Escalation of Attacks on Shipping and Growing Involvement of Foreign
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Keesing's Record of World Events (formerly Keesing's Contemporary Archives), Volume 33, December, 1987 Iran, Iraq, Page 35597 © 1931-2006 Keesing's Worldwide, LLC - All Rights Reserved. Escalation of attacks on shipping and growing involvement of foreign navies Passage of UN security Council resolution calling for ceasefire Summary and key dates Chartering of Soviet tankers by Kuwait (April 1987). Attacks on Soviet vessels (May). Iraqi attack on USS Stark (May 17). Growing involvement of US Navy in Gulf (May; June). Escalation of mine warfare and attacks on tankers (June-July). Reflagging of Kuwaiti tankers under US flag (July 21). Mine damage to reflagged tanker Bridgeton (July 24). Ordering of European minesweepers and warships to Gulf (August; September). Iranian missile attacks on Kuwait (early September). Attack on UK-registered tanker (Sept. 21). Closure of Iranian arms procurement office in London (Sept. 23). US attack on Iranian mine-laying vessel (Sept. 21). Further exchanges between Iranian and US forces (September-November). Iranian gains in north-eastern Iraq (April to August). Air attacks on cities and on Iranian nuclear installation (September-November). Passage of UN security Council ceasefire resolution (July 20). Reactions to resolution; further diplomatic efforts (July-November). Chartering of Soviet tankers by Kuwait - Attacks on Soviet vessels During late March and early April 1987, Iraq continued to carry out bombing raids against Iranian oil installations at Kharg Island, and also against tankers carrying Iranian oil. It was confirmed in mid-April that Kuwait, a strong supporter of Iraq, and the object of numerous Iranian threats, had chartered three Soviet-registered tankers, which would thereby become entitled to Soviet naval protection. A Soviet spokesman on April 21 warned that Soviet forces would “respond firmly” to any attack on the tankers, prompting an expression of concern from United States officials that the Soviet Union would use the chartering as a pretext for increasing its naval presence in the region. A Soviet freighter, the Ivan Koroteyev, was attacked off Dubai on May 6 by Iranian revolutionary guards in speedboats armed with machine-guns and rocket-propelled grenades. This was the first such incident to involve a Soviet ship. Following the attack, Iranian officials stated that security in the Gulf should be the responsibility solely of the region's littoral states. One of the three Soviet tankers chartered by Kuwait, the Admiral Chuykov, was damaged by a mine, believed to have been planted by Iranian forces, on May 16. As in other such incidents the tanker was able to continue its journey under its own power. Three Soviet minesweepers were despatched to the Gulf at the end of May. Iraqi air attack on US frigate The USS Stark, on patrol in the central Gulf, was struck on May 17 by two Exocet missiles fired by an Iraqi aircraft. The ship was seriously damaged and 37 crewmen were killed. The Iraqi government apologized for the attack, which it claimed was a mistake, and offered to pay compensation. Many observers suggested that the attack was a deliberate ploy to persuade the US administration to commit more forces to the Gulf. On the day after the attack, an Iranian spokesman described it as “a serious and dangerous trap” laid by Iraq in an attempt to draw both superpowers into the conflict. It later emerged in the course of congressional and naval inquiries that the Stark had failed to follow certain basic defensive procedures while on patrol, thereby increasing its vulnerability to attack and, in particular, rendering it incapable of destroying the missiles before they struck the ship. The captain and first officer of the Stark were retired from the Navy at the end of July. It was also reported that Saudi F-15 jets had taken off in pursuit of the Iraqi aircraft after it had been detected by a Saudi AWACS (airborne warning and control system) surveillance aircraft; the pilots had, however, refused a US request to intercept the Iraqi plane, claiming that they did not have the necessary authority from their ground commander. On May 21 the US administration announced that it would delay a proposed sale to Saudi Arabia of further F-15s after it had become clear that the Senate would refuse to approve the deal as a protest against the Saudi failure to intercept the Iraqi aircraft [see pages 35291-92]. An incident similar to the Stark attack had occurred during the Arab-Israeli war in 1967, when Israeli aircraft had sunk the USS Liberty in the eastern Mediterranean [see page 22102]. In response to the attack, President Reagan on May 18 ordered US naval forces in the Gulf to be placed on high alert, and announced that they would in future have authorization to fire on any