UNIVERSITY OF CALGARY

Hegemony Over the Heavens: The Chinese and American Struggle in Space

by

John Hodgson Modinger

A THESIS SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

CENTRE FOR MILITARY AND STRATEGIC STUDIES

CALGARY, ALBERTA AUGUST, 2008 © John Hodgson Modinger 2008 Library and Bibliotheque et 1*1 Archives Canada Archives Canada Published Heritage Direction du Branch Patrimoine de I'edition

395 Wellington Street 395, rue Wellington Ottawa ON K1A0N4 Ottawa ON K1A0N4 Canada Canada

Your file Votre reference ISBN: 978-0-494-44361-3 Our file Notre reference ISBN: 978-0-494-44361-3

NOTICE: AVIS: The author has granted a non­ L'auteur a accorde une licence non exclusive exclusive license allowing Library permettant a la Bibliotheque et Archives and Archives Canada to reproduce, Canada de reproduire, publier, archiver, publish, archive, preserve, conserve, sauvegarder, conserver, transmettre au public communicate to the public by par telecommunication ou par Plntemet, prefer, telecommunication or on the Internet, distribuer et vendre des theses partout dans loan, distribute and sell theses le monde, a des fins commerciales ou autres, worldwide, for commercial or non­ sur support microforme, papier, electronique commercial purposes, in microform, et/ou autres formats. paper, electronic and/or any other formats.

The author retains copyright L'auteur conserve la propriete du droit d'auteur ownership and moral rights in et des droits moraux qui protege cette these. this thesis. Neither the thesis Ni la these ni des extraits substantiels de nor substantial extracts from it celle-ci ne doivent etre imprimes ou autrement may be printed or otherwise reproduits sans son autorisation. reproduced without the author's permission.

In compliance with the Canadian Conformement a la loi canadienne Privacy Act some supporting sur la protection de la vie privee, forms may have been removed quelques formulaires secondaires from this thesis. ont ete enleves de cette these.

While these forms may be included Bien que ces formulaires in the document page count, aient inclus dans la pagination, their removal does not represent il n'y aura aucun contenu manquant. any loss of content from the thesis. Canada UNIVERSITY OF CALGARY

FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES

The undersigned certify that they have read, and recommend to the Faculty of Graduate

Studies for acceptance, a thesis entitled "Hegemony Over the Heavens: The Chinese and

American Struggle in Space" submitted by John Hodgson Modinger in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

Supervisor, Dr. David Wright, History

Dr. John Ferris, History *

Dr. Holger Herwig, History

Dr. Joerg Denzinger, Computer Science

External Examiner, Dr. James Fergusson, University of Manitoba

Date

ii ABSTRACT

China's rise has generated awe and fear—awe over the pace of its economic transformation; fear about how that power will be exercised. The rise of a new great power always reshapes the structure of any international system, though turbulence and warfare is as much produced by the actions of declining states. Over the next generation, the world system will be shaped by the dynamics of interaction between Washington and Beijing. The actions of each state will affect the response of the other, and each will act according to the logic of its strategic culture. The transformation from a unipolar to multipolar world is underway. Americans are anxious about that. In an atmosphere of fear and frustration, voters are likely to reward pledges to stem the slide in American power, even though such actions may unnecessarily heighten global tensions and exacerbate the decline they were intended to halt. One controversial proposal seeks to perpetuate American dominance by preemptively * moving to control space. Advocates argue it will preserve American security and end war as we know it, ushering in unmatched global stability and fostering the spread of democracy and liberal institutions. What these advocates frequently marginalize are the staggering costs—economic and political—associated with such a preemptive move. Calls for unilateral action before American primacy in space is seriously challenged assume the placement of weapons in space is inevitable. Ultimately, they may be proven correct; however, a movement in that direction in the near term will likely have several negative consequences which may include a space arms race. Ironically, the greatest threat to U.S. security may be American impulsiveness. Facing an unknown but complex future, the United States may fall prey to worst-case scenario thinking and compromise, rather than improve, global stability. When China demonstrated its anti-satellite capability in 2007, it was not a direct challenge to American space power. Instead, Beijing was challenging the stated American policy goal of wanting to dominate space by military means. How the United States chooses to respond to this latter, more specific, challenge remains to be seen.

in ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

There are many people I must thank. This entire PhD experience would not have been possible without the friendship, support, and faith shown by my boss at the U.S. Air Force Academy (USAFA), Colonel Thomas Drohan. It was he, along with Colonel Steve Baker, who recommended me for selection by the Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT). I also owe a debt to Dr. Jim Titus, a great teacher, good friend and wise mentor, who encouraged my interest in further education. The decision to come to the University of Calgary was not entirely my own, but from the start, the experience has been a positive one. Before coming here, I thought I knew a fair amount about China, international relations, and history. I also thought I was a decent writer. Three years later, I realize I was a novice on all counts. Any progress I have made toward remedying those deficiencies owes much to the instructors I was lucky enough to have while here. Each of them, in their unique way, has provided useful insights and suggestions which have helped me in the process of putting this thesis * together. I must express my thanks to Dr. John Ferris, in particular. Though not my official supervisor, he has been incredibly helpful to me from the day I arrived in Canada. A student could not ask for better mentorship. He has gone the extra mile at every turn, making the learning process a genuine interactive experience—the sweat equity was mine, but he rewarded it by continuous feedback that made the writing task challenging, but highly rewarding. Without his help, this project may not have been completed on time, and the quality would, most certainly, have suffered. I also want to thank Dr. David Wright for his insights and suggestions along the way. It was he who suggested that I might want to focus on the Sino-American relationship within the context of space. The endeavor turned out to be both timely and interesting. Many others have provided invaluable service during my stay. I want to thank Dr. Holger Herwig, Dr. Pat Brennan, and Dr. Joerg Denzinger for their encouragement and support. Additionally, I must thank Dr. James Fergusson, of the University of Manitoba, for agreeing to join my defense committee, as its External Examiner.

iv And, of course, nothing would get done without the behind-the-scene efforts of people like Dawn MacMillan at Graduate Studies or the unsung efforts of Trisha Henschel and Leah Wotherspoon. Dawn MacMillan has helped me resolve more financial and administrative issues than I can count, always with lightning efficiency, a sense of humor, and utmost professionalism. If I could export her back to my new job, I would, but I cannot imagine the university would let her go. Trisha and Leah have provided terrific support and coordination, freeing me to concentrate on other pressing matters. Finally, thanks to my fellow students who have provided empathy, inspiration and friendship throughout my stay. You kept me sane through it all.

v DEDICATION

To my parents, Hodgson and Elizabeth, for the many sacrifices they made to provide me the opportunities I had growing up.

To my brother, Edward, who always makes me laugh.

To my children, Ashley and Jack, who give my life greater meaning and fill it with joy.

Most especially, this work is dedicated to my wonderful wife Annette, for her selflessness, her determination to keep our family strong during my absences, and her love and support. I am a lucky man.

To each of you, I am forever grateful.

VI TABLE OF CONTENTS

Approval Page ii Abstract iii Acknowledgements iv Dedication vi Table of Contents vii List of Tables ix List of Abbreviations x Introduction xiv

CHAPTER ONE: Chinese Ambitions and American Apprehensions 1 In Search of depth and breadth: a literature review 2 Chinese Strategic Thought 3 Theories Regarding China's Rise and the Likelihood of Conflict 12 Military Technology Development 14 Conclusion 30

CHAPTER TWO: Chinese Strategy and Policy 34 Enigmatic or predictable? 35 The Roots of Chinese Behavior 43 * Other Influences on Chinese Strategic Thinking 51 Veiled Belligerency 60 Chinese Perceptions of American Strategic Culture 70 Making War while Avoiding Battle 78 The Fear Factor 85 Conclusion 87

CHAPTER THREE: American Strategy and Policy 90 Survival & Growth 90 Lincoln & the Civil War (1861-1865) 95 1865-1914 97 Theodore Roosevelt 99 Woodrow Wilson 101 Franklin Roosevelt 108 Truman Ill Eisenhower 120 Reagan 125 George H. W. Bush 128 Clinton 132 George W. Bush 141 Conclusion 146

CHAPTER FOUR: Playing Different Games? 149 American and Chinese strategic cultures: different... and similar 150

vii Conclusion 173

CHAPTER FIVE: China Copes With a Changing Environment 176 The PLA's Central Role in China's Development 177 Changing Course 190 American Fears of China's Growing Economy and the High-Technology Prowess that could Accompany It 213 Conclusion 224

CHAPTER SIX: The Weaponization of Space 226 Beyond the Inevitability Argument 245

CHAPTER SEVEN: Contested Space—Possibilities and Implications 266 Nuclear Weapons: Pathway to the Exploitation of Space 266 And Then There Were Three 271 The Ultimate High Ground 273 The Importance of Space 277 Counterspace Operations 278 Innocence Lost 281 Why Now? 290

Conclusion 296 * Bibliography 303

viii LIST OF TABLES

Table 1: Total Industrial Production 98

ix LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND NOMENCLATURE

ABM Anti-Ballistic Missile AFDD Air Force Doctrine Document AFIT Air Force Institute of Technology ALMV Air-Launched Miniature Vehicle AMS Academy of Military Science ASAT Anti-Satellite ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations BMD Ballistic Missile Defense C2 Command and Control C4ISR Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance CCP Chinese Communist Party CD Conference on Disarmament CIA Central Intelligence Agency CMC Central Military Commission CMSS Centre for Military and Strategic Studies CNP Comprehensive National Power COSTIND Commission on Science, Technology, and Industry for National Defense DCS Defensive Counterspace DoD Department of Defense DPG Defense Planning Guidance EELV Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle ELV Expendable Launch Vehicle EU European Union FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation FBIS Foreign Broadcast Information Service FDI Foreign Direct Investment FFE Foreign-Funded Enterprise

x G-8 Group of Eight (Canada, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, Russia and the United States) GDP Gross Domestic Product GEO Geosynchronous Orbit GNP Gross National Product GPS Global Positioning System GSD General Staff Department GWOT Global War on Terror HEO Highly Elliptical Orbit HTDZ High Technology Development Zone HUMINT Human Intelligence ICBM Intercontinental Ballistic Missile IMF International Monetary Fund INSS Institute for National Security Studies 10 Information Operations ISR Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance ISS International Space Station JP Joint Publication KGB Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti (Committee for State Security, former USSR) LEO Low-Earth Orbit MAD Mutually Assured Destruction MEO Medium-Earth Orbit MFN Most-Favored Nation MIC Military-Industrial Complex MILSTAR Military Strategic and Tactical Relay MIRV Multiple Independently-targeted Re-entry Vehicles MITI Ministry of International Trade and Industry MNC Multinational Corporation NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

xi NCW Network-Centric Warfare NDSTC National Defense Scientific and Technological Commission NMD National Missile Defense NPT Non-proliferation Treaty NSC National Security Council ocs Offensive Counterspace OECD Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development OPEC Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries PACOM Pacific Command PLA People's Liberation Army PLAN People's Liberation Army Navy PLAAF People's Liberation Army Air Force PPS Policy Planning Staff/Statement/Study PRC People's Republic of China (Communist or mainland China) R&D Research and Development RMA Revolution in Military Affairs ROC Republic of China (Taiwan) S&T Science and Technology SALT Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty SALT II Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty II SBIS Space-Based Infrared System SDI Strategic Defense Initiative SLBM Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile SOE State-Owned Enterprise SSTC State Science and Technology Commission START Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty TMD Theater Missile Defense UN United Nations U.N. United Nations US United States U.S. United States

Xll USAF United States Air Force USAFA United States Air Force Academy USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction WOFE Wholly-Owned Foreign Enterprise WTO World Trade Organization WWI World War I (First World War) WWII World War II (Second World War)

xiii INTRODUCTION

[W]e know from history that every medium—air, land and sea—has seen conflict. Reality indicates that space will be no different. Given this virtual certainty, the U.S. must develop the means both to deter and to defend against hostile acts in and from space. This will require superior space capabilities.

The U.S. is an attractive candidate for a 'Space Pearl Harbor. A —The Space Commission

It is important ... to recognize that the Chinese space program ... is ... [not] a mirror image of the American or Soviet programs. The apparent absence of early warning satellites, including missile launch and nuclear detonation satellites, suggests that it has somewhat different programmatic objectives than those of the two superpowers. Instead, where the U.S. and Soviet programs, especially in the very early days, were already aiming towards military intelligence objectives ... Chinese writings have often emphasized instead the drive for prestige being a central factor and subsequently civil-military integration of the PRC's aerospace industries. The aim has generally been to contribute to what is termed 'comprehensive national power' rather than to establish military capability per se. Nevertheless, the PLA is today showing steadily growing interest in space as reflected in their thinking about future warfare.2 —excerpt from China's Military Ambitions in Space

Space is a growing area of importance for nations around the globe. They see their futures tied to their ability to exploit the benefits which space can offer them on earth. Space lies at the heart of central technological and economic issues like the Internet; continuous, instantaneous, round-the-clock media coverage; ubiquitous communications;

1 Donald H. Rumsfeld, et al, Report of the Commission to Assess United States National Security Space Management and Organization (Washington: Government Printing Office, 2001), p. 10, 13, http://www.dod.mil/pubs/space20010111 .html (accessed 19 May 08). 2 Dean Cheng, China's Military Ambitions in Space (Washington: George C. Marshall Institute, 2006), p. 6.

xiv worldwide banking and finance; electronic commodities trading; precise tracking—or targeting—anywhere on the planet; and numerous other advancements. The commercial exploitation of space through the use of satellites has enabled a revolution in economic, political, social, and military activity. With so much resting on these complex, fragile, and expensive platforms, it is hardly surprising that states would attempt to secure their access to it while exploring means to deny such access to competitors. In particular, controlling space—including access to it—has become a major objective of United States policy. Momentum has been building within the Pentagon and around Washington for a policy that will ensure friendly access to space while denying it to adversaries. This debate includes discussion of moving into a new frontier of military power, toward space-based weaponization. Space has become essential to American productivity, prosperity, and power. Hence, the United States clearly has a right to defend its space assets and interests. The central question is how best to do it. Should space become a battleground, the United States has the most to lose and also the greatest ability to win, since it is currently "the 800 pound * gorilla in space." By virtue of its commitment to space, it gains the most from that medium. Paradoxically, it also has the most to lose should conflict break out there. Advocates of weaponization, most notably those on the far right of the debate, argue that by capturing "the ultimate high ground" now, before a rival such as China improves its capabilities, the United States can achieve a fait accompli, becoming a gatekeeper to space and master of earth, able to deny access beyond the atmosphere to anyone deemed out-of-step with Washington's prerogatives. The United States could impose terms and put an end to conventional warfare by targeting terrestrially-based forces which threaten American security or global stability. The rest of the world, though likely to be envious of the situation, would accept it because of the peace and stability such a U.S.-controlled system provided. These propositions, however, suffer from multiple dubious assumptions which will be explored by this work. Suffice to say, "//// sounds too good to be true, it probably is. "

3 Walter A McDougall, "The Space Age That Never Arrived: A Meditation on the 50th Anniversary of Sputnik 1," Foreign Policy Research Institute, Nov 2007, http://www.fpri.org/enotes/200711 .mcdougall.sputnikanniversarv.html (accessed 29 Jun 08).

XV The Space Commission deserves credit for raising attention to the value of space in daily life and the vulnerability which currently exists. The need to avoid a "Space Pearl Harbor" is serious. But much of that debate is predicated on the assumption of a serious Chinese menace to United States power in space. These ideas have been raised not merely in Washington, but in Beijing. For two decades, Chinese strategists have written about "assassin's mace" weapons, which can, they argue, alter the strategic landscape overnight. Offensive space-based weapons, able to destroy other space assets and terrestrial targets, fall into that category. Such a development is a possibility, but the probability is low. Nevertheless, colorful scenarios have been circulated by those fearful that China might overtake the United States in space, placing weapons there able instantaneously to strike any anything deemed a threat, leaving America defenseless and at the mercy of Beijing. Similar speculation and theorizing has infected the alcoves of Chinese strategic think tanks as well. This work aims to assess the likelihood of a robust Chinese challenge to American dominance in space and how the United States should handle such actions, particularly * with regard to the wisdom of placing weapons in what has been kind of a sanctuary. A secondary aim of this thesis is to bolster the small literature on the actual, versus perceived, power of modern China. Recent years have witnessed a flood of optimistic assessments about China's current and future prospects. Many of those rosy assessments have been the basis for dire forecasts about what China's rise will mean to the West, in general, and the United States, in particular. Other scholars, professing fascination with China's explosive growth, preach the wisdom of a policy of engagement with, rather than containment of, China. Routinely, such studies, whether premised on the notion that China will be dangerous or benign, rely on economic data and trends which have little resemblance to the reality unfolding through globalization. These economic misperceptions, the manifestation of continued reliance on outdated trade measurement tools, then are used to produce extrapolations about military potential. Some carry these extrapolations a step further, marrying ideas of increased military capabilities, resulting from greater economic performance, to nefarious intentions. Often, however, these bubbly assessments are based on questionable data, or serve an agenda at the expense of objectivity.

xvi The depth of this examination was limited by several factors. Much evidence on the weaponization of space issue remains classified and, therefore, cannot be discussed here. That is doubly true in the case of China, which significantly limits the information available to scholars. The thesis has used material translated and published by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS),4 officially-sanctioned news stories in outlets such as the People's Daily and Xinhua News, public speeches made by Communist officials, and numerous secondary English language accounts, to portray the Chinese perspective. Much of what this thesis will argue is not novel. Instead, it intends to take individual matters, such as culture, strategy, international relations theories and technology, and combine them so to show how they affect one another. Too often, these matters are discussed in isolation, which does not reflect reality. Insights about any of them can come simply from putting them in context with each other. In particular, this dissertation attempts to unify the debate over the weaponization of space, which usually is conducted only in technical and technological terms; with that regarding Chinese and American * competition, which often rests on simplistic assumptions regarding how one state functions, without treating the other as an independent and autonomous actor; and the study of comparative strategic culture, applied to a bilateral competition. These issues never have been treated as a single topic in their own right, but only by doing so can they be understood. The originality of the thesis lies in this approach, which also illuminates an important topic. The capability to do anything is not inherently threatening on its own, but it does become so when coupled with intent, whether the latter really exists or merely is perceived to do so by other states. These circumstances can create a cycle of action and reaction with disastrous results. The issue of space weaponization illustrates how strategic culture can inhibit or fuel the creation of capabilities while also acting as a filter through which one's own culture and actions, and that of others, are evaluated and judged.

4 FBIS is an open source intelligence component of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency's Directorate of Science and Technology.

xvil 1

CHAPTER ONE CHINESE AMBITIONS AND AMERICAN APPREHENSIONS

What made war inevitable was the growth of Athenian power and the fear which this caused in Sparta. —Thucydides

It really is in ill grace for us to be talking down to [the Chinese] and saying, by implication, that 'you ought to learn to govern yourselves as we do '.2 —George F. Kennan

As China's fortunes have risen since its opening to the world during 1978, so has interest in its impact on international relations and the balance of global power. The questions at issue concern not merely China, but also power. The components of power, w though fairly stable, do change with time and place. Some elements become more significant and others less so, while occasionally, something new is added to the mix. Today, we are witnessing such an addition. Space has assumed greater and still growing importance for the strategies and doctrines of leading powers, particularly the United States. The 1991 Gulf War and Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003 demonstrated how much American military forces rely on space to enhance their strategy, operations, tactics, and power. The Chinese were watching—and learning. Meanwhile, the United States has openly declared that space has become critical to its operations. In 2006, it unveiled a new, more muscular, space policy, which extolled the goal of "preserving US freedom of action' and denying the same to foes."3 Therein lies the rub; today's friend could be tomorrow's enemy. Many states could construe freedom for the United States as a threat to themselves. Certainly, Chinese strategists believe that the United States has

1 Thucydides, as quoted in Michael Howard, "The Causes of War," in Joseph J. Fahey and Richard Armstrong, eds., A Peace Reader: Essential Readings on War, Justice, Non-Violence and World Order (Mahwah, NJ.: Paulist Press, 1992), p. 22. 2 George F. Kennan, as quoted in Richard Ullman, "The US and the World: An Interview with George Kennan," The New York Review of Books, 12 Aug 99, p. 6. 3 Wade Boese, "U.S. Nixes Arms Control in New Space Policy," Arms Control Association, Nov 2006, http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2006 11/ACSpace.asp (accessed 16 Mar 08). 2

attempted to contain China's rise—not the behavior of a friend. For the Chinese, American hegemony in space represents an intolerable situation, one which they and other countries must work hard to prevent. How they ultimately will seek to achieve that objective remains in question, but destruction of one of their own derelict satellites with a cost-effective, ground-launched interceptor, during January 2007, demonstrates that they have taken no option off the table. For the first decade after China's emergence from decades of isolation, inquiry into its power and policy focused mainly on the country's gross backwardness, which still was under estimated because China had been closed to the West since 1949. In 1989, when Communist authorities attacked the protestors in Tiananmen Square, many Western commentators were dismayed by the success of the state and the failure of its opposition, both immediately and in the years that followed. Their consternation occurred because they had been operating under a false assumption—that all Communist states were alike, and what was happening in Eastern Europe must occur in China. That so many experts forecast the imminent demise of China's Communist Party requires consideration. This * mistake need not be a condemnation of their work, but it is a cautionary reminder that we still do not fully understand China which is, to borrow Churchill's phrase about the Soviet Union, "a riddle, wrapped in a mystery, inside an enigma. "

In search of depth and breadth: a literature review In order to unravel that mystery, one must review the foundational literature. In this case, the foundation is complex. We will begin with some of the substantive literature on Chinese strategic thought, and then consider the scholarship on the gains in military capability made by China either through indigenous efforts or foreign acquisitions. Later, in Chapter 6, we will explore the growing literature regarding the "weaponization" of space. Space has been "militarized" for some time now, but weaponization is a newer and narrower topic, popularized by the globally televised Iraqi defeats at the hands of cutting-edge American technologies enabled by its space assets.4 This study will

4 Bruce M. Deblois, "Space Sanctuary: A Viable National Strategy," Airpower Journal (Winter 1998), http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/api/api98/win98/deblois.html (accessed 2 May 08); Karl P. Mueller, "Totem and Taboo: Depolarizing the Space Weaponization Debate," RAND, 8 May 02, 3 investigate the roots of Chinese thinking about strategy, in order to assess how they are acting now and may act in the future. To explain how strategic thinking is manifested in flesh and force, this review also will examine Chinese achievements and goals in both military technology development and space.

Chinese Strategic Thought Before assessing Chinese strategic thinking, one needs to ask, "what is 'strategic thought'?" Different scholars offer many answers to that question. No standardized definition of the topic exists at present, nor is one likely to emerge soon, given the range of issues included under such an amorphous concept. Nevertheless, many significant figures in political science, history, international relations, and strategic studies insist that one must appreciate strategic thought and culture, in order to understand and predict the behavior of states in the competition of international relations. The term "strategic culture" was coined by Jack Snyder in 1977 in his short, but groundbreaking book, The Soviet Strategic Culture: Implications for Nuclear Options. Here, Snyder investigated why the Soviets might think about and use nuclear weapons differently than would the United States. Colin Gray followed in Snyder's footsteps by assessing the American style of strategy and the roots for its peculiarities.6 In following years, the momentum behind this approach accelerated as more scholars, vexed by the

7 8 0 anomalies within the competing strains of realism, liberalism, and constructivism, sought new means to explain international behavior. http://www. gwu.edu/~spi/spaceforum/TotemandTabooGWUpaperRevised%5B 1 %5D.pdf (accessed 7 Jan 08). 5 Jack Snyder, The Soviet Strategic Culture: Implications for Nuclear Options, R-2154-AF (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1977). 6 Colin Gray, "National Styles in Strategy: The American Example," International Security, Vol. 6, No. 2 (Fall 1981), 21-47; Colin Gray, Nuclear Strategy and National Style (Lanham, MD: Hamilton Press, 1986). 7 Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1948); Kenneth N. Waltz, Man, the State, and War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959); Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979); John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: Norton, 2001). 8 Norman Angell, The Great Illusion (New York: G. P. Putnam & Sons, 1933; original 1909); Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1977); Richard N. Lebow, "The Long Peace, the End of the Cold War, and the Failure of Realism," International Organization, Vol 48, No. 2 (Spring 1994); Robert O. Keohane and Lisa L. Martin, "The Promise of Institutionalist Theory," International Security, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Summer 1995). 9 Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy is What States Make of It: the Social Construction of Power Politics," International Organization, Vol. 46, No. 2 (Spring 1992). 4

With comparative strategic culture, as with any new field of study, growing pains were natural. There have been three waves of study in the field. In its infancy, during the late 1970s and early 1980s, scholars focused primarily on explaining why Soviet and American strategists thought differently about nuclear strategy, and did so by pointing to influences such as historical experience, political culture, and geography. David Jones also highlighted the importance of social and economic structures, as well as military institutions and civil-military relations.11 However, the approach of this first wave proved unwieldy. A second wave12 argued that a vast difference exists between what leaders think or say they are doing, and the deeper motives behind their actions. This wave provided interesting concepts, like whether elites socialized in strategic culture are constrained by symbolic myths created by their predecessors, but it could not definitively link culture and behavior. The most recent wave of scholarship has been more empirically rigorous and eclectic. Unfortunately, in all these cases, defining what is, and what is not, strategic culture remains problematic. For now,

the field rests largely in an ill-defined, oft debated over netherworld. Comparative Strategic Culture concepts

Alastair Iain Johnston, "Thinking about Strategic Culture," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 4 (Spring 1995), p. 36. Also see Elizabeth Stone, "Comparative Strategic Cultures Literature Review (Part 1)," Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) Advanced Systems and Concepts Office, 31 Oct 06, p. 1. 11 David R. Jones, "Soviet Strategic Culture," in Carl G. Jacobsen, ed., Strategic Power: USA/USSR (London: St. Martin's Press, 1990), p. 35-49. 12 See Fritz Gaenslen, "Culture and Decision Making in China, Japan, Russia, and the United States," World Politics, Vol. 39, No. 1 (Oct 1986), p. 78-103; Martin Wright, "An Anatomy of International Thought," Review of International Studies, Vol. 13 (1987). 13 Authur Waldron, The Great Wall of China: From History to Myth (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Michael Vlabos, "Culture and Foreign Policy," Foreign Policy, Vol. 82 (Spring 1991); Yitzhak Klein, "A Theory of Strategic Culture," Comparative Strategy, Vol. 10, No. 1 (1991); Desmond Ball, "Strategic Culture in the Asia-Pacific Region," Security Studies, Vol. 3, No. 1 (Autumn 1993), p. 44- 74; Douglas J. Murray and Paul R. Viotti, eds., The Defense Policies of Nations: A Comparative Study (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994); Alastair Iain Johnston, "Thinking about Strategic Culture," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 4 (Spring 1995), p. 32-64; Alastair Iain Johnston, Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995); Stephen Peter Rosen, "Military Effectiveness: Why Society Matters," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 4 (Spring 1995), p. 5-31; Jeffrey Legro, "Culture and Preferences in International Two Step," American Political Science Review, Vol .90, No. 1 (March 1996); Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996); Samuel P. Huntington, "The West: Unique, Not Universal," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 75, (Nov/Dec 1996); Paul DiMaggio, "Culture and Cognition," Annual Review of Sociology, Vol. 23 (1997), p. 263-87; Michael C. Desch, "Culture Clash: Assessing the Importance of Ideas in Security Studies," International Security, Vol. 23, No. 1 (Summer 1998), p. 141-70; Andrew Scobell, "China and Strategic Culture," Strategic Studies Institute (May 2002); Andrew Scobell, "Strategic Culture and China: IR Theory Versus the Fortune Cookie?" Strategic Insights, Vol. IV, Issue 10 (Oct 2005). 5

maintain their methodological limitations and the concept remains too amorphous and grossly oversimplified. However, despite this, scholars hold on to strategic culture's utility. 4

Despite issues of definition and scope that have hamstrung the application of the concept of strategic culture, scholars have held on to the idea because it seems intuitively powerful, and has enriched the debate about the roots of state behavior. It also has made researchers aware of the need to prevent ethnocentrism from insidiously infiltrating their own analyses.15 Johnston expresses the value of assessing strategic culture, but also notes the danger of applying insights haphazardly and too broadly.

Done well, the careful analysis of strategic culture could help policymakers establish more accurate and empathetic understandings of how different actors perceive the game being played, reducing uncertainty and other information problems in strategic choice. Done badly, the analysis of strategic culture could reinforce stereotypes about strategic dispositions of other states and close off policy alternatives for dealing with local strategic cultures.

Care in using strategic culture as an analytical tool is especially important as American policy attention shifts to ... the Asia-Pacific region, an area where U.S. images of the "other " have been rife with stereotyped generalizations about particular "strategic styles. " ...It would be a shame if opportunities to develop effective, highly institutionalized multilateral constraints on the military doctrines, force postures and behaviors of states in the region were missed or never created because these were mistakenly deemed incompatible with deeply rooted, slow-to-change strategic cultures.16

14 Stone, "Comparative Strategic Cultures Literature Review (Part 1)," p. 1. 15 Ken Booth, Strategy and Ethnocentrism (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1979). 16 Johnston, "Thinking about Strategic Culture," p. 63-4. 6

In order to understand Chinese strategic thought one must carefully assess its storied, brutal, past. This is not simply the consensus of Western scholars, but also of Chinese ones. Most of the secondary literature about Chinese strategic culture contends that it stems directly from approaches to war and peace, that are embedded within China's ancient military classics, going as far back as the Warring States period (Hc@P#f^, Zhanguo Shidai, 475-221 B.C.). Much of this literature also argues that the sage advice given by Sun-Tzu and other strategists17 remains timeless, suitable to any context—one just has to think deeply enough about how to apply these ideas in one's own time to one's own benefit. As testament to the continued influence of these ancient texts, Mao Zedong frequently borrowed from Sun-Tzu's The Art of War (-B^-f^fe Sun ZiBing Fa). Chiang Kai-shek supposedly had a rare collection of commentaries on Sun-Tzu going back centuries. Ho Chi Minh personally translated the work into Vietnamese for use in training his officers and troops. The Art of War shaped Japanese doctrine and campaigning during World War II. In more recent times, the Gulf War reflects the continuing versatility and relevance of the advice recorded so long ago. General Schwarzkopf s strategy relied heavily upon deception and denying his opponent useful intelligence; while Saddam Hussein's forces remained entrenched in coastal fortifications in anticipation of an amphibious assault, nurtured by visible Coalition activity (shaping the enemy), Schwarzkopf s main attack force slipped unnoticed far to the West. When the ground attack began, Iraqi forces were outflanked, allowing coalition forces to sweep in from the rear and wreak havoc with the help of surprise, speed, maneuver, precision,

1 O and unprecedented communications capabilities. Beyond their military application, the principles of ancient Chinese strategy have been employed by politicians and businessmen the world over, with the simple goal of winning smartly.

Though debate swirls around authorship of these classical writings, the messages within them continue to resonate in Chinese strategic thinking. The ancient Chinese military classics consist of: T'ai Kung's Six Secret Teachings; The Methods of the Ssu-Ma; Sun-tzu's Art ofWar; Wu-tzu; Wei Liao-tzu; Three Strategies of Huang Shih-kung; and Questions and Replies Between Tang T'ai-tsung and Li Wei-kung as translated by Ralph D. Sawyer, The Seven Military Classics of Ancient China, including the Art of War (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993). 18 Mark McNeilly, Sun Tzu and the Art Of Modern Warfare (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 6-7. 7

Beginning in the mid-1980s, coinciding with the founding of the National Defense University and the publication of the first of many volumes in the Chinese corpus of strategy, the PLA began to re-emphasize the importance of Sun-Tzu and other military classics. Precisely as they pursued the strategy of technonationalism, Chinese strategists looked backward at their own heritage, for theories and practices that would enable China to formulate a distinctive military science. They wanted to be innovators, rather than imitators, to surpass Western strategists and remain unfathomable, while simultaneously incorporating the latest advances in weaponry, command, and communications. In effect, they attempted to graft the best which the past and the present had to offer. The PRC packaged this marriage of antiquity and modernity under the rubric of "military science with unique Chinese characteristics" or a "revolution in military affairs with unique Chinese characteristics." 19 Today, Chinese strategists explicitly refer to ancient texts when discussing nuclear strategy, Taiwan, or asymmetric warfare. These military classics also have entered popular Chinese culture through media ranging from books, to cartoons, to television, and video games. The lessons contained in these works, together * with those in famous, epic novels, like Romance of the Three Kingdoms and Water Margin, infuse contemporary Chinese consciousness, framing the way in which Chinese citizens interpret the world around them. The United States military also has come to appreciate the value of studying these ancient texts, both for advice about how to fight more effectively (or not fight at all), and to gain valuable insights into how Chinese decision-makers approach crisis-management, deterrence, pre-emption, and deception. Unfortunately, while the lasting importance of these texts is obvious, it is hard to determine precisely what threads of continuity stem from them or how influential they actually have been compared to other factors. The texts often contain seemingly contradictory advice, precisely because they are works of principle rather than cookbooks. If continuities link the past and the present in Chinese decision-making, obviously those tasked with forecasting China's future behavior must understand its history and the core concepts which propel Chinese strategic thinking. Yet, if China's decision-making matrix stems from multiple traditions, the central question becomes,

Ralph D. Sawyer, "Chinese Strategic Power: Myths, Intent, and Projections," Journal of Military and Strategic Studies, Winter 2006/7, Vol. 9, Issue 2, p. 6-7. x 8

which tradition(s) leaders are drawing on at any point, and why? The heritage of history is only one factor which will drive China in coming decades. That behavior will be influenced by three forces: Its strategic culture; foreign perceptions of and reaction to China; and domestic issues and pressures. Nathan and Ross emphasize the importance of "relativity" as a factor in shaping the way the Chinese state used force against its neighbors—when China has been weak, violence often appeared attractive; when strong, peace prevailed.20 Conversely, Waldron implies that the Ming only began building walls

91 when it became apparent they lacked the capability to be offensive, i.e. the Great Wall 99 reflected weakness, not strength. Ultimately, in order to unravel the mystery of Chinese strategic thought, we must ask still more questions. What constitutes security in Chinese strategy? Is that conception like the American view? How strongly do Chinese strategists believe that conflict is inevitable, in general, and with the United States in particular? How do Chinese strategists rate the value of military force and diplomacy as tools to achieve security? Do Chinese accept the notion of "just war" and, if so, what do they mean by it? How much * stock should outsiders place in Chinese rhetoric and declared doctrine, versus the predictions to be drawn from theories like realism? Many scholars have worked commendably to answer these questions, but the writing of Johnston and Scobell stand out from the pack.24

Andrew J. Nathan and Robert S. Ross, The Great Wall and the Empty Fortress (New York: W.W. Norton, 1997), p. 21. 21 Arthur Waldron, "Chinese strategy from the fourteenth to seventeenth centuries," in Williamson Murray, MacGregor Knox, and Alvin Bernstein, eds., The Making of Strategy: Rulers, States, and War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994). 22 Nathan and Ross, The Great Wall and the Empty Fortress, p. 24. 23 Waldron, "Chinese strategy from the fourteenth to seventeenth centuries;" Michael Swaine, China: Domestic Change and Foreign Policy (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1995); Allen S. Whiting, "Chinese Nationalism and Foreign Policy After Deng," China Quarterly (June 1995), p. 295-316; David Shambaugh, "The United States and China: A New Cold War?" Current History, Vol. 94, No. 593 (Sep 1995); Denny Roy, "The 'China Threat' Issue," Asian Survey, Vol. 36, No. 8 (1996), p. 758-771; Ralph D. Sawyer, One Hundred Unorthodox Strategies: Battle and Tactics of Chinese Warfare (Boulder: Westview Press, 1996); Andrew J. Nathan and Robert S. Ross, The Great Wall and the Empty Fortress (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1997); Richard Bernstein and Ross Munro, "The Coming Conflict with America," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 76, No. 2 (1997), p. 18-32; Michael Swaine, The Role of the Chinese Military in National Security Policy Making (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1998); Zalmay M Khalilzad, et al, The United States and a Rising China: Strategic and Military Implications (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1999); Mark Buries and Abram N. Shulsky, Patterns in China's Use of Force (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2000); Gerald Segal, "East Asia and the 'Constrainment' of China," in Michael E. Brown, et al, eds., The Rise of China (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2000); David Shambaugh, "Containment or Engagement of China? Calculating 9

Both Johnston and Scobell contend that Chinese strategic culture incorporates a Confucian and a "parabellum" or realist strand, although they differ on the importance of each element. Nevertheless, they agree that Chinese strategic culture is a hybrid, displaying characteristics of opportunism and restraint which modulate according to circumstances. This is not meant to imply that the two forces are in balance; there is a clear bias in favor of what Johnston calls the "parabellum" strain, with Confucian ideology largely used just to provide legitimacy for actions congruent with Realpolitik. That said, Confucianism is far more influential than cynics admit. Though the influence of Confucian thought waned considerably, at least within the public domain, during the twentieth century, it still shaped Chinese thinking about righteousness, restraint, and reciprocity. Unfortunately, this philosophy also fosters Sinocentrism, as well as arrogance and xenophobia, which has caused some of China's past missteps. Johnston downplays the importance of the Confucian strand within Chinese strategic culture, which he sees as a fig leaf for realism. His provocative assertion sought to balance the conventional view of the 1990s that China was unusually peaceful and * avoided violence whenever possible. Today, however, most American scholars, commentators, politicians, and soldiers, envision trouble on the horizon accompanying China's rise, though they disagree about how much tension will arise between the two

Beijing's Responses," in Michael E. Brown, et al, eds., The Rise of China (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2000); Michael Pillsbury, China Debates the Future Security Environment (Washington: National Defense University Press, 2000); Michael Swaine and Ashley Tellis, Interpreting China's Grand Strategy: Past, Present, and Future (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2000); Avery Goldstein, "Great Expectations: Interpreting China's Arrival," in Michael E. Brown, ed., The Rise of China (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2000); Gideon Rose and James F. Hoge, Jr., The Rise of China (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2002); Abram N. Shulsky, Deterrence Theory and Chinese Behavior (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2000); Andrew Scobell and Larry M. Wortzel, China's Growing Military Power: Perspectives on Security, Ballistic Missiles, and Conventional Capabilities (U.S. Army War College: Strategic Studies Institute, 2002); David A. Graff and Robin Higham, eds., A Military History of China (Boulder: Westview Press, 2002); Laurie Burkitt, et al., The Lessons of History: The Chinese People's Liberation Army at 75 (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2003); Kevin Pollpeter, U.S.-China Security Management: Assessing the Military-to-Military Relationship (Washington: RAND, 2004); Andrew Scobell and Larry M. Wortzel, Civil-Military Change in China: Elites, Institutes, and Ideas After the 16th Party Congress (U.S. Army War College: Strategic Studies Institute, 2004); Zbigniew Brzezinski and John J. Mearsheimer, "Clash of the Titans." Foreign Policy, Issue 146 (Jan/Feb 2005), http://search.epnet.com.ezproxv.lib.ucalgary.ca/login.aspx?direct;:::true&db=aph&an=:15424798 (accessed 14 Apr 2006); Robert S. Ross, "Assessing the China Threat." The National Interest (Fall 2005), p. 81-87; Bijian Zheng, "China's 'Peaceful Rise' to Great Power Status," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 84, Issue 5 (Sep/Oct 2005), p. 18-24. 24 Johnston, Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History; Andrew Scobell, China's Use of Military Force: Beyond the Great Wall and the Long March (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003). 10

powers. Scobell, in contrast to Johnston, sees a genuine dialectic at work, which he calls the Cult of Defense. It embodies a strain both of Confucianism—conflict-averse and defensive-minded, as well as of Realpolitik—offensive-minded and prone to seek military solutions. According to Confucianism, violence, while regrettable, is nonetheless acceptable under certain circumstances. "Just" wars against those who have shunned repeated warnings (the United States in Korea, India, Vietnam), initiated hostile action (Soviets, 1969), or gone out of their way to instigate trouble (Taiwan, 1995-96) are completely appropriate responses according to Confucian tradition. While Johnston's thesis provided a needed catalyst for greater debate about the foundation(s) of Chinese strategic thinking, Scobell's interpretation, developed later, more accurately captures its essence. In many ways, the resemblance to American political discourse is striking. American politics also is dominated by two competing strands of thought—realism and liberalism. American leaders often have employed liberal principles to explain or justify policy. Cynics contend that this process is mere hypocrisy in motion—aggressive and opportunistic motives repackaged as idealism—but * this charge oversimplifies reality. Why does the American public, generally speaking, see much less incongruity in such words and deeds? Surely, it has to do with culture which feeds into strategy. Those who entirely dismiss liberal tendencies in American political discourse are inevitably surprised from time to time. As a status-quo player on the world stage, America's actions usually are predictable; but sometimes domestic considerations, parochial concerns, sentiment, or ideology compel its involvement in matters unrelated to its vital interests. Moral, economic, political, geographic, and cultural issues interact, and affect decisions. China is similar in this regard. Those who dismiss the influence of Confucian thought on Chinese behavior run the same risks as do those who dismiss the effect of liberalism within the American context. Likewise, those who still profess that China is uniquely averse to conflict, and disposed to finding peaceful solutions to problems, face a substantial hurdle in explaining the frequency and the pre-emptive nature of its military actions over the centuries.

Gray, "National Styles in Strategy: The American Example," International Security, Vol. 6, No.2 (Autumn 1981), p. 38-9. 11

Theoretical constructs also can aid the understanding of Chinese and American behavior. The two major perspectives, or schools of thought, operative in the field of international relations are realism and liberalism. While each perspective incorporates many sub-cultures this survey will focus on the dichotomy between the two schools, rather than become ensnared in the complexities of their sub-cultures. The two perspectives represent opposite outlooks concerning the operation of international affairs at the macro-level, and, specifically, of China's rise within that system. Realists contend that China's ascendancy can come only at the expense of others, most notably, the United States. Realists interpret exchanges within the international arena in terms of relative gains and losses. They argue the United States, facing a rising great power determined to revise the current international structure in ways more favorable to itself, will (or should) aim to contain China, sooner rather than later, before Washington loses valuable leverage. By contrast, the Liberal school, focused on absolute gains, discounts the notion that a gain for one state always is a loss for another. Not surprisingly, liberals advocate policies aimed at engaging China, believing that constructive engagement offers the best * chance to manage China's rise so to preserve peace and prosperity for all involved. Over the last fifteen years, there has been a noticeable shift in American political attitudes, towards a darker, more pessimistic, outlook regarding China. This trend is reflected in the divergent rhetoric of Clinton and Bush administrations officials concerning the Sino- American relationship. While the Clinton administration referred to China as a "strategic partner," Bush administration officials have come to see China more as a "strategic competitor." Whether this shift in language can be ascribed to a changing of the guard in Washington is unclear.27 Unfortunately, both policies, containment and engagement, are flawed; neither one, as they are currently practiced, achieves the two-fold American

Realism can be sub-divided into classical realism, neorealism or structural realism, defensive realism, and offensive realism; liberalism can be sub-divided into classical liberalism and neoliberalism. 27 David M. Finkelstein, "The View From Beijing: U.S.-China Security Relations From Kosovo to September 11, 2001" in Andrew Scobell and Larry Wortzel, eds., China's Growing Military Power: Perspectives on Security, Ballistic Missiles, and Conventional Capabilities (U.S. Army War College: Strategic Studies Institute, 2002), p. 42. 12 objective of fostering greater Chinese democratization and cooperation, while simultaneously protecting United States interests should China become more hostile. Regardless of the motivations behind this change in attitude of United States administration officials, its significance should not be underestimated. Any change in perception will affect how American officials deal with China in coming years, and vice- versa. Of course, such changes did not occur in a vacuum. The Chinese simultaneously have adopted a less deferential, more assertive political agenda toward the United States, which realists naturally would expect. Despite these increasingly muscular policies, China so far has been careful to avoid crossing any threshold that would destabilize the geopolitical environment which China needs to continue its export-oriented strategy of economic growth, that has sustained the CCP's hold on political power and underwritten its military buildup. The continuance of such policies, however, is hardly guaranteed. A change in the preferences of a "misperceived" actor often lies at the root of the misuse of history. Wrong historical lessons are often incorrect extrapolations of others' * preferences and behavior. The historical interpretations themselves are usually correct. However, problems arise when the misperceived actor's preferences change from what they have been in the past. As China acquires more of the trappings of a great power, in terms of power and prestige, it may develop more activist policies.

Theories Regarding China's Rise and the Likelihood of Conflict Theories help us to predict the future in Asia. The seven theories outlined below explain how rising powers are likely to behave and how other states will react to them. They provide structure and clarity to the seemingly chaotic and random interplay of actors and actions. They are offered as possible scenarios; explanations of what might occur and why. They need not be mutually exclusive.

Zalmay Khalilzad, "Congage China," RAND Issue Paper for Project Air Force drawing on Zalmay Khalilzad, et al., The United States and a Rising China (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1999), http://www.rand.org/publications/IP/IP 187/IP187.html (17 Apr 2006). 29 Arthur A. Stein, "When Misperception Matters," World Politics, Vol. 34, No. 4 (Jul 1982): p. 517. 30 Ibid. 31 Brzezinski and Mearsheimer, "Clash of the Titans" 13

The first two theories offer the direst predictions concerning the future and China's rise. Hegemonic Instability Theory asserts that the incongruity between the growing capabilities of a rising power and its subordinate status in an international political IT system dominated by a hegemon produces conflicts that often are resolved via war. Balance of Power Theory34 indicates that China's increasing power in an anarchic international system will threaten other states and so trigger harsh reactions. Both Democratic Peace Theory and Democratic Transition Theory predict increased conflict between China and Western nations, especially the United States, not because of China's capabilities, but because its regime is flawed. Democratic Peace Theory posits that the shared institutions and political values of liberal democracies ensure peace between them, but not with authoritarian governments, where, indeed, it actually tends to produce conflict. The Chinese regime, seeing these confrontations as attempts to subvert IT Communist rule without a fight, reacts with hostility and intransigence in kind. For its part, Democratic Transition Theory addresses the transition from authoritarianism to democracy. In this process, it argues, major political players vie for leadership by * gaining popular support. They do so by tapping into nationalist sentiments through advocating aggressive foreign policies and stirring historical grievances toward other states or by supporting elite and institutional agendas, or both. This theory suggests that Chinese nationalism, together with increased political participation, may prevent Chinese leaders from reaching compromises with other states.39 One also can interpret China's rise through Institutionalism, which presumes that international stability naturally will occur as a result of the establishment of political, economic, and military norms via collective negotiation, integration, and consultation. Despite the power of this phenomenon in post-war Europe, however, institutionalism has 32 Rex Li, "The China Challenge: theoretical perspectives and policy implications," Journal of Contemporary China, Vol. 8, Issue 22 (Nov 1999), p. 443-476. 33 Goldstein, "Great Expectations: Interpreting China's Arrival," p. 29-30. 34 Li, "The China Challenge: theoretical perspectives and policy implications" 35 Kenneth N. Waltz, Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001). 36 Goldstein, "Great Expectations," p. 33. 37 David Shambaugh, "The United States and China: A New Cold War?" Current History, Vol. 94, No. 593 (Sep 1995), p. 244. 38 Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder, "Democratization and the Danger of War," International Security, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Summer 1995), p. 5-38. 39 Goldstein, "Great Expectations," p. 34. 14

had a muted effect on interstate relations in East Asia, for a variety of reasons. Explanations abound for the lack of progress on institutional norms. The two most convincing ones point to Japan's inability to lead East Asia, despite its clout, and given its wartime brutality, while China's size, power, and potential afford it significant leverage over many of its neighbors. Hence, China prefers bilateralism rather than multilateral approaches to regional disputes, which undercuts efforts aimed at creating and enhancing institutionalism.40 Not all theories predict such gloomy consequences to China's rise. One theory which throws a beacon of hope amidst pessimistic predictions is Economic Interdependence Theory. Simply put, this theory argues that nations can avoid the cyclical tragedies that historically have befallen rising and declining states in the competition for power, by recognizing that the costs of war outweigh the gains. Clearly, globalization heightens the appeal of this theory. With each passing year, so goes the theory, China's leaders become more and more constrained in their ability to act unilaterally, because their economic welfare is so intertwined with the global community. While the risk to * economic well-being may not prevent hostilities, it will inhibit them. Of course, this also could have been (and was) said of Germany in 1914. Finally, and ironically, Nuclear Peace Theory provides the most optimistic assessment of China's rise and the prospects for conflict. It argues that nuclear weapons provide a buffer against general war, and also constrain limited war and crisis behavior. In short, Beijing will feel the same pressures that Washington and Moscow did during Cold War crises and be constrained, but not necessarily stopped, since China may believe escalation can be controlled.41

Military Technology Development Recently, there has been a noticeable increase in concern, especially in the United States, over the growth of Chinese military power. Talk of "asymmetrical" warfare, espionage involving high technology, and views of future warfare, dominate the pages of many books, journals, and news media. Most of the literature investigating China's

Ibid, p. 35. Robert Jervis, The Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984). 15

military-technical development has been written by American scholars, because the United States has the greatest strategic interests in the issue. With their military might stretched thin by global commitments and their economy facing challenges associated with globalization, the War on Terror, and rampant deficit spending, many Americans are becoming anxious about Chinese geopolitical intentions, given the double-digit annual increases in its military budget since 1996.42 Most of this increased spending has been allocated to the modernization of conventional force capabilities. Western analyses of the development of Chinese military technology have evolved alongside China's security relationship with the West. In particular, Chinese military modernization initially was assessed through the lens of the Cold War. The literature can conveniently be divided into three phases, with some overlap, 1978-1989; 1989-1995; and 1995 to the present. The selection of these dates has a rationale. In 1978, Deng Xiaoping consolidated his power, and took China in a radically different direction than Mao Zedong had done. 1989 was the year of the Tiananmen Square demonstrations, the crackdown, and ostracism by the West. 1995-6 featured the Taiwan Strait crises, with* Deng Xiaoping nearing death and Jiang Zemin maneuvering for control, marking a new era characterized by a leadership structure similar to a Board of Directors, in which no leading figure was totally unassailable. Paralleling this power shift was a declining level of legitimacy for the CCP, while the new leadership consciously aimed to agitate Chinese nationalism as an alternative means to resuscitate the Party's leading role. Meanwhile, Jiang, lacking the prestige of his predecessors, had to ensure the loyalty of the PLA and did so through increased defense spending. During the first period, 1978-1989, China opened up to the West, which, in turn, lent technical assistance to China's military development. The literature of the period assessed these improved relations and military/technology assistance in the context of the Cold War. The opening also gave scholars increasing access to documents and experts inside China, previously off limits to Western scholars. In the second, post-Tiananmen, phase, with the Soviet threat thrown into the trash heap of history, the literature moved away from consideration of the military-technical relationship with the West toward

"China's Defense Budget," GlobalSecurity.org, http://www.globalsecuritv.org/militarv/world/china/budget.htm (accessed 9 Apr 08). 16 examination of Chinese domestic defense capabilities. The rift between the West and China which followed the 1989 crackdown on advocates of greater political and social freedom, shaped the analysis of the third phase, which was more negative toward China. Most of that scholarly work has fixated on China's mushrooming economic base, growing access to foreign military and dual-use technology, and their implications for American and regional security. These trends are understandable, but there is a troubling imbalance in the coverage, particularly in its assessment of China's ability to indigenize sophisticated manufacturing techniques and high-technology production. Scholars became interested in China's defense-industrial capacity with the opening up of China, against the backdrop of the Cold War. Leading specialists got their start during this time. Before 1978, little open source literature existed on the subject, except for grainy Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) estimates on how China allocated its resources, how much military hardware it produced and its quality, and its order of battle. But within a few years of the opening, a torrent of new scholarship emerged about Chinese military-industrial production and acquisition.43 It particularly focused on the reform * movement and the PRC's defense industrial capacity,44 and on military technology transfers to China.45 Several authors added contextual richness to this brew by assessing

Paul H. B. Godwin, ed., The Chinese Defense Establishment: Continuity and Change in the 1980s (Boulder: Westview Press, 1983); Gerald Segal and William T. Tow, eds., Chinese Defence Policy (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1984); U. Alexis Johnson, George R. Packard, and Alfred D. Wilhelm, Jr., eds., China Policy for the Next Decade (Boston: Oelschlager, Gunn & Hain Publishers, 1984); Charles D. Lovejoy, Jr., and Bruce W. Watson, eds., Chinese Military Reforms: International and Domestic Implications (Boulder: Westview Press, 1986); and Larry M. Wortzel, ed., China's Military Modernization (New York: Greenwood Press, 1988). 44 Harry G. Gelber, Technology, Defense, and External Relations in China, 1975-1978 (Boulder: Westview Press, 1979); Harlan Jencks, From Muskets to Missiles: Politics and Professionalism in the Chinese Army, 1945-1981 (Boulder: Westview Press, 1982); Sydney James, "Military Industry," in Gerald Segal and William Tow, eds., Chinese Defense Policy (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1984); Richard J. Latham, "People's Republic of China: The Restructuring of Defense Industrial Policies," in James E. Katz, ed., Arms Production in Developing Countries (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1984); John Frankenstein, "Chinese Weapons Development: Process, Progress, Program?" in Charles D. Lovejoy, Jr. and Bruce W. Watson, eds., Chinese Military Reforms: International and Domestic Implications (Boulder: Westview Press, 1986); Richard Latham, "Implications of the post-Mao Reforms on the Chinese Defense Industries," in Charles D. Lovejoy, Jr. and Bruce W. Watson, eds., Chinese Military Reforms: International and Domestic Implications (Boulder: Westview Press, 1986); Chong K. Yoon, "Problems of Modernizing the PLA: Domestic Constraints," in Larry M. Wortzel, ed., China's Military Modernization (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1988); Wendy Frieman, "China's Military R&D System: Reform and Reorientation," in Denis Fred Simon and Merle Goldman, eds., Science and Technology in Post-Mao China (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989). 45 David Shambaugh, "Military Modernization and the Politics of Technology Transfer," Contemporary China (Fall 1979); Karen Berney, "Dual-Use Technology Sales," China Business Review (July/August 17 the historical background to these issues, and the obstacles which had confounded the integration of foreign technologies into Chinese defense arrangements during the recent

Writers of the second phase, spanning the years 1989-1995, provided several important works focused on particular aspects of the Chinese military machine, such as research and development toward nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. Among the best of these pieces were collaborative works by John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai.47 Benefiting from the honeymoon period in Sino-American detente, Lewis and Xue commented that the amount of material "the Chinese have elected to publish truly surprised us .... " Admittedly, the motivations behind the release of Chinese documents and the granting of greater access to the scientists and scholars involved in the project, are unknown and subject to debate. A degree of skepticism is warranted regarding their findings and those of several other authors examining these subjects, given the lack of unfettered access to, for instance, the Soviet documents of the period and the paramount importance which the Chinese place on secrecy. Perhaps the Chinese documents made * available could be self-serving, or else skirt issues the Communist leadership would prefer to remain in the dark. Furthermore, the release of internal documents could have

1980); David L. Shambaugh, "China's Defense Industries: Indigenous and Foreign Procurement," in Paul H.B. Godwin, ed., The Chinese Defense Establishment: Continuity and Change in the 1980s (Boulder: Westview Press, 1983); Douglas T. Stuart and William T. Tow, "Arm Sales," in U. Alexis Johnson, George R. Packard, and Alfred D. Wilhelm, Jr., eds., China Policy for the Next Decade (Boston: Oelshlager, Gunn & Hain, Publishers, 1984); Leonard Sullivan, Jr., et al., "Trade and Technology Transfers," in U. Alexis Johnson, George R. Packard, and Alfred D. Wilhelm, Jr., eds., China Policy for the Next Decade (Boston: Oelschlager, Gunn & Hain, Publishers, 1984); William T. Tow, "Arm Sales to China," in Gerald Segal and William Tow, eds., Chinese Defense Policy (University of Illinois Press, Urbana and Chicago, 1984). Richard Gillespie, "Marketing to the PLA," The China Business Review (July/August 1984); Wendy Frieman, "Foreign Technology and Chinese Modernization," in Charles D. Lovejoy, Jr. and Bruce W. Watson, eds., Chinese Military Reforms: International and Domestic Implications (Boulder: Westview Press, 1986); Martin L. Lasater, Arming the Dragon: How Much U.S. Military Aid to China? The Heritage Lecture Series (Washington D.C.: Heritage Foundation, March 1986); Larry M. Wortzel, China's Military Potential (Carlisle Barracks: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, October 1998). 46 Thomas L. Kennedy, The Arms ofKiangnan: Modernization in the Chinese Ordnance Industry, 1860- 1895 (Boulder: Westview Press, 1978); Anthony B. Chan, Arming the Chinese: The Western Armaments Trade in Warlord China, 1920-1928 (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1982); John Frankenstein, "Back to the Future: A Historical Perspective on Chinese Military Modernization," presented at the International Studies Association annual meeting, Anaheim, California, March, 1986. 47 John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai, China Builds the Bomb (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988); John W. Lewis and Xue Litai, China's Strategic Seapower (Stanford University Press, 1988); John W. Lewis and Hue Di, "China's Ballistic Missile Programs: Technologies, Strategies and Goals," International Security, Vol. 17, No. 2 (Fall 1992). 48 Lewis and Xue, China Builds the Bomb, p. viii. 18

been an exercise in disinformation, or misdirection. For all these possible pitfalls, Lewis and Xue's intimate portrayal provided the closest look inside the Chinese strategic weapons program to date, substantiating previous studies while providing revealing new insights. Another vein of research concentrated on China's domestic situation and the likelihood that Chinese defense industries could be transformed into commercially viable entities. Despite the Tiananmen crackdown, China became increasingly accessible, allowing the development of new insights and more nuanced analyses. China's "Open Door" policy was responsible for much of this openness; so too, was Beijing's decision to undertake defense conversion. The latter policy gave foreigners of various stripes— CEOs, businessmen, technical specialists, journalists—opportunities to see what was happening with previously unknown issues. Yet another windfall for academics was the release of official histories chronicling the PLA and the defense industries, enabling scholars to assess the accuracy of their earlier impressions. During the latest period, from 1995 to the present, academic interest changed in response to a shift in political perceptions on both sides, especially with the changing of * the guard in Washington. The political re-orientation on both sides of the Pacific, and the parallel swing in scholarship, reflected several global trends. First, the end of the Cold War caused a decline in global military sales. This downturn hit Russia, already suffering through severe economic chaos, hard. Military sales abroad had been a leading generator of hard currency for Moscow. Adding insult to injury, American hardware had shone in the Gulf War at the expense of the Soviet equipment fielded by Saddam Hussein's inept forces. American and European military hardware, however, was off limits to China after Tiananmen, whereas the Russians were happy to sell Beijing the latest weapons in its arsenal. A second trend was the narrowing gap between commercial technologies and military-related applications, because of dual-use capabilities. The final

Barry Naughton, "The Third Front: defense industrialization in the Chinese interior," China Quarterly, no. 115 (September 1988); Paul Humes Folta, From Swords to Ploughshares? Defense Industry Reform in the PRC (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992); Mel Gurtov, "Swords in market shares: China's conversion of military industry to civilian production," China Quarterly, No. 134 (June 1993); J.C. Berthelemy and Saadet Deger, Conversion of Military Industries to Civilian Production in China (Paris: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development [OECD], June 1995); Joern Broemmelhoerster and John Frankenstein, eds., Mixed Motives, Uncertain Outcomes: Defense Industry Conversion in China (Boulder: Lynne Reinner, 1996). 19 trend was globalization. Together, these trends offered China a unique opportunity for military-related technological advancement.50 At the start of this period, Sino-American relations soured considerably because of several events: In 1995, Taiwanese President Lee Teng-hui was granted a US visa to speak at his alma mater, Cornell University, while China's use of coercive missile diplomacy produced the Taiwan Strait Crisis. After that crisis, China openly conducted a missile buildup and bought much advanced Russian weaponry, while numerous allegations were made of Chinese espionage directed against American high-technology research facilities. Later developments cemented this change in focus, like the Cox Report, the bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade, which killed three Chinese nationals; the 2001 mid-air collision between a US Navy P-3 intelligence gathering aircraft and an overzealous Chinese pilot; the successful launch, orbit, and recovery of two manned space missions; China's use of lasers to blind American satellites, and its anti-satellite test in 2007, long after the United States and Russia had agreed to a moratorium on testing; a continuing lack of transparency by the Chinese regarding * defense expenditures and intentions; and successive record-setting US trade deficits with China, which poisoned perceptions within Congress and among voters. Not surprisingly, many studies conducted during this period explored China's foreign military purchases, how those acquisitions and the increase in defense spending affected regional security, especially regarding Taiwan, and China's attitude toward advanced technologies and the so-called Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA).53 Other books and

Shirley A. Kan, Christopher Bolkcom, and Ronald O'Rourke, "China's Foreign Conventional Arms Acquisitions: Background and Analysis," CRS Report for Congress, 10 Oct 2000, http://www.fas.org/man/crs/RL30700.pdf (accessed 19 Mar 08). 51 Bates Gill and Taeho Kim, China's Arms Acquisitions from Abroad: A Quest for "Superb and Secret Weapons"(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995). 52 James R. Lilley and Chuck Downs, eds., Crisis in the Taiwan Strait (Washington D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1997); Jonathan D. Pollack and Richard H. Yang, eds., In China's Shadow: Regional Perspectives on Chinese Foreign Policy and Military Development (Santa Monica: RAND, 1998). 53 Bates Gill and Lonnie Henley, China and the Revolution in Military Affairs (Carlisle Barracks: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, May 1996); Michael Pillsbury, ed., Chinese Views of Future Warfare (Washington D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1997); Mark A. Stokes, China's Strategic Modernization: Implications for U.S. National Security (USAF Institute for National Security Studies, October 1997); Michael Pillsbury, China Debates the Future Security Environment (Washington D.C.: National Defense University Press, 2000); John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai, Imagined Enemies: China Prepares for Uncertain War (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006). 20

articles tackled allegations of Chinese efforts to steal American technology secrets through outright spying, the use of shell companies, or dual-use technology transfers.5 An interesting, many would say predictable, split emerged in the study of Chinese military-technical development. Where older works focused on China's inability to modernize its military, newer studies were decidedly more favorable on the matter. Many analyses between 1978 and 1995 emphasized the long-standing contradiction between self-reliance and foreign dependence, the organizational, political, and cultural problems which obstructed efforts to innovate, absorb and indigenize technology, and the lack of priority afforded to military modernization within the reform movement. However, more recent examinations depict heated intellectual debates over the future of high-technology warfare, and talk of asymmetric capabilities, "leap frog" technologies and "magic weapons," and express greater optimism about the PLA's ability to overcome the obstacles to technological advancement. These scholars, as well as the Pentagon, recognize the serious hurdles still facing the PLA, but they are willing to believe that PLA leaders will significantly close the gap, if not reach parity, with Western military * capabilities, simply through domestic economic reform, greater funding, unprecedented access to foreign technologies, professionalization, and globalization.55 56 Others, like Wortzel, while acknowledging persistent problems in China's effort to modernize, still note that the Chinese high command seeks to deter or thwart the United States in the en region through creative strategies that avert head-to-head force confrontations. Behind this rising faith in China's ability to succeed, where it largely failed in the past, Stokes argues, are doctrinal changes59 consistent with lessons learned from the

James Mulvenon, Chinese Military Commerce and U.S. National Security (Santa Monica: RAND, 1998). 55 Wendy Frieman, "The Understated Revolution in Chinese Science and Technology: Implications for the PLA in the 21st Century," in James R. Lilley and David L. Shambaugh, eds., China's Military Faces the Future (Washington, DC: M.E. Sharpe, Inc, 1999). 56 Annual Report to Congress, Military Power of the People's Republic of China 2008, Office of the Secretary of Defense, http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/pdfs/China Military Report 08.pdf (accessed 20 Mar 08). 57 Larry M. Wortzel, China's Military Potential (Carlisle Barracks: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, October 1998). 58 Exceptions to the overall dismal performance of the Chinese military and industrial sectors regarding innovation would be strategic nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. See Evan A. Feigenbaum, China's Techno-Warriors: National Security and Strategic Competition from the Nuclear to the Information Age (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003). 21

Gulf War and Iraqi Freedom, and Chinese concern about a looming contingency regarding Taiwan, both of which lend consistency and rationality to Chinese research, development and procurement.60 However, this argument rings hollow. While Stokes and others have identified improvements to PLA readiness and capabilities, they have glossed over complicated economic issues that tell a different story.61 Yasheng Huang argues that the large inflow of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) into China reflects weakness rather than strength.62 Greater funding and access to foreign technology, in and of themselves, do not necessarily equal indigenous capability or innovative spirit. A small, but growing chorus of critics contends that these overly optimistic assessments are based on hyperbolic rhetoric, superficial statistics, and ignorance of how globalization operates. Both Quinlan and Gilboy argue that these flaws cripple much scholarship about the state of China's industrial sectors.63 China's military modernization depends, above all else, on the nation's manufacturing boom. But just because a high-technology device is assembled in China does not mean that the knowledge and capacity needed to construct it from the « start exists in the same place, nor that most of the profits are retained in country.64 Simply to acquire foreign systems and designs is insufficient for these purposes. Even if a production line and increased funding, training, and infrastructure could be established, serious qualitative gaps would remain. Innovation is complex. It requires both physical

Refers to the doctrinal shift from "People's War" to "Local War Under High-Technology Conditions." As China entered the twenty-first century, the Chinese high command became more specific about these high-technology conditions, calling for studying "People's War under Informationisation Conditions. See Ka-po Ng, Interpreting China's Military Power: Doctrine Makes Readiness (New York: Routledge, 2005), p. 21. 60 Mark A. Stokes, China's Strategic Modernization: Implications for National Security (Carlisle Barracks: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Sep 1999), p. 7-13. 61 Martin Hart-Landsberg and Paul Burkett, "China and the Dynamics of Transnational Accumulation: Causes and Consequences of Global Restructuring," Historical Materialism, Vol. 14:3 (3-43), 8 Nov 06; Jinghai Zheng and Arae Bigsten, "Can China's Growth be Sustained? A Productivity Perspective," World Development, 2007; Chengxin Pan, "What Is Chinese About 'Chinese' Business? Implications for American Response to China's Rise," a speech given at the ChinaWorldInternational Conference on 'Made in China vs. Made by Chinese: Global Identities of Chinese Business,' 20 Mar 07. 62 Yasheng Huang, Selling China: Foreign Direct Investment During the Reform Era (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003). 63 Joseph P. Quinlan and Marc Chandler, "The U.S. Trade deficit: A Dangerous Obsession," Foreign Affairs, May/June 2001; Joseph P. Quinlan, "Ties That Bind," Foreign Affairs, July/August 2002; George J. Gilboy, "The Myth Behind China's Miracle," Foreign Affairs, July/August 2004. 64 Edward S. Steinfeld, "Getting China Right: Cutting Through the Myths of Economic Growth," MIT Center for International Studies, Spring 2007. 22 and intangible inputs. China is capable of amassing a potent force, but it cannot do so simply by importing foreign technology or acting as the assembly point for finished goods destined for export. This debate of quantity versus quality has important implications regarding how the United States views the potential Chinese threat to its interests in the region. The Internet and China's increasing openness have afforded researchers greater access to sources, making it easier, though not easy, to assess Chinese aspirations. In the twenty-first century, warfighting is characterized by stealth, speed, precision strike, information dominance, and net-centric warfare, raising the significance of qualitative issues (innovation, research and development, design and organization, education, training, maintenance, sophistication and integration) over mere numbers, important as the latter are to power. Many publications, however, continue to highlight actual or planned Chinese acquisitions of hardware without discussing the context (for instance, past success, or lack thereof, with the integration of foreign systems; the degree of training or other key elements of any attempt at effective force modernization). This habit creates * a false impression of PLA prowess. Another theme that emerges in analyses of Chinese military-technical developments is the effect of Western aid. In the years immediately after China's opening to the world, the United States and Western European nations applied a liberal standard to dual-use exports destined for China, but after Tiananmen Square, they blocked military-related technology transfers. This policy remains in place today, despite frequent calls by businesses to change that policy. Nonetheless, globalization, China's admission to the WTO, and the rapidly blurring line between commercial and military technologies, have served to intensify debate about the proper policies regarding Chinese access to sensitive Western technologies with military uses. Since the late 1970s, many books, articles, and editorials have addressed the issue of military and dual-use technology transfers to China. Between 1978 and 1989, some commentators saw technology transfers to China as a prudent way to balance Soviet

John T. Preston, "Success Factors in Technology-Based Entrepreneurship," Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) Entrepreneurship Center, August 2001. 66 Richard D. Fisher, "Foreign Arms Acquisitions and PLA Modernization," in James R. Lilley and David L. Shambaugh, eds., China's Military Faces the Future (Washington, DC: M.E. Sharpe, Inc, 1999). 23 expansion. Despite detente, Cold War plotting drove the superpowers' decision-making. China acted firmly against Soviet policies and allies in South East Asia. After the fall of Saigon, Cam Ranh Bay, which had been extensively modernized for use by the American Navy, became an important Soviet naval hut)—its largest outside of the Soviet Union. The port, held under a 25-year lease agreement signed in 1979, facilitated the projection of Soviet power into the South China Sea and threatened American interests in the area. Meanwhile, in February 1979, the Chinese initiated a brief and bloody 29-day incursion into Vietnam to punish what they viewed as a series of provocations by Hanoi. These included Vietnamese intimacy with the Soviet Union, hegemonistic "imperial dreams" in Southeast Asia, mistreatment of ethnic Chinese living in Vietnam, and spurning of Beijing's attempt to repatriate them to China. In December 1979, the Soviets invaded Afghanistan. Together, these actions roused American anxieties about Soviet expansionism and its desire for warm water anchorages. These events led the Carter Administration to open the spigot, which sent military and dual-use technologies eastward. This flow increased under the Reagan Administration. As late as 1987, after * Mikhail Gorbachev's ascendancy to leadership in the Kremlin, Reagan Administration representatives continued to press Congress to enable the modernization of Chinese defenses. The United States should cooperate with China to

strengthen China's self-defense capabilities ... expand parallel interest in mutual opposition to Soviet expansion in Asian areas ... support an independent foreign policy [for China] which is not threatening to our [U.S.] friends and allies in the region ... support China's economic modernization program.

Other actors supported technology transfers not for geostrategic reasoning, but for profits. The carefree approach taken by some commentators during this period is startling, given the changes over the last quarter century.

67 "Chinese Invasion of Vietnam: February 1979," Global Secuirty.org, http://www.globalsecuritv.org/military/world/war/prc-vietnam.htm (accessed 21 Mar 08). 68 Congressional Presentation for Security Assistance Programs: Fiscal Year 1988 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1987), p. 23, 273-274, quoted in Larry M. Wortzel, "United States Export Control Policies and the Modernization of the China's Armed Forces," in Larry M. Wortzel, ed., China's Military Modernization (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1988), p. 172. 24

There is no apparent reason why the Chinese cannot develop, adapt, produce, operate, and maintain weapons and other military equipment of contemporary effectiveness. The trick will be to find the means to economically equip very large, dispersed forces with simple, reliable weapons, that ... can match the effectiveness of opposing forces ... A joint multinational effort might well produce the best results for the Chinese.

This cavalier approach continued in the European, Russian, and Israeli defense industries even after Tiananmen Square. Only concerted efforts by American political and defense leaders constrained—not always successfully—widespread military collaboration with Beijing by business-minded opportunists, most especially, the Russians, who were in the throes of an economic meltdown amidst rampant political corruption, desperate for a commodity the Chinese increasingly possessed—hard currency—and possessing goods the latter wanted—above all, advanced military technology. Another camp of academics and writers, however, opposed technology transfers to China, largely for strategic reasons, the same rationale underlying those who supported such assistance. Warning readers about the unpredictability of the future, Sullivan, in 1984, noted the possibility of a Sino-Soviet rapprochement: "... there is no firm basis to conclude that China is no longer a 'potential adversary,' either by returning to some Soviet-led coalition or by actively contesting vital U.S. interests elsewhere in the region. " So too, in 1988, Larry Wortzel, the Assistant Army Attache at the US Embassy in Beijing, with an exceptional vantage point during a critical turning point in Sino- American relations, argued that the West needed to be cautious about sales to China "to ensure that we protect ourselves and do not 'eat' our own technology. " Even before Tiananmen, he warned that, despite China's meager pool of qualified science and technology personnel and its limited capacity to absorb new technology, "the PRC has

Leonard Sullivan, Jr., et al., "Trade and Technology Transfers," in U. Alexis Johnson, George R. Packard, and Alfred D. Wilhelm, Jr., eds., China Policy for the Next Decade (Boston: Oelschlager, Gunn & Hain, Publishers, 1984), p. 312. 70 Ibid, p. 313. 71 Wortzel, ed., China's Military Modernization, p. 159-60. 25 clearly demonstrated the capability to focus its S & T efforts successfully in certain areas critical to China's defense industries. " The events of June 1989 threw cold water on arms transfers to China, and on the literature supporting that idea. The numbers in this suspicious camp multiplied as American trade deficits expanded, its military resources were stretched thin, and Chinese affluence and influence grew. Speaking to Congressional members in 2001, CIA Director George Tenet stated

... [China's] ... drive for recognition as a Great Power is one of the toughest challenges that we face. Beijing's goal of becoming a key world player and especially more powerful in East Asia has come sharply into focus. It is pursuing these goals through an ambitious economic reform agenda, military modernization, and a complex web of initiatives aimed at expanding China's international influence—especially relative to the United States. Russian arms are a key component of this buildup. [But] arms sales are only one element of a burgeoning Sino- Russian relationship. Moscow and Beijing plan to sign a friendship treaty' later this year, highlighting common interests and a willingness to cooperate diplomatically against US policies that they see as unfriendly to their interest.73

A more moderate tone was taken by researchers who recognized the myriad financial, political, organizational, and technological hurdles confronting China's ability to exploit Western technology transfers. Still others pointed to the dubious logic of simultaneously arming Beijing and Taipei. Moreover, Frankenstein argued it was impulsive to proclaim China a new market for Western military hardware or technology, given Chinese leaders

74. repeated calls for "self-reliance". Tow captures the sentiment of these observers even better when he says,

12 Ibid, p. 170. 73 George Tenet, Director, Central Intelligence Agency, as quoted in Michael J. Barron, "China's Strategic Modernization: The Russian Connection," Parameters, Winter 2001-02, p. 72. 74 John Frankenstein, "Chinese Weapons Development: Process, Progress, Program?" in Charles D. Lovejoy, Jr., and Bruce W. Watson, eds., Chinese Military Reforms: International and Domestic Implications (Boulder: Westview Press, 1986), p. 79. 26

the dreams of a massive China arms market, much like nineteenth-century dreams of textile markets, are sorely misplaced. The common cause for the failure of both dreams was to see the question from the point of view of what 'we can sell' rather than what China wants to buy.

These researchers maintained their skepticism even about the considerable, and unforeseen, Russian collaboration with Chinese efforts at modernization. They saw Chinese access to Russian weaponry as "window dressing," because internal hurdles would negate China's capacity to profit from purchases of foreign weapons and dual-use technology. These scholars, while acknowledging Beijing's awareness of these hurdles and its attempts to eliminate them, still believed that Communist political and social orthodoxy would restrict China's ability to leverage its unprecedented access to foreign technology. Over the first decade, this skepticism has faded, if judged simply by the volume of their writing, but many still question the Chinese miracle. It is valuable, when discussing a dynamic subject like technology development, to note areas where scholarly analysis has overshot, undershot, or missed the target. Regardless of whether assessments were overly optimistic or pessimistic, they frequently produced policy orientations with costs. Such an effort can correct our assessments and muffle the unrealistic desire for utter clarity when we try to assess similar issues. Thus, many scholars erroneously discounted the likelihood of significant Russian technology transfers to China, following their ideological split.

Historical experience will most likely temper most Chinese hopes for obtaining arms sales as part of the recent Sino- Soviet negotiations. It remains highly improbable that the Soviets would either offer or that the Chinese would accept arrangements similar to those of the early-1950s, when substantial Soviet nuclear and conventional military assistance was promised but only sometimes delivered to Beijing.77

William T. Tow, "Arms Sales," in Gerald Segal and William T. Tow, eds., Chinese Defence Policy (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1984), p. 159. 76 Bates Gill and Taeho Kim, China's Arms Acquisitions from Abroad: A Quest for "Superb and Secret Weapons" (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995) 77 Tow, "Arms Sales," p. 158. 27

Conversely, recent works on military-technical development in China have benefited from the insights provided by the swelling ranks of foreign engineers, design consultants, industry experts, and business people working inside China, who bolster scholarly assessments through personal insights gleaned from local experience. Frequently, such people possess an in-depth, nuanced knowledge of industries and the realities of Chinese defense and dual-use production, which helps them avoid the outlandish predictions made by some academics. The combination of theory and scholarly rigor with no-nonsense experience makes for compelling reading. Not surprisingly, however, these new contributors to the field often need greater discipline. At times, their articles and arguments are less than compelling because they fail to incorporate sufficient historical context; overemphasize anecdotal evidence of hyper-growth; obsess over recent statistics which paint a picture of an economic behemoth that soon will overshadow America's leading position; or resemble snapshots in time rather than in-depth examinations, and reflect a perceptible, but murky agenda, as much as a search for truth. Second, although several good studies described the agonizingly slow cycle of Chinese weapons design, development, procurement, and fielding,78 researchers often grossly underestimated the time which China would need to field technologically sophisticated weapons systems. One widely publicized initiative involves the acquisition of aircraft carriers and the creation of a "blue-water" navy. PLA intentions, transmitted through various publications, were, and continue to be, given too much weight in Western writings. Though this problem was mostly confined to the trade press, the message crept into other media. Clarke, writing in the mid-1980s, reported that the "PLA Navy now has plans for the construction of five new 20,000 ton aircraft carriers over the next five years. " 25 years later, China possesses no operational carrier and any such development is far off, if still under consideration.80 Though China has become more

78 Kenneth W. Allen, Glenn Krumel, and Jonathan D. Pollack, China's Air Force Enters the 21s' Century (Santa Monica: RAND, 1995), p. 144-7; Christopher D. Yung, People's War at Sea: Chinese Naval Power in the Twenty-First Century (Alexandria, VA.: Center for Naval Analyses, March 1996). 79 Christopher M. Clarke, "Defense Modernization: How China plans to rebuild its crumbling 'Great Wall'," China Business Review (July/August 1984). 80 Ian Storey, "China's aircraft carrier ambitions: seeking truth from rumors," Naval War College Review, Winter 2004, http://findarticles.eom/p/articles/mi mOJIW/is 1 57/ai 113755343 (accessed 22 Mar 08); 28 open to scholars, certain realms still are hidden, most notably, the military one. Meanwhile, American military leaders decry the lack of transparency about Chinese military expenditures and intentions.81 With the arrival of the Internet, the number of websites dedicated to Chinese official rhetoric exploded, all too often serving as propaganda outlets and offering fantastic claims. While the specific motivations behind some of these inflated pronouncements is not always clear,

there has been an historic tendency for Chinese administrations to maintain assertive and bombastic language even at a time of obvious and conscious political and military weakness. Decisions to leave undisturbed the evident gap between declaratory language and the analyses on which practical policies had to be based may have served the purposes of domestic morale and cultural cohesion as well as those of maintaining external aims in principle, pending the achievement of the means to fulfill them. 2

A third flaw within the literature was a willingness to swallow whole the idea that the latest reform of Chinese defense industry would be the decisive one, which would succeed where previous initiatives had failed. Though changes under Deng and his successors did improve the functioning of China's defense industries, the baseline for these improvements was abnormally low, giving an inflated impression of progress. Within a short period of time, the contradictions between rhetoric and reality suffocated the potential for system-wide progress in China. Increasingly, experts agree that the potential for innovation, and thus economic growth, in China, will be capped until the enaction of major political and social reforms including patent protection, property rights, worker mobility, education, and horizontal networking across industries and beyond provincial political boundaries. Beyond those issues, cultural particularities like the

You Ji, "The debate over China's aircraft carrier program," Association For Asia Research, 2 Mar 05, http://www.asianresearch.org/articles/2529.html (accessed 22 Mar 08). 81 David Lague, "China increases military spending," International Herald Tribune, 4 Mar 08, http://www.iht.com/articles/2008/03/04/asia/military.php (accessed 23 Mar 08). 82 Harry G. Gelber, Technology, Defense, and External Relations in China, 1975-1978 (Boulder: Westview Press, 1979). 83 James A. Dorn and Wang Xi, eds., Economic Reform in China: Problems and Prospects (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990); James A. Dorn, "China's Fatal Conceit," Cato Policy Report, 29

method of educational instruction and notions of "saving face" continue to hamper "off the wall thinking" and risk-taking, which are major ingredients for innovation. A final weakness within the literature on Chinese military modernization has been a persistent bias toward quantitative versus qualitative issues. Though scholars have acknowledged the quickening pace of transformation, or the "digitization" of the battlefield,84 "hardware" acquisitions have continued to garner far greater attention than developments in "software" (issues of training, organization and integration, dual-use technology applications, professionalization of the PLA, officer accession and development, continuing education among all ranks to exploit the potential of new technologies, non-commissioned officer development, the realism of PLA exercises). Admittedly, the latter issues are difficult to evaluate. This problem reflects the

May/June 1996, http://www.cato.org/pubs/policyreport/xvi iin3-5.html (accessed 19 Apr 08); U.S. Embassy Beijing, "Tech Innovation In China: Experts Look At Obstacles," China-U.S. Joint Conference on Technological Innovation, 24-27Apr 2000, http://www.usembassy-china.org.cii/sandt/s&tconf,htm (accessed 20 Apr 08); Liu Ji, "The Reform of Chinese Political System," Address to Europe-China Forum in Ireland, 5 Sep 03, http://www.ceibs.edu/ase/Documents/EuroChinaForum/liuii.htm (accessed 21 Apr 08); Shulin Gu and Bengt-Ake Lundvall, "China's Innovation System and the Move Toward Harmonious Growth and Endogenous Innovation," Danish Research Unit for Industrial Dynamics (DRUID), Working Paper No. 06-7, http://www.dniid.dk/wp/pdf files/06-07.pdf (accessed 19 Apr 08); Richard Wallace, "Beijing Summit Ponders Chinese Innovation," InformationWeek, 12 Sep 05, http://www.informationweek.com/shared/printableArticle.ihtml?articlelD=170702410 (accessed 19 Apr 08); Simon Burns, "China plagued by innovation gap: Research gap hurting industry, officials say," vnunet.com, 16 Dec 05, http://www.infomaticsonline.co.uk/articles/print/2147658 (accessed 20 Apr 08); Suisheng Zhao, ed., Debating Political Reform in China: Rule of Law vs. Democratization (London: M.E. Sharpe, 2006); "China wants scientists to risk failure to achieve breakthroughs," International Herald Tribune, 28 Aug 07, http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2007/08/28/asia/AS-GEN-China-Scientists- Research.php (accessed 19 Apr 08); OECD in cooperation with China's Ministry of Science and Technology, "OECD Reviews of Innovation Policy, CHINA: Synthesis Report, " Aug 2007, http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/54/20/39177453.pdf (accessed 20 Apr 08). 84 Lieutenant Colonel Mandille, French Liaison Officer to British Signal Command, "The British Battlefield Digitization," Doctrine #01, December 2003, http://www.cdef.terre.defense.gouv.fr/publications/doctruie/doctrine01/US/etranger/artl9.pdf (accessed 17 Mar 08). Advances in technology continue to affect the conduct of warfare; communications connectivity, line-of-sight limitations, map and compass navigation, hierarchical flow and bottlenecked information, and static command posts are all giving way to new technologies and procedures as the battlefield is "digitized." Digitization refers to the near-real-time transfer of battlefield information between diverse fighting elements and is intended as a means to share awareness of the tactical situation. Digitization aims to leverage information-age technologies to enhance the art of command and to facilitate the science of control. Proponents contend continued insertion of digital technology into sensors, intelligence fusion systems, communications systems, and smart munitions will increase the ability to manage, process, distribute, and display command and control information rapidly and globally. For more detail, see "Battlefield Digitization," GlobalSecurity.org, http://www.globalsecuritv.org/militarvAibrary/policv/ai-mv/fm/3-34-230/Ch4htm.htm (accessed 24 Mar 08). 30 revolutionary nature of these developments. Although this imbalance has been rectified since the end of the 1991 Gulf War, discussions still tend to underrate the complexities and nuances involved. Mao himself repeatedly argued "weapons are an important factor in war, but not the decisive factor; it is people, not things, that are decisive. "86 The PLA has not been tested in combat since its brief, but disastrous, attack on Vietnam in 1979. Though it has made tremendous strides toward fielding a modernized force since then, it is unclear how well they would perform in an actual confrontation. Indeed, "the PLA itself acknowledges that military training continues to suffer from units 'going through the motions,' heavy scripting, and a lack of realism." Acquisitions do not equal capability. That said, scholars should guard against being too conservative as well. Globalization and the continuing reform efforts within China are creating an environment that could, at some point, provide genuine traction to Beijing's efforts to harvest domestic innovation. Given the continuing lack of transparency about military spending and acquisitions, demonstrated capabilities, and overall intentions, developments within the PLA and Chinese defense industries will continue to demand great attention from "China * watchers."

Conclusion China's meteoric rise has attracted attention to its implications. Just as China was emerging from its largely self-imposed isolation, the first serious work on strategic culture also was being produced. As China's fortunes improved in the 1980s, its national self-image benefited as well. Not surprisingly, the PLA started to re-emphasize the importance of China's renowned military classics. Their degree of influence compared to other factors is difficult to measure, but is significant. While the military classics and Confucianism have made deep impressions on Chinese strategic culture, realism is the nexus of Chinese behavior.

John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, ed., In Athena's Camp: Preparing for Conflict in the Information Age (Santa Monica: RAND, 1997); John Ferris, "NCW, C4ISR, 10 and RMA: Toward a Revolution in Military Intelligence?" in Understanding Intelligence in the Twenty-First Century: Journeys in Shadows, ed. L. V. Scott and P. Jackson (London: Routledge, 2004). 86 Mao Zedong as quoted in Michael Ying-Mao Kau and Susan H. Marsh, eds., China in the Era of Deng Xiaoping: A Decade of Reform (New York: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 1993), p. 337. 87 Annual Report to Congress, Military Power of the People's Republic of China 2008, p. 48 31

In recent years, the Chinese military has benefited from double-digit, year-over-year increases in defense spending, largely as a result of its continuing economic success. That spending trend is out of proportion to the threat it faces in the region. Many have suggested that the engine behind this growth is a desire to gain at least regional hegemony. While the Chinese will not even be able to approach what the United States spends on defense, such comparisons mean little. First, the United States has global commitments and interests. China has no global commitments and its interests, while growing, are more manageable than Washington's. Second, a simple conversion of yuan into dollars as a measure of defense spending is disingenuous. A dollar stretches further in China. Third, the cost of supporting a conscript force—even one the size of China's, with its tremendous redundancy—pales in comparison to that required by an all-volunteer force; hence, more of the total Chinese military budget can be allocated to acquisitions and modernization. But money does not buy everything. China has struggled with innovation and self- sufficiency when it comes to high-technology. While significant strides have been made, * the Chinese remain anywhere from one to two decades behind the West in military technology, with the exception of a few pockets of excellence. Significant doctrinal changes consistent with lessons learned from U.S. operations in Iraq in 1991 and 2003, along with concerns over Taiwan, give consistency and rationality to Chinese research, development, and procurement; however, the Chinese continue to lean towards quantity against quality in many areas which can distort the true situation. China is engaged in a massive and long-term, multifaceted effort to improve the quality of its military. It continually makes overt and covert attempts to acquire dual-use technologies from Western, Russian, and Israeli sources. Of these, the Russian connection has proven the most fruitful. Russian desperation after the collapse of the Soviet Union made it a willing partner in China's march toward modernization. After Tiananmen Square, access to Western high-technology with dual-use potential has been limited, thanks, almost exclusively, to political arm-twisting of European allies by the United States, which has grown increasingly concerned about Chinese intentions and capabilities in a region where the United States has significant interests. 32

Augmenting those efforts is a sustained and widespread espionage effort. In an interview with American public television's documentary series Frontline, Edward Appel, a 24-year veteran of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), was asked "... are the Chinese playing a different game [than chess], or do they understand things we don't understand? " He replied

... the thing I'm afraid of is, when you look at a nation that large, that has that large of a presence in the United States, and ... blood in its eye as far as modernization and military and market success, competitiveness, if you will, that the United States has never expended very many resources on the [PRCJ. We 've never thought it represented all that big of a threat. ... as a consequence, we've never had quantitatively as much success as we have against other foreign intelligence services that were operating against the U.S.

