2009).

Australia: Report of the Inquiry into Australian Intelligence Agencies {Flood Report), at http://www.dpmc.gov.au/publications/intelligence_inquiry/docs/intelli gence_report.pdf (accessed 15 March 2009).

UK: • Review of Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction {Butler Report), at http://www.archive2.official- documents.co.uk/document/deps/hc/hc898/898.pdf (accessed 2 May 2009). • Report of the Inquiry into the Circumstances Surrounding the Death of Dr David Kelly C.M.G. {Hutton Report), at http://www.the-hutton- inquiry.org.uk/content/report/ (accessed 9 October 2009).

US • US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence - Report on the US Intelligence Community's Pre-War Intelligence Assessments on Iraq (and five related reports, see Chapter 4 for details), at http://intelligence.senate.gov/108301.pdf (accessed 12 May 2009). • US National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (9/11 Commission), at http://intelligence.senate.gov/108301.pdf (accessed 28 November 2009). US: Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction (Silberman Robb 2005 Commission), at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/wmd/pdf/full_wmd_report.pdf (accessed 19 October 2009). UK: Report into the London Terrorist Attacks on 7 July 2005 (ISC Report), at https://3228332972681721251-a-independent-gov-uk-s- sites.googlegroups.com/a/independent.gov.uk/isc/files/200605_ISC_7Ju ly_Report.pdf?attachauth=ANoY7cqbSVvudMHrfYbcd7fI7drHg3xhC_

2006 BSVjvA4xXwnIAhOvNWob 0em9fqPUnR JQ3SzxZOjbqz6dPAg68 Me7vQo5k90PbB83VKjHrdxeDhqYuYinVh52XZwF-HT3Fv- LlHBY4KiU5_OjyUvH6DSIsoRiFlpSuwUXE9jCUWFBt0kNqaLaonz Zb- 0cfSxlWhELmW7B7E3Wz2d0vCj8EUvS_i7pXtNw%3D%3D&attred irects=0 (accessed 10 April 2009). UK: Could 717 Have Been Prevented? Review of the Intelligence on the 2009 London Terrorist Attacks on 7 July 2005 (ISC Report), at 52

https://3228332972681721251 -a-independent-gov-uk-s- sites.googlegroups.com/a/independent.gov.uk/isc/files/20090519_ISC_ 7-7_Review.pdf?attachauth=ANoY7cquLjpOtdhJkl- qj2jGcGwhlzGv00eZWKWk- _IWihfWanvLdXhNBLyYTQllUvodWvpr35spnCSUHNrX8whf3n21 hi_FYKrNtWlnTOnoYkSnhLVhz9Pb21veFLWC- JRES3NM2mUlDRCpKKLiq00nZKkvWRhWM9DgMYTyDDvHhK rUDAAmdkdQFvtw_5WdRmwmdDX3eMPF_gyb0jGPbS8ehm- pWEgB0w%3D%3D&attredirects=0 (accessed 17 June 2010). Canada: Commission of Inquiry into the Investigation of the Bombing of Air India Flight 182 (Major Commission). Final report issued 17 June 2010, at http://epe.lac-bac.gc.ca/100/206/301/pco- bep/commi ssions/air_india/2010-07- 23/www .maj orcomm.ca/en/reports/fmalreport/defaulthtm (accessed 17 June 2010).

Table 2-1: ABCA Intelligence-related inquiries consulted

These reports are outlined in the following sections.

Canadian inquiry reports Five of the six Canadian inquiries focused on security matters and referred to intelligence practices infrequently, sometimes only tangentially.144 The 1969 Mackenzie Commission (National Security) report has eleven important recommendations, only one of which specifically mentions intelligence.145 It recommended the security service role be removed from the RCMP and a civilian security agency be established, to formally separate law enforcement and intelligence functions, thereby reducing potential abuse by

144. Kellock Taschereau (Information given to foreign agents), Mackenzie (Security practices), Macdonald (RCMP activities), O'Connor (Arar rendition) and Major (Air India) Commissions. The DIR focused on defence intelligence. While not technically a 'major government inquiry,' the DIR is of equivalent importance in the context of this study. 145. Paragraph 297 of the Mackenzie Commission report reads, in part, "WE RECOMMEND the establishment of a new civilian non-police agency to perform the functions of a Security Service in Canada. This agency should eventually be quite separate from the RCMP; it should be generally without law enforcement powers, although it should, when necessary, operate in close liaison and cooperation with the RCMP and other police forces. The organizational and operational detachment of the Directorate of Security and Intelligence from the RCMP may be a necessary first stage in the process of development of the new agency. WE ALSO RECOMMEND that: (a) The duties of the Security Service should include the following tasks, and its terms of reference should be made public: (i) to collect, collate and evaluate information or intelligence concerning espionage and subversion, and to communicate such information in such manner and to such persons as the Head of the Service considers to be in the public interest;...." 53 both. The 1977 McDonald Commission (RCMP activity) reports echoed the Mackenzie Commission recommendations and addressed methods of information collection; personnel management; and organizational development measures that should apply to the new civilian security intelligence organization. Together, the Mackenzie and McDonald Commissions have become almost iconic in their call for enhanced legislated, independent control, and review and oversight of security intelligence activity within Canada. The O'Connor Commission (Arar Inquiry) generated twenty-three recommendations in the "Factual Inquiry" report, the vast majority of which addressed law enforcement and surveillance tradecraft.146 They reinforced recommendations from earlier Canadian reports to enhance inter-agency information sharing and cooperation, but in addition, they clearly highlighted damage that can be done when analysis is devoid of discipline and dissemination is conducted carelessly. The thirteen substantial recommendations in the "Policy Review" dealt mostly with oversight and review issues and in doing so provided an impressive lecture on the standards to be expected in a modern liberal democracy like Canada. There was heavy emphasis on accountability and checks on the potential abuse of information gained for intelligence and law enforcement purposes. The Major Commission (Air India) issued its Phase 1 report in 2006 and its final report on 17 June 2010.147 Both address matters of intelligence governance and efficacy. Analysis of the Phase 1 report, which contained no recommendations, found many implicit critiques of intelligence and law enforcement tradecraft, particularly regarding information sharing and cooperation (or lack of it) between CSIS and the RCMP. These issues were explicitly addressed in the Final Report, alongside critical commentary on the state of Canadian air transport security. Although the Air India event took place over

146. O'Connor Commission, Factual Inquiry: Commissioner's Report, Commission of Inquiry into the Actions of Canadian Officials in Relation to Maher Arar (2006), at http://epe.lac- bac.gc.ca/100/206/301/pco-bcp/commissions/maher_arar/07-09- 13/www.ararcommission.ca/eng/26.htm (accessed 29 November 2008); Policy Review: Commissioner's Report: A New Review Mechanism for the RCMP's National Security Activities (2006), at http://epe.lac-bac.gc.ca/100/206/301/pco-bcp/commissions/maher_arar/07-09- 13/www.ararcommission.ca/eng/EnglishReportDecl22006.pdf (accessed 30 November 2008). 147. Major Commission, The Families Remember: Phase 1 Report (2008), at http://www.majorcomm.ca/en/reports/phasel/phaselreport.pdf (accessed 19 January 2009). The Final Report is at http://www.majorcomm.ca/en/reports/finalreport/ (accessed 17 June 2010). 54 twenty-five years ago, Justice Major concluded that some lack of cooperation continues to plague CSIS and RCMP operations. Perhaps more troubling were his conclusions that certain aspects of CSIS and RCMP institutional resistance to outside scrutiny of their operations remains problematic today. To rectify this apparently troubled relationship, Major's recommendations dealing with intelligence activity are the first Canadian calls for enhanced centralized coordination, if not control. He is keen to see the NSA/PM exercise a more energetic role in resolving differences of opinion and practice between CSIS and the RCMP, and act as the DM for CSEC. This is a shift from the traditional Canadian habit of decentralizing government intelligence activity, while insisting on Ministerial responsibility in matters of intelligence policy and governance. Interestingly, Major is silent on the responsibility of the Minister of Public Safety in this regard.

Australian inquiry reports Between 1954 and 1995, four Australian inquiries of interest to this study were conducted. In early 1954 Vladimir Mikhailovich Petrov, the Third Secretary and Consul in the Soviet Embassy in Australia since February 1951, left his diplomatic employment and requested political asylum, which was granted by the Australian government. His wife also defected. A Royal Commission was subsequently ordered, to inquire into and report upon information provided by Petrov as to the conduct of Soviet espionage in Australia.148 Ultimately, the Commission's principal findings noted that from its establishment in 1943 to its departure in 1954, the Soviet Embassy in Canberra had been used for espionage in Australia, and that the only Australians who knowingly assisted this Soviet espionage were Communists party members.149 Surprisingly, the Commissioners recommended that no prosecutions be initiated as a resulted of the inquiry and no formal

148. National Archives of Australia, Royal Commission on Espionage, 1957, at http://recordsearch.naa.gov.au/SearchNRetrieve/Interface/DetailsReports/AgencyDetail.aspx7reg. no=CA%201882&singleRecord=T (accessed 6 May 2009). The Commission was to also report on whether espionage has been conducted or attempted in Australia by representatives or agents of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR); whether any persons or organizations in Australia communicated information or documents to any such representative or agent unlawfully; and whether any persons or organizations in Australia aided or abetted any such espionage. 149. Ibid. 55 recommendations were made public. Like the earlier Kellock Taschereau Commission in Canada, the Australian Royal Commission on Espionage confirmed the presence of active Soviet spies and reinforced the need for continued state intelligence and counterintelligence activity in the post-Second World War years. In 1974, the Royal Commission on Intelligence and Security (RCIS), chaired by Justice Robert Hope, inquired into the character and structure of the Australian intelligence establishment150 Hope completed his report in 1977, confirming inter alia, the need for Australia's own security intelligence agency.151 In 1983, with the expulsion of a Soviet agent from the embassy in Canberra, Hope was called upon again to head the Royal Commission into the Australian Intelligence Service Agencies (RCASIA) that led to a redefining of the Australian Security Intelligence Organization (ASIO) mandate, to include gathering foreign intelligence in foreign jurisdictions.152 Toward the end of 1993, the Australian Secret Intelligence Service (ASIS) became the subject of media attention after allegations that ASIS was unaccountable and out of control. Then, on 21 February 1994, an Australian television program aired troubling allegations by two former ASIS officers who made claims regarding cultural and operational tensions between ASIS and the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. Two days later, the Australian government convened the Samuels Codd Commission of Inquiry that eventually rejected any notion that ASIS was 'out of control,' but nonetheless reiterated earlier recommendations that ASIS be brought under legislative cover to affirm

150. National Archives of Australia, Royal Commission on Intelligence and Security (Canberra, 1977). Portions of this classified report were released in 2008. Information can be found in the National Archives of Australia at http://recordsearch.naa.gov.au/SearchNRetrieve/Interface/ListingReports/ItemsListing.aspx7series =A8908 (accessed 13 November 2008). 151. Australian National Library, Royal Commission on Australia's Security and Intelligence Agencies, at http://catalogue.nla.gov.au/Record/1582598 (accessed 13 November 2010). 152. National Archives of Australia, Royal Commission on Australia's Security and Intelligence Agencies (Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 1985). Outline information on the Commission is available at http://www.naa.gov.au/whats-on/records- releases/rcis.aspx (accessed 3 October 2010). See also David Martin Jones and Carl Ungerer, "Australia," in PSI Handbook, 165-182. 56 its existence and provide authority for its activities. There were two other major findings. First, the Commissioners recommended that ASIS be given a legislative basis to replace the existing executive authority, to dispel popular misconceptions that ASIS was unaccountable. Second, it was thought that ASIS should be brought under the scrutiny of a parliamentary committee. Both legislation and parliamentary scrutiny were judged to be an adequate compromise between ASIS's need for security and the free flow of information in the public arena.154

Overall, principal findings and recommendations of these inquiries reinforced the need for measures of democratic control over government intelligence activity and the value of independent review, both of which underpin a number of theoretical best practices to be developed in later chapters. Concern over the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 generated additional government intelligence inquiries in Australia (as well as in the UK and the US). Inquiries were launched amid concern that Australian national intelligence services had blindly followed the US lead and failed to provide government with accurate and credible intelligence. However, the 2003 report of the Parliamentary Joint Committee on ASIO, ASIS and the Defence Signals Directorate (DSD) concluded that the Australian intelligence effort had been effective, and that its members had acted professionally and were not subject to inappropriate political interference.155 Another review of Australian intelligence practices

153. Government of Australia, Commission of Inquiry into the Australian Secret Intelligence Service, Gordon Jacob Samuels and Michael H. Codd, Commissioners, Report on the Australian Secret Intelligence Service, Public ed. (Canberra: Australian Government Publishers, 1995). Also Allan Gyngell and Michael Wesley, Making Australian Foreign Policy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 140. 154. See the presentation of the Samuels Commission Report in the Australian Senate by Senator Gareth Evans, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, at the time, at http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;adv=yes;db=CHAMBER;id=cham ber%2Fhansards%2F1995-06-01%2F0066;orderBy=_fragment_number,doc_date- rev;page=4;query=Dataset%3Ahansards%20Decade%3A%221990s%22%20Year%3A%221995 %22%20Month%3A%2206%22%20Day%3A%2201%22;querytype=Day%3A01;rec=5;resCount =Default (accessed 2 January 2010). 155. The Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, Intelligence on Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction (Canberra: Parliamentary Joint Committee on AISO, ASIS and DSD, December 2003), at http://www.aph.gov.au/house/committee/pjcaad/WMD/report/fullreport.pdf (accessed 4 May 2009). 57 is found in the 2004 report of an inquiry into Australian intelligence agencies.156 Unlike the pre-9/11 reports, both these documents describe a national intelligence establishment that is basically sound and professional, but in need of some important 'tweaks' to improve performance.

UK inquiry reports In 2003 and 2004, the UK intelligence community underwent its own 'Years of Inquiry' focused on intelligence issues relating to the decision to go to war in Iraq and the 'war on terrorism.' There were no less than four different inquiries, but their remits were narrowly drawn.157 Initially, the focus was on the two 'dossiers' published by the Prime Minister's Office, one on Iraqi WMD and one on Iraqi security services. The first inquiry by the Foreign Affairs Select Committee was somewhat politicized.158 The mandate of the second inquiry, conducted by the Cabinet Office Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC), was to examine whether the available intelligence, which informed the decision to invade Iraq, was adequate and properly assessed, and whether it was accurately reflected in government publications. It found only minor irregularities in the public presentation of intelligence.159 The focus then shifted to Lord Hutton's inquiry into the death of Dr. David Kelly, a WMD expert with the Ministry of Defence (MoD), which offered further conclusions on the nature of the relationship between the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) and the Prime Minister's Office. Hutton's commentary focused on the risk of

156. Philip Flood, Report of the Inquiry into Australian Intelligence Agencies (Flood Report) (Canberra: Australian Government, July 2004), at http://www.dpmc.gov.au/publications/intelligence_inquiry/docs/intelligence_report.pdf (accessed 9 February 2009). 157. Richard J. Aldrich, "Intelligence and Iraq: The UK's Four Enquiries," in Secret Intelligence: A Reader, 29. 158. House of Commons Foreign Affairs Select Committee, "The Decision to go to War in Iraq," Ninth Report of Session 2002-03, vol. 1 (London: The Stationary Office Limited, 7 July 2003), at http://www.publications.parliament.Uk/pa/cm200203/cmseleciycmfaff/cmfaff.htm#reports (accessed 20 February 2009). 159. Intelligence and Security Committee, "Conclusions and Recommendations," Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction - Intelligence and Assessments (London: Cabinet Office, September 2003), at http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/intelligence/special_reports.aspx (accessed 20 February 2009). 58 having operationally oriented intelligence altered for political advantage. Finally, attention turned to the performance of British intelligence services themselves in 2004, when a committee of Privy Counsellors, chaired by Lord Butler, investigated British intelligence on WMD, the report of which provided valuable insight into the workings of the higher British intelligence apparatus.161 In May 2006, a report of the ISC into the 7 July 2005 bombings of the London transit system concluded all that could be done by British intelligence services prior to the attacks had been done.162 A subsequent report in 2009, which supported the earlier conclusions, provided more detail of the difficulties faced by intelligence and law enforcement agencies.163 The most prominent challenge was posed by the sheer number of targets to be serviced by intelligence agencies and the lack of personnel available to cover even 10% of those judged to be threats. The shortage of trained people is a common constraint in all ABCA countries.

US inquiry reports Between 1974 and 1977, a number of US Congressional Reports examined the American intelligence community directly and indirectly, the most enduring of which are the fourteen reports of the Church Committee.164 The Congressional oversight regime established as a result of Church Committee recommendations remains intact today.

160. The Right Honourable Lord Hutton, Report of the Inquiry into the Circumstances Surrounding the Death ofDr David Kelly C.M.G. (London: The Stationary Office, 2004), at http://www.the-hutton-inquiry.org.uk/content/report/huttonreport.pdf (accessed 11 June 2009). 161. The Right Honourable Lord Butler of Brockwell, Review of Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction: A Report by a Committee of Privy Counsellors (London: The Stationary Office, 14 July 2004), at http://www.archive2.official- documents.co.uk/document/deps/hc/hc898/898.pdf (accessed 2 May 2009). 162. Intelligence and Security Committee, Report into the London Terrorist Attacks on 7 July 2005 (London: House of Commons, May 2006), at http://news.bbc.co.Uk/2/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/l l_05_06_isc_london_attacks_report.pdf (accessed 13 June 2010). 163. Intelligence and Security Committee, Could 7/7 Have Been Prevented? Review of the Intelligence on the London Terrorist Attacks on 7 July 2005 (London: House of Commons, May 2009), at http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/media/210852/20090519_77review.pdf (accessed 13 June 2010). 164. United States Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities (Church Committee), fourteen reports (1976), at Assassination Archives and Research Center, at http://www.aarclibrary.org/publib/contents/contents_church.htm (accessed 4 July 2009). 59

Conversely, about two decades later, the US Aspin Brown Commission of 1996 recommended a range of US intelligence community reforms that were largely ignored.165 Among its more prescient recommendations were suggestions that better coordination was needed within the US intelligence community and that more attention should be devoted to terrorism. In the aftermath of 9/11 and the US-led invasion of Iraq, 2004 would become another 'Year of Inquiry' for the US intelligence community. On 7 July 2004, the US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence published its Report on the US Intelligence Community's Pre-War Intelligence Assessments on Iraq, with one hundred and seventeen conclusions that focused on the quality of collection practices, intelligence analysis, intelligence dissemination and the relationship between intelligence analysts and various senior government officials.166 Not surprisingly, it found fault in all areas and set the stage for the December 2004 report of the US National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (9/11 Commission Report). This report led Congress to pass the 2004 Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA) that subsequently forced a significant restructuring of the entire US intelligence community, including the appointment of a Director of National Intelligence (DNI) with authority to promulgate pan-community policies and drive information sharing initiatives.167 The entire US intelligence community came under additional scrutiny by a Presidential Commission in 2005, when the Silberman Robb Commission submitted a report that concluded the intelligence community was "dead wrong in almost all of its

165. United States Commission on the Roles and Capabilities of the US Intelligence Community, (Aspin Brown Commission), Report, Preparing for the 21st Century: An Appraisal of US Intelligence (1 March 1996), at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/int/index.html (accessed 11 February 2010). Senator David L. Boren claimed "... few if any of the major recommendations... have been implemented." Cited in Robert Steele, On Intelligence: Spies and Secrecy in an Open World (Fairfax, Virginia: OSS International Press, 2001). 166. United States Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Report - US Intelligence Community's Pre-War Intelligence Assessments on Iraq (7 July 2004), at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/serialset/creports/iraq.html (accessed 3 August 2010). 167. United States National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, The 9/11 Commission Report, Third Monograph (New York: Barnes and Noble, 2006). The original report is also available on the Commission's website at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/report/index.htm (accessed 2 August 2009); and the Intelligence Reform and Terrorist Prevention Act of 2004, at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/serialset/creports/pdf/108-796/108-796_intel_reform.html (accessed 16 September 2008). 60

pre-war judgments about Iraq's weapons of mass destruction."1 It provided seventy-four recommendations, most of which are being implemented. The Silberman Robb Commission report is so substantial that it provided many of the recommended practices relevant to all six components of intelligence. However, the report ultimately reinforces other US intelligence inquiry reports calling for more effective information collection, intelligence analysis, and intelligence and information sharing. The recommended practices drawn from these ABCA inquiries not only identified practical intelligence issues of concern to Canadian and allied governments, they served as signposts to guide analysis of remaining expert literature.

OTHER EXPERT INTELLIGENCE LITERATURE This section reviews material that represents the range of other expert intelligence literature consulted in the course of this study. Many of these works cover a number of intelligence issues and a few specialize in areas related to intelligence, but are not about intelligence per se. For convenience and consistency, this remaining collection of expert intelligence literature is reviewed as it was analyzed, by categories, as follows: policy and governance; organization and people; and process, product and action.

Policy and Governance In Canada, academic intelligence literature tends to focus on accountability issues. Reg Whitaker and Stuart Farson write about risks to civil liberties when intelligence services are not held transparently accountable to elected authority. Both are among Canada's most notable intelligence scholars and their work has had significant effect on the way intelligence tends to be thought of in Canada. They do not separate pure intelligence activity from the overall context of accountability.169 In this way, they reinforce many of the findings and recommendations of Canadian commissions of

168. Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction, Report to the President of the United States (Washington, D.C., 31 March 2005), at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/wmd/about.html (accessed 11 June 2010). 169. Reg Whitaker and Gary Marcuse, Cold War Canada: The Making of a National Insecurity State 1945-1957 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1966). Also Stuart Farson and Reg Whitaker, "Democratic Deficit Be Damned: The Executive Use of Legislators to Scrutinize National Security in Canada," in Strategic Intelligence, five vols., ed. Loch K. Johnson (Westport, Connecticut and London: Praeger Security International, 2007). 61 inquiry into security and intelligence matters, but they tend to ignore matters of efficacy or any real debate about the substantive issues in the missions examined. Issues of European intelligence policy, accountability and governance are captured in works published by the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), whose monographs and essays provide balance to US- and UK-centric writing. In one example, Hans Born and Maria Caparini, use a multidisciplinary and comparative approach to identify effective practices that make security services accountable to societies and their governments.170 National intelligence accountability regimes are also examined in another work edited by Born, Johnson and Ian Leigh, which reviews three decades of experimentation in intelligence accountability.171 Contributors examine different political systems, political cultures, legal systems, and democratic traditions, and show how intelligence accountability evolved under a variety of circumstances. They draw together the best practices into a framework for successful approaches to intelligence accountability, including a prescription for a model law. A broader survey of national intelligence policy and governance issues is found in two volumes edited by Farson et al.172 One example is a chapter by Priscila An tunes, in which she discusses nine 'great themes' encountered during deliberations to draft a new Argentinean national intelligence law in 2001.173 All nine themes were related to policy and governance issues. The value of Antunes' work, and that of others in these two volumes, is found in the discussions of the many different ways independent states have chosen to address their own intelligence policy and governance issues. It is interesting to note that in almost all cases, the first consideration is the establishment of democratic control of state intelligence agencies. Effectiveness is, at least initially, a secondary consideration. The implicit suggestion is that effective intelligence activity is best ensured

170. Hans Born and Maria Caparini, eds., Democratic Control of Intelligence Services: Containing Rogue Elephants (Hampshire, UK: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2007). See the DCAF website at http://www.dcaf.ch/ (accessed 23 February 2009). 171. Hans Born, Loch K. Johnson, and Ian Leigh, eds., Who's Watching the Spies: Establishing Intelligence Service Accountability (Virginia: Potomac Press, 2005). 172. Andrew, Aldrich, and Wark, Secret Intelligence: A Reader. Stephen J. Cimbala, ed., Intelligence and Intelligence Policy in a Democratic Society (Dobbs Ferry, New York: Transnational Publishers, Inc., 1987). Farson etal, PSI Handbook. 173. Priscila Antunes, "Argentina," in PSI Handbook, 95-111. 62 by the exercise of democratic control over intelligence services. To achieve that control, organization of the national intelligence community must be considered very carefully.

Organization There is little in the way of expert literature that directly addresses the detailed organization of intelligence establishments, but organizational issues also invariably arise in the course of debates surrounding policy and governance, people and process. Efforts to build the 'right' intelligence organization usually involve the hunt for balance, between giving intelligence services enough appropriate capability to fulfill their mandate and not so much capability that it might be abused to threaten civil rights and individual freedoms. The expert literature addresses a number of international case studies featuring both success and failure in this regard. As mentioned earlier, the PSI Handbook of Global Security and Intelligence presents a variety of organizational approaches to government intelligence, invariably based on national history, the nature of government and threats facing the country.174 From the various accounts of intelligence structures provided, it seems that organization is again most often associated with mechanisms of accountability and oversight. Among the examples, most countries organize to ensure democratic control first, and consider effectiveness second. An exception is found in the US, where the recent reorganization of the intelligence community and the appointment of the DNI was clearly aimed at enhancing effectiveness. Relevant theoretical and background material dealing with organization can be found in four works of note. First, Harold Wilensky's Organizational Intelligence examines intelligence in complex social systems, drawing on a wide range of cases from international relations, economics, politics and welfare.175 He focuses on the doctrinal and structural roots of intelligence failure and concludes that hierarchy, specialization, centralization, and organizational processes all shape intelligence effectiveness. Second, Edward Waltz addresses a different aspect of intelligence organization in his explanation

174. Farson et al, PSI Handbook. 175. Harold L. Wilensky, Organizational Intelligence: Knowledge and Policy in Government and Industry (New York and London: Basic Books Inc. Publishers, 1967). 63 of Knowledge Management in the Intelligence Enterprise."6 This work's particular strength is the clarity with which it integrates human abilities, technology and organizational practices, to make clear that the intelligence enterprise is best thought of as a system of systems. Third, Bruce Berkowitz and Allan Goodman argue that an information-age intelligence organization must move away from a rigid, hierarchical organization to a more networked enterprise. They suggest greater non-analytical use of the private sector because of its agility and supply of capital. At the same time, according to Berkowitz and Goodman, government intelligence organizations would concentrate on the specialized, high-risk activities only they are able to perform.177 Lastly, Reforming Intelligence, edited by Thomas Bruneau and Steven Boraz addresses the more esoteric aspects of intelligence organization within the general field of civil-military relations.178 Using ten international examples, Bruneau and Boraz evaluate five mechanisms used to control intelligence within each country (executive, legislative, judicial, internal, and external). They conclude that intelligence is most effective when those five elements each exercise their organizational role with vigour.179 However, in the world of intelligence, security and accountability requirements often trump rational structure and efficiency. Intelligence organizations exist within the context of government and, in the case of Canada, applicable Treasury Board policies and regulations impose certain organizational imperatives on intelligence agencies. Government Security Policy is an important influence on departmental intelligence organizations.180 Furthermore, intelligence architectures within government departments must conform to the Treasury Board management accountability framework.181

176. Edward Walz, Knowledge Management in the Intelligence Enterprise (Boston: Arctech House Inc., 2003). 177. Bruce Berkowitz and Allan E. Goodman, Best Truth: Intelligence in the Information Age (New Haven, CT. and London: Yale University Press, 2000). 178. Thomas C. Bruneau and Steven C. Boraz. Reforming Intelligence: Obstacles to Democratic Control and Effectiveness (Austin, TX: University of Austin Press, 2007). 179. Ibid., 332. 180. Government of Canada, Government Security Policy (Ottawa: Treasury Board Secretariat, 1 February 2002), at http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/pol/doc-eng.aspx?id=12322 (accessed 5 February 2009). 181. See Treasury Board Management Accountability Framework, at http://www.tbs- sct.gc.ca/maf-crg/index-eng.asp (accessed 8 April 2009). See the DND Program Activity Table, at http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/rpp/2009-2010/inst/dnd/dnd02-eng.asp#sec2a_e (accessed 8 April 2009). 64

In all this literature, people represent a common element. From reading Berkowitz, Boraz, Bruneau, Farson, Goodman, Wilensky and Walz, it is clear that the effectiveness of intelligence organization is largely dependent on people.

People Expert literature devotes considerable attention to the need for increased numbers of professionally competent intelligence-trained personnel. The 2004 DIR featured a section on human resources covering training and career management issues from recruiting to senior appointments. It called for an expansion of the Canadian Forces School of Military Intelligence (CFSMI); a strategic intelligence reserve to offset frequent operational deployments; and the building of collaborative training solutions with other government departments and allies.182 Other ABC A inquiry reports reflect these views, with particular interest being shown in the professional development of intelligence analysts over the span of a career.183 The US intelligence community is extraordinary in the degree to which it has opened itself to public scrutiny, particularly in the area of personnel policy. The US DNI Reading Room displays a large number of intelligence community policy documents and intelligence reports for public review, the majority of which relate to personnel matters.184 Of particular note are directives dealing with the joint duty program, whereby in order to advance to senior levels, intelligence personnel are expected to have successfully served in a number of intelligence posts outside their 'parent' discipline.185 Elsewhere, an annex

182. DIR, 55. 183. The Butler Report declared: "The cost of the Assessments Staff is minimal in relation to the amounts the nation spends on the collection of intelligence. It is a false economy to skimp on the machinery through which expensively collected intelligence passes to decision­ makers. We recommend that... this review should include considering whether there should be a specialism (sic) of analysis with a career structure and room for advancement, allowing the Assessments Staff to include some career members. Butler Report, 600. 184. Director of National Intelligence, Reading Room, at http://www.dni.gov/electronic_reading_room.htm (accessed 2 March 2010). 185. Intelligence Community Directive (ICD) 601, at http://www.dni.gov/electronic_reading_room.htm (accessed 2 March 2010). 65

to the US National Intelligence Strategy contains the US Intelligence Community's Five Year Human Capital Plan, published in 2006.186 Much of the intelligence literature talks of intelligence people, but very little of it says anything about those people.187 One exception is Allen Dulles' chapter in The Craft of Intelligence dealing with the characteristics, as he saw them, of the "American Intelligence Officer," who was expected to spend a career in an intelligence organization and, above all else, must have the requisite motivation.188 As well, Herman's Intelligence in Peace and War traces the evolution of the British intelligence community from the Second World War and, although times and people have changed, he finds intelligence people have a sense of difference, of mission and of secrecy, which sometimes takes on an air of mystery.1*9

Interest in people is prominent in associated literature dealing with knowledge management in the intelligence enterprise. Walz devotes a chapter to the "Knowledge- based intelligence organization" and explores people issues to a degree of comprehensive detail not found in most other works on intelligence.190 Although this book is primarily about organizational functions, this particular chapter is nonetheless notable for its focus on people, their values and their contribution to organizational disciplines. In a similar vein, Richards Heuer has authored a highly regarded 'classic,' in which he discusses the very human biases that inhibit intelligence analysis.191 He proposes a number ways to improve analysis, many of which are now common practice within western intelligence analytical organizations.192

186. Director of National Intelligence, "Strategic Human Capital Plan," United States National Security Plan (Washington, 22 June 2006), at http://fas.org/irp/dni/humancapital.pdf (accessed 12 June 2010). 187. It is an interesting, perhaps disappointing, exercise to scan the index of a book on intelligence and search for 'people' or 'personnel.' In the rare circumstance that the subject is found, one will probably note that not many pages are devoted to the topic. 188. Allen W. Dulles, "The Man on the Job," in The Craft of Intelligence (Guilford, Connecticut: The Lyons Press, 2006), 170. 189. Herman, Intelligence in Peace and War, 328-329. 190. Walz, Knowledge Management, 107-158. 191. Heuer, Richards J. Jr., Psychology of Intelligence Analysis, US Central Intelligence Agency: Center for the Study of Intelligence (1999), https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-inteHigence/csi-publications/books-and- monographs/psychology-of-intelligence-analysis/PsychoflntelNew.pdf (accessed 23 June 2010). 192. Ibid., 178-84. 66

However, ultimately, there was no expert literature that effectively addressed the enduring and pervasive personnel matter that plagues virtually all intelligence organizations - too few qualified people. Recruiting and career management are only generally dealt with, usually in passing, and certainly not with the degree of attention devoted to other intelligence processes and products.

Process, Product and Action A sizeable and growing genre within the field of expert intelligence literature is focused on intelligence analysis,' which is seen as the 'heart' of the intelligence process. Contributions in this category include a book edited by Charters, Farson and American Glenn Hastedt, which addressed mainly US and UK intelligence processes.193 It also introduced peacekeeping intelligence, about which more will be said later. Additional Canadian material is found in annual reports issued by government offices charged with the conduct and review of intelligence activity. The Director of CSIS issues an annual public report that provides a broad, but sketchy outline of its activities over the year.194 The CSIS Inspector General (IG) is required to submit an annual certificate to the Minister of Public Safety, stating the extent to which the IG is satisfied with the annual report of the Director of CSIS.195 The Minister is required by the CSIS Act to transmit both the Director's annual report and the IG's certificate to the Security Intelligence Review Committee (SIRC), which also issues annual and other reports.196 All this is meagre stuff compared to other expert literature dealing with process, product and action. In the more traditional literature, Roger George and James Bruce edit a book that provides a critique of US intelligence analysis.197 It features in-depth and balanced

193. David A. Charters, Stuart Farson, and Glenn Hastedt, eds., Intelligence Analysis and Assessment (London: Frank Cass, 1996). 194. CSIS, Annual Public Report, at http://www.csis-scrs.gc.ca/pblctns/nnlrprt/index- eng.asp (accessed 30 August 2010). 195. CSIS IG annual certificates can be found at http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/abt/wwa/igcsis/igcsis-en.asp (accessed 30 August 2009). 196. SIRC annual reports are at http://www.sirc-csars.gc.ca/anrran/index-eng.html (accessed 30 August 2010). Other SIRC reports are at http://www.sirc-csars.gc.ca/opbapb/index- eng.html (accessed 30 August 2010). 197. Roger Z. George and James B. Bruce, eds., Analyzing Intelligence: Origins, Obstacles and Innovations (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2008). 67 evaluation of more than fifty years of US analysis, including a critique of why it has under-performed at times. It contains a coherent plan for improving analysis that includes enhanced training for analysts, improved collection and information sharing practices, and a closer relationship between intelligence consumers and producers. Among the key of volumes of British expert intelligence literature, Herman's works (1996, 2002) are most often cited as sources of expert opinion on a variety of topics. They were particularly helpful in this study too because Herman, having had extensive experience within the British intelligence establishment, was able to capture the practical aspects and nuances of intelligence tradecraft at the working level, as well as at higher levels in government. Intelligence in an Insecure World, by Gill and Phythian contains British perspectives, in which the authors argue that the study of intelligence must strive to become more self-consciously analytical and theoretical.198 Academics need to be involved because, "intelligence is too important to be left to the spooks."199 Treverton's contributions (2003, 2009) are widely cited in works explaining American processes, but other US authors have also provided commentary on process, product and action. Loch Johnson and James Wirtz broadly address issues associated with these components in an anthology that compares US intelligence agencies to some foreign counterparts.200 Editors Alfred Maurer, Marion Tunstall and James Keagle addressed process, product and action in Intelligence Policy and Process in 1985, but essentially contributed nothing new or novel beyond suggesting intelligence is more than the simple transmission of facts and ideas from producer to policy-maker and that the multiplicity of actors demands 'proper' community management techniques.201 Enduring complexities received further study by Robert Kennedy, who suggested that intelligence failures can be reduced by improvements in organization, technology and

198. Peter Gill and Mark Phythian, Intelligence in an Insecure World (Cambridge, UK and Maiden, MA, USA: Polity Press. 2006). 199. Ibid., 172. 200. Loch K. Johnson and James J. Wirtz, eds., Strategic Intelligence: Windows Into a Secret World (Los Angeles, CA: Roxbury Publishers, 2004). 201. Alfred Maurer, Marion D. Tunstall and James M. Keagle, eds., Intelligence: Policy and Process (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1985). Major Alfred C. Maurer and Captain Marion D. Tunstall were assistant professors and Captain James M. Keagle was an associate professor of political science at the United States Air Force Academy. 68 training, but that even with such improvements the effectiveness of the intelligence apparatus will be limited if policy-makers insist on following their own personal biases and preferences.202 Although intriguing, much of Kennedy's material tends to ignore the fact that elected policy-makers do indeed tend to follow their preferences and biases for good reason - because people elected them to do so. Putting the square peg of intelligence 'arrogance' into the round holes of political agendas has never been an easy fit. The emergence of 'peacekeeping intelligence' should be noted here, as introduced by Ben de Jong, Wies Platje and Robert Steele.203 They present the views of a combination of experienced UN military commanders, experienced national intelligence leaders, and scholars of UN and insurgency history. Themes developed by de Jong and his colleagues were later largely rehashed by Canadians David Carment and Martin Rudner.204 Both books called for the UN to develop the equivalent of a national intelligence organization, from tactical to strategic levels. While interesting, there is really nothing new here because chapters essentially call on the UN to do what national intelligence establishments have already done. The authors tend to be too idealistic in thinking the UN could develop a degree of operational effectiveness that would benefit from a sophisticated intelligence effort, and not realistic enough to accept that independent member states might not allow such a development in the first place. There is, however, a unique and important aspect within these discussions of peacekeeping intelligence that is found only on rare occasions in the rest of the expert intelligence literature, and that is the analysis of views put forward by operational commanders. It seems that senior military officers who have served as UN peacekeeping/peace support mission commanders are happy to discuss intelligence issues

202. Robert Kennedy, Of Knowledge and Power: The Complexities of National Intelligence (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger Security International, 2008). Kennedy is Professor at the Sam Nunn School of International Affairs, Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta, Georgia, USA. He served as Director of the Joint German-American George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies in Germany, Deputy Commandant of the NATO Defense College, Rome and a research analyst at the US Army War College. 203. Ben de Jong, Wies Platje, and Robert David Steele, eds., Peacekeeping Intelligence: Emerging Concepts for the Future (Oakton, Virginia: OSS International Press, 2003). 204. David Carment and Martin Rudner, eds., Peacekeeping Intelligence: New Players, Extended Boundaries (New York: Routledge, 2006). 69 they did or did not face while on duty.205 However, among ABCA countries there are very few senior officers, from any operation - national, UN or otherwise - who seem to be ready to publicly examine higher intelligence challenges.

SUMMARY This chapter reviewed expert intelligence literature underpinning this study. In the first of five sections, it developed criteria used to designate the intelligence experts who author expert intelligence literature. Second, it outlined the evolution of contemporary intelligence literature since 1945, followed by a section that described the initial survey of expert literature conducted to 'get the ball rolling.' The fourth section reviewed reports of ABCA government intelligence inquiries used as 'signposts' to guide the wider analysis of expert literature. The fifth section addressed expert literature associated with six components of intelligence, categorized as they will be presented in later chapters: policy and governance; organization and people; and process, product, and action. Having reviewed the principal expert literature involved in this study, the next chapter describes how this literature was put to use, by outlining the method of research.

205. See de Jong et al, Peacekeeping Intelligence. This work contains chapters by Major- General Patrick C. Cammaert (Netherlands); Colonel (Retired) Richard Connaughton (UK); Major-General Tony van Dieppenbrugge (Netherlands); Major Paul Johnston (Canada); Major- General (Retired) Frank van Kappen (Netherlands); Lieutenant-Commander Wies Platje (Netherlands); General Sir David Ramsbotham (UK); Colonel Jan-Inge Svensson (UK); and Major Pasi Valimaki (Finland). A brief biography of each is contained in the book. 70

CHAPTER 3 METHOD

INTRODUCTION This chapter details the method of research, which can be generalized and used to study other Canadian intelligence organizations in a similar fashion, to a similar end. Research involved the following general steps, each of which is explained in more detail in a subsequent section: 1) an initial survey of the literature to gain a sense of the field, become familiar with seminal works and identify principal authors; 2) development of an analytic framework and method of evaluation; 3) analysis of expert literature and the development of theoretical best practices; 4) a case study of Canadian defence intelligence organization and activity to identify current defence intelligence practices; 5) comparison of both sets of practices; and 6) an evaluation of their alignment. In a seventh and final step, recommendations for the enhanced alignment of Canadian defence intelligence practices and theoretical best practices are offered. Outcomes were validated, at least to a rudimentary degree, by the members of the organization under study and also by the academic community through interviews and the distribution of draft chapters for review and comment.206

INITIAL LITERATURE SURVEY

Academic literature Research began with a three-stage initial survey of expert literature, the details of which were covered in the last chapter. To review, I first examined annotated bibliographies and other Internet sources to get a sense of the field. Second, I studied a select group of works that reinforced my awareness of key works, principal authors and primary issues in the field. Third, I analyzed a wider collection of works derived from the literature in step two. In total, these seventeen volumes provided historical and theoretical contexts for the further survey of expert intelligence literature. They included over a

206. A number of early draft chapters were distributed widely among virtually all those who were interviewed and who are listed in the Bibliography. I particularly wish to thank Stuart Farson, Kurt Jenson, Stephane Lefebvre, Margaret Purdy, Wesley Wark and Lieutenant-General (Retired) Michel Gauthier, all of whom reviewed various full draft versions of my thesis. 71 hundred authors who delivered opinions on a variety of intelligence issues, many accompanied by their prescriptions for improvement. However, as educational as this initial survey was, it offered mainly the views of academia. There was little in the way of official government interpretations of expert literature, intelligence theory, substantive issues and recommended practices. Therefore, to complement the initial survey of academic literature, twenty-six ABCA government inquiries were also analyzed. As a result of this survey I concluded that there are fundamentally six theoretical components of intelligence - policy and governance, organization, people, process, product and action. These six components provide the basis of the analytical framework. Overall, my work identifies the expert literature used in this study, summarizes and categorizes recommendations found within that body of knowledge, distils suggested measures into statements of 'theoretical best practices' and then tests those conceptual approaches against what is known of actual DND intelligence policies, practices, techniques and structures, which comprise current practice. For clarity, I have arranged the discussion into three broad categories, namely Policy and Governance; Organization and People; and Process, Product and Action. Moreover, academic discussion of issues of intelligence accountability is so pervasive that I decided to privilege policy and governance as the premier component that constitutes the context of all defence intelligence.

ANALYTIC FRAMEWORK The analytical framework was designed to guide research, data collection and analysis. It also provided a framework for findings, evaluation and recommendations. An early challenge to developing the analytical framework arose because individual practices, both theoretical and current, were not initially expressed in a common format. All were drawn from disparate and sometimes contradictory sources. Therefore, the initial task was to state theoretical best and current practices in a common form that would facilitate their comparison; in other words, to operationalize them. First, recommended intelligence practices were drawn from ABCA inquiries and other expert literature, operationalized and recorded by component. Within each component, recommended 72

practices were further analyzed to determine their fundamental nature and common elements, from which generic theoretical best practices were derived. The second step identified, operationalized and assigned current Canadian defence intelligence practices to the appropriate component, to facilitate comparison with theoretical best practices. This preliminary analytical framework is graphically depicted in Figure 3-1 below.

Theoretical Dimension Practical Dimension

EXPERT CANADIAN LITERATURE DEFENCE Recommended practices INTELLIGENCE Current practices

^ r V

r y r • • • ^ Policy and Organization People Process Product Action (aovernanc e

Recommended practices are operationalized, allocated to a component and further analyzed to produce generic theoretical best practices in each component II II II II II Current practices are identified, operationalized and allocated to a component for comparison with theoretical best practices

Figure 3-1: The initial analytical framework

I began by analyzing ABCA inquiries because they provided a structured critique of intelligence issues and formal recommendations. I identified recommended practices, operationalized and coded them, and assigned them to an appropriate component of intelligence. For example, the Flood Report produced nineteen recommendations that 73 were placed in the Policy and Governance category, whereas the Aspin Brown Commission report produced three recommendations that fell into the People category.207 Using ABCA inquiry recommended practices as a guide, I then surveyed other expert literature to search out related complementary, contradictory or in any other way different, recommended practices. For instance, the 2003 inquiry into the performance of Australian intelligence agencies recommended inter alia, that: ... there should be an independent assessment of the performance of the intelligence agencies, conducted by an experienced former intelligence expert..., which will report to the National Security Committee of Cabinet and ... recommend any changes that need to take place for the better functioning of the agencies.208

This recommendation was allocated to the policy and governance component. I then found a related view by Boraz and Bruneau who wrote that, "to promote greater effectiveness, governments should create standing committees that regularly review how well the intelligence community is doing its job ...."209 This recommendation was also relegated to the policy and governance component. Having identified recommended practices in each component, I further analyzed the practices to determine their fundamental nature and common elements of preferred approaches. For instance, in the People category, four of the ABCA inquiries provided a total of fourteen recommendations relating to training, education and professional development. A number of other works from expert intelligence literature offered more recommendations in these areas. Further analysis revealed that the overwhelming majority of the recommendations shared a common interest in a comprehensive approach to training, education and development activities throughout a career in the intelligence field. This idea was deemed a theoretical best practice, but it required more precision. Furthermore, some initial theoretical best practices were overly abstract and had to be expressed in more practical terms, in order to be observed, compared with current

207. See Table 3-2: ABCA Inquiry recommended practices below. 208. Parliamentary Joint Committee on ASIO, ASIS and DSD (PJCAAD), Intelligence on Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction (Canberra: The Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, December 2003), 98. 209. Steven C. Boraz and Thomas C. Bruneau, "Best Practices: Balancing Democracy and Effectiveness," in Reforming Intelligence, 335. 74 practices and evaluated. For example, in the Process component, various recommended practices called for a closer relationship between intelligence analysts and decision­ makers. Expressed in an operationalized form, that idea became a theoretical best practice that I worded as: "Intelligence practitioners work closely with policy-makers and strategic decision-makers, to understand their requirements and help educate them in the capabilities and capacities of the intelligence function." In their final form, theoretical best practices in each category were recorded in tabular format and juxtaposed with associated current defence intelligence practices, as depicted in Table 3-1 below.

Policy and Theoretical Best Practice Governance Current Practice (PG) The theoretical approach to Canadian defence intelligence intelligence taken by a suits Canada's parliamentary government reflects the form of government by being subordinated government to be serve, which is to the MND. PG1 then manifest in legislation that defines government intelligence organizations.

Table 3-1: Sample recording of a theoretical best practice and an associated current practice

With theoretical best and current practices thus recorded, remaining elements of the analytical framework were used to compare the two sets of practices, leading to an evaluation of Canadian defence intelligence in each component. Findings and evaluations in each component were then analyzed holistically to produce an overall evaluation of Canadian defence intelligence and recommendations for the enhanced alignment of current practices with theoretical best practices. Figure 3-2 below provides a graphical representation of the full analytical framework. 75

Theoretical Dimension Practical Dimension EXPERT CANADIAN LITERATURE DEFENCE Recommended INTELLIGENCE Practices Current practices

T Policy and People Organization Process Product Action Governance

Recommended practices are operationalized, allocated to a component and further analyzed to produce generic theoretical best practices in each component xc xc xc xc xc Current practices are identified, expressed in operationalized form and allocated to a component for comparison to theoretical best practices 11 I IE n n

COMPARISON OF THEORETICAL BEST PRACTICES AND CURRENT PRACTICES AND EVALUATION OF CANADIAN DEFENCE INTELLIGENCE IN EACH COMPONENT

HOLISTIC EVALUATION OF DEFENCE INTELLIGENCE

CONCLUSIONS Overall findings, evaluation and recommendations

Figure 3-2: The full analytical framework

Thus established, the analytical framework guided data collection, as described in the next section. The framework is again called into service, a final time, in Chapter 7, as the format for presenting overall findings, evaluations and recommendations for the enhancement of the alignment of Canadian defence intelligence current practices with theoretical best practices. 76

DATA COLLECTION Data collection started with analysis of the ABCA inquiries, the results of which then acted as a guide for the subsequent survey of other expert literature. After the ABCA inquiries, Canadian expert literature was scrutinized first, then that of remaining ABCA countries, followed by expert literature from Canada's other NATO allies. Finally non- NATO expert intelligence literature was reviewed, where it was available and relevant. Given that there is very little written about Canadian defence intelligence, almost all data comes from primary sources. They were collected through the analysis of written documentation (e.g. DND administrative documents, previous studies, CDI briefings etc.), interviews with practitioners and direct observation. At the same time, data from informal events and informal conversations with members were also recorded. Although unclassified primary and secondary defence intelligence documents were available during the case study of Canadian defence intelligence, they were not sufficient, in and of themselves, to identify or fully explain existing Canadian practices. Therefore, much of the research in this phase necessarily involved in-depth, semi-structured interviews of subject matter experts (SME), both academic and practitioner. Each interview lasted at least one hour and written notes were taken that later formed the basis of a formal outline meeting report retained by the researcher. A sample interview questionnaire is found at Appendix B and a sample interview record is at Appendix C. Participants were reminded that the research was unclassified and each received a number of guiding questions in advance that helped to focus the discussion, but never restrained it. Most interviewees felt comfortable speaking freely, but those few who requested anonymity are identified as a 'Confidential Source.' Finally, relevant data was collected during many other informal conversations with defence intelligence practitioners the researcher encountered at various meetings, conferences and seminars, but were not used unless corroborated by another primary or secondary source.210 Specific data collection steps are outlined below. Although listed in tandem, these procedural steps were not so linear and one step did not always follow the other in regimented fashion. Steps were usually blurred and occasionally collection activity

210. The most prominent of these events are listed in the bibliography. 77

retreated one or two paces. Sometimes ongoing analysis of a difficult issue required the process to be started again, 'from the top.' The data collection steps were: a. Analysis of ABCA intelligence inquiries, identification of principal issues, followed by identification, recording, coding of recommended practices and their assignment to a component (The overall process of identifying recommended practices, their component assignment and eventual distillation of theoretical best practices involved three much more detailed steps, each of which is explained in detail, in the next section dealing with the derivation of theoretical best practices); b. Survey of Canadian expert intelligence literature, to find and analyze additional material related to ABCA principal issues and derived ABCA recommended practices; c. Survey of remaining ABCA expert literature, to find and analyze additional material related to ABCA principal issues and derived ABCA recommended practices; d. Survey of other NATO expert literature, to find and analyze additional material related to ABCA principal issues and derived ABCA recommended practices; e. Survey of non-NATO expert literature, to find and analyze additional material related to ABCA principal issues and derived ABCA recommended practices; f. Analysis of Canadian defence intelligence documents and literature, to identify, code and record current practices related to ABCA principal issues and derived ABCA recommended practices, and assign them to a component; and g. Interviews with experts, academics and practitioners throughout, to identify, code and record current practices related to ABCA principal issues and derived ABCA recommended practices, and assign them to a component.

