JUNIOR TASKFORCE ON INTELLIGENCE AND FOREIGN POLICY

Professor Keren Yarhi-Milo WWS 401f (Robertson 014) 117 Bendheim Hall Fall 2012 Office Hours: Mon 11:00-12:00 Monday 1:30-4:30 Phone: 609-258-0772 The Woodrow Wilson School of Public and E-mail: [email protected] International Affairs Princeton University

Seminar Description

The 9/11 attacks and the intelligence pertaining to the Iraqi WMD programs have led policy-makers, academics, and journalists to criticize the practices and judgments of the US intelligence community, acknowledge the gap between ideal and practical intelligence- policy relations, and revisit the sources of intelligence failures and their implications for US foreign policy.

To address these issues, the task force will examine several topics that are central to putting the recent controversies over the 9/11 attacks and the War in in context. We will explore the various sources of intelligence failures and successes; the challenges terrorism and nuclear proliferation in particular pose in the context of intelligence analysis in the pre- and- post- Cold War environments; the sources and implications of politicization of intelligence by policy-makers; as well as evaluate the effectiveness of past and more recent attempts to reform the intelligence community. The taskforce will primarily focus on the US intelligence community, although a comparative perspective, using case studies detailing the experiences of Israeli and British intelligence communities, will be highlighted as well when appropriate. We will meet with former intelligence officers and policy-makers to hear different perspectives on the role of intelligence, and challenges they see in forging a trusting relationship between intelligence officers and policy-makers.

The final task force report will be in the form of recommendations to the Director of National Intelligence and the United States Senate Select Committee on Intelligence.

Requirements

Individual Research Paper

Each student should select a topic for a research paper that pertains to the issue of intelligence and foreign policy, and develop a working research plan that includes a preliminary bibliography and the identification of the relevant materials. Students should meet with the research librarians, and identify officials or experts who might be interviewed. Each student should submit a rough draft of their research paper on November 12. Papers should not exceed 24 pages (including appendices and footnotes, but excluding the title, table of contents, briefing memo, and bibliography.) The paper should be concise and cogent, analyzing the nature of the particular problem, comparing alternative options and their implications, and marshaling information for informed policy choices and recommendations. The paper should include its own set of references and bibliography. Papers should be clearly written and accessible to the audience identified for the Final Report. The final paper is due on January 8.

Briefing Paper

Students should also submit a short (one- or two-page) briefing paper that provides a summary of the substance of the issue, its political implications, and the available policy options. Draft of the briefing memo is due on November 12. The briefing paper is also due on January 8.

Oral Presentation

Each student should make an oral presentation based upon the findings and recommendations of her or his research. These presentations will be strictly timed (10 minutes per presentation), and it should single out the significant points in a well- organized way. The student should be prepared to answer questions and respond to the concerns and comments of other Seminar members. The purpose of the question-and- discussion period is to clarify ambiguities, spell out the implications of certain positions, and highlight remaining issues to be addressed.

The Junior Seminar Report

The Senior Commissioner prepares a draft report with recommendations and their justifications. This report is generally a synthesizing, original statement rather than a compendium of the junior papers. It is intended to blend the juniors' views and recommendations in a creative manner, but with faithfulness to all positions represented. The Seminar discusses and debates the draft report and tries to resolve controversial issues, sometimes by formal vote. A minority report is possible. The Final Report is then prepared. Appended to the Report are the individual juniors’ research papers (completed earlier).

Grading

50% Seminar Research Paper 10% Briefing Paper of Research Paper 15% Oral presentation 25% Participation in the group

Required Books • Mark M. Lowenthal, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy, CQ Press. • Loch Johnson & James Wirtz, Intelligence: The Secret World of Spies, Oxford U. Press, Third Edition, 2011. • Paul Pillar, Intelligence and U.S Foreign Policy: Iraq, 9/11, and Misguided Reform. Press, 2011.

Course Outline and Reading List

September 17:

What is Intelligence? And How does it Work? • Mark M. Lowenthal, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy (Washington, DC: CQ Press), Chapters 1, 4-6, and 8 (Skim Chapters 2 and 3). • Lock Johnson, & James Writz, Intelligence, Intro to Part I, Chapters 1, and 4 • Shlomo Gazit. “Estimates and Fortune-Telling in Intelligence Work,” International Security, Vol. 4, No. 4. (Spring 1980), pp.36-56. • Thomas Fingar, Reducing Uncertainty, Chapter 5: Estimative Analysis, pp. 67- 88. • Optional: http://www.nsa.gov/public_info/_files/cryptologic_spectrum/new_national_sigint. pdf