... in the last few years the U.S. has come to an increasing recognition of the potential danger posed by the intelligence services of China ... a foreign intelligence service working against the United States has a decided advantage. We have a free country. We think information is free. ... we have to do a better job of security [in government and business] to protect the things that are essential ...We 're not good at that as a society. And that's QQ what we have to improve. "

Dave Szady, the FBI's former top counterespionage official, rated China the number one counterintelligence threat to the United States. "It's a very large threat, it's pervasive QQ and it's extremely effective." U.S. law enforcement officials note that Chinese espionage differs from classical KGB-style operations during the Cold War, featuring dead drops and microfiche passed in the night. Instead the Chinese rely on a multitude of relative amateurs.90 "The Chinese are very good at using multiple redundant collection

88 "China's Espionage: What's At Stake, an interview with Edward Appel, FBI Special Agent (1973-97), Frontline, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/spv/spies/atstake.html (accessed 29 Jul 08).

89 Dave Szady, as quoted in Lisa Myers and the NBC Investigative Unit, "U.S. Worries about Chinese espionage," MSNBC.com, 20 Nov 06, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/15820017/from/ET/ (accessed 29 Jul 08). 90 Peter Grier, "Spy case patterns the Chinese style of espionage," The Christian Science Monitor, 30 Nov 05, http://www.csmonitor.com/2005/1130/p01s01-usfp.html (accessed 29 Jul 08). 33 platforms and by that I refer to students, delegations, visitors, researchers, development, partnerships, business deals, and false front companies. " High profile prosecutions in recent years may represent only the tip of the iceberg as regards their espionage activities.

Each individual may produce only a small bit of data. But collectively the network might vacuum up an extensive amount of sensitive military and economic information. To the extent we suffer losses against China, typically we suffer them day in and day out on a modest scale of 92 operation.

Because Beijing favors methods of collection unlike those used by other big intelligence services, which have tight control over a few, deeply buried and valuable agents, U.S. law enforcement finds it hard to make a case against suspected spies, since each individual plays such a small role in the overall effort. China often targets Americans of Chinese ancestry for recruitment, at which virtually all recruitment is directed. The Chinese appeal to an individual's desire to help out China in some way.94 Such a prolific * use of spies is in keeping with the methods suggested by Sun-Tzu and others. "It is subtle, subtle! There are no areas in which one does not employ spies. " The next chapter will explore Chinese strategic culture, examining both word and deed so to ascertain the level of threat and the mentality behind it.

91 Myers, "U.S. Worries about Chinese espionage" 92 Grier, "Spy case patterns the Chinese style of espionage" 93 Center for Counterintelligence and Security Studies, "Intelligence Threat Handbook," Interagency OPSEC Support Staff, Jun 2004, http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/handbook/index.html (accessed 29 Jul 08). See the section titled "Foreign Espionage," p. 17-28. 94 Grier, "Spy case patterns the Chinese style of espionage" 95 Sun-Tzu, as translated by Ralph D. Sawyer, Art of War (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994), p. 232. 34

CHAPTER TWO CHINESE STRATEGY AND POLICY

All warfare is based on deception. —Sun-Tzu, The Art of War

Whoever wishes to foresee the future must consult the past; for human events ever resemble those of preceding times. This arises from the fact that they are produced by men who ever have been, and ever shall be, animated by the same passions, and thus they necessarily have the same results. —Machiavelli

The ruthless have always won and the benevolent have always failed. —PLA General Chi Haotian

«•

At the dawn of a new century, one of the most debated and important questions concerns what China's rise will mean for mankind. Not surprisingly, the United States, the remaining superpower, seems among the countries most concerned about the implications of that rise, precisely because history has demonstrated that the rise of a new great power is followed by conflict with the reigning power.4 In an age of nuclear weapons and condensed decision-making timeframes, this concern is only heightened. One of the key issues touched on in this work will be the dynamic interaction between China and America. In effect, why does each side do what it does and how does that affect the decision-making of the other? Context is crucial if one is to arrive at answers to those questions. Too often, books and articles aiming to do so fail to supply the contextual richness that could provide more nuanced interpretations or keener

1 Sun-Tzu, The Art of War, as quoted in Stephen Peter Rosen, "Military Effectiveness: Why Society Matters," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 4 (Spring 1995), p. 9. 2 Niccolo Machiavelli, The Discourses, originally written in 1517, as edited and translated by Bernard Crick, Leslie J. Walker, and Brian Richardson (London: Penguin Books, 1970), 3.43.530, 1.39.216. 3 General Chi Haotian as quoted in Sawyer, "Chinese Strategic Power: Myths, Intent, and Projections" 4 Two exceptions to the rule would be the transfer of global leadership that took place between Britain and the United States. Many have speculated that the reason war did not accompany that shift had to do with the similarities between the two states. 35 insights. Moreover, many of these studies treat the relationship as if one side was static while the other provided the stimulus for all that followed, exposing their ethnocentric bias. Though avoidance of this pitfall is never easy and can never be fully realized, it can be mitigated. In reality, the two sides constantly are behaving in ways that stoke multiple emotions in the other camp, some positive and many negative. This chapter will explore the roots of Chinese thinking and postulate how its strategic culture shapes its policy decisions and outlook. The chapter which follows will do much the same, but from the American perspective. When both are read together, it will provide a balanced look at why these two countries misperceive one another so frequently. Later, chapter six, which is devoted to space, will show how mutual mistrust and misperception are fueling the space weaponization debate.

Enigmatic or predictable? To begin the process of differentiation between Chinese and American perspectives on the strategic landscape, consider a few indisputable facts. First, China lives in a bad * neighborhood; it shares borders with fourteen countries and has fought with several of them, including Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, India, Russia, Vietnam, and one supra- regional power, the United States. The large and constant American presence in the region only intensifies the Chinese feelings of being surrounded. Whereas the United States enjoys a comfortable margin of superiority in terms of troop strength vis-a-vis its continental neighbors Canada and Mexico, China, despite possessing the largest military in the world, finds itself significantly outmanned when one combines the forces of its neighbors—and this does not include the United States. Admittedly, the likelihood of these disparate potential enemies ganging up on China is almost non-existent; however, it does illustrate the disadvantaged position of China when considering territorial strategic security. Second, unlike the United States, which enjoys the benefits of oceanic separation from potential enemies and two benign countries bordering its northern and southern flanks, China has rivals and potential adversaries all around itself and has endured numerous invasions throughout its long history. Reflecting that anxiety, Mao decreed that Guangdong and Fujian provinces not be developed because it was thought they would ultimately have to be bombed by the People's Liberation Army Air Force 36

(PLAAF) to rebuff a Taiwanese or American invasion. Later, in the mid-1960s, as the Sino-Soviet split grew worse and tensions between the United States and Vietnam were ratcheting up, Mao ordered the dismantling of Chinese defense industries and infrastructure from coastal areas and had them moved to remote interior regions.5 Third, America enjoys enormous agricultural surpluses and low population density while China—a country nearly the same size, with approximately 20 percent of the world's population, but only 7 percent of its water—struggles to feed nearly 1.4 billion residents, most of whom live in an area consisting of less than one-quarter of mainland China's total landmass, concentrated along its coastline. Fourth, American security threats are largely confronted in distant lands; China's greatest threats are on its doorstep or inside its own house. Fifth, the West views globalization, open markets, and the growth of "soft power" as harbingers of international stability; China's Communist leaders see these developments as challenges to their authority and control, but also as inescapable. Sixth, in the decade after the collapse of the Soviet Union and an American lightning victory in the Gulf War, the United States enjoyed unprecedented supremacy. As the 1990s came * to a close, China, acutely aware of American dominance over all the important levers of global power, nevertheless saw its future tied to integration within the global trading system, the WTO, led by the United States. In order to join, Chinese leaders agreed to serious compromises that curtailed their grip on power. Therein lies China's multi-faceted dilemma. To achieve the powerful position in global politics to which it aspires, China must become part of the integrated regimes which deal with trade, human rights, the environment, arms control, and many other areas. But doing so makes China subject to outside forces that constrain Chinese freedom of action and indirectly support American power, since these institutions are generally led by the United States. To illustrate the dilemma China faces, consider the following examples: first, China is hardly thrilled about the massive American military presence throughout Asia, an area over which it historically has held sway, and would likely be pleased to see it evaporate; however, that presence also protects against the eruption of an arms race in East Asia. Were such an arms race to ensue it would divert

5 Barry Naughton, "The Third Front: Defense Industrialization in the Chinese Interior," China Quarterly, No. 115 (Sep 88), p. 351-86. 37

precious funds away from China's economic initiatives which have been the lifeblood of its rise. It also would threaten the geopolitical stability necessary for continued economic growth. Second, while China realizes it must become part of the global trading network if it is to continue its upward climb, it fears that the openness mandated by membership will allow more advanced economies to exploit China's market to their advantage. Third, because of the neighborhood China lives in, and its turbulent past, it would like to embark on a program of significant "self-strengthening," but doing so runs the risk of being perceived by others as a threat. Given double-digit defense spending increases over the past decade, China appears willing to run that risk; however, thus far, the buildup seems largely directed at Taiwan. Nonetheless, continued military spending at these rates will ignite the classic "security dilemma" realists often refer to. While the direction of Chinese military modernization will be influenced by what Washington does and vice-versa, such decisions also will be a product of China's strategic culture, which interprets the strategic environment in a unique way. Even though strategic culture is amenable to change, such change takes place over a long * period of time, rather than overnight. This is an important point because democracies, for all their strengths, usually can not list patience as one of their virtues. Elected officials are continuously buffeted by domestic forces with different agendas than their own, affording them narrower windows of opportunity than authoritarian regimes, which can ignore or outlaw such opposition. Since mainland China's unification under the Communists in 1949, its politics have been dominated by a small cadre of people who have made all decisions without needing to consult interest groups, political opponents, voters, or the media—a direct contrast with the American political landscape. That said, Chinese leaders, like politicians everywhere, are influenced by domestic considerations; indeed, many of China's foreign policy decisions can be comprehended only by analyzing the likely impact at home. Though the contexts in which decisions are made in Beijing and Washington remain strikingly different, both operate in the anarchic realm of international relations where perceptions often matter more than reality, and foreign behavior is shaped by domestic concerns. 38

Internationally, Chinese behavior often is misunderstood for two reasons: first, China's strategic situation is markedly different than other major powers; second, the Chinese feel safer obscuring the logic of their actions than explaining them.6 Furthering our misunderstanding of Chinese intentions is the fact that, despite growing openness and limited transparency, the Chinese policymaking process remains veiled. As such, scholars are forced to ascribe motives to actions. By and large, though, China's actions can be interpreted and understood through the lens of realism. China's behavior frequently confounds outsiders. For much of its history, China saw itself as the center of the universe. Indeed, such self-centeredness is reflected in the country's name, Zhongguo, or "Middle Kingdom, " which refers to the idea that all else revolved around China. Its rulers did not concern themselves with European power struggles or events outside its boundaries. Instead, China chose isolation from the barbarian hordes, confident that nothing of a superior nature could evolve outside of China. Later, it was shaken to the core by the realization that it seriously lagged the outsiders in terms of technological sophistication and power. Ever since, it has suffered * from a sort of schizophrenia or paranoia characterized by contradictory and antagonistic behavior that simultaneously seems to believe in the superiority of Chinese culture, while being dumbstruck by its backwardness vis-a-vis those it had previously identified as barbaric. Though China often acts as if it were the fountainhead of realism, it insists its foreign policy is guided exclusively by principle. Not surprisingly, contradictory perceptions of China abound: either it is a disgruntled power aiming to remake the world order closer to its own image, or it is a status-quo power desirous of international stability (needed for continued rapid economic development and domestic tranquility). It is portrayed as either inwardly-focused and aggressive, or culturally-driven and calculating; a force for stability in Asia or a threat to global order. The fact that such dichotomies persist, long after China opened up to the world, should tell us something. We still do not really understand China. International relations are complex; simplistic theories, though tantalizing, are mirages. China is not entirely reflected by either of the perspectives

6 Andrew J Nathan and Robert S. Ross, The Great Wall and the Empty Fortress: China's Search for Security (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1997), p. xv. 39

outlined above. Instead, it exemplifies elements of both, which oscillate in intensity and weighting based on the particular situation. To make sense of China's behavior, one can start by considering its location. As was mentioned earlier, it resides in a dangerous neighborhood. Beyond that, one has to look at what capabilities China has at its disposal, and the perceptions Chinese leaders have regarding their nation's weaknesses. Together, these factors shape China's response to external stimuli. It might be helpful to begin by considering how China sees itself. After coming to power, the Communist leadership sought to project the image of independence from either the Western camp or "First World," led by the United States, or the Socialist camp, or "Second World," led by the Soviet Union. While it obviously had much in common with Moscow, its history and Mao's own ambitions led it toward non-alignment. Since 1954, Beijing has stressed that China pursues a foreign policy based on the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence which are: mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity; mutual non-aggression; non-interference in each other's internal * affairs; equality and mutual benefit; and peaceful coexistence.7 Superficially, these principles carry an air of universality; however, the intent behind them, at inception and now, was to provide a competing beacon around which to rally support for its policies. Early on, and throughout much of its history since 1949, as China struggled for survival, the principles served to bolster China's own territorial integrity while allaying the fears of neighbors regarding Chinese intentions. However, after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the subsequent declaration by American political leaders of support for a "New World Order, " Beijing heralded these principles as a viable, and superior, alternative to that American-sponsored vision of the future. The New World Order relies on the expansion of norms and institutions reflective of American values, while espousing free trade and human rights. In contrast, the Chinese contend their framework emphasizes the equality of states in creating norms and the inviolate sovereignty of all states, which should have the right to administer their countries as they see fit, not as Washington would like.

7 "The Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence," People's Daily Online, 28 Jun 04, http://english.people.com.cn/200406/28/eng20040628 147763.html (accessed 20 May 08). 40

Another facet of China's outward stance is its insistence that while it never seeks hegemony, hegemony is sought by states it perceives as threats to itself. Following Mao's split with Khrushchev, China scornfully described Soviet behavior as hegemonic. Later, China applied the same label to Vietnamese incursions into Cambodia and Laos. Most recently, the term has been used to portray American efforts aimed at global conformity to Western protocols. Simultaneously, the implicit message from Beijing is that its neighbors should not fear growing Chinese economic and military strength, since the Chinese naturally disdain aggression. When it comes to conflicts around the globe, especially those not on its periphery, China falls back on the Five Principles, usually advocating negotiation rather than sanctions, intervention, or other punitive measures. This tends to inflame the passions of other countries like the United States, which is more apt to involve itself in the affairs of other states when it appears that the situation has grown out of control. Take, for instance, the recent devastation in Myanmar. The xenophobic ruling junta was so averse to foreign aid workers entering the country that it denied them entry in most cases. In all * likelihood, this resulted in the needless death of thousands. Some Western countries were so frustrated by the junta's behavior that they discussed forcible entry to deliver aid, regardless of the junta's position. China, Myanmar's patron did little to sway the leadership's intransigence, even though its coercive powers in that situation were significant. In this way, the Five Principles could be interpreted as amoral or realist or even immoral, depending on one's perspective. Nevertheless, they preserve China's commitment to non-interference in the internal affairs of other states. Of course, with each passing year, China's growing wealth, power, and interests mean it will be less able to circumnavigate thorny decisions. Conversely, a recurring theme in Chinese diplomatic rhetoric is the notion that foreign policy should be grounded in moral principles. Until the turn of the century, this insistence had been a rather painless demand, since China's interests, unlike those of the United States, had been predominantly regional. However, this has changed rapidly as it reaches across the globe for markets, commodities, and resources. Only now is China 41 beginning to confront the dilemmas inherent in long-term versus short-term interests and economic versus political pressures, which the United States has faced for generations. Yet another influence on Chinese behavior is its historical relationships with its neighbors. Often, those relationships have been characterized by mutual mistrust. Because of its size, China historically has had considerable influence in these countries. Now that China is reassuming its historical prominence, many of these countries are anxious about what that rise will mean for their bilateral relations. Fanning these concerns in many states are large immigrant Chinese populations, which are viewed with suspicion as possible fifth-column communists. Because China was not aligned with either superpower and lacked vital interests beyond Asia until recently, it spent most of its time frustrating the designs of others rather than trying to push its own agenda. As a spoiler, it was able to act with considerable flexibility when it came to defending its chief interests, security, and survival. Quite rationally, it would play one superpower off against the other to advance its interests. To overcome its self-imposed isolation, China often expended its energies trying to break * apart alliances instead of forging them; it also stressed multipolarity whenever possible. The objective behind this behavior was to gain maneuvering room between the superpowers. If the superpowers and their proxies were able to maintain cohesion, China's freedom of action would be compromised. However, this eccentric behavior began to wane after Deng Xiaoping took over from Mao. Deng and other reformers realized that Mao's policies, while achieving for China a degree of security, had failed miserably in many areas. Consequently, he ended Mao's economic autarky and strove to have China recognized as a responsible member of the global community rather than an ideological hard case. But by intertwining its destiny with the larger world, China moved away from one of its most cherished goals: self-reliance. Ultimately, China's current foreign policy is designed to achieve three goals. First and foremost is to restore and maintain territorial integrity. While Taiwan and several island disputes remain unresolved, tremendous progress has been made on other fronts either through outright return of territory or willingness on the part of Beijing to come to some sort of accommodation. A second goal involves undermining American regional domination and preventing the Japanese from filling the void. This demands a deft 42 handling of many issues to preclude being seen as a threat by other states. Finally, Beijing wants to avoid actions which could threaten regional stability—the key to its economic success. Attainment of these ambitious goals will require a degree of sophistication and temperament China has little experience with. It is far from clear whether it can achieve the agenda it has set for itself given its inherent complexity and the competing demands China must juggle. In the conduct of Chinese foreign policy, the importance of "face" can not be underestimated. It is central to personal relationships as well as large-scale diplomacy. In a sense, the bestowing and receiving of "face" can be likened to a bargaining chip used as leverage in negotiations. It can be used to soften the edges of an otherwise harsh policy demand by another state that would, Chinese diplomats insist, needlessly shame Chinese leaders into a humiliating compromise they would be compelled to reject, thereby increasing interstate tensions and making collaboration less likely. Demonstrating that China's freedom of action is limited by concerns over "face" can convince other players to resist fully pressing their demands and instead settle for * something less. This logic can be especially effective when used by a weaker state vis-a­ vis a stronger one. The current Sino-American relationship would fall into this category, and the Chinese have used this technique to improve the deals they have made or to resist international pressures for greater liberalization. Face also manifests itself in other ways. For instance, if a foreign leader arrives in Beijing and says anything critical of China, the state-run media does not report such things. Instead, such unflattering information is omitted from telecasts and left to foreign sources to broadcast. The information is then filtered, if transmitted back to China. In this way, the leadership controls what people see and hear and, thus, shapes their perceptions in ways favorable to the government. Another influence on Chinese thinking is what might be called the "Middle Kingdom" mentality. China was the epicenter of the world, as the Chinese knew it, for centuries. During the Imperial period, China, due to its size and power, was frequently deferred to by smaller states. The Chinese emperor and his advisors devised a tribute system in which lesser rulers, in exchange for subservience to China, received generous incentives and protection. Arguably, these lesser states, whose rulers symbolically 43

"kowtowed" to the Chinese emperor, benefited disproportionately from this arrangement. In exchange for considerable benefits they had to visit occasionally, pay homage to the emperor, and show deference toward China in their political decision-making. Numerous historians have cited this ancient protocol, which effectively ended in the first half of the nineteenth century when China was in disarray and Westerners began arriving on its doorstep, as instructive in understanding Chinese behavior within the modern nation-state system. China was accustomed to hierarchical, Sino-centric diplomacy and had considerable difficulty transitioning to the European multi-state model which was

o egalitarian, non-ideological, and contractual.

The Roots of Chinese Behavior Of late, it seems many in the West have become enamored with ancient Chinese statecraft. This probably has much to do with the good fortune that has come China's way over the past three decades, as well as the country's opening up to the outside world. Many attribute China's current favorable situation to the adept use of strategy; despite * many weaknesses, both natural and man-made, it has prospered due to its mastery of celebrated stratagems from its own storied past. Of course, such viewpoints gloss over the fact that China's seeming astuteness has come about as a result of disastrous choices made in earlier times. In short, China has a mixed record when it comes to strategic virtuosity. Nevertheless, China's ancient legacy has much to offer, and inspires strategists at home and abroad. As early Chinese civilization evolved and began the torturous march towards unification, many formative ideas solidified. These themes have persisted, in one form or another, to the present day, informing Chinese strategic culture directly or indirectly. Chinese civilization, more than 4,000 years old, is the oldest continuous culture on Earth. But for at least half its existence it was an assortment of clans rather than an entity we would recognize as a state. The Xia (2100-1800 B.C.) gave way to the first widely- recognized dynasty in China, the Shang, a society organized around a multi-deity religion, whose control would last roughly one-thousand years. Eventually, this dynasty

8 John K. Fairbank, ed., The Chinese World Order; Traditional China's Foreign Relations (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968); Mark Mancall, China at the Center: 300 Years of Foreign Policy (New York: Free Press, 1984). 44 was replaced by the Zhou (1027-221 B.C.), a rebellious people living in a province on the outskirts of the Shang Dynasty. During this dynastic period, a theory materialized to explain Shang demise and Zhou ascension—heaven had switched its gaze to a new, worthy leader when the ruling dynasty lost its moral compass. Indicators of change, such as the alignment of the planets and earthquakes, came to be seen as omens. Consequently, the thought that no dynasty lasts forever became ingrained in Chinese thinking. Not surprisingly, the Chinese developed a largely cyclical view of time—in effect, a king rules for as long as Heaven approves. During the initial stage of Zhou rule, often called the "Golden Age," or Western Zhou (1027-771 B.C.) period, there was a notable emphasis on order and cyclically, and society enjoyed a long period of stability. But around 771, Zhou started to falter and the capital city was ravaged by barbarians. In the minds of many, the so- called Mandate from Heaven had been lost. The Zhou, or more specifically the Western Zhou, gave way to the Eastern Zhou Dynasty when a rival city emerged. However, Eastern Zhou rulers were not able to * exercise control to the degree the Western Zhou kings had. This reduced control allowed various warlords to rise up, but none proved overwhelmingly powerful. During this time, referred to as the Spring and Autumn period (^%K$f{X; Chunqiu Shiddi, 11XA15 B.C.), kings increasingly lost power and effectively became figureheads, as feudal lords recognized their weakness. Late in the Spring and Autumn period, Confucius was born. As a man he was greatly troubled by the evolving decentralization of power and predicted it would lead to disaster. Amidst the spiraling chaos, Confucius developed various theories explaining why society was collapsing. Central to his arguments were the importance of tradition and ritual. In effect, his was a reactionary voice attempting to halt the apparent descent. At roughly the same time, another school, the Taoists, were preaching a different argument directed toward the same societal decline they saw gripping civilization. Both philosophical schools gained adherents as society appeared to be rapidly crumbling. As central authority steadily declined, civil war enveloped the dynasty and the Spring and Autumn period receded, ushering in a period of unparalleled, nonstop brutal warfare called the Warring States period (££|I|Btft; Zhdnguo Shiddi, 475-221 B.C.). 45

The Warring States period was the climax of warfare in China. In a real sense, it was "total war" for its time. It was characterized by regional warlords annexing smaller states around them and consolidating their power. Ultimately, seven major states rose to distinction: the Qi, the Chu, the Yan, the Han, the Zhao, the Wei and the Qin. The consolidation of power into the hands of just a few was symbolized by a change in the title of each faction's leader; whereas warlords had tended to see themselves as dukes of the Eastern Zhou king, they now began to refer to themselves as kings, which implied equality with the Zhou king. It is worth noting that the Zhou period, especially the Eastern Zhou, is unique when one is considering the advice given by strategists such as Sun-Tzu. This Feudal period (antiquity — 221 BC) concerns civil war between Chinese. By contrast, during the Imperial period (221 BC — 1911) China's focus and the perspective of Chinese strategists is the threat from the north, and later the colonial powers, i.e. an external threat. This is significant because many of the stratagems recommended by Sun-Tzu, for instance, are fashioned with a similar adversary in mind. When confronting an adversary * unfamiliar with ones own culture, the same stratagems can have an entirely different effect because they are perceived differently. To illustrate the point, consider why Clausewitz argues deception is not very useful while Sun-Tzu insists it is quite important. Their differing opinions can be explained by their perspectives. When you know your enemy well (as was the case with Sun-Tzu), deception can be highly effective. However, European states, with different languages and religions, may not have known one another very well; hence, the efficacy of deception was, in Clausewitz's opinion, of limited value, since the other side may not perceive it in the intended way—the way people with a similar cultural makeup would. This might be exacerbated in instances where a Western force confronted an Eastern one, or vice-versa. Late in the Warring States period, a third major philosophical group, the Legalists, emerged to challenge the contentions of Confucianists and Taoists. According to the Legalists, society was in free-fall because there was no fear of the state. They dismissed the theories of competing schools of thought explaining societal decay and countered by asserting that brutal repression was the solution to the ills confronting society. Possibly as a result of their aggressive approach, the Legalists gained favor with various states 46

hostile toward one another and hired themselves out as advisors, most notably to the state of Qin, which adopted their brutish approach wholeheartedly. In 221 B.C. the Qin, along with its Legalists advisors, defeated the last opposing state and unified a territory roughly one-quarter the size of China today through a combination of military prowess and superior stratagems. As part of their consolidation of power, the Qin did away with the feudal order and along with it shared power and nobility. The ancient organizational structure was replaced by an emperor who ruled over all of China; all levels of government would now answer to the central state. After centuries of civil war and chaos, there was a passion for unity. However, to maintain consolidation, the Qin and its Legalist advisors applied the stick unsparingly. Legalist philosophy taught that people were by nature evil and could only be deterred from acting selfishly through the codification and rigid enforcement of punishments for behavior deemed selfish or evil. Zealous in their pursuit of unity, the Qin squashed diversity, prohibited various styles of writing, mandated a unified monetary system, outlawed all ideologies other than Legalism, and burned books unless they were of a practical nature (for other subjects, * they had little patience). But the Qin Dynasty's own harshness and brutality was its undoing. Civil war erupted once again in 206 B.C. and lasted four years, until 202 B.C., when the Han Dynasty arose. When the Han (202 B.C.- 220 A.D.) assumed control, it sought to retain many Qin initiatives, including a centralized government. Realizing that Qin rule was unnaturally brief due to its draconian nature, the Han made a conscious effort to avoid the extremes of the Qin. Embittered by Qin Legalism and its extreme brutality, the Han rulers and the people largely repudiated the Legalist approach and reaffirmed their commitment to Confucianism and Taoism, but with less fervor than earlier times. With the Qin gone, the challenge facing the Han emperor was how to maintain the political accomplishments hammered out during the Qin Dynasty's brief hold on power and not slip back into incessant civil war. The solution would have to involve something more sophisticated than authoritarian edict, or the Han would suffer the same fate as the Qin. To that end, the Han reached back into antiquity and employed Confucianism as a 47 binding agent to strengthen the central government's control over a growing empire.9 It was adopted as the state ideology and code of ethics because the Han felt its teachings produced the kind of people who would support the idea of a single, unified China. To further that goal, a school was created to teach future government administrators the Confucian classics. Over time, this would have an enduring impact throughout China's Imperial period, influencing China and neighboring states. As incoming waves slowly erase the daily etchings made in sandy beach, so, too, did Confucianism rub out localized practices, superstitions, and culture while introducing a fairly uniform standard of morality, leaving in its wake a heightened sense of one China.10 Confucianism's spread and traction among peasants stemmed from its humaneness versus the harsh, law-based system administered by the Qin rulers. Instead of banning rival schools of thought and philosophy which had developed over the previous three centuries, leading Han thinkers adopted a synctretic policy which attempted to merge the competing schools of thought into a single system. In this spirit, the Han did not burn Legalist books and tolerated other views, but Confucianism enjoyed * prominence. Also consistent with this realignment was growing disdain toward military thought— hardly surprising given the protracted civil war experience (five and a half centuries) from which China was emerging. Of course, the need for military preparedness and strategic mastery never went away; hence, there evolved a tension-filled struggle within the imperial court between Confucianists and Taoists advisors on the one hand and Legalists advisors (to include generals) on the other. In one sense, the Legalists did all the heavy lifting and the Han were able to reap the benefits of previous work. An interesting and quite remarkable coincidence occurred when Imperial China managed to pull itself together at roughly the same time the pastoral nomads united. The nomads resided in what is often referred to as the steppe region (northern China, the

9 W. Scott Morton and Charlton M. Lewis, China: Its History and Culture (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1995) 10 Max Weber, The Religion of China: Confucianism and Taoism (Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1951); David S. Nivison, The Ways of Confucianism: Investigations in Chinese Philosophy (Chicago: Open Court Press, 1996); Philip J. Ivanhoe, Confucian Moral Self Cultivation (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 2000); Xinzhong Yao, An Introduction to Confucianism (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2000); Bryan W. Van Norden, Confucius and the Analects: New Essays (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002). 48

Mongolian plain, and large swaths of eastern Russia). Here rainfall is unpredictable and, consequently, farming is difficult. As a result, the steppe peoples domesticated horses and sheep to fulfill their dietary needs. Of course, dependence on animals dictated a nomadic lifestyle, characterized by moving from one green pasture to the next, for survival. Needing to cover large distances to accommodate the herds, these nomadic peoples became highly accomplished horsemen, and this proved significant as time went on. The mounted archer began to replace the chariot of old as the weapon of choice on the battlefield. Nomadic skill on horseback, when coupled with archery, evolved into a potent combination—mobility and deadly accuracy—something the Chinese never mastered to the same degree. Initially, these pastoral groups encroached on Chinese territory in search of goods they could not produce themselves (metal products, vegetables, and carbohydrates, for example) and those incursions proved relatively easy. However, after China unified itself, this became more difficult. The nomads often threatened violence if the local Chinese refused to meet their demands. Understandably, the Chinese soon grew to despise the nomads and see them as inhuman or barbarian. * Sometimes the Chinese met the demands made upon them; other times, they did not, which was when trouble would erupt. Ironically, the meritocracy espoused by Confucianism and realized in the civil service examination system did not extend to dynastic succession. Eventually, royal succession, hubris, and nepotism gutted the dynasty internally, resulting in corruption and growing dissatifaction. Before long, the empire's defenses weakened and enemies assaulted it. When the Han dynasty collapsed, Confucianism fell with it and remained dormant for the next six centuries. The Han Dynasty's collapse in 220 and was followed by an assortment of short-lived, sometimes overlapping dynasties that "ruled" China until 618. Amidst all this internal upheaval, the nomads controlled much of northern China. From 618 to 907 Tang Dynasty China was mainly concerned with the menace represented by the Turks, who ultimately controlled large areas of northern China from the 900s until the end of the dynasty. In 1279 the Mongols invaded and conquered all of China and in the process established the Yuan Dynasty (1279-1368). This foreign occupation was reversed in 1368 when the Ming ejected the Mongols. But over time the Ming also lost the Mandate of Heaven and was absorbed by the Manchus (Qing 49

Dynasty), another foreign people. It was under the Manchus that China's geographic apogee was realized; it conquered Mongolia, Taiwan, Tibet, and Xinjiang. In 1911, predictably, this dynasty eventually succumbed to the boom-bust cycle reminiscent of earlier dynasties. But unlike previous dynastic cycles, this one marked an end to the rhythmic rise and fall—at least where dynasties were concerned. Instead, it was replaced by Sun Yat-sen's ill-fated attempt to create a republican form of government, thus ushering in China's modern era. But any hopes by the Chinese for a stable state were short-lived as warlordism and civil war quickly engulfed the Middle Kingdom, thereby repeating the cycle of turbulent ebb and flow. Only in 1949, with Mao Zedong's Communist victory on the mainland against Chiang-ki Shek's Nationalists, does China's internal political situation again solidify. The question now: for how long? The cycle of decay, collapse, chaos, and eventual reunification under a new political entity with a " Mandate from Heaven" underscores China's turbulent history, but also its enduring notion of one China. The perpetuation of this notion of unity despite recurrent discord owes much to Confucianism. And while Mao's unification remains incomplete, * it drives Chinese foreign policy and fuels nationalistic sentiment. No discussion of China would be complete without saying something about the initial period of interaction between itself and the West, since this colors China's image both of itself and the world around it. For most of its long history, China was at the epicenter of power;11 its reach was extensive and its influence enormous.12 But by the mid-1800's, China was in a precipitous decline amid increasing Western contact. "The century of shame and humiliation, " as it is referred to today, witnessed China relinquishing territory

t T all around its periphery to rapacious foreigners. The episode continues to tint China's view of the world, through a victim mentality.14 The emergence of "affirmative nationalism," as Whiting refers to it, implies a future which will restore past glory and

11 Read Arthur Waldron's description of the tributary system in "Chinese strategy from the fourteenth to seventeenth centuries," in The Making of Strategy 12 Ibid, p. 33. 13 Gerald Segal, "East Asia and the 'Constrainment' of China," in The Rise of China, ed. Michael E. Brown (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2000), p. 240. 14 David, Shambaugh, "Containment or Engagement of China? Calculating Beijing's Responses," in The Rise of China, ed. Michael E. Brown (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2000), p. 231. Also see Ted Osius, "Discussion of'The Rise of China in Chinese Eyes'," Journal of Contemporary China, Vol. 10, Issue 26 (2001), p. 41. 50

dignity. As Segal contends, "The result is an irredentist China with a boulder rather than just a chip on its shoulder. "16 For their own purposes, Communist authorities have fanned the flames of nationalism by recalling the historical weakness of China in the face of Western imperialism, territorial division, unequal treaties, invasion, anti-Chinese racism, and social chaos. Not surprisingly, they emphasize the Communists' vanguard role in abolishing such injustices and disorder in a blatant effort to bolster the party's legitimacy, which has been in a protracted tailspin resulting from many factors, most notably its own inability to deal with the realities of an open market economic system and rampant corruption within its own ranks.18 When China opened up to the outside world in 1978, it did so in the role of economic suitor offering tax breaks, cheap compliant labor, and the ever-present lure of a huge domestic market. As its economy has taken off, however, it is becoming more hard-nosed in its negotiations, as evidenced by its ascension into the World Trade Organization (WTO) without having to give up its status as a "developing" country, affording it great advantages vis-a-vis other developed economies.19 Increasingly, Beijing's behavior suggests its own self-image is in transition* from that of "object to subject,"20 i.e., its self-image is improving. This transition can already be seen in its increased activism with Asia-Pacific context. How long will it be before the Group of Eight (G-8), a collection of the world's leading economies, becomes the G-9? From a military standpoint, China was, for a long time, a survivalist state husbanding resources during the Cold War, unable to compete. Now, however, with its economic power increasing exponentially and no longer bounded by superpowers, China is looking to shape, rather than merely cope with, the environment around it.21 By briefly outlining the longevity of Chinese civilization, the flux of dynastic power, the recurrent threat later posed by the nomadic tribes to the north of China, and still later

15 Allen S. Whiting, "Chinese Nationalism and Foreign Policy After Deng," China Quarterly (June 1995), p. 295-316. 16 Segal, "East Asia and the 'Constrainment' of China," p. 240. 17 Shambaugh, "Containment or Engagement of China? Calculating Beijing's Responses," p. 231. See also Qingguo Jia, "Disrespect and Distrust: the external origins of contemporary Chinese nationalism," Journal of Contemporary China, Vol. 14, Issue 42 (Feb 2005), p. 11-21. 18 Shambaugh, "Containment or Engagement of China? Calculating Beijing's Responses," p. 220. 19 Avery Goldstein, "Great Expectations: Interpreting China's Arrival," in The Rise of China, ed. Michael E. Brown (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2000), p. 25-26. 20 Ibid, p. 26. 21 Ibid, p. 27. 51 by Westerners intent on capitalizing on China's weakness for their own gain, one can begin to appreciate how the Chinese have historically viewed the world around them: China is the center, security is dynamic and tenuous, and history is cyclical. Because time is cyclical, historical knowledge is considered valuable, for it provides clues about how one can avoid peril, and possibly delay fate indefinitely, by exercising prudence and good governance. In so doing, Chinese leaders are seeking to recapture China's historical superiority as they see it.

Other Influences on Chinese Strategic Thinking China is wary of the United States and its intentions. At the same time, though, China appears committed to forging a constructive arrangement with the United States. Assuming these two factors persist, the future will likely involve a mix of competition and cooperation. To underscore this likely mix of competition and cooperation, consider the following cross-currents: classical international relations theories make it difficult to imagine an environment void of competition. China looks to create a sphere of influence *

99 in an area where the US already enjoys significant sway. Simultaneously, globalization threatens many conventional ideas regarding political theory; states can be engaged, at once, in competition and cooperation. In short, zero-sum game calculations may represent an obsolete paradigm lacking utility and accuracy in a world needing more of both. A spectrum of viewpoints exists within the Chinese establishment regarding how China should proceed in the coming years, but it can be difficult to discern at times, given that debates in China are generally concealed. Some authors wrap themselves in the fiction that debates do not exist. Further complicating attempts to expose divisions within the Chinese hierarchy, authors frequently reflect the position of their sponsoring organizations. Despite limited liberalization, there is no comparable environment to the academic freedoms and diversity of opinion representative of Western debate. Deng 22 U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Report to the Congress of the U.S.-China Security Review Commission: The National Security Implications of the Economic Relationship Between the United States and China, "Chapter 1- China's Perceptions of the United States and Strategic Thinking," (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2002), http://www.uscc.gov/researchpapers/2000 2003/reports/anrp02.htm (accessed 29 May 08). 23 Michael Pillsbury, China Debates the Future Security Environment, (Washington: National Defense University Press, 2000), p. 5. 52

Xiaoping himself said, "Don't debate ... Once debate begins, things become complicated. "24 Nevertheless, differentiations can be noted. But having said that, there appears to be a fairly consistent and clear conviction among these writers concerning the future security environment: A multipolar world is emerging and four nations threaten China: Russia, India, Japan, and America. In their attempts to predict and navigate the future, Chinese leaders rely heavily on Marxist-Leninist doctrine and history, particularly its ancient statecraft.26 More recently, there has also been an emphasis on utilizing mathematical models and formulas to foreshadow the future security environment which China will confront, presumably to help it cope in the most effective ways. Marxist-Leninist education begins at an early age and continues to be pounded into students throughout their academic lives and beyond. Schoolchildren are taught that capitalist states are greedy and continually planning for war and intervention to support their own monopolistic designs. College students are tested on such topics. Even in 1982, when Western international relations theory was introduced to China, it was * summarily rejected, albeit publicly.27 Realism was discounted as hogwash. While much Western research about the causes of war focuses on miscalculation and misperception, Chinese analysts often contend the root cause of conflict is an economic struggle for 28 resources. Moreover, China suffers from acute xenophobia, largely attributable to the many invasions and imperialistic machinations endured over centuries. But this condition is also the result of conscious and continual efforts by the Communist Party to fan the embers of historical setbacks and injustices. Before 1949, when the People's Republic of China was established, more than 1000 treaties and agreements, most of which were unequal in their terms, were forced on China by the Western powers. As many as 1.8 million square

24 Ibid, p. 1. 25 William Burr, ed., The Kissinger Transcripts (New York: The New Press, 1998), p. 216, footnote 57. 26 Pillsbury, China Debates the Future Security Environment, p. 5. 27 Chu Shulong, "Several Issues Concerning the Establishment of the Subject of International Relations," Contemporary International Relations, Vol. 66, No. 4 (April 1995), p. 59-63. 28 Liu Mingde, "Changes in the Forms of War and Their Implications After the Disintegration of the Bipolar Pattern," International Strategic Studies, Vol. 24, No. 2 (June 1992), p. 9. 53

kilometers were also taken away from Chinese territory. This was a period of humiliation that the Chinese people can never forget. This is why the people of China show such strong emotions in matters concerning our national independence, unity, integrity of territory, and sovereignty. This is also why the Chinese are so determined to safeguard them under any circumstances and at all costs.

The party wants to be seen as championing China's ascent back towards an image of greatness by remaining resolute in the face of alleged overreach by other powers intent on stopping China's march forward. Not surprisingly, as a result of this constant propaganda, Chinese authors often imply or pontificate about the hidden intent of Western (understood as American) initiatives to "contain" China's rising power. For Chinese scholars who avoid such blatantly chauvinistic accusations, several obstacles still exist which disguise the true meaning of what they write and say. For instance, linguists point to how significant context is when translating Chinese writings; Get the context wrong and the meaning changes, sometimes significantly. Second, the * unspoken mandate that "debate" remain within the confines of Party strictures means that while some ideological points are open for debate, others are considered sacred and off limits. Third, one must have a thorough understanding of the Warring States era within China. This period is repeatedly drawn upon analogically to create lessons regarding the future security environment. Chinese strategists rely heavily on this period for its supposed lessons and draw analogies to the present geopolitical environment.31 Finally, there is a taboo of sorts surrounding discussions of China's future power projection capabilities. The reason is quite simple: Chinese leaders do not want to fuel the so-called "China Threat Theory," a theory which they believe the United States created and promotes to advance its dominance in the region and around the globe.32

Lt Gen. Li Jijun, Traditional Military Thinking and the Defense Strategy of China, an address to the U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 29 Aug, 97, p. 3, http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/china/doctrine/china-li.pdf (accessed 1 Jun08). 30 Pillsbury, China Debates the Future Security Environment, p. 12. 31 See Ralph Sawyer translations of The Seven Military Classics of Ancient China and One Hundred Unorthodox Strategies. See also Luo Guanzhong (Lo Kuan-Chung) as translated by C.H. Brewitt-Taylor. Romance of the Three Kingdoms. (Tokyo: Charles E. Turtle Company, 1959). 32 "Peng Li on Domestic, International Affairs," Beijing Xinhua Domestic Service, January 2, 1996, in FBIS-CHI-96-002, January 3, 1996. 54

Since the early 1980s, an interesting development within Chinese strategic scholarship has been its penchant for attempting to calculate the future through mathematical models and formulas. This is reflected in military and civilian think tanks, though they differ, sometimes markedly, in their conclusions. But to one extent or another, a recurrent theme repeatedly emerges: American hegemony is in decline. They differ on the nature of the decline (relative or absolute) and the rate at which it is happening. They also disagree on which country will eclipse the United States. The "calculations" portending American decline and a growing multipolar world are based on a variety of factors. The overarching concept, known as Comprehensive National Power (CNP), represents an evolution of the Warring States era mentality which emphasized a need to calculate future power ratios.33 The notion of CNP first rose to prominence in 1984 because of a belief among Chinese civilian and military scholars that Western methods for ranking comparative power were flawed. CNP is an attempt to go beyond such measures as Gross National Product (GNP) or other raw calculations of power. It relies on the quantification of both * tangible and intangible (qualitative) aspects which Chinese authorities believe are crucial in accurately gauging another state's power. Presumably, Chinese leaders seem to believe accurate CNP rankings allow it to adroitly avoid the missteps committed by previous great powers which ultimately collapsed after poorly assessing the correlation of forces. Examples of such poor forecasting would include the various powers that light- heartedly raced to war in 1914, the Axis powers in World War II, and the Soviet Union in the Cold War. The problem with this type of forecasting is the idea that many intangible, qualitative-type characteristics reflecting a society's strength and resilience can somehow be captured in a set of numbers. In assessing China's geopolitical strategy, the Warring States era in China must be considered. "Warring states that rose too fast suffered attack, dismemberment, and even complete extinction. " The analogy for today is clear: the United States, if provoked, could attack or actively contain China to protect its paramount position. Deng Xiaoping, wary of such an outcome, implored China to "bide [its] time and build up [its]

Chunqui Wu, Grand Strategy (Beijing: Shishi chubanshe, 1995), p. 98. Pillsbury, China Debates the Future Security Environment, p. 14. 55

capabilities." In other words, "yield on small issues with the long term in mind. " Dr. Yan Xuetong, Director of the Center for Foreign Policy at the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations, warned his colleagues in 1997 about the "dangerous" decade of 2020 to 2030: "The hegemon [the United States] will form a coalition to strangle to death a rising power when he fears he is to be replaced." In other words, "never be the leader, " or said another way, "don't stick your head out. " Despite the continued reverence for and adherence to the dictates of Deng, there has emerged a faction of scholars who, while employing the same Warring States analogies, argue China should offset America's hegemonic position by forming a coalition with other states against the United States—the reverse of what Deng advised. This, however, appears to be a small faction. The majority of Chinese scholars believe American hegemony will end in the coming decades without overt Chinese activism. This belief in America's decline and China's ascendance is premised on some fairly optimistic assumptions which, should they not hold true, could seriously weaken the chances for avoidance of conflict. He Xin, a noted Chinese nationalist, contends that the * Warring States period is instructive of what China should do now, and he emphatically declares: Know this: the more the United States encounters trouble in other places in the world, the more difficult it is for it to concentrate its power on dealing with China and the greater the opportunities for China's existence and development.38

A distinguished military scholar, General Li Jijun, again drawing on the Warring States era, credits the United States with superb skill as it relates to "strategic misdirection"39 or deception. Indeed, many Chinese analysts are thoroughly convinced the United States brought about the collapse of the Soviet Union with strategic

Deng Xiaoping as quoted in Dan Blumenthal and Christopher Griffin, "Understanding Strategy: A delicate dance," Armed Forces Journal, Apr 06, http://www.af)i.com/2006/04/1813794 (accessed 2 Jun 08). 36 Pillsbury, China Debates the Future Security Environment, p. 14. "Ibid. 38 Xin He, as quoted in Bill Gertz, The China Threat: How the People's Republic Targets America (Washington: Regnery Publishing, 2000), p. 101. 39 Pillsbury, China Debates the Future Security Environment, p. 17. 39 Ibid. 56 misdirection. These scholars argue the U.S. had no intention of deploying space-based weapons ("Star Wars"), but convinced the Soviets to oppose the move, overburdening Soviet fiscal capabilities which led to their demise.40 Other U.S. actions supposedly highlight its expertise with this strategy—American support to the opposition in Poland and Afghanistan, efforts to drive down the price of oil to cut off the main source of Soviet hard currency, exacerbating the Soviet political crisis, and luring Saddam Hussein to invade Kuwait in order to check his growing power. Li Jijun cautions his audience that "unconsciously accepting an opponent's strategic misdirection causes a nation to be defeated or collapse, and not know why. "4 Li's subscribers conclude that

Western forces are attempting to drag China into the mire of the arms race. The United States is planning to pursue a TMD [theater missile defense] system ... so that the Chinese will step into the shoes of the former Soviet Union. In an arms race with the United States, China will consume its national power, and collapse without a battle4

Sun Tzu argued one should attempt to do exactly that to an opponent. The acme of skill was to never actually fight your opponent, but bring about his demise nonetheless. Most of the current Beijing leadership underwent Soviet socialization and are anxious about their hold on power. 3 They are schooled in Marxist-Leninist ideology and are highly skeptical of Western, especially American, agendas.44 They climbed the leadership rungs during the Tiananmen experience. Their party suffers from a lack of legitimacy which has been tenuously maintained through incredible, though unsustainable, economic growth skewed in favor of urban areas.45 The party and people both evince a belligerent nationalism which, despite its outward appearance, reflects a

See Andrew and Robert Ross, The Great Wall and the Empty Fortress (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1997) which discusses the use of deception at length. 41 Jijun Li, "Strategic Culture," China Military Science, Vol. 38, No. 1 (Spring 1997), p. 8-15. 42 "China Must be Ready to Fight a World War—PLA Believes That the West is Hatching Six Major Conspiracies Against China," Hong Kong, 28 May 99, bl4, in FBIS-CHI-1999-0528, 1 Jun 99. 43 Thomas J. Christensen, "Posing Problems Without Catching Up: China's Rise and Challenges for U.S. Security Policy," International Security, Vol. 25, No. 4 (2001), p. 15. 44 Shambaugh, "Containment or Engagement of China? Calculating Beijing's Responses," p. 236. 43 If there is any doubt about this latter dilemma, witness the riots over the last couple of years between outraged peasants and government forces that resulted in the shooting deaths of several protesters. See Howard W. French, "Crackdown on Protests Turns Lethal in China," Salt Lake Tribune, http://www.sltrib.com/portlet/article/html/fragments/print article.isp?article=3296483 (12 Apr 2006). 57

continuing lack of self-confidence and the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP's) lack of legitimacy. Together, these factors create a hostile environment for those seeking to "engage" the Chinese, and a combustible mix as a whole. Since 1978, in all areas of behavior and thought, the Chinese have had to combine Communist ideas with other ones. In some cases, the outcome is odd, as when members of the CCP praise getting rich. The outcome is easier in strategic thought. The Marxist-Leninist-Stalinist approach to strategy is hyper-realistic, assuming that classes and states are involved in a struggle to the death, with attitudes on technical issues influenced by Clausewitz. Mao himself adapted these ideas by incorporating into them ideas drawn from classical Chinese strategy. Hence, a further return to these sources is entirely congruent with Maoism and Marxism-Leninism. About the time of Deng Xiaoping's triumphant return to power, and Mao's death, the study of Chinese strategic traditions experienced a renaissance, which has only gained momentum with time. Ample evidence suggests that Beijing's actions are imbued with the teachings of its own ancient classics dealing with strategy. * The Chinese spectrum of conflict is broader and more nuanced than the American. Classic Chinese military texts often focus on non-military aspects of an anticipated conflict. Whereas American officers and politicians traditionally divide the realms of war and peace, the Chinese view these as parts of a greater whole. For Americans, war is an alternative to bargaining, rather than part of the bargaining process, as in the Clausewitzian view.47 By contrast, Chinese strategists view warfare as one means to achieve their strategic goals, not the means. Even when they employ the military option, battlefield victory is not the measure of success, but rather movement toward attainment of key strategic objectives. For instance, during the Korean War, China, in the opinion of many American observers, at best scored a military draw and at worst suffered a brutal defeat. From a Chinese perspective, however, the country stood up to a superpower and kept it from conquering a buffer important to China's security. Later, when the United States became embroiled in Vietnam, and Beijing hinted at the possibility of intervention should the United States relax its constraints on combat operations inside North Vietnam,

46 Shambaugh, "Containment or Engagement of China? Calculating Beijing's Responses," p. 235-236. 47 Antulio J. Echevarria II, "Toward an American Way of War," Strategic Studies Institute, 1 Mar 04, http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB374.pdf (accessed 13 Apr 08), p. v. 58

China acted from a position of strength. Its track record of backing up words with action played an important role in constraining American military action north of the 17 parallel. The Seven Military Classics, the collective name given to the most revered Chinese military treatises, received that name during the 11th century under the Song Dynasty. For imperial officers, either some or all of the works were required reading to merit promotion, much like the requirement for all bureaucrats to learn and know Confucius' work. According to Waldron, Western military history is the story of ever larger armies and technological breakthroughs. Conversely, the much longer Chinese tradition, in which technology changes little over long stretches of time, highlights strategy and psychological advantage as the keys to success. From the early 1980s, Western strategists began to take a keener interest in classical strategy, including Clausewitz and the Chinese approach to warfare for two reasons: the American debacle in Vietnam and the realization that total war,49 in the nuclear age, was unthinkable. * The concepts offered in these Chinese texts were not especially novel. After World War I, scholars like Liddell Hart advocated what came to be called the "indirect approach," which sought to avoid the massive loss of life and treasure associated with attrition-style warfare. Although Liddell-Hart actually wrote a favorable introduction for one popular translation of The Art of War, any widespread linkage between the notion of the indirect approach and Sun-Tzu or other Chinese strategists was limited, due to the dearth of sources and translations available. By the early 1990s, however, the West benefited from several high-quality translations of Sun-Tzu's classic,50 as well as of China's premier epic dealing with politics and conflict, Romance of the Three

Arthur Waldron, "China's Military Classics: A Review Essay," Joint Forces Quarterly, Spring 1994, p. 114. 49 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976). 50 J. H. Huang, Sun Tzu: The New Translation (New York: William Morrow, 1993); T. Roger Ames, Sun Tzu: The Art of Warfare (New York: Ballantine, 1993); Ralph D. Sawyer, Sun Tzu: Art of War (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994). 59

Kingdoms. No longer were the maxims of Chinese strategic thinking confined to China specialists; now, a much wider audience could read them. Roberts' translation of the Three Kingdoms illustrates why Chinese thinking on warfare differs from Western conceptions. Given its length, almost 1100 pages, probably just a small fraction of those familiar with the story actually have read the book cover to cover. Nonetheless, its stories are well known to virtually all Chinese people. Generations have come to know its characters as well as Westerners once knew biblical stories, or do know sitcoms. Due to its long popularity, the novel Three Kingdoms acts as a lens for Chinese thinking about the role of human interactions in international affairs. The opening line of the epic reflects the anarchic nature of the world: "Empires wax and wane; states cleave asunder and coalesce. "52 Given the pervasive influence of the novel and its offshoots, one can presume the Chinese accept, in no small way, the depictions and ideas captured in its pages. Chinese readers are drawn to it, not only through tradition but also because it echoes their own experience in some way.

The stories praise mirrors-within-mirrors deceit. People with steel nerves and quick wits disarm others' suspicions only to betray them. Leaders lose their power because they give trust. Intended treacheries are secretly perceived and turned against their perpetrators. But cynicism is counterbalanced by a stress on loyalty and legitimacy. ... repertoires of loyalty and betrayal, effort and fatalism, idealism and cynicism.

Warriors populate the pages, but less time is spent covering combat than is true of such Western classics as the Iliad. The central characters are memorable more for moral qualities than for their martial ones.54 The novel is filled with episodes of bravery, but it is the stories of cunning and effective strategizing that ensure the novel's contemporary popularity. In modern American military culture, Clausewitz enjoys primacy as a

Luo Guanzhong, Romance of the Three Kingdoms as translated by Moss Roberts, Three Kingdoms: A Historical Novel (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991). 52 Ibid. 53 Nathan and Ross, The Great Wall and the Empty Fortress, p. 22. 54 Waldron, "China's Military Classics: A Review Essay," p. 114-5. 60 theorist, and Napoleon as a practitioner. But Napoleon, though tactically brilliant, lacked a strategic plan and eventually wrecked his country and himself. Zhuge Liang (a main character in Three Kingdoms renowned for his strategic mastery) did not. Whereas American culture emphasizes technical and operational finesse, Chinese culture emphasizes stratagems. Curiously, however, what often seems to be forgotten or overlooked by fans of this epic—so closely linked to Chinese strategic thinking—is the fact that neither of the two main protagonists manages to unify the empire. In effect, cunning stratagems, applied correctly, may win the battle, but not the war. This is notable because it parallels the criticism that American military strategic thinking tends to be divorced from larger political objectives. At the same time, one can question the value of looking towards a mythical tale that imparts tactical lessons but has no solution to the larger strategic goal of ultimate victory. Nevertheless, the Chinese do; hence, it shapes their perceptions and actions. In China, the crafting of strategy always has received greater attention than technological innovations which could increase a weapon's lethality. This contrasts with * the predominant Western experience, in which victory usually goes to the side pushing harder or tilting the balance of the battlefield through new technology. The long-standing Chinese preference for stratagem stemmed from the sheer scale of conflict. European battles, until recent times, rarely encompassed the area or number of troops common to Chinese conflicts. The distances and manpower involved meant that coercive tactics alone would be insufficient to win a meaningful victory. Hence, the generals tasked with defending a kingdom or dynasty had to incorporate more than military considerations into their decision-making. This differed from the European perspective. Both Napoleon and the Germans convinced themselves that operational expertise could compensate for a flawed strategy.

Veiled belligerency In 1995, Ian Johnston provided a needed catalyst to the study of Chinese strategic culture. He challenged the widely accepted view that China was somehow uniquely benign and did not subscribe to the realist traditions prevalent in the West. Despite critics who questioned his methodology, his groundbreaking examination has led to a more 61 robust debate about China's use of force to achieve its national security objectives. Johnston's controversial but elegant pronouncement was that while two strands of strategic culture existed—a Confucian one and a Realist one—the Confucian one was merely a fig leaf for the underlying and operative Realist one. However, this conclusion is too simplistic. Building on Johnston's work, Andrew Scobell, in his authoritative book China's Use of Military Force: Beyond the Great Wall and the Long March, arrived at a more nuanced and accurate portrayal of Chinese strategic culture by describing what he coined as the "Cult of Defense."55 His use of the word "cult" is interesting. It brings to mind an unthinking or uncritical mass movement that does not question the premise. Like Johnston, Scobell acknowledges two distinct strategic traditions: one, which he identifies as a Confucian-Mencian strain, is conflict averse and focused on defense; the other, a Realpolitik strain, is offense-oriented and biased toward military solutions. Unlike Johnston, however, he convincingly argues that both strands are influential. Scobell avoids the frequent contention made by many scholars that Chinese strategic culture is * the result of any single tradition. Moreover, he rightly points out that it is foolish to discount the importance of domestic politics as they relate to interstate affairs. This last point will also factor into the discussion of American strategy and policy later on. The net effect of the two strands, Confucian and Realist, combining together is this: Chinese strategists and ordinary citizens alike are overwhelmingly likely to see Beijing's strategic behavior as benevolent and paint other nations' behavior as dark and devious. Ironically, while Johnston's work is now considered fundamental to understanding the effect of national cultures on strategic culture, he himself marginalizes the effect of such national culture by discounting the Confucian strain and, instead, arguing that the Realist strain is the only operative one. In effect, he argues that Chinese strategic thought is dominated by considerations of power—-plain and simple. Though less clean-cut, ScobelPs analysis succeeds in incorporating what many scholars have recognized for quite some time: Culture matters. His concept is a sophisticated depiction of how the Chinese see themselves and perceive the world around

Andrew Scobell, China's Use of Military Force: Beyond the Great Wall and the Long March (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 15-39. 62 them. Regardless of how flawed the Chinese conception of things may be, evidence strongly suggests that Chinese leaders interpret the world through a Sino-centric prism. By default, then, the United States must contend with that reality if it hopes to achieve any success in coping with China's rise. Chinese elites sincerely believe that history and philosophy affect not only their own policy and behavior, but that of other states as well. Lieutenant General Li Jijun, a former Vice-President of the Chinese Academy of Military Science (AMS), speaking to an audience at the U.S. Army War College, declared that

Culture is the root and foundation of strategy. ... Each ... nation's strategic culture cannot but bear the imprint of cultural traditions, which in a subconscious and complex way, prescribes and defines strategy making56

Not surprisingly, the perceptions Chinese strategists hold toward potential adversaries such as the United States are heavily influenced by what they see as the cultural tendencies of that particular state. Beijing's images of the United States are colored by historical baggage from the interaction of the two countries over more than a century. Inevitably, such accumulated baggage forms the basis for stereotypes that often rely on subjective interpretations of history and self-image.57 China clearly believes itself to be cut from the Confucian tradition. Consistent with that self-image, the Chinese view their country in a charitable light: pacifist, non- expansionist, and defense-oriented. They are quick to argue that previous uses of force— including offensive and preemptive strikes—were purely defensive.58 According to many Chinese leaders, China has never launched an aggressive military action throughout its entire history, and has never threatened other states. Quite the contrary, they argue; China has never sought hegemony and opposes it in any form.59 "Hegemony" is actually a code word for those who China perceives as threatening to its security. From the late 1960s through about the mid 1980s, the Soviet Union was a

Li Jijun, Traditional Military Thinking and the Defense Strategy of China 57 Allen S. Whiting, China Eyes Japan (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989). 58 Andrew Scobell, "The Chinese Cult of Defense," Issues and Studies, Vol. 37, No. 5 (Sep/Oct 2001), p. 100-127. 59 Nathan and Ross, The Great Wall and the Empty Fortress, p. 5. 63

hegemon. Today, that label is given to the United States because of its domination of the international system. It is curious how China's martial past is reconciled with pronouncements about how peace-loving China has always been. Presumably, domestic or civil war violence is viewed differently than interstate violence, even though China expanded as a result of the former. Additionally, the annexation of areas such as Xinjiang, Tibet, Mongolia, and Taiwan do not seem to unsettle those who are adamant about China's non-aggressive nature. Even when Chinese troops did venture outside its borders, those actions are cast as wholly benign, as being done for a limited time and not in pursuit of additional territory. Mao's assertion that "[China] does not desire one inch of foreign soil, " is routinely invoked as evidence that China has no imperial ambitions. Supposedly,

China's history and the way the Chinese people understand their own civilization militate against any desire for aggression. Over thousands of years the pursuit of peace has been thoroughly absorbed into the Chinese national psyche.61

Another stock example employed to support this contention is the voyaging of admiral Zheng He during the Ming Dynasty. But unlike other examples which can seem forced and disingenuous, Zheng He's exploits genuinely lend credence to the Chinese claim that their culture is benevolent and averse to foreign domination. Scholars both inside and outside China have emphasized that unlike Western explorers, the Chinese did not establish colonies or use force against those they came in contact with. Most nations tend to see their use of force as defensive in nature. But the inclination of Chinese policy elites to see China as non-threatening and wishing only to live in peace with its neighbors seems unusually strong. This may be the result of the theme's omnipresence. The mantra is featured prominently and repeatedly in official pronouncements:

60 Mao Zedong, as referred to in Liu Xiaoming, "China-U.S. Partnership in the New Century," Embassy of the People's Republic of China in the United States of America, 4 Jan 00, http://www.chma- embassv.org/eng/sgxx/sggg/sggyth/t34773.htm (3 Jun 08). 61 Li Jijun, Traditional Military Thinking and the Defense Strategy of China, p. 2. 62 John Garver, as quoted in Nayan Chanda, "Fear of the Dragon," Far Eastern Economic Review, 13 Apr 95, p. 24. The defensive nature of China's national defense policy ... springs from the country's historical and cultural traditions. China is a country with 5,000 years of civilization, and a peace-loving tradition. Ancient Chinese thinkers advocated 'associating with benevolent gentlemen and befriending good neighbors,' which shows that throughout history the Chinese people have longed for peace in the world and for relations of friendship with the people of other countries.

... the development and powerfulness of China will constitute no threat to anyone, but will rather promote the world peace, stability and development. Never to seek hegemony is the Chinese people's solemn pledge to the world ... China has consistently advocated the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons, and has made unremitting efforts to this end. On the very first day it came into possession of nuclear weapons, China solemnly declared that it would not be the first to use such weapons, no matter what the time or the circumstances. Later, China undertook unconditionally not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear- weapon states or nuclear-weapon-free zones.

China steadfastly follows a road of peaceful development, pursues an independent foreign policy of peace and implements a national defense policy that is defensive in nature.

... China maintains military contacts with other countries on the basis of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, and develops cooperative military relations that are non- aligned, non-confrontational and not directed against any third party. China takes part in international security cooperation, strengthens strategic coordination and consultation with major powers and neighboring countries

63 "White Paper on China's National Defense, 1998," Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, Jul 98, http://www.shaps.hawaii.edU/security/china-defense-iulyl998.html#0 (accessed 2 Jun 08). 64 "China Pursues Defensive National Defense," GlobalSecurity.org, 16 Oct 00, http://www.globalsecuritv.org/wmd/librarv/news/china/2000/china-001016a.htm (accessed 2 Jun 08). 65 "White Paper on China's National Defense in 2002," Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, 9 Dec 02, http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/china/doctrine/natdef2002.html (accessed 2 Jun 08). 66 "China's National Defense in 2006," Gov.cn, Chinese Government's Official Web Portal, http://www.china.org.en/english/features/book/l 94485 .htm (accessed 2 Jun 08). 65

Other examples cited as reflective of China's pacifist proclivities include the Great Wall, the country's "No First Use" policy regarding nuclear weapons, and numerous large- scale reductions in PLA troop strength. What is not discussed when mentioning these instances of alleged restraint and benign intent is the fact that in those instances China lacked the capacity to be offensive, that such use would be suicidal, and that excessive troop strength had become a costly obstacle to PLA force modernization. Mao's warning that "If someone doesn't attack us, we won't attack them; however, if someone does attack us, we will definitely [counter] attack"68 is also peddled as clear evidence of China's defensive posture. Against this backdrop, though, is seemingly contradictory behavior, at least from a Western perspective. China's intervention in Korea in 1950; its border clashes in 1962 and 1969 with India and the Soviet Union respectively; and its 1979 invasion of Vietnam were all characterized as "self-defensive." How can Chinese leaders assert that their actions were defensive when they initiated an attack in each instance? In a larger context, to be addressed later, how would such a conception play * itself out in outer space? Any objective analysis quickly recognizes the friction which exists between the central tenets of China's pacifist self-image and its strategic imperatives. It is a case of idealism running headlong into realism, a situation not unknown to other states. For instance, while Chinese elites stress the nation's peace-loving nature, they also accept the idea of "just war."

Just wars are good wars, and unjust wars are bad ones. Just wars are those fought by oppressed groups against oppressors; unjust wars are ones waged by oppressors against the oppressed. In contemporary Chinese thinking, China has long been a weak oppressed country fighting against powerful imperialist oppressors. Thus, for many Chinese, any war fought by their country is by definition a just conflict—even a war in which China strikes first [so

67 See Pan Zhengqian, "China's Insistence on No First Use," Shen Dingli, "Nuclear Deterrence in the 21st Century," Bruce Blair, "Chinese Nuclear Preemption," and Sun Xiangli, "China's Nuclear Strategy," China Security, Autumn 2005, Issue No. 1, http://www.wsichina.org/attach/china securitv.pdf (accessed 1 Jun 08). 68 "White paper on China's National Defense, 1998" 66

long as preemption is seen as nipping in the bud an attack by a foe]69

Confucius introduced this concept into his teachings. The theme thereafter was woven into numerous historical accounts and novels which leaders such as Mao read and incorporated into their explanations behind certain actions. Obviously, "just wars" would include instances where China is attacked. But interestingly, such classification can also apply to conflicts intended to reclaim territory or uphold national prestige. A corollary to the Chinese concept of "just war" is that any wars fought by hegemonic powers are, by default, unjust since the very term "hegemon" indicates they are oppressors. Another strategic imperative of the Chinese state is national unification. The raw memories of exploitation by foreign powers, consciously and continuously churned by the CCP leadership, makes it virtually impossible for any Chinese leader to compromise on the subject. Furthermore, because Communist authorities have lost their ideological legitimacy in the wake of Mao's blunders and Deng's adoption of capitalist philosophy, maintaining territorial integrity has become its raison d'etre. While situations like Hong Kong and Macao resolved themselves peacefully, Beijing has refused to rule out the use of military force in order to bring Taiwan back into the fold.

To end the state of separation and achieve national reunification is the strong aspiration and unshakable will of the entire Chinese people, including our Taiwan compatriots. No force on earth can stop it. The American people, who once went to war to preserve the union, should not find it difficult to appreciate the Chinese people's desire for reunification.

Threat perceptions influence Beijing's decision-making at every turn. One can only speculate about the cause and intensity of China's "siege mentality" which envisions

69 Andrew Scobell, "China and Strategic Culture," Strategic Studies Institute, May 2002, http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdmles/pub60.pdf ("accessed 25 May 08). See Alastair Iain Johnston, "Cultural Realism and Strategy in Maoist China," in Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), p. 231-2,247. 70 Liu Xiaoming, "China-U.S. Partnership in the New Century" 67

threats everywhere. Possibly, it stems from China's diplomatic isolation during much of its post-1949 history until the end of the Cold War. Undoubtedly, CCP efforts to inflame nationalistic sentiments—once it could no longer carry the banner of ideological righteousness—by fanning both chauvinistic pride and historical grievances, reinforced, at least subconsciously, feelings of weakness. Arguably, China's ancient statecraft and its love affair with novels such as The Three Kingdoms contribute to this ongoing paranoia. If not the cause of such perpetual anxiety, they certainly do nothing to mitigate it. The rampant treachery, deceit, and contradictory advice presented in these texts may provide readers with splendid tactics for use in certain situations, but conceivably, they foster perceptions that nothing can be trusted, thereby sabotaging prospects for anything other than incremental change. Clouding the true nature of Chinese strategic thought is the notion of active defense. According to Senior Colonel Wang Naiming, active defense

emphasizes that the nature of our military strategy is defensive, but also active in requirements. It requires the organic integration of offense and defense, and achieving the strategic goal of defense by active offense; when the conditions are ripe, the strategic defense should be led to counterattack and offense.

This convoluted description is, nevertheless, in accord with Sun-Tzu's concept of "absolute flexibility,"73 which aims to keep all options open and does not eschew the possibility of a first strike. Ultimately, the myriad influences informing ScobelPs Cult of Defense create a predisposition on the part of Chinese political and military elites to opt for force. The decision is made easier by the fact they interpret China's use of force as defensive. The strategic culture which emerges, however, not only affects Chinese behavior but also twists perceptions they have regarding the culture of potential rivals.

71 See Li Zhisui, The Private Life of Chairman Mao (New York: Random House, 1994); Pillsbury, China Debates the Future Security Environment. 72 Michael Pillsbury, ed., Chinese Views of Future Warfare (Washington: National Defense University Press, 1997), p. 37. 73 Colleen K. Holmes, "What the Chinese Learned from Sun-Tzu," U.S. Army War College Strategy Research Project, Carlisle Barracks, PA., 10 Apr 00, p. 3, http://www.iwar.org.uk/military/resources/sun- tzu/Holmes_S L Ol.pdf (accessed 2 Jun 08). 68

Above all else, China's perception of the United States concentrates on American involvement with Taiwan. For China, re-unification with Taiwan is its number one political objective. The United States has stood in the way of Beijing's realization of that goal for more than half a century. While the United States has long insisted that it is not opposed to reunification and accepts Beijing's claim that there is only one China, the CCP is frustrated by what it sees as American interference in a domestic matter. Two analogies will illustrate their frustration. During the American Civil War, the Confederacy tried in vain to forge an alliance with Britain as a counterbalance to superior Union military and economic power. Logistical hurdles, political ambivalence, and the contentious issue of slavery ultimately compelled Britain to remain neutral despite large commercial interests with the Southern states. But what if it had not? How would such a development have changed the outcome of the American Civil War? Would a divided "United" States ever have ascended to the heights of power that it did? For a more contemporary example, imagine that Hawaii decided to secede from the * American Union after its indigenous population became convinced it had more in common with Asia than America. This would be unthinkable for Washington strategically and in terms of prestige. Now imagine a more assertive and powerful China interceding on behalf of this new, want-to-be independent Hawaii. Washington would be outraged and willing to do anything to prevent the loss or China's involvement. It would seethe at any Chinese involvement and the American people would be filled with anger towards Beijing. Of course, because the United States has the military strength to thwart Chinese advances, the prospect of this event ever taking place is remote. However, China, ravaged at the end of a brutal world war followed by the resumption of an ongoing civil war between the Communists and the Nationalists, was not in a position to counter security guarantees offered by the United States to the Nationalists on Taiwan in 1949. Though the order of battle has steadily shifted in Beijing's favor over the past three decades, mainland China is still far from capable of invading the island and bringing it back into the fold. This is all the more true because of the continuing security shield provided by American naval forces in the Asia-Pacific region. The resolve of the American guarantee was most recently tested during the 1995-96 Taiwan Strait Crisis. 69

While American diplomats insist that their only objective at this point is the peaceful re­ integration of Taiwan into greater China through a process that insures Taiwan does not have to sacrifice democracy, Beijing remains distrustful of Washington's intentions. They see Washington using Taiwan as leverage against it. The longer Taiwan remains beyond the control of mainland China, the more challenges Beijing faces in subduing pro-independence sentiments in areas such as Tibet and Xinjiang. Understandably, they resent Washington for what they contend is improper meddling in the internal affairs of another state. China has a love-hate relationship with the West. This convoluted association stems from history and ethnocentrism. Beginning late in the Qing Dynasty, when the Chinese came into consistent contact with the West, they repeatedly found themselves in a disadvantaged position due to the superiority of Western technology. However, despite their technological inferiority, China convinced itself that it possessed moral superiority based on its 4,000 year tradition of culture and morality. Evidence suggest this mentality has been carried forth to the present day. Oksenberg called this phenomenon "confident * nationalism. "74 "Confident nationalism" was, and continues to be, an exercise in self- moralization. For instance, during the Cold War scholars often typecast states as First, Second, and Third World countries. As a member of the non-aligned or "Third World," Chinese leaders argued that China was leading the battle for the rights of oppressed states against the imperialistic First and Second Worlds. While their economic backwardness and political isolation qualified them for membership in that group, their rhetoric was designed to showcase China's alleged "moral superiority." This interpretation served to justify Chinese behavior. The First and Second Worlds, led by the "hegemonic" United States and Soviet Union, were by default guilty of immoral or unethical behavior. By contrast, Chinese actions on behalf of the oppressed Third World were ethical because of the noble goals they pursued. In other words, the ends justify the means. In short, China sought to create a double-standard.75

Michel Oksenberg, "China's Confident Nationalism," Foreign Affairs, America and the World 1986, Vol. 65, No. 3, (1987); also see Tianbiao Zhu, "Nationalism and Chinese foreign Policy," The China Review, Vol. l,No. 1 (Fall 2001), p. 1-27. 75 Ching Ho Yu, "Chinese Ethics and Universal Human Rights," 7 Aug 90, http://www.creative- wisdom.com/education/china/Chinese ethics.html (accessed 4 Jun 08). 70

Chinese Perceptions of American Strategic Culture While the Chinese admire aspects of American culture and its many scientific and technical accomplishments, they also see the United States as the primary threat to China in the twenty-first century.7 Many Chinese scholars, both civilian and military, believe the United States is actively trying to prevent reunification with Taiwan and contain 77 China through "peaceful evolution." A high-ranking member of China's Central Military Commission (CMC) gave an impassioned speech following the American bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in which he declared "U.S. hegemonism is public enemy number one of the PLA. " Several things jade Chinese perceptions of the United States: its superpower status; a long and contentious bilateral relationship; American foreign policy rhetoric; and perceptions of American strategic culture that grow out of China's own strategic culture. In effect, the Chinese use mirror image logic when envisioning American intentions toward itself. That is, they reflect their own conception of strategy onto American actions but see them as the reverse of noble Chinese intentions. * Western strategic culture, but especially its American variant, has long been portrayed by Communist authorities as imperialistic and thoroughly realist. Conversely, China's strategic culture is celebrated as peace-loving and principled. Chinese strategists, scholars, and political elites often inject terms like "expansionist" and "hegemonic" into their discussions of American strategic culture. Li Jijun, a vocal critic of U.S. policies, points out that the United States has "greatly expanded its territory through several wars ... and expanded its interests and influence throughout the world through two world wars and the Cold War."'" Of course, this conveniently overlooks the fact the United States did not initiate any of those conflicts. Though it may be true that

76 Allen S. Whiting, "The PLA and China's Threat Perceptions," The China Quarterly, No. 146, June 1996, p. 607-9; Mel Gurtov and Byung Moo Hwang, China's Security: the New Roles of the Military (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1998), p. 70-73. 77 Chi Hung Kwan, '"Three Represents Theory' aims for 'Peaceful Evolution'," China in Transition, 23 Aug 02, http://www.rieti.go.jp/en/chma/02082301.html (accessed 5 Jun 08). 78 General Zhang Wannian, Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission, as quoted in Li Tzu-ching, "The Chinese Military Clamors for War: Vowing to Have a Fight with United States," Cheng Ming, Hong Kong, 1 Jun 99, in FBIS, 28 Jun 99; Li Tzu-ching, "CPC Thinks China and the U.S. Will Eventually Go to War," Cheng Ming, 1 May 97 in FBIS-011-97-126. Also see Michael Pillsbury, Chinese Views of Future Warfare (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1998). 79 Li Jijun, as quoted in Scobell, "China and Strategic Culture," p. 17. 71

American power increased as a result of those wars, such assertions distort the origins of those conflicts and America's entrance into them. When it is not engaging in warfare to expand its interests, Chinese critics argue that the United States attempts to coerce other countries to accept its preferences through an arsenal of political and economic institutions it controls.

On the one hand, [American political and military leaders] are striving to make the US the sole international policeman acceptable to every nation; on the other, they have targeted all the nations opposed to the US hegemony, which is being unleashed either in the pretext of human rights or in the name of American security. °

Here too, such assertions marginalize the collective good served by these so-called tools of American hegemony. Admittedly, the United States often gains a disproportionate benefit from some of these collective associations, but the charge that these actions are all designed to further a hegemonic agenda defies reality. Alongside these efforts to expand its hold on the levers of global power, the United States also pursues ideological hegemonism, seeking to promote American values as a means of cementing its domination. On this count, the Chinese criticism carries some weight. Indeed, the United States comes in for criticism from none other than George Kennan, the chief architect of its Cold War containment policy, who said

Within our time, I don't think that democracy is going to be the universal form of government. I'm very hesitant about pushing democracy and human rights on other countries, whose democracy in any case would be rather different from our own. We can't ask other countries to be clones of 81 America.

In a separate interview, he offered a more biting criticism of what he saw as excessive American involvement in the affairs of other states.

Madan Regmi, Chairman of the China Study Center of Nepal, as quoted in "US Plane Spying Act of Hegemonism: Nepali Scholar," People's Daily, 26 Apr 01, http://english.peopledailv.com.cn/english/200104/26/eng20010426_68678.html (accessed 5 Jun 08). 81 George F. Kennan, as quoted in Bob Guldin, "Mr. X Goes to Washington: An Interview with George Kennan," Foreign Service Journal, May 99. 72

[TJhis whole tendency to see ourselves as the center of political enlightenment and as teachers to a great part of the rest of the world strikes me as unthought-through, vainglorious, and undesirable. If you think that our life here at home has meritorious aspects worthy of emulation by peoples elsewhere, the best way to recommend them is, as John Quincy Adams maintained, not by preaching at others but by the force of example.

A less intrusive phenomenon, known as "soft power" has been popularized in the West by Joseph Nye83 and others; however, Chinese arguments presuppose a level of governmental direction and control that would only be possible in an authoritarian regime such as its own. As evidence of alleged American ideological hegemonism, analysts point to what they consider Washington's fanatical anti-communist crusade in the wake of winning the Cold War. To illustrate their point, they insist one need look no further than the 1999 bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade by American air forces operating under North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) authority. From their perspective, what possible strategic interests were served by intervention in the Kosovo crisis? Overwhelmingly, they tend to believe that it was a swipe at China, broad opposition to a Communist regime in Serbia (or anywhere else for that matter), or an attempt at misdirection designed to stoke an arms race between the United States and China—and maybe all three. Because Beijing has a chokehold on what information its citizens receive, it is understandable that ordinary Chinese subscribed to these opinions and vented their anger by ravaging the facade of the American embassy in Beijing as police watched, but did little to stop it. However, evidence suggests that two other possibilities are as viable as the explanation given by Beijing. First, that it was a mistake; that the bomb was intended for a nearby Yugoslav target; or second, that the bombing was intentional, but not for the reason claimed by Chinese commentators; instead, it was

George F. Kennan, as quoted in Richard Ullman, "The US and the World: An Interview with George Kennan," The New York Review of Books, Vol. 46, No. 13, 12 Aug 99. 83 Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power (New York: Basic Books, 1990) and Soft Power: The Means To Success In World Politics (New York: Perseus Books Group, 2004). 73 hit because it was being used, with Chinese assistance, as a communications and

QA intelligence resource for the Yugoslav army. Another core facet of American strategic culture, according to several Chinese strategic thinkers, is to view technology as a panacea capable of overcoming any challenge.85 Examples routinely invoked to demonstrate this fixation include the Reagan Administration's Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) of the 1980s or the Bush Administration's missile defense initiatives.86 In the same vein, ongoing development of various "smart" weapons provides the United States with the ability to wage war at a comfortable distance that minimizes the risk of casualties. The implication here is that the Chinese are somehow more chivalrous because they do not engage in such sterile forms of combat which, presumably, deaden the senses to the horrors of war and the judgment that should accompany any decision to engage military power. The Chinese have definitely hit on something when they refer to "America's love affair with technology." But these overly simplistic and skewed depictions of robotic warfare and infatuation with technology fail to credit these advances with fewer civilian casualties as * a result of greater precision, thereby making the decision to employ force more palatable. Moreover, Chinese strategists often remain silent about the PLA's recognition of the importance of these weapons and its earnest endeavor to field the same technologies. According to PLA General Li Jijun, another underappreciated but important feature of American strategic culture is its adept use of feints and thrusts. He believes the greater danger to a nation's survival is not warfare but "strategic misdirection." In the tradition of the Warring States, he contends that the United States excels at this type of subterfuge

John Sweeney, Jens Holsoe, and Ed Vulliamy, "NATO bombed Chinese deliberately," The Observer, 17 Oct 99, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/1999/oct/17/balkans (accessed 7 Jun 08); "U.S. Media Overlook Expose on Chinese Embassy Bombing," Fairness & Accuracy in Reporting (FAIR), 22 Oct 99, http.7/www.fair.org/index.php?page=1766 (accessed 7 Jun 08). 85 PLA Senior Colonels Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, Unrestricted Warfare (Beijing: PLA Literature and Arts Publishing House, 1999), http://www.terrorism.com/documents/TRC-Analysis/unrestricted.pdf (accessed 31 May 08). 86 Theater Missile Defense (TMD) and National Missile Defense (NMD) both promise a degree of protection from a missile launch by a rogue state or actor. The Chinese and the Russians, however, argue these systems undermine deterrence and therefore destabilize the strategic situation rather than strengthening it, as the Americans claim. 87 Colin Gray, "How Has War Changed Since the End of the Cold War?" Parameters, Spring 2005, p. 21. 74

in the same way powerful hegemons from Chinese antiquity did. The intent of such misdirection is to send the opponent in the wrong direction and achieve what Sun-Tzu said was the acme of skill—to win without fighting. According to Li, SDI, the Gulf War, and more recently Theater Missile Defense (TMD) and National Missile Defense (NMD) all illuminate American mastery of this stratagem. SDI was crafted to convince the Soviets of American resolve and thereby compel the USSR to compete. Knowing the costs would be prohibitive, Washington believed it could induce collapse by breaking the Soviet bank. For its part, Washington had no intention of deploying such a system. Aggravating the Soviet predicament, the United States lent support to Poland and Afghanistan, orchestrated a collapse in oil prices to choke off the main source of Soviet foreign exchange, and engaged in intrigues designed to worsen the Soviet political crisis. The Gulf War was another example of misdirection. According to Li, the United States lured Saddam Hussein into invading Kuwait as a way to check the Iraqi leader's growing power in the region. The trap was set when the American ambassador indicated * that the United States would be indifferent to his incursion.89 In the process, the Americans were able to establish permanent bases in the area and compelled Arab nations to buy huge amounts of American and British weaponry they had little use for.90 Faced with a rising but peaceful China, sly American strategists hope to use an old trick to take down a newly created foe. TMD is the bait. Meanwhile, Li and others urge China not to bite.

The Western forces are attempting to drag China into the mire of the arms race. The United States is planning to pursue a TMD [theater missile defense] system ...so that the Chinese will step into the shoes of the former Soviet Union. In an arms race with the United States, China will consume its national power, and collapse without a battle91

88 Pillsbury, China Debates the Future Security Environment, "Prologue: Ancient Lessons," http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/china/doctrine/pills2/ (accessed 1 Jan 08). 89 Ibid. 90 Eric Margolis, "Saddam Hussein: Winner of the Gulf War," 21 Jan 01, http://www.ericmargolis.com/archives/2001/01/saddam hussein.php (accessed 7 Jun 08). 91 "China Must be Ready to Fight a World War—PLA Believes That the West is Hatching Six Major Conspiracies Against China," 28 May 99, b!4, in FBIS-CHI-1999-0528, 1 Jun 99 75

But it remains to be seen whether China will fall prey to this alleged clever trap. Interestingly, these wary Chinese strategists regularly fail to address the radically different circumstances facing China in 2008 and the Soviet Union in the early 1980s. The former has a vibrant economy that has registered meteoric growth over the last thirty years and could rival the United States economy within a decade or two. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, was an economic basket case when SDI came on the scene. General Li's warning aside, it would appear that at least some of China's elite are ready to contest stated American goals.

If a country ... seeks to develop advanced TMD or even NMD in an attempt to attain absolute security and unilateral strategic advantage for itself, other countries will be forced to develop more advanced offensive missiles. This will give rise to a new round of arms race, and will be in nobody's interest93

The centrality of deception within Chinese strategic culture colors assessments of American strategic culture made by Chinese strategists. No strategic culture is more enamored with stratagem or the alleged efficacy of deception. A fixation on stratagem and deception can have the benefit of making one more adept at using them against adversaries. However, it can also foster rampant paranoia to the point where nothing is taken at face value and, consequently, collective action is sabotaged, thus undercutting stability and progress. Many Chinese analysts are highly suspicious of American intentions and assume the United States is intent on destroying China through the use of various stratagems in a fashion similar to the approach used against the Soviet Union. According to many of these Chinese analysts, the nefarious nature of American strategic culture can be

92 Besides this particular conspiracy theory, many others abound within China. For instance, there is speculation that the United States was behind the SARS epidemic and the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997, presumably in an effort to weaken potential rivals. See Lisa Chiu, "Outbreak of rumors has China reeling: Conspiracy theories explaining SARA at epidemic level," San Francisco Chronicle, 7 May 03, http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2003/05/07/MN34984.DTL (accessed 8 Jun 08); CSC Staff, "Conspiracy Theory Stalks China-US Financial Relations," ChinaStakes.com, 25 Jan 08, http://www.chinastakes.com/story.aspx?id=177 (accessed 8 Jun 08). 93 Ambassador Sha Zhukang, as quoted in Lars Abmann, Theater Missile Defense (TMD) in East Asia: Implications for Beijing and Tokyo (London: Transaction Publishers, 2007), p. 163. 76 observed from incidents like the Belgrade embassy bombing or the Indian nuclear tests of 1998. These analysts doubt U.S. claims of "intelligence failures" to explain how Indian tests could have happened without forewarning. Instead, they believe the United States secretly approved of the tests as a counterweight to China's growing power in the 94 region. And yet, despite suspected (or assumed) U.S. shrewdness, these same analysts have identified qualities within American strategic culture which they believe hamstring it. The first perceived weakness is political inconsistency. They have watched American administrations bounce back and forth between realism and liberalism. To them, this inevitably foils any long-term strategic vision.95 Because politicians are elected officials, they must continually monitor public opinion. As national psyche ebbs and flows, politicians are compelled to follow rather than lead. Reflective of this pendulum behavior, Chinese analysts point to episodes like Somalia. The Clinton Administration's interventionist bias was stopped cold by the public outcry in the wake of relatively few deaths. Following the U.S. pullout, the UN initiative there collapsed and the country * descended into further chaos, creating the very kind of failed state which made fertile ground for the Taliban, Al-Qaeda, and a host of other threats. Another perceived fault is American reliance on technology to address virtually all problems. This constitutes an Achilles Heel for several reasons, according to many Chinese commentators. First, the price tag of many technology-intensive programs the Pentagon is pursuing will be hostage to operational demands in Iraq, interservice competition to preserve pet programs, and enormous budget deficits resulting from demographic and economic changes. Second, the complexity of new systems emerging under the Department of Defense (DoD) banner of transformation calls into question whether these systems can be successfully integrated, let alone operated, within the

John Garver, "The Restoration of Sino-Indian Comity following India's Nuclear Tests," The China Quarterly, Dec 2001, Vol. 168, p. 865-889; Jing-dong Yuan, "The Dragon and the Elephant: Chinese- Indian Relations in the 21st Century," The Washington Quarterly, Summer 2007, 30:3, p. 131-144, http://www.twq.com/07summer/docs/07summer yuan.pdf (accessed 8 Jun 08). 95 Not surprisingly, some on the American side would dispute this. See Joseph S. Nye, Jr., "Future of Japan-U.S. Alliance," The Korean Times, 12 May 08, http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edU/publication/l 8282/future of japanus alliance.html?breadcrumb=%2Fe xperts%2F3%2Fjoseph s nye (accessed 8 Jun 08). 77

"system of systems." These same systems, in part because of their integrated nature, are also susceptible to electronic and cyber attacks. Other analysts contend that American arrogance will inhibit defensive innovations which might otherwise protect these systems. Moreover, globalization will lead to a diffusion of technology. As a consequence, other states to will be able to rapidly acquire and use comparable technologies, minimizing the impact of any American lead in high-technology weapons. A third failing of American strategic culture is its alleged ignorance of history and culture, especially toward those states that would be considered peer, or near-peer, competitors such as China.

While there is deep admiration for realists (and friends of China) with this outlook such as Zbigniew Brzezinski, Henry Kissinger, and the late Richard Nixon, who are seen as the exception to the rule, most U.S. leaders are viewed more disdainfully.