Practitioners and academics with intelligence expertise were consulted throughout, to confirm the reasonableness, completeness and relevance of derived theoretical best and current practices. Theoretical best practices were reviewed by individual academics 78 interested in intelligence (a somewhat 'virtual' group). My list of current practices was scrutinized separately by a focus group composed of selected intelligence practitioners serving as staff at the CFSMI. To confirm both lists, a third group was assembled, composed of senior officers, both military and civilian, from the CDI staff. Different people formed each group.211 Appendix D contains sample focus group instructions. Groups were asked to meet for one hour and requested, as were those consulted individually, to address the following five questions: a. Are the theoretical best practices/current practices listed reasonable and relevant? b. If not, in what way could they be made more reasonable or more relevant? c. Are the theoretical best practices/current practices listed complete? d. If not, what additional theoretical best practices/current practices should be included? e. For any additional theoretical best practices that should be included, from where in the expert literature can they be derived?

The two focus groups voluntarily remained for well over one hour. Of common interest to all groups was the method used to derive and designate theoretical best practices. That issue is addressed in the next section.

THEORETICAL BEST PRACTICES Intelligence is constrained and buffeted by constitutional, legislative and political influences, in addition to the ultimately unknown impact of an ever-changing global geo- strategic security environment. Theory cannot ignore these pressures and so theoretical best practices relating to real-world strategic level government intelligence activity can really be nothing more than the 'best,' or preferred approach available in the circumstances, rather than an absolute superlative, existing in a perfect world, unhindered by any influence whatsoever. While there is no one commonly accepted definition, the term 'best practice' is conventionally used to describe an activity, process, method or system that is acknowledged as the 'best' in its class. The notion of a best practice is not new. A century

211. Detailed composition of the two focus groups is shown in the Bibliography. 79 ago, Frederick Taylor, widely regarded as the 'father' of scientific management wrote, "among the various methods and implements used in each element of each trade there is always one method and one implement which is quicker and better than any of the rest.'"212 This view came to be known as the "one best way."213 Best practices, as a technique for performance enhancement, rode the popularity of Total Quality Management (TQM) during the 1970s and 1980s. It maintained a favourable profile as part of the enthusiasm for process re-engineering in the 1990s.214 What began as a business term associated with performance measurement and management is now used in most endeavours where improved performance is sought. There is general agreement that the pursuit of best practices aims at greater effectiveness and efficiency but, there are two different views of how to get there. First, best practices are sometimes seen as targets to be identified and exercised. However, today's best practice could easily turn out to be tomorrow's obsolete process. This notion of best practice as a finite, improved practice that can measurably demonstrate improved efficiency and effectiveness does not easily fit the fluid, perpetually changing security environment facing a government intelligence organization. Therefore, a second view of best practices is perhaps more applicable, one in which the continuing search for the 'next' best practice is a best practice in itself. In this way, the quest for best practices is better seen as an idea, a journey that does not end when a 'better' practice is found and instituted. This second view of best practices reflects the accepted approach to benchmarking best practices within the Canadian government. The Treasury Board Secretariat describes benchmarking as the continuous [researcher's italics], systematic process of measuring and assessing products, services and practices of recognized leaders

212. Frederick Taylor, The Principles of Scientific Management (New York: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1919). Taylor (1856-1915) was an American mechanical engineer who became one of the intellectual leaders of the American corporate efficiency movement of the early 20th century. 213. R. Kanigel, The One Best Way: Frederick Winslow Taylor and the Enigma of Efficiency (New York: Penguin Books, 1997). 214. Steven Cohen and William Eimicke, Tools for Innovators: Creative Strategies for Managing Public Sector Organizations (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1998). Cohen is the Director of the Master of Public Administration Program in Environmental Science and Policy at Columbia University's School of International and Public Affairs and Executive Director of the Earth Institute at Columbia University. Eimicke is the founding director of the Picker Center for Executive Education of Columbia University's School of International and Public Affairs. 80 in the field to determine the extent to which they might be adapted to achieve superior performance.215 However, this study has boundaries in time and space so, despite my preference for viewing the benchmarking of best practices as a continuing quest for a 'better way,' I have necessarily chosen to take a 'snapshot' of theoretical best practices from the expert literature as they could be defined at the time of analysis. I am confident they remain 'best' practices and, if their theoretical nature is truly fundamental, they should remain 'best' for a long time to come. Nonetheless, I do not discount the possibility that any of them may be superseded by a 'better' practice at some point. In the course of benchmarking theoretical best practices I followed the advice of Cohen and Eimicke, who, in presenting their own generic benchmarking model, suggested that a necessary first step was to pick benchmarking targets carefully.216 Accordingly, I derived theoretical best practices relevant to a generic, strategic level government intelligence organization, against which current Canadian defence intelligence practices could be compared and evaluated. I felt it necessary to derive generic theoretical practices for two reasons. First, modern intelligence literature covers a variety of government intelligence activity, only one component of which is defence intelligence. Wider analysis of government intelligence stood a better chance of producing more credible and higher quality theoretical best practices than a somewhat restricted examination of defence intelligence organizations. Second, the derivation of generic theoretical best practices has the advantage of providing equivalent and common benchmarks that can be used in evaluating other government intelligence organizations. In most expert literature, theoretical best practices were not usually expressed clearly or explicitly. Moreover, the literature is not monolithic and different, sometimes conflicting, recommendations were offered to solve the same problem. I therefore developed theoretical best practices in three general steps.

215. Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, Quality Service - Benchmarking and Best Practices: An Update (Guide X), at http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/Pubs_pol/opepubs/TB_O/10QG2- 7E.asp (accessed 11 May 2008). 216. Cohen and Eimicke, Tools for Innovators, 72. 81

First, from the ABCA inquiries, I identified and culled out relevant recommended practices, explicit and implicit, that I felt were relevant to a generic, strategic level government intelligence organization. To identify a recommended practice I searched for any description of action that might imply a recommendation or proposal that was accompanied by words (beyond the word 'recommendation') such as: 'advance', 'advocate', 'back', 'champion', 'could', 'counsel', 'espouse', 'exhort', 'favour', 'might', 'offer', 'propose', 'should', 'submit', 'support', 'suggest', and 'urge'.217 Most recommended practices were explicit and segregated in sections or chapters identified with a title that included 'recommendations', but not all. For example, in Volume 2 of the McDonald Commission Second Report, the following explicit recommended practice is found embedded in the text, not separated with other recommended practices: "The consideration of intelligence needs should be a balanced process free from domination by any single government department".218 Wherever they were found, intelligence-relevant recommended practices were pulled out of ABCA inquiries and allotted to a conceptual component of intelligence. In my second step, the ABCA recommended practices were then used to guide my subsequent survey of other expert literature, from which I also winnowed recommended practices using the same technique. For example, Treverton explicitly suggests that, "... intelligence will need to provide working conditions akin to those of universities and, perhaps most important, to specialize in particular countries or topics, in some cases, for entire careers."219 This particular recommended practice was allocated to the People component. When all intelligence-oriented recommended practices from the ABCA inquiries and the extended expert literature had been collected and assigned, I reviewed them again, a second time, within each component, to identify principal themes because many of them tended to say the same thing in different ways, as seen in these examples.

217. Most of these words are simply antonyms of 'recommend' taken from the Merriam- Webster online thesaurus at http://www.merriam-webster.com/thesaurus/recommend (accessed 13 May 2011). An example of an explicit recommended practice is found in Volume 2, of the McDonald Commission Second Report. It says, " WE RECOMMEND THAT the Cabinet annually determine the government's intelligence requirements". "Second Report, vol. 2, McDonald Commission, 847. 218. Ibid. 219. Treverton, Reshaping Intelligence, 228. 82

Herman argues that, "Intelligence has to be close to its users." K.L. Gardiner offers the thought that one solution to overcoming intelligence analyst/policy-maker disputes "would be to find ways to put analysts in closer contact with policy-makers."221 Then, Marrin considers that the analyst/policy-maker relationship should be "an interaction entailing continuous two-way communication to facilitate decision-making."222 Collectively, these recommended practices reflect a theme encouraging closer working relationships between intelligence practitioners and decision-makers. Where recommended practices were this explicit, analysis was relatively straightforward. However, some implicit recommended practices were buried, to different degrees, in various passages and had to be 'teased' out before they could be analyzed further. In the third and final step in deriving theoretical best practices, I distilled generic theoretical best practices by reflecting further upon the recommended practices grouped by theme. They were analyzed again, to derive their fundamental, theoretical essence, from which I formulated an appropriate theoretical best practice. For example, using the Herman, Gardiner and Marrin examples in the preceding paragraph (augmented by many other similar recommended practices drawn from the expert literature), I concluded that a theoretical best practice existed that called for a close, symbiotic relationship between intelligence analysts and the decision-makers they support, to, among other things, help decision-makers understand the capability and capacity of the intelligence staff. This rough idea was subsequently refined and presented as theoretical best practice PP4, in Chapter 6, which says, " Intelligence practitioners work closely with policy-makers and strategic decision-makers, to understand their requirements and help educate them in the capabilities and capacities of the intelligence function."223

220. Herman, Intelligence in Peace and War, 255.n 221. K.L. Gardiner, "Squaring the Circle," in Secret Intelligence, 135 222. Marrin, "Intelligence analysis and decision-making," in Intelligence Theory, 148. 223. See Chapter 6. Additional sources are: Aspin Brown Commission, Report, "Recommendation 8-1," p. 92. DIR, Recommendation 7, p. 41; Recommendation 13, p. 48. Flood- Report, Recommendation 17, p. 184. Carmen Medina, "What to do when traditional models fail," in Secret Intelligence: A Reader, 108-114.Berkowitz, Best Truth, 85. Herman, Intelligence Services in the Information Age, 12-16. James Wirtz, "The Intelligence Policy Nexus," in Strategic Intelligence, 139-150. 83

In this way, a number of disparate, but theme-related recommended practices were distilled into one generic, theoretical best practice that could then be coded, recorded and assigned to an analytical component for comparison with current Canadian defence intelligence practices. This process was repeated in each of the six conceptual components and it eventually produced the thirty theoretical best practices that underpin this study. The theoretical practices identified in the following chapters all have their roots in the ABCA inquiries. As mentioned in Chapter 2, these inquiries have the benefit of being products of concentrated study by teams of academics and practitioner experts and it is not surprising that, collectively, they produce more explicit recommendations on a wider range of intelligence practices than a quantitatively equivalent collection of other expert literature. Overall, the ABCA inquires provided approximately eight hundred and fifty- seven recommendations associated with improved security and intelligence practices. Of that number, about five hundred and forty-seven recommendations specifically addressed intelligence issues. A detailed breakdown of those quantities is show in Table 3-2 below.

Organization (O) and Process Policy and People (P) Product and Year Inquiry Total Governance Action Other Organization People (PG) (PPA) (O) (P) Canada: Kellock 1946 7 0 0 0 1 6 Taschereau Commission Canada: 1969 Mackenzie 11 0 1 0 0 10 Commission US: Rockefeller 1975 30 21 1 2 5 1 Commission Report US: Church 1976 85 52 4 10 10 9 Committee Reports 84

US: Pike The US House of Representatives never officially published the Pike Committee Committee Report and a detailed count of recommendations is not available. Report224 Australia: Hope 1977 36 13 8 7 8 0 Commission Third Report Canada: McDonald 1981 Commission 285 55 18 31 42 139 Reports

Australia: Royal 1985 This report has not yet been released to the public Commission on ASIA US: Aspin Brown 1996 23 6 12 3 2 0 Commission Report US: Joint Inquiry into Intelligence 2002 Community 19 10 3 1 4 1 Activities Before and After 9/11 Report Australia: PJCAAD 2003 Report: 3 0 0 0 3 0 Intelligence on Iraq's WMD UK: ISC Report: 1 0 0 0 1 0 Intelligence on Iraqi WMD UK: Foreign Affairs Committee 16 3 0 0 9 4 Ninth Report: Decision to go to War in Iraq Canada: 2004 DND DIR 50 7 11 7 16 9 Report

224. There is a variety of commentary on the Pike Committee proceedings and an unauthorized draft report was published in The Village Voice in February 1976. Some portions of the committee proceedings have since been published by the Mary Ferrell Foundation, at http://www.maryferrell.org/mffweb/archive/docset/getList.do?docSetId= 1918 (accessed 11 April 2010). 85

(unclassified version) Australia: Flood 47 19 7 6 12 1 Report225 UK: 12 0 3 3 6 0 Butler Report US: SSCI Report, Pre-War Intelligence 13 0 0 0 13 0 Assessments on Iraq (and related reports) US: 9/11 41 4 1 1 3 32 Commission US: Silberman Robb 2005 73 4 10 5 34 20 Commission Report UK: ISC Report 2006 4 0 0 0 4 0 7/7 2005

Canada: O'Connor 36 2 0 0 10 24 Commission (Arar) Report UK: Review of 2009 1 0 1 0 0 0 Intelligence on 7/7 Canada: Major Commission: 2010 64 1 0 0 9 54 Air India Inquiry, Final Report Sub-totals 857 197 80 76 189 310 OVERALL 857 197 156 189 310 TOTALS

Table 3-2: ABCA Inquiries recommended practices

225. There were twenty-three principal recommendations in the Flood Report, but six of them had multiple subsidiary recommendations, many of which, while still relevant to the principal recommendation, were associated with one or more of the categories covered in this study. Therefore, all subsidiary recommendations were counted separately, to bring the total of recommended practices considered to forty-seven. 86

CURRENT PRACTICES To derive current defence intelligence practices a case study of the CDI organization was conducted. Theoretical best practices were used as a guide to aid in the search for corresponding current practices. Defence intelligence documents were analyzed and practitioners interviewed, as well as others outside DND who worked in association with defence intelligence. As with theoretical best practices, the focus was on current practices at the strategic level, practices that were truly relevant to the defence intelligence role within the government intelligence community. Moreover, only current practices associated with derived theoretical best practices were recorded and subject to further analysis and reflection, because the basic point of this study is to evaluate the degree that current practices and theoretical best practices are aligned. Therefore, other current practices having no association to derived theoretical best practices were left to be studied elsewhere.

EVALUATION Evaluation was straightforward. Theoretical best practices and current defence intelligence practices were, for ease of analysis, recorded in a simple tabular format reflecting the construct of the analytical framework. To facilitate evaluation, each recorded practice was juxtaposed to its equivalent of the other type. The next step compared current practices with theoretical best practices to reveal matches, gaps, differences or other anomalies. Comparative analysis quickly became an iterative process because some entries had to be re-examined in order to confirm analysis and their initial coding. For example, one current practice dealing with an organizational aspect at first had no obvious relationship with any theoretical best practice in the same category. A return to the analysis of the current practice revealed that when it was more appropriately described as a process practice it achieved a match with an important theoretical best practice. This happened many times in both current and theoretical best practices and, in some cases, more than once within one practice. Great care was taken to not artificially manipulate any practice only for the purpose of achieving a match. Research went where the analysis took it, but sometimes early analysis had to be revisited 87 in light of subsequent analysis and refined. Perhaps not surprisingly, comparative analysis revealed gaps and anomalies, which were subjected to additional in-depth reflection, to determine their significance and, where possible, the reasons they existed. Evaluation of defence intelligence within specific categories is contained in Chapters 4, 5 and 6. In Chapter 7, overall findings and an evaluation of defence intelligence alignment with expert literature are then offered as a prelude to making recommendations for the enhanced alignment of defence intelligence with theoretical best practices suggested by the expert literature.

SUMMARY This chapter provided an outline of the research method used in this study, developed an analytic framework and discussed the data collection plan. It also explained the derivation of theoretical best practices and current practices. Furthermore, this chapter described the approach to evaluation of Canadian defence intelligence within each component, followed by an explanation of the overall approach to the comprehensive evaluation of Canadian defence intelligence based on a survey of expert literature. This chapter concludes the introductory material of this study. The next three chapters feature detailed analysis and evaluation of Canadian defence intelligence, beginning with the category of Policy and Governance. 88

CHAPTER 4 POLICY AND GOVERNANCE

INTRODUCTION The last chapter described the research method followed in this study. It identified the analytical framework based on six components of intelligence, which have been grouped into three categories: 1) Policy and Governance (PG); 2) Organization (O) and People (P); and 3) Process, Product and Action (PPA). It also outlined the data collection plan, the method of evaluation and the manner in which theoretical best and current practices were derived. This chapter evaluates Canadian defence intelligence in the first category - Policy and Governance - based on a comparison of current Canadian defence intelligence practices with theoretical best practices derived from expert literature. The following section outlines the results of analysis, including identification of theoretical best practices and representative sources from which they were derived; an outline of the alignment of theoretical best and current defence intelligence practices; and an evaluation of Canadian defence intelligence on the basis of that alignment. Principal issues raised during analysis are examined in later sections. Analysis identified eight theoretical best practices associated with intelligence policy and governance at the strategic level. Current Canadian defence intelligence practices are aligned with three of them. One current practice is partially aligned with a theoretical best practice. Four theoretical best practices have no aligned current practice. While it might appear that expert literature in the category of Policy and Governance has had a reasonable impact on Canadian defence intelligence, it can be argued that the four theoretical best practices having no aligned current practice represent significant deficiencies in defence intelligence policy and governance. There is no legislated basis for defence intelligence. Furthermore, there is no national intelligence policy and no subordinate departmental defence intelligence policy. Moreover, in addition to the absence of such 'front-end' guidance, Canadian defence intelligence is not subject to any formal or regular evaluation or review for efficacy. The existing bureaucratic and political mechanisms that control defence intelligence are not reviewed or evaluated 89 either. These shortcomings leave the effective and lawful operation of defence intelligence largely to chance, a worrisome circumstance in any democracy and one that would not exist if views found in expert literature were heeded and applied.

RESULTS OF ANALYSIS

Theoretical best practices Using the method described in Chapter 3, a variety of recommended intelligence practices, both explicit and implied in the expert literature, were compiled and analyzed to identify their common, fundamental, generic characteristics. Further reflection then reduced generic recommended practices to eight theoretical best practices. A detailed account of all sources consulted and their recommended practices is beyond the space available here, but a representative sampling of relevant references and findings are discussed below. A more fulsome explanation of the context from which these theoretical best practices were derived is found later in the section dealing with evaluation. ABCA inquiry recommended practices dealing with policy and governance issues provided the principal basis for most theoretical best practices identified in this chapter. Of the eight hundred and fifty-seven ABCA inquiry recommended practices, one hundred and ninety-seven, or more than one-fifth of the total, are related to intelligence policy and governance. Table 4-1 below lists the number of relevant recommended practices found in each of the ABCA inquiries. 90

Total Policy and Year Inquiry Recommended Governance Practices (PG) 1946 Canada: Kellock Taschereau Commission 7 0 1969 Canada: Mackenzie Commission 11 0 1975 US: Rockefeller Commission Report 30 21 1976 US: Church Committee Reports 85 52 Australia: Hope Commission Third Report 36 13 1977 US: Pike Committee Report Not publicly available 1981 Canada: McDonald Commission Reports 285 55 1985 Australia: Royal Commission on ASIA Not publicly available 1996 US: Aspin Brown Commission Report 23 6 US: Joint Inquiry into Intelligence 2002 Community Activities Before and After 19 10 9/11 Report Australia: PJCAAD Report: Intelligence 2003 3 0 on Iraq's WMD UK: ISC Report: Intelligence on Iraqi 1 0 WMD UK: Foreign Affairs Committee Ninth 16 3 Report: Decision to go to War in Iraq Canada: DND DIR Report (unclassified 2004 50 7 version) Canada: O'Connor Commission (Arar) 36 2 Report Australia: Flood Report 47 19 UK: Butler Report 12 0 US: SSCI Report, Pre-War Intelligence 13 0 Assessments on Iraq (and related reports) US: 9/11 Commission 41 4 2005 US: Silberman Robb Commission Report 73 4 2006 UK: ISC Report 7/7 2005 4 0 2009 UK: Review of Intelligence on 7/7 2005 1 0 Canada: Major Commission: Air India 2010 64 1 Inquiry, Final Report TOTALS 857 197

Table 4-1: ABCA Inquiry recommended practices dealing with Policy and Governance Issues

It appears that the period of greatest concern about intelligence policy and governance occurred in the years immediately following the 'Year of Inquiry' (1975) when US, Australian and Canadian commissions of inquiry racked up one hundred and 91 forty-one of the one hundred and ninety-seven recommended practices. Many of those recommendations were enacted, leading to the establishment of national intelligence structures in place when the 9/11 terrorist attacks occurred. Subsequent US inquiries led to a significant restructuring of the US intelligence community and the establishment of the ODNI. In Canada, the McDonald Commission led to the establishment of CSIS and later, the DIR generated extensive and fundamental changes in Canadian defence intelligence, including the appointment of a CDI supported by an enhanced corporate intelligence management staff. However, it is necessary to remember that ABCA inquiries were conducted by and for mature western democracies. Consequently, given the generally unique circumstances and specific cultures of new and emerging democracies examined in the works cited in earlier chapters, ABCA inquiry recommended practices cannot be applied directly and be expected to bring instant intelligence effectiveness to those new democracies. In fact, despite beginning with ABCA inquiry recommended practices, it quickly became apparent that the expert literature beyond ABCA inquiries provided much more of a basis for the first theoretical best practices in this category. Beyond ABCA inquiries, four other main sources served to underpin theoretical best practices developed in this chapter. Together, they cover government intelligence policy and governance issues at the strategic level, in thirty-three emerging and established democracies (and three arguably less-democratic states (i.e. Cuba, Iran and Palestine) on six continents. Canada's closest intelligence allies are included (Australia, New Zealand, UK and US), as are ten of twenty-six other NATO allies (Albania, Bulgaria, France, Germany, Greece, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Romania and Spain). Other states examined are: Bosnia and Herzegovina; Brazil; Colombia; Cuba; India; Indonesia; Iran; Israel; Japan; Jordan; Pakistan; Palestine; South Korea; Russia; Sweden; and Vietnam.226 First, European perspectives of intelligence reform in Eastern Europe and in the West are presented by editors Born and Caparini.227 Their volume is one of a number of contributions from the Geneva-based DCAF that provide valuable European insight into

226. The key source of this review is Farson et al, PSI Handbook. 227. Born and Caparini, Democratic Control of Intelligence Services, 2007. 92 emerging intelligence issues. In contrast to the substantial American-based intelligence literature, DCAF research is not parochial.228 Its research is more widely applicable and discusses more generic legal and theoretical contexts. A second source provides an exception to American parochialism. In Reforming Intelligence, US editors Bruneau and Boraz argue that intelligence is best conceptualized as a sub-field of civil-military relations."229 Their view is based on the premise that, like military and police forces, intelligence organizations can be both a threat to and defender of, civil liberties in a democratic society. Intelligence agencies should therefore be organized and controlled by government in a similar way.230 The PSI Handbook of Global Security and Intelligence, edited by Farson et al, presents accounts of intelligence policy and governance developments in a variety of new and established democracies.231 In this work alone, the reader will find examples of all eight theoretical best practices. The fourth significant source is Johnson's Volume Five of Strategic Intelligence entitled "Intelligence and Accountability."232 The majority of this book is US-centric, but it nonetheless provides generic lessons and recommended practices related to intelligence policy and governance.233 Countries examined in sources discussed above each have their own distinct set of challenges so complex that "solutions are context dependent rather than following some universal formula."234 Gill, observes that:

228. See the DCAF website, at http://www.dcaf.ch/ (accessed 15 February 2009). 229. Bruneau and Boraz, Reforming Intelligence, 2. Bruneau is a Distinguished Professor at the US Naval Postgraduate School (NPS). He served as Director of the Center for Civil- Military Relations from 2000-2004. Boraz is a Naval Intelligence officer. He is a Distinguished Graduate of the NPS and has served as a Federal Executive Fellow with RAND 2004-2005. 230. Ibid., xiii-xv, and 1-2. 231. Farson et al, PSI Handbook. 232. Johnson, Strategic Intelligence, 2007. 233. Although described in a US historical context, there are valid generic lessons to be learned as presented by A. Denis Clift, "The Coin of Intelligence Accountability," in Strategic Intelligence, vol. 5, 165-181. 234. Robert Jervis, "Intelligence, Civil-Military Relations, and Democracy," in Reforming Intelligence, xix. 93

Even a cursory examination of developments in different countries during recent decades indicates that there is no single 'rulebook' for the design of architectures of democratic control and oversight or review. Clearly the sets of legal and institutional relationships that emerge in any specific state will be the product of its unique culture, history and politics.235

Each country is thus a story unto itself. However, while individual states took their own route, they usually had a common start point. In almost every case, they began by deciding on a theoretical approach to intelligence within their country. The central theoretical question revolves around how to build an effective national intelligence establishment, while not allowing it to abuse the civil rights and freedoms of citizens it is designed to serve. The quandary, according to Jervis, is that 'too much' concern for the protection of civil liberties can render intelligence organizations ineffective and 'not enough' scrutiny risks forms of tyranny.236 This dilemma was particularly acute in some former Soviet Socialist Republics. In Romania, for example, objective deliberation was made difficult by lingering popular rage at the intelligence apparatus of the previous Ceausescu regime. The new Romanian government wanted to avoid a return to a concentration of intelligence power and so decided to divide the intelligence sector into several separate agencies.237 Bulgaria also evolved from under the yoke of Communism, but developed its own approach, which featured, among other things, the separation of military intelligence from the armed forces.238 Whether old or new, established or emerging, democracies working to build a democratic state intelligence function have had to translate their theoretical approach into practical legislation at some point. However, their individual approaches for doing so, have varied considerably. In older, more established democracies, intelligence organizations have typically been shaped, over time, by the executive's perception of need and available money, but different forms of older democratic governments (e.g. US republican-style government; the Westminster parliamentary-style of government in

235. Peter Gill, "Democratic and Parliamentary Accountability of Intelligence Services After 9/11," in Democratic Control of Intelligence Services, 197. 236. Jervis, "Intelligence, Civil-Military Relations, and Democracy," in Reforming Intelligence, xi-xiii. 237. Matei, "Romania's Transition," in Reforming Intelligence, 222-223. 238. Nikolai Bozhilov, "Reforming the Intelligence Services of Bulgaria: The Experience of 1989-2005," in Democratic Control of Intelligence Services, 84-86. 94

Canada, Australia and the UK) still produced different theoretical approaches.239 The need to decide on a theoretical approach and capture it in related legislation is even more readily apparent in ten new or emerging democracies - in Europe, Asia and Africa - examined in Farson's PSI Handbook on Global Security and Intelligence,.240 While history can be influential, contemporary politics can also drive theoretical approaches to intelligence and shape ensuing legislation. The case of the 'new' Bosnia and Herzegovina is instructive. The war of 1992-95 left Bosnia and Herzegovina with three autonomous, ethnically 'clean,' and directly party-controlled intelligence and security agencies.241 The first theoretical issue centered on how many and what kind of intelligence agencies the country needed. Second, government officials had to decide how they wished to create the new service - merge existing organizations, or design a new one? The role and responsibility of the presidency was another issue. Finally, among democratic reforms imposed by the international community was the development of legislation for a democratic intelligence organization that met European standards.242

Theory also led to legislation in Argentina. Antunes outlines nine 'great themes' encountered during deliberations to draft a new Argentinean national intelligence law in 2001.243 The first theme was the issue of what kind of law would be created. The second involved the concepts of intelligence and counterintelligence and the distinction between external and internal threats. An associated issue was whether conceptual definitions should be included in the text of the law. Resolution of these theoretical issues allowed

239. Gill, "Preface," PSI Handbook, 7. See also, for instance, the differences in the theoretical approach to intelligence between the US republican style of government in Loch K. Johnson, "The United States," 53-57; and the Westminster parliamentary governments of Canada in Stuart Farson and Reg Whitaker, "Canada," 35-40; of Australia in David Martin Jones and Carl Ungerer, "Australia," 169-171; of New Zealand in Willem de Lint, "New Zealand," 183-186; and the UK in Mark Phythian, "The United Kingdom," 394-398. 240. Farson, PSI Handbook: Antunes, "Argentina," 97-98; Cepik and Bruneau, "Brazil," 117-122; Boraz, "Colombia," 132-135; Asad Durani, "Pakistan," 233-235; Damien Kingsbury, "Indonesia," 248-250; Sotiraq Hroni, "Albania," 427-429; Kalman Kocsis, "Bosnian and Herzegovina," 439-443; Vesselin Petkov, "Bulgaria," 459-460; David Strachan-Morris, "Iraq," 454-456; Kevin O'Brien, "South Africa," 634-640. 241. See full details of Bosnia and Herzegovina intelligence and security development in Kalman Kocsis, "Bosnia and Herzegovina," in PSI Handbook, 439-455. 242. Ibid., 444-446. 243. Antunes, "Argentina," in PSI Handbook, 95-111. 95 the more practical aspects of organizing intelligence agencies to be subsequently addressed. In the past half-century, all of the countries reviewed have re-considered their theoretical approach to intelligence and subsequently produced a legislated basis for their intelligence establishments, but although there are similarities, no two theoretical approaches or bodies of legislation are identical. Young democracies in Latin America, such as Argentina, Brazil and Colombia made changes largely as a result of discarding dictatorial regimes. New democracies in Eastern European emerged from Soviet oppression at the end of the Cold War after nearly fifty years of insidious state security apparatuses and sought a new way. Western democracies, including ABCA countries were provoked by 9/11 to review their theoretical approach to intelligence and adapt legislation to meet contemporary needs. Given the ubiquitous nature of state consideration of a theoretical approach to intelligence and the consequent development of associated legislation, I considered that these two endeavours, jointly, form the first theoretical best practice in the category of Policy and Governance (PG), which is:

PG 1. The theoretical approach to intelligence taken by a government reflects the form of government to be served, which is then manifest in legislation that defines government intelligence organizations.244

This theoretical best practice is particularly evident in advanced western democracies. For example, since the mid-1970s, all ABCA states have legislated the responsibilities of their major intelligence organizations. In Australia, for example, government passed the Office of National Assessment Act in 1977; the Australian Security and Intelligence Organization Act in 1979; the Inspector General of Intelligence and

244. In addition to the footnoted states shown earlier, see further examples of this theoretical best practice in Farson, PSI Handbook: Farson and Whitaker, "Canada," 47; Cepik and Bruneau, "Brazil," 117; de Lint, "New Zealand," 184; Rahul Roy-Chaudhury, "India," 216 and 223-224; and the rather rocky road to democratic intelligence activity in Jon Moran, "South Korea," 286-87. 96

Security Act in 1986.24 Then, after 9/11, The Intelligence Services Act was passed in 2001, to consolidate the mandates of principal intelligence agencies.246 It is interesting to note however, that while Canada and the UK, both of which have Westminster-style parliamentary governments like that of Australia, have promulgated legislation for national intelligence agencies, they have not produced an overarching statute covering all intelligence activity conducted by government.247 Once initiated, the process of drafting legislation provides additional inherent advantages. Theoretical intelligence issues are usually settled in the course of developing legislation establishing national intelligence agencies and organizations. As a result, national intelligence legislation tends to describe, either implicitly or explicitly, the national intelligence policy, which may or may not be complemented by an associated strategy. Such is the case with the IRTPA in the US, which is complemented by a subordinate national intelligence strategy, published by the DNI.248 Conversely, the absence of overarching intelligence legislation may indicate an absence of intelligence policy. Canada has no umbrella legislation covering the government intelligence

245. Office of National Assessments Act, 1977, at http://www.comlaw.gov.aU/ComLaw/Legislation/ActCompilationl.nsf/0/8283BEC4688C5DlCC A2570D000817615/$file/OfficeNatAssmtl977.pdf (accessed 12 June 2010). Australian Security and Intelligence Organization Act, 1979, at http://www.comlaw.gov.aU/ComLaw/Legislation/ActCompilationl.nsf/0/BDB9F76626CDlEF8C A25773C0014FD09/$file/ASIOl979_WD02.pdf (accessed 12 June 2010). Inspector General of Intelligence and Security Act, 1986, at http://www.comlaw.gov.aU/ComLaw/Legislation/ActCompilationl.nsf/0/ClE92142B85ECD99C A2572C200258FCD/$file/InsGenIntSecl986_WD02.pdf (accessed 12 June 2010). 246. Intelligence Services Act, 2001, at http://www.comlaw.gov.aU/ComLaw/Legislation/ActCompilationl.nsf/0/F82FA4D6F682E34AC A2574750024D77C/$file/IntelligServ2001WD02.pdf (accessed 14 June 2010). 247. In Canada, for example, CSIS is subject to the CSIS Act and CSEC is guided by Part V.l of the National Defence Act. In the UK, the Intelligence Services Act 1994 deals with the Special Intelligence Service (SIS), the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), the Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC) and a Tribunal Commissioner. Canadian and British legislation are silent on defence intelligence and other departmental intelligence activity. 248. IRTPA, "TITLE I-REFORM OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY; Subtitle A-Establishment of Director of National Intelligence," at http://travel.state.gov/pdf/irtpa2004.pd (accessed 4 August 2010); and Office of the Director of National Intelligence. The National Intelligence Strategy of the United States (2009), at http://www.dni.gov/reports/2009_NIS.pdf (accessed 4 August 2010). 97 community, but instead relies on a mosaic of individual statutes that address a variety of intelligence organizations, activities and responsibilities.249 Sims and Gerber explore the nature of intelligence policy and note that it should set priorities for collection and analysis, with whom the results will be shared and how the process will be funded. It should also guide how the intelligence process is managed. In this way, the promulgation of intelligence policy is the prerogative of government, not the exclusive domain of intelligence professionals.250 The requirement for a national intelligence policy is implicit in some ABCA inquiry recommended practices associated with intelligence policy and governance. Kellock and Taschereau offered the simple recommendation that "all security measures should be co- coordinated and rendered as uniform as possible."251 In 1976, the Church Committee implied a need for an overarching intelligence community policy when it found that: ... the nation's intelligence functions should be organized and directed to assure that they serve the needs of those in the executive and legislative branches who have responsibility for formulating or carrying out foreign or national security policy. The Committee finds that Congress has failed to provide the necessary statutory guidelines to ensure that intelligence agencies carry out their necessary missions in accordance with constitutional 252 processes. In Australia, in 1977, Justice Robert Hope concluded that, "The Australian intelligence community is fragmented, poorly coordinated and organized. The Agencies

249. There are about thirty-eight such Acts in Canada. The more substantial intelligence- related Acts are: Department of Justice: Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act (R.S., 1985, c. C-23, at http://laws.justice.gc.ca/eng/C-23/FullText.html; National Defence Act (R.S., 1985, c. N- 5), Part v.l, "Communications Security Establishment," at http://laws.justice.gc.ca/eng/N- 5/FullText.html; Security of Information Act (R.S., 1985, c. 0-5), http://laws.justice.gc.ca/eng/0- 5/20110217/page- 0.html?rp2=SEARCH&rp3=SI«&rpl=intelligence&rp4=aIl&rp9=cs&rpl0=L&rpl3=50#idhitl; and the Charities Registration (Security Information) Act (2001, c. 41, s. 113), http://laws.justice.gc.ca/eng/C-27.55/20110217/page- 0.html?rp2=SEARCH&rp3=SI&rpl=intelligence&rp4=all&rp9=cs&rpl0=L&rpl3=50#idhitl (accessed 30 March 2010). 250. Jennifer E. Sims and Burton Gerber, eds., Transforming U.S. Intelligence (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2005), xii-xiii. 251. Kellock and Taschereau Commission, "Recommendation 3," 685. 252. Church Committee, 425. 98 lack proper guidance direction and control. They do not have good or close relations with the system of government they should serve."253 He went further in his recommendations: These recommendations are designed to improve relations between government and the intelligence agencies and to establish machinery at the centre of government that will involve appropriate ministers and departmental heads with the agencies' heads in the direction and guidance of the intelligence community in a coordinated way.254

Hope then specifically recommended the establishment of a "special ministerial committee.,, to give general oversight and policy control to the intelligence community."255 Beyond ABCA countries, many new democracies have gone to considerable lengths to establish clear intelligence policies. In one example, Kenneth Dombroski describes how the South Africans, in the course of democratization, developed a "road map" of where they wanted to take reforms, through a white paper that outlined the reforms required, what the intelligence community structure would look like, where the intelligence functions would be distributed, to whom they would be accountable and how intelligence agencies and their personnel were expected to act.256 Moreover, various calls for legislated intelligence activity clearly desire a policy that makes intelligence agencies' mandates and accountability structures transparent and lawful. The twenty-three recommendations arising from Justice O'Connor's "Factual Inquiry" portion of the Arar Inquiry effectively set out the parameters for such accountability and transparency in Canada.257 Eleven of the twenty-three recommendations explicitly encourage the enhancement or establishment of written mandates or policies. Finally, given the principle of the rule of law extent in western democracies, it is suggested that their government intelligence establishments operate in accordance with the spirit and letter of the legislation in which they are grounded. To do otherwise is

253. Hope, "Findings," Royal Commission on Australia's Security and Intelligence Agencies (Canberra: National Archives of Australia, 1977), 4. 254. Ibid, 10. 255. Ibid, 17. 256. Kenneth R. Dombroski, "Transforming Intelligence in South Africa," in Reforming Intelligence, 262. 257. O'Connor Commission, Report, "Analysis and Recommendations," 364-369. 99 illegal and, depending on the extent and nature of any transgression, could be morally deficient and repugnant as well. Western intelligence legislation therefore reflects the policy framework in which government intelligence activity is exercised. The prevalence of this practice was widespread, particularly among most ABCA countries. It was therefore interpreted and reduced to the following theoretical best practice:

PG 2. A national intelligence policy, either explicit or implicit, is reflected in legislation explaining the theoretical approach taken, the legislative basis for government intelligence activity and the governance regime that will lead it.258

Once established in legislation, intelligence policy will necessarily address a number of important issues, one of which is the degree of intelligence centralization or decentralization to be adopted. Both centralization and decentralization ('pluralism') have their champions. "Centralization improves efficiency by reducing redundancy and waywardness among organizations, but it is just those inefficient qualities that foster diverse views and challenges to any single orthodoxy," according to Richard Betts.259 On the other hand, "Pluralism makes intelligence production more like a marketplace of

258. Government intelligence policies can be gleaned from most ABCA government intelligence legislation, except in Canada. See the following Australian intelligence legislation at Australian Government ComLaw, http://www.comlaw.gov.au/Search/intelligence (accessed 29 December 2010); Intelligence Services Act 2001; Inspector General of Intelligence and Security Act 1986, at http://www.comlaw.gov.au/Details/C2010C00829 (accessed 11 February 2011); and Australian Security Intelligence Organization Act 1976, at http://www.comlaw.gov.au/Details/C2010C00369. In the UK see: legislation.gov.uk, http://www.legislation.gov.uk/all?title=intelIigence (accessed 19 December 2010); Intelligence Services Act 1994; and the Regulation of Investigatory Powers (Covert Human Intelligence Sources: Code of Practice) Order 2010, at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2010/462/contents/made (accessed 19 December 2010). The vast body of intelligence legislation (as amended) in the US is brought together in the US Intelligence Community Legal Reference Handbook, 2009, at http://www.dni.gov/reports/IC_Legal_Ref_2009.pdf (accessed 19 December 2010). Beyond ABCA countries, this theoretical best practice is exemplified in the South African actsonline; Intelligence Services Act 2002, at http://www.acts.co.za/is/index.htm (accessed 19 December 2010); and in French intelligence legislation in Legifrance.gouv.fr, at http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/rechSarde.do?reprise=true&page=l&lettre= (19 December 2010). 259. Betts, Enemies of Intelligence, 148. 100 ideas, while centralization is more conducive to narrowing interpretations toward a single party line."260 Harold Wilensky, also recognized the dilemma of centralization: ...if intelligence is lodged at the top, too few officials and experts with too little accurate and relevant information are too far out of touch and too overloaded to function effectively; on the other hand, if intelligence is scattered throughout many subordinate units, too many officials and experts with too much specialized information may engage in dysfunctional competition, may delay decisions while they warily consult each other, and may distort information as they pass it up.261

A centralized intelligence function can also lead to centrally agreed assessments that might conceal strong disagreement, or distort weights of diverse, even opposing, opinions. Groupthink is the worst outcome possible.262 Different governments have taken different approaches. ABCA inquiries clearly reflect the differing degrees of centralization found in the US republic form of government and the parliamentary style of government found in the UK, Australia and Canada.263 The former favours centralization, while the latter remains protective of ministerial responsibility. See, for example, the Australian intelligence model as described by Jones and Ungerer.264 A less mature example of national preference is found in Argentina. Antunes explains that the Argentine public have not forgotten about past generations of

260. US House Committee on Armed Services, Report: Inquiry into the USS Pueblo and EC-121 Plane Incidents. David Wise and Thomas B. Ross, The U-2 Affair (New York: Random House, 1962). Trevor Armbrister, A Matter of Accountability (Baltimore: Penguin, 1974). All Cited in Betts, Enemies of Intelligence, 146-150. 261. Wilensky, Organizational Intelligence, 58-62, 126, 179. Wilensky is Professor Emeritus of Political Science at the University of California, at Berkeley. He is a fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences and has twice been a Fellow at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences. 262. Irving L. Janis, Victims of Groupthink (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1972). Groupthink, a term coined by social psychologist Irving Janis (1972), occurs when a group makes faulty decisions because group pressures lead to a deterioration of "mental efficiency, reality testing, and moral judgment" (p. 9). Groups affected by groupthink ignore alternatives and tend to take irrational actions that dehumanize other groups. 263. For example, the IRTPA in the US went further than any other intelligence legislation in US history to centralize significant responsibility in the DNI and made the position a cabinet level appointment. On the other hand, the McDonald Commission recommended that a new Canadian civilian security intelligence agency should be placed under the authority of the Solicitor General. McDonald Commission Second Report, Recommendation 104,1089. 264. David Martin Jones and Carl Ungerer, "Australia," in PSI Handbook, 165-182. 101 authoritarian government and consequently they remain wary of centralized intelligence services. As a result, Argentina has a complicated system of legislative and judicial scrutiny of government intelligence activity.265 Other case studies in the PSI Handbook of Global Security and Intelligence, particularly that of Bosnia-Herzegovina, show that, although approaches differ, the degree to which intelligence is centralized is among the early issues to be decided when establishing a democratic intelligence organization.266 In all examples examined in this study, it was repeatedly apparent that individual countries tend to adopt their own approach and centralize their intelligence services only as far as legislatures decide. It is therefore apparent that government intelligence centralization differs from state to state and is dependent upon the different historical and contemporary determinants influencing state democratic development. Nonetheless, analysis of those varied practices revealed a common, fundamental approach that can be characterized as a theoretical best practice best and expressed as follows:

PG 3. The degree to which government intelligence is centralized or decentralized reflects the nature of the government it serves.267

In addition to settling issues surrounding centralization or decentralization, development of modern democratic intelligence enterprises has come to include transparent accountability and oversight mechanisms, but such reforms seem to be particularly difficult in emerging democracies, where not all intelligence enhancements proceed as expected. Democratic intelligence policy and governance in Romania faced a fifteen-year struggle as a result of the legacy of the despotic Communist regime. Today,

265. Antunes, "Establishing Democratic Control of Intelligence in Argentina," in Reforming Intelligence, 213-215. 266. Kalman Kocis, "Bosnia-Herzegovina," in PSI Handbook, 439-455. 267. Perhaps the most significant example of the degree to which democratic intelligence activity can be centralized within government is found in the US, where the 2004IRTPA established the ODNI (http://www.dni.gov/), which has published at least sixty-four intelligence community-wide directives, policy guidance documents and policy memorandums. A lesser degree of intelligence centralization is found in Taiwan, where intelligence decentralization paralleled democratic changes begun in the 1980s. See, Steven E. Phillips, "Taiwan's Intelligence Reform in an Age of Democratization," in Reforming Intelligence, 176-178. A concise description of an even less centralized government intelligence organization is found in a paper by Sqn. Ldr. A.R. Saluja, entitled, "Indian Intelligence Organization: Need for a Comprehensive Knowledge Management Strategy &Policy," South Asia Terrorism Portal at http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/publication/idr/vol_16(2)/saluja.htm (accessed 23 January 2011). 102

Romanian attempts to establish truly democratic intelligence services are still impeded by old habits and continue to need work, although improved accountability and oversight has gained a foothold.268 ABCA inquiry recommended practices, coming as they do from mature democracies, contain recommendations for enhanced accountability and oversight mechanisms, perhaps none more so than those found in the fifty-five policy and governance recommendations of the McDonald Commission and the fifty-two recommended policy and governance recommendations in the Church Committee report.269 From other expert literature, Boraz and Bruneau suggest that there are five important measures that lead to enhanced scrutiny of intelligence services: 1) raise public interest and pressure; 2) increase civilian awareness and competence; 3) institutionalize processes that support transparency and effectiveness; 4) foster a supportive political culture in society and within the intelligence community; and 5) professionalize the intelligence services.270 In support of these recommendations, Cynthia Nolan persuasively argues that intelligence oversight is not as unique as some think and that governance mechanisms should be more public than they already are.271 This view is shared by the DCAF, which generally reflects European enthusiasm for stringent oversight. The DCAF notes that in democratic societies, maintaining a degree of transparency of intelligence activities is the best way to ensure democratic accountability and control. Transparency is also essential if one hopes to raise public awareness and support for the intelligence services. It is apparent throughout the expert literature that in pursuing modern democratic intelligence development, governments display widespread enthusiasm for the establishment of transparent accountability and oversight mechanisms. I therefore concluded that such actions constituted another theoretical best practice as follows:

268. Cristina Matei, "Romania's Transition to Democracy and the Role of the Press in Intelligence Reform," in Reforming Intelligence, 222-225. 269. McDonald Commission, Second Report, "Summary of Recommendations," 1067. Church Commission, vol. 7, Book I, Chapter XVIII, "Summary of Findings and Recommendations," 423-474. 270. Bruneau and Boraz, Reforming Intelligence, 331-343. 271. Cynthia Nolan, "More Perfect Oversight: Intelligence Oversight and Reform," Strategic Intelligence, vol. 5,115-140. 103

PG 4. A national intelligence governance structure features a clear responsibility and accountability framework, supported by transparent oversight and review mechanisms.272

There are different ways to hold intelligence organizations to account. US congressional committees exercise direct oversight of national intelligence agencies. On the other hand, parliaments have traditionally exercised indirect scrutiny of state intelligence agencies. The British experience, as outlined by Phythian, has direct and historical influence on Canada.273 The McDonald Commission devoted its entire third report to the question of government knowledge of illegal RCMP activity. One part focuses on senior RCMP officials and ministers. At no time does it mention or explore in any way, any form of parliamentary responsibility in intelligence matters.274 On the other hand, the DIR addresses executive government responsibility in Canada and explains that defence intelligence operates under the doctrine of Crown prerogative, as directed by the executive arm of government.275 However, while all ABCA countries have legislated intelligence oversight mechanisms, they are not necessarily a workable model for all democracies.276 Some less stable democracies have a difficult time adopting the 'North Atlantic' intelligence model,

272. In Canada, first mention of the need for a review function came in the Mackenzie Commission, but it was narrowly focused on the review of security-oriented administrative decisions made in certain personnel cases. See Mackenzie Commission, 24 and 38-44. The McDonald Commission noted the need to "strengthen public confidence in the integrity of security intelligence operations and their direction by government, provision must be made for independent review of security activities. See McDonald Commission, 841. The Australian Intelligence Services Act 2001 spells out the accountability and oversight framework within the Australian government intelligence community, at http://www.comlaw.gov.au/Details/C2008C00204 (accessed 12 January 2011). Chapter 11 "Security Services," of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996 outlines responsibility for requirements for intelligence services, at http://www.info.gov.za/documents/constitution/1996/96consll.htm (accessed 12 January 2011). Finally, Section 1011 of the US IRTPA provides detail on the reorganization and management of the intelligence community, at http://www.nctc.gov/docs/pll08_458.pdf (accessed 12 January 2011). It is complemented by an ODNI publication "An Overview of the United States Intelligence Community for the IIIth Congress" (Washington, D.C., 2009), at http://www.dni.gov/overview.pdf (accessed 12 January 2011). 273. Phythian, "The British Experience with Intelligence Accountability," in Strategic Intelligence, vol. 5, 67-88. 274. McDonald Commission, Third Report, Part III, 89-178. 275. DIR, 23. 276. See, for example, Farson and Whitaker, "Canada," in PSI Handbook, 28-30. 104

principally due to the unique nature of their culture(s) and the internal challenges facing them. Mexico is one such example. Institutionalizing intelligence has rarely, if ever, been a priority in Mexico.277 Given the complexities of the internal drug-wars, it seems the Mexican government has just not had the time, resources or energy to set up, let alone sustain and nurture, an effective intelligence oversight regime. A National Security Council established by law in 2005 to oversee state intelligence activity is described by Imtiaz Hussain as an ineffective "motley civilian-military mix under civilian command and control."278 Like Argentina, other former authoritarian states continue to wrestle with control of democratic intelligence services. Nikolai Bozhilov explains that Bulgaria is keen to adopt modern democratic methods and practices to control intelligence services, but struggles to implement them.279 Also in eastern Europe, "the post-1989 history of the Polish secret services abounds with scandals, leaks, falsifications, manipulations, and actions of dubious legality and utility," according to Andrej Zybertowicz.280 He concludes that the Polish political oversight system is underdeveloped, because the post-communist political scene has not yet sufficiently matured and it remains unclear whether the democratic leaders or the heads of secret services controls the other.281 Romania has difficulties too. The violence of the Romanian revolution following the collapse of communism and the perceived negative role played by the intelligence services made effective oversight of successor services a central and immediate priority in 1989. After the 1990 elections, a joint permanent committee for defence and public order was established to inter alia, oversee intelligence services. However, perhaps not surprisingly, in the face of all the other challenges facing the new nation, intelligence