Foreign Policy Decision-Making: Theories and Practice • Richard Heurer, “Psychology of Intelligence Analysis,” Center for the Study of Intelligence. Central Intelligence Agency, 1999. Available on line: https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi- publications/books-and-monographs/psychology-of-intelligence- analysis/index.html (no need to read chapter 3). • Robert Jervis, "Hypotheses on Misperception," World Politics, Vol. 20, No. 3 (Apr., 1968), pp. 454-479. • Fingar: Intelligence and Grand Strategy: http://iis-db.stanford.edu/pubs/23528/Fingar__Intelligence_and_Grand_Strategy.pdf

September 24: The Intelligence – Policy Nexus

** Learning about Library Research Resources with Nancy Pressman Levy (3:45 -4:30 PM)

• Mark Lowenthal, Intelligence. Chapters 9 and 11. • Jervis, Why Intelligence and Policymakers Clash, Political Science Quarterly 125. (Summer 2010): 185-204. • Joshua Rovner, Fixing the Facts. (Cornell University Press: 2011) pp. 8-48. • Richard Betts, “Politicization of Intelligence: Costs and Benefits,” in Betts and Mahnken, eds., Paradoxes of Strategic Intelligence (London: Frank Cass 2003), 59–79. • Loch Johnson & James Wirtz, Intelligence. Chapters 14, 15, 17. • Richard Best, “Intelligence Estimates: How Useful to Congress?” A Congressional Research Service Report, January 2011, 12. • Paul Pillar, Intelligence and US Policy, Chapter 6 “politicization,” pp. 121-174. • Paul Pillar, Intelligence and US Policy, Chapter 5 “Great Decisions and the Irrelevance of Intelligence,” pp. 98-120. • John McLaughlin, “Serving the National Policymaker,” Chapter 4 in Analyzing Intelligence: Origins, Obstacles and Innovations, pp. 71-90. • Dennis Wilder. Improving Policymaker Understanding of Intelligence: An Educated Consumer Is Our Best Customer. https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi- publications/csi-studies/studies/vol.-k55-no.-2/an-educated-consumer-is- our-best-customer.html

October 1: Challenges in Estimating Intelligence

• Jervis, Why Intelligence Fails, Chapters TBD. • Philip Davies, “Intelligence Culture and Intelligence Failure in Britain and the United States,” Cambridge Review of International Affairs, Vol. 17, No.3 (Oct. 2004), pp. 495–520. • Loch Johnson &James Wirtz, Intelligence. Chapters 8, 10 and 12. • John Hedley, “Learning from Intelligence Failures,” International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, Vol. 18, No. 3 (Fall 2005), pp. 435–50. • David Robarge, “Getting It Right: CIA Analysis of the 1967 Arab-Israeli War,” Studies in Intelligence, Vol. 49, No. 1 (2005). • James Davis, Why Bad Things Happen to Good Analysts, Chapter 10 in Analyzing Intelligence: Origins, Obstacles, and Innovations, pp.157-170. • Uri Bar Joseph and Jack Levy, Conscious Action and Intelligence Failure. Political Science Quarterly, Volume 124, Number 3, 2009.

Surprise Attacks • Michael Handel, “Intelligence and the Problem of Strategic Surprise,” in Betts and Mahnken, eds., Paradoxes of Strategic Intelligence (London: Frank Cass 2003), pp. 1-58. • James Writz, “Theory of Surprise,” in Betts and Mahnken, eds., Paradoxes of Strategic Intelligence (London: Frank Cass 2003), pp. 101-116.

October 8: The Use of Historical Case Studies

Pearl Harbor

• Roberta Wohlstetter. “Cuba and Pearl Harbor: Hindsight and Foresight,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 43, No. 4 (Jul., 1965), pp. 691-707. • James Wirtz, “Deja Vu? Comparing Pearl Harbor and September 11,” Harvard International Review, Vol.24, No. 3, (2002), pp. 73-77 (or Chapter 9 in Johnson and Writz).

The Cuban Missiles Crisis • Jonathan Renshon, Mirroring Risk: The Cuban Missile Estimation http://scholar.harvard.edu/renshon/files/Renshon-Mirroring_Risk_copy.pdf

The Fall of the Shah in Iran • Robert Jervis. “Failing to See that the Shah Was in Danger,” in Why Intelligence Fails: Lessons from the Iranian Revolution and the , (Cornell University Press, 2010) , pp. 15-122. • Janne Nolan and Douglass McEachin, “Discourse, Dissent, and Strategic Surprise: Formulating U.S. Security Policy in an Age of Uncertainty,” Institute for the Study of Diplomacy Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, (Georgetown University 2006), Case # 1 (Iran: Intelligence Failure or Policy Stalemate?).

