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"Ottoman Military Organization (Up to 1800)" In

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1 Ottoman military In return, they had to provide men-at- arms in proportion to the amount of bene- organization (up to 1800) fice in their possession. Later they became GA´ BOR A´ GOSTON the fief-based provincial cavalry, or timar- holding , whose remuneration was The , who emerged in secured through military fiefs (timar). The western Asia Minor in the late thirteenth bulk of the early Ottoman forces under century, built one of the longest-lived Osman (?–1324?), the founder of the empires in history, a multi-ethnic state that dynasty, consisted of mounted archers and influenced the lives of millions in Europe excelled in raids and ambushes rather than and Asia for six centuries until the empire’s formal battles and sieges. However, by the demise in . In addition to its reign of (1324–1362) and Murad I pragmatic policies and flexible governance, (1362–1389), the Ottoman military had the Ottoman military played a crucial role been transformed from the ruler’s raiding in the expansion of Ottoman realms. The forces into a disciplined army, and was capa- Ottomans were among the first to create a ble of conducting campaigns and sieges. standing military force, the corps, In the fourteenth century, young volun- which was established as early as the late teer peasants were recruited for the infantry fourteenth century. Until the late seven- (footman) and cavalry mu¨sellem teenth century, the army and logistical sys- (exemptee) corps. Paid by the ruler during tem proved superior to those of their campaigns, they returned to their villages European and Asian rivals. However, eco- after campaigns and were exempted from nomic and social upheavals in the empire certain taxes in lieu of their military service. in the seventeenth century, together with Under Murad I the salaried palace horse- the growing military threat of the Ottomans’ men, known as sipahis, gradually replaced foes, Austria and especially Russia from the the mu¨sellems, whereas the azab infantry mid-eighteenth century onward, resulted in archers and the more famous major changes in the Ottoman military took the yayas’ place in the army. As a con- forces and their financing. sequence, the yayas and mu¨sellems became auxiliary forces, transporting weapons and ammunition and building and repairing THE EARLY OTTOMAN MILITARY roads and bridges during campaigns. The azabs were a kind of peasant militia In the early years of the Ottoman state, the composed originally of unmarried young bulk of the Ottoman army consisted of the men fit for war, who were levied from the ruler’s military entourage, the cavalry taxpaying subjects. In the late fifteenth and troops of Turkoman tribes that had joined early sixteenth centuries, some twenty to forces with the Ottomans, and those thirty reaya households were responsible peasants who had been called up as soldiers for equipping and sending one fighting for military campaigns. The members of the azab soldier to campaigns. Armed with military entourage, known as kul (“slave”) bows and swords, infantry azabs were and no¨ker (“companion, client, retainer”), expendable conscripts who fought in the were the forerunners of the sultans’ salaried first rows of the Ottoman battle formation, troops. The Turkoman cavalrymen received in front of the cannons and Janissaries. a share of military spoils and were granted While their number was significant in the the right to settle on conquered lands. fifteenth century (20,000 at the conquest of

The Encyclopedia of War, First Edition. Edited by Gordon Martel. © 2012 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2012 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2

Constantinople in 1453, and 40,000 in the and in addition to their military training 1473 campaign against the Akkoyunlu they served as a cheap workforce for public Turkoman Confederation in eastern building projects or worked in the sultan’s ), the Janissaries gradually over- gardens, the imperial dockyards in took their role, relegating them to garrison and Gallipoli, or in the imperial cannon service. Azabs also served as archers and foundry. After several years of such service later musketeers on ships; they guarded they became Janissaries or joined the corps the coastline and ports and worked in the of gunners, gun carriage drivers, bombar- imperial naval arsenal and the many ship- diers, and armorers. The levies occurred yards throughout the empire. Paid from the haphazardly in the fifteenth