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STOPPING THE FREE-FALL IMPLICATIONS OF SINO- JAPANESE RIVALRY FOR REGIONAL STABILITY AND CANADAIAN INTERESTS
Jing-Dong Yuan Centre for Non-Proliferation Studies Monterey Institute of International Studies
Prepared for the International Security Research and Outreach Programme International Security Bureau
March 2007
PREFACE
The International Security Research and Outreach Programme (ISROP) is located within the Continental Defence Relations Division of the International Security Bureau. ISROP’s mandate is to provide the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) with timely, high quality policy relevant research that will inform and support the development of Canada’s international security policy in the areas of North American, regional and multilateral security and defence cooperation, non-proliferation (nuclear and non-nuclear), arms control and disarmament. The current ISROP research themes can be found at : www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/ arms/isrop/menu-en.asp.
ISROP regularly commissions research to support Canadian officials by drawing on its think-tank and academic networks in Canada and abroad. The following report, Stopping The Free-Fall: Implications Of Sino-Japanese Rivalry For Regional Stability And Canadian Interests, is an example of such contract research.
DFAIT wishes to acknowledge the work performed under contract by Dr. Jing-dong Yuan.
Disclaimer: The views and positions expressed in this report are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade or the Government of Canada. The report is in its original language.
PRÉAMBULE
Le Programme de recherche et d'information dans le domaine de la sécurité internationale (PRISI) fait partie de la Direction de la défense continentale, qui relève elle-même de la Direction générale de la sécurité internationale. Il a pour mandat de fournir au ministère des Affaires étrangères et du Commerce international (MAECI), en temps utile, des études stratégiques de haute qualité et pertinentes qui permettent d’orienter et de soutenir l’élaboration de la politique canadienne de sécurité internationale concernant l’Amérique du Nord, la coopération régionale et multilatérale en matière de sécurité et de défense, ainsi que la non-prolifération (nucléaire et non nucléaire), le contrôle des armements et le désarmement. Les thèmes de recherches actuels du Programme de recherche et d’information dans le domaine de la sécurité internationale (PRISI) figurent à l’adresse suivante : www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/arms/isrop/menu-fr.asp
Le PRISI commande régulièrement des études pour faciliter le travail des fonctionnaires canadiens, en faisant appel à ses réseaux de spécialistes et d’universitaires au Canada et à l’étranger. Le rapport suivant, intitulé Stopping The Free-Fall: Implications Of Sino- Japanese Rivalry For Regional Stability And Canadian Interests, est un exemple de ce type d’étude.
Le MAECI souhaite reconnaître le travail exécuté à contrat par le Dr. Jing-Don- Yuan
Déni de responsabilité : Les vues et opinions exprimées dans le présent rapport appartiennent exclusivement à l’auteur, et ne reflètent pas nécessairement celles du ministère des Affaires étrangères et du Commerce international, ou celles du gouvernement du Canada. Le rapport est présenté dans la langue de rédaction. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This report discusses developments in Sino-Japanese relations since the end of the Cold War and analyses some of the underlining causes of mistrust, misunderstanding, hostility, and emerging rivalry between these two major Asia powers. It presents a preliminary assessment of the key issues and controversies ranging from Chinese views on the evolving U.S.-Japan military alliance, Japan’s aspiration to become a normal state and its pursuit of greater international role and enhancement of military capabilities, to historical legacies and rising nationalism in both countries, unresolved territorial disputes and competition for resources, and growing Japan-Taiwan ties.
The report argues that the end of the Cold War, the changing international security environment in East Asia, domestic politics and leadership transition in both China and Japan, especially China’s rise as a major power, present serious challenges for the regional balance of power and the need for adaptation and adjustments to the power shift and transformation. This dramatic shift in the power balance also leads to worst-case interpretations by both Beijing and Tokyo of the other’s intentions and behavior. Under such circumstances, the old wounds of history are further aggravated by new nationalism, personality, and changing domestic foreign policy making processes where societal pressures impose significant constraints on conciliatory gestures and “new thinking” on managing bilateral relations.
The report also reviews and evaluates the validity of limited confidence building measures and security dialogue between Beijing and Tokyo and concludes that their utility is constrained by the overall political relationship between the two countries. At the same time, the report also notes that growing economic interdependence, the recognition that continued deterioration of relations serves neither side’s interests; consequently, the resolve of Chinese and Japanese leaders in the post-Koizumi era to mend fences and promote common interests at least for now have prevented the free fall in Asia’s most important bilateral relationship.
Sino-Japanese relations have important implications for Canada’s interests. Canada has long maintained good relationships with both China and Japan for economic and politico-security reasons. Japan has been a traditional trading partner of Canada while China’s phenomenal growth over the last quarter century has drawn significant interest from Canadian businesses. Ottawa made significant efforts in promoting its ties with Asian Pacific countries in the 1990s, as well as participated in and introduced multilateral security institution-building. In this context, the continuing free fall of the Sino-Japanese relationship could seriously affect Canadian interests in the region.
Canada remains a “stakeholder” in the future developments in Sino-Japanese relations for at least three reasons: • China’s rise and its future direction affect both regional peace and stability and the geo-strategic landscape at the global level. China has become an important trading partner for Canada and Canadian “soft power” in engaging and encouraging China to adopt a multilateral approach to regional security and good governance has achieved important results. Ottawa should continue to play an active role in engaging Beijing to promote a disarmament agenda and encourage military transparency so that China’s emergence could be better integrated into the existing international norms and frameworks, values a middle power such as Canada holds dear. • Japan and Canada share many common values and interests. Both are members of the G-8 and OECD, and are concerned with emerging non-traditional security challenges, human security, and international peacekeeping. However, Ottawa and Tokyo have placed different emphasis and have different priorities due to their respective threat perceptions, geography and alliance commitments. • Continued Sino-Japanese rivalry has serious implications for Canadian interests. Prolonged instability and deteriorating security in that region would negatively affect Canada’s interests. Intensified disputes leading to militarized conflicts between China and Japan could result in a number of negative developments. There is the potential for an arms race. Japan strives for greater military capabilities, including nuclear and missile capabilities as Tokyo’s confidence in U.S. nuclear umbrella and the alliance protection wanes.
Canada revitalized its diplomatic activism in the early 1990s when it introduced concepts of cooperative security and multilateralism to the region and played an active role in helping to develop the region’s multilateral security institution. Given the stakes involved, Ottawa should:
• develop and introduce concepts and frameworks that could re-energize the North Pacific security dialogue that could attract both China and Japan, in addition to the region’s other key players, to discuss security mechanisms that could prevent incidents, respond to crises, and seek solutions to disputes; • engage in Track-II activities and re-instate the North Pacific Working Group within the CSCAP framework; • avail itself of the CBM and arms control expertise to engage Chinese and Japanese officials and analysts in discussing, refining, and developing mechanisms that promote confidence-building, security dialogue, and greater mutual trust and understanding; and • facilitate discussions between Beijing and Tokyo regarding the East China Sea dispute via the modality of the CIDA-sponsored South China Sea workshops of the 1990s to shelve disputes and explore joint development possibilities.
RÉSUMÉ
Le présent rapport décrit l’évolution des relations sino-japonaises depuis la fin de la guerre froide et analyse quelques-unes des causes de la méfiance, des malentendus, de l’hostilité et de la rivalité naissante entre ces deux grandes puissances asiatiques. On y présente une évaluation préliminaire des enjeux et des controverses : points de vue de la Chine sur l’évolution de l’alliance militaire entre les États-Unis et le Japon, aspiration du Japon à devenir un État normal et recherche d’un plus grand rôle international et de plus grands moyens militaires, héritage du passé et nationalisme grandissant dans les deux pays, conflits territoriaux non réglés et rivalité pour se procurer des ressources, et liens de plus en plus nombreux entre le Japon et Taïwan.
Dans le rapport, on soutient que la fin de la guerre froide, l’évolution du contexte de la sécurité internationale en Asie de l’Est, les politiques intérieures et le changement de direction en Chine et au Japon, en particulier la montée de la Chine qui devient une grande puissance, menacent l’équilibre du pouvoir dans la région et nécessitent une adaptation et un rajustement à la transformation des pouvoirs en présence. Cette modification spectaculaire de l’équilibre du pouvoir amène Beijing et Tokyo à interpréter les intentions et la conduite de l’autre dans l’optique du pire scénario. Dans ces conditions, les vieilles blessures de l’histoire sont ravivées par le nouveau nationalisme, les personnalités et les nouveaux mécanismes d’élaboration de la politique étrangère, alors que les pressions de la société rendent difficiles les gestes de conciliation et « une nouvelle vision » de la gestion des relations bilatérales.
Le rapport examine et évalue également les mesures de confiance et le dialogue en matière de sécurité entre Beijing et Tokyo et conclut que leur utilité est limitée par la relation politique globale qu’entretiennent les deux pays. En même temps, le rapport constate l’interdépendance économique croissante et reconnaît que la détérioration constante des relations ne sert les intérêts d’aucun des deux pays. La ferme intention des dirigeants chinois et japonais pendant l’ère post-Koizumi d’arranger les choses et de promouvoir leurs intérêts communs, du moins pour le moment, a empêché la chute libre des relations bilatérales les plus importantes en Asie.
Les relations sino-japonaises ont des incidences importantes sur les intérêts du Canada. Le Canada entretient de bonnes relations de longue date avec la Chine et le Japon pour des raisons économiques et des raisons politiques liées à la sécurité. Le Japon est un partenaire commercial traditionnel du Canada, tandis que l’essor phénoménal de la Chine au cours du dernier quart de siècle intéresse vivement des entreprises canadiennes. Ottawa a fait des efforts importants pour améliorer ses rapports avec les pays de l’Asie-Pacifique dans les années 1990, et il a contribué au renforcement d’institutions multilatérales en matière de sécurité dont il avait proposé l’idée. Dans ce contexte, la poursuite de la chute libre des relations sino-japonaises pourrait nuire sérieusement aux intérêts canadiens dans la région.
Le Canada demeure une « partie concernée » par l’évolution future des relations sino-japonaises pour au moins trois raisons : • L’essor de la Chine et l’orientation qu’elle prendra influent à la fois sur la paix et la stabilité régionales et sur le paysage géostratégique à l’échelle mondiale. La Chine est devenue un partenaire commercial important du Canada, dont la pratique du pouvoir de persuasion (dialoguer avec la Chine et l’encourager à aborder la sécurité régionale sous l’angle multilatéral et à adopter les principes de bonne gouvernance) a donné des résultats importants. Ottawa devrait continuer à jouer un rôle actif en convainquant Beijing de favoriser un programme de désarmement et la transparence militaire, de manière à ce que la montée de ce pays puisse mieux s’intégrer dans les normes et les cadres internationaux en place, valeurs chères à une puissance moyenne comme le Canada. • Le Japon et le Canada ont bon nombre de valeurs et d’intérêts communs. Ils sont tous deux membres du G8 et de l’OCDE, et les défis nouveaux en matière de sécurité, la sécurité humaine et le maintien de la paix internationale les préoccupent tous deux. Cependant, Ottawa et Tokyo ont adopté des priorités différentes en raison de leur propre perception de la menace, de leur géographie et des engagements qu’ils ont pris dans le cadre d’alliances. • La rivalité sino-japonaise constante a des conséquences sérieuses pour les intérêts canadiens. Ceux-ci se ressentiraient de l’instabilité prolongée et de la détérioration de la sécurité dans cette région. Une aggravation des disputes qui entraîneraient des conflits militarisés entre la Chine et le Japon pourrait avoir plusieurs conséquences négatives. Une course aux armements demeure possible. Le Japon s’emploie à renforcer ses capacités militaires, y compris en armes et en missiles nucléaires, car Tokyo croit de moins en moins dans la protection nucléaire des États-Unis et dans la protection de l’alliance.
Le Canada a relancé son activité diplomatique au début des années 1990 lorsqu’il a présenté les concepts de sécurité coopérative et de multilatéralisme aux pays de la région, il a contribué activement à la création de l’institution de sécurité multilatérale de la région. Compte tenu des enjeux, Ottawa devrait :
• élaborer et présenter des concepts et des cadres qui pourraient relancer le dialogue sur la sécurité dans le Pacifique Nord, ce qui pourrait inciter la Chine et le Japon, en plus des autres acteurs clés de la région, à discuter de mécanismes de sécurité qui permettraient d’éviter des incidents, de réagir à des crises et de trouver des solutions aux conflits; • participer aux activités de la phase II et rétablir le Groupe de travail du Pacifique Nord dans le cadre du Conseil de coopération pour la sécurité dans l’Asie-Pacifique; • profiter de l’expertise en mesures de confiance et en contrôle des armements pour inviter des fonctionnaires et des analystes chinois et japonais à discuter, améliorer et mettre au point des mécanismes qui favorisent le renforcement de la confiance, le dialogue en matière de sécurité et une confiance et une compréhension mutuelles plus grandes; • faciliter les discussions entre Beijing et Tokyo concernant le litige touchant la mer de Chine orientale au moyen du mécanisme parrainé par l’ACDI dans les années 1990 (ateliers sur la mer de Chine méridionale) pour enterrer la question et examiner des possibilités de développement conjoint.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
INTRODUCTION 1
CHINA RISING AND GROWING SINO-JAPANESE MISTRUST 5
CHINA’S VIEWS ON U.S.-JAPAN ALLIANCE 10
BEIJING ASSESSES JAPAN’S GROWING MILITARY APPETITES 17
Missile Defense Cooperation and Military Integration 19
Intelligence, Satellites, and Japan’s Military Space Policy 22
Japanese Debates on the Three Non-Nuclear Principles 24
HISTORY, TAIWAN, AND TERRITORIAL DISPUTES 28
SECURITY DIALOGUES AND CBMS 32
Official Exchange Visits 33
Security Dialogues 34
Ad Hoc Mechanisms and Track-II Activities 36
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 41
CANADIAN INTERESTS 44
ENDNOTES 49 INTRODUCTION
Despite growing trade, investment, and other socio-economic ties between China and Japan since 1972 when the two countries normalized diplomatic relations, Sino- Japanese relations since the end of the Cold War have become increasingly unstable, deeply suspicious, and at times hostile.i The recent spats between Beijing and Tokyo over territorial disputes, historical issues, military buildups, and the issue of Taiwan pit the two Asian powers in a dangerous rivalry. There are many reasons behind the ambivalence of the bilateral relationship, including: major structural transformation in East Asia as the relative power positions of China and Japan undergo continuous changes; the two countries’ changing domestic political dynamics as new generations of leadership take up the reins and as policy debates are increasingly influenced by public opinion and growing nationalist sentiments; divergent views of and interests in the future security architecture in East Asia and the role of military alliances; suspicion in both capitals of each other’s intentions and military buildups; and perceived and actual competition for the region’s political and economic leadership with China’s continuing growth and Japan’s recent recovery.
China’s significant rise in economic power, political influence, and military capabilities present serious challenges to Japan. With its own lost decade of the 1990s, Japan suddenly finds itself having to contend with a neighboring power of great potential if not already a competitor, a situation it has never experienced since the Meiji Restoration of 1868 and especially after it defeated the Qing China in 1895. At the same time, Tokyo’s own pursuit of a normal state status and a more active international role is exemplified by the dispatch of its Self Defense Force to participate in United Nations peacekeeping operations and post-conflict overseas activities under the auspice of U.S.- led coalitions deeply concerns Beijing. A serious challenge to the leadership in both capitals is that never in history have both countries been powerful at the same time and this raises the question of how this will lead to competition for regional primacy and whether and how it can be managed. This particular problem is vividly captured by
1 Yoichi Funabashi, Japan’s most widely read foreign affairs commentator: “A rising China will induce critical, painful, and psychologically difficult strategic adjustments in Japan’s foreign policy. Japan has not known a wealthy, powerful, confident, internationalist China since its modernization in the Meiji era.”ii
Four sets of factors have influenced the current state of Sino-Japanese relations. The first factor is the changing power transition in East Asia. As mentioned, over the last two decades China’s economy has registered an average of over nine percent annual growth while that of Japan stagnated during the entire 1990s and it is only in recent years that the Japanese economy has shown signs of recovery. China’s dramatic economic growth means that the gap between China and Japan has shrunk and continues to narrow; at the same time, China’s influence in the regional economy is expanding, especially in Southeast Asia where Japan used to hold a commanding position. Japan has begun to feel that China may take over as the leading economy in Asia in the near future. There is an implicit competition for a regional leadership role, if not hegemony or dominance. China’s and Japan’s competing ideas for East Asian regionalism are a good example of such implicit rivalry.iii Table 1 provides a comparison of the key indicators of the two countries.