277. Imtiaz Hussain, "Mexico," in PSI Handbook, 67. 278. Ibid., 83. 279. Nikolai Bozhilov, "Reforming the Intelligence Services in Bulgaria: The Experience of 1989-2005," in Democratic Control of Intelligence Services, 86-90. 280. Andrej Zybertowicz, "Transformation of the Polish Secret Services: From Authoritarian to Informal Power Networks," in Democratic Control of Intelligence Services, 65. 281. Ibid., 82. The researcher informally discussed this issue with two Polish parliamentarians during a visit to Warsaw from 12-17 November 2010. They expressed the same lack of confidence in firm democratic control of state intelligence services. 105 oversight continued to be a low priority until the middle of the decade, despite legislated responsibilities.282 Generally, vigilance is required because the nature of intelligence is such that the delicate balance between secrecy and democracy is difficult to strike.283 The oversight and review mechanisms spoken of in PG 4 are the instruments by which this vigilance is carried out. Oversight and review will be discussed in more detail in later paragraphs, but at this point, I think it important to identify the relationship of oversight vis a vis responsibility. In the countries examined in this study, I found that responsibility for the conduct of intelligence activity rests almost entirely with the executive branch of government. Parliaments or congresses possess different degrees of involvement and although some prerogatives are described as 'oversight,' they do not immediately or directly interfere with direction issued by the executive or legislated appointments charged with directing intelligence activity.284 In parliamentary style governments, such as that found in Canada, the notion of ministerial responsibility is a long-standing constitutional concept that has been repeatedly reinforced in successive government inquiries. Commissioner Mackenzie argued that: In the case of telephone interception, we think ... control should be ministerial rather than judicial, since ministers are more readily aware of the full details of the cases brought to their attention, are in better position to understand the special requirements of security, and could maintain more centralized control of the complete range of wiretapping operations. 285

Commissioner McDonald also covered the topic in considerable detail and provided this judgment:

282. Larry Watts, "Control and Oversight of Security Intelligence in Romania," in Democratic Control of Intelligence Services, 55-58, 283. DCAF, Intelligence Working Group, "Intelligence Practice and Democratic Oversight: A Practitioner's View," Occasional Paper No. 3, at http://www.dcaf.ch/Publications/Publication-Detail?lng=en&id= 18354 (accessed 17 May 2009). 284. See, for example, the reformed South African intelligence executive oversight that resembles the British, Canadian and Australian models as described by Dombroski, "South Africa," in Reforming Intelligence, 253-257. Furthermore Boraz and Bruneau argue that best practices call for the executive branch to provide overall direction of the intelligence community, while the legislative branch of government should restrict itself to ensuring that intelligence organization, activity and budgets are in keeping with national laws. Boraz and Bruneau, "Best Practices," in Reforming Intelligence, 332. 285. Mackenzie Commission, 102. 106

In our view such a distinction between policy and operations leads to insurmountable difficulties in application, and even worse, it results in whole areas of ministerial responsibility being neglected under the misapprehension that they fall into the category of 'operations' and are thus outside the Minister's purview. ... All policies of operations must receive direction from the ministerial level.286

Then Justice O'Connor, in his discussion of the merits of oversight and review mechanisms, offered this view: Given the complex balance between police independence and police accountability, I would be concerned about the effect a true oversight mechanism might have. ... There is also a real risk that adding an oversight mechanism would work to diminish ministerial responsibility for RCMP activities and RCMP accountability to the Minister. ... the police should be accountable to government and that government, through the Minister, should be responsible for police policies.287

Although some cases require closer examination than others, there is ample evidence of direct links between executive responsibility and the exercise of superintending oversight in democratic forms of government. The responsibility for democratic executive control and superintending of intelligence activity therefore rests with the executive branch, which in turn is responsible to an elected legislature. Accordingly, another theoretical best practice can be derived and presented as follows:

PG 5. Oversight superintends intelligence activity and is therefore associated with responsibility. In a parliamentary democracy, executive oversight is vested in government and subordinate legislated appointments. Parliament does not exercise direct oversight of intelligence organizations.288

286. McDonald Commission, Second Report, 869. 287. O'Connor Commission, A New Review Mechanism for the RCMP's National Security Activities, 464. 288. In a recent speech to the British Royal United Services Institute, on 16 November 2010, The Rt. Hon. Sir Malcolm Rifkind, the current Chairman of the Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC) outlined the Committee's remit. Although he used the term 'oversight' to describe the Committee's work, that work clearly involves 'after-the-fact' examination of intelligence activity, rather than 'superintending' intelligence operations. The Rt. Hon. Sir Malcolm Rifkind, Intelligence Oversight in the UK: Intelligence and Security Committee, London, 16 November 2010, at http://docs.google.com/viewer?a=v&pid=sites&srcid=aW5kZXBlbmRlbnQuZ292LnVrfGlzY3xn eDo0OWZlNGE3ZGRhMjdiNmNi (accessed 2 February 2011). The New Zealand oversight system, as publicly described, makes no mention of a parliamentary role. See New Zealand 107

However, the mere description and situating of oversight regimes does not guarantee their establishment and implementation. In keeping with the overall concept that legitimate intelligence activity is based in legislation and thereby subject to the rule of law, ABCA oversight and accountability mechanisms are defined in the legislation establishing individual intelligence agencies. This is also the case beyond ABCA democracies. Therefore, by way of a corollary to PG 4 and PG 5, the next theoretical best practice can be expressed this way:

PG 6. Effective oversight mechanisms of intelligence agencies, both internal and external, are embedded in the legislative framework that establishes the intelligence mandate of those agencies.289

As important as intelligence oversight is, it is only one element of an effective system of intelligence scrutiny. Oversight superintends and controls intelligence activity, exerting 'before the fact' direction. It is complemented by the function of 'review,' an 'after the fact' examination of intelligence practices aimed at judging efficacy or propriety. Intelligence oversight and review mechanisms are different. Gill describes how intelligence review has a common appeal' for a number of people who view it from different perspectives. The desire for formal review first arose from intelligence related scandals in the 1970s. In the 1990s, a renewed impetus for review came from the process of democratization of formerly authoritarian regimes. Now, since 9/11, those concerned

Security Intelligence Service, "Oversight," at http://www.security.govt.nz/about/oversight.html (accessed 2 February 2011). 289. In Canada, see Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act (R.S., 1985, c. C-23), "Management of the Service," Sections 6-11, at http://laws.justice.gc.ca/eng/C-23/page- 2.html#anchorbo-ga:l_I-gb:s_6 (accessed 23 January 2011). In Australia, the Australian Security Intelligence Organization Act 1979 (as amended), Section 8, "Control of Organization" and Section 8A "Guidelines," at http://www.comlaw.gov.au/Details/C2010C00369 (accessed 23 January 2011). In New Zealand see the New Zealand Security Intelligence Service Act 1969 (as amended), Section 5, "Director of Security," at http://www.legislation.govt.nz/act/public/1969/0024/latest/DLM391606.html (accessed 23 January 2011). In the UK, see the Intelligence Services Act 1994, "Secret Intelligence Service - The Chief of the Intelligence Service," at http://www.legislation.gov.Uk/ukpga/1994/13/section/2 (accessed 23 January 2011). In the US see Intelligence Reform and Terrorist Prevention Act, "Director of the Central Intelligence Agency," Sec 104A paras, (a)-(d), at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/serialset/creports/pdf/108-796/titlei_reform_intel.pdf (accessed 23 January 2011). 108 with 'intelligence failure' see formal review as one way to improve intelligence effectiveness.290 Formal review activity grew after the 'Year of Inquiry.' Among the ABCA inquiries it was the Church Committee reports that first led to full-fledged congressional oversight and review of national intelligence agencies, activities and budgets. In following years, the Hope Commissions in Australia and the McDonald Commission in Canada eventually had the same, although less dramatic, result. A separate office of the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security was established in Australia, in 1986 and in Canada, SIRC was set up in 1984.291 However, unlike the congressional oversight bodies in the US, members of the Australian and Canadian review offices are appointed by government.292 In the UK, the Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC), whose members are appointed by the Prime Minister, was established by the Intelligence Services Act 1994 to examine the policy, administration and expenditure of the intelligence services.293 In his Arar Inquiry report, Justice O'Connor also devotes considerable attention to the concept of review, albeit in the context of the review of RCMP national security activity. Nonetheless, his discussion is of considerable relevance here. He prefers review rather than oversight because, in his view, there is "a risk that an oversight mechanism could confuse or even diminish accountability of the RCMP to government and, correspondingly, the responsibility of government for the RCMP."294 O'Connor further

290. Gill, "Democratic and Parliamentary Accountability of Intelligence Services After 9/11," in Democratic Control of Intelligence Services, 196. 291. Australian Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Act 1986, at http://www.comlaw.gov.au/Details/C2010C00829 (accessed 24 January 2011) and 292. Australian Government, "Part II - Inspector-General," Inspector General of Intelligence and Security Act, 1986, Canberra: Attorney-General's Department, at http://www.comlaw.gov.au/ComLaw/Legislation/ActCompilationl.nsf/framelodgmentattachment S/4B967205BC5A5892CA2572C200258FDF (accessed 2 September 2010). Government of Canada, "Security Intelligence Review Committee," Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act, 1985, Part II Review, Section 34, Ottawa: Department of Justice, at http://laws- lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/C-23/20101107/page- 0.html?ip2=HOME&ip3=SI&rpl=security%20intelligence&rp4=all&rp9=cs&rpl0=L&rpl3=50 #idhitl (accessed 25 August 2010). 293. Cabinet Office, The Intelligence and Security Committee, at http://isc.independent.gov.uk/ (accessed 30 April 2010). 294. O'Connor Commission, A New Review Mechanism for the RCMP's National Security Activities, 500. 109 informs us that, "An independent review mechanism should foster ministerial accountability and also provide the Minister with recommendations for improvement."295 My analysis of ABCA inquiry recommended practices and examination of government democratic intelligence practices show widespread preference for and legislated use of review mechanisms. These findings, upon reflection, were reduced to the following theoretical best practice:

PG 7. Review scrutinizes intelligence activity after the fact and is associated with accountability. In a parliamentary democracy, some legislated intelligence review organizations report independently to parliament and others report separately to a responsible minister. Some legislated review bodies may report independently to both.296

The review function has long been established, if not always used aggressively, in Canada. The need for review has also been a consistent consideration in the drafting of other ABCA legislation dealing with intelligence. Democratic enthusiasm for review necessarily leads to the design and implementation of accountability measures. The focus of any accountability mechanism falls on those principal appointments responsible for intelligence activity. Major's interest in ministerial responsibility is a case in point. All forms of oversight and review seek to scrutinize, inter alia, the performance of individuals holding positions of authority within the intelligence establishment. In mature ABCA governments and in emerging democracy legislation, these appointments

295. Ibid. 296. In Canada, Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act, "Reports," Sees. 53-55, at http://laws.justice.gc.ca/eng/C-23/page-3.html#anchorbo-ga:l_III-gb:s_34 (accessed 2 February 2011). In Australia, Inspector-General Intelligence and Security Act, 1986, "Division 4 Reports," at http://www.comlaw.gov.au/Details/C2010C00829 (accessed 2 February 2011). The mandate of the Commissioner of CSEC is set out in the National Defence Act, Part V.l, Sec. 273.63 at http://laws.justice.gc.ca/eng/N-5/page-4.html#anchorbo-ga:l_V_l (accessed 2 February 2011) and in Security of Information Act, Sec. 15, at http://laws.justice.gc.ca/eng/0-5/page- 2.html#anchorbo-ga:s_3 (accessed 2 February 2011). In the UK, the Intelligence Services Act 1994, "Intelligence and Security Committee," Sec. 10, at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1994/13/contents (accessed 2 February 2011). See Rockefeller Commission (note American use of the word 'oversight' is actually 'review'), Chapter 3, Summary of Findings, Conclusions and Recommendations, "C. Supervision and Control of the CIA," Recommendations 3,4, 5 and 9, pp 15-18. Church Committee, Book I, Chapter 18, Summary: Findings and Recommendations, 470-471; Book II, Chapter IV, Conclusions and Recommendations, Recommendations 69-80, pp 332-335. Aspin Brown Commission, Chapter 14, "Accountability and Oversight," 139-145. 110 invariably include elected officials. In many countries ultimate responsibility for intelligence activity rests with the head of government, although frequently, intelligence organizations will be placed under appropriate ministerial responsibility.297 Moreover, democratic governments consistently give responsibility for intelligence activity to elected officials, to the extent that I consider this widespread practice to be a theoretical best practice, described in this way:

PG 8. An elected person, or group of elected persons is designated as being ultimately responsible and accountable for the intelligence activity in government. In a democracy, this is usually the head of government, or a cabinet minister, or a small cabinet committee. Within departments, ministers are held responsible and accountable for intelligence organizations in their portfolio.298

Most ABCA inquiries reflect this theoretical best practice, but perhaps none more so than the US inquiries, which have been consistently clear in their calls for one central authority to guide the US intelligence community, on behalf of the President. The 9/11 Commission led to the IRTPA and the establishment of the DNI, but interestingly, the DNI is not an elected official. He is appointed by the President, with the advice and

297. Farson et al, PSI Handbook: Cepik and Bruneau, "Brazil," 118; Boraz, "Colombia," 135-137; Hajime Kitaoka, "Japan," 264; Jon Moran, "South Korea," 288-289; and Daun, "Germany," 323 and 333. See also, Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act, Part 1, para. 6; United States Intelligence Reform and Terrorist Prevention Act, Sec. 1011, sub-paras, (a) and (b), http://intelligence.senate.gov/laws/pll08-458.pdf (accessed 2 March 2011); and UK Secret Intelligence Service, "Ministerial oversight," https://www.sis.gov.uk/about-us/legislation-and- accountability/ministerial-oversighthtml (accessed 2 March 2011). 298. In Canada, see Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Act 2005, "Powers and Duties of the Minister," Sec. 5, at http://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/P-31.55/page- 2.html#anchorbo-ga:s_4 (accessed 19 February 2011). In Australia, see Intelligence Services Act 2001, Part 1, "Definitions," at http://www.comlaw.gov.au/Details/C2008C00204 (accessed 19 February 2011). The term "responsible Minister is defined as; "(a) in relation to ASIO—the Minister responsible for ASIO; and (b) in relation to an agency—the Minister responsible for the agency; and (ba) in relation to DIO—the Minister responsible for DIO; and (c) in relation to ONA—the Minister responsible for ONA. In New Zealand, see New Zealand Security Intelligence Service, Annual Report 2010, "NZSIS Overview - Responsible Minister," 7, at http://www.nzsis.govt.nz/reports/arlO/nzsis-arlO.pdf (accessed 19 February 2011). In the UK, see the Intelligence Service Act 1994, Sec. 2, "Chief of the Intelligence Service," at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1994/13/crossheading/the-secret-intelligence- service?view=plain (accessed 19 February 2011), which says, " The Chief of the Intelligence Service shall make an annual report on the work of the Intelligence Service to the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State and may at any time report to either of them on any matter relating to its work." Ill consent of the Senate. However, he works directly for the President who is ultimately responsible for the effectiveness of the intelligence community. The President in turn is held accountable by an experienced, if not always appreciated, Congressional intelligence oversight regime, in addition to the President's Intelligence Advisory Board (PIAB) and Intelligence Oversight Board (IOB).300 ABCA inquiries associated with parliamentary style governments protect the concept of ministerial responsibility. Intriguingly, the closest any recommendation comes to restraining ministerial prerogative is found in the Air India Inquiry report, in which Justice Major treads heavily on the issue by recommending that the NSA/PM be given enhanced responsibilities, inter alia, "to supervise and, where necessary, to coordinate... all aspects of the distribution of intelligence to the RCMP and to other government agencies;" and, "to resolve, with finality, disputes among the agencies responsible for national security." He is silent on how these enhanced duties would relate to the responsibilities of ministers who oversee those same agencies and who are responsible for the production of that intelligence.301 Major's views on this issue seem inconsistent with his views on the review function, as discussed above. Let us now see how these eight theoretical best practices compare with current Canadian defence intelligence practices.

Alignment In the category of Policy and Governance, three of eight theoretical best practices derived from expert literature are aligned with current defence intelligence practices. One current practice is partially aligned with a theoretical best practice. No current practice was aligned with any of the four remaining theoretical best practices. Details of the alignment of current defence intelligence practices with associated theoretical best practices, related to Policy and Governance, is shown in Table 4-2 below. Anomalies are shown in italics.

299. ODNI, National Intelligence: A Consumer's Guide (2009), at http://www.dni.gov/reports/IC_Consumers_Guide_2009.pdf (accessed 21 May 2010). 300. Ibid. 301. Major Commission, Report, vol. 3, "The Relationship Between Intelligence and Evidence and the Challenges of Terrorism Prosecutions," Recommendation 1, p. 333. 112

Policy and Theoretical Best Practices Governance Current Practices (PG) The theoretical approach to Partially Aligned. intelligence taken by a Canadian defence intelligence government reflects the form of suits Canada's parliamentary government to be served, which is government by being subordinated then manifest in legislation that to the MND. defines government intelligence However, there is no legislated PG1 organizations. basis for Canadian defence intelligence. It operates under the legal doctrine of Crown prerogative exercised by the federal government in matters of national defence. A national intelligence policy, Not aligned. either explicit or implicit, is There is no national intelligence reflected in legislation explaining policy, nor is there an overall the theoretical approach taken, the defence intelligence policy. legislative basis for government Within DND however, there are intelligence activity and the PG2 various Departmental governance regime that will lead Administrative Orders and it. Directives (DAODs) dealing with specific intelligence activities such as Counter-intelligence and HUMINT. The degree to which Aligned. government intelligence is Canadian defence intelligence is centralized or decentralized centralized under political control, reflects the nature of the but decentralized for government it serves. PG3 implementation. The defence intelligence function resides in DND, subordinate to the MND, It is overseen by the DM and functionally directed by the CDI. An national intelligence Not aligned. governance structure features a There is no Canadian national clear responsibility and intelligence policy. There is no accountability framework, Canadian defence intelligence supported by transparent policy. The defence intelligence oversight and review PG4 mandate is diffuse and implicit in a mechanisms. variety of legislation, based in the legal doctrine of Crown Prerogative and rooted in military intelligence. 113

Oversight superintends Aligned. intelligence activity and is Oversight of Canadian defence therefore associated with intelligence conforms to the DND responsibility. In a parliamentary and CF responsibility and democracy, executive oversight is accountability framework. PG5 vested in government and Operational oversight authority subordinate legislated is vested in the DM, CDS and appointments. Parliament does designated CF commanders, while not exercise direct oversight of functional oversight authority is intelligence organizations. delegated to the CDI. Effective oversight Not aligned. mechanisms of intelligence There is no legislated agencies, both internal and framework for Canadian defence external, are embedded in the PG6 intelligence. legislative framework that establishes the intelligence mandate of those agencies. Review scrutinizes intelligence Not aligned. activity after the fact and is There is no established, regular associated with accountability. In review of Canadian defence a parliamentary democracy, some intelligence. legislated intelligence review However, Canadian defence organizations report PG7 intelligence is subject to ad hoc independently to parliament and review by a number of legislated others report separately to a bodies such as the Federal Court, responsible minister. Some Auditor General of Canada, the legislated review bodies may Canadian Human Rights Tribunal report independently to both. and Parliamentary Committees. An elected person, or group of Aligned. elected persons is designated as The MND is responsible to being ultimately responsible and parliament, the Prime Minister and accountable for the intelligence cabinet for Canadian defence activity in government. In a intelligence. democracy, this is usually the Within DND, the DM is PG8 head of government, or a cabinet responsible and accountable to the minister, or a small cabinet MND for Canadian defence committee. Within departments, intelligence. ministers are held responsible and The CDI is responsible and accountable for intelligence accountable to the DM for organizations in their portfolio. Canadian defence intelligence.

Table 4-2: Theoretical best and current practices - Policy and Governance (PG) 114

Evaluation Less than half of the eight theoretical best practices are fully aligned with current Canadian defence intelligence practices in this category. However, aligned current practices place Canadian defence intelligence firmly under the political control of the MND, an elected member of parliament and duly appointed minister of the Crown. The MND, in turn, is responsible to parliament. Under the MND, a professional, apolitical DM, usually with no previous intelligence experience, oversees defence intelligence, assisted by a military officer appointed as CDI. Both the DM and CDI participate in the centralized coordination of government intelligence activity, led by the PCO. However, within DND, the majority of the workload is carried by the CDI, currently a Major- General. The CDI, being a military officer and a member of the profession of arms in Canada, is subordinate to and directed by the CDS, to whom he is also responsible for the provision of military intelligence. This thesis does not explore that relationship because the focus is on defence intelligence, which is provided to government through the DM and MND. This is not to say that the CDS is not involved in defence intelligence activity. He is. Theoretically, military advice from the CDS, which itself has been supported by military intelligence, is a source of information that must be considered by the CDI and put through all-source defence intelligence analysis before being offered to the DM and MND to assist in their decision-making. The theoretical point being made here is that military intelligence, as explained in Chapter 3, is a principal, but not the only source of defence intelligence information. The influence of the CDS notwithstanding, it would seem that Canadian defence intelligence is securely subordinate to civilian control. Of some concern is the fact that slightly more than half of the derived theoretical practices do not have a fully aligned current practice and these instances of non-alignment represent significant deficiencies that inhibit the full maturation of Canadian defence intelligence. First, the absence of a legislated basis for defence intelligence might indicate an unwillingness to come to grips with important aspects of modern democratic intelligence accountability and oversight practices. Second, the lack of an overall defence intelligence policy may indicate some resistance to strategic thinking in defence intelligence circles. Finally, in light of the absence of a formal process of review and 115 evaluation to monitor the efficacy and propriety of defence intelligence, it could be argued that there is a lack of serious stewardship by Canadian defence intelligence leaders. These issues are discussed in more detail in later paragraphs, after a brief discussion of the legitimization of intelligence in government.

LEGITIMIZATION OF INTELLIGENCE IN GOVERNMENT There are three fundamental theoretical approaches to intelligence that have some relevance to Canada. A fourth does not. First, Abram Shulsky refers to the 'traditional' approach, based in the teachings of Sun Tzu, where espionage is rife, secrecy is paramount and intelligence exists to serve the ruler and protect the regime from both domestic and foreign threats.302 Second, Kent's view sees intelligence as a kind of social science, in which secrecy is not as important as the application of scientific method in the analysis of information from all sources, including the wide range of open sources. An important corollary of the Kent view is that intelligence analysis should be held separate from the deliberations of policy makers, so as to promote academic objectivity and protect it from the influence of partisan politics.303 The third theoretical approach to intelligence acknowledges Kent's social science view and concern for analytical objectivity, but is not held hostage to these conditions. Former US Director of Central Intelligence and now Defense Secretary Robert Gates, has been a contemporary champion of encouraging the close association of intelligence and policy staffs, for the purpose of ensuring the relevance of intelligence analysis and products.304 A fourth theoretical policy approach to intelligence, usually found in countries referred to as national security states, considers the main threat to national security as

302. Abram N. Shulsky, Silent Warfare: Understanding the World of Intelligence, 3r ed., revised by Gary J. Schmitt (Washington, D.C.: Brassey's (US), 2002), 159. 303. Betts, Enemies of Intelligence, 69. According to Betts, the analysts imperative is intellectual, while the policy makers imperative is political. Relationships between the two are much discussed in the expert literature. Betts is an adjunct senior fellow for national security studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. At Columbia University, he is the Arnold A. Saltzman professor of war and peace studies in the political science department, director of the Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies, and director of the international security policy program in the School of International and Public Affairs. His areas of expertise include international conflict, US defence policy, military strategy, political and military intelligence, and terrorism. 304. Ibid., 76. 116 coming from within, with or without foreign instigation and support. Examples can be found in 1960s-era Latin American states, or the apartheid-era South African security services.305 None of the variations of this fourth theoretical approach to intelligence is considered relevant to Canada and will therefore not be dealt with. These theoretical approaches notwithstanding, nothing in the expert literature says there must be a government intelligence policy, but many works discuss various examples of both implicit and explicit intelligence policies developed by various countries. Furthermore, according to the DCAF, intelligence services are legitimate only when their exceptional powers are derived from proper legislation. Laws governing intelligence services should provide a clear and specific mandate, including: 1) geographic areas of responsibilities; 2) subjects of investigation; 3) limits of competence and restrictions imposed on activities; 4) the relations among the services working within the intelligence community and their coordination; 5) the means by which the services are held accountable, including mechanisms of executive control, legislative oversight and judicial review; and 6) the legal means to deal with complaints in cases of agency misconduct.306 Legitimization can come in one or both of two forms. First, the intelligence function can be established in law. A legislated basis for the intelligence function can be as sophisticated as the US 2004 IRTPA that deals with many detailed aspects of the government intelligence community in one document. Alternatively, individual elements of the government intelligence establishment can be dealt with in separate government acts. For example, in Australia, The Intelligence Services Act 2001 makes explicit the role of the Minister for Foreign Affairs in directing ASIS and authorising the conduct of specific activities.307 Ideally, legislation will spawn a national intelligence policy that guides the establishment of an effective intelligence governance structure. In most of the expert

305. For an overview of Latin American security issues see A. Rouquie, The Military and the State in Latin America ( Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1992). Information on South African security services in the apartheid era is found in G. Winter, Inside BOSS: South Africa's Secret Police (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1981). 306. DCAF Backgrounder, Intelligence Services (March 2006), at http://www.dcaf.ch/publications/kms/details.cfm?lng=en&id=18413&navl=5 (accessed 21 August 2010). 307. Government of Australia, The Intelligence Services Act 2001, at http://scaleplus.law.gov.aU/html/pasteact/3/3483/top.htm (accessed 19 April 2008). 117

literature, intelligence policy and governance issues at the strategic level are usually discussed in the context of control and accountability, largely because the secrecy needed for intelligence activities creates the potential for or perception of abuse of intrusive powers by intelligence services.308 Control and accountability arrangements must balance, and be seen to balance, the need to protect national interests with the need to safeguard individual rights and freedoms. Control, in the narrowest sense, means ensuring that specific procedures are followed. It may be exercised by both formal and informal means. There are three forms of control found throughout the four principal sources - political control, exercised by congress or parliament, usually indirectly, and elected government officials (cabinet and/or ministers); operational control, exercised by the executive arm of government and, in some cases, the judiciary; and administrative control, exercised by appointed heads of intelligence agencies, who are under the operational control of government and under the political control of government and congress/parliament. An undervalued, if not totally forgotten, aspect of control is that which results from international cooperation with foreign intelligence services. Foreign services are in a privileged position to judge the performance, value, reliability and credibility of the cooperating intelligence services. While a significant amount of self-discipline is already built into international cooperation, executive control could profit from the feedback given by collaborating with foreign intelligence services in their evaluation of the intelligence exchange and the value of cooperation. The foregoing discussion has suggested that the legitimization of government intelligence is based in legislation, supported by an intelligence policy reinforced by effective oversight and review. Analysis has shown that these remain somewhat problematic issues in Canadian defence intelligence.

NO LEGISLATED FRAMEWORK Allocation and limitation of responsibilities for intelligence work is critical for both the protection of civil liberties and for effectiveness. A group of Harvard experts studying the enhancement of Peruvian intelligence agencies pointedly suggested that the law

308. DCAF has completed considerable research in this field of study See the DCAF website at http://www.dcaf.ch/ (accessed 15 February 2010). 118 should confer upon each intelligence agency a clearly defined mandate. They also argued the law should define what forms of action can and cannot be engaged in by an intelligence agency. Canadian defence intelligence has no federally legislated basis and continues to function in a policy vacuum. The National Defence Act (NDA) implicitly makes the MND responsible and accountable for Canadian defence intelligence, but there is no higher national legislation or policy that publicly defines the role of Canadian defence intelligence, or the powers conferred upon the MND to direct Canadian defence intelligence activity. In the absence of such legislation, Canadian defence intelligence activity is conducted under the doctrine of Crown prerogative. Peter Hogg, a leading constitutional law commentator, has described the prerogative power as follows: The royal prerogative consists of the powers and privileges accorded by the common law to the Crown. Dicey describes it as "the residue of discretionary or arbitrary authority, which at any given time is left in the hands of the Crown." The prerogative is a branch of the common law, because it is the decisions of the courts which have determined its existence and extent.3*0

Clear Canadian judicial support for the continuing existence of the Crown prerogative in matters related to national defence can be found in the Federal Court Trial Division decision rendered in the case of the Vancouver Island Peace Society v. Canada, which included the following passage:

309. Harvard University, "Initiative Report: Peruvian Intelligence Reform Initiative," Internal Security Reform Program, (Harvard University Program on Justice Reform in Times of Transition, April-July, 2002), 8, at http://www.pjtt.org/assets/pdf/project_reports_pdf/LA/INTERNAL%20SECURITY%20REFOR M%20PROGRAM_2002.pdf (accessed 8 May 2009). 310. Constitutional Law of Canada, 2nd ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1985), 10. Halsbury's Law of England, Vol. 8(2), 4th ed., 244, para. 367. Hogg served as Dean of York University's Osgood Hall Law School from 1998 to 2003. Professor Hogg's principal publication is Constitutional Law of Canada (Carswell, Toronto, 5th ed., 2007), two volumes. His writings on constitutional law have been cited in the Supreme Court of Canada more frequently than those of any other writer. He has served as adviser to governments, aboriginal organizations and private law firms on constitutional law, and has appeared as counsel in constitutional cases, thirteen of them in the Supreme Court of Canada. 119

The royal prerogative is comprised of the residual of the miscellaneous powers, rights, privileges, immunities and duties accepted under our law as vested in Her Majesty and under our Constitution exercised by the Governor in Council acting on advice of Ministers. Orders in Council may express the decisions of the Governor in Council in relation to matters within the discretionary authority of prerogative powers. Traditionally the courts have recognized that within the ambit of these powers the Governor in Council may act in relation to matters concerning the conduct of international affairs including the making of treaties, and the conduct of measures concerning national defence and security. The prerogative power is, of course, subject to the doctrine of parliamentary supremacy and Parliament, by statute, may withdraw or regulate the exercise of the prerogative power. The authority of the Governor in Council in the exercise of the prerogative is also bound by the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Operation Dismantle, [1985] 1S.C.R. 441).311

Having Canadian defence intelligence operate under Crown prerogative can be considered safe as long as government remains truly democratic and practitioners operate within the law, with ethical and professional credibility. The customs and traditions of the profession of arms in Canada yield a culture in which Canadian defence intelligence activity is not likely to unlawfully infringe on the civil liberties of Canadians, at least that is the governing assumption. However, defence intelligence capabilities are much more extensive and sophisticated today, and they are more often deployed within Canada. The nature of their use in support of domestic government operations places them in direct contact, both overtly and covertly, with Canadian citizens.312 For example, it is not well known that the CF, on occasion, conducts counter-intelligence work within Canada.313 As well, intrusive defence intelligence collection means have been used against Canadians. For example,

311. Justice MacKay, Vancouver Island Peace Society v. Canada, [1994] 1 F.C. 102 [at page 141], cited in Khadr v. Canada (Attorney General) (F.C), 2006 FC 727, (2006), [2007] 2 F.C.R. 218, para. 92, Office of the Commissioner for Federal Judicial Affairs Canada, http://reports.fja.gc.ca/eng/2006/2006fc727/2006fc727.html (accessed 22 April 2010). 312. Confidential Source 358. 313. To an extent, such activity is governed by three specific Departmental Administrative Orders and Directives (DAOD). See DAOD 8002-0 Counter-intelligence, 8002-1 National Counter-intelligence Program, and 8002-2 Canadian Forces Counter-intelligence Unit, on the DND Assistant Deputy Minister Finance and Corporate Services website at http://www.admfincs.forces.gc.ca/dao-doa/8000/index-eng.asp (accessed 2 July 2009). There are other DAODs dealing with specific intelligence disciplines such as HUMINT, but they are classified documents not available to the public. 120 during the disturbance at Oka, Quebec in 1990, the CF Joint Imagery Centre (CFJIC) provided aerial photos of aboriginal positions. SIGINT assets monitored Mohawk telephone and walkie-talkie conversations, and ground reconnaissance patrols penetrated Reservation boundaries. After the operation, a military intelligence company was awarded the CDS Unit Commendation for their work.314 As well, other traditional defence intelligence activity was carried out by military intelligence elements when placed in support of other lead government departments, such as they were for the preparation and conduct of the 2010 Olympic Winter Games in Vancouver.315 The absence of a legislated framework also impedes the development of other preferred intelligence governance and accountability measures. Government exercises the Crown prerogative when it deploys CF elements overseas, as part of a 'whole-of- government' mission, but expert literature suggests that parameters of such support should be spelled out in a formal way. Justice O'Connor's report, dealing with Maher Arar, recognizes the value of inter-departmental cooperation and specifically states that "agreements or arrangements with other entities in regard to integrated national security operations should be reduced to writing."316 O'Connor also made the point that agencies must remain cognizant of and operate within their legislated mandate, something Canadian defence intelligence still does not have.317 Other ABCA inquiries offer various recommendations for more effective community coordination and scrutiny. The Flood Report suggests expanding the Australian parliamentary committee review mandate and that of the Inspector General Intelligence and Security (IGIS) to cover all intelligence agencies; strengthening the Office of National Assessment (ONA) community assessment coordination role; establishing a Foreign Intelligence Coordination Committee (FICC) to assist in the

314. 1 Canadian Division Intelligence Company Annual Historical Report, 1990, DND Directorate of History and Heritage Archives. 315. CF intelligence assets were deployed in support of the Integrated Security Group (ISG), led by the RCMP, that coordinated security for the 2010 Olympic Winter Games in Canada. Within the ISG was the Joint Intelligence Group (JIG), which included military intelligence representatives. 316. O'Connor Commission, Report, Part I, Chapter IX, "Recommendations," 311. 317. Ibid., Recommendation 1, p. 321. While the CF remains subject to, inter alia, the NDA and the Criminal Code of Canada, Canadian defence intelligence per se is not specifically identified or mandated in either of those documents, nor is it given a mandate in any other legislative instrument. 121 coordination, monitoring and reporting on the performance of all Australian agencies; and having the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet ensure the national and defence priorities are integrated and approved annually.318 The Butler Report welcomed arrangements made to give the JIC more leverage to ensure that the Defence Intelligence Service (DIS) serves wider national priorities as well as it does defence priorities.319 The report of the 9/11 Commission was equally clear when it said: The current position of Director of Central Intelligence should be replaced by a National Intelligence Director with two main areas of responsibility: (1) to oversee national intelligence centers on specific subjects of interest across the U.S. government and (2) to manage the national intelligence program and oversee the agencies that contribute to it.320

Elsewhere, expert literature provides some distinct options for the design and conduct of an intelligence governance regime, among which the primary influence appears to be, not surprisingly, the type of government structure to be served. The governance structure of national intelligence communities also apparently depends as much on historical and economic factors as on rational analysis of governmental effectiveness.321 In 'older' democracies, intelligence agencies have tended to grow in line with the executive's perception of need and the availability of funds, so that typically agencies for foreign, domestic and communications intelligence, exist alongside separate intelligence units within the military, police, border guard and tax agencies. One motivation for maintaining a plurality of agencies may be a preference for competing intelligence, so that no one agency becomes overly influential. Countries in 'transition,' such as South Africa, have interesting literature on the subordination of intelligence to the rule of law. Sandy Africa and Siyabulela Mlombile, pioneers of the transformation of South African intelligence services following the demise of Apartheid, have studied the South African transition experience and identified a number of important key lessons that impact the governance structure of intelligence, including the following requirements: a) define the country's security vision and framework in law; b) ensure ministerial supervision of the services, as opposed to arms'

318. Flood Report, 59-65. 319. Butler Report, 587. 320. 9/11 Commission, Report, 411. 321. Gill, "Introduction," in PSIHandbook, vol. 1, p. 7. 122 length knowledge of their functioning; and c) each intelligence service must have procedures for internally authorizing operations that are sufficiently clear and could therefore be audited for effectiveness, should a minister wish to confirm the legality of a particular operation; and establish parliamentary oversight.322 Overall, it seems that state authorities, having considered these factors and in light of their own unique situation, tend to settle on the degree of centralized intelligence control that suits them. These issues all relate to a persistent concern over the control of intelligence activity. National intelligence activity, particularly in established democracies, is continually treading a sensitive middle-course between complete autonomy (thereby risking becoming a force unto itself) and being micro-managed by a minister (thereby risking becoming a private 'arm' of that minister). An appropriate ministerial control mechanism is an important element that should be covered by the basic legal framework, but it too will require effective oversight and review. All this would ideally be captured in a comprehensive government intelligence policy, promulgated to guide all intelligence activity.

NO CANADIAN DEFENCE INTELLIGENCE POLICY Not only is there no legislated public framework for Canadian defence intelligence, there is neither an overall Canadian defence intelligence policy, nor a comprehensive national intelligence policy. The lack of these policies indicates that, despite the work put into the DIR and the subsequent implementation of many of its recommendations, there is

322. Sandy Africa and Siuyabulela Mlombile, "Transforming the Intelligence Services: Some Reflections on the South African Experience," Working Paper Series on Internal Security Reform, Project on Justice in Times of Transition, Harvard University, at www.law.harvard.edu/programs/criminal-justice/south-africa.pdf (accessed 16 February 2008). Africa was General Manager of the South African Intelligence Academy, the corporate training facility of the National Intelligence Agency and the South African Secret Services. Previously she participated in a support capacity in the proceedings of the resolutions that were taken up in the new intelligence legislation. Mlombile died in 2006. He had been General Manager of Support Services in the National Intelligence Coordinating Committee, the statutory body that coordinated South African intelligence services. Mlombile was a member of the Secretariat to the Ministerial Commission on Transformation of Defense Intelligence, the Secretariat to the Ministerial Intelligence Review Commission, and the Secretariat to the Heads of Civilian Intelligence Services. 123

a lack of serious, sustained, broad theoretical thinking to develop and nurture a mature strategically-oriented Canadian defence intelligence organization.

NO INDEPENDENT OVERSIGHT AND REVIEW An important issue relating to intelligence policy and governance is the overall system for the independent and transparent scrutiny of intelligence. Such scrutiny involves mechanisms of oversight and review. Both are discussed below. Oversight is different from review and it is important that the two activities are well understood before being imposed on intelligence activity. Whitaker notes that "[t]he [Arar Commission] report makes a key distinction between review and oversight, with the former defined as after the fact, as opposed to the hands-on scrutiny of ongoing investigations." 323 Marina Caparini, defines oversight as, "supervision, watchful care, management or control." On the other hand, she defines review as, "to view again, survey again, or take a retrospective view of events or activities that have already occurred.324 Within government there have been traditionally two principal views regarding the oversight of intelligence activity. The first considers intelligence oversight to be an executive function that properly resides within the government hierarchy. This is necessary, the argument goes, to ensure the secrecy and security of information, sources and methods required to protect national security. Conversely, in some new democracies, like Brazil, executive oversight of government intelligence programs are much less popular, given the excesses of past military dictatorships and continued abuses in the early days of civilian regimes in the 1980s. In such circumstances, government has been relegated to a mere 'management' role.325 This, however, is not the approach taken by a majority of democracies. In most democracies, the executive branch of government retains operational control, or oversight of intelligence agencies, while parliaments or congresses exercise indirect influence through legislated review mechanisms. Detailed

323. Reg Whitaker, "Arar: The Affair, the Inquiry, the Aftermath," IRPP Policy Matters, vol. 9, no. 1 (Institute for Research on Public Policy, May 2008). 324. Maria Caparini, "Controlling and Overseeing Intelligence Services in Democratic States," in Democratic Control of Intelligence Services, 3-24. Caparini is Senior Fellow at the DCAF and Coordinator of the Working Group on Internal Security and Civil Society. 325. Marco Cepik and Priscila Antunes, "Brazil's New Intelligence System: An Institutional Assessment," International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, vol. 16 (London: Taylor and Francis Inc., 2003): 349-373. 124 mechanisms vary from state to state, according to government legislation and intelligence policy. Within DND, there is no independent or dedicated departmental review and evaluation mechanism for Canadian defence intelligence, so the ability to know, critique and enhance both efficacy and propriety of defence intelligence is limited, at best.326 Furthermore, there is no apparent interest in embedding such a system of scrutiny within DND. Apart from theoretical best practices identified in this study, no practical case has yet been made for the independent review of Canadian defence intelligence. In the absence of any 'defence intelligence scandal' the prevailing mood seems to be 'it isn't a problem, until it's a problem.' Indeed this may be a fair assessment in the circumstances. Analysis revealed no hint of professional inadequacy or misconduct in the exercise of Canadian defence intelligence. However, underlying all this, and only occasionally apparent in some interviews of defence intelligence practitioners, is a lingering and perhaps immature view that added bureaucratic burdens only make intelligence work harder. Accountability refers to a relationship based on the obligation to demonstrate and be responsible for performance in light of agreed expectations. Effective accountability requires: 1) clear and agreed roles and responsibilities; 2) clear and agreed expectations of what is, and is not, to be done, and how and what is to be achieved; 3) performance expectations; 4) timely and credible reporting of performance achieved in light of expectations; and 5) review of and feedback on the performance reported, such that achievements are recognized and necessary corrections made.327

326. The CRS provides a general departmental review capability, and although the CRS did conduct the original review of defence intelligence in 2001, it has no mandate to conduct regular reviews of this type. Furthermore, the CRS staff has no trained intelligence personnel within its ranks and therefore lacks the capacity to judge intelligence effectiveness which, in any event, only command, not staff, is competent to make. See the CRS website at http://www.crs- csex.forces.gc.ca/index-eng.asp (accessed 23 April 2010). 327. DCAF, "Intelligence Practice and Democratic Oversight - A Practitioner's View," Occasional Paper No. 3 (July 2003), at http://www.dcaf.ch/publications/kms/details.cfm?lng=en&id= 183 54&nav 1=5 (accessed 21 August 2009). 125

SUMMARY This chapter evaluated Canadian defence intelligence within the category of Policy and Governance, by comparing current practices with theoretical best practices derived from expert literature. Findings revealed that three of eight theoretical best practices in this category are fully matched by aligned current defence intelligence practices. The degree of defence intelligence centralized control and decentralized execution reflects Canada's parliamentary system of government. Canadian defence intelligence remains firmly subordinate to an elected minister of the Crown, supported by an apolitical staff governed by a formal responsibility and accountability structure that provides effective oversight of defence intelligence activity. In this way, Canadian defence intelligence organization and activity can be deemed democratically safe. One current practice is partially aligned with a theoretical best practice. While it is true that defence intelligence activity suits Canada's parliamentary-style government by being subordinated to the MND, it has no legislated basis. Canadian defence intelligence operates under the legal doctrine of Crown prerogative exercised by the federal government in matters of national defence. Finally, four theoretical best practices have no aligned current practices and, as such, represent significant deficiencies. Principal among these deficiencies is the fact that Canadian defence intelligence has no legislated basis, is not subject to any explicit national intelligence policy and governed by no departmental defence intelligence policy. Also missing is an independent oversight and review mechanism to monitor efficacy and propriety. Moreover, bureaucratic and political mechanisms that do exist to control defence intelligence activity are themselves neither reviewed nor evaluated. These shortcomings leave the effective and lawful operation of Canadian defence intelligence largely to chance. On balance, in the category of policy and governance, it would seem that Canadian defence intelligence organization and activity, in the category of Policy and Governance, is aligned with theoretical best practices derived from expert literature only to a mediocre degree. Using the same method employed in this chapter, this study moves on to evaluate Canadian defence intelligence in the category of Organization and People. 126

CHAPTER 5 ORGANIZATION (O) AND PEOPLE (P)

INTRODUCTION The policy and governance context of Canadian defence intelligence was evaluated in the last chapter by comparing current practices and theoretical best practices suggested by the expert literature. This chapter moves on to evaluate Canadian defence intelligence within the category of Organization and People. Organization and people are sufficiently related that they can be addressed in tandem, within one category. Organizational issues are ubiquitous. In fact, some aspects of organization have been addressed in the last chapter, in part because of their inherent relationship with governance. Others will be discussed in later chapters, largely because of their association with process. Organizational issues examined in this chapter are not addressed elsewhere. The People component includes all people necessary for the conduct of intelligence activity, from those who direct and guide it, to those who act upon its product. People issues are also pervasive. Those related to policy and governance were touched upon in the last chapter and those that are best discussed in the context of the intelligence process will receive attention in the next chapter. People issues that can stand alone are examined here, but, as the reader will detect, even these issues feature some measure of governance, organizational and procedural interests. The analysis in this chapter exposes an interesting dichotomy between Organization and People. Canadian defence intelligence organization appears sound and aligned with expert literature, but the same cannot be said of current practices relating to personnel in the Canadian defence intelligence organization. Where all three theoretical best practices relating to Organization have fully aligned current practices, no current practices in the People component are fully aligned with any of the eight theoretical practices derived from expert literature. Current Canadian defence intelligence People practices are only partially aligned with two of eight theoretical best People practices. The remaining six theoretical best practices have no aligned current practices. To explain this dichotomy more effectively, each component - Organization and People - will be examined separately. The first part deals with organizational issues. It 127 begins with a section on the results of analysis, which identifies theoretical best practices and representative supporting sources; analyzes the alignment of theoretical best and current practices; and evaluates the comparative alignment of theoretical best practices and current Canadian defence intelligence practices. Subsequent sections address principal organizational issues, starting with a discussion of defence intelligence corporate management, followed by an examination of the higher government intelligence management structure. Then the departmental structure of defence intelligence management is covered. The final section discusses defence intelligence cooperation. The second part addresses defence intelligence People issues. It too begins with the results of analysis, featuring an outline of theoretical best practices and the representative readings from which they were derived; an evaluation of the alignment of theoretical best practices and current practices; and a general evaluation of Canadian defence intelligence, based on that alignment. Principal people issues are examined in subsequent sections, in this order: first, the lack of both an overall defence intelligence policy and human resource strategy; second, the absence of targeted recruiting; third, the fragmentation of defence intelligence training, education and professional development; and fourth, implications of the fact that intelligence tends not to be considered a fully professional endeavour.

RESULTS OF ANALYSIS - ORGANIZATION

Theoretical best practices ABCA inquiries exhibit interest in intelligence organization in two principal ways. First, as outlined in Chapter 4, the organization of government intelligence activity and of individual intelligence agencies is thought to be important in the establishment of government control and democratic accountability. Second, intelligence organization is also seen as a main instrument in improving overall intelligence effectiveness, particularly in the enhancement of cooperation and information sharing across the government intelligence community. Of the eight hundred and fifty-seven ABCA inquiry recommended practices, at least eighty were directly related to intelligence organization. Canadian inquiries have 128 produced more organizational recommendations than any other ABCA country - eighteen in the McDonald Commission (1981), which resulted in the establishment of CSIS and SIRC; and eleven in the DIR, which resulted in a significant re-organization of defence intelligence activity within DND, including the establishment of the CDI in NDHQ. Moreover, each of these inquiries explicitly reinforced the parliamentary convention of ministerial responsibility.328 Increased centralization was a popular concern in later US inquiries. The Aspin Brown Commission had twelve recommended organizational practices, the principal one of which called for the designation of one overall national intelligence authority. It is perhaps somewhat of a surprise to note that the 9/11 Commission made only one intelligence related organizational recommendation; that being the proposal to establish a "National Intelligence Director," a recommendation that was eventually fulfilled by the establishment of the DNI, as a result of the IRTPA.329 There were certainly other Commission recommendations that had impact on US intelligence community organization, but none were as distinctly intelligence related as this particular recommendation. Table 5-1 below lists the ABCA inquiry recommended practices relevant to this chapter.

