NR 3 juli/oktober 2010 The Swedish Submarine Issue by Bengt Gustafsson

most people probably have local legends The year before, the last Swedish destroy- from time to time that give a different pic- er in service, HMS Halland, had been de- ture than the official one of troublesome ployed against a couple of submarines that events, such as the one that exists in the were discovered in the outer ar- United States that it was, in actual fact, chipelago in September. One of them acted President Bush who was behind 9/11. The in the manner we had grown used to, i.e. reason for these backlashes is generally ide- it headed out towards international waters alistic differences of a religious or political when it noticed that it had been detected, nature regarding the complicated state of although it did not come up to the surface affairs or preconceptions about a person, so that its nationality could be determined, an occupation, or an institution. which it should have done in In , we have the subma- The Truth is in line with our regulations con- rine issue. The Swedish armed the Eye of the cerning the admission to Swed- forces assert that, from the mid- Beholder ish territory of foreign naval dle of the 1970’s until autumn vessels. The other one, on the 1992, Sweden was subjected to other hand, remained in Swed- specific violations by foreign submarines ish waters and began a cat-and-mouse game far into our waters, including in the direc- with the helicopters and destroyer that were tion of our naval bases. There was only one deployed. In so doing, it demonstrated a occasion where it was obvious even to the manoeuvrability not previously witnessed. layman which nation was responsible for A few depth charges were discharged when the incursion, i.e. the Soviet Whiskey class there were new indications, but without any submarine which, on the morning of 28 visible results. October 1981, was discovered after it had It was in 1982, also in the autumn, and run aground in the eastern part of the Karl- once more from the skrona Naval Base in southern Sweden. An that the alarm was raised about suspected event that gave rise to newspaper headlines, submarines. This was an alarm that was to like ‘Whiskey on the Rocks’, throughout lead to weapons being repeatedly deployed the English-speaking world. In Sweden, this against indications of foreign underwater is known as U-137-incidenten (the U-137 activity. This anti-submarine operation came incident) after the name temporarily given to be ‘christened’ The Hårsfjärden incident to submarine S-363 by the for after the place where some of these indica- the operation. tions had appeared. The unit

64 DISKUSSION & DEBATT called the Berga Navy School was situated identify the Soviet Union as responsible for at Hårsfjärden. For logistical reasons, the the violations, based on existing indications, international press was then able to follow and stated that possible aims were intelli- the anti-submarine operations at close quar- gence activity and/or training and exercises. ters. Would we once again get to see a Soviet The report led to the Palme Government submarine? The weapons deployed did not immediately presenting a note to the Soviet lead to any underwater craft being forced ambassador in Stockholm, in which it ex- to the surface on this occasion either. This plained that the Government had no infor- was actually the task the Swedish Navy had mation to contradict the conclusions of the been given. During later incidents, the order commission. The wording was also such that was changed to sink the underwater craft. the Politburo could choose to reply that it All of this was followed by an extensive had not, unfortunately, had any knowledge investigation of the seabed, during which of what its military organizations had been tracks from caterpillar treads were found at up to. The Soviet Union, however, rejected a couple of different places, indicating that the allegation, which could in fact have been small craft had been involved in the enemy predicted. The Soviet Union had previously operation. It was estimated that, in total, officially explained the U-137’s appearance a handful of submarines were involved in in the archipelago as being due to this, one of which was a so-called ‘mother defective navigational aids, resulting in a submarine’ to the smaller vessels. Following navigational error. these events, the Swedish Navy began to re- Even before then, a rumour had begun to view warnings of suspected submarine vio- spread about what had actually happened lations and then discovered that violations during the Hårsfjärden incident. This re- of this new type had probably begun in the ferred to the events that took place at the middle of the 1970’s. Among other things, a end of the incident further south, where a mine had been removed from a permanent permanent minefield was located at an island minefield in the vicinity of a naval base at called Mälsten. In March 1983, a Swedish Sundsvall in central Norrland. business publication, Dagens Industri, pub- A parliamentary commission was also lished an article alleging that a West Ger- appointed to examine what had happened man submarine was intentionally released and given the task of proposing measures from Mälsten, where it had been penned in. for strengthening the Swedish capacity to People – journalists, authors, and politicians protect itself against these violations: the – generally with strong left-wing sympathies 1983 Submarine Defence Commission, gradually began to question whether there chaired by the former Social Democratic had actually been any submarine violations defence and foreign minister Sven Anders- at all apart from the U-137. They began to son. Among those on the commission was speak of ‘budget submarines’.3 Doubts grew Carl Bildt, who was then the foreign policy after another incident in the winter of 1984, spokesman for the Moderate Party. Follow- this time within the Naval Base. ing a press conference on 26 April, the com- The deployment of weapons produced no mission submitted a report to the Govern- visible results this time either. ‘If there actu- ment: SOU 1983: 13: Att möta ubåtshotet ally were submarines there, why were none [Countering the Submarine Threat].2 of them sunk? Surely, our navy can’t be that The commission believed that it could bad?’ In the early summer of 1984, the Su-

65 NR 3 juli/oktober 2010 preme Commander of the Swedish armed nevertheless, to take place in the autumn, forces at the time, , men- after which the latter – after a period as tioned for the first time in his diary the ru- minister of education – became ambassador mour that it had actually been U.S. subma- to our neighbouring country, . rines that were involved at Hårsfjärden and As usual, chose to go on the that a damaged U.S. submarine had been offensive in his defence of Bodström. He towed out through the Öresund strait (the accused the opposition of having breached Sound) shortly after the incident. The Soviet the agreed security policy, and, despite all Union, whose propaganda machine had ini- party leaders saying during a debate in the tially concentrated on U-137’s ‘navigational Swedish Parliament that they were totally error’ and also on the Swedish Navy chas- behind Palme’s foreign policy declaration ing ‘ghosts’, promptly took advantage of in the statement of Government policy, he the rumours that it had actually been U.S. persisted in his criticism. Also, as usual, he submarines that were involved and urged thereby, turned the majority of the Swedish us to sink them. The Soviet disinformation news debate into dealing with the disagree- campaign was still going on at the beginning ment on the policy of neutrality instead of of the 1990’s. what Bodström had actually said. Along with earlier politically contentious issues A Split on the Domestic Front connected to the submarine issue, which I will not bore the foreign reader with, this When taking office, which incidentally took domestic foreign policy, so typical of Palme, place right in the middle of the Hårsfjärden created a political split on the submarine is- incident, Prime Minister Olof Palme had sue, which the armed forces were dragged appointed a trade union chairman as for- into. This must have astonished the rest of eign minister in his Government. (Palme, the world as such a ordeal, which the no doubt, wanted to personally deal with incursions were for the officially militarily the most important part of foreign policy.) non-aligned state, should instead have led In 1985, Lennart Bodström, the new for- to national unity, such as that which existed eign minister, attended a dinner arranged by at the beginning of his period of Govern- Swedish journalists at one of Sweden’s larg- ment when Palme appointed the 1983 par- est morning newspapers, the liberal Dagens liamentary commission.5 He also publicly Nyheter. The journalists represented several and loudly criticized Carl Bildt for putting different right-wing newspapers. According a strain on the policy of neutrality by im- to the journalists, during a question-and-an- mediately travelling to Washington after the swer session, Bodström made it known that, commission’s press conference. This was an on his part, he ‘did not believe we had had unnecessary attack, which the others in the any submarine incursions, and if they had, party’s leadership perhaps regretted, as Carl they were not Soviet ones’.4 When Bod- Bildt became better known to the public as ström’s opinion was printed in the news- a politician thanks to this. papers, the centre-right party leaders in the The centre-right parties won the 1991 Swedish Parliament demanded the foreign election, and Carl Bildt was the Prime Min- minister’s resignation. Olof Palme, however, ister for a short time. However, the Social defended the minister for foreign affairs he Democrats returned to power in the au- had chosen up until the election that was, tumn of 1994, and Olof Palme’s successor

66 DISKUSSION & DEBATT as party leader and Prime Minister, Ingvar actually were any violations taking place Carlsson, soon set up an expert commis- in either Norway or Sweden. In the case sion to clarify what actually happened dur- of Sweden, this also appeared so politically ing the submarine incursions of the 1980’s: counterproductive. This would, of course, the 1995 Submarine Commission.6 The just push public opinion and thereby the commission was to examine in detail the neutral Palme Government right into the submission of evidence by the armed forc- hands of NATO. On his return to Sweden es in the case of ten alleged violations. It as a pensioner, Bodström became one of the came to the conclusion that it agreed with founders of the self-appointed ‘Citizens’ the Supreme Commander’s verdict that we Commission’ which pursued the issue that, had had several deep incursions by sub- apart from the U-137 that, of course, had marines, also at our naval bases, and that also happened to enter Swedish waters due the U-137’s incursion was intentional, i.e. to navigational problems, there had been the commission backed up most of what no other foreign submarines in our wa- the armed forces had stated. However, it ters whatsoever. The group also included said that it was not qualified to determine a coast-artillery officer who, like the naval which nation was responsible for the deep officer who conducted the interrogation incursions.7 In practice, it also rejected the of the crew of the U-137, distanced him- determination of nationality by the first self from the theory that the tracks found commission, chaired by Sven Andersson, on the seabed could have been caused by which had consequences for the future. underwater craft. They stated that these Thus, a year later, an internal inquiry were more likely to have resulted from was set up at the Ministry for Foreign Af- anchors being dragged. We will return to fairs (MFA), the findings of which were, this. Henceforth, I will describe people and unfortunately, classified as top secret in the groups with this attitude as ‘sceptics’. late autumn of 1996. According to leaks Unlike almost any other country that to the media, the committee came to the was violated by submarines, both the armed conclusion that it was probably the Soviet forces and the Government in Sweden held Union that was responsible for the viola- frequent press conferences about subma- tions, although it could not be ruled out rine incidents. We could probably say that that another country had also violated this openness was a result of the U-137 us at some point. It was unfortunate that and all the weapons deployed in connec- this was classified as secret. It can now be tion with the Hårsfjärden incident. Nor- considered that there was never a more ap- way was also forced to go public about its propriate time for the Government’s offi- violations, although to a lesser extent, pre- cial position than at that time and that this cisely as a result of conducting a number of would have made its later actions in this anti-submarine operations while deploying matter easier. It does not look as if we can weapons, which also alerted Norwegian look forward to any future admissions or journalists. In Sweden, this was formalized any access to sources within this area. We through the Government commissioning have to make up our minds based on the descriptive and evaluative reports at cer- indications/evidence we have. tain times from the armed forces. At the In Norway, Bodström met Norwegians beginning of the 1980s, the Swedish Navy who, like him, questioned whether there – or, in any case, its naval officers – was, of