Table 1. China and Japan in Comparison Key Indicators 2004 2005 2006 GDP with PPP ($bn) China 7,262.0 8,859.0 10,000.0 (2,512.0*) Japan 3,745.0 4,018.0 4,220.0 (4,911.0*) GDP Growth Rate (%) China 9.1 9.9 10.5 Japan 2.9 2.7 2.8 Trade Volume ($bn) China 1,135.5 1,384.0 1,751.9 (est) Japan 940.6 1,001.6 1,114.0 (est) Foreign Exchange Reserve ($bn) 1,300.0 China 864.7 Japan Defense Budget ($bn) China 25.0 29.0 44.9
2 Japan 45.1 44.7 41.1 Population (m) China 1,298.8 1,306.3 1,321.8 Japan 127.3 127.4 127.4
* Statistics tabulated if using official exchange rates. Sources: The National Bureau for Asian Research, Strategic Asia database; The International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance, selected years; Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook 2007, https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/index.html
The second factor is that the end of the Cold War and the disintegration of the Soviet Union have removed the link that used to bind the two countries in common purpose— checking Soviet expansionism and threats to East Asian security. Indeed, the so-called “golden age” of Sino-Japanese relations between 1972 and 1989 was largely due to their shared—albeit to varying degrees—concerns over Soviet threats, which in turn helped gloss over, if not resolve, some of the inherent conflicts between the two countries. However, with the Soviet threats gone, these issues have re-surfaced; some of them have even intensified. Third, there have been generational changes in the two countries’ leadership. Older-generation Chinese and Japanese statesmen such as Zhou Enlai, Liao Chengzhi, Kakuei Tanaka, Masayoshi Ohira, and Takeo Fukuda expended tremendous efforts at building such a bridge after China and Japan established diplomatic relations. Indeed, in the 1980s, Chinese and Japanese leaders Hu Yaobang and Yasuhiro Nakasone strongly promoted greater Chinese-Japanese youth exchanges. The current leadership in both countries is held hostage to growing nationalism and highly sensitive to domestic public opinion. This creates enormous difficulties for policy flexibility and compromise.iv
Finally, the international security environment has also changed. The nature and scope of the U.S.-Japan alliance has changed, prompted by U.S. post-Cold War strategies of maintaining its primacy in the region and globally, and preparing for contingencies that require alliance systems to be more adaptable. The U.S.-Japan alliance now goes beyond the original bilateral security arrangement to take on more regional and even
3 global missions. Meanwhile, Tokyo is also forming new alliances and looking for new partners in an effort to hedge against China’s continued rise. Australia falls into the former category while India the latter. Perhaps most alarming from China’s perspective is the growing semi-official political and military contacts, in addition to the unofficial but deep-rooted cultural and societal ties between Japan and Taiwan. These four sets of factors combined confront Beijing and Tokyo on how best to manage their bilateral relationship. Managed well, this could be turned into a realistic relationship based on mutual respect, acceptance, and power parity; it could also degenerate into open rivalry, fanned by history, nationalism, and the pursuit of dominance in the region.v
Canada has long maintained good relationships with both China and Japan for economic and politico-security reasons. Japan has been a traditional trading partner of Canada while China’s phenomenal growth over the last quarter century has also drawn significant interest from Canadian businesses. China has already overtaken Japan as Canada’s largest trading partner in Asia, with annual two-way trade for 2006 reaching CAD$42.1 billion (almost double that between Canada and Japan, CAD$22.5 billion).vi Ottawa made significant efforts in promoting its ties with Asian Pacific countries in the 1990s, as well as participated in and introduced multilateral security institution-building. In this context, the continuing free fall of the Sino-Japanese relationship could seriously affect Canadian interests in the region. This report will examine the policy implications of the China-Japan rivalry for Canada and the extent to which Ottawa could leverage its good relationships with both countries to effect better confidence building measures, improve ties between the two Asian powers, to help bridge differences, manage disputes, and search for solutions, with a view to preserving and promoting Canadian interests in the region.
This report provides a preliminary assessment of how and to what extent these factors have affected Sino-Japanese relations since the end of the Cold War and specifically from China’s perspective. The next section looks briefly at the power shifts in Asia and its impact on how Beijing and Tokyo manage and adapt to such changes. It then looks at how Beijing views the changing U.S.-Japan alliance and its effects on
4 important Chinese interests. This is followed by Chinese analysis of Japan’s pursuit of a normal state status by developing military capabilities. A review of some of the most salient history, territorial issues, and Japan’s growing ties with Taiwan are examined before turning to the role of security dialogue and confidence-building measures and an assessment of their validity and utility in managing bilateral conflicts and enhance mutual trust. Finally, it presents some preliminary evaluations of where Sino-Japanese relations stand, how (mis)management of their rivalry and disputes can effect Canadian interests, and policy recommendations as to where Ottawa can play a role in mitigating Sino- Japanese conflict in order to maintain peace and stability in the region, and hence preserve and promote Canadian interests.
CHINA RISING AND GROWING SINO-JAPANESE MISTRUST
Perhaps one of the most significant developments in international relations over the past decade is the dramatic rise of China in economic, political, and military terms.vii First and foremost is the phenomenal economic growth averaging over nine percent annually that has been sustained over the past two decades, quadrupling China’s gross national product (GNP) during that period. China has become, since reforms started in the late 1970s, the world’s fourth largest economy (in 2006): $2.5 trillion GDP, total foreign trade of $1.76 trillion; over $60 billion in foreign direct investment; and foreign exchange reserves of over $1.3 trillion. In purchasing power parity (PPP) terms, China’s GDP is $10 trillion and is ranked as the second largest economy after the United States ($12.98 trillion).viii
Second, China’s growing influence is being felt not only in East Asia but also in regions where in the past it had chosen to keep a low profile. These include Central Asia, where Beijing has become increasingly active and was instrumental in the establishment of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in 2001; Africa, where China’s influence has grown significantly in terms of investments and trade; and Latin America, which used to be the backyard of the United States. Beijing’s weight these days can
5 clearly be felt in the corridors of the United Nations Security Council, the Six-Party Talks on the North Korean nuclear issue, and even in international economic and financial bodies such as the World Economic Forum, the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund.ix
While broad consensus exists on emerging Chinese power in both economic and military terms, there is less agreement on its extent and implications, what security policy Beijing is likely to adopt, or the best strategy to handle change. Debates on whether China is a status quo or revisionist power remain.x A second indicator has been China’s military buildup over the past decade. With double-digit increases in defense expenditure, imports of advanced Russian weaponry to enhance power project capabilities, and the restructuring of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) into an integrated, leaner, and more mobile fighting force, China is seen as presenting a credible and serious challenge to the regional balance of power.xi A third indicator is more behavioral than material, which is the perceived (and occasionally demonstrated) Chinese assertiveness in handling international affairs and growing irredentism. China’s rise encourages it to pursue great- power ambitions in Asia Pacific. It has sought to become a blue water maritime power by boosting its power projection capabilities and by extending and establishing naval presence in both Southeast Asia and South Asia to the Indian Ocean.xii
6 Of particular note is China’s increasing defense spending since the end of the Cold War. On March 4, 2007, at the annual session of the National People’s Congress (NPC), the Chinese government announced that the 2007 defense budget would be 350 billion yuan, or about $44.9 billion, an increase of 17.8 percent over the 2006 budget, and the largest increase in five years.xiii American reaction to China’s hike in defense spending and its expected military buildup was cautious but concerned. U.S. Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates told reporters that greater transparency on Beijing’s part could help clarify both its strategies and intentions. Joint Chief of Staff Chairman General Peter Pace expressed concern over China’s recent anti-satellite weapons (ASAT) test and submarine activities.xiv Deputy Secretary of State John Negroponte echoed this view and emphasized that Beijing should be less secretive about its military even as Chinese officials assailed Washington for its latest arms sale of $400 million of air and ground missiles to Taiwan.xv Even before the 2007 budget announcement, Vice President Dick Cheney called the Chinese ASAT test and China’s swift military buildup “not consistent with China’s stated goal of a peaceful rise.”xvi An analysis from the Heritage Foundation, a conservative U.S. think tank, characterizes Beijing’s latest spending increase as an effort to challenge the United States as the military superpower.xvii
China’s dramatic rise has elicited deep disquiet in Japan. Since the late 19th century, when Japan defeated China under the Qing Dynasty, the country has never experienced living with an equal power in Asia. Envy aside, there is also growing concern over the potential “China threat” especially with Beijing having maintained steady growth in defense expenditure at double-digit rates over the past 18 years, purchased major weapons systems from Russia, and continued nuclear and missile modernization. China’s growing military power, while not comparable to that of the former Soviet Union during the Cold War, nevertheless presents a serious challenge to Japanese interests.xviii The U.S. Department of Defense annual report on China’s military power suggests that some of China’s short-range missiles are targeted at American forces in Okinawa.xix Tokyo’s response has been to strengthen the U.S.-Japan security alliance and to develop closer ties with other Asian countries such as India and Australia to hedge against future contingencies.xx
7 Meanwhile, there has been a gradual shift in Japan’s China policy from “a faith in commercial realism to a reluctant liberalism.” This has been due in large measure to the generational change of leadership and fractured Japanese domestic politics since the early 1990s. The liberal assumption that China would become more accommodating as it became prosperous, hence necessitating a strategy of economic engagement through ODA programs, trade and investment, has been gradually eroded as tensions began to build up between the two countries in the 1990s.xxi Partly as a result of China’s dramatic economic growth (which had justified a gradual phasing-out of Japan’s ODA loans programs to China) and partly motivated by politics, Tokyo has decided to end official assistance to Beijing by 2008, when the Olympic Games will be held in China.xxii
There is also growing doubt within some quarters of the Japanese media about the strange nature of the Japanese-Chinese relationship despite the pretension of continued friendship. Likewise, public opinion surveys conducted in Japan depict more negative attitudes toward China driven by uncertainty of that country’s role in Asia Pacific and its impact on Japan.xxiii At the same time, the domestic process of China’s policy making has also changed dramatically and in the process, the so-called “China school”—career diplomats who have studied, lived in, and presumably understood China better—has lost its unique place in the Japanese bureaucratic politics and hence their influence has been declining.xxiv
Japan is greatly concerned with China’s growing military capabilities and is pushing for greater transparency from Beijing to allay growing ‘feelings of distrust’ among the Japanese. For this reason, the Japanese government has persistently sought to prod for greater Chinese transparency in its military spending and planning.xxv Tokyo has rejected China’s complaints about its involvement in missile defense research. From a Japanese perspective, both the Japan Defense Agency (JDA) and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) look at its participation in such research and development as an alliance- enhancer and a technology-driver, as much as a potential defense against ballistic missiles. Given that Japan does not possess nuclear and missile capabilities, Beijing’s
8 opposition to Tokyo’s research program indicates a desire to be able to strike Japan, something contrary to the “no-first-use” policy.xxvi For instance, in its report, East Asian Strategic Review 2000, the Japanese National Institute for Defense Studies pointed out that China “has not only been deploying and strengthening its ballistic missiles but it had exported ballistic missile and related materials in the past. …The very fact that such a country criticizes a country like Japan, which does not have ballistic missiles, for conducting research into [ballistic missile defense] is misguided and unacceptable.”xxvii Tokyo has in recent years become more explicit in discussing both China’s economic and military rise and expressing serious concerns over the implications of a much stronger and confident China. In the East Asian Strategic Review 2007, analysts from the National institute for Defense Studies (under the Ministry of Defense) give prominent coverage of China’s rise and what they interpret as Beijing’s ambition to “seize regional leadership” and establish a “China-centered new order in the region.”xxviii The report cites, among other things, China’s continuing energy development projects in the East China Sea as a major point of contention between the two countries.
Likewise, China is extremely worried about the consequences of a more assertive Japan actively involved in the region’s security affairs, seeking to be a “normal” power.xxix For instance, the December 2001 National Defense Program Outline (NDPO) earmarked ¥25.16 trillion for the next five years, making Japan second to the United States in terms of overall defense spending and first on a per-soldier basis. Large allocations have been devoted to procuring major sea and air weapons systems and platforms. Japan already has one of the largest defense budgets in the world and has a reasonably sized (given its peace constitution) but the best-equipped military in the region. In addition, Japan’s industrial and technological wherewithal will provide it with ready resources should it decide to become a great military power on short notice, including acquiring nuclear weapons.xxx The dispatch of JSDF ships and personnel to the Gulf and Iraq since the Afghan War is a worrisome sign for the Chinese that Japan may have started on this path.xxxi It is no coincidence that Beijing has also been critical of Japanese intention to upgrade the Japan Defense Agency (JDA) to the ministerial level.xxxii To Chinese analysts, the recent elevation of the JDA to a ministerial level is an
9 important symbol of Japan’s pursuit of normal state status, and also shows that military power is becoming a more critical component of Japan’s security policy. These important changes are in turn linked to Japan’s changing role in the U.S.-Japan alliance, which provides a convenient pathway for Japan to push the constitutional envelope toward eventually doing away with Article 9.xxxiii
This “cold politics” stands in sharp contrast to “hot economics” in Sino-Japanese relations. Over the last three and half decades since the two countries established diplomatic relations, China and Japan have developed extensive ties in the areas of trade, investment, and cultural exchanges. Two-way trade passed the $207 billion in 2006, making Japan China’s number one trade partner. Accumulated Japanese investment in China is well over $56.1 billion, with major Japanese automakers and electronic giants relocating their manufacturing plants to China. Japanese ODA has amounted to $15 billion and has made significant contribution to Chinese economic development over the last three decades. Close to 300 Chinese and Japanese cities are paired as sister cities and two-way people-to-people exchanges exceed 3 million per year.xxxiv However, political relations remain strained even as the two Asian giants are economically more interdependent than ever before. Deep-rooted suspicion and distrust continue to hamper a full-fledged development of bilateral relations on a solid foundation.xxxv
CHINA’S VIEWS ON U.S.-JAPAN ALLIANCE
Chinese attitudes toward the U.S.-Japan alliance have, over the years, shifted from outright condemnation and opposition in the 1960s, to tacit acquiescence in the 1970s and 1980s, to growing apprehension and criticisms since the end of the Cold War. Beijing has reacted negatively to the April 1996 U.S.-Japan Joint Declaration on Security and to the September 1997 U.S.-Japanese Defense Cooperation Guidelines. While in the past the alliance, in Beijing’s eyes, served a useful purpose of keeping Tokyo from seeking re- militarization, it is now increasingly viewed as a security threat. This perception has been largely influenced by changing U.S.-China and Sino-Japanese relations.xxxvi Three issues
10 stand out. First, Beijing considers the revitalized U.S.-Japan military alliance as part of Washington’s containment strategy towards China. After all, the alliance was established during the Cold War years, with the defense of Japanese territories as its primary mission. Now that the Cold War has ended, its very raison d’être – protecting Japan from Soviet aggression – no longer exists. The alliance therefore reflects a Cold War mentality and actually justifies and facilitates continued U.S. military presence in the region with unmistakably clear objectives: to maintain American primacy against China as a potential future adversary.
Second, the 1997 U.S. – Japan Defence Guidelines could be interpreted as extending the alliance’s defense perimeter to include the Taiwan Strait; China is, understandably, concerned with the possible intervention of the U.S.-Japan alliance in what it regards as its internal affairs and re-unification plansxxxvii. Tokyo’s ambiguity regarding its defense perimeter, based not on geography but on events, only heightens Beijing’s suspicions.xxxviii
Third, the revitalized alliance allows the Japanese Self Defense Force (SDF) to take on additional responsibilities. Beijing is increasingly worried that a more assertive Japan, actively involved in the region’s security affairs and seeking to be a “normal” power, will emerge as a result.xxxix The new defense guidelines in effect give Japan the green light to go beyond the original exclusive self-defense to a collective defense function, therefore providing justification for Japan to intervene in regional security affairs.xl
While in the past, China remained less than outspoken about the U.S.-Japan alliance as it was more narrowly focused on defending Japan, that reticence is increasingly being replaced with publicly expressed concerns over the new direction of the alliance and especially the expanded role for Japan in the revised defense guidelines. xli For the Chinese, the fundamental issue is whether the alliance will continue to serve as a useful means to keep a lid on Japan’s military ambition or whether it will become a launch pad for Japan to justify the expansion of the JSDF’s role in support of much expanded alliance missions beyond the defense of Japan.