Together, these perceived flaws in American strategic culture round out Chinese * strategic thinking as it relates to relations with Washington. Unfortunately, this widely- held but superficial "understanding" of American strategic culture will be difficult for American officials to overcome in their dealings with Beijing. Indeed, the possibility exists that such perceptions will spark reciprocal suspicion and animosity. The result may be a self-fulfilling prophesy. Strangely, many Chinese assessments which backhandedly praise supposed American aptitude for scheming and malign it for its allegedly chronic shortsightedness and ineptitude when it comes to strategic vision lack the very sophistication, depth, and breadth which they say American strategists and politicians suffer from. Furthermore, these commentators routinely fail to acknowledge identical or opposite defects plaguing Chinese strategic culture. Consequently, their assessments often resemble boilerplate propaganda or crude stereotypes rather than

96 Arthur Cebrowski, "Planning a Revolution: Mapping the Pentagon's Transformation," an address at the Heritage Foundation, 12 Jun 03, http://www.heritage.org/Research/NationalSecurity/wm292.cfm (accessed 8 Jun 08). 97 "China's cyber army is preparing to march on America, says Pentagon," The Times Online, 8 Sep 07, http://technologv.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/tech and web/the web/article2409865.ece (accessed 8 Jun 08); Shane Harris, "Chinese hackers pose serious danger to U.S. computer networks," Government Executive.com, 29 May 08, http://www.govexec.com/dailvfed/0508/053008ni 1 .htm (accessed 8 Jun 08). 98 Scobell, "China and Strategic Culture," p. 20. 78

genuine analysis. The end result is an inflated view of Chinese capacities and an overly negative appraisal of U.S. fortitude, innovativeness, and judgment. This should worry American strategists. If Beijing thinks it understands Washington better than it really does, it may encourage the Chinese to be more adventurous and less cautious in future dealings with the United States.

Making War while Avoiding Battle Sun-Tzu has long reigned as China's most revered military theorist. More recently, his treatise has been devoured by Western strategists intrigued by his strategic advice. His main theme was deception and maneuver should, whenever possible, supercede battle—"to subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill. "" And yet, despite China's rich strategic tradition, China has had a very mixed record when it comes to warfighting. It has been on the losing end of many conflicts against Western powers and Japan. Though victorious against Vietnam during a brief border war, it was savagely mauled in the process. By contrast, it has had far greater success putting down internal * opponents, like during the Taiping Rebellion, Chiang-ki Shek's Northern Expedition against the warlords, or Mao's defeat of the Nationalists. After Mao's victory, and in the decades which followed, he shaped both the political and strategic thought of his countrymen. Despite enormous setbacks and countless errors of judgment, he was a victor, and as the saying goes, "to the victor go the spoils. "wo Among the spoils: the ability to rewrite history in such a way as to make the eventual outcome seem as if it were inevitable. Later, Mao Zedong's concept of "People's War" became the guiding force behind numerous Third World guerilla-style wars against Western armies. Nowhere was this more true than in Vietnam. America's loss in Vietnam, despite overwhelming technological and military superiority, had the side-effect of boosting the stature and influence of Mao's doctrine. North Vietnamese forces were decimated by American forces in every battle. But the

99 Sun Tzu, The Art of War, trans. Samuel B. Griffith (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971), p. 77. 100 Senator William Learned Marcy of New York coined this phrase in 1832. He used this phrase to describe the spoils system of appointing government workers. Every time a new administration came to power, thousands of government employees were let go, only to see their jobs given to members of the victorious party. See Gregory Y. Titelman, Random House Dictionary of Popular Proverbs and Sayings (New York: Random House, 1996). 79

United States had failed to grasp the true nature of the enemy they were fighting. As a result, it lost the war. Nothing better symbolizes the paradox better than a brief exchange between U.S. Army Colonel Harry Summers and his Vietnamese counterpart following American withdrawal from the conflict. Summers said, "You know you never defeated us on the battlefield" to which his counterpart bluntly commented, "That may be so, but it is also irrelevant. " ° The relevance of this exchange goes beyond the Vietnam debacle. It is instructive regarding the Sino-American relationship, too. A key argument in this work is that the Chinese conceptualize the parameters of the battlefield far differently than Westerners. They see the battlefield stretching far beyond the normally accepted confines of Western parlance. Moreover, Chinese strategic culture deemphasizes victory in battle and instead stresses other aspects of warfare. This is in direct contrast to what might be termed "the Western way of war" which seeks decisive victory. Despite rhetoric to the contrary, throughout history the Chinese continually have engaged in warfare. However, their conception of warfare is different than a Western • one. They view combat as one possible manifestation of warfare, but not as absolutely synonymous with it. Modern Western strategists increasingly recognize the complexity of warfare and the need to integrate into it factors once considered outside military concerns, such as political, economic, diplomatic, and information factors. Chinese military texts did so, over two thousand years ago. Thus, they often appear remarkably contemporary. Conversely, many Western scholars have argued that various technological, institutional, or doctrinal changes represented a "revolution in military affairs" or RMA. Whether these developments represent a revolution or an evolution

Colonel Harry G. Summers, as quoted in Michael Schwartz, "Nine paradoxes of a lost war," Asia Times Online, 18 Oct 06, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/HJl8Ak01 .html (accessed 10 Jun 08). Also see Harry Summers, On Strategy: a critical analysis of the Vietnam War (Novato, CA.: Presidio Press, 1982). 102 See Michael Roberts, "The Military Revolution, 1560-1660," in Clifford J. Rogers, ed., The Military Revolution Debate: Readings on the Military Transformation of Early Modern Europe (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995); Russell Weigley, The American Way of War: A History of the United States Military Strategy and Policy (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1973); Geoffrey Parker, "The Military Revolution, 1560-1660—A Myth?" in Clifford J. Rogers, ed., The Military Revolution Debate: Readings on the Military Transformation of Early Modern Europe (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995); John Brewer, The Sinews of Power: War, Money and the English State, 1688-1783 (London: Unwin Hyman, 1989); Jeremy Black, A Military Revolution? Military Change and European Society, 1550-1800 (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 1990); John A. Warden, III, "Air Theory for the Twenty-first Century," in Battlefield of the 80 remains debatable; but these discussions assume that improvements in the lethality, organization, or speed of weapon systems will directly create military solutions to strategic problems. This assumption is flawed, for it discounts the human aspect which has an infinite capacity to frustrate the best laid plans. Clausewitz stated that war was a continuation of state policy by other means. Bruce Elleman writes "The Chinese have considered this a truism for thousands of years. ... to the Chinese war is not just a continuation of diplomacy, war is diplomacy. " More importantly, though, the Chinese see war as a kind of mind game, where strategy trumps power. Elleman's assertion that the Chinese view war as diplomacy might give the impression that Western traditions parallel Chinese thinking, which would be wrong. The teachings of Sun-Tzu emphasize "all war is deception. " This idea has informed Chinese strategic thinking for more than 2,500 years. In short, deception is a core element of Chinese strategic thinking in a way unlike Western strategic thinking. Deception and scheming are, undeniably, an important part of the Western way of war tradition, but these elements appear as accessories to be used in concert with shock and * decisive blunt force. The Chinese, by contrast, view deception as the central component of strategy; the pivotal factor which can mitigate, if not eliminate, the need for combat. More than a quarter of a century ago, the brilliant strategist Michael Handel wrote that ... any content analysis would be quick to point out, deception is the most frequently discussed theme in the Art of War. Sun Zi 's definition is very broad indeed: it includes both active and passive measures, from elaborate deception plans, simple baits, and diversion to secrecy and concealment. According to Sun Zi, deception must be employed at all times (before and during war) and on all levels, whether diplomatic (to drive a wedge between the enemy and his allies), political (to sow the seeds of suspicion and discord in his army through political subversion) or military. ... [deception is] the key to success in war. ... The weight Sun Zi assigns to pre-war deception operations and political subversion of all types

Future, Sep 1995, http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/battle/chp4.html (accessed 12 Apr 08); John R. Ferris, "NCW, C4ISR, IO and RMA: Toward a Revolution in Military Intelligence?" in John R. Ferris, Intelligence and Strategy: Selected Essays (New York: Routledge, 2005). 103 Bruce A. Elleman, Modern Chinese Warfare, 1795-1989 (London: Routledge, 2001), p. xii. 81

also helps to explain his belief in the feasibility of attacking the enemy's plans at their inception. 4

Unremitting use of deception "at all times and on all levels" is really what distinguishes Chinese strategic thinking from many other strategic cultures, most notably Western ones. The purpose of deception, according to Murawiec, is to

... create an illusion in the mind of the enemy command, to create ... a 'phantom image' ... and have [the enemy] pursue the phantom image rather than reality. The deceiver pursues reality while the deceived pursues the phantom image. A potentially lethal asymmetry is created. The stratagem is the device by which this can be made to occur. 5

Why is China so captivated by deception and so convinced of its efficacy? The answer can be found in China's past and its present. First, consider its past.

Stratagems have been considered significant in China since ancient times. Over the course of the centuries, there gradually crystallized a body of idiomatic expressions, colorful metaphoric phrases that describe a whole range of stratagems. These idioms were fashioned in part by popular speech and in part by military theorists, philosophers, historians and literary figures. Among the stratagems-metaphors, some expressions refer to historic events of '2,000 years ago and earlier; others are rooted in popular folk-tales; some phrases merely allude to tactics, others indicate the specific steps to be taken in carrying out a particular stratagem. ... Many of the individual idioms were familiar to most Chinese from childhood on. The great popularity of the stratagems is due largely to Chinese popular literature [the most popular of which is The Romance of the Three Kingdoms] which might almost be characterized as a stratagem textbook. There is hardly a

104 Michael Handel, "Intelligence and Deception," in John Gooch and Amos Perlmutter, eds., Military Deception and Strategic Surprise (London: Frank Cass and Company Limited, 1982) as quoted in Laurent Murawiec, "Chinese Grand Strategy and the Chinese Way of War," U.S.-China Economic & Security Review Commission, 15 Sep 05, p.7, http://www.uscc.gov/hearings/2005hearings/written testimonies/05 09 1 Swrts/murawiec.pdf (accessed 10 Jun 08). 105 Murawiec, "Chinese Grand Strategy and the Chinese Way of War," p. 7-8. 82

trick of war the planning and the execution of which is not described in its pages, sometimes in great detail.

Second, consider how the mass media has aided the perpetuation and growth of these ancient tales through a variety of formats: books, speeches, cartoons, plays, television, video games, and word of mouth. Given the ubiquity of these celebrated tales, and enduring praise for those who managed to win without sacrificing the preponderance of their strength in battle by using shrewd stratagems, it is no wonder deception figures greatly into modern Chinese strategic logic. But these explanations are less than totally satisfying. Modern military technologies, competing theories of international relations and military strategy, and most significantly, a string of defeats at the hands of Western powers and a Japanese nemesis—which went to great lengths to mimic Western practices—would, one would think, have soured the Chinese on ancient and revered, but possibly impotent, stratagems. But they have not. The question remains: why not? The answer resides in what we know about strategic culture in general. "[It] changes slowly, but it does change—and strategic culture should be understood less as preordaining national behavior so much as informing, shaping, and coloring the choices decision- makers must make. " Cultures, like people, have a tendency to fall back on what they know, even when those traditions could do more harm than good. In the coming years and decades, China will increasingly butt up against American interests. For the foreseeable future, primarily because of China's desire for a stable international environment suitable for continued economic growth, Chinese strategy will be to avoid American strength and target perceived or real weaknesses. In addition, China will continue to rely on deception "at all times and on all levels." Increasingly, China is establishing economic, trade, and security relationships with other states all around the globe. In the future, these relationships may prove to be irritants to American foreign policy or they may give pause to American action. Many scholars, most notably David Lai, have compared Chinese strategy to what might be called Chinese chess (better

106 Harro von Senger, as quoted in Murawiec, "Chinese Grand Strategy and the Chinese Way of War," p. 8. 107 Thomas Donnelly, "Empire of Liberty: The Historical Underpinnings of the Bush Doctrine," American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 24 Jun 05, http://www.aei.org/publications/publD.22756/pub detail.asp (accessed 25 May 08). 83

known by its Japanese name, Go). In Go, a player tries to encircle his opponent and keep him guessing as to his own intentions. The stones, in the hand of a capable player, can be used to frustrate an opponent's strategy and get him to engage in diversionary activity, while the savvy player conserves his strength in anticipation of pouncing when the correlation of forces is in his favor and victory is assured. In closing, it is worth remembering that despite impressive works of strategy and seeming mastery over the maxims within them against the backdrop of contemporary events, China's strategic record is quite mixed. Arguably, its defeats outnumber its victories. One should not fall prey to the notion that Chinese strategists have it all figured out or that they are the most adept at using these stratagems. Understandably, because these stratagems originated in China, and because Chinese strategists are so well- versed in the insights offered, one is sometimes led to believe they are privy to insights a less well-versed strategic culture would miss. Only time will tell if the Chinese have devised a strategy that will guarantee long-term success, but if history is any guide, many things conspire to bend, warp, distort, and undo the best laid plans. What explains the appeal of Sun-Tzu and other ancient strategists among modern Chinese strategists? The Sinologist Frank Kierman concluded that

[The] exultation of the extraordinary stratagem may be a reflection of the Chinese scholar's (and historian's) repugnance of brute force. However sanguinary, warfare may have been more acceptable to the Chinese literati if it could somehow be represented as a kind of intellectual hand-wrestling, with the harsh facts of discipline, organization, armament, endurance, and bloodshed somehow minimized by that stress upon trickiness. It is only a short step from this to the idea that unusually successful generals are wizards possessed of a magical power to control nature and circumstance. This removes warfare still more from the everyday, accepted realm of experience, leaving that sphere to the rationalistic Confucian literati ... And relegating the military enterprise to the sphere of fantasy encourages the sort of dreamlike armchair strategy which has marked Chinese military thinking so deeply down the centuries, into our own day.

Frank Kierman, "Phases and Modes of Combat in Early China," as quoted in Michael I. Handel, Masters of War: Classical Strategic Thought (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2001), p. 143 84

Secondly, for a nation still weak in many respects, low or no-cost stratagems, which promise victory through manipulation of the enemy's perceptions rather than direct confrontation, are attractive. But as Handel points out, "Sun Tzu seldom alludes to the fact that the enemy can be expected to follow the same advice. In this case, his one- dimensional analysis seems to assume that the enemy is passive and will not pursue similar stratagems. "109 The intricacy of the stratagems in classics like The Romance of the Three Kingdoms, let alone their net effect on the outcome at the conclusion of the tale, raises the question, are they really that effective?

If we abandon the weak impressions of abstract concepts for reality, we will find that an active, courageous, and resolute adversary will not leave us time for long-range intricate schemes; but that is the very enemy against whom we need these skills most. It seems to us that this is proof enough of the superiority of the simple and direct over the complex.n '

Deception is a useful tool in many situations, but one has to wonder whether it, like everything else, has a time and a place, beyond which, its employment becomes more of a hindrance than a help. Maybe the explanation for China's continued adherence to the advice of classical Chinese strategists rests on the fact that China remains weaker than some nations, especially the United States. As the weaker power in its bilateral relationship with the United States, avoiding strength has particular appeal. Moreover, stratagems are cost-effective and can be a soothing balm for a power with great aspirations, but still limited capability. As China's power grows, it might begin to tweak its strategic culture to the new conditions it finds itself in, but it is doubtful that it will significantly alter its penchant for stratagem or faith in deception. Going forward, China can be expected to continue basing its strategy on what it feels most comfortable with—stratagems and deception as preached by Sun Tzu and others. "But China's leaders have come to believe that much more than deception and ruse will

Handel, Masters of War, p. 142. Clausewitz, On War, edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, p. 229. 85

be required to accomplish their future strategic goals. " That is not to say that China will avoid the use of force.

119 China's defense budget is now the second largest in the world and is expected to expand three or four-fold in the next two decades.113 As part of that military buildup, China will continue its search for "assassin's mace" or silver bullet-type weapons to offset military inferiority vis-a-vis the United States. In all likelihood, it will attempt to avoid confrontations on terms that favor American strengths. In many ways, the Taiwan Strait reflects this type of thinking. The Chinese have no hope of challenging the U.S. Navy head-to-head. Instead, they are saturating the southeastern coastal areas with missile batteries designed to intimidate and deter carrier tasks forces from entering the Strait as they did during the 1995-96 standoff, embarrassing Beijing in the process since it could do nothing to stop it. Logistically, the Americans are reliant on long supply chains whereas the Chinese are in their own backyard. Relatively speaking, missiles are a strong suit for the Chinese. Because they can not compete technologically with American sea-based weapons, they intended to overwhelm American naval forces with * hundreds of land-based missiles. The sizeable and rapidly expanding military budget may be intended more for intimidation purposes than actual fighting, but should fighting erupt, China will be better equipped than ever before, and possibly more cavalier than would otherwise be the case.

The Fear Factor The perceived speed of China's rise, coupled with unbridled predictions concerning its intentions, lead many to fear China. Avery Goldstein contends that this fear is driven more by changes in the perceptions rather than the realities of power.114 He offers four explanations for why this rise seems so rapid. First, China was a regional hegemon

111 "The Assassin's Mace: China's Growing Military Might," The New Atlantis, Summer 2004, p. 108, http://www.thenewatlantis.com/docLib/TNA06-State%20Of%20The%20Art-Assassins%20Mace.pdf (accessed 12 Jim 08). 112 Controversy surrounds the actual Chinese defense budget. Due to the lack of transparency in spending, estimates vary widely from a low of $45 billion U.S. dollars (USD) to $140 billion USD. Even erring on the low side of the average estimate, China would appear to be the second largest military spender. See Annual Report to Congress: Military Power of the People's Republic of China, 2008 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2008), p. 32-33. 113 "The Assassin's Mace: China's Growing Military Might," p. 108. 114 Goldstein, "Great Expectations: Interpreting China's Arrival," p. 21. 86

during much of its imperial history. In more recent times, the Roosevelt administration included China as one of the Big Four in summits planning grand strategy for the defeat of the Axis powers. Despite the obvious disconnection between this elevated status and the reality of China in the 1940s, this approach fostered latent expectations concerning China. So too, when mainland China's government, the People's Republic of China (PRC), took over China's permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council from the Republic of China (ROC) based in Taiwan, this conferred great power status within the international system. In effect, China represented "an unfulfilled concept."115 Secondly, while China's recent economic boom truly has been impressive, this transformation has been magnified by the opening of China to the outside world. Observers were able to see for themselves the incredible poverty and backwardness resulting from Mao's policies. By contrast, Deng's reform-minded policies tapped into what many observers viewed as China's inherent strengths. The dichotomy between a dismal past and an energetic new path accentuated the sense that Chinese power was booming. Along with economic rejuvenation, a modest military modernization was * inaugurated, which accelerated in the 1990s as many other major powers were cutting military spending. Connected to the modernization of the PLA is the third explanation for why the country's rise seems so swift: targeted investment in those capabilities that would enable its role as a great power, most notably, power projection capabilities, updates to specific air and naval platforms, and ballistic missile and warhead modernization. Finally, Goldstein contends that two events catalyzed changing perceptions about China. The first of these triggers was the 1993 decision by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to switch the method by which it calculated national wealth. With a mere formulaic change, China overnight vaulted from tenth largest economy to third, behind the United States and Japan. Of course, nothing of substance actually had changed. For some, mainly in the business community, the change merely validated what they had long believed to be the case. However, for others this change was a wake up call, perhaps even an alarm bell. Then, in 1995 and 1996, tensions increased dramatically between the United States and China over the future of Taiwan. Amidst the back and forth of rhetoric, Beijing let it be known that the risk of nuclear

115 Nicholas D. Kristof, "The Rise of China," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, Issue 5 (1993), p. 59-74. 87 escalation loomed and could ultimately cause attack on the American homeland, should the United States become embroiled in any cross-strait conflict, which China viewed as a domestic matter. This shaped the perception that China would use all measures at its command to pursue its interests.11 While the incident actually demonstrated that China lacked the capability to back up its rhetoric, many saw it as foreshadowing future power. Together, these incidents implied that sooner or later, capabilities would match intentions, ushering in the potential for conflict.

Conclusion Chinese behavior stems from perceptions formed by interpreting the world around them through the lens of strategic culture. The neighborhood in which China resides further shapes its strategic rationale. Threat perceptions influence Beijing's decision­ making at every turn. While China's military modernization will be influenced by Washington's actions, it also will reflect Chinese strategic culture, typified by the "Cult of Defense." Washington may affect the pace of military modernization, but cannot alter * its course. Chinese leaders, while conscious of the Communist Party's tenuous legitimacy, largely are free of the political pressures imposed on leaders of democratic states. This gives them the luxury of focusing on longer-term objectives. Chinese behavior will continue to confound Westerners, for two reasons: China's strategic situation is markedly different from that of other major powers and the Chinese feel their security is better served by obscuring the logic behind their actions rather than explaining it, as is the custom in the West. Though the PRC insists its foreign policy is based only on principle, it epitomizes realism at every turn. China sees itself as noble, shunning hegemony while accusing perceived rivals, most recently the United States, of doing so. Its Five Principles of Peaceful Co-Existence, the backdrop for its foreign policy, afford it considerable room to maneuver under the canopy of a benign set of tenets. Depending on one's perspective, such aloofness can be interpreted as amoral, realist, cynical, or even immoral. For most of the PRC's history, it was not aligned with either superpower and lacked vital interests beyond Asia. Instead of pushing its own agenda, it occupied itself with

116 Goldstein, "Great Expectations: Interpreting China's Arrival," p. 22-25. 88

frustrating the designs of Moscow, Washington, and others, leveraging its position as a spoiler. Today, its foreign policy is largely defined by three goals: restoring and maintaining territorial integrity; undermining American regional domination, while averting the rise of Japanese activism designed to fill any void left by American retrenchment; and continued regional stability, the key to its continued economic success and political power. One can detect the emergence of a "Middle Kingdom" mentality in Beijing reminiscent of its ancient past, whereby its neighbors felt compelled to consult with China before enacting policy. Though China is wary of U.S. intentions, it remains committed to a constructive relationship with Washington, its most important trading partner and the underwriter of regional stability. In their attempts to predict and navigate the future, Chinese leaders rely on Marxist-Leninist doctrine, ancient statecraft, and calculations of Comprehensive National Power (CNP). For Beijing, Marxist-Leninist doctrine gets to the root of why nations clash: competition for resources; ancient statecraft offers the tools by which China will best its adversaries; and CNP calculations give it confidence that it is on the * right path. There is widespread acceptance among Chinese leaders that the United States is a master of "strategic misdirection" through the use of feints and thrusts, as advocated by Sun-Tzu and others. They see evidence of this in the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Gulf War, and most recently, National Missile Defense (NMD) initiatives. The Chinese fascination with deception only exacerbates such conspiracy thinking. The Chinese leadership both admires and fears the United States; it is impressed by American scientific and technical prowess, but views that country as the primary threat to China in the new century. It also believes the United States, through a variety of "soft power" mechanism, pursues ideological hegemonism, seeking to promote American values as a means to cement its domination. In many ways, China uses mirror image logic when envisioning American intentions toward it. As menacing as some Chinese strategists believe the United States to be, they see weaknesses to be exploited. First among them is political inconsistency, i.e. short-term thinking; the second is, over-reliance on technology to solve a plethora of problems; and the third is, ignorance of history and culture. 89

Though fearful of American misdirection, the Chinese have a much broader conception of warfare. They conceptualize the parameters of the battlefield far differently than Westerners. They are fighting a war, albeit unconventionally, on multiple fronts, against the United States right now, though few Americans appreciate the situation for what it is. For the Chinese, war is not merely a continuation of diplomacy— war is diplomacy, and trade, and many other venues. The unremitting use of deception "at all times and on all levels " distinguishes Chinese strategic thinking. Over coming decades, China will increasingly bump up against American interests, and tensions will rise. However, the Chinese will do their best to avoid American strength and target perceived weakness. Looking at the gains made over the past thirty years, it is easy to be swept away by visions of China inevitably overtaking American leadership through the masterful use of stratagems. But one should remember that China's strategic record is mixed and its rise is very much a work in progress which could be derailed by a host of issues. These facts should calm fears of imminent, unstoppable, Chinese hegemony. 90

CHAPTER THREE AMERICAN STRATEGY AND POLICY

Americans always do the right thing ... eventually. —Winston Churchill

This chapter will address the traditions of American strategic culture. These traditions have had an enduring impact on its behavior; they also have changed over time. Many traditional elements of that culture persist, but a new facet has emerged in recent decades: increased militarism. In particular, American governments have drifted toward a unilateralist strategy, with military forces increasingly viewed as the solution of choice over diplomatic and economic avenues. This approach can fairly be described by the term "militarism," meaning a situation in which military values and institutions are regarded as a model for society as a whole, and have great and autonomous influence over the politics and policy of a country. Though that term usually is associated with such regimes as Wilhelmine or Nazi Germany, it has existed in many cultures, including most Western ones. In the American context, Eisenhower's warning about the Military- Industrial Complex (MIC) referred to a form of militarism, as Secretary of Defense Robert Gates' recent comments about the weakness of civilian agencies involved in strategic affairs, does to another. Above all else, however, this change can be explained largely in terms of power. The end of the Cold War left the world with one, unchallenged superpower, with an unusual experience.

Survival & Growth From the outset, America's founding fathers possessed a guiding vision of what the United States would become—a prominent, possibly preeminent, territorial and commercial power. Indeed, to achieve this aim was their overarching strategic objective. The centrality of that vision to American history can not be overstated. The evolution

1 Winston Churchill, http://homepage.eircom.net/%257Eodvssev/Quotes/History/Churchill.html (accessed 3 Jun 08). 91

from a weak upstart to an emergent great power occurred in three distinct phases: 1783- 1815, centering on the struggle to preserve independence; 1815-1860, marked by explosive economic and population growth together with territorial expansion; and 1861- 1865, the years of the American Civil War, which saw the maintenance of unity; the strengthening of the central government; and the establishment of Federal primacy over individual states. In each of these phases, American political culture, with its parochialism and distrust of centralized power, and political, economic, social, and moral values, shaped strategic culture. Several themes dominated this foundational period: flexibility and pragmatism; the primacy of economics in decision-making; a messianic desire to spread the experiment of freedom; a constant balancing act between liberty and tyranny; and a flux and flow among the people, government, and military, the components of Clausewitz's Trinity. Several strategic advantages facilitated the rise of the United States. First, it enjoyed a favorable geographic position. The Atlantic Ocean constrained the amount of military power which any European power could use to coerce America. Later, the Pacific Ocean * provided the same insulation from any water-borne threats to the West. Even if a European power surmounted the dual obstacles of water and distance, and landed sizeable forces on the continent, the United States had such depth as to make conquest nearly impossible. Second, the adversaries facing the United States in its hemisphere (Indians, Spain, and Mexico) were all weaker than itself, with one exception: the British in Canada. Third, the country experienced tremendous economic and demographic growth. The United States possessed all the attributes that Mahan would identify as prerequisites for achieving the status of a great power (geographical position, physical conformation, extent of territory, number of population, character of the people, and of the government). Finally, America's early leaders possessed strategic wisdom. The Founding Fathers understood the situation confronting the United States, and what the nation could or could not endure. They were sensitive to political constraints and the

2 Peter Maslowski, "To the edge of greatness: The United States, 1783-1865," in Williamson Murray, MacGregor Knox, and Alvin Bernstein, eds., The Making of Strategy: Rulers, States, and War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), p. 205-241; also see Bradford Perkins, The Cambridge History of American Foreign Relations, Vol. 1: The Creation of a Republican Empire, 1776-1865 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993). 3 See Alfred Thayer Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783 (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1890), http://www.bellum.nu/literature/mahanOO 1 .html (accessed 16 Jun 08). 92 limits to their power, producing pragmatic assessments and decision-making. They were even aided by their own weaknesses, relative to European powers. No cohesive military command structure existed, and their forces were dogged by a lack of administrative infrastructure, a poor transportation system, primitive communications, and small permanent forces. Because the army and navy were small and poorly financed, no organization within the bureaucracy systematically studied wartime strategy. This had its costs, but so too the absence of institutional bias reduced the chances of preparing to fight the last war and increased the openness to unconventional, but potentially innovative and opportune, approaches to war. American leaders had to adjust to paradoxical realities. They pursued a two-pronged strategy: aggressive expansion along the western border with defense along the eastern seaboard, to protect themselves from European adversaries. In effect, they followed Sun Tzu's advice to avoid strength and attack weakness. A huge gap existed between a prevalent, almost missionary zeal, to expand the nation's experiment in liberal democracy and its visions of future greatness—typified by men like George Washington, Alexander * Hamilton, Thomas Jefferson and James Madison—and the country's military weakness during its first half century. Many leaders, though not all of them, understood that a weak, fragile Federal government could exercise little control over an individualistic people; consequently, to raise manpower and finances for war would prove difficult, especially if that conflict was long, large, or both. Meanwhile, the nation's size, the primitive nature of communications, and political infighting, bred a local outlook instead of a national one. Not surprisingly, decision-making reflected both populist pressures and limited resources. In the decades immediately after independence, military means were appropriate to political objectives. Fear of tyranny prevented large military forces; so did the price tag. The United States attempted to keep a low profile while consolidating itself, following President Washington's injunction that America should avoid foreign entanglements whenever possible. The Federalist-Republican split over allegiance to British trade or to French republicanism produced a draw, keeping the country unencumbered from a commitment to the death struggle in Europe, by accident rather than by design. The maintenance of a low-profile overseas allowed the country time to build strength and 93

depth. Passions constantly were checked by pragmatism. In those early years, American political and military leaders often were one and the same. Thus, they generally understood the nature of the wars they embarked on. They astutely avoided alliances or wars that did not serve American interests. They had fought one long war and wanted to avoid another, especially given the precarious state of national unity. Prudence and caution dominated American thinking. Strategy was formed in an ad-hoc manner. The national aversion to large standing armies prevented the military bureaucracy from systematically studying military strategy. Therefore, by default, political leaders had to develop their own. Fortunately, as a general rule their assessments were well-informed and their judgments sober. Politicians and strategists did understand the ultimate goal of conflict. Though they attempted to avoid conflict, when it proved necessary their goals were rightly limited in light of national weakness. Limited objectives were easier to obtain and ensured that hostilities would end sooner and with a better ratio of costs and benefits than would have happened with greater goals hinging on prestige and honor. In the second phase of the United States' formative period (1815-1860), American wealth and power grew exponentially. It expanded rapidly across the continent, becoming the dominant power within the Western hemisphere. While avoiding provocative moves in the east, it adopted limited objectives against weak adversaries to the West. Against the Indians, dispersed and without modern weapons, divide-and- conquer was the preferred method; against the Spaniards, whose logistical train stretched across the ocean and whose power had waned, the United States chose political subversion; against the Mexicans, a flimsy pretext provided the cover for fast and decisive conventional victories, which enabled an opportune land grab. Aggressiveness and self-righteousness were cloaked in soothing and seemingly logical arguments designed to lend legitimacy to the effort. But good fortune also brought new headaches. Instead of having one coast to defend, there were two, while a larger border with Canada and Mexico increased the chances for friction and conflict. The major American mistake during this period was to start a war with Britain, which led to an embarrassing defeat, but not a costly one. The War of 1812 convinced politicians that they needed a dependable core of officers and men to serve as a 94 foundation for expansion in time of war. Even so, improvements in its military forces were incremental and small. Administrative chaos persisted and no unified voice spoke for the military or gave advice to civilian leadership. Fortunately, given the country's geographic position, it did not need to match the great militaries of the world either in size or quality. Even so, its modest army was strong relative to its neighbors. By contrast, its navy was considered the first line of defense, since the only major threats to the United States would come from across the sea. Though several large warships were constructed, smaller ones proved more effective against pirates. In order to protect commerce, the navy divided its ships into small squadrons rather than concentrating them to form a battle fleet. Herein lay a clear preference for ideas later espoused by Julian Corbett. The United States was too fragile to build fleets of the size Mahan would advocate later. Its forces were consciously employed to protect and expand commercial activities, and to provide some leverage on the United States' greatest potential danger, Great Britain. By this time, beyond geographic advantage and pragmatic leaders, American strategic * culture also was shaped by two less tangible, but no less important, cultural legacies. First, religious fundamentalism fostered the notion that the American experiment was blessed by God. This belief reinforced a missionary zeal to spread the democratic experience beyond its shores. Second, was confidence that the United States could solve any problem. Americans came to believe that anything the country set its mind to do could be achieved. By 1814, the young country had not only survived, but prospered.4 It had attained victory against all enemies of the republic—including the mighty British. It had become unassailable, at least to foreign powers. Soon it conquered a continent. The American wars of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, together with the mythology that grew up around them, created an illusion of omnipotence5 which was fed by the national success story and the firm conviction that God's hand was guiding the country. In reality, American opponents in those wars either had been anemic or, in the case of

4 John Shy, "The American Military Experience: History and Learning," Journal of Interdisciplinary History, Vol. 1, No. 2 (Winter 1971), p. 205-28. 5 See Denis W. Brogan, "The Illusion of American Omnipotence," Harpers, 205 (Dec 1952), p. 21-8 and American Aspects (New York: Harper & Row, 1964), especially Chapter 2; also see Roger S. Whitcomb, The American Approach to Foreign Affairs: An Uncertain Tradition (Westport, CT.: Praeger Publishers, 1998). 95

Britain, unwilling to commit more than a pittance of its full capability to what it viewed as a secondary theater of operations. The American Civil War, the only hard-fought war in which the United States was engaged during the nineteenth century, did not dampen the American perception of guaranteed success. Indeed, quite the contrary. Whether from the North or the South, Americans came to take pride in the resiliency of the Confederacy, immortalizing Robert E. Lee as a true American hero.

Lincoln & the Civil War (1861-1865) The greatest threat to the United States was brewing not across the ocean, but inside the country itself. The issue of slavery had festered, unresolved, since the birth of the nation. By 1861, it provoked the Civil War. The war consumed all the energies of President Lincoln. By any conventional measure, he was ill-suited to the task; one month in office, minimal military training—a few months of service with his local militia, and no genuine mandate from the electorate. Nevertheless, he took an active role in war planning. What he lacked in formal military * training or experience, he made up for with study and resolution. The war, Lincoln said, "forces us to ask: 'Is there in all republics this inherent and fatal weakness?' 'Must a government, of necessity, be too strong for the liberties of its own people, or too weak to maintain its own existence?'"6 In his prosecution of the war, Lincoln often had no set strategy—unlike many of his generals; consistency and doctrinaire solutions were not his style. Ad-hoc strategizing was, in many respects, a reflection of the country's character and preference for practicality over formality. Effectiveness counted for more than formal education. From the outset, the Union outmatched the Confederacy in every important metric: manpower, naval strength, railroads, financial resources, and industrial capacity.8 Given these quantitative advantages, many believe the South's decision to go to war was

6 Roy P. Basler, ed., The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln (New Brunswick, NJ.: Rutgers University Press, 1953), Vol. 4, p. 426. 7 See James L. Morrison, Jr., "The Best School in the World": West Point, the Pre-Civil War Years 1833- 1866 (Kent, OH.: The Kent State University Press, 1986), p. 95-6; David H. Donald, Lincoln Reconsidered: Essays on the Civil War Era, Third Edition (New York: Vintage Books, 2001), Chapter 7, "Abraham Lincoln and the American Pragmatic Tradition." 8 See E. B. Long, The Civil War Day by Day: An Almanac 1861-1865 (Garden City, NY.: Doubleday, 1971), p. 700-28. 96 foolish. However, several variables reduced the North's material and manpower advantages and help to explain the South's confidence at the start. First, if several border states opted to join the Confederacy, the material imbalances would be substantially altered. Second, a short war would not allow the North to leverage its resources into actual military power. Third, British intervention of behalf of the Confederacy would negate the Union's naval superiority and ability to choke off southern ports. Fourth, as far as leadership qualities went, the resumes of Lincoln and Jefferson Davis indicated the latter was a more capable wartime leader, on paper. Fifth, the South convinced itself that it was more durable in terms of morale, because it was fighting for a way of life against what it saw as a tyrannical regime, like Britain eighty years earlier. Sixth, the Revolutionary experience had shown the South that the weak could defeat the strong; however, this popular analogy was fatally flawed—British advantages in material and manpower during that conflict were offset by logistical headaches which undercut the power it could bring to bear. Seventh, manpower differentials were less important, since the North would have to expend forces simply to guard the logistical network necessary * to carry the fight to the Confederacy, which was fighting on home turf.9 Victory for the Union was not easy. Its campaign was a grand exercise in trial and error. Ultimately, the North triumphed by employing two different strategies. The first, attrition-based, was designed to exhaust the Confederacy, to make it give up its goals without having to pay the cost of destroying it.10 Winfield Scott's "Anaconda Plan," was designed slowly to suffocate the Confederacy by way of blockade. Scott's indirect strategy entailed relatively little bloodshed which would simplify the task of national reconciliation.11 If there was a weakness in this approach, it was, as Scott feared, a preference on the part of the public "to kill the Confederacy with a rattlesnake's quick strike rather than the anaconda's slow squeeze." 2 A second strategy, one of

9 Maslowski, "To the edge of greatness: The United States, 1783-1865," p. 235-6. Also see James M. McPherson, Ordeal By Fire: The Civil War and Reconstruction (New York: Knopf, 1982), p. 186-7; Richard E. Beringer, et al, Why the South Lost the Civil War (Athens, GA.: University of Georgia Press, 1986), p. 249-50. 10 Stephen E. Ambrose, "When Americans Go to War," Reviews in American History, Vol. 1, No. 4 (Dec 1973), p. 477. This was a review of Russell F. Weigley, The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1973). 11 Maslowski, "To the edge of greatness: The United States, 1783-1865," p. 237. 12 Ibid, p. 237-8. 97 annihilation, characterized by high costs in manpower and materiel, was best exemplified by William Sherman's 1864 "March to the Sea." In this campaign, Sherman aimed to accomplish two goals: to destroy resources related to military potential and to sap Southern morale by making the civilian population feel the effects of war—i.e. psychological warfare. As the war expanded beyond what either side anticipated, Lincoln felt compelled to add a second war aim—emancipation. The decision, like many others made throughout the conflict, blended idealism and realism. At once, the goal of abolishing slavery reconciled a long-standing contradiction between rhetoric and reality in American life; gave the Union war effort a revolutionary purpose by infusing it with a moral dimension which energized morale; precluded British intervention; and tapped a new reservoir of manpower—the slave population.13 Like the Founding Fathers, Lincoln believed the United States had been ordained with a special and unique mission—to foster the spread of democracy by example. From the moment the war began, Lincoln insisted he would use all means at his disposal to preserve the Union.14 As the war dragged on, and it * looked as though the Union might not prevail, he remarked "[We] shall nobly save, or meanly lose, the last best hope of earth. "15 It was an idea he would reiterate often. In 1865, the Union finally prevailed. The victory redefined what it meant to be American and definitively shifted the balance of power from the states to the Federal government. It also broke with the traditions of American strategy since 1783, by supporting mass mobilization for a total war aimed at complete victory, which would mark later American actions. With the war over, the preconditions for great power status were now in place: a unified country, an enormous territory containing a wealth of resources, a large population, a rapidly growing economy, and a demonstrated capability to generate enormous military power.16 All that remained to emerge from the shadows was a willingness to use that power and potential on the global stage.

1865-1914

13 Ibid, p. 239-40. 14 Basler, The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln, Vol. 5, p. 48-9. 15 Ibid, Vol. 6, p. 537. 16 Maslowski, "To the edge of greatness: The United States, 1783-1865," p. 241. 98

During this period, the United States again largely devoted itself to internal consolidation and economic growth. Despite exponential productivity gains and creation of wealth, American leaders chose to avoid head-to-head military competition with European powers even though they now could sustain it. Had they chosen to devote any considerable share of national resources to the effort, the United States certainly would have been ranked as a top-tier power in the late 1800s, and as the leading world power from 1890.

Table 1: Total Industrial Production

Country 1880 1900 1913 1928 Britain 73.3 100 127.2 135 France 25.1 36.8 57.3 82 Russia 24.5 47.5 76.6 72 Austria- 14 25.6 40.7 0 Hungary Germany 27.4 71.2 137.7 158 United States 46.9 127.8 298.1 533

American leaders declined to do so for 50 years. The decision followed the country's traditions of avoiding foreign entanglements and minimizing defense expenditures. As events proved, only a great threat could budge these traditions. In the long run, this outcome was not to the United States' disadvantage. An armaments buildup would not only have gained unwanted attention from European capitals, but sapped productive capacity devoted to commercial enterprises—the engine of escalating American strength. Moreover, the United States was satisfied with the world as it existed. The Royal Navy acted to keep threats at bay and London allowed the United States unfettered access to world markets; hence, large military investments could gain little beyond prestige. But prestige was a factor and it led to the construction of a large fleet, though far smaller than that of Britain. Beginning in the 1890s, the United States became a leading naval power, in part, because of the enormous influence of Mahan's The Influence of Sea Power Upon

Paul Bairoch, "International Industrialization Levels from 1750 to 1980," Journal of Economic History 11 (Spring 1982), p. 269-333. 99

History, 1660-1783. Mahan identified factors conducive to the establishment of supremacy at sea and explained why countries like the United States must achieve it. His template was Great Britain which depended heavily on overseas trade, not unlike the United States. He advocated the construction of a powerful battle fleet and a large merchant navy. The idea of a battle fleet conflicted with previous American thinking and behavior, which focused on commerce raiders rather than capital ships, due to their prohibitive cost. Yet rapid economic growth meant an expansion of interests, including the protection of the sea lanes of commerce, and the availability of more money for the military. Consequently, construction was begun on a sizeable fleet capable of more than littoral defense. This marked the United States' first step toward world power.

Theodore Roosevelt The impetus for greater naval strength gained momentum after the four-month Spanish-American War and the ascendancy of Theodore Roosevelt to the presidency. The swift defeat of Spain gave the United States its first taste of imperialism overseas. It * now had far-flung territories to defend and no means but sea power to do it. In addition, Theodore Roosevelt's vision of national greatness demanded a robust capability above anything the United States had known before. From 1907-1909, The Great White Fleet, largely the inspiration of Roosevelt, circumnavigated the globe to demonstrate growing American military power and blue-water capability. Even so, domestic issues remained the chief focus of American leaders. Henry Kissinger, a student and practitioner of balance-of-power politics, has lamented that Americans do not think geopolitically.19 This criticism is inaccurate, because it lumps political elites in with the public at large. If balance-of-power discussions remain suspect in popular discourse, American presidents have engaged in such behavior for generations, while taking care to portray it in ways that harmonize with

Alfred Thayer Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783 (Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 1890). 19 Henry Kissinger, White House Years (Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 1979), p. 914. 100

traditional American perceptions of benign intent and good will. Theodore Roosevelt's presidency illustrates this tendency. Two major objectives of his foreign policy were first, to prevent European incursions within the Western Hemisphere, using the Monroe Doctrine as justification; and second, to create balances of power elsewhere in the world favorable to American interests. It was easy to recast actions designed to foster such balances as noble enterprises that would appeal to fellow politicians, business interests, and the American public. As a result, the United States for the first time in history mattered outside its home continent. In the Far East, the United States supported the "Open Door " in China. The policy had less to do with upholding Chinese territorial integrity than with ensuring that no one foreign power could dominate it, excluding others from the benefits of trade with the most populous country in the world. Roosevelt supported Beijing in its dispute with Moscow over Manchuria to ensure that Russia could not dominate the region. With the same end in mind, he became actively involved in the peace negotiations that ended the Russo-Japanese War, so to help shape a regional balance of power. He saw Russia as a * greater threat to the United States and sought to blunt its thrust into Asia. Through the peace deal he brokered, Japan avoided bankruptcy while Russia saved some face and avoided greater military losses, thereby hastening its recovery. Concerned, however, that victory might embolden Japan to challenge American interests, he signaled American power by including Japan on the itinerary of The Great White Fleet's stopovers. Roosevelt also became involved in the Algeciras Conference on Morocco in 1905.22 Here, for the first time, the United States acted as a great power on an issue of first rank importance to European diplomacy. In doing so, he ignored the Monroe Doctrine's

Michael Dunne, "Hemisphere and Globe: The Terms of American Foreign Relations," International Affairs, Vol. 70, No. 4 (Oct 1994), p. 713; also see Warren I. Cohen, The Cambridge History of American Foreign Relations, Vol. 4: America in the Age of Soviet Power, 1945-1991 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993). 21 Georgia Beale, Theodore Roosevelt and the Rise of America to World Power (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1956); also see Walter LaFeber, The Cambridge History of American Foreign Relations, Vol. 2: The American Search for Opportunity, 1865-1913 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993). 22 Howard Jones, Crucible of Power: A History of American Foreign relations to 1913 (Wilmington, DE.: Scholarly Resources, Inc., 2002), p. 293. 101 provision that America would stay out of European affairs. Roosevelt did so even though the only American direct interest at stake was continued access to Moroccan markets by commercial interests. Undoubtedly, he also worried that the crisis might develop into a war which would affect not only Europe, but also the United States, and perhaps wished to foreclose any opportunistic leapfrogging from Morocco to South America by Germany to gain "a place in the sun. "24 25

Woodrow Wilson Between 1914 and 1945, foreign powers dragged the United States into world wars and world power. American actions were largely, though not entirely, reactive, and motivated more by its own power and external threat than by any grand strategy. Through factors beyond its control, every other power on earth dramatically weakened each other, making the United States relatively more powerful. As John Coogan contends "had the president of the United States deliberately set out in March 1913 to bleed the Great Powers of Europe to death over the next eight years and expand * American influence to fill the vacuum, he could hardly have been more successful. " From 1905 to 1914, tensions steadily rose across Europe. Industrialization, militarism, nationalism, an arms race, and a flurry of secret treaties obligating one country to come to the aid of another in the event of war, combined together to make the continent ripe for war. The industrial era fueled the need for raw materials and export markets for finished goods. These concerns, together with national pride, were the principal drivers of imperialism. Imperialism, in turn, generated tension between the main actors as they competed for territory and treasure; these tensions ignited an arms race that witnessed the creation of huge European military establishments. Together,

23 Promulgated in 1823, the Monroe Doctrine had informed the powers of the Old World that the Americas were no longer open to European colonization, and that any effort to extend European political influence into the New World would be considered by the United States "as dangerous to our peace and safety." The United States would not interfere in European internal affairs, and expected Europe to stay out of the affairs of the New World. 24 A term used by Kaiser Wilhelm II of Germany in a 1901 address to the North German Regatta Association, as quoted in C. Gauss, The German Kaiser as Shown in His Public Utterances (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1915), p. 181-3. 25 See Holger Herwig, Germany's Visions of Empire in Venezuela, 1871-1914 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986). 26 John W. Coogan, "Wilsonian Diplomacy in War and Peace," in Gordon Mattel, ed., American Foreign Relations Reconsidered, 1890-1993 (New York: Routledge, 1994), p. 86. 102 these pressures sparked fears which culminated in the signing of multiple secret treaties, which divided the continent into two armed camps. When war suddenly engulfed Europe in 1914, most Americans saw little reason to become involved. President Wilson publicly announced the country would follow a policy of neutrality "in thought and deed. "27 Despite declaring itself neutral, American sympathies clearly favored the Allies. Beyond the obvious cultural affinities binding the British, French, and American peoples, and the obvious fact of German aggression in Western Europe, considerable American and British propaganda efforts cemented this bias. Other events would steadily push the United States toward involvement in this "European" war. Early in the war, Britain imposed a naval blockade on Germany in an attempt to cut off its supplies. Germany's response was to engage in unrestricted submarine warfare. As Tirpitz put it, "England wants to starve us. We can play the same game. We can bottle her up and destroy every ship that endeavors to break the blockade. "29 An obvious problem with this policy was its indiscriminate nature; it threatened civilian, * commercial, and neutral shipping in the same manner as military vessels, risking the involvement of neutral countries like the United States. Because submarines were vulnerable to attack when surfaced—which would be required if civilian and commercial vessels were to be given adequate time to disembark people before their ship was sunk— the German high command opted to sink them without prior warning.30 This policy was of little consequence between nations already at war, but it was strategically important regarding the United States. In 1915, a British passenger liner with American passengers on board was sunk resulting in 1,198 lives lost, 128 of them American. A year later, the French ship Sussex also was sunk, resulting in two American lives lost. To stem the rising tide of sentiment in the United States to enter the war, Germany agreed to avoid sinking civilian liners without saving the passengers onboard. This made little military sense, but it forestalled U.S. entry into the war. By 1917, however, the Germans decided

27 Woodrow Wilson, as quoted in Robert James Maddox, The United States and World War II (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992), p. 3. 28 Nelson Klose and Curt Lader, United States History: Since 1865, Sixth Edition (New York: Barron's Educational Series, 2001), p. 159. 29 Ernest R. May, The World War and American Isolation, 1914-1917 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1959), p. 115. 30 Ibid, p. 160-1. 103

to resume unrestricted submarine warfare because they believed that the United States was militarily so weak that it could be discounted in the short-term. German military leaders thought they would win on the Western Front before America's industrial might and manpower reserves could be mobilized and deployed. Berlin knew unrestricted submarine warfare would bring the United States into the war, but the generals and admirals convinced themselves and the Kaiser they could win before American strength could be fully brought to bear. They grossly exaggerated how many ships they could sink and the effect it would have on Britain. They were, however, correct in their assessment that American forces were so weak that their weight on the battlefield would not be felt for some time. In fact, the war was over before the United States Army was ready to fight it. The United States reluctantly entered World War I because it identified Germany as a great threat to an acceptable world order, especially after Berlin directly threatened American territory and citizens. Otherwise, the preferred option of President Wilson and of the American public would have been a compromise peace between the two coalitions, * brokered by Washington. Scholars have advanced many explanations for American entry into World War I. Violations of U.S. neutrality and commerce protection lead the way, but other, more cynical explanations abound. Some authors contend that the United States never really was neutral, supporting the British from the start—not unlike what would occur the next time war erupted in Europe. Between 1914 and 1916, trade with the Allies swelled from 800 million dollars to 3 billion dollars;31 if the Allies lost the war, American trade would suffer. Some advance a "Merchants of Death" argument, that American involvement in the war was the result of pressure to boost exports and keep American factory workers employed. This rationale would resurface decades later when Eisenhower called for vigilance against the negative influences of what he coined the "Military-Industrial Complex." Scholars also have focused on balance of power considerations, and the common democratic culture shared by the Allies. More immediate reasons were the

31 Daniel J. Boorstein and Brooks Mather Kelley, A History of the United States (Lexington, MA.: Ginn, 1981), p. 448. Also see Ross Gregory, The Origins of American Intervention in the First World War (New York: W. W. Norton, 1971); Robert H. Ferrell, Woodrow Wilson and World War I, 1917-1921 (New York: Harper & Row, 1985). 104

discovery of the Zimmerman telegram and the Kaiser's decision to resume unrestricted submarine warfare in January 1917,32 which indicated German hostility toward and contempt for the United States. As a result of these events, an outraged American public overwhelmingly supported Wilson's call for a declaration of war by Congress. This represented a rapid and stunning transformation of public opinion. In 1914, American public opinion held that the United States was morally superior to the reactionary empires of Europe; with time, the rest of the world would come to appreciate that fact and adopt American ideals. By 1917, time was a luxury Americans could no longer afford. Germany, especially after Russia's exit from the war, put democracy and freedom at risk. Wilson could claim the moral high ground thanks to German behavior (violating Belgian neutrality, unrestricted submarine warfare, use of poison gas, aerial bombardment of civilians) and the anti-democratic character of its government. Wilson justified U.S. involvement as "an act of high principle and idealism ... [and] ... as a crusade to make the world safe for democracy. " The message resonated with the American people. Several scholars have argued that this * approach became the template for American involvement in power politics. Even Kissinger, a long-time critic of Wilson's foreign policy, concedes that the intellectual framework Wilson crafted for American diplomacy has "remained the bed-rock of all American foreign policy thinking"34 up until the present time. Realists contend that Wilson's rhetoric disguised his real motivation to enter the war. Instead, they argue, he simply saw the writing on the wall and acted before it was too late: a German victory would be detrimental to the United States' interests. Any hopes of spreading democracy and liberalism would collapse if Berlin prevailed across Europe. Conversely, if the Allies won without American help they might carve up the world while

May, The World War and American Isolation, 1914-1917, p. 414. 33 Alfred J. Andrea and James H. Overfield, The Human Record: Sources of Global History (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1994) as cited in David Koeller, "The United States Enters World War One," World History Chronology, 2003, http://www.thenagain.info/WebChron/World/USWWI.html (accessed 20 Jul 08). See also Woodrow Wilson, "Making the World 'Safe for Democracy': Woodrow Wilson Asks for War," 65th Congress, Session 1, Senate Document No. 5, 2 Apr 1917, http://historvmatters.gmu.edu/d/4943/ (accessed 20 Jul 08). 34 Henry A. Kissinger, Diplomacy (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994), p. 52. Also see William N. Tilchin and Charles E. Neu, Artists of Power: Theodore Roosevelt, Woodrow Wilson, and Their Enduring Impact on U.S. Foreign Policy (Westport, CT.: Praeger Security International, 2006), p. xxiii. 105

ignoring American trade interests. Wilson's shrewd approach sought to avoid either of those outcomes. However,

Wilson [was] not ... content to justify American entry into the war for what it was—an effort to restore the European balance of power. Instead, he too imposed an ideological framework by proclaiming as war aims self-determination, open markets, and collective security35 36

At heart, Wilson was a Progressive Imperialist: "When properly directed, there is no people not fitted for self-government. "37 The first half of his statement injects an important qualifier into the notion of self-government. Undoubtedly, Wilson saw the United States as a natural and worthy "director" for other states. To accomplish that task, Wilson aimed to

provide a structure of international institutions and agreements to handle military and economic affairs among democratically constituted capitalist states. In all of these respects, American national security thinking followed Wilson's lead after 194538

Wilson's "peace without victory" proposal was, at its core, a peace to be shaped, if not totally dictated, by the United States,39 although it was woefully unprepared for war and could offer little beyond financial assistance for a year after its entry. Had the war continued for long, the United States would have suffered heavier losses than it did, but also have emerged as clearly the preeminent power on earth, inextricably caught in world politics. Instead, the war ended quickly, and for the United States, cheaply, but with its status merely equal to that of Britain and France.

35 John Lewis Gaddis, We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 5, http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=22791452 (accessed 20 Jul 08). 36 For more information, see David M. Esposito, The Legacy ofWoodrow Wilson: American War Aims in World War /(Westport, CT.: Praeger Publishers, 1996), http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=14266596 (accessed 20 Jul 08). 37 Woodrow Wilson, as quoted in Walter A. McDougall, Promised Land, Crusader State: The American Encounter with the World since 1776 (New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1997), p. 126. 38 Tony Smith, America's Mission: The United States and the Worldwide Struggle for Democracy in the Twentieth Century (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), p. 107. 39 Woodrow Wilson, "Peace without Victory" address to the U.S. Senate, 22 Jan 1917, http://www.sagehistoiy.net/worldwarl/docs/WWPeaceVict.htm (accessed 20 Jul 08). 106

After its short involvement in the war, the United States rebuked the responsibility of global leadership. It was not willing to pay for the international economic order it desired and believed would support capitalism, liberalism, and stability. The United States reverted to the model it had grown comfortable with over time: the ability to enjoy the fruits of a liberal global economic order underwritten by British naval power. In essence, it attempted to get a free ride, while at the same time trying to weaken the guarantor of that order, the United Kingdom. Through its financial and foreign policies, the United States actually sapped the states which maintained the order which kept it rich and secure. Meanwhile, in terms of international influence and military power, the United States remained far weaker than it could have been, and among the least of the great powers. These attitudes overlooked the changing landscape that demanded greater American leadership.

By so reluctantly accepting responsibility for recycling the international payments Europeans owed to Americans, Washington overburdened the economic framework which internationalist republicans and democrats agreed guaranteed a democratic comity. Had the economic connections between German payments and American investment been established on a less precarious basis than they finally were, then Germany's western orientation ... could have been prolonged. °

Wilson's idealism, codified in his Fourteen Points—especially the last one, which called for a League of Nations—demanded greater American involvement in foreign affairs than most of the American public was unwilling to commit at that time. This heated debate highlighted the tensions between America's past and what many saw as its future. Despite the apparent rejection by the American public of calls for greater global activism, in 1924 Harvard professor Irving Babbitt noted an imperialist trend developing in U.S. foreign policy.

We are willing to admit that all other nations are self- seeking, but as for ourselves, we hold that we act only on

Charles S. Maier, "Wargames: 1914-1919," Journal of Interdisciplinary History, Vol. 18, No. 4, The Origin and Prevention of Major Wars (Spring 1988), p. 847-8. 107

the most disinterested motives. We have not as yet set up, like revolutionary France, as the Christ of Nations, but during the late war we liked to look on ourselves as at least the Sir Galahad of Nations. If the American thus regards himself as an idealist at the same time that that the foreigner looks on him as a dollar-chaser, the explanation may be due partly to the fact that the American judges himself by the way he feels, whereas the foreigner judges him by what he does.

Americans had long believed that European elites oppressed the common man, and the United States should stay clear of involvement in European affairs. However, by the time Theodore Roosevelt arrived on the scene, the tide of opinion was turning in favor of the desire for prominence and activism in the world. Wilson further advanced that trend. In 1914, before the outbreak of war, he declared that America's role was to serve "the rights of humanity. " The American flag, he said, was "the flag, not only of America, but of humanity. "42 In doing so, "he divorced the symbolism of the flag's colors and stars and stripes from their historical meaning and reinvented the banner as a universal symbol for * the freedom of all mankind—an audacious claim of boundless national mission. " This trend toward activism had yet to reach a tipping point, as evidenced by the Senate's rejection of Wilsonian internationalism. It had to compete with the older, still dominant model, which emphasized pragmatism more than idealism. That outcome might have happened sooner had not Wilson's own idealism made him "inflexible and uncompromising."44 Most of the Senators who rejected the Versailles Treaty did so for personal and political reasons, including anger at Wilson, rather than ideological or strategic ones.45 According to John Lewis Gaddis, the most significant geopolitical development of the interwar years was the fact that the United States, despite intervention in the Russian civil

41 Irving Babbitt, Democracy and Leadership (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1979; originally published in 1924), p. 337, 295. 42 Woodrow Wilson, speaking at Independence Hall, July 4, 1914, as quoted in Richard M. Gamble, "Savior Nation: Woodrow Wilson and the Gospel of Service," Humanitas, Vol XIV, No. 1 (2001), p. 17. 43 Ibid. 44 Babbitt, Democracy and Leadership, p. 314. 45 See Thomas J. Knock, To End All Wars: Woodrow Wilson and the Quest for a New World Order (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992); John Milton Cooper, Breaking the Heart of the World: Woodrow Wilson and the Fight for the League of Nations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). 108 war and efforts to stabilize war-torn European economies, made no concerted effort to shape political or military developments on the continent after 1920. Conflicting arguments have emerged to explain this path. Some contend the tradition of isolationism reasserted itself. Others argue that Wilson made excessive demands on the American people, exhausting good will. Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, a vocal critic of Wilson's diplomacy, held that the Treaty of Versailles was not overly punitive, but that American support for it and the League of Nations would shackle the nation with burdensome obligations.47 Wilson's own Secretary of State, Robert Lansing, criticized his old boss for abandoning Allied strategic and economic interests in favor of self-determination in Eastern and Central Europe. Still others believe that the necessarily messy nature of the treaty compared to the rhetoric which preceded it made Americans cynical about the world beyond its shores. Gaddis expresses another explanation: the United States withdrew from European politics because it detected no obvious challenge to stability there; hence, there was no threat to American security.49 Debate continues to swirl around the consequences of American disengagement from Europe. For some, * Washington's failure to assert the global economic leadership previously exercised by London deepened and prolonged the Great Depression. Others argue that greater leadership from Washington may have increased the fortitude of European leaders confronted with Adolf Hitler in the 1930s. Less subject to debate was American unwillingness to assume global responsibilities in the absence of a clear and present danger.50 It was more concerned with economic growth and reaping rewards from an international system in which it had few costs, but gained much.

Franklin Roosevelt Beginning in 1914-1918, but accelerating after 1933, the traditional American template for power politics began to unravel, driven by rising challenges to the liberal democratic and capitalist system, and Britain's ability to defend it. In its place emerged a

46 Gaddis, We Now Know, p. 7. 47 Henry Cabot Lodge, The Senate and the League of Nations (New York: Charles Scribner and Sons, 1925) 48 Robert Lansing, The Peace Negotiations: A Personal Narrative (Westport, CT.: Greenwood Press, 1971 [originally printed in 1921]). 49 Gaddis, We Now Know, p. 7. 109

combination of hard-nosed realism, underwritten by the United States' growing power and interests, and liberal internationalism, powered by its millenarian instincts. With the election of Franklin Delano Roosevelt to the White House in 1932, the United States found a leader who was a master at combining idealism and realism. From the moment he entered office, he recognized the danger to American security represented by a Hitler-led Reich. For him, geopolitics trumped ideology; he was a pragmatist above all else, as his quick extension of diplomatic recognition to the Soviet Union demonstrated. It was a tangible step in the direction of future cooperation, despite the ideological divide separating them. In the late 1930s, with the country deeply divided about how to handle the Axis threat, Roosevelt acted preemptively to support the Allied cause long before Pearl Harbor brought the country into the war. In these actions, his closest advisors were generals and admirals who whole-heartedly supported his actions as being essential to American national security. Ryn believes Franklin Roosevelt's sense of American mission may have been as strong as Wilson's.51 Simultaneously, the power of the Executive Branch of* government—including the military—surged, to address the world dilemmas confronting the United States. Roosevelt actively engaged in power politics because he realized that the United States had to be involved—for its own sake as well as that of others—despite the reservations of much of his domestic audience; to do otherwise, he believed, risked the domination of Eurasia by one country. Once engaged in World War II, America began tapping its power to the full. By 1943, it became the senior partner in the Allied coalition, and also a normal great power. Moreover, Roosevelt pushed for unconditional surrender, as Wilson eventually did in World War I, i.e. total victory over its enemies, to preclude the possibility that Germany, Japan, and Italy could reemerge as threats in the near future, as Germany had following the last war's imperfect conclusion. As Maier describes it,

The incompatibilities of the international order that lay at the root of World War I were resolved only after World

51 Claes G. Ryn, "The Ideology of American Empire," Orbis (Summer 2003), p. 390. 52 See Michael Beschloss, The Conquerors: Roosevelt, Truman and the Destruction of Hitler's Germany (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2002); Jon Meacham, Franklin and Winston: An Intimate Portrait of an Epic Friendship (New York: Random House, 2003). 110

War II. In the long view, the two wars represented a passage of hegemony at the expense of the British and, to a lesser degree, the French and other European empires. But the original challengers, Germany and Japan, did not have the strength to seize the succession, and instead the Soviet Union and the United States were drawn in. Such great transitions are probably hard to manage peacefully.

The peaceful transfer of international hegemony was all the more difficult because of the interaction of domestic and foreign politics. The first half of the twentieth century was an era in which Europe's elites differed fundamentally on how to incorporate the industrial working class into politics. ... A new class compromise as well as a new pattern of international leadership had eventually to be formed.

Looking at the political order as of 1914 ... one realizes that, had there not been war, the tendencies in place might well have led to equilibrium similar to the one that followed World War II53

Initially, American thinking about post-war security was vague. This may have been the result of wishful thinking regarding relations with Moscow. While a specific security policy had yet to crystallize, Washington was committed to preventing any hostile power from once again attempting to dominate the European continent. To meet that potential challenge, the United States

... [was] not prepared to see military capabilities reduced to anything like the inadequate levels of he interwar era, nor would they resist opportunities to reshape the international economy in ways that would benefit American capitalism. They resolved to resist any return to isolationism, and they optimistically embraced the 'second chance' the war had provided to build a global security organization in which the United States would play the leading role.

The United States would seek power in the postwar world, not shy away from it as it had done after World War I. It would do so in the belief that only it had the strength to

Maier, "Wargames: 1914-1919," p. 848-9. Ill

build a peace based on Wilsonian principles .... It would administer that peace neither for its exclusive advantage nor in such a way as to provide equal benefits to all: many as yet ill-defined possibilities lay in between these extremes. ...It was within this framework of pragmatism mixed with principle that Roosevelt hoped to deal with Stalin.

Roosevelt had confidence in his ability to transform the tenuous and suspicious relationship with the Soviet Union into a workable partnership. Others, like Winston Churchill, were less hopeful. When Roosevelt died just before the war ended, his Vice- President of eighty-two days was thrust into what could be described as the perfect storm.

Truman Though underestimated by many of his political peers, and lacking the debonaire charm, confidence, and patience of his predecessor, Harry Truman possessed a sharp mind and was a quick study. He was plain-spoken and straightforward. He expected honesty and fair play. When it was not forthcoming, he would speak his mind and vent his frustrations bluntly. Roosevelt kept him in the dark about virtually everything connected to the war effort—including the Manhattan Project—which made Truman's baptism by fire all the more trying. In the political vacuum that enveloped much of Europe, it was only natural that Soviet and Western policies would collide, as they staked out interests. Friction was exaccerbated by other influences which soon poisoned the atmosphere of goodwill. Legacies of mistrust formed before and during the war infused the bilateral relationship; different political traditions and economic systems and political interests separated them. Nevertheless, American policy makers hoped they could continue their partnership with the USSR after the war. As the Soviet Union set up puppet regimes in Eastern Europe and threatened the stability of Western European governments attempting recovery amidst destruction, Washington became puzzled as to why the Soviets were so uncooperative, even hostile. George Kennan, an attache at the American embassy in Moscow, was witness to Stalin's thinking and behavior. Based on his experiences, he

Gaddis, We Now Know, p. 11-2. 112 sent a classified message from Moscow in 1946,55 which became the most famous telegram in American diplomatic history.5 It explained the Soviet view of the world and struck a chord within the Truman Administration. The next year, the essence of the telegram was published under the title "The Sources of Soviet Conduct" in the July 1947 issue of Foreign Affairs. It was signed "X", but Washington insiders knew Kennan had penned it. "The 'X' article," as it came to be known, proved to be the most influential editorial ever written on American foreign policy.58 It advocated a patient, long-term "containment" of the Soviet Union and the simultaneous re-establishment of a stable balance of power in Europe and Asia. His clairvoyant explanation of Soviet behavior included an early attempt to codify what Jack Snyder later defined as Soviet "strategic culture."

The political personality of Soviet power as we know it today is the product of ideology and circumstances: ideology inherited by the present Soviet leaders from the movement in which they had their political origin, and circumstances of the power which they now have exercised for nearly three decades in Russia. There can be few tasks of psychological analysis more difficult than to try to trace the interaction of these two forces and the relative role of each in the determination of official Soviet conduct, yet the attempt must be made if that conduct is to be understood and effectively countered.59

55 George F. Kennan, "Telegram, George Kennan to George Marshall ["Long Telegram"]," Harry S. Truman Administration File, Elsey Papers, Truman Library, 22 Feb 1946, http://www.trumanlibrai'V.org/whistlestop/studv_collections/coldwar/documents/index.php?docurnentdate=: 1946-02-22&documentid=6-6&studvcollectionid=&pagenumber= 1 (accessed 22 Jul 08). Published in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, Vol. VI. 56 Richard Holbrooke, "The Paradox of George F. Kennan," The Washington Post, 21 Mar 05, p. A19, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dvn/content/article/2005/03/26/AR2005032603 911 .html (accessed 15 Jul 08). 57 George Kennan (or "X"), "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," Foreign Affairs, Vol. XXV (July 1947), http://www.foreignaffairs.org/19470701 faessay25403/x/the-sources-of-soviet-conduct.html (accessed 22 Jul 08). 58 Holbrooke, "The Paradox of George F. Kennan." 59 Kennan, "The Sources of Soviet Conduct." 113

In 1948, while serving as the State Department's Director of Policy Planning, Kennan further refined his thinking about the main problems with American foreign policy.

We have about 50% of the world's wealth, but only 6.3% of its population. ...In this situation, we cannot fail to be the object of envy and resentment. Our real task in the coming period is to devise a pattern of relationships which will permit us to maintain this position of disparity. ... To do so, we will have to dispense with all sentimentality and day-dreaming; and our attention will have to be concentrated everywhere on our immediate national objectives We should cease to talk about vague and ... unreal objectives such as human rights, the raising of the living standards, and democratization. The day is not far off when we are going to have to deal in straight power concepts. The less we are then hampered by idealistic slogans, the better. 1

The policy of Containment, with its high cost and long-term approach, could easily have been ignored if not for the surprisingly aggressive Soviet behavior that greeted the West and the fact that it meshed with Truman's firm policy toward the Soviets in Eastern Europe and elsewhere. It would become the centerpiece of American foreign policy for more than four decades. It also provided the context for the first attempt since the Founding Fathers by American governments to formulate a grand strategy. Edward Luttwak has suggested that because the United States usually had fought weaker enemies and benefited from favorable geography, it had little need for strategy until 1945; hence, it neglected to create one63 64 beyond the highly technical functions

George F. Kennan, "PPS/23: Review of Current Trends in U.S. Foreign Policy," published in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, Vol. 1, p. 509-29, 24 Feb 1948, http://www.geocities.eom/Athens/Forum/2496/ruture/k:ennan/pps23.htrnl (accessed 21 Jul 08). 61 Ibid. 62 See Melvyn P. Leffler, A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration and the Cold War (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993); Michael J. Hogan, A Cross of Iron: Harry S. Truman and the Origins of the National Security State, 1945-1954 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Arnold A. Offner, Another Such Victory: President Truman and the Cold War, 1945-1953 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002). 63 Edward Luttwak in W. Scott Thompson, ed., National Security in the 1980s: From Weakness to Strength (San Francisco: Institute for Contemporary Studies, 1980), p. 260-3. 64 Other scholars would disagree with Luttwak, contending that Roosevelt and the U.S. military had a strategy by 1940. 114 associated with "war planning." Other scholars would disagree with Luttwak, contending that Roosevelt and the U.S. military had a strategy by 1940. In any case, by 1945 traditional U.S. strategy clearly was unsuited to American power and interests: it had to be rebuilt. This need occurred in very specific circumstances, which shaped the outcome. The German challenge and the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor convinced American elites that they could not safely withdraw to isolationism. These attitudes were reinforced by the danger that the Soviets would dominate Eurasia unless the Americans stopped them. If it did so, however, as events proved, the United States would possess not merely the world's greatest economy, but also leadership over most of the world's advanced economies—a powerful position for a long and cold war. The need to formulate policy emerged in the context of constant external threat, and the rise of the imperial presidency, with more power accruing to the Executive Branch, especially the military services. So too, the need to formulate strategy arose in an environment of nuclear war and deterrence, and of an established set of ideas about how to create and use force. Colin Gray contends that Americans developed a strategic "style" which involved * far greater devotion to the management of large defense programs than to operational issues. To underscore his point, he cites Martin Van Creveld's study of German military performance during 1914-1945, which drew a stark contrast between the training of German and American officers.66 Gray characterizes Van Crevald's findings to be that

while American officers were taught how to be good at the management of men and the provision of material for combat, German officers were taught, nearly exclusively, how to handle the military asset in combat. The management bias in American higher military education has survived to the present day—with predictable results. The United States ... [has always been] a resource-rich country. [Therefore,] questions pertaining to the actual employment of force, and particularly of limited force, have been deemed secondary to the marshalling of muscle.

53 Gray, "National Style in Strategy," p. 25. 66 See Martin Van Creveld, Fighting Power: German Military Performance, 1914-1945 (Potomac, MD.: C and L Associates, 1980), p. 170-6. Many scholars feel this characterization of German superiority from late 1942 onward is an exaggeration. 67 Gray, "National Style in Strategy," p. 25-6. 115

The Germans, despite suffering from material inferiority, delivered superior performance on the battlefield. But because of their material superiority, and good use of it, ultimately the Allies triumphed. This victory upheld the strategy which the United States employed during that conflict. A preference for waging technological war was understandable given the United States' competitive advantages in this area. Whenever possible, the United States always has attempted to avoid wars of attrition in favor of technological solutions. It has emphasized brute force and the ability to bury an enemy in terms of production, yet this success had its costs. Resource wealth and tremendous productive capacity discouraged the sophisticated formulation of strategy. Natural bounty, together with a faith in technology and an enduring innovative spirit, fostered strategic complacency. These tendencies were reinforced by a set of established preferences for the use of force in war. According to Russell Weigley's influential study, The American Way of War, in major conflicts the United States characteristically has adopted an annihilation- based strategy against all comers, neglecting issues like attrition and limited war.

At the beginning, when American military resources were still slight, America made a promising beginning in the nurture of strategists of attrition; but the wealth of the country and its adoption of unlimited war aims cut that development short, until the strategy of annihilation became characteristically the American way in war.

Until the Civil War, Weigley argues, the United States relied on a cautious strategy consistent with national weakness. The Civil War broke this pattern. Thereafter, the basic theme in American strategy was to crush the enemy as Grant and Sherman had done so successfully. One of Weigley's more insightful passages deals with Sherman's 1864 "March to the Sea" campaign, where he defines the factors which led to the war's extension beyond the battlefield to civilian industry and resources. The psychological

68 "Strategies," such as the "Air Atomic" strategy were essentially an extension of previous thinking into the nuclear realm that made no exception for the revolutionary paradigm shift that took place after the Soviets gained membership in the nuclear club. 69 Russell F. Weigley, The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1973), p. xxii. 70 Edward M. Coffman, a review of Weigley, The American Way of War, The Journal of American History, Vol. 60, No. 4 (Mar 74), p. 1090. 116

impact of that operation was not lost on the Army Air Corps in the years leading up to World War II, and indeed, such thinking continues to predominate Air Force thinking today.71 As Stephen Ambrose puts it, "one might almost argue that the distinctive American contribution to strategy was the concept of annihilating not the enemy's army but its resources. "72 In fact, this was part of an Anglo-American approach to strategy. By 1945, "total assault became so intertwined with victory, that to the American public both Korea and the Indochina War were frustrating and not understandable, " when in fact they were normal. Weigley's views have been criticized by many scholars. Brian Linn74 and Max Boot both criticize him for ignoring the American experience with small wars. Stephen Ambrose says the problem with Weigley's condemnation of a strategy of annihilation is that he does not propose an alternative. Given America's war aims in conflicts like World War I, World War II, and Korea, what other strategy was feasible?

The strategy of annihilation flowed from the political objectives of the government, not vice versa. ... It is difficult to see how any strategist in a modern nation state fighting an ideological war could adopt a strategy other than that of annihilation. ...A strategy of attrition aims at a compromise peace; what compromise was possible in World War II? ... if war comes, Americans will almost certainly fight to annihilate the enemy. The only way to change the strategy is to change the politics.

Weigley's work, however, like that of Gray, reflects important aspects of a fundamental change in strategy. Before the Cold War, the United States always had waged war with the goal of winning—quickly, cheaply, and unambiguously, and usually

Col. John A. Warden, III, The Air Campaign: Planning for Combat (Washington: National Defense University Press, 1988); Brigadier General David A. Deptula, Effects-Based Operations: Change in the Nature of Warfare (Arlington, VA.: Aerospace Education Foundation, 2001). 72 Ambrose, "When American Go To War," p. 479. Joel C. Snell, a review of Weigley, The American Way of War, Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 410, The Energy Crisis: Reality or Myth (Nov 73), p. 224. 74 Brian M. Linn, The Philippine War, 1899-1902 (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 2000). 75 Max Boot, The Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American Power (New York: Basic Books, 2002); "Iraq and the American Small War Tradition," Historically Speaking: The Bulletin of the Historical Society, Jun 03, http://www.bu.edu/historic/hs/june03 .html#boot (accessed 27 Jul 08). 76 Stephen Ambrose, "When American Go To War," Reviews in American History, Vol. 1, No. 4 (Dec 73), p. 479-80. 117 against weaker adversaries. In 1945, the dynamics were different. Americans belatedly realized that they and the Soviets would be antagonistic toward one another, since both demanded global leadership and declined to give much ground. Internally, the Soviet Union was a brutal state, and the countries that fell under its control suffered greatly. It dominated Europe militarily, despite American possession of nuclear weapons, but its external behavior was far less aggressive than the Nazis. Both Americans and Soviets were millenarian in their outlook. Each believed that they had the answers that would solve the world's problems and did not want to be constrained by the other. This competition between universal millenarian ideas produced many of the problems that beset their relationship. Complicating that relationship in 1945 was the fact that neither side had much experience interacting on a day-to-day basis with other major powers. The Soviets had been ostracized by the West since 1917, while Americans had reverted to isolationism after 1919. Hence, American and Soviet experience in dealing with each other really came essentially from the war. Neither really understood the other. Yet neither wanted to risk a crisis that could produce World War III, whatever feelings they * might have about its inevitability. Each believed in the transformative power of their political system and felt they should dictate the basic terms of the new international system. Ultimately, the Cold War started because of the way Americans reacted to the manner by which the Soviets imposed control over their satellites in Eastern and Central Europe. When American observers saw how "Stalinization" worked on the ground, they were appalled. In a brief span of time, cordiality gave wave to hostility, through an action-reaction cycle, whereby the behavior of one side influenced the decisions of the other, and vice-versa. Neither side wished to have a cold war, it just happened that

77 way. A blunt military instrument, focused on total battlefield victory and disinterested in larger political objectives, was ill-suited to the nuclear world. It would take considerable time for that realization to enter American strategic thinking, especially among its warrior caste. From the outset, the United States was constrained from using its full power.

See John Lewis Gaddis, A Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy during the Cold War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982); John Lewis Gaddis, We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997); John Lewis Gaddis, The Cold War: A New History (New York: Penguin Books, 2005). 118

Though it enjoyed a nuclear monopoly from 1945-49, the nation was not psychologically prepared to fight another war. Militarily, the United States had rapidly demobilized as soon as peace was declared, although prudence and new responsibility meant that it maintained larger forces than usual. The Soviets remained far more mobilized; though lacking nuclear weapons, they held overwhelming military superiority on the European continent, exacerbated by demobilization in all Western countries. The American public wanted peace, which constrained American policy. So did the Soviet development of the atomic bomb. Almost immediately after the war ended, but culminating in the period between 1955 and 1964, a stream of works, almost exclusively written by civilian theorists, began to explore the implications of nuclear war. They challenged the traditional American way of war which, according to Weigley, gravitated toward total war and unconditional surrender. In 1946, Bernard Brodie and several Yale colleagues, writing in the shadow of Hiroshima, published a collection of essays titled The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World Order, which outlined the fundamentals of nuclear deterrence strategy. " Brodie was quick to note that the utility of atomic weapons lay not in their use, but in the threat of their use. Though Brodie and military leaders agreed regarding the value of the threat, they differed about the use of nuclear weapons. Brodie argued that "thus far the chief purpose of our military establishment has been to win wars. From now on its chief

70 purpose must be to avert them. It can have almost no other useful purpose. " This view contrasted with military contingency planning, which included the use of nuclear weapons by an "Air Atomic" strategy.80

The adoption of nuclear deterrence strategy by the Truman Administration revolutionized America's approach to war. In the past, Americans had generally prepared for war only after a war had begun. Now, the advocates of deterrence argued, the United States would have to prepare for war in

See Russell F. Weigley, The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy (New York: Macmillan Co., 1973). 79 Bernard Brodie, "War in the Atomic Age" and "Implications for Military Policy," in Bernard Brodie, ed., The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World Order (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1946), p. 36. 0 Edward A. Kaplan, Making Doctor Strangelove: Strategy in the Air-Atomic Age, a PhD dissertation (Calgary: University of Calgary, 2007). 119

advance of war, in order to prevent war [i.e. "If you want peace, prepare for war. "]. However, it was never quite clear how much force would be needed to deter the outbreak of war, an ambiguity that would ultimately do much to stimulate the production of nuclear weapons.

The United States was prepared to spend far more on defense in peacetime than it—or any other country in history—ever had done. Yet, for all the monies spent, victory became elusive in the nuclear age. Korea was the first major conflict fought after the Soviets developed nuclear weapons. That development drastically undercut the freedom of action afforded to military commanders in the field. When intervention by the Soviets, or Communist China, was possible, strategic and political considerations superceded operational concerns, challenging the United States' preferred way of war. When Douglas Mac Arthur proclaimed, "There is no substitute for victory, " he expressed the frustrations of many people, unhappy with the complexities of power in a nuclear-armed world. The Korean War ended in a messy compromise. So too, because the United States was unwilling to engage in a direct conflict with the Soviet Union, it had to share leadership in the world. But to Kissinger, American policy was pursued poorly due to the failure of strategic thinking within the United States.83 Whereas the early years of the Cold War were defined by episodic crises (over Berlin, Communist China, Korea, Sputnik, the U-2 shoot-down incident, the Berlin Wall, the Cuban Missile Crisis and others) that threatened to produce world wars, later years were marked by greater stability, characterized by "Open Skies," the "hotline", the Outer Space Treaty, and the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT). From 1945 to 1991, the United States found itself in the unfamiliar role of being a status-quo power defending an order under threat. As such, millenarian concerns took a back seat to realist calculations. Though never absent from rhetoric and sometimes surfacing in action, those impulses

Ronald E. Powaski, March to Armageddon: The United States and the Nuclear Arms Race, 1939 to the Present (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), p. 50-1. 82 Douglas MacArthur, as quoted in Harold Pollack, '"There Is No Substitute for Victory' and Other Flights from Reality," The Huffington Post, 10 Apr 08, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/harold-pollack/there-is-no- substitute-fo b 96104.html (accessed 2 Jun 08). 83 Henry Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1957), Chapter 1. 120 were restrained by the realities of a daily struggle against another nuclear power with a universalistic ideology and global ambitions.

Eisenhower The pace of technological development began to accelerate during the presidency of Dwight Eisenhower posing many serious threats to the United States. Failure to master these technologies, and to maintain sufficient force, might threaten the American alliance system and its own security. Too much development in these areas might sap its economic strength. Too cautious a policy might weaken America in the long term; too aggressive a policy could provoke the danger of war. Fortunately, American policy was in experienced hands. Eisenhower formulated a long-term policy which carried the United States safely through the Cold War. It also guided its initial steps in policy toward space. As the first president to face the possibility of nuclear war with intercontinental missiles, he realized that drastically reduced decision times made timely information more essential than ever. He became concerned that a nuclear exchange must be prevented at all cost. He knew from experience that a large, potent military force was not enough to prevent war. To address that concern, aircraft flew along the borders of the Soviet Union and occasionally over its territory taking photographs; however, this proved to be a dangerous and politically expensive operation, more than once ending with a shoot down.84 Convinced the world would be safer and more secure if both sides were allowed to overfly the other's territory, Eisenhower proposed a policy called "Open Skies." Khrushchev rejected the concept outright.85 Both sides were feverishly working on technologies to launch satellites into space that promised continuous, unassailable "eyes in the sky." However, technological issues were not the only hurdles facing the Eisenhower Administration. If the United States were the first to launch and operate a satellite flying over Soviet territory, it might be interpreted as an act of war. Eisenhower

Philip Taubman, Secret Empire: Eisenhower, the CIA, and the Hidden Story of America's Space Espionage (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2003). 85 Dwayne A. Day, "Tinker, tailor, satellite, spy," The Space Review, 29 Oct 07, 121 had to find a way to establish that a nation's sovereignty extended no further than the earth's atmosphere. His rival gave him one. In 1956, the CIA became convinced the Soviets would launch a satellite within a year. Pressure began to mount within the Pentagon for authority to launch before then in order to beat the Soviets. Eisenhower had his reasons for denying such requests. Among them, he wanted such a launch to be handled by the yet to be created National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) to highlight the peaceful nature of the endeavor. The pressure spiked exponentially after the launch of Sputnik on October 4, 1957. Though he anticipated a public outcry about the perception that the United States was lagging, he was surprised by the massive hysteria, fear, and recriminations that infected his countrymen. His public approval ratings dropped 20 percent overnight. Repeated press briefings and public comments did little to assuage the anxiety felt by ordinary citizens. Given what we know now, Eisenhower deserves credit for ignoring the criticisms. Responding more forcefully would have undermined the higher goals he was achieving. A long four months later, the United States launched Explorer I from Cape Canaveral, not some clandestine military base. By allowing the Soviets to be first in space, the USSR had established a precedent. The Soviets could hardly protest the passing of an American satellite over Soviet territory since Sputnik had been doing just that—with Eisenhower's public blessing no less. In coming years, the United States would gain far more than the USSR from these developments, building on the basis of practical power in space nurtured under Eisenhower. In allowing the Soviets to launch first, "Open Skies" became a reality, in space rather than in the atmosphere. Eisenhower possessed courage and moral authority that allowed him to discount public opinion in favor of a higher good, swallowing his pride and emphasizing long-term concerns. It is doubtful that such perseverance could exist today in the face of polls and focus groups. Roger Launius makes the case that

Paul Dickson, Sputnik: The Shock of the Century (New York: Walker Publishing Company, 2001). 87 Day, "Tinker, tailor, satellite, spy," The Space Review, 29 Oct 07, http://www.thespacereview.eom/article/989/l (accessed 15 Jul 08). 88 Dickson, Sputnik: The Shock of the Century, p. 4. 89 Taylor Dinerman, "Review: Satellites, Rockets, and Eisenhower," The Space Review, 3 Nov 03, http://www.thespacereview.eom/article/56/l (accessed 15 Jul 08). 122

more than perhaps any president in the Cold War era, Eisenhower had a formal strategy for defeating the Soviet Union. Consequently, the president's strategic vision did more to establish conditions for success than any other single set of decisions during that 40-year conflict.9

This episode is significant to the modern debate about space weaponization. Eisenhower created NASA with a defined mission, that avoided making it the "miracle solution to all current difficulties"91 advocated by aggressive space supporters. Contemporary space hegemonists—those who want to see the United States capitalize on its commanding lead in space by taking full control of the medium and, by default, they argue, the world—are pressing for the same sort of "miracle solution" demanded by advocates in Eisenhower's day, and avoided. The Eisenhower Administration oversaw the maintenance of the greatest peacetime military forces the United States had seen, along with the most rapid and dramatic growth of the U.S. nuclear stockpile. Numbers ballooned from 1,750 to 23,000 weapons, while yields increased significantly with the fielding of thermonuclear weapons. 2 The large scale production of nuclear armaments and conventional ones, inevitably fostered the growth of scientific, congressional, business, and military lobbies which brought their self-interest to bear on American decisions. The massive, and permanent, enlargement of the defense industry created a bureaucratic and political web with an agenda of its own that could threaten other national priorities. Ironically, no one better understood the consequences than Eisenhower himself, a military officer of five-star rank, but also a firm adherent of traditional American political values. Hence, he warned the American people just before leaving office about the inherent political dangers involved in maintaining a large, permanent military establishment and a widely distributed industrial infrastructure to feed it.

90 Roger D. Launius, "Eisenhower and Space: Politics and Ideology in the Construction of the U.S. Civil Space Program," in Dennis E. Showalter, Forging the Shield: Eisenhower and National Security for the 21s' Century (Chicago: Imprint Publications, 2005), p. 153; also see Roy F. Houchin, review of Showalter, Forging the Shield, 22 Aug 07, http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/bookrev/showalter.html (15 Jul 08). 91 Ibid. 92 Gregg Herken, '"Not Enough Bulldozers': Eisenhower and American Nuclear Weapons Policy, 1953- 1961," in," in Dennis E. Showalter, Forging the Shield: Eisenhower and National Security for the 21s' Century (Chicago: Imprint Publications, 2005), p. 85. ... America's leadership and prestige depend, not merely upon our unmatched material progress, riches and military strength, but on how we use our power in the interests of world peace and human betterment ... to strive for less would be unworthy of a free and religious people.

Progress toward these noble goals is persistently threatened by the conflict now engulfing the world. It commands out whole attention, absorbs our very being. We face a hostile ideology global in scope, atheistic in character, ruthless in purpose, and insidious in method. Unhappily the danger it poses promises to be of indefinite duration. But each proposal [of a military nature] must be weighed in light of a broader consideration; the need to maintain balance in and among national programs .... Good judgment seeks balance and progress; lack of it eventually finds imbalance and frustration.

The record of many decades stands as proof that our people and their Government have, in the main, understood these truths and have responded to them well in the face of threat and stress. But threats, new in kind or degree, constantly arise. Of these, I mention only two.

A vital element in keeping the peace is our military establishment. Our arms must be mighty, ready for instant action, so that no potential aggressor may be tempted to risk his own destruction.

Our military organization today bears little relation to that known by any of my predecessors in peacetime, or indeed by the fighting men of World War II or Korea. Until the latest of our world conflicts, the United States had no armaments industry. ... But now we can no longer risk emergency improvisation of national defense; we have been compelled to create a permanent armaments industry of vast proportions. Added to this, three and a half million ... are directly engaged in the defense establishment. We annually spend on military security more than the net income of all United States corporations.