century, and imperial treasury, the number of marine more regularly in the sixteenth century, azabs decreased from 2,279 in the mid- when the frequent wars often decimated sixteenth century to 239 in 1694. the ranks of the Janissaries. By the end of that century, however, the ranks of the Janissaries were filled with sons of Jan- THE STANDING ARMY issaries and thus the child levy became unnecessary. Established in the 1370s, the Janissaries, or With the broadening of the pool of “new troops” (Turkish yeni¸eri c ), served recruitment, the initial guard was soon initially as the sultan’s elite guard and com- transformed into the ruler’s elite household prised only a few hundred men. At first the infantry, numbering about 2,000 men by the sultan used prisoners of war to create his (1389), 5,000 men in the own independent military guard. Later, in mid-fifteenth century, and about 10,000 men the 1380s, the child levy or “collection” by the end of Mehmed II’s reign in 1481. The () was introduced to recruit new Janissaries remained about 10,000–12,000 soldiers. Under this system, Christian boys strong until the end of the sixteenth century. between 8 and 20 years old, and preferably The bulk of the Ottoman army, however, between 12 and 14 years of age, were peri- remained cavalry. Until the beginning of the odically taken at varying rates, usually one sixteenth century the freelance light cavalry boy from forty households. akıncı raiders remained militarily signifi- A group of 100–200 boys, called “the cant. In 1475, Mehmed II mobilized 6,000 flock,” was collected and a detailed register such raiders, whereas Suleiman I was compiled, containing each boy’s name (r. 1520–1566) brought 20,000 of them to and physical description. The “flock” then his 1521 campaign against Hungary. Along traveled on foot to the capital. Those who with the standing infantry forces, the did not escape or perish during the long sultans also paid six cavalry units whose journey were inspected on arrival, circum- number doubled between 1527 and 1567, cised, and converted to Islam. The smartest from 5,088 men to 11,251. were singled out for education in the An even larger cavalry force was empire’s elite . The rest were maintained through the timar military hired out to Turkish farmers for seven to fiefs. In return for the right to collect reve- eight years, learning the rudiments of the nues from his assigned villages, the Otto- and Islamic customs. man provincial cavalryman had to provide After these years the boys joined the ranks for his arms (short sword, bows), armor of Janissary novices. They lived in their own (helmet and chain mail), and horse, and barracks under strict military discipline, to report for military service along with 3 his armed retainers when called upon by the sixteenth century. For major sultan-led cam- sultan. The number of armed retainers that paigns, Mehmed II, (r. 1512–1520), the provincial cavalryman had to keep, arm, and Suleiman I could and did mobilize and bring with him on campaigns increased 70,000– 80,000 men or more, including the proportionately with the income from his standing units, the provincial cavalry paid fief; the more income he had, the more through military fiefs and vassals, thus soldiers he was obliged to provide. In greatly outnumbering their opponents. order to keep track of the number of fief- Based on Ottoman treasury accounts, the holding cavalrymen and their obligations, paper numbers of the Ottoman salaried the Ottomans introduced various survey troops are summarized in Table 1. registers, perhaps as early as the reign of As we shall see later, the paper figures in Bayezid I. During campaigns, muster rolls Table 1 are often inflated, especially from were checked against these registers in order the late seventeenth century onward, and to determine whether all the cavalrymen the size of deployable and deployed central reported for military duty and brought the troops was considerably smaller. However, required number of retainers and equip- they reflected one important trend, the ment. If the cavalryman did not report for increase of salaried troops, which took service or failed to bring with him the place in the Ottoman military as a response required number of retainers, he lost his to the new challenges that the Ottomans military fief, which was then assigned to faced when fighting against their Habsburg someone else. and Romanov enemies. The timar fiefs and the related bureau- cratic surveillance system provided the Otto- man sultans in the fifteenth and sixteenth WEAPONRY, ARMS INDUSTRY, centuries with a