By ZARMINA BALOCH

PAKISTAN’S POST 9/11 AFGHAN POLICY: CHALLENGES AND PROSPECTS (2001-2014)

ZARMINA BALOCH

AREA STUDY CENTRE

(RUSSIA, CHINA & CENTRAL ASIA)

UNIVERSITY OF PESHAWAR (AUGUST, 2018) PAKISTAN’S POST 9/11 AFGHAN POLICY: CHALLENGES AND PROSPECTS (2001-2014)

ZARMINA BALOCH

A dissertation submitted to the Area Study Centre (Russia, China, & Central Asia) University of Peshawar in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

DECLARATION I hereby declare that this dissertation is the outcome of my Individual research and that it has not been submitted to any other University for the grant of a degree.

December 2018 ZARMINA BALOCH

DEDICATION

I dedicate this research work to my parents, Husband, Children and all family members

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The preparation of this thesis owes its thanks to many individuals and to institutions, without whose guidance and help, it would have been difficult to complete the thesis. For financial support, my acknowledgement goes to my husband Muhammad Faiq Ahmad Khan. I owe special gratitude to my supervisor, Professor Dr. Ijaz Khan, under whose guidance, supervision and direction, the thesis took the shape, which it has today. Professors including current Director Prof. Dr Shabir Khan and Former Director Prof. Dr Sarfarz Khan and friends in the Area Study Center (Russia, China & Central Asia), University of Peshawar have been invaluable in their support and assistance, especially Mr Sahar Gull whose assistance and expert help format it. Special thanks go to colleague Dr. Asif Saleem for his guidance during my work. My dear family deserves special mention in this wonderful journey. My husband, my wonderful children Muhmmad Musa Ahmad Khan and Hannah Khan and my mom in law Sajjida Malik were enthusiastic supporters in this endeavor. Special thanks to my parents, Abid Baloch and Nagina Qazi, my siblings Dayyam Baloch and Samrina Baloch, sister in Law Mashal Dayyam, my nephews Ibrahim, Sikandar and Hayam whose moral support made my tough journey possible, who gave their unflinching support, stood by me through the thick and thin of this journey and patiently understood my preoccupation with my work.

Thank you all.

ABSTRACT Pakistan after 11thSeptember, 2001 changed its policy of supporting Taliban Government in Afghanistan and joined US led Global War on Terror. US military action in Afghanistan started in October 2001; this operation pushed the militants and operatives of Al-Qaida from Afghanistan into Pakistan’s Tribal Areas. Thus, turning it into a safe sanctuary for foreign militants and also provided base for Al-Qaeda and Afghan Taliban, these militants used the porous Pak-Afghan border to attack US and Western forces in Afghanistan. Though Pakistan became a close ally of US and its allies in GWOT in Afghanistan and was given the status of a “major non-NATO ally” for its important role in supporting US forces to get hold of Al-Qaida and its supporters. However, Afghan government (established in 2001 in Bonn Conference), Western and international community began to blame Pakistan for allowing and supporting militant groups and for encouraging cross-border attacks. This mistrust ruined Pakistan’s relations with Afghanistan. India subsequently took advantage of situation and became a major actor in Afghanistan through investing and rebuilding projects and started growing its economic and political influence in Afghanistan. Pakistan’s post 9/11 Afghan policy designed to protect Pakistan from any external threat perception and supported Afghanistan politically, financially and hosted millions of Afghan refugees but despite these efforts distrust between both the neighbours, Pakistan and Afghanistan and excessive Indian presence in Afghanistan was a major strategic defeat for Pakistan. It gave rise to security threat perception of Pakistan in its neighbour hood which it always wanted to counter. The flaws in Pakistan’s Policies in responding to the militancy post 9/11 are its entire dependence on the hard options and neglecting peace inside the state. This thesis develops its argument for the appropriate approach to the regional and internal security of Pakistan. This Thesis also shows to embrace the solutions for eliminating the root cause of militancy and extremism on which terrorism feeds and grows.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

DECLARATION II

DEDICATION III

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS IV

ABSTRACT V

LIST OF ACRONYMS X

GLOSSARY XIII CHAPTER ONE 1

INTRODUCTION 1

1.1INTRODUCTION 1

1.2 SECURITY 6 1.2. ARealist perspective: 6 1.2. A.I Balance of Power Theory: 6 1.2. A.II Balance of Threat: 7 1.2. B .IDemocratic Peace Theory: 11 1.2. B. IIComplex interdependence: 12 1.2. A.VI Non-Traditionalist: 8

1.3 SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIVISM 12 1.2. A .III Clash of Civilization: 8

1.4 NATIONAL SECURITY 18 1.4.A. Security Concerns of Nations 18

1.5THREAT 19

1.6SECURITY THREAT PERCEPTION 21

1.7LITERATURE REVIEW 24

1.7JUSTIFICATION OF THE STUDY 41

1.8AIMS AND OBJECTIVES 42

1.9 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 43 1.9.A HYPOTHESIS 43

1.10METHODOLOGY 44

1.11TENTATIVE CHAPTERS 46

REFERENCES 49 CHAPTER TWO 57

PAKISTAN’S FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS AFGHANISTAN: A

HISTORICAL BACKDROP (1947-2001) 57

INTRODUCTION: 57

2.1. SECURITY THREAT PERCEPTION OF PAKISTAN: 58

2.1 SECURITY THREAT PERCEPTION OF PAKISTAN FROM INDIA: 58

2.2 SECURITY THREAT PERCEPTION FROM AFGHANISTAN: 67

2.3 FOUR PHASES OF PAKISTAN-AFGHANISTAN RELATIONS: 70 2.3.a Phase I: Beginning of Poor Relationship (1947-1979) 70 2.3.b Phase 2: US Proxy War (1979-1992) 79 2.3.b.i Afghan Jihad during Soviet War and its Impact on security of Pakistan: 84

2.4 PHASE 3: RISE OF TALIBAN IN AFGHANISTAN 92 2.3.4. a Pakistan’s pro-Taliban Policy and its Strategic Interests: 98 2.3.5 Pakistan Afghan Policy during Musharraf era pre 9/11: 100

CONCLUSION: 103

REFERENCES: 107 CHAPTER 3 117

PAKISTAN AFGHAN POLICY: POST 9/11 ERROR! BOOKMARK NOT DEFINED.

INTRODUCTION ERROR! BOOKMARK NOT DEFINED.

3.1 CHANGE IN PAKISTAN’S FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS AFGHANISTAN

POST 9/11 ERROR! BOOKMARK NOT DEFINED.

3.2 PAKISTAN’S AFGHAN POLICY DURING DEMOCRATIC ERA 2008-2014:ERROR! BOOKMARK NOT DEFINED.

3.3 FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO CHANGE IN PAKISTAN’S AFGHAN

POLICY: ERROR! BOOKMARK NOT DEFINED. 3.3.1With us or against us: Error! Bookmark not defined. 3.3.2Indian Factor in the Post 9/11 change of Pakistan’s Afghan policy: Error! Bookmark not defined.

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3.3.3FRAGILE PAKISTAN’S ECONOMY: ERROR! BOOKMARK NOT DEFINED. 3.3.4 Counter Security Threat Perception: Error! Bookmark not defined.

3.4 SUPPORT AND CO-OPERATION PROVIDED BY PAKISTAN TO US IN

GWOT: ERROR! BOOKMARK NOT DEFINED.

3.4 BENEFITS FROM WEST AND US AID TO PAKISTAN POST 9/11:ERROR! BOOKMARK NOT DEFINED.

3.5 PAK-AFGHAN RELATIONS POST 9/11:ERROR! BOOKMARK NOT DEFINED. 3.5. 1 Blame Game: Error! Bookmark not defined.

CONCLUSION: 162

REFERENCES 165

PAKISTAN’S AFGHAN POLICY POST 9/11: CHALLENGES AND

PROSPECTS 177

4.1 MILITANT’S TACTICS AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN FATA: 177

4.2 OPERATIONS CONDUCTED BY PAKISTAN’S MILITARY ON ITS SOIL: 182 4.2.1 Operation Al-Mizan: 183 4.2.2 Operation Kalosha March (2004): 184 4.2.3 Shakai Agreement (April 2004) & Sararogha Agreement (2005): 185 4.2.4 Operation Rah-e-Haq (2007, 2008 & 2009): 186 4.2.5 Operation Zalzala (2008): 186 4.2.6 Operation Sirat-e-Mustaqeem (June 2008): 187 4.2.7 Operation Sher –Dil (Aug 2008 & Feburary 2009): 187 4.2.8 Operation Rah-e-Rast (May 2009): 188 4.2.9 Operation Rah-e-Nijat (2009 till 2010): 188 4.2.10 Operation Koh-e-Sufaid (July 2011): 188 4.2.11 Operation Zarb – e- Azab: 189 4.3 Pakistan’s Participation in War on Terror: Impact on FATA: 189 4.3.1 Impact on Society: 192 4.3.1.a Extremism: 192 4.3.1.b Enmity: 194 4.3.1.c Status of Women: 194 4.3.1. d Arms Carrying Custom: 196

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4.3.1.e Education: 197 4.3.1.f Economic Life: 198

4.4 IMPACT ON KYBER PAKHTUNKHWA (KP): 200 4.4.1 Political Situation: 200

4.5 IMPACT ON PAKISTAN: 203 4.5.1 Economic Cost: 203 4.5.2 Growing Extremism, Sectarianism and Intolerance in Society: 204 4.5.3 Democracy: 206

4.6 EXTERNAL FACTORS: 208 4.6.1 Indo-US Collaboration post 9/11: 208 4.6.2 Indo-US closeness and its Implications for Pakistan: 210 4.6.3 Pakistan’s Post 9/11 Afghan Policy and its Impact on Pakistan’s Kashmir Policy: 212 4.6.4 Pak-Iran Relations Post 9/11: 215 4.6.5 Pak-US Relations: 217 4.5.6 Issues between Pakistan and US post 9/11: 220 4.5.6.a Issue of Haqqani Network: 220 4.6.6.b Insurgencies’ in Kashmir and Afghanistan: 221 4.6.6.c Drone Attacks: 222 4.6.6.d Issue of Dr Abdul Qadir Khan: 223 4.6.6.e Indo-US Deals: 223 4.6.6.f Raymond Davis: 224 4.6.6.g Osama’s Death: 225

CONCLUSION: 228

REFERENCES 234 CHAPTER FIVE 247

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 247

REFERENCES 265

LIST OF ACRONYMS AfPak (Afghan-Pakistan) BAI (Barelvi Ansar-ul-Islam) BBC (British Broadcasting Corporation) BLA (Baloch Liberation Army) BNA (Baloch National Army) CASA1000 (Central Asia-South Asia power project) CENTO (Central Treaty Organization) CIA (Central Intelligence Agency) CRS (Congressional Research Services) CNN (Cable News Network) CSF (Coalition Support Fund) CTBT (Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty) DLI (Deobandi Lashkar-e-Islami) DRA (Democratic Republic of Afghanistan) ETIM (East Turkestan Islamic Movement) ECO (Economic Cooperation Organization) ESF (Economic Support Fund) EPPA (Enhanced Partnership for Pakistan Act) EU (European Union) FATA (Federally Administered Tribal Areas) FBI (Federal Bureau of Investigation) FCR (Frontier Crimes Regulations) FC (Frontier Corps) FDI (Foregin Direct Investment) FMF (Federal Ministry of Finance) GDP (Gross Domestic Product) HuA ( Harkat-ul-Ansar) HIA (Hezb-i-Islami)

HJK (Hizb-e-Jamhuri Khwahan) IDPS (Internally Displaced People) ISAF (International Security Assistance Force) IMU (Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan) ISI (Inter Services Intelligence) ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and Syria) JUI (Jamiat-uI- Ulema-e-Islam) JUA (Jamaat –ul- Ahrar) JUD (Jamat-ud-Dawa) JI (Jamat -I –Islami) KLB (Kerry- Luggar-Berman Bill) KP (Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa) LK (Lashkar-i-Khorasan) LJ (Lashkar-e-Jhangvi) LeT (Lashkar- e-Tayyaba) MMA (Mutahida Majlis-i-Amal) NADRA (National Database and Registration Authority) NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organisation) NCA (National Command Authority) NPT (Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty) OEF (Operation Enduring Freedom) PDPA (People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan) PML (N) (Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz Shareef) PPP (Pakistan People’s Party) ROZ (Reconstruction Opportunity Zone) SAP (Indo-Afghan: Strategic Agreement) SATP (South Asian Terrorism Portal) SM (Sipah-Muhammad) SPD (Strategic Plans Division) SSP (Sipah-i-Sahaba)

SSG (Special Service Group) SU (Soviet Union) TAPI (Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India Gas Pipeline)

TTP (Tehrik-I-Taliban Pakistan) TIFA (Trade and Investment agreement) UN (United Nations) UNHCR (United Nations High Commissionar for Refugees) UNF (United National Front) U.S.C (United States Security Controls) USSR (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) UIFSA (United Islamic Front for Salvation of Afghanistan) WMD (Weapons of Mass Destruction)

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GLOSSARY Athanr: Special tribal dance Arbab: Middleman/Landlord Badal: Revenge Badi: Animosity Badraga: If anyone happens to move through the tribal territory, his protection is the responsibility of that tribe through which he moves Cheegha: Constituting a team of tribe Deyat: is the financial reparation paid to the victim or his heirs in the cases of murder or bodily harm or property damage, under Islamic Law. Ghairat: courage to protect one’s own rights or tribe’s prestige), Jihad: Holy War Jirga: formal meeting of elders among Pashtuns for taking decisions on collective issues, resolving disputes and representing the tribe or village in negotiations with others. Khasadars: these are the Forces operating throughout (FATA) (now a part of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province in Pakistan) is a locally recruited and maintained tribal security force, paid for through a stipend provided to the tribe by the Pakistani government. Loya Jirgah: Grand Assembly Malik: Village or Tribe Headman Marrana: bravery Melmastia: Hospitality Nanawati: the going of one party of conflict to the place of another party to seek forgiveness/ end to the conflict. Nang: courage, generosity, grace Pakhtunwali: is a non-written ethical code and traditional lifestyle which the indigenous Pashtun people follow. It is a system of law and

xiii governance that is preserved and still in use today, mostly in the rural tribal areas. Qazi: Judge Qisa: Story Riwaj: Customary Laws Sar: bride’s money Saranwal: Public Prosecutor in Afghanistan Shah: King Shura: Arabic / Islamic term for Consultative assembly Swara: when a young girl is married off to the victim party as punishment for some crime committed by her male relatives. Tarboor: cousins Tarboorwali: first cousin rivalry Ulema: Religious scholars Wali: Provincial governor in Afghanistan Wilayat: Province in Afghanistan Wolesi Jirgah: Lower House of Afghan Parliament Zin, Zer, Zamin: Women, Gold and Land

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CHAPTER ONE INTRODUCTION

1.1INTRODUCTION Keeping in view, politico-strategic scenario in Afghanistan, this study describes and analyzes impact of post 9/11 event on Pakistan’s Afghan policy. This research focuses on the shift in Pakistan’s Afghan policy to achieve its political, strategic and economic objectives. Pakistan’s politico-strategic interests are: to have friendly pro-Pakistan Afghan government, to secure Western border of Pakistan, to reduce Indian influence in Afghanistan, to repatriate three million Afghan refugees and to stop drug trafficking (Sisodia, Behuria, 2007:73). Economic interest include capturing Afghanistan’s market, access to oil and gas resources in Central Asia through projects like Turkmenistan- Afghanistan-Pakistan-India gas project (TAPI).1Historically, Pakistan’s Afghan policy has been revolving around Afghanistan’s claim over Durand Line (Siddiqi, 1960:2), and perceiving Afghanistan’s friendly policy towards India as a security threat from India. As a result, Pakistan has been reacting to different happenings and events in Afghanistan. These include: Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan in 1979 (Shahi, 1984:28-29) and Pakistan’s support to mujahedeen resistance, welcoming Afghan refugees (Alikuzai, 2013:155), and Pakistan’s support to Taliban’s rule in Afghanistan (1996-2001). During Taliban’s rule Pakistan appeared to have achieved some of her Afghan policy goals like minimizing Indian influence in Afghanistan (Hussain, 2005:185). But after 9/11, Pakistan

1 An agreement was signed by the leaders of Turkmenistan, Afghanistan and Pakistan on 8th of June 2002, for transportation of Turkmen natural gas to Pakistan via Afghanistan.

1 attempted to adjust her Afghan policy according to new challenges to gain her objectives (Khan, 2012:58). Following events of September 11, 2001, USA launched War on Terror against network of Al-Qaida and its allies. United States of America declared Afghanistan safe haven for Al-Qaida and Taliban. Hence, USA launched War against Terrorism in Afghanistan with the approval of United Nations Security Council Resolution 13682and support of her allies on October 07, 2001(Rizvi, 2004:2).Following shift in the regional and international environment, Pakistan adapted to reverse her pro-Taliban policy in favour of US-led Global War on Terror (Mahmood, 2002:176). Moreover, United Nations Security Council Resolution 1368 made Pakistan legally bound to support action against Taliban in Afghanistan; consequently, it influenced Pakistan’s Afghan policy. As a result, Pakistan began expecting support and help from USA and allies. For instance, lifting of US sanctions, i-e, Non-Statutory Sanctions3 were imposed on Pakistan after nuclear tests conducted by

2United Nations ,Security Council, Resolution 1368 (2001), “Adopted by The Security Council meeting on 12th September 2001:” Calls on all States to work together urgently to bring to justice the perpetrators, organizers and sponsors of these terrorist attacks and stresses that those responsible for aiding, supporting or harboring the perpetrators, organizers and sponsors of these acts will be held accountable; Calls also on the international community to redouble their efforts to prevent and suppress terrorist acts including by increased cooperation and full implementation of the relevant international anti-terrorist conventions and Security Council resolutions, in particular resolution 1269 of 19 October 1999”

3Sanctions, in law and legal definition, are penalties or other means of enforcement used to provide incentives for obedience with the law, or with rules and regulations. Criminal sanctions can take the form of serious punishment, such as corporal or capital punishment, incarceration, or severe fines. Within the civil law context, sanctions are usually monetary fines, levied against a party to a lawsuit or his/her

Pakistan in 1998. These sanctions were imposed by Clinton’s administration as their foreign policy. Under this amendment high level exchanges and military to military contacts and exchanges were restricted. Moreover, some foreign assistance, military sale under Arms Export Control Act, non-basic human need loans, providance of dual use items nuclear as well as non-nuclear were either suspended or terminated (U.S. Sanctions, August 5, 2014). Meanwhile, India urged international community to declare state of Pakistan and Kashmiri militants as terrorist (Dibb, 2002:136-137), and to strengthen her ties with US by offering her soil for War against Terrorism. However, shift in Pakistan’s Afghan policy in Afghanistan was to counter Indian influence (Mohanty, 2013:107). For instance, Pakistan supported NATO backed US-led Global War on Terror (GWOT) in Afghanistan in terms of providing land, sea, air bases, intelligence and logistical support to US-led coalition forces (Cheema, 2011:11). Moreover, Pakistan’s Policy makers were certain that assistance to US in WOT against Al-Qaida and Taliban will pave way for having friendly Afghan government which would help Pakistan achieve its objective of countering India’s hegemonic plans in Afghanistan (Mahapatra. C, 2001). Pakistani policy makers also believed that Pakistan is facing internal threat from extremism, economic and sectarian and external threats particularly from India (Washington Post, 2001). Therefore, the decision makers of Pakistan aligning with US after 9/11 justified it as “National Interest4” (The attorney, for violating rules of procedure, or for abusing the judicial process. The most severe sanction in a civil lawsuit is the involuntary dismissal, with prejudice, of a complaining party's cause of action, or of the responding party's answer. This has the effect of deciding the entire action against the sanctioned party without recourse, except to the degree that an appeal or trial de novo may be allowed because of reversible error.

News, 2001). It was also believed by the Pakistani policy makers’ that due to non-existence of the statehood, extremism took roots in Afghanistan (Akbar M, 2015:128). But looking at the results of elections held in Pakistan in 2002, an alliance of religious political parties Mutahida Majlis-i-Amal (MMA) won 19% seats in National Assembly and took control of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa’s government despite its anti-American worldview (Akbar M, 2015:129). It indicates that substantial number of voters pooled against war on terror in Afghanistan. Meanwhile, US government kept pushing Pakistan to do more against terrorist organizations in Pakistan and FATA. It has complicated relations between Pakistan and US. Moreover, a very strong debate on whether this GWOT that Pakistan has joined is Pakistan’s own war or is it fighting for US interest. Some politicians and security analysts thought it that US presence in Afghanistan and the GWOT has actually destabilized Pakistan in terms of peace and development. The evidence that military operations in FATA resulted in breaking traditional administration, economic and social structure, supports this argument. It escalated suicide bombing against security forces and civilians. Furthermore, this school of thought believes that only if Pakistan detaches itself from GWOT and assistance of US could only result in subsiding terrorism in Pakistan. Additionally, another school of thought in Pakistan supports the argument that the reason behind the spread of terrorism and chaos in Pakistan is because of the policies of

4the interest of a nation as a whole held to be an independent entity separate from the interests of subordinate areas or groups and also of other nations or supranational groups Any foreign policy which operates under the standard of the national interest. H. J. Morgenthau

4 the state of Pakistan post 9/11, which have aggravated the already existing non-state infrastructure of violence there. Furthermore, they believe that US leaving Afghanistan will not end problems faced by Pakistan unless state alter its policies and no more rely on non-state actors as its strategic assets (ibid:3). Although, a lot of internal pressure and criticism was faced by Pakistan, but it stayed determined for providing every possible intelligence and logistic support to US and its allies in their war against terrorism (Hussain T, 2005). Pakistan was soon declared as major non- NATO5 ally for helping US and its allies in hunting Al-Qaida and Taliban militants in Afghanistan (Wirsing: 2004). Pakistan attained instant benefits after joining GWOT, like, US financial aid, removal of economic sanctions, better Pak-US relations that evaded any threat of attack from US on Pakistan’s strategic assets, preserved Kashmir cause and saved it from being declared as a terrorist state and averting Indo-US relation (Farauqi. A, 2003). In addition to that military regime in Pakistan also got legitimacy from international community and developed an image of a responsible state (Zeb. R, 2003:73). Pakistan started facing numerous challenges out of its Afghan policy that include: securing strategic interest, resurgence of Taliban and their terrorist activities in Pakistan, cross border terrorism and decreasing of foreign direct investments. On the other hand, post 9/11 event provided an opportunity for India to regain influence in developing good relationship with Afghan elected government, to construct physical infrastructure including Salma dam, Zaranj-Dilaram Highway, to build

5Major non-NATO ally is a designation given by the United States government to close allies that have strategic working relationships with the US Armed Forces but are not members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The following countries are designated as major non-NATO allies: Afghanistan, Argentina, Australia, Bahrain, Egypt, Israel, Japan, Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, Republic of Korea, Thailand, and Tunisia.