This conjunction of an immense military establishment and a large arms industry is new in the American experience. The total influence ... is felt in every city, every Statehouse, every office of the Federal government. We recognize the imperative need for this development. Yet we must not fail to comprehend its grave implications.

In the councils of government, we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military-industrial complex. The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power and will persist. We must never let the weight of this combination endanger our liberties or democratic processes. We should take nothing for granted.

... largely responsible for the sweeping changes in our industrial-military posture, has been the technological revolution during recent decades. In this revolution, research has become central, it also becomes more formalized, complex, and costly. A steadily increasing share is conducted for, by, or at the direction of, the Federal government. ... Partly because of the huge costs involved, a government contract becomes virtually a substitute for intellectual curiosity. ... The prospect of domination of the nation's scholars by Federal employment, project allocations, and the power of money is ever present—and is gravely to be regarded. ...we must also be alert to the equal and opposite danger that public policy could itself become the captive of a scientific- technological [or political] elite.

Another factor in maintaining balance involves the element of time. ... we ... must avoid the impulse to live only for today, plundering for, for our own ease and convenience, the precious resources of tomorrow.

May we be ever unswerving in devotion to principle, confident but humble with power, diligent in pursuit of the Nation's great goals93

The stunning growth in the size and influence of defense contractors in recent decades shows how Eisenhower's sage advice has been ignored. The disturbing degree to which self-interested parties have taken control of defense priorities should give Americans pause. Various lobbies, with short-term and self-centered focuses, are leading

Dwight D. Eisenhower, President of the United States, Farewell Address, 17 Jan 61, http://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/dwightdeisenhowerfarewell.htnil (accessed 8 Jul 08). 125

America towards disaster by bleeding its coffers dry and encouraging other states to engage in an arms race.

Reagan Most American decisionmakers, policy analysts, and commentators saw the Cold War as a defensive battle to defend free countries against the onslaught of totalitarian domination, to be won by careful policy and husbanding national resources. Some saw the struggle in more expansive terms. They had a vision for remaking the world that, while different from that espoused by their Soviet counterparts, also was universalistic. In the nuclear context, caution limited this vision to the realm of rhetoric, yet words have meaning. When Ronald Reagan came to office, he found a country mired in disillusionment. Many thought that America's best days were behind it. From Reagan's perspective, America had forgotten what made it great. He set out to restore moral clarity and win the Cold War, rather than endure it. "The Great Communicator" ratcheted up the ideological rhetoric by describing the Soviet Union as "an evil empire." *

The decay of the Soviet experiment should come as no surprise to us. While we must be cautious about forcing the pace of change, we must not hesitate to declare our ultimate objectives and to take concrete actions to move toward them. We must be staunch in our conviction that freedom is not the sole prerogative of a lucky few but the inalienable and universal right of all human beings. It is time that we committed ourselves as a nation—in both the public and private sectors—to assisting democratic development .... What I am describing now is a plan and a hope for the long term—the march of freedom and democracy which will leave Marxism-Leninism on the ash heap of history as it has left other tyrannies which stifle the freedom and muzzle the self expression of the people.94

Most of Reagan's actions were talk, but he also committed the United States to the largest peacetime military buildup in its history, with the aim of winning the Cold War.95

Ronald Reagan, President of the United States, in a speech to the House of Commons, June 8, 1982, http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/1982reaganl.html (accessed 27 Jun 08). 95 Beth A. Fischer, The Reagan Reversal: Foreign Policy and the End of the Cold War (Columbia, MO.: University of Missouri Press, 1997), p. 26. 126

The actions of his administration, combined with those of every administration since Truman, and the aid of America's allies over decades, put more stress on the USSR than it could bear. The foe collapsed and the Cold War ended in a sudden and spectacular fashion. For forty-five years, the two sides had wrestled for global leadership, with the specter of nuclear conflagration tempering their behavior. Each side attempted to expand its power, often in ways that contradicted its principles, though Machiavellian behavior always was interpreted to support the guiding ideology. Poor economic management and a political system rife with internal contradictions undid the Soviet system. By 1989 the death spiral of the Communist experiment was irreversible. Numerous failed attempts at reform, a broken economy, and a war in Afghanistan, produced enormous discontent inside the Soviet Union and throughout its empire. Political and social freedoms, without economic prosperity, led to open criticism of the Moscow regime. Mikhail Gorbachev's efforts to re-energize and streamline the Communist system produced a cascade of unintended consequences. Countries across Eastern Europe shrugged off the yoke of * Communism in rapid succession. Two years later, the Soviet Union imploded. The Cold War was over. It was lost by the USSR, rather than won by the United States, and the true architect of American success was Eisenhower, rather than Reagan. When Moscow capitulated, due to gross ineptitude, the internal contradictions of the Soviet system, and the courage of dissidents who dared to challenge Soviet authority,9 the main constraint on the unimpeded exercise of American power dissolved. A chance to remake the world in its own image presented itself to the United States. One might have expected America's historical bias toward isolation to check any tendency toward adventurism in this context. Instead, these events tested the new tradition of U.S. strategy, and produced new responses. As one hostile critic put it,

At the end of the Cold War, Americans said 'yes' to military power. Indeed, ever since Vietnam, Americans have evinced a deepening infatuation with armed force, soldiers, and military values. ... The ensuing affair has had a heedless, Gatsby-like aspect, a passion pursued in utter

Robert Strayer, Why Did the Soviet Union Collapse? Understanding Historical Change (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1998). 127

disregard of any likely consequences. Few in power have openly considered whether valuing military power for its own sake or cultivating permanent global military superiority might be at odds with American principles.

Though the United States took a "peace dividend" at the end of the Cold War, it did so far less than any other major country. Its military forces remained mobilized so to ensure a stable transition from a bipolar world to a "New World Order, " led by the United States. Russian military spending and power collapsed as did that of its old satellite states. Developing states were too puny to matter in terms of conventional power. Seeing an opportunity to share burdens, American statesmen and strategists encouraged European countries to expand their strategic role beyond self-defense. Instead, they opted for a large "peace dividend."

Since the Berlin Wall fell, European countries have cut defense budgets by more than 16 percent, to an average below 2 percent of GDP. European major equipment procurement budgets have dropped by 18 percent since 1996, compared with an 8 percent decrease in the United States over the same period. The United States spends more than four times the European total on defence research and development. US spending per active duty service member is almost four times that of Europe's. The list goes on and on. The result of this spending shortfall is clear. Europe, as a whole, is investing significantly less than the United States in the meaningful and substantive defense reform necessary to retool for modern requirements. Where it invests, it gets less return, in terms of capabilities. And European defense industrial development has been hampered by restrictions on industrial cooperation, both no within Europe and on a transatlantic level.

97 Andrew J. Bacevich, "The Real World War IV," The Wilson Quarterly, Vol. 29, Issue 1 (Winter 2005), http://facultv.maxwell.svr.edu/merupert/BACEVICH%20The%20Real%20World%20Waro/o20IV.pdf (accessed 15 Jun08). 98 James Appathurai, "Capabilities, capabilities, capabilities," NATO Review, Autumn 2002, http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2002/issue3/english/art 1 .html (accessed 12 Jun 08). 128

The United States became a "hyperpower,"99 without a peer, or any great threat, or even any need for allies, because of its actions and those of all other countries.

George H. W. Bush By 1991, with the demise of the Soviet Union, the world stood ready to be transformed and the United States was more powerful than any state ever had been. Even before the final nail was hammered into the Soviet coffin, the stage was being set for an American sweep. James Baker, the U.S. Secretary of State, speaking to an audience in Berlin, enthusiastically declared that the United States should help promote common universal values everywhere. In order to do that, "new thinking"100 was required.

The old political and economic structures have broken down .... [WJe can serve as a catalyst for political and economic reform. ... we must be idealists and realists, setting a goal, and then adapting our successful, workable trans-Atlantic architecture to meet the new challenges of a post-Cold War era.W1

But as Lord Palmerston once said, "there are no permanent allies ... only permanent interests." 2 Many observers envisioned a democratic peace and a multilateral system, whereby the conflict-riddled past would be supplanted by greater collective decision-making under American leadership. In some ways, it was the Wilsonian vision resurrected. The world was seized by a sense of hope. Armageddon had been avoided; freedom had bested authoritarianism. Western values of freedom and democracy seemed to be on the march

99 Hubert Vedrine, French Foreign Minister, as quoted in "To Paris, U.S. Looks Like a 'Hyperpower'," International Herald Tribune, 5 Feb 99, http://www.iht.eom/articles/1999/02/05/france.t O.php (accessed 7 Jul 08). 100 James Baker, U.S. Secretary of State, "The Euro-Atlantic architecture: from West to East," a speech given in Berlin, 24 Jun 91, http://findarticles.eom/p/articles/mi ml584/is n25 v2/ai 11218409/print?tag=artBody;coll (accessed 28 Jun 08). 101 Ibid. 102 Lord Palmerston, the 19th century British Foreign Secretary, as quoted by Raj an Menon, "New Order: The End of Alliances," Council on Foreign Relations, 2 Mar 03, http://www.cfr.org/publication.html?id=5639 (accessed 2 Apr 08). 129

across the globe. The framework for effecting this transformation, however, remained ill-defined and unclear. The United States was instrumental in forming the United Nations (UN) and had been committed to it since its inception. But during the Reagan years, hostility towards the UN grew. Reagan Administration officials saw the organization as being dominated by Third World countries, bloated, inefficient, corrupt, and anti-American.103 Antipathy towards the UN continued under Reagan's successor, but was more muted. However, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait appeared to trigger a change of heart. Bush was quick to enlist the UN's support to mandate action against Iraq. His Wilsonian-like call for a "new world order," predicated on collective security to meet the challenges of aggression, led many to believe that the Reagan Administration's disenchantment with the UN was an anomaly. However, shortly after the lopsided victory in the Gulf War, the White House quietly reduced its language about a new world order, not wanting to heighten expectations about an enhanced role for the UN.104 This atmosphere of possibility also brought challenges to multilateralism which began * to enter the mainstream. Groups of intellectuals, following an age-old American tradition of overemphasizing its contribution to wars won by joint efforts, and its moral superiority, began to argue that the United States should make the world good through unilateralism, power and hegemony. By 1986, Irving Kristol argued that the United States should embrace unilateralism, but admitted that would be difficult so long as America remained an imperial power without realizing the fact.105 Kristol felt that such a realization would help to shape a new self-definition, and prepare Americans to accept a policy of global unilateralism.106 In late 1989, Charles Krauthammer wrote a piece titled Universal Dominion, which championed a new outcome—a unipolar world.107 Unipolarity would require "unashamedly laying down the rules of world order and being

103 Richard Falk and David Krieger, "Subverting the UN," The Nation, 17 Oct 02, http://www.thenation.com/doc/2Q021104/falk (accessed 5 Jul 08). 104 Falk, "Subverting the UN." 105 Irving Kristol, Wall Street Journal, 3 Mar 86; quoted in Gary Dorrien, The Neo-Conservative Mind: Politics, Culture, and the War of Ideology (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1993), p. 117. 106 David Ray Griffin, "Neocon Imperialism, 9/11, and the Attacks on Afghanistan and Iraq," 911Truth.org, 27 Feb 07, http://www.globalresearch.ca/PrintArticle.php?articleId=4961 (accessed 29 Jun 08). 107 Charles Krauthammer, "Universal Dominion: Toward a Unipolar World," National Interest (Winter 1989), p. 47-49. 130 prepared to enforce them. " "We Americans should like [unipolarity]—and exploit it. "109 Rather than treating the end of the Cold War as an opportunity to lay down some of the United States' burdens, and its power, accepting a smaller role in world affairs and reductions in the military, several intellectuals and political appointees, most notably Undersecretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, quietly advocated that the United States play an even larger role on earth. They saw America's power as offering a historic opportunity to remake the world through the spread of democracy and human rights. The American vision had not only survived the challenge posed by Communism—a competing universalistic ideology—but beaten it. The United States must seize the chance and its power to establish a "New World Order" and make hostile regimes accept it. Such developments, of course, would require continued American dominance around the globe, even though the Soviet menace was gone. The most ardent architects of this policy, a small, but growing constituency, known as the "neocons," or neo-conservatives, were influential in the first Bush Administration, though they would take center stage only with the election of his son, George W. Bush, in 2000. * Neighborly pronouncements calling for a trans-Atlantic effort to remold the world in the Western liberal tradition were paralleled by theorizing inside and outside the Pentagon about the role of American power after the Cold War. Prevent the Re- Emergence of a New Rival was a classified document, better known by its more drab official title, Defense Planning Guidance or "DPG." That document envisioned the United States having the "pre-eminent responsibility" for tackling "those wrongs which threaten not only our interests, but those of our allies or friends, or which could seriously unsettle international relations. " The DPG was "a blueprint for permanent American global hegemony. " u It confidently expected that American world dominance would facilitate the spread of democracy and open markets. To that end, "America's political

Charles Krauthammer, "The Unipolar Moment," Foreign Affairs (Winter 1990). 109 Charles Krauthammer, "Bless Our Pax Americana," Washington Post, 22 Mar 91. 110 Patrick E. Taylor, "U.S. Strategy Plan Calls for Insuring No Rivals Develop: A One-Superpower World: Pentagon's Document Outlines Ways to Thwart Challenges to Primacy of America," New York Times, 8 Mar 92, http://work.colum.edu/~amiller/wolfowitzl992.htm (accessed 29 Jun 08). 111 Andrew J. Bacevich, American Empire: The Realities and Consequences of U.S. Diplomacy (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002), p. 44. 131 and military mission in the post-cold-war era will be to ensure that no rival superpower

7/9 is allowed to emerge

[The challenge will be] convincing potential competitors that they need not aspire to a greater role or pursue a more aggressive posture to protect their legitimate interests. ... [The United States] must sufficiently account for the interests of the advanced industrial nations to discourage them from challenging our leadership or seeking to overturn the established political and economic order ... the world order is ultimately backed by the U.S. ... the United States should be postured to act independently when collective action cannot be orchestrated.

The United States should stay top dog forever, block the rise of competitors, and re-shape the world to its own liking. When the then Secretary of Defense, now Vice-President, Cheney read the document he was pleased, telling its chief author, Zalmay Khalilzad, "you've discovered a new rationale for our role in the world. " The document bore the unmistakable imprint of Wolfowitz and other neo- conservatives, including I. Lewis Libby, Khalilzad, Richard Perle, Albert Wohlstetter, and Andrew Marshall, head of the Pentagon's Office of Net Assessment. When the 46- page document was leaked in March 1992, possibly by an individual concerned about its goals, to the New York Times and the Washington Post, it elicited a negative reaction in most corners. Senator Robert Byrd complained that the document said "We love being the sole remaining superpower in the world and we want so much to remain that way that we are willing to put at risk the basic health of our economy and well-being of our people to do so. "U5 The leak caused embarrassment for the President and necessitated a swift and public White House retraction.116 Here was evidence that KristoPs new American

112 Taylor, "U.S. Strategy Plan Calls for Insuring No Rivals Develop." 113 Excerpts from Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) for the Fiscal Years 1994-1999 draft dated 18 Feb 92. 114 Zalmay Khalilzad, as quoted in Mitchell Plitnick and Chris Toensing, '"The Israel Lobby' in Perspective," Middle East Report, 243, http://www.merip.org/mer/mer243/plitnick_toensing.html (accessed 29 Jun 08). 115 Senator Robert Byrd, as quoted in Barton Gellman, "Keeping the U.S. First: Pentagon Would Preclude a Rival Superpower," Washington Post, 11 Mar 92. ii6" j992 Draft Defense Planning Guidance," Political Research Associates, 13 Mar 08, http://rightweb.irc- online.org/profile/1571 .html (accessed 29 Jun 08). 132

self-definition did not yet exist; most of its citizens were uncomfortable with the notion of unilateralism. But even as Bush distanced himself from the offending document, portraying it, in Bacevich's words, "as the musings of an insignificant lower-tier appointee acting without official sanction, "117 others praised it. The document did not die; it lived on in the shadows among neo-conservative think tanks and advocacy groups until another Bush occupied 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue and a trigger set it in motion. After the end of the initial euphoria surrounding the end of the Cold War, realism reasserted its influence on Washington. Instead of pursuing a dynamic policy to parallel the dramatic geopolitical changes afoot, the Bush Administration, despite the rhetoric touting a "New World Order," adopted a cautious wait-and-see approach that amounted to shaping structures and changes rather than trying to guide them. Some have argued that a precious opportunity was lost at this juncture, but given the murky and complex circumstances, the Bush Administration's approach was understandable. While the United States appeared to have free reign to pursue whatever direction it wanted, the situation was more complex. Certainly, the end of bipolarity gave greater freedom of* action to the United States, as evidenced by the unfettered deployment of a huge American-led coalition to uphold the territorial integrity of Kuwait. Having routed Saddam Hussein's forces, but with Saddam still in power, America entered a long stay in the Persian Gulf, where it had a massive quick-reaction force available to—among other things—secure the free flow of oil, and a messy commitment on the other hand. Removal of the yoke of the Cold War unleashed decades of pent up hostilities in numerous regions around the globe. Ethnic, religious, and political conflicts began to erupt, as various groups staked out positions that conflicted with those of others. Moreover, the generally bipartisan approach to strategy which had functioned in the United States during the Cold War broke down, from both sides at once.

Clinton

Bacevich, American Empire: The Realities and Consequences of U.S. Diplomacy, p. 45. 133

The Clinton campaign of 1992 promised to focus "like a laser beam " on domestic issues, which was George H.W. Bush's weak spot and became the Democrats' advantage. When foreign policy was debated between the candidates, Clinton appeared to prefer an approach which one of his Secretaries of State, Madeline Albright, later called "assertive multilateralism. "U9 As the first President elected after the Cold War, many assumed that his administration would embark on a new direction in international relations. Clinton began his presidency with the same attitude as Woodrow Wilson, who in 1913 said "it would be an irony of fate if my administration had to deal chiefly with foreign affairs. " Despite his declared intention to focus on domestic renewal, Clinton was drawn into the vortex of foreign affairs, because of the impact of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the rise of China. As Martin Fletcher wrote, "no President since Harry Truman had assumed office with the world so unstable. "ni Yet Clinton's domestic agenda defined his approach to foreign policy. Clinton worried that he would spend too much of his time on foreign policy issues; hence, he was reluctant to get involved in them at all. Without an overarching vision, policy and decision-making tended to drift. A * memo written in October 1993, nine months into the administration, demonstrates this inattention to foreign affairs. His senior national security advisors "urged the president to give them one hour a week for the discussion of foreign affairs" to which he agreed, with the qualifier "when possible. " He indicated that all issues would be assessed by their impact on his domestic renewal plan—that is, internal issues would define external policy. Thus, the Clinton Administration adopted a reactive approach to foreign policy, precisely as the world became more fluid and complex. This caused confusion regarding the nature of American national security interests. Clinton came to Washington with no defined plan for foreign policy. To underscore that fact, Warren Christopher, his first

118 Charles-Philippe David, '"Foreign Policy Is Not What I Came Here to Do': Dissecting Clinton's Foreign Policy-Making: A First Cut," Center for United States Studies of the Raoul Dandurand Chair of Strategic and Diplomatic Studies, Occasional Paper 1, 26-28 Jun 03, http://www.dandurand.uqamxa/download/pd^articles/foreign policy firstcut.pdf (accessed 3 Jul 08). 119 Madeline Albright, as quoted in Brian Urquhart, "Looking for the Sheriff," Global Policy Forum, 16 Jul 98, http://www.globalpolicy.org/reform/sheriff.htm (accessed 3 Jul 08). 120 Woodrow Wilson, as quoted in David, "Foreign Policy Is Not What I Came Here to Do," p. 4. 121 Martin Fletcher, "World Disorder Undermines the Domestic Agenda," Times (London), 16 Jan 93, p. 10. 122 Robert Lieber, ed., Eagle Adrift: American Foreign Policy at the End of the Century (New York: Longman, 1997), p. 13. 134

Secretary of State, declared "I will not attempt to fit the foreign policy of the next four years into the straightjacket of some neatly tailored doctrine. " The statement foreshadowed an administration that stumbled, in ad-hoc fashion, from one crisis to another with little strategic direction during its first term. To some, Clinton was Warren G. Harding revisited, adopting a "laissez-faire" posture in foreign affairs.1 Richard Haass wrote that the administration's rudderless foreign policy engaged "the full range of both means and ends, " which he did not entirely mean as a compliment. Spates of internationalism, minimalism, Wilsonianism, "economism," realism and humanitarianism coalesced with tension between the preferred multilateralist strategy and occasional unilateralist impulses: "multilateralism when we can, unilateralist when we must" seemed to be the guiding principle. In fairness, this approach was shaped by the reluctance of other powers to take on the responsibility to handle major crises. Like the administrations that preceded it, Clinton's foreign policy was a work in progress that slowly underwent a "conversion from idealism to trial and 177 error.' Eventually, Clinton realized that foreign affairs could no longer be a neglected stepchild and might allow easier success than in the increasingly fraught area of domestic policy. He took an active role in this arena, eliciting praise from realist critics like Stephen Walt, who wrote that Clinton "does not deserve the chorus of criticism he has received." Even so, his record was mixed at best and lacked a consistent theme. Rebutting Walt, Haass argued "[Clinton] gave the American people the foreign policy that polls suggested they wanted. "129 Haass pointed to an insidious trend within presidential politics, which originated during the Nixon years, and grew influential over time. Administrations have become hostages to the "permanent campaign," which entails

Warren Christopher, U.S. Secretary of State, "Statement at Senate confirmation hearing," U.S. Department of State Dispatch, 25 Jan 93. 124 David, "Foreign Policy Is Not What I Came Here to Do," p. 5. 125 Richard Haass, "Paradigm Lost," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 74 (Jan-Feb 95), p. 52. 126 David, "Foreign Policy Is Not What I Came Here to Do," p. 6. 127 William Hyland, Clinton's World: Remaking American Foreign Policy (Westport: Praeger Publishers, 1999), p. 197. 128 Stephen Walt, "Two Cheers for Clinton's Foreign Policy," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 79 (Mar-Apr 2000), p. 63. 129 Richard Haass, "The Squandered Presidency," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 79 (May-Jun 2000), p. 140. 135

the addition of 'outreach' offices designed to buttress the president's popular support, the expansion of the president's advisory network to include professional political consultants and pollsters, and the use of campaign-like tactics to govern. ... The permanent campaign mentality not only has affected individual presidents, but also has had an enduring effect on the institution of the presidency ... manifest[ing] itself in day- to-day White House operations.130

Two factors shaped the presidency of permanent campaign which underlay Clinton's foreign policy. First, the public apathy towards international affairs gave partisan interest groups considerable influence, making foreign policy a political football. Second, Clinton's focus on domestic issues, coupled with surging disdain for foreign affairs in Congress, especially after the 1994 Congressional elections gave the Republicans a majority, forced him to juggle priorities so to ensure that he emerged on top of political battles more often than Congress did. As a result, "domestic constraints were accommodated to an extent unmatched by previous presidents, leading to contradictory * conduct that can only be explained by the influence of domestic priorities. " Moreover, Clinton's managerial style was to let his senior operatives work out solutions to problems, with little involvement by himself, while no cabinet appointee could dominate politics and fashion a coherent strategy. This produced what Preston called "paralysis by analysis. "132 From the outset, Clinton sought to work through multilateral means and the UN, so that he could focus on domestic issues. However, this policy preference soon encountered problems. The debacle in October 1993 in Mogadishu, Somalia, causing the death of eighteen American soldiers, affected the Clinton Administration in many ways. The experience soured Washington on collaboration with the UN. The United States soon withdrew American forces, effectively ending the UN mission, leaving Somalia in the hands of warlords. This humiliation proved fertile ground for groups such as Al-

Norman J. Ornstein and Thomas E. Mann, eds., The Permanent Campaign and Its Future (Washington: AEI Press, 2000), p. 108-9; also see Stanley Renshon, High Hopes: The Clinton Presidency and the Politics of Ambition (New York: New York University Press, 1996), p. 272. 131 David, "Foreign Policy Is Not What I Came Here to Do," p. 11. 132 Thomas Preston, The President and his Inner Circle: Leadership Style and the Advisory Process in Foreign Affairs (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001), p. 219-250. 136

Qaeda, and convinced many members of Clinton's inner circle that in the future, American military intervention should be limited largely to air power, to avoid losses in far-flung areas of which the American people knew nothing. That lesson, in turn, shaped American involvement in the Balkans and Rwanda, and the way tragedy unfolded in these countries. Ironically, the president who entered office declaring he wanted to see a greater role for the UN and multilateralism, contributed to their weakening. In April 1994, after American forces left Somalia, Clinton issued a policy directive that sharply curtailed American involvement in armed humanitarian interventions. Meanwhile, the Republican-led Congress continually restricted U.S. contributions to UN peacekeeping efforts, because of their hostility to that institution.133 The Somalia debacle reflected the many forces at work in the formation and execution of American strategy after the Cold War. The decision to intervene in Somalia was made by H. W. Bush. No material or strategic interests were at stake. The intervention was motivated, in part, by idealism, both on the part of the administration and the people. Therein lies the problem, according to Glanville: "... in the absence of* complementary material interests, a commitment to ideational concerns can prove to be unsustainable when human and economic costs begin to rise ...." 134 Beyond this, "television had a great deal to do with President Bush's decision to go in. ... the television pictures of [those] starving kids (and) substantial pressures from the Congress that came from the same source " 35 created a compelling reason to intervene, according to Lawrence Eagleburger, Acting Secretary of State at the time. Another factor likely was at play: his presidential legacy. Trumping those motivators was the assessment that the risks and costs of deploying American forces were low when compared to other hot spots, like Bosnia, where Bush opted not to send troops, even though the strategic 137 interest was greater.

133 Walter Clarke and Jeffrey Herbst, "Somalia and the Future of Humanitarian Intervention," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 75, No. 2 (Mar/Apr 96). 13 Luke Glanville, "Somalia Reconsidered: An Examination of the Norm of Humanitarian Intervention," The Journal of Humanitarian Assistance, 1 Sep 05, p. 2, http://www.iha.ac/articles/al78.pdf (accessed 5 Jul 08). 135 Lawrence Eagleburger, Acting Secretary of State, as quoted in Nicholas J. Wheeler, Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 180. 136 Glanville, "Somalia Reconsidered," p. 5. 137 Don Oberdorfer, "The Path to Intervention: A Massive Tragedy 'We Could Do Something About,'" Washington Post, 6 Dec 92, p. Al; see also Wheeler, Saving Strangers, p. 181. 137

From 1984 until 1993, the use of American force had been guided by the Weinberger Doctrine, which outlined thresholds to be met before committing troops to a combat no operation. That doctrine was sparked by a failed peacekeeping mission in Lebanon that ended after 241 Marines were killed in the bombing of a Beirut barracks. On the eve of Clinton taking power, General Colin Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, reiterated the importance of the Weinberger Doctrine and amended it further, by warning against the use of limited or incremental applications of military force; instead, overwhelming force was required to achieve quick, decisive victories. The Clinton and Bush Administrations both violated this codicil, by sending small forces to Somalia and denying repeated requests for greater firepower.140 Polls conducted at the time indicated that Bush had made a popular decision. 81 percent of respondents agreed that the United States was doing the right thing by intervening in Somalia. 70 percent thought the mission was worth the loss of American lives.1 Under the Clinton Administration, however, as casualties began to mount, so did opposition to the operation from both parties. Democratic Senator Robert Byrd, writing * in the New York Times, argued that "lacking congressional and popular support, US combat forces in Somalia should be removed as soon as possible. "I4 Republicans felt that "assertive multilateralism" was akin to "a vision of foreign policy from which national self-interest is purged. "143 The Clinton White House tried to deflect the bipartisan barrage by attacking the UN, accusing it of "mission creep" at the expense of

Casper W. Weinburger, "The Uses of Military Power," Address to the National Press Club, Washington, DC, 28 Nov 84. 139 Colin Powell, "US Forces: Challenges Ahead," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 71, No. 5 (Winter 1992/93), p. 32- 45. 140 See General Thomas Montgomery (Ret), "Ambush in Mogadishu," Frontline/PBS interview, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/ambush/interviews/montgomery.html (accessed 5 Jul 08) and Mark Bowden, Black Hawk Down: A Story of Modern War (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1999). So too, the George W. Bush Administration violated the doctrine in the context of the post-combat operations phase of Iraqi Freedom; see Eric Schmitt, "Pentagon Contradicts General on Iraq Occupation Force's Size," Global Policy Forum, 28 Feb 03, http://www.globalpolicv.org/securitv/issues/iraq/attack/consequences/2003/0228pentagoncontra.htm (accessed 5 Jul 08). 141 William Durch, "Introduction to Anarchy: Humanitarian Intervention and 'State Building'" in William Durch, ed., UN Peacekeeping, American Policy, and the Uncivil Wars of the 1990s (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996), p. 320. 142 Robert C. Byrd, "The Perils of Peacekeeping," New York Times, 19 Aug 93, p. A23. 143 Jeane Kirkpatrick, former U.S. Ambassador to the UN, as quoted in Glanville, "Somalia Reconsidered," p. 11. 138

American lives. But after a disastrous raid on October 3, 1993, after which graphic images of the body of a dead, mutilated American soldier (one of eighteen killed that day, along with anywhere from 500-1000 Somalis) dragged in the dirt by an angry mob were broadcast around the globe, public and official support for the mission evaporated. Senator Byrd called once again for withdrawal: "Americans by the dozen are paying with their lives and limbs for a misplaced policy on the alter of some fuzzy multilateralism. "144 Within days, Clinton bowed to congressional and public pressure by promising to bring the troops home within six months.145 When American casualties reached double digits, the realization that the United States had no vital interests at stake trounced any commitment to humanitarian norms. This instance was noted in Baghdad and Beijing and shaped Saddam Hussein's belief in 2002-03 that the United States would not attack Iraq. This episode does not imply that the American public is fickle, but it does demonstrate the lack of patience with the loss of American lives and treasure for the sake of peripheral, as opposed to core, American interests.146 Pragmatism trumps ideology * when the costs are brought home in a poignant way. Casualty aversion did not kill American participation in Somalia. Support already had vanished before the Black Hawks went down. The casualties simply buried a poorly-planned, poorly-supported intervention. This reality has implications for the evolving contest between Washington and Beijing. The American public will support a firm response to clear threats to the United States, but not to less obvious dangers. Unless major interests are at stake, the American public is casualty-averse. Recognition, and exaggeration, of this fact has infected the

Ivo H. Daalder, "Knowing When to Say No: The Development of US Policy for Peacekeeping," in William Durch, ed., UN Peacekeeping, American Policy, and the Uncivil Wars of the 1990s (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996), p. 56. 145 Bill Clinton, President of the United States, "THE SOMALIA MISSION; Clinton's Words on Somalia: 'The Responsibilities of American Leadership'" New York Times, 8 Oct 93, http://querv.nvtimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9F0CE0DA 153 AF93BA35753C1 A965958260&sec=&spo n=&pagewanted= 1 (accessed 5 Jul 08). 146 Bruce W. Jentleson, "The Pretty Prudent Public: Post-Vietnam American Opinion on the Use of Military Force," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 36, No. 1 (Mar 1992), p. 49-73; Bruce W. Jentleson and Rebecca L. Britton, "Still Pretty Prudent: Post-Cold War American Public Opinion on the Use of Military Force," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 42, No. 4 (Aug 1998), p. 395-417; Mark J. Conversino, "Sawdust Superpower: Perceptions of U.S. Casualty Tolerance in the Post-Gulf War Era," Strategic Review, Vol. 25, No. 1 (Winter 1997), p. 15-23; Steven Kull and I. M. Destler, Misreading the Public: The Myth of a New Isolationism (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 1999). 139

thinking of many American policy makers and military leaders, hindering their willingness to use force, and limiting military options in support of coercive diplomacy and national strategy.147 While Nathan's assertion that policy elites have surrendered to the Weinburger and Powell Doctrines, thus giving the military a veto over policy options short of the threshold of "vital interests," is an overstatement, he correctly notes that these attitudes weaken many forms of diplomacy. An unwillingness to use "a big stick" undermines deterrence and emboldens adversaries. Many Chinese strategists already believe that a casualty-averse attitude defines American strategy, which they see as a weak link in American fortitude during any future conflict. Confronting disarray in Bosnia, Somalia, and Rwanda, the Clinton Administration divided over foreign policy. One side pushed for a strategy aimed to expand the realm of democracy and free markets along with more traditional geopolitical interests, as a replacement for the Cold War strategy of containment. The other side espoused engagement, with emphasis on key geographic regions. A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement attempted to reconcile these differing positions while * reflecting Clinton's priorities.

For America to be strong abroad it must be strong economically at home; at the same time, domestic economic renewal depends on the growth and integration of the global economy. ... The best way to advance America's interests worldwide is to enlarge the community of democracies and free markets throughout the world. ... Democratic states are less likely to threaten our interests. ... There may be times when it is in our interests to place US troops under the temporary control of a competent UN or allied commander. However, under no circumstances

Charles K. Hyde, "Casualty Aversion: Implications for Policy Makers and Senior Military Officers," Aerospace Power Journal (Summer 2000), http://findarticles.eom/p/articles/mi mOICK/is 214/ai 68507700/print?tag=artBody;coll (accessed 5 Jul 08). 148 James Nathan, "The Rise and Decline of Coercive Statecraft," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings (Oct 95), p. 64. 149 Anthony Lake, National Security Advisor, "From Containment to Enlargement," a speech delivered at Johns Hopkins University, 21 Sep 93, http://www.mtholvoke.edu/acad/intrel/lakedochtml (accessed 3 Jul 08). 140

will the President ever relinquish his command authority over US forces.150

In Clinton's second term, the foreign policy decision-making system would function better and register greater successes, mainly because he took a more active role in the process. But for many outside the White House, the Clinton foreign policy agenda remained weak, directionless and naive. Neo-conservatives liked talk of spreading democracy and free markets, but not of multilateralism and close association with the UN. John Bolton, a staunch neo-conservative and future Bush-appointed U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, once said "There is no such thing as the United Nations ... If the U.N. Secretariat Building in New York lost 10 stories, it wouldn 't make a bit of difference." He added "It's a big mistake for us to grant any validity to international law even when it may seem in our short-term interest to do so—because, over the long-term, the goal of those who think that international law really means anything are those who want to constrain the United States. "15 Other critics claimed that the decision to decouple China's Most Favored Nation (MFN) status from its record on human rights, reflected the real motivation behind Clinton's policy: finance. This policy shift, like others, demonstrated Clinton's change from idealist to pragmatist. Where Woodrow Wilson strove to make the world safe for democracy, Clinton aimed to make it safe for capitalism. While Clinton, at the end of his administration, could claim several laudable accomplishments (an end to deficit spending, budgetary surpluses, reduced unemployment, curbed inflation, the greatest sustained period of economic growth in modern American history,153 NATO expansion, the Irish peace accord, and the prevention of widespread nuclear proliferation resulting from the collapse of the Soviet empire) he could not further the cause of multilateralism, nor establish a clear-cut strategy for the United States. Of course, such a crystallization of purpose also would

150 Bill Clinton, President of the United States, "Advancing Our Interests Through Engagement and Enlargement," in Alvin Z. Rubenstein, Albina Shayevich and Boris Zlotnikov, eds., The Clinton Foreign Policy Reader: Presidential Speeches with Commentary (New York: M.E. Sharpe Inc., 2000), p. 28-35. 151 John Bolton, as quoted in Samantha Power, "Boltonism," The New Yorker, 21 Mar 05, http://www.newvorker.com/archive/2005/03/21/050321ta talkpower (accessed 29 Jun 08). 152 James D. Boys, "Two Years In The White House: The Presidency of Bill Clinton & U.S. Foreign Policy, 1993 & 1994," 49th Parallel, An Interdisciplinary Journal of North American Studies, http://www.49thparallel.bham.ac.uk/back/issue9/bovs.htm (accessed 3 Jul 08). 153 Rubenstein, et al, The Clinton Foreign Policy Reader, p. 4. 141 elude the second Bush, until Muslim extremists turned civilian airliners into cruise missiles and attacked a nation still trying to find its footing in a world after the Cold War.

George W. Bush During the 2000 election campaign, George W. Bush sounded like an isolationist. He openly questioned the idea that America could and should try to fix all problems in the global community, implying that such thinking displayed hubris and would stir anti- American sentiment. After September 11, 2001, his approach changed. Undoubtedly, much of this change stemmed from being attacked, but beyond pragmatic changes necessitated by self-defense, his rhetoric "began to take on a neo-Jacobin coloring. "154 A Wilsonian tone emerged in his speeches. President Bush spoke of America's unique mission in the world. He equated the attack on the United States with one on freedom itself. This defense of metaphysical values became linked to grand strategy. A year after the attack, the White House released its annual publication, the National Security Strategy of the United States.155 Normally, this document changes little from * year to year. In 2002, however, its pages outlined a new and ambitious role for the United States in world affairs. The document largely abandoned the concept of deterrence, the dominant approach during the Cold War. It formally introduced the concept of preemptive strikes to deal with potential threats, such as the proliferation of WMDs. Finally, it justified American hegemony and advanced the proposition that "the United States should do everything to maintain its status as the only superpower by maintaining a military capability ... so far ahead of potential rivals that those states would not seek to compete. " The Bush presidency, through its repudiation of multilateralism, its hostility towards existing arms control treaties, global environmental protocols, and the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court, became more hostile to the UN than any before. The President's close affiliation with Evangelicals, often referred to as the "religious right," coupled with his personal convictions, lent a tone of crusade to these changes in policy.

154 Ryn, "The Ideology of American Empire," p. 392. 155 The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, Sep 2002), http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdfCaccessed 28 Jun 08). 156 "National Security Strategy Report—September 2002," GlobalSecurity.org, http://www.globalsecuritv.org/militarv/library/policv/national/nss-020920.htm (accessed 28 Jun 08). 142

In a sharp detour from "mainstream ... Christianity, which has made a distinction between the things of God and the things of Caesar, this form of religion identifies a particular political power, America, with God's will, " making American foreign policy "less humble and more belligerent. " 7 In November 2004, George W. Bush was re-elected to a second term as the 43rd President of the United States, after eighteen months of war in Iraq with no end in sight, and with budget deficits spiraling out of control. His policies had been portrayed as militaristic, expansionist, and unilateralist by a flurry of politicians, journalists, policy experts, and disenchanted and angry people across the globe. Still a majority of the American people opted to give him another four years at the helm of foreign policy. The question is, why? Many commentators suggest that this support occurred precisely because the Bush Doctrine, which pursues political transformation around the globe so to support freedom, through aggressive and unilateral actions, was more closely aligned to traditional American values than some critics cared to believe. Thus, Thomas Donnelly denies that the Bush Administration is an anomoly in United States foreign policy. He * believes that the Bush Doctrine parallels the American experience more closely than its critics acknowledge. "If asked of empire ... the American Founders would not have hesitated to embrace the word, " he argues.158 The United States may not always have had the means to act on its vision, but the concept was there from the start.

Although typically ill-regarded for its attempts at diplomacy, the Bush administration has managed ... to bring about one of the most striking rapprochements in foreign policy memory: that of conventional conservatives and doctrinaire liberals, both of which groups have been vociferous in their condemnation of the war in Iraq. 5

Ryn, "The Ideology of American Empire," p. 396. 158 Thomas Donnelly, "Empire of Liberty: The Historical Underpinnings of the Bush Doctrine," American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 24 Jun 05, http://www.aei.org/include/pub print.asp?pubID=22756 (accessed 7 Jul 08). 159 Ibid. 143

Much evidence supports his view. Maslowski concurs that "... the Founding Fathers ... envisioned the United States as a great territorial and commercial empire." Alexander Hamilton, in the Federalist Papers, wrote that the America was "an empire in many respects the most interesting in the world, "161 and "Hercules in a cradle."'62 In the 1830s, de Tocqueville prophesized that the United States "... seems marked out by

7/C2 the will of Heaven to sway the destinies of half the globe. " Theodore Roosevelt captured the recurrent theme of American destiny in 1899, when he outlined the proper course for American policy, using words that would serve as a prelude to his Presidency a short time later.

As it is with the individual, so it is with the nation. It is a base untruth to say that happy is the nation that has no history. Thrice happy is the nation that has a glorious history. Far better it is to dare mighty things, to win glorious triumphs, even though checkered by failure, than to take rank with those poor spirits who neither enjoy much nor suffer much, because they live in the gray twilight that knows not victory nor defeat.

We of this generation do not have to face a task such as that our fathers faced, but we have our tasks, and woe to us if we fail to perform them! We cannot, if we would, play the part of China, and be content to rot by inches in ignoble ease within our borders, taking no interest in what goes on beyond them, sunk in a scrambling commercialism; heedless of the higher life, the life of aspiration, of toil and risk, busying ourselves only with the wants of our bodies for the day, until suddenly we should find, beyond a shadow of question, what China has already found, that in this world the nation that has trained itself to a career ofunwarlike and isolated ease is bound, in the end, to go down before other nations which have not lost the manly and adventurous qualities. If we are to be a really great people, we must strive in good

160 Maslowski, "To the edge of greatness: The United States, 1783-1865," in The Making of Strategy: Rulers, States, and War, p. 205. 161 Alexander Hamilton, "FEDERALIST No. 1: General Introduction," Founding Fathers, info, http://www.foundingfathers.info/federalistpapers/ (accessed 6 Jun 08). 162 Alexander Hamilton, as quoted in John L. Harper, "Mentor for a Hegemon—-Alexander Hamilton," The National Interest, Fall 2000, http://findarticles.eom/p/articles/mi m2751/is 2000 Fall/ai_65576872/print (6 Jun 08). 163 de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, p. 343. faith to play a great part in the world. We cannot avoid meeting great issues. All that we can determine for ourselves is whether we shall meet them well or ill.

We cannot sit huddled within our own borders and avow ourselves merely an assemblage of well-to-do hucksters who care nothing for what happens beyond. Such a policy would defeat even its own end; for as the nations grow to have ever wider and wider interests, and are brought into closer and closer contact, if we are to hold our own in the struggle for naval and commercial supremacy, we must build up our power without our own borders.

If we drove out a medieval tyranny only to make room for savage anarchy, we had better not have begun the task at all. It is worse than idle to say that we have no duty to perform, and can leave to their fates the islands we have conquered. Such a course would be the course of infamy. It would be followed at once by utter chaos in the wretched islands themselves. Some stronger, manlier power would have to step in and do the work, and we would have shown ourselves weaklings, unable to carry to successful completion the labors that great and high-spirited nations are eager to undertake.

The work must be done; we cannot escape our responsibility; and if we are worth our salt, we shall be glad of the chance to do the work—glad of the chance to show ourselves equal to one of the great tasks set modern civilization.

I preach to you, then, my countrymen, that our country calls not for the life of ease but for the life of strenuous endeavor. The twentieth century looms before us big with the fate of many nations. If we stand idly by, if we seek merely swollen, slothful ease and ignoble peace, if we shrink from the hard contests where men must win at hazard of their lives and at the risk of all they hold dear, then the bolder and stronger peoples will pass us by, and will win for themselves the domination of the world. Let us therefore boldly face the life of strife, resolute to do our duty well and manfully; resolute to uphold righteousness by deed and by word; resolute to be both honest and brave, to serve high ideals, yet to use practical methods. Above all, let us shrink from no strife, moral or physical, within or without the nation, provided we are certain that the strife 145

is justified, for it is only through strife, through hard and dangerous endeavor, that we shall ultimately win the goal of true national greatness.164

Critics on opposite sides of the political spectrum often were united in criticism of American militarism. Chalmers Johnson, a sharp critic of what he sees as American imperialism, said in The Sorrow of Empire: Militarism, Secrecy and the End of the Republic, that

From the moment we took on a role that included the permanent military domination of the world, we were on our own—feared, hated, corrupt, maintaining order through state terrorism and bribery, and given to megalomaniac rhetoric and sophistries that virtually invited the rest of the world to unite against us.165

Johnson saw the enforcement of American hegemony across the globe as a form of „ empire, which is a fair comment. Unlike traditional empires, however, which maintained control via colonies, the United States has developed a vast network of military bases around the world to protect its strategic interests. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989, rather than demobilize its armed forces, the United States accelerated its reliance on military solutions as solutions to problems both economic and political. The result of this militarism, Johnson argues, has been increased terrorist attacks on the United States and its allies, the loss of core democratic values at home, and an eventual disaster for the American economy. The conservative scholar Andrew Bacevich, a retired Army colonel who fought in Iraq in 1991 and lost a son there in May 2007,166 condemns the Bush Administration's decision to start the 2003 Gulf War, but also implicates politicians and the American

Theodore Roosevelt, "The Strenuous Life," a speech before the Hamilton Club, Chicago, April 10, 1899, http://209.10.134.179/58/l.html (accessed 1 Jun 08). For more of his speeches, see Theodore Roosevelt, The Strenuous Life; Essays and Addresses (New York: The Century Company, 1900), http://209.10.134.179/58/ (accessed 1 Jun 08). 165 Chalmers Johnson, The Sorrow of Empire: Militarism, Secrecy and the End of the Republic (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2004), p. 284. 166 Brian MacQuarrie, "Son of professor opposed to war is killed in Iraq," The Boston Globe, 15 May 07, http://www.boston.com/news/local/articles/2007/05/15/son of professor opposed to war is killed in ira g/ (accessed 10 Jon 08). 146

people in that decision, for overestimating the usefulness of military power in foreign affairs. He too has repeatedly sounded the alarm bell—militarism has subtlly woven itself into the fabric of American life and will damage the country and the world if not reversed. By the end of the 20th century, the skepticism about arms and armies that informed the American experiment from its founding had vanished. Political leaders, liberals and conservatives alike, became enamored of military might. Militarism insinuated itself into American life.167

The Democratic challenger in 2004, Senator John Kerry, writing in the Washington Post, declared that what the United States really needed was "a policy that finally include [d] a heavy dose of realism. Our foreign policy has achieved greatness only when it has combined realism and idealism, our sense of practicality and our deep commitment to values such as freedom and democracy. "168 Echoing that sentiment days before the election, Thomas Friedman encouraged Americans to

vote for the candidate who embodies the ethos of George H. W. Bush—the old guy. Vote for the man who you think would have the same gut feel for nurturing allies and restoring bipartisanship to foreign policy as him ... vote for the man who has the best instincts for balancing realism and idealism ... Yes, next Tuesday, vote for the real political heir to George H. W. Bush. I'm sure you know who that is.

Conclusion American strategic culture has been founded on a record of expansion and success, which stemmed as much from good fortune, and accident, and weak enemies, as from wisdom. Deeply ingrained in that culture is a millenarian ideology intertwined with universalist thinking, missionary fervor, a bias toward practicality, a penchant for

167 Bacevich, "The Real World War IV" 168 John F. Kerry, "A Realistic Path in Iraq," The Washington Post, 4 Jul 04, p. B07, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dvn/articles/A24762-2004Jul2.html (accessed 7 Jun 08). 169 Thomas L. Friedman, "The Apparent Heir," The New York Times, 31 Oct 04, http://www.nvtimes.eom/2004/10/3 l/opinion/3 lfriedman.html (accessed 14 Jun 08). 147 technological and managerial solutions to problems, and an abiding confidence that every problem can be fixed and that all conditions are problems. The United States began to emerge from the shadows after the Civil War, but passed on the opportunity to become a great power. At the turn of the century, it had a coming out party with a first taste of imperial glory, followed by the voyage of the Great White Fleet around the globe. It soon soured on imperialism overseas, which contradicted the underlying strategic culture, and resumed its isolationalist stance beyond the Western Hemisphere. Grudgingly, it was drawn into World War I, but cultural proclivities prevented it from usurping British leadership after 1918. Only with the threat posed by Germany in World War II, and British inability to destroy it without help, was America able finally, and definitely, to assume the mantle of leadership. Believing the security of the country, and the world, were best served by the spread of democracy, liberal institutions, and capitalism, successive American presidents attempted to do just that, amidst a decades-long struggle against another millenarian power, the Soviet Union. After the collapse of the Soviet empire, the United States saw an historic opportunity to*' reshape the world in its own image—a long-held ambition. However, confusion over how to accomplish that task, coupled with a lack of bipartisanship resulting from the absence of a definite threat, led to wild policy shifts between administrations. That lack of consistency, a stark contrast to the unanimity shown during the Cold War, not only created a waste of effort, but also reinforced the very political differences which make bipartisanship difficult to forge. Though the divide can be traced back at least as far as Ronald Reagan, it bloomed only with the collapse of any unifying menace that could act to submerge parochial preferences. There is little reason to suspect this divide will end soon, and by default, policy will oscillate depending on who occupies the White House. This divide will be particular in the tug-and-pull between unilateralism and multilateralism, and preemption versus a traditional defense posture of wait-and-see. The absence of a coherent and consistent national security policy does not bode well for a competition with Beijing. The United States is suffering an identity-crisis. From 1945 to 1991, it grew comfortable with its role as leader of the free world. After 1991, it became a "hyperpower" which dwarfed all others in absolute power. However, relatively speaking, 148 its power had been in decline for some time, starting especially in the 1960s, with the United States' surrender of overwhelming superiority in nuclear weapons to accept parity with the USSR, and the sharp decline in its share of world manufacturing as other advanced countries recovered from the damage of the war. This was especially true of Germany, and even more so Japan, both of which experienced economic miracles. That slow trend was overshadowed by the demise of the Soviet Union, the stunning victory in the Gulf, the resurgence of the American economy in the 1990s, and the evaporation of any major threat to its interests. Yet none of this meant a rise in American power, simply the collapse of its greatest competitor and the temporary eclipse of any open threat. After the terrorists attacks of 2001, the growing and maturing power of China and other economies like India and Brazil, the resurgence of Russia under Vladimir Putin and his bellicose rhetoric, staggering fiscal woes, and other concerns, the slide became more apparent and stoked fear in the hearts of Americans across the political spectrum. The days of American "hyperpowerhood" are numbered, if not already behind us. However, the slide in power can be gradual and safe, if the United States assumes a level-headed * approach. The transition will be a natural return to the norm and should not be seen as a cataclysmic event worthy of unbridled panic. If American administrations adopt a strategy which seeks a "soft landing," in which the United States becomes one great power center among several, and probably the greatest of them for the next century, the rise of China is less likely to stir the kind of reactions typical among revolutionary changes within an international system. But acceptance of such a development by American political elites is a tall order. The United States starts from an unprecedented position. While it can afford to lose much of its relative position without suffering much practical loss, elected representatives will be tempted to halt and reverse that decline with appeals to populism and nationalism. Crises and wars erupt as often because of the actions of a declining status-quo power as they do the rising revisionist power. The interaction between them will shape the next phase of the evolution of world power. 149

CHAPTER FOUR PLAYING DIFFERENT GAMES?

The map is not the terrain.1 —Baron Henri de Jomini

You fight your way and I fight my way. —Mao Zedong

In Clausewitz's opinion, "In the whole range of human activities, war most closely resembles a game of cards. " The same could be said of strategy. Like a game of cards, strategy has its own rules, but also is influenced by chance and skill. To consistently win games of cards, two things are absolutely necessary. One must understand the rules of the game, and hone the ability to analyze opponents. Mastery of this second step separates professionals from amateurs. Admittedly, this mastery can be difficult in a card game, due to the randomness of who will occupy which chairs across table. Nevertheless, sustained play gives a skilled player the opportunity to record an opponent's "tells," a noticeable change in behavior or manner that offers clues to a rival's appraisal of his hand. A player gains an advantage if he observes and understands the meaning of another player's tell, especially if it is unconscious and consistent. Conversely, a player may feign a tell, hoping to deceive opponents into making poor judgments. "Tells" also provide clues about an opponent's preferences and likely behavior within given parameters. Some players are better at concealing their own tells and detecting those of opponents than others. Card games, of course, are different from competitions of power politics in many ways. In the realm of strategy, a state usually has much time to learn the preferences of other governments. A national strategic culture encompasses the universe of possible behaviors from which a state will choose its actions

1 Henri de Jomini, The Art of War, as translated by Capt. G. H. Mendall and Lt. W. P. Craighill (Westport, CN: Greenwood Press, 1971). This work was originally published in 1862. 2 Mao Zedong, as quoted in Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: The Military Power of the People's Republic of China 2005 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 2005), p. 15. 3 Clausewitz, as translated in Michael Howard and Peter Paret, eds., On War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), p. 86. 150

when conducting power politics. It also explains how that state will interpret and apply the rules. Knowing an adversary's strategic theory and its preferences can let another state anticipate its behavior and adopt effective steps. Obviously, chance, the luck of the draw, always constrains skill. Winning every hand is not the goal of the game, nor is it realistic; indeed, there are times when one might want to lose. Instead, the ultimate purpose is to increase one's odds of winning at the critical times and across the game as a whole. Just as no one becomes great at cards by relying purely on luck, strategists refine their predictive skills by thoroughly studying other states within the anarchic international system, always attempting to anticipate behavior and to then act in ways that benefit themselves. As Sun-Tzu says,

... one who knows the enemy and knows himself will not be endangered in a hundred engagements. One who does not know the enemy but knows himself will sometimes be victorious, sometimes meet with defeat. One who knows * neither the enemy nor himself will invariably be defeated in every engagement.4

Scholars must do the same thing in order to understand the nature of strategic competitions, and the strategies of competitors.

American and Chinese strategic cultures: different... and similar The two strategic cultures share some surprising similarities, as well as obvious differences. In War and American Thought, Reginald Stuart describes an American strategic culture which has surprising similarities to the Chinese "Cult of Defense" described by Scobell. Like China, armed conflict litters the American past, but citizens and elites believe their culture to be pacific.5 Americans generally believe that they go to war only in self-defense or for good causes, just as Chinese do. And yet,

4 Sun Tzu, as translated in Ralph D. Sawyer, The Art of War (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994), p. 179. 5 Reginald C. Stuart, War and American Thought: From the Revolution to the Monroe Doctrine (Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 1982). 151

the record reveals that Americans have fought both offensive and defensive wars, and that many can only be labeled aggressive, and even expansionist. Further probing suggests that in all cases, these conflicts arose from the ambitions of politicians and leaders who conceived of themselves as thinking and acting in the national interest. War, like peace or trade, has always been used as an instrument of policy, although American mythology has maintained that Americans always rejected Carl von Clausewitz 's dictum to that effect.6

An examination of Chinese history would reveal similar beliefs. So too, Colin Gray suggests that traditionally, Americans had an abiding faith in the notion that "good" causes defeat evil ones. Not surprisingly, "good" and "evil" are left up to interpretation. Nevertheless, Americans fought only for what they considered to be noble causes countenanced by a higher power, i.e. when God was on their side. There is a noticeable parallel to the Chinese notion of "the Mandate from Heaven" and the Confucian "just war" tradition. In the American case, conceptions of "just war" were key to the formation of strategy, or more precisely, the failure to do so. Preemption is another common thread shared by these strategic cultures; though a recent addition to the American one, Chinese strategic culture has long embraced the concept.7 Confucianism has never been opposed to the use of force—even preemptive force—as long as it is defensive in nature. It is not difficult to imagine a wide range of offensive actions that could qualify as defensive under the "Cult of Defense" philosophy and the idea of "active defense," which

posits a defensive military strategy and asserts that China does not initiate wars or fight wars of aggression, but engages in war only to defend national sovereignty and territorial integrity and attacks only after being attacked.8

6 Ibid, p. ix. 7 Andrew Scobell, "China and Strategic Culture," Strategic Studies Institute, May 2002, http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.armv.mil/pdffiles/pub60.pdf (accessed 25 May 08). See Alastair Iain Johnston, "Cultural Realism and Strategy in Maoist China," in Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), p. 231-2,247. 8 Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: The Military Power of the People's Republic of China 2005, p. 15. 152

Beijing's definition of an attack against its territory, or what constitutes an initial attack, is left vague .... In instances where Beijing's use of force involves core interests, such as Taiwan, it could claim, as it has in the past, that preemptive uses of force are strategically 'defensive' in nature, such as the 1979 'counter-attack in self defense' against Vietnam. Consequently, the term 'active defense' indicates little about when or how China would initiate hostilities9

Several enduring characteristics in American strategic culture stem back to the founding of the nation. First and foremost, it rests on ideology. American elites, from the outset, held that the United States had a unique responsibility to create an empire of liberty. As the country gained strength, America would wield power, not for its own sake, but to give oppressed peoples around the world the "inalienable" rights enjoyed by all Americans, except, of course, for slaves and Indians. That idealized vision was buffeted continually by the realities of power and human nature. Despite the chasm between idealism and realism, the former significantly shaped American strategic culture. * The latter, and the elites which nurtured it, came to embody the belief that in the long- term, their security could be established only through the spread of democracy. The engine of change often was American military power. When the United States has engaged in war, it consistently has striven to create a balance of power favorable to the spread of liberal democracy. This long-standing conviction about the power of democracy to enhance American and global security, coupled with the exponential growth of American military power, has led the United States to broaden the scope of its millenarian drive. The Bush Administration machinations in the Middle East easily can be interpreted as an evolutionary move in this direction. A second component of American strategic culture is the widespread assumption that the United States is the epicenter of international affairs; a sort of "Middle Kingdom."10 The origins of this view that the United States differed qualitatively from all other

9 Ibid. 10 Donnelly, "Empire of Liberty," p. 4. 153

nations because of its fortuitous historical evolution, revolutionary political innovation, or divine sanction, or some combination thereof, go back long before the United States became a great power. Alexis de Tocqueville spoke of this idea, but the term itself gained widespread usage only after World War II. In Strategic Culture: The American Mind, Anita Arms contends that this exceptionalist attitude stems, at least in part, from the American education process, which fosters a "chauvinistic, ethnocentric view of the 10 world." The rich diversity and relative isolation allowed the United States to develop into one of the most ethnocentric states in the world; as morality and religion mixed with these conditions, the sense of uniqueness and ethnocentrism grew. Once again, this characteristic is strikingly similar to Chinese strategic culture, where Confucian-based morality is the cornerstone for Chinese self-perceptions of uniqueness, and ethnocentrism is fostered by rigid state-control of the educational system and the media. In more recent times, most notably after 1991, this idea of American exceptionalism has been co-opted by critics of American foreign policy who argue that it stems from a perverse interpretation of history that overlooks egregious acts undertaken by the* American government or its society. Arguments about American exceptionalism are mere ethnocentrism and propaganda.13 American participation in the First and Second World Wars, the Cold War, and Iraq were motivated by economic and military self- interest rather than an actual desire to spread liberty and equality, as proven by an extensive record in Latin America controlling economies and suppressing democratic revolutions against U.S.-backed dictators when necessary. In their assault on the notion of American exceptionalism, critics juxtapose, with some fairness, the United States against other countries that have claimed a special destiny, like Great Britain (Pax Britannica), Israel, the Soviet Union, Nazi Germany, the Roman Empire, and China. Nonetheless, a self perception of exceptionalism is an important factor in the strategic culture of the United States, and of China.

11 Seymour Martin Lipset, American Exceptionalism: A Double-Edged Sword (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1996), p. 18. Also see Deborah L. Madsen, American Exceptionalism (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1998). 12 Anita M. Arms, "Strategic Culture: The American Mind," in Strategy and Its Theorists (Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College, 1999), p. 333. 13 Howard Zinn, "The Power and the Glory: Myths of American exceptionalism," Boston Review, 24 Nov 06, http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/articlel5732.htm (accessed 21 Jun 08). 154

A third characteristic of American strategic culture is a penchant for expansion. Between the Monroe Doctrine and the Spanish-American War, colorful rhetoric trumpeting the necessity to expand the liberal democratic experiment was combined with conquest. However, after its foray into European-style imperialism in 1898, Washington lost interest in conquest. Instead, it sought high levels of political influence by way of favorable trade terms, support for pro-American leaders, and the occasional brandishing of military might, rather than direct physical control, which ultimately, provided many of the same benefits without the costs, or the contradictions between idealistic principles and the practicalities of power. Thus, American expansion came to differ substantially from the normal way that empires have been created in the past. American policy after World War II illustrates this nuanced approach. After defeating Germany and Japan, the United States sought to divest itself of its role as occupier as soon as was practical, but still retained significant sway over these defeated foes through alliances and international organizations. Through its influence over international organizations, invention of technological breakthroughs like the Internet, and commanding economic might, backed * by immense military power, the United States set in motion the phenomenon of globalization, which has become synonymous with Westernization, if not Americanization. Throughout its history, American strategic culture has been consistent in purpose. It possesses both a realist strain and an idealist one, combining pragmatism and optimism. The United States, the "city upon a hill, "14 which John Winthrop spoke of during a 1630 sermon to Puritan settlers, has confined itself "within the walls of the city. "15 Of course, with the growth of American power, the placement of those walls—the perimeter of "good society"—has steadily moved outward from the center, and the desire to continue this expansion remains. This desire became turbo-charged after 1991, with the demise of the Soviet Union, the last power that could stand in the way of the pursuit of the leading American strategic goal; the spread of liberal ideals and democratic governance to all reaches of the globe, so creating good societies and genuine security for all.

John Winthrop, "We shall be as a city upon a hill" sermon as quoted in Owen Collins, compiler, Speeches That Changed the World (Louisville, K.Y.: Westminster John Knox Press, 1999), p. 63-5. 1 Gerald Stourzh, Alexander Hamilton and the Idea of Republican Government (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1970), p. 128. 155

The emerging clash between the United States and China will be shaped by their national strategic cultures, and by the ability of each side to understand, influence, and compete with the other. While American strategic culture has been shaped by many influences, Anita Arms contends that six are particularly important: fortuitous geography, political ideology, educational fervor, capitalistic values, Protestant ethics, and technological prowess. Together, these forces "continue to shape the nation's domestic and international outlook and mold its exercise of political and military power. " These characteristics also give a potential foe clues—not answers—as to how the United States could be expected to act in various scenarios. Fortuitous geography gave the United States a rare opportunity to craft an identity safe in the knowledge that foreign powers could not invade it. This condition, too, helps explain the phenomenon of American exceptionalism. Over time, advantageous geography helped to forge a mentality that "the need to fight a war was a decision to be made, not an inevitability to be faced. "18 Not since the American Civil War—short,1 if bloody—has a major conflict been fought on American soil. Excluding that war, * Americans usually have fought against enemies who were severely disadvantaged in one way or another (geographically, politically, or materially). Often, their intervention came late in the conflict, when the prospective adversary had already been mauled by would-be allies. As a result, the relatively quick collapse of adversaries in the wake of American entry into conflicts gave many Americans an inflated sense of their contribution to the outcome. Before the attacks of September 2001, American strategic culture was shaped by an historical experience that "teaches that war is episodic, waged abroad ... and that there is not a high level of menace in the external world. " "To Americans war was an aberration, a disturber of normalcy. War and peace were viewed as distinct and separate episodes, and American tradition in war has been first to declare, then to

16 Arms, "Strategic Culture: The American Mind," in Strategy and Its Theorists. 17 Ibid, p. 329. 18 Ibid, p. 330. 19 For example, in comparison to the Chinese experience. The Taiping Rebellion (1850-1864) is virtually unknown in the West despite claiming 20-30 million lives. When placed alongside the American Civil War, which only lasted four years and claimed roughly 620,000 lives, such ignorance is hard to fathom. Though the Great Leap Forward (1958-61) was not a civil war, it certainly had a similar effect; 15-40 million people died, mostly from starvation, during this brief period. 20 Gray, "National Style in Strategy," p. 27-8. 21 Arms, "Strategic Culture: The American Mind," p. 330-1. 156 prepare." More recently, Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm reinforced the perception that war was a deviation from the norm. The American-led coalition which defended the oil fields of Saudi Arabia before evicting Saddam Hussein from Kuwait

came in a tidy cultural package for Americans; one which had clearly defined installments of diplomacy and war. When the diplomacy stopped, war began; when the fighting was over, diplomacy and a separate episode of post- conflict resolution began23

So too, the "War on Terror" reflects American strategic culture. American administrations had responded to multiple acts of terrorism on U.S. targets in piecemeal fashion before the attacks on New York and Washington. Arguably, such feeble responses encouraged and emboldened Islamic extremists. But in launching the attacks of September lll, Al-Qaeda misread American strategic culture, and its response to direct attack. [IJt helped draw clear lines in an otherwise muddy confrontation with a ubiquitous and mysterious enemy. War is a national energizer; it reinforces one's internal cohesion, gives direction and sense of purpose to one's leadership24

The tragedy that unfolded on that beautiful morning, captured live on television, along with the large loss of life, and the subsequent declaration of a "War on Terror," lent moral clarity to what previously had been, for most Americans, an ambiguous struggle. America's great wars, including the Civil War, were pursued as all-out struggles until the enemy was totally destroyed. While the "War on Terror" was launched in that tradition, it also instigated changes within American strategic culture, most notably, by legitimizing the notion of preemptive attack. Undoubtedly, this change was affected by the nature of the September 11, 2001 attacks. The war was on America's front door, which rattled

Maurice Matloff, "Allied Strategy in Europe, 1939-1945," in Peter Paret, ed., Makers of Modern Strategy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), p. 679-80. 23 Philip C. Skuta, Lt Col, USMC, "Poker, Blackjack, Rummy, and War: The Face of American Strategic Culture," U.S. Army War College Research Project, 15 Mar 06, p. 4. 24 Giles Andreani, "The 'War on Terror': Good Cause, Wrong Concept," Survival, Vol. 46, No. 4 (Winter 2004-05), p. 35. 157

elites and the public, more than many foreign observers appreciated. With an eye toward the future, to keep threats away from American shores, pre-emptive actions took on a new luster. Though other nations frequently had endured attacks on their home, this was a new experience for the United States,25 which legitimized ideas previously taboo in American political thought. Technology is yet another force that has influenced American strategic culture, for better and worse.

... hunger for newness and technology permeates American life, usually at the expense of tradition. As a result, the United States has become a throw-away society. Americans are fascinated by newness, have institutionalized change and raised the short term view of the future to an art form. While they may not always enjoy change, they probably accept it more readily than many other cultures. ... [they accept] a lack of permanence in their lives. In practice, Americans eschew time as a continuum, rarely looking to the past and, when looking ahead, viewing only the near term, not the distant future. They act in almost every facet of life as if time were the enemy26

Despite a love affair with technology and widespread acceptance that change is normal, the United States also has shown itself capable of long-term thinking and strategizing. For instance, National Security Council Report 68 (NSC-68) became the bedrock for United States foreign policy for more than two decades. But alongside episodes of long-term focus, has existed a striking penchant for short-term political thinking, largely due to the nature of a democratic system. While the Soviet menace provided a constant reminder of threat, since its collapse the absence of such a signal has produced uncertainty. Solid assumptions, held by politicians from both political parties, once acted to mitigate wild swings in policy. By contrast, the current strategic environment is characterized by

Granted, the American Civil War was very destructive and costly, but it was Americans fighting Americans which is psychologically different than foreign attack. 26 Arms, "Strategic Culture: The American Mind," p. 337-8. 158

... considerable turbulence .... The international system [is] so fluid and complex that to think intelligently about military issues [means] taking an integrated view of political, social, technological, and economic developments. ... In short, we have entered an age in which many of the fundamental assumptions that steered [the United States] through the chilly waters of the Cold War require rethinking ... 7

Members of the Hart-Rudman Commission were correct to say in order to handle such a turbulent and complex environment, states need an integrated approach. Unfortunately, current American national security policy lacks that approach involving the sophisticated application of all instruments of national power. Instead, it leans toward unilateralism and military solutions to complex strategic problems, which could better be addressed by a combination of economic, diplomatic, and military carrots and sticks. This phenomenon has three main roots. First, the United States enjoys unrivaled military power, especially when it comes to power projection. Military power is its strong suit, where it has the greatest degree of freedom of action. While still possessing the largest economy, conversely, its power in that realm is diminishing in relative terms; hence, it must routinely consult with others. Second, military power is easier and faster to use than other tools of statecraft. Diplomacy, economic sanctions, collective bargaining, and so forth demand time if they are to work, which they might fail to do. The siren song of military power, especially in light of the 1991 victory in the Gulf War and the absence of an equal, struck many in Washington as an expeditious and efficient means to vexing problems. As Operation Iraqi Freedom demonstrated, however, such beliefs were unwarranted. Third, the attacks of September 1 ll wrecked a pillar of American strategic culture, the idea of oceanic protection from threats. While the advent of ICBMs had eliminated the protection afforded by geography, those weapons never were used, leaving the American public to believe itself safe from attack. Al-Qaeda changed that perspective.

U.S. Commission on National Security/2 Is Century (Hart-Rudman Commission), New World Coming: American Security in the 21s' Century (Sep 1999), p. 57, http://www.fas.org/man/docs/nwc/NWR A.pdf (accessed 9 Jul 08). 159

Only the prevention of threats through preemption could replace the protection once guaranteed by an enormous Atlantic-Pacific moat. For the moment, that preemption would take place through conventional forces, but ultimately, the real promise lay in controlling the high ground. These ideas, added to rapid technological advancements in the field of missile defense, growing nuclear proliferation, and a dominant American position in space, propelled the United States political and military leadership to embrace a strategy called Full Spectrum Dominance, whereby "... U.S. forces operating alone or with allies [can] defeat any adversary and control any situation across the range of military operations." For American strategists, in the absence of a peer rival, the challenge is to avoid a short-term focus

The strategic cards must be played in such a manner as to win the game, not just the hand. For an adversary this [American] tendency to favor a near-term strategic perspective represents an opportunity, one which can be ' exploited in a 'long war' to win the strategic game.

But focusing on the short-term is exactly what the United States has done on many fronts since the end of the Cold War. That behavior is sowing the seeds of future problems which threaten American leadership. Commentators derisively call Washington "a one crisis town," because of its alleged proclivity to focus on one problem at a time. Colin Gray alludes to such behavior when he discusses "monochromatic, one-thing-at-a-time cultures, and polychromatic everything is interconnected cultures." While that characterization of politics in Washington is an exaggeration, it does highlight a real tendency, especially true in instances where an event is long in duration, such as the "War on Terror." Arguably, China represents one of those "everything is interconnected cultures" which Gray discusses. The United States is overly fixated on one long, ongoing crisis in a world marked by complexity, taking its eye off a game with greater long-term strategic implications, namely, the rise of China, a rival power which shows no

28 Jim Garamone, "Joint Vision 2020 Emphasizes Full-spectrum Dominance," American Forces Press Service, 2 Jun 00, http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=:45289 (accessed 9 Jul 08). 29 Skuta, "Poker, Blackjack, Rummy, and War," p. 7. 30 Colin Gray, Modem Strategy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 149. 160 signs of surrendering global hegemony to Washington. By contrast, Beijing appears to be combining a move on several fronts toward its main objectives. Carnes Lord suggests that American strategic culture is characterized by unusual variability, rather than predictability. This instability within American strategic culture, oscillating between extremes,31 produces an advantage, he contends, because of the problems it poses for adversaries. In some contexts, such gyrations could have advantages, but not in others. To China, which already views such oscillations as a strategic weakness of the United States, sign of such swings can boost its confidence. Furthermore, following a measured and consistent strategy, against one that ebbs and flows with electoral moods, produces significant advantages in the long-term. A related question is the staying power of a democracy with regard to a long war. George Marshall famously said that "a democracy cannot fight a Seven Years War. " A list of long wars involving the United States certainly would include the Revolutionary War, the Cold War, the Vietnam War, and the ongoing "War on Terror." The first two were struggles for survival, which produced fortitude. Vietnam was not, at least not for* the Americans. When losses mounted, progress eluded commanders, and Americans doubted whether it was a "vital interest," the country set about withdrawing. The willingness to continue the "War on Terror" remains in question. American strategic culture is sequential in nature; it tends to concentrate on one major task before moving to another. It does not multi-task well. It is oriented toward solving problems rather than enduring conditions. Moreover, the United States, believing that peace and war are different matters, and that peace generally means good relations between states, rather than just another form of power politics, does not accept readily the

Lord points to oscillation between early support for the Vietnam War and later alienation from it. Somalia is another example. The humanitarian nature of it appealed to Americans; however, once dead Americans were seen being dragged in the streets by angry mobs, support evaporated overnight. And yet, Americans still support humanitarian efforts. A contemporary example would be Operation Iraqi Freedom: initial support for the mission; followed by years of growing cynicism and dissatisfaction as the original rationale was debunked, fatalities climbed, and sectarian violence escalated; followed by a resurgence in support for the mission in the wake of the "troop surge" which appears to have been a significant, positive turning point. 32 Carnes Lord, "American Strategic Culture," Comparative Strategy, Vol. 5, Issue 3 (1985), p. 288. 33 George C. Marshall, as quoted in Steve Coll, "General Accounting," The New Yorker, 24 Sep 07, http://www.newvorker.com/talk/comment/2007/09/24/070924taco talk coll?printable=true (accessed 10 Jul 08). 161 idea of continuing conflict34—conventional or otherwise—as was part of Soviet ideology during the Cold War, and Chinese thinking since then. The United States, of course, can stick to a long task, as the Marshall Plan, and the Cold War containment strategy show. But in the absence of solid conviction combined with a well-defined strategy, rational long-term planning is unlikely to occur. Just like the Global War on Terror (GWOT), the competition with China will be a long war. While the Bush Administration has a guiding strategy, originally outlined in the 1992 Defense Planning Guidance (DPG), it is mired in one step of that strategy, and has not demonstrated a robust capacity simultaneously to handle other major concerns. Moreover, the ideas contained within the DPG may not survive the change of guard in Washington, given the setbacks in Iraq, the loss of political capital in international affairs, massive fiscal deficits, and perhaps a different party in charge. In his seminal work, The American Way of War, Russell Weigley writes that a nation cannot escape its strategic history. In the U.S. case, that history, beginning with the Civil War, has been to crush the enemy as Grant and Sherman did so successfully in * 1864-65.36 The problem is that many conflicts do not involve an enemy that can easily or quickly be vanquished.

The word 'war' makes Americans set a goal of discernable victory—somebody surrenders, signs a document, an evil empire collapses, a wall comes down, a villain bites the dust, and life returns to normal. ... 'Combating' terrorism [or engaging in a long-term struggle with China] ... implies an enduring task. It has largely disappeared from the vocabulary of American officials. Wars are to be won, not waged indefinitely. 7

34 Colin S. Gray, Nuclear Strategy and National Style (Lanham, MD.: Hamilton Press, 1986), p. 42,48. 35 Russell F. Weigley, The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1973). 36 Edward M. Coffman, a review of The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy, The Journal of American History, Vol. 60, No. 4 (Mar 74), p. 1090. 37 Jenkins, "Looking for 'High Noon' in a Hundred Years' War." 162

Of course, the United States can adapt to such circumstances. Gray argues that strategic

TO cultures do evolve, but not rapidly. In the interim, that history informs others about U.S. strategic preferences, and they certainly will try to play to its weaknesses. Mythology surrounds the American experience with war. Victory often is correlated with speed, decisiveness, and overwhelming firepower. While that pattern was true in some conflicts, in others, it was not. The Cold War is an obvious example which does not fit into the popular perception, as were many of the small wars which involved the United States over the last two centuries.39 Most American decisionmakers and strategists have discarded the "small war" tradition and chosen to draw their lessons almost exclusively from the major wars in which the country was involved. Vietnam was an instance where the United States ignored its small war tradition, opting instead to fight a conventional war. This characteristic has importance today, for the "War on Terror" and also the struggle with China. The GWOT will not be won solely by the application of military power, which might actually exacerbate the conflict, but only through the techniques and strategies employed successfully in small wars. Those processes, * however, take time to work, and time, as Arms reminds us, has long been considered the enemy in American strategic thinking. The Chinese, along with many Americans,40 have identified impatience as a weakness in American strategic culture.41 They are consciously pursuing a strategy that not only buys them time to catch up with the United States on many fronts, but creates a struggle which the United States is ill-suited to contend with over the long haul. While the Cold War or the almost twenty-year U.S. involvement in Iraq seemingly contradict this Chinese conclusion, there are significant differences between those drawn-out wars and the more opaque one being waged today by Beijing.

Gray, Modern Strategy, p. 149. 39 Max Boot, The Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American Power (New York: Basic Books, 2002), p. xvi. 40 Ralph Peters, Lt Col, USA (Ret), "Principles of Warfare Culminating Seminar," The Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory, 13 Apr 05, http://www.ihuapl.edu/POW/notes/peters_4 13.doc (accessed 25 Jul 08). 41 Vietnam is the classic example that comes to mind, among Americans and foreign observers like the Chinese. See Ralph Peters, "No Silver Bullets: Fighting the Insurgency in Iraq," Armed Forces Journal, Jan 06, http://www.armedforcesiournal.com/2006/01/1380018 (accessed 25 Jul 08). 163

Another war, if rarely portrayed as such, is taking place between the United States and China. Whereas American strategic culture preaches the virtues of Clausewitz, but often fails to practice them, China thinks like Clausewitz. For them, power politics and war are forms of "politics by other means, " contrary to the American belief that war and peace are different matters. Behind the guise of "a peaceful rise," the Chinese government is waging a sophisticated, low-key, struggle of long duration against what it sees as American attempts to contain it, and possibly to derail its return to greatness. President Bush has repeatedly cast the "War on Terror" as a generational struggle, but even that portrayal is different from the jihadist portrayal of it. Whereas Americans view war as an aberration, the Jihadists see it as a perpetual condition.42 Here, they share some attitudes with Chinese strategists, who see their own struggle with the United States through a long lens. At present, the battles are being fought on the shelves of Wal-Mart, in the conference rooms in Geneva, across the Internet and television. But military forces are also being co-opted for this purpose, for coercion, deterrence, and occasionally, as was the case in January 2007, when China destroyed one of its own derelict satellites, to * signal the United States that it intends to challenge Washington's hegemonic ambitions. Though the Pentagon routinely draws attention to the intentions behind the Chinese military buildup, and has repositioned military assets to address those Chinese developments, American decision-makers are overly engrossed in the Middle East, to the detriment of a long-term strategy to deal with China's growing commercial, diplomatic, and military clout. In the Cold War, the United States faced an enemy bent on global domination. The Soviets did not hide their intent. The Chinese are playing a more sophisticated game, characterized by subtlety and comprehensiveness—"Subjugating the [enemy] ... without fighting is the true pinnacle of excellence. "43 Furthermore, while China retains some trappings of discredited Communism, its strategic culture lacks a universalist ideology. This combination makes it difficult for American strategists to raise warning flags, without being accused of alarmism by many liberals or people fatigued and frustrated by the Bush Administration's prosecution of the War on Terror.

42 Brian Michael Jenkins, "Looking for 'High Noon' in a Hundred Years' War," RAND Corporation, 22 Aug 04, http://www.rand.org/commentary/082204SDtJT.html (accessed 10 Jul 08). 43 Sun-Tzu, as translated by Sawyer, Art of War, p. 177. 164

Thus if I determine the enemy's disposition of forces while I have no perceptible form, I can concentrate while the enemy is fragmented. ... The location where we will engage the enemy must not become known to them. If it is not known, then the positions they must prepare to defend will be numerous. If the positions the enemy prepares to defend are numerous, then the forces we will engage will be few.

Probe them to know where they have an excess, where an insufficiency. If [our efforts against them] are formless, then even the deepest spy cannot discern it or the wise make plans against it.

... the ... disposition of force is like water. Water's configuration avoids heights and races downward, [avoid] the substantial and strike the vacuous. Water configures its flow in accord with the terrain ... [do] not maintain any constant strategic configuration of power, water has no constant shape.

As in martial arts, where one is taught to use an opponent's strength against him, China treats an American strength—the open competition of ideas (which the Chinese view as a weakness ... "Don't debate ... Once debate begins, things become complicated. "45 )—against it. Adhering to many of Sun-Tzu's dicta, the Chinese are attacking plans and alliances46 in inconspicuous ways. By minimizing provocative displays they confound the plans advocated by the many American strategists who want the United States to focus attention on China's "full spectrum" rise. Indeed, Deng Xiaoping advised his countrymen to "hide brightness, nourish obscurity, " to "bide our time and build up our capabilities," and to "yield on the small issues with the long term in mind. "4 The Chinese are undermining American alliances through rapprochement with Tokyo, postponement of contentious territorial issues with other Asian states; and oblique efforts to undermine the Western embargo on dual-use technology transfers, by playing

Ibid, p. 192-3. Deng Xiaoping, quoted in Pillsbury, China Debates the Future Security Environment, p. 1. Sun-Tzu, as translated by Sawyer, Art of War, p. 177. Deng Xiaoping, quoted in Pillsbury, China Debates the Future Security Environment, p. 14. 165

European and Israeli commercial interests against American strategic ones—"Display profits to entice them. Create disorder and take them. In buying up enormous amounts of U.S. Treasury notes, the Chinese are slowly leveraging their ability to confound economic pressure which the United States, in conjunction with other leading Western countries, may want to exert on China. Though many American military officers—including the Commanding General of U.S. forces in Iraq, General David Petraeus—understand that warfare must be conceptualized in broader terms, that continues to be a minority view. Most see war within rigid parameters. The strategy contained in ancient Chinese military texts often sounds like Confucius on fortune cookies. In fact, Sun-Tzu considered war an art rather than a mechanical process, and a broad topic involving the interconnectedness of politics, diplomacy, logistical preparations, combat, and post-war operations and behavior. Indeed, it is precisely these complexities that make the waging of war an art form. David Lai contends that in Sun-Tzu's framework, "the art of war is, in essence, the process of diplomacy; warfighting is only diplomacy by other means. "49 The Art of War emphasizes * the importance of strategy and stratagems. To preserve the vital interest of the state without having to fight is the acme of skill;50 to achieve such a victory, one must be exceptionally well-versed in strategy and stratagems. Not surprisingly, Sun-Tzu treats warfare in all its phases—preparation, execution, and termination—primarily as a contest of wits and secondarily, a contest of force. Ideally, force is applied only as necessary to consolidate a victory truly achieved through strategy. Sun-Tzu stresses that a wise leader exploits the dialectical nature of war and strategy, frustrating the enemy's plans and actions while obscuring the true condition of his own force. ... although capable, display incapability to them. When committed to employing your forces, feign inactivity. When [your objective] is nearby, make it appear as if distant; when far away, create the illusion of being nearby.

Sun-Tzu, as translated by Sawyer, Art of War, p. 168. 49 David Lai, Learning From the Stones: A GO Approach to Mastering China's Strategic Concept, Shi (Carlisle Barracks: Strategic Studies Institute, 2004), p. 3. 50 Sun Tzu, The Art of War translated by Yuan Shibing (Hertfordshire, United Kingdom: Wordsworth Editions Limited, 1998), p. 25. 166

If they are substantial, prepare for them; if they are strong, avoid them. If they are angry, perturb them; be deferential to foster their arrogance. If they are rested, force them to exert themselves. If they are united, cause them to be separated. Attack where they are unprepared. Go forth where they will not expect it.5

Several scholars argue that the ancient Chinese game of strategy, weiqi (known better by its Japanese name, Go) is also a metaphor for the Chinese approach to strategy. The game at once reflects Chinese philosophy, strategic thinking, stratagems, and tactical interactions. Weiqi roughly translates as "encircling territory." The object of the game is not to vanquish an opponent, but rather to control more territory by encircling it on the board. The stones have equal power—there is no almighty queen or lowly pawn as in

cry chess; a long-term, calculated strategy is central to this game. Placing stones close together helps them to support each other and avoid capture, whereas placing them far apart creates influence across more of the board. One challenge of the game is to find a balance between those aims; playing too conservatively secures insufficient territory and * influence, while playing too aggressively invites the opponent to invade one's territory. Players sometimes will accept a tactical loss when it confers a strategic advantage—not unlike the real world. Frequently, comparisons are made between go and chess to help explain Western versus Eastern strategic thinking.53 The American way of power politics and war is likened to chess. Juxtaposing the nature and objective of each game serves to highlight the different philosophies about strategy in Beijing and Washington. Go starts with an empty board; from there, players build their strength through simultaneous battles, deploying forces as they wish across the board; individual stones are important only as part of larger groups, the effect of which is determined only as the game progresses; the game culminates in a point-based win which can be narrow. In chess, by contrast, players begin with equal strength deployed on the board in fixed locales; individual

51 Sun-Tzu, as translated by Sawyer, Art of War, p. 168. 52 Lai, Learning From the Stones, p. 8. 53 Robert T. Myers and Sangit Chatterjee, "Science, Culture, and the Game of Go," Journal of Science and 167 pieces have designated powers that remain constant; the game ends when one player kills an opponent's king, or both agree that neither of them can.

Chess has only two outcomes: draw and checkmate. The objective of the game is absolute advantage—that is to say, its outcome is total victory or defeat—and the battle is conducted head-on, in the center of the board. The aim of Go is relative advantage; the game is played all over the board, and the objective is to increase one's options and reduce those of the adversary. The goal is less victory than persistent strategic progress.

Lai uses particular moves on the Go board to illuminate Chinese behavior over time and around the globe. For instance, a probing move made by one player to test the intentions of the other is equated to Chinese efforts in the 1960s to garner African support for its UN membership bid, as African states formed a large voting block within the General Assembly. To generate favor, the Chinese built sports stadiums in many poor African countries. On the surface, these policies may appear unconnected, but Lai claims that it went a long way towards getting China the votes it needed. Such moves, says Lai, are atypical of American thinking and behavior. Americans are more straightforward; when they act, they expect immediate results. To demonstrate this point, Lai highlighted American policy toward North Korea, which emphasized reciprocity, difficult to gain as timely and satisfactory responses from Pyongyang are hard to come by. Conversely, Seoul, until recently pursued a "Sunshine" policy toward Pyongyang. Reciprocity was not demanded; instead, Seoul believed that change would come from long-term, gradual efforts aimed to promote change above the 38 parallel. Americans find it hard to stomach such incrementalism, while Seoul called on Washington to give its initiative more time to bear fruit.55 In hindsight, given the policy shift of the new government in Seoul and recent progress in the nuclear standoff between the U.S. and North Korea, one can debate whether Seoul's approach was more enlightened or naive than that of Washington. In all likelihood, that progress was due to numerous developments, including China's greater activism and pressure on the North. Lai says that the same Go

54 Henry A. Kissinger, "America's Assignment," Newsweek, 8 Nov 04. 55 Lai, Learning From the Stones, p. 11. 168 move, one of several early engagements designed to test an opponent's reaction and intention, also reflects Chinese thinking about market share. In Go, as in the business world, one naturally wishes to capture all the contracts; however, the wise player should guard against this temptation and pursue a mutually beneficial outcome in which he gains the most. Overly aggressive behavior usually spells disaster.56 These reconnaissance plays are common throughout the duration of a Go match. Other features of Go include divide and rule tactics, and the relativity of offense and en defense, i.e. the question of who is attacking whom depends on one's perspective. Of course, the same can be said about chess. At times, a particular configuration of stones causes a "ho, " where the strategies of the two players intersect on the board. The rules of the game prevent such a situation from devolving into a repetitive exchange of the same territory; instead, they generate activity elsewhere on the board which threatens the other player's position in that region, so that the ko no longer is the only draw on players' attention. The threat posed at the new location is explicit and measurable. Lai uses the concept of ko to explain the U.S. failure to make China meet* Washington's demands for changes in China's human rights policy, in exchange for continuation of its most-favored nation (MFN) trade status during the 1990s. Three problems sank American efforts to link these issues. First, human rights covered a huge swath of issues, making direct connection between the failure to enact a specific change and receipt of a specific consequence difficult. Second, the United States continually moved the goal post. Third, cutting MFN status would be painful for both parties. "The ko in this case was not well-established. The result was that the United States continued to make ill-defined threats; China continued to show defiance; and the MFN continued to be renewed every year. " Another tactic, employed as part of a larger Go strategy, involves isolating certain stones. Once cut off, it is generally inadvisable to come to the rescue of a lone stone, because doing so makes one more susceptible to attack. The Chinese often interpret the China-Taiwan standoff in such a light. Instead of attempting a rescue, the more sensible

Ibid, p. 12. Ibid, p. 13-4. Ibid, p. 15. Ibid, p. 15-6. 169

option involves using the stranded stone as a bargaining chip in a "ko" situation. The Chinese see the United States doing exactly that with Taiwan over the decades, and tell Taiwan as much, i.e. "you are a pawn on the American chessboard. "

From the Go perspective, many Chinese would ridicule Americans for their lack of understanding of this geo­ political situation between Taiwan and mainland China—it is a lone stone against a huge mass. The United States, believing in its ability to project power ... nevertheless dismisses China's view. However, the cost of defending Taiwan must not be underestimated. The Go perspective provides a theoretical and strategic insight into the costs.