11
Beijing is closely monitoring the expanded role of the Japanese Self-Defense Force since the 9/11 terrorist attacks against the U.S., including the dispatch of JDF personnel overseas beyond UN-sponsored peacekeeping operations. Chinese commentators suggest that Tokyo is using this and the North Korean nuclear crisis as pretexts to not only become a “normal” country but also to embark on a path of re- militarization. Chinese analysts point out the revised defense guidelines provided convenient pretext for Japan to undertake re-militarization away from the original defense of Japan-only principles. This principle ensured that Japan would: keep a minimum self defense forces; not possess offensive weapons and power projection capabilities; not launch preemptive military strikes and only engage in limited self- defense actions when directly attacked; have defense parameters limited to the surrounding air space, sea, and maritime territories; and refrain from intelligence gathering extended to others’ air space. However, these have all been bypassed or modified.xlii Japan, in particular, needs the alliance to both address concerns of Asian countries and enhance its military capabilities. The nature and parameter of Japan’s role within the alliance has undergone a significant transformation: from a uni-dimensional U.S. defense of Japan to joint security cooperation where Japan will play a greater supportive role. The new alliance is no longer confined to the defense of only Japan but is extended to the Asia-Pacific region, hence the danger of Japan’s involvement in military conflicts over Taiwan; Japan is steadily moving toward becoming a normal country, with a number of “breaches” already taking place—overseas dispatch of JSDF personnel; support for the principle of collective defense; use of force in self-defense.xliii
Of the three issues related to the consolidation of the U.S.-Japan alliance, the issue of Taiwan is perhaps the most salient. Tokyo’s ambiguity regarding its defense perimeter, based not on geography but on events, only heightens Beijing’s anxiety. For instance, after the second mid-term report on amending the 1978 U.S.-Japan Defense Guideline, Japanese officials responded to queries about the definition of the so-called “surrounding areas” by stating that any area that could seriously affect Japan’s security could be considered as a surrounding area and Japan’s role in alliance actions would
12 depend on the specific circumstances. This, in effect, made it possible for the JSDF to engage in supporting U.S. military operations away from the Japanese territory. However, Tokyo did seek to reassure neighboring countries that the alliance’s actions would be in accordance with the United Nations Charter and international law and that Japan’s role would be confined within the constitutional framework.xliv
The controversy surfaced in late 1997 as remarks by Japanese officials again brought up the contentious issue of whether Taiwan would be within the parameter of the so-called “surround areas.” On July 22, 1997, Koichi Kato, the Secretary General of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), said to the U.S. Under Secretary of State Thomas Pickering that “the areas surrounding Japan” mentioned in the Japan-U.S. defense guidelines then under review and hence covered by the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty would not include the Taiwan Strait. This position was echoed by the Foreign Ministry of Japan.xlv However, a few weeks later, on August 17, Chief Cabinet Secretary Seiroku Kajiyama stated “In case of a Taiwan-China military conflict, how could we flatly refuse a request from U.S. forces for support, even a supply of water?”
Beijing reacted strongly to Kajiyama’s remarks. A Foreign Ministry spokesman demanded that the Japanese government clarify its position and abide by its one China pledge, as committed by Japan in the communiqué establishing bilateral relations in 1972 and reiterated in the 1978 Sino-Japanese Treaty of Peace and Friendship. Vice Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan pointed out that the Taiwan Strait was “the most important and sensitive issue in Chinese foreign affairs” and demanded a clarification. Chinese officials and commentators reminded Tokyo that the treaty, in which the PRC and Japan normalized their diplomatic relations, specifically stipulates that Taiwan is a part of China xlvi
That China should be concerned with the alliance’s potential impact on the Taiwan issue is reinforced by developments in the last few years during which the United States and Japan clearly have demonstrated their interests in what Beijing considers to be purely its own internal affair. The United States, Japan, and Taiwan have in recent years
13 held high-level military exchanges and dialogue. In August 2002, the trilateral strategic dialogue was held, with a second meeting scheduled for 2003. In addition, the first Japan- Taiwan air defense conference was also held in Taipei in November 2002.xlvii The most significant development was the joint statement released at the end of the February 2005 U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee meeting (the so-called 2+2 meeting). The two countries’ foreign and defense ministers for the first time publicly stated that “the peaceful resolution of issues concerning the Taiwan Strait through dialogue” and China’s military transparency as among their common strategic objectives, along with peaceful resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue.xlviii
The joint statement incurred strong condemnation from the Chinese government. Its Foreign Ministry spokesman stated at a press conference that Beijing “resolutely opposes the United States and Japan in issuing any bilateral document concerning China’s Taiwan, which meddles in the internal affairs of China, and hurts China’s Sovereignty.”xlix The Chinese objection came on the heels of its protest in response to Director of U.S. Central Intelligence Agency Porter Goss’s testimony at the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence where he pointed out that “Beijing’s military modernization and military buildup is tilting the balance of power in the Taiwan Strait” and that “improved Chinese military capabilities threaten U.S. forces in the region.”l Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, at another hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee, also voiced concerns over the expansion of China’s navy.li
14 What alarmed Beijing is what it views as the unprecedented clarity with which Washington and Tokyo define their security interests and perimeter in the region, which now clearly includes the Taiwan Strait. This is seen by China as exceeding the jurisdiction of a bilateral security pact whose original objective was the defense of Japan. While the U.S.-Japan joint statement also made a point to “develop a cooperative relationship with China, welcoming the country to play a responsible and constructive role regionally as well as globally,” the spat and misunderstanding that could arise from this development could cast a shadow over the long-term stability in the region.lii
American intentions to develop and deploy theater missile defenses in Northeast Asia and Japanese participation in their research and development programs raise another concern for China. While Beijing tacitly acknowledges the role of TMD in protecting U.S. forward deployed troops from missile attacks, it objects to advanced TMD systems that could be extended to cover Taiwan. In an interview with Defense News in February 1999, Sha Zukang, then director-general of the arms control and disarmament department in the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, said that China was not concerned about “what we call genuine TMD.” Instead, “what China is opposed to is the development, deployment and proliferation of antimissile systems with potential strategic defense capabilities in the name of TMD that violate the letter and spirit of [the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty] and go beyond the legitimate self-defense needs of relevant countries.”liii
China has voiced a number of specific concerns over the development and deployment of theatre missile defense.liv First, the Chinese see TMD as yet another deliberate step that the United States has taken to strengthen the U.S.-Japan military alliance, hence enhancing its offensive as well as defensive capabilities. It has been reported that the U.S. may begin deploying the TMD system as early as 2008.lv Second, China contends that TMD research and development encourage and provide a pretext for Japanese re-militarization. Beijing’s suspicion of a post-Cold War assertive Japan is reinforced by Tokyo’s reluctance to be forthcoming on its historical records; its ambiguity regarding its defense perimeter; its potent and potential military capabilities; and its potential involvement in a Taiwan crisis.lvi
15
Consequently, Japan’s participation in theater missile defense is also drawing increasing attention from China and elsewhere in Asia. Indeed, Beijing closely watches Japan’s participation in TMD R&D.lvii Since the North Korean Taepo-dong missile launch in August 1998 and recent nuclear developments, Japan has speeded up steps to acquire and deployment missile defense systems in addition to its ongoing research and development collaboration with the U.S.lviii According to Chinese estimates, the JDA began a covert study in 1995 of TMD technical feasibility and spent 550 million yen between 1995 and 1998. In September 1998, the U.S. and Japan formally signed the MOU on joint TMD research and development.lix Given Japan’s current naval capability (it already possesses four Aegis destroyers and has the strongest naval fleet among Asian countries), TMD systems would equip Japan with both offensive and defensive capabilities. Soon after the passage of the UN resolution on maintaining the ABM Treaty in November 1999, the JDA’s deputy director-general told reporters that it would not affect U.S.-Japan joint research on TMD.lx
Overall, since the mid-1990s, and, in particular, since the Bush administration came into office in 2001, the U.S.-Japan military alliance has been strengthened in a number of areas: a new military consultative mechanism has been established to discuss long-term military strategies; there is closer cooperation in missile defense research and development; and there is greater Japanese SDF rear area support of U.S. military operations and defense of U.S. military installations in Japan. Burden sharing aside, Washington wants to develop a special relationship with Tokyo just like the one it has with London. The Armitage Report of 2000 argued that Japan’s role in the alliance should be elevated to follow the pattern of the special U.S.-U.K. special relationship. The recently released Armitage/Nye Report of 2007 reaffirms this position, calling for even closer security and military cooperation between the two allies.lxi The U.S. is also encouraging Japan to discard the ban on undertaking collective defense functions so that it could fulfill its obligations such as rear area support as specified in the new defense guidelines. This is in line with the overall adjustment of U.S. strategic re-orientation which is shifting focus from Europe to Asia.lxii
16
BEIJING ASSESSES JAPAN’S GROWING MILITARY APPETITES
One of the major concerns that Beijing has over the strengthening of the U.S.- Japan alliance is whether Tokyo would take advantage of the requirements of the alliance, coupled with the changing international security environment, especially in the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, to introduce changes and amend the peace constitutions so that Japan would legitimately rearm and step out of the postwar constitutional limitation on overseas deployment of military personnel. Chinese analysts suspect that Tokyo may be seeking to acquire independent self defense even as it strengthens its alliance with the United States. There are a number of telltale signs of this effort. One is the modernization of the JSDF in both force structure and equipment. In addition, Japan has established an indigenous defense manufacturing capability and is seeking to acquire an independent intelligence-gathering ability. Finally, there is always the concern that one day Japan may acquire nuclear weapons. Whether or not Japan can achieve these objectives depends on how Washington handles the bilateral alliance that serves both as a cork in the bottle to prevent Japanese re-militarization and encourages Japan to play a more active role in regional and global contingencies.lxiii
When JDA announced its participation in the 2000 RIMPAC military exercises, the Liberation Army Daily commented that Japan “is casting off its peace constitution” and “the ghost of Japanese militarism is stirring on the Japanese archipelago.” General Zhang Wannian, then vice chairman of China’s Central Military Commission, reportedly told high-ranking PLA officials that Sino-Japanese relations hinged on whether Tokyo would follow Washington’s policy and whether Japan will re-militarize. More specifically, Zhang suggested that while Sino-Japanese economic relations have been close and stable, there has been limited cooperation in the political sphere since the mid- 1990s and that bilateral security cooperation has come to a standstill. Zhang also warned against the rise of militarist forces in Japan seeking hegemony in East Asia.lxiv
17 The 2004 Japanese Defense Program Outline introduced major changes, including expansion of the scope of national security interests from defense of Japan to global defense. In particular, the latter shifts from traditional emphasis on the defense of Japan to its abilities to respond to terrorism, ballistic missile threats, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and securing stability in regions critical to Japanese national interests. Second, Japan has undertaken measures to strengthen defense capabilities through closer cooperation with the international community, with allies, and self-strengthening. Third, Tokyo is pursuing normal country status, including the right and ability to exercise collective defense, changes to its “three non-nuclear principles” and principles governing arms exports. Fourth, there is even closer coordination with U.S. strategic posture and military interoperability. This includes building a more agile, flexible, multi-functional JSDF, shifting focus to areas spanning from the Middle East to East Asia, especially key sea lines of communication (SLOCs) vital to Japan’s secure supplies of raw materials and resources. Lastly, the new defense outline of 2004 pays greater attention to the growing threats from China and North Korea.lxv
In accordance with its new security policy and strategic orientation, Japan has undertaken to improve its military capabilities to meet its new defense requirements and those of the alliance in the areas of interoperability, joint efforts in missile defense developments, and greater rear area support of U.S. and other allied operations. There has been a clear shift from the emphasis on cheque book diplomacy, and ODA to enhancement of its military and intelligence gathering capabilities, including power projection capabilities. In addition, the parameter of defense has also shifted from preventing a direct attack on Japan to helping shape the international environment outside Japan’s own territory.lxvi
Chinese experts describe the 1990s in Japan as the “decade of conservatism” in that Japanese politics decidedly shifted to the right. A number of pieces of legislation were passed that aimed at promoting the objectives of pursuing normal country status. It was also the decade of a “leap forward” in defense policy, with the passage of the New Defense Guidelines of 1999, the special anti-terrorism bill of October 2001, and
18 emergency measures bill of 2002. These bills have in effect resulted in three major breakthroughs: the first is the removal of geographic restrictions on overseas dispatches of JSDF personnel beyond the Far East and surrounding areas of Japan; the second is the right to use arms for self-defense and use of force; and third is the power of the cabinet to dispatch without prior parliamentary permission but only post-dispatch permission. Indeed, 9/11 provided the opportunity for Japan to take major strides in realizing its desire for normal country status.lxvii It is no coincidence that Beijing was also critical of Japanese intention to upgrade the Japan Defense Agency (JDA) to the ministerial level, now a reality.lxviii
What is most significant is Japan’s right to collective self-defense, especially under the following two contingencies. One is when the United States is involved in a conflict with a third country not directly affecting Japanese interests, whether or not Japan will render logistic support; the second is whether or not Japan would provide direct logistic support when allies close to Japan, including the United States, are under attack or involved in military conflicts. Either way, Japan will increasingly become involved in participating in U.S.-led military operations, including in the Taiwan Strait.lxix
Missile Defense Cooperation and Military Integration
Beijing is focusing its analyses most sharply on the implications of ever closer cooperation between Tokyo and Washington, as the two countries knit together missile defense networks and move toward implementation of the United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment. Chinese commentators and analysts have particularly scrutinized four sets of developments, because they are seen as reflecting not only Tokyo’s sense of urgency in quickly deploying a working missile defense system, but also a carefully thought-out, long-term plan to transform Japan into a “normal” country by gradually chipping away the constitutional and political obstacles to acquiring the customary trappings of military power.
19 Just before its elevation to the ministerial level, Japan Defense Agency requested 219 billion yen (US$1.87 billion) in funding for missile defense for the 2007 fiscal year, an increase of more than 56 percent over the current spending. The money would be used for purchases and early deployment of both the land-based U.S. Patriot Advanced Capability 3 (PAC-3) anti-missile system and the sea-based U.S. Standard Missile-3 interceptor. It will also be used for improvements in Japan’s early warning systems, such as electronic surveillance and the introduction of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). The sale to Japan of Standard-3 defensive missiles, worth $458 million, will be the first such U.S. sales to a foreign country. In June 2006, the Aegis-equipped cruiser U.S.S. Shiloh successfully intercepted a medium-range missile using a SM-3 during the RIMPAC exercises off Hawaii, in which Japan participated.lxx The United States reportedly will also provide 80 PAC-3 interceptors to Japan, although this has not been confirmed by the JDA. Chinese media note that the JDA cites both the July North Korean missile tests and the Sino-Japanese territorial disputes as the impetus for the funding increase.lxxi
A second major development being watched by Chinese analysts is the acceleration of Japan’s missile defense deployment schedule, apparently prompted by North Korea’s July 2006 missile tests. The United States and Japan had originally set 2011 as the year for deployment in Japan of defenses against theater-range missiles, although both countries have also viewed 2006 as a critical year for aggressively advancing the joint missile defense efforts. Japan for its part has decided to move its originally scheduled deployment of March 2008 ahead by several months to the end of 2007, with the initial units of PAC-3 interceptors deployed in four bases around the Tokyo metropolitan area. Meanwhile, in the immediate aftermath of the July 5 tests, the United States has also sped up deployment of sea-based missile defense systems to the region, assigning two additional Aegis-class vessels, a destroyer and a cruiser, equipped with the Standard-3 missile interceptors, to Yokosuka, which will bring the total of Aegis-class ships assigned there to eight.lxxii
The Chinese media has also focused on the U.S.-Japan agreement to develop a joint center for missile defense intelligence-gathering and information-sharing, seeing it
20 as an important new military link between the two countries. Once operational, it will become a core component of the U.S.-Japan missile defense system, which will monitor and evaluate events such as future North Korean missile tests. When Pyongyang conducted its missile tests in 2006, the United States and Japan gathered and processed information independently, with little coordination.lxxiii
Finally, Japan’s more active participation in U.S.-led military exercises, the most recent being the June 2006 RIMPAC exercise, has also come under the microscope of the Chinese media. In the maneuvers, the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force destroyer Kirishima, equipped with the Aegis radar system, took part in a missile intercept by tracking the target missile. Meanwhile, the Chinese media have noted that Washington and Tokyo have moved closer toward development of unified military commands.lxxiv
Chinese analysts argue that Japan’s core interest in speeding up missile defense deployment is directed toward China, despite Tokyo’s claims that its objective is to defend itself against North Korean missiles. Chinese commentators argue that Japan plans to deploy missile defenses on Okinawa, which would make them particularly useful in protecting Japanese Self-Defense Forces in their operations in the East China Sea, the Taiwan Strait, and the Diaoyu/Senkaku Island area, with China obviously in mind.lxxv In fact, the defensive systems will be deployed by the United States on U.S. bases on Okinawa, rather than by Japan. This may not diminish the challenge they could pose for China in the theaters noted by the Chinese commentators.