Afghan Parliament (Kaminsky, 2008:80-83), and to strengthen ties with US (Kidwai, 2010:229). Though, Pakistan suffered huge losses including lives of soldiers and civilians together with economic loss in supporting US-led War on Terror, however, the West has still been demanding for doing more. In 2008, when the government of Pakistan changed and democratically elected government led by Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) took over the government and later in 2013 Pakistan Muslim League (PML-N) ruling the country, no big change in Pakistan Afghan Policy was witnessed. However, the challenges kept growing for Pakistan and tackling with security concerns of the state, curbing terrorism and handling internal disputes remained a problem. 1.2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND CONCEPTS 1.2. A REALIST PERSPECTIVE: They are also positivists, their perspective is entirely focused on state, assuming about world politics and security. Their perspective for national security is completely based on military terms, which ensure sovereignty, independence, autonomy, territorial integrity from outside threats. Traditional realist approach has various strands in its theoretical construct regarding hegemonic competition. Some of them are as follows: 1.2. A. I BALANCE OF POWER THEORY: Kenneth Waltz (Waltz K, 1991: 44-79) develops this theory and he states that:“States seek to balance power, and thus the preponderance of power in the hands of a single state (i.e. the United States) will stimulate the rise of new great powers, and possibly coalition of powers, determined to balance the dominant state”(ibid: 53-60). Further analyzing this theory Christopher Layne says that: “In Uni- polar systems, states do indeed balance against the hegemon’s unchecked power” (Layne C, 1993: 5-51).

1.2. A. II BALANCE OF THREAT: While discussing this theory which takes the theme of theory of Balance of Power with several variations Stephen Walt proposes that: “Power and threat overlap, but are not identical... Geographic proximity, offensive capability, and aggressive intentions are also relevant considerations... States that are viewed as aggressive are likely to provoke others to balance against them” (Walt, 1991:211- 239). in post cold war era Michal Mastanduno analyses both above mentioned theories and concludes that :“Evidence neither fully supports nor fully refutes either one... Eventually power will check power... Balance-of-threat theory reminds us to appreciate the classical realist insight that statecraft matters” (Mastanduno M, 63- 70). Furthermore, John Mearsheimer states on traditionalist perspective being state centric regarding security that states would always enter into war when they are in security competition, in such relationship coordination and cooperation also takes place but within limits (Mearsheimer J, 1994: 5-49). Mean while, bounded and unbounded state-centric6 are the two main divisions within the discussion of positivist security. Bounded state-centric perspectives by Realists/Neo- Realist, Neo-Liberalism/Neo-Institutionalism, describe security as state security and define threat in terms of military towards another state. It discusses that state needs to counter external aggression (threat). However, Neo-Liberals, however, considers in the capability of institutions to restrained the anarchic nature of international politics. On the other hand, unbounded state-centric approach, discusses that security of the state should be protected primarily. However, they

6 This terminology is used in, Terry Terriff, Stuart Croft, Lucy James, Patrick M. Morgan, op.cit, pp: 174-176.

7 consider that state should be guarded against any threat and military or any other threat faced by the state. Moreover, state security according to them is based on several factors like, political, economic, social and environmental. Moreover, military or non-military any dealing could give rise to security threat to the state. Similarly, threats are not generated externally but internal factors could also aggravate the security threat. Unbounded state-centric perspectives believe that security of the state could be societal, individual or environmental as these factors could also affect the state security (Buzan 1983: 218). According to them state security is critical for its survival and threat to this security could arise from an individual, group or environment. 1.2. A. III CLASH OF CIVILIZATION: S. Huntington develops this thesis and according to this theory, conflicts of power will dominate international politics but that conflict would not be between states rather between competing civilizations. Moreover, future conflicts would be based on cultural differences and would not be state centric This theory is not state centric but focuses more on ethno-nationalists and civilizations and believes that these nationalists and civilizations could become ruthless towards others for their survival (Huntington S, 199: 30-39).

1.2. A.VI NON-TRADITIONALIST: They are also known as Post Positivist, they strongly believe that single referent for security should not be chosen as it ignores other very important referents like, society, individual or environment. Similarly, they believe that all referents are important in considering security, as knowledge of the world is social construction in which state is considered as an element of society and state institutions are woven in that society. Post-Modernist questions Realist on their views on international security as realist looks at security as an objective tool

8 and terms it hazardous which according to them serves as a hurdle in establishment of a peaceful hegemonic discourse (Baylis J:215-218). According to Post-modernists (ibid) there could be no sole understanding of global reality. Moreover, they argue that the nature of knowledge is subjective and Ideas are put forward by experts and academics which can then alter language and discussion about international politics. They also believed that the character of international politics can be changed and altered, furthermore, non- military security issues (long overlooked by traditionalists) could be addressed well by spotlighting the key role of individuals which is termed as “epistemic communities”7. Peter Haas explains this term as: “A network of professionals with recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue area. Although an epistemic community may consist of professionals from a variety of disciplines and backgrounds, they have a shared set of normative and principled beliefs…shared causal beliefs…shared notions of validity…and a common policy enterprise” (Haas M, 1992:1-35).

Similarly, Colin Hay points out that, “Tendency towards nihilism, fatalism and passivity an abstention from judgment; is not postmodernism’s normative respect for “difference‟ in the end self- defeating precluding the taking of action to protect difference? Are their implications not profoundly conservative deconstructions without the possibility of the reconstruction of an alternative? Internal contradictions is not postmodernism itself the meta-narrative to end all

7An epistemic community is a transnational network of knowledge-based experts who help decision-makers to define the problems they face, identify various policy solutions and assess the policy outcomes. The definitive conceptual framework of an epistemic community is widely accepted as that of Peter M. Haas.

9 meta-narratives and hence a contradiction in terms, tends towards pure descriptive narrative as opposed to political analysis” (Hay C, 2002:22). Moreover, Critical Theory gives different perspective on security. They argue that the key structure of international politics basically material and not social. Furthermore, by changing the perspective about international relations can vitally enhance international security.8 Alexander Wendt further states that: “Security dilemmas and wars are the result of self-fulfilling prophecies... policies of reassurance can also help to bring about a structure of shared knowledge which can help to move states towards a more peaceful security community” (Wendt A, 1992:391-425). Therefore, it would be appropriate to mentioning the perception on security post cold war in international politics continued resulting in some very comprehensive and systematic approach towards security.

1.2. B. Liberalism: Liberalism is identified by Political theorists with the basic principle of the importance of freedom of an individual. The ideal description of liberalism is explained by discussing four essential institutions. First is that citizens possess equality, fundamental rights like, freedom of religion, press etc. Secondly, the ruler and leaders of the state represents legislatures and powers which they derived from approval and support of the electorate and exercise their delegated authority free from all pressures and restraints except

8 On social constructivism, see A. Wendt, “Anarchy is What States Make of it”, International Organization, Vol. 46, No. 2, (1992); F. Kratochwill, Rules, Norms, and Decision, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989, and; N. Onuf, A World of or Making: Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International Relations, Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1989.

10 from the prerequisite of preserving the basic civic rights. Mainly relatable, the effect of liberalism on foreign relations is such that it is neither subject to any external authority of any other state nor the internal state’s authority of special privileges held like the monarchs and bureaucracies of forces had over foreign policy. Thirdly, the state’s economy lies on an acknowledgment of the right to own private property beside the possession of the means of production. Individuals justify property on acquisition, social agreement or by social utility. State’s socialism or state’s capitalism is excluded after this practice but market Socialism or various forms of the mixed economy are not excluded from its circle. Fourthly, forces of supply and demand shape economic decisions, domestically as well as internationally and are supposed to be free from strict control by bureaucracies (Badie. B, 2011:1434) Liberalism has always apprehensive with security, although the security of the all like, of person; security of institutions, state institutions are all established and maintained by a person and is instrumental to their needs and desires. In Modern era, research on liberalism in international security has taken up realist language by considering states as an actor, and its characteristic input has been its insistence that foreign policies and international outcomes differ with the several forms of state, mainly their domestic institutions. Contrary to the claims of realists, liberals disagree that liberal democracies participate better and are more secure in an anarchical international system (Jhon. M, Owen. IV, Mar 2010). 1.2. B .I DEMOCRATIC PEACE THEORY: Michael Doyle and Bruce Russett developed this theory and according to this theory democracy is the best security for the state as one democracy would less likely enter in war against another democracy. Though further debate has been conducted on this theory like Steve

Chan, believed that democracy does not lessen the chances of conflicts in fact it increases them (Chan S, 1984:614-48). Similarly, Zeev Maoz and Nasrin Abdolali, gave their analysis that though democratic states never entered in war against each other but they are equally prone to conflicts as non-democratic states (Moaz, Abdolali, 1989: 3-35). 1.2. B. II COMPLEX INTERDEPENDENCE: Joseph Nye and Robert Keohane, argues that globalization leads to great connections between states which further leads to minimize the threat to the security of the state. They believe, since inter connection between states are increasing on one hand and on the other hand inter dependence of states on each other are developing. This complex inter dependence could manage the behavior of self help and relative gains (Keohane & Nye, 1972:335-345). Adding ideas along with real politick and power Collective security theorists adds one more key component in the international security calculus. Furthermore, they argue that modern states are capable of extending and broadening their national interests and could also aim for collective betterment of the international community resulting in much better world. 1.3 SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIVISM The first theorist in International Relations theories’, who introduced the term constructivism, was Nicholas Greenwood Onuf in 1989 in his book “World of Our Making”. He stated this book that States survive and live like individuals. Likewise, human associations along with international relations are comprised of thoughts and ideas basically not on material circumstances or forces. This element is idealist philosophically in constructivism which distinguishes with the materialist philosophy of most social science positivism. Constructivist philosophy, states that a social world is not something which is given or is out there which exists free from the ideas and thoughts of the people concerned. It

12 cannot be discovered by scientific research and cannot be explained by scientific theory as argued by behaviouralists and positivists. In Political world there are no natural laws of economics, society and politics; it is not the component of nature. Moreover, history is not an evolving and changing process which is independent of human ideas and thoughts. Hence, in the world view of strict positivist sense laws of economics, society and politics cannot be objective sciences. Rationality, according to Constructivists is a more subjective term rather than an objective position. An evaluation of the most advantageous act in a particular situation depends on the principles that an individual has cultured through socialization and ideas. Similarly, a state’s cognition depends upon its general culture (Wendt. A, 1999: 371). Fundamentally, the culture of a state is made up from the ideas which show how that particular state understands the world. Moreover, ideas are considered as a key to create international change by the Constructivists rather than power. Ideas can undermine and often replace state authority. For instance, transnational forces like religious extremism and nationalism that are not contained within the borders of one particular state, like: in the Middle East, demonstrated by the role played by Islamic extremism (Snyder. J, 2004: 12). The example of transnational activist groups can also be considered here. They can manipulate the behavior and the conduct of a state with their greater military power through their groups’ capability to transform international ideas or customs, which consecutively pressuring the state to change its course (ibid). The social world is partly created by the physical entity. However, it is the ideas and thinking about those entities which is mainly important and these entities signifies in the minds of community. The security and defense of international system consists of population, territories, weapons and supplementary physical resources. Except of all other

13 things it is only ideas and thoughtfulness in accordance to which these resources are considered, systematize and utilize. Like for example within alliances and armed forces and so on. The physical element and intellectual element both are present but physical element is secondary to the intellectual one as it infuses it with meaning, sense, plans, organizes and guides it. That is why the thoughts in international security are important than physical resources since those resources have no significance without the intellectual component. This theory in international relations believes that States subsist inside a world of our own making which is social and not material. Social interactions not only shape the behaviors of the state but also design the welfare, interests and its characteristics. Thinkers such as Nicholas Onuf, Alexander Wendt, Emanuel Adler, Friedrich Kratochwil, John Gerard Ruggie and Peter Katzenstein in 1980’s and 1990’s have established Constructivism as “Social Theory of International Politics”. They emphasized that Social Construction of world affairs as contrary to the claim of neo-realists who believed that international politics is shaped by the rational- choices, behaviors and decisions of egoist actors who follow their wellbeing and interests by making utilitarian estimation to capitalize on their profits and benefits and lessen their losses therefore, the materiality of international structures. Focus of Constructivism is on ideas of norms, the development of structures and the relationship between actors and said structures and with how identity persuade actions as well as behavior between actors (Reus-Smit, 2005: 188), and also how norms themselves designs an actor’s character (Reus-Smith, 2005:198). Therefore, constructivists focus on how one forms an identity based on interactions (Ruggie, 1998). In the course of “interactions” with each other those who earlier had no relationship or reaction towards a state

14 with the passage of time can turn into either friend, enemy, or continue to be neither. Same thing goes for individuals also. As Wendt (1992) clarify that there is no reason for people meeting for the first time with each other, to have an unenthusiastic or disrespectful relationship. Nevertheless, if the interactions between them are not positive then eventually and further leads to tense meetings than this are exactly what could happen. 1.4 SECURITY The term security means feeling insecure from a threat but the source of insecurity differs from state to state. It is derived from the Latin word Securita or French word Securite. Mostly dictionaries and encyclopedias define this word as freedom from any threat, fear, danger or deprivation. Security like National Interest in discourse of international relations is sufficiently well established in designing foreign policy (Buzzan. B, 1986:4-5). Primary objective of the state is to protect and maintain its security; it means to prevent any interference or threat of interference from any foreign power in internal matters. Security is not only state’s desire for survival but also protection from external interference which can harm the interest of the state (Gaddis. L. J, 1982:27).In the middle of Twentieth Century Bernard Brodie defined the word security in terms of national security, focusing more military and non-military means to achieve economic strength, welfare and stability. He defined security as, “derivative value, being meaningful only in so far as it promotes and maintains other values which have been or are being realized and are thought worth securing, though in proportion to the magnitude of the threat it may displace all others in primacy” (Brodie, 1949:477). Helga Haftendorn, believes that security if defined in format or if defined in content both ways is ambiguous. She further states that it is

15 not clear weather security is a goal, a concept, a discipline or a research program (Haftendom H, 1991:3). Furthermore, she defines real nature of Security as, “Value and/or system maintenance over time, and the absence of threats to it.” (ibid: 5)

Stephen Walt looks at security more as a phenomena of War, though he initially criticized security in military sense (Walt S, 1987:159-164). He defines security in military terms and not as a goal and aim. According to him security is,” the study of the threat, use, and control of military force” (Walt. S, 1991:2). Richard Ullman describes relation between national Security and threat as, “A threat to national security is an action or sequence of events that (1) threaten drastically and over a relatively brief span of time to degrade the quality of life for the inhabitants of a state, or (2) threatens significantly to narrow the range of policy choices available to the government of a state or to private non-governmental entities (persons, groups, corporations) within a state” (Ullman. R. 1983:135). During Cold War era and post 9/11, the world has witnessed certain uncertainties. These new qualms are apparent or are not covert dangers emerging either from individuals or from societal groups. This danger can be prevented by security forces and by taking political measures. It means that security is not a situation which is free from any dangers; instead it is ‘insurance’ towards risks as a character faced by the modern societies. This shift of focusing on insurance in the situation of theoretical risks, security has taken the shape of “a general ‘societal idea of value’ (Wertidee) and has become a universally used ‘normative concept’, which is employed with several meanings in an “affirmative manner” (Makropoulos 1995: 749). According to Art understanding insecurity in social science is still ambiguous and flexible (Art 1993: 820–22).

Security is considered as a result of a process of political and social interaction in a society having social values, social norms, collective characteristics and traditions. If we look at security through this perspective, it is “intersubject” or it can be stated that “security is what actors make of it” (Wendt 1992). Arnold Wolfers defined the term Security in reference to national security by relating it to the national interest. He was of the thought that any policy designed and adapted by state to endorse nation’s demands rather than individual and that national security assigns an Objective of policy evident from others (Wolfers. A, 1952:484). He further defined it as, “a value, of which a nation can have more or less and which it can aspire to have in greater or lesser measure” (ibid: 481). Moreover, Arnold Wolfers discussed security concept in dual sense as, “Security, in an objective sense, measures the absence of threats to acquired values, in a subjective sense, the absence of fear that such values will be attacked” (Wolfers 1962, p. 149).

Wolfers by stating “absence of objective” meant danger of security challenge or threat and by “subjective fears or concerns” meant a perception thereof. Objective security from the perspective of Realists is accomplished when the dangers caused by various threats or challenges are either prevented or avoided or managed and then accepted by the society, societal groups, individuals , state or regional/international organizations and associations. According to social constructivist approach once fear or perception of threats and challenges are defeated, then security is achieved. This security perception is dependent of worldview and how analysts analyze the situation (Bull 1977, Wight 1991) on the approach of policy makers (Booth 1979, 1987: 39–66) which repeatedly spoil

17 evaluation of new threats and challenges and that, “Freezing international relations into rough images, portray its processes as mechanistic responses of power and characterize other nations as stereotypes” (Booth1987: 44; 1998: 28).

1.4. A NATIONAL SECURITY National Security is the state of autonomy, freedom and liberty from any external physical threat. National Security has broad meanings and multi-dimensional features. It is concerned with protecting/defending territorial integrity of a Nation or a State and is also concerned with politico-economic stability, ethnic harmony and social integration between the members of state (B. M. Jain, 1985: 5). Hence, National Security can be considered as the means to protect the State from internal and external threats while maintaining economic stability and independence, internal unity, political stability and reaching to the stage where the economy and industry of a nation flourish without depending on others. 1.4. B SECURITY CONCERNS OF NATIONS Security is very significant for the society or a state to originate; it is the basic desire of the state or a society. An authority is accepted and obeyed in the state for the sake of coping better with antagonistic and hostile environment (Marvin G. weing baun :4). It can be analyzed here that the security concerns for the nations and states are an old phenomena as countering security threats to the nation is the integral ingredient for its survival. However, post World War II many independent Nations emerged after Decolonization on the world map especially in Continent Africa, Asia and Europe. It gave rise to the awareness regarding security issues of a State/ Nations and academic interest in National Security studies begun.

Every Nation strives for Security and counters any threat to its Security. Their main objective is to defend and protect adequate resistance for its territory. States security varies from state to state owing to its geographic location in different regions of the world. However, every state needs to have protection, territorial integrity, prosperity and safeguarding its security having friendly relations with its neighbours and other states, self-determination for commerce and Trade and aggression and denunciation towards hostilities. 1.5 THREAT Danger is the term mostly used to define Threat, danger is further understood as a likelihood of any harm, damage, injury or killing or destroying somebody or something (Wheier S, 2001:316).Moreover, risk and hazard could also be used to define Threat but that refers to the Threat arises as a result to any conscious action. Threat is a, statement or expressions of intention to hurt, destroys, punishes, etc. In retaliation or intimidation, or is an indication for a sudden harm like the threat of war (McKechnie, 1979: 1901). For David Baldwin “Threat” is passive not active, an outcome instead of undertaking (Baldwin, 1971:71-78). Raymond Cohen defines threat perception by limiting it to the aspect of state only, by stating that any looming harm to the state which could be economic, military or strategic is perceived by the decision makers or observers of that particular state (Cohen R, 1979:5). Perceived Threat is categorized and distinguished by Klaus Knorr in actual and potential Threat. For him actual threat is incidental of intent and potential threats are the capability of inflicting harm by an enemy (Knorr K, 1976:78). According to Celeste Wallander, Robert Keohane and Haftendorn Threat is the most obvious and simplest security problem (Haftendorn, Keohane and Wallander, 1999:2). Furthermore, they argued that if any state or group of states has capacity and intention to

19 confine or limit the security of any other state is when a Security Threat is created (ibid:2). They further states that, “Security may be diminished by a state that is politically unstable (thereby posing the risk of disintegration, instability, and regional conflict) or the future of which is uncertain and problematic creating the danger of a regime with aggressive or revisionist intentions” (ibid:2). David Singer’s discussion on Threat perception in international politics has concentrated on military and political aspect mainly (Singer D, 1958:93-94). He argued that in situation of armed hostility threat arises during which analysts and a policy maker presumes that the other state has aggressive intentions. It is further assumed by them that aggressive state if considers that aggressiveness will earn gains for them will not hesitate in using direct and physical power. Perception of threat varies, While In different conditions at different levels and in accordance with different things being threatened. Therefore, perception of threat varies at different levels like at personal level mostly people considers life and health as most important but still perception changes with changed circumstances. For example, a poor will perceive threat to food, clothes and shelter. However, a rich person will perceive threat if any harm supposedly is going to happen to his assets. Same goes to all states in international world, different states perceive threat differently as they posses their own security main concern. Moreover, loss of power / authority is considered as a security main concern. It was during cold war that in an outline of national security two types of threats to the state institutions were discussed. One threat is by using force/capabilities and the other one is ideology (Buzan, 1983: 57). Any kind of damage and attacks from within or outside of the state could be a threat for the territory of that particular state. Different types of threats effects different apparatus of a state like, those states which are

20 strong are mainly threatened by the external forces and those which are weak are threatened by both external and internal forces. Moreover, threats are being differentiate into, i) economic threats which are price/currency control, export – import control, ii) military threats are the ones which could result into seizure of territory, changing of governments, policy manipulation and iii) ecological threats are destruction of physical base of the state (Buzan, 1983:75-83). Above- mentioned threats characterize state’s insecurity and lays down a plan for solving security problems faced by the state. Elimination and reduction of the causes and sources of threats should be done by political action (Buzan 1983: 218). 1.6 SECURITY THREAT PERCEPTION According to the Social Constructivists’ view, identities and interests of the states are shaped and reshaped by the social interactions as these social interactions together with past experiences lead to determine the rules, statements and policies of the state according to the respective social structure of the society. Furthermore, these rules, statements and policies, in turn, add to construct the perception of the general public. For instance, fear or threat perception amongst people portrays the policy of the state. Agents, elites or decision makers (functionaries of the government) of the state are empowered to devise policy of the state and subsequently pursue it keeping in view the general perception of the society. Since, the social structure of the society varies from society to society creating different perceptions and, hence, different states work out different policies according to their diverse perceptions. Certainly, policies of states, thus, are designed, shaped and reshaped to achieve their interests and objectives accordingly.9

9 Dr. Ijaz. ,”Pakistan - Afghanistan Security Perceptions and Relations “. Research journal of Area Study Center, Peshawar , Pakistan