328. McDonald Commission, Report, Part VIII, "A Plan for the Future: Direction and Review of the Security Intelligence System," specifically Chapter 1, C. "Ministerial Direction/' paragraphs 58-70, at http://epe.lac-bac.gc.ca/100/200/301/pco-bcp/commissions- ef/mcdonaldl979-81-eng/mcdonaldl979-81-report2/mcdonaldl979-81-report2-vol2- eng/mcdonaldl979-81-report2-vol2-part2-eng.pdf (accessed 16 June 2010). 329. 9/11 Commission, Report, 411. 129

Year Inquiry Total Organization (O) 1946 Canada: Kellock Taschereau Commission 7 0 1969 Canada: Mackenzie Commission 11 1 1975 US: Rockefeller Commission Report 30 1 1976 US: Church Committee Reports 85 4 Australia: Hope Commission Third Report 36 8 1977 US: Pike Committee Report Not public y available 1981 Canada: McDonald Commission Reports 285 18 1985 Australia: Royal Commission on ASIA Not public y available 1996 US: A spin Brown Commission Report 23 12 US: Joint Inquiry into Intelligence Community 2002 19 3 Activities Before and After 9/11 Report Australia: PJCAAD Report: Intelligence on 2003 3 0 Iraq's WMD UK: ISC Report: Intelligence on Iraqi WMD 1 0 UK: Foreign Affairs Committee Ninth Report: 16 0 Decision to go to War in Iraq Canada: DND DIR Report (unclassified 2004 50 11 version) Canada: O'Connor Commission (Arar) Report 36 0 Australia: Flood Report 47 7 UK: Butler Report 12 3 US: SSCI Report, Pre-War Intelligence 13 0 Assessments on Iraq (and related reports) US: 9/11 Commission 41 1 2005 US: Silberman Robb Commission Report 73 10 2006 UK: ISC Report 7/7 2005 4 0 2009 UK: Review of Intelligence on 7/7 1 1 Canada: Major Commission: Air India Inquiry, 2010 64 0 Final Report TOTALS 857 80

Table 5-1: ABCA Inquiry recommended practices dealing with Organization

Beyond the ABCA inquiries, the four principal sources discussed in Chapter 4 are also important here because, in addition to their examination of policy and governance issues, they provide many recommended practices regarding the strategic level organization of intelligence services. There are three additional principal sources that address intelligence organizational challenges facing governments now and in the future, based on a recognition of the fact that contemporary threats have moved beyond that 130 posed by the former Soviet bloc. Herman suggests that intelligence organizations developed to address the Soviet threat throughout the Cold War need to be re-designed if they are to effectively address the myriad new threats facing the West in the post-Cold War world.330 In Intelligence for an Age of Terror, Treverton subsequently argues that, "if organizing intelligence - on the collection side, by source, and on the analysis side, by agency - may have made a certain sense during the Cold War, it cannot be the right way to organize now."331 Other related intelligence transformation issues, such as the importance of establishing cooperative links with intelligence allies, are covered by Lowenthal in Transforming US. Intelligence.332 ABCA inquiries also address issues of intelligence legislation and consumer requirements, but do not deal directly with the more esoteric aspects of organizational theory. However, it is worth noting that some intrinsic theoretical organizational issues nonetheless arise when considering ABCA recommended practices. One particular example is found in the Silberman Robb Commission report, in the section discussing various advantages and disadvantages of organizing around priority intelligence missions, rather than being based on functions.333 Accordingly, 'mission managers' would be responsible for intelligence community efforts against a specific target, thereby eliminating questions of accountability. It is thought that these mission managers would assist in focusing the intelligence community effort and eventually serve as agents of community integration. Some expert literature covers theoretical organizational aspects explicitly.334 As far back as 1967 Wilensky argued that hierarchy, specialization, and centralization can be identified as major sources of organizational distortion.335 In the mid-1980s Hastedt examined organizational issues associated with intelligence failures and developed a framework for studying intelligence estimating that emphasizes organizational

330. Herman, Intelligence Power in Peace and War, 305-338. 331. Treverton, Intelligence for an Age of Terror, 75. See the entire chapter "The Imperative of Change," 75-99. 332. Mark Lowenthal, " Intelligence Analysis: Management and Transformation Issues," in Transforming U.S. Intelligence, 220-238. 333. Silberman Robb Commission, Report, 317. 334. Glenn P. Hastedt and B. Douglas Skelley, "Intelligence in a turbulent world," in Intelligence Theory Key questions and debates, 112-130. 335. Wilensky, Organizational Intelligence, 41-62. 131 dimension.336 More recently, James Monnier Simon Jr. unflatteringly characterized the US intelligence community as "Frankenstein's creature: an impressive achievement in its parts, but flawed as a whole."337 He goes on to suggest a re-organized governance structure. Other authors discussed ways of improving intelligence structures and provided a number of specific and general proposals, which I examined and distilled into the following theoretical best practice:

O 1. Intelligence organizations are structured in a manner that finds balance among preferred measures espoused in relevant organizational theory, legislated oversight mechanisms, the various requirements of different consumers and practical considerations of security.339

This is a difficult mixture. Certain management challenges exist in establishing an implementable and sustainable working relationship among theory, legislation and consumer requirements. In an effort to link the theoretical and the practical, Orit Gadiesh and Scott Olivet discuss the requirement for future organizations to "design for [i]mplementability" and make the point that organizational restructure must include a broad range of work (akin to the breadth of the six components) to cover all necessary aspects: "top and bottom organizational layers; vertical and horizontal channels; relationships, as well as decisions and processes; jobs and teams; the structure and the

336. Hastedt, "Organizational Foundations of intelligence Failure," Intelligence Policy and Process, 140-156. 337. James Monnier Simon Jr. "Managing Domestic, Military, and Foreign Policy Requirements; Correcting Frankenstein's Blunder," Transforming U.S. Intelligence, 149. 33S. Ibid., 156-159. 339. Wilensky, Organizational Intelligence, 179. Harry Howe Ransom, The Intelligence Establishment (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1970), 212. A knowledge management-centric view of organizational components to be considered is provided by Waltz, Knowledge Management, 300-310. In discussing the need to "Rebuild the Social Contract," Treverton examines the necessity to balance constitutional, legislative and administrative concerns, in Intelligence for an Age of Terror, 242-248. Earlier, Treverton described a new paradigm of intelligence openness, where the analysis and processing of open source information would matter more than the collection of secrets, in Reshaping National Intelligence, 225-229. Democratic oversight organizational issues are explored by Gill and Phythian in Intelligence in an Insecure World, 149-150 and more general organizational concerns on pages 178-179. That balance and compromise is inevitable in intelligence organizations is seen in Betts suggestion that the intelligence reform process tends to be dialectical, in Enemies of Intelligence, 143 .Finally, Simon calls for an intelligence organization that is more responsive to the needs of senior officials, in Transforming U.S. Intelligence, 156-159. 132

'supports.'"34 Similar recommendations by the Silberman Robb Commission aim at forging an integrated intelligence community.341 They intrinsically address management issues inherent in the six conceptual components of intelligence. In a somewhat complementary fashion, McDonald's Second Report goes into some detail on the management, personnel and structure of the proposed new security intelligence organization.342 Here too, recommendations encompass management of the six components. More recently, the six conceptual components of intelligence are implicitly covered in Part III of the DIR, particularly by the substance of Recommendations 48 and 49.343 These recommended practices point to the need for broad management of various organizational functions brought about by the complex structures previously described in theoretical best practice O 1. Concurrently, the six components of intelligence developed earlier in this study provide a workable framework for the identification and analysis of such functions. Moreover, actual intelligence agency organizations, as found in a number of western democracies, show that the six components, in one form or another, receive dedicated management attention. Accordingly, as manifest in all ABCA government intelligence organizations and in those of other advanced democracies, the preferred generic structure of intelligence management has been captured in this theoretical best practice:

340. Orit Gadiesh and Scott Olivet, "Designing for Implementability," in Hesselbein et al, The Organization of the Future (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1997), 53-64. 341. Silberman Robb Commission, Report, Chapter 6, "Leadership and Management: Forging an Integrated Intelligence Community," 311-350. 342. McDonald Commission, Second Report, vol. 1, Part VI, "A Plan for the Future: Management, Personnel, and Structure of a Security Intelligence Agency," 665-774. 343. DIR, Part III, "Optimizing the Defence Intelligence Architecture," 111-125. Recommendation 48 calls upon the new CDI organization to be "re-aligned to include the following principal components: a) an Intelligence Production Division... b) an Intelligence Capabilities Division... c) a CDI Secretariat to include Policy, Programs, Human Resources, Information Management, and Corporate Management staff functions. Recommendation 49 proposes that the "necessary personnel and financial resources be allocated to support the establishment of the recommended governance, functional management and process management frameworks." 133

O 2. Intelligence organizations have managerial elements that administer the six components of a government intelligence function - policy and governance, organization, people process, product and action.344

However, even with modern and competent management addressing requirements in all six components of intelligence, national intelligence organizations in all ABCA states and those of Canada's NATO allies acknowledge that taken individually, they each cannot meet all national intelligence requirements by themselves. Not a day goes by without some sort of intelligence exchange with an international partner. No one nation is likely to have a monopoly on all intelligence and no single agency, no matter how large, can collect all the information needed. So international cooperation has an obvious utility, but even here accidents of coverage will influence analysis. That alone argues in favour of putting perceptions from a number of countries on the table, but the simple pooling of effort is no panacea. International intelligence cooperation will be discussed in more detail later, but here the aim is to highlight the organizational requirement necessary to enable such cooperation. Such issues could have been addressed within the Process component, but they are examined here, in an organizational context, because organization enables process. There can be no enduring process of cooperation without formal organizational links of some kind. In the absence of such links, some minor degree of cooperation might exist, but it would be personality dependent and likely unreliable in the long-term. The quality of organizational links to close intelligence allies is an important aspect of defence intelligence effectiveness because, as will be discussed later, they provide most of our defence intelligence products.

344. ASIO organization, http://www.asio.gov.au/img/files/Unclassified-Org-Chart.pdf (accessed 2 March 20ll).Bundesnachrichtendienst (Germany), http://www.bnd.de/cln_117/nn_1435078/EN/Struktur/Struktur node.html? nnn=true (accessed 2 March 2011). CSIS, http://www.csis-scrs.gc.ca/bts/rgchrt-eng.asp (accessed 3 March 2011). CIA organization chart, https://www.cia.gov/about-cia/leadership/cia-organization-chart.html (accessed 2 March 2011). Danish Security and Intelligence Organization, http://www.pet.dk/upload/100728_orgdiagram_eng.pdf (accessed 2 March 2011). Direction generate de la secrite exteerieure (France), http://www.defense.gouv.fr/dgse/tout-le- site/organisation (accessed 2 march 2011). National Intelligence Organization of Turkey, http://www.mit.gov.tr/english/teskilat.html (accessed 2 March 2011). UK Security Service organization, https://www.mi5.gov.uk/output/organisation.html (accessed 2 March 2011). 134

Given its apparent importance, it is somewhat surprising to see that international intelligence cooperation receives relatively scant attention ABCA inquiries. The Aspin Brown Commission report is one that calls for more effective international intelligence cooperation.345 There is, however, no specific mention of enhanced international intelligence cooperation in the 9/11 Commission report. Neither does the Silberman Robb Commission report have anything to say about intelligence cooperation with allies. US inquiries generally show little enthusiasm for international intelligence cooperation at all, except in a lead role.346 Neither the Australian PJCAAD Inquiry nor the Butler Report directly dealt with international intelligence cooperation, but this might be because the issue at hand (intelligence related to alleged Iraqi WMD) was related to less than effective intelligence cooperation with the US. Finally, being somewhat of an exception, international partnerships are featured in one paragraph of the DIR.347 Despite this lack of recognition, international intelligence cooperation is, de facto, an important aspect of most western state intelligence activity. The nature and extent of international intelligence cooperation is covered in other expert literature some of which is discussed in a subsequent section below.348 Intra-national intelligence cooperation, on the other hand, has been the target of all post-9/11 ABCA inquiries. The 9/11 Commission report is perhaps the most demanding of all ABCA inquiry reports when it comes to intra-national cooperation, a stance that resulted in the establishment of the first DNI in US history.349 This is a popular theme that has led practitioners and academics alike to recommend a doctrine of "need to share" be adopted in place of the former Cold War tenet of "need to know."

345. Aspin Brown Commission, Report, Recommendation 11-1, p. 118 and Recommendation 12-1, p. 130. 346. Ibid., xvi. 347. DIR, Part II, Section 6: "Partnerships - Other Government Departments and Allies," 70-75. 348. Three examples are Stephen Lander, "International intelligence cooperation; An inside perspective," in Andrew, Secret Intelligence: A Reader, 140-153. Thorsten Wetzling, "European Counterterrorism Intelligence Liaisons," in Farson et al, PSI Handbook, vol. 2,498- 529. Richard Aldrich, "Dangerous Liaisons: Post-September 11 Intelligence Alliances," in Harvard Business Review, vol. 24, issue 3 (2002), at http://www.thefreelibrary.com/ Dangerous+liaisons%3a+post-September+1 l+intelligence+alliances....-a090984135 (accessed 19 August 2010). 349. 9/11 Commission, Report, "13.2 Unity of Effort in the Intelligence Community," 407-416. 135

Widespread acknowledgement of the nature and extent of transnational threats facing western democracies lies at the root of contemporary interest in international intelligence cooperation. No one country has all the information on all threats. Only by pooling national intelligence resources and efforts can today's global threats be more fully addressed. One is therefore not surprised that ABCA inquiry recommended practices and other expert literature covering issues of intelligence organization reflect widespread use of intelligence partnerships, to a degree that warrants expression as a theoretical best practice as follows:

O 3. Government intelligence functions have well-established partnerships, both foreign and domestic, with other intelligence organizations in informal, bilateral, coalition allied and multilateral contexts.350

These three theoretical best practices were compared to current defence intelligence practices and the extent of their alignment analyzed. The results of that analysis follows.

Alignment - organization Table 5-2 below compares theoretical best practices relating to Canadian defence intelligence organization (coded 'O') with associated current practices. All three derived theoretical best practices have an aligned current practice.

350. Insight into these vital relationships can be gleaned from the following sources. Privy Council Office, The Canadian Security and Intelligence Community: Helping Keep Canada and Canadian Safe and Secure (Ottawa, 2001), 3. Rockefeller Commission, Report, "Recommendation (30)," 39. Church Committee, Foreign and Military Intelligence, Book I, "J. Intelligence Liaison," 459. McDonald Commission, Second Report, 410,422,424; "Relationships with Foreign Agencies, 632-641; Chapter 8 "Relationships with Other Departments Provincial and Municipal Authorities," 647-664. Aspin Brown Commission, Report, 57,77; Recommendations 11-1, p. 122; and Recommendation 12-1, p. 132. DIR, Part II, Section 6, "Partnerships-Other Government Departments and Allies, 70-75. Flood Inquiry, Report, 14, "Intelligence Relationships," 157-158. Butler Inquiry, Report, Chapter 7, 583-584. 9/11 Commission, Report, Chapter 13,399-416. O'Connor Inquiry, Report, 431. 136

Organization Theoretical Best Practices Current Practices (O) Intelligence organizations are Aligned. structured in a manner that finds Defence intelligence is under balance among preferred the political control of the MND, measures espoused in relevant and structured in accordance organizational theory, legislated with the principles laid out in the oversight mechanisms, the 01 CF Joint Intelligence Doctrine various requirements of different and recommendations found in consumers and practical the 2004 DIR report. It conforms considerations of security. to the requirements of the Canadian Government Security Policy. Intelligence organizations Aligned. have managerial elements that Since its reorganization, administer the six components begun in 2005, defence of a government intelligence intelligence now has leadership function - policy and and managerial capacity 02 governance, organization, people available to administer the six process, product and action. components. The adequacy of these organizational elements is discussed later in Chapter 6. Government intelligence Aligned. functions have well-established Defence intelligence partnerships, hoth foreign and exercises an extensive network domestic, with other intelligence 03 of intelligence cooperation, organizations in informal, principally with ABCA and bilateral, coalition, allied and NATO allies. multilateral contexts.

Table 5-2: Theoretical best and current practices - Organization (O)

Evaluation • Organization Current Canadian defence intelligence organizational practices are generally aligned with theoretical best practices derived from expert literature. The CDI organization balances the various requirements of organizational theory, client requirements and operational security. Moreover, since implementation of the DIR began in early 2005, a new responsibility and accountability framework has been put in place. However, despite the soundness of this structure, information contained in chapters preceding and following this one provide ,further insight into the detailed health and 137 effectiveness of the organization, indicating that Canadian defence intelligence needs more resources to reach full potential. Subsequent sections discuss principal organizational issues found in the defence intelligence corporate management structure; the higher government intelligence management structure; the departmental structure of defence intelligence management; and defence intelligence cooperation.

CORPORATE MANAGEMENT Most ABCA inquiry reports and other commentaries on intelligence reform devote significant attention to the physical organization of intelligence establishments, aiming at improved accountability and efficacy. However, perhaps as a result of the political context in which the reports were promulgated, relatively little attention has been paid to whether proposals make sense in terms of underlying organizational logic. Missing is any examination of what organization theory might contribute to the structure, control mechanisms and organizational environment of government intelligence organizations. Westminster-style governments such as those of Canada, Australia and the UK tend to decentralize control of intelligence activities, while retaining some centralized coordination function. The US on the other hand, with its republican form of government, has historically leaned toward centralized intelligence control. Centralized control has also been the preference of authoritarian regimes. Debates over the degree of centralization of intelligence authority are fundamentally concerned with the relative distribution of power in government, because organizational structure is neither neutral nor passive. It usually favours certain interests and facilitates specific kinds of communications and control.352 Structure can also

351. Hastedt and Skelley, "Intelligence in a Turbulent World," 115. 352. Morton Egeberg, "How Bureaucratic Structure Matters: An Organizational Perspective." Handbook of Public Administration, eds., B. Guy Peters and Jon Pierre (London: Sage Publications, 2003), 116-126. Morton Egeberg has been a professor of political science at the University of Oslo since 1993. He specializes in the relationship between organizational/institutional forms and decision-making processes, and how organizational /institutional forms themselves change. His empirical focus is on the executive branch of government at the European level, as well as at the national level, and the interplay between the two levels. 138 influence the agenda by determining recommendations senior decision-makers approve.353 In this way there is more than symbolism involved in placing control authorities between intelligence practitioners and higher decision-makers. One consequence of centralization can be more complexity. Consider these two aspects. First, where a central intelligence authority exists, it is expected to exert some degree of coordination and policy control over subordinate intelligence organizations that continue to operate in their own milieu. Second, these subordinate organizations must serve, in turn, at least three masters: their own departmental authorities; the centralized intelligence authority; and the range of consumers they support. Consequently, interaction among intelligence agencies will likely cross more organizational boundaries than would be the case in decentralized intelligence architectures. Moreover, the existence of boundaries is not inconsequential. Boundaries constrain information flow, particularly when they are reinforced by legislative obstacles to information sharing and may thus have a pathology all their own.354 Ironically then, centralizing intelligence might just add to the existing boundaries that impeded information flow in the past.355 The cure might be worse than the original disease. Given the intrinsic security and secrecy aspects of any national intelligence establishment, government regulations will play some role in the design of intelligence organizations and could even limit the application of accepted organizational theory. Government security and accountability requirements often trump rational structure and efficiency. Canadian defence intelligence is generally structured in accordance with the

353. Different structures will manipulate the same data differently and thereby influence decision outcomes. Thomas Hammond, "Agenda Control, Organizational Structure and Bureaucratic Politics," American Journal of Political Science, vol. 30, no. 2 (1986): 382. Hammond is a Professor in the Department of Political Science at Michigan State University. His current projects include a study of how the organizational structure of the US intelligence community has affected its intelligence-gathering capacities. 354. Egeberg, "How Bureaucratic Structure Matters," 116-126. Legislation very often impedes (but does not always prevent) the free flow of information between Canadian government departments. For example, the Privacy Act allows the disclosure of personal information by a government institution "to an investigative body specified in the regulations, on the written request of the body, for the purpose of enforcing any law of Canada or a province or carrying out a lawful investigation, if the request-specifies the purpose and describes the information to be disclosed." Privacy Act (R.S., 1985, c. P-21) Section 8.(2)(e), at http://laws- lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/P-21/page-3.html#anchorbo-ga:s_7 (accessed 2 October 2010). 355. Hastedt and Skelley, "Intelligence in a Turbulent World," 117. 139

Treasury Board management accountability framework and the DND program activity matrix.355 Canadian Government Security Policy promulgated by the Treasury Board Secretariat is another important influence on defence intelligence organization.357 Beyond security and accountability there are other corporate requirements that must be addressed. Prominent within the post-9/11 expert literature, are the following, generic organizational elements found in most democratic government intelligence establishments: a. a meeting of cabinet or cabinet committee to exercise the highest level of political control, policy direction and strategic oversight; b. subordinate to cabinet/cabinet committee, there is a high-level (deputy minister/under-secretary) committee of senior apolitical bureaucrats, responsible for policy and strategic coordination throughout the intelligence community; c. subordinate to and supporting cabinet/cabinet committee and senior bureaucrat direction, there is a central office (e.g. Privy Council Office/ Prime Minister's Office) that prioritizes and manages the day to day policy and strategic coordination throughout the intelligence community; d. decentralized intelligence staffs, within individual government departments, serve ministers responsible for a particular area of expertise (e.g. foreign affairs, defence, national security etc.); e. sole-source collection organizations (usually designated as 'agencies') with a pan-government role and generally organized functionally, (e.g. SIGINT, HUMINT, IMINT etc.) under the legislated authority of a government appointed director; and f. depending on need, some elements from a variety of intelligence capabilities will be 'grouped' into multi-disciplinary centres (e.g. Integrated Threat Assessment Centre (ITAC) in Canada, or the Joint

356. See Treasury Board Management Accountability Framework, http://www.tbs- sct.gc.ca/maf-crg/index-eng.asp (accessed 8 April 2009). See the DND Program Activity Table at http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/rpp/2009-2010/inst/dnd/dnd02-eng.asp#sec2a_e (accessed 8 April 2009). 357. Government of Canada, Government Security Policy (Ottawa: Treasury Board Secretariat, 1 February 2002), at http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/pol/doc-eng.aspx?id=12322 (accessed 5 February 2009). 140

Threat Assessment Centre (JTAC) in the UK), usually to address major transnational threats such as terrorism or the proliferation of WMD.358

Ideally, a mature departmental intelligence establishment would feature a 'corporate headquarters,' capable of exercising the planning and direction role, consumer liaison; allied intelligence liaison; professional and public outreach initiatives (particularly to enhance and sustain recruiting efforts); and the complicated business of intelligence 'force' structure and doctrine development, which is necessary for the sustained effectiveness and relevance of the function.359 The department should also have a collection management capability; an analytical capability; and a production and dissemination capability. Most of these elements are found in Canadian defence intelligence, but are based mainly in military intelligence capabilities, as shown in the next section.

HIGHER GOVERNMENT INTELLIGENCE MANAGEMENT Canadian government intelligence organization generally and Canadian defence intelligence organization specifically, reflect all these elements and factors to some degree. Descriptions of higher-level Canadian government intelligence control and coordination mechanisms are difficult to come by and details of how they work are not all publicly available. However, research succeeded in revealing the general organizational structure of the federal intelligence governance and coordination framework. The Prime Minister is ultimately accountable to Parliament and the people of Canada for national security. Several Ministers lead federal departments with national security responsibilities. The Cabinet Committee on Foreign Affairs and Security

358. See the range of international intelligence organizations in Farson et al, PSI Handbook (two vols.), and in Robert D'A. Henderson, Brassey's International Intelligence Yearbook, 2002 Edition. (Washington, D.C.: Brassey's Inc., 2002). 359. The ABCA inquiries variously call for the promulgation of policy frameworks for activities such as client liaison and public outreach programs. As one example, see the report of the 1996 report of the US Aspin Brown Commission, which calls for more aggressive "government-to-government" arrangements with allies in space reconnaissance, enhanced information-sharing arrangements in multi-national environments, and maintaining a global presence by establishing offices in "most countries." Similarly, the 2004 Australian Flood Inquiry report recommended a community-wide strategy on liaison relationships, a comprehensive customer engagement strategy and a "strategy for IT connectivity with primary customers." 141 considers foreign affairs, international development, security, emergency management, and defence policy issues.360 Within government, there are a number of active intelligence offices. Figure 5-1 below is a graphical representation of the Canadian government intelligence community.

360. See the composition of the Foreign Affairs and Security Committee at http://pm.gc.ca/eng/feature.asp?pageld=53 (accessed 3 January 2011). At the time of writing, the committee was composed of following ministers: Peter MacKay (National Defence - Chair); Robert Nicholson (Attorney-General - Vice-Chair); and the following members; Jean-Pierre Blackburn (Veterans Affairs), Beverley Oda (CIDA), Lawrence Cannon (Foreign Affairs and International Trade), Vic Toews (Public Safety) and Peter Van Loan {International Trade). The Minister of State and Chief Government Whip, the Minister of State (Transport) and the Minister of State of Foreign Affairs (Americas) attend meetings, but are not full members of the committee. PRIME MINISTER OF CANADA

Privy Council Office (PCO) Department of Foreign Affairs and National Security International International Trade Security and Assessments (DFAIT) Advisor Intelligence Staff (IAS) Intelligence (NSA) Secretariat and Security Bureau Public Safety Canada

Canadian Security Department of Integrated Threat National Defence Intelligence Assessment Service (CSIS) Centre (DND) Chief of Defence Intelligence (CDI) Royal Canadian Canada Border Mounted Police Services Agency (RCMP) (CBSA) Communications Security Establishment Canada (CSEC)

Other Government Departments and Agencies Citizenship Financial Transactions and and Reports Analysis Immigration Centre (FINTRAC) Canadian Food Health Treasury Inspection Transport Canada Justice Board Canada Canada Agency

Figure 5-1: The government intelligence community,36 1

361. Chief of Defence Intelligence, Defence Intelligence Overview, 29 January 2010. 143

The government intelligence community is directed by elected appointments and coordinated by apolitical Public Service and military officials, as shown in Figure 5-2 below:

Ad Hoc Committee of Ministers on Security and Intelligence Priorities chaired by the Prime Minister (attended by the MND)

DM Committee on National Security chaired by the NSA to the Prime Minister (attended by the DND DM)

DM Intelligence Sub-Group of the Committee on National Security chaired by the NSA7PM (attended by the DND DM)

ADM Committee on National Security chaired by the Assistant Secretary to the Cabinet and head of the S & I Secretariat, PCO and Public Safety Canada (DND Office of Primary Interest (OPI) - ADM Policy, DND Office of Collateral Interest (OCI) - CDI; both attend)

ADM Committee on Intelligence chaired by the Assistant Secretary to the Cabinet and head of the S & I Secretariat, PCO (DND OPI - CDI, DND OCI - ADM Policy; CDI attends)

DM Afghanistan Intelligence Lead Official (AILO) Committee chaired by the NSA/PM

ADM AILO Committee Chaired by the Executive Director of the IAS, PCO (DND OPI - CDI, DND OCI ADM Policy; CDI attends)

Figure 5-2: Government intelligence coordination structure 144

The government convenes, as may be required, the Ad Hoc Committee of Ministers ' on Security and Intelligence Priorities, chaired by the Prime Minister. Members usually include Ministers of departments forming the core of the government intelligence community (i.e. Privy Council Office, Minister of Public Safety, Minister of Foreign Affairs, MND and the Attorney General. Other Ministers and perhaps heads of intelligence agencies attend on direction or request).362 One level lower, to implement ministerial direction, the Deputy Ministers Committee on National Security is chaired by the National Security Advisor to the Prime Minister (NSA/PM). As the name implies, membership includes Deputy Ministers of departments having a principal role in national security affairs (i.e. PCO, Public Safety Canada, DFAIT, DND, Transport, Health, Finance, Justice, Citizenship and Immigration and others as directed or invited). A sub-committee focuses on intelligence. The DM Intelligence Sub-Group of the Committee is also chaired by the NSA/PM. Membership is restricted to those departments having a principal intelligence role within government, such as DND, DFAIT and Public Safety Canada (see Figure 5-1 above). Information indicates that this committee and its sub-group meet as required and that no regular schedule has been established. To support and coordinate the implementation direction issued by DMs, the Assistant Deputy Minister (ADM) Committee on National Security meets under the co- chairmanship of the Assistant Secretary to the Cabinet and head of the Security and Intelligence (S&I) Secretariat in the PCO and a principal appointment from Public Safety Canada. The DND Office of Primary Interest (OPI) is the DND ADM Policy, supported by the CDI who is the DND Office of Collateral Interest (OCI).363 Both appointments have a seat at the table. Intelligence issues at this level are specifically dealt with in the ADM Committee on Intelligence, chaired by the Assistant Secretary to the Cabinet and head of the S&I Secretariat in the PCO. Intelligence matters of a classified nature are discussed in this forum and so membership is restricted to principal intelligence

362. This information and the following description of committees that follow are adapted from an unclassified briefing package used within DND. 363. The designations of OPI and OCI are used to identify which appointment is lead and which is in a supporting role. 145 appointments. The DND seat is occupied by the CDI, who is the DND OPI. The DND ADM Policy is the OCI within DND, but does not usually attend. To coordinate intelligence efforts in support of Canada's whole-of-government mission in Afghanistan, the government established the Deputy Ministers Afghanistan Intelligence Lead Official (AILO) Committee, to be chaired by the NSA/PM. It is supported by the ADM AILO Committee under the chairmanship of the Executive Director of the IAS in the PCO. The coordination structure shown above in Figure 5-2 is current as of the time of writing. It can be, and has been, altered from time to time as political circumstances dictate. For example, with any change in the Canadian mission in Afghanistan that might occur in 2011, the ADM AILO Committee may or may not continue in its present form.

DEPARTMENTAL INTELLIGENCE MANAGEMENT At the strategic level, Canadian defence intelligence supports the MND and the DM, who represents DND at deputy head level interdepartmental intelligence meetings. The CDI represents DND on other inter-departmental intelligence committees. Figure 5-3 below graphically depicts the upper reaches of defence intelligence and its structural relationship with other higher government intelligence organizations. Cabinet

MND

PCO DM NSA/PM T Foreign and Defence CDI Other Policy Secretariat government intelligence offices and Security and International agencies Intelligence Assessments Secretariat Secretariat

Figure 5-3: Defence intelligence at the strategic level

Within NDHQ, the CDI is placed as shown below in Figure 5-4.

Minister of National Defence Deputy Chief of the Minister Defence Staff

Vice Chief of the Defence Staff Departmental Environmental Assistant Chiefs of Staff l Deputy Ministers Operational Level Commanders

Chief of Defence Intelligence

Figure 5-4: CDI placement among senior leadership/management 147

Within DND, defence intelligence is manifest in the CDI organization, led by a Major-General/Rear-Admiral who exercises functional authority over Canadian defence intelligence activity.364 As a serving military officer, the CDI is responsible to the CDS, through the Vice-Chief of the Defence Staff (VCDS) for the exercise of that functional authority and for the effective and efficient administration of the CDI organization. The CDI, however, is accountable to both the DM and CDS for the collection, production and dissemination of Canadian defence intelligence. The CDI outline organization is shown in Figure 5-5 below:

Chief of Defence Intelligence

Chief of Staff

Director General Director General Military SIGINT Intelligence Production

Director CF Information Intelligence Operations Group Operations Director Director Intelligence Director J2X (HUMINT) Information Transnational Management Intelligence Director Intelligence Capabilities Director Director Scientific and Intelligence Technical Director Geospatial Intelligence Intelligence Plans and Programs Director Regional Intelligence CF National CF Joint Mapping and Counter Imaging Charting Director Intelligence Centre Establishment Meteorology Unit and Oceanography

Figure 5-5: Outline CDI organization

364. CDI, Defence Intelligence Overview, 2010. 148

The CDI exercises oversight and direction of defence intelligence activity, on behalf of the DM and MND, ensuring that defence intelligence requirements of DND and other designated decision-makers are met. In addition to his role as the departmental intelligence advisor to senior leaders and managers, the CDI also acts as the DND authority within the government intelligence community. Moreover, the CDI is the departmental authority in matters of defence intelligence cooperation and partnerships with allies. The CDI also coordinates execution of departmental intelligence priorities and provides advice on the allocation of defence intelligence resources. He or she is also responsible for oversight of designated secure information management systems and coordination of associated information management priorities and resources. Within DND, the CDI is charged with leading the development of future defence intelligence capability, with specific responsibility for intelligence advice to C4ISR (command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance) projects and programs. The CDI is also designated as the Requirements Authority (RA) for defence intelligence, with responsibility to approve capability requirements and sponsor selected projects, such as the integration of selected classified systems. One level lower than NDHQ, at the operational level, four operational level headquarters extend Canadian defence intelligence along functional and geographical lines. Three of them have an intelligence staff. The Canadian Operational Support Command (CANOSCOM) does not. Figure 5-6 shows the extent that defence intelligence reaches down and out through military commands and formations. 149

CDS

I I CEFCOM CANADACOM CANSOFCOM CANOSCOM I I International Special Operations Operations

r Joint JRTF West JRTF East Regional (Edmonton) (Montreal) Task Force (JRTF) Pacific JRTF North JRTF Central JRTF Atlantic (Victoria) (Yellowknife) (Toronto) (Halifax)

Figure 5-6: CF commands and formations with a defence intelligence role

Canadian Expeditionary Forces Command (CEFCOM) has a small intelligence staff that works in direct contact with the CDI staff in NDHQ. Subordinate to CEFCOM are all internationally deployed CF operations, including Joint Task Force Afghanistan (JTF-A), in which intelligence elements of the CF, CSIS, RCMP and CBSA and Corrections Canada work together. Canada Command (CANADACOM) oversees all CF operations in Canada except those conducted by NORAD and CANSOFCOM, as well as Canadian Forces Counterintelligence Unit operations overseen by the CDI.365 It cooperates with OGD intelligence staffs at the national level.366 An important government operation recently conducted was Operation GAMES, in which DND and the CF (Operation PODIUM) supported the 2010 Olympic Winter Games in Vancouver, B.C. The RCMP was responsible for providing security for the games, but defence intelligence elements worked through CANADACOM, in close partnership with CSIS and RCMP intelligence elements within Canada.367

365. DND, CFJP 2.0 (Draft), Joint Intelligence, 4-19. 366. Ibid. 367. Confidential Source 673. 150

CANADACOM directs operations in Canada through a series of six joint regional task force (JRTF) headquarters, a role superimposed on existing military headquarters across the country. Each of these joint task force headquarters has a small intelligence staff that is linked directly to the CDI staff in NDHQ and locally, to provincial civil authorities, law enforcement intelligence organizations and emergency management services. They coordinate intelligence activity with OGDs at the regional level.368 Perhaps understandably, not much is known about defence intelligence activity in the Canadian Special Operations Forces Command (CANSOFCOM). What can be said however is that CANSOFCOM intelligence works regularly across all three levels of conflict - strategic, operational and tactical - in both domestic and foreign theatres^ Many special operations involve tactical action against strategic targets that require high-level political approval. Such decisions are informed by the full range of relevant defence intelligence, derived from information collected from some unique and very sensitive sources, at home and abroad.369 The acquisition of information abroad is greatly aided by traditional and long-standing links to close intelligence allies.

INTELLIGENCE COOPERATION Canadian defence intelligence cooperation is nearly as old as Confederation itself, well established and continuously utilized. The post-Second World Warp ABCA intelligence partnership is so close as to be unique in the world.370 Practitioners interviewed regularly made the point that while Canadian intelligence contributions are important, Canada is a 'net importer' and gets much more out of the relationship than it puts into it.371 Colonel David Marshall, the Chief of Staff of the CDI staff, said that 90% of the intelligence received comes from outside Canada.372

368. DND, CFJP 2.0 (Draft), Joint Intelligence, 4-19. 369. Confidential Source 436. 370. See details on the UKUSA Agreement in Jeffrey T. Richelson and Desmond Ball, The Ties that Bind: Intelligence Cooperation between the UKUSA Countries (Boston: Allen and Unwin, 1985). 371. Among them, Captain(N) Josh Barber, Chief of Defence Intelligence Staff, National Defence Headquarters, Interview, 28 April 2009. 372. Colonel David Marshall, Chief of Defence Intelligence Staff, Interview, 28 January 2010. 151

The literature is split on the future of intelligence cooperation and partnerships. Multilateral intelligence cooperation, a mainstay of NATO intelligence during the Cold War, is less preferred than it used to be. Intelligence agencies fear losing control of information passed to other organizations and any ensuing compromise or damage to the source of that information. To pass information to a trusted ally is one thing, but to contribute information into some kind of multilateral pot, like NATO, is something quite different. Once information is in the larger pot, the donor loses control of who might have access to it. This is a serious challenge to some of the more ambitious plans to share information in the post-9/11 climate. The more traditional. Cold War-centric views like those of Herman maintain that, despite the historical success of the UKUSA and ABCA arrangements, intelligence cooperation in the future is more likely to be bilateral, rather than multilateral. The tendency toward bilateral ties results largely from the fact that intelligence cooperation depends on trust and reciprocity for effectiveness. Moreover, bilateral arrangements are perhaps the most prevalent form of partnerships mainly because they usually make it is easier to meet the goals of each state. Such formal arrangements notwithstanding, informal bilateral information and intelligence sharing is thought to be far more extensive. For some practitioners, the very informality of such networks is their strength, compared with more bureaucratic procedures put in place by treaties, agreements and memoranda of understanding.373 Other practitioners disagree. According to Stephane Lefebvre, there are six factors that lead to the assumption that "intelligence agencies likely prefer formal rather than informal agreements because they offer more protection and lay the base for a more equitable quid pro quo" of intelligence exchange. In outline, they include: 1) differences in foreign policy objectives and perceptions of threats; 2) unequal power relationships; 3) poor human rights record of a liaison partner; 4) legal issues associated with operations within a liaison partner's national boundaries; 5) the fear that intelligence passed to a liaison

373. Farson, et a\, "Introduction," PSI Handbook, 15. 152 partner will be compromised or passed to a third party; and 6) the intelligence exchanged through a liaison relationship might be used for unintended purposes.374 On the other hand, Sir Stephen Lander, Chair of the UK Serious Organized Crime Agency, champions the view that the complexity and pervasiveness of threats in the current international security context demands a "step change" in multilateral intelligence cooperation because many states are affected by the same threats.375 He feels, for instance, that the UKUSA Agreement should be expanded beyond SIGINT and that the ABCA relationship should take in a number of European allies. Lander also points out the growth of what he calls "intelligence diplomacy, the recognition by governments that there are relationships and understanding in their intelligence communities, which can be used diplomatically."376 However, intelligence cooperation does not necessarily indicate a desire for closer political cooperation. At the end of the day, it is driven by utility and national self- interest. Consider these five factors: first, different states with different collection philosophies will turn out different products; second, shared intelligence can create competition over responsibility for action; third, for states to share intelligence reporting there has to be a presumption that in-country coordination is effective and secure; fourth, legislation in some states precludes the sharing of intelligence products outside national borders, or to other than specified organizations; and fifth, the 'problem' of other allies - that is to say, in some organizations, like NATO, if 'everyone' is in the pool, will anyone share anything really significant?377 Despite these difficulties, the transnational nature of current security threats makes intelligence isolation a risky option, so it is reassuring to see that Canadian defence

374. Stephane Lefebvre, "The Difficulties and Dilemmas of International Intelligence Cooperation," International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, vol. 16 (2003): 527- 542. 375. Stephen Lander, "International Intelligence Cooperation," in Andrew et al, Secret Intelligence: A Reader, 140-153. Lander is Chair of the Serious Organized Crime Agency and is also a Non-Executive Director of Northgate Informational Solutions. He was previously Director General of the Security Service (MIS) 1996-2002 having served in that organization since 1975. 376. Ibid., 141. 377. Ibid., 151. 153 intelligence does cooperation well. Canada receives far more than it gives. Since its inception, Canadian military and defence intelligence has been fully integrated with close allies, most notably the UK and US, by way of the UKUSA Agreement and Quadripartite arrangements (both of which also include Australia and New Zealand). Bilateral defence intelligence cooperation with the US, mainly in aerospace issues, is also found within NORAD and CANUS (a bilateral continental defence planning relationship), and alliance intelligence arrangements in NATO. Particularly close relationships between Canadian defence intelligence and US partners exist in GEOINT, IMINT and METOC. Canadian defence intelligence has exchanged a number of Memoranda of Understanding, with a number of 'convenient' like-minded states. Partnerships have been established between the Canadian Mapping and Charting Establishment (MCE) and equivalents in each of France, Germany, Hungary, UK and US. A separate agreement between Canadian defence intelligence and the UK DIS allowed Canadian military personnel to take HUMINT training in the UK.379 There is no way of knowing how many of these types of relationships exist at the classified level, or how many of them might have been concluded in the past. However, from what is known, it is apparent that specific bilateral agreements are made where needed, particularly when the agreement provides mutual benefit. Defence intelligence exercises the gamut of intelligence cooperation and in doing so exemplifies the general soundness of its organization. Here, current practices and theoretical best practices are fully aligned. Regrettably, the same cannot be said when talking about the People aspect of Canadian defence intelligence.

378. There is no empirical information to support this claim, but it is widely taken to be true by both academics and practitioners. When this researcher served in the NATO SHAPE intelligence staff in 2000-01, shared intelligence was made available in these rough proportions: US 80%; UK 10%; Canada, Germany, Netherlands, Hungary and Poland 5% in total; remainder in total 5%. Of the intelligence handled by the CDI organization, about 90% of it comes from allies. Colonel David Marshall, COS of the CDI staff, Interview, 28 January 2010. 379. Colonel Christian Rousseau, Chief of Defence Intelligence Staff, National Defence Headquarters, Interview, 25 January 2008. In fact, the UK helped Canada build up its own HUMINT training capacity, much of which is now done here. 154

RESULTS OF ANALYSIS - PEOPLE

Theoretical best practices Eight theoretical best practices applicable to People were developed from recommended practices found in a variety of expert literature, including those identified in the last two chapters and the earlier part of this chapter. Policy, governance and organizational issues inherently involved people issues. As Julian Richards noted, "Organizational issues within the intelligence function include training and exercising of analysts to improve their tradecraft."380 As well, expert literature dealing with collection, analysis and dissemination inevitably ends up examining some people - human resources - issues haphazardly, but rarely comprehensively. In this part of Chapter 5, ABCA inquiries provided seventy-six recommended practices relating to people, as listed below in Table 5-3.

380. Richards, The Art and Science of Intelligence Analysis, 35. 155

Year Inquiry Total People (P) 1946 Canada: Kellock Taschereau Commission 7 0 1969 Canada: Mackenzie Commission 11 0 1975 US: Rockefeller Commission Report 30 2 1976 US: Church Committee Reports 85 10 Australia: Hope Commission Third Report 36 7 1977 US: Pike Committee Report Not public! y available 1981 Canada: McDonald Commission Report 285 31 1985 Australia: Royal Commission on ASIA Not public y available 1996 US: Aspin Brown Commission Report 23 3 US: Joint Inquiry into Intelligence Community 2002 19 1 Activities Before and After 9/11 Report Australia: PJCAAD Report: Intelligence on 2003 3 0 Iraq's WMD UK: ISC Report: Intelligence on Iraqi WMD 1 0 UK: Foreign Affairs Committee Ninth Report: 16 0 Decision to go to War in Iraq 2004 Canada: DND DIR Report (unclassified version) 50 7 Canada: O'Connor Commission (Arar) Report 36 0 Australia: Flood Report 47 6 UK: Butler Report 12 3 US: SSCI Report, Pre-War Intelligence 13 0 Assessments on Iraq (and related reports) US: 9/11 Commission 41 1 2005 US: Silberman Robb Commission Report 73 5 2006 UK: ISC Report 7/7 2005 4 0 2009 UK: Review of Intelligence on 7/7 1 0 Canada: Major Commission: Air India Inquiry, 2010 64 0 Final Report TOTALS 857 76

Table 5-3: ABCA Inquiry recommended practices relating to People

The McDonald Commission reports provide more recommendations dealing with people than any other ABCA inquiry (thirty-one of seventy-six).381 The depth of detail is extraordinary and although it examines the challenges of changing from a law enforcement context to a new professional security intelligence environment, the requirements for professional security intelligence practitioners are clearly and objectively laid out, with supporting material drawn from Canada's other ABCA allies.

381. McDonald Commission, Second Report, vol. 2, chap. 2, "Management and Personnel," 693-750. 156

Recruitment, career path, discipline, training and professional development policies are proposed. As with other functional areas of government intelligence, interest in a community-wide human resource strategy has become more widespread since 9/11. In 2004, Recommendation 16 of the DIR called on DND to develop a human resource strategy for defence intelligence.382 A year later, the Silberman Robb Commission report recommended the establishment of a central human resources authority.383 On 22 June 2006, the DNI published the Intelligence Community Strategic Human Capital Plan as an Annex to the US National Intelligence Strategy, which outlines DNI plans to build an agile 'all-source' workforce; win the war for talent; and create a culture of leadership at all levels.384 The establishment of pan-community personnel policies is seen another method to eliminate Cold War 'stovepipes.' As discussed in previous sections, it stands to reason that in a time of complex transnational threats, governments would wish to mobilize all elements of national intelligence power. Such a comprehensive approach requires a policy that produces integrated personnel strategies, in addition to integrated organization and management practices. Interest in an integrated human resource enterprise is manifest in many forms throughout the expert literature and is consistent in its desire for community-wide application. Accordingly, I have come to believe that the development and implementation of a policy-driven human resource strategy represents a contemporary theoretical best practice, best expressed as follows:

P 1. From a national intelligence policy, a human resource strategy is derived, to guide the management and development of human resources across the government intelligence community.385

382. DIR, Recommendation 16, p. 56. 383. Silberman Robb Commission, Report, Recommendation 4, p. 321. 384. DNI, The US Intelligence Community's Five Year Strategic Human Capital Plan, at http://www.dni.gov/reports2.htm (accessed 14 December 2009). 385. Ibid. DIR, Recommendation 16, p. 56. McDonald Commission, Second Report, Recommendation28, p. 1077; Recommendation 169, pp. 876-877. Aspin Brown Commission, Report, Recommendation 9-2 and 9-3, p. 107. Flood Report, Recommendation 15 c), 183. Silberman Robb Commission, Report, Chapter 6, Recommendation 4, p. 321. Anthony F. Smith and Tim Kelly, "Human Capital in the Digital Economy," in The Organization of the Future, ed. Francis Hesselbein, Marshall Goldsmith and Richard Beckhard (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1997), 210. 157

Furthermore, ideally, the nature of a human resource strategy called for in this theoretical best practice will define the broader professional context in which intelligence people operate. The context for a community-wide human resource strategy is set by post- Cold War ABCA inquiries that suggest there is a requirement to recognize the fact that intelligence work is more of a professionalized vocation than traditionally thought. There is growing awareness of an emerging formal body of knowledge and the need for unique expertise derived from long study and practice.386 Herman in particular, argues the need for professional qualities in all involved personnel throughout the intelligence process.387 Accordingly, the next theoretical best practice flows from ABCA inquiry recommendations that call on authorities to improve the professional life of intelligence practitioners. The Silberman Robb Commission suggests that the intelligence community "should expand the use of non-monetary incentives that remind analysts of the importance of their work and the value of their contributions to national security."388 Not surprisingly, such enthusiasm extends beyond ABCA countries. The Brazilian intelligence career model pays considerable attention to the professional development of intelligence personnel.389 In Colombia, a Special Commission emphasized the need to treat intelligence as a profession based on four elements: specialized skills, meritocracy, democracy and a new culture of intelligence.390 Democracies broadly recognize the need for professionalized intelligence services and, in doing so, tend to acknowledge and acquiesce to the notion that intelligence personnel should be treated and developed as more of a professional breed than in times passed. Given the number and range of examples indicating acknowledgment and encouragement of the enhanced professional status being granted to intelligence practitioners, I decided that the development should be portrayed as the following theoretical best practice:

386.1 am indebted to Dr. Douglas Bland, Chair of Defence Management Studies, in the School of Policy Studies at Queen's University for encouraging me to explain this point more clearly. 387. Herman, "Ethics and Intelligence after September 2001." Intelligence and International Security, vol. 19, no. 2 (Summer 2004): 350. 388. Silberman Robb Commission, Report, Recommendation 15, p. 423. 389. Cepik, "Intelligence in Brazil," in Reforming Intelligence, 163-64. 390. Steven C. Boraz, "Colombia," in Farson et al, PSI Handbook, 139. 158

P 2. The professionalization of the intelligence function is recognized and intelligence personnel are remunerated adequately, treated with respect and offered career enhancing development, including the opportunity to compete for advancement into meaningful leadership and management positions in the intelligence community.391

Beyond simple recognition however, the professionalization of intelligence people demands a number of other strategies to be manifest. Among them, professional recognition requires effective recruiting strategies and methods, to attract suitable personnel with the necessary aptitude and potential. Wide and aggressive recruiting practices are key to recruiting and retaining leaders, according to Peg Thorns.392 However, little of the expert literature surveyed deals directly or in any substantial way with the theory or practice of intelligence recruiting. Even Major Hal Skaarup's detailed trilogy makes only passing, sporadic reference to intelligence recruitment.393 Despite this lack of overt recognition, the subject was frequently raised indirectly when examining other human resource management issues. One exception that does address recruiting challenges is the McDonald Commission's Second Report, which devotes six pages to "Recruitment procedures," including a recommendation for the new security intelligence organization to "employ a wide range of recruiting techniques to determine those best suited for security intelligence work."394 McDonald's aim was to enlarge the recruiting pool. He also recommended that the security service be "redesigned so that it is more suitable for better educated, more experienced recruits."395 Another rare reference to intelligence recruiting practices comes from Richard Russell in his discussion of the need to increase the intellectual capacity of analytical cadres. Russell argues for "mid- and senior-level" hires in the CIA, to bolster the analytic staff, because this is one way to bring in specific expertise to address particular issues and

391. McDonald Commission, Second Report, Recommendations 77,79, pp. 1084-1085. Flood Report, Recommendation 15. e), 183. 392. Peg Thorns, Finding the Best and Brightest: A Guide to Recruiting, Selecting and Retaining Effective Leaders (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 2005). 393. Harold A. Skaarup, Out of Darkness - Light: A History of Canadian Military Intelligence, vol. 1, Pre-Confederation to 1982; vol. 2, 1983-1997; vol. 3, 1998-2005 (New York, Lincoln and Shanghai: iUniverse, 2005). 394. McDonald Commission, Second Report, 111. 395. Ibid., 730. 159 tap "the intellectual capital that lies in the United States."396 Interestingly, McDonald had also recommended mid- and senior-level hires from outside the security agency twenty- six years earlier.397 Beyond McDonald and Russell, material on recruiting practices is thin, but given its inherent influence, it could not be ignored. Consequently, the next theoretical best practice is derived principally from an examination of ABCA and some NATO country recruiting methods as portrayed on state intelligence websites, the most impressive version of which is that of the US DNI.398 It is the most comprehensive community-wide intelligence website among ABCA and NATO countries. Other national intelligence websites are generally agency-based and therefore tend to miss out on the advantages of economy of scale enjoyed by the DNI website.399 As an example of the quality of initiative and outreach found in US intelligence circles, the US Centers of Academic Excellence (CAE) program is noteworthy. The US intelligence community established CAE in the National Security Studies Program in 2005, in response to a perceived need for intelligence professionals who are educated and trained with unique knowledge, skills and capabilities. The program aims to recruit and retain the best and brightest - those with diverse ethnic, cultural and professional backgrounds, as well as regional, geographical, industry, language and technical expertise, especially first and second generation Americans.400 Other national intelligence recruitment programs are not as sophisticated, but they do, nonetheless, engage contemporary communications methods as best as allocated

396. Russell, "Facing Future Strategic Intelligence Challenges," in Sharpening Strategic Intelligence, 156. 397. McDonald Commission, Second Report, 729. 398. DNI, http://www.intelligence.gov/ (accessed 23 July 2010). 399. For examples of agency-based websites, see the British Secret Intelligence Service at http://www.sis.gov.uk/output/careers-l.html; the Australian Security Intelligence Organization at http://www.asio.gov.au/Careers/Overview.html; and the German Foreign Intelligence Service (Bundesnachrichtendienst - BND)at http://www.bnd.de/cln_117/nn_1365548/DE/JobsUndKarriere/JobsUndKarriere node.html? n nn=true (accessed 11 May 2010). An exception to the agency-based approach is the community- wide website of the Italian Intelligence System for the Security of the Republic (Sistema di informazione per la sicurezza della Repubblica), at http://www.sicurezzanazionale.gov.it/web.nsf/pagine/en_home (accessed 11 May 2010). 400. DNI, "Overview," Intelligence Community Centers of Academic Excellence Programme, at http://www.odni.gov/cae/overview.htm (accessed 14 may 2009). 160 resources will allow. Given more resources, recruiting could be enhanced in both quality and scope. Gathering the best elements of ABCA and NATO intelligence recruiting practices produces a mosaic of preferred initiatives that can be presented in the form of the following theoretical best practice:

P 3. Intelligence recruitment efforts leverage modern communications and media to attract and recruit prospective intelligence people. Intelligence communities cooperatively engage colleges and universities in the attraction and recruitment of highly educated, qualified and skilled candidates from the ranks of graduate and post-graduate students and faculty. Recruitment targets appropriate candidates with a demonstrated pre-disposition and intellectual potential for intelligence work.401

It must be remembered however, that recruitment is a means, not an end. There is more to be done in the way of training and professional development once an intelligence candidate enrols in the community. A practical strategic context for theoretical best practice P 3 is outlined in Enterprise Objective (EO) 6 of the National Intelligence Strategy of the United States (2009).402 It reads: EO 6: Develop the Workforce Attract, develop, and retain a diverse, results-focused, and high-performing workforce capable of providing the technical expertise and exceptional leadership necessary to address our Nation's security challenges.

