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Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East

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Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East CSIS_______________________________ Center for Strategic and International Studies 1800 K Street N.W. Washington, DC 20006 (202) 775-3270 (To comment: [email protected] For Updates see CSIS.ORG, “Strategic Assessment”) Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East Regional Trends, National Forces, Warfighting Capabilities, Delivery Options, and Weapons Effects Anthony H. Cordesman Arleigh A. Burke Chair for Strategy Center for Strategic and International Studies September 2000 Copyright Anthony H. Cordesman, all rights reserved. Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East 8/31/00 Page ii Table of Contents PART ONE........................................................................................................................................................... 1 CAUSES, WARFIGHTING OPTIONS, AND ARMS CONTROL .................................................................... 1 REASONS FOR PROLIFERATING AND WAR FIGHTING OPTIONS ............................................................................... 2 REASONS FOR PROLIFERATING OUTWEIGH PERCEIVED RISKS ............................................................................... 3 WAR FIGHTING OPTIONS ..................................................................................................................................... 4 UNSTABLE POSSIBLE COMBINATIONS OF ADVERSARIES........................................................................................ 5 ONE-HALF CHEER FOR ARMS CONTROL............................................................................................................... 6 STRATEGY, TACTICS, AND OPERATIONS............................................................................................................... 7 MAJOR UNCERTAINTIES ...................................................................................................................................... 8 PART TWO ....................................................................................................................................................... 10 WHO IS PROLIFERATING............................................................................................................................. 10 PROLIFERATION IS ALREADY HERE:................................................................................................................... 11 MIDDLE EASTERN CASE STUDIES IN CREEPING PROLIFERATION ......................................................................... 11 CREEPING PROLIFERATION AFFECTS MANY KEY COUNTRIES ............................................................................. 12 UNSTABLE POSSIBLE COMBINATIONS OF ADVERSARIES...................................................................................... 13 PART THREE ................................................................................................................................................... 14 PROLIFERATION BY COUNTRY.................................................................................................................. 14 ALGERIA’S SEARCH FOR WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION ............................................................................... 15 Delivery Systems........................................................................................................................................... 15 Chemical Weapons ....................................................................................................................................... 15 Biological Weapons...................................................................................................................................... 15 Nuclear Weapons ......................................................................................................................................... 15 LIBYA’S SEARCH FOR WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION ................................................................................... 17 Delivery Systems........................................................................................................................................... 17 Chemical Weapons ....................................................................................................................................... 17 Biological Weapons...................................................................................................................................... 19 Nuclear Weapons ......................................................................................................................................... 19 EGYPT’S SEARCH FOR WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION................................................................................... 20 Delivery Systems........................................................................................................................................... 20 Chemical Weapons ....................................................................................................................................... 21 Biological Weapons...................................................................................................................................... 22 Nuclear Weapons ......................................................................................................................................... 22 ISRAEL’S SEARCH FOR WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION .................................................................................. 24 Delivery Systems........................................................................................................................................... 24 Chemical Weapons ....................................................................................................................................... 26 Biological Weapons...................................................................................................................................... 27 Nuclear Weapons ......................................................................................................................................... 28 Missile Defenses........................................................................................................................................... 31 Advanced Intelligence Systems...................................................................................................................... 35 SYRIA’S SEARCH FOR WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION ................................................................................... 36 Delivery Systems........................................................................................................................................... 36 Chemical Weapons ....................................................................................................................................... 38 Biological Weapons...................................................................................................................................... 40 Nuclear Weapons ......................................................................................................................................... 41 Missile Defenses........................................................................................................................................... 42 IRAN’S SEARCH FOR WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION ..................................................................................... 43 Delivery Systems........................................................................................................................................... 43 Chemical Weapons ....................................................................................................................................... 55 Biological Weapons...................................................................................................................................... 58 Copyright Anthony H. Cordesman, all rights reserved. Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East 8/31/00 Page iii Nuclear Weapons ......................................................................................................................................... 60 Missile Defenses........................................................................................................................................... 69 IRAQ’S SEARCH FOR WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION ..................................................................................... 70 THE SUDANS’S SEARCH FOR WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION ......................................................................... 86 Delivery Systems........................................................................................................................................... 86 Chemical Weapons ....................................................................................................................................... 86 Biological Weapons...................................................................................................................................... 86 Nuclear Weapons ......................................................................................................................................... 86 INDIA’S SEARCH FOR WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION .................................................................................... 87 Delivery Systems........................................................................................................................................... 87 Chemical Weapons ......................................................................................................................................
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