Ground facts of the society, such as socio-economic conditions, culture, geography and economy, play a pivotal part in shaping the policies of the state. For instance, Nicholav Greenwood Onaf his work, “World of Our Making”, published in 1989, introduced the term Social Constructionism as “states much same as individuals are living in a world of our making, where many entities such as social facts are made by human actions, as opposed to brut facts that do not depend for their existence on human action, but rather are phenomenon of human condition”. Since, perception of the society is an ability of seeing, hearing or becoming conscious about something through sensual organs. It thus enables to understand, identify and interpret the social behavior, relationship, feelings of happiness, fear, security and threat, ethnic groups and various communities. Notwithstanding the other elements of social environment, this study is focused to identify and interpret security threat perception of Pakistan leading it to devise policies of the state according to the established social structure and general perception. However, the perception of security threat also varies from social structure to social structure. Hence, it is meant differently by different societies according to their respective social structures. Thus, the term security has no specific meaning at all as it is a relative term concerning with perception of general public in a given social structure. In social science, the meaning of security is ambiguous and expandable having two aspects i.e. subjective and objective. By subjective, it seems certain abstract concepts such as fear, violence, terror and panic, whereas, objective security seems a step taken to avoid threats for protecting the acquired subjective values. Simply, security is the degree of resistance to protect state against any threat, danger or fear. Similarly, perception is a psychological term to recognize as well as interpret these subjective-

22 objective elements such as threats through sensory organs. Hence, it depends on the policy makers to recognize and interpret these threats and achieve optimum level of security by overcoming these threats. All the agents, elites or decision makers of the state, thus, work out their policies of national-security to meet aims and objectives of their specific national-security. All this while, it has to deal with numerous threats both from internal and external sides. However, aim of national-security policy is to protect and enhance the most cherished goals on permanent basis including values, norms, national way of life, governmental and educational institutions. National-security aims to internally stabilize society and politics, integrate the political unit (state), strengthen economy, create balance in the ecology, create harmony in culture, obtain consensus on moral and spiritual principles on one side, and to externally achieve peace at borders on the other. Since, every state works out to interpret security in of its own, such as nuclear proliferation, mistrust, ideological confrontation and political rivalries, in modern parlance. Hence, foreign policy of Pakistan has also been manipulating from the lenses of its social structure and security perceptions. Examples of India and Afghanistan can be best quoted in this regard. This thesis applies the theories of social constructivism and realism together to understand Pakistan’s Afghan Policy. Social constructivism looks at the social setup, culture and behavior of people in a state, how their perception about another state develops. Like for example, Pakistan’s perception about Afghanistan and the people of Afghanistan considers Pakistan as their hostile neighbour. Similarly, Realism looks into objectives of the state in regard to the current situation and then decides the strategy accordingly. As Pakistan and Afghanistan have faced different situation in every era like: Soviet invasion during cold war era, Taliban’s regime in post cold war era and

23 then GWOT post 9/11. Consequently, Pakistan has to decide looking into realist situation also. Social constructivists claim that agency and structure are jointly instituted, which entails that structures impact agency and that agency stimulates structures. Agency refers to the ability of someone to act, whereas structure can be understood as the transnational, international and global system that comprises of physical and ideational elements.For example, Pakistan perceives Afghanistan as a threat to its existence and political stability. Another crucial part of constructivism is identities and interests. Constructivists maintain that states can have several characteristics that are socially constructed through interface with other states. Identities are exemplifications of an actor’s estimation of who they are, which indicates their interests.These factors provide a base for the formulation of a foreign policy and action of a state as an actor. Pakistan and Afghanistan have peculiar identities that spur divergent interests of both actors. This thesis evaluates these identities and interest of Pakistan that leads to a particular ideation about Afghanistan in the mind of foreign policy makers of Pakistan. 1.7 LITERATURE REVIEW The work “Pakistan’s Security and Foreign Policy” by Agha Shahi, published in 1984, this book highlights foreign policy of Pakistan towards Afghanistan, India and super powers, but confines to only one period, i-e, mostly on period of Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. Imtiaz Gul, 2002 in his book, The Unholy Nexus: Pak-Afghan Relations under the Taliban has focused on Pakistan’s Afghan Policy during Taliban era. He concentrated more on how Pakistan developed relations with Taliban. He focuses on relations Pakistan’s agencies shared with Mujahedeen and Taliban.

Owen Bennett Jones, in 2002, in his book, Pakistan: The Eye of the Storm, discusses the nature of problems confronted by Pakistan mainly during 1998 till 2000. Jones, also argues over the challenges faced by the military ruler of Pakistan General Musharaf, Kashmir Issue its history and also discusses the nature of relationship Pakistan have with India ,i-e, three wars fought between them and East Pakistan issue. The role played by military in Pakistan’s affairs of state, policy making both internal and external. While appreciating Musharaf’s decision of joining WOT, he affirms that G. Musharaf was aware of the reaction he would face for his pro west policies at home. He further converse about the modernist and reformist attitude of General Musharaf and states that Musharaf tried to impose reforms in Pakistani society and modernize it. He took several steps in doing so but his efforts could not bear fruits. The author focuses mainly on Musharaf’s policies from 1998 -2000.

Touqir Hussain, 2005, in his article, “U.S.-Pakistan Engagement: The War on Terrorism and Beyond” discusses that US and Pakistan’s engagement may seem to be related to GWOT but actually it addresses many other issues and concerns of US like, strategic, economic and political opportunities in South Asia, nuclear proliferation, security etc. he throws light on the US and Pakistan’s engagement during cold war, Soviet-Afghan war, when Pakistan conducted nuclear tests, during military rule in Pakistan and post 9/11 in Afghanistan. During all this time the sanctions Pakistan faced and the impact it had on their relations. He concludes his paper with the suggestion that US should develop its relations with Pakistan if it wants to get better results out of its strategies in South Asia. Moreover, sanctions on Pakistan can only spoil their relations and develop trust deficit between them, further weak Pakistan will make US attain its objective in the region difficult.

Focus of the author in this book is on US role and approach towards Pakistan from cold war till 9/11. Steve Col in his book,” Ghost Wars: the Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001” published in (2004) explores the history of US intervention in Afghanistan. He begins with the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 and he ends just before the attack on World Trade Center on 11th September 2001 in the United States. In 1979, after Soviet invasionseveral factions revolted against Soviet army in Afghanistan and they started waging guerrilla war against Soviet Army stationed in different regions in Afghanistan. US due to cold war decided to counter Soviet Invasion in Afghanistan by supporting those radical Afghan troops. CIA provided money, trainings and weapons to those radical groups for fighting against USSR. In 1989, Soviet Army withdrew from Afghanistan, US also declared neutrality and withdrew major intelligence operations there and Afghanistan suffered great power vacuum. This resulted into breaking out of civil war between Afghan central government and radical groups. Later the author writes about the expulsion of Osama Bin Ladin from Saudi Arabia and setting up of Al-Qaida headquarters initially in Sudan and then in Afghanistan. Al-Qaida developed close links with Taliban leaders all the facilities US used to counter Soviet army in Afghanistan were now used by those radical groups for training purposes. Meanwhile, Al-Qaida and Taliban grew stronger and started conducting terrorists’ attacks in different countries like, bombings in hotel in Yemen in 1992 and the bombing in African in 1994 in of US embassies.US tried to get hold of Osama but in vein then September 2001 took place in US. According to the author the money and training given by US during Soviet invasion of Afghanistan had a long lasting impact on the region.The author in this book looks into Osama Bin

Ladin’s role from Soviet intervension till 2001 and discusses the events led to strengthening of Al-Qaida and Taliban.

Muhammas Amir Rana, 2005, “The Seeds of Terrorism”, describes about how mujahedeen were trained in Pakistan by US and Saudi fund and the role they played in defeating USSR in Afghanistan. While writing about post 9/11 era he focuses on militant organizationsin tribal belt of Pakistan. He argues that Musharaf’s Afghan policy was an offshoot of previous militant supporting policies of Pakistan.According to him shift in Pakistan Afghan policy post 9/11 was supposed as taking place under international pressure which led to antipathy in religious political parties as well as militants towards Pakistan. He argues that supporting Mujahideen in cold war has been the reason for the militancy Pakistan is facing post 9/11. He believes that change in Pakistan’s Taliban policy post 9/11 occurred under international pressure which caused antipathy towards the state of Pakistan from religious political parties and militants. Rizwan Hussain, 2005, Pakistan and the Emergence of Islamic Militancy in Afghanistan, Hussain in his book writes about the historical background, which led to the creation of Taliban and dominated Pakistan’s policies towards Afghanistan from the security perspective only. He believes that creation of Taliban was based on security of the state which further has strengthened its roots in the society and in designing national security policy. Hussain Haqqani, 2005, Pakistan between Mosque and Military, he narrates different important events right from the independence of Pakistan. Furthermore, he focuses on highlighting the association between military and Islamic elements of Pakistan. He argues that religious parties and clergy has strengthen their role in Pakistani society cause of the traditional concept of military regarding national

27 security as this concept led to use religion as a binding factor of toeing multiethnic Pakistani society. He also claims that Islamist groups maintained military’s political dominance and also influenced internal policies while exploiting religious sentiments of people and leaving them with no choice.Haqqani looks into the role clergy and military plays in designing foregin and regional policies of Pakistan.According to him madaris are not simply educational institutions but hold a great role in society as a social institution. He also looks into further how pro Islamist groups’ policies adopted by the different regimes in Pakistan at different times led the country into chaos. He concluds that the main reason behind this chaos in Pakistan is the alliance between the Mullah and the military. Hassan Abbas, 2005, Pakistan’s Drift into Extremism, discusses and analyses important events took place since inception of Pakistan. He argues that Pakistani leadership had a strong inclination towards capitalist camp as well as the economic and security needwhichresulted in Pakistan alliance with US. Consequently, military of Pakistan became main receiver of US financial assistance. He further argues that Kashmir issue, association with religious parties and weak political leadership are major factors leading towards the domination of military in Pakistan. He also mentions that Pakistan’s policy after Russian wagging in Afghanistan 1979, gave rise to militancy in Pakistan. Further he discusses that Pakistan joining US led WOT resulted in anti-Musharaf and anti-US demonstration across the country and military operations in tribal areas of Pakistan further raised anti-military terror campaign. He argues that following US interests and designing policies accordingly and supporting Jihadi groups have been responsible for militancy in Pakistan’s tribal areas and cross border insurgency in Afghanistan.

Frederic Grare, 2006, in his book Pakistan-Afghanistan Relations in the Post-9/11 Era has worked on Pakistan-Afghanistan relations post 9-11, describes Pakistan’s role in Afghan insurgency and focuses more on Pakistan’s relations with Afghanistan. He also discusses different bone of contentions between both the states and how a different factor spoils the relations of both the states randomly. Ayesha Siddiqa, in her book Military Inc.: Inside Pakistan's Military Economy, 2007, discusses Pakistan becoming US ally post 9/11 and became a third bigger receiver of aid from US. She discusses military role in country’s power politics. She claims in her book that military of Pakistan has gained not only political but economic and social power with the passage of time. This power of military transformed the society and military emerged as an independent class in the state. She also asserts that few military senior officers own largest corporate companies and hold big chunk of economy in their hands. She further explores the impact of such military and corporate merger had on Pakistan’s society. Ayesha examins the multiple institutional interests of Pakistan military and the way they protect such self defined interests resulting in encouraging military of Pakistan to interfere and influence almost every aspect of national policy. Ijaz Khan, in his book in 2007, “Pakistan’s Strategic Culture and Foreign Policy Making: A Study Of Pakistan’s Post 9/11 Afghan Policy Change”, highlights the foreign policy making culture of Pakistan Foreign Policy. He discusses the institutions involved in foreign policy making in Pakistan. He analyses rise of Taliban and Pakistan’s Pro-Taliban policy and also discusses the change in policy post 9/11 on domestic level and also explains the role of regional players like India, Iran, China and Central Asian States.

Zahid Hussain, 2007, Frontline Pakistan: the Struggle with Militant Islam, he discusses the event of 9/11 and the changed international scenario which pressurized Pakistan to join US led WOT. The decisions at that time taken by General Musharaf and the factors responsible for his decision which resulted in turning Pakistan into a major partner in US led WOT was also discussed. Hussein also threw light on how intense backlash Pakistan faced from the extremists within Pakistan. He discussed the relationship jihadi militant groups shared with intelligence agencies of Pakistan. Moreover, US pressure on Pakistan to stop its support to Kashmiri jihad, movement of militants across Pakistan-Afghanistan border and then chaos played by these militants in tribal areas of Pakistan resultantly, military operations conducted by military of Pakistan in Tribal areas were discussed. He believed that General Musharaf failed in delivering peace and eliminating religious extremism from Pakistan after 9/11 turning Pakistan indispensible for US War on Terror. Pakistan’s policy shift from supporting Taliban and militant organizations to abandonment of them under US pressure caused intense domestic pressure and severe backlash from militant and extremist forces. Rasul Bakhsh Rais, in 2008, in his article,”Afghanistan and Pakistan: Difficult Neighbors” examines the trouble and difficulties Pakistan and Afghanistan face in scheming steady relationship having strong basis of trust, mutual interest and cooperation. His argument is that Pakistan critically need stable Afghanistan for its internal peace but taking post 9/11 Afghan leaders into confidence was a tough task. Reason being they were inclined towards India and subsequently India using Afghan soil to create disturbance in Balochistan province of Pakistan, furthermore, Afghan government kept accusing Pakistan of double game in Afghanistan. According, to the author Pakistan should accept Afghanistan as a sovereign state and accept its inclinations in

30 the region but Afghanistan has to be more cautious and sensitive about Pakistan’s security interests. Ahmad Rashid, in 2008, in his book “Decent into Chaos”, criticizes Pakistan Afghan policy and believes that the shortcoming of this policy led to the relation between state of Pakistan and non state actors which resulted in exploiting religion. He also criticized US policies towards Central Asia and Asia and blame power state for spoiling the regions. He critically discussed the factors like drugs, smugglers, warlords etc leading towards creating problems in Afghanistan. He while discussing the social setup and reaction of tribal areas of Pakistan towards militants unveils several actions and strategies of prominent militant leaders like Aymen Al Zawahiri.he looks into the alliance of religion, state and non-state actors (who exploits religion for their interests). Omar Sharifi in 2009 (an Afghan writer) in his article” Pakistan’s Foreign Policy towards Afghanistan from 1947-2008”, writes about post 9/11 Pakistan’s policy with historical perspective but the work seems biased. The writer believes that Pakistan wants to have friendly government in Afghanistan mainly to tackle with long term problem of Durand Line between both the states, to attain objective of strategic depth in Afghanistan and to gain access to Central Asian market. According to the writer above mentioned reasons were behind Pakistan’s Afghan policy of supporting Taliban. Furthermore, Pakistan never entertained neighbouring state’s concernsover Taliban support. He further mentions that after supporting Mujahideen during Soviet intervention Pakistan expected to install Friendly government in Afghanistan after Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. Similarly, Pakistan expected the same after assisting Taliban and its government in Afghanistan. He also believed that post 9/11 it became clear that Pakistan’s Afghan policy and domestic policy doesn’t have

31 coordination with each other due to which it has a very bad impact on Pakistan’s Afghan Policy. Naseem Ahmad, 2010, in his article “General Musharaf’s Taliban Policy 1999-2008”, focuses on G. Musharaf’s policies towards Taliban during his era and the reasons behind the decisions taken by Musharraf towards Afghanistan. The author focuses on Pakistan’s Taliban policy during General Musharaf’s era in two parts. First part is pre-9/11 and second is post 9/11. According to the author before 9/11 incident took place General Musharaf kept following Pakistan’s Taliban policy of supporting Taliban regime in Afghanistan. Furthermore, General Musharaf justified his decision on the basis of national interest and to further avoid any aggression from its western border as eastern border always is threatened by Indian aggression. The author appreciates General Musharaf’s prudent decision of participating in GWOT, but the results Pakistan witnessed till 2008 were not satisfying and according to the author unstable Afghanistan is the reason behind this failure. According to him stable Afghanistan is the key to successful implementation of Pakistan’s Afghan policy. Dr. A.Z.Hilali, 2010, “Fata: the strategic depth of Pakistan”, in his article the writer explains the importance of FATA in the region. He also discusses the features of FATA, how the social setup of tribal belt works. Later he explains the role of religious Mullas and Jirgas in tribal areas. The Socio-cultural fabric of Pakhtun race and the role they played in religious parties. How the Pashtun race is exploited by the militants and their activities in FATA. Insurgence in FATA from Fakir of Ipi in 1930 till 9/11 is being discussed. Then the writer analyses Pakistan’s response to the axis developed between India, US and Afghanistan. The writer further explains different myths related to Pakistan’s policy of strategic depth in Afghanistan.

Dr Lubna Abid Ali, 2010, in her article “Religions Radicalism Resurgence of Taliban and Curbing Militancy: Implications for Pak – Afghan Relation”, first explains major events took place in history which shaped Pakistan relations with Afghanistan. It also explains how Pakistan and Afghanistan designed their foreign policy objectives towards each other. The author also explains the objectives Pakistan had behind supporting Taliban in Afghanistan.

Manzoor Ahmad, 2010, in his article “Implications of the War on Terror for Khyber Pukhtunkhwa, Pakistan” discusses rise of militancy in Tribal region of Pakistan and itspolitical, economic and social implications on these areas. He criticizes Pakistan’s Policies towards Taliban which instead of bringing peace has created havoc in KP and Tribal belt. Moreover, these policies gave rise to anti-state sentiments amongst Pakhtuns. Aparna Pande, 2011, in her book “Explaining Pakistan’s Foreign Policy: Escaping India” investigates the philosophies of Pakistan’s foreign policy and Pakistan’s support for jihadi elements based on Pakistan’s concern over Indian relations with Afghanistan and security issues, but this work seems biased. She believes that Pakistan’s Afghan and regional policies are Indian Centric. Syed Saleem Shahzad, 2011, in his book “Inside Al-Qaida and the Taliban, Beyond Bin Laden and 9/11” gives a comprehensive outlook of creation, objectives, role and strategies of Al-Qaida and Taliban in Afghanistan. He also discusses the actions and strategies of these organizations in Pakistan. He also focuses on how Taliban intervened in Swat and what impact it had on Pakistan relations with Afghanistan. He further discusses the role of some eminent actors in Afghan Jihad.

Dr. Saima Ashraf Kayani, 2011, in her article “Global War On Terror: The Cost Pakistan Is Paying “concentrates more on Pakistan and US role in GWOT , its impact on relations between them and security of Pakistan by focusing more on Indian factor. She explains terrorism and then discusses War on Terrorism. She later focuses on role played by Pakistan in GWOT and making things possible for US in Afghanistan and how this all resulted in worse security situation of Pakistan. Riaz Mohammad Khan, in 2011in his book, “Afghanistan and Pakistan, Conflict, Extremism, and Resistance to Modernity” concentrates on conflict between Pakistan and Afghanistan especially focusing on extremist factors. Rising of Taliban and their role from 1995 till 2001 and then after 2001 the challenges they posed for Pakistan in the shape of religious militancy and extremism. Further the interest of regional and international powers and their role in this fragile scenario in Pakistan and Afghanistan is also discussed by him. Hanif-ur-Rehman and Jamshed Khan, 2014, “Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and Pak-Afghan Relations After 9/11” in his article discusses law and order situation in FATA, military operations in FATA post 9/11 and status of Pak- Afghan relations. Muhammd Ishaq Fani in 2005, his article “Pakistan’s Foreign Policy: Changes and Opportunities after 9/11” writes about how Pakistan foreign policy started taking its shape and how post 9/11 decision of joining GWOT was taken and what changes it brought in Pakistan’s foreign policy. M. Saleem Kidwai, 2010, in his book, “US Policy towards the Muslim World: Focus on Post 9/11 Period”, focuses on US foreign policy post 9/11 and how its policies focus on Muslim countries and Muslim societies. Resultantly, a tension between US and Muslim

34 world deepened. He discusses impact of US President Bush policies on its relations with Muslim world and then focuses on President Obama policies post 2008. Muslim world perceive that US uses its powers to extricate the regimes US is not comfortable with and US on the other hand spread the information that Muslim world is the threat to the peace of the world.

A series of discussions edited by Kristen P. Williams, Steven E. Lobell, Neal G. Jesse in a book, ”Beyond Great Powers and Hegemons: Why Secondary States Support, Follow, or Challenge “ in 2012 is focusing hegemony exercised by big regional and international powers by secondary powers. This book looks into the objectives and motives of these powers behind that. It is discussed in the book that secondary states are not powerful enough to exercise their powers against hegemonic states directly. Editors of this book discuss several regions of the world where hegemony of the powers were exercised in different eras. Pakistan is also discussed in the book. The editors believe that Pakistan to counter US hegemony in Afghanistan either had to ally with US or support Al-Qaida and Taliban. Looking at Pakistan’s long term objective in Afghanistan and that is countering Indian influence Pakistan chose a middle way.

Riaz Muhammad Khan in 2012 in his book,” Afghanistan and Pakistan: Conflict, Extremism, and Resistance to Modernity” starts discussing conflicts Afghanistan and Pakistan faced after Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Further, this situation led to the intervention of US and its Allies in Afghanistan. These conflicts according to the author had external and internal players; Mujahedeen during Soviet era and Taliban in Post Soviet era were the proxies in these conflicts. These conflicts gave rise to extremism in Afghanistan and Pakistan

35 later Pakistan also witnessed religious extremist militancy. Soviet intervention, Taliban regime and GWOT in Afghanistan, these three decades of conflicts Afghanistan and Pakistan faced resulted in haltering peace building, health, education and many important components of the state. The conditions both the states faced also pushed them in extremism and terrorism. According to the author Pakistan can fight with all these challenges by developing tolerance and modernization in the society and this tolerance and modernization could only be achieved by education and socio-economic growth. Bruce Riedel in 2012 in his book “Deadly Embrace: Pakistan, America, and the Future of the Global Jihad” gives brief historical picture of evolution of Pakistan. Then the bloody war it faced, crisis of leadership after the death of Jinnah later military dominating Pakistan’s politics. He carries on and started discussing on the events led to develop alliance between US and Pakistan. He also criticizes US for being an ally for several decades but still Pakistan remained in the state of degeneration. According to the author both the states US and Pakistan have faced several lows in their relationship but the one they faced post 9/11 is the deadliest one. The author discusses the jihad started in Pakistan in General Zia era and its progression till becoming global jihad. He believes that Osama and Mulla Umar has played vital role in injecting terrorism into global Jihad. He suggests several policy options for US to work on for the practical solution of distrust between relations of US and Pakistan and to counter ills faced by Pakistan. This, according to the author will help US achieving its objectives more precisely.