standing provincial cavalry AND LOGISTICS army of 50,000–80,000 strong, while reliev- ing the central Ottoman bureaucracy of the The bulk of the Ottoman army (infantry burden of revenue-raising and paying mili- azabs, cavalry timariots, and akıncıs) used tary salaries. The system also proved instru- swords and bows. The Ottomans adopted mental in administering the provinces, firearms in the latter part of the fourteenth maintaining law and order, and protecting century, and established a separate artillery the taxpaying subjects from abuses on the corps as part of the sultan’s standing part of their “landlords.” Provincial and dis- army in the early fifteenth century, well trict governors, also remunerated through before their European opponents. Initially, these military fiefs, served as military com- the Janissaries were equipped with their manders of the cavalry forces of their respec- formidable recurved bow, saber, shield, tive provinces and districts, as well as heads and light coat of mail, while other units of the provincial administration, which was used crossbows, javelins, and war-axes. charged, among other duties, with collecting Under Murad II (r. 1421–1444, 1446– taxes and maintaining law and order. The 1451), they began to use matchlock arque- frequent rotation of governors and their sur- buses, called tu¨fek in Ottoman sources. The veillance by Muslim judges, sent by the cen- fact that fortress inventories of the mid- tral government, prevented the emergence of fifteenth century listed tu¨feks alongside can- independent local strong men in the prov- nons (top) suggests that by this time the inces and proved an efficient way to maintain tu¨fek had evolved into hand-held firearms and mobilize large forces until the end of the of the arquebus type. By the mid-sixteenth 4

Table 1 The paper number of central salaried troops

Date Janissary Artillery Cavalry Total

1514–1515 10,156 1,171 5,316 16,643 1527–1528 7,886 2,163 5,088 15,137 1567–1568 12,798 2,671 11,044 26,513 1574 13,599 2,034 6,047 21,680 1609 37,627 7,966 14,869 60,462 1652 55,151 7,246 20,479 82,876 1654 51,047 6,905 19,844 77,796 1660–1661 55,151 7,246 ? ? 1661–1662 54,222 6,497 15,248 75,967 1665–1666 20,467 ? ? ? 1666–1667 47,233 ? ? ? 1669–1670 39,470 8,014 14,070 61,554 1694–1695 78,798 21,824 13,395 114,017 1696–1697 69,620 14,726 15,217 99,563 1698–1699 67,729 15,470 13,447 96,646 1700–1701 42,119 11,485 13,043 66,647 1701–1702 39,925 10,893 12,999 63,817 1702–1703 40,139 10,010 12,976 63,125 1704–1705 52,642 11,851 17,133 81,626 1710–1711 43,562 5,510 15,625 64,697 1712 36,383 1723–1724 24,403 1727–1728 24,733 1728–1729 24,803 1729–1730 98,723 1761–1762 49,708 1775–1776 61,239

Source: Genc¸ and O¨ zvar (2006), vol. 1: 237–238; A´ goston (2010): 116, 128–129. century most Janissaries carried firearms. in Hungary (Buda and Temesva´r), the Murad III (r. 1574–1595) equipped his Balkans (Rudnik, Semendire, I˙skenderiye, Janissaries with the more advanced match- Novaberda, Pravis¸te, and Belgrade), Anatolia lock musket, although flintlock muskets (Diyarbekir, Erzurum, Birecik, Mardin, and with the Spanish miquelet-lock were also Van), Iraq (Baghdad and ), and manufactured in the empire from the late (Cairo). The center of cannon casting, how- sixteenth century. The Janissaries were fir- ever, was the Imperial Cannon Foundry ing their weapons row-by-row from the in Istanbul, which was established by early sixteenth century, but it seems that Mehmed II after the capture of the city. It they started to use volley fire of the West was one of the first arsenals in late medieval European type only in the 1590s. Europe that was built, operated, and The Ottomans also established cannon financed by a central government, at a time foundries and gunpowder works throughout when most of Europe’s monarchs acquired their empire. Major foundries operated their cannons from smaller artisan work- along the Adriatic (Avlonya and Prevesa), shops. The Istanbul foundry could easily 5 multiply its capacity before and during advanced provisioning, supply, and logistical major wars, casting several hundreds of systems. The Ottoman treasury closed most cannon before the campaign season. years with surplus up until the 1590s. They In addition to the Istanbul gunpowder had a sophisticated road network, partly works, the Ottomans produced gunpowder inherited from Roman and Byzantine in their provincial centers, including Cairo, times, and elaborate and well-functioning Baghdad, Aleppo, and in the courier and relay systems, the stations of Arab provinces; Buda, Esztergom, Pe´cs, which were also