Japan’s interest in accelerated missile defense deployments, its growing integration into related U.S. military operations, and its active participation with the United States in joint research and development activities raise serious questions, Chinese analysts say, about Tokyo’s intentions. They see these actions as encouraging Japanese reconsideration of the long-standing restrictive interpretation of Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution, which limits its right to collective self-defense, and as leading Tokyo to reexamine its ban on arms transfers to states that could become involved in regional conflicts, in particular missile-defense related technology transfers to the United States
21 (which could potentially become involved in a conflict in the Taiwan Strait). Most troubling for Chinese analysts, it appears, is the possibility that Tokyo’s missile defense activities could set the stage for Japanese involvement in a future conflict over Taiwan, with Japan’s sea-based missile defense systems deployed to support Taiwan’s defenses, as a counter to Chinese short-range missiles.lxxvi
Intelligence, Satellites, and Japan’s Military Space Policy
Chinese media is also paying growing attention to Japanese efforts to develop independent intelligence-gathering and space surveillance capabilities. Over the years, and in particular since the North Korean launch of the Taepo-dong missile, Tokyo is determined to acquire its own capacities in this critical area. On January 24, 2006, a Japanese Advanced Land Observation Satellite named Earth was launched by an H-2A rocket from the Yoshinobu space complex on Tanegashima Island. A second satellite, a multi-purpose satellite MTSAT-2 was scheduled for launch in mid-February 2007 but a malfunction has forced its postponement. While Tokyo emphasizes that the satellite is for earth observation, Chinese media consider it as a spy satellite, citing US news sources that the satellite carries three high-performance sensors that can detect objects of 2.5 m diameter size on earth and have surveillance over the entire Asia-Pacific 24 hours a day.lxxvii
Japan launched its first two spy satellites in March 2003, prompted largely by the need to have its own intelligence in response to growing concerns over North Korea’s nuclear and missile developments. Indeed, according to one Chinese news source, a satellite intelligence center was set up within the Japanese Self-Defense Agency in early 2001, the first step in the country’s intelligence satellite program.lxxviii Despite (and perhaps because of) the setback in late 2003 when two satellites broke up soon after launch and again in 2005 when launch had to be postponed, Tokyo is determined to acquire advanced intelligence gathering and reconnaissance capabilities via satellites by allocating over 61 billion yen (approx $5.2 billion) in a special appropriation in 2006 for satellite launches and maintenance.lxxix
22
Chinese analysis is focused on three worrisome trends in Japanese space policy as reflected in its satellite endeavors. The first is the Japanese government’s effort to modify existing regulations governing the peaceful use of space, promulgated in 1969. Chinese observers note that a special committee on space policy was established within the ruling Liberal Democratic Party to reassess current policy and make recommendations to the government for any necessary changes. The 1969 regulation prohibits JSDF from developing and using satellites for missile defense early warning purposes. One major change will be to modify the current complete ban on the military use of space to allow so-called “non-offensive military use of this environment. This change would explicitly authorize the Japanese Self-Defense Forces to develop and use space assets for defensive military purposes, including intelligence-gathering.lxxx
The second trend is Japan’s interest in developing its military space capabilities to enable the Self-Defense Force to increase the number and expand the scope of missions overseas. Japan is contemplating revising Article 9 of its Constitution to pave the way, Chinese analysts believe, for rebuilding itself into a major military power. This would require it to develop its own military surveillance, reconnaissance, intelligence- gathering, and communications capabilities. At the moment, Japan depends on the United States for support in these areas, due to Japan’s lack of these indigenous capabilities.lxxxi
Third, Japan’s satellite program is strongly driven by Tokyo’s vision of a future rivalry with the region’s other major powers, and China, in particular. While Tokyo justifies its program as driven by concerns over North Korea’s nuclear and missile developments, in reality it is seeking to hedge against China, through satellites that can gather military intelligence using high-resolution imagery and early warning of missile launches, in support of Japan’s emerging missile defense systems. Over time, Japan seeks to enhance its capabilities in the areas of force projection, precision positioning and targeting, and military surveillance.lxxxii
23 Japanese Debates on the Three Non-Nuclear Principles
Finally, and perhaps the most serious concern that Beijing has is over Tokyo’s potential reversal of its nuclear policy, especially the three “non nuclear principles”—not to produce, use, or introduce nuclear weapons into Japan. North Korea’s October 9, 2006, nuclear test has touched off international condemnation. The United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 1718 imposing sanctions on Pyongyang. Amid the reactions to North Korea’s nuclear brinkmanship, Japan’s debates on the nuclear options have caught the attention of Chinese media and analysts.
Shoichi Nakagawa, chairman of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party’s policy research council, suggests that Japan needs to discuss its nuclear options in response to North Korea’s nuclear test. He further argued that Japan’s constitution does not prohibit the country from possessing nuclear weapons. Foreign Minister Taro Aso told a parliamentary committee that it is important to discuss the matter.lxxxiii While both also stated that Japan would stick to the three non-nuclear principles and indeed Prime Minister Shinzo Abe declared the debate over, the ripple effect of these statements has already attracted much attention, especially from China.
Chinese analysis of the issue focuses on three factors: (1) Japan’s technical capabilities and material base for building nuclear weapons; (2) motivations for Tokyo to discard its non-nuclear principles and pursue the nuclear options; and (3) the obstacles, both domestic and international, to Japan’s nuclear options, especially the role of the United States. Beijing is watching closely Japan’s growing virtual nuclear capabilities. In an article published in the 2006 Yearbook on International Arms Control and Disarmament, three analysts from the Beijing Institute for Applied Physics and Computational Mathematics (IAPCM) carefully examine Japan’s plutonium stockpiles and point out that while Tokyo in 1997 pledged to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) that it would not hold surplus plutonium, it had by the end of 2004 accumulated over 43 tons, enough for making 5,000 nuclear warheads. In addition, Japan
24 is planning a new spent fuel reprocessing facility in Rokkasho-mura and will also introduce fast-breeder reactors.
The IAPCM analysts raise a number of issues concerning Japan’s plutonium policy. One is the real purpose of Japan’s pursuit of complete nuclear fuel cycle—it being the only non-nuclear weapons state to have both uranium enrichment and spent fuel reprocessing capabilities. They point out that Japan had in the past pursued its own nuclear weapons program and conducted special studies in the 1960s and 1990s. Second, there is the question of safety regarding the Rokkasho-mura facility and the material accounting issue. Third, the introduction of fast-breeder reactors would allow Japan to have access to the so-called super grade plutonium ready for nuclear weapons use. At the time when both the IAEA and the Bush administration call for moratorium on allowing more countries to have complete nuclear fuel cycle capabilities, Japan’s plutonium policy smacks of a double standard and is not conducive to maintaining the integrity of the regime and makes it more complicated in dealing with Iran’s and North Korea’s nuclear problems.lxxxiv There is great consensus among Chinese analysts that Japan has the necessary nuclear technologies, excessive quantities of plutonium potentially usable in making nuclear weapons, and computer techniques to simulate tests to derive relevant data for nuclear weapon designs, all of which would allow Japan to make nuclear weapons at very short notice.lxxxv
Chinese media reports focus on the motivations behind Japan’s nuclear debates. As pointed out by a number of analyses, Japan has conducted numerous studies on the feasibility and cost-benefit of possessing nuclear weapons. In recent years, as Tokyo becomes increasingly engrossed by its desire to become a normal country, domestic debates on the peace constitution, Japan’s role in the world, and the mission of Self- Defense Forces have been introduced. But none is more controversial than the debate on Japan’s nuclear options, a taboo subject in the past but one that is gradually being accepted by the Japanese public. Indeed, former Japanese Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone suggested in September 2006 that Japan needs to consider the nuclear option.lxxxvi
25
One prominent Chinese Japan specialist points out that the current debate is based on a combination of factors: Japan’s desire to achieve greater independence of U.S. control and the sentiment of great power status, a growing emphasis on military power; fear of nuclear and missile threats in the region as well as the rise of neighbouring countries (such as China); and a revisionist approach to history.lxxxvii Indeed, a number of Chinese analysts have suggested that North Korea’s nuclear test provides a convenient excuse and could prompt Japan to reconsider its nuclear options, including discarding its non-nuclear principles.lxxxviii
However, Chinese analysts also acknowledge that whether Japan could go nuclear will depend on a number of factors. Washington has strongly opposed any Japanese intention to acquire nuclear weapons and this will likely remain U.S. policy. While the international nuclear non-proliferation regime has gone through significant strain over the last years, the international community remains united in opposing further nuclear proliferation. Given Japan’s reliance on overseas markets and resources, the consequences of going nuclear could be anticipated as very severe. As the only country suffering nuclear attacks, there is strong sentiment against acquiring nuclear weapons in Japan. Indeed, the Nakagawa/Aso comments incurred immediate rebukes from the opposition parties and victims of nuclear bombs. Other LDP officials and cabinet members, including JDA director general and chief cabinet secretary, expressed concerns over the Nakagawa/Aso statements, and consider them contradictory to Japan’s domestic laws and international commitments that could send the wrong signals to other countries. The ultimate consideration would be if acquiring nuclear weapons, given the constraining factors listed above, would enhance Japan’s security and whether Tokyo remains confident in U.S. nuclear umbrella.lxxxix
American attitude toward Japan’s nuclear debates and its role in reining in Japanese nuclear ambition is critical, according to Chinese analysts. Some Chinese reports describe Secretary Rice’s October 2006 trip to Japan as an effort to shore up Tokyo’s confidence in the U.S. nuclear umbrella as well as to secure pledges from the
26 new Abe administration that Japan will not renege on its three non-nuclear principles. Aso, for instance, pledged to Rice that Japan has no intention to acquire nuclear weapons, saying that Japan “is absolutely not considering” building a nuclear arsenal in response to the North Korean nuclear test. This has not passed unnoticed by the Chinese media, which implicitly gives a positive spin of U.S. nuclear umbrella as well as the U.S.-Japan security alliance and their role in keeping a lid on Japan’s nuclear aspirations. Chinese analysts note that U.S. military presence in Japan serves an important function in its strategy for East Asian security, that is, to both allow Japan to play a more active role in regional security but at the same time to control Japan. In this context, a nuclear Japan will be detrimental to fundamental U.S. strategic interests.xc
27 HISTORY, TAIWAN, AND TERRITORIAL DISPUTES
Sino-Japanese relations experienced their most serious deterioration during 2001- 2006 when Koizumi was the Japanese Prime Minister.xci Three issues in particular strained the bilateral relationship: the historical baggage and growing nationalism in both countries; territorial disputes, especially in the context of Beijing-Tokyo competition for energy resources; and Japan-Taiwan ties, which Beijing views as blatant interference in its domestic affairs. These developments are taking place at a time when both countries are experiencing generational change in leadership transition against the dynamics of changing domestic politics and the external environments.xcii
Indeed, the structural change discussed above has also been paralleled by the emerging nationalism in both countries and growing negative feelings toward each other. For domestic reasons, both Chinese and Japanese leaders have sought to take advantage of public sentiments to cement their political positions and become reluctant in undertaking conciliatory gestures in bilateral relations for fear of being viewed as weak and concessionary. This process of feeding nationalism for political gains in turn has greatly constrained diplomatic flexibility for both countries, making reconciliation difficult.xciii This is clearly reflected in the two countries’ sharply divergent interpretation of history. Prominent examples include: the massive anti-Japanese demonstrations in China in early 2005 in response to the issuance of Japanese history textbooks that whitewash Japan’s atrocities in China during the Second World War and Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi’s visit to the Yasukuni Shrine; China opposing Japan’s bid to become a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council in early 2005; and public display of disdain for Japan during the 2004 Asian Cup Soccer Tournament Final in Beijing.xciv
The two countries remain haunted by the past. The Japanese middle school textbook issue continues to irritate China. The controversial annual visits to the Yasukuni Shrine by Japanese politicians, including Prime Minister Koizumi and cabinet members, further anger and alienate Beijing. Koizumi in particular showed considerable defiance in
28 the face of Chinese protests and went to Yasukuni six times during his tenure, with the last one deliberately on August 15, 2006, the date that Japan surrendered in the Second World War and a most sensitive anniversary. This understandably caused significant offence not only to the Chinese but also to the Asians who suffered from Japanese invasion and occupation in the early half of the last century. Tokyo’s refusal to face history has strained its relationships with many of its neighbours.xcv The 2003 incident involving several dozen Chinese workers exposed to the leakage of abandoned chemical weapons left by the invading Japanese army in Qiqihar in Heilongjiang Province keeps the memory fresh of Japan’s wartime atrocities.xcvi While Beijing admonishes Tokyo to face up to its historical past, the new generation of Japanese politicians, and the public at large, are becoming increasingly impatient with the politics of apologies.xcvii
China and Japan have yet to resolve their territorial disputes over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands. Tokyo reacts strongly to what it considers as serious intrusions of its territorial waters by Chinese maritime survey ships and demands explanations from Beijing. In November 2004, a Chinese submarine reportedly sailed into Japanese waters without identifying itself. Beijing eventually acknowledged that “technical problems” caused the accidental veer.xcviii Beijing is angered by the Japanese government’s acquiescence in allowing right-wing Japanese groups (and some politicians) to conduct provocative activities. Offshore development of oil fields along the continental shelf cause additional disputes over the reaches of the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) in areas where Chinese and Japanese territorial waters overlap.xcix The fact that both countries now depend on oil imports also drives them to fierce rivalry for energy sources in Russia as well as for the East China Sea. Beijing claims the entire area based on the continental shelf principle set forth in the 1994 UN Law of the Sea Treaty while Tokyo insists on dividing the maritime territories by the median line.c
One worrying trend, as far as Beijing views it, is the growing ties between Taipei and Tokyo. While Japan officially upholds the “one China” policy ever since 1972, its position on Taiwan’s legal status has always been ambivalent. When the Tanaka cabinet decided to conclude normalization of diplomatic relations with Beijing in September
29 1972, there was strong opposition from the pro-Taiwan Diet members and politicians within the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). In 1973, the LDP established a Diet Members’ Japan-Taiwan Dialogue Group to maintain contact with Taiwanese politicians. The Democratic Party of Japan in 1997 also established a Diet Members’ Japan-Taiwan Friendship Association. The language that the Japanese government adopted at the time was that it “fully understands and respects” the position of the Chinese Government that “Taiwan is an inalienable part of the territory of the People’s Republic of China.”ci During the so-called “golden era” of bilateral relations (1972-1989), Beijing and Tokyo were able to handle the sensitive issue of Taiwan’s status and the Japanese government for the most part kept Tokyo-Taipei ties strictly at the non-official level.
However, three developments changed this relatively stable status. First, Taiwan has evolved from the KMT-controlled authoritarian regime to an emerging democracy. Especially since the former Taiwanese President Lee Teng-hui succeeded Chiang Ching- kuo in 1988, the process of democratization has picked up speed. In 1996, the first open presidential election was held in Taiwan and in 2000, the formerly banned opposition party the Democratic Progress Party (DPP) won the election and its leader Chen Shui- bian took office as the President.cii He was re-elected in the controversial 2004 election. Lee Teng-hui in particular took the initiative to push for more and high-level official interactions between Taiwanese and Japanese officials. There is growing affinity between Taiwan and Japan as a result. Second, China’s 1995-96 missile exercises in the Taiwan Strait raised the specter that Beijing might resort to the use of force to resolve the Taiwan issue. Given Taiwan’s strategic location on the path of Japan’s sea lines of communication (SLOC), Tokyo has become more attentive to the cross-Strait developments and hence incentives for more interaction with Taiwan.ciii
Third, the East Asian regional economic transformation and growing economic interdependence has promoted greater Japanese-Taiwanese economic ties in that Japanese companies seek to use Taiwanese businessmen’s connections to the mainland to gain access to markets and establish manufacturing facilities. Indeed, recent years have seen growing official interactions between Taipei and Tokyo, although these remain
30 largely between legislators rather than high-level officials. While Tokyo still denies visas to Taiwanese officials holding the following five posts—president, vice-president, premier, defense and foreign ministers—it is reported that Taiwan’s National Security Advisor regularly visits Japan for consultation with Japanese officials, although such reports have not been confirmed.civ For instance, between January 2005 and July 2006, more than 350 Japanese Diet members/times visited Taiwan in 21 groups. Japan has also granted Taiwanese visa waivers—against Beijing’s strong protest and opposition—to facilitate tourism. In 2006, 1.2 million Taiwanese visited Japan while 1.18 million Japanese tourists visited Taiwan.cv Indeed, it has been widely agreed that except for the official recognition, relations between Taipei and Tokyo have never been better even though Japan maintains that its “one China” policy has not changed.cvi
As a result, the Japan-Taiwan ties have grown in recent years.cvii The Japanese government has granted visas to former Taiwanese President Lee Teng-hui to travel to Japan for medical treatment; former Japanese Prime Minister Mori has visited Taiwan; and Chen Shui-bian has even called on Tokyo to adopt a Japanese version of Taiwan Relations Act. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s book during last year’s campaign for the LDP leadership, Changing Japan into a Beautiful Country, calls for closer cooperation between Japan and other democracies in the Asia-Pacific region, the so-called coalition of maritime democracies that presumably could also include Taiwan. Japan has publicly supported Taiwan’s full membership in the World Health Organization, a move that even Washington has so far not undertaken.cviii Beijing therefore has plenty of reasons to be worried about the growing Tokyo-Taipei ties. Indeed, Chinese analysts suggest that Taiwan is more critical to Japan than it is to the United States. For the latter, it is merely a pawn in Washington’s overall strategic game and a useful one for slowing down China’s rise. But for Japan, the future of Taiwan could affect Japan’s claims to the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, its sea lines of communication, and the East China Sea. Therefore, there are even more incentives for Tokyo to obstruct the eventual unification between the mainland and Taiwan.cix
31 In sync with growing activities related to readiness by U.S.-Japan military alliance to intervene in case of contingencies in the Taiwan Strait, Japan has redeployed its SDF ground units to Okinawa and discussed constructing equipment depots on the island for U.S. troops. The U.S. also plans to station F-22 fighter wings on Okinawa, which could arrive at the Taiwan Strait within 20 minutes.cx More worrisome, from the Chinese perspective, is the increasing military-to-military contacts between Japan and Taiwan. In August 2006, Taiwan’s Army Commander Hu Zengpu reportedly went to Japan to observe JSDF exercises under the guise of a “tourist excursion”. The Japanese side declined comments on such reports. That controversy aside, it is known that Japan- Taiwan military ties have steadily emerged and expanded. According to Chinese analysts, four indicators mark this trend. First, retired high-ranking military officers are now appointed to key positions in the quasi-official representative offices in each other’s capital. Second, retired Japanese military officers are increasingly engaged in bilateral security dialogues with serving Taiwanese military personnel. Third, there is even discussion of retired JSDF personnel serving as advisors to the Taiwanese armed forces on military exercises. And finally, there is reported intelligence-sharing between the two. With the introduction of PAC missile defense systems to Taiwan, it can be expected that more intelligence-sharing could take place among Washington, Tokyo, and Taipei.cxi
SECURITY DIALOGUE AND CBMS
Between the mid-1980s to 2001, China and Japan developed some rudimentary confidence-building measures (CBMs), including an annual security dialogue since 1993 and exchange visits between the two countries’ top defense officials. Given that the two countries at the time were not poised to pose immediate military threats to one another but remained suspicious of each other’s intentions, the focus of bilateral CBM efforts had been more on reassurance than developing specific mechanisms.cxii While this approach was helpful in facilitating ongoing bilateral dialogues without directly and prematurely introducing constraining measures, the expanding missions of the two militaries, coupled with continuing disputes over territorial issues and the sea lanes of communications,
32 could elevate the role of CBMs in bilateral relations. For our purpose Sino-Japanese CBMs could be grouped into three categories of activities: exchange visits between the two countries’ top defense officials; security dialogues; and other ad hoc mechanisms, including Track-II activities.
