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1 Ottoman military In return, they had to provide men-at- arms in proportion to the amount of bene- organization (up to 1800) fice in their possession. Later they became GA´ BOR A´ GOSTON the fief-based provincial cavalry, or timar- holding sipahis, whose remuneration was The Ottoman Turks, who emerged in secured through military fiefs (timar). The western Asia Minor in the late thirteenth bulk of the early Ottoman forces under century, built one of the longest-lived Osman (?–1324?), the founder of the empires in history, a multi-ethnic state that dynasty, consisted of mounted archers and influenced the lives of millions in Europe excelled in raids and ambushes rather than and Asia for six centuries until the empire’s formal battles and sieges. However, by the demise in World War I. In addition to its reign of Orhan (1324–1362) and Murad I pragmatic policies and flexible governance, (1362–1389), the Ottoman military had the Ottoman military played a crucial role been transformed from the ruler’s raiding in the expansion of Ottoman realms. The forces into a disciplined army, and was capa- Ottomans were among the first to create a ble of conducting campaigns and sieges. standing military force, the Janissary corps, In the fourteenth century, young volun- which was established as early as the late teer peasants were recruited for the infantry fourteenth century. Until the late seven- yaya (footman) and cavalry mu¨sellem teenth century, the army and logistical sys- (exemptee) corps. Paid by the ruler during tem proved superior to those of their campaigns, they returned to their villages European and Asian rivals. However, eco- after campaigns and were exempted from nomic and social upheavals in the empire certain taxes in lieu of their military service. in the seventeenth century, together with Under Murad I the salaried palace horse- the growing military threat of the Ottomans’ men, known as sipahis, gradually replaced foes, Austria and especially Russia from the the mu¨sellems, whereas the azab infantry mid-eighteenth century onward, resulted in archers and the more famous Janissaries major changes in the Ottoman military took the yayas’ place in the army. As a con- forces and their financing. sequence, the yayas and mu¨sellems became auxiliary forces, transporting weapons and ammunition and building and repairing THE EARLY OTTOMAN MILITARY roads and bridges during campaigns. The azabs were a kind of peasant militia In the early years of the Ottoman state, the composed originally of unmarried young bulk of the Ottoman army consisted of the men fit for war, who were levied from the ruler’s military entourage, the cavalry taxpaying subjects. In the late fifteenth and troops of Turkoman tribes that had joined early sixteenth centuries, some twenty to forces with the Ottomans, and those thirty reaya households were responsible peasants who had been called up as soldiers for equipping and sending one fighting for military campaigns. The members of the azab soldier to campaigns. Armed with military entourage, known as kul (“slave”) bows and swords, infantry azabs were and no¨ker (“companion, client, retainer”), expendable conscripts who fought in the were the forerunners of the sultans’ salaried first rows of the Ottoman battle formation, troops. The Turkoman cavalrymen received in front of the cannons and Janissaries. a share of military spoils and were granted While their number was significant in the the right to settle on conquered lands. fifteenth century (20,000 at the conquest of The Encyclopedia of War, First Edition. Edited by Gordon Martel. © 2012 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2012 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2 Constantinople in 1453, and 40,000 in the and in addition to their military training 1473 campaign against the Akkoyunlu they served as a cheap workforce for public Turkoman Confederation in eastern building projects or worked in the sultan’s Anatolia), the Janissaries gradually over- gardens, the imperial dockyards in Istanbul took their role, relegating them to garrison and Gallipoli, or in the imperial cannon service. Azabs also served as archers and foundry. After several years of such service later musketeers on ships; they guarded they became Janissaries or joined the corps the coastline and ports and worked in the of gunners, gun carriage drivers, bombar- imperial naval arsenal and the many ship- diers, and armorers. The levies occurred yards throughout the empire. Paid from the haphazardly in the fifteenth century, and imperial treasury, the number of marine more regularly in the sixteenth century, azabs decreased from 2,279 in the mid- when the frequent wars often decimated sixteenth century to 239 in 1694. the ranks of the Janissaries. By the end of that century, however, the ranks of the Janissaries were filled with sons of Jan- THE STANDING ARMY issaries and thus the child levy became unnecessary. Established in the 1370s, the Janissaries, or