used as grain-storage depots. Temesva´r, Belgrade, Salonica, and Gallipoli Roads, mountain passes, and bridges were in the European provinces; as well as Izmir, repaired before the campaigns, and substan- Bor, Erzurum, Diyarbekir, Oltu, and Van in tial quantities of wheat, barley, flour, and Asia Minor. These works met the demand biscuit were stored in the depots along the of the army, navy, and garrisons well into campaign routes. The mobilization, storage, the eighteenth century. However, in and distribution of food supplies to the fight- the 1770s diminishing production forced ing army remained the strength of the Istanbul to import substantial quantities of Ottomans until about the mid eighteenth powder from Europe. At the end of the century, positively affecting discipline and eighteenth century, the new Azadlı gun- moral. Owing to their supply and logistical powder works in Istanbul, modernized system, Ottoman soldiers were usually better with French assistance, were again able to fed than their opponents. However, during manufacture sufficient quantities of the Russo-Ottoman Wars of 1768–1774, the gunpowder of a much better quality. Ottoman supply system seems to have Despite allegations to the contrary in collapsed, contributing to the Ottomans’ the literature, the Ottomans managed to disastrous defeat. keep pace with Europe regarding weapons Ottoman firepower superiority, combined technology. More importantly, their mili- with numerical and logistical superiority, tary-industrial complex in the capital, proved to be crucial in mounting a continu- supplemented by smaller provincial cannon ous pressure on Europe. Attempts to match foundries and gunpowder workshops, Ottoman firepower prompted a series of enabled the Ottomans to establish long- European countermeasures. These included lasting firepower superiority in eastern and modernization of fortress systems (the intro- central Europe, the Mediterranean, and the duction of the star fort or trace italienne into Middle East. While factors such as numerical central and eastern Europe); changing the superiority, cavalry charge, and better cavalry–infantry ratio; improving the train- logistics and tactics were important in ing and tactics of field armies; increasing the the Ottoman victories at Chaldiran (1514), quality and production output of arma- Marj-i Dabiq (1516), Raydaniyya (1517), ments industries; and modernizing state and Moha´cs (1526) against the Safavids, administration and finances. While all , and Hungarians respectively, these were part of a larger phenomenon, Ottoman firepower superiority played a cru- often referred to as the “European military cial role in all these field battles. In siege revolution,” and were undoubtedly fostered warfare, Ottoman firepower superiority by the frequency of interstate violence remained the Ottomans’ strength through- within Europe, in eastern and central out the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Europe it was Ottoman military superiority The Ottomans also had a well-oiled finan- that constituted the greatest challenge and cial and bureaucratic apparatus, as well as required adequate countermeasures. 6

THE NAVY suspended the building of galleons and returned to the production of galleys. It was Under Mehmed II and Bayezid II only after 1682 that the galleons became (r. 1481–1512), the Ottomans acquired the standard warships in the . Of common naval technology of the Mediterra- the ten galleons built in 1682, four carried nean, adopting the oared as their prin- 60 bronze guns, and six 80 guns. From the cipal vessel. The usual Ottoman galley beginning of the eighteenth century some of carried a single mast with a lateen sail and the three-decker and larger galleons had 24–26 banks of oars on both sides, with carried as many as 112 and 130 guns. In three oarsmen to a bench, all pulling separate 1735–1740 the Ottoman navy consisted of oars until the mid sixteenth century. From 33 ships, of which 27 were three- and two- the 1560s, following their Mediterranean decker ships of the line and six smaller vessels rivals, the Ottomans too adopted the al of the fifth rank. The next phase of the scaloccio system, by which all oarsmen on modernization of the Ottoman navy took the same bench pulled a single oar. This place under Selim III, as part of the sultan’s arrangement helped to increase the number military reforms. of oarsmen. Ottoman galleys usually carried The size of the Ottoman navy was already a center-line cannon and two smaller impressive under Mehmed II, who employed flanking culverins. However, impressed by 380 galleys