Official Exchange Visits
Early bilateral efforts in CBMs date back to the 1980s when both China and Japan faced threats from the Soviet Union. While Beijing never publicly acknowledged the existence of a Japanese military force (therefore rendering military-to-military relations a non-starter), limited exchanges between the PLA and the JSDF nevertheless did take place occasionally. In 1984, China’s Defense Minister Zhang Aiping paid an unofficial visit to Japan. The PLA Chief of the General Staff Yang Dezhi visited Japan in 1986 and the Director General of the Japan Defense Agency visited China for the first time in 1987.cxiii With the end of the Cold War, both China and Japan began to reassess their security environments and develop new policies, including the need for more regular bilateral exchanges on security issues. Since the mid-1990s, top defense officials of the two countries have exchanged visits and a security dialogue was initiated in 1993. The following senior Chinese military officers paid official visits to Japan since the early 1990s: Gen. Zhang Wannian, CMC vice chairman, the highest military officer (September 1998); Gen. Chi Haotian, China’s Defense Minister (February 1998); Gen. Fu Quanyou, PLA Chief of General Staff (April 2000); Lt. Gen. Wang Tailan, deputy director of the PLA General Logistics Department (September 1999); Gen. Xiong Guangkai, deputy chief of the General Staff of the PLA (November 2000); and Gen. Liu Shunyao (February 2001). Top Japanese defense officials have made numerous official visits to China: in 1995, the Chairman of the Joint Staff Council of JSDF (1995); JDA administrative vice minister (August 1996); JDA Director-General Kyuma Fumio (May 1998); JDA administrative vice minister Seiji Ema (November 1999); Yuji Fujinawa, chairman of the Council of Joint Chiefs of Staff of the Self-Defense Forces of Japan (June 2000); and Takegouchi Shoji, chief of the Air Self-Defense Force of Japan (October 2000).cxiv These exchange visits covered a wide range of CBM-related issues,
33 including discussion on mutual port calls, joint training, and exchange of students from each other’s military academies.cxv Table 2 provides a brief summary of selected bilateral defense exchanges and security dialogue between 1984 and 2006.
Security Dialogues
The first bilateral security dialogue was held in December 1993 between the two foreign ministries. In March 1994, a meeting between the two defense ministries took place. The third meeting, held in 1995, was attended by both foreign and defense officials of the two countries. cxvi The sixth round of bilateral security dialogue was held in Tokyo on October 7, 1999. The two sides exchanged views on a number of issues of common concerns, achieved some consensus but remained divided on others. In particular the Chinese side was not satisfied with Japanese explanation of the U.S.-Japan military alliance.cxvii The dialogue process was stalled for almost two years as a result of sharp differences over the passage of the U.S.-Japan defense guidelines in the Diet and Japanese participation in the research and development of theater missile defense systems. On June 19, 2000, the seventh Japan-China Security Dialogue took place in Beijing. On November 2, 2000, another round of bilateral security dialogue was held in Tokyo in the wake of Premier Zhu Rongji’s visit to Japan. Among the topics covered were: reaffirmation of reciprocal port visits, with a visit by a PLAN ship scheduled in 2001; invitation by respective defense ministers for official visits; exchanges of defense white papers; agreement on visits by service chiefs, also scheduled for 2001; continued consultation at the deputy-minister level; prior notification of maritime research activities; and support to promote visits of young PLA officers to Japan.cxviii
Table 2. Selected Sino-Japanese Defense Exchanges and Security Dialogue, 1984- 2006 (Security dialogues in bold)
Dates Activities 1984 Chinese Defense Minister Zhang Aiping paid an unofficial visit to Japan 1986 PLA Chief of General Staff Yang Dezhi visited Japan 1987 Director General of the Japan Defense Agency visited China
34 December 1993 First bilateral security dialogue held in Beijing between two foreign ministries March 1994 Second bilateral security dialogue held in Tokyo, attended by both foreign ministry and defense officials January 1995 Third bilateral security dialogue held in Beijing 1995 Chairman of the Council of Joint Chiefs of Staff visited China January 1996 Fourth bilateral security dialogue held in Tokyo December 1997 Fifth bilateral security dialogue held in Beijing February 1998 Chinese Defense Minister Gen. Chi Haotian visited Japan May 1998 JDA Director General Kyuma Fumio visited China September 1998 CMC Vice Chairman Gen. Zhang Wannian visited Japan September 1999 Lt. Gen. Wang Tailan, deputy director of the People’s Liberation Army’s General Logistics Department, visited Japan October 1999 Sixth bilateral security dialogue held in Tokyo November 1999 JDA Administrative Vice Minister Seiji Ema visited China April 2000 Gen. Fu Quanyou, PLA Chief of General Staff visited Japan June 2000 Seventh bilateral security dialogue held in Beijing June 2000 Chairman of the JDA Council of Joint Chiefs of Staff Yuji Fujinawa visited China November 2000 Gen. Xiong Guangkai, PLA deputy chief of general staff visited Japan October 2000 Takegouchi Shoji, Chief of the Air Self-Defense Force of Japan visited China November 2000 Eighth bilateral security dialogue held in Tokyo November 2000 JDA vice minister Ken Sato met Gen. Xiong Guangkai, PLA deputy chief of the general staff February 2001 PLA Air Force Commander Gen. Liu Shunyao visited Japan November 2001 China and Japan agreed to exchange warship visits March 2002 Ninth bilateral security dialogue held in Tokyo July 2006 Tenth bilateral security dialogue held in Beijing November 2006 PLA Assistant Chief of the General Staff Zhang Qinsheng visited Japan
However, the bilateral security dialogue was suspended in 2001 due to the Japanese textbook issue and Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro’s controversial visit to the Yasukuni Shrine. It was resumed in Tokyo in March 2002 amidst China’s double-digit increase in defense expenditure. Japan raised concern over the increase and the lack of transparency while China worried about the expansion of Japan’s military role.cxix Ten rounds of talks were held at the Vice-Ministerial level by July 2006, which involve both diplomats and military officers from the two sides.cxx During this period, mid-level
35 military exchanges continued. For instance, a JSDF delegation visited China in the summer of 2006. This was the sixth in the bilateral PLA-JSDF flag officer exchanges first sponsored by the Sasakawa Foundation in 2000. Over sixty JDA officials and JSDF officers and 100 PLA officers participated in this program.cxxi A strategic dialogue has now been established and with the recent thaw in bilateral relations, it is expected that the military-to-military contacts will also resume. A high-level PLA delegation visited Japan in November 2006 and both sides agreed to exchange port visits in 2007. It has been reported that Chinese Defense Minister General Cao Gangchuan is scheduled to visit Japan in summer 2007, followed by the Chairman of the JSDF Joint Chiefs’ return visit to China, the highest ranking Japanese military officer ever to visit China since the end of the Second World War.cxxii
Ad Hoc Mechanisms and Track-II Activities
Since the late 1990s, growing controversy over the disputed Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands developed between the two countries. Reported Chinese naval and research activities into what Japan considers as its EEZ and around the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands became a major concern for Tokyo. The Japanese media has suggested that the Chinese incursions include intelligence gathering activities. The ‘Haibing 723’ was identified as being such an incursion when it was reported to have made repeated transits through the Tsugaru Strait and the Tsushima Strait.cxxiii This was one of the top agenda items during Japanese foreign minister Yohei Kono’s visit to China in August 2000.cxxiv While both sides vowed to prevent future incidents from harming bilateral relations, this may largely depend on whether and when an eventual resolution of this touchy, and at times emotional, issue can be worked out.cxxv
As a consequence, the two governments discussed and agreed on developing CBMs to avoid further incidents. During the Kono visit to China, Chinese foreign minister Tang Jiaxuan suggested that each side inform the other about its research in the disputed waters. China also pressed Japan to define its western maritime border in light of the recurring incidents in disputed waters.cxxvi On September 27-28, 2000, the second
36 round of Japan-China consultations on mutual prior notification of maritime research activities was held in Beijing. This mechanism was reaffirmed during Zhu’s visit to Japan in October even though both sides continue to hold fast to their respective positions.cxxvii
Sino-Japanese discussions on CBMs also focused on: developing function-level activities such as port visits and exchanges of senior military officers; cooperation in promoting regional security; and implementation of international arms control agreements. On October 20, 2000, during the Japan-China foreign ministers’ meeting held on the fringe of the Third Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM III), the two sides discussed a number of issues, including a reaffirmed commitment to realize mutual port visits of naval vessels and agreement to hold a second round of consultation on prior notification of maritime research activities. China also raised the TMD issue.cxxviii The ASEAN+3 also provide a venue for broader multilateral diplomacy and multilateralism for both China and Japan. The two sides also agreed to coordinate their efforts to urge North Korea to sign CTBT.cxxix
One of the ways in which the two countries could enhance mutual trust is through cooperative implementation of international arms control treaties to which both countries are parties. In this instance, Japan’s decision to send a mission to China to help excavate abandoned CW left by the Imperial Japanese Army during World War II could contribute to such efforts.cxxx The two-week long operation, from September 13-27, 2000, including some 75 Japanese and 200 Chinese civilian and military personnel removed close to 900 CW-contained shells left by the Japanese Imperial Army. The Japanese team included eight SDF personnel and was the first such operation in which Japan participated fully.cxxxi
The two governments have also maintained the Sino-Japanese Consultation on the East China Sea and Other Matters at the director-general level since October 2004. To date seven rounds of meetings have been held, however no breakthrough has been achieved regarding the territorial issue and the latest meeting held in Tokyo proved no exception.cxxxii China has proposed joint exploration and development, and the two sides
37 have agreed to set up a maritime hotline to deal with unpredictable situations. Indeed, it has been suggested that the two countries should establish crisis management mechanisms to prevent potential military conflicts and resolve disputes as a result of survey activities conducted by naval vessels in the East China Sea.cxxxiii
Parallel to the official exchanges, Track-II activities promoting security dialogue have also taken place. Former Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto led a delegation including former JDA officials (Joint Staff Council chairman Tetsuya Nishimoto, and former administrative vice defense minister Masahiro Akiyama) to China in October 25- 28, 2000, to promote greater exchanges between personnel of the two militaries and experts. The delegation was at the invitation of the China Institute of International Strategic Studies (CIISS), headed by Gen. Xiong Guangkai (ret.), a former deputy chief of the general staff.cxxxiv
However, a major constraint on the credibility and effectiveness of Japan’s approaches to CBMs is the U.S.-Japan security alliance, which makes real progress on Sino-Japanese relations impossible without posing the risk of seriously rupturing the former. Japan is in an awkward position of having to convince China of its harmless intentions while at the same time maintaining and even strengthening its alliance with the U.S.cxxxv This raises questions of credibility. Indeed, Tokyo’s pursuit of a nuclear disarmament policy without forfeiting U.S. nuclear umbrella can hardly be taken seriously. Likewise, Tokyo’s policy toward China also complicates its relationship with Washington, as it continues to rely on the latter for the provision of defense.cxxxvi
Despite these concerns, efforts were made in the past to develop constructive trilateral security dialogue among the three countries. A number of Track-II workshops were conducted in the 1990s to promote greater understanding and exchanges of ideas. For instance, the Japan Center for International Exchange, the United States Institute of Peace, and the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences has held a series of meeting since December 1996. Other efforts include: those coordinated by the Japan Institute of International Affairs, the China Institute of International Studies, and the Asia Center at
38 Harvard University, which held three meetings in 1998 and 1999; and Japan’s Research Institute for Peace and Security, the China Institute of International Strategic Studies, and CSIS Pacific Forum, which also held three meetings in 1996 and 1997.cxxxvii
While the overall political relationship during 2001-2006 imposed significant restraints on Sino-Japanese security and military ties, limited contacts continued. Xu Caihou, Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission, in meeting a delegation of the Sasakawa Japan-China Friendship Fund in June 2006, told the visiting Japanese delegation that China would continue to promote understanding and mutual trust, and to strengthen defense cooperation between the two countries.cxxxviii
Given the importance of bilateral relations, both sides have sought ways to improve ties or at least manage their differences through dialogue. Beijing appointed Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Wang Yi, a skillful Japan specialist, to be China’s ambassador to Tokyo.cxxxix While Beijing shunned direct summit meetings with Koizumi after 2002, Chinese leaders continued to meet him on the sidelines of multilateral forums such as the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) informal leaders’ meetings; the ASEAN + 3 meetings, and the China-Japan-South Korea summit meetings. Chinese President Hu Jintao laid out the five principles to govern Sino-Japanese relations during his meeting with Koizumi at the 50th anniversary of the Asian-African Summit in Jakarta, Indonesia in April 2005:
First, the Japanese government should strictly abide by the Sino- Japanese Joint Statement marking the normalization of bilateral relations (1972), the Peace and Friendship Treaty (1978), and the Sino-Japanese Joint Declaration (1998); and take specific actions to forge a friendly and cooperative relationship with China toward the 21st century;
Second, Tokyo should regard history as a mirror to reflect on its wartime past and deal with historic problems in a serious and sincere manner;
39
Third, the Taiwan issue must be properly handled and the “One China” principle maintained;
Fourth, differences between the two countries should be resolved through dialogues and consultation on an equal footing; and
Fifth, China and Japan should further strengthen communication and cooperation in various areas and encourage people-to-people ties; the two countries should also strengthen mutual understanding and broaden mutual benefits.cxl
On its part, Tokyo also tried to improve relations by maintaining dialogue at various levels and in different channels. The Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ (MOFA) annual Diplomatic Bluebook devotes significant coverage to its relations with China. It identifies the Japan-China Comprehensive Policy Dialogue (at the Vice- Ministerial level), the Japan-China Consultations Concerning the East China Sea and Other Matters (director-general level), and various other working-level meetings and consultations. In addition, activities related to cultural exchange, student visits, and sports events are also being promoted. The New Japan-China Friendship Committee for the 21st Century holds regular meetings in both countries. And the Japanese government also set up a “Japan-China joint working program” to promote bilateral relations. Most recently, over 200 Diet members have formed a committee to support the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games.cxli
From the Chinese perspective, there are three layers in Sino-Japanese relations. The first relates to history and the Taiwan issue. The second is the anchoring of this relationship. During the Cold War, their common interest in opposing Soviet expansionism made a China-Japan-U.S. alignment possible. But the end of the Cold War has removed this pillar. However, growing economic interdependence seems to have replaced the old security pillar. The third layer contains various so-called “T” problems:
40 Taiwan, territorial disputes, textbooks, trade friction, etc. To enhance mutual trust, the two countries need to devote more efforts to developing the four “C”s: communication, confidence, cooperation, and common interests. While current the Sino-Japanese relationship could be described as being at its very lowest point, some Chinese analysts also point out it is also one of growing interdependence and areas of cooperation. Economic ties aside, the two countries have also established mechanisms for security dialogue in both bilateral and multilateral fora, including the Six-Party Talks, ARF, ASEAN+3 to deal with terrorism, WMD proliferation, and regional security.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Sino-Japanese relations are destined to be one of the key elements of East Asian security in the coming years. While over the last three decades, since the diplomatic normalization between the two Asian powers, China and Japan have developed extensive ties in the areas of trade, investment, and cultural exchanges. However, deep-rooted suspicions and distrust still linger. Partly due to the historical legacy, a changing generation of leadership and politicians in both countries, and partly due to the two countries’ divergent perspectives on building the post-Cold War security architecture in the region, Beijing and Tokyo remain locked in a relationship of rivalry rather than expending their energies in building and leading the region toward greater peace, stability, and prosperity. Of particular salience is how the two countries manage major structural transformation in East Asia as their relative power continues to undergo changes. For the first time in history, the two countries face each other as equals, instead of the “one strong, one weak” situation over the past 150 years since the Meiji Restoration. This requires both Beijing and Tokyo to adapt and accept the new realities and work toward cooperation and manage potential disputes.cxlii
Both countries recognize the importance of managing bilateral relations in a constructive manner and have made efforts to introduce CBMs through regular contacts and exchange of views. A series of security dialogues have been held since the early
41 1990s and military-to-military exchanges, while limited and sporadic, have continued over the same period. However, without fundamentally reorienting their perspectives on security, and given the continuing salience of U.S.-Japan security alliance for Tokyo, little progress can be expected. At the same time, as China has begun to move toward greater acceptance of the rationales and norms of multilateralism in Asia Pacific security, Japan seems to be moving away from what it actively promoted in the early 1990s and appears to be more reliant on its military alliance with the United States. This being the case, CBMs between China and Japan likely will remain minimalist in their approaches and scope.
