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Technical Note - TN 020: 2018 For queries regarding this document [email protected] www.asa.transport.nsw.gov.au Technical Note - TN 020: 2018 Issued date: 02 August 2018 Effective date: 02 August 2018 Subject: Update to SPG 0706 - clarification of signal, trainstop and rail vehicle detection placement This technical note is issued by the Asset Standards Authority (ASA) as an update to SPG 0706 Installation of Trackside Equipment, version 2.3 to clarify the construction requirements with respect to the relative position of the signal, trainstop and rail vehicle detection point. The update also clarifies the placement tolerances with respect to where installation or site constraints exist. © State of NSW through Transport for NSW 2018 Page 1 of 3 Technical Note - TN 020: 2018 Replace Figure 4 in Appendix A with the following figures: 101 101 AT DIRECTION OF TRAVEL MAXIMUM PERMITTED STAGGER IN OPEN TRACK – 2.4m (MEASURMENT TAKEN FROM THE POINT AT WHICH THE 101 AT SECTION DROPS) Figure 4A – Relative positions – insulated rail joint – preferred arrangement MAXIMUM PERMITTED STAGGER IN OPEN TRACK – 2.4m (MEASURMENT TAKEN FROM THE POINT AT WHICH THE 101 AT 101 SECTION DROPS) 101 AT DIRECTION OF TRAVEL 1m MAX # 2.5m MAX NOTE: • # - FROM SIGNAL POSITION • INSULATED RAIL JOINT MAY BE PLACED UP TO 2.5m IN ADVANCE OF THE SIGNAL POSITION. • TRAINSTOP MAY BE PLACED UP TO 1M IN ADVANCE OF THE SIGNAL POSITION. • TRAINSTOP SHALL NOT BE PLACED IN ADVANCE OF THE INUSLATED RAIL JOINT. • INSULATED RAIL JOINT AND TRAINSTOP SHALL NOT BE PLACED IN REAR OF THE SIGNAL POSITION. Figure 4B – Relative positions – insulated rail joint – alternate arrangement (installation constraints) © State of NSW through Transport for NSW 2018 Page 2 of 3 Technical Note - TN 020: 2018 Replace Figure 5 in Appendix A with the following figures: SI – SELF INDUCTANCE DIRECTION OF TRAVEL (CENTRE POINT OF 101 TUNED LOOP) TU SI 3.5M Figure 5A – Relative positions – tuned loop – preferred arrangement DIRECTION OF TRAVEL SI – SELF INDUCTANCE (CENTRE POINT OF 101 TUNED LOOP) TU SI 1m MAX # 2.5M MAX 3.5M NOTE: • # - FROM SIGNAL POSITION • SIGNAL MAY BE PLACED UP TO 2.5M IN REAR OF THE RAIL VEHICLE DETECTION POINT. • TRAINSTOP MAY BE PLACED UP TO 1M IN ADVANCE OF THE SIGNAL POSITION. • TRAINSTOP SHALL NOT BE PLACED IN ADVANCE OF THE RAIL VEHICLE DETCTION POINT. Figure 5B – Relative positions – tuned loop – alternate configuration (installation constraints) Authorisation: Technical content Checked and Interdisciplinary Authorised for prepared by approved by coordination release checked by Signature Date Name Daniel Oakes Omer Saricilar Peter McGregor Jagath Peiris Position Principal Engineer A/Lead Signals and A/Chief Engineer Director Technical Standards Control Systems Network Standards Engineer and Services © State of NSW through Transport for NSW 2018 Page 3 of 3 Technical Note - TN 030: 2017 For queries regarding this document [email protected] www.asa.transport.nsw.gov.au Technical Note - TN 030:2017 Issued date: 02 August 2017 Effective date: 02 August 2017 Subject: Amendment to balise tail cable installations This technical note is issued by the Asset Standards Authority to notify the following amendment to SPG 0706 Installation of Trackside Equipment, version 2.3. Replace the heading and the contents of Section 9.3 ETCS Tail Cable with the following content: Section 9.3 Balise tail cable The balise tail cable is a single pair cable connected to the ETCS junction box at one end and terminated to the balise at the other end. It is a surface run cable that shall be provided for mechanical protection. Section 9.3.1 Installation of balise tail cable Balise tail cabling shall be installed so that it is secured in such a way to positively locate and protect cables within the danger zone, making the installation compatible with the operation of track tampers and ballast regulators. Where the balise is mounted on a sleeper, the balise tail cable shall be secured to the sleeper using RailCorp approved track cable protector plates (details for manufacture and installation outlined in the RailCorp ‘Track Cable Protector’ guideline). Refer to standard construction drawings M05-507, M05-510, M05-512, M05-544 and M05-558 for installation details. Surface run balise tail cables between the ETCS junction box and balise shall be sleeved with approved orange flexible electrical hose over the length of the cable to provide mechanical protection and to improve visibility. Refer to standard drawing M05-510 for standard surface mounted cable construction guidelines. When assessing an existing conduit route, balise tail cables shall not be run with air lines. © State of NSW through Transport for NSW 2017 Page 1 of 3 Technical Note - TN 030: 2017 Section 9.3.1.1 Cross-track cable installations The whole-of-life costs have been assessed and it is not cost effective to install