A study of Go demonstrates how patient Chinese can be when their strategy is unfolding. Just as Chinese leaders draw inspiration from history and their military classics, exemplified in games like Go, their American counterparts also draw on cultural touchstones. Americans often mine games such as chess, poker, and football to find metaphors for strategy. Lai, in the concluding pages of his monogram, draws contrasts between Go and several American games with two purposes in mind: first, to expose distinctions between American and Chinese strategic thinking; second, to help American strategic thinkers overcome what he sees as their shortcomings—"stones from other hills may serve to polish the jade of this one. "6! In the American games Lai juxtaposes against Go, he contends that the common feature is the centrality of physical force and its application. Their strength is their obsession with capability, but they foster a "lack of sophisticated skill on strategy and stratagem. "62 Chess is a power-based competition, with each piece carrying a different weight. Go is a skill-based game, in which each stone has identical power, which receive different weight based on the configurations which develop. In chess, the balance of power at any given time can be predicted by tallying up the remaining pieces and their relative strength; in Go, no simple tally of the stones is indicative of victory. In chess, the total forces are lined up at the outset and players

60 Ibid, p. 18. 61 Randall E. Stross, Bulls in the China Shop and Other Sino-American Business Encounters (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1990), p. xx. 62 Lai, Learning From the Stones, p. 27. 170 proceed to destroy them; in Go, the battlefield is empty at the start and the deployment of troops is gradual, dependent on the opponent's interim moves. Lai's conclusion is that "a chess mindset-guided military analysis focuses on what one can achieve given limited resources at the moment, whereas a go player thinks about what he can bring to bear with additional resources. " In chess, the aim is to win decisively; there is a winner and a loser. In Go, "total" victory is a rarity; between two equally skilled players, the margin of victory is quite small. Lai argues that the driving philosophy behind Go is relative gain rather than total annihilation. This comparison is an overreach. A chess player may be single-minded in wanting to kill the opposing king, but an accomplished player does not necessarily seek total annihilation; he may do so through attrition, involving the alternating sacrifice of many pieces. Lai implies that American strategic culture is flawed because, like chess, it focuses on a single goal, whereas Go—and by extrapolation, Chinese strategic thinking—avoids a singular focus and "keepfsj the whole situation in mind. " Alluding to the prolonged and complex game of power politics, he contends, "go players focus on building or creating rather than chess players' emphases on removal * and destruction. " It is, however, true to suggest that the games favored by Americans focus on tactics and operations, while Go does so more on strategy. Lai also explores the impact of the game of poker on American strategic thinking. He believes it has strongly influenced United States foreign policy. Poker turns on risk- taking and bluffing. Players cannot control the cards they receive; only risk-taking and bluffing can maximize the leverage of a mediocre hand. Metaphorically, risk-taking and bluffs resemble threats and ultimatums. Lai characterizes such short-term behavior as gambling, and says that while occasionally effective to achieve policy objectives, they are poor substitutes for a long-term, multifaceted strategy. Go players, instead of relying on bluff, attempt to "make a foothold locally or reconnect with the home base, "6S building on established strength. Neither Go players nor Chinese leaders, he says, "utilize a risky ultimatum as in poker." Lai's arguments are provocative, if subjective; this is understandable given he is a native of China (but now an American citizen teaching at the

Ibid, p. 28. Ibid. Ibid, p. 29. Ibid. 171

Air War College). While Lai is right to point out that short-term policies are no substitute for a well-thought out, multifaceted strategy, he oversimplifies Chinese decision-making when he implies they are risk-averse. By contrast, other scholars believe the Chinese have a high tolerance for risk and may, in fact, view crises as opportunities. If true, this does not bode well for future Sino-American relations. Abram Shulsky says the Chinese see the use of limited amounts of force as an integral part of their overall strategy. By seamlessly integrating military actions into their overall strategy, rather than the American tendency to draw a line between military and non-military means, one could argue they are more inclined to gamble than their Western counterparts. In Deterrence Theory and Chinese Behavior, Shulsky argues

[tjhe Chinese have often shown a willingness to resort to force precisely because they see the resulting tension as being in their interest. It is often claimed that, since weiji, the Chinese word for crisis, is composed of two characters that can be translated as danger and opportunity, respectively, it does not have an entirely negative connotation. ... for the Chinese leadership, a crisis is not necessarily a negative phenomenon: It may provide an opportunity for making gains that would otherwise not be achievable.

The purpose of the tension may be domestic mobilization ... alternatively, it may be intended to exert a psychological impact on a foreign power and hence bring about a change in its policies. ... This type of behavior may be difficult to deter. Threats to use (limited amounts of) force in reply may indeed play into a Chinese strategy. If the object is to create tension, the adversary's counter-threats help rather than hurt, as long as the harm they threaten to cause remains within acceptable bounds67

According to Buries and Shulsky, though China will remain relatively weak for the foreseeable future, such weakness cannot necessarily be relied upon to dissuade China from using force. It does not seek to avoid risk altogether, and it is willing to gamble.

Abram N. Shulsky, Deterrence Theory and Chinese Behavior (Santa Monica: RAND, 2000), p. 38-9. 68 Mark Buries and Abram N. Shulsky, Patterns in China's Use of Force: Evidence from History and Doctrinal Writings (Santa Monica: RAND, 2000), p. 2. 172

The central question is Chinese confidence about its ability to control the level of tension and the risk of escalation. Generally speaking, deterrence works because both sides can see the military capabilities of the other, calculate the harm such capabilities would inflict on it, and act accordingly. Presuming the calculations are sound, one side (and possibly both) recognizes the unfavorable balance and avoids further actions that might ignite conflict which would impose unacceptable damage, or defeat. The weakness is the assumption that both sides are playing the same game and that calculations are based on near- complete information. Shulsky offers a window into the dangers inherent in over-reliance on deterrence theory. The United States often relies on the forward deployment of forces, such as a carrier battle group, as a way to signal its ability and willingness to use force. In effect, it seeks to deter actions by other states through a measured and visible demonstration. But with a different strategic tradition emphasizing the importance of surprise attacks, such a demonstration could actually embolden the Chinese. From the Chinese perspective, the * deliberate parading of forces might imply the opposite: unwillingness to actually use force. After all, if the United States truly had intended to attack it would have been more discreet in preparing to do so. Conversely, Washington could interpret the absence of overt preparations for the use of force by the Chinese as evidence of a lack of will or capability, when it actually might reflect a Chinese desire to achieve surprise when it pounces.69 The PRC has a mixed record when it comes to deterrence.70 Sometimes it has succeeded (Soviets, 1969; the United States in Vietnam; Taiwan 1995-96); other times, it has failed miserably (Korea, 1950; Taiwan 1954-55; India 1962; Vietnam, 1979). Because Chinese actions frequently have been crafted with greater emphasis on surprise—and the shock it can produce—than deterrence, one can argue they may have sacrificed a strategic gain or stalemate for a tactical triumph. Yet other evidence suggests that the Chinese appreciate the role of deterrence, albeit in their own culturally-specific way. They seem to place more emphasis on the cumulative effect of past actions than on

Shulsky, Deterrence Theory and Chinese Behavior p. 33-4. Ibid, p. 55-79. 173 specific threats about the future. For instance, using military force to "teach a lesson" to an adversary may be intended to make that adversary think twice before acting against its interests in the future.71 One could interpret the Chinese action in Korea in November 1950 as pivotal in restraining American behavior in Vietnam. In effect, the Chinese had already demonstrated sincerity and resolve. This gave the Americans pause, and ultimately, the United States curtailed its operations there as a result.

That Lyndon Johnson and his advisors were mindful of China is not controversial. In fact, one of the things about which there is strong consensus among Johnson's former military and civilian advisors is that this last lesson of Korea, the specter of Chinese intervention, constrained American strategy in Vietnam decisively. If the other five lessons of Korea suggested that the United States ought to intervene and win in Vietnam, this sixth lesson reminded the policymakers of the necessity of avoiding another war with China. ... Looked at this way, the stakes of avoiding war with China were as high, if not higher than, the stakes in Vietnam7

Conclusion For the first time in its history, the United States faces the prospect of being a declining power, in the face of a state with rapidly growing economic and military resources. What will the United States do? In realist discussions of international relations, the emphasis usually is on the rising power and the threat it poses to the status- quo. However, it is just as important to consider the actions of the declining power, in this case the United States. The United States and China are playing a new game, unlike the one waged during the Cold War. In fact, they may be playing different games. Both lack much experience in dealing directly with the other. American leaders often misunderstand the roots of their behavior, and the characteristics, contradictions, and flaws associated with it, just as Chinese decision-makers do. The Chinese, with their enduring Marxist-Leninist perspective, may be overestimating their ability to predict the future. Moreover, Chinese

71 Ibid, p. 55-6. 72 Yuen Foong Khong, Analogies at War: Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu, and the Vietnam Decisions of 1965 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), p. 136-7. 174 leaders bathed in the logic of the "Cult of Defense" and convinced the country's upward trajectory is the result of a superior strategy, may be inclined to overplay their hand. The current Sino-American relationship is characterized by a lack of understanding, and by overconfidence on both sides. Politics and power matter. Indeed, they are the most important elements in the dynamics; to pretend otherwise would be folly. But the nature of power and politics are unlikely to change in any appreciable way; hence, we should focus on things that can be changed. The United States has long been on top. As is natural, it developed a self-centered perspective fueled by its own accomplishments, the respect it received from less powerful actors, and the fact that victory skewed the historical record to suggest that it was inevitable. China sees itself on a mission to recapture lost greatness, which it believes was sapped more by foreign intrigues than internal decay. This victim mentality, tightly woven into Chinese consciousness, partially explains its behavior vis-a-vis Western powers. It sees the United States as trying to keep it down—the latest in a string of imperialist plans challenging China's right to share top billing. Of course, this line of* reasoning also overlooks many disastrous decisions taken by Mao and earlier leaders, and the fact that China's rise owes much to the fact that Western countries welcomed it into the international system. Both sides are realist at their core, but both also are influenced by many other factors as well. The United States needs to accept the reality that its relative power and ability to shape terms within the international system are in decline. If Americans look on the last half century as more of an anomaly than a preordained or willful achievement, such a transition will be much easier. America will not become a pushover by any means. It will continue to garner tremendous respect and influence. But it will become, over time, one great power among many. On this point, the Chinese have it right.73 The sooner the United States accepts this reality, the better off it will be. The Chinese leadership, for its part, needs honestly to evaluate past successes (and failures) in running risks. To do otherwise may give it unwarranted confidence in its ability to navigate risks in the future. Unfortunately, enhanced economic, political, and military power work against such assessments being made. Indeed, China may feel more

See Pillsbury, China Debates the Future Security Environment. 175 comfortable taking risks now than in the past. When it ran risks in earlier times it could rely on the support of one superpower against the other.74 Now, no such cover exists. The bilateral relationship between the United States and China is dynamic and reciprocal. We would do well to understand the process rather than fall in love with systematic theories and diagrams that mislead us by overgeneralizing the value of generalizations.

Buries and Shulsky, Patterns in China's Use of Force, p. 76. 176

CHAPTER FIVE CHINA COPES WITH A CHANGING ENVIRONMENT

In China, war is the main form of struggle and the army is the main form of organization ... China's problem can not be solved without armed force. —Mao Zedong

China made contributions to the world down through the ages, but for a long time conditions have been at a standstill in China and development has been slow. Now it is time for us to learn from the advanced countries. China cannot develop by closing its door, sticking to the beaten track and being self-complacent. You ask us whether it runs counter to our past traditions to implement the policy of opening to the outside world. Our approach is to define new policies according to new circumstances, while retaining our best traditions2 —Deng Xiaoping

This chapter looks at Chinese efforts to construct an atomic weapon, and its subsequent efforts to apply the insights gained through that endeavor across the entire range of Chinese industry so to increase national power and competitiveness, especially in areas of high technology. It also examines the hurdles which have and will continue to thwart Chinese aspirations to achieve technological self-sufficiency. Finally, this chapter explores some of the mythology surrounding the ideas both of China's rise and America's demise. In the early 1950s, China faced a desperate situation. A century of imperialism, warlordism, civil war, world war, civil war, and a nasty conflict on the Korean peninsula, which pitted the world's most populous country against its wealthiest one, had devastated

1 Zhiling Lin and Thomas W. Robinson, The Chinese and Their Future: Beijing, Taipei, and Hong Kong (Washington, DC: The AEI Press, 1994), p. 69. 2 Deng Xiaoping, as quoted by Michael Pecht, Preface for "China's Electronic Industry," Center for Advanced Life Cycle Engineering, 21 Jun 06, http://www.calce.umd.edu/general/AsianElectronics/pref chn.htm (accessed 10 Mar 08). 177 the country. After Mao's triumph on the mainland, Western nations, led by the United States, treated it like a pariah. The Korean War only aggravated this situation. While the Soviets proved helpful to China in the early years after the Communist victory, that relationship was wrecked by the clash between Mao and Khrushchev's personalities and ambitions. By 1960, China was cut off from outside assistance for the development of high technology. Meanwhile, nuclear weapons, the ultimate symbol of power and prestige, threatened its existence. Mao insisted that China must have these weapons in order to avoid political blackmail by the superpowers. In 1964, the PRC achieved that aim. The way in which China achieved that strategic breakthrough, and the steps it has taken since so to spur innovation, have implications for China's ability to challenge American dominance in space. The quick development of the atomic bomb demonstrated Chinese resourcefulness in the face of external threats and internal decay; these actions shifted the strategic calculus of both superpowers; they altered Chinese conceptions about the nature of power and security; and finally, they taught lessons which, if adopted and applied properly, would let China compete* successfully against the United States in the realm of technological innovation, which increasingly is the coin of modern power. Space enables terrestrial technologies to be leveraged to great effect, both commercially and militarily. Nations which can harness the power of technological innovation have the greatest opportunity to benefit from space. Those which fall behind risk losing that opportunity to a power, or powers, which not only use space, but control it. In the event of conflict, space represents a vantage point like no other. Recent conflicts like the Gulf War, Kosovo, and Iraqi Freedom, all show that space operations can multiply terrestrial power. These facts have not been lost on the Chinese.

The PLA's Central Role in China's Development In early 1987, Qian Xuesen, the father of China's strategic missile program, told a group of fellow scientists that China must steel itself for a century of sustained "intellectual warfare." In the coming century, national power, economic prosperity,

3 Evan A. Feigenbaum, China's Techno-Warriors: National Security and Strategic Competition from the Nuclear to the Information Age (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003), p. 1. 178

military security, and even social welfare—in effect, Comprehensive National Power (CNP, zonghe guoli)—required a country to be at the forefront of science and technology. Should a nation fail to lead in these fields, he insisted, its international standing would slip behind that of other countries. Thus, national self-sufficiency in high technology would be a key determinant both of China's development and its standing in the global balance of power.5 In the West, leaders routinely use sports metaphors to make connections between technology, national power, and purpose.6 In 1961, for example, President John F. Kennedy challenged Americans to brace themselves for a space "race" with the Soviet Union.7 In China, however, military metaphors, not sports analogies, customarily are used for this purpose. In particular, science and technology are viewed as a type of warfare. Progress on the "technology front" often is considered integral to China's

Q standing in the international strategic balance. The centrality of military metaphors in the discourse of Chinese public policy reflects the influence of a long martial history and of Soviet styles of rhetoric, but especially, of the crucial role played by the PLA in * China's rise after 1949. The needs of the military and those who led it were the catalyst for China's technological development up to and after Deng Xiaoping's reforms in the late 1970s. That the PLA played such a role is not unique among armies. In many countries and epochs (though not in every case), a military establishment has served as the driving force behind state-building and industrialization.9 That the military should have played such a role in China, however, is surprising, given Communist ideology, the PLA's deplorable state as it entered the nuclear age, and the abysmal conditions found throughout the country after more than a century of dynastic decay, imperialism, civil

4 Michael Pillsbury, China Debates the Future Security Environment (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2000), http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/china/doctrine/pills2/index.html (accessed 1 Sep 07). 5 Feigenbaum, China's Techno-Warriors, p. 1. 6 David Lai, "Lessons From the Stones: A GO Approach to Mastering China's Strategic Concept, Shi," May 2004, http://www.fas.org/man/eprint/lai.pdf (accessed 8 Jun 07). 7 John F. Kennedy, A Special Address to Congress On The Importance of Space, 25 May 61, http://www.homeofheroes.com/presidents/speeches/kennedv space.html (accessed 12 Jan 08). 8 Feigenbaum, China's Techno-Warriors, p. 1-2. 9 John Brewer, The Sinews of Power: War, Money and the English State, 1688-1783 (London: Unwin Hyman, 1989). 179

strife and war. Despite the signs of backwardness everywhere, in the decades after 1949 China's leaders committed themselves to modernizing their country. Dichotomies abounded. Farmers used ancient techniques to bring in the harvest, while engineers worked to master atomic energy. A state which described nuclear weapons as a "paper tiger" made their pursuit one of its leading objectives. State-directed planning for socialism gave the military the lion's share of China's limited resources. As a result, the nation later became only the fifth country on earth to possess nuclear weapons, while simultaneously experiencing the largest famine in the history of the world.10 Such contradictions and priorities created intense political debates. In particular, they drove the PLA to adopt a form of politics which gave its high-technology forces unusual autonomy and control over resources. Key figures within the PLA's scientific community,11 coupled their petitions for new weapons and technologies, with demands for the development of a set of managerial protocols which aimed to eliminate, or at least to reduce, the bureaucratic morass typical of authoritarian regimes, including the PRC. These figures contended that such* streamlining was necessary in order to achieve the lofty aims sought by the politicians. Even more, they implied that technological progress could be furthered only if scientific principles overrode political dogma. In effect, these militarized scientists demanded autonomy over the processes involved in making China a nuclear power, and that is what they gained. China's leaders wanted so much to acquire nuclear technology that even during the chaos of the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution, the military scientific establishment largely was left alone. Mao himself helped this one body to avoid Maoism.

Vaclav Smil, China's Past, China's Future: Energy, Food, Environment (London: Routledge Curzon, 2004), p. 80. The best demographic reconstructions indicate roughly 30 million people died during the 1959-61 period as a result of The Great Leap Forward, a largely man-made catastrophe. 11 Among its most prominent members: Marshal Nie Rongzhen, architect of China's strategic weapons programs; Qian Xuesen, a pioneering Chinese missile scientist; Liang Shoupan, also a missile pioneer and chief designer of China's anti-ship cruise missiles; Huang Weilu, chief designer of China's solid propellant, submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM); Zhu Guangya, a nuclear weapons administrator and physicist; Ren Xinmin, chief designer of China's liquid propellant rocket engines as well as lead engineer of China's communication satellite programs; Cai Jintao, a missile guidance pioneer; Tu Shou'e, chief designer of China's ICBM; Sun Jiadong, chief designer of remote sensing satellite technology; Yang Jiachi, flight control expert. 12 Brian Harvey, China's Space Program: From Conception to Manned Spaceflight (New York: Springer Praxis Publishing, 2004). 180

The approach and the accomplishments of this community slowly affected those involved in other aspects of China's technological development. Over time, the political leadership generalized the practices it adopted toward these military scientists, to other fields, and the approach became an intrinsic part of the guiding ideology of the state. Chinese leaders adopted this approach from necessity. In 1949, China was a weak state in a world of threats. Even worse, in both the industrial and the nuclear ages, the rapidity of technological change constantly increased the gap between developed and "developing" states. Desperate to re-establish the greatness of China, and forever worried about the intentions of more powerful countries, particularly the United States, Mao and his entourage linked technological prowess inextricably to national power, prestige, and purpose. Initially, they also placed hope in support from the USSR. As years passed, and the Sino-Soviet friendship pact evaporated, however, China felt increasingly isolated. Its policy always, but increasingly, emphasized self-reliance whenever and wherever possible, so as to avoid dependency on or coercion from another state. Though China* necessarily relied upon foreign purchases and expertise for many high technology endeavors, it also consistently aimed to end such dependence. The exponential growth of Chinese industry after Mao's death, and its burgeoning integration with the global economy, gave China the resources needed to fuel military priorities while simultaneously addressing domestic needs. This expansion also provided invaluable experience and indigenous capabilities in case China lost access to foreign technology transfers or expertise, as happened after the end of Soviet assistance in 1960. In fact, China experienced another bout of the strangulation of foreign technology after Tiananmen Square in 1989. While China initially militarized its development of technology because the PRC faced serious external threats after consolidating its grip on power in mainland China, this practice has continued to the present, albeit in a more subtle form, despite a more benign international environment. Past successes with this approach have reinforced its significance; inertia and entrenched thinking have perpetuated these policies, as have continued Chinese weakness in many areas. The Chinese are unwilling to believe that tranquility in the present will continue for long. 181

They continue to maintain a siege mentality regarding technological development as a hedge against an uncertain and dangerous future. The hostile environment faced by Communist China stemmed from the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union, the zero-sum thinking which accompanied it, and the nature of power. In the atomic age, technological sophistication was at a premium. A nation's power was evaluated through the lens of technological prowess. Nuclear weapons represented the pinnacle of strategic power. In the Cold War, relative power was fundamental to China's very existence. This linkage between technological prowess and strategic power was strengthened by the intimidation tactics which the United States used against China in the Korean War and the Taiwan Strait crises. In both cases, Washington threatened the use of nuclear weapons unless China abandoned policies which its leaders thought were justified, and American pressure did deter China. Ultimately, these factors convinced the Communist leadership that China needed not only the bomb, but also the ability to produce it indigenously, so to avoid dependence on other nations. They came to see sophisticated technology as an integral * part of their grand strategy and power, with self-reliance as the means to maintain independence.13 However, this goal of self-reliance has been buffeted by internal contradictions. China's technological and economic policies always have been shaped by a strong undercurrent of nationalism. Though some roots for this attitude can be traced back several centuries, most of it stems from the more recent experiences of China's "century of shame and humiliation. " This desire for autonomy also has been limited by the reality of China's economic and technological backwardness. As Deng Xiaoping and others attempted to integrate China into the global economy, so to strengthen their country, they also had to bow to pressure from the international system which collided with Chinese nationalism. Amid these constraints, both external and internal, visionaries within the PLA's nuclear weapons development program attempted to coordinate the imperatives of national security and economic development into a highest common denominator

13 Feigenbaum, China's Techno-Warriors, p. 4. 182 compromise, rather than through means which unnecessarily harmed one of them. Unfortunately for China, the best laid plans often went astray. Imaginative leaders within the PLA, most notably Marshal Nie Rongzhen, were charged with developing China's nuclear weapons program. As Chinese historian Evan Feigenbaum notes, these men advocated, in the context of Chinese decision-making, organizations with relatively flat hierarchies and substantial horizontal coordination across bureaucratic fiefdoms; competition; networking; free exchange of ideas; peer review; standards-based metrics; the encouragement of risk-taking behavior; and political acceptance of failure.14 They also insisted that China's industrial base must, first and foremost, serve the needs of the strategic weapons programs, while commercial or domestic concerns needed to take a back seat. In order to achieve their proposal, a large share of China's limited resources were directed toward enterprises which primarily benefited military priorities, often without offering significant residual benefits to the economy at large. This outcome contradicted the PLA's promises to the senior leadership. So too, despite their best efforts, top-down management often corrupted* promising beginnings. Together, these influences undermined the vibrancy of the economy, which Chinese leaders had hoped would provide the ingenuity, innovation, and growth needed to make China a great power. Even after the decision of January 1955 to pursue a nuclear deterrent, Chinese decision-makers still were divided over how to accomplish the goal. The strategic weapons community supported a directed strategy of investment in critical high technology areas, which, they loosely assured Party leaders, would spill over to the larger economy. In effect, they argued, although national security concerns should take precedence, still to meet them would aid the development of the larger economy. For advocates of this idea, frequently called "technonationalism, "15 China's relative standing among the world powers should guide choices for economic investment. The aspiration

14 Ibid, p. 6. 15 David Kang and Adam Segal, "The Siren Song of Technonationalism," Far Eastern Economic Review, March 2006, http://www.feer.com/articlesl/2006/0603/free/p005.html (accessed 18 Jan 08). Also see Dennis Posadas, "The dark side of Asia's technonationalism," Asia Media, 24 Jul 06. Chalmers A. Johnson, in his book, MITI and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth of Industrial Policy, 1925-1975 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1982) gives this idea a different name. He calls it a "plan- rational" system and popularizes a related term, the "developmental state," in this instance, Japan, as opposed to the "regulatory state" reflected by such economies as the United States and Great Britain. 183

to be free of Western dependence was strong. Chinese leaders saw the role of the state as going beyond market maintenance. Mao and others believed in continuous, active intervention by the state in economic affairs to enhance international competitiveness and socialism. However, this strategy, which focused on sophisticated technologies, faced sustained opposition from various groups who argued that China's scarce resources should be focused on more rudimentary and widely applicable technologies. Ultimately, the nuclear weapons elite largely achieved its aims, thanks to patronage from the highest echelons of the CCP, but still it faced continual assaults from parties favoring a different approach, and suffered occasional setbacks. David Kang and Adam Segal define technonationalism as "the desire of Asian states to free themselves from dependence on Western technologies." It has parallels to mercantilism, an economic approach which is rejected by mainstream Western economic thought. Mercantilism, though not an economic theory per se, involved a pragmatic, government-led tweaking of the economy. From 1600 and 1800, Western Europe generally operated under some form of mercantilism. It generated a collection of* economic regulations engineered to maintain and enhance a particular state's prosperity at the expense of others. Among its basic assertions was the idea that the volume of global trade was fixed, that any state and national economy could grow only at the expense of others, while a government should aim for a positive balance of trade. To accomplish these aims, mercantilists advocated government intervention thru protectionism and tariffs—encouraging exports and discouraging imports. The intent was to focus limited resources toward chosen industries, so to increase a nation's relative power in areas deemed critical for national security and power. This zero-sum thinking often manifested itself thru actions that contradicted market forces and violated a basic tenet of classical, or laissez-faire, economics: that the state lacks the collective intelligence to be more efficient than the market. In reality, state intervention into the workings of the market often produce massive distortions with regard to resource allocation resulting in gross inefficiencies across the economy. The state's proper role, according to classical theorists, should entail setting rules to define the framework of the

Dennis Posadas, "Is there technonationalism in the Philippines?" Business World, 9 May 06, http://www.itmatters.com.ph/columns.php?id=posadas 050906 (accessed 18 Jan 08). 184 economy and help it operate smoothly, but not to directing from above what or how much to produce. Chinese technonationalism, a variation on mercantilism, differs from neo­ classical economics in its view of the role of government and, importantly, of the system itself. Whereas neo-classical economic thought focuses on creating efficiency, neo- mercantilism tries to target effectiveness, particularly by focusing investments into high technology areas which produce advanced military equipment. Advocates of each approach can point to the advantages of their favored model; and critics certainly can identify the drawbacks or inconsistencies in the rival approach. The Chinese have had mixed success with their particular approach to technological autonomy and economic growth. The strategic weapons community developed its bias for high-technology during the Korean War. The hammering taken by the PLA during repeated confrontations with United Nations forces, particularly American ones, showed how backward it was. This experience shattered long-held myths about the superiority of the Chinese or the Communist fighting man and forced a heated debate about how the PLA could improve * itself. Analysis of the experiences in Korea produced three themes in the PLA: increasing demands for Soviet assistance, which created dependency on Moscow; doctrinal deliberations, that created an opening for those who demanded that China pursue advanced technology; and Chinese frustration with Soviet assistance, sparking a desire for indigenous production capabilities. Meanwhile, a group within the political leadership accepted the ideas espoused by leading PLA thinkers. Despite his rhetoric to the contrary—Maoist doctrine always emphasized the superiority of spirit and manpower over weapons and technology—Mao was the chief patron of this group, led by Marshals Peng Dehuai (the PLA commander in Korea), Liu Bocheng (a revolutionary hero and head of the influential military academy at Nanjing) and Nie Rongzhen (who oversaw the strategic weapons programs). Liu gave expression to the consensus that warfare had changed with the introduction of new technologies and so too, the PLA must adapt. However pedestrian this insight, it

John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai, China Builds the Bomb (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1988). 185

challenged decades of Maoist doctrine and thinking within the PLA officer corps. Precisely because it was pedestrian, however, it offered vague guidance for the future. Though united by the conviction that "People's War" in a pure form could not always overcome superior firepower, Peng and Rongzhen were split over how best to proceed. Peng wanted to focus on the modernization of conventional forces, so to increase the PLA's capabilities on the battlefield, while Nie wished to emphasize strategic weapons so to bolster China's deterrent power. Subsequent reductions in military funding exacerbated the debate, as bureaucrats attempted to cut spending drastically across the board. Supporters of conventional modernization used this opportunity to argue for a reduction of investment in strategic programs. Only in 1959, when Peng was purged from power, succeeded by weaker figures (Marshal He Long and General Luo Ruiqing, Chief of the PLA General Staff), and the Great Leap Forward was in full swing, creating havoc across China and its economy, did Nie's proposal gain momentum. Nie's genius lay in the way he framed his program. He argued that strategic* weaponization, beyond giving China a viable deterrent, also would significantly benefit the economy. Despite the vagueness of this argument, it resonated with Mao, who benchmarked Chinese progress against strategic competitors, just as Stalin favored the development of heavy industry rather than consumer goods. To connect technological achievements and a country's standing in the world was not a new approach. Its roots can be found in the arguments of the early mercantilists. Among its advocates were men ranging from Vladimir Lenin and Josef Stalin to Herbert Hoover. After the Second World War, however, such doctrines became stronger as the Cold War, and the need each superpower felt to demonstrate the superiority of its system to all comers, intensified.19 Caught between these competitors, the Chinese came to adopt their ideas about how to view their rank in the international system. Additionally, there

Harry Harding, China's Second Revolution: Reform After Mao (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1987), p. 16. 19 Walter A. McDougall, The Heavens and the Earth: A Political History of the Space Age (New York: Basic Books, 1985). Also see Hal Bowser, "How the Space Race Changed America," Invention & Technology Magazine, Fall 1987, Volume 3, Issue 2, http://www.americanheritage.eom/articles/magazine/it/1987/2/1987 2 24 print.shtml(accessed21 Jan 08). 186 was an Asian precedent for this idea, and the pursuit of a militarized economy, in the Japanese experience. During Mao's tenure in power, the Chinese version of technonationalism, which involved indigenization and nurturing of promising technology, became critical facets of China's national policy. The term "indigenization" means absorption and mastery of the sophisticated techniques in the host of sub-fields necessary to consistently produce world-class production of a particular good. However, not until after Mao died, and Deng Xiaoping ushered in a new model for interaction with the global economy, did China fully adopt a key part of the strategic weaponeers' argument—the means to achieve indigenization. In Mao's vision, indigenization was a crucial matter, but a distant second to independence. Its pursuit was crippled by the Sino-Soviet split. International events pushed China into autarky (a "closed" economy with little or no interaction with the larger global economy, such as North Korea has in 2008) far earlier than military scientists had anticipated, leaving Chinese research and development on its own. Nie and his associates coupled not merely security and economic modernization, they also pushed for a more Westernized system of organization—though couched in politically correct verbiage—which entailed devolution of decision-making power; systemic collaboration across institutional boundaries; flat, non-hierarchical organizational structures; and standardization and benchmarking against recognized international standards. As this approach conflicted with Mao's ideas of political economy, it was tough to sell. Because of political repression, until the early 1980s, this initiative was not widely adopted outside of strategic weapons programs. For the strategic weaponeers, this approach offered significant benefits: it paralleled highly successful and widespread Western patterns of interaction; it became responsible for China's greatest technology gains since the founding of the PRC; it elevated the importance of scientists, technicians, and engineers; and it created an open and flexible alternative to the stifling bureaucratic model more typical of Chinese technology

Richard J. Samuels, Rich Nation, Strong Army: National Security and the Technological Transformation of Japan (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1994). 187

sectors. While unable to gain widespread acceptance for this radical departure from Party orthodoxy, Nie did create a sheltered world for his community. Inside this protected realm, scientists largely were immune from the chaotic influences afflicting Chinese society at large, and from the languishing influences of Maoism.22 Routinely, Nie was able to bring the best minds working in other fields into the strategic weapons fold. Of course, all these actions magnified the gap between his community and those in civilian sectors or working with conventional weapons. Nie also established a system whereby his chief weapons designers regularly met the inner circle of the CCP's leadership. The conventional weapons sector enjoyed no such access or protection from the extremes of Maoist theory or practice. Its lack of achievements between 1949 and 1979 reflected those disparities. Not that Nie's system worked without friction or setbacks. Despite their insulated environment, the Great Leap Forward still corrupted the work of his strategic weaponeers. Nie himself lamented how this social experiment fostered a "lack of respect for the objective laws governing research" even among elite members of China's* strategic weapons programs.24 By 1960, politically-charged interference had become so widespread that Nie felt compelled to assess the damage within his directorates. What he discovered was disturbing. Most scientists were able to spend less than half their time conducting research, with the rest divided between, and wasted by, political study and manual labor.25 Nie used his privileged position within the Party hierarchy to end the incessant politicalization of science, by convincing Party leaders that such actions would only derail progress toward their highest priority, the bomb. Nie also moved on other fronts to further his agenda. First, he and his chief scientists drafted guidelines, intended to redefine the balance between bureaucrats and scientists

21 Samuels, p. 40 22 Feigenbaum, China's Techno-Warriors, p. 45. 23 Michael D. Swaine, The Role of the Chinese Military in National Security Policymaking (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1998). 24 Feigenbaum, China's Techno-Warriors, p. 46. 25 "China and Weapons of Mass Destruction: Implications for the United States," National Intelligence Council, 5 Nov 99, http://www.dni.gov/nic/confreports chinawmd.html (accessed 19 Jan 08). Also see "China—A Country Study: 'Reds' Versus 'Experts' in the 1950s and 1960s," http://www.country- data.eom/frd/cs/cntoc.html#cn025 8 (accessed 3 Jan 08). 188

which were codified under The Fourteen Points on Scientific Work. Mao's approval of these guidelines, and the principle that the physical and engineering "science[s] had no class character "21 reflected his grudging acknowledgement that the Great Leap Forward had damaged scientific endeavors. Second, so to overcome this damage, Nie pressed for the appointment of technicians, rather than apparachiks, to senior-level managerial positions throughout industry, who appreciated the needs of engineers and would act according to the dictates of science. Third, he strove to overcome the lack of coordination resulting from excessively vertical bureaucratic channels of information. He did so by inaugurating a steady stream of reforms which stood Chinese bureaucratic organizational thinking on its head, or more precisely, on its side. Horizontal coordination, putting experts in contact with other experts, was his aim. PRC patterns of organization conventionally contained excessive administrative layers and inflexible chains of command. He replaced them with institutionalized means for communicating across technical areas and between senior scientists and top Party officials. Finally, the strategic weapons community gauged its progress against international standards. This * move was aided by placing technicians in the administrative echelons of the strategic weapons program, who facilitated the development of a culture committed to benchmarking and experimentation—completely unlike most of the Chinese system. Reforming the administrative structure was crucial, but in itself insufficient to ensure the task at hand. A lack of basic infrastructure and of trained personnel hobbled early efforts to master advanced technologies. Unlike the United States, which began the Manhattan Project with a large pool of homegrown and expatriate scientists, or the Soviet Union, which launched a crash program in 1943, China had little infrastructure, personnel, funding, or research programs to aid its development of nuclear weapons. It had missed out on the "happy Thirties" in nuclear physics, referring to the terrific breakthroughs experienced in this field over that decade, rather than the political events of the time.28 China tried to build the bomb with a small contingent of physicists who

26 Deng Xiaoping, "Some Comments on Work and Science," People's Daily, 8 Aug 77, http://english.peopledailv.com.cn/dengxp/vol2/text/bll30.html (accessed 23 Jan 08). 27 Sigrid Schmalzer, "On the Appropriate Use of Rose-Colored Glasses: Reflections on Science in Socialist China," Isis, 2007, 98: p. 581. 28 Gerald E. Brown and Chang-Hwan Lee, eds., Hans Bethe And His Physics (London: World Scientific Publishing Co, Pic, 2006), p. 144. 189 had been trained in foreign lands by leading scientists. To augment this small cadre of specialists, the strategic weapons program drafted large segments of the Chinese university system, including many of its brightest stars. That Nie and his clan could gain so large a share of such small resources reflected the urgency of the project, and the importance which Mao and others attached to the advancement of science and technology. Between 1949 and 1976, Marshal Nie and other like-minded scientists forged a legacy of success with strategic weapons. These successes and the political and organizational changes institutionalized under the aegis of Nie and his Politburo supporters, was no small feat, given the constant turmoil taking place in China. By the time of Mao's death, Nie's efforts to link national power to economic modernization had become orthodox in Chinese thought and would remain so even as China's new leaders, especially Deng Xiaoping, redirected the country's attention toward economic growth, and a new strategy to achieve it. Mao's geopolitical strategy, with its distorted investment priorities and fixation on* benchmarking against the strategic technologies of the superpowers, produced many technical breakthroughs in highly specialized areas. However, it also fostered extraordinary backwardness in industry at large, agriculture, and basic infrastructure. The reformers who followed him sought to remedy these failures by shifting China's policies and resources to support a greater expansion of the basic economy. This change in priorities challenged the privileged position of the strategic weapons community. It must adapt to stay influential, even if not necessarily on top. Though the bases were moving, the game remained the same: power and influence. In this game, the strategic weaponeers had lost some cards, but held one which rose in power: having escaped the excesses of the Cultural Revolution, which had decimated the ranks of scientists in so many fields of expertise, they represented, far and away, the group of technicians best- suited to re-orient China's economic backwardness. But this advantage did not produce a blank check for Nie and his agenda, or maintain the primacy of strategic weapons development. The re-orientation of Chinese strategy, away from a focus on the military, and specifically on high-technology, strategic weapons, was due primarily to China's improving geostrategic position. This 190 improvement was attributable to greater stabilization in superpower relations, as well as to China's adroit foreign policy and its possession of atomic power. For all of his gargantuan domestic missteps, Mao and his associates still had forged a geostrategic position which removed China from immediate threat. Meanwhile, many senior politicians and military leaders sensed that Nie's development strategy had provided a modest nuclear deterrent, but little else. Together, a more benign external environment and growing frustration with China's internal malaise undermined the logic for continued large investments in strategic technology.

Changing Course The change in focus began during Mao's final years. The chaos wrought by the Cultural Revolution and its aftermath robbed Maoism of its legitimacy. This disastrous social experiment, ill-conceived and brutishly carried out, brought China to the brink of anarchy, pitting the young and rebellious against the established order, neglecting industry until it virtually collapsed, and squashing intellectual progress. The results* horrified even most of the revolutionary stalwarts who "engineered" the Cultural Revolution. In their desperate attempts to find people competent to restore normalcy, they rehabilitated many previously purged officials; these included Deng Xiaoping, a twice-purged veteran leader. Mao's self-appointed successor, Hua Guofeng paled next to the resurrected Deng. Hua, plucked from obscurity and without a credible Long March pedigree, had Mao's blessing, but limited capability. By contrast, Deng drew upon his revolutionary credentials, experience, old alliances, a lack of responsibility for the Cultural Revolution, and a vision of a new China. Deng marginalized Hua within two years of his return to the CCP leadership. Once in command, Deng reversed China's direction in foreign policy and its domestic priorities. He did so by changing Mao's emphasis on military and capital-intensive industries, instead targeting the production of consumer goods, which were treated as a stepping stone to more sophisticated production later on. In order to establish support for this wholesale realignment, Deng pointed both to the failures of Maoism, and to China's

Feigenbaum, China's Techno-Warriors, p. 72. 191

increasingly benign external environment. Convincing his audience that Maoism had failed was not difficult, while Nixon's visit showed that China could use the United States to balance the Soviet Union. For the first time since the founding of the People's Republic of China, the country was not engaged in a struggle for survival. Metaphorically speaking, China could breathe, drink in new ideas, and seek new ways to exploit a stable international setting. This change in priorities initially angered the strategic weapons community, because it threatened their power, along with that of the PL A in general. To ease the blow, and to win this elite group over to his cause, Deng advocated a greater role for science and technology in national development, along with more government funding for research that could benefit the economy. This threw a life belt to the strategic weaponeers, but not a guarantee of a cherished place in the new order. While embracing Nie's faith in high- technology, Deng wanted to eliminate the political dominance of the Marshal's community over national research and development. Deng was able to achieve all these aims because he had been a chief patron of the strategic elites in earlier years, and * retained much stature in the PLA. It is unlikely that anyone other than himself or Mao would have effected the changes Deng proposed. Certainly, these strategic elites defeated an effort in 1976-77 by Hua Guofeng to change spending priorities in a similar direction. In 1975, with Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai both nearing death, Deng was recalled to active duty to serve as Chief of the PLA General Staff. During this period he observed, up close, how ineffective had become even the PLA, a relatively well-financed and autonomous organization. China's development, he insisted, could not continue to be hobbled by a military-led agenda. Instead, consolidation and reorganization would best achieve military preparedness. He wanted to slash the size of the PLA so to make it more nimble and effective.

Our army has fine traditions ... However, it was thrown into considerable chaos after Lin Biao was put in charge of army work in 1959, and especially in the later period under him. Now, many fine traditions have been discarded and the army is seriously bloated organizationally. The size of the armed forces has increased substantially and military 192

expenditures take up a larger proportion of the state budget than before, with a lot of money being spent just on food and clothing. What is more important is that an over- expanded and inefficient army is not combat-worthy. I think that the overwhelming majority of our army comrades are dissatisfied with the present state of affairs. It is for this reason that Comrade Mao Zedong has called for the consolidation of the army. We must reduce the size of our armed forces, confront the problem of extensive over staffing and restore the army's fine traditions.

As Deng worked to solidify consensus around his reforms, he argued that the nation must reward professionalism, adhere to scientific principles and overcome the reflexive temptation to denounce science and scientists as elitist. All this was music to the ears of a scientific community long forced to operate under the stagnating influence of Maoist ideology. Deng denounced the idea of untrained Party apparatchiks occupying places of authority throughout the system, generalizing to other sectors Marshal Nie's repeated efforts to give scientists and technicians, rather than bureaucrats, the central role in,, decision-making. When he spoke at the historic 1978 National Science Convention, Deng insisted that scientists and technicians, not Party officials should control research. The Party should maintain oversight and intervene to alleviate administrative or logistical problems, but leadership must reside with professionals, not the Party.

We must create within the party an atmosphere that allows us to ... oppose the false notion that intellectual work is not worthy of respect. Whether or not work is mental or manual, it is labor. People engaged in mental work are also laborers. In the future, it will become harder to distinguish between these two forms of work

He reinforced his argument by invoking Marxist theory; Marx, he contended, recognized science and technology as "productive forces." By inference, those opposed to his idea did not understand Marxist theory. Deng's forthright legitimization of science, and the

Deng Xiaoping, "The Army Needs to be Consolidated," People's Daily, 25 Jan 75, http://english.peopledailv.com.en/dengxp/vol2/text/b 1010.html (accessed 28 Jan 08). 31 Deng Xiaoping, as quoted in Martin King Whyte, "Deng Xiaoping: The Social Reformer," The China Quarterly, No. 135 Special Issue: Deng Xiaoping: An Assessment, Sep 1993, p. 515-535. 193 scientific method, led to its increasing use in everything from forecasting, to economic and social planning, to calculations of Comprehensive National Power (CNP). Deng Xiaoping's efforts at reform produced respect for science and generalized the managerial innovations which Nie had championed for the strategic weapons community, but they also undercut Nie's strategy for development. This realignment of priorities began before Deng consolidated his grip on power. In late 1977, the top Party leaders decided to give primacy to the goal of conventional military modernization, reversing the previous bias toward strategic weapons programs, while also recommending that Nie's managerial initiatives be adopted across the gamut of Chinese military and industrial production. Thus, in an ironic twist of events, the agenda of the strategic weapons elite suffered a major setback precisely while their managerial innovations became the template for national development. As the PLA was made smaller and more professional, the modernization of ground forces took center stage. Not surprisingly, these units were among the PLA forces which had lacked a meaningful link to strategic weapons programs. Unfortunately for China, * this shift in preferences for modernization came too late to help its forces in the quick, but embarrassing, 1979 border war with Vietnam. That debacle laid bare to the world the deterioration within the PLA's conventional forces, and also showed the limits to the value of strategic forces. So far as Hanoi was concerned, Chinese nuclear forces were a "paper tiger." Deng's shift in favor of the modernization of conventional forces and the demilitarization of national policy about science and technology, threatened to become a two-pronged assault on the strategic weaponeers' agenda, which easily might make them irrelevant. Unless they could find a new niche, conventional weapons specialists likely would take control over the agenda for military technology. To preclude that development, the strategic weapons community began to rethink the role of high technology. For a group which had given China nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles, and satellites, the transition in thinking was difficult, but necessary. To accommodate these new developments, while still justifying their dominance over research and development for conventional weapons, the strategic weaponeers championed microelectronics, which, they argued, were increasingly essential to all modern weapons, not just strategic ones. 194

Not coincidentally, expertise in microelectronics was almost exclusively associated with Nie's programs. Yet their proposal had added appeal for reformers because electronics applications would benefit the entire economy, not just narrowly-defined military functions. Nor did Deng and his allies break with Nie's group. As Deng worked to consolidate power, Maoist radicals continued to criticize scientists and technicians, which inadvertently supported the "revolutionary" managerial innovations introduced by Nie. In stark contrast to every other facet of the Chinese economy during the Cultural Revolution, Nie's programs, insulated from chaos, had delivered high profile successes. Now, with the ruinous Cultural Revolution behind them, the CCP wished to bolster its own legitimacy and China's battered economy. For Deng, the strategic weapons programs represented a viable alternative to Mao's discredited forms of political economy. Mao's centrally-planned political economy, prone to indiscriminate execution and episodic extremism, was the antithesis of Nie's model, which embodied professionalism, flexibility, cooperation, collaboration, and risk-taking. Deng rejected * Maoist strategy for development and held up Nie's model as worthy of emulation, though he saw room for improvement. On January 16, 1980, Deng defined his agenda for the next two decades in a speech titled "The Present Situation and the Tasks Before Us" (Muqian de xingshi he renwu). Its ideas owed much to the late premier, Zhou Enlai, who had promoted the notion of Four Modernizations (si ge xian dai hud) consisting of agriculture, industry, science and technology, and national defense. Repeatedly, Deng emphasized that economic development must have the highest priority.

... in a nutshell, the four modernizations mean economic construction. Without sound economic foundations, it will be impossible to modernize our national defense, and science and technology should primarily serve economic construction ... Everything depends on our doing the work in our own country well. Already our international role is

Feigenbaum, China's Techno-Warriors, p. 82-85. 195

not insignificant. With a stronger material base, we will be able to enhance it... economic development is primary33

In effect, he said, Nie Rongzhen had been wrong to argue that a military industrial base could forge a national economic base. Instead, Deng held that a strong military could be achieved only on the shoulders of a strong economy. While he admired Nie's means to organize science, he criticized the return it had provided for the investment it had received. To convince the PLA about these ideas was not easy. In order to achieve this ambitious transition, Deng employed the same techniques for coalition-building that he had used to support the modernization of conventional forces a few years earlier. He used as levers his own stature within the Party, and the performance of the PLA during the border war with Vietnam. Deng's political skills and the marshals grudging realization that the PLA's aspirations for the future required the development of a broader national infrastructure shaped a consensus that things must change. Still, Andrew Scobell < and Larry Wortzel note, "the so-called military 'reform' undertaken by the PLA in the 1980s was marginal in the sense that it hardly touched on issues of technology and related military theory. " Later, "Beijing used the Gulf War deliberately to underline and advertise its military weakness rather than vice versa. " The logic behind Deng's low ranking of national security within the Four Modernizations, and the key to its acceptance by the PLA, was that peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region allowed China to feel more secure. Present tranquility35 gave China a unique opportunity to reposition itself at small risk, he argued. Not since the Opium Wars had China been able to contemplate much more than survival. Carpe diem! was his mantra. It is hard to predict what may happen internationally ...We believe, of course, that world war can be put off and peace maintained for a longer time if the struggle against hegemonism is carried on effectively. This is possible, and it is precisely what we are working for.

33 Deng Xiaoping, "The Present Situation and the Tasks Before Us," People's Daily, 16 Jan 80, http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/dengxp/vol2/text/bl390.html (accessed 30 Jan 08). 34 Andrew Scobell and Larry M. Wortzel, eds., Chinese National Security: Decisionmaking Under Stress (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2005), p. 208. 35 Michael Pillsbury, China Debates the Future Security Environment 196

Like the people of the rest of the world, we really need a peaceful environment, and thus, for the interest of our own country the goal of our foreign policy is a peaceful environment for achieving the four modernizations ... We want to achieve the four modernizations by the end of this century ...

Given his assessment of the favorable international scene, possibly as an enticement to the military, Deng even held out the prospect of re-unification in the near future with Taiwan . However, during the 1980s, while indicating that reunification was a national goal, and without rejecting the use of force to make it happen, Deng confined China's activities to mundane personal and commercial exchanges designed to increase transactions between itself and Taiwan, while publicizing China's policy of "one country, two systems " (yiguo liangzhi)38 as a foundation for peaceful reunification. Following the successful testing of China's first submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) in 1982, the process of defense conversion accelerated. The PLA, and* especially the strategic weapons community, began to feel the effects of Deng's reallocation policy resources away from military investment. In late 1984, at a meeting of the Central Military Commission (CMC), Deng announced that all industry, including most military producers, excluding only their most specialized aspects and associated research, should focus on civilian production.39 After the high-technology iron rice bowl was broken, most military industries had to learn how to stand on their own feet, without previous levels of subsidization from the central government. At first, most leaders of defense industry believed that excess capacity could be redirected toward the manufacture of light industrial or commercial products, which would find an easy market in the population. Such notions soon proved optimistic. Lacking consumer information or sales experience, these new entrants to capitalism were unprepared to compete effectively. Deng's reordering of priorities caused a shift of attention toward coastal

Deng Xiaoping, "The Present Situation and the Tasks Before Us" "Ibid. 38 "China Facts and Figures," 2006, China.org.cn, http://www.china.org.cn/english/features/china/203730.htm (accessed 31 Jan 08). 39 Evan Medeiros, et al, Modernizing China's Military: Opportunities and Constraints (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2005). 197

areas, where most of the population lived. Military production facilities, however, were disproportionately located in China's interior, away from markets for their commercial products. The segments of the military production system which were hardest hit were those focused on simpler products (engines, replacement parts, etc.) routinely used by the military, but redundant in this period of austerity. This dramatic, but largely unscripted, reform, caused massive underemployment among large swathes of the military industrial workforce.40 In 1985, seven years after the political decision to shift China's focus on development, the CMC authorized a 1,000,000 man reduction in the size of the PLA. This decision was in accord with the CMC's assessment that the likelihood of conflict in the foreseeable future was low, and also followed the doctrinal shift from "People's War," to "People's War Under Modern Conditions," to "People's War Under High Technology Conditions. " The decision to cut PLA personnel from 4.5 million to roughly three million stemmed from the benign international environment and the desire to create a leaner, better-equipped, combat-ready force, fit for strategic realities. * The shift in emphasis toward economic development was hastened by the mounting evidence that in the Mao era, China had failed to keep pace with international progress. Beginning in the mid-1960s, in industrialized countries throughout the West, the scale of innovation began to tip in the direction of the civilian sector. At the root of this change was the development of microelectronics, semiconductors and integrated circuits. The epicenter for these revolutionary advances was an area which would later be known as "Silicon Valley."41 This major change missed China, until after the opening up to the West following Nixon's 1972 visit. It had no significance on Deng's rise to power, but it did shape the use of his opportunities. In the years following Deng's consolidation of power, high-ranking patrons of the strategic weapons programs began to retire or die in rapid succession, including Marshal Nie. This development forced the strategic weapons community to find new levers for influence on policy and planning for technology. Deng's demilitarization of technology

Feigenbaum, China's Techno-Warriors, p. 101. 41 Tom Abate, "High-tech culture of Silicon Valley originally formed around radio," SFGate.com, 30 Sep Q7.hltp://www.sfgatexom/cgi-bin/articlexgi?file=/c/a/2007/09/30/MNDTSEMSJ.DTL&tvpe=prmtabk (accessed 1 Feb 08). 198

planning, however, and his efforts to de-politicize the PLA, meant the strategic weaponeers were unlikely to recover the influence they had once enjoyed. During the reign of first-generation leaders like Mao, Zhou and Nie, informal relationships had governed the handling of many issues. Under second or third generation leaders, who lacked the prestige of their predecessors drawn from the great struggles which forged the PRC, decisions became increasingly bureaucratic. Newer leaders increasingly were beholden to their bureacracies; their formal posts were their source of influence. Hence, they were less willing, or able, to dispense favors for groups like the strategic weaponeers, lying outside their own bureaucratic lanes. To complicate matters further, the 1977 decision to give priority to conventional military modernization moved acquisition decisions closer to the end users, represented by the General Staff Department (GSD). In 1982, as part of the reforms unleashed by Deng, the Commission on Science, Technology, and Industry for National Defense (COSTIND) was created in order to eliminate barriers between civilian and military research, development and industry.42 * Before this decision, military science and industry had been secretive, segregated, and privileged, with material, financial, and personnel resources unavailable to the civilian sector. Chinese leaders hoped that COSTIND would facilitate the transfer of technology between the military and civilian sectors.43 Cadres from the strategic weapons elite were the natural choice to head COSTIND. Superficially, it appeared that the strategic weaponeers again controlled the commanding heights of military industry. But as the 1980s unfolded, that body failed to control technology decisions, mainly because the political landscape had become less driven by personality. When Marshal Nie had led the National Defense Scientific and Technological Commission (NDSTC), he had been a member of the highest military council who, at times, shared operational control of the PLA. As a former chief of the PLA general staff, he could counterbalance his bureaucratic weakness by talking directly with Mao and others. By contrast, in the 1980s, COSTIND's director was not even a

42 Shirley A. Kan, "Commission of Science, Technology, and Industry for National Defense (COSTIND) and Defense Industries," 96-889 F, Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress, 3 Dec 97, http://countingcalifornia.cdlib.org/crs/pdf/96-889.pdf (accessed 2 Feb 08). 43 "Commission on Science, Technology, and National Defense Industry (COSTIND)," Federation of 199 member of the CMC, where many bureaucratic rivals, including senior PLA generals, occupied key positions. For many reasons, the time was ripe for strategic weaponeers to branch out from their heretofore exclusively military focus. In 1984, China's State Council issued a report which highlighted several areas which it deemed crucial for the nation's future development including: information technology, space, aviation, and nuclear technologies. The strategic weapons community had pioneered Chinese research in each of these fields. The report emphasized that while these technologies had military applications, their greatest utility lay with their potential civilian applications. Henceforth, future development of such projects would be evaluated on the basis of their potential for dual use and the economic benefits they were likely provide.44 This position represented a quantum shift in technology policy. By emphasizing the importance of the ease with which technologies could be integrated into commercial sectors, China's leaders turned older thinking on its head. They clearly rejected Nie's research and development system, which, its detractors contended, ignored the economic * benefits of high-tech pursuits. Although a new crop of strategic weapons leaders addressed these criticisms, the latter were supported by yawning backwardness in many areas of the economy. Furthermore, given the international dynamics of the mid-1980s, it appears that Beijing felt that the past accomplishments of the strategic weaponeers would have diminishing relevance in the twenty-first century. In 1985, the State Council issued The Decision on the Reform of the Science and Technology Management System, which argued:

Modern science and technology constitute the most dynamic and decisive factors in the new productive forces We should reform China's science and technology management system resolutely and step by step in accordance with the strategic principle that our economic construction rely on science and technology and that our scientific and technological work must be oriented to economic construction .... Regarding the operating

44 Michael Pillsbury, "China's Progress in Technological Competitiveness: the Need for a New Assessment," A report prepared for the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 21 Apr 05, http://www.uscc.gov/researchpapers/2005/05 04 21 technological progress.pdf (accessed 21 Feb 08). 200

mechanism, it entails reforming the funding system, exploiting the technology market and overcoming the defects of relying on purely administrative means in science and technology management, with the state undertaking too much and exercising too rigid a control .... We should promote the commercialization of technological achievements and exploit the technology market so as to suit the needs of the socialist commodity market ... emphasis should be placed on encouraging partnership between research, educational and designing institutions on the one hand and production units on the other and on strengthening the enterprises' capability for technology absorption and development. ... it is necessary to deploy our scientific research forces rationally and in depth. More decision-making power should be granted to research institutes, and micromanagement of scientific and technological work by government organs should be improved. Opening to the outside world and establishing contact with other countries is a basic and long-term policy in China's scientific and technological development. Management of scientific and technological personnel should be reformed to create a situation favorable to the emergence of large numbers of talented people who can put their specialized knowledge to best use.

The strategic weaponeers were being marginalized by the PLA General Staff and the State Science and Technology Commission (SSTC), which sought to govern the agendas for military and civilian technology planning. These challenges caused self-searching in the strategic weapons community and so did the insights gained from increased international exchanges. Work alongside foreign scientists via exchanges and through international conferences, allowed Chinese scientists to benchmark their progress in all fields. It became obvious that China was far behind global standards, and that Nie's focus on strategic technology, and its ill-defined spin-off philosophy, had become obsolete—if indeed, it ever had been appropriate. An important early exchange occurred when William Perry visited China as the US Undersecretary of Defense for Research and Engineering. Perry, in both private industry and government, was closely linked to the development of "smart" weapons and stealth

45 State Science and Technology Commission, "The Decision on the Reform of the Science and Technology Management System," The International Development Research Centre, March 1985, http://www.idrc.org.sg/en/ev-55185-201-l-DO TOPlC.html (accessed 3 Feb 08). 201 technology. His arrival in China stemmed both from China's opening to the West, and from American concerns about the Soviet military buildup in the Far East. Hence, his visit was intended to help the Chinese develop their military power and technology. When his Chinese counterparts—mainly members of the strategic weapons clan— outlined ambitions which they hoped could be realized with America's technological assistance, Perry politely, but clearly, challenged their grandiose visions. In many of these areas, China's low level of technical sophistication negated the possibility of government-to-government collaboration. Perry suggested they pursue a broader, longer- range and less military-specific, program of technological cooperation. "If I were Chinese ...I simply wouldn't go about doing it your way. Your real need is to build a national technology infrastructure which, if you do it right, may give you some dual-use potential." A purely military technology base was too narrow a foundation on which to modernize China's industry, much less its conventional forces.47 This, and other frank exchanges with foreign experts in defense technology, profoundly shaped the strategic weaponeers. They started to appreciate that, compared to international norms, they were w overly fixated on systems and needed to focus on components, and also to move from hardware—where improvements were becoming more incremental—toward software and processes—which offered greater potential for growth. The shadow of China's political economy was an obstacle to the re-orientation of Chinese technology policy. In contrast to the West, where commercial enterprises were a wellspring for innovation, China had no working memory of capitalism. Given the abysmal state of its transportation, logistical, and commerce infrastructure, and its lack of resources, the strategic weaponeers rightly felt it was unrealistic to assume that Chinese civilian enterprises could generate innovations on a large scale. This left them few alternatives. Given constraints unlike their Western counterparts, China's scientists had

He received his B.S. (1949) and M.A. (1950) degrees from Stanford University, and a Ph.D. in mathematics from Penn State University in 1957. He was director of the Electronic Defense Laboratories of Sylvania/GTE in California from 1954 to 1964, and from 1964 to 1977 president of ESL Inc., an electronics firm that he helped found. From 1977-1981, he served as Undersecretary of Defense for Research and Engineering. He then entered the private sector (investment banking specializing in high- tech companies), but returned in 1994 as Secretary of Defense under the Clinton Administration. Also see David Halberstam, War in a Time of Peace: Bush, Clinton, and the Generals (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2002). 47 William Perry interview with Feigenbaum, China's Techno-Warriors, p. 133. 202 to use the strategic weapons infrastructure as the vehicle to promote change from within. Top-down planning and direction, with greater room for flexibility and innovation, and the importation of Western technology as one method to achieve indigenous capability, would continue to be their model. This issue pitted the politicians, who insisted on defense conversion to address China's backwardness, against the strategic weaponeers, who challenged the dysfunctional relationship between technology and bureaucracy at the national level. The latter reasoned that they had demonstrated the effectiveness of non-hierarchical consultation and coordination, which Deng Xiaoping had recognized as a general model for Chinese industry. Hence, the weaponeers claimed, they should be allowed to oversee that process. Their expertise, both scientific and managerial, would facilitate technology transfer and promote collaboration among groups accustomed to operating through secrecy, protocol, and rote "thinking," and so produce a synergistic environment whereby dual-use technology could be best exploited and diffused into the economy. Of course, this meant the strategic weapons community itself would have to split apart and entrench * itself within civilian industries. This was a calculated political move; self-preservation was the motive. However self-serving was this scattering of the strategic weapons community, it was wrenching. Some, veterans like Qian Xuesen, feared that the adoption of a new paradigm would destroy the positive aspects of the old, strategic, paradigm. He contended that the state should continue to define strategic needs as related to technology development, while still using the best practices gleaned from foreign interaction.48 Although strategic priorities were revamped within and outside the defense establishment, the fiscal realities confronting the PLA throughout the 1980s constrained any ambitious retooling of technology policy. Nothing like the Mao-era, Manhattan Project-style quest for atomic weapons could occur. Instead, limited funding led to a concentration of resources for specific projects. On its surface, this decision reeked of the same old centrally-planned push for technology. Not surprisingly, proponents of this strategy defended its merits on economic grounds: the development of technology was

48 Michael Pillsbury, "Testimony Before the United States Senate Select Committee on Intelligence," Global Security.org, Nov 1997, http://www.globalsecuritv.org/intell/librarv/congress/1997 hr/970918- pillsbury.htm (accessed 2 Feb 08). 203

becoming more complex, interconnected and expensive, and possible only with state intervention. It must invariably involve failures that commercial ventures alone could not easily weather, even in industrialized nations, let alone China. Due to long timeframes for research and development, no Chinese and few Western companies could absorb the high costs associated with large-scale programs that might bear fruit only years or decades later, if ever. Hence, state support for key initiatives in research was vital, regardless of whether research and development eventually was conducted within the economy at large. Indeed, without state backing, research academies and high-tech companies probably would not pour money into projects that could not promise a quick return on investment. These arguments made some sense, but equally, Soviet-style, top-down, massive pushes had become outdated. They brought to mind disastrous initiatives like the Great Leap Forward and the effort to develop the military industrial sector deep within China's undeveloped interior. The strategic weaponeers had achieved several successes by marrying their management model to Mao's push, but at great cost. They had used an* enormous commitment of resources, to achieve their primary goals—acquisition of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems. The weaponeers' organizational paradigm had depended not only on the approval of leadership for a commitment of resources, but also its engagement in a way that went beyond policy. Leaders had invested considerable time in discussing with the weaponeers, the technical considerations associated with China's development goals, and had given them important commitments. These guarantees ensured that science trumped politics, that the scientists would maintain contact with the leaders, and control significant resources. The strategic weaponeers hoped that they could resurrect this alliance with the leadership if they could show that a guided technology development strategy was essential to serve the economy—Deng's number one priority. Four leading elders presented the strategic weaponeers' solution direct to Deng on March 3, 1986,49 exploiting their political clout and long-standing relationship with him so to circumnavigate the bureaucracy. They emphasized China's past glories with

49 "S & T Programs: National High-Tech R&D Program (863 Program)," Ministry of Science and Technology of the People's Republic of China, http://www.most.gov.cn/eng/proCTammesl/index.htm (accessed 15 Jan 08). 204 strategic weapons, how they had happened and how the system which had produced them could be reformed to suit new needs. They explained that technological innovation in the industrialized world stemmed from structural changes which China had not yet assimilated; furthermore, the pace of these changes was accelerating. The strategic weaponeers were ideally suited to address and close the gap. Moreover, science and technical talent were vital for China's aspirations to create a vibrant national economy. The elders then identified seven areas critical to long-term security and economic competitiveness: biotechnology, aeronautics (to include space technology), information technology, lasers, automation, energy, and new materials.5051 Success in all of these areas would require government investment and political mobilization. Their argument, that government backing for these strategic initiatives was essential, challenged the accepted arguments that the centralization and targeting were at least partly to blame for China's primitive technological foundations. However, the elders strengthened that argument with economic justifications. The paramount leader quickly accepted their proposal, which came to be known as the 863 Plan.52 Obviously, Deng Xiaoping did not * reject central planning so long as it supported his aims of economic primacy and the need for China to be competitive, internationally. The plan combined his agenda with the best traditions of Nie's programs. It gave the strategic weaponeers a strong role in policy and planning for science and technology, emphasized competition, and sought to institutionalize the training of technicians across the whole economy. Deng was not reversing his rejection of Nie's economic trickle-down theory (that military research and development ultimately would bestow tremendous benefits on the civilian economy), but he was telegraphing his agreement that technology shaped China's standing in the world, and must be developed under some sort of central guidance.

If we had not possessed nuclear and hydrogen bombs, and launched satellites since the 1960s, China would not be

50 "China's S & T Policy: A View From Within," a report from the US Embassy in Beijing, Dec 1996, http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/china/doctrine/stvwin5.htm (accessed 5 Feb 08). 51 "Chapter 7: The High-technology Sector," The International Development Research Centre, http://www.idrc.ca/en/ev-55199-201- l-DO_TOPIC.html (accessed 10 Feb 08). 52 «863" refers to the year (1986) and month (March) when the plan was unveiled. For dates, the Chinese use the format: year/month/day. 205

regarded as an influential world power, nor would it have the international position it occupies today.

Deng's support gave the weaponeers a political opening which they were well placed to exploit. By the mid-1980s, the strategic weaponeers had had nearly a decade to spread their influence into the wider bureaucracy. Prominent members of that community had influence on most government offices connected to technology policy, which they often headed. When the 863 Plan was adopted as policy, strategic weapons alumni used their control of key positions to dominate how their agencies enacted it. These cadres shared common attitudes toward the development of high-technology, a common professional heritage, an extensive network of personal and career ties, and a deep commitment to the managerial practices pioneered by Nie and his associates.54 This facilitated a rapid, informal communications web which functioned better than the sluggish Chinese bureaucratic mold,55 often dogged by patchy information. The greatest impact of the 863 Plan was and continues to be the organizational reforms it sparked. Once technology planners across China began to adopt the "revolutionary" managerial concepts imbedded within the plan, the state-directed system of research and development was transformed. Under the previous, ministerial system, efforts at research and development tended to operate independently, producing duplication of effort, lack of standardization, and little chance for synergy. This compartmentalization crippled China's capacity to follow, let alone pioneer, technological breakthroughs. The PRC had capable scientists, especially thanks to the return of Western-educated immigrants, but their work was hamstrung by a Soviet-style, command economy and the reckless nature of Mao Zedong. By contrast, the strategic weapons community had a history of collaboration across institutional boundaries, and of generating results, however inefficiently. Now its strengths were improved and

33 Deng Xiaoping, as quoted in Wenren Jiang, "CCP Celebrates 50 Years of Nuclear Achievements," The Jamestown Foundation, Vol. 5, Issue 23, 8 Nov 05, http://www.iamestown.org/publications details.php?volume id=408&issue id=3519&article id=2370439 (accessed 5 Feb 08). 54 Evan A, Feigenbaum, "Who's Behind China's High Technology 'Revolution'?: How Bomb Makers Remade Beijing's Priorities, Policies, and Institutions," International Security, Vol. 24, No. 1 (Summer, 1999), p. 111-2. 55 Donald Chisholm, Coordination without Hierarchy: Informal structures in Multi-Organizational Systems (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1989), p. 65. Also see Lucian Pye, The Dynamics of Chinese Politics (Cambridge, MA: Oelgeschlager, Gunn, and Hain, 1981). 206

unleashed across the economy with the support of Deng Xiaoping, a pragmatic leader with a sophisticated understanding of the relationship between politics and science. That is not to say that the transformation unfolded evenly or without hiccups; some powerful civilian ministries proved to be monopolistic and territorial. Ultimately, however, the spread of the institutions and practices once exclusive to the strategic weapons community overcame these obstacles. It produced a more collaborative environment across the entire state-led complex of civilian research and development, yet still a centralized one. Scientists, engineers, and technicians—both within and outside the military sector—wielded tremendous authority over decisions and greater prestige.56 The 863 Plan represented the extension of a version of Marshal Nie's research and development template across all of Chinese industry. Its proponents believed that these changes would give China the means to catch up with the West technologically and economically. By merging the strategic weapons model for organization—flat hierarchies, horizontal coordination, competition; networking, the free exchange of ideas, peer review, standards-based metrics, risk-taking * behavior, and political acceptance of failure—with the perceived advantages of a nationalistic, state-led technology strategy for development, and the initiative of firms and scientists, the 863 Plan appeared, at least to many in the government, to create an ideal situation. It would free science from the chokehold of politics, while maintaining a focus on the development of capabilities central to China's security and prosperity. Unfortunately, these hopes were challenged by the harsh realities of technological innovation. However free science was under 863, still it was driven by government targets and goals. One of those targets, an insistence upon the indigenization of technological expertise and production, conflicted with another objective that Deng also identified as critical to China's future: integration into the global economy. In order to do so, China must make compromises which either would confound some of its goals or infringe on its sovereignty, or both. The necessity for those compromises immediately exposed flaws in the 863 concept, specifically, the combination of ideas of a technonationalist mindset

56 Feigenbaum, "Who's Behind China's High Technology 'Revolution'?: How Bomb Makers Remade Beijing's Priorities, Policies, and Institutions," p. 119. 207 combined with the strategic weapons management style. 863 began to languish under the combined effects of managed innovation, continuing dependence on the transfer of foreign technology, and scripted competition. At its core, 863 attempted to make something old new again, albeit in an improved and expanded form. Confronting new and complex challenges, Chinese leaders reached back into their recent past and cherry-picked what approaches Deng and others hoped would be a universal panacea for all of China's problems. Alas, it was not. Though this system was better than its predecessor and alleviated systemic problems in the Chinese research and development system, it did not produce the results its authors originally envisioned. While state-led development under 863's authorization delivered some notable achievements, it failed to stimulate widespread innovation. The PRC leadership's steadfast commitment to indigenization, and decades of nationalistic pride and policy, crashed into the nation's acute dependence on the transfer of foreign technology, and the demands made by the international trading system to which China sought membership. Finally, even after disbanding monopolies and promoting the* participation of new players in markets, arbitrary whims and corruption often determined the outcome of any competition. Political and cultural impediments sabotaged the efficacy of the 863 Plan. They could be overcome only through new steps. Though older cadre still controlled the agenda focused on national initiatives, increasingly, younger technicians, with experience in privately-financed technology ventures abroad, began to shape the debate over Chinese research and development and political decisions. The 863 Plan had sparked an effort to redefine the role of the state in policy development. Many, especially younger scientists, felt that technology should serve a wider purpose than just the good of the state; it should simultaneously address the needs of industry, agriculture, commerce, and education. Technology should embrace all aspects of society, not just martial ones, which ultimately would benefit the power of the state. In 1992, many of the scientists who had pitched the 863 Plan to Deng made a second appeal, which again emphasized the importance of high technology in national power. Their approach emphasized electronics (computer chips and software), telecommunications, and space technology—a twist on the idea—but moved away from 208

attempts to "plan innovation" and tell scientists what to innovate. Instead, they focused on the commercialization of technology and its extension to less productive sectors of the economy, popularizing what existed, often with seed money, to see what emerged through the dynamic interaction between end-users and producers. One example of this shift was the Spark Plan, which took its name from Mao's famous phrase, "A single spark can start a prairie fire " (xinghuo liaoyuan),57 designed to elevate the use of technology in agriculture and small industries via indirect finance. The Torch Plan, a more elaborate initiative, required more government investment. It provided state support for commercialization, industrialization, and high technology transformation, experimenting with market economics rather than focusing on strategic goals. In contrast to 863, which was predominantly government run, Torch sought to attract foreign technology and investment to high technology development zones (HTDZ)58 within China, with the goal of promoting commercially viable and profitable firms and, eventually, indigenization. These zones attracted foreign investment and technology by offering preferential tax treatment, and very low labor costs. Torch also * aimed to upgrade local infrastructure and to break the hold of older, inefficient firms. The first of these ancillary objectives contrasted with the preferential treatment which 863 afforded to national enterprises and laboratories. The second involved a re­ orientation of conventional ways of doing business. As a deputy director of SSTC said when criticizing a university for linking industrialization to research and training,

Just emphasize getting rich and making money ... That is all that is needed. If you make money, soon you will be able to improve the old professors' dormitories and improve conditions for running the school and doing scientific research. Isn 't that better than coupling teaching and research? ... You should find out which [technical]

Mao Zedong, "A Single Spark Can Start A Prairie Fire," Selected Works of Mao Zedong, 5 Jan 1930, http://eprintsxddc.vt.edu/marxists/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/volume-l/mswvl 6.htm (accessed 7 Feb 08). 58 "China Development Zones," http://www.export.gov/china/exporting to china/developmentzones.pdf (accessed 16 Jan 08). Also see "New and high-tech development zones," GOV.cn, (china.org.cn), Chinese Government's Official Web Portal, http://english.gov.cn/2006-02/09/content 184039.htm (accessed 16 Jan 08). 209

projects will make money, then start work on those projects as quickly as possible59

Advocates of this approach clearly hoped that commercial pressures would foster innovation, as companies moved away from fulfilling state targets toward meeting market demand. However, it proved hard for factory managers to discard their attitudes of dependency on state planning, or for bureaucrats to lose their penchant for control. The Communist Party remains emotionally devoted to the notion of top-down direction, although many of its leaders realize that this approach inhibits the goal of programs like 863 and Torch: technological innovation. This factor, combined to the equally toxic effect of nationalism on technology policy, helps to explain why China is far behind Western nations in innovation. Despite the government's efforts, it is totally dependent on foreign technology in many areas, evidenced by its arms purchases from Russia and recurring complaints about American and European export controls. When the Communists took control in 1949, China was cut off from the world's leading industrial states. Undaunted, Mao outlined ambitious goals for China, which he hoped to pursue through the idea of "self-reliance" (zili gengsheng). That term really meant that China would acquire technologies from abroad with the intention of indigenizing them so to free itself from foreign dependence. This aim proved hard to achieve with either the USSR or Western states. As a result, China, ultimately, developed a contradictory policy: it pursued the desire to be free of foreign dependence, technonationalism, starting from heavy reliance on foreign assistance. For decades, the Chinese government's technonational stance has been at odds with its desire to integrate with the global economy. Backwardness has compelled China's leaders frequently to backtrack on policies, at least in the short-term, so to build a strong, prosperous nation. When China was admitted to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1999, it pledged to abolish trade barriers which were designed to shield Chinese business from foreign competition. Yet Western nations argue China has refused to keep its promises to the WTO. This constant tug-of-war between technonationalism and

Li Xu'e, as quoted in Feigenbaum's China's Techno-Warriors: National Security and Strategic Competition from the Nuclear to the Information Age, p. 196. 210 pressure to compromise with the international trading system generates friction inside China and with other nations. While China has experienced tremendous economic growth since 1978 due to opening up to the outside world, its leaders seem to be cynical about the liberal foundations of economic globalization.60 Despite enjoying the easiest external environment the country has known since 1839, Chinese leaders continue to stress the strategic implications of technology and economic policy. The plight that China faced in the 1950s and 1960s because of isolation echoes today. Many within the Chinese government still insist that reinventing the wheel has merit, because this advances its domestic knowledge base and skill set. Though China wants to be a global leader in technological innovation, its policies, rooted in technonationalism, often contradict that ambition and confound foreign firms operating in China. China is struggling to come to grips with the reality that cutting-edge technology development rarely confines itself to borders and relies on free markets. Impeding China's march toward joining the ranks of the world's most innovative*' countries, is its continued attachment to the strategic weapons model. That model gave China a credible strategic deterrent and the beginnings of a promising space capability, but did little to address other pressing needs. Under Deng, that paradigm's useful attributes, when applied to the economy at large, generated significant improvements. However, throughout the late 1980s and into the 1990s, it became increasingly clear that Nie's innovations and Deng's reform of them were insufficient. Whether China can wean itself from the strategic weapons model remains to be seen. One barometer of the success of the reform of science and technology in China, is the fact that China has yet to produce its first Nobel Prize winner.61 Such an accomplishment would be a great feather in China's cap; however, several problems prolong attainment of that dream. High among the obstacles is diminishing, yet persistent, faith in the notion that innovation can best be achieved by top-down directives. In October 2007, the

60 Cheng Li, "China's Political Succession: Four Misperceptions in the West," Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Asia Program Special Report, No. 96, June 2001, p. 22, http://wwics.si.edu/topics/pubs/asiarpt 096.pdf (accessed 19 Feb 08). 61 Zhang Yu and Li Jing, "Chinese may win Nobel Prize," China Daily, 29 Mar 06, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2006-03/29/content_555445.htm (accessed 10 Feb 08). There have been Chinese-born scientists who have won the Nobel Prize; however, these men were citizens of other countries when they won. 211

Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) reported on innovation in China. It stated "the country is still far from achieving the 'innovation- oriented' economy that it aims to build by 2020. "

... in the hierarchical system by which 'big science' projects operate, the primary task of young scientists is to ensure that the tasks and projects allocated to them are completed effectively, rather than to develop a capacity to think independently. The result is that they are increasingly distanced from innovation, rather than moved closer to it.

There is a widespread and naive belief that wholesale importation of hardware, without absorption of the underlying expertise, can somehow make China modern. As the U.S. Embassy noted, China has imported much foreign technology ... but often has been unable to master and then improve on these technologies. As a result, technology gaps have often widened rather than narrowed. China needs to change its technology import policy. Multinational companies are highly protectionist of their technology and prefer to sell obsolete ... technologies to developing countries. When considering technology imports, the Chinese side should consider what China is learning ... Merely buying advanced foreign products doesn't transfer to Chinese companies the technology they need to become more profitable and more competitive on international markets.

Finally, politicization and corruption damage an evolving market economy. Minxin Pei and many others, inside and outside China, argue that they threaten China's future.

Corruption poses one of the most lethal threats to China's economic development and political stability. Illicit activities such as bribery, kickbacks, theft, and misspending of public funds cost at least 3 percent of GDP ... undermines the legitimacy of the ruling Chinese

Jia Hepeng, "China needs to encourage 'bottom-up' innovation," Science and Development Network, 12 Oct 07, http://www.scidev.net/editorials/index.cfm?fuseaction=printarticle&itemid=228&language=l (accessed 5 Feb 08). 63 "China's S & T Policy: A View From Within" 212

Communist Party, fuels social unrest, contributes directly to the rise in social inequality, and undermines China's environmental security. The prevalence of corruption in China is rooted in the country's partially reformed economy and absence of genuine political reform. 4

The scorching and sustained pace of Chinese economic growth has sparked an increasingly heated debate among strategists about Chinese intentions, between those who believe in the transformative power of liberal economics, and those who fear increased Chinese economic might and technical capacity. Central to this debate is the question of how China acquires technological sophistication. In order to become a fount of innovation, China must undergo further reform, institutionalize legal and proprietary rights common throughout the Western world, and enforce them. Without the establishment of such protections, foreign technology firms will be unwilling to share proprietary information, lest it be stolen with little hope of fair compensation or legal retribution. The creation and enforcement of such protections will Mr further intertwine China's future with that of the global economy. Additionally, China will have to rid itself of the many structural obstacles which stand in the way of its achieving indigenous technical innovation. Not only would this strengthen its capacity to innovate and increase its influence within the global economy, it would also foster less dependence on foreign technology imports. Ultimately, this would create a stronger base on which to build a modern military. China's admission to the WTO, over time, may prove to be a watershed event. Membership in that organization came at a price. In gaining entry to the premier trading arena on earth, Communist authorities committed China to a set of principles which ran counter to its historical patterns in technology development, industrialization, and politics since the creation of the PRC. The transition undoubtedly will be painful to some (bureaucrats, inefficient businesses, and ideological conservatives) and long overdue in the opinion of others (reformers, those with foreign collaboration experience,

Minxin Pei, "Corruption Threatens China's Future," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Policy Brief Number 55, Oct 2007, http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/pb55 pei china corruption final.pdf (accessed 10 Feb 08). Also see Minxin Pei, "The Dark Side of China's Rise," Foreign Policy, Mar/Apr 2006, http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=print&id;=18110 (accessed 8 Feb 08). 213

entrepreneurs). It will be interesting to see what elements of its strategic weapons legacy China chooses to retain as it marches forward. Evidence suggests that the state continues to see great value in directing "strategic" technology initiatives, for two reasons: the leadership can ensure that core technical priorities are met while simultaneously compensating for the long lead times between research and commercialization—a risk which all but the largest enterprises are averse to underwriting, let alone capable of doing. In recent years, indigenization has required "nurturing." Much as a new hatchling requires care, feeding and guidance from its mother in order to capitalize on its innate gifts, so too, do Chinese businesses, long accustomed to strict targets provided from above, need state support to handle the inevitable setbacks and difficulties associated with adopting new technologies, new ways of doing business, and so forth. The transition from the strategic weapons model to the 863 Plan was significant in China's evolution. While skeptics would argue the widespread "civilianization" of high- technology development under the auspices of 863 was less a matter of demilitarization than of a reorientation of defense modernization, this opinion tends to oversimplify the * thinking behind the change. The Chinese, through exchanges with experts in other countries, began to understand the pendulum had swung in the direction of entrepreneurs versus governments when it came to innovation. Nowhere was this more apparent than Silicon Valley beginning in the mid-1960s. Chinese leaders also began to appreciate the stagnating effect of Soviet-style bureaucratic organization upon creative thinking. The 863 Plan's emergence—and other programs that followed, like Spark and Torch— testified to the growing realization among Chinese technology planners about the changing origins of innovation. In industrialized nations, military capabilities were increasingly the result of commercial developments, not the other way around.

American Fears of China's Growing Economy and the High-Technology Prowess that Could Accompany It Contemporary impressions of China often have been linked to observations of the Chinese economy. If, as one prominent American media source suggests, it is true that 214

"the business of [China] is business,' then the nature and strength of Chinese business will illuminate the country and its future direction. By acting on these twin realizations, the changing origins of innovation and the stagnating effects of top-down technology management, the Chinese leadership enabled significant economic gains, and made China a huge trading power; however, ample evidence suggests that Chinese initiatives designed to foster innovation largely have failed. The question, of course, is why. China's rapid ascent to the top echelons of the global trading system has stirred awe and fear amongst foreigner observers. China has become the world's hottest investment niche, with investors trampling over one another to purchase shares of Chinese companies. Very often, however, these investors have no grasp as to how these companies actually function. Paralleling this phenomenon, many commentators offer hyperbolic projections coupling China's recent achievements with its massive size, indicating that the balance of trade and technology will swing radically in favor of China to the detriment of the United States, economically and militarily. These sensations of* awe and fear are overstated. They naively ignore flaws in China's position and miss the benefits which the United States reaps from China's integration into the global economy. Excessive fear, based on misperceptions, sometimes has compelled Washington to engage in protectionism. Obviously, this is also true of China's relations with the United States. These American misperceptions are intimately related to assumptions about the degree of innovation occurring inside China. Though American protectionist spasms so far have been mild, increasing trade imbalances and greater Chinese activism on the global stage could imperil US-China relations, sew discord between American allies, and reduce American influence in Asia. Despite hawkish rhetoric to the contrary, in the economic sphere, China and the United States are establishing precisely the sort of bilateral relationship which American strategy has attempted to create for decades. In 2008, China has become a central player in the global economic system largely crafted by the United States at the end of World War II; China's leaders have re-opened the country's economy to outsiders to the point

65 "China's Rise," CBS News, 4 Apr 04, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2004/04/01/sunday/printable609910.shtml (accessed 14 Mar 08). 215

where China is the number one destination for Foreign Direct Investment (FDI); China's entry into the WTO has generated considerable prosperity and liberalization within China and throughout East Asia. These are positive developments for American foreign and trade policy. Furthermore, American and Western industrialized countries will continue to enjoy technological superiority over China for the foreseeable future because China, in its top- down transformation from a command to a market economy, has chosen to integrate with the global economy without enacting internal political and social reforms to match its economic liberalization. As a result, China's bustling economy is burdened by inefficiencies and a lack of focus. In order to check the emergence of a politically independent private sector, Beijing's economic reforms are biased towards support for state-owned enterprises (SOEs).67 Most of these SOEs are inefficient in their use of resources and labor, yet receive preferential access to funding, technology, and commercial opportunities. These same governmental reforms also have tended to favor foreign investment. As a result, foreign firms export most of China's industrial output* and have carved out sizeable market shares within the domestic market. This combination of policies has produced bloated and inefficient SOEs which must compete against more agile foreign firms, while Chinese private industry struggles against them both, and the odds. Another bizarre consequence of China's quasi-liberalization (that is, economic, but not political or social)68 is the persistence of old attitudes toward doing business. Because China has yet to develop a robust legal system able to protect entrepreneurs, or a genuine venture capital market to assist longer-term product innovation, Chinese business owners and managers have tended to emphasize short-term profits, local autonomy, and diversification. Chinese companies tend to devote considerable attention to forging privileged relationships with members of the CCP leadership. They often oppose horizontal association and networking with other firms

66 Jin Ju, Forward for "China's Electronic Industry," Center for Advanced Life Cycle Engineering, 21 Jun 06, http://www.calce.umd.edu/general/AsianElectronics/pref chn.htm (accessed 10 Mar 08). 67 For an interesting discussion of the positive and negatives aspects of SOEs see Ha-Joon Chang, "State- Owned Enterprise Reform," United Nations Department for Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA), 2007, http://esa.un.org/techcoop/documents/PN SOEReformNote.pdf ("accessed 8 Mar 08). 68 Xavier Richet and Jean-Francois Huchet, "Between Bureaucracy and Market: China's Industrial Groups in Search of a New Corporate Governance System," http://www.cerdi.org/Colloque/IDREC2001/Richet Huchet.pdf (accessed 7 Mar 08). 216 and neglect investments in research and development or diffusion, i.e. indigenization. Small wonder that these firms continue to be dependent on imported foreign technology. That is, China joined the global economy in a manner which, instead of emancipating China from dependence on foreign technology, actually reinforced that dependency. Despite tremendous strides toward improving its economy, those improvements largely are skin-deep because economic reforms are patchy and contradictory while China's leaders have prevented political and social reforms. Until China's leadership becomes serious about political reform, the country's technological and economic weaknesses will persist, as will its technological inferiority to the leading industrial democracies. Critics of the current US-China trade relationship fixate on particular problems while overlooking the larger picture. For instance, they point to the PRC's refusal to let the yuan exchange rate "float." Henry Liu, like other noted economists such as Nicholas Lardy, has dismissed these cries about the exchange as a sideshow.

This pressure from the US is motivated by the misguided conventional assumption that a lower exchange rate of the dollar will reduce the US trade deficit, despite clear historical data showing that past revaluations of the Japanese yen and the German mark had not reduced US trade deficits with these major trade partners in the long run ...A rising US trade deficit with China has generated much heat but little light about unfair Chinese trade practices ... the validity of many of the complaints of unfair trade does not survive reality checks with actual macro- data. 69

The rhetoric surrounding the currency issue obscures the fact that the current trade relationship provides many strategic benefits to the United States. Morgan Stanley contends that cheap imports from China have saved the American consumer more than $600 billion in the past decade, and manufacturers even more. 70 The outsourcing of jobs to overseas locations has been painful for many American communities, but such migrations also have a silver lining. A study conducted by Global Insight, a private

Henry C K Liu, "The Wages of Neo-Liberalism (parts I and II)," Asia Times Online, 1 Apr 06, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China Business/HDO 1 Cb05 .html (accessed 3 Mar 08). 70 Fareed Zakaria, "Does the Future Belong to China?" Newsweek, 9 May 05, http://www.fareedzakaria.com/articles/newsweek/050905.html (accessed 5 Mar 08). 217

consulting firm, for the Information Technology Association, an industry lobbying firm, found that outsourcing created 90,000 American jobs in information technology during 71 2003, and estimated that such relocations would create a total of 317,000 jobs by 2008. Though China often is called, and sometimes derided as, "the workshop of the world," a reference to Britain's commanding productive capacity at the start of the Industrial Revolution, it also imports more than any other nation in northeast Asia. While China enjoys a trade surplus with the United States, it has trade deficits with many other countries.72 In 2003, China had a trade deficit of $5 billion, versus a trade surplus of $20 billion five years earlier. In the category of high technology, China averaged an annual trade deficit of $12 billion over the decade from 1993-2003.73 China also is far more open to imports and investment than some of its neighbors, most notably Japan and Korea, which for decades continuously blocked American exports. Foreign firms are allowed to invest in China on a scale unheard of in the rest of Asia. A final strategic benefit which the United States derives from China's integration into * the global economy is the promotion of liberalism in Asia. The trend favors greater transparency as the years pass, though patience will be required, for those changes will occur on a timetable sure to frustrate many Americans. Despite noteworthy strategic benefits, many Americans remain apprehensive about China's mushrooming share of global exports, especially in the areas of high-technology and industrial production. Hawks fear the emergence of another mercantilist mega-power in Asia, like Japan and South Korea, but with the size and resources to become a strategic juggernaut, dwarfing those two economies and challenging American supremacy. These concerns, while understandable, are overblown. Most of China's high-technology exports actually are made by foreign firms with operations inside China, while China

71 "Outsourcing creates jobs, study says," CNNMoney.com, 30 Mar 04, http://monev.cnn.com/2004/03/30/news/economv/outsourcing/ (accessed 29 Feb 08). 72 Thomas Lum, Wayne M. Morrison, and Bruce Vaughn, "China's 'Soft Power' in Southeast Asia," Congressional Research Service (CRS) Report for Congress, 4 Jan 08, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL34310.pdf (accessed 10 Mar 08). Also see Andrew Leonard, "How the World Works: China's Trade Deficits," Salon.com, 11 Jul 06, http://www.salon.com/tech/htww/2006/07/ll/trade deficit/index.html (accessed 2 Mar 08). 73 George J. Gilboy, "The Myth Behind China's Miracle," Foreign Affairs, July/August 2004, http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20040701faessav83405/george-i-gilboy/the-mvth-behind-china-s- miracle.html (accessed 28 Feb 08). 218

remains heavily dependent on foreign expertise, design, and manufacturing equipment. Despite concerted efforts by Beijing, Chinese companies, by and large, are failing to indigenize the technology they import or to diffuse it throughout the economy, primarily because of the lack of political and social reforms. A senior Chinese economic official, quoted in the People's Daily, identified persistent problems in China's global trade.