Sino-Japanese ties were seriously strained during the Koizumi administration of 2001-2006. While serious structural problems remain—from power transition, historical issues, to territorial disputes driven increasingly more by economic interests—the recent thawing of bilateral relations with the ice-breaking trip to Beijing by Prime Minister Abe in October 2006 the resumption of summit meetings and more official exchanges (including those between the two militaries) offer the opportunity for both Beijing and Tokyo to keep their disputes to the backburner while looking for long-term solutions.cxliii The next two years could be critical in the bilateral relationships as they prepare for two important anniversaries. Whether the current momentum can be sustained remains to be seen.cxliv Some Chinese analysts suggest that Japan’s path to normal country status can be bolstered by its continued pursuit of peace and development, giving up its right to war and collective defense, upholding the three principles on arms exports and space non- weaponization, economic assistance to neighboring countries, and peaceful partnership with its neighbors. Indeed, they acknowledge that pacifism is widely accepted by the Japanese people, and that opposition to nuclear weapons, nuclear disarmament, and environmental protection are deeply rooted in the Japanese society.
Prime Minister Abe’s ice-breaking trip to China, days after he assumed office and a first for Japanese politicians (as they normally go to the United States first), provides a unique opportunity for both China and Japan to reverse what looks like a free fall in bilateral relations over the next five years. It would be naive to expect that the current
42 atmosphere and positive developments—resumption of summit meetings, including Premier Wen Jiabao’s April 2007 visit to Japan, where he met with Abe and spoke at the joint sessions of the Diet; defense consultation and military exchanges; high-level visits—to paper over the structural, perceptual, historical issues and territorial disputes, which remain largely unresolved. For instance, one could argue that the Yasukuni Shrine for the time being has been removed but not resolved in bilateral relations.cxlv
But what is encouraging is that at least Beijing and Tokyo can explore ways to see how best these disputes can be managed if not resolved for the time being. This is a qualitative as well as procedural difference from the past five years, when the very vehicle for communication—summit meetings and regular official exchanges—was almost completely suspended. Leaders of both countries should seize the moment and make important progress toward re-building trust and friendship to mark the two upcoming anniversaries: the 35th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations and the 30th anniversary of the 1978 China-Japan Treaty of Peace and Friendship. Asia’s peace, stability, and prosperity will also be at stake whether the two powers can manage to live together and lead the region into the 21st century.
Japan’s pursuit of hard power over the past decade, while worrisome in the eyes of Chinese analysts, has not dramatically earned it good standing in the international community; its failure to gain significant endorsement for the UNSC bid is a case in point. At the same time, by forfeiting its soft power potential—its steadfast position on nuclear disarmament and, for decades, its three non-nuclear principles—Tokyo now has an image of a power aligned to the United States. While the Japanese government has conducted a series of studies over the years on the feasibility of pursuing nuclear weapons, Tokyo has in the end upheld the three non-nuclear principles. Its international standing also rose in the postwar years, from a militarized aggressive imperial state to one that has achieved its economic superpower status through industrialization, innovation, and the maximization of its comparative advantage in the international market place. It became one of the most generous—if not the most—country providing
43 ODA and technical help to developing countries. It remains to be seen if the pursuit of normal state status by building hard power will in the end pay off.
CANADIAN INTERESTS
Sino-Japanese relations have important implications for Canadian interests in the region, in at least three respects. First is China’s rise as a major regional and, increasingly, a global player encouraging Beijing to play a more positive and conducive role in promoting regional peace and stability.cxlvi Canada needs to reassess its relationship with China and to build upon close to four decades of growing ties to advance Canadian political and economic interests.cxlvii China was Canada’s second largest source of imports and fourth-largest destination for exports in 2006. Exports grew by 7.8% to $7.7 billion while import values increased by 17% to $34.4 billion. What is most important is the potential for future expansion of bilateral trade and investment as China’s thirst for raw materials continue to grow and Canada’s rich resources provide good trading opportunities.
Since the early 1990s, Canada’s China policy has shifted both from an earlier period of a “special relationship” and the immediate post-Tiananmen shock (1968-1988) to a more pragmatic approach of engagement and dialogue.cxlviii This approach has been based on a more realistic assessment of China’s role in the Asia-Pacific region and its potential as an emerging global power, and Ottawa’s ability to apply its “soft power” to influence events, in particular in seeing a growing and responsible China that is crucial to regional stability in the years to come. Such a China will be helpful in promoting Canadian values and interests, viz., international and regional order, human security, and increased opportunities for trade and investment.cxlix
It would certainly be an overstatement to suggest definitively that Canadian initiatives over the years have brought about changes in China’s security perceptions, but there is increasing convergence between the two on a number of issues. One noticeable
44 development is that Beijing has gradually overcome its earlier suspicion of the multilateral approach in discussing regional and sub-regional security issues. This has been demonstrated by its more proactive participation in various multilateral security forums such as the ARF and NEASD (Northeast Asian Security Dialogue) and other channels including the ASEAN + 3, and China-ASEAN, where security issues are also discussed. Apparently, Canadian engagement of the Chinese policy-making community as well as the think tanks and academia has paid off in that Beijing’s attitude toward multilateralism has significantly changed. One such effort, the CANCHIS (Canada-China Seminar on Asia-Pacific Multilateralism and Cooperative Security), has been credited with training a new generation of young Chinese diplomats, and think-tank analysts on key concepts of security, confidence building, transparency, among others. Of particular interest to Canadian participants (this author included) is the reported pending appointment of Ambassador Fu Ying, the head of the Chinese delegation when the CANCHIS first started in 1997, to be Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs.cl
What is most important, though, is that through these Track I and Track II channels, there are increasing opportunities for the Chinese and Canadians to exchange views and understand each other better on a wide range of issues. To some extent, an epistemic community of experts has been established and its number is growing, at least in terms of moving toward a common understanding of key security concepts and terms so that dialogue is possible, both knowing what the other is referring to.cli Ottawa and Beijing now also share a number of interests regarding global and regional security issues. Perhaps most prominently, the two countries share common concerns over the issue of weaponization of outer space. Both recognize that the existing international treaties were negotiated over three decades ago and that new regulations are urgently needed to prevent the space from being weaponized. An international framework for maintaining outer space as a weapons-free environment would benefit generations to come. Missile defense systems leading to increasingly military use of space (and to weaponization) for defense purposes could (and already has caused) serious concern.clii
45 A second implication is Canada’s relations with Japan. The two countries are democracies, members of the G-8 and OECD, and have a long diplomatic relationship, and share many common interests.cliii Over the years, Ottawa and Tokyo have sought to consolidate and strengthen political and economic ties. In recent years the two countries have set the bilateral agenda for security cooperation and established the Canada-Japan Symposium on Peace and Security that assembles both officials and academics to discuss issues of mutual concern, ranging from human security, anti-terrorism, UN peacekeeping, to disarmament and non-proliferation.cliv
However, bilateral relations have yet to fully realize their potential. Japan ranks much lower in its trade relations with Canada, representing only slightly half of that which exists between China and Canada. On regional security issues, while Canada is more interested in promoting multilateral security institutions such as the ASEAN Regional Forum, Tokyo continues to anchor its core security interests in the U.S.-Japan alliance, and is increasingly interested in forming new alliances, or partnerships with the so-called arc of maritime democracies. The recent Japan-Australia alliance is one example. This emphasis on alliances rather than on regional security institutions, which Ottawa promotes and Beijing now accepts, contributes to heightened suspicions in China. In a way, Japan and Canada adopt different approaches even though they both share similar interests and goals. This may be in large measure due to geography and threat perceptions as much as to the historical legacy of Cold War East Asia.clv While Japan tends to be focused on China’s rise, North Korea, Taiwan, and WMD proliferation in the region, Canadian emphasis seems to be placed more on the emerging non-traditional security challenges such as drug and human trafficking, diseases, environmental degradation, among others.clvi
The third ramification of Sino-Japanese rivalry for Canada relates to the country’s longer-term security interests, including sustained economic development and prosperity, in Asia Pacific and Northeast Asia. A growing portion of Canada’s trade and investment flows are now with the Asia-Pacific countries, with China, Japan and South Korea among Canada’s major trading partners. Prolonged instability and deteriorating security in that
46 region would negatively affect Canada’s interests. Intensified disputes leading to militarized conflicts between China and Japan could result in a number of negative developments. There is the potential for arms race as Japan strives for greater military capabilities, including nuclear and missile capabilities if Tokyo’s confidence in U.S. nuclear umbrella and the alliance protection wanes. A strengthened U.S.-Japan military alliance, and deployment of missile defenses in the region, could further encourage China to undertake counter-measures, including development and deployment of anti-satellite capabilities.clvii Both developments would have serious consequences for nuclear non- proliferation and space weaponization, issues dear to Canadian interests.
Ottawa must remain engaged in the region. The last time a Canadian Prime Minister was in the region (not including APEC leaders’ informal meetings in Vietnam and the Philippines) was in 2005 when Paul Martin visited Japan. In contrast to the 1990s when the Chretien government formed several Team Canada delegations to the region to promote trade, investment, and better political ties, such official outings have significantly reduced. While it is true most of Canada’s trade and major economic activities remain with the United States and within the NAFTA framework, it is short- sighted to not pay sufficient attention to Asia. Given Japan’s weight and China’s growing economic potential, prospects remain for Canada to expand resource-based trade with both countries.
Canada should also remain active in regional diplomacy to promote confidence building, transparency, and conflict management. Ottawa’s support of the region’s multilateral security building process is critical in moving the ARF to the next phase of institutionalization and preventive diplomacy. This is especially important given the recent developments in alliance formation that could render ARF irrelevant with China and Russia on the one side, and the United States, Japan, and Australia on the other, with the dangerous consequence of turning Asia into a zone of balances and maneuvers.
Canada played a very important facilitating role in early 1990s in developing the concept of North Pacific that included all the key actors in the region and engaged them
47 in dialogues on cooperative security, multilateralism, and confidence building measures. Efforts could be made to revive the North Pacific Working Group within the Council for Security Cooperation in Asia Pacific (CSCAP), of which Canada is the co-chair. In addition, academic interactions involving scholars from China, Japan and Canada could also be encouraged to facilitate discussions and better understanding on history, management of territorial disputes, and emerging non-traditional security challenges that affect all and require closer cooperation among the key players in the region and beyond.
Given Ottawa’s expertise in CBMs it could encourage and provide the modalities for Chinese and Japanese analysts and officials to develop and implement crisis management, conflict prevention, and dispute resolution mechanisms. Canada’s experience in organizing the CIDA-sponsored South China Sea workshops in the 1990s could also be helpful in identifying ways to shelve territorial disputes in favor of joint exploration and developments.
48 ENDNOTES:
i Reinhard Drifte, Japan’s Security Relations with China since 1989: From Balancing to Bandwagoning? (London: Routledge, 2003); Wan Ming, Sino-Japanese Relations: Interaction, Logic, and Transformation (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006). ii Yoichi Funabashi, ‘Tokyo’s Depression Diplomacy’, Foreign Affairs 77:6 (November/December 1998), p.2. iii Aurelia George Mulgan, “Why Japan Still Matters,” Asia-Pacific Review 12:2 (November 2005), pp. 104-121. iv Mike M. Mochizuki, “China-Japan Relations: Downward Spiral or a New Equilibrium?” in David Shambaugh, ed., Power Shift: China and Asia’s New Dynamics (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2005), pp. 135-150. v Mochizuki, “China-Japan Relations.” vi Trade statistics drawn from Statistics Canada, Canadian International Merchandise Trade, February 13, 2007. vii On China’s rise and its implications for regional and global security, see David Shambaugh, ed., Power Shift: China and Asia’s New Dynamics (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005); Avery Goldstein, Rising to the Challenge: China’s Grand Strategy and International Security (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005); Kokubun Ryosei and Wang Jisi eds., The Rise of China and a Changing East Asian Order (Tokyo: Japan Center for International Exchange, 2004); Michael E. Brown, et al., eds., The Rise of China (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2000); Yong Deng and Fei-ling Wang, eds., China Rising: Power and Motivation in Chinese Foreign Policy (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2005); Barry Buzan and Rosemary Foot, eds., Does China Matter? A Reassessment (London and New York: Routledge, 2004). viii Figures drawn from the Central Intelligence Agency, The World Fact Book: China, http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/ch.html; National Bureau of Asian Research, Strategic Asia Database, http://strategicasia.nbr.org/Data/CView/; Reuters, “China’s 2006 Trade Surplus Jumps 74 Percent,” International Herald Tribune, January 10, 2007. ix For an excellent overall assessment, see Phillip C. Saunders, China’s Global Activism: Strategy, Drivers, and Tools (Washington, D.C.: Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, October 2006), http://www.ndu.edu/inss/Occasional_Papers/OCP4.pdf x Thomas J. Christensen and Richard K. Betts, “China: Getting the Questions Right,” The National Interest 62 (Winter 2000); Alastair Iain Johnston, “Is China a Status Quo Power?” International Security 27:4 (Spring 2003), pp.5-56. xi David Shambaugh, “China’s Military Modernization: Making Steady and Surprising Progress,” in Tellis and Wills, eds., Strategic Asia 2005-06, pp. 67-103; U.S. Department of Defense, The Military Power of the People’s Republic of China 2006, June 2006. xii Robert G. Sutter, China’s Rise: Implications for U.S. Leadership in Asia (Washington, DC: East-West Center, 2006); Carolyn W. Pumphrey, eds., The Rise of China in Asia: Security Implications (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, January 2002; Zalmay Khalilzad et al., The United States and Asia: Toward a New U.S. Strategy and Force Posture (Santa Monica: RAND, 2001); Jonathan Pollack and Richard Yang, eds., In China’s Shadow: Regional Perspectives on Chinese Foreign Policy and Military Development (Santa Monica: RAND, 1998). xiii Jim Yardley and David Lague, “Beijing Increases Defense Spending,” International Herald Tribune, March 4, 2007, http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/03/05/asia/web-0305military.php. xiv Bill Gertz, “Beijing Shields Goals of Military Modernization,” Washington Times, March 8, 2007, http://washingtontimes.com/national/20070307-104921-2524r.htm.