67 NR 3 juli/oktober 2010 course, also interested in the violations be- preparations consisted of.9 As is evident by ing brought to the attention of the the title of the report, Bildt had agreed with public and politicians, since the navy real- the leader of the opposition Ingvar Carls- ized that, in terms of budgets, it was getting son to only study the period up to 1969, squeezed between an increasingly more ex- i.e. neither of Olof Palme’s periods in gov- pensive air force and a large army based on ernment – the first half of the 1970’s and compulsory military service for men fit for the middle of the 1980’s – would be subject war. This interest waned, however, when to investigation. It would soon prove to be groups began to doubt their competence, the case that the democratic society was as they never obtained any visible results not satisfied with this, and the next Social from their anti-submarine operations. This Democratic Prime Minister Göran Persson situation also led to an increase in the decided to have the submarine inquiries number of ‘sceptics’ among journalists and and the Commission on Neutrality Policy politicians, especially those on the Left. (NPK) supplemented. For this purpose, he appointed a single investigator, Rolf Ekéus, the newly returned ambassador from ”The Ekéus Inquiries” and Washington. Despite a couple of other on- their Consequences8 erous tasks, the latter was to complete two reports within a period of two years.10 In the spring of 1992, Christer Larsson, However, Ekéus did not put the nation- a radio reporter, revealed that, during the ality question to bed either. On the con- , the armed forces had main- trary, he increased confusion by saying in tained certain technical preparations so as the report that he did not need to decide to be able to receive assistance from NATO whether the U-137’s intrusion was inten- in the event of a Soviet attack. On the po- tional or unintentional. Immediately after litical side, knowledge of the substance the report was published, he did, however, of these preparations had been limited to express the fact that he personally believed the Prime Minister and the Minister and the Russian explanation of a navigational the undersecretary of state at the Ministry error. His conclusion on the issue of na- of Defence and, on the military side, to a tionality is as follows: handful of generals/admirals in the high The majority of reasons thus suggest that command with a few officials for assistance the motives behind the underwater viola- and, in any case up until the 1960’s, also a tions were for the function of operational few regional commanders. In purely formal planning prior to a great-power conflict in terms, the Parliamentary Advisory Council Central Europe and that, there­fore, both on Foreign Affairs was informed on 9 Feb- pacts could have had similar reasons for be- ruary 1949 that the Government was to ing interested in violating Swedish waters. make a decision on whether to enter into The Soviet Union can, therefore, hardly be ruled out as a possible violating power.11 such cooperation with and Nor- way. We will return to these preparations As ‘both pacts could have had similar further on under the heading ‘Cooperation reasons’ and the Soviet Union ‘cannot be with the West’. Carl Bildt, who was Prime ruled out’, the reader is undeniably given Minister at the time of this revelation, ap- the impression that Ekéus may just as well pointed a commission to clarify what these believe that it could be the United States and

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NATO that had their submarines in our wa- Tunander is notorious for misusing both ters. In that case, this would have been with the oral and written sources he quotes. The our permission, as he has just referred to project leaders at the Swedish universities our cooperation with the West in the same did not seem to have bothered checking the paragraph. This is as far as Ekéus dares to scholarliness of the report before accepting go in his public report as regards expressing it. They were perhaps tempted to publish it an opinion on the question of nationality, after the Danish Institute for International despite the fact that Ingvar Carlsson went Studies (DIIS) was careless in examining its further in his memoirs the year before: ‘The sources in its report about Danmark under Warsaw Pact had the strongest motives for den kolde krig [Denmark during the Cold exploring our waters. This could be a mat- War] earlier in the summer of 2005. Ini- ter of military planning, of intelligence ac- tially, Tunander was one of the Submarine tivity, or training and exercise programmes. Inquiry’s experts. On the information available, it is impos- Tunander’s hypothesis is based on the sible to rule out NATO submarines having Reagan administration in the United States, violated our waters at some point’.12 This supported by Britain’s Margaret Thatcher, is a synopsis that I previously supported on exploiting the Soviet submarine running my part, but which I have now once more aground in Gåsefjärden to trick the Swedish examined as a result of the questioning of people into believing that the Soviet Union this conclusion over the last few years. It was continuing to violate us in a provocative has, therefore, been asserted that it was, manner. The American reason for showing on the contrary, mostly NATO submarines that there were supposedly Soviet subma- that were involved; in fact, it was U.S. sub- rines along our coast was so that an increas- marines in particular that were here. This ingly more anti-Soviet electorate would force interpretation has even spread throughout Palme to pursue more pro-Western policies. the academic world and has acquired more This is in line with how public opinion on and more advocates among journalists, or, the Soviet Union, which was seen as posing in any case, led to an increase in the number an increasing threat, actually developed and of ‘sceptics’. the fact that Carl Bildt, who presented him- The driving force behind this hypothesis self as one of the navy’s defenders, was, in about U.S. submarines is a Swedish peace 1991, able to take over government from the researcher, Ola Tunander, from the Peace Social Democrats, who were unclear about Research Institute in Oslo (PRIO), who, in the submarine issue. This is probably one of the same year as the Submarine Inquiry’s the reasons why Tunander’s theory received report came out, had a book published in support it did not deserve. It also accuses a Sweden and a couple of years later also in number of Swedish admirals of being aware the United Kingdom and North America.13 of this and, in 1982, helping a U.S. subma- In the autumn of 2007, he published a new rine that was damaged at Hårsfjärden to book on the subject, now concentrating on escape from Mälsten in Stockholm’s south- the aforementioned Hårsfjärden incident ern archipelago, where it had been penned and accepted as Working Report no. 16 of in. They would thus have been conspiring the research programme Sverige under det against the Swedish Government. Tunander kalla kriget (SUKK) [Sweden during the goes as far as to hint that naval officers, Cold War], which is remarkable, seeing as along with members of the Swedish secu-

69 NR 3 juli/oktober 2010 rity service, were behind the murder of Olof rect and, above all, complete answers, but I Palme. hope I will encourage one or more political In 2000, Jonas Olsson, a reporter for scientists or historians to continue to study Sveriges Television (SVT), interviewed, for this question and that, in so doing, they example, both the former U.S. Secretary of will be able to make use of my narrative as Defense Caspar Weinberger (1981–1987) a gateway to their advanced studies. and Sir Keith Speed, the British Undersec- retary of State for the Royal Navy (1979– 1981).14 Tunander has attempted to use We Should be in no Doubt these interviews to back up his assertions in that there were Violations of various ways. In the autumn of 2007, SVT then aired a couple of new programmes that our Waters! took Tunander’s conspiracy theory as their The fact that the starting point and this is what encouraged were not able to sink, find, or salvage a me to once again devote myself to finding submarine, or even force one to the surface better answers to the questions that are still so that its nationality could be determined, the subject of discussion in Sweden. In the is, of course, the main reason for the talk middle of this work, the secretary of the of budget submarines and the emergence of Submarine Inquiry published a book of his sceptics. It is probably difficult for anyone own that supported Tunander and this fur- who has not been involved in anti-subma- ther encouraged me.15 Along with Ekéus’s rine operations to understand how hard refusal to express an opinion in 2000, this this is, particularly in the Baltic. When, at book gives the impression that, even as early the beginning of the 1980’s, we began to re- as this, the inquiry was thinking along the alize what we were being subjected to, our lines that it could be mainly NATO subma- last Swedish destroyer, which, along with rines that were involved. our frigates, had been the main means of anti-submarine operations, was being tak- en out of service. In our territorial waters, Three Questions need this task would, in the future, be primarily to be Answered dealt with by land-based helicopters which had a limited weapons load and endurance The following account attempts, as far as in the theatre of operations. It took a while this is possible based on the information before we were able to develop our capac- we have at present, to answer the three ity again, primarily due to our training and questions that are still being discussed, i.e. technology in anti-submarine vessels hav- ing been undeveloped since the 1960’s. Ini- • Were there actually ever any subma- tially, our own submarines were used only rine incursions? for surveillance and intelligence activities, • If so, which party or parties were in- and, shortly after we had given two of our volved here? most modern and best-trained submarines • Was the U-137’s intrusion into Gåse- permission to fire, these particular intru- fjärden intentional or unintentional? sions came to an end. I do not expect to convince all the sceptics The armed forces did make an unfortu- or conspiracy theorists that I have the cor- nate miscalculation as regards the submis-

70 DISKUSSION & DEBATT sion of evidence. In those cases where we shortly after the damage. This also includes had recorded audio from our passive so- seabed tracks from craft that, on a few oc- nars, we had, of course, observed that many casions, were in the bays. These come from sounds are natural and particularly com- both keels and caterpillar treads, i.e. paral- mon and are of biological origin. Despite lel tracks with a grooved pattern. Sceptics this, the authorities involved in the evalua- usually claim that these tracks were caused tion – the , the Defence Materiel by different types of anchors being dragged, Administration, and the Swedish Defence but the civilian specialists responsible for Research Agency – made a mistake when we the investigations have demonstrated clear procured, in 1992, a new hydrophone buoy differences between the tracks we are refer- system that was considerably more sensitive ring to and those from various types of an- than the systems we had previously had. In chors. In addition, they have been able to 1992, this system recorded just under ten compare the tracks from caterpillar treads and, in 1993, just over ten indications of with tracks from an unmanned experimen- sound which were deemed to be propeller tal vehicle with a caterpillar tread that we cavitations and which, along with paral- designed ourselves. We also have three so- lel events, led to the Supreme Commander nar diagrams of recordings from active hy- reporting some of them as confirmed sub- drophones, recorded in 1984, 1988, and marine incursions. Once the Cold War had 1992. All are images of a small submarine, ended, we gradually began to suspect that a coastal submarine with a length of just un- these sounds could, nevertheless, have come der thirty metres and with a conning tower. from a biological source, particularly as the The 1995 Submarine Commission, which number of indications increased again in carried out a detailed examination of the the spring of 1994. By chance, the Swedish proven intrusions referred to, established in Navy was able to establish at the end of July several cases that ‘it has been demonstrated that same year that the sound of swimming beyond doubt that Swedish territorial wa- minks, which are rather common in Swe- ters have been violated on these occasions den’s archipelagos, could be so similar that by foreign underwater craft’.16 As the in- these could be confused. In the light of this, vestigation was carried out so long after the evidence from passive hydrophones has very incidents, it did not consider itself able to little credibility with the Swedish public. examine individual observations of foreign So, even if we have an audio library of submarine activity that had been referred submarines operating in the Baltic, I will not to, but, in summing up, stated: be referring to these findings in this account as regards either the incursions or who We believe, however, that the obser- was responsible for them. There is other vations by people – particularly in evidence that there were violations of our the light of the tracks found and the waters, which has not just been reported technical indications – lends support by the armed forces, but also by the 1995 to the conclusion that there has been Submarine Commission. These include foreign underwater activity in Swed- thefts from and damage to permanent mine- ish waters.17 fields we had laid and an anti-submarine net, which were examined by the National The chairman of the commission, the presi- Swedish Laboratory of Forensic Science dent of the Royal Swedish Academy of En-