First is the great technological dependence on developed countries. Second, China's manufacturing is still at a low level. Third is the lack of resources and a big demand for foreign material supply. Among these are 100 percent of fiber optics imports and integrated circuits, 80 percent of oil and oil processing and 57 percent of mechanical products. Fourth is a lack of large international [China- based] enterprises.74

It is almost as if the economic reforms were a veneer placed on top of a structure not yet primed for finishing. The veneer, when applied to the unfinished structure, gave an overall appearance of quality to shoddy workmanship. Today, foreign-invested or owned entities perform most "Chinese" export manufacturing, particularly at the high end. In 2004, foreign firms produced 57 percent of China's manufactured exports.75 This position contrasts starkly to the failure of foreign firms to penetrate other Asian economies. According to Huang Yasheng, in Selling China, foreign-funded enterprises (FFEs) produced 20 percent of Taiwan's manufactured exports in the mid-1970s, and 25 percent of South Korea's during 1974-78. In Thailand, FFEs averaged 18 percent of manufactured production during the 1970s, which decreased to a mere 6 percent by the mid 1980s. When one looks specifically at advanced industrial exports from China, in 2003, FFEs or multinational corporations (MNCs) operating inside the country handled 81 percent of production.76

John Chan, "Chinese Capitalism: Industrial Powerhouse Or Sweatshop Of The World?" Countercurrents.org, 31 Jan 03, http://www.countercurrents.org/economv-chan050504.htm (accessed 11 Mar 08). 75 Edward S. Steinfeld, "Getting China Right: Cutting Through the Myths of Economic Growth," MIT Center for International Studies, Spring 2007, http://web.mit.edu/cis/editorspick template precis.html (accessed 10 Mar 08). Also see Titus O. Awokuse and Weishi Gu, "The Contribution of Foreign Direct Investment to China's Export Performance: Evidence from Disaggregated Sectors," June 2007, http://www-agecon.ag.ohio-state.edu/programs/Anderson/trade/60AkwoseGu.pdf (accessed 10 Mar 08). 76 Chan, "Chinese Capitalism: Industrial Powerhouse Or Sweatshop Of The World?" 219

This large inflow of FDI into China, while improving its economy and the prosperity of segments of the population, reflects underlying weakness rather than strength in the 77 Chinese system. During the 1990s, in the move toward entry into the WTO, Beijing allowed a shift away from joint ventures toward wholly-owned foreign enterprises (WOFEs).78 These WOFEs now account for 65 percent of new FDI in China,79 and even more in high-technology exports.

China's economic development is completely geared to the requirements of foreign corporations. In fact, the domination of foreign capital over economic life is assuming dimensions far greater than when China was a semi-colony of the major capitalist powers in the late 19fh ... and early 20' centuries.

Unlike joint ventures, WOFEs are not contractually obligated to share or transfer technology with Chinese firms. Instead, and quite logically, they protect their proprietary technology so as to obtain a larger domestic market share. ' As a result of legal changes to Chinese business regulations governing the operations at foreign firms inside the country, intended to boost the flow of FDI and to comply with WTO rules, FFEs increased their total share of high-technology exports from 74 percent in 1998 to 85 percent in 2002. Gilboy highlights an even more striking fact: over the same period, FFEs increased their share of total domestic high-technology sales from 32 percent to 45 percent while China's most competitive industrial firms, the SOEs, declined 01 from 47 to 42 percent market share. Chinese private firms, which presumably might be more innovative,82 are hampered by unequal treatment from Communist authorities, who remain suspicious of domestic

77 Yasheng Huang, Selling China: Foreign Direct Investment During the Reform Era (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003). 78 Jiang Yong, "Economic Security: Redressing Imbalance," China Security, Vol 3, No 2, Spring 2007, p. 69-70, http://www.wsichina.org/cs6 5.pdf (accessed 11 Mar 08). 79 Ranjit Shastri, "Twisted Tactics in the FDI Game," Businessworld, 23 Aug 04, http://www.businessworldindia.com/aug2304/gameplan.asp (accessed 11 Mar 08). 80 Chan, "Chinese Capitalism: Industrial Powerhouse Or Sweatshop Of The World?" 81 Gilboy, "The Myth Behind China's Miracle" 82 John T. Preston, "Success Factors In Technology-Based Entrepreneurship," Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) Entrepreneurship Center, August 2001, p. 7, 13, 220

private ventures. SOEs, despite continuing inefficiencies and rampant addiction to government loans, continue to receive preferential access to markets and financing. This fact, coupled with the towering influence of long-established foreign firms operating independently inside the country, makes it hard for private Chinese enterprises to get a foot in the door. Though changes to Chinese law have buoyed the fortunes of FFEs, their growing market share of both the export and domestic markets does not stem from this single development. In another departure from the models for comprehensive economic strategies adopted by Japan, Taiwan and South Korea, SOEs and private firms in China have largely not developed long-term, sophisticated relationships with research facilities, financiers, partners, suppliers, and customers.83 Without constant inputs from research facilities, knowledge tends to stagnate quickly; without established relationships with financiers, the acquisition of capital to fund new ventures is constrained; without horizontal networking between companies, talent is stove-piped and supply chains remain fragile and undependable; without trend information and intelligence on rapidly changing * consumer demands, firms produce what people wanted yesterday, not today or tomorrow. The rigid, orthodox Communist political system is the predominant factor shaping this lack of long-term investment in technology or the infrastructure to support its indigenization and diffusion is. While the 863 program, and others like it, were designed to overcome obstacles to horizontal networking and to spark innovation, the absence of political reforms to complement economic reforms has produced an increasingly dysfunctional union which undermines many of the objectives Deng Xiaoping enunciated after taking the reins of power, most notably, for China to become self-sufficient technologically. Because the Chinese economy lacks institutions able to challenge the rulings of the CCP, party officials habitually interfere in the workings of the economy. Despite Beijing's establishment of rules to govern the market economy, CCP leaders, especially http://www.angelcapitalassociation.org/dir downloads/resources/Research Entrepreneurship.pdf (accessed 20 Jan 08). 83 Chengxin Pan, "What is Chinese About 'Chinese' Business? Implications for American Response to China's Rise," speech given at the ChinaWorldInternational Conference on 'Made in China vs. Made by Chinese: Global Identities of Chinese Business,' 19-20 Mar 07, http://ir.lib.cbs.dk/download/ISBN/x65652613x.pdf (accessed 12 Mar 08). 221 at the local level, continue to exercise considerable autonomy in interpreting and implementing those rules, with little or no oversight from above. Given the opportunities for profit, local officials often manipulate rules to suit their liking, because of corruption; conflicts of interests (they might own or operate a particular business); tolerance; and, often, implicit support from political elites who want to see continued economic growth and political stability at virtually any cost. Unfortunately for China, this behavior does not stimulate and perpetuate innovative practices. On the contrary, it splinters national industries, wastes investment capital through overlap, destroys any sense of consistency in the application of rules, negates networking between firms, and sours collective action or risk-taking. Due to idiosyncratic policies and enforcement, firms are conditioned to pursue preferential treatment and exemptions from local CCP officials. Routinely, companies avoid partnerships within their industry, because those partners may lack the political perks which an official has bestowed on them; this is especially true when collaboration requires crossing bureaucratic or provincial boundaries.84 A survey of 800 Chinese firms engaged in domestic mergers and acquisitions, revealed that 86 percent of* them invested in firms within their own city and 91 percent in firms within their own province. Powerful local political ties tend to isolate each region from the rest of the economy, which helps to explain why Chinese firms often are small and national industries are fragmented.85 As a hedge against fratricidal price competition, and because of excess productive capacity and overlapping investment, companies frequently over- diversify their product lines. Instead of building national dominance in a particular industry through technological progress, Chinese companies tend to diversify into other sectors, in order to exploit scale economies.86 As Steinfeld notes, Chinese

firms focus on activities with low barriers to entry. Once the cost pressures become too intense, rather than moving upward into higher end activities or taking the time to develop proprietary skills, the firms diversify into other low

Jinghai Zheng and Arne Bigsten, "Can China's Growth be Sustained? A Productivity Perspective," World Development, 28 Nov 06, p. 14, http://www.handels.gu.se/epc/archive/00Q05194/01/gunwpe0236.pdf (accessed 12 Mar 08). 85 Gilboy, "The Myth Behind China's Miracle" 86 Maximilian von Zedtwitz, "International R&D Strategies in Companies from Developing Countries— The Case of China," United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), Jan 2005, p.5, http://www.unctad.org/sections/meetings/docs/zedtwitz paper en.pdf (accessed 5 Mar 08). 222

entry barrier markets. The products themselves ... are standardized.

QO As a result, most Chinese research and development is opportunistic and second rate. Most firms aim at short-term gains over long-term investments. This fixation on short-term gains has short-circuited Beijing's efforts to assimilate technology and generate innovation. This fixation takes many forms. First, parochial concerns foster a bias toward the importation of foreign-manufactured high-technology hardware, as opposed to software. Whereas hardware is ready-to-use, software generally requires absorption and mastery of the technology it contains in order to generate domestic innovation. The lack of spending on indigenization efforts contrasts sharply with the actions of South Korea and Japan in the 1970s and 1980s, as they attempted to attain parity with the West in innovative capacity. In those countries, the amount of money spent on technology indigenization efforts was between two and three times the SO amount spent on hardware. f

'Techno-nationalist' states—like Japan and Korea through the 1980s—were willing to bear economic costs in order to maintain a high degree of technological and economic independence. Techno-nationalist policies in these countries were designed to create independent domestic capabilities in core or critical technologies, supported the establishment of domestic institutions that encouraged the diffusion of these technological capabilities across sectors, and assisted producers and users of these technologies.90

While decision-makers in China are abandoning some of the policy tools and institutions usually associated with techno-nationalism, especially the state-run version, they are not

Edward S. Steinfeld, "Chinese Enterprise Development and the Challenge of Global Integration," prepared as background paper for World Bank Study Innovative East Asia: The Future of Growth, Nov 2002, p. 14, http://web.mit.edu/polisci/research/steinfeld/Steinfeld-EnterpriseDevelop.pdf (accessed 12 Mar 08). 88 von Zedtwitz, "International R&D Strategies in Companies from Developing Countries—The Case of China" 89 Gilboy, "The Myth Behind China's Miracle" 90 Samuels, Rich Nation, Strong Army: National Security and Technological Transformation in Japan 223

discarding the project's larger ambition of expanding domestic technological capabilities. Nevertheless,

Chinese planners act as if the old, coherent package of MITI-style techno-nationalist policies are simply no longer viable or efficacious, and that they therefore have little choice but to select a few weakly related policies that promise some return in particular instances. 2

The short-term focus also has stunted the growth of China's domestic supply system and severely curtailed the breadth of its research and development efforts.

In 2002, Chinese firms devoted less than 1 percent of their total science and technology budgets (which include technology imports, renovation of existing equipment, and research and development) to purchasing domestic technology. China's best firms are among the least connected to domestic suppliers: for every $100 that state- owned electronics and telecom firms spend on technology imports, they spend only $1.20 on similar domestic goods. Thus Chinese technology suppliers do not enjoy a strong "demand pull" from the best domestic firms to stimulate their own innovative capabilities ... Chinese industrial firms ... spent 93 percent of their $2.7 billion total R&D outlay in-house ... 2percent on collaborative activities with universities and less than 1 percent on projects with other domestic firms.

Chinese businesses operate under a host of constraints, resulting from the CCP's abhorrence of large-scale political and social reform, which inhibit the country's ability to innovate. Thus, China has less ability to threaten the global balance of economic and strategic power than some American commentators argue. According to the "China hawk" argument, economic power creates potential military power which one day soon could be directed against the United States. This likely will prove correct, but over a

Barry Naughton and Adam Segal, "Technology Development in the New Millennium: China in Search of a Workable Model," Center for International Studies, MIT, Union of Concerned Scientists, Feb 2001, p.2, http://web.mit.edu/mit-japan/outreach/working-papers/WP0103.pdf (accessed 2 Feb 08). 92 Ibid. 93 Gilboy, "The Myth Behind China's Miracle" 224

much longer time frame because China is struggling to ignite technological innovation and indigenization. Therefore, fears of America losing its technological leadership to China in the middle term seem misplaced. No doubt, the American economy and its continued leadership in high technology face serious challenges, but China does not constitute the leading one. Hence, the United States should avoid the siren song of protectionist initiatives, which would backfire, unleashing a global spate of reciprocal responses, ultimately hurting all sides. Periodic bilateral sanctions, multinational pressure, and WTO complaint mechanisms should all be exercised when necessary to thwart unfair Chinese trade practices. However, the American public, and legislators, need to reach a more comprehensive understanding of the dynamic nature of international trade in the twenty-first century. China is not the monolithic entity many observers make it out to be.

Conclusion China's rapid climb to the top tier of the global trading system has generated awe and* fear among foreign observers. Both of these sensations are overdone. Critics of the current Sino-American trade relationship fixate on specific problems while missing the larger picture. The current relationship provides many strategic benefits to the United States. China offers a more inviting environment for American products than can be found in Europe, Japan, or Korea, in many instances, and its integration into the global economy encourages the promotion of liberalism in Asia. Nevertheless, many remain apprehensive about China's increasing share of global exports, fearing the rise of another mercantilist mega-power in Asia, orders of magnitude greater than Japan or Korea. But the reality is often quite surprising. Today, foreign-owned companies perform most of "Chinese' export manufacturing, particularly at the high-end. A rigid, orthodox political system is largely responsible for the lack of long-term investment in technology or the infrastructure to support indigenization and diffusion. While China's economic boom represents a challenge to the rest of the world, the threat is less ominous than many hawkish commentators would have us believe. These voices are understandably concerned by the trends they see, and their clarion call could end up being prophetic, but for now, their depictions are excessively dire. 225

This chapter has traced China's efforts to compete in the realm of high-technology. In many ways, despite repeated attempts, the Chinese have largely been unsuccessful in indigenizing innovation or producing high-technology. But its ability to develop an atomic bomb in a relatively short amount of time given adequate resources demonstrates that the Chinese can work wonders. Having closely studied the Gulf War and subsequent U.S. military operations, the Chinese are convinced that future victory in warfare will depend on high-technology and the ability to use space so to leverage the potential of conventional military forces. Given the stated U.S. goal of ensuring access to space and possibly denying it to enemies, the Chinese will not surrender the high ground without a fight. Whether the fight stays cold or goes hot is anybody's guess. For the foreseeable future, China will continue to lag technologically, so it can be expected to use many means to frustrate American plans for dominance in space. China's rapid and sustained economic boom is fueling not only greatly improved living standards for the majority of Chinese, but also eye-popping growth within the PLA. Given the importance which the Chinese attach to high-technology and space, presumably, much of that increased funding* is going towards research and development on symmetric and asymmetric responses to American might in the heavens above. 226

CHAPTER SIX THE WEAPONIZATION OF SPACE

It has become ever clearer that the United States ... is on the pathway to becoming the first nation to deploy space weapons.

We live in a glass house ... We should not be organizing rock-throwing contests2

Though space has been "militarized" for decades, a debate is raging as to whether a threshold of "weaponization" already has been crossed. Technically speaking, it is fair to argue that the "sanctuary" status of space was violated with the development of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs), which, if ever launched, would traverse space (on sub-orbital trajectories) as they sped toward their targets. Again, both the* Soviet Union and the United States conducted anti-satellite (ASAT) tests more than 20 years ago, to say nothing of the Chinese and American episodes in 2007 and 2008, respectively. In all these instances, terrestrially-based weapons systems destroyed space- based platforms. Ground-based jammers and lasers also have existed for some time. Jammers can distort the navigational signals transmitted to platforms from satellites; ground-based lasers can blind, disable, or destroy satellites. It seems pointless to argue whether space should, or should not, be weaponized—it is already. The real question is whether weapons should be based in space, since this appears to be a political threshold, and hence, a potential "tipping point." This question, in turn, raises a more basic one: "What is space? Where does it begin?" Unfortunately, there is no consensus on the issue3 which has complicated treaty negotiations about banning

1 Theresa Hitchens, "Staking Out the High Ground: U.S. Air Force Plans for Space," presentation to the Missile Defense Conference in London, 9 Nov 04. 2 John Pike, speaking on behalf of the Federation of American Scientists, as quoted in The Associated Press, "Pentagon said to lack understanding of satellite's vulnerability to attack," GlobalSecurity.org, 5 Jan 00, http://www.globalsecuritv.org/space/library/news/2000/000105-asat.htm (accessed 29 Jul 08). 3 Hans Haubold, as quoted in Dan Kois, "Where Does Space Begin? Eighty kilometers above the Earth's surface? 100 KM? 600 KM?" Slate, 30 Sep 04, http://www.slate.com/toolbar.aspx?action=print&id=2107381 (accessed 24 Aug 08). Also see Glenn H. 227 weapons in space. Nor is it easy to answer another related question, "What constitutes a space weapon?" Once again, there is no consensus on the topic; virtually anything can become a weapon is the right context. For instance, consider a small cylinder orbiting in space filled with common screws. It would seem impossible for a reasonable observer to conclude that a simple screw is a weapon: yet what if that cylinder explodes on command, hurling the screws out into space at great velocity in the vicinity of other space platforms? Though this means anyone able to launch a satellite into orbit has the means to destroy many, or most, of the assets which every country and company presently has in space. Extrapolations from this example illustrate how difficult it is to define space weapons, or stop their deployment. Given these points, is there any way one can prevent an advanced power from weaponizing space? Moreover, the costs both of creating offensive, space-based weapons, and of applying any measures to protect satellites, are astronomical versus the expense of damaging or destroying them, which can be done through simple means. This is not to imply that passive defensive measures are a waste of money, but merely to highlight the technological and fiscal asymmetry between the * placement of offensive weapons in space, and the defense of any space assets, versus the ease with which a spoiler could threaten them. This gap challenges the merits of any plan aimed at hegemony in space. Certainly, the commentators who make a great distinction regarding the placement of weapons in space, often refuse to acknowledge that ground-based or air-launched weapons can accomplish many of the same tasks of a space-based system, or seem to hope that somehow, by keeping space a weapons-free sanctuary, the entire issue will go away. They also fail to realize the technical difficulties in verifying whether treaty obligations to any proposed weapons ban in outer space can be upheld.4 Without means of mutual verification, any treaty is meaningless. Nuclear deterrence was, and continues to be, successful precisely because each side could confirm, through many means, that the other side was meeting its treaty obligations. With the explosion of dual-use

Reynolds and Robert P. Merges, Outer Space: Problems of Law and Policy, Second Edition (Boulder: Westview Press, 1997), p. 11-2. 4 James Oberg, "Space weapons: hardware, paperware, beware?" The Space Review, 13 Nov 06, http://www.thespacereview.eom/article/744/l (accessed 28 Apr 08); Nick Cumming-Bruce, "U.N. Weighs a Ban on Weapons in Space, but U.S. Still Objects," The New York Times, 13 Feb 08, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/13/world/europe/13arms.html? r=l&pagewanted=print&oref=slogin (accessed 28 Apr 08). 228 technologies, and the impossibility of conducting on-site inspections of space platforms, the problem of verification remains one of the greatest stumbling blocks to any space weapons ban, at least as far as the United States is concerned—and rightly so. At a recent annual Conference on Disarmament, China stated:

Due to the complex nature of verification in outer space activities, which bears on the security interests of all countries, as well as to technical and financial constraints of verification, currently it is extremely difficult to negotiate a verification provision. For the time being, to put on hold the verification issue until conditions are ripe, and to negotiate a treaty without verification provisions could be a practical alternative5

The Russians supported this statement, adding that "elaborating the treaty without verification measures, which could be added at a later stage, might be a preferable option. "6 James Oberg, a leading student of space weaponization and a 22-year veteran of NASA Mission Control, retorted that

... forgetting about inspections and just signing the treaty that all parties will trust each other to obey, has profound implications. It demolishes the foundation from under the fundamental values of a treaty: verifiability and enforceability. If it all comes down to blind trust of non- binding ambiguous promises, why bother with signing at all, ever?

The debate about the weaponization of space often is depicted as a battle between idealistic, liberal arms control enthusiasts opposed to weapons of any kind, versus militarists who never saw a weapon they did not like.8 Undoubtedly, some people do fit these stereotypes, but not most scholars involved in the space weaponization debate, nor the public statements of officials. Arguments range along a spectrum, with positions determined, in large measure, by whether or not scholars believe the weaponization of

5 Oberg, "Space weapons: hardware, paperware, beware?" 6 Ibid. 7 Ibid. 8 Karl P. Mueller, "Totem and Taboo: Depolarizing the Space Weaponization Debate," RAND, 8 May 02, p.l. 229 space is inevitable. At least six perspectives can be identified9 within the two overarching schools of thought, opponents and supporters of weaponization. These divisions frame scholarly debate within the American context, and offer some insight into the discussions within other states. Nonetheless, states like China, with different strategic cultures, levels of technological sophistication, and political systems, might have dissimilar opinions, and fewer or more divisions, concerning the inevitability or desirability of the weaponization of space. Equally, their views might be similar to those on which American scholars and observers base their arguments, but for different reasons. Discussion moves along this notional spectrum from left to right, with the label assigned to each perspective derived from a defining attitude, conviction, or goal. The first three camps (Purists, Stability Seekers, and Relativists) all favor keeping space a sanctuary, for different reasons, while the second three camps (Reluctant Weaponizers, Controllers, and Hegemonists), have divergent rationales to support weaponization. Often, participants in the debate offer rationales which make it hard to fit them easily into * one category or another; instead, they fall somewhere in-between. Regardless, for organizational purposes, positions are broken out with the caveat that individuals may belong to more than one camp within one of the two main schools of thought. Purists, those most opposed to the weaponization of space, might have the most adherents, especially outside the United States. The motivations behind this policy preference are as varied as the advocates themselves. Some argue that just because weapons can be deployed in space does not mean that such actions are strategically required or prudent.10 Others cite moral or philosophical objections; some want to see the relatively unpolluted realm of space remain so, while still more fear that weaponization will divert resources11 from peaceful uses and needlessly heighten animosity among nations. Members of this camp want the United States to enter a new

9 Ibid, p. 6-13. Also see Michael V. Smith, Ten Propositions Regarding Spacepower, Thesis, School of Advanced Airpower Studies, June 2001, Maxwell AFB, AL., p. 20-40. 10 Colin S. Gray, as referenced in William L. Spacy, II, Does the United States Need Space-Based Weapons? Thesis, School of Advanced Airpower Studies, 1998, Maxwell AFB, AL., p. 9. 11 Robert Grey, Director, Bipartisan Security Group, "Weaponization of Outer Space," 9 May 07, p. 1, http://www.gsinstitute.org/bsg/docs/05 09 07 Grey space.pdf OOJul 08). He claims that credible experts place the cost for a system designed to defend against an attack from a small number of missiles at 220 billion to a trillion dollars. 230

international agreement on space which will supercede or augment the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, and, if such a treaty proves beyond reach, to restrain itself unilaterally from developing or deploying space weapons, so as to reduce the need for other states to field weapons of their own. These commentators accept the dubious notion that space-based weapons are intrinsically different from terrestrially-based ones. Others possess a more sophisticated view, but believe the widespread perception of sanctuary is something worth maintaining. Bill Graham, the Canadian Foreign Affairs Minister, remarked in 2001 that "The big, red line we all have is the weaponization of outer space, which would be immoral, illegal, and a bad mistake. " Robert Grey, former U.S. Ambassador to the Conference on Disarmament (CD), which is supposed to deal with the weaponization issue, was completely surprised by the sudden shift in policy during 1999 from reluctance to outright refusal regarding arms control in outer space. "Retrospectively, it appears that the then beleaguered Clinton Administration may have decided to appease the neo- con star wars proponents by throwing them a small bone. " Speaking to a European audience in 2007, Grey said

... it is surprising that America's friends and allies with few exceptions seem willing to let us proceed to destabilize space in ways that threaten the entire international community. It is wonderful to have friends and allies when you are leading them in a positive direction. It is even more important to have friends and allies who will speak out forcefully and with conviction when your government is headed in the wrong direction. ... today is the time for our allies and friends to be telling us in no uncertain terms that radical, preemptive, unilateralism, ... in outer space ... has neither their support nor their approval.

Without respect for the rule of law and a commitment to the UN Charter and treaty obligations, especially those enshrined in the NPT, we undermine a system which has served us all imperfectly but on the whole very well.

12 Bill Graham, Canadian Foreign Affairs Minister, as quoted in Col John Hyten (USAF) and Robert Uy, "Moral and Ethical Decisions Regarding Space Warfare," Air & Space Power Journal, Vol. XVIII, No. 2 (Summer 2004), http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/api/api04/sum04/hyten.html (accessed 30 Jul 08). 13 Grey, "Weaponization of Outer Space," p. 1-2. 231

... the radical neoconservative approach to international affairs and the rule of law which characterize the present Administration is ending. Simply put, it is as dead as the dodo. It has been a moral and strategic disaster. It has eroded the US constitutional system, threatened our civil rights, plunged us into debt, debased our international reputation and raised legitimate questions about our capacity to manage ourselves much less lead the international community. ...It has weakened US national security and international security as well.u

Some of these idealists argue that, by forgoing weaponization altogether, the United States would encourage others to do the same. Likewise, "fi]t would be a disaster for us to put weapons in space of any kind under any circumstances. It only invites other countries to do the same"15 argued Senator Tom Daschle. These "doves" are not necessarily opposed to improving space tracking capabilities or satellite hardening. In concert with the other positions identified along the spectrum, Purists see no value in American vulnerability, which might encourage other states to exploit the situation; ^ however, they differ on how to prevent it. Purists oppose weapons in principle. Stability Seekers oppose the weaponization of space because they fear it might destabilize international relations. Nader Elhefnawy insists that the pervasive faith among many weaponization advocates that America's capacity to exploit space and deny its use to opponents will go unquestioned is a myth.16 Drawing on the notion of a security dilemma,17 Stability Seekers contend that space weapons are intrinsically offensive, encouraging both sides to strike preemptively in a crisis. Weaponizing space will erode deterrence: first, by encouraging first strikes, which are made more palatable by increasing confidence in one's ability to hit whatever second

14 Ibid, p. 3-5. 15 Senator Tom Daschle, as quoted in Hyten and Uy, "Moral and Ethical Decisions Regarding Space Warfare."

16 Nader Elhefnawy, "Four Myths about Space Power," Parameters, (Spring 2003), p. 125, http://www.carlisle.armv.mil/usawc/Parameters/03spring/elhefnaw.htm (accessed 29 Jul 08). 17 Robert Jervis, "Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma," World Politics, Vol. 30, No. 2 (January 1978), p. 167-214; Steven E. Miller, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Stephen Van Evera, eds., Military Strategy and the Origins of the First World War (Princeton: Princeton University press, 1991); Sean M. Lynn-Jones, "Offense-Defense Theory and Its Critics," Security Studies, Vol. 4, No. 4 (Summer 1995); Stephen Van Evera, "Offense, Defense, and the Causes of War," International Security, Vol. 22, No. 4 (Spring 1998), p. 5-43. 232 strike capability remains; second, by destroying space-based systems which are designed to detect missile launches, so reducing warning time and, possibly, the ability to locate the origin of launches; third, by allowing conventional, space-based, kinetic-type weapons, such as hypervelocity rod bundles, sometimes referred to as "Rods from God,"18 to serve as first strike weapons; and fourth, somewhat surprisingly, by encouraging nuclear proliferation—because states lacking weapons in space might see nuclear weapons as an asymmetric balancer. Though advocates of this position support any efforts to reduce the vulnerability of satellites from attack, they do not automatically support United States reciprocity in response to the deployment of space weapons by another state. Instead, they believe each instance is unique, and so the decision to respond in kind could either increase or decrease stability based on the context. Relativists are classical realists. They oppose weaponization not because it would create instability, but because it would diminish American power relative to the rest of the world (even though the United States might become more powerful in absolute terms).19 Theresa Hitchens, Vice President of the Center for Defense Information, is a* frequent consultant to the Defense Department, and a vocal critic of its intention to move ahead with space-based weapons.20 USAF Lieutenant Colonel Bruce DeBlois provides a compelling argument for keeping space weapons-free. "The immediate military advantages of being the first nation to weaponize space are undeniable but must be

18 Michael Goldfarb, "The Rods from God," GlobalSecurity.org, 8 Jun 05, http://www.globa1securitv.org/org/news/2005/050608-gods-rods.htm (accessed 22 Apr 08). 19 David W. Ziegler, Safe Heavens: Military Strategy and Space Sanctuary Thought (Maxwell AFB: Air University Press, 1998); Karl P. Mueller, "Space Weapons and U.S. Security: The Dangers of Fortifying the High Frontier," paper presented at the American Political Science Association Annual Meeting, Boston, MA., 6 Sep 98; Lt. Col. Bruce M. DeBlois, "Space Sanctuary: A Viable National Strategy," Air Power Journal, Vol. 12, No. 4 (Winter 1998), p. 41-57; Charles S. Robb, "Star Wars II," The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 221, No. 1 (Winter 1999), p. 81-6. 20 Theresa Hitchens, "Weapons in Space: Silver Bullet or Russian Roulette? The Policy Implications of U.S. Pursuit of Space-Based Weapons," a presentation to the Ballistic Missile Defense and Weaponization of Space Project, Space Policy Institute and Security Policy Studies Program at George Washington University, 18 Apr 02, http://www.cdi.org/program/document.cfm?documentid=209&programID=6&from_page:=::../friendlyversio n/printversion.cfm (accessed 29 Jul 08); "Worst-Case Mentality Clouds USAF Space Strategy," Center for Defense Information, 14 Feb 05, http://www.cdi.org/program/document.cfm?documentid=2885&programID=68&from page=. ./friendly vers ion/printversion.cfm (accessed 29 Jul 08); "U.S. Military Space Policy and Strategy," presentation to the e- Parliament Conference on Space Security, 14 Sep 05, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2004 2009/documents/dv/hitchens-05 12 01 /hitchens- 05 12 01 en.pdf (accessed 29 Jul 08); "U.S.-Sino Relations in Space: From 'War of Words' to Cold War in Space?" China Security (Winter 2007), p. 12-30. 233

weighed against long-term military costs, as well as against broader social, political, and economic costs. " Though opposed to weaponization, he avoids accusations of having his "head in the sand" by pointing out that

the ... historical trend in U.S. space policy has been to hedge our sanctuary bets with investments in space- weapons research and development. Pursuing space sanctuary policy does not preclude being prepared to do otherwise; in fact, one can make strong arguments that such preparedness encourages other actors to follow the sanctuary policy, since they could gain no advantage by challenging that policy22

As the United States benefits from the use of space more than any other country under the status-quo, it has the most to lose from the weaponization of space. If the United States were to rely predominantly on space-based weapons to deal with future threats, other states would seek to boost their space capability by developing space weapons, too. Relatively speaking, such a development would disproportionately benefit those countries when compared to the United States. Indeed, any shift toward greater reliance on space- based weapons will undercut American predominance in air and naval power, just as Britain's naval supremacy was challenged when steam replaced sail, neutralizing its lead and allowing states that had trailed badly to get a fresh start, though, in fact, Britain did master that challenge. This camp also argues that if the United States leads the charge toward weaponization, not only will this antagonize China and Russia, it also will push allies toward balancing behaviors and reduce burden-sharing about defense expenditures, and encourage unilateral American behavior. Many argue that the United States triumphed in the Cold War largely because most countries viewed it as a relatively benign superpower.24 If the United States were the first to deploy space-based weapons, it would encourage others to reciprocate, remove the political headaches for them to do

21 Deblois, "Space Sanctuary: A Viable National Strategy," p. 41. 22 Ibid, p. 57, note 43. 23 Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987). 24 John Lewis Gaddis, We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997). 234 so, and reduce the technological and financial barriers associated with research, development, and deployment of space weapons.25 Crossing past the dividing line separating opponents and supporters of weaponization are the Reluctant Weaponizers. These commentators are reluctant to weaponize space. Though many sympathize with those who wish to keep space weapons-free, they believe that weaponization is inevitable given human nature. Hence, they feel it is better that America lead, rather than follow, in the development and deployment of space weaponry.

... we know from history that every medium—air, land, and sea—has seen conflict. Reality indicates that space will be no different. Given this virtual certainty, the United States must develop the means both to deter and to defend against hostile acts in and from space. This will require superior space capabilities. —The Space Commission Report, 2001

This group could just as easily be called the Pessimists, or the Fatalists, in that they view w a space arms race as inevitable and believe that it would be foolish and irresponsible to let other countries surpass, or even rival, the United States in this field. That belief has a precedent in the nuclear arms race of the 1970s and 1980s, when having a larger nuclear stockpile might have been militarily irrelevant in a relationship characterized by Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD), but still was politically significant because it could shape perceptions about which side was dominant.27 Timing is important from this group's perspective. The behavior, capabilities, and perceived intentions of other states will act as drivers for determining precisely when and at what speed to introduce weapons into space. The United States cannot allow another state—be it an actual or a potential threat—to close the gap in terms of development and deployment. To them, such a

Alexander Gerschenkron, "The Advantages of Backwardness," in Alexander Gerschenkron, Economic Backwardness in Comparative Perspective (Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press, 1962), p. 5-11; Kenneth B. Pyle, "Advantages of Foliowership: German Economics and Japanese Bureaucrats, 1890- 1925," Journal of Japanese Studies, Vol. 1, No. 1 (Autumn 1974), p. 127-164; Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), p. 176-9. 26 Donald H. Rumsfeld, Chairman, Commission to Assess United States National Security Space Management and Organization (The Space Commission Report), 11 Jan 01, p. 10, http://space.au.af.mil/space commission/executive summary.pdf (accessed 26 Apr 08). 27 Charles L. Glaser, "Why Do Strategists Disagree about the Requirements of Strategic Nuclear Deterrence?" in Lynn Eden and Steven E. Miller, eds., Nuclear Arguments (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989), p. 109-171. 235 situation would be catastrophic; indeed, one can imagine their anxiety mirroring, and in all likelihood exceeding, the panic reached after Sputnik, were that to happen. While some detractors argue that the pessimists are simply wrong to assume that states inexorably will be driven to weaponize space, proponents have a large body of history on their side; however, there is much less evidence for their argument that it would be disastrous if another country were to field such weapons first. Sanctuary theorists have defined several costs to be paid by the state which initiated space-based weapons deployment. Furthermore, it would take a long time for a country to field a force sufficiently able to give it an advantage high enough to make it willing to take risky steps, possibly risking a nuclear exchange. These arguments would delay the time at which the United States must move as the pessimists imagine is inevitable. A fifth group, the Controllers, believe space undoubtedly will become a major arena of future conflict—much like ground, sea, and air environments are today—because of the tremendous military benefits which accrue to states able to operate there.

We can't be deceived by the fact that we enjoyed space dominance in Kosovo and in the Gulf War. We controlled the high ground, not because of superior technologies or strategies, but because our adversaries didn't use space. We gained space superiority by default; this was our bye round, and a key take-away is that the whole world took notice. Just as Milosevic modified his air defenses to try and deny our air superiority, others will modify their forces to try and deny our space superiority2 —USAF General Richard B. Meyers, 2000

Some military missions, such as boost-phase ICBM intercepts, which eliminate the threat at the earliest opportunity, possibly while over the enemy's territory and still accelerating, and before it can maneuver or activate its multiple interdependent re-entry vehicles (MIRV), are feasible only from space-based platforms. Ground-based ballistic missile defense systems, by contrast, are constrained by distance and warning time; they can intercept an incoming threat only at later stages, diminishing the room for error and increasing the difficulty of the intercept. Controllers emphasize the vital importance of

28 General Richard B. Meyers, "Space Superiority is Fleeting," Aviation Week and Space Technology, 1 Jan 00, p. 54-55. 236

satellites for communications, targeting, early-warning, reconnaissance, and other functions, and insist on the fundamental need to ensure friendly access to space while denying it to any foe. By default, this attitude implies the inextricable relationship between offensive and defensive elements within an overall space strategy. Many of the voices in this camp belong to members of the military space community, a distinct sub­ culture in the wider service culture,29 with an acute understanding of the technical specifics associated with fighting in, through, and from this medium. That position makes them the most powerful, though not necessarily the most vocal, group of supporters of the weaponization of space. In the years following the Gulf War, a steady drumbeat of voices began to call for action in space. Their thoughts were delivered on Capitol Hill, in the pages of official government publications, or in journals which track trends in the military. In 1996, the USAF Scientific Advisory Board published a study titled New World Vistas. While emphasizing technical issues and making broad pronouncements about the utility of controlling space, it gave only lip-service to the political consequences of the plan. The * drafters of the document admitted as much—"There are political issues related to the projection of power from space, but we treat only the technological ones "30—but one wonders why such considerations were ignored. The absence of analysis about the possible backlash, political and otherwise, resulting from the pursuit of their policy seems central. General Estes, CINCSPACE declared

the writing is on the wall. If we don't [devote] some attention to [space control] now, when the time comes, we'll wish we had—because it'll be a crisis that causes a huge government reaction. I want [us] to start working on it now, in a measured way, so we don't find ourselves in a crisis [where] chances are greater that we'll make the wrong decision.

Colin S. Gray, Modern Strategy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 148. 30 Gene H. McCall and John A. Corder (Maj. Gen., USAF Ret), Director and Deputy Study Director, USAF Scientific Advisory Board, New World Vistas: Air and Space Power for the 21s' Century (Maxwell AFB: Air University Press, 1996), Summary Volume, 6.4. 31 William B. Scott, "CINCSPACE Wants Attack Detectors on Satellites," Aviation Week and Space Technology, Vol. 149, 10 Aug 98, p. 22. 237

General Ralph Eberhart, in a November 2000 interview, echoed a similar theme.

/ don't think we would be good stewards of space capabilities if we only thought about 'integration.' We should also be spending resources and intellectual capital on space control and space superiority ...as our economy becomes more reliant on space.

If we only look at space in terms of 'integration,' in my view, we '11 fall into the same trap we fell into with the airplane. We [initially] thought of it in terms of intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, communication, and weather [support]. If we only think of space in these ways, [it's just] a 'higher hill' as opposed to a center of gravity32

A year earlier, at the urging of Senator Bob Smith, a vocal advocate for a robust American military presence in outer space, a commission was formed to investigate American space management and organization as it related to national security. The,, commission was headed by former and future Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. Its findings were made public nine days before George Bush entered the White House and Rumsfeld assumed command of the Pentagon, with headline grabbing conclusions: that the United States "is an attractive candidate for a 'space Pearl Harbor'" and must begin hedging against hostile acts in and from space by deploying "superior space capabilities. "33 This report opened the floodgates for those who had supported a more assertive policy, but remained silent given the Clinton Administration's opposition to such a stance. Four days later, the deputy commander for U.S. space operations testified before the House Armed Services Committee that "space is so critical now that if we

General Ralph Eberhart, as quoted in Peter L. Hays, United States Military Space: Into the Twenty-First Century, INSS Occasional Paper 42 (Maxwell AFB: Air University Press, 2002), p. 12; also see Peter hays and Karl Mueller, "Going Boldly—Where? Aerospace Integration, the Space Commission, and the Air Force's Vision for Space," Aerospace Power Journal (Spring 2001), http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/api/api01/spr01/mueller.pdf (accessed 29 Jul 08). 33 U.S. Government, Report to the Commission to Assess United States National Security Space Management and Organization (Washington: Government Printing Office, 2001), p. 100. 238 don't do something about [our vulnerability] ... we're going to have a 'space Pearl Harbor' and we '11 deserve what we get. "34 While many Controllers acknowledge that weaponizing space will carry political and financial costs, some ignore these problems amidst their enthusiasm for pushing the bounds of American power. Like Reluctant Weaponizers, they agree that such costs eventually will have to be borne, thus better to be first than second, while the gains will outweigh the costs. They also deny that American restraint would constrain other states once they see a military benefit to weaponizing, or that treaties can limit the process. Unlike the Reluctant Weaponizers, they contend that the timing of the decision to weaponize should be driven by benefits to American power, rather than the behavior of other countries, so the United States can exploit its current technological advantage rather than squander it while waiting for a challenger. At the far right of the spectrum lie the Hegemonists, the most ardent supporters of weaponization. Leading the charge for this extreme position are writers like Everett Dolman35 and former Senator Bob Smith,36 but their views seem to be supported by some* neo-conservatives (the remainder being Controllers). While Controllers see space becoming a fourth combat environment, Hegemonists see it as the supreme battlefield, the "ultimate high ground." Though space enthusiasts have yet to find their Mahan or Douhet, Hegemonists subscribe to the notion that a state which controls space will control the world.37 Control of space means control of the world, far more certainly, far more totally than any control that has been achieved by weapons or troops of occupation. Space is the ultimate position of total control over Earth38 —Lyndon Baines Johnson, 1958

Whereas Controllers see space weapons as complementing terrestrial military operations, Hegemonists view them as the dominant capability in future conflict, whether battles take

34 William B. Scott, "Commission Lays Foundation for Future Military Space Corps," Aviation Week and Space Technology, Vol. 154, 15 Jan 01, p. 433; also see Walter Pincus, "U.S. Satellites Vulnerable to Attack, Officer Warns," Washington Post, 21Jun 01. 35 Everett C. Dolman, Astropolitik: Classical Geopolitics in the Space Age (London: Frank Caas, 2001). 36 Senator Bob Smith, (R-N.H.) "The Challenge of Spacepower," Airpower Journal, Vol. 13, No. 1 (Spring 1999), http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/api99/spr99/smith.html (accessed 29 Jul 08). 37 Mueller, "Totem and Taboo," p. 12. 38 Lyndon Baines Johnson, as quoted in Smith, Ten Propositions Regarding Spacepower, p. 86. 239

place in space or down below. Hegemonists see space weapons as the culmination of the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). While the three weaponization camps vary regarding the efficacy of space weapons, it is in the political dimension that Hegemonists stand out. For Hegemonists, space control equals global control. It can come about in one of two ways. Either American space power will be perceived as so daunting that other states will forgo challenging it, or, should they do so, the United States will crush any challenger before an arms race ensues, simply by destroying any space-bound hardware launched without its consent. States either will perceive American dominance as benign—as happened during the Cold War among NATO allies—or unshakable. Oddly, the Hegemonists fear a rival state doing the same thing to the United States first (hence, their calls for immediate action), but argue that if the United States acts first, others will accept its position as gatekeeper to space. One question is central to all of these positions—is the weaponization of space inevitable? The three sanctuary perspectives deny that weaponization is a foregone conclusion. Their position has been challenged by recent developments like the Bush * Administration's deployment of a ballistic missile defense system, reported incidents of U.S. satellite "blinding" by China, the Chinese ASAT test, and the recent American shooting of a defunct intelligence satellite. The inevitability question weighs most heavily on Reluctant Weaponizers; indeed, it is what places them on the pro- weaponization side of the spectrum.

We have a lot of history that tells us that warfare migrates where it can—that nations engaged in a conflict do what they can, wherever they must.3

Controllers and Hegemonists rely less on the answer to justify their positions. Those who support weaponization argue that human nature is dark; nature hates a vacuum; once one group develops an advantage, they will use it to improve their lot against another. Those who oppose weaponization point to counter examples, like the 1957 treaty banning the establishment of military bases in Antarctica; the widespread

39 Sheila E. Widnall, Secretary of the Air Force, "The Space and Air Force of the Next Century," address to the National Security Forum, Maxwell AFB, AL., 23 Sep 97, as quoted in Smith, Ten Propositions Regarding Spacepower, p. 99. 240 rejection of the use of chemical and biological weapons, as well as anti-personnel mines, by most states; the fact that many countries have forgone the development of nuclear weapons; while nations in possession of these weapons have not placed them in space. Each of these counter examples can be eliminated easily. The absence of military facilities in Antarctica says less about the benign nature of mankind than it does about the inhospitable climate, the logistical headaches connected with supporting such bases, the distance from trade routes, and the lack of technology which could profitably exploit any natural resources. Antarctica remains a sanctuary because the meager benefits associated with establishing sovereignty are outweighed by the political and economic costs of doing so. The scientific research taking place in this pristine environment serve the needs of great and small powers, but if vital national interests were at stake, states would do whatever was necessary to bolster their security, as presently marks the evolving disputes surrounding the Northwest Passage, where the changes caused by global warming are encouraging states to claim areas they recently ignored. Equally, chemical and biological weapons are shunned and anti-personnel landmines repudiated by states because of cost- * benefit rationalization. Where the benefits are clear, the weapons remain. Chemical and biological weapons are publicly denounced because that stance improves a states' political image, but more importantly, because of concerns about the ability to control the effects, fear of reciprocal usage by enemies, and the dubious gains derived from previous uses of these weapons in World War I and the Iran-Iraq War. Even so, chemical and biological weapons remain in the arsenals of the United States and Russia—as well as many others—precisely because it deters other states which might exploit a situation where they alone possessed such capabilities. As for anti-personnel mines, the United States conspicuously opposed their elimination because the regime would not make allowances for the situation along the 38th Parallel separating North and South Korea. Arguably, the anti-personnel minefields there have been the only insurance against a Communist attack. Were that barrier removed, how would the United States defend South Korea before the North accomplished its objectives? By using tactical nuclear weapons? How would the Chinese or the Russians react? Again, many nations with the technological capacity to build nuclear weapons have chosen not to do so, because they see little benefit from doing so. Take Japan, for instance. Not only would Japanese 241

lawmakers face enormous resistance from much of their society given their experiences with Hiroshima and Nagasaki, but development of such weapons would not particularly improve Japan's security, as it already falls under the protective umbrella of its alliance with the United States. Of course, were the United States to redraw its geostrategic obligations, Japan might well fill the void by going nuclear. For other countries in the same position, like Canada, Germany, or South Africa, the benefits of going nuclear also appear minimal. Conversely, states such as Israel, North Korea, India, Pakistan, Iran, Iraq, and possibly Syria see such weapons as desirable and have chosen to develop them, or tried to do so, because the cost-benefit calculation works in their favor. The fact that space has not yet been weaponized offers little proof that it never will be so. Space-based weapons have not yet appeared because of political and practical considerations. But, as technological advances ease issues of practicality, the political reservations will diminish, if simply because states realize that their own security will be jeopardized if they opt for the status-quo, while others seek advantage. Ultimately, the logic of realism is compelling. Arguments of historical precedent are applied to buttress the premise of the inevitability of weaponization:

If we examine the evolutionary development of aircraft, we see uncanny parallels to the current evolution of spacecraft The potential of aircraft was not recognized immediately. Their initial use was confined to observation ... until one day the full advantage of applying force from the air was realized and the rest is history. So too with the business of space .... [Military] space operations, like the land, sea, and air operations that evolved before them, will expand [into] the budding new missions already included in the charter of U.S. Space Command of space control and force application as they become more and more critical to our national security interests.

General Howell M. Estes III, Commander, Air Force Space Command, speech to the Air Force Association Annual Symposium, Los Angeles, 18 Oct 96 as quoted in Paul J. Bolt, Damon V. Coletta, and Collin G. Shackelford, eds., American Defense Policy, Eighth Edition (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005), p. 384. 242

Mueller, however, suggests that the parallels between the evolution of air and space power are less robust than the weaponization school suggests. Merely a decade elapsed between the Wright brothers' first flight and the beginnings of aerial combat, he notes, whereas five decades after Sputnik, space remains weapons-free. This point is weak because, although space still may be a sanctuary, space warfare is complex. Ground- based interceptors, lasers, jammers, kinetic AS AT weapons, airborne lasers, and other platforms are all weapons which can disorient, disable, or destroy space assets, the links between them and ground controllers, or the terrestrially-based nodes of the system. The Soviets and Americans both developed at least a primitive ASAT capability. While both sides abandoned further development after 1985, each had a working system at that point. Mueller addresses these points by emphasizing that both sides abandoned these programs, something without precedent in the evolution of airpower,41 indicating that what happened in one realm need not necessarily repeat itself in the other. This is a less than satisfying conclusion. Though space power might evolve in a different way than airpower, Mark Twain's shrewd reflection that "the past does not repeat itself, but it* rhymes "42 is worth recalling. Undoubtedly, combat experience hastened the development of airpower theory and influenced its direction. While spacefarers lack a similar formative experience, still they have a half century of experience under their belts, and have made great advances in this domain. The development of American airpower was hamstrung because it was controlled by ground commanders throughout its early years, finally freeing itself only with the creation of an independent air force in 1947. Space has long suffered under the same handicap.

General Carl Spaatz once commented in exasperation that soldiers and sailors spoke solemnly about the years of experience that went into training a surface commander, thus making it impossible for outsiders to understand their arcane calling. Yet, they all felt perfectly capable of running an air force43

41 Mueller, "Totem and Taboo," p. 16-7; Paul B. Stares, The Militarization of Space: U.S. Policy, 1945- 1984 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1985). 42 Mark Twain as quoted in "History is (fill in the blank)," The University of Memphis, Department of History, http://historv.memphis.edu/history is.html (accessed 17 Mar 08). 43 Col. Phillip S. Meilinger, Ten Propositions Regarding Air Power (Washington: Air Force History and Museums Program, 1995), p. 49. 243

Similarly, the Rumsfeld Space Commission Report noted, in regard to Air Force leadership of military space programs,

In the Air Force pilot and Navy nuclear submarine career fields, military leaders have spent about 90 percent of their careers within their respective fields. In contrast, military leaders with little or no previous experience in space technology or operations often lead space organizations. A review by the Commission of over 150 personnel currently serving in key operational leadership positions showed that fewer than 20 percent of the flag officers in key space jobs come from space career backgrounds. The remaining officers, drawn from pilot, air defense artillery, and Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) career fields, on average spend 8 percent, or 2.5 years, of their careers in space or space related positions. Officers commanding space wings, groups, and squadrons fare only slightly better; about one-third of the officers have extensive space experience, while the remaining two-thirds averaged less than 4.5 years in space related positions44

Though the situation is improving, space operations remain under the control of airmen rather than space operators, well-versed in the complexities and peculiarities of operating in the "fourth dimension." As a result, the theory of space and war has suffered.

How many 'G 's' is that satellite pulling [pointing to the sinusoidal peaks made by the ground track of a Low-Earth Orbit (LEO) satellite on aflat map projection]?4

—A question posed by an unnamed Commander of U.S. Space Command (a career fighter pilot) in his first week on the job

Pilots unfamiliar with space operations invariably see space assets primarily serving in support roles, rather than as offensive or primary weapons in their own right. In its early

The Space Commission Report, p. 43. Smith, "Ten Propositions Regarding Spacepower," p. 92. 244 years, the Bush Administration appeared mindful of this situation and worked to correct it, but time will be needed for space leaders to rise and dominate the key positions within their service. Once that process is complete, which may involve the establishment of a separate service, or a Space Corps within the Air Force (similar to the relationship between the Marine Corps and the Navy), these space warriors probably will push the envelope as far as possible and advocate the fielding of weapons designed to protect friendly assets and attack enemy ones. To claim that, unlike the evolution of airpower, space has a precedent of states refusing to push for weaponization mischaracterizes the decision by the superpowers to put a hold on ASAT development. They simply chose to postpone it until the technologies were mature, the costs could be accommodated, technical issues (like space debris) solved, and political objections overcome (especially that it would be counterproductive to take out the information-gathering satellites which strengthened deterrence). Again, critics of the inevitability argument emphasize that while aircraft, surface ships, and submarines carried nuclear weapons as soon as delivery systems were * developed, this was not the case with space platforms. Though this observation certainly is true, the reasons are not altruistic, but practical. Nuclear explosions in space would create enormous debris clouds, effectively denying the use of valuable orbital areas to all, whereas hypervelocity kinetic weapons or lasers directed at terrestrial targets would not do so. Admittedly, such platforms would become desirable targets (resurrecting the debris issue), but not if they launched first strikes. Research and testing of such weapons is proceeding, presumably, with the intention of fielding them. Finally, recent ASAT demonstrations by China and the United States indicate that space weaponization is marching forward, despite the absence of space-based weapons. When the perceptual threshold will be crossed, producing the placement of weapons in space is unclear. China's recent upsurge in activity and lack of decades-long experience with brinksmanship, makes it a likely candidate for rash, ill-thought out actions reminiscent of its ASAT test of 2007 which put at risk, for years to come, numerous satellites, demonstrated a recklessness in strategic behavior, and crippled the value of political activity which it had pursued for a decade. 245

Arguments of military utility and economic vulnerability round out the inevitability thesis. Its proponents contend that the military utility of space weapons soon will become so potent that, regardless of whether or not the United States opts to advance with space-based initiatives, other countries—like China, which have the technical and financial means, and do not have to justify such moves to voters—will do so, precisely because American military forces are addicted to satellite-based services, while such weapons might effectively counterbalance American conventional military superiority. Against this, other countries are increasingly dependent on space services as well, while further options exist to attack the U.S. space system which are more politically palatable, affordable, feasible, and even anonymous, such as cyber attacks, in which China does appear to be working seriously.46

Beyond the Inevitability Argument While the central question of this debate is inevitability, that fixation obscures other relevant questions. Among them, two stand out. Would it be advantageous, let alone * politically feasible, for the United States to lead the way in deploying space-based weapons? And when would be the appropriate time to cross the Rubicon, i.e., deploy space-based weapons? These questions further define the camps. For the Reluctant Weaponizers, to be first in the field is all-important. Members of this camp envision tremendous advantage— possibly an insurmountable one—accruing to the country which first deploys space-based weapons. They do not welcome dissolution of sanctuary status for space. Rather, believing in the inevitability argument, they are convinced the United States must be first to do so. That said, they appear willing to hold off on "casting the die" so long as other states cannot roll it either. Controllers, and especially Hegemonists, believe that the United States should proceed with weaponization immediately, or at least at the earliest possible juncture, regardless of what other states choose to do. By contrast, Stability Seekers (sanctuary advocates who believe that weaponization will create international instability) and Relativists (sanctuary proponents who fear weaponization will jeopardize

Ted Bridis, "US probes whether laptop copied on China trip," The Associated Press, 29 May 08, 246

American terrestrial hegemony) doubt that, in the foreseeable future, another state could achieve a decisive lead over the United States in any arms race in space by taking the first step. Even if space-based weapons deployments do occur at some point, then any delay to that outcome still is desirable. These concerns regarding dominance over the commanding heights of space and the need, or lack thereof, to achieve it quickly require close scrutiny.

Much of the literature flowing from the Department of Defense on space and its role for future military operations makes a fundamental assumption: 'Space will be weaponized; we only need to decide if the US will take the lead.'47

It's politically sensitive, but it's going to happen ... we're going to fight in space. We 're going to fight from space and we're going to fight into space ... That's why the US has development programs in directed energy and hit-to- kill mechanisms. We '11 expand into these two missions— space control and space force application—because they will become increasingly important. We will engage terrestrial targets someday—ships, airplanes, land targets—from space. We will engage targets in space, from 48 space. —Gen. Ashy, Commander of U.S. Space Command, 1996

Such statements reflect the prevalent thinking within the American defense establishment. Their tenor is hardly surprising, given the military's charge: to defend the nation. The American military has a long tradition of drawing clear lines between what it considers to be its area of responsibility—winning wars—and that of politicians, with all else residing outside the realm of military affairs. Despite rhetoric extolling the acumen of Clausewitz, the American military has a nagging tendency to forget his message once the military machine gets rolling. Clausewitz insisted that "war is a continuation of

Deblois, "Space Sanctuary: A Viable National Strategy" 48 General Joseph Ashy as quoted in Karl Grossman and Judith Long, "Waging War in Space," The Nation, 27 Dec 99, http://www.thenation.com/doc/19991227/grossman (accessed 5 May 08). 247 politics by other means." Incumbent in that terse phrase was the idea that military operations always should contribute to the overriding political objectives; otherwise, war would come to be seen as an end in itself.50 Though it is understandable that military leaders would advocate the weaponization of space, so as to seize the benefits of controlling the high ground, that bias illuminates a collective preoccupation with short- term military benefits at the possible expense of longer-term military, social, economic, and political costs. Of course, one must ask, what are the political objectives? It may be that military and political objectives are congruent, but often the two are not in accord. For instance, during the Cold War, the Air Force initially pursued an "Air Atomic" strategy, designed to "win" a nuclear confrontation. While this strategy made sense when the United States possessed a nuclear monopoly, notions of a winnable nuclear war always rested on simplistic rationalizations. However, with time the political leadership re-oriented American strategy away from the notion that a global nuclear war could be won toward the idea of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD), in effect, forcing the military to recognize their long-held beliefs for what they were: a recipe for disaster. As * the logic of MAD spread, so did the view that the development of weapons or policies designed to increase the chances of winning a nuclear war were inherently destabilizing. Seemingly, there are parallels between the evolution of planning about strategic nuclear forces and the emerging debate about the weaponization of space. Why did the United States not use its asymmetric nuclear advantage in the late 1940s? Did such restraint occur because of fear of the unknown, or the strategic culture of the country? Why, when faced with American hegemony between 1945 and 1949, did the Soviets not simply accept that situation? So too, the United States clearly is the leader in space and could field space-based weapons now, though at considerable economic and political cost. Why has Washington chosen not to do so? Is it merely a matter of cost? That is doubtful, given the historical willingness of American presidents to "pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe, in order to insure the

Carl von Clausewitz, On War, edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), p. 87. 50 Bernard Brodie, "A Guide to the Reading of On War," in Clausewitz's On War, edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, p. 646. 248

survival and the success of liberty. More likely, such restraint has much to do with American strategic culture. When the Soviets became able to mount a challenge, albeit a relatively small one initially, to the American monopoly, the United States continued to practice restraint despite occasional veiled threats to the contrary against Soviet proxies. Arguably, this approach stemmed from the American public's discomfort with the ideas of hegemony or preemptive war or aggression. Additionally, just as the leadership in Washington during the Cold War appreciated that the United States would lose much more than it might gain in any nuclear exchange, so too today many American strategists and politicians recognize this likely outcome in any future space war. The United States has more to lose than any other country if space is weaponized. Furthermore, restraint, as reflected in the decisions and policies of American politicians, sometimes begot reciprocal restraint on the part of the Soviet Union (for example, with the Carter Administration's decision to forgo further development or deployment of the neutron bomb, because it could be seen as heading down a slippery slope between conventional and nuclear warfare, thus making the latter more likely).52 That does not imply that the * Soviets saw nuclear weapons or war in the same way American strategists and political leaders did, nor does it forget the Soviet challenge with nuclear weapons of the late 1970s, merely that American actions affected Soviet behavior and that restraint sometimes begot restraint. Such reciprocity seems a reasonable expectation in current and future dialogue with China. Proponents of the weaponization of space must consider what actions and behaviors trigger arms races and wars53 and examine other factors like world opinion, potential enemy capabilities and intentions, technological and economic hurdles, and basic strategic logic when recommending that the United States take the giant leap forward which they support. Simply to note the benefits of such a move, without acknowledging

John F. Kennedy in his Presidential Inaugural Address, 20 Jan 61, http://www.bartlebv.com/124/pres56.html (accessed 5 May 08). 52 Michael A. Aquino, The Neutron Bomb, PhD dissertation, University of California, 1982, http://www.xeper.org/maquino/nm/NeutronBomb.pdf (accessed 5 May 08); Lawrence S. Wittner, The Struggle Against the Bomb (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003). 53 Colin S. Gray, "The Arms Race Phenomenon," World Politics, Vol. 24, No. 1 (Oct 1971), p. 39-79; Colin S. Gray, "The Urge to Compete: Rationales for Arms Racing," World Politics, Vol. 26, No. 2 (Jan 1974), p. 207-33; John C. Lambelet, "Do Arms Races Lead to War?" Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 12, No. 2 (1975), p. 123-8. 249 its drawbacks, is an exercise in daydreaming, or a dangerous politicalization of a serious national security issue. At least the right-wing component the Controller camp and all Hegemonists, believe, first and foremost, that space can be controlled or dominated by one—and only one— power, that the state which moves first probably will achieve that status and certainly will gain a clear advantage in military power back on earth. They see the United States as the perfect candidate to attempt that feat, because it has the greatest capacity, the most dependence on space and importantly, the moral superiority to guarantee a benign hegemony over the heavens. Their argument about capabilities is direct. The list of possible contenders to the United States is quite small. Between Russia, China, and the United States, only the latter has the necessary requisites to deploy a space-based weapon system or systems: deep pockets, an elaborate worldwide space-tracking infrastructure, and technological sophistication in the field. The contention about urgency also is straightforward. The United States is, and will * continue to be for the foreseeable future, the country most dependent on space assets. The degree to which American economic and military activities have come to depend on satellites is underappreciated, but staggering. While such integration increases profits in the economy and efficacy on the battlefield, the ubiquitous reach of space within American society also presents an Achilles' heel which can, and will, be targeted by future adversaries.5 Hence, American satellites must be protected. Supporters of weaponization maintain that, rather than adopting a reactive strategy based on passive defenses and symmetrical responses, American vital interests in space can best be secured through a proactive strategy that uses current American technological preeminence so to shape the future. The last part of their argument is more controversial: they assume that the United States, and its political system, is the closest thing to perfection that can be hoped for in an imperfect world at the present time, thus the best hope for safeguarding the future of humanity, and that other states will accept its hegemony over the heavens. Of course, such figures are not trying to sell this argument to the world, but rather at home. In a

The Space Commission Report, p. 22. 250 sense, they assume "If America buys it, and builds it, the rest of the world will live with it, willingly or otherwise. " Interestingly, their reasoning also draws on the theory of the Democratic Peace, i.e. liberal states do not wage war against one another; time will bring all states to that status, ultimately ushering in a new world without war, characterized by peaceful coexistence.55 Until then, the United States will ensure that those states yet to be transformed, including China and Russia, cannot reverse or corrupt the progress of the last few centuries. Ironically, these supporters of weaponization have something in common with Purists. While Purists want to see all powers refrain from placing weapons in space, Hegemonists want one power, the United States, to enforce a weapons-free zone, or more precisely, a non-American weapons-free zone. In such an environment, some more zealous weaponization enthusiasts say, the United States, with its Zeus-like power, can cast down strikes instantaneously from high above the clouds, preemptively acting to insure peace. The resulting peace and stability, benefits of liberally-oriented American omnipotence, will encourage the spread of democracy.56 Once the world democratizes, * wars will become relics of the past. Perhaps Hegemonists and, to a lesser extent, Controllers are using such arguments to co-opt their rivals. Actually, the neoconservatives in key ways are ideologues who borrow heavily from the liberal internationalist tradition, which helps explain the similarity in their arguments. What is fascinating about the weaponization debate is that both those for and against weaponization often define themselves as realists, even though many realists view Democratic Peace Theory as untested, and possibly coincidental.57 Moreover, realists, unlike Purists, argue that military force is not the cause of destabilization or war, which rather stems from the attitudes and perceptions held on opposing sides. For realists, mutual strength guarantees stability, whereas lopsided power situations fuel balancing behavior.

Michael W. Doyle, "Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs," Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol. 12, No. 3 (Summer, 1983), p. 205-35 and Part 2, Vol. 12, No. 4 (Autumn, 1983), p. 323-53. 56 William Thompson, "Democracy and Peace: Putting the Cart Before the Horse," International Organization, Vol. 50, Issue 1 (Winter, 1996), p. 141-74. 57 John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2001). 251

If one assumes that democratic nations are averse to fighting one another due to shared values, one should think that a robust American effort to control space would generate little concern amongst liberal powers. And yet, as the German Space Agency, speaking on behalf global concerns, made quite clear some time ago, "the policing of space is an international concern ... The international community will be very concerned if the U.S. goes alone to solve problems that affect all space powers. "58 Not surprisingly, non-democratic states would be concerned by such a development, as well. A Russian government scientist commented,

It is obvious to educated Russians that Americans are subject to self-persuasion. Americans say they intervene to uphold democracy and peace, but Russians see some other objective, oil, uranium, bananas. Therefore what America should not do in space at the present time is any sort of anti-satellite activity .... Almost all of the Earth's states have some space requirements, and will see any move by the US towards space superiority as threatening. t

Advocates of weaponization frequently describe as naive those who say that the best protection for American space assets is to avoid introducing any weapons into this environment. Such attitudes, they argue, rely on wishful thinking; in a world still made up of democratic and non-democratic states where anarchy persists, security remains tenuous. Proponents of weaponization, especially the more "hawkish" ones, see a better option to the haphazard one now in place. Rather than wait on crises, hurried negotiations, and a sub-optimal compromise, America simply should grab control of the future. It must courageously assume the role of global protector, enforcing global conformance with international norms and free-market access, enabled through hegemony over space. Undoubtedly, such boldness will have costs, but it will benefit the United States and all states.

Dr. H. Richarz and Dr. K. Schrogl speaking on behalf of DARA—the German Space Agency, as quoted in Deblois, "Space Sanctuary: A Viable National Strategy" who cites "Space Power Theory Research Trip—Western Europe," Headquarters USSPACECOM/J5X, trip report, 10 Oct 97, p. 7. 59 Dr. M. Tarsenko, Russian Center for Arms Control, Energy, and Environmental Studies, as quoted in Deblois, "Space Sanctuary: A Viable National Strategy" who cites "Space Power Theory Research Trip— Western Europe," Headquarters USSPACECOM/J5X, trip report, 10 Oct 97, p. 11. 252

Hegemonic Stability Theory maintains that only a hegemonic power can establish a system of rules and standards necessary for the success of a global liberal order. Despite a flurry of anti-American rhetoric and diplomatic setbacks in recent years, Hegemonists (and many Controllers) see the period following the collapse of the Soviet Union and before the rise of a new challenger such as China, as a pivotal point in world history. Right now, the United States enjoys a degree of power and influence which is rare in history, or unprecedented. Hegemonists, and other members of the weaponization school of thought, believe that this window of opportunity must be seized so as to make the international system more compatible with the liberal capitalist agenda. Interestingly, many of these commentators do not believe the United States will remain forever on top, though they might favor it. They see hegemony as a passing phenomenon;60 hence, the need to act, before such circumstances change. Debate swirls around whether the United States is near the height of its hegemonic power, due to the recent demise of the Soviet Union, or if it has been declining since the late 1960s when the Japanese economy came into its own. Either opinion has * implications for American strategic behavior.61 Those who perceive American hegemony in decline predict that it will attempt to preserve for as long as possible its declining market share and military advantage. How better to preserve military advantage than by taking the high ground? Those who see American hegemony near its peak want to see liberal ideals and values replicated through a new world order, expanding American economic and political reach and increasing U.S. security. Again, the best method to secure that outcome is to control the high ground and dictate terms. The objective of Hegemonists, the desire of Controllers, and the hope of Reluctant Weaponizers, is that by being the first to put weapons in space, the United States can establish the conditions needed for global peace and prosperity. All find the promise of space control compelling. Once a nation seizes this high ground, it can deny access to all others. For some supporters of weaponization, this fact alone is sufficient motivation to take the leap. Others, sensitive to charges of naked aggression, swaddle their proposals

Mancur Olsen, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965). 61 See Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984). 253 in a claim that the United States is a unique power with a track record of benign intervention and disdain for empire. These traits make the United States the ideal candidate to take control of space. This scenario is enticing; it fuses the hopes of those who oppose war and support empire. If the United States takes command of the high ground, other states still will be free to engage in space commerce, since such desires would align with the liberal capitalist world order. The United States would fulfill a role like that played by British sea power in an earlier age: enforcement of a safe operating environment necessary to expand trade and exploration. To accomplish that goal, American space commanders would function like air traffic controllers, but in a far larger jurisdiction. Clearance to launch would be granted, assuming the mission and flight plan received pre-approval from American command and control locations. Should American intelligence- surveillance-reconnaissance (ISR) assets detect potentially hostile movements by any state (ex. missile preparations or pre-launch actions), it would unilaterally terminate such developments before they could come to fruition. Of course, other states could consider* this oversight function legitimate only if the United States refrains from military interventions and is seen as acting impartially and decisively. While many would accuse the United States of imperialism, since American hegemony in space will be only used to prevent wars, such complaints will soon fade as humans grow accustomed to the benefits this system would offer. As time passes, states will reduce military spending, since weapons will have no utility; their use, offensively, will not be tolerated and, defensively, they will be unnecessary. Though terrorism and asymmetric warfare would continue, they could be mitigated. Conventional warfare would become a thing of the past. Ironically, the long-held dreams of the anti-war coalition would be realized by a daring, realist initiative. By opting to weaponize space now, the United States will preempt the arms race and possible war that could develop should it delay acting until a challenger arises. Acting swiftly to control space is the single best way to preserve peace. This scenario is neat. It provides a clear vision and straightforward solutions to predictable hurdles. Unfortunately, its answers are too simple. This vision rests on ideas pioneered by Charles Kindleberger, a British economic historian, further developed by Stephen Krasner, a political scientist, which have collectively come to be known as 254

Hegemonic Stability Theory. Kindleberger, best known for his analysis of the 1929 Depression and its after-effects,62 argued that an international system of trade and finance could prosper only if there was a hegemon within the international system able to tackle the "collective action problem." The hegemon's rationale for regulating and institutionalizing trade and finance lies in the disproportional benefit it gains, yet other members of the community benefit as well. One example of this theory was the Bretton Woods system, established after World War II with the intent of avoiding a repetition of the economic calamity that befell global trade in the 1930s. Kindleberger's thesis emerged from the British experience. He argued that as British manufacturing capacity outstripped French production in 1850, London championed the role of exporter of capital. It was not hesitant to open foreign markets through "gunboat diplomacy." Acting from a position of strength, Britain flexed its muscles to maintain the international system. By the 1930s, however, Britain was no longer the dominant player nor was anyone ready to take its place. When the Depression unfolded, the system collapsed because no hegemon could bolster the system. According to Keohane, a hegemon has * three key attributes: the ability to create and enforce rules for the system perceived as mutually beneficial to the major states operating in it; the will to do so; and decisive economic, technological, and military dominance.63 But critics like Keohane charge that order is not achieved solely by the existence of a hegemon; other major actors must recognize some form of hierarchy. For instance, during the Cold War, fear of the Soviet Union provided an incentive for Britain, France, and Germany to fall in line behind American policies. Another question to ask is whether the United States remains a hegemon. While political and economic setbacks recently have battered the American machine, still it enjoys tremendous structural power and influence around the world (i.e. "soft power") and its military power knows no equal. Yet, it is unclear whether America can be accurately called a hegemon today. Probably the greatest weakness of Hegemonic Stability Theory is its inability to articulate how the hegemon can avoid the realist tendencies that favor relatively strengthening itself over the collective good, which many advocates of space weaponization use to promote their vision.

62 Charles P. Kindleberger, The World in Depression, 1929-1939 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973), p. 288-306. 63 Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy 255

Should the United States place weapons in space, this will encourage other states to reciprocate, and worry allies. The rise of one predominant military power traditionally has sparked a coalition looking to rectify such imbalance.64 Another concern which proponents of space weaponization need to address is which country or countries threaten American space dominance. Admittedly, they have been helped recently by the Chinese ASAT test and by the combative Russian rhetoric spewing from Vladimir Putin. While nations such as China are increasing their situational awareness through their ISR satellite deployments, in times of hostility those platforms can be handled by less provocative systems than space-based ASATs. Frequently, supporters of weaponization defend their position through fallacious argument; that only space weapons can defend space assets. They discount the idea of collective security via rules of the road agreements and the efficacy of passive satellite defenses. Much of the enthusiasm behind the argument for weaponization revolves around the presumed potency of space-based weapons. However, such optimism seems misplaced * given what we know of some other space visions.

Scientists and engineers now know how to build a station in space that would circle the Earth 1,075 miles up .... Within the next 10 or 15 years, the Earth will have a new companion in the skies, a man-made satellite that could be either the greatest force for peace ever devised, or one of the most terrible weapons of war—depending on who makes and controls it. —Wernher von Braun, 1952

A more recent example of optimism about the cost and technical feasibility of space operations can be found in the disparity between Space Shuttle plans of the 1970s and

Walt, The Origins of Alliances; Michael E. Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller, eds., The Perils of Anarchy: Contemporary Realism and International Security (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1995), p. 238. 65 Wernher von Braun, "Crossing the Last Frontier," one article in a series by Collier's titled "Man Will Conquer Space Soon!" 22 Mar 52. Also see T. A. Heppenheimer, The Space Shuttle Decision: NASA's Search for a Reusable Space Vehicle (Washington, DC: Smithsonian, 2002), http://www.nss.org/resources/library/shuttledecision/index.htm (accessed 28 Apr 08). 256 actual experience. Originally, NASA predicted 24 missions per year (the limiting factor being the manufacturing capacity of the facility which constructed the main external fuel tank) aiming to provide low-cost launches through amortization. Instead, the shuttle has averaged 4-6 launches per year. Twenty-seven years later, the Space Shuttle has essentially become a space truck with horrible gas mileage, with a cost per pound delivered to space of $20,000 dollars.67 The Space Shuttle program illustrates how the best laid plans can go awry. Like the Space Shuttle, space weapons and their supporting systems will undoubtedly prove to be costly, complex, fragile, and the source of political headaches. There are four major criticisms of the Space Shuttle program. First, the program failed to reduce the costs associated with gaining access to space; per-pound launch costs are not significantly less than those associated with expendable launchers.68 After the 2003 Columbia disaster and the resultant grounding of the Space Shuttle fleet for more than two years, per-pound costs climbed considerably, scuttling any remaining projected cost savings. Second, the shuttle program did not provide reliable access to space,* largely because of the multi-year groundings following the two deadly shuttle accidents. Third, the budgetary pressures created by chronically high Shuttle program costs, left no money for manned space flight beyond low earth orbit (Apollo 17, the last such mission, took place in December 1972). It also limited funding of other initiatives using unmanned probes, which, according to many experts, provide more productive space science than the repetitive Shuttle launches. Finally, critics charge that NASA's promotion of the Shuttle stalled domestic commercial Expendable Launch Vehicle (ELV) programs until after the 1986 Challenger disaster. Ultimately, most of the unfulfilled promises of the Space Shuttle program stem from unforeseen cost overruns and maintenance issues which crippled other issues. More generally, in virtually every defense program involving high-technology, such as the B-2

The Associated Press, "Critics scrutinize cost of shuttle," USA Today, 4 Feb 03, http://www.usatodav.com/news/nation/2003-02-04-shuttle-critics x.htm (accessed 28 Apr 08). 67 Ibid. 68 "Space Transportation Costs: Trends in Price Per Pound to Orbit 1990-2000," Futron Corporation, 6 Sep 02, http://www.futron.com/pdf/resource center/white papers/FutronLaunchCostWP.pdf (accessed 7 May 08). 257

Stealth Bomber, the F-22 Air Superiority Fighter, the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV), or the Space-Based Infrared System (SBIS), cost overruns cause fewer platforms to be built,70 resulting in less redundancy and overlap, i.e. less margin for error. For any space-based weapons system, however, fewer numbers easily could produce a fragile architecture which could be inundated or destroyed during a crisis. The troubles that hobbled the Shuttle and NASA's broader mission stem from many factors, some preventable, but many more unavoidable or unexpected. Many of the standard problems which confronted a complex system like the Shuttle, whether bureaucratic, fiscal, operational, technical, or otherwise, also would likely hamper the development of space-based weapons platforms. The final design of the Shuttle was quite different than the original concept.71 While this is normal in the refinement of ambitious projects, it often costs time and money.72 The higher than anticipated operational costs stemmed largely from the thermal protection tiles. Repairing and replacing these tiles proved labor-intensive. It took one person a week to replace or* repair one damaged tile—and hundreds were, after every mission. The Shuttle routinely returned from missions missing up to twenty of these tiles. This did not cause problems until 2003, onboard Columbia, when a missing tile from the critical leading edge of the wing allowed super-heated gas to enter critical compartments during the fiery re-entry

TX * procedure. The intense maintenance regimen extended to the Shuttle's main engines,

Associated Press, "GAO Says F-35 Costs to Hit $1 Trillion," Military.com, 12 Mar 08, http://www.militarv.eom/NewsCon.tent/0.13319.163800.00.html (accessed 7 May 08). 70 Leslie Wayne, "Pentagon Struggles With Cost Overruns and Delays," The New York Times, 11 Jul 06, http://www.nvtimes.eom/2006/07/l l^usiness/lloven-uns.html?_r=1«fepagewanted=print&oret=:slogin (accessed 2 May 08). In the case of the EELV, cost have doubled, yet the number of projected launches has decreased from 181 to 138. As far as SBIS is concerned, while development costs have nearly tripled, the number of satellites in the planned system has decreased from 5 to 3. 71 "Space Shuttle History," Century of Flight: The Exploration of Space, http://www.century-of- tlight.net/Aviation%20historv/space/Space%20Shuttle%20history.htm (accessed 6 May 08). 72 However, had the designers opted to stick with the original design it would have been far more complex than the system which eventually became the Shuttle. Bob Thompson, Space Shuttle Program Manager from 1970-1981, has stated that the more complex (and more expensive), fully-reusable design could have doomed the entire project. See Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) Mishap Report, Chapter 1, National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), Aug 2003, http://klabs.org/richcontent/Reports/Failure Reports/columbia/caib report/caib report.htm (accessed 7 May 08). 73 John Young, the Commander of STS-1, has revealed that on the Space Shuttle Columbia's maiden re­ entry in 1981, the right main landing gear buckled due to gap filler between tiles sticking out and ducting 258

which had to be removed and inspected after each flight. Understandably, after the Challenger and Columbia accidents, crew safety became the paramount concern. Unfortunately, this decreased launch rates, and cost-effectiveness, leading many potential users to pursue alternative methods to get their payloads into orbit. After the loss of the Challenger, the military turned to expendable launch vehicles. In 1988, President Reagan ordered NASA to get out of the commercial satellite launch business.75 Over following years, per-pound rates declined as domestic commercial ventures and foreign competition caused many to go with more economical and dependable options offered by Russia, China, and the European Space Agency. All of these unanticipated developments left the Shuttle with less to do. The Shuttle experience highlights how unplanned events can skew effectiveness.

It is now commonly accepted that [the decision to develop the Space Shuttle and the International Space Station] was not the right path. We are now trying to change the path while doing as little damage as we can. —NASA Chief Administrator Michael Griffin, 2005

If the Space Shuttle saga does not cause proponents of space weaponization to pause, a few physical and technical realities associated with operating in the "fourth dimension" should. First of all, the energy differential separating air and space flight is staggering. Deblois notes that roughly 1.15 million pounds of thrust are required to get "an F-16- sized" vehicle with a reasonable payload to orbit. By contrast, an F-16 fighter aircraft produces 29,000 pounds of thrust at sea level, i.e. 40 times less than the thrust required to get it to orbit, while an air-breathing engine like that found in any conventional aircraft is incompatible with the space environment.77 Second, there is a tendency, in the early design phase of space systems, to underestimate the realities of operations in this hostile hot gas into the wheel well. See Jeff Foust, "John Young's shuttle secret," The Space Review, 14 Apr 03, http://www.thespacereview.eom/article/15/l (accessed 2 May 08). 74 "Space Shuttle History" 75 "Legal Aspects of the Commercialization of Space Transportation Systems," http://www.law.berkeley.edu/journals/btlj/articles/vol3/fought.html (accessed 4 May 08). 76 Traci Watson, "NASA administrator says space shuttle was a mistake," USA Today, 27 Sep 05, http://www.usatodav.com/tech/science/space/2005-09-27-nasa-griffin-interview x.htm (accessed 5 May 08). 77 Deblois, "Space Sanctuary: A Viable National Strategy" 259 environment, like space debris (man-made and natural), extreme temperatures, and radiation which mandate shielding, insulation, and energy-dissipation mechanisms. Sally Ride recalled a run-in with space debris on her first space mission:

About halfway through the flight there was a small pit in the window of the space shuttle and we didn 't know what it was. An awful lot of analysis was done while we were in orbit to make sure that the strength of the window would sustain re-entry. ... the analysis afterward showed that our window had been hit by an orbiting fleck of paint, and the relative velocities were enough that the paint actually made a small but visible gouge in the window. Well, a fleck of paint is not the same as a small piece of metal traveling at that same speed. So, as soon as you start increasing the amount of junk in a low-Earth orbit, you have an unintended by-product that starts putting some of your own quite valuable satellites at possible risk.

Third, space vehicles produce and maintain limited amounts of energy—and there are no gas stations in space. Fourth, it is becoming increasingly difficult to distinguish who owns what in orbit and their precise roles for their owners. While some platforms clearly are owned by one country and serve a clearly defined purpose, others are jointly owned and operated, while dual-use technologies allow multi-tasking. This complicates targeting decisions and re-introduces the issue of space debris. Lastly, even if the United States establishes a huge space-capability differential between itself and other states, that will not guarantee a significant coercion capability, since asymmetric responses by other states are to be expected.79

All told, the story of proliferated space access and exploitation in the near future is grossly exaggerated. Since the beginning of the space age, we have readily assumed away the very many technical and political difficulties associated with access to and movement in space. It is a natural thing to do—the skies were readily conquered; why not space? Visions of Buck Rogers

78 Sally Ride as quoted in Dawn Levy, "Sally Ride Speaks On The Tactical Role Of Space And War," Space Daily, 22 Apr 02, http://www.spacedailv.com/news/milspace-02n.html (accessed 7 May 08). 79 Deblois, "Space Sanctuary: A Viable National Strategy" 260

"flying" through space reinforce the natural, albeit false, analogy between the conquest of air and space—hence the misnomer spaceflight ... it must not cloud rational decisions80

Advocates of weaponization, while lauding the benefits of their strategy, must honestly address the drawbacks as well. Aside from political costs and the effect on other military spending, there are other, less tangible considerations. Should the United States attempt to amass a huge asymmetrical advantage in space, how likely is it that other countries will stand idly by? If they do not, is the United States prepared to engage in a drawn-out arms race? What priorities will be sacrificed as a result, i.e. what opportunity costs are involved? Of course, these questions presume that the nation can afford such expenditures. But can it? America's chronic deficit spending can not persist indefinitely. Without a drastic attitude adjustment, fiscal realities will eventually bring grandiose dreams crashing down. Finally, even if the country could shoulder the financial commitment, should it do so, since many of the technologies are still in their infancy? Will the United States dig itself even further in debt, maturing technologies only to see other countries mimic those advances at a fraction of the cost, in effect, benefiting from their own technological backwardness? American strategists would do well to remember history: The United States led the way in microelectronics research and development, only to see the Japanese exploit that development to their advantage. Just as the United States saw its commanding lead in microelectronics vanish thanks to parasitic foreign behavior, the same fate could befall America in the realm of space technology.83 Furthermore, given what is known about the deleterious effects of space debris, made exponentially worse as a result of any sustained combat in space, it is difficult to imagine an American President authorizing the use of space-based weapons against other space- based vehicles in any scenario short of total war. If so, why would the nation want to adopt a strategy which is critically flawed and prohibitively expensive? Weaponization

81 Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers (New York: Random House, 1987). 82 Gerschenkron, "The Advantages of Backwardness" 83 U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, International Competition In Services, OTA-ITE-32S (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, July 1987), p. 192-3. 261 proponents must carefully assess the benefits of keeping space free from weapons, rather than impulsively dismissing it as naive. Without question, the weaponization of space is accelerating, albeit through the development and deployment of terrestrially-based options. To ignore such a "reality" is foolish and dangerous. Any pragmatic space strategy recognizes that and proceeds accordingly. A space strategy that keeps space weapons-free is the most practical means of keeping America secure, but such a strategy should not simply rely on the good will of China and other likely competitors. A viable space strategy must incorporate other key components. First, Washington must clearly identify American goals. Ambiguous language only stirs anxiety in foreign capitals, and though ambiguity can provide flexibility, it robs the nation of a clear vision for going forward and needlessly antagonizes other states. Second, a fruitful space strategy demands political leadership at the highest level. Space operations have become a vital national interest. The President should take hold of * American policy in this realm rather than allowing strategy to be stitched together on an ad-hoc basis, via conflicting military service and commercial agendas. Renewed diplomatic efforts need to stress the collective good resulting from a weapons-free space environment. Despite verification hurdles resulting from the dual-use nature of many space platforms and the inability to inspect them, efforts should continue to form a genuine consensus regarding what defines a space weapon. Strong, purposeful leadership, like that provided by President Kennedy in the early 1960s, is needed to forge a common vision, supported by the people, regarding the future direction of the American space program. Clear, attainable objectives need to be articulated, not only to benchmark progress, but also to energize and inspire once again a society that has lost the passion it once had for space. Third, operational unity of command is essential. Just as early advocates for an independent air force argued that airpower must be centrally commanded by an airman in order to leverage its full capacity, the same holds true for space power. This requires a transformation in thinking within the military, or political directive. Space is more than just an enabler of terrestrial operations, but it will continue to be viewed that way until it 262 is led by a cadre of space warriors with the knowledge and experience needed to fashion doctrine and policy reflective of space power's potential. Fourth, greater attention must be paid to securing space assets. To date, this has achieved inadequate attention mainly because no real challenger appeared willing or able to pose such a threat. The Chinese ASAT demonstration has highlighted the need to redouble such efforts. While collective security arrangements could provide a degree of security, sole reliance on such promises is out of the question. While critics argue that defensive measures are expensive, such costs pale in comparison with the cost of an arms race in space. Enhanced security can be achieved through a variety of means: redundancy; fall-back options in the event a space system is compromised or lost; deception; camouflage; encryption; improved ISR capabilities to provide greater warning; orbital maneuvering; shielding or hardening; instantaneous shutdown of platforms once electro-magnetic or laser activity is detected coupled with the ability to ascertain where such activity originated; continuous frequency modulation; and routine operational security measures. Finally, the technical envelope must be continuously pushed to ensure that the nation is able to quickly deploy space-based weapons should another country decide to do so first. This may entail a space race of sorts, involving terrestrially-based weapons, but it would still place a "lid" on the competition. However, American vigilance and continued technological innovation will serve to deter other states from breaching the sanctuary of space itself. Those who argue the United States should act now and become the gatekeeper for all who wish to enter space are overestimating the American public's willingness to become a hegemon. Such a role runs against the grain of American strategic culture and is unsustainable without a clear threat. At present, no such threat exists. However, by choosing to be the first to base weapons in space, the United States will create a self- fulfilling prophesy. Weaponization proponents ground their conviction on the assumption that human behavior is unchanging and, therefore, always knowable. But this is not true. Over time, many cultures have witnessed considerable evolution regarding their perspectives on a host of issues: political organization and participation, freedom of 263

expression, women's rights, slavery, interstate trade, total war, German and Japanese militarism, European union, and the environment, to name a few. Power politics and warfare always have relied on wits and force. However, a perceptible shift away from large-scale use of force and the diminishing utility of conventional power appears underway. As such, stratagems are more significant as a means to achieve national goals. The United States currently has unrivaled political, economic, and militarily capability, but those advantages are relative, and the scales are shifting towards greater multipolarity in the world. Some argue that the United States should capitalize on this transitory pinnacle of power and attempt to make it permanent by acquiring absolute dominance in space. Such designs have little chance of succeeding. The technological and political hurdles are significant. America's interests are wide-ranging, as are its obligations in defense of them. An overly short-sighted strategy, stemming from frustration at the dilemma posed by tremendous American power, which cannot make other states accept American hegemony, risks ruin. In attempting to control space—and through it, the world—the United States risks losing its * vaulted position by aggravating potential rivals, alienating friends, and bleeding itself dry. If the history of warfare teaches anything, it is that the ascendance of the offense (in this case, space-based weaponization by the United States) is always followed by the rise of defensive measures that mitigate those advantages. The competitiveness of other states and nation-blocks like the EU are increasing while traditional alliances, such as NATO, are weakening. The continuance of American leadership is best served by avoiding the placement of weapons in space. Doing so does several things: it sends a strong moral message; it demonstrates confidence in American capabilities; it necessitates greater cooperation with friends and non-aligned nations; it eases fears on the part of other states that the U.S. is bent on domination; it puts the burden of the political and economic costs for violating space sanctuary on others; it avoids prohibitive expenditures at a time when American infrastructure is crumbling and its fiscal dysfunctionality and indebtedness threatens to undermine its future potential; its aligns with traditional American strategic culture, rather than hubris-inspired designs that have

Michael Beschloss, The Conquerors: Roosevelt, Truman and the Destruction of Hitler's Germany, 1941- 1945 (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2002), p. 288. 264

gained a degree of legitimacy in the post-Cold War era. Importantly, such a decision does not preclude research and development into terrestrially-based space weapons. While this may spur an arms race, the financial and political costs are astronomically high, both of which would tend to mitigate such a spiral. Finally, it will leave the United States, for decades to come, with the easy ability to dominate space should anyone else try to move for it by surprise. This latent power will deter adventurism and also have a broader effect of its own. William Pitt, the British Prime Minister once said, "Unlimitedpower is apt to corrupt the minds of those who possess it. "85 So too, the American Constitution was crafted with its separation of powers, not because of an abiding belief in man's good nature, but due to genuine fear of man's darker instincts. Many advocates for space-based weaponization seemingly forget these ideas. An all or nothing attitude does not characterize the debate over space weaponization. Many positions are staked out between the extremes. But extreme positions often generate attention beyond the confines of their support. Many supporters of American control of space seem blinded by ignorance, zeal, fear, or a * combination of all three. They see space-based weapons not just as a necessary evil, but as the ultimate protection against threats to the United States, and as a way to guarantee peace in general through preemptive action. For other members of this grouping, space weaponization simply is the next logical step in the evolution of warfare—better the United States be on top than any other power. The stated intention of such action is to make terrestrial weapons unnecessary, since either can be destroyed from on high in a flash. In theory, the United States would become the guarantor of world peace and the first (and last) global hegemon. This reasoning presumes that after a spate of initial grumblings the world would acquiesce in this condition because the pluses outweighed the negatives. Regardless of whether the world resigns itself to this liberation from war thanks to American space power, supporters of this policy would do well to remember

William Pitt "the Elder," First Earl of Chatham, British Prime Minister (1776-1778), in a speech to the House of Lords in 1770; see "10 Downing Street: PMs in History," http://www.number 10.gov.uk/output/Page 167.asp (accessed 14 Jul 08); also see Jeremy Black, Pitt the Elder (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992). 265

Lord Acton's warning that "power tends to corrupt, and absolute power corrupts absolutely. "

86 John Emerich Edward Dalberg Acton or Lord Acton (1834-1902), in a letter to Bishop Mandell Creighton in 1887, as quoted in E. D. Hirsch, Jr., et al eds., The New Dictionary of Cultural Literacy, Third Edition (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2002). 266

CHAPTER SEVEN

CONTESTED SPACE- POSSIBILITIES AND IMPLICATIONS

The mastery of outer space will be a requisite for military victory, with outer space becoming the new commanding heights for combat. . . lightning attacks and powerful first strikes will be more widely used in the future. —PLA Captain Shen Zhongchang

[TJhe Chinese have highlighted space systems as targets for preemption. That should only make us pay more attention to improving the survivability of the American space force2 —Research analyst with Project Asia *

Nuclear Weapons: Pathway to the Exploitation of Space Among the most famous sayings of Chairman Mao was the view that nuclear weapons were a "paper tiger."3 This view did not represent his real views. After the Communist victory over the Nationalists in mainland China, the Korean War, and in the midst of the first Taiwan Strait crisis, otherwise known as the Quemoy and Matsu Island crisis, Mao Zedong pondered the feasibility and utility of developing nuclear weapons. On January 15, 1955, at a meeting of the Politburo's Central Committee, Mao argued that China had the resources and scientific and technical capability to develop its own nuclear arsenal, and the need to do so.