Once recruited, it is expected that intelligence practitioners will receive extensive training throughout their career.403 The DIR provided seven recommendations directed at people, one of which explicitly called for "a training and education plan for military and civilian Defence Intelligence requirements. ... and the potential need for PG [post­ graduate] educational opportunities for both military and civilian intelligence specialists."404 Community training requirements at all levels are also discussed in the

401. Church Committee, Report, Recommendation 32, p. 444. McDonald Commission, Second Report, Recommendations 74 and 75 (e), p. 1083. DIR, 51-56. 402. National Intelligence Strategy of the United States (2009), Enterprise Objective 6, 16, at http://www.dni.gov/reports/2009_NIS.pdf (accessed 16 August 2009). 403. Differences between the terms 'training,' 'education' and 'professional development' are clarified in a subsequent section. 404. DIR, Recommendation 17, p. 56. See also Monik Beauregard, "Re-thinking intelligence analyst training," in Vanguard Magazine, at 161

Flood Report and the Aspin Brown Commission report.405 A more extensive call for community-wide joint training is found in the Silberman Robb Commission report. Recommendation 4 asks for "a central human resources authority for the Community ... [to] direct a "joint" personnel rotation system; and establish a National Intelligence University."406 Calls for comprehensive, career-spanning training of intelligence personnel parallel accepted programs in other professional groups serving government, such as the public service and the armed forces. It seems entirely reasonable therefore that the following theoretical best practice should also be considered applicable to democratic governments:

P 4. There is a community-wide training framework that offers training at the entry, mid-career and advanced levels, focused on various intelligence tradecrafts.407

While acknowledging its importance, it must be noted that training is insufficient in itself. Over and above intelligence tradecraft addressed in training, higher and broader requirements of professional development exist, to prepare promising intelligence practitioners for senior positions and added responsibility. The 9/11 Commission explored the idea of requiring potential intelligence leaders to demonstrate success in 'joint' intelligence assignments in an intelligence agency other than their parent organization. The aim, like that of joint assignments in the US armed forces, is to groom candidates for future senior intelligence appointments in the broader institutional aspects of their work and develop more of a corporate attitude among intelligence people 'on the way up.'408 The idea has subsequently been adopted as an official DNI policy and civilian intelligence practitioners in the US intelligence community "will not be promoted or http://www.vanguardcanada.com/IntelligenceAnalystTrainingBeauregard (accessed 4 February 2009). 405. Flood Report, 155. Aspin Brown Commission, Report, 66. 406. Silberman Robb Commission, Report, Recommendation 4, p. 321. 407. Aspin Brown Commission, Report, Recommendation 6-3, p. 75. Flood Report, Recommendation 8. f), 181. DIR, 53. 9/11 Commission, Report, 415. Silberman Robb Commission, Report, Chapter 7, Recommendation 6, p. 373. 408. 9/11 Commission, Report, 408-409. The nuanced differences between training, education and professional development will be discussed in more detail in later paragraphs. 162

assigned to a senior civilian position in the IC unless that employee has been awarded joint duty certification."409 Joint professional development is also mentioned in the Aspin Brown Commission report, but only to the extent of moving CIA operational case officers to other agency directorates to gain wider experience.410 Elsewhere in the expert literature, Herman had earlier argued that intelligence communities would benefit from "some provision for future leaders at agency level with multi-agency experience."411 More recently, Lowenfhal examined changes in intelligence analysis after US intelligence experiences surrounding 9/11 and the 2003 invasion of Iraq, and concluded there is a requirement for joint training. 412 The idea of joint intelligence professional development is also a logical extension of the modern approach to integrated intelligence and other government operations in developed democracies. Given the fact that the idea is frequently suggested, explicitly and implicitly, in post-9/11 expert intelligence, I regard the following theoretical best practice as safe and credible:

P 5. Professional development programs for intelligence personnel include opportunities for joint development with other intelligence organizations and with principal intelligence consumers. Successful completion of such joint development is a preferred criterion for professional advancement, particularly for those seeking senior intelligence community appointments.413

Joint professional development opportunities and community-wide training programs will provide benefit to those seeking higher generalist management positions

409. ODNI, Intelligence Community Policy Guidance Number 601.1, "Intelligence Community Civilian Joint Duty Program Implementing Instructions" (4 September 2009), at http://www.dni.gov/electronic_reading_room/ICPG_601_l.pdf (accessed 13 February 2010). 410. Aspin Brown Commission, Report, Recommendation 6-5, p. 76. 411. Herman, Intelligence in Peace and War, 319. 412. Mark Lowenthal "Intelligence Transition: Analysis after September 11 and Iraq," in Analyzing Intelligence: Origins, Obstacles and Innovations, 230-232. 413. Church Committee Report, Recommendation 34, p. 444. Hope Commission, Third Report, "Abridged Findings and Recommendations," paras. 72, 75,76 and 81. McDonald Commission, Second Report, "Summary of Recommendations," paras. 73 and 74, pp. 1083-1084. Aspin Brown Commission, Report, Recommendation 6-5, p. 76; Recommendation 9-4, p. 108. US Joint Committee, Report, Recommendation 11. p. 10. Flood Report, Recommendation 8. g), 181; Recommendation 16. c), 184. Silberman Robb Commission, Report, Chapter 6, Recommendation 4, p. 321. 163 within a government intelligence community. Intelligence analysts however, present a particular challenge for intelligence professionalization. The training and career management of intelligence analysts receive; particular attention throughout the expert literature, often and routinely at the expense of other intelligence people and capabilities.414 The Butler Report recognized a "specialism" related to intelligence analysis when it recommended, "... this review should include considering whether there should be a specialism (sic) of analysis with a career structure and room for advancement, allowing the Assessments Staff to include some career members.415 Mark Lowenthal is a champion of a single 'professional' intelligence analytical cadre.416 He is supported by Stephen Marrin and Jonathan Clemente who compare intelligence analysis to the profession of medicine, claiming that both pursuits, among other things, require a defined skill set and academic preparation.417 Others do not accept the designation of intelligence analysis as a profession, but they do see it as having particular importance. Rebecca Fisher and Robert Johnston discuss intelligence analysis as a "discipline" and conclude that it should be considered an ongoing process rather than full-fledged profession.418 Among expert authors, Fisher and Johnston are clearly in the minority on this issue. In many recent ABCA inquiries intelligence analysis is treated separately and distinctly from other intelligence activity. Moreover, some ABCA countries host professional associations for intelligence analysts, which tend to exclude non-analysts.419

414. There are a number of professional associations for intelligence analysts (e.g. Canadian Association of Professional Intelligence Analysts - CAPIA) but none for other intelligence disciplines (i.e. there is neither an 'Intelligence Collectors of America' organization, nor an 'Association for the Dissemination of Intelligence'). 415. Butler Report, 600. 416. Mark Lowenthal, "Intelligence in Transition: Analysis after September 11 and Iraq," in Analyzing Intelligence, 230-233. 417. Stephen Marrin and Jonathan Clemente, "Modeling an Intelligence Analysis Profession on Medicine," International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, vol. 19, no. 4 (Winter 2006-2007): 642-665. 418. Rebecca Fisher and Robert Johnston, "Is Intelligence Analysis a Discipline?" in Analyzing Intelligence, 55-68. 419. In Canada, for example, the Canadian Association of Professional Intelligence Analysts (CAPIA) is sponsored by the Intelligence Assessment Staff in the PCO, but CAPIA's existence is not discussed in public. In the UK, see the Association for Crime and Intelligence Analysts at http://www.acia.org.uk/ (accessed 5 March 2011); In the US, see the International Association for Law Enforcement Intelligence Analysts at 164

Thus gathered, the evidence is clear that intelligence analysts are a professionally distinct group deserving of attention as described in this theoretical best practice:

P 6. Intelligence analysis is a distinct intelligence specialty having a separate career path with appropriate monetary and non-monetary incentives to attract people of calibre; a distinct program of professional development; and sufficiently varied employment to allow career advancement.420

Among the beneficial and desirable intellectual skills in any intelligence analyst is some facility in a relevant language. In the post-Cold War ABCA inquiries there is noticeable emphasis on providing intelligence analysts with the necessary linguistic skills. The Aspin Brown Commission recommends analysts be rewarded for learning and maintaining proficiency in foreign languages and that they be "encouraged to take university or graduate courses here and abroad ...."421 The Flood Report recommended additional funding for key language capabilities of the Australian intelligence agencies, paying particular attention to emerging needs.422 The US Army took intelligence analysts earmarked for deployment to Iraq or Afghanistan and seconded them to various national collectors for up to one year to 'read-in' to the theatre, prior to leaving the US.423 Foreign language skills are important enablers that allow analysts to better understand alien cultures. ABCA inquiries and other selected western expert intelligence literature enthusiastically endorse language training programs for intelligence analysts. So common was this view that the following theoretical best practice seems unavoidable: http://www.ialeia.org/files/docs/CICA%20announcement.pdf (accessed 4 March 2011); FBI Intelligence Analysts Association at http://www.fbianalysts.org/ (accessed 5 March 2011); and the Minnesota Association for Criminal Intelligence Analysts at http://themacia.org/ (accessed 5 March 2011). 420. Church Committee, Report, Recommendation 31, p.444. Hope Third Report, "Abridged Findings and Recommendations," para. 77. Aspin Brown Commission, Report, Recommendation 6-2, p. 74; Recommendation 8-2, p. 94. Butler Report, 144. Silberman Robb Commission, Report, Chapter 8, Recommendations 8 and 9, pp. 409-410; Recommendation 15, p. 423. 421. Aspin Brown Commission, Report, 87. 422. Flood Report, 156. 423. See Association of the United States Army, "Key issues relevant to Army intelligence transformation," Torchbearer National Security Reports (Land Warfare Institute, July, 2007), 11-12, at http://www.ausa.org/programs/torchbearer/nsr/Pages/default.aspx (accessed 17 June 2009). 165

P 7. Community-wide training programs are established to prepare intelligence analysts (and perhaps collectors) in both the language and culture of the operational theatre in which they will be operating. 424

Discussion of language training administered to intelligence analysts served as a conduit for further discussion on advanced education in general. In the context of a discussion on language training, Richard Betts makes the more general argument that long term improvement of analysis requires the timely revision of educational norms, to ensure analysts keep pace with requirements of the contemporary security environment.425 Former CIA analyst John Gannon also looks forward to a "revolution in training and education."426 Such interest could be applied to education provided to all intelligence practitioners, not just analysts. As yet another example of the interest in reviewing educational standards, Elbridge Colby suggests that continuing to educate intelligence practitioners in "the hopeless twentieth-century pursuit of taming human life through predictive social science" should be replaced by more realistic categories of wisdom and intuition.427 In line with Colby, Hastedt holds that the humanities, not the social sciences, are the proper training ground for intelligence analysts.428 On the other hand, Amy Zegart complains that the problem may be even more fundamental. Academics do not study US intelligence, she argues, because it is not yet an academically worthwhile field of study.429 Therefore, it may be that intelligence education does not need revision as much as it needs a 'jump start.' But such a judgment might be somewhat harsh, given the example of the evolving US National Defense Intelligence College (NDIC), which has emerged from an earlier

424. Church Committee, Report, Recommendation 84, p. 473. Aspin Brown Commission, Report, Recommendation 8-2, p. 94. Flood Report, Recommendations 19 and 20, p. 185. 9/11 Commission, Report, 415. 425. Betts, Enemies of Intelligence, 132. 426. John Gannon, "Managing Analysis in the Information Age," in Analyzing Intelligence, 223-224. 427. Elbridge Colby, "Making Intelligence Smart," Policy Review, Hoover Institution (August and September 2007), at http://www.hoover.org/publications/policyreview/8817787.html. 428. See "The New Context of Intelligence Estimating: Politicization or Publicizing?" in Intelligence and Intelligence Policy in a Democratic Society, 55. 429. Zegart, Secret Intelligence: A Reader, 21-34. 166 armed service-centric Joint Military Intelligence College (JMIC), to serve the entire post- 9/11 US intelligence community. In addition to new bricks and mortar, the entire approach to intelligence education has been modernized and continues to undergo scrutiny. "There is no point where the faculty and center personnel can relax and teach the same curriculum year in and year out. ... the College strives to bring its students the most current, timely, critical, and up-to-date issues and thinking from the IC."430 Furthermore, there are other examples of unique thought in this area, such as that of Matthew Herbert who suggests intelligence analysis might be more appropriately seen as a challenge of managing epistemic complexity, rather than continue to be serviced by traditional analytic methods.431 From such discourse I concluded that, not only do intelligence training programs require review and revision to remain relevant, the overall intelligence community academic framework needs continuing professional scrutiny, followed by upgrading and enhancement when called for. This is best expressed in the following theoretical best practice:

P 8. The intelligence education framework continuously receives serious academic methodological review to ensure it remains relevant to the analytical requirements of the contemporary security and threat environment.432

430. Vance R. Skarstedt, "The National Defense Intelligence College," American Intelligence Journal, vol. 26, no. 2 (Winter 2008/2009), 16. 431. Matthew Herbert, "The Intelligence Analyst as Epistemologist," International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, vol. 19, no. 4 (Winter 2006-2007): 666-684. 432. DIR, Recommendation 17, p. 56. In Brazil, the Bicameral Commission on Intelligence is empowered to review and analyze the curriculum of the National Intelligence School (ENI), Antunes, "Establishing Democratic Control of Intelligence in Argentina," in Reforming Intelligence, 214. See a suggested new perspective of the traditional intelligence studies paradigm in: Christopher A. Corpora, "The Stone and Quarry: Intelligence Studies in a Dynamic Global Environment," American Intelligence Journal, vol. 25, no. 2 (Winter2007/2008): 12-23. Also Gordon R. Middleton, "A Maturity Model for Intelligence Education," American Intelligence Journal, vol. 25, no. 2 (Winter 2007-2008): 33-45. An intriguing story of strategic intelligence education adaptation is found in an interview with Denis Clift, President of the US National Defence Intelligence College. See "New Directions for NDIC: A Conversation with President A. Denis Clift, American Intelligence Journal, vol.26, no. 2 (Winter 2008/2009):7-13. 167

The academic validity of this theoretical best practice is easily challenged, however. It is not explicitly discussed in any of the ABCA inquiries, nor does it enjoy any noticeable profile in the mainstream expert intelligence literature. Furthermore, it has a rather generic character that can apply not only to intelligence studies, but also to many other pedagogical endeavours. Nonetheless, it is highlighted it here to point out the profound nature of intelligence studies, which extends beyond merely trying to produce better analysts and better products. Continuous review and enhancement of the overall educational framework forming the basis of defence intelligence professional development could be considered a best practice of fundamental importance to any government intelligence organization. Having been identified, these eight theoretical best practices are now compared to Canadian defence intelligence current practices and their alignment evaluated in the next few paragraphs.

Alignment - people Table 5-4 below compares theoretical best practices with associated current practices relating to people (coded 'P'). Anomalies are italicized. Of eight theoretical best practices derived from expert literature, none are matched by a fully aligned current practice. Only two current practices are partially aligned with associated theoretical best practices. Six theoretical best practices have no aligned current practice. Theoretical Best Practices People (P) Current Practices From a national intelligence Not Aligned. policy, a human resource strategy There is no distinct defence is derived, to guide the intelligence human resource management and development of strategy. human resources across the CFpersonnel are managed in government intelligence PI accordance with overall CF community. personnel policies and civilian defence intelligence personnel are managed in accordance with overall Public Service personnel policies. The professionalization of the Not Aligned. intelligence function is recognized Defence intelligence is not and intelligence personnel are recognized within DND, nor remunerated adequately, treated respected as a professionalized with respect and offered career practice, although it is considered enhancing development, including P2 to be an important support and the opportunity to compete for enabling process. advancement into meaningful leadership and management positions in the intelligence community. Intelligence recruitment efforts Not Aligned. leverage modern communications There is no formal intelligence and media to attract and recruit recruitment effort directed at prospective intelligence people. colleges and universities, nor are Intelligence communities recruitment efforts targeted in any cooperatively engage colleges and specific way, beyond the normal universities in the attraction and CF recruiting processes, aptitude recruitment of highly educated, P3 tests and specialist training. qualified and skilled candidates While CF recruitment from the ranks of graduate and campaigns do generally leverage post-graduate students and faculty. modern communications Recruitment targets appropriate technologies, they do not target candidates with a demonstrated prospective intelligence recruits pre-disposition and intellectual with demonstrated pre-disposition potential for intelligence work. for intelligence work. There is a community-wide Partially aligned. training framework that offers Military entry-level intelligence training at the entry, mid-career training is available only to and advanced levels, focused on P4 military intelligence branch various intelligence tradecrafts. personnel. Separate entry level training is available to limited numbers of civilian defence intelligence personnel. Military intelligence mid-level training is available mainly to military intelligence branch personnel. There is no formal, mid-level intelligence training available to defence intelligence personnel. Entry and mid-career level civilian intelligence training is ad- hoc and sporadic. Advanced-level training is inadequate for senior military personnel and non-existent for civilian defence intelligence personnel. Professional development Partially Aligned. programs for intelligence Some defence intelligence personnel include opportunities for personnel are posted to liaison 'joint' development with other positions with close (ABCA) intelligence organizations and with intelligence allies and have principal intelligence consumers. returned to occupy senior defence Successful completion of such intelligence positions. joint development is a preferred Some defence intelligence criterion for professional personnel are seconded to advancement, particularly for intelligence staffs in OGDs (e.g. those seeking senior intelligence PCO, ITAC and CSIS). community appointments. The extent of 'joint' assignments is limited and, P5 although viewed favourably when being considering personnel for promotion or appointment, it is neither overtly 'preferred' nor mandatory for advancement. There are no formal defence intelligence profess ional development programs. Both military and civilian defence intelligence practitioners follow the traditional CF and Public Service career development programs respectively. Intelligence analysis is a Not Aligned. distinct intelligence specialty P6 Intelligence analysis is having a separate career path with considered to be a distinct 170

appropriate monetary and non­ specialty, but not to the degree that monetary incentives to attract it forms a distinct occupational people of calibre; a distinct category with its own career program of professional pattern. There is no formal development; and sufficiently intelligence analyst professional varied employment to allow career development framework or career advancement. path. Community-wide training Not Aligned. programs are established to Such training and force prepare intelligence analysts (and generation planning does not exist collectors) in both the language P7 within defence intelligence. and culture of the operational theatre in which they will be operating. The intelligence education Not Aligned. framework continuously receives Not only is there no serious serious academic methodological academic review given to the review to ensure it remains defence intelligence education relevant to the analytical framework, there is no formal requirements of the contemporary defence intelligence education security and threat environment. P8 program. Defence intelligence personnel, both civilian and military are, however, free to pursue sponsored or non-sponsored advanced education as they may wish and for which they are qualified.

Table 5-4: Theoretical best and current practices - People (P)

Evaluation - People It was surprising to learn that there are no current Canadian defence intelligence practices fully aligned with theoretical best people practices as derived from expert literature, because the Public Service, DND and the CF routinely tout people as being their most important asset. All three organizations have extensive professional training and development regimes in many disciplines, but not, it appears, in intelligence. Canadian defence intelligence seems to have paid little heed to expert literature in this area. The 2004 DIR expressed significant enthusiasm for a more centralized approach to human resource recruiting, management and development within defence 171 intelligence.4 Major components of such a program are also called for in the most recent ABCA studies. First, there is a requirement for an overall defence intelligence policy, from which a human resource strategy can be developed. Such a strategy would ideally include guidance for the targeted recruiting of defence intelligence personnel; their training, education and professional development; and subsequently, formal recognition of defence intelligence work as a distinct discipline requiring a separate career path that includes appropriate opportunities for advancement. Evaluation of defence intelligence continues, in more detail, in the four sections that follow. First, the lack of a defence intelligence policy and human resource strategy is addressed, followed by a section on the absence of targeted recruiting. The fragmentation of defence intelligence professional development, education and training is examined in a third section. Finally, the fourth section discusses implications of the fact that intelligence tends not to be considered a fully professional endeavour.

LACK OF POLICY AND STRATEGY There is no overarching defence intelligence policy, nor any subordinate, equally over-arching, defence intelligence human resource strategy, despite the fact that expert literature advises having both. ABCA inquiries make the point explicitly. Recommendation 16 of the 2004 DIR called on DND to develop a human resource strategy for defence intelligence to include elements such as baseline personnel resource requirements; military/civilian mix; military and civilian recruiting; civilian career development; and the potential of a strategic reserve unit to offset personnel shortages.434 Flood suggested the Foreign Intelligence Coordination Committee (FICC) should consider options for career management across the intelligence community, including a program of secondments across agencies.435 The Silberman Robb Commission wanted the DNI to act as a centralized human resource authority for the entire intelligence community, creating a uniform system of performance evaluations and compensation; a joint personnel rotations system; and community-wide training programs for both analysts and managers.

433. DIR, Part II, Section 3, "Human Resources," 49. 434. DIR, Recommendation 16, p. 56. 435. Flood Report, 155. 172

Such calls for more consideration of career issues are not new. In 1996, the Aspin Brown Commission recommended using the CIA Community Management Staff to establish cooperative arrangements within the intelligence community in the areas of job recruiting, the conduct of background investigations, internal and external training programs, and the sharing of common facilities.436 In the US, much of this has gained some traction, largely as a result of the IRTPA that called upon the future DNI to work with the heads of subordinate agencies to prescribe "sets of standards for education, training, and career development of personnel of the intelligence community."437 On 22 June 2006, the DNI published the Intelligence Community Strategic Human Capital Plan as an annex to the National Intelligence Strategy.™ It identified several challenges to modernizing its human capacity, including 'hyper-competition' with the public sector; an insufficiently diversified workforce; a problematic generation gap within the community; and an aggravating degree of competition with contractors for the services of their own personnel. It laid out three goals: "build an agile 'all-source' workforce; win the war for talent; and create a culture of leadership at all levels."439 There is a CF Human Resource Strategy, common to all military personnel, but no separate strategy for the management and development of defence intelligence personnel themselves.440 The absence of such a focused policy, in both CF and Public Service contexts, means that personnel requirements unique to defence intelligence can be addressed only within a wider, common regulatory framework.441 Attraction and hiring

436. Aspin Brown Commission, Report, Recommendation 9-3, p. 103. 437. US House of Representatives, 108th Congress, 2d Session, Intelligence Reform and Terrorist Prevention Act of 2004 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office (GPO Access), 7 December 2004), at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/serialset/creports/pdf/108-796/108- 796_intel_reform.html (accessed 2 May 2010). 438. John Negroponte, US Intelligence Community's Five Year Strategic Human Capital Plan (Washington, D.C.: Office the Director of National Intelligence, 22 June 2006), at http://www.dni.gov/reports2.htm (accessed June 2008). 439. Ibid. 440. The CF Human Resource Strategy can be found at http://www.cmp- cpm.forces.gc.ca/pd/hrs-smr/index-eng.asp (accessed 1 March 2009). 441. Lieutenant-General Mike Gauthier (Retired), a former CDI who oversaw the DIR and its early implementation, points out that within DND, the civilian defence intelligence does not have enough of a profile to generate any Public Service interest in creating a separate employment field. In fact, there is no overarching human resource strategy across the Canadian 173 practices cannot be tailored to suit defence intelligence requirements and civilian career progression within defence intelligence remains haphazard. Government anti- discriminatory regulations and recruiting practices prohibit the flexible re-focussing of enrolment efforts to achieve a more culturally and ethnically diverse intelligence workforce. Defence intelligence is thus constrained from adapting any faster, or with any more agility, than any other departmental function facing routine challenges, no matter what the threat environment demands. These circumstances implicitly place the enforcement of government bureaucratic regulations ahead of national security requirements and make it apparent that defence intelligence is regarded, not as a distinct and professional function on its own, but simply as another 'business' line of government, one that does not merit a separate management framework or its own human resource strategy. Canadian defence intelligence is simply not mature enough to exist as a distinct activity.

LACK OF TARGETED RECRUITING After the end of the Cold War, many Western states enthusiastically reaped a 'peace dividend' during the 1990s, by which government spending generally, and military security spending particularly, was significantly reduced. Recruiting quotas dropped too. Now, post-9/11 expansion in national intelligence and security sectors has generated a new crop of junior personnel at the same time as the older cohort from the Cold War era arrives in senior ranks and prepares for retirement. Missing is the group of middle-aged officers and managers that were not recruited and developed in the 1990s. A career 'trough' exists between the new generation of intelligence people and the older, departing generation. US reaction to this 'trough' provides a dated, but nonetheless stunning indication of the shift to a new generation of intelligence people after 9/11. At a conference of the International Association for Intelligence Education (IAFIE), held in Washington, D.C. on 11 June 2007, General Michael Hayden, then Director of the CIA told the audience: government intelligence community. There seems to be no interest in developing one either. CSEC and CSIS are content with their own independent hiring practices and are not keen to have any centralized policy imposed on them. Gauthier, Interview, 12 January 2010. 174

a. in the whole CIA, one in seven officers had been hired in the past year; b. in the whole CIA, 48% of CIA officers had been hired since 9/11; c. in the Directorate of Intelligence, one in five analysts had been hired in the past year; d. in the Directorate of Intelligence 50% of the analysts had been hired since 9/11.442

Expert literature is clearly enthusiastic about meeting the human capacity demands of the modern strategic intelligence function. ABCA inquiries call for the full staffing of approved intelligence organizations, based on what the Flood Inquiry report refers to as "the growing importance of intelligence in war-fighting and planning."443 It "called on the Department of Defence and the Australian Defence Force to agree on a strategy to redress the shortfall of military personnel assigned to the Defence Intelligence agencies, including in leadership positions, to ensure military staffing levels."444 In a similar vein, the Canadian DIR makes the point that the CDI should "staff the resource requirements needed to support the process management framework."445 In the face of calls for full staffing it is therefore surprising to find relatively little discussion in intelligence expert literature about human capital attraction and recruitment. This may be because there is really nothing 'special' about intelligence recruitment beyond principles and measures traditionally discussed in professional human resource literature.446 Even on national government websites, where they exist, there is little new to

442. General Michael Hayden, Address to the IAFIE, Washington, D.C. 11 June 2007. The Researcher was in attendance. IAFIE was formed in June 2004 at a gathering of intelligence studies trainers and educators at the Sixth Annual International Colloquium on Intelligence at Mercyhurst College in Erie, Pennsylvania. This group, from various intelligence disciplines including national security, law enforcement and competitive intelligence, recognized the need for a professional association that could span diverse disciplines, provide resources, and act as a catalyst for the development of Intelligence Studies programs. The current membership of IAFIE numbers over 700 individuals, a dozen corporate members and over two dozen institutional members. They include the active participation of intelligence experts from around the world, many of whom are cited in this work. The researcher is a member of IAFIE. 443. Flood Report, 125. 444. Ibid. 445. DIR, Recommendation 12, p. 46. 446. One example is Anthony F. Smith and Tim Kelly, "Human Capital in the Digital Economy," Hesselbein, Frances, Marshall Goldsmith, and Richard Beckhard, eds., Organization of the Future, Drucker Foundation Future Series (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1997), 175 be found dealing with recruiting intelligence personnel. A survey of thirty-six countries with public intelligence organization websites revealed that most offered a decidedly conservative approach to recruitment.447 Perhaps not unexpectedly, exceptions are found in the attraction and recruitment effort of US intelligence agencies. All sixteen US intelligence community agencies have an enhanced web page aimed, in part, at prospective recruits.448 Other American intelligence community outreach is also impressive. The reader is reminded of the US CAE program that was discussed in an earlier section.449 Regrettably, no detailed information on intelligence recruitment numbers is publicly available from the US, or other states approached in the course of this research.450 It is therefore difficult to measure the effectiveness of national intelligence recruiting efforts. As well, there is no way of knowing what other, less visible recruitment methods are in place. Nonetheless, there is an important lesson for Canadian defence intelligence in all this. Without a focused human resource strategy, recruiting of defence intelligence people enjoys no special profile in the normal course of CF and Public Service recruitment programs. In such circumstances there are no targeted defence intelligence recruitment efforts to leverage modern communications media, to establish outreach links to institutions of advanced learning or to attract the culturally and ethnically diverse candidates called for in almost every ABCA inquiry report. No connection was found between Canadian defence intelligence recruiting and consideration of future intelligence requirements and force generation needs. Canadian defence intelligence recruitment is allowed to continue along in an ad hoc manner. It is generally a passive exercise.

199-211. The chapter specifically covers "Attracting the Best;" "Developing the Best" and "Retaining the Best." 447. Intelligence organizations from all twenty-eight NATO member nations were examined, as well as those of Australia, Brazil, Chile, India, Ireland, Japan, Mexico, Russia, South Africa and Sweden. 448. All sixteen websites can be accessed from http://www.dni.gov/members_IC.htm (accessed 22 February 2009). 449. "Overview," Intelligence Community Centers of Academic Excellence Program, at http://www.odni.gov/cae/overview.htm. (accessed 13 April 2009). 450. Canada, Australia, Germany, Hungary, India, Lithuania, New Zealand, Russia, Turkey, UK, US. 176

FRAGMENTED PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMMENT, EDUCATION AND TRAINING The terms 'professional development,' 'education' and 'training' are often used synonymously. This is an error because the three terms represent three different activities. The Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat (TBS) defines professional development as "activity that assists employees further their careers and is aligned with departmental business priorities and management improvement objectives of the government."451 TBS does not define education, but it does say that learning "is the acquisition of new knowledge and ideas that change the way an individual perceives, understand or acts.452 Finally, it defines training as an "organized way to transfer the knowledge and know-how that is required for successful performance in a job, occupation or profession."453 The three terms are more precisely defined and related in the CF, where professional development encompasses: individual training and education; employment experience; and self-development.454 The CF Individual Training and Education System (CFITES) defines training as "the skills, knowledge and attitudes required to perform the assigned duties."455 Education in turn, is defined as " base of knowledge and intellectual skills upon which information can be correctly interpreted and sound judgment applied."456 Practically speaking, training provides the skills for a specific job; education provides an understanding of a field of study; and professional development prepares one for vocational or professional career advancement, more responsibility and greater authority. There are five theoretical best People practices relating to professional development, education and training. Current defence intelligence practices are aligned with two of them. There are no current practices aligned with the remaining three theoretical best

451. Ibid. 452. Ibid. 453. Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, Policy on Learning, Training and Development, Appendix 1, at http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/pol/doc- eng.aspx?id=12405§ion=text#cha4 (accessed 9 January 2010). 454. ADM Fin CS, "Individual Training and Education Strategic Framework," DAOD 5031-2 (Ottawa, Ontario: Department of National Defence, 31 January 2003), at http://www.admfincs.forces.gc.ca/dao-doa/5000/5031-2-eng.asp (accessed 24 February 2010). 455. Canadian Forces Individual Training and Education System (CFITES), A-P9-050- 000/PT-001, Manual of Individual Training and Education, vol. 1 (Kingston, Ontario: Canadian Defence Academy, undated), at http://www.cda-acd.forces.gc.ca/dte- die/documents/Interim20Guidance20Volume201v2.pdf (accessed 2 April 2010). 456. Ibid. 177

People practices. The overall problem lies in the fact that there is no formal, comprehensive defence intelligence professional development, education or training program that caters to both military and civilian defence intelligence practitioners at all career levels - entry, mid-career and advanced studies. Some of these elements are found within the CF, but while they are routinely available to military intelligence personnel, they are not available to all civilian defence intelligence practitioners. One theoretical best People practice calls for community-wide training at the entry, mid-career and advanced levels. Another recommends a professional development program that includes an opportunity for joint development with other community intelligence organizations and principal intelligence consumers. Current defence intelligence practices are only partially aligned with both. There is no formal mid-career or advanced intelligence training program in Canada. Individual CF Intelligence Branch officers may be awarded an ad-hoc opportunity to attend an intelligence tradecraft course in the UK or US. This is not, however, a regular occurrence.457 Civilian analysts are left to their own devices to find professional development, education and training opportunities.458 Furthermore, there is no formal Canadian defence intelligence professional development program, but again, some military intelligence personnel are seconded to other Canadian government intelligence organizations or those of close intelligence allies, but the practice is neither extensive nor particularly career enhancing.459 Joint or exchange positions are a 'preferred' qualification, but not mandatory for promotion.460 One explanation for the lack of an overall defence intelligence professional development, education and training program is the fact that there is no centralized control of intelligence professional development, education and training. Even though the CDI is the designated DND functional authority for defence intelligence, his official

457. Major Gordon Ohlke, Land Force Doctrine and Training System, Interview, 27 August 2008. 458. Dr. Kurtis Simpson, Interview, 22 January 2010. 459. Ohlke, Interview, 27 August 2008. 460. Jensen, Interview, 14 May 2009. 178 influence extends only to articulating professional tradecraft standards. Further impact is personality dependent because it can only be brought about by CDI consultation with, and advice provided to, other senior appointments with complementary responsibilities. Beyond the CDI, influence of intelligence training is diffuse. Professional development and education for CF Intelligence Branch and other military officers and NCMs is controlled by the Chief of Military Personnel (CMP).462 Civilian professional development and learning policies and programs are the responsibility of the ADM (Human Resources-Civilian (HR-Civ)). CF Intelligence Branch training is conducted under the training management authority of the Commander, Canadian Defence Academy (CDA). Most intelligence tradecraft or specialist training takes place at CDA schools located in Kingston, Ontario, or on an Army base, controlled by the Chief of the Land Staff (CLS).463 Training budgets are distributed among CDI, Commander CDA and the Environmental Chiefs (Chief of the Maritime Staff (CMS), Chief of the Land Staff (CLS) and Chief of the Air Staff (CAS)). There are programmed military intelligence courses at CFSMI for military personnel, but no equivalent career pattern intelligence training program for civilian analysts. Defence intelligence civilians are left largely on their own to pursue advanced education and professional development opportunities.464 There has been at least one significant attempt to develop a holistic defence intelligence training and education policy and to consolidate intelligence training and education in one place, but it appears to have gone nowhere.465 For example, in early January 2008 a draft report purporting to be a 'training strategy' for the defence intelligence function was produced by an intelligence training development team at the

461. CF message CANFORGEN 05/06 CDS 031/06 301050Z MAR 06 confirmed the CDI as the CF and DND functional authority for defence intelligence. CDI, Defence Intelligence Overview, 29 January 2010. 462. Assistant Deputy Minister (ADM) Finance and Corporate Services (Fin CS), "Learning and Professional Development," DAOD 5031-0 (Ottawa, Ontario: Department of National Defence, 31 January 2003), at http://www.admfincs.forces.gc.ca/dao-doa/5000/5031-0- eng.asp (accessed 25 April 2010). 463. CFB Kingston. The CDA schools are: CFSMI and the CF School of Communications and Electronics (CFSCE). 464. Simpson, Interview, 22 January 2010. 465. Captain (N) Josh Barber, Interview, 27 April 2010. 179

CDA in Kingston, Ontario. It aimed to "propose a strategy towards the implementation of a fully integrated 'Centre of Excellence' for defence intelligence. It was clearly based in lessons learned from the Afghanistan campaign and support to other CF operations. One of its three thrusts described a CDI initiative to develop a Defence Academy for Intelligence (DAI), which involved establishing a national-level intelligence training and education institution. It was based on the idea that greater integration of inter­ departmental intelligence training and education would leverage specialist capabilities from other government departments, achieve efficiencies and further enhance defence intelligence. The draft training strategy referred to this as a 'down range target' for the evolution of intelligence training. Research showed that the project is, to put it politely, 'stalled' and unlikely to proceed anytime soon. Margaret Purdy, a former senior government intelligence official in the PCO and now Visiting Scholar at the University of British Columbia, was hired by DND, in the fall of 2007, to conduct a feasibility study about establishing a DAI. She described how she 'shopped' the idea around the principal intelligence offices in government, at the DM and ADM level (PCO, CBSA, CSIS, RCMP, Citizenship and Immigration and Transport Canada to name a specific few). She was pleasantly surprised by the degree of acceptance and enthusiasm for the idea she encountered. In fact, she recalls no one being opposed to the initiative.467 However, after she submitted her report, the project quickly ran into bureaucratic resistance in early 2008, based largely on issues of control, resourcing, cost and sustainment. No department wanted to lead or join the initiative. None were enthusiastic about having to provide the people to staff the new Academy, let alone spare the personnel to attend as students. The project has not been heard of since. It seems there is no interest in creating a professional school for intelligence people, in part perhaps, because intelligence is not seen as a distinctly professional pursuit. At the other end of the scale however, some small, but significant advances are being made. Since 2007, there has been a rudimentary, interdepartmental training initiative sponsored by the IAS, aimed at entry-level analysts and first-level managers of

466. Canadian Forces School of Military Intelligence, "Defence Intelligence: Training Strategy for the Intelligence Function," Draft v 3.3 (Kingston, ON: Canadian Defence Academy, January 2008). (Not publicly available). 467. Margaret Purdy, Interview, 31 October 2008. 180 intelligence analysts. The Entry Level Course (ELC) is intended for new members of the Canadian intelligence community who require familiarity with the inner workings of the community, practical knowledge of the intelligence process and the basic skill set to work as an intelligence analyst. The course runs for ten days, three times a year (two in English, one in French) and caters to anywhere between twelve and thirty-five students. The Managers of Intelligence Analysis Course (MIAC) reviews structured analytical techniques, the nurturing of analysts and methods to improve analytic capability. It runs for two and a half days, twice a year and usually has ten to fifteen people in attendance. These are admirable efforts on the part of the IAS, but no more than two or three defence intelligence personnel have attended any one of these courses, not enough to build and sustain a formidable critical mass of strategic analytical capability in DGIP. It certainly does not support any claim to professional status.

PROFESSIONAL STATUS Within the CF, intelligence work enjoys a noticeable degree of formal recognition as a professional pursuit However, in the Public Service, it is generally not considered to be anything more than 'specialized' work, capable of being done by most people with appropriate training. Regrettably, it seems that most public servants are not trained, in the course of their careers, to understand or use intelligence.469 Within DND, there is no formal recognition of defence intelligence civilian personnel as being anything other than public servants. In both establishments, defence intelligence personnel are systematically prevented from reaching senior positions outside the intelligence field. Intelligence employment is generally not seen as a path to senior leadership or management appointments and, despite improvements over the past two decades, defence intelligence people are still not considered the 'equal' of those in the 'operational' classifications.

468. John Pyrik is the IAS Training Coordinator. The researcher has been involved with both courses as a guest lecturer and panel member. 469. Vincent Rigby, Interview, 12 February 2009. Mr. Rigby was the ADM Policy in DND from 2007-2008. He is now the Executive Director of the IAS in the PCO, responsible for the production of strategic assessments for Cabinet. He openly admits that during his time in DND he did not take full advantage of the intelligence capability available. Now, having had even the short experience in the IAS, he feels that should he ever return to a policy position in the Public Service, he will be much more proactive and knowledgeable in seeking intelligence support. 181

Civilian defence intelligence practitioners might advance to the EX-2 level to lead the defence intelligence analytical staff, but with only one of these positions available, prospects for promotion are not high. In the CF, a professional cadre of intelligence personnel has been formally established as a military employment specialty (MES) branch. However, it seems intelligence work does not lead to enhanced military career prospects either. Not since 1 November 1972 has any Intelligence Branch officer been promoted to Flag or General Officer rank.470 The lack of a comprehensive professional development, education and training program for senior appointments in Canadian defence intelligence leaves many unprepared to compete for and succeed in senior operational positions of responsibility. In effect, they are 'confined' to defence intelligence employment and, given the size of the Canadian defence intelligence establishment, they will not get beyond the rank of Colonel/Captain(N). From another perspective, the Intelligence MES is an enabling staff function and therefore the Intelligence Branch is seen as a supporting service, in which the senior rank that can be attained is Colonel/Captain(N). There are more Colonels in the Intelligence Branch today than at any time in the past, but no matter how many Colonels are on the roster, they find it difficult to champion Branch interests among other larger, operationally-oriented branches (i.e. infantry, armour, pilot etc.) whose leadership includes a number of Flag and General Officers that may simultaneously occupy senior CF command positions. It is from this central core of 'operational MES' that the senior leaders of the CF have been traditionally, and continue to be, drawn. Similarly, although intelligence analysis enjoys a certain degree of respect within the CF, it is not enough to rate designation as a formal specialty on its own.471 It is seen as a skill that can be acquired through training, not as a vocation or profession that needs to be learned through education and professional development. It certainly is not viewed as

470. On that date Colonel Reg Weeks, then serving as the Canadian Defence Attache in Bonn, West Germany, was promoted Brigadier-General and appointed Director General Intelligence and Security in NDHQ. Harold A. Skaarup, Out of Darkness - Light: A History of Canadian Military Intelligence, vol. 1 (New York: iUniverse, Inc., 2005), 452. 471. In DND, civilian intelligence analysts are designated as part of the Administrative Services (AS) occupational specialty. See an employment advertisement at http://www.dndjobs.forces.gc.ca/working-travailler/ia-ar-eng.asp (accessed 11 March 2010). 182

needing its own organizational structure, but rather, is seen as simply one part of the intelligence process. In DND, the number of intelligence analysts, both military and civilian, is just too small to generate a higher profile or press the case to formalize their work as a designated specialty, having its own associated career path.

SUMMARY The aim of this chapter was to evaluate Canadian defence intelligence by comparing current practices and theoretical best practices associated with organization and people. Findings indicated that all three identified theoretical best practices related to organization have an aligned current defence intelligence practice. Conversely, none of the ten identified theoretical best practices associated with people were fully aligned by any current defence intelligence practice. The Canadian defence intelligence organization appears sound. It has been structured in accordance with the principles laid out in CF Joint Intelligence Doctrine and recommendations found in the 2004 DIR report. It conforms to the requirements of the Canadian Government Security Policy. Since its reorganization, started in 2005, Canadian defence intelligence has acquired the leadership and managerial capacity available to address the six components of intelligence - policy and governance; organization; people; process; product; and action. The overall organizational structure has been rationalized and the necessary responsibility and accountability framework put in place. However, overall defence intelligence effectiveness does not rest entirely on organization. This chapter also revealed little alignment between theoretical best practices and current practices dealing with defence intelligence people. Notably, no overarching defence intelligence human resource strategy exists and, consequentially, there is no targeted recruiting of defence intelligence personnel. Defence intelligence, beyond the CF, has no established training, education or professional development program for its people. These gaps are complicated by the fact that in most discussions with defence intelligence practitioners, the lack of personnel came up. While detailed defence intelligence personnel strengths were not available, it was clear that the number of people serving in a defence intelligence role was constrained by one or more of: a) institutional 183 limitations placed on positions allocated to the defence intelligence establishment within DND; b) strict adherence to federal government hiring practices relating to civilian personnel; and c) military and defence intelligence personnel requirements in international operations being filled from CDI organization leaving many defence intelligence positions vacant across the CF at home.472 In the end, one is left with the overall impression that official declarations of how important intelligence is to contemporary government, defence and military activity are simply not borne out in practice. There appear to be three reasons for this. First, defence intelligence is short of trained people. Second, within the CF and Public Service, there is no special, distinct effort to recruit intelligence personnel. Third, those serving in Canadian defence intelligence do not receive as much professional training and development throughout their career as their counterparts on operational career tracks. As well, the lack of comprehensive training, education and professional development programs for senior officers and other personnel in defence intelligence leaves many unprepared to compete for and succeed in senior operational positions of responsibility. It will be seen in later chapters that this lack of comprehensive intellectual development in the defence intelligence field has more dire consequences than simply limiting promotion.

472. Generally, on any given day, the CDI organization is short seventy people (mostly military personnel but usually including 3-5 civilian defence intelligence analysts) who are either deployed, or engaged in training for deployment. Marshall, Interview, 28 January 2010. 184

CHAPTER 6 PROCESS, PRODUCT AND ACTION (PPA)

INTRODUCTION In the last chapter, evaluation of Canadian defence intelligence indicated that current organizational practices are aligned with theoretical practices, but that significant deficiencies existed in the People category. This chapter further evaluates Canadian defence intelligence by delving deeper to compare current and theoretical best practices in the category of Process, Product, and Action. As in the previous chapter, these conceptual components of intelligence are too closely related to be treated separately. This chapter demonstrates that of eleven theoretical best practices, four are paired with a fully aligned CF current practice. The remaining seven partially or unaligned theoretical best practices represent significant shortcomings indicative of an immature defence intelligence function. The identified gaps and anomalies, when considered collectively, reflect three significant issues. First, there is less than optimum training and development of civilian Canadian defence intelligence leaders prior to taking up their defence intelligence responsibilities. Second, perhaps consequently, there is also less than optimum direction and the consequential lack of a comprehensive strategic collection plan, as well as an under-optimized strategic analysis capability. Third, there is no process of review and evaluation aimed at enhancing the efficacy of Canadian defence intelligence. The following sections begin with a brief discussion of the results of analysis conducted in this chapter, including an overview of representative sources from which theoretical best practices were distilled; an outline of the comparative alignment of theoretical best practices and current Canadian defence intelligence practices; and an evaluation of Canadian defence intelligence based on that comparison. Then, each of the principal issues above is discussed in turn, in further detail, beginning with the lack of preparation of civilian defence intelligence leaders, followed by an explanation why Canadian defence intelligence lacks an overall strategic collection plan. Third, the absence of formal review and evaluation of defence intelligence, as well as the absence of a defence intelligence lessons-learned process is explored. 185

RESULTS OF ANALYSIS

Theoretical best practices In this chapter, eleven theoretical best practices are derived from the analysis of recommended practices related to intelligence product, process and action. ABCA inquiries produced one hundred and eighty-nine recommendations in this category. Canada's McDonald Commission was the most prolific (forty-two), followed closely by the US Silberman Robb Commission (thirty-four). In fact, Canadian inquiries presented more recommendations in this category (seventy-eight) than any other ABCA country (the US is in 'second' place with seventy one recommendations). Canadian recommendations come from reports that are concerned largely with the propriety of intelligence activity and are therefore focused on accountability issues. The Silberman Robb Commission recommendations, on the other hand, represent the culmination of US congressional frustration with the "major intelligence failure" that occurred while assessing Iraq's pre-war WMD program.473 That the Commission not only found serious shortcomings in the way intelligence assessments were made, but also in the way they were communicated to decision-makers indicates the focus was on intelligence efficacy.474 The numbers of relevant recommended practices found in individual ABCA inquiries are listed in Table 6-1 below.