71 NR 3 juli/oktober 2010 gineering Sciences, Professor Hans G. Fors- the Nordic countries had for keeping track berg, took part in a seminar on 30 January of each other’s submarines at the entrances 2008 at the Swedish National Defence Col- to the Baltic, on a level with Jutland to be- lege, where, as part of the discussion, he yond the Danish island of . Apart stated: ‘However, the fact that there was a from Sweden, Denmark, and Norway, the considerable number of violations, not just United Kingdom had also signed up to this the ten we analyzed in detail, but many earlier. West would sign up to this more than that, the commission was abso- in the 1960’s, once it had acquired a sub- lutely convinced of this’.18 Which party or marine force. In the actual straits, all sub- parties were here then? marines were to go into a surface position on both the Danish and Swedish sides. The straits are heavily trafficked and are so shal- Were these NATO low that ordinary submarines must operate Submarines? visibly for safety reasons. The Danish admi- rals have provided an official assurance that The naval officers who took part in the they carried out technical checks on this.19 anti-submarine operations and the subma- Neither have the conspiracy theorists suc- rine officers in particular, including the so- ceeded in finding any witness who can claim nar operators in the cooperating countries to have seen a U.S. submarine in the Sound, who had listened to our tape recordings, let alone a damaged one being towed. believe that – ‘if the surface was clear’ – we In the 1970’s and 1980’s, the United have unambiguous proof of who was here. States quite simply did not have suitable For the reasons given above, however, this submarines for operations in the Baltic, evidence will not be used in the subsequent or, in any case, not a sufficient number of presentation. them in the Atlantic. In addition, they had It is strange that of all the NATO coun- two of their most loyal European allies, the tries, Tunander and others have chosen to United Kingdom and West Germany, who single out the United States as being the had great experience of submarine opera- intruder. For many reasons, this is least tions in the Baltic ever since the First World likely. With the United States constructing War, and a sufficient number of submarines nuclear-powered submarines in the 1950’s, themselves to take operational responsibil- it stopped building diesel-electric ones. This ity, along with Denmark, for the Baltic in is linked to the fact that they were so far times of peace and war. U.S. submarines did away from their enemies, and they needed not even pay a single visit to a naval base on submarines with high speeds and long en- the Swedish Baltic coast at any time during durance for their operations on the other the Cold War. side of the Atlantic or Pacific. They devel- Tunander probably feels that he has been oped what they called a ‘blue-water navy’, supported by the aforementioned Caspar i.e. an ocean-going navy. The only trace I Weinberger interview. This does not, how- have found of U.S. submarines inside the ever, mention any extensive activity and not Baltic is from 1955 in the diary of Stig even, with any degree of certainty, U.S. sub- Hansson Ericsson, Commander-in-Chief of marines. It does, however, mention NATO. the Swedish Navy, in which he noted that This involves what Weinberger calls tests, the United States was joining the procedure i.e. the kind of activity that the United

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States’ so-called ‘red units’ were involved annual naval target practice in the southeast in. Tunander suggests, therefore, that it was Baltic. Sometimes they headed north along the Red Cell for testing naval bases that was the Baltic coast, perhaps to check out the deployed during the Hårsfjärden incident to Golf class submarines once they were intro- check the Swedish naval defences of the bas- duced in the Baltic in 1976. This is because es. There is just one problem: this unit was their nuclear missiles had the range to reach not organized until two years after the inci- the UK. On the way back, the British would dent. His second alternative is SEAL (Sea, sometimes go north of and down Air, and Land) Team Two with Italian midg- into the international channel between the et submarines. Why use Italian midget sub- island and the mainland. It is possible that marines when the West Germans had their they would have entered Swedish waters at own and SEAL had been working together some time in connection with this, or that with their Kampfschwimmer frogmen since they would have headed north in an under- 1976? Nor is it likely that the Swedish Navy water position through the Åland Sea up to would have deployed as many weapons if the Gulf of Bothnia which belonged to the this had involved a conspiracy that had been theatre of operations of the Allied Forces agreed by Swedish admirals. Besides, if the Baltic Approaches (BALTAP).21 British sub- intention had been as asserted by Tunander, marines (sometimes an entire unit) made i.e. a long-term operation aimed at influenc- regular naval visits to Sweden, even to Baltic ing Swedish policy, it would have required a ports south of the Åland Sea. written presidential directive for the opera- The same applies to the West German tion.20 No such operation is mentioned in coastal submarine units that sometimes even the declassified titles of the National Security made naval visits to ports along the Norr­ Decision Directives (NSDDs), and neither of land coast. For the purpose of war tasks the two that are still classified corresponds, and exercises as preparation for these, the timewise, with the U-137 being the inspira- West German submarine commander also tion for a psychological operation (PYSOP) took command of the Danish submarines. aimed at Sweden. The German coast is, like the Baltic, less In his interview, Keith Speed speaks un- suitable for basing naval forces. You have to equivocally of British submarines ‘testing’ use harbours. The opponent can lie in wait Swedish surveillance systems underwater outside and wait for you to set sail. So dur- and of these tests taking place in agreement ing both the First and Second World Wars, with Sweden via the British Foreign Office. the German submarines had their so-called As far as I have been able to ascertain, these, resting positions in Swedish waters. Dur- in this case, were carried out in connection ing the Cold War, the West German Navy’s with the naval visits approved by the Swed- base options were even more vulnerable. ish Government. These can hardly be called As we will soon see, the West German Bal- violations. (Our own submarines also car- tic Navy, therefore, planned in agreement ried out a similar test on another friendly with the Swedish Navy so that they could, country’s surveillance system in connection with permission, regroup naval forces in with a naval visit.) The British Oberon class the Swedish archipelago. With this in mind, submarines regularly entered the Baltic for their logistics were, to a great extent, - intelligence operations, including in connec- borne. There was, therefore, a great deal of tion with the Soviet Union carrying out its West German interest in keeping up to date

73 NR 3 juli/oktober 2010 with Swedish coastal areas, which they did that this was the kind of experience that through, among other things, naval visits. meant that West German submarines were /the Soviet Union, like Germany, subsequently so careful that they person- had operated submarines in Swedish wa- ally reported to the Swedish ters during both the First and Second World via their staff that they had entered Swedish Wars. During the Cold War, they would waters but were on the way out. If this was certainly have felt the need to keep an eye the case, the Swedish Navy was doing the on each other’s nearby submarines within political leadership a favour – on both sides. the same Swedish waters they used then. As Perhaps they even consulted or informed mentioned in my introduction, soon after the Swedish politicians. The Swedish parties the Hårsfjärden incident, a rumour circulat- had a close relationship with their German ed that the Swedish Navy had intentionally counterparts, as they had with the British. released a West German submarine. When They would certainly not have wanted to we now afterwards attempt to immerse our- have them embarrassed as a result of a mis- selves in what happened at Mälsten, it turns take. Of course, if this was the case, it was a out that the documentary material required one-off event. is missing in many cases. This applies to The good cooperation between the dif- analysis results from something Tunander ferent political parties in Sweden, the Unit- calls ‘yellow patches’, which, he claims, ed Kingdom, and West Germany makes it are a U.S. distress signal, a tape-recording unlikely that any of these countries would of a sound that was, at the time, believed secretly and intentionally have violated to be an underwater repair, the identifica- Swedish waters in the archipelago areas and tion of a metal object found on the seabed in the vicinity of our naval bases. Particu- and recorded on video, and a report that larly once we had begun to deploy weapons the electrical system at Mälsten was respon- with no warning in our inner waters. If a sible for the interference signals picked up democratic country had been caught red- by its tape recorder. In the light of this, it handed in the way the Soviet Union was is odd that Tunander has not instead asked in Gåsefjärden, this would also have had whether it could have been a West German consequences for domestic politics in this submarine spying on the Soviet group and country. So, let us look a bit closer at what entering Hårsfjärden to see what it was do- it was all about. The cooperation main- ing and then ending up trapped along with tained between the political parties had its the group. They may have later intercepted military equivalent. It is well known that or been briefed about the fact that – to take there was cooperation within the areas of into account the risk to third parties – there intelligence activity and technological devel- was, when it was dark, a weapons-hold sta- opment, particularly with the United States tus for the minefield at Mälsten. within aviation. What is less well known is It was, perhaps, a German submarine the extensive training given to senior Swed- such as this that went out late in the evening ish officers and specialists, primarily within between 13 and 14 October, as, according the Swedish Air Force and Navy. The Com- to the Submarine Inquiry, there are no pages mission on Neutrality Policy, like the later (notes) in the Swedish Defence Staff’s war Inquiry on Security Policy which looked at diary despite it saying that there was fran- the Palme period, tones down the extent tic activity at Mälsten. It could be the case and degree of Swedish preparations for re-

74 DISKUSSION & DEBATT ceiving assistance from NATO in the event MFA began to regularly send figures on iron of us being attacked by the Soviet Union, ore exports to Germany. At the same time, as it is put. The question is whether there the Ministry of Defence would send the were, in actual fact, preparations for join- Swedish Navy’s weekly ice reports, which is ing NATO when things began to ‘come to why the British were able to calculate when a head’? In any case, it was in the interests iron ore exports went from Luleå in the Gulf of the United States and NATO, particularly of Bothnia to in northern Norway for our neighbours Denmark and Norway, and were able to attack the iron ore to get us on board with holding up any sur- on their way down to the North Sea and the prise attack launched by the Warsaw Pact Skagerrak. Later, reports from Sweden’s air against the Nordic countries until such time reconnaissance would also provide infor- as the United States was able to intervene in mation for more minelaying from the air in Europe. I will return to this, but first: How the channels the Germans were using in the did it begin and why? Baltic. When the battleship Bismarck left the Baltic in May 1941, this was brought to Cooperation with the West the attention of the British in the same way. Carl Petersén, the head of the secret Swedish It is well known that, after the occupation intelligence organization, first established a of Norway on 9 April 1940 and prior to the secret channel via a Norwegian to the Brit- attack on the Soviet Union, Nazi Germany ish legation in Stockholm. Through this, the was allowed to use the Swedish rail network British also received intelligence from the and the inshore routes for their sea transports Danish resistance movement. This was later along the east coast. The export of iron ore formalized into direct intelligence meetings and ball bearings, which were important to every fortnight. The British would also be the German armaments, also continued for given access to the remnants of a prototype most of the war. This action and the declara- of a V2 missile that crashed in southern Swe- tion of neutrality have often been criticized, den and were then allowed to set up a sig- particularly by the United States, which did nals intelligence station on southern Öland, not enter the war itself until attacked. The targeted at the German research station in Swedish Social Democratic Prime Minister Peenemünde.24 Per Albin Hansson had decided as early as In Sweden, in the autumn of 1943, we 1938 to try to spare his people from the hor- began to train the Norwegian and Danish rors of a war. He declared to his parliamen- conscripts who, since April 1940, had been tary party: ‘We are all in agreement that our escaping to Sweden. Politically, this was or- policies must be based on keeping us on the ganized by the academically educated Un- outside in the event of war. If we are forced dersecretary of State to the Swedish Minister to become involved, then it is clear that, as of Health and Social Affairs. His name was Mr Undén has said, we must ensure that we Tage Erlander, a name that we will come back are on the side of the democratic states’.22 to, as he succeeded Hansson as party leader By this, he meant the other Nordic countries and Prime Minister when the latter died and, above all, the United Kingdom. in 1946. These were called ‘police troops’, In actual fact, what I am calling coopera- out of consideration for the declared policy tion with the West began early with the Unit- of neutrality.25 In actual fact, this involved ed Kingdom.23 Thus, at the end of 1940, the military training so that they could take