Safdar Hussain in 2012, in his article, ”Issues and Challenges in Pakistan-Afghanistan Relations after 9/11” This paper examines

36 several issues emerged after 2001 between Pakistan-Afghanistan in their mutual relationship. The author believes that various development pursuits (political and economic) and security maintenance between both the states significantly rely on mutual and cordial supportive relations. However, the trust deficit which existed long ago between them and then war against terrorism has become a major concern and issue between both the neighbouring states. Afghanistan kept urging Pakistan to do more for defeating and stopping the suspected radical infiltrations inside Afghanistan while Pakistan over and over again denies all these allegations and holds Afghan government responsible for all its failure and incompetence of checking cross border infiltration and rebuilding Afghan as a nation-state. Regional powers mainly Indian involvement in Afghan internal affairs and close relations with Afghan government had negative impact on relations of both the states. These factors resulted in worsening the relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan. The author argues that both the existence of states are very significant for each other comprehensively like economic, political, geo-strategic, and other reasons makes it so important for them to have cordial and trustworthy relationship and it will further result into fulfilling larger interests in regard to regional peace and also in international context. Together they can defeat and counter several many faced by the both the neighbors.

Hamid Alikuzai, 2013, “A Concise History Of Afghanistan in 25 Volumes, Volume 1” writes about different eras and happenings in Afghanistan and also threw light on 9/11 and its aftermath on Afghanistan. SaleemMazhar and Naheed S. Goraya, 2013, in their article “Foreign Policy of Pakistan: Internal Challenges” discuss the different phases of Pakistan’s Foreign Policy without focusing on any

37 particular state and then analyze its impact on political situation of Pakistan. Akbar Ahmad, 2013, in his book, ”The Thistle and the Drone: How America's War on Terror Became a Global War on Tribal Islam” states that US while fighting against terrorism considered as a vital weapon.US considered Drones as a strategy for their safety post 9/11. However, this strategy of using US drones was against Muslim Tribal societies of Afghanistan, Pakistan, Somalia and Yeman. The impact of these Drones was the terror spreading in that area and psychological deterioration of these societies. The author analyses these tribal societies in their own historical and cultural context like these societies were living with the honor and elders domination since centuries, focusing mainly on Pashtuns, Somalians, Kurds and Yemenies. Joachim Krause, Charles King Mallory, IV (edited) a book in 2014 named, “Afghanistan, Pakistan and Strategic Change: Adjusting Western regional policy”. In this book the writers discusses Afghanistan’s situation before and after 2014. They discussed the reasons US decided to with draw its troops from Afghanistan. According to them several factors like reduction in threat from Al- Qaida and Taliban as most of them had been wiped out through US drone strikes or by the actions of US Special Forces, financial and economic crisis faced by US, discouraging efforts for state building in Afghanistan as it had no concept of Modern state, corrupt and inefficient working of Karzai Government in Afghanistan and involvement of regional states in Afghanistan for acquiring their own national interest slowing down US’s efforts of peace building there. The authors believe that US and Western world entered Afghanistan with a lot of goodwill but the problems Afghanistan possessed obstructed the way towards making Afghanistan peaceful, developing its trade route and natural resources and strengthening the state. They

38 believe that through negotiations with Al-Qaida and staying of Western forces (to some limit) in Afghanistan could solve the problem. They also believe that the geography plays an important role in problems faced by Afghanistan secondly international community has also made some mistakes in deciding their actions in Afghanistan. Dr. Muqarrab Akbar in his article in, 2015“A Critical Analysis of Pakistan’s U-turn on Afghan Policy after September 11”critically analyze the situation under which President Musharaf took the decision of joining GWOT. He further discusses the factors considered by the policy makers while designing the policy post 9/11. He shared the results of his research conducted among common Pakistanis. According to his research most of the people in Pakistan doesn’t support joining US GWOT basically on the reason that there is no solid proof of justifying that attack on Twin Towers in New York were conducted by Al-Qaida. He confined his work on the events took place in initial two years of GWOT.

Iftikhar H. Malik in his book published in 2016,” Pashtun Identity and Geopolitics in Southwest Asia: Pakistan and Afghanistan since 9/11” focuses initially on discussing the origin of Pahtuns and their status on both sides of Durand Line. He then continues discussing the conditions led to the creation of Taliban’s ideology and what scenario rose for Pashtuns after that. US policies and Indian agencies their role in these areas and their impact is also discussed in the light of geo-political perspective. Later, the author throws light on the troubles and problems faced by Pashtun lands and ways to counter them.

Muhammad Idrees and Khalid Anwar, in their article published in 2017, “Pakistan and Afghanistan After 9/11: A Case of the Failing Bilateralism” initially discusses briefly the factors effecting Pak-

Afghan relations. They focus on mistrust Hamid Karzai’s government had on Pakistan and how it impacted on relations of both the states. They also state that Indian factor played an important role in spoiling relations of Pakistan and Afghanistan and how Afghanistan turned into battleground between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Later in the article authors discusses that the steps taken by Turkey for resolving issues between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Pakistan efforts like inviting Afghan Army for training and assistance in agriculture etc for enhancing the sphere of trust between both the states. Afghanistan also initiated few steps for the same purpose. During Nawaz Sharif’s government the bilateral relations are also discussed and post 2015 July were discussed briefly. Mark Stokreef, in his book,in 2017,”Pakistan's Double Agenda: A Study of Islamabad's Post 9/11 Afghanistan Policy” states thatPakistan observed dual Afghanistan policy after 9/11. Whereas Pakistan supported the United States as a strategic ally in the war against international terrorism, at the same time the government appeared to be reluctant and unable to effectively engage the Afghan Taliban on Pakistani territories. While discussing the role played by domestic actors and regional powers the structure of the state, geographical factors, threat perceptions, and negotiation strategies. He argues that Pakistan convinced US of allying with it and on the other hand it kept Taliban assists proxy. Steve Coll, in his book, “Directorate S: The C.I.A. and America's Secret Wars in Afghanistan and Pakistan” published in 2018 he explains that US relations with Pakistan and Afghanistan have always been complex and complicated due to few groups with contradictory interests. He further discuss that Pakistan is facing critical relations with its neighbours like in East India is its rival and they have fought three wars after their independence in 1947. On its

West, Pakistan borders Afghanistan. Afghanistan is the state with multiple ethnic tribes and several versions of Islam. It after Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan has seen civil war between religious groups with moderate government in Kabul, in 1996 Kabul was ruled by the Taliban leaders. Later in this book author writes about how Taliban were out thrown by US supported Northern Alliance. According to the author US tried to counter ISI in Afghanistan rather than having strong strategies which as a result proved to be US greatest strategic failure.

1.8 JUSTIFICATION OF THE STUDY The above literature review shows the very large number of studies on Pakistan’s foreign policy as well as internal policies in the wake of 9/11.hpwever, they don’t tackle the challenges and prospects of foreign policy together. This study is an attempt to fill that gap. This study analyzes Pakistan’s Afghan policy post 9/11. A large quantity of academic analysis has been done in finding the effectiveness and success of Pakistan’s policies towards countering Terrorism enacted post 9/11. These policies especially Musharaf’s government faced criticism frequently on several grounds. Many Pakistani analysts have analyzed the events post 9/11 and discussed its impact inside Pakistan. On the other hand non-Pakistani analysts mostly tried to find out how Pakistan reacted towards US policies against terrorism and till which level Pakistan was being able to achieve West’s security goals. Hence, no such scholarly effort has been done yet to describe as well as analyze challenges and prospects / opportunities arising out of Pakistan’s Afghan Policy during military regime post 9/1.Moreover, this study also looks at the security threats Pakistan faced post 9/11 and designed its Afghan Policy.

Moreover, this research draws on the interviews of several people involved in policymaking post 9/11 till 2014. It includes politicians, academicians, Maliks of FATA, people belonging to different fields of life from FATA and KP, media analysts and youth. These interviews would give a close insight into relation and information flow between designing Afghan policy from 2001 till 2014. Furthermore, they would reveal or the gap and links in Pakistan Afghan policy and would give enhanced and practical understanding of Pakistan Afghan policy on ground realities. This study adds to that existing body by attempting to understand how different opportunities, which were presented by the happenings of 9/11, turned into challenges. This study evaluates Pakistan’s post 9/11 Afghan policy and provides recommendations and suggestions how to meet those challenges. This study helps researchers, policy makers, students as well as the general public. Like any new research the present study also had to face some challenges, mainly due to its dependence on human supply of information and the strong possibility of partisanship implicated in a human source. The suspicion of the interviews and their intentional vagueness in their view towards Afghan policy is considered. In order to rectify such weaknesses historiographic lens and both primary and secondary sources accessible on the theme is considered. Resultantly, this thesis fills in the cracks and gaps in the published accounts of Pakistan Afghan policy. Therefore, this work studies, discuss and analyze Pakistan Afghan policy and also evaluates these policies in the framework of security in Pakistan. 1.9 OBJECTIVES 1) To identify the shift of Pakistan’s post 9/11 Afghan policy. 2) To Identify and analyze the security impact of the event of 9/11 on Pakistan’s Afghan policy.

3) To evaluate and analyze Pakistan’s post 9/11 Afghan policy’s successes and failures. 1.10 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 1) What had been Pakistan’s Afghan policy prior to 9/11 event? 2) What had been the change in Pakistan’s Afghan policy post 9/11? 3) What are the failures and successes in Pakistan’s post 9/11 Afghan policy?

1.9. A HYPOTHESIS 1) Pakistan’s policy towards Afghanistan prior to 9/11 was to establish friendly/pliant government in Afghanistan for countering Indian via Taliban government, and to keep links with energy rich Central Asia, through Afghanistan. 2) Post 9/11 event led Pakistan to adjust its policies to align itself with the United States led War on Terror against Taliban. Pakistan decided to help US and Allies in fighting GWOT in Afghanistan and to provide land, sea and air route in this regard. Pakistan wanted to secure its interests in Afghanistan that is why it decided to ally with US in its war against Pakistan’s longstanding proxy Taliban in Afghanistan as well as in Tribal areas of Pakistan. 3) Pakistan has failed to achieve objectives of her long and short term Afghan policies. The war on terror has led to mistrust between Pak-Afghan governments, having an unstable social and

political environment as a result of terrorism and extremism and international isolation. Moreover, Pakistan and US relations also got effected. Though Pakistan got a lot of aid and different sanctions were removed which resulted in the revival of Pakistan’s economy. 1.10 METHODOLOGY Security threat refers to several interrelated and extends beyond topics and queries. This nature of security Dilemma makes it immeasurable. Therefore, qualitative method will be used. The study would be conducted by analyzing several books, articles, documents, electronic journals and personal interviews (from the actors who played or are playing role in Pakistan’s Afghan policy making as well as implementation). Therefore, this dissertation would include content analysis or textual interpretation for summarizing and identifying main points and then analyzing them. This research would be designed by analyzing different data achieved from several books, electronic media, articles and reports. The conceptual framework this study proposes is based on critically analyzing existing literature on Pakistan Afghan Policy post 9/11, reasons led to design Pakistan’s Afghan policy and its impact on Pakistan’s security, economic and social aspect internal and external both. Therefore, Pakistan Afghan Policy remains the center of the study and it is assumed that a security threat remains a rational objective of Afghan Policy. This study examines whether Pakistan’s Afghan policy designed after 9/11 incident actually had some substantive change (not only theoretically but also practically) and what were the implications faced by Pakistan on domestic, regional and international level. Furthermore, systematically it will be assessed that alliance with US post 9/11 in GWOT gave a significant twist the

44 security of Pakistan and cultivated an impression that Pakistan’s previous Afghan policy had been altered. Moreover, this decision stimulated the gap in perceptions of what comprised national interest for state and for the domestic extremist elements. The networks and sub-state organizations that had been considered as a tool for state’s external security (strategic depth) in Kashmir and Afghanistan emerged as an alarming challenge for its integrity and survival. Likewise, Pervez Musharaf stated that for the sake of state’s security, extremists’ elements should be eliminated completely to erase any security threat to the state and thrive to achieve the objective of moderate and dynamic state (Nation, 2003). a multi-track research strategy is adopted as a research technique in this study, as:

1) Data would be gathered after conducting interviews from multiple walks of life who are either directly or indirectly involved in designing, implementing or evaluating Pakistan Afghan Policy. Moreover, the mode of communication preferred by the responded would also be considered, while focusing on making this study significant and meaningful.

2) Several interpretive and participatory research initiatives would be undertaken from trips, seminars, dialogues, and discussions conducted for academicians’, media personals, students, researchers or political groups randomly. The deductions achieved from these programs would help to understand the complexity of Pakistan Afghan Policy and its impact. 3) A flexible and resilient approach in interpreting several evidences obtained during research would be applied to balance the limitations of the empirical data, for instance

limited access to primary sources particularly, official documents and agreements due to secrecy and confidentiality. This required remedy to a broaden and incorporated research methodology considering the complication of threat and the response towards it, which would help in docile numerous conclusions from the research query. 4) Primary and secondary sources regarding historical or contemporary information would be critically analyzed, for instance, government reports, laws and ordinances, national/ regional or international think tanks, policy statements, assessments and documentary evidence, other than statistical data obtained from either public or private sources that would complement the methodological framework. The objective of this open ended research methodology would highlight the comparative nature of the problem that requires the thorough study of the subject from multiple perspectives. The study is composed of five chapters that attempt to draw a realistic picture of Pakistan‘s Afghan Policy post 9/11. . 1.11 CHAPTERS This work is divided into five chapters. First chapter deals with introduction, problem, objectives of study, significance of study, review of literature, methodology. Second chapter is descriptive study of Pakistan’s Afghan policy up till 2001, security threat from India, security threat from Afghanistan. This chapter surveys the main historical accounts of Pakistan Afghan Policy since its inception. It discusses different stages Pakistan Afghan Policy passed through. It covers all the key events and decisions till 9/11 which resulted in changing or impacting on Pakistan Afghan policy.

Third Chapter deals with Pakistan’s Afghan policy in post 9/11era. This chapter explores Pakistan Afghan policy during military rule of General Musharaf, democratic rule of Zardari and Nawaz Sharif. Analysis of various factors for shifting of Pakistan’s Afghan policy is also included in this chapter. Factors, which compelled Pakistan in designing or changing its post 9/11 Afghan policy and on benefits Pakistan won after following post Afghan policy 9/11 and joining GWOT is also investigated and discussed in this chapter. This chapter also discusses Pak-Afghan relations and analyses the factors responsible for trust deficit between them. Fourth Chapter evaluates the challenges Pakistan confronted as the results of its policy. This chapter discusses impact of Pakistan Afghan policy on social, economic and educational life of FATA. It also deals with the security threats Pakistan faced internally and externally as a result of its post 9/11 Afghan Policy. Impact of Pakistan Afghan policy on Pakistan’s neighbours like Iran and India would also be discussed. Fifth chapter presents a conclusion by discussing results achieved out of post 9/11 Pak-Afghan policy. It synthesizes and summarizes the main findings of this research. It highlights the factors which could become the foundation of convergence in interests of both the states, which would result in friendly relations between them. Recommendations and suggestions would be offer in the end as well as hypothesizing guidelines for Pakistan to design its future Afghan policy.

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CHAPTER TWO

PAKISTAN’S FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS AFGHANISTAN: A HISTORICAL BACKDROP (1947-2001)

INTRODUCTION: Strategically, Afghanistan has been one of the most important neighbours of Pakistan owing to former’s location at the crossroad of South and Central Asia. The rivalry between Soviet Union and USA enhanced the significance of Afghanistan during period of the Cold War (1945-1991); however, it had laid negative impacts on Pak- Afghan relationship. From the inception of Pakistan in 1947, it inherited a unique and difficult security situation because it suffered immensely owing to its antagonistic relationship with India on one hand and on the other it got an unfriendly western neighbour in shape of Afghanistan. Notwithstanding the security threats, Pakistan never overlooked significance of Afghanistan rather it took Afghanistan as regional potential friend due to various reasons. These reasons included: landlocked status of Afghanistan making it economically reliant on Pakistan alongside the resemblance of culture and religion. However, their relationship has remained at odds since the last seven decades.

This chapter discusses Pakistan’s complex relationship with Afghanistan right after its inception in 1947. It is a descriptive study of Pak-Afghan relations, dividing them into four phases, Covering period from 1947-2001. Accordingly, 1947 to 1979 is considered as the first period; 1979 to 1992 delimits the second period; and 1992 till 1999 the third period, when Taliban installed their government in Afghanistan. Last phase of Pakistan Afghan Policy will be analyzed during

Musharaf government in Pakistan starts from 1999 till 2001. Pakistan through different variations continued its national interest as determined by security threat perception. 2.1. SECURITY THREAT PERCEPTION OF PAKISTAN: Cautious border policy is extremely important for the security of the state. Rationale behind having right border policy is that many strong empires have fallen because their borders were not watched vigilantly from external incursions or skirmishes. Pakistan since its independence is facing disputes on its border. Pakistan shares its two ling borders with Afghanistan and India and both these states have claim over Pakistan’s territory from the very first day of its inception. Therefore, Pakistan’s foreign policy main and foremost determinants have been preventing any interference or attack from India in the East and Afghanistan from the West.

2.1 SECURITY THREAT PERCEPTION OF PAKISTAN FROM INDIA: National security is the main concern of every nation-state and there are various issues that pose serious security threats to Pakistan from India since inception. Therefore, Indian threat perception made security a very vital and critical determinant of Pakistan’s Foreign Policy. Afghanistan always remained as a main focus of Indian Foreign Policy due to strategic and geographical location, economic purposes and most importantly its rivalry with Pakistan. Resultantly giving rise to security threat perception of Pakistan from Indian in Afghanistan. This security perception of Pakistan impacted over Pakistan’s Policy makers while designing Afghan Foreign Policy.

Furthermore, these perceptions developed due to several conflicts and issues between both the states like:  India instead of accepting creation of Pakistan preferred a lot of bloodshed during freedom movement before independence and that is why India will never let go of any opportunity which could result in splitting Pakistan (Khan, Ijaz, 2007: 142-143).  Issue of Kashmir that had been instituted in UN Resolutions on Kashmir and the latter had also given people of Kashmir the right to decide their destiny through plebiscite (Khan.A.N, 2018, 22). However, India had massively deployed troops in Jammu and Kashmir posing a grave threat to national security of Pakistan. As a result, three wars were broken out between India and Pakistan including: war during 1947-48, 1965 and 1999 (Paul.T.V, 2005:160).  Partition of the subcontinent had changed the entire political structure of the region by creating numerous issues including water issue of Indus Basin10. Following partition in 1947, a

10It was signed on 19th September 1960 in Karachi. Mr. Eugene R.Black, president World Bank and Pandit Jawahar Lal Nehru flew in Karachi to sign the treaty. The treaty for Pakistan was signed by the President Field Marshall Muhammad Ayub Khan and for India by the Prime Minister Jawahar Lal Nehru, President of the World Bank Mr. Eugene R. Black was the main witness.  TREATY PROVISIONS: It was decided that for ten years, India will let the waters of Eastern Rivers flow through the rivers and Pakistan will complete its canal system during that period.  It was also decided that Pakistan can construct Dams or Head-works on river Indus, Jhelum and Sutlej, according to its requirement.  If, to meet the electricity requirement, India wants to construct dams on River Chenab, it will be run-of-river arrangement and no reservoir will be constructed.  Pakistan and India will keep daily record of withdrawal at the heads and release from reservoirs, and will exchange the data every month.

conflict arose when Indus Basin was divided between India and Pakistan (Barrett. S, 2003:65). Because, the head works at Madhupur on Ravi and at Ferozpur on the Sutlej had been in India, however, several canals, taken off from these heads, were to irrigate the entire farming land of the Punjab. Hence, Pakistan can understand the significance of incessant flow of water for the growth of its economy and production; however, discontinuation or reversal will endanger the agriculture of Punjab posing threat to Pakistan (Akhtar.S, 2010:17).  After inception Pashtunistan issue11 between Pakistan and Afghanistan provided a critical chance of stressing and pressurizing Pakistan from its eastern as well as western borders. Furthermore, since the emergence of Taliban in Afghanistan, India began opposing the Taliban on one hand and

 The agreement set up the Permanent Indus Commission to adjudicate any future disputes arising over the allocation of waters. The Commission has survived three wars and provides an ongoing mechanism for consultation and conflict resolution through inspection, exchange of data and visits. The Commission is required to meet regularly to discuss potential disputes as well as cooperative arrangements for the development of the basin. Either party must notify the other of plans to construct any engineering works which would affect the other party and to provide data about such works. In cases of disagreement, a neutral expert is called in for mediation and arbitration. While neither side has initiated projects that could cause the kind of conflict that the Commission was created to resolve, the annual inspections and exchange of data continue, unperturbed by tensions on the subcontinent.

11 After the 1947 Partition of India, the government of Afghanistan found an opportunity to reclaim the lands lost to British India as a result of the Durand Line Agreement in 1893. These lands, known as Pashtunistan, were annexed to Pakistan. The issue of Pashtunistan’s fate became the backbone of Afghanistan’s foreign and domestic policies.

criticizing Pakistan for backing it on the other. Moreover, relationship of India in Afghanistan has bothered Pakistan posing threat on the western borders. Consequently, Afghanistan turned into a battleground for proxy war between India and Pakistan (Idrees.M, Anwar.K, 2017:2). Therefore, any government which is unfriendly towards Pakistan was always welcomed and supported by India for creating chaos in Pakistan and to isolate it in Afghanistan and from international community.  India, since long is maintaining its relations with Afghan governments. India shared very strong ties with Afghan King Zahir Shah and with communist governments taking over Afghanistan after him. These relations also raised the perception of security threat from Indian as these governments had opposed the ideology of Islamist jihadist groups backed by US and Pakistan in Afghanistan. Furthermore, to counter Pakistan’s military superiority seeked more military support from USSR (Howenstein N, Ganguly S: 127-140). Once, Jawaharlal Nehru commented on flourished Indo-Afghan relations that this closeness between them is due to multiple factors like they share mutual enemy and that is Pakistan which is one of the most prominent actors in Afghanistan (Kiran Afifa, 2009:15).  India has successfully played an important part for rebuilding and development of Afghanistan providing support worth of $2 Billion (Alikuzai.H, 2013:814). It primarily focuses on development of physical infrastructure, capacity building of institutions, development and security of agriculture and food, education, scholarship programs and health. This relation of

India with Afghanistan also threatens Pakistan endangering its national security.  India supported USSR during Soviet Afghan War 1979-1989. Post Geneva Accord when Soviets left Afghanistan the Afghan government was ruled by Najibullah and his family was residing in India. He was completely supported by India later in 1992 he was killed by the militants (Khan Suhrab A, 2009:23-24). Later when Taliban took over the government in Afghanistan Indian influence reduced to minimum level. The reason for anti-Indian stance of Taliban was due to their support to Kashmiri Jihadis in their areas of influence. India was alarmed by the Taliban rule in Afghanistan because they perceived that if they became stronger and successful they will also target a democratic and secular Indian society and will destroying it (Ahmad M, 2001:37). This perception of India led it support Northern Alliance in Afghanistan against Taliban. Similarly, the families of Northern Alliance’s leaders also resided in India. Furthermore, post 9/11 era brought a relief for India and the Afghan government chosen in Bonn Agreement in 2001 was comprised of majority of members from Northern Alliance (mostly the leaders whose families resided in India) resulting in restoring long term Indian bilateral relations with Afghanistan(Hussein B, 2001:34) .  The fall of Taliban’s regime in Post 9/11 era proved to be a blessing for India to again enhance its presence there. This situation possessed a grave security threat perception for Pakistan due to lack of confidence building between Pakistan and India and also due to Indian claim since independence that it will undo Pakistan.  Post Hamid Karzai’s government was installed Indian government instantly sent the diplomatic mission along with

the medical team from Indian armed forces and ministry of foreign affairs to Afghanistan. The Indian envoy to Afghanistan S.M.Lamba expressed the willingness of Indian government to install Indian Embassy in Kabul which in September 1996 was abandoned by Taliban (Reddy L, 2002: 284)). The Indian embassy was inaugurated by Indian foreign minister Jaswant Singh who cherished the opening of embassy there and declared the Indo-Afghan relation during Taliban era as“A painful gap of more than five years”(Zaman A, 2002:2).