49 xv Jim Yadley and David Lague, “Beijing Accelerates Its Military Spending,” New York Times, March 5, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/05/world/asia/05military.html. xvi BBC, “Cheney Warns on China Military Build-Up,” February 23, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia- pacific/6388557.stm. xvii John J. Tkacik, Jr., “A Chinese Military Superpower?” The Heritage Foundation WebMemo No. 1389, March 8, 2007, www.heritage.org/Research/AsiaandthePacific/upload/wm_1389.pdf. xviii Yoshihide Soeya, “Japan: Normative Constraints Versus Structural Imperatives,” in Muthiah Alagappa, ed., Asian Security Practice: Material and Ideational Influences (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), pp.203-206. See also, The National Institute for Defense Studies, East Asian Strategic Review 2006. xix “Defense strategists look to China’s attack threat,” Japan Times, November 9, 2004; Reuters, “Japan PM Advisers See China Military Threat,” September 15, 2004; Michael Jonathan Green, “Managing Chinese Power: The Views from Japan,” in Alastair Iain Johnston and Robert S. Ross, eds., Engaging China: The Management of An Emerging Power (London and New York: Routledge, 1999), pp.152-175. xx Takahara Akio, “Japan’s Political Response to the Rise of China,” in Kokubun Ryosei and Wang Jisi eds., The Rise of China and a Changing East Asian Order (Tokyo: Japan Center for International Exchange, 2004), pp. 157-174; Kokubun Ryosei, “The Shifting Nature of Japan-China Relations after the Cold War,” in Lam, Japan’s Relations with China, pp. 21-36. xxi David Arase, “Japanese ODA Policy toward China: The New Agenda,” in Lam, Japan’s Relations with China, pp. 92-106. xxii Tsukasa Takamine, “A New Dynamism in Sino-Japanese Security Relations: Japan’s Strategic Use of Foreign Aid,” The Pacific Review 18:4 (December 2005), pp. 439-461; Reinhard Drifte, “The Ending of Japan’s ODA Loan Programme to China—All’s Well that Ends Well?” Asia-Pacific Review 13:1 (May 2006), pp. 94-117; Nakajima Mineo, “Rethinking Japan’s Aid to China,” Japan Echo 32:3 (June 2005), pp. 33-37. xxiii Neil E. Silver, The United States, Japan, and China: Setting the Course (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2000), pp.19-25; Gilbert Rozman, “Japan’s Images of China in the 1990s: Are They Ready for China’s ‘Smile Diplomacy’ or Bush’s ‘Strong Diplomacy’?” Japanese Journal of Political Science 2:1 (May 2001), pp. 97-125; Gilbert Rozman, “China’s Changing Images of Japan, 1989-2001: The Struggle to Balance Partnership and Rivalry,” International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, Vol. 2 (2002), pp. 95-129. xxiv Interviews, National Institute for Defense Studies, May 2006; March 2007. Quansheng Zhao, Japanese Policymaking: the Politics behind Politics (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993); Murata Koji, “Domestic Sources of Japanese Policy towards China,” in Lam, Japan’s Relations with China, pp. 37-49. xxv James Kynge, ‘Japan Presses China on Military Ambitions’, Financial Times, August 29, 2000 (internet version); Jason Sherman, “Japan Directs New Attention at China,” Defense News, July 23-29, 2001, p. 18. xxvi Green, ‘Managing Chinese Power’, pp.155-156. xxvii The National Institute for Defense Studies, East Asian Strategic Review 2000 (Tokyo: NIDS, 2000). xxviii The National Institute for Defense Studies, East Asian Strategic Review 2007, March 2007. http://www.nids.go.jp/english/dissemination/east-asian/pdf/e2007summary.pdf. xxix Lu Zhongwei, “Riben de guojia zuoxiang yu rizhong guanxi [Japan’s Course of Direction and Its Relationship With China],” Xiandai guoji guanxi [Contemporary International Relations], (July 2001), pp.2-7. xxx “Opposition Leader Ozawa Says Japan Could Produce Nuclear Weapons,” Kyodo in English, April 6, 2002.
50 xxxi Beijing Xinhua, “Riben anbao tixi yanbian [Japan’s Evolving Security System],” February 22, 2004; “The ‘New Defense Group’ in Japanese Polity and the Adjustment in Security Strategy],” Forum on International Studies, No.3, 2003), pp.38-47. xxxii Pan Xiaoying, “Be Vigilant against Japanese Desire to Establish a Ministry of Defense,” Beijing Renmin ribao in Chinese, December 11, 2000, p. 2. FBIS-CPP20001211000026; “Riben mingnian jian guofangbu [Japan to Establish Ministry of Defense Next Year],” Renmin Ribao [People’s Daily], December 1, 2006, p.16. xxxiii Ni Po, “Riben: xiangdang yazhou diyi junshi qiangguo [Japan: Wanting to be Asia’s No. 1 Military Power],” Huqnqiu Shibao [Global Times], March 21, 2007, p. 8. xxxiv Yi Chengde, “Anbei zhengfu wajiao zhengce tiaozheng jiqi juxian [Adjustments and Limitation of the Abe Government’s Foreign Policy],” China Institute of International Studies, February 15, 2007; David Ibison, “Japanese Investment into China Hits Record High,” Financial Times, April 3, 2006; Yang Yanyi, “Dui gaishan he fazhan zhongri youhao hezuo huoban guanxi de jidian kanfa” [Some Personal Views on Improving and Developing Sino-Japanese Friendly Cooperative Partnership],” Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi [World Economic and Politics] (September 2003), pp.26-29. xxxv Hanns Gunther Hilpert and Rene Haak, eds., Japan and China: Cooperation, Competition, and Conflict (Hampshire and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002); Reinhard Drifte, Japan’s Security Relations with China since 1989: From Balancing to Bandwagoning? (London: Routledge, 2003); Wu Jinan and Chen Hongbin, Zhongri Guanxi ‘Pingjin’ Lun [The “Bottleneck” in Sino-Japanese Relations] (Beijing: Shishi Chubanshe, 2004); June Teufel Dreyer, “Sino-Japanese Rivalry and Its Implications for Developing Nations,” Asian Survey 46:4 (July/August 2006), pp. 538-557. xxxvi Wang Jianwei and Wu Xinbo, Against Us or with Us? The Chinese Perspective of America’s Alliances with Japan and Korea (Stanford: The Asia/Pacific Research Center, 1998); Thomas J. Christensen, “China, the U.S.-Japan Alliance, and the Security Dilemma in East Asia,” International Security 23:4 (Spring 1999), pp.49-80; Camilla T.N. Soerensen, “Strategic ‘Triangularity’ in Northeast Asia: The Sino-Japanese Security Relationship and U.S. Policy,” Asian Perspective 30:3 (Fall 2006), pp. 99-128. xxxvii Paul Midford, “China views the revised US–Japan Defense Guidelines: Popping the Cork?” International Relations of the Asia-Pacific 4:1 (February 2004), pp.113-145; Liang Ming, “Rimei xin fangwei jihua yinren zhumu [The New US-Japan Defense Guidelines Attracts Attention],” The PLA Daily, December 22, 2000 (internet version). xxxviii Liu Jiangyong, “Xin ‘rimei fangwei hezuo zhizhen’ heyi lingren youlu [Why the New US-Japanese Defence Cooperation Guidelines Arouse Concerns]?” Xiandai guoji guanxi [Contemporary International Relations], no.11 (November 1997), pp.7-12. xxxix Lu Zhongwei, “Riben de guojia zuoxiang yu rizhong guanxi [Japan’s Course of Direction and Its Relationship With China],” Xiandai guoji guanxi [Contemporary International Relations], (July 2001), pp.2-7. xl Liang Ming, “Rimei xin fangwei jihua yinren zhumu [The New US-Japan Defense Guidelines Attracts Attention],” The PLA Daily, December 22, 2000 (internet version). xli Paul Midford, “China views the revised US–Japan Defense Guidelines: Popping the Cork?” International Relations of the Asia-Pacific 4:1 (February 2004), pp.113-145; Liang Ming, “Rimei xin fangwei jihua yinren zhumu [The New US-Japan Defense Guidelines Attracts Attention],” The PLA Daily, December 22, 2000 (internet version). xlii Yang Bojiang, “Qianghua rimei tongmeng: riben mianxiang 21 shiji de zhanlue qitiaoban [Strengthening the U.S.-Japan Alliance: A Launching Board for Japan in the 21st Century]?” Xiandai guoji guanxi [Contemporary International Relations], No. 6 (1999), pp. 24-28. xliii 金熙德 [Ji Xide], “日美同盟的’再定义’及其未来趋势 [The Re-Definition of the U.S.-Japan Alliance and Its Future Trends],” 世界经济与政治 [World Economics and Politics], No.7 (2000), pp. 13-18. xliv Liu Jiangyong, “Xin ‘rimei fangwei hezuo zhizhen’ heyi lingren youlu [Why the New US-Japanese Defence Cooperation Guidelines Arouse Concerns]?” Xiandai guoji guanxi [Contemporary International Relations], no.11 (November 1997), pp.7-12; Yang Bojiang, “Rimei xiugai ‘fangwei hezuo zhizhen’ zhongqi baogao chuxi [A Preliminary Analysis of the Mid-Term Report on Amending the U.S.-Japan Defense Guidelines],” Xiandai guoji guanxi [Contemporary International Relations], No. 7 (1997), pp. 12- 17.
51 xlv “Military Proposal Doesn’t Target China, Official Says,” Nikkei Weekly, July 28, 1997. xlvi Zhang Guocheng, “Weixian de yanlun [Dangerous Remarks],” Renmin ribao [People’s Daily], August 19, 1997, p. 6. xlvii 杨运忠 [Yang Yunzhong], “日本防卫政策面临重大转折 [Japanese Defense Policy Faces Major Transition],” online publication posted on the South Asian Studies in China website at http://www.casas- pkucis.org.cn/Bak/ddyt/0305-1.htm xlviii “Joint Statement - US-Japan Security Consultative Committee, 2/19/2005,” http://hongkong.usconsulate.gov/uscn/state/2005/021902.htm xlix “U.S.-Japan statement on Taiwan opposed,” China Daily, February 20, 2005, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2005-02/20/content_417717.htm l Bill Gertz, “Chinese Military Buildup Assessed As Threat to U.S.,” Washington Times, February 18, 2005, http://www.washtimes.com/national/20050217-114812-3737r.htm. li Jane A. Morse, “U.S. Monitoring China’s Military Improvements, Rumsfled Says,” U.S. Department of State International Information Program, February 18, 2005. lii 胡继平 [Hu Jiping], “美日’共同战略目标’与日本涉台立场变化 [U.S.-Japan ‘Common Strategic Objectives’ and Changes in Japan’s Stance on Taiwan],” 现代国际关系 [Contemporary International Relations], No.3 (2005), pp. 35-36, 38. liii Sha Zukang, “Some Thoughts on Nonproliferation,” address give at the 7th Carnegie International Nonproliferation Conference, January 11-12, 1999, Washington, D.C. http://www.ceip.org/programs/npp/sha/html; Howard Diamond, “China Warns U.S. on East Asian Missile Defense Cooperation,” Arms Control Today 29:1 (January/February 1999), p. 27. liv Medeiros, Ballistic Missile Defense and Northeast Asian Security, and Missiles, and Theatre Missile Defense, and Regional Stability. lv “U.S. Informs Japan Joint Missile Shield To Be Deployed in 2008,” Kyodo News, November 10, 2002. lvi Hong Yuan, “The Implications of a TMD System in Japan to China’s Security,” Nuclear Policy Project Special Report, August 1999; Sun Cheng, Riben yu yatai – shiji zhijiao de fenxi yu zhanwang [Japan and Asia Pacific – Analysis and Prospect at the Turn of the Century] (Beijing: Shijie zhishi chubanshe, 1997). lvii Michael Swaine, Rachel Swanger, Takashi Kawakami, Japan and Ballistic Missile Defense (Santa Monica: RAND, 2001); Norimitsu Onishi,“Japan Support of Missile Shield Could Tilt Asia Power Balance,” New York Time, April 3, 2004; Kori J. Urayama, “Chinese Perspectives on Theater Missile Defense: Policy Implications for Japan,” Asian Survey XL: 4 (July/August 2000), pp.599-621. lviii “Japan Adopts Missile Defense System,”Mainichi Daily News, December 19, 2003
52 lxv 胡继平,“从新防卫大纲看日本安全战略的调整方向 [U.S.-Japan ‘Common Strategic Objectives’ and Changes in Japan’s Stance on Taiwan],”《现代国际关系》[Contemporary International Relations], January 2005, pp. 48-49, 52. lxvi Christopher W. Hughes, “Japanese Military Modernization: In Search of a ‘Normal’ Security Role,” in Ashley J. Tellis and Michael Wills, eds., Strategic Asia 2005-06: Military Modernization in An Era of Uncertainty (Seattle, WA: The National Bureau of Asian Research, 2006), pp. 105-134. lxvii 张春燕,“美日安全关系的变化及走势 [U.S.-Japan Security Ties: Changes and Trends],” 《现代国际关系》[Contemporary International Relations] (September 2002), pp. 43-47, 36; 陆忠伟, “把握变化, 重视未来—中日建交三十周年回顾与前瞻 [Keeping Abreast of Changes with a View to the Future—Sino-Japanese Relations in the 30th Anniversary: Retrospect and Prospect],” 《现代国际关系》[Contemporary International Relations] (August 2002), pp. 1-6. lxviii Pan Xiaoying, “Be Vigilant against Japanese Desire to Establish a Ministry of Defense,” Beijing Renmin ribao in Chinese, December 11, 2000, p. 2. FBIS-CPP20001211000026. lxix 李秀石, “‘行使集体自卫权’与日本防卫转向 [‘The Right of Collective Self-Defense’ and the Changing Direction of Japan’s Defense,” 《现代国际关系》[Contemporary International Relations] (June 2005), pp. 14-18. lxx Dongfangwang, “Rimei jueding 29 ri zai hengxuhe jidi bushu mei zuixin yusidunjian [Japan and US to Deploy Newest American Aegis Cruiser to Yokosuka on August 29],” August 20, 2006; “U.S. Sends Missile Destroyer to Japan,” CBS News, July 8, 2006, accessible at http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f- news/1662371/posts. lxxi Dongfangwang (Eastday), “Meiguo jiangxiang riben tigong 80 duomei aiguozhe-3xing daodan [U.S. to Supply 80 PAC-3s to Japan],” August 24, 2006; Gao Yong, “Richeng zhongri lingtu jufen shijushi jizhang, yuzeng daodan fangyu yusuan [Japan to Increase Budget for Missile Defense Due to Heightened Tension Caused by Sino-Japanese Territorial Dispute],” Renmin ribao wangzhan (www.people.com.cn), September 1, 2006; Dongfangwang, “Ri fangweiting jiang zhiding 227 yi riyuan yingdui chaoxian daodan yusuanan [JDA Budgets $22.7 Billion in Response to North Korean Missile Tests],” August 23, 2006.Gao Yong, “Richeng zhongri lingtu jufen shijushi jizhang, yuzeng daodan fangyu yusuan [Japan to Increase Budget for Missile Defense Due to Heightened Tension Caused by Sino-Japanese Territorial Dispute],” Renmin ribao wangzhan (www.people.com.cn), September 1, 2006; Dongfangwang, “Ri fangweiting jiang zhiding 227 yi riyuan yingdui chaoxian daodan yusuanan [JDA Budgets $22.7 Billion in Response to North Korean Missile Tests],” August 23, 2006. lxxii “Riben tiqian bushu daodan fangyu xitong queli juedui junshi yushi [Japan to Deploy Missile Defense Ahead of Schedule to Establish Absolute Military Superiority],” August 15, 2006.; Zhongguo xinwenwang, “Riben ni tizao yinian bushu sizuo aiguozhe-3xing daodan fashejia [Japan to Complete Four PAC-3 Deployment One Year Ahead],” July 10, 2006. lxxiii “Meiri daodan fangyu hezuo mabutingti, lianguo tisheng qingbao fenxiang [U.S. and Japan Missile Cooperation Without Halt, Enhance Joint Information Sharing],” September 9, 2006. lxxiv “Japan to Deploy Missile Defense Ahead of Schedule.” lxxv Dongfangwang, “Meiri dazao dongya dandan fangyuwang mingfang chaoxian shiji zhendui zhongguo [U.S. and Japan Deploy Missile Defense Nets Ostensibly Against North Korea But In Fact with China as Target],” July 3, 2006. lxxvi Zhang, “The Evolution of Japanese Missile Defense Development.” lxxvii Ye Lian and Sima Hangren, “Spy Eyes Hidden in Japanese Satellite,” China’s National Defense, February 7, 2006, http://www.chinamil.com.cn/site1/zbx1/2006-02/07/content_401384.htm lxxviii Li Wentao, “Japan Speeds Up Building All-Dimension Intel Networks,” Global Times, January 16, 2006, p. 8. http://military.people.com.cn/GB/1077/52987/4036891.html lxxix “At 61 Billion Yen, Japan Set to Launch Two Additional Spy Satellites,” Xinhua, January 7, 2006, http://military.people.com.cn/GB/1077/52987/4006621.html lxxx You Wenhu, “Japanese Space Policy Going Through Significant Change,” Renminwang Military Channel, January 11, 2006, http://military.people.com.cn/GB/1078/4017365.html; Qiu Yongzheng, “Unbinding ‘Non-Militarization’ Ban: JSDF Poised for Space Charge,” Youth Reference, January 10, 2006, p. 5, http://military.people.com.cn/GB/1077/52987/4010693.html
53 lxxxi “Japan Spends Huge Amounts on Spy Satellites: Paying the Way for Major Military Power Status?” Xinhua, January 25, 2006, http://news.xinhuanet.com/mil/2006-01/25/content_4095876.htm lxxxii “Japan Covertly Develops Military Space Capabilities,” Xinhua, January 28, 2006, http://news.xinhuanet.com/mil/2006-01/28/content_4110297.htm lxxxiii Reuters, “Japan Should Reexamine Its Nuclear Weapons Ban, Ruling Party Official Says,” Washington Post, October 16, 2006, p. 16; Glenn Kessler, “Japan, Acting to Calm U.S. Worries, Rules Out Building Nuclear Arms,” Washington Post, October 19, 2006, A24. lxxxiv Sun Xiangli, Wu Jun, and Hu Side, “Riben de buwenti jiqi guoji guanqie [Japan’s Plutonium Issue and International Concerns,” in China Arms Control and Disarmament Association, 2006: Guoji Junbei Kongzhi yu Caijun Baogao [2006 Yearbook on International Arms Control and Disarmament] (Beijing: Shejie zhishi chubanshe, 2006), pp. 83-91. lxxxv Duan Wei, “Zhanlue guancha: riben hewuqi shengchan qianli jiemi [Strategic Survey: Disclosing Japan’s Nuclear Weapons Production Capabilities],” Junshi Wenzhai [Military Digest], April 3, 2006. lxxxvi “Nakasone Proposes Japan Consider Nuclear Weapons,” The Japan Times, September 6, 2006. See also, “Riben yaozizhi hebaohusan [Japan Intends to Develop Its Own Nuclear Umbrella],” Guoji xianqu daobao [International Herald Leader], September 19, 2006. For a detailed analysis of why Japan will not go nuclear, for the time being at least, see Llewelyn Hughes, “Why Japan Will Not Go Nuclear (Yet): International and Domestic Constraints on the Nuclearization of Japan,” International Security 31:4 (Spring 2007), pp. 67-96. lxxxvii Jin Xide, “Shiping: jingti riben ‘chihelun’ hungshui muyu [Commentary: Beware of Japan Fishing in Trouble Water for Nuclear Weapons Possession],” Guoji xianqu daobao [International Herald Leader], October 20, 2006. lxxxviii Gu Shan, “Fenxi renshi: chaoxian heshiyan keneng tuidong riben fazhan hewuqi [Analysts: North Korean Nuclear Test Could Motivate Japan to Develop Nuclear Weapons],” Zhongguo xinwenwang [Chinanews.com], October 9, 2006. lxxxix Jin Xide, “Beware of Japan”; Gong Chang, “Meiguo danxin riben ‘hewuzhuang’ [U.S. Concerned over Japan’s Going Nuclear],” Huanqiu shibao [Global Times], October 18, 2006, p. 2. xc Geng Xin et al., “Laisi mengya riben hechongdong [Rice Supresses Japan’s Nuclear Urge],” Huanqiu shibao [Global Times], October 19, 2006. See also, Kessler, “Japan, Acting to Calm U.S. Worries.” xci “So Hard to be Friends,” The Economist, March 23, 2005; James Brooke, “Japan’s Ties to China: Strong Trade, Shaky Politics,” New York Times, February 22, 2005; Michael Yahuda, “The Limits of Economic Interdependence: Sino-Japanese Relations,” in Alastair Iain Johnston and Robert S. Ross, eds., New Directions in the Study of China’s Foreign Policy (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006), pp. 162-185. xcii Reinhard Drifte, Japan’s Security Relations with China since 1989: From Balancing to Bandwagoning? (London: Routledge, 2003); Wan Ming, Sino-Japanese Relations: Interaction, Logic, and Transformation (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006); Linus Hagström, Japan’s China Policy: A Relational Power Analysis (London and New York: Routledge, 2005); Lam Peng Er, ed., Japan’s Relations with China: Facing a Rising Power (London and New York: Routledge, 2006). xciii Masaru Tamamoto, “Japan’s Politics of Cultural Shame,” Global Asia 2:1 (Spring 2007), pp. 14-20; Yuan Weishi, “Nationalism in a Transformed China,” ibid., pp. 21-27. xciv Peter Gries, “Nationalism, Indignation and China’s Japan Policy,” SAIS Review 25:2 (Summer 2005), pp. 105-114; He Yinan, “National Mythmaking and the Problems of History in Sino-Japanese Relations,” in Lam, Japan’s Relations with China, pp. 69-91; Che-po Chan and Brian Bridges, “China, Japan, and the Clash of Nationalism,” Asian Perspective 30:1 (2006), pp. 127-156; xcv Anthony Faiola, “Koizumi Stirs Anger with War Shrine Visit,” Washington Post, August 15, 2006, A10; Norimitsu Onishi, “Koizumi Exits Office as He Arrived: Defiant on War Shrine,” New York Times, August 16, 2006. On the history issue and Chinese nationalism, see Yinan He, “History, Chinese Nationalism and the Emerging Sino-Japanese Conflict,” Journal of Contemporary China 16:50 (February 2007), pp. 1-24. xcvi “Abandoned Chemical Weapons (ACW) in China,” NTI, February 6, 2004, http://www.nti.org/db/China/acwpos.htm xcvii Haruko Satoh, “The Odd Couple: Japan and China—The Politics of History and Identity,” JIIA Commentary 4 (August 4, 2006); Jing Huang, “On Sino-Japanese Tension and the US Approach,” Japan Economic Currents 58 (October 2005), pp. 4-8. xcviii Edward Cody, “Beijing Explains Submarine Activity: Japan Considers Account an Apology,” Washington Post, November 17, 2004, A22.