75 NR 3 juli/oktober 2010 part in the liberation of their homelands, or, tively strong domestic Communist party. in any case, disarm surrendering Germans This was allowed to appoint the minister and take over territorial responsibility for of the interior in the Finnish Government, liberated areas. The deployment of the po- which was also under a great deal of pres- lice troops was under discussion in the late sure from the Soviet chairman of the Allied autumn of 1944, when Soviet forces began Control Commission. Concern increased af- to repel the Germans in northern Norway. ter the Prague Coup of 1948.27 The Social This was made possible through a U.S. Democratic Government of the post-war transport aircraft division being deployed at period certainly tried to establish a better a Swedish airbase at Luleå in the north at relationship with the Soviet Government Christmastime. This was then responsible through a trade agreement, but there was, for supplying the Norwegian units until Au- of course, never any doubt that they would gust 1945. The greatest departure from the also choose the democratic side in this declared policy of neutrality was, in actual new situation if they were forced to make fact, not the concession to Nazi Germany at a choice. They had already dealt with their the beginning of the war, but the fact that, at revolutionary elements by 1917. the end, the Government allowed the Allies Cooperation with the Royal Navy began to fly over southern Sweden on their way with minesweeping in the Danish straits. to bomb German cities and industries. In so Swedish naval officers were sent to the Unit- doing, the Western air force units avoided ed Kingdom for training in, among other the strongest elements of the German air de- things, anti-submarine warfare, which the fence, which was built up on the Channel Royal Navy had devoted a great deal of time coast and to the north in Denmark. This is to during the war. The Swedish Air Force said to have involved a total of more than six learned to use radar and night fighters. Sur- thousand aircraft missions with information plus equipment was bought for all parts of on emergency landing bases being provided the Swedish armed forces from the United verbally to those planes that returned dam- Kingdom, but also from the equipment aged from Germany.26 Towards the end of left behind in Europe by the United States. the war, an Allied operation to liberate Nor- Training support came with the equipment. way was discussed, which would have tak- At the cessation of hostilities, the Soviet en a route via Gothenburg. In Sweden, this armed forces were to the south of Sweden. could be based on an operation planned by The internal German border between the the Swedish Defence Staff, ‘Save Norway’. East and West was established west of the There was also a ‘Save Denmark’ plan. Sound. The military authorities in Denmark, So, in 1945, upon the conclusion of peace, Norway, and Sweden could see before them a new Swedish military command took over a new race between the great powers for the what was, in practice, an already established Baltic outlets. They began to discuss how cooperation with the West which would be they would be able, in a situation like this, to cultivated as a result of the development of avoid friendly fire and perhaps also cooper- the Cold War at the end of the 1940’s. For ate on the defence of the three countries and historical and political reasons, the military the outlets. Even before the Second World command was fiercely anti-Soviet. In Swe- War, Norwegian and Swedish air defences den, we were particularly concerned about had been coordinated. Politically, the Swed- the situation in which had a rela- ish Government was striving for a neutral

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Scandinavian Defence Union and, in late garding tactics and unit production was autumn 1948, actual negotiations on such developed further between, for instance, a union were entered into, but soon broke the British and Swedish navies. Meetings down, primarily because Norway did not had been arranged between the Pentagon want to relinquish its ‘lifeline’ to the West, and the Swedish military command and Er- and the Swedish Government insisted that lander personally visited President Truman the defence union must be neutral. Norway in 1952. A National Security Council (NSC) and Denmark instead joined the Atlantic Al- document from 1948 that was relatively liance. The solution for Sweden was to es- negative about Sweden, in which the United tablish secret preparations for ‘being able to States complained about the Swedish policy receive assistance from the democratic side’ of neutrality, was to be changed in 1952 in ‘the event of an as yet undefined security into a positive view of supporting the Swed- situation’.28 These preparations were kept ish armed forces regarding technological de- within a small political and military circle velopments. Intelligence cooperation began so as not to jeopardize the Swedish policy to be developed, particularly with regard to of neutrality. During the 1950’s, there was signals intelligence. In practice, Sweden was a coordinated expansion of the Danish and treated as if it was a NATO country.32 Swedish defences of the Sound.29The pro- Olof Palme, who, in 1954, began to tection of essential sea transports through work part-time for Erlander on foreign and the Skagerrak was jointly planned between security policy issues, was in the know and Sweden and Norway and a reserve route for eventually handled these issues, while his Sweden’s imports via Trondheim in central colleague, Ingvar Carlsson, devoted him- Norway was established, which was also in- self to domestic policy. In a conversation tended for the supply of aviation fuel. For he had with me shortly before his death, this reason, the Swedish military command in which Palme mentioned the fact that he proposed planning for an intervention in had worked with analysts within the armed Norway in the event of the Soviet Union forces’ intelligence service at the beginning launching an operation against Norway of the 1950’s, he called Carlsson and him- across the Lofoten Islands.30 It is unclear self ‘Erlander’s ’. When, at the whether the politicians ever sanctioned this end of the 1960’s, he gave anti-Vietnam War planning, but there was supposed to have speeches, he sent, at the same time, for future been a plan like this during some period in Supreme Commander and the 1950’s. told him that he needed to do what he was For the rigid Östen Undén, it appears doing for domestic policy reasons, but that as if these preparations only included Den- the armed forces would ensure that there mark and Norway, although, as members, continued to be a good relationship with the they were controlled militarily by NATO’s United States. This approach was repeated operational command. As late as 1959, at to the incoming commander of the Swed- a presentation for the whole Government, ish Navy Bengt Lundwall in 1970.33 In the with Undén present, Erlander only allowed other democratic parties, only the members the Swedish Defence Staff to describe the of the Advisory Council on Foreign Affairs preparations with Denmark and Norway, were informed, probably more succinctly. including options for coordinating the air Trusted senior MFA officials were briefed defences.31 In actual fact, cooperation re- at times, including those who worked in the

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NATO countries concerned when it regard- Swedish Defence College has described, ed the country they were serving in. Apart based on declassified NATO sources that from this, only the minister and the Under- have appeared in Norwegian research, how secretary of State at the Ministry of Defence U.S. and British strategic bombers were, were fully briefed on cooperation with the according to a plan from 1956, Operation West. Anders Thunborg, later the Swedish SNOWCAT (Support of Nuclear Opera- ambassador to the United States, was Sven tions with Conventional Attacks), to fly over Andersson’s first Undersecretary who was Sweden on their way to targets in the GDR, briefed, and this was not until the end of the , and the Baltic states, supported by 1960s. Norwegian fighter aircraft.34 Even in the Now is probably the time to tell the read- 1970’s and 1980’s, they were to take a low er that my predecessor, Lennart Ljung, had flight path over Sweden. This concurs with destroyed the folder at Operational Com- how the Soviet Union perceived the threat mand which contained the requisite docu- from Scandinavia (see Fig. 1). It remains for ments on what this preparation involved those in the know to tell the rest of us how, and information for making the necessary for example, the Swedish Air Force of the contact with the people informed in the co- 1950’s fitted in with this when they not only operating countries, such as West Germany, introduced the NATO standard for fuel, but the United Kingdom, and the United States. also for hose couplings. A link was also to be established with the Given Sweden’s importance to NATO’s Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Eu- rope (SHAPE). The only thing that was retained at Operational Command was a ‘telephone directory’. Whether Len- nart Ljung did this on his own initiative or was asked to do so by Olof Palme, I do not know, because both were dead by the time I realized, in the spring of 1992, that these preparations had existed. I find it hard to understand why my predeces- sor kept quiet about this. Because, as has proved to be the case from my studies, it continued as before behind my back with trips to Copenhagen and Oslo as well as staff talks in London. You would also think this would be a strange time to discontinue the planning, as the early 1980’s were a period during which there was a great deal of tension between the great-power blocs, and even, at times, a high level of readiness among the Soviet nuclear forces. Figure 1. The Soviet view with regard to threats In a recently published article, the re- from Scandinavia according to a Russian publica- searcher Mikael Nilsson at the National tion of the 1980s (private archives).

78 DISKUSSION & DEBATT defence of the Baltic exits and the North- in practice, the United Kingdom and the ern Flank, it is difficult to imagine that the United States. If we had become involved United States or the other NATO countries from the beginning, we could have worked would politically jeopardize their contact together with the West German, British, and with the Palme Government by secretly vio- Danish navies and air forces in the Baltic. lating our waters, which is assumed in the On the other hand, the fact that Lennart conspiracy theories. At the same time as the Ljung did not inform me of what had taken submarine incursions, the Palme Govern- place – even if he believed that it was be- ment took part in supporting the independ- ing discontinued – is unforgivable. Minister ent Polish trade union Solidarity.35 In real- for Defence Roine Carlsson perhaps be- ity, both the United States and the United lieved that Ljung had done so, because he Kingdom did what they could to strengthen never raised the matter with me, despite the our anti-submarine capacity and bring the fact that I occasionally briefed him about violations of our waters to an end, for ex- measures I felt were borderline with regard ample by letting us equip submarines and to the declared policy of neutrality. Did he other vessels with the most modern anti- himself not know? My subordinates within submarine equipment they had. The ques- the armed forces did not mention either tion is more a case of what the thinking was how extensive these preparations were. Did behind Erlander’s and, later, Palme’s expan- they also think that I had been briefed by sion of the cooperation with the West. Lennart Ljung? I was, of course, involved in the close intelligence cooperation, but at- tempted to maintain the bilateral nature of A Few Reflections this without, as I understand it, completely Let me say that I do not, of course, think succeeding. The technology and equipment that it was wrong for us to make these cooperation was also well known, particu- practical preparations in order to be able to larly within aviation. In addition, personal work together with NATO operationally. relationships were developed, primarily If anything, I do not think that these were with people in the Nordic countries and in extensive enough to have a sufficient effect. the West, such as with the Supreme Allied If we actually believe that the aim of our Commander Europe (SACEUR) General security policy was to shape our society in Jack Galvin. So, in this respect, I was per- accordance with our values, we should ac- sonally part of the preparations and was, tually have made it our intention to defend of course, mentally prepared for it being the Nordic countries in every situation to- obvious which side we would choose if we gether with NATO right from the outbreak were forced into this. But I was fooled by of war and conducted exercises in this, at the rhetoric about the policy of neutrality, least with Norway. Who believes that we which became even stronger as a result of would have had any freedom of action if Olof Palme. As Lennart Ljung was supposed we had become a Soviet satellite within to have said when he shredded the NATO the Warsaw Pact? When, in 1992, Christer folder: ‘After all, it is not relevant anymore’. Larsson revealed the secret preparations, So, I personally served the purpose of a ‘use- the reaction of most Swedes was probably ful idiot’ in this double-dealing. also a positive one to us having prepared As I was not even briefed that we had for receiving assistance from NATO, i.e. conducted these preparations along with