473. Silberman Robb Commission, Report, 557. 474. Ibid. 186

Process, Product and Year Inquiry Total Action (PPA)

1946 Canada: Kellock Taschereau Commission 7 1 1969 Canada: Mackenzie Commission 11 0 1975 US: Rockefeller Commission Report 30 5 1976 US: Church Committee Reports 85 10 Australia: Hope Commission Third Report 36 8 1977 US: Pike Committee Report Not public y available 1981 Canada: McDonald Commission Report 285 42 1985 Australia: Royal Commission on ASIA Not public y available 1996 US: Aspin Brown Commission Report 23 2 US: Joint Inquiry into Intelligence Community 2002 19 4 Activities Before and After 9/11 Report Australia: PJCAAD Report: Intelligence on Iraq's 2003 3 3 WMD UK: ISC Report: Intelligence on Iraqi WMD 1 1 UK: Foreign Affairs Committee Ninth Report: 16 9 Decision to go to War in Iraq 2004 Canada: DND DIR Report (unclassified version) 50 16 Canada: O'Connor Commission (Arar) Report 36 10 Australia: Flood Report475 47 12 UK: Butler Report 12 6 US: SSCI Report, Pre-War Intelligence Assessments 13 13 on Iraq (and related reports) US: 9/11 Commission 41 3 2005 US: Silberman Robb Commission Report 73 34 2006 UK: ISC Report 7/7 2005 4 4 2009 UK: Review of Intelligence on 7/7 1 0 Canada: Major Commission: Air India Inquiry, Final 2010 64 9 Report TOTALS 857 189

Table 6-1: ABCA Inquiry recommended practices relating to Process, Product and Action

475. There were twenty-three principal recommendations in the Flood Report, but six of them had multiple subsidiary recommendations, many of which, while still relevant to the principal recommendation, were associated with one or more of the categories covered in this study. Therefore, all subsidiary recommendations were counted separately, to bring the total of recommended practices considered to forty-seven. 187

Apart from ABCA inquiries, a complete list of recommended practices and the sources from which they were drawn cannot be provided in the space available here. In fact, unlike in previous chapters, beyond the ABCA inquiries it is difficult to clearly identify specific principal sources because so many recommended practices were found in so many works. Given the nature of expert intelligence literature, in which most experts authored individual book chapters or journal papers rather than entire books, I found some degree of recommended practices in this category in a majority of bibliographic entries at the end of this thesis. Given this rich harvest of information, it is easier to reveal the principal authors whose work was a constant and reliable source of relevant ideas. In alphabetical order, the principal authors, with an example of their work, are: Andrew {Secret Intelligence: A Reader, 2009); Berkowitz {Best Truth: Intelligence in the Information Age, 2000); Betts {Enemies of Intelligence, 2007); Born and Caparini {Democratic Control of Intelligence Services, 2007); Gill, Marrin and Phythian {Intelligence Theory: Key Questions and debates, 2008); Herman {Intelligence Power in Peace and War, 1996); Johnson {Strategic Intelligence, 2007); Lowenthal {From Secrets to Policy, 2003); Posner {Uncertain Shield: The U.S. Intelligence System in the Throes of Reform, 2006); Sims and Gerber {Transforming U.S. Intelligence, 2005); and Treverton {Reshaping National Intelligence for an Age of Information, 2003 and Intelligence for an Age of Terror, 2009). Additional selected references are included throughout discussion that follows. On balance, across the expert literature, Canadian and European literature emphasizes the importance of government accountability to parliament and ministerial responsibility. The McDonald Commission report proposes the conceptual premises for such accountability and responsibility when it says, "In our system of government the Cabinet must be responsible for determining... policy questions, subject always to its accountability to Parliament."476 McDonald's Recommendation 167 proposes that "the Minister responsible for the security intelligence agency should have full power of direction over the agency."477 Subsequent recommendations and their associated text

476. McDonald Commission, Second Report, Part VIII, Chapter 1,845. 477. Ibid., 876. 188 describe the role and responsibilities of the professional bureaucracy designated to oversee and manage the security intelligence agency. However, more recently, Commissioner Major's first recommendation in the Air India Right 182 Inquiry Final Report seemed to challenge the concept of ministerial responsibility. In it, Major stated that the role of Canada's NSA/PM should be enhanced to, among other tasks; "supervise and where necessary, to coordinate national security activities; ... resolve, with finality, disputes among the agencies responsible for national security; [and] ... provide oversight of the effectiveness of national security activities."478 The government of Canada's Action Plan in response to this and other Air India Inquiry recommendations says nothing about enhancing the NSA/PM role, thereby implicitly continuing to rely on ministerial responsibility and accountability in these areas of

479 concern. The concept of ministerial responsibility is not unique to Canadian parliamentary tradition. The German national intelligence model clearly shows intelligence agencies being subordinate to the Chancellor, the Minister of the Interior and the Minister of Defence.480 The structure of the Romanian intelligence community also places various intelligence agencies under the direct control of government ministers.481 Also, recall detail in Chapter 4 that reinforced the widespread practice of political, usually ministerial, responsibility and accountability practices in other emerging democracies. However, democratic intentions are not always followed through as planned. In Bulgaria, the National Intelligence Service (NIS) was subordinated to the President by a State Council and Parliamentary decree, but there was no accompanying legislation to make the NIS specifically subordinate to the President's authority. As a result, the NIS continues to work in a legislative vacuum.482 Notwithstanding this circumstance, the NIS remains subordinate to the President, who in turn remains accountable to Parliament.

478. Air India Inquiry, Final Report, vol. 1, "The Overview," Recommendation 1, p. 194. 479. Government of Canada, Action Plan: The Government of Canada Response to the Commission of Inquiry into the Investigation of the Bombing of Air India Flight 182 (December 2010), at http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/prg/ns/ail82/_fl/res-rep-eng.pdf. 480. Anna Daun, "Germany," in PSI Handbook, 333. 481. Matei, "Romania's Transition to Democracy," in Reforming Intelligence, 223. 482. Vesselin Petkov, "Bulgaria," in PSI Handbook, 460. 189

In all democracies discussed throughout the expert literature ultimate authority rested with elected representatives. Intelligence organizations were found to be responsive and accountable, either directly (in parliamentary forms of government) or indirectly (in republic forms of government) to elected officials at one or more levels. These elected officials, individually or collectively, were the source of direction that drove intelligence activity. Consideration of the consistency with which this arrangement was followed and the breadth of its application generates the following theoretical best practice:

PPA 1. Direction flows from elected political authorities, who, in a democracy, are in some way directly responsible to a parliament or congress. Direction is implemented through the government bureaucracy and sometimes supported by a non-elected, expert advisory body of some sort.483

While they may be the source of intelligence direction within government, political authorities rarely act alone in developing such direction. In some cases, to complement ministerial responsibility, unelected advisory bodies are formed, such as those found in India and the US. In India, the National Security Advisory Board (NSAB) comprises retired senior officials, academics and experts appointed for a two-year term to advise the National Security Council (NSC), the most senior national security body, chaired by the Prime Minister and including key security-related Cabinet Ministers.484 The US President's Intelligence Advisory Board consists of not more than sixteen members, appointed by the President, who are not employed in any part of the federal Government. Members are distinguished citizens selected from the national federal security, political, academic, or private sectors. The Board is a nonpartisan body,

483. Church Committee, Report, Recommendation 16, p. 434; Recommendation 23, p. 441. Hope Commission, Third Report, "Abridged Findings and Recommendations," paras., 86, 89, 96 and 102. McDonald Commission, Second Report, "Summary of Recommendations," 158- 180, pp. 1068-1102. US Joint Inquiry into Intelligence Community Activities Before and After the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001 (2002), Report, Recommendation 1, p. 2. O'Connor Inquiry, Report, Recommendation 5, p. 366. 484. Rahul Roy-Chaudhury, "India," in PSI Handbook, 222. 190 independent of the intelligence community, with full access to the complete range of intelligence-related information.483 Canada, Australia and the UK have not seriously entertained the establishment of intelligence advisory bodies and have not expressed any readily apparent reason for not doing so. Upon reflection, one reason for not pursuing such support might be the expected challenge such a body could pose to ministerial responsibility, particularly if the members of any advisory body were not politically beholden to a minister. The point of this conjecture is to reveal a related and perhaps somewhat abstract theoretical best practice that could have been included in the Organization and People category, but the essence of which is key to guiding the higher processes of government intelligence activity and the pursuit of effective intelligence. While organization is an important element of the intelligence function, it cannot hide or prevent human inadequacies from having adverse impact on intelligence practices and products; hence the idea to incorporate advice from people of proven competence in the field. Where that advice is not provided as an organizational adjunct to the intelligence process, it must be found within the structure, in the form of the people who lead and manage intelligence activities. This puts a premium on the selection of leaders and managers, on whose talents the quality of intelligence products ultimately depend. N Support for this idea is found in the Rockefeller Commission Report, which concluded that, "The best assurance against misuse of the Agency [CIA] lies in the appointment ... of persons with the judgment, courage, and independence to resist improper pressure and importuning .... The Agency must rely on the discipline and integrity of the men and women it employs."486 The 9/11 Commission Report also recognized "that the quality of the people is more important than the quality of the wiring diagrams," before recommending changes to the US national security apparatus of government.487 Canadian intelligence inquiries have usually addressed detailed personnel issues before discussion of organizational changes. The McDonald Commission Second

485. The White House, President's Intelligence Advisory Board and Intelligence Oversight Board, at http://www.whitehouse.gov/administration/eop/piab/about (accessed 24 October 2010). 486. Rockefeller Commission, Report, 17. 487. 9/11 Commission, Report, 399. 191

Report initially dealt with the overall functions of the proposed new security intelligence agency and then went on to describe the management and personnel practices that agency should have. It subsequently dealt with its appropriate structure within the Canadian government.488 There is other expert literature that supports the primacy of good people. Gardiner suggests that, "Perhaps more conscious attention needs to be given to selecting people at the top of the intelligence pyramid who can function comfortably in both [intelligence and policy] worlds.489 Loch Johnson suggests that organization alone is not effective if not populated by capable personnel. He argues that US intelligence community reorganization in 2005 did nothing more than make the new DNI a "eunuch".490 The central importance of high quality leadership and intelligence expertise runs as somewhat of an undercurrent throughout the expert literature, only occasionally revealing its existence by erupting at the surface. Such appearances seem to fade quickly however, returning the issue to a state of background noise that, like a car engine, is critical, but not noticed until something goes wrong. Consequently, in the pursuit of efficiency and effectiveness in any intelligence establishment, the primary focus should fall on the quality people in charge, as suggested in this theoretical best practice:

PPA 2. Effective intelligence performance depends, in the first instance, on the quality of the people occupying leadership and management positions. Organizational change is a secondary means of achieving intelligence effectiveness.491

Once appointed, government intelligence leaders are responsible for establishing, guiding and managing effective intelligence processes, particularly the control and coordination of the overall intelligence cycle, including the requirement to measure the

488. McDonald Commission, Second Report, 667. 489 Keith L. Gardiner "Squaring the circle: Dealing with intelligence-policy breakdowns," in Secret Intelligence: A Reader, 135. 490. Johnson, "The United States," in PSI Handbook, 62. 491. Rockefeller Commission, Report, 17. Hope Commission, Third Report, "Abridged Findings and Recommendations," para. 77. 9/11 Commission, Report, 399. Keith L. Gardiner "Squaring the circle: Dealing with intelligence-policy breakdowns," in Secret Intelligence: A Reader, 135. Johnson, "The United States," in PSI Handbook, 62. 192

efficiency and effectiveness of intelligence activity. The general idea that intelligence activity should be managed in some effective way was reflected in the findings of the Church Committee report that noted "intelligence activities should not be regarded as ends in themselves. Rather, the nation's intelligence functions should be organized and directed to assure that they serve the needs of the executive ...."492 In a more practical vein, "a strong priority setting mechanism is vital for a healthy intelligence system," according to the Flood Report, which recommended the establishment of "a community- wide collection management strategy."493 Furthermore, Flood goes on to outline a priorities and resource planning system.494 The point being made here is that intelligence activity requires some form of ordered process, so that it can be managed and controlled within government and its efficiency and effectiveness accurately judged. Analysis highlighted the requirement for some form of what has been conventionally referred to as the collection coordination and information requirements management (CCIRM) process. CCIRM is an 'end to end' function that coordinates the direction of the intelligence collection effort with processing, production and the timely dissemination of intelligence products to relevant decision-makers.495 However, as self-evident as the need for CCIRM might be, not all authors agree on its form. Herman is skeptical of the value of conventional CCIRM, as expressed in his description of the modified 'real' intelligence cycle. But even his 'market-style' intelligence cycle needs some method to measure effectiveness and efficiency.496 Despite differing opinions as to what it might look like, every intelligence model examined in this study had some form of the CCIRM process and therefore I concluded that the establishment of this sort of structured intelligence production process was a manifestation of the following theoretical best practice:

492. Church Committee, Report, 425. 493. Flood Report, 63-65. 494. Ibid., 166-167. 495. DND, CFJP 2.0, Joint Intelligence (Draft), 1-18. 496. Herman, Intelligence Power in Peace and War, 289 and 295-296. 193

PPA 3. A formal CCIRM process (in a generic sense) is embedded as a principal means of process management.497

With workable managerial mechanisms such as CCIRM in place, intelligence leadership then turns to the challenge of meeting consumer requirements, the first step of which is to establish a viable relationship with policy-makers and other senior decision­ makers. The expert literature reveals different views on how this relationship can be manifest. Some US practitioners have favoured at least the professional, if not physical separation of intelligence producers and policy-makers, to avoid politicization.498 This approach has never taken hold in the UK, Australia or Canada, largely because those individual national intelligence communities are not big enough to allow or sustain any significant separation, even if they wanted to. Both Canada and Australia inherited the historical 'DNA' of British intelligence practices that continue to embed intelligence staffs in operational departments. Some central intelligence organizations, such as CSEC, are administratively embedded in a government department (in the case of CSEC, in DND) and operationally managed by the centralized cabinet bureaucracy in the PCO. Where it might exist, the distance between intelligence producers and consumers is shrinking. Despite traditional views of separation, there has been an enduring campaign of support for closer producer-policy relationships for many years. Major-General Sir Kenneth Strong, who served as General Eisenhower's principal intelligence officer in Europe during the Second World War and subsequently led intelligence staffs in the UK Home Office and Ministry of Defence, suggests intelligence officers should work alongside policy-makers, but stand apart from any allegiance the might distort their

497. Rockefeller Commission, Report, Recommendation 14.a., p. 23. US Joint Inquiry, Report, Recommendation 1, p. 2. DIR Recommendation 11, p. 46; Recommendation 27, 28 and 29, p. 78. 498. Treverton recounts a 2006 conversation with George Shulz, a former US Secretary of State, in which Shultz the difference between the "Helms Approach" and the "Casey Approach" to relations between intelligence and policy staffs. Richard Helms, the DCI in the Nixon administration, favoured the separation of intelligence officers from policy. When he briefed senior policy bodies, he left the room and the end of his presentation; his job done. On the other hand, William Casey, the DCI in the Reagan administration, behaved as a Cabinet officer, mixing intelligence briefing and advocacy as he wished. Treverton, "Intelligence Analysis; Between 'Politicization' and Irrelevance," in Analyzing Intelligence, 101.

i 194 objectivity.499 The Church Committee initially challenged traditional US views on the separation of intelligence analysis and policy-making when it opined that the "influence a DCI [Director of Central Intelligence] could have from a close relationship with the President has generally been lacking."500 In 1996, the Aspin Brown Commission agreed and began its overall findings and conclusions by stating that "intelligence must get closer to those it serves."501 The Commission went on to recommend that "intelligence producers take a more systematic approach to building relationships with consumers in policy agencies."502 Later, the 9/11 Commission said, "Intelligence must be closer to those it serves."503 In the US today, enthusiasm for separation has waned considerably. John McLaughlin, a former Deputy Director of Intelligence at the CIA, argues, "the most effective way for analysts to understand the policymakers (sic) needs is to live and work among them ...."504 In the same vein, Treverton describes intelligence as a "service industry" whose essence is "anticipating what policy will want."505 He argues that intelligence can no longer remain separate from policy-makers because, to do so, runs the risk of intelligence becoming irrelevant to the policy development process.506 As time goes on, cooperation between intelligence producers and decision-makers in democracies is getting closer, so much so it is now a preferred circumstance that merits expression as a theoretical best practice as follows:

PPA 4. Intelligence practitioners work closely with policy-makers and strategic decision-makers, to understand their requirements and help educate them in the capabilities and capacities of the intelligence function.507

499. Major-General Sir Kenneth Strong, Intelligence at the Top: The Recollections of an Intelligence Officer, (London: Cassell Company, Ltd., 1968), 242-249. 500. Church Committee Report, 433. 501. Aspin Brown Commission, Report, xv. 502. Ibid., xxi. 503 9/11 Commission, Report, v. 504. John McLaughlin, "Serving the National Policymaker," in Analyzing Intelligence, 74. 505. Treverton, Reshaping National Intelligence for an Age of Information, 179. 506. Ibid., 197-202. 507. Aspin Brown Commission, Report, "Recommendation 8-1," p. 92. DIR, Recommendation 7, p. 41; Recommendation 13, p. 48. Flood Report, Recommendation 17, p. 184. Carmen Medina, "What to do when traditional models fail," in Secret Intelligence: A Reader, 195

Closer producer-consumer relationships are not, however, ends in themselves. They are means to better, more effective intelligence. The Aspin Brown Commission was greatly concerned with how US intelligence could be enhanced. One of its overall conclusions argued that "the quality and utility of intelligence to the policy community should be improved."508 Intelligence producers, it was suggested, should build more direct relationships with customers ... and take additional measures to improve the quality and timeliness of their product.509 Key consumers should be identified and consulted with respect to the form of support they desire.510 The aim of this closer relationship between analysts and consumers is to establish a dialogue that leads to sensemaking, a continuous, iterative, largely intuitive effort "to paint a picture of what is going on in the environment of a target."511 Having established workable producer-consumer relationships, intelligence leaders can then put intelligence processes to work to actually produce intelligence for decision-makers. The production of intelligence is the raison d'etre for government intelligence organizations, as discussed in Chapter 1. A substantial amount of the expert literature focuses on the intelligence product and the analytical processes required to provide the value-added character to that product. For example, Lowenthal summarizes the theoretical practice this way: The managerial choices here consist largely of choosing the right product to get the right amount of intelligence to meet policymakers' needs within a specified timeframe. One must take into account how much intelligence is needed, the urgency of the need, and the degree to which the policy maker already has sufficient background on the issue."512

Beyond production, consumer needs also impact other intelligence activity. For example, they can affect dissemination in important ways. Gill suggests that the adequacy, or otherwise, of agencies' performance will be judged on the utility and

108-114.Berkowitz, Best Truth, 85. Herman, Intelligence Services in the Information Age, 12-16. James Wirtz, "The Intelligence Policy Nexus," in Strategic Intelligence, 139-150. 508. Aspin Brown Commission, Report, xvi. 509. Ibid. 510. Ibid., xxi. 511. Treverton, Intelligence for an Age of Terror, 164. 512. Mark Lowenthal, "Intelligence Analysis: Management and Transformation Issues," in Transforming US. Intelligence, 226. 196 timeliness of what they produce. He argues that "how intelligence is presented will depend on to whom it is addressed."514 In both practice and theory then, Best Intelligence is focused on the consumer's needs. Given that important consumers include elected leaders who direct intelligence activity and other strategic level decision-makers who pursue national missions, it is no surprise that the requirements of those consumers influence the design and presentation of intelligence products. This customer influence is so widespread and consistent it represents a theoretical best practice expressed as follows:

PPA 5. Best Intelligence products are tailored to the intelligence consumer, taking into consideration the level and preference of that consumer, the time available until a related decision must be made, the time available for advantageous action to be taken and the dissemination technology available.515

Describing how intelligence products are derived is one thing, but actually implementing the process to produce them is a separate exercise. Expert literature describes how closer producer-consumer relationships must function in order to produce the desired effect. Carmen Medina argues that analysts must focus on customers, even to the point of starting (as she does) "her day by reviewing feedback and tasking from customers, instead of first reading the morning traffic." She goes on to reinforce earlier suggestions that analysts "need to use technology ... to create stronger links between analysts and customers."516 Such an approach is not always easy to implement, as revealed in A. D. McLennan's explanation of the establishment of Australia's ONA and the difficulties it faced in getting close to decision-makers in its early years.517

513. Peter Gill, Rounding up the Usual Suspects? Developments in Contemporary Law Enforcement Intelligence (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishers, 2000). See also Herman, Intelligence Power in Peace and War, 45. 514. Gill and Phythian, Intelligence in an Insecure World, 91. 515. Aspin Brown Commission, "Recommendation 81," p. 92. Flood Report, Recommendation 8 d), 181. Gardiner, Secret Intelligence: A Reader, 136. Lowenthal, in Transforming US. Intelligence, 226-228. Herman, "The Customer is King," in Strategic Intelligence, 167-177. 516. Medina, Secret Intelligence: A Reader, 111. 517. A. D. McLennan, "National Intelligence Assessment," in Intelligence Analysis and Assessment, 79-80. McLennan is a former ONA analyst. 197

Here again we see the 'Kent' school of analysis (academic separation of analysis and policy-making) pitted against the 'Gates' approach (analysts work closely with policy-makers to understand their requirements). Given the analytical failures of 9/11, Richard Russell, a former senior CIA manager, favours the latter.518 Marrin agrees and concludes that a new intelligence production model, featuring "interaction entailing continuous two-way communication to facilitate decision-making," is needed.319 Across post-Cold War expert intelligence literature it is made clear that not only is it important that intelligence products meet consumers' requirements, it is also important that the relationship between analysts and consumers be close and didactic throughout the course of generating those products. This is a change from views during the Cold War years that preferred some distance between intelligence analysts and policy-makers. Closer relationships between analysts and consumers are now preferred arrangements, particularly in this era of complex, transnational global threats. This shift from distant to close analyst-consumer relationships has gained momentum, to the extent that I consider it to be a theoretical best practice, articulated in this way:

PPA 6. Intelligence products are optimized by a close, symbiotic relationship between a decision-maker and supporting analysts; and by the synergy of frequent personal interaction between the two.520

Such close relationships are also means to desired ends. Dialogue between intelligence analysts and policy-makers enhances analysis and is therefore particularly important in today's complex national security environment where operations require a comprehensive approach by governments, in which a range of departments and agencies must work together. Such integrated action calls up community-wide intelligence collaboration in a number of areas, one of which is intelligence analysis.

518. Russell, Sharpening Strategic Intelligence: Why the CIA Gets It Wrong and What Needs to be Done to Get It Right, 149-169. 519. Marrin, "Intelligence analysis and decision-making: Methodological challenges," in Intelligence Theory: Key Questions and Debates, 131-150. 520. Silberman Robb Commission, Report, 412,417,418-422. Jack Davis, "Intelligence Analysis and Policy Makers: Benefits and Dangers in the Relationship," in Strategic Intelligence, 143-164. Herman, Intelligence in Peace and War, 129-130. Treverton, Reshaping National Intelligence, 179-191; 218-219; 245-246. 198

Intelligence analysis itself attracts a considerable degree of attention in the expert literature, not the least because modern national security threats, such as terrorism, blur the domestic-foreign divide and transnational threats, such as organized crime, ignore national boundaries. Beginning with the Aspin Brown Commission report, expert literature has consistently recognized the need for community-wide collaboration in all aspects of intelligence activity, in recognition of the changing nature of threats facing western democracies. It set the tone for modern intelligence activity at the government level when it said that intelligence agencies "should function more closely as a 'Community.'"521 The CIA and FBI were pointedly taken to task by the 9/11 Commission for failing to collaborate, cooperate and coordinate their actions in the spring and summer of 2001. The 9/llCommission report called for a "National Intelligence Director" who would ''manage the national intelligence program and oversee agencies that contribute to it."522 Moreover, the Silberman Robb Commission report devotes an entire chapter to integrating intelligence analysis across the entire intelligence community and giving them "new tools that can assist analysts in filtering and correlating the vast quantities of information" available.523 Finally, the expert literature is producing new ideas like that of Timothy J. Smith, who describes the interesting concept of "collaboratories," which would be purpose-built to bring together analysts and methodologists for cycles of synthesis and analysis.524 Interest in comprehensive, community-wide intelligence collaboration is well established in expert literature. Conversely, analysis uncovered no champion for, or support of, continuing parochial intelligence analysis practices within bureaucratic 'silos.' The preferred way ahead is therefore captured in this theoretical best practice:

PPA 7. Community-wide collaborative analysis is practiced.525

521. Aspin Brown Commission, Report," xvi. 522. 9/11 Commission, Report, 411 523. Silberman Robb Commission, Report, 390-402. 524 Timothy J. Smith, "Predictive Warning: Teams, Networks, and Scientific Method," in Analyzing Intelligence: Origins, Obstacles, and Innovations, 275-277. This idea was earlier promoted by Rob Johnston, "Integrating Methodologists into Teams of Experts, " Studies in Intelligence 47, no. 1 (2003): 57-65. 525. US Joint Inquiry, Report, Recommendation 5, p. 5. DIR, Recommendation 46, p. 110. 9/11 Commission, Report, 408,417 and 418. Silberman Robb Commission, Report, 320, 327, 372, 402, 413. 199

Inherent in the simplicity of this theoretical best practice is the recognition that sufficient and effective technological means exist to enable pan-community collaboration and analysis, but this was not always so. Early enthusiasm for this theoretical best practice is found in the Church Committee Report* which discusses the requirement to enhance the ability of the DCI to exercise his coordinating responsibilities across the entire US intelligence community. It recommended that the DCI be empowered to draw on intelligence agency representatives to help him do so.526 At that point, technology was not yet seen as a foundational community instrument. However, technology has since become a staple consideration in recent ABCA inquiries. Information management (IM) practices and information technology (IT) programs gained prominence when the 9/11 Commission recommended that the President himself lead a government-wide program to "bring major national security institutions into the information revolution." It was suggested that the President "co-ordinate the resolution of the... technical issues across agencies to create a 'trusted information network."527 The DIR also explored issues associated with strategic IM capability and concluded that the most pressing needs are for the interoperability of IM systems and the centralized oversight of modernization and network integration.528 These concerns have been largely met within DND due to implementation of a department-wide IM 'enterprise' approach, recommended in a 2002 strategic review of DND IM requirements. While it may stand to reason that community-wide analysis requires community- wide IM/IT programs, they are not easily attained, particularly in parliamentary democracies where applying the doctrine of ministerial responsibility leads to the pursuit of unique IM/IT policies, procurement and practices within the various departments of government. However, the state of technology is such that different offices can, or should be able to, continue to have different IM/IT equipment while still being able to collaborate and communicate with each other (e.g. a PC can talk to a Mac). In the specific

526. Church Committee, Report, 432-435. 527. 9/11 Commission, Report, 418. 528. The requirement for community-wide IM and IT policies is explicitly addressed in DIR, Part II, Sections 4 and 5, 57-69. 529. DND, The IM Strategic Review, "Final Report," 11 April 2002. 200 case of information sharing, as emphasised by the 9/11 Commission, equipment may not have been as big an obstacle as departmental regulations and parochial habits. Ultimately, what is required is an appropriate IM/IT policy that supports the call for community-wide intelligence analysis. For this reason, I concluded that the following theoretical best practice was essential:

PPA 8. There is a community-wide information management (IM) and information technology (IT) policy that holistically manages IM/IT development and acquisition issues, to enable an information sharing environment that thwarts the existence of harmful 'stovepipes.'530

The advantages of the IM/IT 'enterprise' approach highlighted in this theoretical best practice has been specifically discussed by Walz, but the idea gained global attention in the context of "network-centric warfare," as championed by Retired US Navy Vice- Admiral Arthur Cebrowski.531 Further support for community-wide IM and IT programs comes from Michael Herman, who laments the time it took to address intelligence community IT issues in the UK intelligence community.532 It has been suggested that theoretical best practice PPA 8 is also a necessary a precursor to improved information sharing, but that is not the only advantage of adopting a comprehensive IM/IT approach. As well as enabling collaborative analysis once information has been received, it also enables comprehensive collection management aimed at acquiring the necessary information in the first place. This is not a new idea, but until recently, technology did not permit the full integration of collection means. A number of impediments prevented a comprehensive approach to collection management and thwarted good intentions to do otherwise. In 1971, US President Richard Nixon issued a classified memorandum that directed the DCI to establish requirements and priorities for intelligence collection.533 In 1992, Congressional

530. DIR, "Key Findings," 63 and Recommendations 18 and 19, p. 64. Flood Report, Recommendation 8 h), 181. Silberman Robb Commission, Report, 326. Berkowitz, Best Truth, 58-98. Walz, Knowledge Management, 327-340. 531. Walz, Knowledge Management, 17-20. Arthur K. Cebrowski and John J. Garstka, "Network-Centric Warfare: Its Origin and Future," United States Naval Institute Proceedings, vol.124, no. 1 (January 1998): 28-35. 532. Herman, Intelligence Services in the Information Age, 99-100. 533. Aspin Brown Commission, Report, 48. 201

amendments to the US National Security Act of 1947 explicitly made the DCI responsible for creating a centralized process for identifying requirements and priorities for intelligence collection and analysis.534 However, despite these directions, collection continued to be pursued by individual intelligence agencies, in part because organizational boundaries had been inadvertently reinforced by certain ABCA inquiry reports in the 1970s. The Rockefeller Commission, The Church Committee, the McDonald Commission and the Australian Royal Commission on Security and Intelligence all were based on concerns of propriety and therefore dealt mainly with issues of governance, organization and review. Their recommendations centered on ensuring that intelligence agencies lived and acted within their mandates. As a result, intra-agency cooperation came to be perceived as something of a legal risk. Nonetheless, the trend to pan-community activity continued, albeit tentatively. The Aspin Brown Commission urged greater centralization of control over the entire US intelligence community and suggested a number of measures to increase the DCI's capability to exert such control.535 The 9/11 Commission noted that, in its view, the need to restructure the intelligence community grew out of six problems that had become apparent even before the terrorist attacks in 2001. One of those problems was the array of structural barriers obstructing intelligence work. "National intelligence is still organized around collection disciplines of the home agencies, not the joint mission."536 One way to enhance national intelligence collection is found in the Flood Inquiry recommendation that, "The Foreign Intelligence Coordination Committee should develop and.implement a community-wide collection management strategy."537 Finally, the Silberman Robb Commission recommended a comprehensive approach be taken with regards to collection and specifically urged the DNI to create a new management structure to manage collection as an "integrated collection enterprise."538 This integrated approach would include coordinated target development, collection management, data management,

534. Ibid. 535. Ibid., 54. 536. 9/11 Commission, Report, 408. 537. Flood Report, 65. 538. Silberman Robb Commission, Recommendation 1, Report, 556. 202

strategic planning and investment, and the development of new collection techniques. 9 In other literature, Richelson outlines five aspects that must be addressed by technical collection means in order for them to be effective, including the coordinated use of sensors and platforms.540 Within this context, the DIR is in good company when it recommends that "all CF strategic collection resources should be included within the scope of a centralized strategic Collection Coordination Intelligence Requirements Management (CCIRM) function."541 Related recommendations go further. They call for the CDI to be mandated and staffed to exercise authority over management and development of all strategic intelligence collection capabilities., as well as assuming greater responsibility for the integration of ISR capabilities, in an operational context and in development"542 In light of this information, I therefore concluded that the expert literature clearly favours a comprehensive collection management approach at the strategic, government level, as reflected in this theoretical best practice:

PPA 9. Strategic technical collection programs are viewed and managed holistically, through a centralized management process that coordinates deployment and employment of assets at the highest practical level and provides an effective mechanism for moving collected information to the processing phase.543

On a different, but related tack, there are two further distinctive theoretical best practices not traditionally found in discussion of intelligence products, processes or action. One originates in the UK, the other in Canada. The former gained international attention in the wake of the suicide of Dr. David Kelly and the latter comes from the thoughtful work of Commissioner McDonald. In making its case for action against Iraq in 2003, the British government publicly drew on an unclassified JIC assessment, but in translating JIC material, warnings about the limited intelligence base upon which some judgments were made were lost on the

539. Ibid. 540. Richelson, "The technical collection of intelligence," in PS1 Handbook, 105. 541. DIR, Recommendation 27, p. 28. 542. DIR, Recommendation 28 and 29, p. 78. 543. Flood Report, Recommendation 8 a), 181. Silberman Robb Commission, Report, 319,356,375,376, 436-444. Herman, Intelligence in Peace and War, 354-361. 203

public audience. Government language gave the impression that intelligence was fuller and firmer than was actually the case. The Hutton Report explored the details of Dr. Kelly's suicide and the alleged links to issues surrounding the government's public airing of JIC intelligence, the production of which Dr. Kelly played some part. The issue is also addressed in the conclusions of the Butler Report dealing with the public use of intelligence.544 The two inquiries did not disagree. The Hutton Report generally suggested that government should take considerably more care when considering the public use of intelligence in the future. Butler concluded that publicizing JIC authorship was "a mistaken judgement" that put the JIC into an area of public controversy and should be avoided in the future.545 He went on to say that if "intelligence is to be used more widely by governments in public debate ... it will be essential ... that clearer and more effective dividing lines between assessment and advocacy are established when doing so."546 The general issue is also clearly addressed in the Flood Report, which devotes a section to the public presentation of intelligence-based material. Flood suggests eight guidelines for the release of such material, one of which stipulates there should be no influence from ministers or policy departments on the intelligence conclusions reached.547 Challenges inherent in making intelligence public are not new. Writing in 1987, Hastedt discussed the publicizing of intelligence by the Carter and Reagan governments and suggests the phenomenon is an issue for policy-makers and analysts, but, while the latter must "come to accept the legitimacy of political directives ... it in no way-justifies the production of 'intelligence to please.'"548 However, practice might be more difficult than theory. Urging intelligence analysts to ignore unpleasant professional pressure is not always easy. A rather stark example of consequences that can follow the exposure of misuse of intelligence is found

544. Butler Report, Chapter 8, "Summary of Conclusions - The Use of Intelligence," 153. 545. Ibid., 154. 546. Ibid., 155. 547. Flood Report, 158-160. 548. Glenn P. Hastedt, "The New Context of Intelligence Estimating: Politicalization or Publicizing?" Intelligence and Intelligence Policy in a Democratic World (Dobb's Ferry, New York: Transnational Publishers, Inc., 1987). 47-68. 204 in the removal of John Morrison from his position as Deputy Chief of Defence Intelligence in the UK Ministry of Defence.549 Equivalent dilemmas have not arisen in Canada, at least as far as we know. However, the evidence presented here is sufficient to suggest the existence of the following important theoretical best practice that is applicable to all democratic forms of government and that serves to raise awareness of possible danger ahead:

PPA 10. Intelligence assessments supporting government decision-making are developed in an objective, non-partisan, high-quality way, without concern over possible subsequent release to the public.550

This theoretical practice, based on the notion of objective Best Intelligence, is intended to act as both a warning and encouragement to government officials and intelligence analysts. However, both require some method of determining that the intelligence being provided is indeed "objective, non-partisan [and] high quality ...." Producers and consumers need to know if the intelligence process is efficient and the products it generates, effective. The review process can be invoked here. Whereas review

549. Paul Waugh, "Fresh Storm on Iraq War Intelligence; Ex-Defence Chief Accuses PM Over Saddam Threat," The Evening Standard (28 October 2004), 2. "Tony Blair today faced fresh claims he misled the nation over Iraq when a former senior defence chief accused him of "misusing" intelligence. John Morrison, the former Deputy Chief of Defence Intelligence, said the Prime Minister's claim that Saddam represented a threat was not backed up by evidence within the Ministry of Defence. Mr. Morrison said that no threat existed "in the true meaning of the word" and that such a view was supported by intelligence reports before the war. ...he also claimed that well before 2002, New Labour's love of news management led to systematic pressure on intelligence experts to make their findings fit political ends. The former MoD chief spoke out for the first time since he was ousted from a Cabinet Office job for appearing on the BBC's Panorama programme to criticise Mr. Blair earlier this year. Mr. Morrison said at the time the intelligence services were stunned when Mr. Blair warned of Saddam's "serious and current threat" to Britain in his foreword to the Downing Street dossier of September "When I heard him using those words I could almost hear the collective raspberry going up around Whitehall," he said. Mr. Morrison, who worked for the MoD [from] 1995 to 1999, became the chief adviser to the Intelligence and Security Committee but his contract was ended early because of his remarks. Today, he broke his silence over his removal and expanded his criticism to include his bosses within the Defence Intelligence Service (DIS). He said there was a misuse of intelligence by senior management within the DIS and a misuse of intelligence terminology by Mr. Blair over Iraq. In a statement the MoD said that at the time of military operations, the press office worked closely with all parts of the department, including the DIS, to obtain information for the media." 550. PJCAAD Report, Recommendation 2, p. 74. ISC Report, 45. FAC Report, "Conclusions and Recommendations," para. 16, p. 4; para. 23, p. 5.j. 205 for propriety was discussed in Chapter 4 - Policy and Governance - review for efficacy will be examined in the following paragraphs. The need for a disciplined test of effectiveness and efficiency is established by Herman in Intelligence Power in Peace and War.551 Marrin has also argued that the "value of intelligence analysis is not measured solely by its accuracy, but rather by the value it has for decision-makers."552 Review for efficacy has been discussed in Canadian inquiries too. In 1981, when speaking of the duties of the head of a proposed new Canadian security intelligence organization, Justice McDonald stated that "constant and thorough review of the efficacy, legality and propriety of security intelligence operations must be carried out by the Director General and senior management of the agency itself."553 Approximately twenty-five years later, Justice O'Connor dealt with the review function in some depth in his Commission of Inquiry in relation to events surrounding the rendition of Maher Arar. Among recommendations flowing from his report on a new review mechanism for the RCMP, O'Connor argues that bodies that review for propriety ought to be separate from bodies that review efficacy, because the subjects are not similar and the skills needed to review each are different. However, he acknowledges that sometimes, reviews of propriety can bring up issues of efficacy.554 A lessons-learned process has been seen as a complementary adjunct to the review process. In 2004, when US intelligence reform was in the air, Nolte argued for a dedicated intelligence evaluation and assessment center, explaining that while a lessons- learned process may be compatible with and complementary to a review process, the two are not identical.555 Whereas review is conducted by 'outsiders', "... lessons-learned processes should be defined as professionals judging themselves as part of a continuous learning credo or the repeated self-application of deeply held standards and values."556

551. Herman, Intelligence Power in Peace and War, 296-300. 552. Marrin, "Adding value to the intelligence product," in Handbook of Intelligence Studies, 199. 553. McDonald Commission, Second Report, 425 554. O'Connor Commission, Report, "A New Mechanism for the Review of the RCMP's National Security Activities," 523. 555. William Nolte, "Preserving Central Intelligence: Assessment and Evaluation in Support of the DCI," Studies in Intelligence, vol. 48, no. 3 (2004). 556. Ibid. 206

The IRTPA subsequently merged proposals for reviews of efficacy and lessons learned. A section relating to the assignment of responsibilities for analytic integrity, directs the DNI to assign "an individual or entity ... [who] shall perform, on a regular basis, detailed reviews of finished intelligence product or other analytical product ...." That individual or entity "upon completion of any review ... may draft lessons learned, identify best practices, or make recommendations for improvement ,..."557 A year later, the Silberman Robb Commission reiterated the spirit of these requirements and recommended that "examinations of finished intelligence should be routine and ongoing, and the lessons learned from the 'post mortems should be incorporated into the intelligence education and training program."558 Finally, the importance of consumer feedback in the evaluation of intelligence has been made clear in the current US ODNI national intelligence consumer's guide, which states that, " consumers need to evaluate the intelligence from their own perspective and provide feedback to producers on whether the intelligence was useful and accurate. The consumer's feedback feeds into the Planning and Direction process ,..."559 Although not widely implemented, the theoretical validity of a review process targeting efficacy is well established in recent expert literature and can be considered an essential partner to any review for propriety. Expressed as a theoretical best practice, the review process can be described thus:

PPA 11. A continuous and formal evaluation of the intelligence process for efficacy is undertaken through the mechanism of the consumer relations process and based mainly on the judgments of supported decision-makers, supported by a lessons-learned process that operationalizes lessons in intelligence training, education and professional development programs, leading to the implementation of improved intelligence practices.560

557. IRTPA, Sec. 1019, 2004. 558. Silberman Robb Commission, Report, 425. The Commission referred the intelligence community to the effective, institutionalized process for benefitting from lessons learned found in the Department of Defense. The Canadian Army has a similarly effective lessons learned system at http://armyapp.forces.gc.ca/allc-clra/default_e.asp (accessed 2 October 2010). 559. ODNI, National Intelligence: a consumer's guide, 19. 560. PJCAAD Report, Recommendation 1, p. 51; Recommendation 3, p. 98. DIR, Recommendation 8, p. 41. Flood Report, Recommendation 8 e), 181; Recommendations 11, 12 and 13, pp 182-183; and Recommendation 23, p. 185. Butler Report, 145. 9/11 Commission, Report, 419-421. Silberman Robb Commission, Report, 336,341,424-425. Boraz and Bruneau, Reforming Intelligence, 335. 207

These eleven theoretical best practices will now be compared to current Canadian intelligence practices and the resulting alignment evaluated.

Alignment Of eleven theoretical best practices derived from expert literature dealing with process, product and action: four are matched by an aligned current Canadian defence intelligence practice; four theoretical best practices are partially aligned by a current practice; and three theoretical practices have no aligned current practice. Generally speaking, the four aligned theoretical best and current practices show that Canadian defence intelligence is structurally and functionally sound, despite the fact, as seen in this and previous chapters, that a number of theoretical best practices have no aligned current practice. The four partially aligned theoretical and current practices demonstrate that while Canadian defence intelligence might be structurally and functionally sound, it is not operating optimally. While appropriate intelligence processes and products exist, they could be better. Furthermore, the non-aligned theoretical best practices provide more evidence of a general lack of human resources, a shortage of intelligence-savvy civilian leaders and an absence of aggressive strategic requirements within Canadian defence intelligence, all of which reinforce the apparent lack of strategic stewardship of intelligence generally. For example there is no overall defence intelligence review and evaluation process. Table 6-1 below compares the two sets of practices. Process, Products Theoretical Best Practices Current Practices and Action (PPA) Direction flows from elected Aligned. political authorities, who, in a The MND is responsible for democracy, are in some way the direction of Canadian defence directly responsible to a intelligence. The DM oversees parliament or congress. Direction defence intelligence on behalf of is implemented through the PPA1 the MND. The CDI directs the government bureaucracy and defence intelligence effort as sometimes supported by a non- guided by the DM. elected, expert advisory body of There is no non-elected, some sort. separate defence intelligence advisory body. Effective intelligence Partially Aligned. performance depends, in the first While senior military instance, on the quality of the intelligence appointments are people occupying leadership and appointed on merit and have at management positions. least some intelligence exposure, Organizational change is a the same is not true of Public secondary means of achieving Service personnel. intelligence effectiveness. Some senior civilian defence intelligence appointments (i.e. PPA 2 DGIP) are occupied by civilians with extensive intelligence experience. While other senior Public Service appointments in DND are made on merit (i.e. DM and ADM) there is no guarantee they have any knowledge of, or experience in, intelligence generally, or defence intelligence in particular. A formal CCIRM process (in a Aligned. generic sense) is embedded as a Defence intelligence has PPA 3 principal means of process arguably the best CCIRM in management. government. Intelligence practitioners work Partially Aligned. closely with policy-makers and Defence intelligence is often strategic decision-makers, to consulted by the MND, CDS and understand their requirements and PPA 4 DM on important issues and help educate them in the particularly in advance of trips to capabilities and capacities of the foreign countries and important intelligence function. meetings such as the G8 and the NATO NAC. Senior appointments do not take time to look ahead beyond current events and engage defence intelligence in future policy or strategy options. Best Intelligence products are Partially Aligned. tailored to the intelligence Defence intelligence tries to consumer, taking into adapt to consumer preferences and consideration the level and delivers a variety of written preference of that consumer, the intelligence reports, verbal time available until a related briefings and graphic material, but PPA5 decision must be made, the time DGIP ability to produce tailored available for advantageous action products is limited at best. to be taken and the dissemination Strategic intelligence products technology available. are generally neither timely nor thoughtful, according to senior operational level commanders. Intelligence products are Not Aligned. optimized by a close, symbiotic There is no evidence that senior relationship between a decision­ defence decision-makers have maker and supporting analysts; PPA6 established a regular and close, and by the synergy of frequent symbiotic relationship with any personal interaction between the defence intelligence analyst, on two. any issue. Community-wide collaborative Aligned. analysis is practiced. Collaborative analysis is practiced in defence intelligence, PPA7 due mainly to the military habit of working with and supporting commanders at all levels. There is a community-wide Partially Aligned. information management (IM) and Defence intelligence IM/IT is information technology (IT) policy planned and managed holistically that holistically manages IM/IT within CDI, but it is not development and acquisition autonomous within DND, or the issues, to enable an information PPA8 wider government at large. sharing environment that thwarts Intelligence IM/IT is viewed as the existence of harmful one component of the overall 'stovepipes'. government IM/IT program, but it does enjoy support in the area of secure systems. Strategic technical collection Not Aligned. programs are viewed and managed There is no comprehensive PPA9 holistically, through a centralized defence intelligence collection management process that plan and DND, let alone the CDI, 210

coordinates deployment and does not control or coordinate employment of assets at the national strategic collection highest practical level and means. provides an effective mechanism for moving collected information to the processing phase. Intelligence assessments Aligned. supporting government decision­ Difficulties relating to the making are developed in an public release of defence objective, non-partisan, high- PPA10 intelligence have not arisen in quality way, without concern over Canada. possible subsequent release to the public. A continuous and formal Not Aligned. evaluation of the intelligence Unlike military intelligence, process for efficacy is undertaken defence intelligence does not through the mechanism of the monitor decision-making or consumer relations process and actions taken as a result of its based mainly on the judgments of products. supported decision-makers, This shortcoming has been PPA11 supported by a lessons-learned recognized but a system of process that operationalizes customer relations officers (CROs) lessons in intelligence training, has yet to be meaningfully education and professional implemented. No study has been development programs, leading to done to show that CROs are a the implementation of improved more effective measure than direct intelligence practices. analyst-client relationships.

Table 6-2: Theoretical best and current practices - Process, Product and Action (PPA)

Evaluation Aligned practices reflect the generally sound governance and doctrinal structures of Canadian defence intelligence. Defence intelligence production is free of political interference and has not been subject to the pressures of public use of intelligence products for political purposes. Moreover, defence intelligence production is enhanced by an excellent level of cooperation within the CF and with close military allies, mainly through ABCA links. Cooperation with other Canadian government intelligence organizations is good at the working level. Within CDI, intelligence production responds in a doctrinally correct and effective manner to requirements of senior defence leaders. 211

However, while the CDI organization can do all it is being asked to do, it could do more, if given more focused and informed direction. The DM and ADMs in DND, who should be consumers of strategic level defence intelligence, are not. They rarely ask for strategic intelligence products. In fact, rather than pushing CDI for strategic intelligence products, the DM occasionally goes beyond DND for such assessments.561 Moreover, senior civilian managers are not knowledgeable in the defence intelligence function generally and therefore have failed to take advantage of it. They do not 'drive' the defence intelligence process. As a result, Canadian defence intelligence has not been challenged as much as it should be at the strategic level. In the absence of such demanding leadership, little in the way of true strategic analysis is asked for and consequently there has been little incentive to pursue a holistic strategic collection program. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, there is neither formal evaluation of the effect of intelligence on decision-making, nor a dedicated defence intelligence lessons- learned process. Of these three issues, the argument can be made that the first, the lack of professional development of senior public servants in the field of intelligence, is the root of the other two.

CIVILIAN INTELLIGENCE LEADERSHIP

Training and professional development Inadequate intelligence training and related professional development prevents senior public servants, assigned to positions with defence intelligence responsibilities, from fully exercising their duty in this field. In the CF, one cannot ascend to senior military command without having been an intelligence client along the way. The same

561. Marshall, Interview, 28 January 2010. The DM has been known to consult the IAS and DFAIT directly. There is nothing 'wrong' with this practice. In fact it demonstrates an admirable interest in different intelligence perspectives. However, it would be preferable if the DM used CDI to gather and assess these products from OGDs. 212

cannot be said for senior civilian appointments generally. Intelligence exposure or training is simply not a major topic in a Public Service career profile.562 A former DND ADM Policy willingly acknowledged that he did not know anything about intelligence on taking up his post in 2005 and that he probably did not take adequate advantage of it during his tenure. At the end of his time in DND, he was beginning to understand the intelligence function, but it was time to move on in his career. Ironically, his next post, that of Executive Director of the IAS in the PCO, produces the highest level of intelligence assessments for Cabinet.563 The current DM of DND arrived unacquainted with the defence intelligence role.564 This is an important point because the DM is the nominal head of defence intelligence, who sits at the table in senior fora, with his peers, to discuss government intelligence matters. This lack of expertise impedes proactive direction and stewardship to the defence intelligence program.

Direction and Stewardship Clear direction is common at military operational and tactical levels, where issues are relatively well defined in time and space. At the policy and strategic decision-making levels, where issues are less clear and time frames usually longer, analysis has shown that instances of explicit personal direction are considerably less numerous. In fact, the absence of such clear direction is a persistent point of discussion in much of the expert literature that arose often in interviews with intelligence practitioners. According to K. L.