aircraft believed to be of hostile intent. Growing involvement of US Navy in Gulf, May to June On May 26 the US State Department admitted that US warships had recently provided protection for a Kuwaiti merchant ship transporting US military equipment to Bahrain. Two days later, an administration spokesman announced that the planned re-registering of 11 of Kuwait's 22 state-owned oil tankers under the US flag, originally scheduled for June 1, would be delayed “for several weeks”. The postponement followed expressions of concern by congressmen who feared that such a move could result in a dangerous escalation of the conflict in the Gulf waters. It was also reported that leaders of other Gulf Arab states had privately expressed misgivings over the plan. For its part, the Kuwaiti government stressed that all five permanent members of the UN security Council (ie China, France, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom, in addition to the USA) had been asked to approve the re-registering of Kuwaiti tankers under their respective flags. President Reagan had written to Western European leaders in May to elicit their support for US efforts to ensure the free flow of oil through the Gulf. Following cautious responses from European leaders, officials were by early June playing down earlier calls for active European tactical support for the US Navy's operations in the Gulf, and were instead stressing the importance of reaching an agreement on joint action through the UN. This was reflected in the statement on the Iran-Iraq conflict issued at the Venice summit of major industrialized countries on June 9 [see page 35611]. US warning to Iran over deployment of Silkworm missiles Mr Frank Carlucci, then the US National security Adviser, warned Iran on June 7 not to deploy the Silkworm HY-2 missiles with which it was believed to have been supplied by China during 1986 [see page 35160]. Based on the Soviet Styx missile, each Silkworm carried 500 kg of high explosive and had a range of 80 km. From launch sites on the south-western Iranian coast, they could strike any vessel passing through the Strait of Hormuz (at the mouth of the Gulf), which were only 40 km across at the narrowest point. From the Iranian-occupied Fao peninsula, in southern Iraq, the Silkworms would be within range of tankers in Kuwaiti harbours. The Chinese government had repeatedly denied supplying the missiles to Iran, although this denial was treated with some scepticism by independent observers. An Iranian spokesman claimed on Aug. 14 that the missiles were Iranian-manufactured copies of ones seized from Iraq. The White House Chief of Staff, Mr Howard Baker, suggested on June 7 that US forces might carry out pre-emptive strikes against the Silkworm batteries on the Strait of Hormuz. The following day, however, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Adml. William Crowe, told the Senate armed services committee that he was opposed to any such action. The Silkworms were reportedly placed on their launchers for the first time on July 4. In a report to Congress on June 16, the Defence Department stated that “US ships or aircraft are authorized to defend themselves… whenever hostile intent or a hostile act occurs” and that “any aircraft or ship which manoeuvres into a position where it could fire a missile, drop a bomb or use gunfire, is demonstrating hostile intent”. Escalation of mine warfare and attacks on tankers In the first such incident since May 16, a Greek oil tanker on June 9 struck a mine in the central Gulf. A Liberian tanker carrying Kuwaiti oil struck a mine off Kuwait on June 19, and two days later Kuwait requested the Saudi Arabian and US Navies to assist in clearing mines from the Gulf. US officials announced on June 23 that Saudi Arabia had agreed to help with mine-clearing operations, and to extend Gulf patrols in conjunction with the US deployments. US officials reported on June 18 that mines had been detected for the first time at the approaches to the Ahmadi channel–the principal route for tankers sailing to Kuwaiti ports. Saudi minesweepers and helicopters began work on clearing the channel on June 26. After a month's lull, Iranian speedboats recommenced hit-and-run attacks on tankers on June 27. Most such attacks consisted of little more than harrassing operations, due to the relatively light weapons possessed by the Revolutionary Guards manning the speedboats. Iraqi aircraft, meanwhile, continued to stage occasional bombing and missile attacks on tankers carrying Iranian oil. At the end of June, Iraq launched a series of air-raids on Iranian oil platforms and islands in the Gulf, some of which housed Revolutionary Guards” bases. The US administration announced on June 30 that 11 Kuwaiti tankers would be re-registered in mid-July, after completion of formalities which included their being inspected by US Coastguard officials.