Cold War Intelligence • John Diamond, The CIA and the Culture of Failure: US Intelligence from the End of the Cold War to the Invasion of Iraq, (Stanford University Press, 2008), Chapters 1 and 2. • Kirsten Lundberg, CIA and the Fall of the Soviet Empire: The Politics of Getting It Right, Case Study C16-94-1251.0 for the Intelligence and Policy Project, John F. Kennedy School of Government (Cambridge, MA: , 1994).

The Yom Kippur War • Or Honig, “Surprise Attacks – Are They Inevitable? Moving Beyond the Orthodox-Revisionist Dichotomy.” Security Studies, 17: 72–106, 2008.

China, Korea • P. K. Rose, “Perceptions and Reality Two Strategic Intelligence Mistakes in Korea, 1950” https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of- intelligence/kent-csi/vol45no5/html/v45i5a06p.htm • Cohen, E. A. (1990). “Only half the battle’: American intelligence and the Chinese intervention in Korea, 1950,” Intelligence and National Security 5 (I): 129-149. • Ford, Harold. “Calling the Sino-Soviet Split: The CIA and Double Demonology” https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi- publications/csi-studies/studies/winter98_99/art05.html

October 15: Recent Blunders

September 11 Attacks • R.J. Heuer, Jr., “Limits of Intelligence Analysis,” Orbis Vol. 49 Nov.1 (2005), pp. 75-94. • Paul Pillar, Intelligence and US Policy, Chapters 9-10, pp. 233-292. • A.B. Zegart, “9/11 and the FBI: The Organizational Roots of Failure,” Intelligence & National Security, Vol. 22, No. 2, (2007) pp. 165-184. • Lock Johnson & James Writz, Intelligence. Chapter 33.

The Iraq War • Thomas Mahnken, “Spies and Bureaucrats: Getting Intelligence Right,” Public Interest, No.81, (Spring 2005). • Robert Jervis, “Reports, Politics and Intelligence Failures: The Case of Iraq.” The Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 29, No. 1 (February 2006), pp.3 – 52. • Paul Pillar, “Intelligence, Policy, and the War in Iraq,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 85, No. 2 (2006), pp. 15-27. In Lock Johnson & James Writz, Strategic Intelligence. Chapter 36. • Paul Pillar, Intelligence and US Foreign Policy, Chapters 2-3. • Lock Johnson & James Writz, Intelligence. Chapter 3 and 14.

Old and New Challenges I: Nuclear Proliferation • Richard Russell, “A Weak Pillar for American National Security: The CIA’s Dismal Performance against WMD Threats,” Intelligence and National Security, Vol. 20, No. 3 (Sept. 2005), pp. 466–85. • Donald Steury, “Dissecting Soviet Analysis, 1946–50: How the CIA Missed Stalin’s Bomb,” Studies in Intelligence, Vol. 49, No.1 (2005), pp. 24–25.

October 22: Intelligence Reform (No Class: Need to Schedule a Make Up) • Michael Warner, US Intelligence Community Reform Studies since 1947 (with J. Kenneth McDonald, Center for the Study of Intelligence, 2005); read on-line at https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books- and- monographs/US%20Intelligence%20Community%20Reform%20Studies%20Since%201 947.pdf

• Richard Posner, The 9/11 Report: A Dissent (available via www.nytimes.com) DNI McConnell’s 100 Day Plan (at http://www.odni.gov/100-day-plan/100 day-plan.pdf) • Richard Betts, “Fixing Intelligence,” Foreign Affairs Vol. 81 (January/February 2002). • Richard K. Betts, “The New Politics of Intelligence, Will reforms Work This Time?,” Foreign Affairs (May/June 2004). • Amy Zegart. “An Empirical Analysis of Failed Intelligence Reforms Before September 11.” Political Science Quarterly Vol. 121, No. 1 (2006). • Joshua Rovner and Austin Long, “The Perils of Shallow Theory: Intelligence Reform and the 9/11 Commission,” Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence Vol.18, No. 4 (Winter 2005–2006), pp. 609– 37. • Uri Bar Joseph and Rose McDermott, “Change the Analyst and Not the System” Foreign Policy Analysis, Vol 4. (2008), pp. 127-45. • Paul Pillar, Intelligence and US Foreign Policy, chapters 11-12, pp. 292- 330.

October 29: No Class - Fall Break

November 5:

Guest Lecture: Paul Pillar

November 12:

Oral Presentations

** Draft Papers Due

November 19:

Oral Presentations

November 26: NO CLASS – MAKE UP ** Guest Lecturer: John McLaughlin

December 3:

Discussion of draft report and minority reports & recommendation

December 10: Presentation of Final Report and Discussion