79 NR 3 juli/oktober 2010 several NATO countries, I do not have any 1948, he ordered a study by the armed forc- duty of confidentiality to anyone either and es into the basing of U.S. aircraft in Swe- my general duty of confidentiality to the den.38 Preparations for defending Scandina- Government and the armed forces only ap- via along with NATO from the very outset plies to secrets I was made aware of in serv- of war were, however, not something that ice. I, therefore, feel free to say a few things he could win over his party with, or even here about what I have now discovered as a secretly his government. ‘The policy of neu- pensioner about our preparations for being trality’ was perhaps only for times of peace. able to receive help from NATO, but per- It has, of course, been convenient for social haps to also assist NATO in defending its democracy to be able to explain the policy Northern Flank in Europe in certain situa- of neutrality by referring to Finland’s situ- tions. The preparations for both purposes ation. In actual fact, it has been the desire can be reconciled. to remain in power that has been the main In this section, all that remains are a few incentive. Per-Albin Hansson had succeeded reflections. As early as February 1949, Er- in keeping us out of the Second World War lander said: ‘Let us together transform Scan- through, it is said, the policy of neutral- dinavia into a fortress so strongly defended, ity. This was a winning phrase during the that an attack against us will mean that our Cold War, which people gradually became territory is transformed into a base area for captive to. So captive that the Social Demo- another, non-aggressive great-power group- crats still use the argument today, although ing’.36 For its part, the Commission on Neu- this has been changed to being militarily trality summarizes this as follows: non-aligned, at the same time as Sweden is Against this backdrop, it is clear to the part of the European Union and its foreign Commission that the Minister of Defence policy. In actual fact, Per Albin was lucky. It and his closest colleagues were intent that was Finland that saved us, as Göran Persson Sweden, with the greatest possible consid- acknowledged. eration for the policy of neutrality, should As things turned out, the Soviet Union make preparations so as to be able – in a probably knew everything at an early stage, threatening, not more closely defined situ- so it was primarily our own citizens and vot- ation – to receive military support from the ers who had the wool pulled over their eyes Western Powers, and that to a certain ex- by Erlander and Palme, not to mention the tent such preparations were actually made majority of their governments. On the other in the 1950’s.37 Is it not conceivable that Er- hand, using this rhetoric, they succeeded in lander had come to this conclusion himself, keeping the Swedish Communists isolated to and perhaps in his discussions with Palme a large marginal political phenomenon dur- that we could not stay out of any new great- ing the entire Cold War. This was the choice power war and would be forced to take that both Erlander and Palme made. They NATO’s side from the outset? Just as in the probably realized that we would not be able Second World War that we had recently en- to stay out of yet another great-power war. dured, the great powers would, in the event They had military geography against them. of a new war, have needed Swedish airspace But by deferring the decision to become a and perhaps even our airbases. It was, there- member of NATO until it became necessary, fore, necessary to involve the major NATO they could maintain their own majority for countries in the preparations. As early as a long time. The question is whether this

80 DISKUSSION & DEBATT would have worked in practice if the worst i.e. after the Soviet withdrawal from Latvia. had come to the worst? For Erlander, Nor- They would probably not have known at wegian NATO membership was considered the time that two of them had already been to mean that the Nordic countries would photographed in their dark military colours be dragged into World War Three from the inside the submarine tunnel in Liepaja. In outset. He wrote in his diary: ‘The respon- any case, it became a military submarine sibility that Lange and Hauge are taking on again when they later tried to earn money should feel terrible, but it does not seem to from selling it. bother them’.39 In Jane’s International Defence Review (no. 11, 1984), there is an article with a photograph of a Soviet midget submarine This leaves the Soviet with a caterpillar tread, which was origi- Submarines nally published in 1973 in Pravda. The photograph was taken west of Gibraltar, The Soviet leaders did not have to take into where it was said the submarine was search- consideration any real domestic protests ing for the lost city of Atlantis. Because it against their foreign policy until mothers could not possibly have been searching began to complain about their sons coming for NATO’s military installations, or lost home in ‘body bags’ from Afghanistan dur- equipment, could it? It also says, however, ing Gorbachev’s glasnost. The West did, of that, in a Soviet radio programme on 10 course, complain a bit when the Soviets had September 1984, it was mentioned that behaved extremely badly, but reverted to she was still there; so she perhaps was, ‘business as usual’ after a few months. along with her support vessel, the equiva- What is, in my opinion, a strong indica- lent ‘Watch Dog’ of the Baltic inlets.40 The tion – not to say proof – that it was the Soviet channels are, of course, considerably deep- Union that violated our waters is the similar- er here, so perhaps just one surface vessel ity with other Soviet intelligence activities in was not enough. It says that the midget our country, particularly the Professor class submarine can operate down to a water training ships. They served the same purpose depth of 105 metres, unusually shallow as some of the submarines that visited our for a research submarine and that there is waters, i.e. monitoring our equipment trials a manned class, called Argus, and an un- and changes to the infrastructure along our manned class, called Zvuk. Examples are coast, particularly to defence installations. also mentioned of mother ships for midget The resources used depended on what they submarines, namely the Polish-built Vityaz were looking for and what suited best. Few and ‘the unknown’ Rift. These also came have denied in the Soviet Union that there under the Institute of Oceanology of the were ‘civilian’ midget submarines, painted Academy of Sciences, like the Akademik in red and white stripes. It is just the fact Aleksey Krylov, which is in a photograph that they were under the control of the same in the article by Lähteinen cited below. The Institute of Oceanology of the Academy of latter has a hatch on the side of the hull, Sciences as the training vessels and this was which seems suitable for one of the Spet- probably not truly civilian, like so much else snaz units’ midget craft: Triton 2. in the Soviet state. The Russian Piranja class In their Northern Fleet, there was an was also painted red and white for a while, India-class submarine (NATO designation)

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marine research.41 In the earlier book, there is a vignette picture of a mother submarine with two machines with caterpillar treads connected; it is not evident from the pic- ture whether this is for the power supply or steering, perhaps for both. The photograph shows a Russian-designed underwater ma- chine, equipped with a caterpillar tread and a ‘funnel’ to protect the cable attachment from the mother submarine or some other support vessel (Fig. 2). One disadvantage with underwater craft equipped with caterpillar treads is actually the energy that is used to make the crawl- ing movement on the seabed. There is, how- ever, an example from the United States that demonstrates that it is entirely possible to Figure 2: The former GRU Colonel V. A. Pla- construct a self-sufficient version of such a vins, who visited me in February 2007, was machine. In the 1940’s, the inventor Halley accompanied by a security man. He told me about a Soviet factory outside Liepaja which Hamlin designed one that could travel a dis- made underwater vessels with caterpillar tance of 35 km at a speed of 4.5 knots. It treads like the one in the picture (Private ar- was, nevertheless, able to run for thirty-two chives). hours on its batteries with a two-man crew.42 At both Mälsten and Kappelshamnsviken, there were other indications that a mother with two smaller so-called rescue subma- submarine may have been involved and rines in holes in the stern. These were, no could, in this case, have been responsible for doubt, also rescue submarines and, unlike the power supply. The second photograph the Argus, were deep-draught, but at least shows an older, well-used Soviet underwa- one of the types seems to be designed to be ter machine with something that looks like equipped with a caterpillar tread. A midget two adjustable engines so that it is able to submarine with a caterpillar tread may be lift itself up and float, for example up on a particularly useful when it comes to laying, mother submarine (Fig. 3). maintaining, or picking up magnetic or hy- In the Swedish debate, it has sometimes drophone cables, an activity that was of rel- been said that, even afterwards, no one has evance for their own harbour defences, but been able to show that the Soviet Union also for investigating and destroying, prior had the resources. Others, including Ingvar to war, the SOSUS (sound surveillance sys- Carlsson, ask themselves why no one who tem) lines that NATO had laid during the was involved will stand up and tell us that Cold War to keep tabs on the Soviet Union’s they were here? Both questions only show nuclear submarines. The Soviet Union de- that we are not taking in or searching for veloped midget submarines with caterpillar the information available. It is generally well treads for both civilian and military purpos- known in military circles, at least since the es. This is evident in two Russian books on 1970’s, that each of the Soviet fleets had a

82 DISKUSSION & DEBATT so-called Spetsnaz brigade with diving units and four-man types, respectively, and with for intelligence missions and marine sabo- lengths of approximately thirteen, twenty, tage. These also had the means to transport and twenty-three metres, respectively. Jud- themselves further and quicker than by ging by the widths and heights of these, they simply swimming from submarine torpedo must have been rather clumsy in comparison tubes or from fishing trawlers outside the with later creations. It also states that they boundaries of territorial waters. Guide to carry torpedoes; in any case, the three-man the Soviet Navy, first published in 1970, type does. The book was originally written states, for example: by Siegfried Breyer, a West German naval specialist, particularly on the Soviet Navy, Since the war, the Soviets have built sev- eral types of midget submarine, probably as early as the 1960’s and has, since then, for offensive use in coastal waters. The been continually reissued in new updated first sighting of these types was during editions by the U.S. Naval Institute in Anna- fleet manoeuvres in April 1957. The in- polis. (As a reminder, it is worth mentioning centive to build such craft was, no doubt, that it says in the 1970 edition of the book provided by the operations of German, that the Baltic Fleet is the Soviet Union’s lar- British, Japanese, and Italian midget sub- gest fleet.) marines during the Second World War. Three types are believed to be in exist- I am not actually certain that these ence, one being carried by a “mother” midget submarines were at the immedi- submarine ..., while the other two types ate disposal of the fleet units. In any case, are transported to their operational area they later had other means of transport, by surface vessels.43 such as the two-man wet Sirena and Tri- ton 1 as well as one-man towing vessels There then follows a specification table commonly known as underwater scooters. of these three types, called two-, three-, This did not prevent these midget subma- rines from having sometimes been put at their disposal, when this was required, like the Whiskey class submarines.44 The Sirena looks like a torpedo with special ‘saddles’ for its two ‘riders’. They can carry a nose charge, which can be used for various purposes when carrying out sabotage. Like the frogmen, she can pass through the torpedo tubes of a Whiskey class submarine. The Triton was further developed during the 1970’s into a larger midget submarine with a length of 9.5 m for two crewmen and four accompany- ing frogmen. The latter is said to exist in both wet and dry designs and in a total of twenty-four types according to the serial numbers, i.e. about six per fleet.45 They Figure 3: An older Russian-designed underwa- were also the only underwater craft they ter machine (Private archives). had in the Baltic Fleet’s Spetsnaz bri-