With the broadening of the pool of “new troops” (Turkish yeni¸eri c ), served recruitment, the initial guard was soon initially as the sultan’s elite guard and com- transformed into the ruler’s elite household prised only a few hundred men. At first the infantry, numbering about 2,000 men by the sultan used prisoners of war to create his Battle of Kosovo (1389), 5,000 men in the own independent military guard. Later, in mid-fifteenth century, and about 10,000 men the 1380s, the child levy or “collection” by the end of Mehmed II’s reign in 1481. The (devshirme) was introduced to recruit new Janissaries remained about 10,000–12,000 soldiers. Under this system, Christian boys strong until the end of the sixteenth century. between 8 and 20 years old, and preferably The bulk of the Ottoman army, however, between 12 and 14 years of age, were peri- remained cavalry. Until the beginning of the odically taken at varying rates, usually one sixteenth century the freelance light cavalry boy from forty households. akıncı raiders remained militarily signifi- A group of 100–200 boys, called “the cant. In 1475, Mehmed II mobilized 6,000 flock,” was collected and a detailed register such raiders, whereas Suleiman I was compiled, containing each boy’s name (r. 1520–1566) brought 20,000 of them to and physical description. The “flock” then his 1521 campaign against Hungary. Along traveled on foot to the capital. Those who with the standing infantry forces, the did not escape or perish during the long sultans also paid six cavalry units whose journey were inspected on arrival, circum- number doubled between 1527 and 1567, cised, and converted to Islam. The smartest from 5,088 men to 11,251. were singled out for education in the An even larger cavalry force was empire’s elite Palace School. The rest were maintained through the timar military hired out to Turkish farmers for seven to fiefs. In return for the right to collect reve- eight years, learning the rudiments of the nues from his assigned villages, the Otto- Turkish language and Islamic customs. man provincial cavalryman had to provide After these years the boys joined the ranks for his arms (short sword, bows), armor of Janissary novices. They lived in their own (helmet and chain mail), and horse, and barracks under strict military discipline, to report for military service along with 3 his armed retainers when called upon by the sixteenth century. For major sultan-led cam- sultan. The number of armed retainers that paigns, Mehmed II, Selim I (r. 1512–1520), the provincial cavalryman had to keep, arm, and Suleiman I could and did mobilize and bring with him on campaigns increased 70,000– 80,000 men or more, including the proportionately with the income from his standing units, the provincial cavalry paid fief; the more income he had, the more through military fiefs and vassals, thus soldiers he was obliged to provide. In greatly outnumbering their opponents. order to keep track of the number of fief- Based on Ottoman treasury accounts, the holding cavalrymen and their obligations, paper numbers of the Ottoman salaried the Ottomans introduced various survey troops are summarized in Table 1. registers, perhaps as early as the reign of As we shall see later, the paper figures in Bayezid I. During campaigns, muster rolls Table 1 are often inflated, especially from were checked against these registers in order the late seventeenth century onward, and to determine whether all the cavalrymen the size of deployable and deployed central reported for military duty and brought the troops was considerably smaller. However, required number of retainers and equip- they reflected one important trend, the ment. If the cavalryman did not report for increase of salaried troops, which took service or failed to bring with him the place in the Ottoman military as a response required number of retainers, he lost his to the new challenges that the Ottomans military fief, which was then assigned to faced when fighting against their Habsburg someone else. and Romanov enemies. The timar fiefs and the related bureau- cratic surveillance system provided the Otto- man sultans in the fifteenth and sixteenth WEAPONRY, ARMS INDUSTRY, centuries with a standing provincial cavalry AND LOGISTICS army of 50,000–80,000 strong, while reliev- ing the central Ottoman bureaucracy of the The bulk of the Ottoman army (infantry burden of revenue-raising and paying mili- azabs, cavalry timariots, and akıncıs) used tary salaries. The system also proved instru- swords and bows. The Ottomans adopted mental in administering the provinces, firearms in the latter part of the fourteenth maintaining law and order, and protecting century, and established a separate artillery the taxpaying subjects from abuses on the corps as part of the sultan’s standing part of their “landlords.” Provincial and dis- army in the early fifteenth century, well trict governors, also remunerated through before their European opponents.
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