1 Leonard David, "Pentagon Report: China's Space Warfare Tactics Aimed at US Supremacy," Space News, 1 Aug 2003, http://www.space.com/news/china dod 030801.html (accessed 16 Dec 07). 2 Ibid. 3 Mao Zedong, "Talks with Marshal Montgomery on the Three Principles and the Question of Nuclear Weapons," Sep 1961; China Daily, 28 Sep 07, http://www.chinadailv.com.cn/china/2007- 09/28/content 6143129.htm (accessed 7 Jan 08). 267

During the past years we have been busy doing other things, and there was not enough time for us to pay attention to this matter [of nuclear weapons]. Sooner or later, we would have had to pay attention to it. Now, it is time for us to pay attention to it. We can achieve success provided we put it on the order of the day. Now, [because] the Soviet Union is giving us assistance, we must achieve success! We can also achieve success even if we do this ourselves.4

Not surprisingly, given Mao's grip on power, a Central Committee resolution, code- named "02," supported the idea.5 A year later, Mao reiterated his opinion. "We also need the atom bomb. If our nation does not want to be intimidated, we have to have this thing. "6 Without nuclear weapons China would not be taken seriously as a world power. The events of the First Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1954-5 cemented his belief that without nuclear weapons, China would constantly be under the threat of nuclear blackmail from the United States because that was precisely what the latter had done over Quemoy.7 In 1957, Deng Xiaoping, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Secretary General bluntly* stated, The Soviet Union has the atom bomb. Where does the significance lie? It lies in the fact that the imperialists are afraid of it. Are the imperialists afraid of us? I think not ... The United States stations its troops on Taiwan because we have no atom bombs or guided missiles.

Despite China's resources, it needed Soviet assistance to develop a nuclear program and initially received it, in significant ways. However, the Sino-Soviet split of the early 1960s halted any further collaboration. China would have to develop its weapon on its own. It was determined to do so, in order to break the superpowers' nuclear monopoly,9

4 "China's Nuclear Weapons Program," Atomic Forum, http://www.atomicforum.org/china/china.html (accessed 7 Jan 08). 5 Rosita Dellios, "China's Space Program: A Strategic and Political Analysis," Culture Mandala, Vol. 7, no. 1, Dec 2005. 6 "World: Asia Pacific China and the bomb," BBC News, 15 Jul 99, http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/world/asia- pacific/352503.stm (accessed 11 Jan 08). John Gittings, 77ze World and China (Oxford University Press, London, 1967), p. 203. 8 Robert S. Norris, Andrew S. Burrows, and Richard W. Fieldhouse, Nuclear Weapons Databook, Vol. S.­ British, French, and Chinese Nuclear Weapons (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994), p. 327. 9 Major General Yang Huan, "China's Strategic Nuclear Weapons," Institute for National Strategic Studies, 268 prevent blackmail by the United States or its new enemy, the Soviet Union (USSR), and to enhance its prestige and power internationally. As the fifth country to develop nuclear weapons, China could profit not just from Soviet expertise but also from a wide array of published literature on nuclear weapons production. Given its constrained finances, not having to begin from scratch was a major advantage. It let China streamline its efforts and proceed only along those avenues most likely to succeed. Furthermore, China benefitted from the return of Western-trained physicists, thanks largely to "Red Scare" witchhunts of the early 1950s in the United States. Among the returnees was Qian Xuesen, considered the "Father of Chinese Rocketry."13 Upon his return, he immediately joined the fledgling atom bomb project, and soon was granted permission to initiate a ballistic missile program as well.14 On October 16, 1964, China surprised the West by detonating its first atomic device in the remote, northwestern desert of Lop Nor. The device was code-named "596"—shorthand for June 20, 1959 (the date the USSR denied China a prototype nuclear weapon, so signalling its unwillingness to further strengthen it following their ideological split). 5 China's space program began in 1955 with the decision to build nuclear weapons. Alongside the "596" program, engineers refined aviation and rocket technologies so to accommodate a nuclear warhead delivery system. Only two years earlier, on October 4, 1957, the Soviets had launched Sputnik, the world's first satellite. This watershed event shattered American public confidence and acted as a catalyst for its space efforts, by fueling the perception of a "Missile Gap." This event also energized the Chinese. Sputnik-1 demonstrated Soviet mastery of heavy rocket propulsion, a forerunner to intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) capability,16 which represented a dire situation for those states lacking a similar capability. Hence, the flurry of activity on the American side following Sputnik's launch. As for China, its main adversary, the United States, had

11 Federation of American Scientists, "Nuclear Weapons," http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/china/nuke/index.html (accessed 7 Jan 08). 12 See John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai, China Builds the Bomb (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1988). 13 Dwayne A. Day, "A dragon in winter," The Space Review, 14 Jan 08, http://www.thespacereview.eom/article/1035/l (accessed 14 Jan 08). 14 Iris Chang, Thread of the Silkworm (New York: Basic Books, 1995). 15 Norris, et al, Nuclear Weapons Databook, p. 331. 16 Dellios, "China's Space Program: A Strategic and Political Analysis" 269

17 demonstrated the capability and willingness to employ nuclear weapons—twice! It chose the option of nuclear weapons over a planned invasion of the Japanese home islands so as to win the war in the Pacific as quickly, and from the US perspective, painlessly as possible. In the decades to follow, China would continue to be concerned about the threat and use of nuclear weapons by the United States. Those worries were well-founded. The Truman and Eisenhower administrations deliberated the merits of using nuclear weapons during the Korean War and the Taiwan Strait crises. American considerations went beyond mere talk. The United States actually deployed nuclear- capable weapons to Taiwan and Japan, and planned to use nuclear weapons in case of war, which it thought quite possible. For its part, Moscow, following its split with Beijing, heightened Chinese anxieties by stationing nuclear missiles in the Far East. Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, China worked feverishly to meet these dangers and develop a deterrent capability by producing a series of rockets able to carry nuclear weapons towards its foes in retaliation for their attacks. Along the way, China launched its first satellite, the Mao-1, in April 197019 followed, shortly thereafter, by a successful* test of its first ICBM, the Dongfeng (^JxlH# or East Wind) 5.20 Having achieved this rudimentary capability, however, China then relaxed the pace, even as the US-Soviet arms race heightened in the last stages of the Cold War. In September 1992 however, after several episodic and lackluster attempts at a manned space program which ultimately amounted to little,21 the Chinese government initiated "Project 921," also known as the Shenzhou {Divine Vessel) Program. Shenzhou, aiming at persistant human space exploration,22 had three phases, beginning with unmanned and

17 It chose the option of nuclear weapons over a planned invasion of the Japanese home islands so as to win the war in the Pacific as quickly, and from the US perspective, painlessly as possible. 18 Norris, et al, Nuclear Weapons Databook, p. 324-6. Also see Hans Kristensen, "Japan Under the US Nuclear Umbrella," The Nautilus Institute, http://www.nautilus.org/archives/librarv/security/papers/Nuclear-Umbrella-3.html (accessed 7 Jan 08). 19 Wei Long, "China Celebrates 30th Anniversary Of First Satellite Launch," Space Daily, 25 Apr 00, http://www.spacedailv.com/news/chma-OOu.html (accessed 7 Jan 08). The satellite, commonly referred to in the literature as the DFH-1 (Dong Fang Hong or The East is Red), was vaulted into space aboard the appropriately named CZ-1 (Changzheng or Long March) rocket. 2 The DF-5, however, would not be operational for another decade. 21 It seems the main constraint was the expenditures involved. The new Chinese leader, Deng Xiaoping mandated priority be given to economic modernization. As a result, the manned space program initiative suffered from insufficient funding and focus. 22 "China National Manned Space Programme (Project 921)," SinoDefence, 25 May 2007, http://www.suiodefence.com/strategic/mannedspace/proiect921 .asp (accessed 7 Jan 08). The code-name, 270 manned launches and culminating with the establishment of a permanent space station. Project 921 grew out of the so-called "863 Plan" begun in the 1980s. This latter plan represented a long-term initiative designed to transform eight key strategic industries: automation, biotechnology, energy, information technology, lasers, new materials, and space technology.24 Under the mandate of the 863 Plan, scientists began, once again, seriously to plan for a manned space program and all that entailed. By 1992, efforts in this area had achieved momentum, while China, due to the success of its export-based economic miracle, could better afford the outlays required. Moreover, from the CCP leadership's perspective, a manned space program would heighten the nation's prestige and underscore the Party's vanguard role in facilitating China's return to great power status. After all, in the wake of the collapse of Communism in many corners of the world, the legitimacy of the CCP increasingly was called into question, not only by foreign commentators, but also domestically. Project 921, in conjunction with other activities, most notably continuing rapid economic growth, were seen as crucial to strengthening the CCP's waning image. A new, slimmed-down reincarnation of Russia, emerging from the long shadow cast by the Soviet Union, was desperate to collaborate with foreign countries which could provide capital infusions to sustain the Russian space program.25 To the rescue came Beijing, flush with new wealth from its booming economy. Technical assistance began to flow. After China and Russia signed a space cooperation agreement in 1996, the two countries carried out very fruitful cooperation in docking system installations, model spaceships, flight control, and means of life support and other areas of manned space flight. Russia's experience in

or code-number, "921" was derived from the September 21, 1992 meeting of the CCP leadership where final go ahead for a manned space program was given. 23 Ibid. Phase 1: launch two unmanned and one manned mission before 2002; Phase 2: perfect space docking procedures by 2007 and establish a small, temporarily-manned space lab; Phase 3: build and deploy an 20-ton permanent space station. For comparison, the Russian Mir station weighed approximately 130 tons and the partially constructed International Space Station (ISS) currently comes in at around 200 tons. 24 Ibid. 25 James Oberg, "China's Great Leap Upward," Scientific American, October 2003, http://www.sciam.com/article.cfm?id=0005B4B6-lCEC-lF5D-905980A84189EEDF&Dage=6 (accessed 8 Jan 08). 271

space technology development was and is of momentous significance as enlightenment to China.26

In 1995, a deal was signed whereby two Chinese military pilots would be sent to train alongside Russian cosmonauts. These newly-minted "taikonauts"27 returned to China in 1998 to join up with twelve taikonaut candidates. The secretive nature of the Chinese program made it difficult to chart its progress, but by 1998 a new launch site at Jinquan, and a command and control facility on the outskirts of Beijing, were nearing completion; in early 1999, the overhaul and refit of China's Yuan Wang ("Long View") space tracking naval squadron was completed at the port of Shanghai, and a fourth vessel built; finally, a new launch vehicle, the Long March 2F (CZ-2F), was undergoing final "shakedown" tests before becoming operational.29 Attempting to slide into the history books before the new millenium, Shenzhou 1 was launched on 19 November 1999.30 This unmanned prototype, with a striking resemblance to the venerable Soviet-designed Soyuz spacecraft, was followed by three more unmanned launches between January 2001 and December 2002. With the success of those missions, only one objective remained unfulfilled in the first phase of the three- phase Shenzhou program.

And Then There Were Three The names Yuri Alekseyevich Gagarin and Alan Shepard are forever etched in history as the first man and the first American, respectively, to go into space. On October 15, 2003, a third name was added to that roster: Lang Liwei. Taikonaut Lang's 21-hour orbiting of the Earth was a prestigious moment for China and its people, even

26 As quoted in Xinhua News Agency's magazine Liaowang in 2002. See James Oberg, "Senate Testimony: International Space Exploration Program," gyre, org, 27 Apr 04, http://www.gvre.org/news/article/3839/ (accessed 8 Jan 08). 27 The term taikonaut is derived from the Chinese tai kong (outer space). Chinese officialdom and press agencies regularly use the term yuhangyuan. to describe spacefarers. The term roughly translates to "space navigator." 28 "China National Manned Space Programme (Project 921)" 29 Ibid. 30 Originally, the launch was supposed to occur on Oct 1, 1999—the 50th anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic of China. 31 Oberg, "China's Great Leap Upward" 272

though it occurred more than forty years after the Soviet Union breached the threshold of the atmosphere. The event ushered China into the select club of nations which have sent their people to outer space and underscored Beijing's resolve to modernize the PLA. In their role as interested and envious onlooker during the Cold War, Desert Storm, and most recently, Iraqi Freedom, Chinese analysts, strategists, and leaders have learned to appreciate the strategic benefits resulting from space support for terrestrial military operations. Space has dramatically enhanced the speed, reach, and precision of military and civilian capabilities in areas such as command-and-control (C2), global communications and logistics, weather forecasting, intelligence, and targeting. However, there is a drawback to reliance on space-based assets to boost the efficiency of terrestrial forces. United States forces have deeply integrated space operations into their battleplan, making it a linchpin to their power. Adversaries view it as a potential Achilles Heel. Since the lift off of China's economy, the PLA, despite its low priority in the Four Modernizations (E'f'iEJM't'ffc; pinyin: si ge xian dai hua) adopted by Deng Xiaoping in 1978,33* increasingly has been able to fund and deploy satellites of its own, so to exploit the advantages space offers. China's deployment of advanced C234 and intelligence- surveillance-reconnaissance (ISR) satellites a decade ago,35 have, for many years, concerned United States strategists.36 These concerns were multiplied by fears that China was conducting covert efforts to create systems able to deny, disable, or disrupt an opponent's space assets. Recently, it has become clear that China was doing precisely that.

David, "Pentagon Report: China's Space Warfare Tactics Aimed at US Supremacy" 33 Although first articulated by Zhou Enlai in 1975, the Four Modernizations are generally associated with Deng Xiaoping who, in December 1978 at the Third Plenum of the 11th Central Committee, announced the official launch of the Four Modernizations, formally marking the beginning of the reform era. 34 Phillip Clark, "Civil and Commercial Satellite Communications—China," Jane's Space Directory, Jane's Information Group, 8 Dec 04, http://www4.janes.com/subscribe/isd/doc view.isp?K2DocKey=/contentl/ianesdata/vb/isd/isd_0154,htm@ current&Prod Name=JSD&QueryText (accessed 11 Dec 07). 35 "White Paper: Full Text of China's Space Activities," FBIS CPP20001122000046, 22 Nov 00. 36 Though it must be said many intelligence agencies were not surprised; this was especially true of the DoD. In the years leading up to the ASAT test, the OSD, in its Annual Report to Congress: Military Power of the PRC, repeatedly stressed that the Chinese were working on such capabilities; see Annual Report to Congress, Military Power of the People's Republic of China 2007 (Washington, DC: Department of Defense (DoD) Publications, 23 May 2007), http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/pdfs/070523-China-Military- Power-final.pdf (accessed 15 Dec 07) 273

The epicenter of China's secretive space program, Jiuquan, is located in the splendid isolation of China's arid northwest, at the edge of the Gobi Desert, straddling the border of Gansu province and the Inner Mongolia region. It is a Chinese version of Cape Canaveral; an entire city built for one purpose—reaching the stars. Here, some of China's best and brightest minds work to develop ASAT lasers, parasitic satellites, and a host of other space weapons.38 These weapons, from the perspective of United States analysts and strategists, represent "disruptive" technologies which constitute an "emerging" threat to United States space superiority.39 Numerous Chinese commentators have implied as much themselves: ... "For countries that can never win a war with the US by using the method of tanks and planes, attacking the US space system may be an irresistible and most tempting choice. "40 China's counterspace advances, coupled with ever-increasing American reliance on its space infrastructure, present a challenge to the United States and perhaps a danger. So to understand the problems facing United States planners, one must assess the unique characteristics of operations in and through space, its distinct advantages and* constraints, the functions of space assets, their key components or nodes, and the counterspace technologies China has, or soon likely will have, which could disrupt, disable, or destroy United States space systems.

The Ultimate High Ground Space represents the ultimate perch or "high ground," which generals always have sought to control. From this vantage point, a commander can see more and further than his opponent and thus better orchestrate his forces to achieve victory. Control of the high

37 "China's Secret Cape Canaveral A Sprawling City Of 15,000," Space Daily, 2 Sep 04, http://www.spacedailv.com/news/china-04zze.html (accessed 15 Dec 07). Also see Stephanie Hoo, "China allows rare look at top-secret launch center," USA Today, 1 Sep 04, http://www.usatodav.com/tech/science/space/2004-09-01-china-space-center x.htm (accessed 7 Jan 08). 38 For more discussion on Chinese ASAT development, read Phillip Saunders, Jing-dong Yuan, Stephanie Lieggi, and Angela Deters, "China's Space Capabilities and the Strategic Logic of Anti-Satellite Weapons," Center for Non-Proliferation Studies (CNS), Monterey Institute of International Studies (MIIS), Monterey, CA, 22 Jul 02. http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/week/020722.htm (accessed 15 Dec 07). 39 The National Defense Strategy (NDS) of the United States of America (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), Mar 05), p. 2-3. http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Mar2005/d20050318nds 1 .pdf (accessed 14 Dec 07). 40 Wang Hucheng, "The US Military's 'Soft Ribs' and Strategic Weaknesses," Liaowang, Vol. 27, reprinted in Xinhua Hong Kong Service, July 5, 2000, FBIS CPP20000705000081. 274

ground makes it easier to see developing situations and act in a timely manner, so to exploit fleeting opportunities or avoid potential surprises. While space is not a universal panacea, able to replace other forms of intelligence (eg. HUMINT41) or compensate for poor strategy, it does give users profound advantages over conventional terrestrial vehicles built for a similar purpose, such as the retired SR-71 spy plane. Space provides potent advantages to its master. First, it gives the user continuous or near-continuous access to critical information requested by warfighters. Compared to the persistent nature of space assets, a variety of hurdles can degrade or destroy the effectiveness of land, sea, and air forces. Land forces are constrained by geography, large bodies of water, topography, and logistics. Sea forces can operate only on water. Aircraft, with few exceptions, must land to refuel, which cripples their range and payload, and adds to pilot fatigue. All three forces are frequently compromised by inclement weather. Most importantly, borders create political hurdles which affect tactical, operational, and strategic decisions and outcomes. In general, space assets stand above these constraints. Because satellites traverse territorial borders without consent,42 * they can obtain a tremendous amount of information that would otherwise be hard or impossible to gather by other, terrestrial, means. Their superiority is demonstrated by the Soviet destruction of Francis Gary Powers' U-2 spy plane in 1960, and the resulting political controversy, to the verification protocols carried out under the SALT I, SALT II, and START treaties by satellites. Second, space assets accomplish their missions with little or no forward "footprint." Satellites often can handle their missions without deployment of personnel and equipment overseas, which can avert negative political ramifications, save money, and avoid placing personnel in harm's way. A third advantage is cost, though this statement must be qualified. To place satellites in orbit is

HUMINT is a military acronym for Human Intelligence, i.e. intelligence gained from personal contacts made in the target area over a period of time. This form of intelligence can give one a sense of the more nuanced aspects of life in the target area to include social and psychological factors. Communications Intelligence (COMINT), can also be very helpful, but its usefulness, in the specific case of China, is limited due to countermeasures. Electronic Intelligence (ELINT) and Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) can provide valuable information regarding capabilities, but, generally speaking, offer little insight regarding the intentions of another actor. 42 "Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and other Celestial Bodies," Office of Outer Space Affairs, United Nations, originally signed in Jan 1967, http://www.oosa.unvienna.org/SpaceLaw/outerspt.html (accessed 16 Dec 07); commonly referred to as the 1967 Outer Space Treaty. 275 an expensive endeavor, often costing more than a billion dollars per launch, which few nations can afford to do. However, once in orbit systems can function for ten or more years. When compared to alternatives requiring sizeable and expensive logistical "tails" and constant maintenance costs, satellites are economical in the long term, despite the high up-front costs. The value of satellites can be illustrated by considering a crisis in the Taiwan Strait. The Chinese, lacking the military capability to go head-to-head against the US, might perhaps be tempted to launch a large-scale missile barrage of the island, or invade it so to affect victory before United States forces could engage en masse. To achieve either end would require surprise. This possibility, however, is considerably diminished because satellites provide continuous eyes and ears in the sky, letting United States commanders watch the situation develop and act, appropriately. If the PL A decided to launch a pre­ emptive missile barrage, the reaction of United States forces would be aided by their access to instantaneous C2, ISR, and missile warning. Since satellites have the added benefit of being able to multi-task, making them cost efficient and timely, Combatant * Commands other than Pacific Command (PACOM) still could utilize the services provided by these "engaged" assets.43 Space assets are a powerful adjunct to United States power against China in the most obvious area where they might clash. But satellites have limitations. They are difficult to move once in orbit, due to fixed constraints imposed by the laws of orbital mechanics.44 Not only does such movement take time, it also requires the expenditure of fuel. As satellites cannot be refueled in orbit, any burn time necessarily diminishes their life span. Fuel on board is used to maintain orbit or position or both (geo-stationary), which tend to slowly "degrade" or "decay" over time. 5 When any one Combatant Commander requests additional satellite

FM 44-100, Air and Missile Defense Operations, Appendix C, Space Support, 15 Jun 00 http://www.fas.org/spp/starwars/docops/fm44-1 OOfd/index.html (accessed 16 Dec 07) 44 "Basic of Space Flight: Orbital Mechanics," Rocket and Space Technology, http://www.braeunig.us/space/orbmech.htm (accessed 10 Dec 07). Orbital mechanics is a branch or sub- field of celestial mechanics, which addresses the motions of planets, moons, and comets. Orbital mechanics primarily deals with spacecraft trajectories, including orbital maneuvers, and orbit plane changes. It is used by mission planners to predict the results of propulsion. 45 "How Long Does A Satellite 'Last' And Why Do They Get Regularly Replaced?" Stason.org, http://stason.org/TULARC/entertainment/satellite-tv-faq/39-How-Long-Does-A-Satellite-Last-And-Why- Do-They-Get-Regu.html (accessed 12 Dec 07). At present, the average lifespan for a communications satellite is about 10 years. While the electronics inside the satellite can last longer, the determining factor is 276 coverage, this means either less coverage or bandwidth or both for neighboring ones. While this aim can be achieved easily, when conflicts are localized, like in Desert Storm or Iraqi Freedom, still there are consequences—shortened lifespan for the asset moved (which also affects replacement launch schedules, cost factors, etc) and less utility for adjacent commands. Other drawbacks to space systems are their fragility and endurance. Once in orbit, maintainers have little ability to repair or replace parts. While computer glitches and other anomalies can be resolved with the click of a mouse, or the reboot of a program, physical repairs are problematic. They can be done only by the Space Shuttle which, given its own fragility and complexity, can not be routinely utilized for repair services, because of its sporadic availability, commitments, and the exorbitant costs connected with such activities. In this regard, terrestrial vehicles have a decided advantage over satellites: legions of personnel dedicated to maintaining and repairing them on a regular basis. Furthermore, air, land, and sea assets have life expectancies far beyond those for satellites. While the B-52 and U-2 continue to blaze the skies more than half a century after their arrival on the scene, satellites rarely last more than a decade, due * to the combined effects of minimal maintenance, limited fuel reserves, power supply deterioration, radiation, and occasional contact with orbital debris. These limitations will affect how the United States employs its space assets in any future conflict with China. Because of the lead times involved, the expense, and the dearth of spares, the space assets which America has in hand at the start of a conflict, probably will be all it can bring to bear during one. Few assets dedicated to other coverage areas can be moved to augment this need. Combat will pose exceptional peril to fragile space systems. Probably no significant reinforcements could be found, as few replacement vehicles typically are on standby and launching has inherent complexities. In case of hostilities in space, the capabilities provided by these satellites could be

the "station keeping fuel." Satellites only appear to be stationary because of their location in the Clarke Belt. In reality, they whir about the planet and their orbits become eccentric if left alone, which is prevented by small rockets on board that regularly adjust the orbit of "the bird". After roughly ten years, this fuel runs out. The satellite can no longer be adjusted with respect to its position, and starts to "wobble" up and down in the orbital plane, eventually becoming unusable. Before this happens, a replacement bird is launched and the old satellite is "kicked" up into a higher "parking" orbit. While some day a space salvage company might refuel all those old birds, it is unlikely; the rapid changes in technology make the older low power satellites nothing more than curious antiques. 277

quickly degraded or eliminated due to intensified stresses, attacks, and the absence of a robust reserve.

The Importance of Space Losing these space-based capabilities would have a great impact on United States military power. Its dependence on computers, information sources, and other technologies enabled by space is staggering; insidiously, these devices have become vital to many processes now taken for granted. The insights gained from space operations inform political decisions, help identify trends, provide enhanced transparency, and help to avoid Armageddon. TV signals, the Internet, telephone traffic, tracking devices, inventory programs, weather forecasting, intelligence gathering, and deterrence-oriented confidence-building measures, are a few of the functions which rely on satellites to leverage their power and reach. Though users could muddle through following the loss of these capabilities, the latter would be more than inconvenient; it would be catastrophic. Given the current global addiction to these services, economies would shudder,* productivity would crash, the capabilities and intentions of rival states would become harder to discern. This would increase global instability and the possibility of pre­ emptive strikes by one state against another as a hedge against the unknown. Chaos would ensue. Space assets carry out a wide variety of functions—communications, imagery, weather, navigation, data collection, intelligence and reconnaissance, and missile warning. Despite the heavy reliance on space infrastructure, few people realize, let alone understand, the complexities involved in feeding steady streams of data to hundreds of millions of user terminals and devices. Satellites are only part of a much larger system providing capabilities and services to military and civilian users. A space system is comprised of ground stations, launch sites, satellite production, checkout, and storage facilities; communication links; interface terminals, and spacecraft (both manned and unmanned);46 if any part, or node, is lost, the system is degraded or destroyed.

Joint Publication (JP) 3-14 Space Operations (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, 9 Aug 02), p. 1-1, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new pubs/jp3 14.pdf (accessed 19 Dec 07). 278

An understanding of these nodes illuminates the difficulty or ease with which an adversary can target a space system. Most counterspace threats focus on one node of a system. Terrestrial nodes, the simplest to target, can be destroyed by conventional munitions available to virtually any state or non-state actor. Space nodes are more difficult to disable or destroy, but still they can be targeted by many terrestrially-based weapons. The Chinese are honing their abilities for several counterspace options.

Counterspace Operations In American doctrine for space warfare, counterspace operations are divided into two areas: Offensive Counterspace (OCS) and Defensive Counterspace (DCS). Actions directed against an opponent's satellites or affiliated systems represent OCS operations. United States Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 2-2.1, Counterspace Operations, defines OCS actions as those designed to

... preclude an adversary from exploiting space to their advantage. OCS operations may target an adversary's space capability (space systems, terrestrial systems, links, or third party space capability), using a variety of permanent and/or reversible means. The "Five Ds" — deception, disruption, denial, degradation, and destruction—describe the range of desired effects when targeting an adversary's space systems. 47

On the other hand, DCS operations seek to

... preserve [one's] ability to exploit space to [one's] advantage via active and passive actions to protect friendly space-related capabilities from enemy attack or interference. ... DCS operations are key to enabling continued exploitation of space ... by protecting, preserving, recovering, and reconstituting friendly space- related capabilities before, during, and after an adversary attack48

Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 2-2.1 Counterspace Operations (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air Force Doctrine Center (AFDC), 2 Aug 04), p. 3, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/iel/service pubs/afdd2 2 1.pdf (accessed on 19 Dec 07). 279

Sometimes, OCS and DCS overlap; an action characterized as being OCS in nature can, simultaneously, serve a DCS end. For example, if, during a crisis in the Taiwan Strait, United States precision-guided munitions destroyed a Chinese facility used to jam communications between the 7th Fleet and Pacific Command (PACOM) Headquarters, this act would be OCS, in the sense that it smashed part of the enemy's space system, and also DCS, because it eliminated a threat to United States space operations. OCS operations, though waged with various means, are simple to comprehend. DCS operations are trickier. They focus on thwarting an adversary's attack on one's own systems. DCS tactics may involve: system hardening, dispersal, maneuvering, system configuration changes, and the suppression of enemy counterspace capabilities.49 At present, the scales are weighted in favor of OCS capabilities. While some OCS operations—like jamming—can be overcome by offsetting DCS measures, AS AT lasers, direct ascent vehicles, and "space mines," pose threats to existing satellite networks against which limited countermeasure exist. While the latest series of Global Positioning System (GPS) satellites and the United States Air Force's Military Strategic and Tactical * Relay (MILSTAR) network incorporate enhanced DCS capabilities,50 little can be done to reduce significantly the threat to these systems from more aggressive OCS options that are economically feasible or operationally practical. DCS systems, be they space or terrestrially-based, violate no existing treaties. OCS systems, by contrast, confront political and other hurdles. To date, no nation has fielded a space-based weapon. While the Reagan Administration introduced the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) into the space lexicon, it never matured as a program beyond the research stage. Both the USSR and the United States did, however, test terrestrial-based OCS weapons. The Soviets experimented with an ICBM topped with an explosive warhead, designed to detonate near its intended target (and hurl thousands of bits of shrapnel towards it).51 The United States developed

49 Ibid, p. 26-7. 50 NAVSTAR GPS Block III Specs, Space and Tech, http://www.spaceandtech.com/spacedata/constellations/navstar-gps-block3 conspecs.shtml (accessed 18 Dec 07) and "Boeing MDR Payload Adds New Capabilities to U.S. Air Force Milstar II Satellite" Boeing News Release, http://www.boeing.com/ids/news/sdc/010115 milstar.html (accessed 18 Dec 07). 51 "Space Weapons Basics: A History of Anti-Satellite Weapons Programs," Union of Concerned Scientists, http://www.ucsusa.org/global security/space weapons/a-historv-of-asat-programs.html (accessed 19 Dec 07). 280

Program 437, a blunt AS AT system which employed a Thor ballistic missile armed with a 1.4 megaton nuclear warhead.52 The system suffered from a major logistical headache—it was set up to launch only from Johnston Island in the Pacific Ocean, could only engage targets in certain orbits, and required significant preparation time due to the fact the missiles were not co-located with the launcher; instead, they were kept in California, and had to be flown out, to be married with the warheads—to say nothing of the fact that exploding a nuclear warhead in space would have great political consequences, as both sides came to appreciate; hence, the program eventually was abandoned. In the early 1980s, the United States Air Force tested the Air-Launched Miniature Vehicle (ALMV). Launched from an F-15 fighter, the ALMV zoomed directly toward its intended target, achieving a kill via direct impact—a "kinetic kill," whereby the satellite is destroyed by a high-speed collision.53 However, these avenues of research and testing—on both sides—ultimately lost momentum, because of limited funding, space debris issues, and fears of igniting a space arms race. Above all, neither side vigorously pursued terrestrial-based OCS systems because it threatened to destabilize the * tenuous nuclear balance, which increasingly relied upon transparency, communication, and verification. A perverse consequence of the destruction of enemy satellites is to deny (to the other side) its communication, ISR, or early warning capability, a step which could, potentially, be interpreted as precursor to a first strike, necessarily forcing the leadership to assume the worst and so take dangerous steps.54 As a result, many kinetic energy ASAT systems found little support in the opposing Cold War camps; many complex and pricey OCS systems, whether based in space or on Earth, often had limited utility and were destabilizing. Given the historical cost-benefit ratio involved in developing and deploying ASAT technologies, current and future opponents could be expected to channel their counterspace efforts toward less controversial, more economical and fruitful technologies. Many countries are interested in mitigating the powerful leverage which

52 Dwayne Day, "Blunt arrows: the limited utility of ASATs," The Space Review, 6 Jun 05, http://www.thespacereview.eom/article/388/l (accessed 20 Dec 07). 53 "Space Weapons Basics: A History of Anti-Satellite Weapons Programs." Also see Day, "Blunt arrows: the limited utility of ASATs." 54 For extended coverage of some of the issues involved, see Edward Kaplan's doctoral dissertation, Making Doctor Strangelove: Strategy in the Air-Atomic Age. (Calgary, Alberta, Canada: University of Calgary, 2007). 281 space-faring nations—especially the United States—have gained through use of their space assets. Often, the most practical approach involves targeting the links in a space system; in effect, jamming the uplink or downlink signals. This tactic is economical; by targeting the links of a space system rather than actual assets; technologies designed to disrupt and deny capability, rather than destroy it, are cheap and easy to construct. Moreover, jamming works—even for small and technologically unsophisticated powers—though its effectiveness varies with the power and sophistication of the jammer(s) and the expertise of the operators.55 It also avoids the dilemma posed by technologies which critics contend weaponize space, while achieving a similar effect. Lasers also could target space and terrestrial nodes, and the links between them, from or through space. However, to date, lasers of lethality have been difficult to construct, test, and mobilize, to say nothing of the high costs and political headaches associated with their development and use. Space mines, while cheaper to develop than some other OCS systems, present considerable political and operational drawbacks. Because there is still considerable political will to keep space free of weapons, China,* in the near term, is most apt to pursue ground-based counterspace options to include directed energy, kinetic energy missiles, jammers, and lasers.56 It already has taken some steps in that direction.

Innocence Lost On the morning of January 11, 2007, China shook the intelligence world and, a few weeks later, the public. Without any public pronouncement, before or after, China

Various instances of satellite jamming with varying degrees of success: Charles R. Smith, "China Takes Aim at U.S. GPS System," Newsmax.com, 20 Nov 07, http://www.newsmax.com/smith/china eves GPS/2007/11/20/50867.html (accessed 21 Dec 07). Addressing Iraqi use of GPS jammers during Operation Iraqi Freedom Air Force Maj. Gen. Victor Renuart, "CENTCOM Charts Operation Iraqi Freedom Progress," American Forces Press Service, 25 Mar 03, http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=29230 (accessed 21 Dec 07) stated "We have noticed some attempts by the Iraqis to use a GPS-jamming system that they have procured from another nation ... actually, we've been able to identify the location of each of those jammers ... we have destroyed all six of those jammers in the last two nights' airstrikes ... in fact, we destroyed one of the GPS jammers with a GPS-guided weapon." The bottom line was that the jammers had no effect on Allied air operations. See also "Cuba denies jamming broadcast," BBC News, 19 Jul 03, http://news.bbc.co.uk/lM/worlo7americas/3080891.stm (accessed 21 Dec 07).

56 See Federation of American Scientists, "Executive Summary," http://www.fas.org/resource/10072004163510.pdf (accessed 26 Dec 07). 282 launched a direct-ascent ASAT weapon, which destroyed one of its own aging weather satellites. That achievement demonstrates the level of sophistication of China's program. Why it took these actions, remains a mystery, but many theories have addressed that issue. Some scholars and China watchers contend that its startling action was an inept attempt to press the United States to accept an arms control treaty banning the weaponization of space. Others call it a blatant display of force—muscle flexing— designed to enhance Beijing's prestige and leverage. Still others think it was a crude signal designed to demonstrate China's determination to defend its territorial integrity (Taiwan) at all costs, i.e. a form of intimidation directed at Taipei and breast-beating toward Washington. The most convincing explanation for this raw exhibition of brawn, however, is that it follows China's long-standing doctrine of deterrence and its concept of en "active defense" . While most people were surprised by China's ham-fisted act, a small minority anticipated such behavior, given the threatening environment China sees whenever it gazes up at the stars. In the years leading up to the test, Chinese leaders have heard, read, and seen many manifestations of the Bush Administration's goals in space, and reached certain conclusions which affect its strategy. Like the rest of the world, China was amazed at the speed, precision, and lethality which United States forces demonstrated in their rapid victory over Saddam Hussein's Iraq in 1991. Though the opponent was militarily inferior and strategically foolish, the event showed the extraordinary gap which had emerged between American power and that of any other country; that gap has only widened with time. Technologies in their infancy during the Gulf War had matured by the time American forces entered Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003. The United States' ability to use space assets for reconnaissance, navigation, and communication allowed it to bring incredible force to bear with heretofore unimaginable swiftness and precision. However, the Chinese took away more from these events than did commentators who were simply dazzled by them and confident that America held an unassailable advantage. Upon close analysis, it became apparent to Chinese leaders, and to more than a few in the

Deng Xiaoping as quoted in Andrew Scobell, China's Use of Military Force: Beyond the Great Wall and the Long March (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 35. 283

Pentagon, that the United States was dangerously over-dependant upon space as an enabler of terrestrial victory and might. Alongside American advances aimed at tightening the "feedback loop" between sensor and shooter, policy directives and supporting documents advocated control, even dominance, of space. When coupled with the Bush Administration's rejection of efforts to craft any treaty against the weaponization of space,59 Beijing became convinced that Washington was intent on dominating the space environment. Whether or not this is Washington's true intention is irrelevant, but many Chinese leaders believe it is, not unreasonably. This expectation, not surprisingly, led them to conclude that the weaponization of space is inevitable, and the sooner they act on that reality, the further ahead they will be. On another front, Bush Administration support for and funding of National Missile Defense (NMD) and Theater Missile Defense (TMD) presents a threat to China's modest nuclear deterrent. While NMD/TMD research, testing, and deployment are touted as prudent steps toward protecting the world from rogue regimes which might be tempted to preemptively strike the United States or another state, the Chinese see it as a direct* assault on the deterrent value of their retaliatory nuclear strike capability. Their worries are reasonable. While these intercept systems are not perfect, ° they nevertheless diminish the power of any delivery systems China would have left following a supposed first-strike by the Americans; hence, the Chinese feel their core security is at stake, doubly so because American space war games routinely consider China a foe.61 It is immediate considerations, however, that probably generate the highest concern among PLA leaders. United States dominance in space almost certainly precludes Chinese victory in a clash over Taiwan.

58 Ashley J. Tellis, "China's Military Space Strategy," Survival, Vol. 49, Issue 3, 1 Sep 07, p. 41-72. 59 Lu Yousheng, "The Aim of US New Space Policy," Outlook Weekly, 1 Nov 06, as referenced in Eric Hagt, "China's ASAT Test: Strategic Response," China Security, Winter 2007, p. 32. 60 See Lisbeth Gronlund, "NMD: Test Failures and Technology Development," testimony before the US House Committee on Government Affairs, Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs, and International Relations," 8 Sep 00, http://www.ucsusa.org/global security/missile defense/nmd-test- failures-and-technology-development.html (accessed 14 Jan 08). Also see Michael Puttre and Ted McKenna, "The US Deploys Ground-Based Midcourse Defense against ICBMs," 21 Nov 05, http://www.mputtre.com/idl 9.html (accessed 14 Jan 08). 61 Thomas E. Ricks, "Space Is Playing Field For Newest War Game: Air Force Exercise Shows Shift in Focus," The Washington Post, 29 Jan 01, http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp- dyn?pagename=article&node=&contentId=A58813-2001Jan28 (accessed 14 Jan 08). 284

Taken as a whole, American technological advances, policy pronouncements, and, at times, overly militaristic diplomacy, have compelled China's leaders to "stand up" and say "this ... will not stand." They find Washington's stance unpalatable and intolerable.62 The Chinese ASAT test was, pure and simple, a blunt message to the United States that it will not tolerate the strategic imbalance which it believes Washington wishes to perpetuate. Despite China's marked effort in recent years to build a reputation as a responsible power dedicated to the peaceful use of space, it obviously is willing to endure international condemnation when it feels that core national interests are at stake. Lingering questions remain about whether the test was made with the full support or knowledge of the Chinese power establishment. In this case, did the left hand not know what the right hand was doing? There are precedents for such events in the past.63 The secrecy regarding Chinese political deliberations only heightens suspicions. If the decision to conduct the test was made without consulting the entire leadership, who was involved and who left out? What would such a situation convey about the unity of the * government? Would such a cleavage suggest that America should not overreact to the situation, because the ASAT test was driven by internal power relationships within the CCP, rather than representing a national policy toward a perceived strategic threat posed by the United States? Another important, but unresolved, question is this: when was the decision made to conduct the test? This question is crucial because the answer would illuminate Chinese strategic thinking. If the decision to launch was reached in a short period of time, that would indicate either bureaucratic division and wrangling about the future direction of Chinese policy in this realm, or an awakening to a newly identified threat. On the other hand, if the decision to conduct the test, shock the world, and recklessly jeopardize many orbiting vehicles—including manned-vehicles like the International Space Station (ISS) and the Space Shuttle—by creating a debris cloud, was

62 Eric Hagt, "China's ASAT Test: Strategic Response," China Security, Winter 2007, p. 33. 63 A case in point would be the Chinese government's handling of the April 2001 mid-air collision between an American EP-3 and a PLAAF interceptor. The PLA was very selective with regard to what information it released to the Foreign Ministry for dissemination. In the days that followed, it became increasingly clear that the PLA was not fully disclosing details or coordinating with the Foreign Ministry. For an exhaustive discussion of the bureaucratic stove-piping tradition as it relates to China, see Susan L. Shirk, China: Fragile Superpower: How China's Internal Politics Could Derail its Peaceful Rise (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007). 285 taken years ago, it would suggest the Chinese already have made a fundamental decision about the future of space and its need to compete there. In this case, one must wonder about the efficacy of any treaty designed to ban weapons in space, and the sincerity of Chinese rhetoric aimed at achieving one. In recent years, most notably through the recurring sessions of the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, China has engaged in a flurry of diplomatic initiatives aimed at a space weapons ban and testing ban. Their stated position, and seeming dedication to this cause, garnered them considerable good will from many corners. Meanwhile, China joined with Russia and Belarus in decrying the American decision to withdraw from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty in order to construct a viable NMD network. These political moves were buttressed by two official "White Papers"64 and a handful of official documents65 which reinforced its publicly stated stance: China wished to see space remain a sanctuary open to the peaceful use by all of mankind, and wished to work alongside others to accomplish those ends. As the ASAT test shows, however, China did not put all its eggs in one basket. « Instead, in what amounted to a two-pronged strategy aimed to contain the threat it saw coming from stated American goals about control of outer space, China not only engaged in a diplomatic assault, but also worked on a hedge—a military one—with dual objectives; to strengthen China's existing and planned satellite networks, and to gain the ability to damage the capabilities of other space-faring nations, particularly those of the United States, via a vigorous ASAT program employing many technologies. These ASAT technologies are also designed to leverage China's limited financial and technical means against stronger rivals, i.e. the United States and Russia. Indeed, this represents a broader phenomenon; in the coming decade and beyond, peripheral players in space will have a great temptation to create at least a modest ASAT capability, as a deterrent against unwanted pressure by greater powers.66

64 Information Office of the PRC State Council, "China's Space Activities," 22 Nov 00, http://www.fas.org/spp/guide/china/wpll2200.html and "China's Space Activities in 2006," 12 Oct 06, http://www.fas.org/spp/guide/china/wp2006.pdf (both accessed 14 Jan 08). 65 "China's Space Activities (White Paper)," China National Space Administration, 15 Dec 03, http://www.cnsa.gov.cn/n615709/n620681/n771967/69198.html (accessed 14 Jan 08). 66 Hagt, "China's ASAT Test: Strategic Response," p. 34. 286

Because the military side of China's space program is kept secret—even more so than the United States program—its evolution is hard to trace in detail, however, the limited open source literature suggests that it matured gradually, in direct response to United States activities. Beginning in the early 1980s, China perceived a threat to its national security from the Reagan Administration's Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), better known as "Star Wars." Anti-satellite weapons or missile defense initiatives could undermine the limited deterrent capability of China's modest nuclear arsenal. But as China then was economically and technologically primitive and could not afford large defense expenditures, it pursued primarily diplomatic means to ensure the viability of its deterrent force. Over the next generation, the confluence of increasing Chinese economic muscle, the intractable logjams in Geneva, and acknowledgment that any "active defense" measures in space would require long lead times to cultivate expertise and capabilities, worked to support the idea of developing defensive—and offensive—space technologies. These efforts were given a significant boost by other events: the 1998 Rumsfeld Commission Report, the accidental 1999 bombing of the Belgrade embassy by * a United States aircraft operating under NATO direction, the 1999 Cox Committee Report, the war games held at Schriever Air Force Base in 2001, and the April 2001 mid­ air collision between a United States Navy EP-3 intelligence-gathering aircraft and a Chinese fighter off China's southeastern shore in disputed territory. These events, taken as a whole, vindicated China's growing fear it was becoming the focus of the United States military's space program. Given this perception, China felt time was running out for a diplomatic solution, and pressure was building for a military option. In 2003, Operation Iraqi Freedom provided further tangible evidence of how potent United States military forces had become, due to enabling space technologies. Coupled with the righteous rhetoric of the Bush Administration, which tended to see threats everywhere, the track of a military solution, as opposed to the diplomatic, gained increasing momentum within Chinese political and military hierarchies. The ASAT test, due to the complex technologies and expertise involved, clearly was in the works for a long period. It reflects Chinese policy aims just as much as do its words at Geneva. Around 2003, a small but growing chorus of academics and PLA strategists began publicly to push the idea of creating a dedicated space command, so mimicking earlier 287 developments in the United States and Russia. To create a dedicated infrastructure responsible for space certainly would increase the visibility of space-related issues, and probably produce heightened budgetary priority, paralleling the experience of the PLA's Second Artillery—the strategic rocket force comprising the nation's nuclear deterrent— upon its founding in 1966.67 How senior Chinese leaders regard such an entity is unclear, but the increasing volume of calls for it indicates how seriously Chinese analysts view the situation. An offshoot of this drive for a space command has been the creation of lobbies inside and outside the PLA, including industry, with a vested interest in China's current and future space vision or strategy, which compete for influence and authority. With time, such interest groups tend to entrench themselves and take on a power of their own, creating inertia which drives policy, regardless of external drivers. The AS AT test implies that the military option is gaining traction in Beijing at the expense of a diplomatic solution, probably because China's diplomatic efforts to gain American consent to some form of ban on space weaponization have failed. The United States has steadfastly rejected any treaty which would curtail its freedom of action in * space. The Bush Administration has claimed there is no need for a treaty to ban weapons in space, because there is no arms race there, while the dual-use nature of space technology makes verification problematic. In fact, America's qualms about signing a treaty banning weapons in space are rooted in the fear that other states, China and Russia in particular, will covertly pursue space weapons while the United States is hog-tied, destroying the wide lead it currently enjoys. Then, if the United States withdrew from such a treaty because it found that others were cheating, it would draw world condemnation, but have to defend its assets from the basis of a weakened position. From a Chinese perspective, though, the American stance suggests a hidden agenda, aimed to give it unobstructed access to space and the ability to deny it to others. Probably the greatest insight which Beijing gleaned from its abortive diplomacy is that the United States negotiates from a position of strength. Without much strength of its own, China lacked the ability to make the United States bargain. The Cold War, too, taught the Chinese that strength begets respect. Once the Soviets became able to inflict

"Second Artillery Corps," Federation of American Scientists, 288

intolerable damage on the United States, Washington altered its strategy which changed the calculus of nuclear war. When China exploded its first weapon in 1964, so too, the USSR and United States looked at it differently. Once respect is achieved, many other things follow. That idea underlay China's January 2007 gamble in space, which was designed to tilt the scale back towards equilibrium and away from United States dominance.68 Some have speculated that possibly the ASAT test was conducted without the expressed consent of the top leadership in Beijing. Were this view true, it would make guessing the motivations behind the test more difficult, and indicate the impotence of the CCP hierarchy. Frankly, such speculation seems far-fetched. While the upper echelons of the Party, the PLA, and the Central Military Commission (CMC) undoubtedly are factionalized, it is inconceivable that the ASAT test could have occurred without the foreknowledge of China's leadership. Their support would have been required along the way regarding funding, priorities, and so forth. An aggressive faction within the Party, the government, or the military could not have taken such action in a vacuum, oblivious * to broader issues. In all likelihood, pained deliberations were undertaken with full knowledge that a decision to test would erode the hard-won image of China's "peaceful rise." That said, most of the participants in the debate obviously felt that the potential reward, i.e. a treaty reigning in the United States, outweighed the risks and costs. The suggestion that the decision to test the ASAT weapon was taken without the knowledge and support of President Hu Jintao seems nonsensical. Some China "hawks," conversely, argue that diplomacy was merely a distraction designed to buy the military time to field a capable ASAT weapon. This line of reasoning confronts many problems. Such deception counters Chinese interests. China wants a stable environment whereby it can continue along the trajectory defined by Deng Xiaoping in 1978. It is vastly outmatched by the United States in the military realm. The ASAT test could spark an arms race, depleting China's resources and derailing its progress over the last thirty years. It also would cause a strategic imbalance with India and Japan, neither of which could be expected to tolerate any gross realignment of

Hagt, "China's ASAT Test: Strategic Response," p. 44. 289 regional power; nor does the idea that diplomacy was merely a facade masking its true intentions square with China's history since 1949. The military always has been subordinate to the Party. When China was alone, without the Soviet Union at its side, and targeted with nuclear weapons by both superpowers, it pursued a modest deterrent rather than a robust one. Some might argue that this restrained effort was dictated by its meager resources. This argument is flaccid given the track record of other, less- developed, states in the face of threat. Again, the priorities set by Deng Xiaoping and successive leaders put a tight leash on military spending, concentrating resources to modernize other aspects of its Comprehensive National Power (CNP). This argument also presupposes that the Foreign Ministry was on board with the plan, willingly subjugating its efforts to direction from outside. This seems unlikely, given what we know of bureaucratic politics. China would not wish to undermine years of painstaking work aimed at improving its global image as a status-quo player committed to diplomatic solutions to vexing issues for the sake of dubious military gains. It simply does not wash with the typical patience displayed by China, nor with their own beliefs about national * strength. A strong power will not feel compelled to negotiate when threatened by a weaker power—quite the contrary. To enter into negotiations at that point would equate to appeasement. Of course, it would never happen because domestic political considerations would not allow for it. After identifying the numerous holes in this line of argument, however, it is possible that the diplomatic corps either accepted the inevitability of the test, given its continued failure to alter the United States position, or simply was kept in the dark about the test until later. The latter possibility seems more likely, given anecdotal accounts of the frequent disconnects between branches of the Chinese bureaucracy, both intentional and unplanned. The Chinese delay in reporting the test, plus its flat-footed and clumsy response to inquiries, also supports this theory.

Apparently, the test was a planned and measured act aimed at restoring a balance in space. Once in possession of an effective ASAT weapon, and convinced that the United States would not discuss a space weapons ban, China acted. In doing so it sent a crystal clear message to Washington: we can hurt you. But while the test was disquieting, it was also defensive. In the natural world, the King Cobra uses its menacing hood to warn off threats, and strikes only when cornered, in self-defense, or to protect its eggs. 290

Interestingly, upon first contact, the snake and the human often misconstrue the other's motives —as do states. The ASAT test was an expression of frustration, but also of deterrent capability, and resolve. China's nuclear deterrent always has been defensive in nature, intended solely to prevent coercion by stronger states. This latest ASAT test was in line with China's overall deterrence posture. It did not breach the thresholds of complexity or destructiveness touched by the tests of the USSR or the United States. Its test was not so much a challenge to the United States as it was an alert... "we, too, can play this game." China did only what the superpowers had done during the Cold War. Given what we know about Chinese ASAT capabilities, it seems probable that they could have done much more than they did.

Why Now? The question to be answered is why China decided to act now. What caused Hu Jintao and his clan to decide it was worthwhile to destroy all the diplomatic capital they * had earned, when they blew up the weather satellite? It seems that the Chinese concluded space would be weaponized and the United States wanted to be in the driver's seat. Numerous Department of Defense (DoD) and Air Force documents advocate dominance of space, albeit with cryptic terminology. In 2006 the Bush Administration issued its National Space Policy, which states the United States should seek to preserve its advantageous position in space while, if necessary, denying access to others.71 Coupled with sporadic progress on a National Missile Defense system and other related weapons programs, these developments triggered anxiety among Chinese strategists and analysts. Ironically, however, an act designed to halt American hegemony in space, by demonstrating how China could counterbalance United States ambitions, has breathed new life into programs which appeared doomed because of budgetary, technical, and political hurdles. Increasing international pressure, a shift in political leadership within Congress, and the ongoing costs of war in Iraq and Afghanistan, all seemed to portend

"King Cobra," http://home.vicnet.net.au/~neils/bobby/cobra.html (accessed 12 Dec 07). 70 Hagt, "China's ASAT Test: Strategic Response," p. 39. 71 United States Government, "U.S. National Space Policy," 31 Aug 06, 291 less funding for controversial initiatives for space access, control, and denial. China's actions may counter these pressures. Ostensibly, this outcome supports the argument that the test was a clumsy attempt to get the United States talking, or simple muscle flexing; however, the truth is more mundane. The test likely was a manifestation of a persistent problem with grave implications for the future—the poor state of Sino-American communications. The myopic American strategic outlook, and its refusal to consider any treaty which would constrain its military actions in space, confirm Chinese suspicions about United States intentions in space. The Chinese penchant for secrecy in political and military deliberations forces American strategists to assume the worst of intentions. Can the United States be expected to base its security decisions on the word of a government which continues to be frustratingly opaque and overly enamored with deception? Can China base its security decisions on the promises of a complex democratic system full of contradictions and apt to change leaders often? With a change of administrations in the coming year, it seems reasonable to assume the matter of whether or not the United States * will weaponize space is up in the air.72 Of course, China's military can not rest its strategy on the hope that the United States simply will abandon its attempt to dominate the high ground. Charged with the solemn responsibility of defending the homeland, the PLA, like all professional military forces, is inherently conservative and, by default, must assume the worst. High-level military exchanges could afford leaders on both sides opportunities to express their respective security concerns in an amicable environment and mitigate the tendency to see the other side in the harshest light. Given the virtual absence of such exchanges between American and Chinese counterparts (for a variety of reasons),73 however, an adversarial relationship is more likely. While the recent Pentagon announcement concerning the establishment of a "Hotline" with Beijing74 is a step in the right direction, the purpose of a "Hotline" is to cool an already tense situation. What is needed are frequent, on-going

72 JeffFoust, "Where the candidates stand on space," The Space Review, 31 Dec 07, http://www.thespacereview.eom/article/1028/l (accessed 7 Jan 08). 73 Kevin Pollpeter, U.S.-China Security Management: Assessing the Military-to-Military Relationship (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2004), p. 43-86. 74 Walter Pincus, "U.S., China Aim to Mend Ties," The Washington Post, 14 Jun 07, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dvn/content/article/2007/06/13/AR2007061302227.htmKaccessed 10 Dec 07). 292 exchanges, which can keep an issue from ever getting "hot". Before both sides can tackle that obstacle, they must address the underlying concerns which prevented full-scale adoption of the exchange program earlier. Another factor which probably drove the Chinese to conduct their ASAT test sooner rather than later is the realization it is rapidly becoming vested in space. Its ambitions are bold. The growth rate of its program rivals past Soviet and American efforts. While China is not as dependent upon space for its economic success as is the United States, with each passing year its dependence grows ... and thus, its vulnerability. Hence, to destroy its own satellite was to signal an intention and ability to defend its interests. The world was startled by China's ASAT demonstration. It also was angry; angry because the Chinese put their satellites—and in some cases, people—at risk. But the world, by and large, is impotent in so far as what it can do to China. Many have become so dependent upon China that they dare not risk jeopardizing the lucrative connection, although China probably needs them more than they do it. Nevertheless, overcoming timidity, they have pressed China for answers as to why it did what it did. As of yet,' China's answers have been pathetic. What the United States will do remains to be seen. After this ASAT test, both American and Chinese actions will determine whether it spins into a space arms race or not. This "primitive diplomacy" was not a signal that China intends to start a space race or wants to compete in one. Instead, it was a clear message to United States leaders: China will confront what it considers an unacceptable threat to its security, but prefers to avoid ruinous competition in areas where it knows itself to be weak. This attitude can be illustrated by reference to Chinese nuclear forces during the Cold War and up to the present time. From 1955, China realized it could not compete head-to-head in nuclear weapons with the superpowers; however, it also recognized that it must create some capability in the realm, so to gain international respect and leverage. Hence, at painful cost, it created a small nuclear capability, without a second strike capability, which easily could have been annihilated by the United States or the USSR. By the logic of Western deterrence theory, this policy was odd, seeming to create an incentive for China either to use these weapons, therefore starting a war it could not win, or else lose them, by inviting any enemy to attack first. By the logic of realpolitik, the story was different: these 293 weapons allowed China to rank as a world power and gave it some credibility against the United States and the USSR, while it evaded the "use it or lose it" dilemma by conducting a cautious policy when it came to challenging real Soviet or American interests. One might expect the Chinese to apply a similar logic to a comparable perceived threat in space, through a policy which recognizes their own weakness, but also absolute need to acquire and demonstrate a minimal military position, which can confer diplomatic credibility and block the rise of hegemony by a foreign power, and yet avoid peril so long as its own policy objectives are cautious. In space, moreover, China's deterrent is far more powerful than it was, or is, with nuclear weapons. However, without providing more transparency and openness about China's strategic intentions, the ASAT test, rather than causing the United States to reflect about its policy toward space control, likely will antagonize Washington and lead to a dangerous, spiraling race for supremacy. Assume for a moment that, despite what has been written above, China is convinced that the weaponization of space is an inevitability. Presumably, it could still be* persuaded to forgo this option if the United States demonstrates restraint and there is resolute international pressure. China needs the world more than the world needs China—at least right now. Surely, the majority of decision-makers in Beijing recognize how disproportionately costly an arms race with the United States would be to China in the near-term. Nevertheless, without United States recognition that its plan to dominate space represents an intolerable situation for other countries with mushrooming interests in space, there is virtually no hope for maintaining the sanctuary status of outer space. So, in some sense, China has put the ball in America's court. The United States can choose to see China's act as blatantly hostile and react accordingly; or, it can opt to interpret it as something else—an opportunity to reach an understanding, or at least craft some "rules of the road" as it applies to space. It is in the interest of both China and the United States to avoid an arms race in space. The costs of such a race would be astronomical, but would pale in comparison to the costs if such weapons were actually used. Imagine what would happen if early warning satellites and other intelligence platforms were among the first to be destroyed—some according to a plan; others by accident, the result of debris impact. Militaries are trained to think in worst-case 294

scenarios. When one cannot see, hear, or sense what is going on, it is only natural to assume the worst. Who destroyed the platforms? Who could have missiles hurtling towards the United States, vice versa, or other nuclear-armed states like Russia? What happens if China does not launch its weapons? Does it lose them? With only a couple dozen long-range ICBMs, it may feel compelled to launch. Beyond the more obvious costs associated with the outbreak of conflict, possibly due to misperceptions and heightened tensions stemming from an arms race, consider the long-term impact of an issue that often gets swept under the rug: space debris. China's 2007 anti-satellite demonstration brought the issue to the fore, but the headaches it caused for operational planners are relatively minor in comparison to what would confront users in the aftermath of a significant altercation, let alone outright war in space. Because space currently is a sanctuary, the issue of debris rarely is mentioned, but it is central to the weaponization debate. Currently, space debris remains a manageable problem, given the number of objects relative to the area. However, a space arms race would produce the potential for warfare in that medium. The resulting debris cloud, to say nothing of the* enhanced radiation resulting from nuclear blasts as part of an anti-satellite campaign, would forever orbit the planet, making the use of space virtually impossible, given the damage such debris would inflict on future platforms. It goes without saying that reciprocity will be required at every turn. Additionally, America must ask itself why China felt the need to conduct the test. It must put itself in the shoes of another and honestly assess what it would do if the situation were reversed. For its part, China must moderate—better yet, abandon—its xenophobia and obsession with secrecy. It must sincerely examine how its opaqueness and obfuscation contribute to the internal apprehensions felt by other states. In short, China must stop unthinkingly projecting its mirror-image onto other players. Furthermore, if either side feels the other is short-changing it, any trust will vanish and the adage "fool me once, shame on you; fool me twice, shame on me" will take hold. Over time, America and the Soviet Union learned to play by a fairly well established set of norms that successfully kept the world from Armageddon. The same could happen now. 295

China's AS AT test was not orchestrated to contest American space power, but rather to challenge the declared United States policy to dominate space. Given the asymmetrical military balance of power, China had few options to effectively oppose the United States. As such, the test was less of a military threat than an attempt to get the United States' attention. It was not, however, a desperate attempt to bring the United States to the bargaining table as some have suggested; rather, it was part of a larger strategy firmly rooted in realism. The world is rapidly moving away from unipolarity toward multipolarity; the Chinese predicted as much quite some time ago; the United States is grudgingly coming to grips with it, but the temptation to remain alone on top is strong. Beijing is trying to manage America's decline just as much as Washington wishes to manage China's rise.

Hagt, "China's ASAT Test: Strategic Response," p. 44. 296

CONCLUSION

Americans learn only from catastrophe and not from experience. —Theodore Roosevelt

Prediction is very hard, especially about the future.2 —Yogi Berra

A century ago, President Theodore Roosevelt suggested that the United States should "•walk softly, and carry a big stick "3 That was sound advice. Unfortunately, American political elites and many ordinary citizens have forgotten the first half of that counsel. The United States does carry a huge stick, but with power has come the hubris that has infected so many powers in the past. Heightened militarism has made Americans more comfortable with military solutions to complex problems than to political and economic * ones. Unilateralism, like sirens calling sailors to the rocks, is tempting, but will lead to disaster. That is particularly true of United States relations with China. Most scholarship on this topic points to increased competition between the two states, and possibly conflict, rather than cooperation. China is a classic case of a rising power, but with a twist: it is on a mission to regain what it sees as its rightful place on the global stage.4 Regardless of the real intentions of other states, China will see them in a negative light and protest restraints on its action. China's leaders believe that the United States wants to prevent China's rise, or at least to curtail it. They will use China's power to leverage its

1 Theodore Roosevelt, President of the United States, in a 1905 speech as referenced in Jennifer Barrett, "Walk Softly, But Carry a Big Stick (interview with Nye)," Newsweek, 8 Apr 04, http://ics.leeds.ac.uk/papers/vpO 1 •cfm?outfit=pmt&folder= 1393&paper= 1507 (accessed 26 Jun 08); Theodore Roosevelt, Theodore Roosevelt: An Autobiography (New York: Macmillan, 1913), http://www.bartleby.com/55/ (accessed 27 Jul 08). 2 Yogi Berra, as quoted in Jim Oberg, Space Power Theory (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1999), p. 155, http://space.au.af.mil/books/oberg/index.htm (accessed 28 Jul 08). 3 Theodore Roosevelt, as quoted in Andy Walton, "The reluctant superpower: America's status on the world stage a relatively new phenomenon," CNN Specials—Democracy in America, 2001, http://www.cnn•com/SPECIALS/2000/democracv^igger.pict^re/stories/isolationism/ (accessed 27 Jul 08). 4 Yan Xuetong, "The Rise of China in Chinese Eyes," Journal of Contemporary China, Vol. 10, No. 26 (2001), p. 33-34, http://irchina.org/en/xueren/china/pdf/vxt2.pdf (accessed 20 May 08). 297 advantages, seeking to string together successive small victories that, taken as a whole, will create a strategic shift in its favor. Its approach will vary according to the strength of its rivals. States lacking power, or the ability to harness considerable leverage vis-a-vis China, will be unable to check its actions; one scholar even refers to the "Finlandization" of ASEAN.5 China's attitudes toward the United States will be far more cautious. Total war between China and the United States in the foreseeable future is unlikely, as indeed any use of force at all, with one exception. Armed conflict is a possibility when it comes to Taiwan, the most likely place where the Chinese might challenge the United States both in military terms and space. If Beijing thought it could destroy a considerable portion of U.S. space assets around the Asia-Pacific region as a prelude to an attack on Taiwan, China might believe it could achieve a fait accompli, which the United States could not reverse, given the costs. The United States must prevent this option from seeming to be open. Scholars offer a wide range of opinions regarding the proper means for the United States to handle these circumstances. Richard Bernstein and Ross Munro assert that* China is bent at least on regional hegemony, which the United States should block by whatever means are necessary.6 Of course, by adopting such an approach the United States inevitably would make China an adversary, with foreseeable consequences. Perceptions can create a self-fulfilling prophecy. If the United States sees China as a threat and acts accordingly, China might—in fact, would—respond identically, fostering a spiraling set of images and actions which easily might produce conflict. By contrast, Robert Ross contends that China essentially is a status-quo player and will remain so for the foreseeable future.7 Segal and Osius recommend an optimistic, but vigilant stance, in between the positions advanced by Bernstein and Munro or Ross.8 Two obvious dangers may emerge from the current situation in space. First, the United States may try to preempt all other countries, violating the sanctuary of space, provoking a backlash from other nations which feel threatened by the prospect of leaving

5 Segal, "East Asia and the 'Constrainment' of China," p. 252. 6 Bernstein and Munro, "The Coming Conflict with America," p. 18-32. 7 Robert S. Ross, "Beijing as a Conservative Power," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 76, No. 2 (1997), p. 33-44. Also see Ross, "Assessing the China Threat," p. 81-87. 8 Osius, "Discussion of 'The Rise of China in Chinese Eyes'," p. 43; also see Segal, "East Asia and the 'Constrainment' of China," p. 237-265. 298 so much power in the hands of one state. Second, China may push its luck too far, and take aggressive steps in space, increasing the likelihood of a firm U.S. reaction. If the United States avoids an attempt to dominate space by placing weapons platforms there, the Chinese are unlikely to seek to change the balance of power in that medium radically during the foreseeable future. Should the United States adopt a hegemonic approach, however, it will stir the Chinese and others to meet that threat, which they may well succeed in doing: it is easier to be a spoiler than a master of space. Moreover, the technical hurdles that still must be overcome in order to achieve that end are significant, costly, and would fail to block other threats to American security, such as dirty bombs or nuclear devices smuggled into the United States. Ultimately, members of the various weaponization camps must honestly confront this question: Is hegemony or control—as defined by Controllers—of space really possible? Many of their arguments to date reflect a conviction that it is, but they also reflect a nagging obliviousness to the complexities surrounding such a provocative move. Today, the United States benefits from space more than any other country, thanks to * its enormous investment in that domain. Those investments, both military and commercial, give it strategic advantages which no one else has. Of course, by integrating space assets into so many operations, the United States finds itself the country most vulnerable to a disruption or discontinuation of those services. The latter, in turn, could be done through a military strike launched by any of several space-capable states, which at present it could do little to thwart.9 At this point, China need only demonstrate a credible "spoiler" capability to negate grandiose visions of hegemony in space. If space weapons are positioned in higher Earth orbits (MEO or GEO, for instance), their vulnerability will diminish, in the sense that fewer actors are able to reach those heights; however, the expenditure to get them into those orbits also will increase dramatically, to say nothing about the problems of handling such changes. A rational space policy must recognize the fragility and high cost of space assets, while seeking to enhance survivability and bring down costs (possibly through miniaturization, redundancy, less capable, but less costly alternatives, or some combination thereof). In any case, the

9 While defensive measures do exist, they come with significant costs (construction, operational, and longevity) which may prove ineffectual should a rival, such as China, launch a persistent, but relatively inexpensive counterspace effort. 299

United States gets a great deal from space—far more than anyone else—from its present investment, and yet has no clear means to prevent a spoiler from wrecking that capability, or of preventing it from moving in the direction of control or hegemony. Its best approach at present is to not rock the boat, while still studying means to strengthen is position should matters change. There is no inherent need for an immediate Sino-American struggle in space. The United States, which has undisputed primacy there at the moment and for least the next few decades unless matters change dramatically, has no reason to provoke such a situation. It also has the most to lose by weaponizing space, precisely because it already gains the most from the current environment. Furthermore, by placing weapons in space (as opposed to maintaining terrestrial weapons that can reach space), the United States risks undermining its conventional military superiority. This step would force other states, like China, to respond in ways that would endanger space support for the U.S. military, which otherwise no other states can hope to match in the near to middle-term. In turn, United States power in space, as in all areas of high-technology and advanced * weapons, provides a long breathing space in which it can try to shape Chinese policy and its rise among states. What can be done to encourage a peaceful rise and policy and "integrate China into the institutions that promote global norms on proliferation, trade, the environment, and human rights" ° which is clearly in the interest of all concerned? First, one must acknowledge that simple politics of "containment" or "engagement" will not work. China respects power. Balanced Engagement, involving both incentives and penalties (and a steadfast willingness by states to impose and enforce them in concert, making clear the costs of unilateral action) is required. Second, the United States must increase its leverage with China through a more balanced trade environment11 that involves a strategic rethinking of current trends and addresses voracious American consumption. Third, Washington must recognize that American power is declining in relative terms and begin to adopt strategies based on a transition to a multipolar environment. In parallel

10 William J. Clinton, a speech given at the Mayflower Hotel, Washington, 7 Apr 99, as quoted in Osius, "Discussion of The Rise of China in Chinese Eyes'," p. 44. 11 Rich Miller and Stan Crock, "No More Mr. Nice Guy With China?" BusinessWeek Online, http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/05 17/b3930064 mzOll.htm (11 Apr 06). 300 fashion, China must consider whether its penchant for seeing threats everywhere is harmful to its goal of becoming a great power. Habitual reliance on deception, surprise, and an outmoded victim mentality may garner tactical gains at the expense of strategic ones. The sage advice offered in classical Chinese military texts was intended for application against like-minded foes, that is other Chinese. Toward foreigners exhibiting different cultural traditions, the value of such advice is limited, because no common frame of reference exists. To avoid a catastrophe on earth and in space, China and the United States must understand each other. Misperception continues to cloud and poison the bilateral relationship. The United States needs to be less ambiguous in regards to deterrence. China needs to take the concerns of the United States more seriously, and to adopt a reciprocal demeanor, rather than continue its current attitude of trying to take every trick while offering nothing in return. Each side must recognize that they both suffer from overconfidence regarding their ability to manage crises, which makes them happy to enter them. The only remedy for that danger is likely to be time spent working together. * This policy maintains the status-quo, where for free, the United States is the dominant power in space, and can use that medium to multiply the power of its terrestrial forces greatly, more than anyone else can do. The United States still would retain the ability to move for hegemony whenever it wants, and so retain the ability to deter others. In effect, this policy forecloses no options. It also minimizes the chances that the United States will unnecessarily provoke China into actions that may cause struggle. That is, this approach is the best policy to avoid the danger of an accidental or unnecessary struggle, arising from mistake or misperception. But it can not prevent a struggle that happens intentionally, because one side or the other wants to force one in the foreseeable future; however, this approach will not weaken the United States' position in this latter case, where it remains the dominant player. In a surprising announcement, literally as this thesis goes to press, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates issued a new National Defense Strategy. Immediately, the reader is struck by two things: the absence of talk about preemptive military action and the reference to "the long war" which, while it explicitly referred to the fight against extremism, is an encouraging sign in light of the subtle and protracted war China is 301 waging against the United States on several fronts. Where Rumsfeld called for preemptive action against threats and sought partnerships with "like-minded states, " the new strategy calls for the patient accumulation of quiet success ... and the importance of improved relations with "old allies and new partners" to confront shared dangers. What makes the publication of the document so surprising is the timing. Barack Obama or John McCain will soon take the reins of power and likely want to put his stamp on policy. However, Gates' proposal may ease the transition toward a more multilateralist approach under a new administration. Indeed, Gates calls it "a blueprint to success " for a future administration. Some critics already have started to criticize the document. Michele Flournoy, President of the Center for a New American Security, while commending the paper for emphasizing irregular warfare, also said it went too far. "I think irregular warfare is very important, particularly in contrast to preparing solely for conventional warfighting, but it shouldn't be our only focus, " because countries like China likely are preparing for "high-end" warfare, using anti-satellite and cyberspace technologies.14 James Carafano* of the Heritage Foundation echoed those concerns. "It is overstating the case to say that extremist Islamic ideology is going to define the next 20 or 30 years. I think that's not helpful because you 're sacrificing everything for this one fight. " Reportedly, Gates also met resistance from the Joint Chiefs of Staff who expressed concerns over the long term risks of shifting focus too far away from conventional threats, most notably in the skies or in space.16 Certainly, Gates' long-standing emphasis on unconventional threats has created tensions with ardent supporters of advanced weapons systems which he argues, are designed to meet conventional threats the United States no longer faces.17 These criticisms are premature and overdone. A shift towards a more pragmatic approach and moderate tone in strategy is a step in the right direction. It emphasizes the

12 David Morgan, "Pentagon makes fighting extremism its top priority," Reuters, 31 Jul 08, http://news.vahoo.eom/s/nm/20080731/ts nm/usa military strategy dc (accessed 31 Jul 08). 13 Robert M. Gates, Secretary of Defense, as quoted in Josh White, "Gates Sees Terrorism Remaining Enemy No. 1: New Defense Strategy Shifts Focus From Conventional Warfare," Washington Post, 31 Jul 08, p. A01, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp- dvn/content/article/2008/07/30/AR2008073003240.html?hpid=topnews (accessed 31 Jul 08). 14 Michele Flournoy, as quoted in White, "Gates Sees Terrorism Remaining Enemy No. 1" 15 James J. Carafano, as quoted in White, "Gates Sees Terrorism Remaining Enemy No. 1" 16 White, "Gates Sees Terrorism Remaining Enemy No. 1" 17 Morgan, "Pentagon makes fighting extremism its top priority" 302

need for matters that have been lacking from American strategy for several years. Furthermore, it seeks to institutionalize support for asymmetric skills repeatedly ignored in the recent past by a defense community biased towards expensive conventional and strategic programs. Even more, the new strategy pledges "continuous strategic dialogue

TO with China" to decrease the chance of miscalculating the potential threat posed by China's military buildup. The statement also says the United States wishes "to use the opportunity of an absence of fundamental conflict between great powers to shape the future, and to prevent the reemergence of great power rivalry. "19 While commenting that he did not see Russia or China as a threat, Gates did express concern over their modernization programs and stated that the United States would "continue to improve and refine [its] capabilities to respond to China if necessary. "20 This thesis has described a bilateral and reciprocal strategic relationship, through a combination of cultural, strategic, theoretical, economic, military, and technological issues, and is linked to the most important emerging frontier of power on earth. To better understand that relationship, this work looked at how the United States and China got * where they are, why they think the way they do, the implications if the current level of misunderstanding between them persists, and how hegemony over the heavens will shape relations between these countries, and power and order on earth. Now is an excellent time for America to reacquaint itself with the wisdom of Teddy Roosevelt, who long ago told his countrymen "[what] will destroy America are prosperity at any price, peace at any price, safety first instead of duty first, the love of soft living and the get rich quick theory of life."

J.U1U-. 19 Ibid. 20 Robert M. Gates, as quoted in Jim Mannion, "New US defense strategy centers on 'long war'," Agence France Presse (AFP), 31 Jul 08, http://news.yahoo.eom/s/afp/20080801/wl sthasia afp/usmilitaryiraqafghanistan (accessed 31 Jul 08). 21 Theodore Roosevelt, as quoted in George Grant, Carry a Big Stick: The Uncommon Heroism of Theodore Roosevelt (Nashville, TN.: Cumberland House Publishing, 1996), p. 129. BIBLIOGRAPHY

Abate, Tom. "High-tech culture of Silicon Valley originally formed around radio." SFGate.com, 30 Sep 07, http://www.sfgate.com/cgi- bin/article.cgi?file=/c/a/2007/09/30/MNDTSEMSJ.DTL&tvpe=printable (accessed 1 Feb 08).

Abmann, Lars. Theater Missile Defense (TMD) in East Asia: Implications for Beijing and Tokyo. London: Transaction Publishers, 2007.

Allen, Kenneth W., Glenn Krumel, and Jonathan D. Pollack. China's Air Force Enters the 21s' Century. Santa Monica: RAND, 1995.

Ambrose, Stephen E. "When Americans Go to War," Reviews in American History, 1, 4 (Dec 1973).

Ames, T. Roger. Sun Tzu: The Art of Warfare. New York: Ballantine, 1993.

Andrea, Alfred J. and James H. Overfield. The Human Record: Sources of Global History. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1994

Andreani, Giles. "The 'War on Terror': Good Cause, Wrong Concept." Survival, 46, 4 (Winter 2004-05).

Angell, Norman. The Great Illusion. New York: G. P. Putnam & Sons, 1933; original 1909.

Appathurai, James. "Capabilities, capabilities, capabilities." NATO Review, Autumn 2002, http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2002/issue3/english/artl.html (accessed 12 Jun 08).

Aquino, Michael A. The Neutron Bomb. PhD dissertation, University of California, 1982. http://www.xeper.org/maquino/nm/NeutronBomb.pdf (accessed 5 May 08).

Arms, Anita M. "Strategic Culture: The American Mind." In Strategy and Its Theorists. Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College, 1999.

Arquilla, John and David Ronfeldt, ed. In Athena's Camp: Preparing for Conflict in the Information Age. Santa Monica: RAND, 1997.

Associated Press, The. "Pentagon said to lack understanding of satellite's vulnerability to attack." GlobalSecurity. org, 5 Jan 00, http://www.globalsecurity.org/space/librarv/news/2000/000105-asat.htm (accessed 29 Jul 08). 304

Awokuse, Titus O. and Weishi Gu. "The Contribution of Foreign Direct Investment to China's Export Performance: Evidence from Disaggregated Sectors." June 2007, http://www-agecon.ag.ohio-state.edu/programs/Anderson/trade/60AkwoseGu.pdf (accessed 10 Mar 08).

Babbitt, Irving. Democracy and Leadership. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1979; originally published in 1924.

Bacevich, Andrew J. American Empire: The Realities and Consequences of U.S. Diplomacy. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002.

. "The Real World War IV." The Wilson Quarterly, 29,1 (Winter 2005), http://facultv.maxwell.svr.edu/merupert/BACEVICH%20The%20Real%20World%20,Wa r%20IV.pdffaccessed 15 Jun 08).

Bairoch, Paul. "International Industrialization Levels from 1750 to 1980." Journal of Economic History 11 (Spring 1982): 269-333.

Baker, James, U.S. Secretary of State. "The Euro-Atlantic architecture: from West to East." A speech given in Berlin, 24 Jun 91, http://findarticles.eom/p/articles/mi_ml584/is n25v2/ai 11218409/print?tag=artBody;c * oil (accessed 28 Jun 08).

Ball, Desmond. "Strategic Culture in the Asia-Pacific Region." Security Studies 3,1 (Autumn 1993): 44-74.

Barrett, Jennifer. "Walk Softly, But Carry a Big Stick (interview with Nye)." Newsweek, 8 Apr 04, http://ics.leeds.ac.uk/papers/vp01 .cfm?outfit=pmt&folder=l393&paper=l 507 (accessed 26 Jun 08).

Barron, Michael J. "China's Strategic Modernization: The Russian Connection." Parameters (Winter 2001-02): 72-86.

"Basic of Space Flight: Orbital Mechanics," Rocket and Space Technology, http://www.braeunig.us/space/orbmech.htm (accessed 10 Dec 07).

Basler, Roy P. The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln. New Brunswick, NJ.: Rutgers University Press, 1953), Volumes 4 and 5. "Battlefield Digitization," GlobalSecurity.org, http://www.globalsecuritv.org/militarv/librarv/policy/armv/fm/3-34-230/Ch4htm.htm (accessed 24 Mar 08).

Beale, Georgia. Theodore Roosevelt and the Rise of America to World Power. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1956. Beringer, Richard E., et al. Why the South Lost the Civil War. Athens, GA.: University of Georgia Press, 1986.

Berney, Karen. "Dual-Use Technology Sales." China Business Review (July/August 1980).

Bernstein, Richard and Ross Munro. "The Coming Conflict with America." Foreign Affairs 76, 2 (1997): 18-32.

Berthelemy, J.C. and Saadet Deger. Conversion of Military Industries to Civilian Production in China. Paris: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development [OECD], June 1995.

Beschloss, Michael. The Conquerors: Roosevelt, Truman and the Destruction of Hitler's Germany, 1941-1945. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2002.

Black, Jeremy. A Military Revolution? Military Change and European Society, 1550- 1800. Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 1990.

Blair, Bruce. "Chinese Nuclear Preemption." China Security, 1 (Autumn 2005), http://www.wsichina.org/attach/china_securitv.pdf (accessed 1 Jun 08).

Blumenthal, Dan and Christopher Griffin. "Understanding Strategy: A delicate dance." Armed Forces Journal, Apr 06, http://www.afu.eom/2006/04/l 813794 (accessed 2 Jun 08).

"Boeing MDR Payload Adds New Capabilities to U.S. Air Force Milstar II Satellite." Boeing News Release, http://www.boeing.com/ids/news/sdc/010115 milstar.html (accessed 18 Dec 07).

Boese, Wade. "U.S. Nixes Arms Control in New Space Policy." Arms Control Association, Nov 2006, http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2006_ll/ACSpace.asp (accessed 16 Mar 08).

Bolt, Paul J., Damon V. Coletta, and Collin G. Shackelford, eds. American Defense Policy, Eighth Edition. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005.

Boorstein, Daniel J. and Brooks Mather Kelley. A History of the United States. Lexington, MA.: Ginn, 1981.

Boot, Max. The Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American Power. New York: Basic Books, 2002.

. "Iraq and the American Small War Tradition." Historically Speaking: The Bulletin of the Historical Society, Jun 03, http://www.bu.edu/historic/hs/i une03 .html#boot (accessed 27 Jul 08). 306

Booth, Ken. Strategy and Ethnocentrism. New York: Holmes and Meier, 1979.

Bowden, Mark. Black Hawk Down: A Story of Modern War. New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1999.

Bowser, Hal. "How the Space Race Changed America." Invention & Technology Magazine 3,2 (Fall 1987) http://www.americanheritage.eom/articles/magazine/it/1987/2/1987_2_24_print.shtml (accessed 21 Jan 08).

Boys, James D. "Two Years In The White House: The Presidency of Bill Clinton & U.S. Foreign Policy, 1993 & 1994." 49th Parallel, An Interdisciplinary Journal of North American Studies, http://www.49thparallel.bham.ac.uk/back/issue9/boys.htm (accessed 3 Jul 08).

Brewer, John. The Sinews of Power: War, Money and the English State, 1688-1783. London: Unwin Hyman, 1989.

Brewitt-Taylor, C.H., trans. Romance of the Three Kingdoms by Luo Guanzhong (Lo Kuan-Chung). Tokyo: Charles E. Turtle Company, 1959.

Bridis, Ted. "US probes whether laptop copied on China trip." The Associated Press, 29 May 08, http://news.vahoo.eom/s/ap/20080530/ap_on go cast pe/chinahacking (accessed 29 May 08).

Brodie, Bernard. "A Guide to the Reading of On War." Chapter in On War, edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret 641-711. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976.

. "War in the Atomic Age" and "Implications for Military Policy." In The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World Order, ed., Brodie, Bernard. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1946.

Broemmelhoerster, Joern and John Frankenstein, eds. Mixed Motives, Uncertain Outcomes: Defense Industry Conversion in China. Boulder: Lynne Reinner, 1996.

Brogan, Denis W. "The Illusion of American Omnipotence," Harpers, 205 (Dec 1952): 21-8

. American Aspects. New York: Harper & Row, 1964, especially Chapter 2.

Brown, Gerald E. and Chang-Hwan Lee, eds. Hans Bethe And His Physics. London: World Scientific Publishing Co, Pic, 2006. 307

Brown, Michael E., Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller, eds. The Perils of Anarchy: Contemporary Realism and International Security. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1995.

Brzezinski, Zbigniew and John J. Mearsheimer. "Clash of the Titans." Foreign Policy 146 (Jan/Feb 2005), http://search.epnet.com.ezproxv.lib.ucalgarv.ca/login.aspx?direct-true&db=aph&an=154 24798 (accessed 14 Apr 2006).

Burkitt, Laurie et al. The Lessons of History: The Chinese People's Liberation Army at 75. Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2003.

Buries, Mark and Abram N. Shulsky. Patterns in China's Use of Force: Evidence from History and Doctrinal Writings. Santa Monica: RAND, 2000.

Burns, Simon. "China plagued by innovation gap: Research gap hurting industry, officials say." vnunet.com, 16 Dec 05, http://www.infomaticsonline.co.Uk/articles/print/2147658 (accessed 20 Apr 08).

Burr, William, ed., The Kissinger Transcripts. New York: The New Press, 1998.

Byrd, Robert C. "The Perils of Peacekeeping." New York Times, 19 Aug 93.

Cebrowski, Arthur. "Planning a Revolution: Mapping the Pentagon's Transformation." An address at the Heritage Foundation, 12 Jun 03, http://www.heritage.org/Research/NationalSecurity/wm292.cfm (accessed 8 Jun 08).

Chan, Anthony B. Arming the Chinese: The Western Armaments Trade in Warlord China, 1920-1928. Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1982.