54 xcix Maria Fedorova, “The Roots of Sino-Japanese Differences over the Senkaku (Diaoyudao) Islands,” Far Eastern Affairs 33:1 (Jan-Mar 2005), pp. 109-125; Linus Hagström, “Quiet Power: Japan’s China Policy in Regard to the Pinnacle Islands,” The Pacific Review 18:2 (June 2005), pp. 159-188; Yukie Yoshikawa, “Okinotorishima: Just the Tip of the Iceberg,” Harvard Asia Quarterly IX:4 (Fall 2005), http://www.asiaquarterly.com/content/view/29/1/ c Mark J. Valencia, “Pouring Oil on the East China Sea,” International Herald Tribune, February 24, 2005; Selig S. Harrison, “Quiet Struggle in the East China Sea,” Current History (September 2002), pp. 271-277. ci Sadako Ogata, Normalization with China: A Comparative Study of U.S. and Japanese Processes (Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, 1988); Philip Yang, “Japanese- Taiwanese Relations and the Role of China and the U.S.,” NBR Analysis 16:1 (October 2005), p. 94. cii Shelley Rigger, From Opposition to Power: Taiwan’s Democratic Progress Party (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publisher, 2001). ciii Yoshihide Soeya, “Changing Security and Political Contexts of Japan-Taiwan Relations: A View from Japan,” NBR Analysis 16:1 (October 2005), pp. 39-56; Yang, “Japanese-Taiwanese Relations,” pp. 97-98. civ Interviews, Tokyo and Taipei, March 2007. cv Interview, Taipei, March 2007. Zheng-Jia Tsai, “Jingji nenggou dapu zhengzhi de fanlima: 2000 nian zhihou tairi guanxi de zhuanbian [Can Economy Break the Political Hedge: The Transition of Relationship between Taiwan and Japan after 2000],” Yuanjing Jikan [Prospect Quarterly] (Taipei) 7:3 (2006), pp. 75- 104. cvi Interviews, Tokyo and Taipei, March 2007. cvii Since 2002, the Foundation on International and Cross-Strait Studies in Taipei and the Institute for International Policy Studies in Tokyo have co-sponsored the annual Taiwan-Japan Forum, attended by both officials and academics from the two sides. cviii Agence France Presse, “Japan and China Lock Horns Again over Visa for Ex-Taiwan President,” December 16, 2004, http://www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/afp_asiapacific/view/122613/1/.html; Hiroyasu Akutsu, “Tokyo and Taipei Try to Tango,” Far Eastern Economic Review (January/February 2007), pp. 31-35. cix Zhao Jieqi, “Riben duitai zhengce dongxiang zhide zhuyi [Japan’s Policy toward Taiwan Deserves Attention],” Heping yu Fazhan [Peace and Development] 4 (2004), pp. 51-54; Yu Yongsheng, “Taihai wenti: meiri yinsu you chayi [The Taiwan Strait: The Difference between the U.S. and Japanese Variables],” Shijie Zhishi [World Affairs], 4 (2006), pp. 28-29. cx Zhang Zhuo, “Jiedu meiri beizhan taihai celue [Interpreting U.S.-Japan War Preparation for Taiwan Strait Contingencies],” China Radio International Online, January 31, 2007. cxi Interviews, Tokyo, Taipei, March 2007. Wu Jinan, “Ritai junshi hudong de xianzhuang, beijing ji weilai zoushi [Japan-Taiwan Military Interaction: Current Status, Background, and Future Direction],” Xiandai Guoji Guanxi [Contemporary International Relations] (September 2006), pp. 56-63. cxii For a general discussion, see Jianwei Wang, ‘Confidence-Building Measures and China-Japan Relations’, in Benjamin L. Self and Yuki Tatsumi, eds., Confidence-Building Measures and Security Issues in Northeast Asia. Report No. 33 (Washington, DC: The Stimson Center, February 2000), pp.71-91. cxiii Wang, ‘Confidence-Building Measures and China-Japan Relations’, p.83. cxiv Xinhua, ‘CMC Vice Chairman Zhang Wannian Meets Japan’s SDF Chairman’, 19 June 2000. FBIS, CPP20000619000115; Xinhua, ‘PRC Defense Minister Chi Haotian Meets SDFJ Chairman Fujinawa’, 20 June 2000. FBIS, CPP20000620000098; Xinhua, ‘PRC Chief of General Staff Meets Japan Air Force Chief’, 13 October 2000. FBIS, CPP20001013000166; Beijing Xinhua Domestic Service in Chinese, ‘PLA Air Force Commander Meets Japanese Defense Agency Leaders’, 1 March 2001. FBIS, CPP20010301000050; ‘Japan, China to hold deputy minister-level defense talks’, Kyodo, 26 October 2000 (Internet version). FBIS. cxv Jianwei Wang, ‘Confidence-Building Measures and China-Japan Relations’, pp.83-84. cxvi Yoshihide Soeya, ‘Japan: Normative Constraints Versus Structural Imperatives’, in Muthiah Alagappa,
55 ed., Asian Security Practice: Material and Ideational Influences (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), p.223; The Daily Yomiuri (Tokyo), ‘Japan-China defense dialogue to resume’, 5 September 1999. cxvii Beijing Xinhua, ‘Spokeswoman Says PRC, Japan to Continue Security Dialogue’, 12 October 1999. FBIS; Tokyo Sentaku in Japanese, 1 September 2000. FBIS. cxviii James J. Pryzstup, ‘The Zhu Visit and After … Efforts to Steady the Course’, Comparative Connections (Pacific Forum CSIS, December 2000); ‘Spokeswoman concerned over Japan-US security ties’, Beijing Xinhua in English, 12 October 1999. FBIS. cxix James J. Przystup, ‘Smoother Sailing across Occasional Rough Seas’, Comparative Connections: An E- Journal on East Asian Bilateral Relations, vol. 4, no. 1 (Honolulu: CSIS Pacific Forum, April 2002)
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Tribune, March 30, 2007. cxxxiii “China, Japan End 6th Round of East China Sea Talks, Differences Remain,” People’s Daily Online, July 10, 2006, http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200607/10/eng20060710_281516.html; The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “The Seventh Japan-China Consultations on the East China Sea and Other Matters,” March 27, 2007, http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/event/2007/3/1172942_844.html; “Chinese and Japanese Officials Discuss Military Crisis Management Mechanisms to Prevent Conflicts in the East China Sea,” Eastday Online (Shanghai), May 3, 2006. cxxxiv Miwa Shimizu, ‘Japanese Delegation to Promote Japan-PRC Security Dialogue’, Tokyo Shimbun, 22 September 2000 (morning edition), p.2. FBIS; Xinhua, ‘PRC Military Official Xiong Guangkai Meets Former Japanese PM’, 26 October 2000. FBIS, CPP20001026000160. cxxxv Michael H. Armacost and Kenneth B. Pyle, ‘Japan and the Engagement of China: Challenges for U.S. Policy Coordination’, NBR Analysis, vol. 12, no. 5, December 2001. cxxxvi See, for example, Reinhard Drifte, ‘US Impact on Japanese-Chinese Security Relations’, Security Dialogue, vol. 31, no. 4, December 2000, pp.449-462; Anthony DiFilippo, ‘Can Japan Craft An International Nuclear Disarmament Policy?’ Asian Survey, vol. 40, no.4, July/August 2000, pp.571-598. cxxxvii Morton I. Abramowitz, Funabashi Yoichi, and Wang Jisi, China-Japan-US: Managing the Trilateral Relationship (Tokyo: Japan Center for International Exchange, 1998); ‘Trialogue: U.S.-Japan-China Relations and Asian-Pacific Stability’ (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, September 1998); U.S.-Japan-China Relations: Can Three Part Harmony Be Sustained (Honolulu: CSIS Pacific Forum, September 1998). cxxxviii Xinhua, “China Seeks to Strengthen Defense Cooperation with Japan,” June 28, 2006. FBIS- CPP20060628052001. cxxxix Editorial, “We Welcome Beijing’s Decision to Send Its Japan Expert,” Asahi Shimbun Online, September 21, 2004. cxl Xinhua, “Chinese Official: Policy on China-Japan Ties ‘Clear, Consistent and Unswerving’,” April 19, 2006. FBIS-CPP20060419144041. cxli “Tokyo Decides to Create Japan-China Joint Working Program to Strengthen Ties,” Sankei Shimbun, March 27, 2005, in FBIS-JPP20050327000069; cxlii Feng Shaokui, “Zhongri guanxi: cong lishi dao weilai [Sino-Japanese Relations: From History to Future],” Shijie Jingji Yu Zhengzhi [World Economics and Politics] (September 2005), pp. 35-40; Minxin Pei and Michael Swaine, “Simmering Fire in Asia: Averting Sino-Japanese Strategic Conflict,” Policy Brief 44 (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, November 2005). cxliii Joseph Kahn, “China and Japan Take Steps to Mend Fences,” International Herald Tribune, October 9, 2006; David Pilling and Mure Dickie, “Abe Soothes Relations with China,” Financial Times, October 9, 2006, p. 2; Yang Bojiang, “Redefining Sino-Japanese Relations after Koizumi,” The Washington Quarterly 29:4 (Autumn 2006), pp. 129-137. cxliv For a preliminary assessment, see “Reconciliation between China and Japan,” the special issue of Asian Perspective 31:1 (Spring 2007). cxlv Interview, Tokyo, March 12, 2007. On Wen’s recent visit, see Kenichi Ito, “Sino-Japanese Relations: The Impact of Wen’s Visit,” AJISS-Commentary, no. 2 (Tokyo: Association of Japanese Institutes of Strategic Studies, April 23, 2007), http://www2.jiia.or.jp/en_commentary/200704/23-1.html cxlvi The following discussion draws on and updates the author’s earlier report on China’s role in the North Korean nuclear issue, prepared for Foreign Affairs Canada in 2006. cxlvii For a discussion of the general thrust of such a strategy, see Paul Evans and Yuen Pau Woo, “Canada and A Global China: From Special Relationship to Policy Partnership,” policy paper prepared for the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, April 29, 2004. http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/cip-
57 pic/library/Evans-Woo-e.pdf cxlviii Paul M. Evans and B. Michael Frolic, eds., Reluctant Adversaries: Canada and the People’s Republic of China, 1949-1970 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1991). cxlix DFAIT, “Canada-China Relations,” fact sheet, last updated November 15, 2005. http://www.dfait- maeci.gc.ca/asia/main/china/bilateral-en.asp cl Evans and Yuen, “Canada and a Global China,” p. 7. cli A reflection of this on-going effort can be found in David H. Capie, Paul M. Evans and Akiko Fukushima, Speaking Asia Pacific Security: A Lexicon of English Terms with Chinese and Japanese Translations and a Note on the Japanese Translation. (Toronto: Joint Centre for Asia Pacific Studies, 1998). clii Conference report on “Safeguarding Space for All: Security and Peaceful Uses,” an international conference co-organized by the People’s Republic of China, the Russian Federation, the Simons Centre for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Research, and the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, Geneva, March 25-26, 2004. http://www.unidir.ch/pdf/activites/pdf-act254.pdf cliii Anna Turinov and Yuen Pau Woo, “Canada-Japan Relations at 75: New Reasons to Revive an Old Friendship,” Canada Asia Commentary 37 (October 2004); Mackenzie Clugston, “A Changing Japan and Implications for Canada,” International Insights 3:4 (January 2006). cliv Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, “2005 Canada-Japan Agenda for Peace and Security Cooperation”; The 4th Canada-Japan Symposium on Peace and Security Cooperation, June 10-12, 2005, Research Institute for Peace and Security, Tokyo, Japan. clv Akiko Fukushima, “Review of Japan-Canada Cooperation for Peace and Security,” paper presented at the 4th Canada-Japan Symposium on Peace and Security Cooperation. clvi See, for example, Seiichiro Takagi, “Peace and Security in the Asia-Pacific Region,” and David Dewitt, “Peace and Security in the Asia Pacific Region,” both papers presented at the 4th Canada-Japan Symposium. clvii Bill Gertz, “China Has Gained and Tested Array of Space Weapons,” Washington Times, March 30, 2007; Paul Eckert, “China Cyberspace, Outerspace War Gains Impress: U.S.,” Reuters, March 30, 2007.
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