 Moreover, Afghans have a special friendly tilt towards India as it is one of the largest donors for reconstruction and rebuilding of Afghanistan that is why its presence in Afghanistan cannot be curbed. Being an independent state Afghanistan claimed India as a good friend (Lal.R, 2006 :23).  India always wanted to have friendly Afghan government to gain its economic objectives from Central Asian Republics (Balouch Q, B, 2008:29). India also wanted to dominate and promote its interests in Afghanistan and for that purpose post 9/11 India established its consulates in Heart, Jalalababad, Kandahar and Mazar-i- Sharif. All these areas border Pakistan’s provinces of Balochistan and KP. India sent almost 300 commandos in Afghanistan for protecting their citizens, this act of Indian Foreign ministry was considered as alarming by Pakistan. Pakistan’s concern was that workers from several states for rebuilding of Afghanistan are present in Afghanistan but none of the state has sent commandoes for protecting their citizenship (Zeb R, 2006:72). Pakistan’s concern was due to security threat which was perceived from existence of Indian Consulates on Afghan soil for the covert purposes of

destabilizing Baluchistan and KP. This act of India maximized the trust deficit both the countries were already having (Ashraf, F, 2007: 2).  Pakistan’s sensitive and strategically important province Baluchistan which makes to Mackinder’s Heartland12 i-e, Southern strategic route to Central Asia, and is also a component of Rim land (Arabian Sea coastline) and several ports in Gawadar. This strategic location makes it very critical for India that is creating unrest and turmoil (Tribune, Aug 3, 2015) there result in undoing the province from the state , delink China and ports of Gawadar from Central Asia. This Indian policy most possibly tears down the bright economic future of Pakistan. Pakistan charged India and Afghanistan on several forms for backing Baloch National Army (BNA) and Baloch Liberation Army (BLA). Furthermore, BLA was also blamed for recruiting militants and train them in their camps in Afghanistan (Hasnat.S.F, 2011:99). This situation gave further rise to Pakistan’s security threat perception from India.  President of Afghanistan Hamid Karzai in 2006 invited Indian companies (Rediff, April 11, 2006) to invest in Afghanistan and expressed eagerness of Afghan people to work with them and to offer them market for their commodities. India as a

12Sir Halford John Mackinder was a British geographer who wrote a paper in 1904 called "The Geographical Pivot of History." Mackinder's paper suggested that the control of Eastern Europe was vital to control of the world. Mackinder postulated the following, which became known as the Heartland Theory:Who rules Eastern Europe commands the Heartland, who rules the Heartland commands the World Island,Who rules the World Island commands the world. The "heartland" he also referred to as the "pivot area" and as the core of Eurasia, and he considered all of Europe and Asia as the World Island.

result proposed several dams in Kabul and Kunar (Bradnock.W.R, 2015: 200). Pakistan perceived security threat from this situation that both the states Afghanistan and India wants to deprive Pakistan from water resources as this water flows into Indus River by crossing Kabul River (Haide H, Anwar I, 2011).  India developed good relations with Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan and Indian companies of oil and gas remained active there post 9/11.moreover, a military base at Ayani (Tajikistan) was also renovated by India in 2007(ibid). India apart from US, Germany, Russia is the fourth state which has a military base in central Asia. Suda Ramachandaran, an Indian journalist highlighted the importance of military base in Central Asia by saying that they could be highly useful in an hour of any disturbance and danger arising from Afghanistan. Pakistan perceived that such Indian influence in central Asia gives India a chance of sending its special forces at the time of conflict with Pakistan. Furthermore, India could attack or hit Pakistan from Tajikistan at the hour of need (ibid). This influence of Indi in Afghanistan and Central Asia gives ample strength to India to counter Pakistan’s influence in Afghanistan (Ramchandan S, 2010).  Relations between Pakistan and India have also been threatened by the threatening remarks and statements. Like, it’s been expressed by the Indian Congress leaders that they desire to take Pakistan as a satellite. These Indian desires have been expressed on several forums by them. President of Indian National Congress, Achary Kripalani, in 1947 announced that congress and people of India and its congress have not surrendered its claim over Pakistan (united India).similarly,

first Indian Home Minister Sardar.V.B.Patel was confident that sooner or later Pakistan would be again part of India”(Khan.A.M:116) .Moreover, Jawahar Lal Nehru , told his United Nation’s counterpart Joseph Korbel that India wants to work in collaboration and cooperation towards Pakistan but the merger of Pakistan is unavoidable but the time span is not clear (The Concept, 1983:46). It was stated by prominent Indian personalities on several platforms that Pakistan cannot survive on its own and one day they will have to come back and join them (ibid:47). Therefore, Pakistan has always had passionate antipathy and complicated relations with India. There are several factors like political, social, psychological, historical and religious which plays the role of sinister between both the states (Salahuddin.C.A, 1981:72). That is why India constitutes a very major and important part in Pakistan’s international relations (Hussain.A, 1981:72). Therefore, after independence Pakistan tried to get some help from Britain and other members of Commonwealth against India and to resolve Kashmir dispute but its hopes were not fulfilled (Chaudhury & Hassan, 1968:8). As stated by Callard, “Britain and the other members of the Common wealth…avoided the discussion of matters in dispute between member countries. No one wished to give offence to India, especially as the Commonwealth had no machinery for enforcing its action. The main dispute, Kashmir had been referred to the UN and there was little indication that the Commonwealth would be more successful in finding a solution. None of these arguments was satisfactory to Pakistan, which felt that Commonwealth policy was unduly cautious in its attempt to avoid offending India” (Callard.K, 1957: 15).

4) Pakistan then turned towards Islamic countries but was also disappointed from the (Callard.K 1957:316). On 2nd June 1949 while a visit of Prime Minister Liaqat Ali Khan to Iran, he received invitation from Soviet Union (SU) for establishing diplomatic relations which was postponed for a while and later for indefinite time. Later, when P.M of Pakistan was offered a visit to US he accepted it, established good relations and a foundation for future economic assistance were laid down. Furthermore, President Ayub Khan stated that security and development are the principle objective of Pakistan foreign policy (Khan.A.M:114). 5) Protecting security and developing armed forces became Pakistan’s dilemma. Pakistan wanted to counter India’s military superiority and acquisition of Kashmir. Acquisition of Kashmir to justify two nation theory and economically, Kashmir contains main head 6) Course of water Pakistan’s major rivers Chenab, Indus and Ravi. Pakistan’s agriculture is highly depended on these rivers that are why saying that Pakistan’s survival is depended on them. That is the reason Pakistan’s Foreign policy is Indian centric and countering possible Indian threat is so critical for Pakistan. 2.2 SECURITY THREAT PERCEPTION FROM AFGHANISTAN: Both the neighbouring countries, such as Pakistan and Afghanistan, have usual complaints of similar elements like violence and terrorism. These include: local and external elements of violence and terrorism. The most important one amongst local elements include so-called Taliban (students of religious institutions), who are still operating in both the countries. The aim of their operations is to destabilize the political governments and to impose Islamic government with their own interpretation of Shariah by overthrowing

67 the existing governments of both Afghanistan and Pakistan (Hussain. Z, 2007: XV). Conversely, they have also some stark differences over strategic issues. This division can evenly be seen in the ranks of Pakistani Taliban over issues relating to strategic plan and tactics. For instance, some of the Pakistani Taliban support to exclusively fight on the soil of Afghanistan, whereas, some of them are determined to hit soft targets like schools, colleges, universities, masjids and markets (Clements. F, 2003: 153). However, these Taliban continue to cover similar ideological agenda on bigger canvass and, hence, minor differences amongst their ranks can simply be ignored. Historically, Afghanistan had always been maintaining a hostile attitude towards Pakistan owing to two major reasons including mostly: issues of Durand Line and Pashtunistan. These issues had been on ambitions of Afghanistan to retake control of present Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP, henceforth) together with other areas, which were captured by Ahmad Shah Abdali13 (1747-1773) during his reign. When Afghan rulers came to know likelihood of Pakistan’s independence from the British bondage during fourth decade of the twentieth century, they asked the British Indian government to either give back

13Ahmad Shāh Durrānī (c. 1723 - 1773) also known as Ahmad Shāh Abdālī) and born as Ahmad Khān Abdālī, was the founder of the Durrani Empire and is regarded by many to be the founder of modern Afghanistan.The Pashtuns of Afghanistan often call him Bābā ("father"). He also used the title "pearl of pearls," or "pearl of the age" (Durr-i-Durrani), hence the name of his dynasty. Following the assassination of Nader Shah Afshar, he became the Amir of Khorasan. After consolidating his rule over territory stretching between Amu Darya and the Indian Ocean and from Khorasan into Kashmir, the Punjab, and Sind he invaded India on nine occasions. At the time, only the Ottoman Empire was larger in the Muslim world. In 1757, he sacked the cities of Delhi, Agra, Mathura, and Vrndavana, but made no attempt to establish rule there. He confronted the Sikhs in the Punjab during an extended campaign, eventually abandoning that region

68 the entire territory of KP to Afghanistan or make an independent Pashtunistan state; British did not accept this demand and supported independent Pakistan. From thence, it has been playing vital role to establish an independent Pashtunistan state up till now on basis of Pashtun ethnic nationalism as India also partitioned on basis of religio- cultural, historical and economic differences (Olaf Caroe, 2004:436) Consequently, referendum was held to decide the future of KP and it resulted in securing 289244 votes in favour to integrate KP with Pakistan, whereas, 2874 votes were polled against integration (Burki, Ziring, 70). Side by side, the entire tribal belt decided to be the part of Pakistan on condition to continue holding similar relationship with Pakistan as they used to have with the British. Correspondingly, Afghanistan also took a position to oppose Pakistan’s admission at United Nation during September 1947 (Hameed, Rai, 1981:35). Afghanistan itself not a serious threat however, close relationship with India enhanced threat from Afghanistan (previously explained). Afghan rulers since then remained Indian friendly though they never created any problem from their border for Pakistan during Pak-Indian wars in 1965 and 1971. However, Pakistan policy makers were always apprehensive about Indian presence and involvement in Afghanistan. When Sardar Daud14 in 1973 overthrew King Zahir Shah’s15 regime in

14Mohammed Daoud Khan or Daud Khan (July 18, 1909 – April 28, 1978) was the 5th Prime Minister of Afghanistan from 1953 to 1963 and later the President of Afghanistan. Born into the royal family, he overthrew the Musahiban monarchy of his first cousin Mohammed Zahir Shah and declared himself as the first President of his republic in 1973 before his assassination in 1978 as a result of the Saur Revolution led by the communistPeople's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA). Daoud Khan was known for his progressive policies, his efforts for the improvement of women's rights, his Pashtun nationalism, and for initiating two five-year modernization plans which increased the labor force by about 50 percent.. After his

Afghanistan establishing a secular state there. Sardar Daud was inclined towards Russia and India that is why he was a staunch supporter of Pashtunistan issue (Haqqani H, 2005:159-198). Other then supporting Pashtunistan issue he also started supporting and aiding Baloch separatist in Pakistan’s province of Baluchistan resultantly, Pak-Afghan relations became sour. Furthermore, he also refused to accept Durand line (border between Pakistan and Afghanistan) and a lot of arms smuggled from Afghanistan resulting in bomb blasts in Pakistan (ibid: 111-113).

2.3 FOUR PHASES OF PAKISTAN-AFGHANISTAN RELATIONS: To create a coherent understanding of the issue, this research work divides Pakistan Afghanistan’s bilateral relationship into three phases. Phase 1, from 1947 till 1979, phase 2 from 1979 up to 1992, phase 3 from 1992 till1999 and the last phase discusses Pakistan Afghan Policy after General Musharaf military coup.

2.3. A PHASE I: BEGINNING OF POOR RELATIONSHIP (1947-1979) This phase embarks upon beginning of their poor relationship starting from inception of Pakistan in 1947 up till period of 1979. Once,

overthrow and assassination, Afghanistan plunged into a civil war that since then never ended. 15King Mohammed Zahir Shah was born October 15, 1914 in Kabul, Afghanistan. Zahir Shah came to the throne at the age of 19, after the assassination of his father in 1933. He undertook a number of economic development projects backed by foreign aid, largely from the United States and the Soviet Union. He was also able to maintain Afghanistan's neutral position in international politics.

President Ayub Khan16 (1958-1969) pointed out two misconceptions between Pakistan and Afghanistan which immensely contributed to influence their upcoming relationship. These included: weak defense capability and physical infrastructure of Pakistan at the beginning that might easily be dismantled on one hand and on the other, it might undermine Afghanistan if it remained stable and democratic (Khan, Ayub, 1967:174,175). Notwithstanding the unfriendly neighbours, Pakistan tried hard and struggled to survive as an independent and sovereign state. Moreover, it formulated foreign policy with a view to promote friendly relations with its neighbours. It was in the best interests of Pakistan to keep friendly relations with Afghanistan with a view to get rid of becoming a sandwich between Afghanistan on its West and India on its East. Consequently, Pakistan dispatched Mr. Ismael Ibrahim Chundrigar, (Pakistan Quarterly, 1956:52)in the capacity of an ambassador, to Afghanistan and followed by a delegation under leadership of Sardar Abdul Rab Nishter to represent Pakistan at Jashin e Azadi’s (Independence Day) celebrations in Afghanistan. Subsequently, Pakistan withdrew its troops from tribal belt to create favorable conditions of mutual trust and secure loyalty of the tribal’s inhabitants. It was a friendly gesture from Pakistan’s side and sign of showing respect and trust to tribal traditions that was responded from the Loya Jirgah (Grand Assembly) of tribal belt in providing allegiance to Pakistan. Similarly, Afghanistan also re-conciliated to withdraw its vote at UN against Pakistan and agreed to exchange

16Mohammad Ayub Khan (14 May 1907 – 19 April 1974), was a Pakistani military dictator and the secondPresident of Pakistan who forcibly assumed the presidency from first President through coup in 1958, the first successful coup d'état of the country. The popular demonstrations and labour strikes which were supported by the protests in East Pakistan ultimately led to his forced resignation in 1969.

71 ambassadors in 1948; however, these efforts could not bear fruits because, subsequently, grand assembly of Afghanistan denied recognizing Durant Line and relating agreements in June, 1949 (International Journal of Punjab Studies, 1994-2003:125). Moreover, King Zahir Shah of Afghanistan also added fuel to the fire by making speech against Pakistan, dropping anti-Pakistan leaflets through airplane and hoisting Afghan flag (Rizvi, Mujtaba, 1971:156,157). Meanwhile, Prime Minister of Pakistan was assassinated by an Afghan national in 1951 and, as a result, it further deteriorated Pak-Afghan relations (Curmally, 2001:64). Moreover, their relationship also became strained when Afghanistan openly developed relations with India and began opposing any chance of U.S’s arm support to Pakistan. For instance, Mohammad Kabir Ludin, an Afghan Minister, staged a protest to US Secretary Dulles against US militarily support to Pakistan on January 4, 1954(Kux,2001:60). However, USA paid no heed to Afghan’s protest because the former wanted to contain influence of the Soviet Union in the region. During the course of time, there were two subsequent events that created mistrust between the two including: rise of Sardar Daud (a staunch supporter of Pakhtunistan) into power and Pakistan’s membership at Central Treaty Organization (CENTO)17 in 1955 and

17 Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) earlier Middle East Treaty Organization, or Baghdad Pact Organization Mutual Security Organization dating from 1955 to 1979 and contained of Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, Iraq and the Britain. Turkey and Iraq are founding initiators who laid the foundation of the Baghdad Pact for mutual defense and security that was signed on 26 February 1955. Turkey and Iraq invited Pakistan to join but Pakistan was not willing and not enthusiastic to do so without the participation of United States. But pressure from Britain and United States was adequate stimulus for Pakistan to sign the Baghdad Pact on 23 September 1955 along with Britain and Iran. United States was unwilling due to the treaty in the incident of a war involving Israel and the Arab states. Although U.S. functioned for treaty as

South East Association Treaty Organization (SEATO)18 in 1955. Meanwhile, Pakistan began restructuring to incorporate administrative units (provinces) into single unit of West Pakistan (Dawn, 2011). . Consequently, government of Afghanistan heatedly debated and vehemently opposed the issue of integrating the Pashtun-dominated province of KP into West Pakistan. They urged Afghan population to organize rallies for protesting the issue of incorporating Pashtunprovince into single unit. It resulted in chaos including: sacking of Pakistan’s embassy at Kabul, attacking Pakistan’s consulates at Kandahar and Jalalabad and molesting flag of Pakistan (Ahmad,Salahuddin,1996:88). Subsequent retaliatory attacks on Afghan consulate in Peshawar and transit trade were also observed in Pakistan. Meanwhile, USA intervened and managed to conciliate and re-normalize Pak-Afghan relations (Kux, 2001: 77). To counter US support of Pakistan at CENTO and SEATO, top-notch leadership of Soviet Union paid visits to India and Afghanistan on November, 1955. They endorsed stance of India on Kashmir and pledged to disburse $100 million to Afghanistan for economic and military support (Clements, Franks, 2003:18). Thus, it created Soviet- Indo-Afghan nexus against Pakistan (Kux, 2001: 78). Moreover, USA and its allies such as Egypt, Iran and Saudi Arabia urged Pakistan to avoid severing its diplomatic relations with Afghanistan (Rabbani, unofficial observer, the United States signed individual agreements with each of the countries in this Pact 18Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), regional-defense organization from 1955 to 1977, created by the Southeast AsiaCollective Defence Treaty, signed at Manila on Sept. 8, 1954, by the representatives of Australia, France, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The treaty came into force on Feb. 19, 1955. Pakistan withdrew in 1968, and France suspended financial support in 1975. The organization held its final exercise on Feb. 20, 1976, and formally ended on June 30, 1977.

Ikram, 2006:344). Subsequently, president Iskandar Mirza and Prime Minister H. S Suharwardi of Pakistan paid visits to Afghanistan with a view to normalize relations in August, 1956 and June, 1957 respectively(Haq,Azizul,1985:101). To reciprocate, Afghan ruler King Zahir Shah and premier Sardar Daud Khan19 also visited Pakistan in 1958 and 1959 respectively. These frequent visits had resulted in betterment of relations on both sides (Kux.D, 2001: 77). Both president of Pakistan and premier of Afghanistan agreed to downgrade their political issues and conceded to envisage setting up a transit zone for promoting Afghan trade in Karachi, build up physical infrastructure such as railroad through Pakistan’s borders such as Chaman and Landi Kotal, to improve Pak-Afghan roads and facilities for storing products in Afghanistan. USA had to take this responsibility to initiate developmental facilities which estimated worth of $30 million (Development Business, 2004: 15). Sardar Daud seemed intelligent to acquire advantage from prevailing situation and sought to develop friendship with Soviet Union during Cold War on one side, whereas, on the other, Soviet Union extended its support to Afghanistan in terms of developing physical infrastructure with a view to make strategic use of it in future. Meanwhile, president of Pakistan Ayub Khan wanted USA to play its role to contain influence of the Soviet in the region; however, USA did not agree to follow the suit and

19Mohammad Daud Khan, (born July 18, 1909, Kabul, Afghanistan—died April 27, 1978, Kabul), Afghan politician who overthrew the monarchy of Mohammad Zahir Shah in 1973 to establish Afghanistan as a republic. He served as the country’s president from 1973 to 1978. Educated in Kabul and France, Daud Khan, a cousin and brother-in-law of Zahir Shah, pursued a career in the military. He rose to command an army corps in 1939 and held the post of minister of defense from 1946 to 1953. As prime minister (1953–63) he instituted educational and social reforms and implemented a pro-Soviet policy.

74 avoid to further push Afghanistan into the camp of the Soviet (Kux.D, 2001: 124). Backed by Indo-Soviet support, Afghanistan began raid making incursion through borders of Pakistan in 1961 (Marsden.P, 1998: 23). In 1962, following US-led U-2 incident20 from US-Canadian air base at Badhber in Peshawar, Soviet Union began penetrating into Afghanistan and also threatened Pakistan for providing assistance to USA (Afzal.M.R, 2001: 251). It aimed at supporting Afghanistan on one side and on the other damaging Pakistan at any cost. As a result, it led to close Pak-Afghan relations, Afghan’s consulates in Peshawar as well as offices to trade from Peshawar and Quetta. Similarly, Afghanistan terminated its diplomatic and transit-trade relations with Pakistan (Kux.D, 2001:124). Consequently, land-locked Afghanistan halted to continue its relationship with rest of the world and improve its economic conditions by limiting to carry on transportation links with the Soviet Union and having partial access to Iran and India. On the other side, USA urged to manage the crisis by offering its good offices to pacify the situation between Pakistan and Afghanistan and reduce influence of Soviet Union. It also offered to financial support by constructing railroads via Pakistan to Afghanistan and revives trade relations with Afghanistan. However, Pakistan conceded US offer to construct railroads from Quetta and consider arranging a meeting between Pak-Afghan foreign ministers at New York in September 1962 (Dupree.L, 2014:552). This mediation proved successful in

20The U-2 Incident. Shot down by a Soviet surface to air missile on the morning of May 1, 1960, CIA pilot Francis Gary Powers had been on a top secret mission: to over fly and photograph denied territory from his U2 spy plane deep inside Russia. On May 7 he revealed that the pilot of the plane, Francis Gary Powers, had parachuted to safety, was alive and well in Moscow, and had testified that he had taken off from Peshawar, in Pakistan, with the mission of flying across the Soviet Union over the Aral Sea.