562. Nothing in the way of intelligence studies is delivered at the Canada School of Public Service. However, at the time of writing, DND was particularly well-served by ADM appointments with some exposure to intelligence. Three of the ADMs at this point come from operational military backgrounds and a fourth came from DFAIT, having worked to support various international missions. It should also be noted that the previous DM, Ward Elcock had served as Director of CSIS from 1994-2004, prior to serving as DM DND from 2004-2007. However, this collection of talent, at these times, is an exception. 563.1 am indebted to Mr. Vincent Rigby for his frankness and candour here. Mr. Rigby became Executive Director of the IAS in 2008 and acknowledges that only now does he think he knows enough to use intelligence wisely in a policy role, should he ever return to the field. Vincent Rigby, Interview, 12 February 2009. 564. Vincent Rigby, Interview, 12 February 2009. The DND DM declined to respond to requests for an interview, submitted by this researcher on various occasions throughout 2008 and 2009. The current DGIP also did not respond to similar requests throughout the same period. 213

Gardiner, retired deputy director of the Analytic Group of the US National Intelligence Council: ... there have been efforts since the dawn of organized intelligence to persuade decision-makers to be more forthcoming with guidance and feedback. As others have noted, however, the successes in this area are always temporary.565

In practice, Canadian defence intelligence direction receives less than full attention, for two main reasons. First, public servants placed in senior DND positions are not likely to have had any intelligence experience or training prior to their appointments. Second, as described in the last chapter, defence intelligence is organizationally embedded in military intelligence, under the direction of the CDI. Put simply, senior public servants are not regularly linked to ongoing intelligence activity. There is no close, symbiotic relationship between strategic level decision-makers and intelligence analysts. These circumstances conspire to make direction of defence intelligence less effective than it could be. A lacklustre producer-consumer relationship can also place a drag on robust direction. As seen in the Canadian defence intelligence organization diagrams in the last chapter, civilian defence intelligence leaders have no intimate relationship with the defence intelligence staff. As a result, strategic intelligence products are delivered to them irregularly, if at all, in one of two ways. First, they may see and hear strategic intelligence products delivered to a select senior meeting such as the Daily Executive Meeting (DEM), or have it delivered by hand, in hard-copy format, to loiter in an in-basket until read. There is virtually no dialogue between senior civilian appointments and defence intelligence analysts. One reason why intelligence is handled in this way is the fact that senior civilian appointments within DND do not have a dedicated intelligence staff officer, as do most senior military leaders. In the military chain of command, senior appointments develop a close relationship with 'their' principal intelligence officer and, in this way, get the synergistic benefit of both written product and dialogue. Principal intelligence staff officers act as a senior appointment's 'gateway' into the intelligence system. They

565. K.L. Gardner, "Squaring the circle: Dealing with intelligence-policy breakdowns," in Andrew et al, Secret Intelligence: A Reader, 131. 214 provide the day-to-day management of the senior appointment's intelligence 'take' and ensure they see that which is needed to be seen. Defence intelligence could be enhanced by having senior appointments develop an equally close relationship with the analyst who is expert on any issue at hand, but this is often unworkable because of the sheer number of issues arising and the limited number of analysts addressing them. The DGIP, being the senior public servant within CDI, enjoys increasingly regular access to the DM. Ultimately however, without a dedicated defence intelligence staff officer working directly for the DM or ADMs, they are denied the intimate knowledge of defence intelligence activity needed to provide robust direction. In this, they are entirely dependent on the CDI.566 In the absence of regular and determined intelligence direction, defence intelligence tends to be reactive, falling victim to issues that develop from the ground up - from tactical and operational level events. Given that such events often demand political and public affairs attention, DM/CDI attention is often focused on those levels, often running from 'pillar to post' to gather information needed by the MND to publicly explain what happened. This continuing gravitational pull toward operational and tactical issues makes it difficult to focus on important strategic topics. Strategic intelligence products are therefore seldom asked for, which in turn means there is little call for a proactive strategic collection plan or strategic analysis.567

COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS

Collection The more recent ABCA inquiries show a clear preference for a community-wide collection regime. The report of the Flood Inquiry suggested a community-wide collection management strategy, while the 2004 Canadian DIR proposed that the CDI be

566. For a brief period in 2008-2009, a dedicated defence intelligence officer was appointed to act as the DM's intelligence staff officer. It did not work out because the DM did not use the assigned person as an intelligence advisor, but as more of an intelligence 'clerk,' to manage intelligence-related paperwork. The person was withdrawn by the CDI and the DM no longer has a dedicated defence intelligence officer on his staff. Marshall, Interview, 28 January 2010. 567. Major-General Christopher Davis, Director General International Security Policy, National Defence Headquarters, Interview, 10 April 2008; and Dr. Kurtis Simpson, Defence Research and Development Canada (Ottawa), Interview, 22 January 2010. 215

mandated and staffed to exercise authority over management and development of all strategic intelligence collection capabilities.568 The 2005 US Silberman Robb Commission clearly sees an entirely new collection management structure being formed within ODNI that would manage collection as an "integrated collection enterprise," including target development, collection management, data management, strategic planning and investment, and the development of new collection techniques.569 Within the Canadian government intelligence community, defence intelligence is one of the larger and more proficient players. Defence intelligence has call on strategic ISR assets controlled by DND, but there are other ISR assets, such as communications and observation satellites, that are controlled by other government departments. The overall collection of national ISR assets is not directed per se, by any one central authority, but it is coordinated, in a collegial fashion, by the PCO. Requests for Information (RFI) are routinely sent from one department seeking a certain type of information to another 'owning' the appropriate capability. These RFI are responded to when and how possible by the receiving department, largely depending on the size and pace of the workload at the time. Consequently, while the CDI can plan on and coordinate DND ISR assets, the CDI can only plan on those of other government departments to the point they may be available to help him at the time. While this issue is addressed here as a collection issue, its fundamental cause is found in analysis, because collection responds to analytical requirements. If analysis does not busy itself with strategic issues, there will be no call for strategic level collection activity. An example of this difficulty arose when the decision was made to redeploy the Canadian mission in Afghanistan from Kabul to Kandahar in 2005. As will be discussed in the section below, there was no direction to defence intelligence to examine issues beyond tactical concerns that might face the Canadian-led Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT), to be located in Kandahar City. The lack of strategic-level intelligence analysis led to the failure to recognize that the Taliban insurgency was growing across

568. Flood Report, 65. DIR, Recommendation 28. 569. Silberman Robb Commission, Report, 356. 216 southern Afghanistan and that more than just a PRT would be required to counter the coming Taliban attempt to take Kandahar City.570

Analysis This was a particularly difficult phase of the research because, in addition to the fact that there are no strategic level Canadian defence intelligence products in the public domain, strategic intelligence direction issued by the MND, DM or CDS is also not available for study.571 Moreover, detailed defence intelligence analytical activity is not open to public scrutiny. However, one thing is apparent. The strength of Canadian defence intelligence lies mainly at the military operational and tactical levels, not at the strategic level.572 The sub-strategic level is perhaps a natural focus for defence intelligence given that, historically, CF international deployments have traditionally conducted operations at the tactical level and only rarely at the operational level.573 This is not to say that defence intelligence does not sometimes produce strategic intelligence. It does, but only infrequently, largely because calls for strategic defence intelligence are rare. Recall Rigby's chagrin at not being able to take more advantage of defence intelligence in managing defence policy. This shortcoming was also reflected in remarks by the then Director General International Security Policy.574 He noted that defence intelligence, and DND as a whole, did not have a 'strategic intelligence culture' and

570. Brigadier-General David Fraser, Commandant, Canadian Forces College, Interview, 15 January 2008. See a description of Canadian activity in Afghanistan from 2005-2008 in Carl Forsberg, Report Number 3, The Taliban's Campaign for Kandahar, Washington, D.C.: The Institute for the Study of War, 2009, 24-35. Available at http://www.understandingwar.org/files/The_Talibans_Campaign_For_Kandahar.pdf (accessed 7 May 2010). 571. In fact, five military officers interviewed doubted that such direction even exists. 572. Gregory Fyffe, Former Executive Director, International Assessment Staff, Privy Council Office, Interview, 17 September 2008; and Vincent Rigby, Executive Director, International Assessments Staff, Privy Council Office. Interview, 12 February 2009. 573. 1st Cdn Corps in the First World War was a tactical formation. 1st Canadian Army HQ in the Second World War was an operational level headquarters. 25 Infantry Brigade Group in Korea was a tactical level formation. All CF UN mission deployments have been tactical operations. All CF NATO deployments since the Cold War have been tactical operations. The Canadian NORAD Region Headquarters in Winnipeg is an operational level Headquarters, but air interception activity is composed of tactical level operations. 574. Davis, Interview, 10 April 2008. 217 tended to be overly focused on intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance (ISTAR), a decidedly tactical level process.575 Defence intelligence analysis is conducted by a mixed military and civilian staff within the DGIP division of the CDI organization. Among nearly one hundred defence intelligence analysts are approximately two seconded analysts from the PCO. DGIP personnel are, in turn, seconded out to PCO and ITAC. DGIP analytical capability covers a number of significant areas; a. Military capabilities, tactics, techniques, procedures; b. Proliferation and arms control verification; c. Weapons; d. War crimes/criminals; e. Procurement and defence industries; f. Human trafficking (in operational areas); g. Narcotics (in operational areas); h. Leadership/social profiling; and i. Space systems and satellite technical analysis.576

The CDI organization generates a number of intelligence products that may or may not contain strategic level intelligence. They are shown in Table 6-3 below:

575. Ibid., ISTAR is the tactical level procedure linking the functions of Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance. See a full description of the ISTAR project in the 2009-10 DND Report on Plans and Priorities, at http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/rpp/2009- 2010/inst/dnd/st-tspr-eng.asp?forniat=print (accessed 6 April 2009). 576. DND, Defence Intelligence Overview, 29 January 2010. 218

Daily Intelligence Concise reporting and analysis of issues of interest to the Digest (DID) intelligence community and senior leadership. A one-page assessment prepared during crisis situations, Special Intelligence which informs senior DND/CF leadership of recent and Report expected developments. An assessment of all available intelligence relating to a specific situation, country or geographic area. IAs should be Intelligence Assessment mid- or long-term assessments and should focus on (IA) providing predictive analysis on the issue or subject in question. Specialized Intelligence Assessments that support decision­ Threat Assessment making by strategic leadership. Such reports typically review (TA) threat information relating to a location/activity and assess an overall threat to Canada. Indications and warning and other strategic warning items Strategic Warning providing predictive analysis. A weekly product which provides focused intelligence Global Scan assessments of global issues of concern to DND/CF leadership on a continent by continent basis. Weekly intelligence briefings to MND, DM/CDS, CEFCOM Briefings as well as briefings in support of CF battle rhythm (IOLA). Strategic Intelligence CAN/US (the annual document which examines threats Assessment affecting Canada & US) and MC 161.577

Table 6-3: Canadian defence intelligence products

These lists of defence intelligence analytical fields and products are unremarkable at first glance, but there is no evidence that intelligence in these areas or products are routinely delivered or that, when they are delivered, that the analysis is at the strategic level. A former Commander of the Canadian Joint Task Force Afghanistan said, in confidence, he was disappointed at the "simplistic and shallow" character of intelligence briefing notes for senior departmental officials he has seen.579 A former Commander of CEFCOM felt that the DGIP ability to produce tailored products was limited at best. Apparently timely, thoughtful assessments were just not produced for him. He opined that

577. Military Committee (MC) document 161, the annually updated strategic intelligence summary of NATO, agreed to by all member states (not publicly available). 578. DND, Defence Intelligence Overview, 29 January 2010. 579. Confidential Source 712. 219 he was less well-served by CDI than was the pre-DIR Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff by the now defunct National Defence Command Centre 2 (intelligence) staff.580 Opinions also vary as to how useful some products might be. From the point of view of a defence intelligence analyst, it is often a case of submitting a product to a decision-maker, through the chain of command, and not hearing what became of it. Occasionally, decision-makers acknowledge receipt of a product, but seldom explain how it was used, let alone whether it provided value to their decision-making process.581 Defence intelligence analysts have said that more and more of their senior clients want quick, direct verbal briefings, usually supported by PowerPoint slides, or other state- of-the-art graphics.582 A particularly troublesome aspect comes in the form of occasional calls by senior CDI appointments for 'quick and dirty' briefings by analysts, to prepare for an imminent meeting with a more senior DND or CF decision-maker. These briefings are usually short-notice and seldom last long enough for the analyst to say all they think needs to be said. Analysts also feel some degree of frustration that their impromptu views will be presented second-hand to decision-makers, perhaps without the benefit of background expertise on the subject. There are rare occasions when an appropriate desk analyst attends the higher meeting to offer their assessment first-hand, but these are certainly not a routine occurrences.583 On occasion, the lack of strategic intelligence work can be startling. An example is the apparent absence of attention paid to one of Clausewitz's most fundamental edicts: The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgement that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish ... the kind of war upon which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature.584

580. Gauthier, e-mail comments, 1 February 2010. 581. Intelligence Analysis Coordination Committee (IACC) Focus Group, Ottawa, 25 June 2008. The issue was first raised by a defence intelligence analyst in attendance, but agreed to by at least three other analysts from other government departments. Other analysts who did not speak up seemed sympathetic to and in agreement with the defence intelligence analyst. 582. IACC Focus Group, Ottawa, 25 June 2008. This point was also raised during the CDI focus group held in National Defence Headquarters on 4 November 2008. 583. Simpson, Interview, 22 January 2010. 584. Karl Von Clausewitz, On War, 88, edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1976. 220

Brigadier-General (now Major-General) David Fraser, who led coalition forces in southern Afghanistan against the Taliban throughout most of 2006 confirmed that the battles to prevent massed Taliban forces from marching on Kandahar City had not been expected and that the subsequent shift to a persistent insurgency in the following months had certainly not been anticipated.585 To be fair, the August 2005 deployment to Kandahar came at a time that defence intelligence was only beginning to adapt to the DIR recommendations, but even today, DGIP still is not oriented toward identifying the nature of future conflicts, which may impact Canada and the CF. When asked if anyone in Canadian defence intelligence was examining the next "kind of war upon which they may embark" no interview participant could name any one person or office who was doing so. This makes the development of future strategy difficult. Without a strategic framework, strategic intelligence suffers not only from a lack of focus; collection becomes little more than random surveillance, analysis little more than guess-work and decision-making haphazard. As determined in interviews of both defence decision-makers and intelligence practitioners, there is clear linkage between Canadian defence intelligence dealing with Afghanistan and government strategy. There is less apparent linkage in other areas where government strategy is not as clear. In these circumstances, defence intelligence exercises its own judgment as to what products are required. For instance, there is no distinct government strategy relating to the variety of CF international deployments in missions other than Afghanistan. Nonetheless, defence intelligence continues to cover events in the various deployment areas to the degree they think necessary, intending to provide intelligence products to consumers as they feel is required.586 Gaps and anomalies in the alignment of current and theoretical best practices in the category of process, product and action exist largely because there is no formal strategic level review and evaluation of defence intelligence practices. No one is checking requirements or reviewing if they have been met and, while the CF have one of the most

585. Fraser, Interview, 15 January 2008. 586. This is decided by the CDI, in consultation with the DGIP and as a result of the CDI's general situational awareness of operational issues within NDHQ. Gauthier, Interview, 12 January 2010. 221 effective operational lessons learned systems in the world, there is simply no formal defence intelligence lessons learned process at all.587

REVIEW, EVALUATION AND LESSONS-LEARNED PROCESSES Chapter 4 noted that there is no regular, independent review and evaluation mechanism at the departmental level, within DND, so the ability to know, critique and enhance both efficacy and propriety of defence intelligence is non-existent. Chapter 4 also revealed that the field literature, particularly when discussing intelligence practices in democratic countries, usually focused on the review of intelligence for purposes of propriety - to ensure intelligence activity was acting within the law and according to political direction. In this section, review and evaluation are examined in relation to matters of efficacy. The 2003 Australian PJCAAD inquiry report called for a review and evaluation process to do three things. First, it was to review the capacity of the central government intelligence assessment organ to ensure it remained tuned to existing national security circumstances. Second, review was to determine if the entire intelligence community remained independent and objective in deriving its assessments. Finally, an independent authority would periodically evaluate the performance of individual components of the intelligence community and recommend changes to ensure their effectiveness.588 In 2004, the Flood Report also suggested independent review of central intelligence agencies.589 The 2004 Butler Report offered something of a twist when it recommended that review offer "the provision of proper channels for the expression of dissent [via] a confidential outlet for conscientious objection or dissent within the intelligence agencies."590 To complement review, evaluation should do more than simply identify shortcomings, according to the 2005 Silberman Robb Commission recommendations that called for a formal lessons learned process. Once identified, lessons must be operationalized and then fed into intelligence training, education and professional development programs as quickly as possible, to ensure they are implemented in the field.

587. Barber, Interview, 27 April 2010. 588. Parliamentary Joint Committee on ASIO, ASIS and DSD. Intelligence on Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction, Recommendations 1,2 and 3, December, 2003. 589. Flood Report, 62-63. 590. Butler Report, 143. 222

A successful lessons learned cycle that runs from review to implementation of improved behaviour is a sign of an effective learning organization.591 In the early stages of this research, it seemed that there was little apparent concern on the part of defence intelligence practitioners that such processes do not exist. The most commonly expressed reason for them not being in place is the claim that there simply are not enough qualified people available to do the job. Also recall that Vincent Rigby, the former DND ADM Policy and Major-General Christopher Davis, the former Director General International Security Policy, were openly chagrined, but not overly concerned about not using defence intelligence to its fullest capacity, a reflection perhaps of a lack of will among senior defence officials to do anything about it, particularly if the responsibility to take action is not within their terms of reference. However, at the time of writing, there were indications that a formal review and evaluation regime to scrutinize defence intelligence was being considered.592 Throughout the literature, not much is said about how such review and evaluation will be carried out in practice. There is however, occasional mention of the need to base any evaluation of intelligence effectiveness mainly on the judgments of consumers.593 In the mid-1990s, Jan Herring, an eminent competitive intelligence expert in the US, wrote "Intelligence must be measured to be valued, so let us take the initiative and ask our management, [and] the users, to evaluate us and our products."594 Intelligence has to be useful to decision-makers and so it should be evaluated on the basis of consumer satisfaction. However, evaluating the value of intelligence within government can be challenging. One reason is that there is no clear 'bottom line' conclusion. How does one rate the effect of intelligence in any activity when intelligence simply 'advises,' but does

591. Peter Senge, The Fifth Discipline: The Art and Practice of the Learning Organization, 2nd ed. (New York and London: Currency Doubleday, 2006), 283-316. 592 Marshall, Interview, 28 January 2010. There is still no word on any development in this area at the time of writing in March 2011. The general interest in review and evaluation comes from recommendations made by Justice O'Connor, which have broad applicability across government, not from any specific interest that may have arisen independently within DND. 593. Treverton, Reshaping National Intelligence, 206. 594. Jan P. Herring, Measuring the Effectiveness of Competitive Intelligence: Assessing and Communicating CI's Value to Your Organization (Alexandria, VA: Society of Competitive Intelligence Professionals, 1996), 63. 223 not 'act'? It is never clear to what degree any intelligence product had any effect on operational outcomes. Exceptions may be apparent at the tactical level (warning given that enabled successful counter-action), but they become less clear at the operational and strategic levels. Moreover, even when defence and military initiatives are successful, or international actions unfold as planned, they can be costly and perhaps painful. Finally, intelligence consumers rarely acknowledge the role good intelligence plays in their own success. While usually quick to bring attention to intelligence failures, consumers do not always give feedback on successful outcomes enabled by good intelligence. As a result of this lack of information, intelligence managers tend to fall into the mode of 'bean- counting' - counting the number of reports produced, the number of consumers served, or the number of hours worked etc.595 This approach largely misses the crucial point that intelligence is for decision-makers, not producers.596 Review and evaluation must continue to examine the efficacy of intelligence products throughout the decision-making process and beyond, including the impact of any advantageous action taken. Senior decision-makers know that decisions at the policy and strategic levels are seldom 'one-shot' events. Consequently, continuing assessment of the impact of decisions made is essential to the maintenance of initiative and advantage. The vehicle for such assessments comes in the form of intelligence review and evaluation. Together they provide a constant, parallel and iterative intelligence activity that should be conducted at a pace at least equivalent to the tempo of events or issues being addressed, so that intelligence efficacy can be repeatedly enhanced to protect advantage. Ultimately, feedback from the use and impact of intelligence products and the behaviour they enable will be used to develop more intelligence products, for further decisions leading to future advantageous action. And so it continues. It is the persistent and iterative monitoring of the intelligence product and ensuing action that gives intelligence its power to influence behaviour and, more than any other component, provide it with advantage.

595.This is the general practice within the CDI organization. Thompson, Interview, 4 November 2009. 596. See Lt. Col. Robert R. Glass and Lt. Col. Phillip B. Davidson, Intelligence is for Commanders (Harrisburg, Pennsylvania: Military Service Publishing Company, 1949). 224

SUMMARY This chapter evaluated Canadian defence intelligence in the category of Process, Product and Action, by comparing current defence intelligence practices with theoretical best practices derived from expert literature. Four current practices were fully aligned with theoretical best practices. Four other current practices were partially aligned and three theoretical best practices were found to have no aligned current practice. These gaps and anomalies are seen to be symptoms of an immature defence intelligence program that has been merely mediocre in aligning itself with theoretical best practices. When considered collectively, gaps and anomalies reflect three significant issues. First, the lack of training and development of senior civilian Canadian defence intelligence leaders, prior to their assuming defence intelligence responsibilities, limits their ability to provide optimum direction and stewardship to defence intelligence. Second, there is also a lack of a comprehensive strategic collection plan, probably linked to an under-optimized strategic analysis capability. Third, there is no process of review and evaluation aimed at enhancing the efficacy of Canadian defence intelligence. Given the evidence, an overall evaluation of Canadian defence intelligence in this category can reasonably conclude that senior defence intelligence leaders and consumers have failed to take full advantage of the defence intelligence capability, especially at the strategic level. While the shortage of trained and qualified intelligence people might be one impediment to building a more fully developed defence intelligence enterprise, it is hard to ignore the impact of the lack of determined intelligence stewardship in the Canadian government at large and in Canadian defence intelligence specifically. This chapter concludes the detailed evaluation of Canadian defence intelligence in the three categories. Chapter 7, the next and last chapter, brings all this analysis together to provide overall findings, evaluation and recommendations for the enhancement of Canadian defence intelligence. 225

CHAPTER 7 OVERALL FINDINGS, EVALUATION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

INTRODUCTION The three previous chapters evaluated Canadian defence intelligence in three categories based on the six conceptual components of intelligence - Policy and Governance; Organization and People; and Process, Product and Action. This chapter discusses the overall findings of this study and offers a further, overall evaluation of Canadian defence intelligence, based on the alignment of current practices and theoretical best practices derived from expert literature. The first section below describes the general alignment of all theoretical best practices and current practices, grouped according to degrees of alignment - aligned, partially aligned and not aligned - followed by the final evaluation of this alignment, by component -Policy and Governance; Organization; People; Process; Product; and Action. To conclude, recommendations aimed at enhancing the alignment of current practices and theoretical best practices are offered, as well as proposals for future study. Overall, current defence intelligence practices conform to theoretical best practices in little more than half the instances examined. Of the thirty pairs of associated theoretical best and current practices identified in this study: ten theoretical best practices are fully aligned by current practices; seven theoretical best practices are matched by partially aligned current practices; and thirteen theoretical best practices have no corresponding current practice. Given the extent of non-alignment, it can be argued that Canadian defence intelligence adaptation has not been optimally informed by expert academic opinion, as expressed in the theoretical best practices derived from the expert literature. That is not to say Canadian defence intelligence organization and activity is deemed unreliable, unprofessional, or useless, but it is sub-optimal and open to criticism. It is constrained at all levels, by an apparently chronic lack of sufficiently experienced and trained personnel, by the general absence of civilian intelligence stewardship within government and an absence of intelligence-savvy civilian leadership within DND. These constraints are 226 symptoms of a lack of a government intelligence culture, itself a consequence of there being no strategic culture in the Canadian government as a whole.597 Specific findings revealed the need for Canadian defence intelligence to be grounded in legislation and the requirement for a complementary national defence intelligence policy. Another important finding is the need for intelligence studies to be included in the professional development of senior public servants, to enhance their ability to provide engaged leadership and stewardship for the Canadian defence intelligence establishment. Other recommendations suggest a need for more aggressive, targeted recruitment and training efforts to grow the Canadian defence intelligence organization, particularly the strategic analysis cadre. An enhanced strategic intelligence capability should include a comprehensive strategic defence intelligence collection plan.

GENERAL ALIGNMENT General alignment of Canadian defence intelligence current practices with theoretical best practices is shown in Table 7-1 below. Organization 1:0 ) and Policy and Process, People ( Governance P) Product and TOTAL Organization People (PG) Action (PPA) (0) (P) Aligned 3 3 0 4 10 Partially 1 0 2 4 7 aligned Not 4 0 6 3 13 aligned TOTAL 8 3 8 11 30

Table 7-1: General alignment of current practices with theoretical best practices

597. See W.D. McNamara and Ann Fitz-Gerald, "A National Security Framework for Canada," Policy Matters, vol. 3, no. 10, Institute for the Research of Public Policy, October 2Q02. The authors addresses the lack of any framework for articulating Canada's national security strategy. Also, Andrew Richter, "Mission Impossible? The Ongoing Struggle to Identify Canadian Strategic Thought." Paper delivered at the Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, Dalhousie University, 10-12 June 2005, at http://centreforforeignpolicystudies.dal.ca/pdf/msc2005/msc2005richter.pdf (accessed 17 August 2010). 227

Within individual categories, only the Organization component features full alignment (three of three) of current practices with theoretical best practices. The majority of the Process, Product and Action current practices are aligned with derived theoretical best practices. Half of Canadian defence intelligence current practices are not aligned with theoretical best practices in the category of Policy and Governance. In the People component, only two current practices are partially aligned with theoretical best practices. These findings are examined further in the following sections, beginning with aligned practices, followed by partially aligned and non-aligned practices, in that order.

ALIGNED PRACTICES The ten Canadian defence intelligence current practices aligned with derived theoretical best practices indicate the presence of a professional intelligence organization that is politically reliable and structurally sound, in which competent practitioners work hard. However, as reassuring as this may sound, it might be insufficient. The Canadian defence intelligence organization remains under-populated and its efforts are constrained by an absence of aligned current practices in areas requiring intellectual exercise. These circumstances are discussed later in this chapter. Aligned practices are shown in Table 7-2 below.

Policy and Theoretical Best Practices Governance Current Practices (PG) The degree to which Aligned. government intelligence is Canadian defence intelligence centralized or decentralized is centralized under political reflects the nature of the control, but decentralized for government it serves. PG3 implementation. The defence intelligence function resides in DND, subordinate to the MND. It is overseen by the DM and functionally directed by the CDI. Oversight superintends Aligned. intelligence activity and is Oversight of Canadian therefore associated with defence intelligence conforms to PG5 responsibility. In a parliamentary the DND and CF responsibility democracy, executive oversight and accountability framework. is vested in government and Operational oversight subordinate legislated authority is vested in the DM, appointments. Parliament does CDS and designated CF not exercise direct oversight of commanders, while functional intelligence organizations. oversight authority is delegated to the CDI. An elected person, or group Aligned. of elected persons is designated The MND is responsible to as being ultimately responsible parliament, the Prime Minister and accountable for the and cabinet for Canadian intelligence activity in defence intelligence. government. In a democracy, Within DND, the DM is this is usually the head of PG8 responsible and accountable to government, or a cabinet the MND for Canadian defence minister, or a small cabinet intelligence. committee. Within departments, The CDI is responsible and ministers are held responsible accountable to the DM for and accountable for intelligence Canadian defence intelligence. organizations in their portfolio. Organization Theoretical Best Practices Current Practices (0) Intelligence organizations are Aligned. structured in a manner that finds Defence intelligence is under balance among preferred the political control of the MND, measures espoused in relevant and structured in accordance organizational theory, legislated with the principles laid out in the oversight mechanisms, the Ol CF Joint Intelligence Doctrine various requirements of different and recommendations found in consumers and practical the 2004 DIR report. It conforms considerations of security. to the requirements of the Canadian Government Security Policy. Intelligence organizations Aligned. have managerial elements that Since its reorganization, administer the six components begun in 2005, defence of a government intelligence intelligence now has leadership function - policy and and managerial capacity 02 governance, organization, available to administer the six people, process, product and components. action. The adequacy of these organizational elements is discussed later in Chapter 6. Government intelligence Aligned. functions have well-established Defence intelligence partnerships, both foreign and 03 exercises an extensive network domestic, with other intelligence of intelligence cooperation, organizations in informal, principally with ABCA and 229

bilateral, coalition, allied and NATO allies. multilateral contexts. Process, Theoretical Best Practices Products and Current Practices Action (PPA) Direction flows from elected Aligned. political authorities, who, in a The MND is responsible for democracy, are in some way the direction of Canadian directly responsible to a defence intelligence. The DM parliament or congress. oversees defence intelligence on Direction is implemented PPA1 behalf of the MND. The CDI through the government directs the defence intelligence bureaucracy and sometimes effort as guided by the DM. supported by a non-elected, There is no non-elected, expert advisory body of some separate defence intelligence sort. advisory body. A formal CCIRM process (in Aligned. a generic sense) is embedded as Defence intelligence has PPA 3 a principal means of process arguably the best CCIRM in management. government. Community-wide Aligned. collaborative analysis is Collaborative analysis is practiced. practiced in defence intelligence, due mainly to the military habit of working with and supporting PPA 7 commanders at all levels. While technical means could be better, they do not significantly inhibit collaborative analysis within DND and the CF. Intelligence assessments Aligned. supporting government decision­ Difficulties relating to the making are developed in an public release of defence objective, non-partisan, high- PPA 10 intelligence have not arisen in quality way, without concern Canada. over possible subsequent release to the public.

Table 7-2: Aligned practices

PARTIALLY ALIGNED PRACTICES Seven Canadian defence intelligence current practices are partially aligned with theoretical best practices in three categories: one in Policy and Governance; two in the People component; and a further four in Process, Product and Action. Within Policy and 230

Governance, DND oversight and accountability of Canadian defence intelligence is structurally sound, but the practice of defence intelligence qua intelligence is not based in legislation. Defence intelligence is conducted under the doctrine of Crown prerogative, which, while constitutionally and democratically safe in Canada, is no guarantee against abuse. Partially aligned practices provide early indication of a worrying institutional pathology that prohibits the optimal conduct of defence intelligence practices at senior levels. The Public Service does not recognize intelligence as a separate occupational category, so there is less attention paid to training, education and professional development for civilian Canadian defence intelligence personnel than in other, more formalized Public Service employment categories. Consequently, they lag behind their Public Service colleagues and are systemically denied the career tools required to remain in the professional stream leading to promotion and senior appointment.598 This circumstance is aggravated by the fact that senior Canadian defence intelligence civilian appointments do not regularly develop proactive direction for the defence intelligence staff. Partially aligned practices are shown in Table 7-3 below.

Policy and Theoretical Best Practices Governance Current Practices (PG) The theoretical approach to Partially Aligned. intelligence taken by a government Canadian defence reflects the form of government to intelligence suits Canada's be served, which is then manifest parliamentary government by in legislation that defines PG1 being subordinated to the MND. government intelligence However, there is no organizations. legislated basis for Canadian defence intelligence. It operates under the legal doctrine of

598. Simpson, Interview, 22 January 2010. Among the hundreds of courses run by the Canadian School of Public Service, not one of them deals with the practice of intelligence. See "Courses" at http://www.csps-efpc.gc.ca/cat/maf-eng.asp#idl (accessed 9 May 2010). Four classroom courses address the subject of Emotional Intelligence. See "Classroom Courses" at http://www.csps-efpc.gc.ca/sch/index- eng.asp?SearchString=intelligence&goButton=Go&NavEvent=&FirstRow=&SearchMode=allwo rds&SearchZone=course&mylang=E (accessed 9 May 2010). 23

Crown prerogative exercised by the federal government in matters of national defence. Theoretical Best Practices People (P) Current Practices There is a community-wide Partially aligned. training framework that offers Military entry-level training at the entry, mid-career intelligence training is available and advanced levels, focused on only to military intelligence various intelligence tradecrafts. branch personnel. Separate entry level training is available to limited numbers of civilian defence intelligence personnel. Military intelligence mid- level training is available mainly to military intelligence P4 branch personnel. There is no formal, mid-level intelligence training available to defence intelligence personnel. Entry and mid-career level civilian intelligence training is ad-hoc and sporadic. Advanced-level training is inadequate for senior military personnel and non-existent for civilian defence intelligence personnel. Professional development Partially Aligned. programs for intelligence Some defence intelligence personnel include opportunities for personnel are posted to liaison joint development with other positions with close (ABCA) intelligence organizations and with intelligence allies and have principal intelligence consumers. returned to occupy senior Successful completion of such defence intelligence positions. joint development is a preferred Some defence intelligence criterion for professional P5 personnel are seconded to advancement, particularly for intelligence staffs in OGDs (e.g. those seeking senior intelligence PCO, ITAC and CSIS). community appointments. The extent of 'joint' assignments is limited and, although viewed favourably when being considering personnel for promotion or appointment, it is neither overtly 'preferred' nor mandatory for advancement. There are no formal defence intelligence professional development programs. Both military and civilian defence intelligence practitioners follow the traditional CF and Public Service career development programs respectively. Process, Theoretical Best Practices Product and Current Practices Action (PPA) Effective intelligence Partially Aligned. performance depends, in the first While senior military instance, on the quality of the intelligence appointments are people occupying leadership and appointed on merit and have at management positions. least some intelligence Organizational change is a exposure, the same is not true of secondary means of achieving Public Service personnel. intelligence effectiveness. Some senior civilian defence intelligence appointments (i.e. DGIP) are occupied by civilians PPA2 with extensive intelligence experience. While other senior Public Service appointments in DND are made on merit (i.e. DM and ADM) there is no guarantee they have any knowledge of, or experience in, intelligence generally, or defence intelligence in particular. Intelligence practitioners work Partially Aligned. closely with policy-makers and Defence intelligence is often strategic decision-makers, to consulted by the MND, CDS understand their requirements and and DM on important issues help educate them in the and particularly in advance of capabilities and capacities of the trips to foreign countries and intelligence function. PPA 4 important meetings such as the G8 and the NATO NAC. Senior appointments do not take time to look ahead beyond current events and engage defence intelligence in future policy or strategy options. 233

Best Intelligence products are Partially Aligned. tailored to the intelligence Defence intelligence tries to consumer, taking into adapt to consumer preferences consideration the level and and delivers a variety of written preference of that consumer, the intelligence reports, verbal time available until a related briefings and graphic material, decision must be made, the time but DGIP ability to produce PPA5 available for advantageous action tailored products is limited at to be taken and the dissemination best. technology available. Strategic intelligence products are generally neither timely nor thoughtful, according to senior operational level commanders. There is a community-wide Partially Aligned. information management (IM) and Defence intelligence IM/IT information technology (IT) policy is planned and managed that holistically manages IM/IT holistically within CDI, but it is development and acquisition not autonomous within DND, or issues, to enable an information PPA8 the wider government at large. sharing environment that thwarts Intelligence IM/IT is viewed the existence of harmful as one component of the overall 'stovepipes'. government IM/IT program, but it does enjoy support in the area of secure systems.

Table 7-3: Partially aligned practices

PRACTICES NOT ALIGNED Thirteen theoretical best practices have no aligned current practices, either because associated current practices are doing something different or are non-existent. Non-alignment is found in the categories of Policy and Governance; and Process, Product and Action; as well as in the People component. There is no legislated basis for Canadian defence intelligence; no national intelligence policy in Canada and no explicit Canadian defence intelligence policy. Noticeable consequences of not having legislation or policy for defence intelligence include the lack of attention paid to the departmental intelligence enterprise by senior civilian appointments; ad-hoc practices that sometimes vary from staff to staff; the lack of a common basis for intelligence studies at the senior or advanced levels; and the absence of formal standards of propriety and effectiveness against which performance can be measured. Moreover, there is also no formal, independent review 234 process that scrutinizes the propriety of defence intelligence activity. While defence intelligence is subject to a number of ad-hoc independent, non-intelligence review activities, like any other Canadian government institution, none is regular or frequent. The most extensive degree of non-alignment is found in the People component, which is significant because of the centrality of people in the practice of intelligence. Even if alignment existed in all other categories, non-alignment in people, depending on its nature and extent, could thwart the production of effective intelligence. The central issue here is that, while the CF has a professional Intelligence Branch, intelligence generally, and defence intelligence particularly, is not yet seen as a formal, established vocation within government or the Public Service. Consequently, specialist classifications, managed career patterns, structured training, education and professional development programs are virtually non-existent for defence intelligence civilians. Within the CF, such things are better, but neither as strong nor as comprehensive at the senior level as they could be. There are other systemic difficulties. Defence intelligence training, education and development programs do not aggressively or extensively engage other 'whole of government' partners. Furthermore, there is a total absence of academic methodological review of defence intelligence education, training and professional development, to ensure they are anticipating and keeping up with trends and future requirements. Three theoretical best practices in the category of Process, Product and Action are unmatched by any current practice. Missing current practices are indicative of the inability of Canadian defence intelligence to sustain production of strategic intelligence and the need to rely on the provision of strategic intelligence from allies, perhaps to an extent that inhibits fully Canadian judgments in all cases. Furthermore, there is a lack of close symbiotic relationships between senior DND civilian appointments and the Canadian defence intelligence analytical staff. This lack of engagement was also apparent in the absence of strategic direction to the defence intelligence staff as a whole. Also of some concern, are the facts that the CDI does not control or coordinate all strategic collection assets; and that there is no formal evaluation of the efficacy of defence intelligence, as judged by either consumer or practitioner. Without these processes in place, defence intelligence meanders, dependent on the initiative and professionalism of 235

Canadian defence intelligence personnel, but unguided by decision-makers. In this way, it is suggested, senior defence intelligence appointments may be abrogating their responsibility to direct the Canadian defence intelligence process. Table 7-4 below shows non-aligned practices in all categories.

Policy and Theoretical Best Practices Governance Current Practices (PG) A national intelligence policy, Not aligned. either explicit or implicit, is There is no national reflected in legislation explaining intelligence policy, nor is there an the theoretical approach taken, overall defence intelligence the legislative basis for policy. government intelligence activity Within DND however, there PG2 and the governance regime that are various Departmental will lead it. Administrative Orders and Directives (DAODs) dealing with specific intelligence activities such as Counter-intelligence and HUMINT. A national intelligence Not aligned. governance structure features a There is no Canadian national clear responsibility and intelligence policy. There is no accountability framework, Canadian defence intelligence supported by transparent policy. The defence intelligence PG4 oversight and review mandate is diffuse and implicit in mechanisms. a variety of legislation, based in the legal doctrine of Crown Prerogative and rooted in military intelligence. Effective oversight Not aligned. mechanisms of intelligence There is no legislated agencies, both internal and framework for Canadian defence external, are embedded in the PG6 intelligence. legislative framework that establishes the intelligence mandate of those agencies. Review scrutinizes Not aligned. intelligence activity after the fact There is no established, regular and is associated with review of Canadian defence accountability. In a PG7 intelligence. parliamentary democracy, some However, Canadian defence legislated intelligence review intelligence is subject to ad hoc organizations report review by a number of legislated independently to parliament and bodies such as the Federal Court, others report separately to a Auditor General of Canada, the responsible minister. Some Canadian Human Rights Tribunal legislated review bodies may and Parliamentary Committees. report independently to both. Theoretical Best Practices People(P) Current Practices From a national intelligence Not Aligned. policy, a human resource strategy There is no distinct defence is derived, to guide the intelligence human resource management and development of strategy. human resources across the CF personnel are managed in government intelligence PI accordance with overall CF community. personnel policies and civilian defence intelligence personnel are managed in accordance with overall Public Service personnel policies. The professionalization of the Not Aligned. intelligence function is Defence intelligence is not recognized and intelligence recognized within DND, nor personnel are remunerated respected as a professionalized adequately, treated with respect practice, although it is considered and offered career enhancing to be an important support and P2 development, including the enabling process. opportunity to compete for advancement into meaningful leadership and management positions in the intelligence community. Intelligence recruitment Not Aligned. efforts leverage modern There is no formal intelligence communications and media to recruitment effort directed at attract and recruit prospective colleges and universities, nor are intelligence people. Intelligence recruitment efforts targeted in any communities cooperatively specific way, beyond the normal engage colleges and universities CF recruiting processes, aptitude in the attraction and recruitment tests and specialist training. P3 of highly educated, qualified and While CF recruitment skilled candidates from the ranks campaigns do generally leverage of graduate and post-graduate modern communications students and faculty. Recruitment technologies, they do not target targets appropriate candidates prospective intelligence recruits with a demonstrated pre­ with demonstrated pre-disposition disposition and intellectual for intelligence work. potential for intelligence work. Intelligence analysis is a P6 Not Aligned. distinct intelligence specialty Intelligence analysis is having a separate career path considered to be a distinct with appropriate monetary and specialty, but not to the degree non-monetary incentives to that it forms a distinct attract people of calibre; a occupational category with its distinct program of professional own career pattern. There is no development; and sufficiently formal intelligence analyst varied employment to allow professional development career advancement. framework or career path. Community-wide training Not Aligned. programs are established to Such training and force prepare intelligence analysts (and generation planning does not exist collectors) in both the language P7 within defence intelligence. and culture of the operational theatre in which they will be operating. The intelligence education Not Aligned. framework continuously receives Not only is there no serious serious academic methodological academic review given to the review to ensure it remains defence intelligence education relevant to the analytical framework, there is no formal requirements of the defence intelligence education contemporary security and threat P8 program. environment. Defence intelligence personnel, both civilian and military are, however, free to pursue sponsored or non-sponsored advanced education as they may wish and for which they are qualified. Process, Products and Theoretical Best Practices Current Practices Action (PPA) Intelligence products are Not Aligned. optimized by a close, symbiotic There is no evidence that relationship between a decision­ senior defence decision-makers maker and supporting analysts; PPA 6 have established a regular and and by the synergy of frequent close, symbiotic relationship with personal interaction between the any defence intelligence analyst, two. on any issue. Strategic technical collection Not Aligned. programs are viewed and There is no comprehensive managed holistically, through a defence intelligence collection PPA 9 centralized management process plan and DND, let alone the CDI, that coordinates deployment and does not control or coordinate employment of assets at the national strategic collection 238

highest practical level and means. provides an effective mechanism for moving collected information to the processing phase. A continuous and formal Not Aligned. evaluation of the intelligence Unlike military intelligence, process for efficacy is defence intelligence does not undertaken through the monitor decision-making or mechanism of the consumer actions taken as a result of its relations process and based products. mainly on the judgments of This shortcoming has been supported decision-makers, PPA11 recognized but a system of supported by a lessons-learned customer relations officers process that operationalizes (CROs) has yet to be meaningfully lessons in intelligence training, implemented. No study has been education and professional done to show that CROs are a development programs, leading more effective measure than direct to the implementation of analyst-client relationships. improved intelligence practices.

Table 7-4: Practices not aligned

FINAL EVALUATION Canadian defence intelligence organization and activity have been less than optimally informed by expert intelligence literature. Current defence intelligence practices are aligned with only slightly more than half of the thirty theoretical best practices derived from expert literature. While Canadian defence intelligence is a politically reliable and structurally sound 'blue collar' enterprise, significant gaps exist between theory and practice in areas of intelligence policy, human resource development and procedural efficiency. The extent of non-alignment suggests that Canadian defence intelligence is not functioning as well or as effectively as it could, were it given a legislated mandate, a national intelligence policy, a larger and more professionally trained strategic analysis cadre and senior civilian leadership imbued with a sense of stewardship. Detailed evaluations associated with each component of intelligence follow.

Policy and Governance Although politically reliable and constitutionally sound, the policy and governance component of Canadian defence intelligence is less robust than suggested in 239 expert intelligence literature. Four theoretical best practices have no current practices aligned and those gaps represents the fact that there is no legislated framework, no complementary defence intelligence policy and no independent review process. These gaps exists because there appears to be little serious intelligence theorizing and research done in Canada generally and in defence intelligence specifically. Although it falls outside the aim and scope of this study, it is interesting to note a passage in Justice Major's opening remarks on 17 June 2010, when he introduced his final report of the Investigation of the Bombing of Air India Flight 182: Communications within and between security, law enforcement and transport agencies were often flawed or non-existent. Agencies relied on different concepts of risk and what constituted a threat to security. A lack of awareness of the threat... at the agency level led to inadequate procedures and practices, and employees were often poorly trained. This reflected a culture of complacency.5"

Complacency, if not apathy, seems to describe the lack of action on the part of DND when it comes to consulting expert literature in the development of a modern defence intelligence policy and governance regime.

Organization Canadian defence intelligence organization reflects advice found in expert intelligence literature largely because it is embedded in military intelligence, which heeded recommendations coming the DIR report.600 However, the defence intelligence organization has not yet reached optimal operational capacity because of significant constraints traditionally found in other components, the principal one being the persistent, perhaps systemic but certainly historical, shortage of personnel. Other constraints already mentioned include: the lack of a defence intelligence policy; the lack of sustained direction for strategic intelligence; the lack of a holistic strategic collection plan; the lack of adequate strategic analysis capability; and the lack of independent continuous review

599. John C. Major, Opening Remarks, at http://www.majorcomm.ca/en/reports/finalreport/commissioner-remarks.pdf (accessed 24 June 2010). 600. Shortly after implementation of the DIR began, the larger program of CF transformation overtook DIR implementation, but the DIR remained a 'touchstone' and was often used to justify changes, particularly additional personnel, required to meet transformation goals. Marshall, Interview, 28 January 2010. 240 and evaluation. The Canadian defence intelligence organization is adequate as it is. To reach optimal performance, there just needs to be more of it.

People The People component of Canadian defence intelligence seems greatly uninformed by expert intelligence literature. Six of eight theoretical best practices derived from expert literature are not reflected in any current practice. This is not to say all current defence intelligence practices are inadequate or ineffective. The specific difficulty is that many management programs are not, and systemically cannot, be tailored to address unique intelligence personnel requirements. The most obvious symptom of this problem is the chronic shortage of adequately qualified and capable people, particularly in the analytical field. There are qualitative concerns too. A former defence intelligence analyst neatly described an important challenge facing defence intelligence when she opined that military personnel were generally over-trained and under-educated, while, conversely, civilian defence practitioners were often over-educated and sadly under-trained.601 In the CF there are insufficient, strategic level education and professional development opportunities for senior Intelligence Branch officers. For civilian defence intelligence personnel, there is simply a lack of training, education and professional development opportunities at all levels. This makes for a limited (in the case of the CF) or non-existent (in the case of civilians) career path in the intelligence field. These deficiencies have notable impact on intelligence processes.

Process Expert literature has had mediocre impact on the Process component of Canadian defence intelligence. There is minimal intelligence awareness or experience among senior civilian defence appointments and no formal program exists to remedy their lack of preparation to engage in, or understand defence intelligence matters prior to taking up their appointment in DND. Consequently, their ability to direct the defence intelligence

601. Monik Beauregard, IACC Focus Group, Ottawa, 25 June 2008. Ms. Beauregard is now the Executive Director of the ITAC. 241 function is impaired on arrival. Fortunately, so far, this weakness has been somewhat offset by the proactive professionalism of senior military intelligence officers. However, even with strong military support, senior defence intelligence authorities have apparently not required, or demanded, a sustained flow of strategic level defence intelligence. There has therefore been no institutional requirement for the centralized coordination, let alone control, of national strategic collection means by the CDI. Strategic intelligence analysis is consequently constrained. Being able to conduct analysis and derive assessments at the strategic level is surely a good portion of the job, but it is essentially incomplete if its value and effect cannot be meaningfully judged. In parallel with the lack of a review process (for propriety) in the Policy and Government category, the Process, Product and Action category lacks a formal, independent process that evaluates defence intelligence efficacy. Moreover, while the review for propriety requirement was, to some extent, 'covered' by available ad-hoc review processes elsewhere in government, there are no such secondary processes available to independently judge efficacy of defence intelligence. Within military intelligence, efficacy is judged, doctrinally and in practice, by military commanders, who retain responsibility for the results of their orders and actions. Things are far from being so clear within the senior defence intelligence hierarchy, where senior civilian appointments have no equivalent 'command' authority and the results of decisions made are not so apparent or imminent. Furthermore, as discussed above, senior civilian defence intelligence appointments are not always engaged in their intelligence duties and are therefore perhaps not inclined to worry about formal review of intelligence they received, what they did with it and what effect resulted. Senior civilian defence appointments with intelligence duties are doctrinally and systemically important to the intelligence process in the direction stage and in the evaluation and review stage. Analysis has shown they are weak in both. This makes it difficult to produce value-added intelligence products.

Product The Product component of Canadian defence intelligence may be well informed by expert intelligence literature but it has been unable to sustain the pace and level of 242 performance suggested by expert opinion. Operational and tactical level military intelligence, like that produced in support of Canada's military mission in Afghanistan, has become routinely superb, but the inability of the CDI organization to match such performance at the strategic level is striking. There are at least three reasons why defence intelligence cannot sustain meaningful effectiveness at the highest level. They center on issues of capability, capacity and interest. First, as discussed in the section dealing with people, the defence intelligence analytical staff simply does not have enough intellectual horsepower to produce relevant and perceptive estimative assessments to the degree needed to apprehend and hold the interest of strategic defence decision-makers. Defence intelligence should be the consultative source of first choice, but it is not. Second, senior defence decision-makers have extensive experience in their own political, military or bureaucratic domains. Many, if not all, will have at least one Masters level degree, as well as some formal professional development achievements under their belt. Most strategic level military leaders have more operational military experience than military personnel in the CDI staff, and certainly more than civilian personnel. Without credible advanced academic credentials reinforced by relevant operational experience, defence intelligence analysts may not be equipped to tell senior defence leaders, civilian or military, anything they may not already know from their own research or other sources. Finally, Canadian defence intelligence also lacks the close, synergistic relationships between analyst and consumer that will be needed to sustain strong, strategic level intelligence products. Three reasons have been previously discussed. First, senior civilian defence intelligence appointments are not seized with their intelligence role. Second, defence intelligence analytic capacity is less than needed for a full strategic level program. Third, the lack of a continuing, independent process of evaluation prevents objective judgement of the efficacy of any intelligence product offered. Moreover, a more fundamental and complex interpretation of the intelligence product, that achieves optimal effect only through synergistic interchange between analyst and consumer, is more of a process than a single item or lone act, but such a cycle is lacking in Canadian practice. 243

Action There is virtually no trace of any reference to expert intelligence literature in Canadian defence intelligence practices related to the Action component. The action component should be included in any process of review and evaluation of intelligence, because the overall intelligence process extends from the beginning of the direction phase, all the way through to the conclusion of action generated by intelligence-supported decision-making. Inherent in this comprehensive understanding of the intelligence process is the requirement to acknowledge continuous review and evaluation as the method by which intelligence is judged to be adequate and complete. Based on analysis completed in this study, Canadian defence intelligence is devoid of regular or continuing evaluation for efficacy and therefore, it cannot be accurately judged, not only whether intelligence has been adequate, but also whether advantageous action has truly been taken or completed.