in his naval expeditions against the Venetian galeasses, which played an the Genoese-administered Crimean port important role in the Christians’ victory at town of Caffa in 1475. During the 1499– the , the Ottomans were 1503 Ottoman–Venetian War, Bayezid II quick to imitate these large and heavily considerably strengthened the navy, order- armed galleys that could fire broadsides, as ing the construction of no fewer than 250 opposed to the traditional galleys, which galleys in late 1500 alone. The reorganiza- had guns only on the prow. During the tion of the Ottoman navy under Bayezid II rebuilding of their fleet, destroyed at transformed the originally land-based Lepanto, the Ottoman shipyards in Sinop empire into a formidable naval power. and Istanbul constructed some four or five The navy was instrumental in halting galeasses. These vessels could carry as many Portuguese expansion in the and as 24 guns and fire them from the stern, bow, the and in the Ottoman con- and sides. Although the Ottomans’ allies in quest of Egypt in 1516–1517. the Barbary states started to use warships of Appointing the famed corsair Hayreddin the Atlantic type from the early seventeenth Barbarossa grand admiral of the Ottoman century and the Algerine war vessels carried navy (1533) and co-opting the corsairs of as many as 30 to 50 guns and 250–350 men the Barbary states of and Tunis was by the last third of the century, the Ottomans a smart and economically efficient way to were slow to adapt to the shipbuilding revo- further strengthen the Ottoman navy and lution. Recognizing the superiority of the to project Ottoman military and political Venetian sailing galleons during their attack power as far as Algiers and Tunis. on in 1645, the Ottomans tried to The Mediterranean fleet under the com- imitate the Venetians. However, due to the mand of the grand admiral was the core of inexperience of their crew, several of these the Ottoman navy. Operating indepen- new galleons were either captured or dently of this main fleet were smaller squad- destroyed by the Venetians in the mid- rons under the command of the captain of 1650s. In 1662, Istanbul temporarily Kavala, who patrolled the northern Aegean; 7 the district governors of and , Hungarian wars of 1593–1606, the Ottomans the latter commanding the sea routes faced increased firepower from the musket- between Egypt and Istanbul; the admiral of bearing Habsburg infantry, whose ratio to Egypt, who controlled both the Egyptian the cavalry in certain units reached 75 per- fleet based in Alexandria and the cent. The Ottomans strove to counterbalance fleet; and the captain of Yemen, who this in two ways: by substantially increasing guarded the entry to the Red Sea. In addi- the number of musket-bearing Janissaries tion, smaller flotillas operated on the (see Table 1), and by recruiting musketeers , Tigris, and Euphrates. The fighting from the subject population. The latter were power of such flotillas was impressive. disbanded after the campaign seasons in On the Shatt al-Arab in 1698–1699, there order to ease the burden on the treasury. were 60 with 70 soldiers aboard These disbanded soldiers often turned each ship, which meant a fighting force of into bandits and contributed to the late 4,200 troops. sixteenth- and early seventeenth-century Gelibolu, the first naval arsenal, uprisings. remained an important shipyard for the The swelling of the ranks of the Janissaries construction and repair of Ottoman ships. also had several negative consequences. The Nevertheless, by the beginning of the child levy system lapsed, and with it the old sixteenth century the Istanbul Naval Arsenal methods of training and drill also weakened, on the shore of the , inherited resulting in deteriorating discipline and from the Genoese of and expanded skills. Prebends were turned into crown under Selim I, had become the principal lands so that the treasury could pay the grow- center of Ottoman shipbuilding and main- ing number of salaried troops. However, tenance. In the 1550s, 250 ships could be with the decline of the timar system, Istan- constructed and/or repaired there at a time. bul lost its control over the provinces and its In addition to Gelibolu and Istanbul, there ability to maintain law and order through were shipyards at Izmit on the Sea of their provincial cavalry commanded by the Marmara, at Sinop and Samsun on the sultan’s governors and other officers. These , at Suez in the Red Sea, and at functions were increasingly fulfilled by Birecik and Basra on the Euphrates and the semi-independent local strongmen, who Shatt