75 reconciliation both countries to sit together and conclude Tehran Accord in 1963 (Farahi.A.J, 2005:220). Following concluding Tehran Accord, both the countries agreed to reinstate developing their terms in various ways including: diplomacy, trade and commerce, conflict resolution through amicable means under international law and create a congenial atmosphere for developing mutual trust (Pande.A, 2011: 143). As a result, these efforts bore fruits when Sardar Daud resigned and both the countries resumed their trade routes and bilateral relations in September 1963. Following his resignation, it lowered the significance of Pakhtunistan issueand also softening the attitude of Afghan’s rulers towards Pakistan. Later, Afghanistan’s neutralized stance during Indo-Pak war in 1965 and subsequent visit of King Zahir Shah in 1968 was warmly welcomed by Pakistan (Hussain.R.2002). Similarly, Finance Minister of Pakistan Muzafar Ali Khan paid a visit to Afghanistan with a view to discover new ways to strengthen possibility of trade and commercial activities (Rizvi. M, 1971:159). Disbanding one unit and restructuring a separate KP also led to strengthen their mutual trust. During this span of peaceful co-existence, Afghanistan also remained neutral during Indo- Pak War in 1971 avoiding getting undue advantage of Pakistan’s position in the war (Haroon Asif, 1005:375). Following short span of peaceful co-existence from 1963 to 1973, Sardar Daud staged a coup d’état, backed by Peoples’ Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA, henceforth), and deposed King Zahir Shah when the later was on visit to Europe in July 1973(Calvocoressi,P,2001:570-71). He established a republican government by abolishing Afghan’s monarchy and declared himself a president. This sudden political change in Afghanistan had greatly alarmed Pakistan and soon Sardar Daud revived his policy of supporting separatist elements both at KP and Baluchistan violating

76 sovereignty and integrity of Pakistan. For instance, Afghanistan gave a friendly gesture to elements of insurgency and secessionist groups at Baluchistan during 1974-75 and mobilized Afghan forces at Pak- Afghan borders for attack. As a result, Pakistan also deployed its troops at its western borders to counter Afghan’s aggression (Durani, M. Khan, A,36) To counter Sardar Daud’s hostility towards Pakistan, policy makers in Pakistan opted for organizing anti-Daud, anti-communist and anti- secularist religious groups against him. (Matinuddin, Kamal. 1991:18). For instance, Pakistan supported to train Afghan elements at Peshawar such as Gulbaddin Hekmat Yar21, Ahmad Shah Masood22 and Burhan- ud-din Rabbani23 for creating stirrings inside Kabul to topple down

21 Gulbuddin Hekmatyar is an Afghan politician and former warlord. He is the founder and current leader of the Hezb-e Islami political party, ideologically influenced by the Muslim Brotherhood and more specifically Sayyid Qutb. 22Ahmad Shah Masood was was born in 1953 in the Jangalak district of Panjsher. He played one of the most important roles in Afghanistan's modern history. To his admirers, he is known as the "Lion of Panjsher", a name given to him for his successes as a military commander during the war against the Soviet occupation. After the Communists were defeated, Masood's troops were the first Mujahideen group to enter Kabul, and help establish a Mujahideen government. He served as President Burhanuddin Rabbani's Defense Minister, and engaged in numerous battles to prevent Rabbani's rivals such as Gulbuddin Hekmatyar from taking over the government. Eventually, Rabbani's government fell, and the Taliban with secret financial and military help from the Pakistanis, took over the capital. Masood and his allies pulled their forces north and worked on defending the north and the central regions from being completely taken over by the Taliban. Masood was chosen as the military leader of UNIFSA when on September 9, 2001, two days before the September 11 terrorist attacks in the United States, Masood was killed. 23Burhanuddin Rabbani, Afghan Islamic scholar and political leader (born 1940, Faizabad, Badakhshan, Afg.—died Sept. 20, 2011, Kabul, Afg.), Rabbani, a member of Afghanistan’s Tajik minority, attended a religious school in Kabul. As a strong opponent of King Mohammad Zahir Shah’s secular reforms, he became the head of

Daud’s regime (Hussain, Khawar, 2005:22-23). It trained anti-Daud Afghan elements ranging from three to five thousands at various unidentified safe-houses (Weinbaum, M, 1994:5). These counter efforts of Pakistan bent down Daud to knee who, in turn, decided to resolve the issue and sent an invitation offering premier of Pakistan Mr. Zulifiqar Ali Bhutto to visit Afghanistan. Following Bhutto’s visit to Afghanistan in June 1976, Daud also paid a reciprocal visit to Pakistan on August 1976. As a result of reciprocal visits, it revived to create an atmosphere of mutual trust, deactivate tension, revive span of peaceful coexistence and discover ways to settle disputes amicably. (Durani, M. Khan, A, 36). Khalqi wing of People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) took control of Afghan government under presidency of Noor Mohammed Taraki and premiership of Hafizullah Amin (Male. B, 2015:25). It declared Afghanistan as Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA, henceforth). Following taking charge, PDPA led government announced progressive reforms in various fields such as agriculture and education. These reforms infuriated Afghan feudal lords and clergy class who, in turn, held protests and staged riots against The Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA) at every corner of Afghanistan. Furthermore, Iranian-based Islamic revolution, 1979 further accelerated the efforts to resist progressive reforms in an Islamic political party, which evolved into a powerful mujahideen rebel group during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan (1979–92). Rabbani was the second president after the Soviet withdrawal, but he refused to step down from the rotating presidency. Four years later he was forced out by Taliban forces, though he retained international recognition. He returned home in the wake of the U.S.-led attacks in 2001 and briefly served as interim president until the election that November of Hamid Karzai. From 2010 Rabbani was head of the High Peace Council, which sought to pursue peace talks with the Taliban. He was assassinated by a suicide bomber claiming to be a Taliban emissary.

Afghanistan (Hughes.G, 2008: 326-350). Soviet-backed DRA also seemed creating threats to integrity of Pakistan, hence, Pakistan had either to submit or support anti-Khalqi forces to oust Noor Mohammed Taraki. Side by side, Pakistan had to accommodate more than Six million Afghan refugees within territory of Pakistan henceforth (World Refugee Survey: 1986: 6). In the meanwhile, Hafizullah Amin staged a coup d’état within PDPA in September 16, 1979 and became president by killing Noor Mohammad Taraki (Emadi H, 2005: xxiii).

2.3. B PHASE 2: US PROXY WAR (1979-1992) On December 27, 1979, Soviet invaded Afghanistan and established the government under presidency of Babrak Karmal24 after assassination of Hafizullah Amin (Kux,D.2001:245). Following arrival of the Soviet forces into Afghanistan, it created an alarming situation for Pakistan inasmuch as the Soviet forces reached very close, from the north, to the borders of KP. It also upset process of Islamization of Zia- ul-Haq and further proliferated insurgency already existing in Baluchistan that led to accelerate insecurity in Pakistan. Now the Soviet forces were very much close to warm waters that included: the Gawdar port25, the Indian Ocean26 and the Persian Gulf27, thus, it

24Babrak Karmal was an Afghan politician who was installed as President of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union when they invaded in 1979. Karmal was born in Kamari and educated at Kabul University. is a port city on the southwestern coast of Pakistan's Balochistan (گوادر) 25Gwadar province where the Arabian Sea meets the Persian Gulf just outside the Strait of Hormuz near key shipping routes in and out of the Persian Gulf. Under development as a free trade port, it is the district headquarters of Gwadar District. It is about 700 km from Karachi and 120 km from the Iranian border. Gwadar was an overseas possession of Muscat and Oman from 1783 to 1958. On 8 September 1958, Pakistan purchased Oman's exclave for 5.5 billion rupees, effective 8 December 1958. Most of the money for the purchase came from donations, Muhamad Najmul Hasnain, Muhammad Abdullah Khan contributing the most. The government paid the remainder through taxes.The area was integrated into Balochistan province on 1 July 1977 as the Gwadar District subdivision.

79 began posing a direct strategic threat not only to Pakistan but also to integrity of Khomeini’s Iran (Chah-e-Bahar and port of Abbas) and littoral states of the Persian Gulf. Pakistan needed to either surrender it, offer complete support to anti-Soviet forces resisting the invasion, or muster support of the world to pressurize the Soviet Union to leave Afghanistan forthwith(Shahed,I.2008:790). The concept of Buffer Zone had vanished away the day when Soviet intervened in Afghanistan and it might also consolidate itself in Afghanistan and use it as launch pad after consolidation for having an access to the warm

26Borders of the Indian Ocean, as delineated by the International Hydrographic Organization in 1953 included the Southern Ocean but not the marginal seas along the northern rim, but in 2000 the IHO delimited the Southern Ocean separately, which removed waters south of 60°S from the Indian Ocean, but included the northern marginal seas. Meridionally, the Indian Ocean is delimited from the Atlantic Ocean by the 20° east meridian, running south from Cape Agulhas, and from the Pacific Ocean by the meridian of 146°55'E, running south from the southernmost point of Tasmania. The northernmost extent of the Indian Ocean is approximately 30° north in the Persian Gulf.

The Indian Ocean covers 70,560,000 km2 (27,240,000 sq mi), including the Red Seaand the Persian Gulf but excluding the Southern Ocean, or 19.5% of the world's oceans; its volume is 264,000,000 km3 (63,000,000 cu mi) or 19.8% of the world's oceans' volume; it has an average depth of 3,741 m (12,274 ft) and a maximum depth of 7,906 m (25,938 ft).

27The Persian Gulf is located in the Middle East between Iran and the Arabian Peninsula. It is an extension of the Indian Ocean. The narrows at its mouth is the Straits of Hormuz, a strategically important area in various conflicts. "Persian Gulf" has been the usual term in English for centuries, but it is sometimes also called the "Arabian Gulf", mainly in Arab countries. The entire east coast of the Gulf is in Iran, formerly known as Persia. We have an article for the Iranian coastal region.

The west coast is shared by a number of countries. Saudi Arabia has most of it, and we have an article for the Saudi Gulf coast. The Gulf Cooperation Council hasSaudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates as members. Nationals of any of these countries can work and reside in the others without a visa.

80 water. Though, Pakistan did not like Soviet forces to stay in Afghanistan, however, it also never wanted to get directly entangled with Soviet Union. Hence, it took a middle way to sort out the way to handle the issue (Sattar, A.1997:462). On the other side, Soviet intervention in Afghanistan also threatened interests of US in the region which decided to contain the former by providing support to strengthen Pakistan in terms of military equipment, food and other assistance. Hence, Pakistan agreed to facilitate US for using its territory to launch a proxy war to counter Soviet expansionism to its south. US offered support in worth of $400 million and assistance to Pakistan in terms of militarily and economically, however, Pakistan rejected this support considering inadequate and insufficient to counter a gigantic threat (Branigan, W.1980). Though, it did not affect cooperation between Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and Inter Services Intelligence (ISI), however, US realized the dynamics of the situation and importance of providing support to Pakistan, hence, it decided to boost both military and economic assistance of worth of $3.2 billion for a period of five years. In 1986 US provided US $ 4 million to Pakistan (Ali.M, 2009:251). Pakistan Afghan Policy at the time of Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was based on several reasons. Most important was providence of shortcut to legitimize General Zia’s military rule. Pakistan along with US agreed to use Islamic solidarity as a tool in Afghanistan against Soviets and those (Soviets) were hailed as infidels. West was comfortable with this strategy and called Zia as a blessing to fight the war to defend democracy and freedom (48).this war in Afghanistan was given several names and slogans like holy war and Islam in danger by West and Pakistan. The proxies’ i-e Mujahedeen were trained and sheltered in tribal areas of Pakistan bordering Afghanistan (Fayyaz.S,

2010: 93). Furthermore, Pakistan wanted to counter external security threat emerged in Afghanistan after Soviet Invasion by siding with US. Pakistani Policy makers were concerned by Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and had expected that next target of Soviet Red Army will be Pakistan as Soviets always desired for warm waters of Pakistan (ibid: 94). Hence, financial aid was granted to Pakistan to fight against Soviets took the shape of a more ideological politics, resulting into internationalizing Afghan Jihad (Fayyaz.S, 2010: 102). In Pakistan religious political parties like Jamat -I -Islami (JI) and Jamat- I- Ulema-e-Islam (JUI)1 started gaining strength not only as manpower, institutional association and financially in tribal areas but also getting hold of lethal weapons and gaining international exposure (ibid). Main purpose of providing assistance to Pakistan was to raise, train, manage and equip anti-Soviet elements such as Hezb-i-Islami of Gulbuddin Hikmatyar and prepare them to fight against the Soviet Union (Weinbaum,M.1994:34). The rationale behind this policy was to marginalize Shia Iran state and have Saudi-US-Pak dominant friendly state in post Soviet Afghanistan (Bruno. G, December 10, 2008). As a result, the Soviet Union was finally surrendered and impelled to seek political solution of Afghan issue guaranteeing its sovereignty and non-alignment. Moscow soon realized futility of intervening Afghanistan and considered it sheer loss of money, time and resources. It, thus, gave way to revive Afghan’s diplomatic negotiations with Islamabad that led Soviet Union to withdraw its troops from land of Afghanistan. Both Pakistan and Afghanistan finally agreed to conclude Peace Accord at Geneva of Switzerland on April 14, 1988 under auspices of US and Soviet Union as co-guarantors (Clements. F, 2003: 90). The Accord included: withdrawal of Soviet troops within span of nine months, whereas, fifty percent of the troops would have to be withdrawn in early three months of the Accord; banning of infiltrating

82 activities across the borders and ensuring to suspend supply of arms for at-least period of one year. However, Geneva Accord proved to be a failure since Mujahedeen were not represented in it and secondly Afghan regime supported and backed by Soviet Union did not collapse immediately(ibid). Pakistani policy makers even after the departure of Zia’s rule (1988) followed the policy of Strategic Depth in Afghanistan and justified it on the ground that Pakistan cannot confront enemies on two borders i-e Western and Eastern(Fayyaz.S, 2010:104). However, post-withdrawal of Soviet troops had produced a civil war- like condition, rivalries and coalitions shifted among Afghan groups; it was now between Sunnis and Shias, Pashtuns and Non-Pashtuns, within PASHTUN groups, Durranis and Ghalzais. Apart from these rivalries, interests of regional states also contributed in enhancing tension in Afghanistan and those states are mainly Saudia Arab and Iran and some Central Asia Republics. Hence the war in Afghanistan was not only civil war between different groups but also took the shape of proxy war for serving the interests of external players (Akhund I, 200:152-153). The policy of Islamisation i-e, jihad designed during Soviet War in Afghanistan also laid the foundations of Jihadi culture in Pakistan (Qadeer.M, 2006:32). Resultantly, the difference between religious and political parties, jihadi elements, sectarian groups etc became vague. Defeat of Moscow by the non state actors in Afghanistan gave rise to the doctrine of proxy war waged by non state actors. Owing to the stoppage of US supply of arms and ammunition to anti- Soviet elements, hence, deprived those elements to continue to combat. Following disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991, it resulted in the

83 collapse of Dr. Najibullah’s28 rule and installation of the interim government under leadership of Sibghatullah Mujadedi. However, Burhanuddin Rabbani replaced the government and began ruling the country as president in 1994 later on. During the periods of 1992-1994, Afghanistan confronted severe crisis ravaging the country in entirety and it gave great loss of human and material resources including more than forty five thousands dead and wounded. As a result, Rabbani developed close relations with India, declared citizens of Pakistan as traitors, closed Embassy of Pakistan at Kabul in July 1994 and also closed down Pak-Afghan’s borders. During the course of the events, anti-Soviet elements began converting into Taliban (students) at south of Afghanistan. It, thus, created an alternate choice, for Pakistan, to replace Rabbani.

2.3.B.I AFGHAN JIHAD DURING SOVIET WAR AND ITS IMPACT ON SECURITY OF PAKISTAN: Role of Pakistan in withdrawal of Soviet forces in 1989 from Afghanistan and later installation of Taliban government in mid 1990’s in Afghanistan was critical. For playing this role Pakistan had to open and share its domestic social framework with the networks of extremists elements on national and international platform who designed this military struggle i-e Jihad. Resultantly Pakistan became home to almost fifty eight religious parties as well as Twenty four armed religious militia (Shafqat S, 2002: 133) also known as jihadi groups. Jihad is a sacred Islamic concept defined by the last Prophet of Muslims Muhammad (PBUH) as,

28Najibullah Ahmadzai, commonly known as Najibullah or Dr. Najib, was the President of Afghanistan from 1987 until 1992, when the mujahideen took over Kabul.

The best Jihad is speaking of a word of justice to a tyrannical ruler (Dawad A, 1988:43-44). Jihad is further explained by the worthy Islamic scholar Professor Javed Ahmad Ghamdi, as, “Jihad literally means to strive for a cause and there are many kinds of Jihad and role of individual varies accordingly. The directive of using force is given to Muslims in their collective responsibility. All verses of the Quran which mention this directive do not address Muslims in their individual capacity. Thus, no person or group among them has the right to take a step on its own in this regard on behalf of the Muslims… It‟s only the state that has the right to declare „Jihad‟… Al-Qaeda and Taliban are misusing our territory (that is, Pakistan) for so-called Jihad. They have no right to lead us or fight in our name”( Fayyaz.S, 2010:105). However, the interpretation of the word Jihad in modern era by extremist religious scholars is, “They invoke Jihad to help Muslims who are in distress around the world, though their agendas are more political than religious. In their view, even killing of innocent civilians for their higher cause is justified, though this is in clear violation of the established laws of Islamic warfare… Today’s jihadi, however, is least concerned about such Islamic traditions. Furthermore, it is not only Hindus, Jews, and Christians who are their perceived enemies, but even Muslims having views different from theirs are considered heretics and hence worth eliminating” ( Abbas H, 2005:201-202). Jihad during Soviet war was interpreted by the jihadi organization either inside or outside Pakistan, in such a way that it legitimizes any vicious and violent action. It took more than a decade to develop Jihad as a mindset and could not be changed overnight ( Stern. J, 2000: 13). Pakistan’s Afghan policy in the last decade of twentieth Century was

85 in support of Taliban rule in Kabul. Many analyst and policy makers in Pakistan kept criticizing Pakistan Afghan Policy, like for example Sardar Asif Ali the former Foreign Minister as, “We are proud of our contribution to the Afghan Jihad. We must remember that today’s unipolar world; in no small measure is the result of the Afghan war. And yet in the aftermath of the victory of the Afghan Jihad, [we] were left not with the sweet dish of victory, but the gifts of drug trafficking, Kalashnikov culture, colossal environment damage, social tensions and a host of other painful legacies that flowed from the free use of our territory for the fight against Soviet occupation forces” (Khan M, 1996). Likewise, it can be stated that post Afghan Jihad the structure of militants remained operational resulting into security threats to Pakistan. Hence, Afghanistan turned into a favorable destination for training terrorists and Afghan refugees in Pakistan a means of floating terrorism, drugs, smuggling and weapons in Pakistan. These military camps became a ground for producing militants who further added fuel to sectarian and ethnic violence in Pakistan. Pakistan’s participation In Soviet war and accepting millions of Afghan refugees served as an additional security implication here (Washington, 1988:287). Moreover, post Afghan Jihad several religious sectarian groups in Pakistan were active like Sipah-i-Sahaba (SSP), this group was a staunch supporter of Sunni Pakistani state and opposed Shia (Ahl e Tashi). Furthermore, killing Shias was jihad for them and gradually they started developing ties with the drug mafia further developing relations of religious groups with Drug Dealers they practice which was commonly observed in Afghanistan (Nasr S, V.R:95) The other famous group was Harkat-ul-Ansar, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (Lj), their target was Shia community who works in governmental institutions focusing more on Punjab (Adil A, 1996). Another group Sipah-

Muhammad (SM) also was following pro Shia ideology (Stem J, 2000:124). In these circumstances regional states started serving their interests like Saudi Arabia never wanted Shia sect to gain strength in Pakistan as it will provide a difficult situation for Pakistan to become a Sunni Islamic State. These groups had their own sponsor states and they received money via Pakistan’s military or state agency (Nasr S, V.R:89). In 1990 an Iranian Counsel General Sadiq Ganji was murdered in Pakistan by an old SSP Riaz Basra, this incident resulted in spoiling Pak-Iran relations to worse (Moj.M, 2015: 105). He was labeled as a hero by SSP and was encouraged to commit more such actions. Later in 1992 he was arrested by the security forces of Pakistan but he escaped in 1994 and took refuge in Afghanistan. He started leading SSP‘s radical group Lashkar-e-Jhangvi having its camp in Afghanistan. This militant group LJ was discussed by Hassan Abbas as, “Lashkar distinguished itself as the most violent sectarian force in Pakistan... It also started operating in Indian- controlled Kashmir but, keeping in line with its philosophy, it embarked on this journey by starting to murder Kashmiri Shia leaders before targeting the Indian forces… Lashkar also attempted to assassinate Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif on January 3, 1999... Lashkar activists were using Afghanistan as a sanctuary courtesy of the Taliban…Riaz Basra developed a close working relationship with Al-Qaeda and Osama bin Laden”(Abbas H:204-210). Consequently, Iran started supporting pro-Shia militant groups more and Pakistan turned into a battle ground between Saudia and Iran. Iran blamed Pakistan for the killing of almost nine Iranian Diplomats in Mazar-i-Shareed in 1998 and demanded stopping of support to Taliban (CNN, 1998). Pakistan though considered these Iranian demands as

87 counter creative strategy for the national interest of Pakistan. This sectarian violence which in turn became a security threat for Pakistan was used to pressurize the democratic governments (Ahmad S, 1997:107-127). The aftermath of Soviet war faced by Pakistan was the activities of militant networks in Pakistan and across the western border. The other major impact Pakistan witnessed after Soviet War was that the border between Afghanistan and Afghanistan faded away. Regular movement of drugs, criminals, zealots, guns and refugees took place (Qadeer.M, 2006: 32). It further resulted into arms and drug culture in Pakistan particularly in areas of Pakistan which borders Afghanistan. Osama Bin Laden: Osama Bin Laden was the youngest son of a rich Saudi Constructor who left around US $ 80 million for him. Osama, in 1979 post Soviet invasion of Afghanistan got involved in Fighting against Soviet army (BBC: 2011). This war ended in 1989 resulting in Soviet defeat at the hands of Muslim fighters backed by US, Saudia Arabia and Pakistan. Post Soviet invasion of Afghanistan Osama’s task was to recruit fighters, raise funds for them and to transport fighters and volunteers to Afghanistan. He bought logistics from sponsors as well as from his family’s construction business to make the difficult terrain of Afghanistan more difficult by carving roads and bunkers in eastern Afghanistan making it difficult for Soviet forces to move. He resided along with his followers lived under the protection of Jalalabad Shura and worked closely with Saudi and Pakistani officials (Rubin.R.Bannet, 2013:34). Later, after Soviet withdrawal he went back to Saudi Arabia. Due to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, Saudi Arab needed protection against Iraqi aggression. That was the reason for installation of US forces there. He thus moved to Sudan in 1991 and started developing his links and connections with terrorist

88 organizations. Al-Qaida at that time was involved in several terrorists’ activities. Sudan was under immense US pressure to hand over Osama, later in 1996 Osama moved to Afghanistan (Pender. A, 2011:79). Since, Osama considered infidel forces as enemies of Islam he was extremely critical of presence of US forces in Saudi Arab (Scheuer.M, 2011:101). This criticism of Osama over Saudi Royal family’s policies and their corruption led to his being expelled from Saudi Arab and then was disowned by his family. This was the time when Taliban in Afghanistan were gaining success. Osama gave US $ 3 million to Taliban which helped them in capturing Kabul and Jalalabad. He further took his anti US ideology and appreciated attacks on US forces in Saudi Arab. He claimed that the war between US and Muslims have started now. In August 1996, Osama issued first “Declaration of WAR” from Al-Qaida against US. Later in 1998 he formed “International Islamic Front against Jews and Crusaders”. A Fatwa was also issued in which he called and compelled Muslims to kill Americans and their Allies, their military and people. He outlined his objectives for this Fatwa and they were: to pull out US forces from Arabian Peninsula, liberating Palestine and overthrowing Saudi Royal family and to support Islamic Revolutionary group around the globe. Osama this way justified killings of US citizens and became very violent against US and was propagating anti-US sentiments among Muslims.