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­gade, according to Admiral Baltuska, who ‘Delfin’. Their mission was to engage in I interviewed in 2006 prior to an earlier covert activity against foreign naval bases project.46 ‘I have personally been responsi- in order to carry out intelligence and di- ble for maintaining them’, he told me. versionary tasks. I actually think that we On 24 April 1998, the FLT news agency are talking about two different things here. sent a fax that also confirmed the existence Delfin is probably a special unit under the of resources for violating other countries’ direct command of Moscow and carrying waters: out missions outside the Baltic. Baltuska also had something to say about this: At Admiral Vladimir Kuroyedov says that Kronstadt, there were three approximately this involves a special unit that exists in all 60-metre-long submarines that were not four Russian fleets, in the Baltic, North- under the command of the commander of ern, Pacific, and Black Sea Fleets... The fact that the Russian armed forces were the Baltic Fleet, and which he believed car- equipped with midget submarines is noth- ried out missions in the Atlantic. ing new. The Submarine Commission had Or as early as 22 September 1996, we already established this in its final report could have watched a Swedish TV pro- in 1995. On the other hand, the existence gramme on TV 2 called Reportrarna [The of special units has never been able to be Reporters], in which there were interviews confirmed before... The Military Intelli- with three men who had all served on So- gence Service, the GRU, organizes under- water forces that carry out secret activi- viet submarines and all of them spoke of ties against foreign naval bases. The GRU being in the waters of foreign countries. uses midget submarines that are of the Swedish and Scandinavian waters were same length as those hunted by the Swed- mentioned here, and they spoke about the ish Navy in Swedish waters.47 Sirena and Triton. In these programmes (there were actually two of them: the sec- The last sentence refers to the Soviet– ond one two weeks later on their nuclear Russian Piranja, which, in any case, has weaponry!), it was said that, whilst in been in the Baltic since its 1984 prototype, foreign waters, they were often subjected when it was discovered in Swedish waters. to depth charge attacks, resulting in col- On 19 August 2004, there was fresh con- leagues having panic attacks and having firmation in the form of an interview in to be restrained and anaesthetized un- Svenska Dagbladet with the commander til they reached port and could be given of the Baltic Fleet, the Russian admiral professional help. It was also sometimes Vladimir Valuyev, on a visit to Sweden the case that colleagues were killed, par- while the Swedish submarine force cel- ticularly among the divers on missions ebrated its centenary year. In the interview, outside the vessels. It was also mentioned Valuyev gave the following answer: ‘Yes, that they got stuck in an anti-submarine we are equipped with midget submarines’. net on one occasion, but cut themselves Already at the time of Kuroyedov’s ‘initia- free. In the 1995 Submarine Commission’s tive’, Interfax provided supplementary in- report, it is mentioned that, in 1986, the formation by stating that the naval Spet- Swedish Navy discovered damage like this snaz units were set up in 1969 and that, to a net across one of the entrances to just a year later, the GRU began to organ- Hårsfjärden, an incident that need not be ize underwater forces under the name of connected to the incident referred to in the

84 DISKUSSION & DEBATT interview, of course, but could be. When and Finnish Experiences].48 In this article, I watched these TV programmes again as he describes, among other things, the three preparation for my book, I remembered aforementioned Reportrarna interviews as a section from Lennart Ljung’s diary, dat- follows: ed 28 December 1982, i.e. almost three months after the Hårsfjärden incident: A Russian submarine officer, aged around forty and now in the reserve, provided I received a phone call from an editor details of the Sirena and Triton craft that were used on missions like this. He told called Teander from Nerikes Allehanda, how agents were transported on them. who I already know. He has, among The divers could, for example, leave the other things, studied at the National mother submarine on an underwater Defence College. He had two pieces of scooter a few kilometres outside a har- information, one of which was a West bour that was to be explored, carry out German statement that the Swedish and their mission and then return, usually in Soviet Governments had agreed to re- the early morning hours. It was easiest to lease a submarine. I was, of course, able operate in the evenings, at weekends, and to emphatically deny this. The other in the autumn. This was when surveil- piece of information was more interest- lance was at its weakest. The reason for ing. Teander had received information this activity was to train in realistic con- that a Russian citizen had visited a Swede ditions and to detect changes to the har- in the Örebro area over Christmas. The bours. The submarine officer telling his Russian had mentioned at the time that story had frequently been in Swedish and he had a distant relative who had served other Scandinavian countries’ territories onboard the Soviet submarine fleet in illegally. It was easy for the submarines the Baltic. He had now been reported to hide among the rocks in the archi- missing since the exercises took place in pelago. According to Russian informa- the western Baltic. He also said that the tion, several divers had died during these Russian had stated that it was said that operations. As regards the Whiskey class several Russian submariners had been submarine that ran aground in 1981, the officer stated that another Soviet subma- injured during this activity. The dates rine had also been at the scene and tried could have corresponded with the events all night to pull the stranded submarine in Hårsfjärden. I have got the intelligence free. people to make some discrete enquiries. The second person interviewed was a naval doctor, with the rank of commo- Has any country, other than Sweden and dore, and he stated that he had served Norway, deployed depth charges and on submarines for five years. His home station was Paldiski in . The of- mines to combat submarine incursions in ficer said that he had taken part in many times of peace? Let us continue with the missions in foreign countries’ waters. He evidence as the resources have been avail- said that depth charges were often de- able. For information was certainly avail- ployed against his submarine, and that able to anyone who wanted to listen, and it once got stuck in an anti-submarine listen is just what the Finnish captain Jussi net. The orders to penetrate foreign wa- ters came from the general staff in Mos- Lähteinen did. In addition, he has taken cow. In practice, the operation was led the trouble of writing an article about it, by a GRU intelligence officer. The doctor entitled ‘Ubåtars territorialkränkningar – mentioned reconnaissance missions and erfarenheter i Sverige och Finland’ [Terri- exercises as the reasons for the incur- torial Violations by Submarines – Swedish sions. Good performances were reward-

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ed with promotion. Twenty years ago, he to Bulovanov, the submarine was built in had been a lieutenant. the early 1970’s at the Sudomekh shipyard The third person interviewed was a in Leningrad. It could, therefore, have been naval officer in uniform; he had served in the navy for thirty years. He had been the extremely active in the 1980’s and, if so, captain of a submarine in the Baltic. Be- also in the Baltic. fore he retired, he had operational staff The description also corresponds very duties in Kaliningrad. He talked of the well with a phenomenon that I encoun- use of midget submarines for sabotage tered many times at presentations on the and mining missions in the harbours. The Sirena class diving craft, which were submarine issue during my time as Su- transported in torpedo tubes, became preme Commander, which is the so-called standard equipment on their submarines ‘Whaleback’ effect that would cause a from the 1950’s onwards. The people wash near the surface and often attracted interviewed had also provided a lot of additional detail to the presenter, which confirmed their accounts.

Why do not more people speak up? As a military man, I find it easy to accept that special units of this type, and particularly when they have been subjected to the kind of stresses described in the interviews, de- velop an extraordinary loyalty to each oth- er and to the organization. In addition, the GRU developed a fear of its organization Figure 4: A Soviet midget submarine. that was at least on a par with the fear of the KGB. Thus, it was even a crime to talk the attention of holidaymakers, but also of its existence. Our informant from the of more professional reconnaissance units. ‘Watch Dog’ disappeared before we had a There is even a Politburo decision to send chance to complete the debriefing. the Delfin unit, which was newly set up at Let me finish with an example from the the beginning of the 1970’s, to Swedish International Commission of Military His- waters in peacetime. We can read about tory’s trip to the former Soviet Union in the this in a book written by the UN Under- summer of 1992. There is a photograph Secretary General for Disarmament Issues from this trip of a man leaning against a Arkady N. Shevchenko, who defected: midget submarine, displayed as an exhibit (Fig. 4). It was taken inside the naval base In important foreign policy matters the in Balaklava, to which the party was ad- Kremlin leadership’s typical double- mitted thanks to the former GRU officer handed approach was expressed in the approval of a plan to send submarines Dimitri Bulovanov taking the opportunity to probe Swedish and Norwegian coastal to earn some money as their guide. When areas soon after Swedish Prime Minis- measured ‘through furtive pacing’, the re- ter Olof Palme visited Moscow in 1970 sult is that it is sixteen metres long. It is and received assurances that the Soviet also spool-shaped, has no conning tower, Union intended to widen the friendly co- and has a dark military colour. According operation with his country. At a meeting

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in the spring of 1972, it was decided to naive if it believed that the submarine in- sign the convention on the liquidation of cursions would cease. This was the same biological weapons. But General Aleksei Arbatov who, later in the summer of 1983, A. Gryzlov told me that Defense Minister told Palme that Defence Minister Ustinov Andrei Grechko had instructed the mili- tary not to abandon its program to pro- had announced that he had ordered that no duce weapons. It is not possible that the more submarines were to be sent to Swe- Politburo was unaware of this order.49 den. About two months later, Orgakov, Ustinov’s successor, said the same thing to Anders Thunborg. In his diary (17 August), These are the only examples of this re- Ljung noted: ‘This can also be taken as an curring characteristic of the Soviet state’s admission of the previous incursions’. notorious unreliability and double-hand- May I conclude this list of ‘indications’ edness that Shevchenko provided in his that it was the Soviet Union that was here extensive memoirs: four sentences. What by mentioning that, as early as 29 June is, of course, important for him is to tell 1988, while the incursions were still going his predominantly American readership, on, Aftonbladet featured an article in which the country of which he became a citizen, it claimed that a Soviet government offi- that they are at risk of being attacked by cial, an expert on Scandinavia, had stated biological weapons despite the UN agree- that Soviet submarines had been operating ment. The fact that he also mentions the in Swedish waters over the last few years. submarine incursions is due to this also This was, of course, now ‘glasnost’ and he being relevant to his American readership thought that the submarine incursions had precisely at the time the book was written. come to an end with Gorbachev. It is my They themselves had seen ‘Whiskey on the opinion that the territorial waters of all the Rocks’ on the front pages of their newspa- Nordic countries were at times violated by pers and knew that it was true. Besides, we Soviet submarines during the Cold War. now know that, timewise, this corresponds And there were probably several different well with the setting up of the new Delfin organizations responsible for these visits unit! and these had slightly different reasons for Georgi Arbatov, director of the Institute visiting our waters. The following passage for the U.S. and Canadian Studies, was, on describes the units this may have involved the same night (26 April 1983) as Sven An- and what reasons they could, in this case, dersson was singling out the Soviet Union possibly have had for visiting Swedish wa- as the guilty party for the 1982 violations, ters. due to speak to a private audience of fewer The Spetsnaz units of the Baltic and than a hundred people at the Carnegie En- Northern Fleets could, in all likelihood, dowment for International Peace in Wash- have been responsible for the coastal intel- ington DC. He was said to have spoken ligence activity required for any landings about the special responsibility that rested in the event of war in Europe. Aleksandr with the superpowers, the United States Rzhavin has described this (the North- and the Soviet Union, with their large ern Fleet’s units in northern Norway, in stocks of nuclear weapons. According to any case, and the Baltic Fleet in general) several sources, he was also to have said in ‘Navy Spetsnaz’, a translation done by something about Sweden, therefore, being MUST (the Swedish Military Intelligence