Chan, John. "Chinese Capitalism: Industrial Powerhouse Or Sweatshop Of The World?" Countercurrents.org, 31 Jan 03, http://www.countercurrents.org/economy- chan050504.htm (accessed 11 Mar 08).

Chanda, Nayan. "Fear of the Dragon." Far Eastern Economic Review, 13 Apr 95. Shen, Dingli. "Nuclear Deterrence in the 21st Century." China Security, 1 (Autumn 2005), http://www.wsichina.org/attach/china security.pdf (accessed 1 Jun 08).

Chang, Ha-Joon. "State-Owned Enterprise Reform." United Nations Department for Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA), 2007, http://esa.un.org/techcoop/documents/PN_SOEReformNote.pdf (accessed 8 Mar 08).

Chang, Iris. Thread of the Silkworm. New York: Basic Books, 1995.

"Chapter 7: The High-technology Sector." The International Development Research Centre, http://www.idrc.ca/en/ev-55199-201 -1 -DO TOPIC.html (accessed 10 Feb 08). Cheng, Dean. China's Military Ambitions in Space. Washington: George C. Marshall Institute, 2006.

Cheng Li. "China's Political Succession: Four Misperceptions in the West." Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Asia Program Special Report 96 (June 2001), http://wwics.si.edu/topics/pubs/asiarpt 096.pdf (accessed 19 Feb 08).

Chi Hung Kwan. '"Three Represents Theory' aims for 'Peaceful Evolution'." China in Transition, 23 Aug 02, http://www.rieti.go.ip/en/china/02082301.html (accessed 5 Jun 08).

"China—A Country Study: 'Reds' Versus 'Experts' in the 1950s and 1960s." http://www.country-data.eom/frd/cs/cntoc.html#cn0258 (accessed 3 Jan 08).

"China and Weapons of Mass Destruction: Implications for the United States," National Intelligence Council, 5 Nov 99, http://www.dni.gov/nic/confreports chinawmd.html (accessed 19 Jan 08).

"China Development Zones." http://www.export.gov/china/exporting_to_china/developmentzones.pdf (accessed 16 Jan 08).

"China Facts and Figures." China.org.cn, 2006, http://www.china.org.cn/english/features/china/203730.htm (accessed 31 Jan 08).

"China Must be Ready to Fight a World War—PLA Believes That the West is Hatching Six Major Conspiracies Against China." Hong Kong, 28 May 99, bl4, in FBIS-CHI- 1999-0528, 1 Jun 99.

"China National Manned Space Programme (Project 921)." SinoDefence, 25 May 2007, http://www.sinodefence.com/strategic/mannedspace/proiect921 .asp (accessed 7 Jan 08).

"China Pursues Defensive National Defense." GlobalSecurity.org, 16 Oct 00, http://www.globalsecuritv.org/wmd/librarv/news/china/2000/china-001016a.htm (accessed 2 Jun 08).

"China wants scientists to risk failure to achieve breakthroughs." International Herald Tribune, 28 Aug 07, http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2007/08/28/asia/AS-GEN-China- Scientists-Research.php (accessed 19 Apr 08).

http://technologv.tin (accessed 8 Jun 08). "China's Defense Budget." GlobalSecurity.org, http://www.globalsecurity.or g/military/world/china/budget.htm (accessed 9 Apr 08).

"China's National Defense in 2006." Gov.cn, Chinese Government's Official Web Portal, http://www.china.org.cn/english/features/book/194485.htm (accessed 2 Jun 08).

"China's Nuclear Weapons Program." Atomic Forum, http://www.atomicforum.org/china/china.html (accessed 7 Jan 08).

"China's Rise." CBS News, 4 Apr 04, http.7/www.cbsnews.com/stories/2004/04/01/sunday/printable609910.shtml (accessed 14 Mar 08).

"China's Secret Cape Canaveral A Sprawling City Of 15,000." Space Daily, 2 Sep 04, http://www.spacedaily.com/news/china-04zze.html (accessed 15 Dec 07).

"China's Space Activities." Information Office of the PRC State Council. 22 Nov 00, http://www.fas.org/spp/guide/china/wp 112200.html (accessed 14 Jan 08).

"China's Space Activities in 2006." 12 Oct 06, http://www.fas.org/spp/guide/china/wp2006.pdf (accessed 14 Jan 08).

"China's Space Activities (White Paper)," China National Space Administration, 15 Dec 03, http://www.cnsa.gov.cn/n615709/n620681/n771967/69198.html (accessed 14 Jan 08).

"Chinese Invasion of Vietnam: February 1979," Global Secuirty.org, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/prc-vietnam.htm (accessed 21 Mar 08).

(accessed 21 Dec 07). Ching Ho Yu. "Chinese Ethics and Universal Human Rights." 7 Aug 90, http://www.creative-wisdom.com/education/china/Chinese ethics.html (accessed 4 Jun 08).

Chisholm, Donald. Coordination without Hierarchy: Informal structures in Multi- Organizational Systems. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1989.

Chiu, Lisa. "Outbreak of rumors has China reeling: Conspiracy theories explaining SARA at epidemic level." San Francisco Chronicle, 7 May 03, http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2003/05/07/MN34984.DTL (accessed 8 Jun 08).

Christensen, Thomas J. "Posing Problems Without Catching Up: China's Rise and Challenges for U.S. Security Policy." International Security 25, 4 (2001): 5-40.

Christopher, Warren, U.S. Secretary of State. "Statement at Senate confirmation hearing." U.S. Department of State Dispatch, 25 Jan 93. 310

Chu, Shulong. "Several Issues Concerning the Establishment of the Subject of International Relations." Contemporary International Relations 66, 4 (April 1995): 59- 63.

Churchill, Winston. http://homepage.eircom.net/%257Eodvssev/Quotes/History/Churchill.html (accessed 3 Jun 08).

Clark, Phillip. "Civil and Commercial Satellite Communications—China." Jane's Space Directory, Jane's Information Group, 8 Dec 04, http://www4.ianes.com/subscribe/j sd/doc view.i sp?K2DocKev=/content 11\anesdata/vb/i s d/jsd 0154.htm@current&Prod Name=JSD&QueryText (accessed 11 Dec 07).

Clarke, Christopher M. "Defense Modernization: How China plans to rebuild its crumbling 'Great Wall'." China Business Review (July/August 1984).

Clarke, Walter and Jeffrey Herbst. "Somalia and the Future of Humanitarian Intervention." Foreign Affairs, 75, 2 (Mar/Apr 96).

Clausewitz, Carl von. On War, as translated by Howard, Michael and Peter Paret, eds. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976.

Clinton, Bill, President of the United States. "THE SOMALIA MISSION; Clinton's Words on Somalia: 'The Responsibilities of American Leadership'." New York Times, 8 Oct 93, http://querv.nvtimes.com/gst/fullpage.html7res-9F0CE0DA153AF93BA35753ClA9659 58260&sec:=&spon:=::&pagewanted:::::: 1 (accessed 5 Jul 08).

Clinton, Bill, President of the United States. "Advancing Our Interests Through Engagement and Enlargement." In The Clinton Foreign Policy Reader: Presidential Speeches with Commentary. Rubenstein, Alvin Z., Albina Shayevich and Boris Zlotnikov, eds. New York: M.E. Sharpe Inc., 2000.

Cohen, Warren I. The Cambridge History of American Foreign Relations, Vol. 4: America in the Age of Soviet Power, 1945-1991. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993.

Coll, Steve. "General Accounting." The New Yorker, 24 Sep 07, http://www.newvorker.com/talk/comment/2007/09/24/070924taco_talk col^printable^tr ue (accessed 10 Jul 08).

"Commission on Science, Technology, and National Defense Industry (COSTIND)." Federation of American Scientists, http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/china/agency/costind.htm (accessed 2 Feb 08). 311

Conversino, Mark J. "Sawdust Superpower: Perceptions of U.S. Casualty Tolerance in the Post-Gulf War Era." Strategic Review, 25, 1 (Winter 1997).

Coogan, John W. "Wilsonian Diplomacy in War and Peace." In American Foreign Relations Reconsidered, 1890-1993, ed., Martel, Gordon. New York: Routledge, 1994.

Cooper, John Milton. Breaking the Heart of the World: Woodrow Wilson and the Fight for the League of Nations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001.

Creveld, Martin Van. Fighting Power: German Military Performance, 1914-1945. Potomac, MD.: C and L Associates, 1980.

Crick, Bernard, Leslie J. Walker, and Brian Richardson, eds. and trans. Niccolo Machiavelli, The Discourses, originally written in 1517. London: Penguin Books, 1970.

"Critics scrutinize cost of shuttle." USA Today, 4 Feb 03, http://www.usatodav.com/news/nation/2003-02-04-shuttle-critics x.htm (accessed 28 Apr 08).

CSC Staff. "Conspiracy Theory Stalks China-US Financial Relations." ChinaStakes.com, 25 Jan 08, http://www.chinastakes.com/story.aspx?id= 177 (accessed 8 Jun 08).

"Cuba denies jamming broadcast." BBC News, 19 Jul 03, http://news.bbc.co.Uk/l/hi/world/americas/3080891.stmCoffman, Edward M. A review ofThe American Way of War, Weigley, Russell F. The Journal of American History, 60, 4 (Mar 74).

Cumming-Bruce, Nick. "U.N. Weighs a Ban on Weapons in Space, but U.S. Still Objects." The New York Times, 13 Feb 08, http://www.nvtimes.com/2008/02/13/world/europe/13arms.html? r=l&pagewanted=prin t&oref-slogin (accessed 28 Apr 08).

Daalder, Ivo H. "Knowing When to Say No: The Development of US Policy for Peacekeeping." In UN Peacekeeping, American Policy, and the Uncivil Wars of the 1990s, Durch, William, ed. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996.

David, Charles-Philippe. '"Foreign Policy Is Not What I Came Here to Do': Dissecting Clinton's Foreign Policy-Making: A First Cut." Center for United States Studies of the Raoul Dandurand Chair of Strategic and Diplomatic Studies, Occasional Paper 1, 26-28 Jun 03, http://www.dandurand.uqam.ca/download/pdf/articles/foreign policy firstcut.pdf (accessed 3 Jul 08).

David, Leonard. "Pentagon Report: China's Space Warfare Tactics Aimed at US Supremacy." Space News, 1 Aug 2003, http://www.space.com/news/china dod 030801 .html (accessed 16 Dec 07). 312

Day, Dwayne. "Blunt arrows: the limited utility of ASATs." The Space Review, 6 Jun 05, http://www.thespacereview.eom/article/388/l (accessed 20 Dec 07).

. "Tinker, tailor, satellite, spy." The Space Review, 29 Oct 07, http://www.thespacereview.eom/article/989/l (accessed 15 Jul 08).

. "A dragon in winter." The Space Review, 14 Jan 08, http://www.thespacereview.eom/article/1035/l (accessed 14 Jan 08).

DeBlois, Bruce M., Lt. Col. "Space Sanctuary:, A Viable National Strategy." Air Power Journal 12, 4 (Winter 1998): 41-57.

Dellios, Rosita. "China's Space Program: A Strategic and Political Analysis." Culture Mandala 7, 1, Dec 2005.

Deng Xiaoping. "The Army Needs to be Consolidated," People's Daily, 25 Jan 75, http://english.peopledailv.com.cn/dengxp/vol2/text/bl010.html (accessed 28 Jan 08).

. "Some Comments on Work and Science." People's Daily, 8 Aug 77, http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/dengxp/vol2/text/bl 130.html (accessed 23 Jan 08).

. "The Present Situation and the Tasks Before Us." People's Daily, 16 Jan 80, http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/dengxp/vol2/text/bl390.html (accessed 30 Jan 08).

Department of Defense. Defense Planning Guidance (DPG)for the Fiscal Years 1994- 1999 draft dated 18 Feb 92.

Deptula, David A., Brigadier General. Effects-Based Operations: Change in the Nature of Warfare. Arlington, VA.: Aerospace Education Foundation, 2001.

Desch, Michael C. "Culture Clash: Assessing the Importance of Ideas in Security Studies." International Security 23, 1 (Summer 1998): 141-70.

Dickson, Paul. Sputnik: The Shock of the Century. New York: Walker Publishing Company, 2001.

DiMaggio, Paul. "Culture and Cognition." Annual Review of Sociology 23 (1997): 263- 87.

Dinerman, Taylor. "Review: Satellites, Rockets, and Eisenhower." The Space Review, 3 Nov 03, http://www.thespacereview.eom/article/56/l (accessed 15 Jul 08).

Dolman, Everett C. Astropolitik: Classical Geopolitics in the Space Age. London: Frank Caas,2001. 313

Donald, David H. Lincoln Reconsidered: Essays on the Civil War Era, Third Edition. New York: Vintage Books, 2001, Chapter 7, "Abraham Lincoln and the American Pragmatic Tradition."

Donnelly, Thomas. "Empire of Liberty: The Historical Underpinnings of the Bush Doctrine." American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 24 Jun 05, http://www.aei.org/publications/pubID.22756/pub detail.asp (accessed 25 May 08).

Dorn, James A. "China's Fatal Conceit." Cato Policy Report, May/June 1996, http://www.cato.org/pubs/policv report/xviiin3-5.html (accessed 19 Apr 08)

Dorn, James A. and Wang Xi, eds. Economic Reform in China: Problems and Prospects. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990.

Dorrien, Gary. The Neo-Conservative Mind: Politics, Culture, and the War of Ideology. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1993.

Doyle, Michael W. "Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs." Philosophy and Public Affairs 12, 3 (Summer, 1983): 205-35 and Part 2,12,4 (Autumn, 1983): 323-53.

Dunne, Michael. "Hemisphere and Globe: The Terms of American Foreign Relations." * International Affairs, 70, 4 (Oct 1994).

Durch, William. "Introduction to Anarchy: Humanitarian Intervention and 'State Building'." In UN Peacekeeping, American Policy, and the Uncivil Wars of the 1990s, Durch, William, ed. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996.

Echevarria, Antulio J., II. "Toward an American Way of War." Strategic Studies Institute, 1 Mar 04, http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB374.pdf (accessed 13 Apr 08).

Eisenhower, Dwight D., President of the United States. Farewell Address, 17 Jan 61, http://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/dwightdeisenhowerfarewell.html (accessed 8 Jul 08).

Elhefnawy, Nader. "Four Myths about Space Power." Parameters (Spring 2003): 124- 132, http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/03spring/elhefnaw.htm (accessed 29 Jul 08).

Elleman, Bruce A. Modern Chinese Warfare, 1795-1989. London: Routledge, 2001.

Esposito, David M. The Legacy ofWoodrow Wilson: American War Aims in World War I. Westport, CT.: Praeger Publishers, 1996, http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=14266596 (accessed 20 Jul 08). 314

"Executive Summary." Federation of American Scientists. http://www.fas.Org/resource/l 0072004163510.pdf (accessed 26 Dec 07).

Fairbank, John K., ed. The Chinese World Order: Traditional China's Foreign Relations. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968.

Falk, Richard and David Krieger. "Subverting the UN." The Nation, 17 Oct 02, http://www.thenation.com/doc/20021104/falk (accessed 5 Jul 08).

Feigenbaum, Evan A. "Who's Behind China's High Technology 'Revolution'?: How Bomb Makers Remade Beijing's Priorities, Policies, and Institutions." International Security 24, 1 (Summer, 1999): 95-126.

. China's Techno-Warriors: National Security and Strategic Competition from the Nuclear to the Information Age. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003.

Ferrell, Robert H. Woodrow Wilson and World War I, 1917-1921. New York: Harper & Row, 1985.

Ferris, John. "NCW, C4ISR, IO and RMA: Toward a Revolution in Military Intelligence?" Chapter in Understanding Intelligence in the Twenty-First Century: Journeys in Shadows. London: Routledge, 2004. *

. "NCW, C4ISR, IO and RMA: Toward a Revolution in Military Intelligence?" Chapter in Intelligence and Strategy: Selected Essays. New York: Routledge, 2005.

Finkelstein, David M. "The View From Beijing: U.S.-China Security Relations From Kosovo to September 11, 2001." Chapter in China's Growing Military Power: Perspectives on Security, Ballistic Missiles, and Conventional Capabilities. 19-62. U.S. Army War College: Strategic Studies Institute, 2002.

Fischer, Beth A. The Reagan Reversal: Foreign Policy and the End of the Cold War. Columbia, MO.: University of Missouri Press, 1997.

Fisher, Richard D. "Foreign Arms Acquisitions and PLA Modernization." Chapter in China's Military Faces the Future. Washington, DC: M.E. Sharpe, Inc, 1999.

Fletcher, Martin. "World Disorder Undermines the Domestic Agenda." Times (London), 16 Jan 93.

Folta, Paul Humes. From Swords to Ploughshares? Defense Industry Reform in the PRC. Boulder: Westview Press, 1992.

Foust, Jeff. "John Young's shuttle secret." The Space Review, 14 Apr 03, http://www.thespacereview.eom/article/15/l (accessed 2 May 08). . "Where the candidates stand on space." The Space Review, 31 Dec 07, http ://www. thespacerevie w. com/article/102 8/1 (accessed 7 Jan 08).

Frankenstein, John. "Back to the Future: A Historical Perspective on Chinese Military Modernization." A speech presented at the International Studies Association annual meeting, Anaheim, California, March, 1986.

. "Chinese Weapons Development: Process, Progress, Program?" Chapter in Chinese Military Reforms: International and Domestic Implications. Boulder: Westview Press, 1986.

French, Howard W. "Crackdown on Protests Turns Lethal in China." Salt Lake Tribune, http://www.sltrib.com/portlet/article/html/fragments/print article.i sp?article=3296483 (12 Apr 2006).

Friedman, Thomas L. "The Apparent Heir." The New York Times, 31 Oct 04, http://www.nvtimes.com/2004/10/31/opinion/31friedman.html (accessed 14 Jun 08).

Frieman, Wendy. "Foreign Technology and Chinese Modernization." Chapter in Chinese Military Reforms: International and Domestic Implications. Boulder: Westview Press, 1986.

. "China's Military R&D System: Reform and Reorientation." Chapter in Science and Technology in Post-Mao China. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989.

. "The Understated Revolution in Chinese Science and Technology: Implications for the PLA in the 21st Century." Chapter in China's Military Faces the Future. Washington, DC: M.E. Sharpe, Inc, 1999.

Gaddis, John Lewis. A Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy during the Cold War. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982.

. We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History. New York: Oxford University Press, 1997, http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=22791452 (accessed 20 Jul 08).

. The Cold War: A New History. New York: Penguin Books, 2005.

Gaenslen, Fritz. "Culture and Decision Making in China, Japan, Russia, and the United States." World Politics 39, 1 (Oct 1986): 78-103.

Gamble, Richard M. "Savior Nation: Woodrow Wilson and the Gospel of Service." Humanitas, XIV, 1 (2001).

"GAO Says F-35 Costs to Hit $1 Trillion." Military.com, 12 Mar 08, http://www.militarv.eom/NewsContent/Q, 13319 J63800.00.html (accessed 7 May 08). 316

Garamone, Jim. "Joint Vision 2020 Emphasizes Full-spectrum Dominance." American Forces Press Service, 2 Jun 00, http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=45289 (accessed 9 Jul 08).

Garver, John. "The Restoration of Sino-Indian Comity following India's Nuclear Tests." The China Quarterly 168 (Dec 2001): 865-889

Gauss, C. The German Kaiser as Shown in His Public Utterances. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1915.

Gelber, Harry G. Technology, Defense, and External Relations in China, 1975-1978. Boulder: Westview Press, 1979.

Gellman, Barton. "Keeping the U.S. First: Pentagon Would Preclude a Rival Superpower." Washington Post, 11 Mar 92.

Gerschenkron, Alexander. "The Advantages of Backwardness." Chapter in Economic Backwardness in Comparative Perspective. Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press, 1962.

Gertz, Bill. The China Threat: How the People's Republic Targets America. * Washington: Regnery Publishing, 2000).

Gilboy, George J. "The Myth Behind China's Miracle." Foreign Affairs, July/August 2004.

Gill, Bates and Taeho Kim. China's Arms Acquisitions from Abroad: A Quest for "Superb and Secret Weapons. " Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995.

Gill, Bates and Lonnie Henley. China and the Revolution in Military Affairs. Carlisle Barracks: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, May 1996.

Gillespie, Richard. "Marketing to the PLA." The China Business Review (July/August 1984).

Gilpin, Robert. War and Change in World Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981.

Gittings, John. The World and China. Oxford University Press, London, 1967.

Glanville, Luke. "Somalia Reconsidered: An Examination of the Norm of Humanitarian Intervention." The Journal of Humanitarian Assistance, 1 Sep 05, http://www.iha.ac/articles/al78.pdf (accessed 5 Jul 08). 317

Glaser, Charles L. "Why Do Strategists Disagree about the Requirements of Strategic Nuclear Deterrence?" Chapter in Nuclear Arguments. 109-171. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989.

Godwin, Paul H. B., ed. The Chinese Defense Establishment: Continuity and Change in the 1980s. Boulder: Westview Press, 1983.

Goldfarb, Michael. "The Rods from God." GlobalSecurity.org, 8 Jun 05, http://www.Rlobalsecurity.org/org/news/2005/050608-gods-rods.htm (accessed 22 Apr 08).

Goldstein, Avery. "Great Expectations: Interpreting China's Arrival." Chapter in The Rise of China. 3-40. Cambridge: MIT Press, 2000.

Graff, David A. and Robin Higham, eds. A Military History of China. Boulder: Westview Press, 2002.

Grant, George. Carry a Big Stick: The Uncommon Heroism of Theodore Roosevelt. Nashville, TN.: Cumberland House Publishing, 1996.

Gray, Colin. "The Arms Race Phenomenon." World Politics 24, 1 (Oct 1971): 39-79.

. "The Urge to Compete: Rationales for Arms Racing." World Politics 26,2 (Jan 1974): 207-33.

. "National Styles in Strategy: The American Example." International Security 6,

2 (Fall 1981): 21-47.

. Nuclear Strategy and National Style. Lanham, MD: Hamilton Press, 1986.

. Modern Strategy. New York: Oxford University Press, 1999. . "How Has War Changed Since the End of the Cold War?" Parameters (Spring 2005): 14-26.

Gregory, Ross. The Origins of American Intervention in the First World War. New York: W.W.Norton, 1971.

Grey, Robert. "Weaponization of Outer Space." 9 May 07, http://www.gsinstitute.org/bsg/docs/05 09 07 Grey space.pdf (30Jul 08).

Griffin, David Ray. "Neocon Imperialism, 9/11, and the Attacks on Afghanistan and Iraq." 91 lTruth.org, 27'Feb07, http://www.globalresearch.ca/PrintArticle.php?articleId=4961 (accessed 29 Jun 08). 318

Griffith, Samuel B. Sun Tzu, The Art of War, translation. New York: Oxford University Press, 1971.

Gronlund, Lisbeth. "NMD: Test Failures and Technology Development." Testimony before the US House Committee on Government Affairs, Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs, and International Relations," 8 Sep 00, http://www.ucsusa.org/global security/missile defense/nmd-test-failures-and- technology-development.html (accessed 14 Jan 08).

Grossman, Karl and Judith Long. "Waging War in Space." The Nation, 27 Dec 99, http://www.thenation.com/doc/19991227/grossman (accessed 5 May 08).

Gu, Shulin and Bengt-Ake Lundvall. "China's Innovation System and the Move Toward Harmonious Growth and Endogenous Innovation." Danish Research Unit for Industrial Dynamics (DRUID), Working Paper No. 06-7, http://www.druid.dk/wp/pdf_files/06- 07.pdf (accessed 19 Apr 08).

Guldin, Bob. "Mr. X Goes to Washington: An Interview with George Kennan." Foreign Service Journal (May 99).

Gurtov, Mel. "Swords in market shares: China's conversion of military industry to civilian production." China Quarterly 134 (June 1993). *

Haass, Richard. "Paradigm Lost." Foreign Affairs, 74 (Jan-Feb 95).

. "The Squandered Presidency," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 79 (May-Jun 2000).

Hagt, Eric. "China's AS AT Test: Strategic Response." China Security, Winter 2007.

Halberstam, David. War in a Time of Peace: Bush, Clinton, and the Generals. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2002.

Hamilton, Alexander. "FEDERALIST No. 1: General Introduction." Founding Fathers.info, http://www.foundingfathers.info/federalistpapers/ (accessed 6 Jun 08).

Handberg, Roger. Seeking New World Vistas: The Militarization of Space. Westport: Praeger Publishers, 2000.

Handel, Michael. "Intelligence and Deception." Chapter in Military Deception and Strategic Surprise. London: Frank Cass and Company Limited, 1982.

. Masters of War: Classical Strategic Thought. London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2001. 319

Hans Kristensen, "Japan Under the US Nuclear Umbrella," The Nautilus Institute, http://www.nautilus.org/archives/librarv/security/papers/Nuclear-Urnbrella-3.html (accessed 7 Jan 08).

Harding, Harry. China's Second Revolution: Reform After Mao. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1987.

Harper, John L. "Mentor for a Hegemon—Alexander Hamilton." The National Interest, Fall 2000, http://findarticles.eom/p/articles/mi m2751/is 2000 Fall/ai 65576872/print (6 Jun 08).

Harris, Shane. "Chinese hackers pose serious danger to U.S. computer networks." Government Executive.com, 29 May 08, http://www.govexec.com/dailyfed/0508/053008ni 1 .htm (accessed 8 Jun 08).

Hart-Landsberg, Martin and Paul Burkett. "China and the Dynamics of Transnational Accumulation: Causes and Consequences of Global Restructuring." Historical Materialism 14:3 (8 Nov 06): 3-43.

Harvey, Brian. China's Space Program: From Conception to Manned Spaceflight. New York: Springer Praxis Publishing, 2004.

Heppenheimer, T. A. The Space Shuttle Decision: NASA's Search for a Reusable Space Vehicle. Washington, DC: Smithsonian, 2002, http://www.nss.org/resources/librarv/shuttledecision/index.htm (accessed 28 Apr 08).

Herken, Gregg. '"Not Enough Bulldozers': Eisenhower and American Nuclear Weapons Policy, 1953-1961." In Forging the Shield: Eisenhower and National Security for the 21st Century, Showalter, Dennis E. Chicago: Imprint Publications, 2005.

Herwig, Holger. Germany's Visions of Empire in Venezuela, 1871-1914. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986.

"History is (fill in the blank)." The University of Memphis, Department of History, http://historv.memphis.edu/history is.html (accessed 17 Mar 08).

Hitchens, Theresa. "Weapons in Space: Silver Bullet or Russian Roulette? The Policy Implications of U.S. Pursuit of Space-Based Weapons," a presentation to the Ballistic Missile Defense and Weaponization of Space Project, Space Policy Institute and Security Policy Studies Program at George Washington University, 18 Apr 02, http://www.cdi.org/progr am/document.cfm?documentid=209&programID=6&from_page =../friendlyversion/printversion.cfm (accessed 29 Jul 08).

. "Staking Out the High Ground: U.S. Air Force Plans for Space." A presentation to the Missile Defense Conference in London, 9 Nov 04. 320

. "Worst-Case Mentality Clouds USAF Space Strategy," Center for Defense Information, 14 Feb 05, http://wwwxdi.org/program/documentxfm?documentid=2885&programID=68&from pa ge=../friendlwersion/printversion.cfm (accessed 29 Jul 08).

. "U.S. Military Space Policy and Strategy," presentation to the e-Parliament Conference on Space Security, 14 Sep 05, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2004_2009/documents/dv/hitchens- 05 12 01 /hitchens-05 12 01 en.pdf (accessed 29 Jul 08).

. "U.S.-Sino Relations in Space: From 'War of Words' to Cold War in Space?" China Security (Winter 2007): 12-30.

Hogan, Michael J. A Cross of Iron: Harry S. Truman and the Origins of the National Security State, 1945-1954. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.

Holbrooke, Richard. "The Paradox of George F. Kennan." Washington Post, 21 Mar 05, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp- dvn/content/article/2005/03/26/AR2005032603911 .html (accessed 15 Jul 08).

Holmes, Colleen K. "What the Chinese Learned from Sun-Tzu." U.S. Army War College Strategy Research Project, Carlisle Barracks, PA., 10 Apr 00, * http://www.iwar.org.uk/military/resources/sun-tzu/Holmes S L 01 .pdf (accessed 2 Jun 08).

Hoo, Stephanie. "China allows rare look at top-secret launch center." USA Today, 1 Sep 04, http://www.usatoday.com/tech/science/space/2004-09-01 -china-space-center x.htm (accessed 7 Jan 08).

Houchin, Roy F. Review of Dennis E. Showaiter, Forging the Shield: Eisenhower and National Security for the 21s' Century, 22 Aug 07, http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/bookrev/showalter.html (15 Jul 08).

Howard, Michael. "The Causes of War." In A Peace Reader: Essential Readings on War, Justice, Non-Violence and World Order, eds., Joseph J. Fahey and Richard Armstrong. Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press, 1992.

Howard, Michael and Peter Paret, eds. and trans, of Carl von Clausewitz. On War. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976.

"How Long Does A Satellite 'Last' And Why Do They Get Regularly Replaced?" Stason.org, http://stason.org/TULARC/entertainment/satellite-tv-faq/39-How-Long- Does-A-Satellite-Last-And-Whv-Do-Thev-Get-Regu.html (accessed 12 Dec 07). 321

Huan, Yang, PLA Major General. "China's Strategic Nuclear Weapons." Institute for National Strategic Studies, http.V/www.fas.org/nuke/guide/china/doctrine/hvian.htrn (accessed 7 Jan 08).

Huang, J. H. Sun Tzu: The New Translation. New York: William Morrow, 1993.

Huang Yasheng. Selling China: Foreign Direct Investment During the Reform Era. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003.

Huntington, Samuel P. "The West: Unique, Not Universal." Foreign Affairs 75 (Nov/Dec 1996): 28-46.

Hyde, Charles K. "Casualty Aversion: Implications for Policy Makers and Senior Military Officers." Aerospace Power Journal (Summer 2000), http://findarticles.eom/p/articles/mi mOICK/is 2 14/ai 68507700/print?tag=:artBody;col 1 (accessed 5 Jul 08).

Hyland, William. Clinton's World: Remaking American Foreign Policy. Westport: Praeger Publishers, 1999.

Hyten, John and Robert Uy. "Moral and Ethical Decisions Regarding Space Warfare." Air & Space Power Journal, XVIII, 2 (Summer 2004), http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/api/api04/sum04/hvten.html (accessed 30 Jul 08).

Ivanhoe, Philip J. Confucian Moral Self Cultivation. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 2000.

James, Sydney. "Military Industry." Chapter in Chinese Defense Policy. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1984.

Jencks, Harlan. From Muskets to Missiles: Politics and Professionalism in the Chinese Army, 1945-1981. Boulder: Westview Press, 1982.

Jenkins, Brian Michael. "Looking for 'High Noon' in a Hundred Years' War." RAND Corporation, 22 Aug 04, http://www.rand.org/commentary/082204SDUT.html (accessed 10 Jul 08).

Jentleson, Bruce W. "The Pretty Prudent Public: Post-Vietnam American Opinion on the Use of Military Force." International Studies Quarterly, 36, 1 (Mar 1992): 49-73.

Jentleson, Bruce W. and Rebecca L. Britton. "Still Pretty Prudent: Post-Cold War American Public Opinion on the Use of Military Force." Journal of Conflict Resolution, 42, 4 (Aug 1998): 395-417. 322

Jervis, Robert. "Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma." World Politics 30, 2 (January 1978): 167-214.

. The Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984.

Ji, Liu. "The Reform of Chinese Political System." Address to Europe-China Forum in Ireland, 5 Sep 03, http://www.ceibs.edu/ase/Documents/EuroChinaForum/liuji.htm (accessed 21 Apr 08).

Ji, You. "The debate over China's aircraft carrier program." Association For Asia Research, 2 Mar 05, http://www.asianresearch.org/articles/2529.html (accessed 22 Mar 08).

Jia, Hepeng. "China needs to encourage 'bottom-up' innovation." Science and Development Network, 12 Oct 07, http://www.scidev.net/editori als/index.cfm?fuseaction=printarticle&itemid=228&languag e=l (accessed 5 Feb 08).

Jia, Qingguo. "Disrespect and Distrust: the external origins of contemporary Chinese nationalism." Journal of Contemporary China 14, 42 (Feb 2005): 11-21.

Jiang, Wenren. "CCP Celebrates 50 Years of Nuclear Achievements." The Jamestown Foundation 5, 23, 8 Nov 05, http://www.iamestown.org/publications details.php?volumeid=408&issue id=3519&art icle id=2370439 (accessed 5 Feb 08).

Jin Ju. Forward for "China's Electronic Industry." Center for Advanced Life Cycle Engineering, 21 Jun 06, http://www.calce.umd.edu/general/AsianElectronics/pref chn.htm (accessed 10 Mar 08).

Johnson, Chalmers A. MITI and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth of Industrial Policy, 1925-1975. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1982.

Johnson, Chalmers. The Sorrow of Empire: Militarism, Secrecy and the End of the Republic. New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2004.

Johnson, U. Alexis, George R. Packard, and Alfred D. Wilhelm, Jr., eds. China Policy for the Next Decade. Boston: Oelschlager, Gunn & Hain Publishers, 1984.

Johnston, Alastair Iain. "Thinking about Strategic Culture." International Security 19, 4 (Spring 1995): 32-64.

. Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995. 323

. "Cultural Realism and Strategy in Maoist China." In The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics, Katzenstein, Peter J., ed. New York: Columbia University Press, 1996.

Jomini, Henri de. The Art of War, as translated by Mendall, G. H., Capt. and Lt. W. P. Craighill. Westport, CN: Greenwood Press, 1971.

Jones, David R. "Soviet Strategic Culture." Chapter in Strategic Power: USA/USSR. 35-49. London: St. Martin's Press, 1990.

Jones, Howard. Crucible of Power: A History of American Foreign relations to 1913. Wilmington, DE.: Scholarly Resources, Inc., 2002.

Kan, Shirley A. "Commission of Science, Technology, and Industry for National Defense (COSTIND) and Defense Industries." 96-889 F, Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress, 3 Dec 97, http://countingcalifornia.cdlib.org/crs/pdf/96-889.pdf (accessed 2 Feb 08).

Kan, Shirley A., Christopher Bolkcom, and Ronald O'Rourke. "China's Foreign Conventional Arms Acquisitions: Background and Analysis." CRS Report for Congress, 10 Oct 2000, http://www.fas.org/man/crs/RL30700.pdf (accessed 19 Mar 08).

Kang, David and Adam Segal. "The Siren Song of Technonationalism." Far Eastern Economic Review, March 2006, http://www.feer.com/articlesl/2006/0603/free/p005.html (accessed 18 Jan 08).

Kaplan, Edward A. Making Doctor Strangelove: Strategy in the Air-Atomic Age. PhD dissertation. Calgary: University of Calgary, 2007.

Katzenstein, Peter J. ed. The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics. New York: Columbia University Press, 1996.

Kau, Michael Ying-Mao and Susan H. Marsh, eds. China in the Era of Deng Xiaoping: A Decade of Reform. New York: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 1993.

Kennan, George F. "Telegram, George Kennan to George Marshall ["Long Telegram"]." Harry S. Truman Administration File, Elsey Papers, Truman Library, 22 Feb 1946, http://www.trumanlibrarv.org/whistlestop/study collections/coldwar/documents/index.ph p?documentdate= 1946-02-22&documentid=6-6&studycollectionid=&pagenuniber= 1 (accessed 22 Jul 08). Published in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, Vol. VI.

. "The Sources of Soviet Conduct." Foreign Affairs, XXV (July 1947), http://www.foreignaffairs.Org/l 9470701 faessav25403/x/the-sources-of-soviet- conduct.html (accessed 22 Jul 08). 324

. "PPS/23: Review of Current Trends in U.S. Foreign Policy." Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, Vol 1, 509-29,24 Feb 1948, http://www.geocities.com/Athens/Forurn/2496/future/kennan/pps23.html (accessed 21 Jul 08).

Kennedy, John F. Presidential Inaugural Address. 20 Jan 61, http://www.bartlebv.com/124/pres56.html (accessed 5 May 08).

. A Special Address to Congress On The Importance of Space, 25 May 61, http://www.homeofheroes.com/presidents/speeches/kennedy space.html (accessed 12 Jan 08).

Kennedy, Paul. The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers. New York: Random House, 1987.

Kennedy, Thomas L. The Arms ofKiangnan: Modernization in the Chinese Ordnance Industry, 1860-1895. Boulder: Westview Press, 1978.

Keohane, Robert O. After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984.

Keohane, Robert O. and Joseph S. Nye. Power and Interdependence: World Politics in * Transition. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1977.

Keohane, Robert O. and Lisa L. Martin. "The Promise of Institutionalist Theory." International Security 20, 1 (Summer 1995): 39-51.

Kerry, John F. "A Realistic Path in Iraq." The Washington Post, 4 Jul 04, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dvn/articles/A24762-2004Jul2.html (accessed 7 Jun 08).

Khalilzad, Zalmay. "Congage China." RAND Issue Paper for Project Air Force drawing on Zalmay Khalilzad, et al., The United States and a Rising China. Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1999.

Khalilzad, Zalmay M et al. The United States and a Rising China: Strategic and Military Implications. Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1999.

Khalilzad, Zalmay and Jeremy Shapiro, eds. Strategic Appraisal: United States Air and Space Power in the 21st Century. Santa Monica: RAND, 2002, http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/2005/MRl314.pdf (accessed 15 Mar 08).

Khong, Yuen Foong. Analogies at War: Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu, and the Vietnam Decisions of 1965. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992. 325

Kindleberger, Charles P. The World in Depression, 1929-1939. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973.

"King Cobra," http://home.vicnet.net.au/~neils/bobby/cobra.html (accessed 12 Dec 07).

Kissinger, Henry A. Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1957, Chapter 1.

. White House Years. Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 1979.

. Diplomacy. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994.

. "America's Assignment." Newsweek, 8 Nov 04.

Klein, Yitzhak. "A Theory of Strategic Culture." Comparative Strategy 10, 1 (Jan-Mar 1991): 3-23.

Klose, Nelson and Curt Lader. United States History: Since 1865, Sixth Edition. New York: Barron's Educational Series, 2001.

Kois, Dan. "Where Does Space Begin? Eighty kilometers above the Earth's surface? 100 KM? 600 KM?" Slate, 30 Sep 04, http://www.slate.com/toolbar.aspx?action=print&id=2107381 (accessed 24 Aug 08).

Knock, Thomas J. To End All Wars: Woodrow Wilson and the Quest for a New World Order. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992.

Koeller, David. "The United States Enters World War One." World History Chronology, 2003, http://www.thenagain.info/WebChron/World/USWWl.html (accessed 20 Jul 08).

Krauthammer, Charles. "Universal Dominion: Toward a Unipolar World." National Interest (Winter 1989): 47-49.

. "The Unipolar Moment." Foreign Affairs (Winter 1990).

. "Bless Our Pax Americana." Washington Post, 22 Mar 91.

Kristof, Nicholas D. "The Rise of China." Foreign Affairs, 72, 5 (1993): 59-74.

Kull, Steven and I. M. Destler. Misreading the Public: The Myth of a New Isolationism. Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 1999.

LaFeber, Walter. The Cambridge History of American Foreign Relations, Vol. 2: The American Search for Opportunity, 1865-1913. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993. Lague, David. "China increases military spending," International Herald Tribune, 4 Mar 08, http://www.iht.com/articles/2008/03/04/asia/militarv.php (accessed 23 Mar 08).

Lai, David. Learning From the Stones: A GO Approach to Mastering China's Strategic Concept, Shi. Carlisle Barracks: Strategic Studies Institute, 2004, http://www.fas.org/man/eprint/lai.pdf (accessed 8 Jun 07).

Lake, Anthony National Security Advisor. "From Containment to Enlargement." A speech delivered at Johns Hopkins University, 21 Sep 93, http://www.mtholvoke.edu/acad/intrel/lakedoc.html (accessed 3 Jul 08).

Lambelet, John C. "Do Arms Races Lead to War?" Journal of Peace Research 12, 2 (1975): 123-8.

Lambeth, Benjamin S. Mastering the Ultimate High Ground: Next Steps in the Military Uses of Space. Santa Monica: RAND, 2003, http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph reports/MRl649ZMR1649.pdf (accessed 1 Mar 08).

Lansing, Robert. The Peace Negotiations: A Personal Narrative. Westport, CT.: Greenwood Press, 1971 [originally printed in 1921].

Lasater, Martin L. Arming the Dragon: How Much U.S. Military Aid to China? The Heritage Lecture Series. Washington D.C.: Heritage Foundation, March 1986.

Latham, Richard. "People's Republic of China: The Restructuring of Defense Industrial Policies." Chapter in Arms Production in Developing Countries. Lexington: Lexington Books, 1984.

. "Implications of the post-Mao Reforms on the Chinese Defense Industries." Chapter in Chinese Military Reforms: International and Domestic Implications. Boulder: Westview Press, 1986.

Launius, Roger D. "Eisenhower and Space: Politics and Ideology in the Construction of the U.S. Civil Space Program." In Forging the Shield: Eisenhower and National Security for the 21st Century, Showalter, Dennis E. Chicago: Imprint Publications, 2005.

Lebow, Richard N. "The Long Peace, the End of the Cold War, and the Failure of Realism." International Organization 48, 2 (Spring 1994): 249-277.

Leffler, Melvyn P. A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration and the Cold War. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993.

"Legal Aspects of the Commercialization of Space Transportation Systems." http://www.law.berkeley.edu/iournals/btli/articles/vol3/fought.html (accessed 4 May 08). Legro, Jeffrey. "Culture and Preferences in International Two Step." American Political Science Review 90, 1 (March 1996): 118-137.

Leonard, Andrew. "How the World Works: China's Trade Deficits." Salon.com, 11 Jul 06, http://www.salon.com/tech/htww/2006/07/ll/trade deficit/index.html (accessed 2 Mar 08).

Levy, Dawn. "Sally Ride Speaks On The Tactical Role Of Space And War." Space Daily, 22 Apr 02, http://www.spacedaily.com/news/milspace-02n.htnil (accessed 7 May 08).

Lewis, John W. and Hue Di. "China's Ballistic Missile Programs: Technologies, Strategies and Goals." International Security 17, 2 (Fall 1992).

Lewis, John W. and Xue Litai. China's Strategic Seapower. Stanford University Press, 1988.

. China Builds the Bomb. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988.

. Imagined Enemies: China Prepares for Uncertain War. Stanford: Stanford

University Press, 2006.

Li Jijun. "Strategic Culture." China Military Science 38, 1 (Spring 1997): 8-15.

. Traditional Military Thinking and the Defense Strategy of China. An address to the U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 29 Aug, 97, http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/china/doctrine/china-li.pdf (accessed 1 Jun08). Li, Rex. "The China Challenge: theoretical perspectives and policy implications." Journal of Contemporary China 8, 22 (Nov 1999): 443-476.

Li Tzu-ching. "CPC Thinks China and the U.S. Will Eventually Go to War." Cheng Ming, 1 May 97 in FBIS-011-97-126.

. "The Chinese Military Clamors for War: Vowing to Have a Fight with United States." Cheng Ming, Hong Kong, 1 Jun 99, in FBIS, 28 Jun 99.

Li, Zhisui. The Private Life of Chairman Mao. New York: Random House, 1994.

Lieber, Robert, ed. Eagle Adrift: American Foreign Policy at the End of the Century. New York: Longman, 1997.

Lilley, James R. and Chuck Downs, eds. Crisis in the Taiwan Strait. Washington D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1997. Lin, Zhilmg and Thomas W. Robinson. The Chinese and Their Future: Beijing, Taipei, and Hong Kong. Washington, DC: The AEI Press, 1994.

Linn, Brian M. The Philippine War, 1899-1902. Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 2000.

Lipset, Seymour Martin. American Exceptionalism: A Double-Edged Sword. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1996.

Liu, Henry C.K. "The Wages of Neo-Liberalism (parts I and II)." Asia Times Online, 1 Apr 06, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China Business/HDO 1 Cb05.html (accessed 3 Mar 08).

Liu, Mingde. "Changes in the Forms of War and Their Implications After the Disintegration of the Bipolar Pattern." International Strategic Studies 24, 2 (June 1992).

Liu, Xiaoming. "China-U.S. Partnership in the New Century." Embassy of the People's Republic of China in the United States of America, 4 Jan 00, http://www.china- embassy.org/eng/sgxx/sggg/sggyth/t34773.htm (accessed 3 Jun 08).

Lodge, Henry Cabot. The Senate and the League of Nations. New York: Charles Scribner and Sons, 1925.

Long, E. B. The Civil War Day by Day: An Almanac 1861-1865. Garden City, NY.: Doubleday, 1971.

Lord, Carnes. "American Strategic Culture." Comparative Strategy, 5, 3 (1985).

Lovejoy, Charles D. Jr., and Bruce W. Watson, eds. Chinese Military Reforms: International and Domestic Implications. Boulder: Westview Press, 1986.

Lum, Thomas, Wayne M. Morrison, and Bruce Vaughn. "China's 'Soft Power' in Southeast Asia." Congressional Research Service (CRS) Report for Congress, 4 Jan 08, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL34310.pdf (accessed 10 Mar 08).

Lynn-Jones, Sean M. "Offense-Defense Theory and Its Critics." Security Studies 4,4 (Summer 1995).

MacQuarrie, Brian. "Son of professor opposed to war is killed in Iraq." The Boston Globe, 15 May 07, http://www.boston.com/news/local/articles/2007/05/15/son_of_professor opposedtowa r is killed in iraq/ (accessed 10 Jon 08).

Maddox, Robert James. The United States and World War II. Boulder: Westview Press, 1992. 329

Madsen, Deborah L. American Exceptionalism. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1998.

Mahan, Alfred Thayer. The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1890, http://www.bellum.nu/literature/mahan001.html (accessed 16 Jun 08).

Maier, Charles S. "Wargames: 1914-1919." Journal of Interdisciplinary History, 18,4, The Origin and Prevention of Major Wars (Spring 1988).

Mao Zedong. "A Single Spark Can Start A Prairie Fire." Selected Works of Mao Zedong, 5 Jan 1930, http://eprints.cddc.vt.edu/marxists/reference/archive/mao/selected- works/volume-1/mswvl 6.htm (accessed 7 Feb 08).

. "Talks with Marshal Montgomery on the Three Principles and the Question of Nuclear Weapons." China Daily, Sep 1961 (28 Sep 07), http://www.chinadailv.com.cn/china/2007-09/28/content_6143129.htm (accessed 7 Jan 08). http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/china/nuke/index.html (accessed 7 Jan 08).

Mancall, Mark. China at the Center: 300 Years of Foreign Policy. New York: Free Press, 1984.

Mandille, Lieutenant Colonel, French Liaison Officer to British Signal Command. "The British Battlefield Digitization." Doctrine #01, December 2003, http://www.cdef.terre.defense.gouv.fr/publications/doctrine/doctrineO 1 /US/etranger/artl 9 .pdf (accessed 17 Mar 08).

Mannion, Jim. "New US defense strategy centers on 'long war'." Agence France Presse (AFP), 31 Jul 08, http://news.vahoo.eom/s/afp/20080801/wl_sthasia afp/usmilitarviraqafghanistan (accessed 31 Jul 08).

Mansfield, Edward D. and Jack Snyder. "Democratization and the Danger of War." International Security 20, 1 (Summer 1995): 5-38.

Margolis, Eric. "Saddam Hussein: Winner of the Gulf War." 21 Jan 01, http://www.ericmargolis.com/archives/2001/01/saddam hussein.php (accessed 7 Jun 08).

Maslowski, Peter. "To the edge of greatness: The United States, 1783-1865." In The Making of Strategy: Rulers, States, and War, eds. Murray, Williamson, MacGregor Knox, and Alvin Bernstein. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994.

Matloff, Maurice. "Allied Strategy in Europe, 1939-1945." In Makers of Modern Strategy, Paret, Peter, ed. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986. 330

May, Ernest R. The World War and American Isolation, 1914-1917. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1959.

McCall, Gene H. and John A. Corder (Maj. Gen., USAF Ret), Director and Deputy Study Director, USAF Scientific Advisory Board. New World Vistas: Air and Space Power for the 21s' Century. Maxwell AFB: Air University Press, 1996, Summary Volume, 6.4.

McDougall, Walter A. The Heavens and the Earth: A Political History of the Space Age. New York: Basic Books, 1985.

. Promised Land, Crusader State: The American Encounter with the World since 1776. New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1997.

. "The Space Age That Never Arrived: A Meditation on the 50th Anniversary of Sputnik 1." Foreign Policy Research Institute, Nov 2007, http://www.fpri.org/enotes/200711.mcdougall.sputnikanniversary.html (accessed 29 Jun 08).

McNeilly, Mark. Sun Tzu and the Art Of Modern Warfare. New York: Oxford University Press, 2001.

McPherson, James M. Ordeal By Fire: The Civil War and Reconstruction. New York: * Knopf, 1982.

Meacham, Jon. Franklin and Winston: An Intimate Portrait of an Epic Friendship. New York: Random House, 2003.

Mearsheimer, John J. The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2001.

Medeiros, Evan, et al. Modernizing China's Military: Opportunities and Constraints. Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2005.

Meilinger, Phillip S., Col. Ten Propositions Regarding Air Power. Washington: Air Force History and Museums Program, 1995.

Menon, Rajan. "New Order: The End of Alliances." Council on Foreign Relations, 2 Mar 03, http://www.cfr.org/publication.html7id-5639 (accessed 2 Apr 08).

Meyers, Richard B., General, USAF. "Space Superiority is Fleeting." Aviation Week and Space Technology (1 Jan 00): 54-55.

Miller, Rich and Stan Crock. "No More Mr. Nice Guy With China?" BusinessWeek Online, http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/05 17/b3930064 mzOl 1 .htm (11 Apr 06). 331

Miller, Steven E., Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Stephen Van Evera, eds. Military Strategy and the Origins of the First World War. Princeton: Princeton University press, 1991.

Montgomery, Thomas, General (Ret). "Ambush in Mogadishu." Frontline/PBS interview, http://www.pbs.org/wRbh/pages/frontline/shows/ambush/interviews/niontgomery.html (accessed 5 Jul 08).

Morgan, David. "Pentagon makes fighting extremism its top priority." Reuters, 31 Jul 08, http://news.vahoo.eom/s/nm/20080731/ts nm/usamilitary strategy dc (accessed 31 Jul 08).

Morgenthau, Hans J. Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1948)

Morrison, James L., Jr. "The Best School in the World": West Point, the Pre-Civil War Years 1833-1866. Kent, OH.: The Kent State University Press, 1986.

Morton, W. Scott and Charlton M. Lewis. China: Its History and Culture. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1995.

Mueller, Karl P. "Space Weapons and U.S. Security: The Dangers of Fortifying the High * Frontier." A paper presented at the American Political Science Association Annual Meeting, Boston, MA., 6 Sep 98.

. "Totem and Taboo: Depolarizing the Space Weaponization Debate." RAND, 8 May 02, http://www. gwu.edu/~spi/spaceforum/TotemandTabooGWUpaperRevised%5B 1 %5D.pd f (accessed 7 Jan 08).

Mulvenon, James. Chinese Military Commerce and U.S. National Security. Santa Monica: RAND, 1998.

Murawiec, Laurent. "Chinese Grand Strategy and the Chinese Way of War." U.S.-China Economic & Security Review Commission, 15 Sep 05, http://www.uscc.gov/hearings/2005hearings/written testimonies/05 09 15wrts/murawie c.pdf (accessed 10 Jun 08).

Murray, Douglas J. and Paul R. Viotti, eds. The Defense Policies of Nations: A Comparative Study. Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994.

Myers, Robert T. and Sangit Chatterjee. "Science, Culture, and the Game of Go." Journal of Science and Culture, 69, 7-8 (2003), http://www.bob.mvers.name/pub/go- overview.doc (accessed 11 Jul 08). 332

NASA. Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) Mishap Report, Chapter I, National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), Aug 2003, http://klabs.org/richcontent/Reports/Failure Reports/columbia/caib report/caib report.ht m (accessed 7 May 08).

NASA. "Space Shuttle History." Century of Flight: The Exploration of Space, http://www.centurv-of- flight.net/Aviation%20history/space/Space%20Shuttle%20history.htm (accessed 6 May 08).

Nathan, Andrew J. and Robert S. Ross. The Great Wall and the Empty Fortress. New York: W.W.Norton, 1997.

Nathan, James. "The Rise and Decline of Coercive Statecraft." U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings (Oct 95).

"National Security Strategy Report—September 2002," GlobalSecurity.org, http://www.Rlobalsecurity.org/militarv/librarv/policy/national/nss-020920.htm (accessed 28 Jun 08).

Naughton, Barry. "The Third Front: Defense Industrialization in the Chinese Interior." China Quarterly 115 (Sep 88): 351-86.

Naughton, Barry and Adam Segal. "Technology Development in the New Millennium: China in Search of a Workable Model." Center for International Studies, MIT, Union of Concerned Scientists, Feb 2001, http://web.mit.edu/mit-iapan/outreach/working- papers/WPO 103.pdf (accessed 2 Feb 08).

NAVSTAR GPS Block III Specs, Space and Tech, http://www.spaceandtech.com/spacedata/constellations/navstar-gps- block3 conspecs.shtml (accessed 18 Dec 07).

"New and high-tech development zones." GOV.cn, (china.org.cn), Chinese Government's Official Web Portal, http://english.gov.cn/2006-Q2/09/content 184039.htm (accessed 16 Jan 08).

Ng, Ka-po. Interpreting China's Military Power: Doctrine Makes Readiness. New York: Routledge, 2005.

Nivison, David S. The Ways of Confucianism: Investigations in Chinese Philosophy. Chicago: Open Court Press, 1996.

Norris, Robert S., Andrew S. Burrows, and Richard W. Fieldhouse. Nuclear Weapons Databook, Vol. 5: British, French, and Chinese Nuclear Weapons. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994. 333

Nye, Joseph S., Jr. Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power. New York: Basic Books, 1990.

. Soft Power: The Means To Success In World Politics. New York: Perseus Books Group, 2004.

. "Future of Japan-U.S. Alliance." The Korean Times, 12 May 08, http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/18282/future ofjapanus_alliance.html?br eadcrumb-%2Fexperts%2F3%2Fioseph s nve (accessed 8 Jun 08).

Oberdorfer, Don. "The Path to Intervention: A Massive Tragedy 'We Could Do Something About'." Washington Post, 6 Dec 92.

Oberg, Jim. Space Power Theory. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1999, http://space.au.af.mil/books/oberg/index.htm (accessed 28 Jul 08).

. "China's Great Leap Upward." Scientific American, October 2003, http://www.sciam.com/article.cfm?id=0005B4B6-1CEC-1F5D- 905980A84189EEDF&page=6 (accessed 8 Jan 08).

. "Senate Testimony: International Space Exploration Program." gyre.org, 27 Apr 04, http://www.gyre.org/news/article/3839/ (accessed 8 Jan 08). *

. "Space weapons: hardware, paperware, beware?" The Space Review, 13 Nov 06, http://www.thespacereview.eom/article/744/l (accessed 28 Apr 08).

OECD in cooperation with China's Ministry of Science and Technology. OECD Reviews of Innovation Policy, CHINA: Synthesis Report, Aug 2007, http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/54/20/39177453.pdf (accessed 20 Apr 08).

Office of the Secretary of Defense. Annual Report to Congress: The Military Power of the People's Republic of China 2005. Washington: Government Printing Office, 2005.

Offner, Arnold A. Another Such Victory: President Truman and the Cold War, 1945- 1953. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002.

Oksenberg, Michel. "China's Confident Nationalism." Foreign Affairs, America and the World 1986, 65, 3 (1987).

Olsen, Mancur. The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965.

Ornstein, Norman J. and Thomas E. Mann, eds. The Permanent Campaign and Its Future. Washington: AEI Press, 2000. Osius, Ted. "Discussion of 'The Rise of China in Chinese Eyes'." Journal of Contemporary China 10, 26 (2001).

"Outsourcing creates jobs, study says." CNNMoney.com, 30 Mar 04, http://nioney.cnn.com/2004/03/30/news/economy/outsourcing/ (accessed 29 Feb 08).

Pan, Chengxin. "What is Chinese About 'Chinese' Business? Implications for American Response to China's Rise." A speech given at the ChinaWorld International Conference on 'Made in China vs. Made by Chinese: Global Identities of Chinese Business,' 19-20 Mar 07, http://ir.lib.cbs.dk/download/ISBN/x65652613x.pdf (accessed 12 Mar 08).

Pan, Zhengqian. "China's Insistence on No First Use." China Security, 1 (Autumn 2005), http://www.wsichina.org/attach/china_security.pdf (accessed 1 Jun 08).

Parker, Geoffrey. "The Military Revolution, 1560-1660—A Myth?" Chapter in The Military Revolution Debate: Readings on the Military Transformation of Early Modern Europe. Boulder: Westview Press, 1995.

Pecht, Michael. Preface for "China's Electronic Industry." Center for Advanced Life Cycle Engineering, 21 Jun 06, http://www.calce.umd.edu/general/AsianElectronics/pref_chn.htm (accessed 10 Mar 08).

Pei, Minxin. "The Dark Side of China's Rise." Foreign Policy, Mar/Apr 2006, http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa::=print&id-l 8110 (accessed 8 Feb 08).

. "Corruption Threatens China's Future." Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Policy Brief 55, Oct 2007, http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/pb55 pei china_corruption_final.pdf (accessed 10 Feb 08).

"Peng Li on Domestic, International Affairs." Beijing Xinhua Domestic Service, January 2,1996, in FBIS-CHI-96-002, January 3, 1996.

Perkins, Bradford. The Cambridge History of American Foreign Relations, Vol. 1: The Creation of a Republican Empire, 1776-1865. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993.

Peters, Ralph, Lt Col, USA (Ret). "Principles of Warfare Culminating Seminar." The Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory, 13 Apr 05, http://www.ihuapl.edu/POW/notes/peters 4 13.doc (accessed 25 Jul 08).

. "No Silver Bullets: Fighting the Insurgency in Iraq," Armed Forces Journal, Jan 06, http://www.armedforcesiournal.com/2006/01/1380018 (accessed 25 Jul 08). 335

Pillsbury, Michael. Chinese Views of Future Warfare. Washington D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1997.

. "Testimony Before the United States Senate Select Committee on Intelligence." Global Security.org, Nov 1997, http://www.globalsecurity.Org/intell/library/congress/l 997 hr/970918-pillsbury.htm (accessed 2 Feb 08).

. China Debates the Future Security Environment. Washington: National Defense University Press, 2000.

. "China's Progress in Technological Competitiveness: The Need for a New Assessment." A report prepared for the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 21 Apr 05, http://www.uscc.gov/researchpapers/2005/05 04 21 technological progress.pdf (accessed 21 Feb 08).

Pincus, Walter. "U.S. Satellites Vulnerable to Attack, Officer Warns." Washington Post, 21 JunOl.

. "U.S., China Aim to Mend Ties." The Washington Post, 14 Jun 07, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp- * dvn/content/article/2007/06/13/AR2007061302227.html (accessed 10 Dec 07).

Plitnick, Mitchell and Chris Toensing. '"The Israel Lobby' in Perspective." Middle East Report, 243, http://www.merip.org/mer/mer243/plitnick toensing.html (accessed 29 Jun 08).

Pollack, Harold. '"There Is No Substitute for Victory' and Other Flights from Reality." The Huffington Post, 10 Apr 08, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/harold-pollack/there-is- no-substitute-fo b 96104.html (accessed 2 Jun 08).

Pollack, Jonathan D. and Richard H. Yang, eds. In China's Shadow: Regional Perspectives on Chinese Foreign Policy and Military Development. Santa Monica: RAND, 1998.

Pollpeter, Kevin. U.S. -China Security Management: Assessing the Military-to-Military Relationship. Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2004.

Posadas, Dennis. "Is there technonationalism in the Philippines?" Business World, 9 May 06, http://www.itmatters.com.ph/columns.php?id=posadas 050906 (accessed 18 Jan 08).

. "The dark side of Asia's technonationalism." Asia Media, 24 Jul 06. 336

Powaski, Ronald E. March to Armageddon: The United States and the Nuclear Arms Race, 1939 to the Present. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987.

Powell, Colin. "US Forces: Challenges Ahead." Foreign Affairs, 71, 5 (Winter 1992/93): 32-45.

Power, Samantha. "Boltonism." The New Yorker, 21 Mar 05, http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2005/03/21/050321ta_talk_power (accessed 29 Jun 08).

Preston, John T. "Success Factors In Technology-Based Entrepreneur ship." Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) Entrepreneur ship Center (August 2001) http://www.angelcapitalassociation.org/dir_downloads/resources/Research Entrepreneurs hip.pdf (accessed 20 Jan 08).

Preston, Thomas. The President and his Inner Circle: Leadership Style and the Advisory Process in Foreign Affairs. New York: Columbia University Press, 2001.

Puttre, Michael and Ted McKenna. "The US Deploys Ground-Based Midcourse Defense against ICBMs." 21 Nov 05, http://www.mputtre.com/idl9.html (accessed 14 Jan 08).

Pye, Lucian. The Dynamics of Chinese Politics. Cambridge, MA: Oelgeschlager, Gunn, * and Hain, 1981.

Pyle, Kenneth B. "Advantages of Foliowership: German Economics and Japanese Bureaucrats, 1890-1925." Journal of Japanese Studies 1, 1 (Autumn 1974): 127-164.

Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, PLA Senior Colonels. Unrestricted Warfare. Beijing: PLA Literature and Arts Publishing House, 1999, http://www.terrorism.com/documents/TRC-Analysis/unrestricted.pdf (accessed 31 May 08).

Quinlan, Joseph P. "Ties That Bind." Foreign Affairs, July/August 2002.

Quinlan, Joseph P. and Marc Chandler. "The U.S. Trade deficit: A Dangerous Obsession." Foreign Affairs, May/June 2001.

Reagan, Ronald, President of the United States. A speech to the House of Commons, June 8, 1982, http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/1982reaganl .html (accessed 27 Jun 08).

Renshon, Stanley. High Hopes: The Clinton Presidency and the Politics of Ambition. New York: New York University Press, 1996. 337

Renuart, Victor, Air Force Major General. "CENTCOM Charts Operation Iraqi Freedom Progress." American Forces Press Service, 25 Mar 03, http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=::29230 (accessed 21 Dec 07) Reynolds, Glenn H..and Robert P. Merges. Outer Space: Problems of Law and Policy, Second Edition. Boulder: Westview Press, 1997.

Richet, Xavier and Jean-Francois Huchet. "Between Bureaucracy and Market: China's Industrial Groups in Search of a New Corporate Governance System." http://www.cerdi.org/Colloque/IDREC2001 /Richet Huchet.pdf (accessed 7 Mar 08).

Ricks, Thomas E. "Space Is Playing Field For Newest War Game: Air Force Exercise Shows Shift in Focus." The Washington Post, 29 Jan 01, http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp- dyn?pagename=article&node=&contentId:=A58813-2001 Jan28 (accessed 14 Jan 08).

Robb, Charles S. "Star Wars II." The Washington Quarterly 221, 1 (Winter 1999): 81-6.

Roberts, Michael. "The Military Revolution, 1560-1660." Chapter in The Military Revolution Debate: Readings on the Military Transformation of Early Modern Europe. Boulder: Westview Press, 1995.

Roberts, Moss. Three Kingdoms: A Historical Novel (based on Romance of the Three Kingdoms by Luo Guanzhong). Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991.

Roosevelt, Theodore. "The Strenuous Life." A speech before the Hamilton Club, Chicago, April 10,1899, http://209.10.134.179/58/1 .html (accessed 1 Jun 08).

. The Strenuous Life; Essays and Addresses. New York: The Century Company, 1900, http://209.10.134.179/58/ (accessed 1 Jun 08).

. Theodore Roosevelt: An Autobiography. New York: Macmillan, 1913, http://www.bartleby.com/55/ (accessed 27 Jul 08).

Rose, Gideon and James F. Hoge, Jr. The Rise of China. New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2002.

Rosen, Stephen Peter. "Military Effectiveness: Why Society Matters." International Security 19, 4 (Spring 1995): 5-31.

Ross, Robert S. "Beijing as a Conservative Power." Foreign Affairs, 76, 2 (1997).

. "Assessing the China Threat." The National Interest (Fall 2005): 81-87.

Roy, Denny. "The 'China Threat' Issue." Asian Survey 36, 8 (1996): 758-771. 338

Rumsfeld, Donald H., Chairman. Commission to Assess United States National Security Space Management and Organization (The Space Commission Report), 11 Jan 01, http://space.au.af.mil/space commission/executive summary.pdf (accessed 26 Apr 08).

, et al. Report of the Commission to Assess United States National Security Space Management and Organization. Washington: Government Printing Office, 2001, http://www.dod.mil/pubs/space20010111.html (accessed 19 May 08).

Ryn, Claes G. "The Ideology of American Empire." Orbis (Summer 2003).

Samuels, Richard J. Rich Nation, Strong Army: National Security and the Technological Transformation of Japan. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1994.

Saunders, Phillip, Jing-dong Yuan, Stephanie Lieggi, and Angela Deters. "China's Space Capabilities and the Strategic Logic of Anti-Satellite Weapons." Center for Non- Pro liferation Studies (CNS), Monterey Institute of International Studies (MIIS), Monterey, CA, 22 Jul 02. http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/week/020722.htm (accessed 15 Dec 07).

Sawyer, Ralph D. The Seven Military Classics of Ancient China, including the Art of War. Boulder: Westview Press, 1993.

. Sun Tzu: Art of War. Boulder: Westview Press, 1994.

. One Hundred Unorthodox Strategies: Battle and Tactics of Chinese Warfare. Boulder: Westview Press, 1996.

. "Chinese Strategic Power: Myths, Intent, and Projections." Journal of Military and Strategic Studies 9, 2 (Winter 2006/7): 1-64.

Schmalzer, Sigrid. "On the Appropriate Use of Rose-Colored Glasses: Reflections on Science in Socialist China." Isis, 2007, 98.

Schmitt, Eric. "Pentagon Contradicts General on Iraq Occupation Force's Size." Global Policy Forum, 28 Feb 03, http://www.globalpolicy.org/securitv/issues/iraq/attack/consequences/2003/0228pentagon contra.htm (accessed 5 Jul 08).

Schwartz, Michael. "Nine paradoxes of a lost war." Asia Times Online, 18 Oct 06, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/HJl 8AkO 1 .html (accessed 10 Jun 08).

Scobell, Andrew. "The Chinese Cult of Defense." Issues and Studies 37, 5 (Sep/Oct 2001): 100-127.

. "China and Strategic Culture." Strategic Studies Institute (May 2002): 1-46, http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.armv.mil/pdffiles/pub60.pdf (accessed 25 May 08). 339

. China's Use of Military Force: Beyond the Great Wall and the Long March. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003.

. "Strategic Culture and China: IR Theory Versus the Fortune Cookie?" Strategic Insights W, 10 (Oct 2005).

Scobell, Andrew and Larry M. Wortzel. China's Growing Military Power: Perspectives on Security, Ballistic Missiles, and Conventional Capabilities. U.S. Army War College: Strategic Studies Institute, 2002.

. Civil-Military Change in China: Elites, Institutes, and Ideas After the 16th Party Congress. U.S. Army War College: Strategic Studies Institute, 2004.

. Chinese National Security: Decisionmaking Under Stress. Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2005.

Scott, William B. "Commission Lays Foundation for Future Military Space Corps." Aviation Week and Space Technology, 154,15 Jan 01.

Segal, Gerald. "East Asia and the 'Constrainment' of China." Chapter in The Rise of China. 237-266. Cambridge: MIT Press, 2000.

Segal, Gerald and William T. Tow, eds. Chinese Defence Policy. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1984.

Shambaugh, David. "Military Modernization and the Politics of Technology Transfer." Contemporary China (Fall 1979).

. "China's Defense Industries: Indigenous and Foreign Procurement." Chapter in Paul H.B. Godwin, ed., The Chinese Defense Establishment: Continuity and Change in the 1980s. Boulder: Westview Press, 1983.

. "The United States and China: A New Cold War?" Current History 94, 593 (Sep 1995).

. "Containment or Engagement of China? Calculating Beijing's Responses." Chapter in The Rise of China. 207-36. Cambridge: MIT Press, 2000.

Shastri, Ranjit. "Twisted Tactics in the FDI Game." Businessworld, 23 Aug 04, http://www.businessworldindia.com/aug2304/gameplan.asp (accessed 11 Mar 08).

Shirk, Susan L. China: Fragile Superpower: How China's Internal Politics Could Derail its Peaceful Rise. New York: Oxford University Press, 2007. 340

Shulsky, Abram N. Deterrence Theory and Chinese Behavior. Santa Monica: RAND, 2000.

Shy, John. "The American Military Experience: History and Learning." Journal of Interdisciplinary History, 1, 2 (Winter 1971): 205-28.

Skuta, Philip C, Lt Col, USMC. "Poker, Blackjack, Rummy, and War: The Face of American Strategic Culture." U.S. Army War College Research Project, 15 Mar 06.

Smil, Vaclav. China's Past, China's Future: Energy, Food, Environment. London: Routledge Curzon, 2004.

Smith, Bob (Senator, R-N.H.) "The Challenge of Spacepower." Airpower Journal, 13, 1 (Spring 1999), http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/api/api99/spr99/smith.html (accessed 29 Jul 08).

Smith, Charles R. "China Takes Aim at U.S. GPS System." Newsmax.com, 20 Nov 07, http://www.newsmax.com/smith/china_eyes_GPS/2007/ll/20/50867.html (accessed 21 Dec 07). Smith, Michael V. Ten Propositions Regarding Spacepower. Thesis, School of Advanced Airpower Studies, Maxwell AFB, AL (June 2001).

Smith, Tony. America's Mission: The United States and the Worldwide Struggle for Democracy in the Twentieth Century. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994.

Snell, Joel C. A review of The American Way of War, Weigley, Russell F. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 410, The Energy Crisis: Reality or Myth (Nov 73).

Snyder, Jack. The Soviet Strategic Culture: Implications for Nuclear Options, R-2154- AF. Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1977.

"S & T Programs: National High-Tech R&D Program (863 Program)." Ministry of Science and Technology of the People's Republic of China, http://www.most.gov.cn/eng/programmesl/index.htm (accessed 15 Jan 08).

"Second Artillery Corps." Federation of American Scientists, http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/china/agencv/2-corps.htm (accessed 14 Jan 08).

"Space Transportation Costs: Trends in Price Per Pound to Orbit 1990-2000." Futron Corporation, 6 Sep 02, http://www.futron.corn/pdf/resource center/white papers/FutronLaunchCostWP.pdf (accessed 7 May 08). "Space Weapons Basics: A History of Anti-Satellite Weapons Programs." Union of Concerned Scientists, http://www.ucsusa.org/global security/space weapons/a-history- of-asat-pro grams .html (accessed 19 Dec 07).

Spacy, William L., II. Does the United States Need Space-Based Weapons? Thesis, School of Advanced Airpower Studies, Maxwell AFB, AL. (1998).

Stares, Paul B. The Militarization of Space: U.S. Policy, 1945-1984. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1985.

State Science and Technology Commission. "The Decision on the Reform of the Science and Technology Management System." The International Development Research Centre, March 1985, http://www.idrc.org.sg/en/ev-55185-201-l-DO TOPIC.html (accessed 3 Feb 08).

Stein, Arthur A. "When Misperception Matters." World Politics 34, 4 (Jul 1982): 505- 26.

Steinfeld, Edward S. "Chinese Enterprise Development and the Challenge of Global Integration." A background paper for World Bank Study Innovative East Asia: The Future of Growth, Nov 2002, http://web.mit.edu/polisci/research/steinfeld/Steinfeld- EnterpriseDevelop.pdf (accessed 12 Mar 08).

. "Getting China Right: Cutting Through the Myths of Economic Growth.." MIT Center for International Studies, Spring 2007, http://web.mit.edu/cis/editorspick template precis.html (accessed 10 Mar 08).

Stokes, Mark A. China's Strategic Modernization: Implications for U.S. National Security. USAF Institute for National Security Studies, October 1997.

. China's Strategic Modernization: Implications for National Security. Carlisle Barracks: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Sep 1999.

Stone, Elizabeth. "Comparative Strategic Cultures Literature Review (Part 1)." Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) Advanced Systems and Concepts Office (31 Oct 06): 1- 9.

Storey, Ian. "China's aircraft carrier ambitions: seeking truth from rumors." Naval War College Review, Winter 2004, http://findarticles.eom/p/articles/mi mOJIW/is_l_57/ai_l 13755343 (accessed 22 Mar 08).

Stourzh, Gerald. Alexander Hamilton and the Idea of Republican Government. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1970. 342

Strayer, Robert. Why Did the Soviet Union Collapse? Understanding Historical Change. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1998.

Stross, Randall E. Bulls in the China Shop and Other Sino-American Business Encounters. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1990.

Stuart, Douglas T. and William T. Tow. "Arm Sales." Chapter in China Policy for the Next Decade. Boston: Oelshlager, Guim & Hain, Publishers, 1984.

Stuart, Reginald C. War and American Thought: From the Revolution to the Monroe Doctrine. Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 1982.

Sullivan, Leonard, Jr., et al. "Trade and Technology Transfers." Chapter in China Policy for the Next Decade. Boston: Oelschlager, Gunn & Hain, Publishers, 1984.

Summers, Harry, Colonel, U.S. Army (Retired). On Strategy: a critical analysis of the Vietnam War. Novato, CA.: Presidio Press, 1982.

Sun-Tzu. The Art of War as translated by Sawyer, Ralph D. Boulder: Westview Press, 1994.

Sun Tzu. The Art of War translated by Yuan Shibing. Hertfordshire, United Kingdom: * Wordsworth Editions Limited, 1998.

Sun, Xiangli. "China's Nuclear Strategy." China Security, 1 (Autumn 2005), http://www.wsichina.org/attach/china security.pdf (accessed 1 Jun08).

Swaine, Michael. China: Domestic Change and Foreign Policy. Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1995.

. The Role of the Chinese Military in National Security Policymaking. Santa Monica: RAND, 1998.

Swaine, Michael and Ashley Tellis. Interpreting China's Grand Strategy: Past, Present, and Future. Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2000.

Sweeney, John, Jens Holsoe, and Ed Vulliamy. "NATO bombed Chinese deliberately." The Observer, 17 Oct 99, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world71999/oct/17/balkans (accessed 7 Jun 08).

Taubman, Philip. Secret Empire: Eisenhower, the CIA, and the Hidden Story of America's Space Espionage. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2003.

Taylor, Patrick E. "U.S. Strategy Plan Calls for Insuring No Rivals Develop: A One- Superpower World: Pentagon's Document Outlines Ways to Thwart Challenges to 343

Primacy of America." New York Times, 8 Mar 92, http://work.colum.edu/~amiller/wolfowitzl992.htm (accessed 29 Jun 08).

Tellis, Ashley J. "China's Military Space Strategy." Survival 49, 3 (1 Sep 07): 41-72.

"The Assassin's Mace: China's Growing Military Might." The New Atlantis, (Summer 2004) http://www.thenewatlantis.com/docLib/TNA06-State%20OP/o20The%20Art- Assassins%20Mace.pdf (accessed 12 Jun 08).

"The Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence." People's Daily Online, 28 Jun 04, http://english.people.com.cn/200406/28/eng20040628 147763.html (accessed 20 May 08).

The National Defense Strategy (NDS) of the United States of America. Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), Mar 05, http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Mar2005/d20050318ndsl .pdf (accessed 14 Dec 07).

Thompson, W. Scott. National Security in the 1980s: From Weakness to Strength. San Francisco: Institute for Contemporary Studies, 1980.

Thompson, William. "Democracy and Peace: Putting the Cart Before the Horse." * International Organization 50, 1 (Winter, 1996): 141-74.

Tilchin, William N. and Charles E. Neu. Artists of Power: Theodore Roosevelt, Woodrow Wilson, and Their Enduring Impact on U.S. Foreign Policy. Westport, CT.: Praeger Security International, 2006.

Titelman, Gregory Y. Random House Dictionary of Popular Proverbs and Sayings. New York: Random House, 1996.

"To Paris, U.S. Looks Like a 'Hyperpower'." International Herald Tribune, 5 Feb 99, http://www.iht.eom/articles/1999/02/05/france.t O.php (accessed 7 Jul 08).

Tow, William T. "Arm Sales to China." Chapter in Chinese Defense Policy. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1984.

"Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and other Celestial Bodies," (1967 Outer Space Treaty)." Office of Outer Space Affairs, United Nations, originally signed in Jan 1967, http://www.oosa.unvienna.org/SpaceLaw/outerspt.html (accessed 16 Dec 07).

Ullman, Richard. "The US and the World: An Interview with George Kennan." The New York Review of Books, 46, 13, (12 Aug 99). Urquhart, Brian. "Looking for the Sheriff." Global Policy Forum, 16 Jul 98, http://www.globalpolicv.org/reforrn/sheriff.htm (accessed 3 Jul 08).

U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission. Report to the Congress of the U.S.-China Security Review Commission: The National Security Implications of the Economic Relationship Between the United States and China, "Chapter 1- China's Perceptions of the United States and Strategic Thinking." Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2002, http://www.uscc.gov/researchpapers/2000 2003/reports/anrp02.htm (accessed 29 May 08).

U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century (Hart-Rudman Commission). New World Coming: American Security in the 21st Century. (Sep 1999), http://www.fas.org/man/docs/nwc/NWR A.pdf (accessed 9 Jul 08).

U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment. International Competition In Services, OTA-ITE-32S. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, July 1987.

U.S. Embassy. "China's S & T Policy: A View From Within." A report from the US Embassy in Beijing, Dec 1996, http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/china/doctrine/stvwin5.htm (accessed 5 Feb 08).

. "Tech Innovation In China: Experts Look At Obstacles." China-U.S. Joint Conference on Technological Innovation, 24-27Apr 2000, http://www.usembassy- china.org.cn/sandt/s&tconf.htm (accessed 20 Apr 08).

U.S. Government. "1992 Draft Defense Planning Guidance." Political Research Associates, 13 Mar 08, http://rightweb.irc-online.Org/profile/l571 .html (accessed 29 Jun 08).

. Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 2-2.1 Counterspace Operations. Maxwell AFB, AL: Air Force Doctrine Center (AFDC), 2 Aug 04), http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/iel/service_pubs/afdd2_2_l.pdf (accessed on 19 Dec 07).

. Annual Report to Congress, Military Power of the People's Republic of China 2007. Washington, DC: Department of Defense (DoD) Publications, 23 May 2007, http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/pdfs/070523-China-Militarv-Power-final.pdf (accessed 15 Dec 07)

. Annual Report to Congress, Military Power of the People's Republic of China 2008, Office of the Secretary of Defense, http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/pdfs/China Military Report 08.pdf (accessed 20 Mar 08).

. Congressional Presentation for Security Assistance Programs: Fiscal Year 1988. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1987. 345

. FM 44-100, Air and Missile Defense Operations, Appendix C, Space Support, 15 Jun 00 http://www.fas.org/spp/starwars/docops/fm44-1 OOfd/index.html (accessed 16 Dec 07).

. Headquarters USSPACEC0M/J5X, trip report, "Space Power Theory Research Trip—Western Europe," 10 Oct 97.

. Joint Publication (JP) 3-14 Space Operations. Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, 9 Aug 02, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/iel/new pubs/ip3 14.pdf (accessed 19 Dec 07).

. The National Security Strategy of the United States of America. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, Sep 2002, http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf (accessed 28 Jun 08).

. "U.S. National Space Policy." 31 Aug 06, http://www.ostp.gov/html/US%20National%20Space%20Policv.pdf (accessed 20 Dec 07).

"U.S. Media Overlook Expose on Chinese Embassy Bombing," Fairness & Accuracy in Reporting (FAIR), 22 Oct 99, http://www.fair.org/index.php?page=1766 (accessed 7 Jun 08).

"US Plane Spying Act of Hegemonism: Nepali Scholar," People's Daily, 26 Apr 01, http://english.peopledailv.com.cn/english/200104/26/eng20010426 68678.html (accessed 5 Jun 08).

Van Evera, Stephen. "Offense, Defense, and the Causes of War." International Security 22, 4 (Spring 1998): 5-43.

Van Norden, Bryan W. Confucius and the Analects: New Essays. New York: Oxford University Press, 2002.

Vlabos, Michael. "Culture and Foreign Policy." Foreign Policy 82 (Spring 1991): 59- 78. von Braun, Wernher. "Crossing the Last Frontier." An article in a series by Collier's titled "Man Will Conquer Space Soon!" 22 Mar 52. von Zedtwitz, Maximilian. "International R&D Strategies in Companies from Developing Countries—The Case of China." United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), Jan 2005, http://www.unctad.org/sections/meetings/docs/zedtwitz paper en.pdf (accessed 5 Mar 08). 346

Waldron, Arthur. The Great Wall of China: From History to Myth. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990.

. "China's Military Classics: A Review Essay." Joint Forces Quarterly, Spring 1994.

. "Chinese strategy from the fourteenth to seventeenth centuries." Chapter in The Making of Strategy: Rulers, States, and War. 85-114. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994.

Wallace, Richard. "Beijing Summit Ponders Chinese Innovation." InformationWeek, 12 Sep 05, http://www.informationweek.com/shared/printableArticle.ihtml?articleID=170702410 (accessed 19 Apr 08).

Walt, Stephen M. The Origins of Alliances. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987.

Walt, Stephen. "Two Cheers for Clinton's Foreign Policy." Foreign Affairs, 79 (Mar- Apr 2000).

Walton, Andy. "The reluctant superpower: America's status on the world stage a relatively new phenomenon." CNN Specials—Democracy in America, 2001, • http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/2000/democracv/bigger.picture/stories/isolationism/ (accessed 27 Jul 08).

Waltz, Kenneth N. Man, the State, and War. New York: Columbia University Press, 1959.

. Theory of International Politics. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979.

. Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis. New York: Columbia University Press, 2001.

Wang Hucheng. "The US Military's 'Soft Ribs' and Strategic Weaknesses." Liaowang 27, reprinted in Xinhua Hong Kong Service, July 5, 2000, FBIS CPP20000705000081.

Warden, John A., III. "Air Theory for the Twenty-first Century." Chapter in Battlefield of the Future, Sep 1995, http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/battle/chp4.html (accessed 12 Apr 08).

. The Air Campaign: Planning for Combat. Washington: National Defense University Press, 1988.

Watson, Traci. "NASA administrator says space shuttle was a mistake." USA Today, 27 Sep 05, http://www.usatodav.com/tech/science/space/2005-09-27-nasa-griffin- interview x.htm (accessed 5 May 08). 347

Wayne, Leslie. "Pentagon Struggles With Cost Overruns and Delays." The New York Times, 11 Jul 06, http://www.nvtimes.com/2006/07/ll/business/lloverruns.html? i^l&pagewantecNprint &oref-slogin (accessed 2 May 08).

Weber, Max. The Religion of China: Confucianism and Taoism. Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1951.

Wei, Long. "China Celebrates 30th Anniversary Of First Satellite Launch." Space Daily, 25 Apr 00, http://www.spacedailv.com/news/china-00u.html (accessed 7 Jan 08).

Weigley, Russell F. The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy. New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1973.

Weinburger, Casper W. "The Uses of Military Power." Address to the National Press Club, Washington, DC, 28 Nov 84.

Wendt, Alexander. "Anarchy is What States Make of It: the Social Construction of Power Politics." International Organization 46, 2 (Spring 1992): 391-425.

Wheeler, Nicholas J. Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000.

Whitcomb, Roger S. The American Approach to Foreign Affairs: An Uncertain Tradition. Westport, CT.: Praeger Publishers, 1998.

White, Josh. "Gates Sees Terrorism Remaining Enemy No. 1: New Defense Strategy Shifts Focus From Conventional Warfare." Washington Post, 31 Jul 08, p. A01, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp- dvn/content/article/2008/07/30/AR2008073003240.html?hpid=topnews (accessed 31 Jul 08).

"White Paper: Full Text of China's Space Activities." FBIS CPP20001122000046, 22 Nov 00.

"White Paper on China's National Defense, 1998." Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, Jul 98, http://www.shaps.hawaii.edU/securitv/china-defense-iulyl998.html#0 (accessed 2 Jun 08).

"White Paper on China's National Defense in 2002." Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, 9 Dec 02, http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/china/doctrine/natdef2002.html (accessed 2 Jun 08).

Whiting, Allen S. China Eyes Japan. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989. 348

. "Chinese Nationalism and Foreign Policy After Deng." China Quarterly (June 1995): 295-316.

. "The PLA and China's Threat Perceptions." The China Quarterly 146 (June 1996): 596-615. Gurtov, Mel and Byung Moo Hwang. China's Security: the New Roles of the Military. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1998).

Whyte, Martin King. "Deng Xiaoping: The Social Reformer." The China Quarterly 135, Special Issue: Deng Xiaoping: An Assessment (Sep 1993): 515-535.

Wilson, Woodrow. "Peace without Victory." Address to the U.S. Senate, 22 Jan 1917, http ://www. sagehistory .net/world war 1 /docs/W WPeaceVict.htm (accessed 20 Jul 08).

. "Making the World 'Safe for Democracy': Woodrow Wilson Asks for War." 65' Congress, Session 1, Senate Document No. 5, 2 Apr 1917, http://historvmatters.gmu.edu/d/4943/ (accessed 20 Jul 08).

Winthrop, John. "We shall be as a city upon a hill." In Speeches That Changed the World, Collins, Owen, compiler. Louisville, KY.: Westminster John Knox Press, 1999.

Wittner, Lawrence S. The Struggle Against the Bomb. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003.

"World: Asia Pacific China and the bomb." BBC News, 15 Jul 99, http://news.bbc.co.Uk/l/hi/world/asia-pacific/352503.stm (accessed 11 Jan 08).

Wortzel, Larry M., ed. China's Military Modernization. New York: Greenwood Press, 1988.

. "United States Export Control Policies and the Modernization of the China's Armed Forces." Chapter in China's Military Modernization. Westport: Greenwood Press, 1988.

. China's Military Potential. Carlisle Barracks: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, October 1998.

Wright, Martin. "An Anatomy of International Thought." Review of International Studies 13 (1987).

Wu, Chunqui. Grand Strategy. Beijing: Shishi chubanshe, 1995.

Yan Xuetong. "The Rise of China in Chinese Eyes." Journal of Contemporary China, 10,26 (2001): 33-9, http://irchina.org/en/xueren/china/pdf/vxt2.pdf (accessed 20 May 08). Yao Xinzhong. An Introduction to Confucianism. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2000.

Yong, Jiang. "Economic Security: Redressing Imbalance." China Security 3,2 (Spring 2007), http://www.wsichina.org/cs6 5.pdf (accessed 11 Mar 08).

Yoon, Chong K. "Problems of Modernizing the PLA: Domestic Constraints." Chapter in China's Military Modernization. Westport: Greenwood Press, 1988.

Yuan, Jing-dong. "The Dragon and the Elephant: Chinese-Indian Relations in the 21st Century." The Washington Quarterly 30:3 (Summer 2007): 131-144, http://www.twq.com/07summer/docs/07summer yuan.pdf (accessed 8 Jun 08).

Yung, Christopher D. People's War at Sea: Chinese Naval Power in the Twenty-First Century. Alexandria, VA.: Center for Naval Analyses, March 1996.

Zakaria, Fareed. "Does the Future Belong to China?" Newsweek, 9 May 05, http://www.fareedzakaria.com/articles/newsweek/050905.html (accessed 5 Mar 08).

Zhang, Yu and Li Jing. "Chinese may win Nobel Prize." China Daily, 29 Mar 06, http://www.chinadailv.com.cn/china/2006-03/29/content 555445.htm (accessed 10 Feb 08).

Zhao, Suisheng, ed. Debating Political Reform in China: Rule of Law vs. Democratization. London: M.E. Sharpe, 2006.

Zheng, Bijian. "China's 'Peaceful Rise' to Great Power Status." Foreign Affairs 84, 5 (Sep/Oct 2005): 18-24.

Zheng, Jinghai and Arne Bigsten. "Can China's Growth be Sustained? A Productivity Perspective." World Development, 28 Nov 06, http://www.handels.gu.se/epc/archive/00005194/01/gunwpe0236.pdf (accessed 12 Mar 08).

Zhu, Tianbiao. "Nationalism and Chinese foreign Policy." The China Review 1, 1 (Fall 2001): 1-27.

Ziegler, David W. Safe Heavens: Military Strategy and Space Sanctuary Thought. Maxwell AFB: Air University Press, 1998.

Zinn, Howard. "The Power and the Glory: Myths of American exceptionalism." Boston Review, 24 Nov 06, http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/article 15732.htm (accessed 21 Jun 08).