Al-Qaida network and its objectives: Al-Qaida is an Arabic word means “The Base”, was found in 1984-85. Osama and Abdullah Azam29 formed it for recruiting mujahedeen from

– Abdu’llāh Yūsuf ‘Azzām; 1941‘, عبد هللا يوسف عزام :29Abdullah YusufAzzam (Arabic 24 November 1989) also known as Father of Global Jihad was a Palestinian Sunni

89 foreign states to fight Afghan war against Soviet occupation (Mockaitis.T, 2010:54). AL-Qaida is an idea of Egyptian Islamist Jihad group by Abu –Ubaidah al-Banjshiri and Abu-Hafs (Jouvenal.P. 2010 :331).Azam explains about Al Qaida organization in his article in 1988 as, “Every principle needs a vanguard to carry it forward and, while forcing its way into society, puts up with heavy tasks and enormous sacrifices. There is no ideology, neither earthly nor heavenly, that does not require such a vanguard that gives everything it possesses in order to achieve victory for the ideology. It carries the flag all along the sheer endless and difficult path until it reaches its destination.Thevanguard constitutes the solid base (al qaida)for the expected society” (Azzam. A, 1988: 46). Abu –Ubaidah al-Banjshiri while explaining the role of Osama in the organization and objectives of organization to the young Al-Qaida recruit stated that, “He has spent a lot of money to buy arms for the young mujahedeen as well as in training them and paying for their travel tickets. We should not waste this. We should invest in these young men and we mobilize them under his umbrella. We should form an Islamic army for jihad that will be called al Qaida. This army will be one of the fruits of what bin Laden has spent on the Afghan Jihad. We should train these young men and equip them to be ready to uphold lslam and defend Muslims in any aprt of the world. The members of this army should be organized and highly trained” (Musa.M:330). Al-Qaida, since 1996 operated as a heart of international Terrorist Network in Afghanistan, controlled by Osama Bin Laden. It served as

Islamic scholar and theologian and founding member of al-Qaeda. Azzam preached both defensive and offensive jihad by Muslims to help the Afghan mujahideen against the Soviet invaders. He raised funds, recruited and organised the international Islamic volunteer effort of Afghan Arabs through the 1980s, and emphasised the political aspects of Islam.

90 an umbrella towards other groups and functions were to dispense money, clearing house, logistical support, preparing and training fundamentalist Islamic terrorist groups. It is created by an ideology rather than national or ethnic links. Their cells were established in almost 50 countries and were also linked to several Muslim Fundamentalist groups (Benjamin and Steve Simon, The New York Times, January 4, 2000:A23). Osama, in 2002 supposedly presided a lose network of around 3000 - 5000 militants scattered worldwide, i-e, Asia, North Africa and Middle East (Eur,2002:3). He played the role of ideological theorists, financer and propagandist in Al-Qaida. Shura, for developing membership standards of Al Qaida laid down specific conditions for membership of the organization. Like, the recruit had to be submissive and respectful; secondly he should be completely committed to the organization. Moreover, someone already serving in organization must recommend Eighteen Thousand of recruits who have passed the training camp but out of them a small number of recruits will stay in Afghanistan. The remaining passed recruits used to be sent to fight in Kashmir, Bosnia, Chechnya or returns to their own country and wait for any further wait for Shura’s or Osama’s instructions. During 1990’s the headquarter of Al-Qaida in Afghanistan had a setup like a multinational corporations. Its corporate head office was comprised of leadership, camps, committees and permanent cadres (Mockaitis.T, 2010:57). Moreover, Al-Qaida by 2001, commanded international network of cells in almost 76 countries (Al Jazeera: 211). Besides, permanent cells, Al-Qaida also recruit a local operator who carries out attacks inside the country. However, post 9/11 Al-Qaida became much more than its office, a network of linked organizations and its ideological association extended by recruiting through internet

, made Al-Qaida strong enough that it became difficult to disrupt its functioning (Mockaitis.T, 2010:58). Al-Qaida’s main focus and objective was to vacate Saudi Arabia from US and other non-Muslims. This organization wanted to restructure Muslim world and to replace secular states with Islamic Political leadership. Moreover, Al-Qaida’s also wanted to avenge Christians and Jews for all the wrongs they committed against Muslims. Al-Qaida was also looking for support from the entities that are against US war in Iraq and Afghanistan and also against Israel (BBC, 2004).

2.4 PHASE 3: RISE OF TALIBAN IN AFGHANISTAN This section attempts to briefly describe rise of Taliban in Afghanistan in 1993 and changes occurred in Pakistan’s policy towards Afghanistan during Taliban era. Pakistan urged to revitalize peace and tranquility in Afghanistan so that return of the Afghan refugees to their mother land might become possible. Following rise of Taliban in Afghanistan, they (Taliban) began advocating their programme of action to pursue in future. Their programme included: to entirely de-weaponize Afghanistan, to enforce Sharia (Islamic Law) for restoring peace, tranquility and social order, to get control under Taliban and to safeguard integrity of Islam in Afghanistan(The Guardian, 2009).Subsequently, Taliban began capturing Kandhar in November 1994, Charasyab in February 1995, Herat in September 1995 and Jalalabad in September 1996(Chitkara, M, G.2003:524). Meanwhile, India persuaded anti-Taliban elements to improve their capability to guard against Taliban by providing all kind of support including diplomatic, material and financial. For instance, it was reported that India used Bagram air base for supplying its support to anti-Taliban elements on June 15-16, 21, 1995 (Ganguly.S, 2010).

However, Taliban succeeded in capturing twenty seven out of thirty two provinces of Afghanistan on May 1997. Side by side, India also succeeded in uniting its interest with Iran against same enemy in shape of Taliban (Alikuzai.W.H, 2013: 939). The sole purpose of India was to stop Pakistan to coagulate as citadel of Muslim world. Moreover, India also supported anti-Taliban elements with a view to dilute influence of Taliban in Kashmir (Bansal & Dutt, 2012:40). However, by rapid capturing rest of the Afghan’s territories and establishing peace, tranquility and social order, they also captivated allegiance of the opponents under their control. Consul General of Pakistan Sultan Amir in Herat evoked that Taliban established peace, tranquility and social order by destroying poppy’s crops, providing education to all freely and other facilities. Subsequently, Taliban captured Kabul in September 27, 1996 (Khan.J.S, 2001: 172). A stable and peaceful Afghanistan was in great national interest of Pakistan because it would enable Afghan refugee to return to their mother land on one hand and, on the other, it would offer Pakistan the safest route to oil and gas rich markets of Central Asia. Hence, Pakistan extended full economic and diplomatic support to Taliban to develop friendly relations and, therefore, it contributed in providing both technical and financial support to Afghanistan for reconstructing Chaman-Kandhar-Herat-Kushka highway. To support Taliban, Pakistan had some geo-economic and geo-strategic objectives to achieve. These included: to reduce hagemonistic influence of India in Afghanistan for securing strategic interest of Pakistan (Rubin.R.B, 2015: 369), to promote Pashtun factor, to secure trade access to markets of Central Asia, to give strength to Kashmiri’s struggle for independence, to penalize Rabbani for sacking Embassy of Pakistan in Kabul and to create peace, tranquility and social order by taking control over war-lords (Poolos.A, 2001). Thus, Pakistan bolstered its

93 relationship with Taliban and awarded them diplomatic recognition in May 1997 just after Taliban captured Mazar e Sharif (Goodson.P.L, 2001:78). Taliban government succeeded in taking control of most of the territories including capital of Afghanistan fulfilling the basic requirements of statehood under International Law. Some of the countries also recognized Taliban’s government such as Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirate and Turkmenistan alone in countries of Central Asia (The Middle East, 1999: 426). Following recognizing Taliban’s government, Iran became frightened and deteriorated its relations with Pakistan after closure of its embassy by Taliban in Afghanistan ( Jaffrelot. C, 2002: 144). Though, USA did not interfere considering initially Talibanization as an indigenous movement of Afghanistan, however, it moved a resolution on May 05, 1999 at US Senate (Katzman.K, 2006:8) for discrediting Taliban’s government owing to presence of Usama and Taliban’s oppressive rule to molest rights of women. Meanwhile, Pakistan provided enormous support to Afghanistan of worth $6 million in 1998 (Pande A, 2011: 200) together with trade and commerce’ facilities, however, it kept pressurizing Taliban to run their government in connivance with major ethnic groups of Afghanistan. Consequently, Taliban did not comply with demand of Pakistan and sided with Usama Bin Laden (Khan, I, 2007: 56) for obtaining economic support. They managed to provide Usama facility to live at ease in Afghanistan who, in return, managed to provide material and human resources. On refusal of Taliban, Pakistan had been under immense pressure of USA (Jetly.R, 2009 :128 ) on one side and annoyance of Iran on the other. Meanwhile, killing of Iranian diplomats by Taliban in Heart further added fuel to the fire (Hunter. S, 2010:148). Pakistan began distancing itself from Taliban to revive its relationship with USA and

Iran (Iqbal.S. 2018:110). Subsequently, UN Security Council adopted Resolution No. 1214 on December 09, 1998 (Press B : 281) asking Taliban: to conclude ceasefire with Northern Allies, to discontinue protecting Usama and Company, to stop trading narcotics and to come into peace terms with opposing factions. Subsequently, Taliban agreed to conclude with Northern Allies at Ashkhabad owing the efforts of Pakistan and UN influence on March 10-14, 1999 for creating peace, concluding ceasefire and making arrangements to build a broad-based government in Afghanistan (Asia Yearbook, 200: 73). However, they could not reach to an agreeable conclusion and it ended in failure. As a result, UN passed a resolution No. 1267 demanding Taliban to surrender Usama on October 15, 1999, however, Taliban failed to comply with and, thus, it led UN to impose economic sanctions on Taliban on November 14, 1999 (Riedel.B, :74). Taliban-Al-Qaeda relations were of reciprocal nature because Taliban provided facility of safe asylum to Usama in lieu of gaining support in terms of human and material resources. At Ministerial Conference of Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) at Tehran, Pakistan announced to support every step of either from Iran or from UN for building peace in Afghanistan, provided, it was acceptable to Afghans as well (Press B, : 1043 ). Consistent efforts of Pakistan created an atmosphere for improving and highlighting Afghan’s issue on international scene. And it was the result of Pakistan’s efforts that Afghanistan amicably resolved its differences over Afghan Transit Trade with Pakistan and also agreed to surrender proclaimed offenders involving in creating sectarian violence inside Pakistan. Similarly, Taliban held meeting with Thomas Pickering, US under Secretary, with a view to create understanding over various issues of conflict (Clements.F, 2003 :323). Consequently, Taliban agreed to close down some of the training camps such as Rashkor and

Kargha together with narcotics factories and also put restraints on Arab fighters relating to Usama (Strategic Studies, 2000:204). Owing to this friendly gesture from Taliban, it created an atmosphere of mutual trust amongst Afghanistan, Pakistan, USA and rest of the neighbouring countries. Moreover, in 2000 many incidents in Quetta capital city of Baluchistan of burning or discarding video shops, video recorder, televisions and rental shops took place. Few Such incidents were also reported in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. The extremists strongly determined to burn anything which threatens their society, setup and religion (Yusufzai.R, 2001). The tide of rising extremism and radicalism activities of extremist groups continued in KP and Baluchistan. Pakistan’s Interior minister Moinuddin Haider handed over the list of 60 suspects supposedly involved in sectarian killings in Pakistan to Afghan governments as it was believed that these suspects took refuge in Afghanistan. However, Taliban government in Afghanistan refused to sign any extradition treaty. Hence, it was assumed that the sectarian killings in Pakistan and Taliban government must have had some links (Salahuddin G: 2001). Such radicalized sections of Pakistani society were mentioned by Brigadier A.R.Siddiqui as, Whether bonafide Afghans or Pakistani activists involved in the Afghanistan Jihad. Pakistan simply bristles with armed, battle-tested activists (call them terrorists, if you will) on the lookout for operational vistas and new battle grounds. Pakistan remains their sanctuary, their safe haven and ethnic base (Frontier Post, 1996). On the other hand, collapse of Soviet Army from Afghanistan was huge success and boost to the confidence of religious militants and they started believing that their model of jihad is successful. These militant organizations gained their strength from Western support in provision of arms, weapons, finances and this link between West and

Militants was managed by Pakistan (Farooq.N.T, 2016:159). The facilitation in establishing US-Taliban government Riffat Hussain who served in Pakistan’s Embassy in Washington that, The Taliban delegation was invited by Ambassador Maleeha Lodhi for dinner where it privately met with members of the Senate Committee such as Hank Brown and Robert Hathaway. This delegation consisted of most of the members of the future Taliban Council. Our efforts were to take the Taliban out of isolation and bring it into the mainstream diplomatically (ibid). Further, this situation is described by Muhammad Waseem as, The involvement of Islamic militants in the wars in Afghanistan and Kashmir contributed to privatization of foreign policy and militarization of Islamic activists. The international Islamic networks finally provided a global agenda for the movement in terms of endemic anti-Americanism... State policies, regional instability and non- resolution of conflicts involving Muslims in the region and in the world at large are the leading determinants of the nature and direction of Islamic organizations in Pakistan (Waseem M, 2007:33). It can be stated that post Soviet war Pakistan faced jihad and sectarian activities in Pakistan and they seemed to be interrelated to each other. However, event of 9/11, 2001 had changed the world scenario altogether, whereas, USA alleged Usama by holding him responsible for attacking World Trade Centre and Pentagon of USA. Subsequently, USA cautioned Taliban to either surrender Usama to USA or pay the price (Glennon.L, :731). Taliban did not agree to comply with demand of USA and considered it a disgrace to hand over their guest who provided support in liberating their mother-land from clutches of the Soviet Union. Consequently, USA had no other choice except to attack Afghanistan for annihilating Usama, Taliban and their network. It

97 urged to shift power of governance to non-Pashtun of the Northern Alliance. 2.3.4. A PAKISTAN’S PRO-TALIBAN POLICY AND ITS STRATEGIC INTERESTS: Afghanistan initially shaped Pakistan’s security perception by claiming over North Western and Baluchistan province of Pakistan, not accepting Durand line and border clashes in 1950 and 1960 between Pakistan and Afghanistan (Hussain.Z, 2008:30). These disputes between both the states resulted in Afghan claim for greater Pashtunistan (this claim was supported by the left wing of PAKHTUNS inside Pakistan), further dissolving diplomatic relations between them in 1952 -1962 (Alikuzai.W.H, 2013:496). To counter these Afghan claims Pakistan’s President General Zia opted for Afghan Jihad (Dawn, 2015). According to the Afghan policy established at that time was to have pro Pakistan Pashtungovernment to have better linkages between Afghanistan and Pakistan’s KP and Baluchistan Province, as these provinces have Pashtun population (Sreedhar, 2000). Later post cold war, Afghanistan faced civil war and different factions of Mujahideen, Pakistan considered Taliban as a much more reliable proxy in Afghanistan. Pakistan’s policy makers hoped to achieve much needed objectives. Like,

 Most importantly it was assumed by the Pakistani policy makers that from Taliban that they will recognize Durand line and a long term border dispute between both the countries will resolve.  Pakistan wanted to counter future security threat perception from Afghanistan since 1947 as both the states never had

cordial relations. a friendly and strong regime in Afghanistan would ensure minimum threat to Pakistan.  Post cold war Pakistan supported Gulbaddin Hikmatyaar’s (mujahideen leader) cause policy makers in Pakistan assumed that he would provide pliant and friendly Afghan regime but his inability to takeover Kabul tore Pakistan’s expectations (Brookings, 2002).  Furthermore, friendly Afghan government would provide strategic depth against India. Post cold war, it was apprehended by Pakistan’s policy makers that strategic depth would give such depth to Pakistan where freedom fighters in Kashmir would be trained, armed and funded (Rashid.A, 2010 :186)

 Pakistan to enhance its geo-political standing with the West for outlining future of Central Asian Region. Pakistan wanted domination in Afghanistan as it would help Pakistan exercising its dominance over its Southern Corridor leading towards Central Asia. This dominance and control of Pakistan over Southern corridor would provide political and economic rewards as West would want an access to Central Asia region for its huge oil and gas resources.  Pakistan wanted to secure trade route to Central Asia and if Taliban regime would have control in Afghanistan this could be done.  Taliban being extremist in their ideology was conceived as a guarantee by Pakistani policy makers that they not let any anti-Islam, secular and pro-Indian policy work in Afghanistan.  A peaceful and stable Afghanistan was expected to be installed by Taliban as they had control over almost 90% of

Afghanistan (Shah.Babar, 2000). Peaceful Afghanistan can help Pakistan promote beneficial regional cooperation. Many projects like TAPI, CASA 1000 etc could become operational after peace in Afghanistan.  Taliban being strong in Afghanistan especially in the areas bordering Pakistan, and for avoiding disturbance and instability in those areas Pakistan wanted to have better relations with Taliban government.  Shortest route to reach Third largest reservoir of the world-e, Karakum Desert in Turkmenistan is through Afghanistan. The estimate of the gas reservoir there is around Three Trillion Cubic meters and Taliban government could provide that route to Pakistan.

Hence, Pakistan was looking for geo-economic and geo-political gains from Taliban government in Afghanistan. Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, after his triumph in 1997 and recognized Taliban government on 25th May 1997.(Amin.M.Shahid, 200:106) Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates also recognized Taliban government after few days.

2.3.5 PAKISTAN AFGHAN POLICY DURING MUSHARRAF ERA PRE 9/11: On October 12th 1999, General Pervez Musharaf came into power after a military coup resulted in overthrowing of then Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s government. General Musharaf took over the government and shared his seven point’s reforms agenda to the nation on October 17th 1999. Those seven points’ agenda included: Rebuild national confidence and morale; Strengthen the federation, remove inter-provincial disharmony and restore national cohesion;

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Devolution of power to the grass roots level; Revive the economy and restore investor confidence; Ensure law and order and dispense speedy justice; Depoliticize state institutions; and, Ensure swift and across the board accountability (The News, 1999). It was hoped that General Musharaf’s seven point’s agenda will stabilize the economy of Pakistan and will control growing militancy and sectarianism and will have strong internal and external policies (Zulfiqar.B, 2011:88). However, on international platform Pakistan faced US sanctions, and international isolation for suspending democracy. Moreover, Pakistan kept its Afghan policy of cooperation with Taliban enacted though Taliban denied to back and support Pakistan on several platforms, for example, handing over militant refugees responsible for sectarian killings in Pakistan and Pakistan’s demand not to destroy Bamiyan Buddhas (Caldwell.D, 2011 : 278) in Afghanistan. Pakistan despite the fact of opting for supporting Taliban accepted isolation but still Talibanisation30 remained as a threat that the military government overlooked. However, the establishment of Pakistan had clear idea of Taliban’s close links with Al-Qaida (Clements.F, 2003: 210) and knew that Taliban in Afghanistan use Pakistan’s logistics but does not follow their wishes. Afghanistan’s trade dependence on Pakistan gave Pakistan the confidence of having

30 Talibanization‟ is used in this study as a metaphor to describe a set of measures or maneuvers that were favored on both sides of the Pak-Afghan border by the Taliban regime in Kabul and religious right groups in North Western Frontier Province (NWFP) in Pakistan respectively. Talibanization is not simply an explanation of events in Afghanistan. It consists of the following perception: Hegemony of a majority Sunni (Deobandi) sect of Muslims as the basis of political unity and control in multi-sectarian and ethnically diverse societies. A fundamentalist version of Islam as the basis of legitimacy in a nation that is overwhelmingly Muslim. Use of coercion and force is justified to eliminate dissent where Islam and ethnic dominance have failed to do so.