87 NR 3 juli/oktober 2010 and Security Service) of a book in Russian the coast of the Gulf of Bothnia towards and edited by the son of a Latvian Spet- both Sweden and Finland could very well snaz soldier.50 In my previous article, I had be a description of landings by forces from a picture, which is reproduced here, of the Leningrad military district. During Sta- what form Soviet planning against Sweden lin’s time, the Baltic Fleet consisted of two could have taken in the 1950’s and perhaps fleets, one for each military district, and, as also later as an alternative in the event of late as in Breyer’s Guide to the Soviet Navy Sweden being dragged into or deciding to (1970), it is mentioned that the Baltic Fleet become involved in the war. In any plan, consists of two groups, a northern one in they would probably have intended to de- Tallinn and a southern one in Baltiysk. As stroy the coastal sensors we had, as they we can see from the arrows from the sea were aware that the results from these were towards the coast of southern Finland, it also reported to NATO, such as those from would not have been strange if the coast the FRA (National Defence Radio Estab- around the Hanko Peninsula had been vis- lishment) installations.51 At a PHP (Paral- ited by Soviet submarines during the Cold lel History Project) conference in Bodø in War. My previous study came to the con- August 2007, during which I presented clusion that the Soviet Union’s primary op- the findings of my earlier research into the Soviet threat against Sweden, the Russian general Vladimir Dvorkin also participat- ed. He told us that the Soviet Union had assigned ten divisions to overpower Scan- dinavia. There was no doubt that the main target was Norway, but it was rather un- clear how much it was intended that Swe- den would be affected. The forces to be de- ployed suggest that this could only involve the most northerly area for a reason that will soon be discussed. In McQuail’s illustration (see Fig. 5), we see thick arrows leading from the coast of the Baltic military district to- wards the southern part of Sweden and up to Härnösand. Occupying Finland – and northern Norway – was, however, a task for the Leningrad military district, and its forces could possibly also open the Swed- ish railway from Boden to Narvik at a later stage in order to provide supplies to their occupation forces in northern Nor- way (unless Sweden allowed them to use Figure 5: The invasion picture is taken from an the railway without a fight, as we did with article entitled ‘Khrushchev’s Right Flank’ which the Germans between 1940 and 1943). was written by U.S. colonel Robert P. McQuail The small arrows going in the direction of (source: Military Review, no. 1, 1964).

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the name of the U-137 – was on just such a journey when it ran aground in Gåse- fjärden. It actually had an additional com- mander/examiner onboard: Commander Avsukjevitj. This was perhaps prior to a more difficult intelligence operation at a NATO base. The political officer onboard has recently written a book indicating that Avsukjevitj might actually have been a GRU officer.53 In this book, it shows that Avsukjevitj took command of events when the rounding of Utklippan Lighthouse was interrupted and a course set for the narrow entrance to Gåsefjärden. The order was Figure 6: The likely Soviet objective for the given from the electronic intelligence sys- operation in the Northwestern Theatre of tem down below up to Captain Gushchin Strategic Military Action. This illustration is taken from Bengt Gustafsson, “Det sovjetis- in the conning tower. The course for 030 ka hotet mot Sverige under det kalla kriget“ was actually obtained through the signal (Stockholm: Försvarshögskolan, 2007). from a Swedish radar on the mainland just inside Gåsefjärden.54 Anyone who does not believe that this was intentional must also tion was, from the beginning of the 1960’s explain why the U-137 went into a surface in any case, to bypass Sweden and, in so position if she – as they say – was on the doing, they were expecting us to declare way to a loading area with a depth of 40 ourselves neutral, just as we had done in metres. This corresponds better with an the spring of 1940 when Denmark and intentional incursion in shallow water, as Norway were ccupied (see Fig. 6). does the fact that one of the diesel engines But there were more than just intel- was being used to charge the batteries on ligence units in Swedish waters. In the the way in.55 middle of the 1960’s, the then head of the Although it cannot be gathered from the Swedish military intelligence service Bo statistics whether the intruding submarines Westin asked the Pentagon for assistance operated particularly openly, we are, nev- in carrying out a study into why Soviet ertheless, struck by the fact that so many submarines regularly violated Swedish Whiskey class submarines have shown their waters. The assistant naval attaché Bob- conning towers over the years. The Soviet by Ray Inman, who was made available, submarine school may have had the same would later go on to have a successful rules for their ‘exams’ as those the former career within the U.S. intelligence organi- Swedish Minister for Defence Eric Krön- zation. The study came to the conclusion mark described a British submariner telling that it was the Soviet submarine school, him about: ‘We were to enter a Norwegian located in the Baltic, that was setting its fjord and show ourselves’. If this is true, we exams in Swedish waters.52 have to assume that this was an agreement It could be conceivable that for its exam reached with the Norwegians and before the submarine S-363 – temporarily given they started firing with live ammunition. As

89 NR 3 juli/oktober 2010 a Swede, it is not particularly pleasant to at the outbreak of war. What a shame that have to accept the fact that the Soviet state Ekéus did not stick to his guns as an inves- did not show greater consideration for our tigator just over ten years later. neutral country and its defences than using Since they needed to train anyway, they us as a training ground, even at a time when could just as well carry out intelligence mis- we had destroyers and frigates. At that time, sions for other purposes aimed at Sweden this could hardly have been due to our poor or the infrastructure that was of importance anti-submarine capacity, but they knew, of for Swedish cooperation with NATO. Dur- course, that it was simply a case of doing ing the intelligence operation RYaN, which as it said in the Ordinance concerning In- started at the beginning of the 1980’s, they, tervention by Swedish Defence Forces in the for example, investigated whether the de- Event of Violations of Swedish Territory in ployed West German Baltic submarines Peacetime and in Neutrality, etc. (IFKN), had sought refuge along the Swedish coast if they were detected and then they would in preparation for the U.S. nuclear first avoid combat. What was then going on at strike, which Soviet President Andropov the time of the Politburo decision of 1970, was waiting for.57 This could potentially be shortly after Olof Palme had been on a visit a forewarning of an U.S. first strike. The to Moscow? Someone was going to be al- West German submarine force was also to lowed to send submarines to coastal areas be expanded when the Soviet decision was in Sweden and Norway but obviously, they made at the start of the 1970’s, which they were already doing so! had surely also noted. It was to be almost The Delfin unit, which was set up in doubled in size. 1970, has already been mentioned, i.e. ‘a The old diesel-electric Golf class sub- particularly skilled reconnaissance and marines, with their nuclear charges, would sabotage unit was created directly under also be introduced in the Baltic in 1976, the general staff (GRU) for operations followed by the Juliette class submarines in against the bases of foreign countries’. It 1982. They would continue to have impor- is actually not very strange then that Hårs- tant missions from their launching sites in fjärden, Karlskrona, Gullmarsfjorden, and the Baltic, such as attacking NATO airbas- the Sundsvall area were visited. But did the es in northern Norway.58 The number of Spetsnaz not primarily focus on NATO’s NATO aircraft would have to be reduced nuclear arsenal? Indeed, that is why I believe before they could break out through the that the former ‘disarmer’ Rolf Ekéus was Danish straits. At the time, in the 1950’s, absolutely right when, in Geneva in 1988, the Golf class submarines were built to go he replied to the MFA’s internal inquiry and far into the deep North Atlantic; so, from a in so doing suggested, among other things, purely technical perspective, they may have that the Soviet units were carrying out ex- needed a greater launching depth than they ercises using Sweden’s bases as preparation had available to them near the Baltic coast for the task of sabotaging NATO’s nuclear or in the Gulf of Finland. These were per- submarines in the French (Brest) and Brit- haps close to the Swedish coast. All the ish (the Orkneys) bases.56 This seems to be more reason to keep tabs on where the a correct assumption. They may also have German submarines were going. The Ju- been given missions involving the SOSUS liette class’s missiles also had such a short lines, which were probably to be destroyed range that these could only be used against

90 DISKUSSION & DEBATT northern Norway if they went up into the new maritime strategy in the Scandinavian Gulf of Bothnia. region. Aircraft carriers were carrying out So there were certainly military reasons exercises in northern Norway and the battle­ for the Soviet Union to visit Swedish wa- ship Iowa entered the Baltic. This activity ters and sneak up into the Gulf of Bothnia included providing support to the Polish op- through the Åland Sea. It is usually said position movement Solidarity, and little old that it was politically counterproductive Sweden had the nerve to take part in this. It for the Soviet Union to violate Swedish wa- was probably this anger that Arbatov was ters. This is cited as one of the reasons why venting at the Carnegie meeting. it would not have been their submarines It was also, of course, the U-137 incident that were here. It is also certainly another that led to how the question of the intrud- reason for why Swedes and our Scandina- ing submarines was dealt with. Prior to this, vian neighbours have found it so easy to there had been articles now and then, but accept Tunander’s conspiracy theory. Al- also periods of silence, which I have seen though the Soviet leaders were bound to examples of from the 1950’s to the 1970’s. be aware of most of Sweden’s cooperation After Hårsfjärden, a reporting procedure with NATO, I do not believe either that from a public authority to the Government they had any particular political motive for was formalized by the latter, and, as a result giving the ‘military’ permission at the be- of this, press conferences were held at both ginning of the 1970’s to train the new unit levels. The politicians were probably of the near the Swedish coastal areas. They had, opinion, as was my predecessor, that this ac- of course, already done this with the sub- tion was necessary out of consideration for marine school without this previously hav- the ‘open society’ and the informer activity ing caused any problems. It was not until that had become the norm within all sectors 1981 that they would be caught in the act, of Swedish society, even the armed forces run aground on the way into Gåsefjärden. and the police. On the other hand, I believe that there was Before concluding the section on the increasing political anger at Swedish ac- Soviet Union, it should perhaps be men- tions during the 1980’s. It was not enough tioned that Poland had four Whiskey class that we did not have the sense to settle the submarines, three of which were, in any U-137 incident in a flexible manner that a case, operational during the 1980’s. As superpower deserves in its backyard, but we they took part in other military intelligence even had the gall, two years later, to publicly activities in our country, they could also accuse them of having been in Hårsfjärden. have been here as a member of the Warsaw The Swedish Government had not behaved Pact. About a week after HMS Halland this badly since the beginning of the 1950’s. dropped depth charges during the Utö in- Moreover, this took place when tension bet­ cident a Polish salvage ship and two Whis- ween the blocs was greater than it had been key submarines were found southeast of for a long time. In this case, we also have to the island of Gotland. On the other hand, go back to the beginning of the 1960’s and Poland had offensive missions planned the Cuban Missile Crisis to find an equally against Denmark.59 It should perhaps also tense period. The Reagan administration be mentioned that it was not just Oberon was conducting economic and psychologi- class submarines that entered the Baltic. As cal warfare against the Soviet Union with a a rule, every five or six weeks a Whiskey

91 NR 3 juli/oktober 2010 class submarine went in or out of the Dan- rines were up to around the Swedish coast. ish straits. This involved submarines being In the 1980s, the United Kingdom and the relieved in a patrol area north of Scotland, United States gave the Swedish Navy con- where British and forward-deployed U.S. siderable support so that we would be able nuclear submarines operated. to defend ourselves against the Soviet vio- In summary, for the reasons given above, lations, which also involved our ‘inner wa- it can be asserted that it was essentially ters’. Violations of this type appear to have the Soviet Union that was responsible for ceased since the autumn of 1992, which is, the submarine violations of Swedish wa- of course, mainly due to the collapse of the ters. The presence of Russian and German Soviet Union. However, from the end of submarines in our coastal areas has been the 1980’s, it would appear that Sweden’s a tradition from the two world wars that improved ability had already forced the So- continued so that, in the event of a new viet elite units to adjust their activity. The war, they would be able to ensure signifi- so-called submarine school may already cantly better protection for their own sub- have ceased its activity in Sweden in the marines than that offered by the Baltic and early 1980’s. North German coasts. The various Soviet motives for operating in our waters were also a reason for West Germany and the The author is a General and former Su- United Kingdom using submarines to in- preme Commander. He is a member of the vestigate what the Soviet/Russian subma- Academy.