al-Arab, respectively. If one includes were then appointed as governors, for the the smaller shipyards, the number of state needed their private armies against sixteenth-century Ottoman shipbuilding Austria and Russia. For instance, traditional sites is close to 70. timariot cavalry forces comprised less than 12 percent of the 86,884 troops mobilized for the 1697–1698 Hungarian campaign. At IMPERIAL OVERSTRETCH, MILITARY the same time, the household troops of TRANSFORMATION, AND REFORM governors and non-timariot provincial troops together accounted for more than By the late sixteenth century the Ottoman 32 percent of the mobilized army. It was army reached the limits of its operational only with the help of such private and pro- capabilities. Power relations on all fronts vincial troops that the Ottomans could were more balanced, wars lasted longer, and still mobilize an army whose infantry-to- they required commitments in fighting men, cavalry ratio (57:43) was comparable to weaponry, supplies, and money at scales that of Istanbul’s Habsburg and Romanov previously unseen. Moreover, during the rivals. 8

Since the state still lacked the funds to and associated financial and administrative pay its swelling troops, the Janissaries were reforms of Selim III resulted in a new, dis- allowed to engage in trade and craftsman- ciplined, European-style army equipped ship. It is hardly surprising, thus, that in the with up-to-date weaponry and dressed in mid seventeenth century some 30 percent of modern uniforms. Financed from an inde- the Janissaries were pensioners or guards, pendent treasury, the new army was 23,000 not fit for active military service. Some 30 to strong by 1807, when opposition –mounted 60 percent of the Janissaries performed gar- by an alliance of the Janissaries and the rison duties. Thus only a fraction of the religious establishment – forced Selim III Janissaries (17 to 30 percent at the turn of to disband it and abdicate. the seventeenth century) participated in campaigns. SEE ALSO: Austro-Ottoman War By the end of the seventeenth century, (1736–1739); Janissaries; Lepanto, Battle of the Ottomans’ European opponents had (1571); Military Revolution, the (1560–1660); established their own standing armies that Muscovy, military rise of (1460–1730); Otto- were comparable in size to that of the man conquests; Ottoman military organization Ottomans. While revenues of the European (1800–1918); Peter I of Russia (“the Great”) fiscal-military states increased sharply in (1672–1725); Russo-Turkish Wars (pre-1878); the seventeenth and especially in the eigh- Selim I (“the Grim”) (1465–1520); Suleiman I teenth centuries, the Ottoman central gov- (“the Magnificent”) (1494–1566). ernment’s share of the redistribution of revenues shrank from 58 percent in the 1520s to 24 percent in the 1660s, and the REFERENCES Ottoman state’s revenues increased by only 10 percent in the eighteenth century. A´ goston, G. (2010) “Empires and Warfare in East- Whereas in the middle of the century the Central Europe, 1550–1750: The Ottoman– revenues of Russia and the Ottoman Habsburg Rivalry and Military Transformation.” Empire measured in tons of silver were still In Frank Tallett and D. J. B. Trim (Eds.), European comparable, by 1796 St. Petersburg’s reve- Warfare, 1350–1750. Cambridge: Cambridge nues were almost ten times greater than University Press, pp. 110–134. those of Istanbul. In addition to such fiscal Genc¸, M. and O¨ zvar, E. (Eds.) (2006) Osmanlı ˙ imbalance of power between the two Maliyesi: Kurumlar ve Bu¨tc¸eler, 2 vols. Istanbul: Osmanlı Bankası Ars¸iv ve Aras¸tırma Merkezi. empires, Russia also had a conscription sys- tem, which resulted in much larger armies. European troops in general were of higher quality, enjoyed an efficient supply system, FURTHER READING better command, and professional military bureaucracy. A´ goston, G. (2005) Guns for the Sultan: Military The eighteenth century thus witnessed Power and the Weapons Industry in the experimentation with other forms of recruit- . New York: Cambridge Univer- ments and military systems ranging from sity Press. Aksan, V. H. (2007) Ottoman Wars 1700– militias to state-contracted formations, lead- 1870: An Empire Besieged. Harlow: Longman/ ing to the “New Order” (Nizam-i Cedid) Pearson. Army of Sultan Selim III (r. 1789–1807). Bo¨rekc¸i, G. (2006) “A Contribution to the Military Launched in the aftermath of the Russo- Revolution Debate: The Janissaries’ Use of Volley Ottoman War of 1787–1792, the military Fire during the Long Ottoman–Habsburg War 9

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