RECOMMENDATIONS AND FUTURE STUDY In keeping with the theory that intelligence should lead to action, as captured in the description of the six conceptual components of intelligence (policy and governance; organization; people; process; product; and action), I will proceed to offer some modest proposals for action to close gaps between theoretical best practices and current Canadian defence intelligence practices.

Academic Competence To begin to achieve greater alignment with intelligence concepts found in expert literature, it is suggested that there needs to be a willingness among defence intelligence leaders and practitioners to embrace expert academic opinion and to more openly reach out and become involved in academic research in the field. To this end, three related measures should be taken. First, a qualified academic should be appointed as the academic advisor the CDI, with responsibility to oversee the theoretical development of defence intelligence throughout the CF and establish appropriate academic links with other organizations in the Canadian government intelligence community, the Canada School of Public Service and with non-military academia through the SDF program run by ADM Policy in NDHQ. Second, at the Canadian Forces College (CFC), a formal 244 defence intelligence module, containing both theoretical and practical aspects, should be placed within the curriculum of senior courses and a qualified member of the faculty assigned primary responsibility for the development and teaching of that module. This faculty member would also be responsible for establishing and maintaining links with senior allied intelligence-oriented educational establishments such as the US National Intelligence University.602 Finally, another qualified academic should be appointed as the academic advisor to the Commandant of CFSMI and be given responsibility to oversee the theoretical and pedagogical development of military intelligence. The CFSMI academic advisor would also have the responsibility for establishing and maintaining links with allied military intelligence schools, such as that located at Chicksands in the UK. This trio of academic advisors will generate a synergy that is not only aimed at enhancing the academic linkage to defence intelligence within DND and the CF, but to heighten awareness of defence intelligence development and practices among academia throughout Canada and the world. To align DND and CF intellectual effort with contemporary strategic level concepts derived from expert literature, a 'larger', more comprehensive conceptual model of defence intelligence could be developed, which will, in turn, require a significantly greater degree of theoretical thinking about intelligence. The practical implications of this idea are contained in the strategic recommendations that follow. They are generally aimed at creating the legislative, theoretical, organizational and procedural conditions for the recognition, sustainment and development of a modern, comprehensive model of Canadian defence intelligence. They represent the components of defence intelligence examined in this thesis. Every one involves a significant degree of future study.

602. The National Intelligence University (NIU), created in 2005, is subordinate to the US ODNI. It is largely a 'virtual' system that integrates training, education, and related research efforts across the intelligence community. NIU also builds a network of partnerships beyond the community, with federal education institutions and the broader academic world. The University will also lead the development of a community "lessons learned" process. See the comments of General Michael Hayden delivered before the US House Permanent Select Committee Subcommittee on Oversight, 28 July 2005, at http://www.dni.gov/testimonies/20050728_testimony.htm (accessed 11 may 2010). 245

Policy and Governance One could get side-tracked into a kind of 'chicken or egg' argument when trying to decide which is needed first - legislation or policy. The answer, of course, is that it doesn't really matter. Both are required to guide and control Canadian defence intelligence. Here, to privilege the concept of the rule of law, legislation is discussed first. The launch of any serious consideration of the future development of Canadian defence intelligence immediately encounters the fundamental requirement for a legislated framework. The promulgation of such legislation is the first recommendation. This will undoubtedly involve deliberation at the cabinet level, to position defence intelligence within the government intelligence community and clarify the nature and use of its domestic and external capabilities. Ultimately, to remain consistent with other forms of legislation, the NDA should be amended to include a part dedicated to defence intelligence, just as there is a part focused on the CSEC. Established legislation would allow the promulgation of an omnibus Canadian defence intelligence policy, one that is sufficiently grand to include the full range of issues from theorizing about the future of defence intelligence, through a description of a Canadian defence intelligence governance regime to the most practical concerns of the six components of intelligence examined in this study. The promulgation of such a policy would require a more complete study of defence intelligence than is found here. When appropriate legislation and policy are enacted, adaptation of the formal governance structure can be completed, to include an independent review and evaluation function. Other strategies will be needed too, including an overall approach to organization.

Organization The absence of formal review and evaluation of Canadian defence intelligence was noted in a number chapters. This requirement could be met by the establishment of an Inspector General of Defence Intelligence (IGDI), an Order-in-Council appointment akin to the Judge Advocate General or the DND and CF Ombudsman, reporting directly to the MND. The IGDI mandate would include independent review and evaluation of defence intelligence for both propriety and efficacy. The inclusion of both propriety and efficacy should require the appointment of an IGDI who has significant intelligence 246 practitioner experience, not simply one with legal or judicial experience, as has usually been the case in government. Legal or judicial expertise might be captured in the appointment of a Deputy IGDI.

People Perhaps not surprisingly, there are a number of recommendations associated with the people component of Canadian defence intelligence. They are identified in the following paragraphs, beginning with the requirement for a human resource strategy. Recommendations on capacity, employment classifications and professional development follow.

Human Resource Strategy A national defence intelligence policy should lead to promulgation of a defence intelligence human resource strategy that covers the generation, sustainment, development and retirement of a qualified, experienced and highly educated workforce, both military and civilian. Among the important issues to be addressed in the strategy could be: a. the recognition of distinct intelligence career path within DND and perhaps elsewhere in the government intelligence community; b. the production and sustainment of sufficient number of both military and civilian defence intelligence personnel over time; c. enhanced experience, education and professional development opportunities at all levels; and d. structured training, education and professional development frameworks at the entry, mid- and advanced-levels. This human resource strategy might be informed by a full study of other equivalent strategies used by other close intelligence allies and adapted to Canadian requirements and conditions. 247

More Capacity Perhaps the most obvious and least complex recommendation is simply a call to bring more people into Canadian defence intelligence. The objective is clear, but the methods of achieving it are less so. The defence intelligence personnel establishment should be increased to account for all defence intelligence positions, including those generated by international CF deployments. Acknowledging that the total number of such positions will rise and fall with the commencement and conclusion of overseas missions (not all of which are necessarily predictable), it is proposed that the ebb and flow of the number of positions be better managed within the CF Annual Military Occupational Review (AMOR) complemented by a more imaginative and extensive use of intelligence personnel in the Reserve Force.603 Beyond those measures, it may be of value to study ways of making more effective use, part-time or full-time, of personnel recently retired from the Public Service and those in the CF Supplementary Reserve, particularly those eligible to retain their security clearances.

Intelligence employment classification The Public Service is encouraged to examine the intelligence employment classification model used by the CF, for possible adoption across government. The central idea is that there would be a 'civilian intelligence branch' of service akin to the CF intelligence occupational specialty. By almost any measure, Canadian government intelligence activity today is much more sophisticated than in 1945 and it is reasonable to suggest that intelligence practitioners merit their own employment category within the Public Service, especially considering that correctional service workers, meteorologists

603. Given that basic occupational training requires from 2-7 years, the need to correctly forecast intake volume and types of personnel well in advance is paramount. The AMOR is a military personnel management tool designed for planning and sustaining the health of CF occupations and sub-occupations within the Regular Force. The AMOR addresses both internal and external issues that impact an occupation, both positively and negatively; monitors the health of occupations to ensure their viability in meeting CF requirements; and consider/recommend changes to military personnel policies and processes. See CF Mil Pers Instr 1/08, at http://www.cmp-cpm.forces.gc.ca/pd/pi-ip/doc/01-08-eng.pdf (accessed 11 May 2009). 248 and lighthouse keepers, among others, have their own professional pay groups. Members of a 'civilian intelligence branch' would be eligible for specialist intelligence employment across government. This would result in a much more stable and well- trained intelligence staffs everywhere in government, not just in DND.

Comprehensive training, education and development program It is recommended that DND and the CF integrate civilian and military intelligence training, education and professional development into one comprehensive defence intelligence program, the constituent parts of which would be taught at the appropriate point in a career, under the functional authority of the CDI. The central objectives would be to study overall intelligence theory and teach derived concepts of defence and military intelligence, from the tactical to the strategic level. To address the apparent lack of intelligence exposure and experience among senior civilian incumbents and refresh other senior civilian and military appointments, it is recommended that the DND DM and CDI conduct an annual defence intelligence symposium, at which intelligence theory, aspects of the intelligence process, defence intelligence issues facing DND and the CF at the time, and a study of developing defence intelligence requirements for the future would be discussed. Appropriate appointments from OGDs should be invited to attend for two reasons. First, intelligence is not just a DND activity; it is a government activity and the study of intelligence is relevant to all departments with a national security role to play. Second, this DM/CDI symposium would represent a contribution to intelligence stewardship within government, to correct the noticeable lack of such stewardship today.

More analytical capacity DND and the CF should make greater efforts to develop a larger, better educated and more eclectic strategic intelligence analytical capacity. Where the majority of military and civilian analysts hold Master's level degrees, measures should be taken to increase

604. "Rates of Pay for the Public Service of Canada," at http://canadaonline.about.eom/gi/o.htm ?zi=l/XJ/Ya&zTi=l&sdn=canadaonline&cdn=newsissues &tm=7&f=ll&tt=14&bt=0&bts=0&zu=http%3A//www.tbs- sct.gc.ca/pubs_pol/hrpubs/coll_agre/rates-taux_e.asp (accessed 11 May 2010). 249 the number of experienced analysts holding a relevant Ph.D. It is suggested that those with a Ph.D. should be in the clear majority. Military or civilian personnel with newly minted M.A.s and an enthusiasm for intelligence analysis should be recruited and encouraged, no matter where they come from. Young Ph.D. graduates with energy for novel and intriguing research should be enticed into Canadian defence intelligence. Inherent in this suggestion is the thought that analysts need not be 'traditional' public servants needing to be managed in the 'usual' way over their career. While advanced academic credentials are certainly a preferred criterion, a certain degree of practical training in higher military affairs or conflict management would be welcome, in addition to some 'life experience' or 'seasoning.' Older academics who have had a career teaching in a relevant field should also be sought out and encouraged to join the Canadian defence intelligence analysis effort, either full or part-time; working in NDHQ or at home; within their field of expertise or in a related field. In the end, the optimum defence intelligence organization will have a synergistic blend of older and younger; established and new; military and civilian; academic and operational intelligence analysts, the majority of whom hold relevant Ph.D.s and mentoring an up-and-coming bloc of younger analysts with M.A.S.

Canadian Defence Institute for Intelligence Studies The CDA, Canadian Forces College and RMCC jointly represent the hub of military education and development in Canada. CFSMI is the centre of gravity for military intelligence training. The Canada School of Public Service is the central training authority for public servants. As effective as these institutions are, they have not played any substantial role in developing a defence intelligence culture within DND and the CF. If defence intelligence is to enjoy the conceptual and professional profile implied by this study, achieve alignment with theoretical best practices and develop the habit of advanced, comprehensive and complex intellectual study, it will need an established academic centre of gravity. As they have done in the past, DND and the CF should proceed with sponsorship of a Canadian Defence Institute for Intelligence Studies, perhaps as a component of the 250

Canadian Defence Academy and located in Kingston, Ontario, to achieve synergy with RMCC, Queen's University and CFSMI. Alternatively, it might be located in Ottawa, where it could cooperate with Carleton University and the University of Ottawa, for better access to senior personnel and defence intelligence partners. All this, of course must be determined by a more comprehensive study than that found here.

The Security and Defence Forum Finally, it is recommended that DND and the CF build effective and imaginative outreach programs to increase and improve Canadian defence intelligence capacity. A readily available vehicle for doing so can be found in the Security and Defence Forum (SDF).605 The SDF program seeks to promote and develop scholarly interests in contemporary security and defence issues. It is mandated to develop a domestic competence and national interest in defence issues of current and future relevance to Canadian security by awarding grants to Centres of Expertise, scholarships and special grants to finance relevant academic projects, conferences, or other unique initiatives. SDF provides, directly and indirectly, significant funding and support for graduate-level research, peer-review through conferences and publications. Thus, the SDF network has helped create and foster a research-oriented security culture in Canadian universities. The SDF 2009-2010 Annual Report mentions the word 'intelligence' only four times, referring only to conference themes and titles of academic papers - nothing substantive. None of the twelve SDF Centres lists intelligence as a main item of expertise, although David Charters at the University of New Brunswick and John Ferris at the University of Calgary are noted Canadian intelligence scholars. Nonetheless, the point is that there is currently no connection between the CDI organization and the SDF initiative. Consequently, there is no formal academic outreach underway to support CDI development or analysis. More could be done in this regard.

605. See the SDF website at http://www.forces.gc.ca/admpol/newsite/SDF-eng.html (accessed 3 November 2010). Intelligence is not mentioned among the listed examples of academic interests, but it is not prohibited either. 251

Process Civilian defence intelligence appointments should become more engaged in the direction of Canadian defence intelligence activity by embedding intelligence deliberation in their weekly routines, devoting a significant period (say one hour) to consultation with the CDI and relevant analysts, to review current defence intelligence, relevant estimative and warning products, and discuss future policy and strategic level issues; all of which would conclude with meaningful direction to the defence intelligence staff. With frequent and iterative consultations among MND, DM, CDI and defence intelligence analysts, a more synergistic and effective relationship will develop. The establishment of such routine consultation would be a significant step in generating truly strategic level defence intelligence and a habit of strategic level defence intelligence analysis. An important precursor to this development would be a fulsome study of the entire spectrum of national collection (ISR) assets available to support MND collection requirements. DND might at least promulgate a rolling defence intelligence strategic collection plan, incorporating all strategic collection assets (both Canadian, and to the extent appropriate, allied). Enhanced coordination of strategic collection usually leads to better intelligence products.

Product When consumers understand that intelligence is a product derived from a continuing relationship with analytical expertise rather than a simple piece of paper, then Best Intelligence and advantageous action are more likely to be manifest. Continuous review of the effectiveness of intelligence products will identify lessons to be learned. When those lessons are applied, there is a greater probability that Best Intelligence will be produced.

Action The recognition of action as the culminating phase of the intelligence process serves to extend the intelligence cycle and provides the evaluation function with a clear measure of effectiveness. For this reason Canadian defence intelligence should adopt a mature enthusiasm for a more broadly academic approach to intelligence development, to complement traditional and conventional adaptation of military doctrine. 252

SUMMARY This chapter discussed overall findings and evaluated Canadian defence intelligence. It described the general alignment of all theoretical best practices and current practices, grouped according to degrees of alignment - aligned, partially aligned and not aligned - followed by the final evaluation of this alignment by component - Policy and Governance; Organization; People; Process; Product; and Action. Then a number of recommendations aimed at enhancing the alignment of current practices and theoretical best practices were presented, complemented by proposals for future study. The overall findings and evaluation presented in this final chapter note that Canadian defence intelligence practices conform to theoretical best practices in little more than half the instances examined. Of the thirty pairs of associated theoretical best and current practices: ten theoretical best practices have aligned current practices; seven theoretical best practices were matched with partially aligned current practices; and thirteen theoretical best practices had no corresponding current practice. It was argued that this extent of non-alignment indicates Canadian defence intelligence adaptation has not been optimally informed by theoretical best practices derived from expert literature. Evaluation showed that Canadian defence intelligence is constrained by an apparently chronic lack of sufficiently experienced and trained personnel; by the general absence of civilian intelligence stewardship within government; and by an absence of intelligence-savvy civilian leadership within DND. Specific recommendations suggested that Canadian defence intelligence should be grounded in legislation and that a complementary national defence intelligence policy be promulgated. Intelligence studies should also be included in professional development programs of senior public servants, to enhance their ability to provide engaged intelligence leadership and stewardship. Other recommendations call for targeted recruitment and training efforts to grow the Canadian defence intelligence organization. The strategic analysis staff in particular, needs augmentation because it is thought that an enhanced strategic intelligence capability will enable the production of a comprehensive strategic defence intelligence collection plan. 253

Finally, formal intelligence studies within Canadian institutions of higher learning could be nurtured and reinforced by a more active role being taken by the SDF and, as recommended, the establishment of a Canadian Defence Institute for Intelligence Studies.

CONCLUSION Defence intelligence is an important component of government intelligence activity, which itself is a principal element of Canadian national security policy. A comprehensive review of defence intelligence resulted in changes that began to be implemented in 2005. Despite the national importance of such a study, it appears DND neglected to consult as widely as it could have. In particular, there is little evidence that expert academic opinion was sought out during the study. While academia is not the only source of expert opinion, there is a rapidly maturing body of knowledge, including theories and conceptualizations in the field of intelligence studies that could be of some value. Analysis of expert theoretical literature on intelligence can contribute to the enhancement of intelligence practices. Academic research also has the potential to shape public perceptions of how intelligence agencies actually function and influence policy choices about how to make intelligence agencies work better. Formal academic study of intelligence in the West has grown steadily since the end of the Second World War, particularly in the US.606 Interest in intelligence studies increased after the Cold War and accelerated further after 9/11. ABCA intelligence literature grew and matured throughout this period, most notably in the US, which became and remains the field literary 'superpower.' British intelligence literature ranks second in quantity in the English language. Australia and Canada also provide a substantial contribution. Beginning in 1998, Canadian defence intelligence was subject to internal DND study that eventually resulted in fifty (unclassified) recommendations for change and modernization contained in the DIR report. Many of those recommendations began to be

606. The Association of Former Intelligence Officers displays a list of North American universities and colleges that have courses in intelligence, at http://www.afio.com/12_academic.htm (accessed 17 August 2010). 254

implemented in 2005. In the past six years, the extent of change has resulted in something of a transformation of Canadian defence intelligence. However, in those early studies, there is little indication that recommended changes were informed by academic opinions found in expert literature. In fact, amid continuing post-9/11 security environment challenges, an extant CF transformation agenda and a perceived lack of academic consultation, there continues to be virtually no public evidence that academic expert literature and opinion have influenced Canadian defence intelligence adaptation. Accordingly, this study set out to answer the central research question: to what extent has expert intelligence literature informed the practice of twenty-first century Canadian defence intelligence? In doing so, it identified thirty theoretical best practices relevant to a government intelligence organization at the national strategic level and developed criteria for judging expert intelligence literature. Two subsidiary questions were also addressed. First, as derived from the expert intelligence literature, what are the theoretical best practices relevant to a government intelligence organization at the national strategic level? Second, what are the criteria for judging expert intelligence literature? Lacking evidence of any direct link between Canadian defence intelligence and expert academic opinion, I adopted a method of study that involved the comparison of current Canadian defence intelligence practices with theoretical best practices drawn from expert literature. Overall results indicate that Canadian defence intelligence has been less than optimally informed by expert intelligence literature. It was further determined that defence intelligence is an effective intelligence organization whose forte resides at the operational level, but that significant gaps between theory and practice exist in areas of intelligence policy, human resource development and procedural efficiency. Findings were provided in three categories reflecting six conceptual components of intelligence: 1) Policy and Governance; 2) Organization and People; and 3) Process, Product and Action. They show that current Canadian defence intelligence practices are aligned in some way with slightly more than half of the thirty theoretical best practices derived from expert literature. Thirteen theoretical best practices are without any aligned current practices. 255

Expert academic opinion offers views on how these gaps might be mitigated. Analysis of these findings led to recommendations aimed at improving the alignment of current and theoretical best practices. Principal recommendations called for a legislated basis for defence intelligence; a defence intelligence policy; a departmental intelligence human resource policy; a larger, more widely experienced and better educated strategic analytical cadre; and more rigorous leadership and stewardship of the defence intelligence enterprise. A number of other important recommendations addressed personnel issues. One calls for intelligence studies to be included in the professional development of senior public servants, to enhance their ability to provide robust leadership and stewardship for the Canadian defence intelligence establishment. Senior level intelligence studies in the CF are thought to be in need of improvement too, for the same reasons. There were also recommendations that argued for more aggressive, targeted recruitment and training efforts to grow the Canadian defence intelligence establishment, particularly its strategic analysis cadre. More specifically, DND and the CF should proceed with sponsorship of a Canadian Defence Institute of Intelligence Studies, to be the centre of excellence for the study and practice of intelligence in the government intelligence community. Furthermore, recommendations were made to enhance process, product and action, including the establishment of a DND IGDI and a closer more synergistic relationship between civilian Canadian defence intelligence leaders and defence intelligence analysts. Finally, given the results of this study, it is argued that Canadian defence intelligence organization and activity has not been optimally informed by expert academic opinion as expressed in theoretical best practices derived from expert literature. As a result, defence intelligence development has been denied the full advantage of a rich and growing body of knowledge in the relatively young academic field of intelligence studies, with its conceptualizations and theories of intelligence practices not normally found in studies of conventional doctrine and military lessons learned. This is perhaps reason enough why Canadian defence intelligence should adopt a more broadly academic approach to intelligence development. In anticipation of such a move, it is hoped that this study has at least served to illuminate a starting point. BIBLIOGRAPHY

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Commissions of Inquiry

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Interviews and Consultations

Barber, Captain(N) Josh. Chief of Defence Intelligence Staff, National Defence Headquarters. Interview. 28 April 2008 and 27 April 2010.

Barker, Lynsey. Human Resources Officer, Assistant Deputy Minister Human Resources (Civilian), National Defence Headquarters. Interview. 31 October 2007.

Beauvais, Lieutenant Colonel Michael. Commandant, Canadian Forces School of Military Intelligence. Interview. 5 December 2007.

Beharriell, Lieutenant-Colonel Susan. Directing Staff, Canadian Forces College. Interview. 5 December 2008.

Campbell, Anthony. Former Executive Director of the International Assessments Secretariat, Privy Council Office. Interview. 19 September 2007.

Cave, Master Warrant Officer Trevor. Personnel Generation Requirements Directorate. Interview. 17 October 2008.

Compton, Mr. Jeremy. Graduate student. University of Victoria, Wellington, New Zealand. Various e-mails from 19 September 2007.

Cross, Chief Warrant Officer (Retired) Donald J. Personnel Generation Requirements Directorate, National Defence Headquarters. Interview. 17 October 2008.

Davis, (then) Major-General Christopher. Director General International Security Policy, National Defence Headquarters. Interview. 10 April 2008.

Davis, Colonel James. Canadian Special Operations Command. Interview. 15 October 2009.

Denbiegh, Edward. Personnel Generation Requirements Directorate, National Defence Headquarters. Interview. 17 October 2008.

Denovsky, Barry. Former Director General Research and Production, CSIS. Interview. 28 October 2008. 264

Derbentseva, Natalia, Thinking, Risk, and Intelligence Group, Adversarial Intent Section, Defence R&D Canada. Various e-mails and documents. 2 June 2009 to present.

Farson, Stuart. Adjunct Faculty, Simon Fraser University. Various e-mails from 3 February 2008 to present. Interview, 1 November 2008 and 28 October 2009.

Ferron, Brigadier-General James. Director General Information Operations Management, NDHQ. Interview. 8 October 2008.

Focus Groups 4 November 2008, National Defence Headquarters. Chief of Defence Intelligence Staff. 1 x Captain(Navy); 2 x Lieutenant Colonels; 3 x Majors/Lieutenant Commanders; 2 x senior civilian intelligence analysts.

16 October 2008, Canadian Forces School of Military Intelligence. 11 personnel (1 x Lieutenant-Colonel; 3 x Majors; 2 x Captains; 2 x Master Warrant Officers/Chief Petty Officers, Second Class; 2 x Warrant Officers/Petty Officers, First Class; 1 x Sergeant/Petty Officer, Second Class.

Fyffe, Gregory. Former Executive Director, International Assessment Staff, Privy Council Office. Interview. 17 September 2008.

Fraser, Brigadier-General David. Commandant, Canadian Forces College. Interview. 15 January 2008.

Gauthier, Lieutenant-General (Retired) Michel, former Commander, Canadian Expeditionary Force Command and former Chief of Defence Intelligence. Interview. 12 January 2010. Gjos, Lieutenant-Colonel Eric. Canadian Expeditionary Forces Command. Interview. 21 April 2008.

Grimshaw, Commander Paul. Chief of Defence Intelligence Staff, National Defence Headquarters. Interview. 14 April 2008.

Henry, Hugh. International Assessment Staff, Privy Council Office. Interview. 21 January 2010.

Intelligence Assessment Coordination Committee Focus Group on a strawman Intelligence Managers Course. Ottawa, 25 June 2008.

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Jensen, Dr. Kurt. Adjunct Faculty. Carleton University. Interview. 25 January and 18 July 2008. Various e-mails from 25 January 2008 to 31 December 2009.

Kruger, Mr. Jorgen. Chief of Defence Intelligence Staff, National Defence Headquarters. Interview. 21 April 2008.

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Mandel, Dr. David. Head; Threat, Risk and Intelligence Group, Thinking, Risk, and Intelligence Group, Adversarial Intent Section, Defence R&D Canada. Defence Interview. 20 October 2008. Various e-mails.

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Purdy, Margaret. Resident Scholar, Liu Centre, University of British Columbia. Various e-mails from 4 July 2008. Interview, 31 October 2008.

Quiggan, Tom. Author of Seeing the Invisible: National Security Intelligence in an Uncertain Age. World Scientific Publishing, 2007. Interview 27 February 2008. Various e-mails .

Rigby, Vincent. Executive Director, International Assessments Staff, Privy Council Office. Interview. 12 February 2009. Rousseau, Colonel Christian. Chief of Defence Intelligence Staff, National Defence Headquarters. Interview. 25 January 2008.

Simpson, Kurtis. Defence Research and Development Canada (Ottawa). Interview. 22 January 2010.

Thompson, Gudmund E. Chief of Defence Intelligence Staff, National Defence Headquarters, Interviews. 9 July and numerous others to 17 May 2010. Numerous times ending 10 May 2010. Various e-mails continuing to present.

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Whitaker, Dr. Reg. University of Victoria. Various e-mails February 2008.

Wodejko, Marta. Human Resources Officer, Assistant Deputy Minister Human Resources (Civilian), National Defence Headquarters. Interview 31 October 2007.

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COMPARATIVE ALIGNMENT OF THEORETICAL BEST PRACTICES AND CURRENT PRACTICES IN CANADIAN DEFENCE INTELLIGENCE

POLICY AND GOVERNANCE CATEGORY

Policy and Theoretical Best Practices Governance Current Practices (PG) The theoretical approach to Partially Aligned. intelligence taken by a Canadian defence intelligence government reflects the form of suits Canada's parliamentary government to be served, which government by being is then manifest in legislation subordinated to the MND. that defines government However, there is no PG1 \ intelligence organizations. legislated basis for Canadian defence intelligence. It operates under the legal doctrine of Crown prerogative exercised by the federal government in matters of national defence. A national intelligence Not aligned. policy, either explicit or implicit, There is no national is contained legislation intelligence policy, nor is there explaining the theoretical an overall defence intelligence approach taken, the legislative policy. basis for government Within DND however, there PG2 intelligence activity and the are various Departmental governance regime that will lead Administrative Orders and it. Directives (DAODs) dealing with specific intelligence activities such as Counter­ intelligence and HUMINT. The degree to which Aligned. government intelligence is Canadian defence intelligence centralized or decentralized is centralized under political reflects the nature of the control, but decentralized for government it serves. implementation. The defence PG3 intelligence function resides in DND, subordinate to the MND. It is overseen by the DM and functionally directed by the CDI. An national intelligence Not aligned. governance structure features a There is no Canadian clear responsibility and national intelligence policy. accountability framework, There is no Canadian defence supported by transparent intelligence policy. The defence oversight and review PG4 intelligence mandate is diffuse mechanisms. and implicit in a variety of legislation, based in the legal doctrine of Crown Prerogative and rooted in military intelligence. Oversight superintends Aligned. intelligence activity and is Oversight of Canadian therefore associated with defence intelligence conforms to responsibility. In a parliamentary the DND and CF responsibility democracy, executive oversight and accountability framework. is vested in government and PG5 Operational oversight subordinate legislated authority is vested in the DM, appointments. Parliament does CDS and designated CF not exercise direct oversight of commanders, while functional intelligence organizations. oversight authority is delegated to the CDI. Effective oversight Not aligned. mechanisms of intelligence There is no legislated agencies, both internal and framework for Canadian defence external, are embedded in the PG6 intelligence. legislative framework that establishes the intelligence mandate of those agencies. Review scrutinizes Not aligned. intelligence activity after the fact There is no established, and is associated with regular review of Canadian accountability. In a defence intelligence. parliamentary democracy, some However, Canadian defence legislated intelligence review intelligence is subject to ad hoc PG7 organizations report review by a number of legislated independently to parliament and bodies such as the Federal Court, others report separately to a Auditor General of Canada, the responsible minister. Some Canadian Human Rights legislated review bodies may Tribunal and Parliamentary report independently to both. Committees. An elected person, or group Aligned. of elected persons is designated The MND is responsible to as being ultimately responsible PG8 parliament, the Prime Minister and accountable for the and cabinet for Canadian intelligence activity in defence intelligence. government. In a democracy, Within DND, the DM is this is usually the head of responsible and accountable to government, or a cabinet the MND for Canadian defence minister, or a small cabinet intelligence. committee. Within departments, The CDI is responsible and ministers are held responsible accountable to the DM for and accountable for intelligence Canadian defence intelligence. organization in their portfolio.

ORGANIZATION AND PEOPLE CATEGORY Organization Theoretical Best Practices Current Practices (0) Intelligence organizations are Aligned. structured in a manner that finds Defence intelligence is under balance among preferred the political control of the measures espoused in relevant MND, and structured in organizational theory, legislated accordance with the principles oversight mechanisms, the laid out in the CF Joint 01 various requirements of different Intelligence Doctrine and consumers and practical recommendations found in the considerations of security. 2004 DIR report. It conforms to the requirements of the Canadian Government Security Policy. Intelligence organizations Aligned. have managerial elements that Since its reorganization, administer the six components of begun in 2005, defence a government intelligence intelligence now has leadership function - policy and and managerial capacity 02 governance, organization, people available to administer the six process, product and action. components. The adequacy of these organizational elements is discussed later in Chapter 6. Government intelligence Aligned. functions have well-established Defence intelligence partnerships, both foreign and exercises and extensive network domestic, with other intelligence 03 of intelligence cooperation, organizations in informal, principally with ABCA and bilateral, coalition allied and NATO allies. multilateral contexts. Theoretical Best Practices People (P) Current Practices From a national intelligence Not Aligned. policy, a human resource PI There is no distinct defence strategy is derived, to guide the intelligence human resource management and development of strategy. human resources across the CF personnel are managed in government intelligence accordance with overall CF community. personnel policies and civilian defence intelligence personnel are managed in accordance with overall Public Service personnel policies. The professionalization of the Not Aligned. intelligence function is Defence intelligence is not recognized and intelligence recognized within DND, nor personnel are remunerated respected as a professionalized adequately, treated with respect practice, although it is and offered career enhancing considered to be an important P2 development, including the support and enabling process. opportunity to compete for advancement into meaningful leadership and management positions in the intelligence community. Intelligence recruitment Not Aligned. efforts leverage modern There is no formal communications and media to intelligence recruitment effort attract and recruit prospective directed at colleges and intelligence people. Intelligence universities, nor are recruitment communities cooperatively efforts targeted in any specific engage colleges and universities way, beyond the normal CF in the attraction and recruitment recruiting processes, aptitude of highly educated, qualified and P3 tests and specialist training. skilled candidates from the ranks While CF recruitment of graduate and post-graduate campaigns do generally leverage students and faculty. modern communications Recruitment targets appropriate technologies, they do not target candidates with a demonstrated prospective intelligence recruits pre-disposition and intellectual with demonstrated pre­ potential for intelligence work. disposition for intelligence work. There is a community-wide Partially aligned. training framework that offers Military entry-level training at the entry, mid-career intelligence training is available and advanced levels, focused on only to military intelligence various intelligence tradecrafts. P4 branch personnel. Separate entry level training is available to limited numbers of civilian defence intelligence personnel. Military intelligence mid- level training is available mainly to military intelligence branch personnel. There is no formal, mid-level intelligence training available to defence intelligence personnel. Entry and mid-career level civilian intelligence training is ad-hoc and sporadic. Advanced-level training is inadequate for senior military personnel and non-existent for civilian defence intelligence personnel. Professional development Partially Aligned. programs for intelligence Some defence intelligence personnel include opportunities personnel are posted to liaison for joint development with other positions with close (ABCA) intelligence organizations and intelligence allies and have with principal intelligence returned to occupy senior consumers. Successful defence intelligence positions. completion of such joint Some defence intelligence development is a preferred personnel are seconded to criterion for professional intelligence staffs in OGDs (e.g. advancement, particularly for PCO, ITAC and CSIS). those seeking senior intelligence The extent of 'joint' community appointments. assignments is limited and, although viewed favourably P5 when being considering personnel for promotion or appointment, it is neither overtly 'preferred' nor mandatory for advancement. There are no formal defence intelligence professional development programs. Both military and civilian defence intelligence practitioners follow the traditional CF and Public Service career development programs respectively.

Intelligence analysis is a Not Aligned. distinct intelligence specialty P6 Intelligence analysis is having a separate career path considered to be a distinct with appropriate monetary and specialty, but not to the degree non-monetary incentives to that it forms a distinct attract people of calibre; a occupational category with its distinct program of professional own career pattern. There is no development; and sufficiently formal intelligence analyst varied employment to allow professional development career advancement. framework or career path. Community-wide training Not Aligned. programs are established to Such training and force prepare intelligence analysts generation planning does not (and collectors) in both the P7 exist within defence language and culture of the intelligence. operational theatre in which they will be operating. The intelligence education Not Aligned. framework continuously receives Not only is there no serious serious academic methodological academic review given to the review to ensure it remains defence intelligence education relevant to the analytical framework, there is no formal requirements of the defence intelligence education contemporary security and threat program. P8 environment. Defence intelligence personnel, both civilian and military are, however, free to pursue sponsored or non- sponsored advanced education as they may wish and for which they are qualified.

PROCESS, PRODUCT AND ACTION CATEGORY Process, Theoretical Best Practices Products and Current Practices Action (PPA) Direction flows from elected Aligned. political authorities, who, in a The MND is responsible for democracy, are in some way the direction of Canadian directly responsible to a defence intelligence. The DM parliament or congress. oversees defence intelligence on Direction is implemented PPA1 behalf of the MND. The CDI through the government directs the defence intelligence bureaucracy and sometimes effort as guided by the DM. supported by a non-elected, There is no non-elected, expert advisory body of some separate defence intelligence sort. advisory body. Effective intelligence PPA 2 Partially Aligned. performance depends, in the first While senior military instance, on the quality of the intelligence appointments are people occupying leadership and appointed on merit and have at management positions. least some intelligence exposure, Organizational change is a the same is not true of Public secondary means of achieving Service personnel. intelligence effectiveness. Some senior civilian defence intelligence appointments (i.e. DGIP) are occupied by civilians with extensive intelligence experience. While other senior Public Service appointments in DND are made on merit (i.e. DM and ADM) there is no guarantee they have any knowledge of, or experience in, intelligence generally, or defence intelligence in particular. A formal CCIRM process (in Aligned. a generic sense) is embedded as Defence intelligence has PPA3 a principal means of process arguably the best CCIRM in management. government. Intelligence practitioners Partially Aligned. work closely with policy-makers Defence intelligence is often and strategic decision-makers, to consulted by the MND, CDS understand their requirements and DM on important issues and and help educate them in the particularly in advance of trips capabilities and capacities of the to foreign countries and intelligence function. PPA4 important meetings such as the G8 and the NATO NAC. Senior appointments do not take time to look ahead beyond current events and engage defence intelligence in future policy or strategy options. Best Intelligence products are Partially Aligned. tailored to the intelligence Defence intelligence tries to consumer, taking into adapt to consumer preferences consideration the level and and delivers a variety of written preference of that consumer, the intelligence reports, verbal PPA5 time available until a related briefings and graphic material, decision must be made, the time but DGIP ability to produce available for advantageous tailored products is limited at action to be taken and the best. dissemination technology Strategic intelligence available. products are generally neither timely nor thoughtful, according to senior operational level commanders. Intelligence products are Not Aligned. optimized by a close, symbiotic There is no evidence that relationship between a decision­ senior defence decision-makers maker and supporting analysts; PPA6 have established a regular and and by the synergy of frequent close, symbiotic relationship personal interaction between the with any defence intelligence two. analyst, on any issue. Community-wide Aligned. collaborative analysis is Collaborative analysis is practiced. practiced in defence intelligence, due mainly to the military habit of working with and supporting PPA7 commanders at all levels. While technical means could be better, they do not significantly inhibit collaborative analysis within DND and the CF. There is a community-wide Partially Aligned. information management (IM) Defence intelligence IM/IT is and information technology (IT) planned and managed policy that holistically manages holistically within CDI, but it is IM/IT development and not autonomous within DND, or acquisition issues, to enable an PPA8 the wider government at large. information sharing environment Intelligence IM/IT is viewed that thwarts the existence of as one component of the overall harmful 'stovepipes'. government IM/IT program, but it does enjoy support in the area of secure systems. Strategic technical collection Not Aligned. programs are viewed and There is no comprehensive managed holistically, through a defence intelligence collection centralized management process plan and DND, let alone the that coordinates deployment and CDI, does not control or employment of assets at the coordinate national strategic PPA9 highest practical level and collection means. provides an effective mechanism for moving collected information to the processing phase.

Intelligence assessments Aligned. PPA 10 supporting government decision- Difficulties relating to the making are developed in an public release of defence objective, non-partisan, high- intelligence have not arisen in quality way, without concern Canada. over possible subsequent release to the public. A continuous and formal Not Aligned. evaluation of the intelligence Unlike military intelligence, process for efficacy is defence intelligence does not undertaken through the monitor decision-making or mechanism of the consumer actions taken as a result of its relations process and based products. mainly on the judgments of This shortcoming has been supported decision-makers, PPA11 recognized but a system of supported by a lessons-learned customer relations officers process that operationalizes (CROs) has yet to be lessons in intelligence training, meaningfully implemented. No education and professional study has been done to show that development programs, leading CROs are a more effective to the implementation of measure than direct analyst- improved intelligence practices. client relationships. 305

APPENDIX B

SAMPLE INTERVIEW QUESTIONNAIRE

COLONEL XXX DIRECTOR YYY

Date of Interview

This research project identifies theoretical best practices of defence intelligence within a theoretical framework comprised of the following conceptual components: a. policy and governance; b. people; c. process; d. product; e. organization; and f. action.

It then compares these theoretical best practices with current defence intelligence practices. Anomalies are identified and explained. Remedial recommendations are then offered.

The following questions are intended to guide, not restrict, discussion. I hope to take advantage of your wide experience in other areas beyond your current responsibilities.

POLICY AND GOVERNANCE

1. Is there any formal distinction made between military and defence intelligence functions within DND and the CF? Is there a legal distinction?

2. Is there any one 'official' definition of 'intelligence' within the defence intelligence function"? Any one official definition of defence intelligence?

3. To what degree is Canadian defence intelligence development affected by the intelligence initiatives being taken in the US? Is Canadian defence intelligence development more a reflection of the US initiatives, or UK initiatives?

ORGANIZATION

1. What is the status of implementation of the unclassified DIR recommendations relating to intelligence capabilities? a. Have staff resources been strengthened in both the geomatic and imagery programmes? b. Has CDI developed an imagery policy? c. Has a MASINT working group been established to examine cooperation, coordination, direction and standardization of current and future 306

developments as well as potential architectures for MASINT tasking, collection, processing and dissemination? d. Has a MASINT policy and concept of operations been developed? e. Is CFWOS capable of providing an intelligence product?

2. On what cabinet or PCO committees is defence intelligence development represented? Who is that represents defence intelligence?

3. What is the status of the development of the Canadian Academy for Intelligence Studies?

4. What is the status of JIIFC?

5. Have the MSOCs achieved IOC as advertised in the 2007-08 RPP?

PEOPLE

6. Who is the intellectual lead in defence intelligence development? Who is researching intelligence theory? Where is it done? Is it integrated with other intelligence thinking within the government of Canada?

7. Is there an equivalent of your position anywhere else within the government intelligence community?

8. Is intelligence experience or training any kind of formal requirement for employment within defence intelligence generally? In CDI specifically? In defence intelligence capability development?

9. Is the degree of personnel continuity within CDI adequate?

PROCESS

10. From whom do you get your development guidance?

11. To what extent is intelligence capability development integrated with the CF force development process? With closely allied intelligence capability development?

12. What CF force development committees, boards or working groups include CDI representation?

13. Do you have adequate influence over all intelligence related capital projects? JIIFC? C4ISR?

14. What interdepartmental intelligence development committees, boards or working groups include CDI representation? 307

15. Is there a DND-wide collection, coordination, information requirements management (CCIRM) process? A government-wide CCIRM process?

16. Is there a process to sustain innovation embedded in defence intelligence? Who leads it? How do you pursue the 'next great idea' in the defence intelligence function? What is the 'next great idea'?

17. Will today's practice of 'reach-back' and the ASIC concept become the way in which the entire intelligence function will work in the future?

PRODUCT

18. What products do you produce? To whom are they provided? In what form? How often?

19. What specific examples can you give of Canadian defence intelligence capabilities that are leading edge/world-class/ better than anyone else?

20. Is a 'Common Operating Picture' really able to provide true intelligence? (Discuss 'Navy' intelligence ...)

ACTION

21. To what degree does defence intelligence capability development play a role in driving government intelligence capability development? Is defence intelligence capability development sought out and respected? Does defence intelligence exercise its own initiative or wait to be told what its priorities should be? 308

APPENDIX C

PHD THESIS RESEARCH INTERVIEW RECORD

COLONEL XXX DIRECTOR YYY

Date: x Jan 09 Time: 1400-1500 Location: NDHQ Interviewee Colonel XXX Contact information NDHQ, 101 Colonel By Drive, Ottawa, ON Purpose of interview To examine the status of policy and development within the CDI staff and the evolution of its place within the government intelligence community, with a particular interest in the status of DIR implementation. Conduct of interview In office. Results of interview Colonel XXX is an Intelligence Branch officer with more than 25 years in the defence intelligence realm. He has been responsible for defence intelligence policy development for about three years. Colonel XXX's views on the effectiveness of the government intelligence community, the apparent intelligence apathy in higher echelons and the distinct lack of an intelligence culture within government reflected similar views I have heard throughout all intelligence research. I learned that DND is wrestling with the degree to which they want to promulgate Ministerial direction to the defence intelligence function, particularly those aspects that might be activated within Canada. Further, thought is being given to the degree of Ministerial oversight that might be required for certain intelligence activities overseas, to ensure they remain within the bounds of Canadian law where required. It was learned that n of t DIR recommendations were being actively implemented, with no action yet on the other 37. Colonel XXX made it clear that one of the main impediments to DIR implementation is the challenge of getting appropriately qualified people - either military or civilian. Public Service hiring and management practices are problematic and the military training system simply does not produce enough, fast enough. His information is very helpful in situating contemporary defence intelligence among other intelligence organizations. Further work I will return to interview Colonel XXX again later this year to pursue the status of DIR implementation at that time.

25 May 09. I met with Col XXX again. There has been no significant advance on any of the issues raised earlier. 309

ANNEXD SAMPLE FOCUS GROUP INSTRUCTIONS

A COMPARISON OF THEORETICAL BEST PRACTICES AND CURRENT PRACTICES

Thank you for agreeing to participate in a focus group, to be conducted as part of a doctoral research project by James Cox. The project aims to promulgate a doctoral thesis, to be submitted to the Division of Graduate Studies of the Royal Military College of Canada, in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy (War Studies). The working title of the thesis is Adapting to the 21st Century: A Strategic Evaluation of Canadian Defence Intelligence Based on a Survey of Expert Literature (changed to current working title in October 2009).

You are being asked to review the attached table, comparing theoretical best practices derived from expert literature and current practices derived from a case study of Canadian defence intelligence, and to respond to four questions relating to each set of practices.

The theoretical best practices describe those practiced, or intended to be practiced, by strategic-level government-wide intelligence establishments in modern liberal democracies like Canada. These 'best' practices are not ideals to be found in a perfect world. They are observational and have been derived from current, planned or recommended practices as described in the expert literature (expert authors, government inquiries, case studies etc.). They simply reflect what others think are the best achievable in real world circumstances.

First, you are asked to respond to the following four questions relating to the attached list of theoretical best practices. 310

1. Is the list of theoretical best practices reasonably complete?

2. If not, what additional theoretical best practices should be added and from where in the expert literature do they come?

3. Are each of the theoretical practices described accurately and fairly?

4. If not, how better might certain theoretical best practices be described to make them more accurate and fair and what evidence supports such amendments?

Second, you are asked to respond to the following four questions relating to the attached list of theoretical best practices.

1. Is the list of current practices reasonably complete?

2. If not, what additional current practices should be added and what evidence supports that inclusion?

3. Are each of the current practices described accurately and fairly?

4. If not, how better might certain current practices be described to make them more accurate and fair and what evidence supports such amendments?

This review is designed to take a maximum of one hour, but you are invited to take as long as you think is necessary to complete the task. I will act as an objective moderator simply to ensure the questions are addressed, to take notes during group discussion, to offer points of clarification only when requested and to ensure that discussion concludes on time. 311

During the hour, group discussion will be left entirely to the participants. I will not interfere in group activity, engage in any discussion, debate any views or contest any findings.

After the focus group is concluded, should anyone be so inclined, I will be more than happy to receive any separate commentary on any issue related to my project.

Again, thank you for participating. Should you require any further information to help you with this review, please do not hesitate to contact me.

Jim Cox Jim Cox 6048 Meadow glen Drive Analyst Ottawa, ON K1C 5S3 International Affairs and Defence Division 613-841-6183 Parliamentary Information and Research Service [email protected] Library of Parliament 50 Rue O'Connor St. Ottawa, ON K1A 0A9 Tel: (613) 944-6208; Fax: (613) 943-2826; [email protected] 312

VITA

Brigadier-General (Retired) James S. Cox was commissioned in 1967, into the Black Watch (Royal Highland Regiment) of Canada and later joined the Royal Canadian Regiment in 1970. During the period 1972-74, he served as the Canadian exchange officer with the Gloucestershire Regiment, then part of the British Army of the Rhine, in West Germany.

In following years, Brigadier-General Cox served with the Infantry School, Allied Command Europe Mobile Force (Land), twice with the Canadian Airborne Regiment and in senior staff appointments in Army Headquarters and National Defence Headquarters. He commanded the 3rd Battalion, The Royal Canadian Regiment and served as Deputy Commander of the Special Service Force and Base Commander, Canadian Forces Base Petawawa before taking up duty as the Military Chief of Staff in the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM I and II) during 1992 and 1993. Upon return to Canada Brigadier-General Cox was appointed Commander, 1 Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group. In 1995 he became Director General Land Force Development in National Defence Headquarters. From 1996 until 1998, he served as the Army Command Inspector, prior to taking up duties as Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff Intelligence at Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), in Mons, Belgium, in July 1998. He retired from the Canadian Forces in August 2001.

Brigadier-General Cox trained with the United States Army, The United States Marine Corps, the British Army, the Special Air Service and the Royal Marines. He has completed six operational tours of duty with the United Nations and two with NATO. In 1993 he was awarded the Order of Military Merit in the grade of Officer.

Brigadier-General (Retired) Cox is a graduate of the University of Manitoba, the Canadian Land Force Command and Staff College, the Canadian Forces College and has studied at the NATO Defence College in Rome. Since 2001, he has completed a Master of Arts in War Studies at the Royal Military College of Canada (RMCC) and served as the Executive Secretary of the Canadian Association for Security and Intelligence Studies in 2004. During the period from 2005 until 2011 he has been a doctoral candidate in War Studies at RMCC and an analyst in the Library of Parliament, providing national security, defence and veterans issues advice to parliamentarians, parliamentary committees and the Canadian delegation to the Canada-NATO Parliamentary Assembly. Brigadier-General (Retired) Cox currently teaches part-time at the University of Ottawa and Carleton University.

Publications Academic papers

"Watershed in Somalia." In Peacekeeping with Muscle: The Use of Force in International Conflict Resolution, 127-32, edited by Alex Morrison, Douglas Fraser, and James Kiras. Government of British Columbia, 1993. 313

The Transformation of Canadian Defence Intelligence Since the End of the Cold War, M.A. War Studies Thesis, Royal Military College of Canada, 2004.

"The Essence of Intelligence." Paper presented at the International Studies Association 2010 Annual Conference. New Orleans, USA, 17 February 2010.

Intelligence: Definitions, Concepts and Governance, Library of Parliament publication PRB 09-22E, Ottawa, 21 December 2009.

Parliamentary Reports drafted

House of Commons Special Committee on the Canadian Mission in Afghanistan. Canadian Mission in Afghanistan. Report No. 1, 40th Parliament, 3rd Session, 17 June 2010.

House of Commons Standing Committee on National Defence. Health Services Provided to Canadian Forces Personnel with an Emphasis on Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder. Report No. 2,40th Parliament, 2nd Session, 17 June 2009.

Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence Subcommittee on Veterans' Affairs. Report on Reductions of Service Income Security Insurance Plan Long Term Disability Benefits. Tenth Report, 39th Parliament, 2nd Session, 18 June 2008.

. An Enduring Controversy: the Strategic Bombing Campaign Display in the Canadian War Museum. Sixteenth Report, 39th Parliament, 1st Session, June 2007.

House of Commons Standing Committee on National Defence. Canadian Forces in Afghanistan. Report No. 1, 39th Parliament, 1st Session, 18 June 2007.