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Notes the 1980’s Frank Cass, London 2004. 14. Striptease, SVT, 7 March and 11 April 2000. 15. Mossberg, Mathias: I mörka vatten, Leopard, 1. The name of the Swedish Conservative Party. Stockholm 2009. 2. SOU is an acronym for statens offentliga 16. Op. cit., note 7, p. 263. utredningar (Swedish Government Official 17. Ibid., p. 273. Reports). 18. Fältström, Herman (ed.): Ubåtsoperationer 3. ‘Budget submarines’ were imaginary subma- och kränkningar under det kalla kriget, rines that were designed to support the Swed- FOKK no. 15, Axel Abrahamsons förlag, ish military’s case for more resources. 2008, Karlskrona p. 115. 4. It must be admitted that exactly what Bod- 19. Former Danish Chief of Defence Admiral ström actually said has never been reported, Sven Thiede’s statement in the Danish Uden- but the wording I have used is in line with rigspolitiske Selskab on 22 September 2005. what a colleague of Minister for Foreign Af- 20. See Woodward, Veil, Bob: The Secret Wars of fairs, Magnus Faxén, told Lennart Ljung was the CIA, 1981–1987, Simon & Schuster, New Bodström’s opinion just over a year earlier York, NY 1987, p. 307. ‘Any effort by the and is what Ljung has quoted in his diary. CIA abroad to influence events in a foreign 5. A brief comment on other contentious issues: country was defined as covert action and I also refer here to the way that Palme toned required a formal presidential finding’. down the fact that Georgi Arbatov actually 21. In the Åland Sea, as in the Sound, submarines admitted in a speech in Washington that it must operate in a surface position according was Soviet submarines that violated Swedish to international treaties. BALTAP is NATO’s waters, something that Palme called ‘after- command for the Baltic and its outlet, and is dinner gossip’. based in Denmark. 6. It can be surmised that the aim of this was, 22. Wahlbäck, Krister: Brobyggarna: En vänbok in addition to examining the earlier actions till Nils Andrén, Nerenius & Santérus förlag, of the military authorities, to unite his own Stockholm 1997, p. 32. Undén is Östen party on this issue. It was not just Bodström Undèn, chairman of the Swedish Parliament’s who had a problem with his conception of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs dur- world. ing the war and then Minister for Foreign Af- 7. Ubåtskommission, Ubåtsfrågan 1981–1994, fairs until 1962. He was also an internation- SOU 1995: 135 Fritzes, Stockholm 1995. ally well-known lawyer. During the post-war 8. The two inquiries headed by Ambassador period, he was also Sweden’s interpreter of the Rolf Ekéus were officially known asthe Sub- policy of neutrality and extremely formal in marine Inquiry and the Inquiry on Security these respects. As we will see, the new Prime Policy. See n. 10. There are summaries in Minister, who was more pragmatic, did not English of the reports. keep Undén informed about the entire content 9. The Commission on Neutrality Policy, Had of the cooperation with the West. There Been a War ... Preparations for the 23. Chaplin, Philip & Harris, Daniel G.: Ob- Reception of Military Assistance, 1949–1969, served Secretly: Northern Window, Helms- Report of the Commission on Neutrality man Publications, Ottawa 2006. Policy, SOU 1994:11 Fritzes, Stockholm 24. The information in the previous and follow- 1994. ing passages has been taken from articles 10. Ubåtsutredningen, Perspektiv på ubåtsfrågan, written as part of the Swedish Armed Forces SOU 2001: 85 Fritzes, Stockholm 2001 and Staff and War College’s Department of Mili- Säkerhetspolitiska utredningen, Fred och säk- tary History’s series on the Second World War, erhet – svensk säkerhetspolitik 1969–1989, which was published by Probus at the begin- SOU 2002: 108 Fritzes, Stockholm 2002, the ning of the 1990’s. latter in two parts with appendices. 25. Johansson, Anders: Den glömda armén, Scan- 11. Ibid., Ubåtsutredningen, p. 344. dBook, Falun 2005. 12. Carlsson, Ingvar: I skuggan av Olof Palme, 26. Article in the aforementioned work by Leif Hjalmarsson & Högberg, Stockholm 2009, p. Leifland, Swedish Ambassador to the United 91. Kingdom during most of the 1980’s. 13. Tunander, Ola: The Secret War against Swe- 27. The sources for this account are prima- den – US and British Submarine Deception in rily from the diaries of people involved and

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checked against the Commission on Neutral- 42. Teknik för Alla, 15 1950. ity Policy, which does not give a very factual 43. Breyer, Siegfried: Guide to the Soviet Navy, description. That may be due to the fact that trans. M. W. Henley United States Naval it has had to rely, to a great extent, on oral Institute, Annapolis, MD 1970, p. 134ff. sources. The author of this work has also 44. As regards the Whiskey class, during the pre- had access to the researcher Robert Dalsjö’s paratory work for my previous publication, sources for his thesis, Life-Line Lost: The I was told by the Lithuanian rear-admiral Rise and Fall of ‘Neutral’ Sweden’s Secret Raimundus Baltuska that there were a couple Reserve Option of Wartime Help from the of these that had been specially rebuilt for West, Santérus förlag, Stockholm 2007. These intelligence operations. consist of copies of documents and letters 45. In a dry midget submarine the frogmen are from and to the Swedish Defence Staff in the sheltered from temperature and water pres- 1950’s and 1960’s. sure but not in a wet one. 28. Op. cit., note 9, p. 257. 46. Gustafsson, Bengt: Det sovjetiska hotet mot 29. Holmström, Mikael: Det dolda blixtlåset – Sverige under det kalla kriget, FOKK no. 12 minspärren i Öresund, Address of admission Försvarshögskolan, Stockholm 2007. to Kungl Örlogsmannasällskapet on the 29th 47. FLT Nyhetsbyrå, 24 April 1998. of October 2008. 48. Lähteinen, Jussi: “Ubåtars territorialkränk­ 30. NPK, p. 23. ningar – erfarenheter i Sverige och Finland“, 31. Memorandum on the Report, 21 November KKrVAHT, 4. häftet 1997. 1959, among Robert Dalsjö’s sources. 49. Arkady N. Shevchenko: Breaking with Mos- 32. The Commission on Neutrality Policy’s cow, Alfred A. Knopf, New York, NY, 1985, appendices and Silva, Charles: Keep Them p. 179. Shevchenko had been the personal Strong, Keep Them Friendly: Swedish-U.S. advisor to Foreign Minister Gromyko on dis- Relations and the Pax Americana, 1948–1952 armament issues in particular at the beginning Akademitryck, Stockholm 1999, p. 348ff. of the 1970’s, so he should have been very 33. Östberg, Kjell: I takt med tiden: Olof Palme, aware of what was happening at a central 1927–1969 Leopard förlag, Stockholm 2008, level, among other things, through the flood p.311, and När vinden vände: Olof Palme, of rumour that the second example in his text 1969–1986 Leopard förlag, Stockholm 2009. is evidence of. 34. Nilsson, Michael: “Amber Nine: NATO’s 50. MUST is an acronym for: den svenska mil- Secret Use of a Flight Path over Sweden and itära underrättelse- och säkerhetstjänsten, i.e. the Incorporation of Sweden in NATO’s Infra- the Swedish military intelligence services structure“, Journal of Contemporary History, 51. FRA (Försvarets Radioanstalt) is the Swedish 44, 2 (2009), p. 287ff., based on Skogrand, signals intelligence organization. Kjetil and Tamnes, Rolf: “Fryktens likevekt: 52. See Widén, Jerker: Väktare, ombud, kritiker: Atombomben, Norge og verden, 1945–1970“, Sverige i amerikanskt säkerhetstänkande, Tiden, Oslo 2001, p. 197ff. 1961–1968, Santérus Academic Press Sweden, 35. Schweizer, Peter: “Victory–The Reagan Ad- Stockholm 2009, p. 105. ministration’s Secret Strategy That Hastened 53. Besedin, Vasily: Inifrån U 137, Albinsson och the Collapse of the Soviet Union“, The Atlan- Sjöbergs Bokförlag, Karlskrona 2009. tic Monthly Press, New York NY 1994. 54. Ibid., p. 38f. 36. Op. cit., note 9, p. 253. 55. Conversation with Commodore Karl Anders- 37. Ibid., p. 257. son, who interrogated Gushchin, December 38. Ibid., p. 27. 2009. 39. The Norwegian Foreign Minister and Defence 56. Subject file HP 52 G, the Archives of the Minister. Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Stock- 40. We called the Warsaw Pact vessels that con- holm. stantly monitored traffic in the Baltic ‘Watch 57. Regarding Ryan, see my article “Det sovjetis- Dogs’. ka hotet“ (the English version, ‘The Soviet 41. Diomidor, M. N. and Dmitnov, A. N.: Threat to Sweden during the Cold War’, “The Conquest of the Depth of the Sea“ (in has been published by the Parallel History Russian), ed. L. A. Zenkevitj Sudustroenie, Project on Cooperative Security), http://www. Leningrad 1964, and Underwater Technology php.isn.ethz.ch/collections/coll_sovthreat/ (in Russian) Leningrad, 1984. Introduction.cfm?navinfo=46465 or https://

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www.cia. gov/library/center-for-the-study-of- duction, describes in detail the Polish coastal intelligence/csi-publications/book front’s attack all the way to the English Chan- 58. A conversation with Baltuska. nel and up into Danish Jutland and also the 59. The DIIS, which is mentioned in the intro- Baltic Fleet’s landings on the Danish islands.

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