a ULX/URX for an ETCS balise tail cable(s) to cross one track. In certain circumstances it may be necessary to install a surface-laid balise tail cable in such a way that it is required to cross an adjacent line before being connected to an ETCS balise. Surface-laid cross-track installation of a balise tail cable as shown in M05-509 is considered as a non-standard installation. The application of surface-laid cross-track installations for balise tail cables shall be restricted to ETCS limited supervision only. At locations where multiple balise track cables are required to be run across an adjacent line, steps shall be taken to minimise the use of cross-track installations by combining the actual cross-track location. Prior to considering using this installation method, an evaluation of the site conditions is necessary to identify any constraints that can exist and to ensure all risks have effective treatments. Justification to use a non-standard installation method shall be documented and shall include evidence of proper consultation. This shall include consultation with the local maintainers to ensure any impacts to local maintenance practices are also taken into consideration. Factors influencing the decision to install a surface-laid cross-track cable installation may include, but not limited to, the following: • no existing ULX within the vicinity • existing ULX is not re-enterable for balise tail cable • any requirements for keeping the adjacent line operational during maintenance activities The minimum requirements of standard drawing M05-509 shall be included into the installation of surface-laid cross-track cables. The installation of a surface-laid cross-track cable shall follow the criteria as shown in M05-510 and shall also include the following: • The balise track cable shall be protected by an approved standard 32 mm orange coloured PVC electrical hose between two parallel and immediately adjacent tracks. • The orange hose shall be continuous and installed along the sleeper face in the four-foot under the cable protector plates continued across the six-foot on top of the ballast to the balise located on the adjacent track. • The cross-track cable installation shall cross one adjacent line only. • The route to the balise across the six-foot shall have no more than a four sleeper stagger. © State of NSW through Transport for NSW 2017 Page 2 of 3 Technical Note - TN 030: 2017 Authorisation: Technical content Checked and Interdisciplinary Authorised for prepared by approved by coordination release checked by Signature Date Name Eric Edwards Peter McGregor Jason R Gordon Jagath Peiris Position Senior Signal Lead Signals and Chief Engineer Director Engineer Control Systems Network Standards Engineer and Services © State of NSW through Transport for NSW 2017 Page 3 of 3 Technical Note - TN 011: 2016 For queries regarding this document [email protected] www.asa.transport.nsw.gov.au Technical Note - TN 011: 2016 Issued date: 20 April 2016 Effective date: 20 April 2016 Subject: Update to SPG 0706 Installation of Trackside Equipment This technical note is issued by the Asset Standards Authority to notify the following changes to SPG 0706 Installation of Trackside Equipment, Version 2.3. Section 9.1.1.4 Temporary speed warning balise groups (TSW’s); second paragraph is replaced with the following content: The balise group for a temporary speed restriction (TSR) shall be positioned at the Warning TSR sign in the normal direction being protected but may be moved up to 30 m beyond the TSR Warning sign if required. Section 9.1.1.4 Temporary speed warning balise groups (TSW’s); fourth paragraph is replaced with the following content: The TSW balise group shall not be located closer than 10 m from any other balise on the same track. Section 9.1.1.4 Temporary speed warning balise groups (TSW’s); add the following final paragraph: Where a guard rail or other object is encountered in the four foot, the TSW balise group should be relocated. As a simplified requirement, the balise shall not be any closer than 10 m from guard rails, point's equipment or any large objects (containing metal) in the four foot. The entire contents of Section 9.1.2 Balise installation is replaced with the following content: There are three types of balise mounting methods permitted: • Vortok (or the approved alternative) on-sleeper spreader beam (eClip or FastClip) © State of NSW through Transport for NSW Page 1 of 5 Technical Note - TN 011: 2016 • direct fixed (typically bolted direct to sleeper or slab) • Vortok (or the approved alternative) between-sleeper universal mount spreader beam (for example, for TSW or where the normative balise permanent mounting methods are impractical due to the infrastructure constraints) Balises shall be secured in a manner that allows repeated removal and re-fixing using tools, by authorised personnel.
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