101 leverage over Taliban’s regime, however, Taliban were independent and uncompromising towards Pakistan in their decisions (Farooq.T.N, 2016:160). Though Pakistan was the only state Taliban had relations that are why Pakistan faced international pressures for compelling them to shut down terrorist camps and to hand over Osama to US. But Pakistan as always did not want to create an enemy on its western border and secondly non involvement of Pakistan with Afghan government will lead to give enough space to Northern Alliance (supported by India, Iran and Russia), who will in turn carry out anti Pakistan activities (Musharaf. P, 2006:202-203). Pakistan firmly believed that engaging Taliban regime will lead to attain its objectives in Afghanistan. In December 2000, General Musharaf visited Iran to discuss Afghan crisis and to coordinate over Afghan policy (Goodson.L.P:83). He very clearly pointed out to the Shia Clerics of Iran Taliban regime as De Jure government. Moreover, he also mentioned to them that since 90% of land is in control of Taliban that is why no solution to Afghan crisis is possible without them. He further added that this is the reality on ground which should be accepted (ibid: 84). However, United Nations gave a six plus two formula (According to this formula six neighbouring states of Afghanistan, i-e, Pakistan, Iran, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and China along with Russia) for resolving Afghan crisis (Hussain, 2005:222). On the contrary, General Musharaf kept stating that only Pakistan, Iran, Taliban and Northern Alliance should be the party to resolve Afghan crisis. Furthermore, military government of Pakistan even persuaded Muslim states like Jordan, Lebanon and Syria to have talks with Taliban. Later, in 2000, General Musharaf while in his visit to Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan (Inside Cental Asia, 2000:8) he argued that they should have better relations with Taliban which will further lead to carrying on trade of Kazakh oil

102 through afghan soil. Prior to his visit to Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, general Musharaf also visited other Central Asian states which resulted in ending their criticism on Taliban regime. Even President Karimov stated that Taliban pose no threat to the region (Ahrari.M.E, Aug 2001: 26). General Musharaf also succeeded in mediating between China and Taliban and gained several rebuilding projects from China in Kabul. Furthermore, Afghan Ambassador to Pakistan Syed Muhammad Haqqani also assured Pakistan that they will not let anyone use Afghan soil against China. China was observing a neutral attitude towards Taliban and anti-Taliban forces (Chandra. R, 2004:275). Though Pakistan was under intense US pressure for handing over Osama but Pakistan’s stance was that he is living there as Taliban’s guest (Facts on File World News Digest, 2001: 717). Pakistan kept supporting Taliban regime in Afghanistan as they were gaining speedy victory in Northern East of Afghanistan, secondly, they also succeeded in assassinating Ahmad Shah Mehsud in early September 2001(CNN, 2003). For better description and analysis of Pakistan Post 9/11 policy, introduction of Osama Bin Laden and his Al-Qaida network and their objectives is critical. CONCLUSION: Foreign policy of Pakistan since independence has focused on safety and integrity of her borders and political independence. But Indian aggression over borders and Afghanistan’s irredentist claims over Durand line and Pashtunistan issue with Pakistan has always challenged these determinants of Pakistan foreign policy. Right from the beginning Pakistan and Afghanistan has shared turbulent relationship. Afghanistan having reservations towards Pakistan initially, they thought that democratic neighbour can be proved as a threat to their kingship. Secondly, Indian propagation

103 against Pakistan as a week and fragile state which cannot survive for long has ignited the issue of Pashtunistan. To counter threat on both eastern and western borders Pakistan joined SEATO and CENTO. Joining both the organizations disappointed Soviet Union’s military aims in the region. Soviet Union, Afghanistan and India developed a nexus against Pakistan in the region. Pakistan-Afghanistan relations in such geopolitical scenario had to fluctuate. Since Afghan policy makers till 1979 were influenced a lot by Soviet communist in Afghanistan at the same time economic dependence of Afghanistan over Pakistan and Iran grew more with the passage of time.Daud realized the importance of Pakistan for Afghanistan’seconomic development and tried to pave way for the solution of problems between both the states. But then Bhutto’s removal and Daud’s assassination derailed the process of resolving problems. Pakistan out of its Afghan policy had some gains like convincing Afghan leaders about the illegitimacy and weakness of their stance over Pashtunistan and Durand line and bringing them to talks for the resolution of these issues. Similarly, despite the fact that Afghanistan shared very close relations with India in comparison to Pakistan but they remained neutral during indo-Pak wars in 1965 and 1971. This also indicates towards the fact that the religious, ethnic and culture ties can play a role of soft power between both the countries. During Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, not only Pakistan but the regional and international states developed a threat perception of Soviet expansion towards warm waters and Gulf region. This threat perception was further strengthened by the fact that since Pakistan is only 500 km away from Gulf region could provide passage for the incessant flow of oil from Gulf. Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was

104 perceived as a strategic threat by US and Pakistan. They feared that Soviet army would move from invading one country after another. It left Pakistan with few choices, Pakistan could not take Soviet invasion of Afghanistan lightly,it had to counter the security threat it perceived from presence of Soviet army in the region. Moreover, Pakistan economy burdened by the huge influx of Afghan refugees was already a challenge. Pakistan’s relations with Soviet Union throughout the history remained strained and Afghanistan was always considered as a buffer between a huge and strong Soviet Union and Pakistan. After disappearance of buffer Pakistan had to design its policies, Pakistan could not go well with Soviet army or it could trust Afghan weak army. Pakistan taking advantage of convergence of interest with US in pushing Soviet army back and it took this decision. Furthermore, through Pakistan’s foreign policy towards Afghanistan during Soviet war 1979-1989, Pakistan did achieve her short term objective of Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. Pakistan also gained international sympathy and military support. US also did no objection over Pakistan’s nuclear program. But there were also negative impact of Pakistan’s Afghan policy like Pakistan had to host millions of refugees, religious fundamentalism, war lordism and narcotics. It seemed that Pakistan was able to achieve its foreign policy objectives till Geneva Accord. But, Pakistan’s Afghan policy’s long term objective of friendly Afghan government could not be achieved. Some factors behind this failure were continuous Soviet support to Najibullah maintain Soviet influence for few more years and non establishment of interim government in Afghanistan after Geneva Accord. Pakistan tried to keep Mujahideeen in unity by signing Peshawar and Islamabad Accord. But continuous competition between them was very disappointing for Pakistan’s policy makers. This failure of mujahedeen

105 of being divided in different factions and inter conflicts gave rise to Taliban in Afghanistan. Pakistan by supporting Taliban’s regime in Afghanistan achieved her long term objective of friendly Afghan government but that was just for the span of few years. But many objectives remained un fulfilled which were assumed by policy makers of Pakistan that they will achieve from the rise of Taliban in Afghanistan in 1996. These unfulfilled expectations from Taliban regime were several, like, it was expected that Taliban regime in Afghanistan will turn Afghanistan into friendly and welcoming land for Pakistan but none of Pakistani leader found it safe to visit Afghanistan during Taliban era. Moin Ud Din Haider , Interior Minister of Pakistan was an exception(even he was disappointed from his visit). Pakistan looked forward to have safe passage from Afghanistan to Central Asian States during Taliban era, it was hoped that Taliban can give this favour to Pakistan as they hold about 90% of Afghan land. However, this objective of Pakistan also remained un attained in Afghanistan. Moreover, Durand line an international border between Pakistan and Afghanistan was also not recognized by Afghanistan resulting in disappointment for Pakistan towards Afghanistan. Pakistan faced irrational and unreasonable terrorist waive in Pakistan which claimed thousands of innocent lives. Furthermore, Pakistani society became prone to Talibanisation; extremist Islamic groups in Pakistan took the advantage from the regional situation and started exploiting the religious sentiments for achieving their political gains. .In terrorist attack over US trade towers by Osama Bin Laden , who was provided protection by Taliban regime in Afghanistan, changed the international politics and US decided to attack Afghanistan for hosting Osama.

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Akhtar, Shaheen. (2010). “Emerging Challenges to Indus Waters Treaty: Issues of Compliance & Transboundary Impacts of Indian Hydro Projects On The Western Rivers”. Regional Studies,38(4), 1–66 .www.irs.org.pk. Ali, M. (2009). “US Foreign Aid to Pakistan and Democracy: An Overview”. Massey (PJSS), University, New Zealand, Pakistan Journal of Social Sciences. Vol. 29, No. 2. (December 2009), pp. 247-258. Asia Yearbook, Asia 2000 Yearbook, Far Eastern Economic Review, 2000, 73. Aziz, S. (May 17, 2015). “A leaf from history: The Afghan war spills over”. Dawn, https://www.dawn.com/news/1181963 Babar Shah. (2000). “Pakistan Afghanistan Policy: An evaluation”. Strategic Studies, No: 2, Vol:3. Balouch, B.Q & Niazi,H A. (Jan-March, 2008). “Indian Encroachment in Afghanistan: A New Imperialism in the Making”, The Dialogue, 3:1 18. Behera, A. (Friday, March 22, 2002). “ Pakistan’s Strategic Vision: With and Without theTaliban”. Brookings, https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/pakistans-strategic- vision-with-and-without-the-taliban. Beman, P. (2002). ”Yearbook of the United Nations 2002”.Vol- 56.Department of Public Information, United Nations, NewYork. Branigan, W. “Pakistan seeks Billions in US Aid”. Washington Post,January 23rd, 1980. Bruno. G. (December 10, 2008). “Saudi Arabia and the future of Afghanistan”.Council on Foreign Relations.https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/saudi-arabia-and- future-afghanistan

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Clements, F. (2003). ” Conflict in Afghanistan: A Historical Encyclopedia”. ABC-CLIO, 2003Strategic Studies, Volume 20, Institute of Strategic Studies. Curmally, F. H. “The Great Game and the Durand Line”. The Defence Journal, Karachi, Vol.13, No.2, September-October 2009. Dutt, S. and Bansal. A. (etd). (2012). ”South Asian Security: 21st Century Discourses”. South Asian Security, 21st Century Discourse. Dev, N. G . (1994-2003). Punjab Journal of Politics, Volume 6, Department of Political Science, University, Publisher: New Delhi ; Thousand Oaks, Calif. : Sage Publications. Durani, M and Khan, A. ”Pakistan - Afghan Relations: Historic Mirror”.The Dialogue, Volume IV Number 1, p 36. Facts on File World News Digest Yearbook, Vol 61, Facts on File News Services, 2001. Farooq, T. N. (2016). ”US-Pakistan Relations: Pakistan’s Strategic Choices in the 1990s”. UK: Routledge Studies in South Asian Politics. Ganguly, S. (March 2010).“India-Pakistan Rivalry in Afghanistan”. Journal of InternationalAffairs, Columbia, https://jia.sipa.columbia.edu/india-pakistan-rivalry-afghanistan.

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CHAPTER 3

PAKISTAN AFGHAN POLICY: POST 9/11

INTRODUCTION This chapter develops the study and describes Pakistan Afghan Policy from 2001 till 2014. This chapter identifies and discusses the factors responsible for the change in Pakistan’s Afghan Policy post 9/11. This chapter also looks at the economic, material aid and support Pakistan got from the West after joining GWOT. Later this chapter looks into the turbulent Pak-Afghan relations and focuses on the distrust existed between the governments of both the states.

3.1 CHANGE IN PAKISTAN’S FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS AFGHANISTAN POST 9/11 The events of 11 September 2001 are responsible in bringing drastic change in Pakistan’s foreign policy. Pakistan’s government decided to join US led War on Terror and abandoned its two-decade-old Afghan policy thus communicating the world that Pakistan has revised its Afghan policy (Haqqani, 2004).The Security Council under the article 51 of the UN Charter (Charter of United Nations, chap VII) considered a number of terrorist acts that counted a huge number of civilian casualties, due to armed attacks. Referring to the 9/11 incident as “A Threat to the International Peace” it was decided collectively to take “all important actions to react to the terrorist attacks” (Preamble UN, 1999). Moreover, acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter which calls for “retaliation regarding threat to peace, contravention of peace and acts of violence”, the Security Council collectively decided that all member states shall stop and suppress the funding to the terrorist activities, highly discourage the financing of such acts, confiscating the

117 financial assets, accounts, and economic resource of persons and organization involved in such activities and suspend their citizenships or any persons or entities within their jurisdiction from making financial assets or economic resources available for the benefit of persons involved in such acts. According to Brig Mehmood Shah, Pakistan had no option after Security Council’s declaration, urging all the states to assist US in WOT31. Pakistan military government tried to avoid attack by US on Afghanistan and urged Mullah Umar to hand over Osama through General Mehmood Ahmad but Mullah Umar refuted by stating that he is helping his muslim brother. When he was asked by Rahimullah Yousafzai that this favour can cause a lot of damage to his state he answered: “that I know my people and their inclination. Tomorrow they will not say that we couldn’t help our Muslim brother”.32 Security Council’s decision also required that all states shall refrain from supporting anyone involved in terrorism, take all possible steps to prevent such acts including preventive warning to other states and sharing of information, strictly prohibit protection to those involved in such activities, ban those involved in such acts from using their territories for terrorist activities, make sure that any person who commits such heinous crimes must be brought to justice, found involved in investigations or other criminal activities related to the funding or supporting shall be dealt mercilessly. Furthermore each state shall be responsible for preventing terrorist insurgency by

31 Brig, Mehmood Shah, defence and security analyst, he formerly headed security affairs in the tribal areas was interviewed with the author on 4thMay, 2018. 32RahimullahYusufzai is a Pakistani journalist, best known for having interviewed Osama bin Laden, and Afghan Taliban leader Mullah Omar. He is a war correspondent. He was interviewed with the author on 15thMay, 2018.

118 effective border control and other means. Furthermore, the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (adopted by General Assembly of United Nations in resolution 54/109 of 9th December 1999 regarding individuals those, directly or indirectly, illegally and willingly, provide any help or collect funds to be used in terrorist acts (Wasif, 2001).The decision by Pakistan from pro-Taliban stance towards joining international coalition against Taliban and embracing a more practical policy indispensable for the national security accords with both the afore mentioned convention and the Security Council resolutions. Moreover, the blocking of Al-Rasheed Trust33 account, then putting embargo on fund collections in the streets for Jihadi organizations(Dawn, 2016), the formulating laws for the proper functioning of Madaris is among

33Al Rashid Trust (ART) is a Pakistan-based charity known to have provided support to jihadi activities in Chechnya, Kosovo, Afghanistan and Kashmir. It was founded by Mufti Mohammad Rashid soon after the 1996 Taliban takeover in Afghanistan. Mufti Mohammad Rashid was joined by Mufti Abu Lubaba, who became the group's ideologue and Maulvi Sibghatulla (of the Dar-ul-Uloom, a religious school in Karachi) who became director of ART's Kandahar operations. In 1996, ART started charity and welfare projects in Afghanistan and Pakistan to provide financial and legal support to Muslim militants around the world. ART ran a food provision program in Afghanistan that included bakeries in Kabul, Herat, Jalalabad, Kandahar and Mazar-e-Sharif. Following the September 11 attacks, it took over 155 bakeries vacated by the UN's World Food Program (WFP). ART's goal at that point was to provide food for 350,000 poor Afghans without relying on any UN relief organization for help. ART closely coordinated its activities with Wafa Kahiria, an Arab NGO in Afghanistan whose activities were allegedly funded by Osama bin Laden.

ART was also involved in the establishment of a network of madrassas in Afghanistan. Before 9/11, it was building 20 mosques around the lunar landscape of the Kabul-Kandahar highway, and five mosques on the Kandahar-Chaman highway.

119 the numerous legal and security measures taken directly in accordance with the doctrine of International Law and UN resolution (Pakistan Horizon, 2002:205-303). Moreover, Bonn Conference held for power sharing in Afghanistan in 2001, Pashtuns were marginalized by supporting other warlords and faction leaders resulting in occurrence of less political reconciliation in political environment and on the other hand encouraged Taliban for resurgence (Sial & Basit, 2011). Bonn Conference resulted into emergence of three major groups in Afghan political arena, they are, Peshawar group backed by Pakistan, Hamid Karzai group backed by international community and Iran backed Cyprus group (Sial & Basit, 2011). Pakistan was not happy with the emergence and prominence of Northern Alliance in Afghan political scenario. It resulted into marginalizing Pakistan’s interest and say in post 9/11 political setting of Afghanistan. (Abbas, 2010). For Bonn Conference Hamid Karzai was taken by US helicopter, he was then put in Sindh airport and from there he was taken to the Conference.34 Similarly, June 2001 elections in Afghanistan resulted in marginalizing Pashtuns. However, Pashtuns replaced many Northern Alliance’s leaders in Afghan parliament by winning 2005 elections (Grare. F, 2006). Reportedly, Pakistan had no interference in 2004 Afghanistan’s Presidential elections and 2005 parliamentary elections in Afghanistan (Kronstad, 2008). Pakistan under this new policy was ready to facilitate US in intervening in Afghanistan and to break the network of terrorist groups based in Pakistan and to wash out extremism and fundamentalism from the state (Haqqani, 2004).Pakistan’s refusal in its dealing with the US and its coalition forces at that stage would have clearly given India a

34 Brig, Mehmood Shah, defense and security analyst, he formerly headed security affairs in the tribal areas was interviewed with the author 4th May 2018.

120 life time opportunity to dismantle the security interest of Pakistan with the help of wounded US by inflicting a fatal blow to vital national issue-the bleeding state of Jammu and Kashmir (Pirzada, 2001).Pakistan wanted to counter Indian propaganda of banding Pakistan with militants, to refrain India taking leading role in Afghan theater by becoming a leading ally of US. Since India immediately offered to use military base at Avantipur in Indian held Kashmir (People’s Daily, 2001) .Furthermore, to avoid isolation from the world, which Pakistan started facing after recognition of Taliban government in 1996 in Afghanistan and later, after testing nukes in 1998, Pakistan decided to change its Afghan policy from supporting Taliban’s regime into countering Taliban by allying with US (Eggers. Jeff, 2017). Pakistan also intended to secure its political legitimacy and economic assistance to the military regime. (Ayoob, 2002: 51). According to Rahimullah Yousafzai, quoted ISI Chief Ahsan-Ul-Haq which he shared with him about change in Pakistan Afghan Policy that, “He said we sat in a room for deciding to participate in GWOT. For army it was not an easy decision to take, tough time it was, we consulted experts and looking at Pakistan’s interests decided to participate in GWOT. Otherwise, Pakistan had to face tough consequences as India was ready to hand over its land and Pakistan could go into isolation”.35 Pakistan offered assistance to US and its Allies. President General Musharaf claimed in his speech that looking into severity of situation it is best to agree to US’s demands as it was the question of survival of Pakistan (The News, 2001). Pakistan completely supported Bonn Conference. Taliban were not happy with Pakistan Afghan policy.

35Rahimullah Yusufzai is a Pakistani journalist, best known for having interviewed Osama bin Laden, and Afghan Taliban leader Mullah Omar. He is a war correspondent. He was interview with the author on 15thMay, 2018.

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US wishes were handed over to Pakistan via serving Pakistan’s Ambassador to US Maliha Lodhi. There were some thoughts of criticizing General Musharaf’s decision as personal or individual decision. By stating this Ambassador of Pakistan expressed his point of view as. No matter how necessary or Justified the policy turnaround was, it only the ad hoc and arbitrary nature of decision making process in Pakistan on national security and foreign policy issues during the days following 9/11.this was also reminiscent of many earlier policy decisions, including the one of inventing” and then recognizing and supporting the Taliban regime (Ahmad. S, 2009:63). US put forward a list of demands for Pakistan which was claimed as non negotiable by them. Military government of Pakistan readily agreed to them. Those demands were: i) To end all logistic support from Pakistan to Osama and to stop any Al-Qaida shipment coming to Pakistan from Afghanistan and also to seize shipments of arms through Pakistan (Cohen. P. S, 2011:254) ii) To discontinue all shipments of fuel from Pakistan for Taliban (Khan. Z. W. Rehman. J, 2014:37), iii) To stop all volunteers from Pakistan who wants to join Taliban in Afghanistan( ibid); iv) To denounce attack on Twin Trade Towers in New York on September 9/11 and to extend complete support in curbing all domestic lexis which support terrorism (ibid); v) To give blanket land ( for landing) and air (passage) rights to US’s aircrafts(Archives: US Department of State, 2002), vi) To give access to US to the areas bordering between Afghanistan and Pakistan (Congressional Research Report, 2010:20),

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vii) Pakistan should sever all diplomatic relations and support to Taliban if evidence proves that Taliban shelter Osama or Al-Qaida any more in Afghanistan (Cohen. P. S, 2011:254) , viii) To give access to Pakistan’s air and naval bases to US (Jetly. R, 2009:23), ix) To proceed in sharing all intelligence information with US (Abbas .H, 2005: 217). In order to provide assistance to US, Brig Mehmood Shah, who was serving as Director M.I Balochistan at that time comments on this deal between US and Pakistan, that: “For Pakistan while deciding handing over support to US was a difficult phase. Pakistan thought certain principles should not be crossed. I was strictly for lying limits. I will not offer anything against sentiments of my people, i-e, Pashtun feeling. US wanted Zhob airport. I was against it and conveyed to President Musharaf via General Tariq Majeed that if US cross the line and enters in Zhob airport I will resign”.36

Pakistan’s government decided to provide strategic as well as informational support to the U.S. Pakistan also provided US, access to bases in Jacobabad, Dalbadin, Shamsi and in Pasni (Kidwai.M, 2010:218). Pakistan also provided intelligence and immigration services to US. All kinds of logistic, political and social support to Taliban from Pakistan were cut off on US demand and pressure. The US and allied forces started using bases in Pakistan for conducting operation against Terrorism named Operation Enduring Freedom (Khalid.I. Roy I,:240).However, it was also decided not to shoot a

36 Brig, Mehmood Shah, defence and security analyst, he formerly headed security affairs in the tribal areas were interviewed with the author on 4th May 2018.

123 single bullet towards Afghanistan fromPakistan’s territory. Shamsi base, supposedly had to be used to get hold of any fault with the planes but loaded planes could not fly and enter in it37. Jackoabad airport was provided to US as rear evacuation base, for organizing attack and for bringing their injured there. Likewise, a lot of intelligence was given to them.38 US installed radar equipment in Pakistan for observing air strikes. Pakistan played its role as an important US ally in GWOT by deploying Frontier crops (FC), military units, special services group (SSG) and Pakistan’s agency ISI for conducting operations along with infiltration search in Pakistan from Afghanistan (Javaid. U, 2013, p. 54). The most important thing to note here is that though Pakistan decided to side along US and to abandon relations with Taliban but have not compromised over their limits like, i) Passni airport was not given to US to operate from, ii) Zhob airport was not given, iii) Darbandein airport was given to them for limited operations but they tried to put their air control which they failed in managing39. Furthermore, General Musharraf justified these moves by giving examples from Islamic books as to how even peace pacts with the enemy could be signed into as a temporary measures by an Islamic State for the sake of political or strategic feasibility and could then be reverted later on to defeat the enemy. Supporting his new Afghan policy, Musharraf said in an interview to BBC on October 1, 2001 that Pakistan’s Afghan policy has always been on a right direction. The

37 Ibid. 38Rahimullah Yusufzai is a Pakistani journalist, best known for having interviewed Osama bin Laden, and Afghan Taliban leader Mullah Omar. He is a war correspondent. He was interviewed with the author on 15thMay, 2018. 39 ibid

124 past policy was aimed at the supreme national interests and this policy has not met with collapse but experienced a change according to circumstances. Policies are always ratified and endorsed keeping the situation in view hence contemporarily; Pakistan has re-visited its Afghan policy.40Moreover, Pakistan was already being isolated and had no other option for securing its nuclear assets (ibid). Our earlier foreign policy could have worked our national interests in a better way, had the situation been the same ubiquitous prior to 9/11. Later Islamabad realized that countering terrorism and militancy at home was a difficult task as public support and capacity was lacking for attainment of this purpose. Similarly, lack of confidence building and deviation in strategic interests and objectives between key actors launching war on Terrorism created the environment of mutual assistance much difficult in Afghanistan. Resultantly, for Pakistan making the prospects of fighting together with coalition forces for countering insurgency and implementing new Afghan policy became a challenging task, not only in Afghanistan but also in tribal areas of Pakistan bordering Afghanistan41.

Islamabad was under intense international pressure for launching an effective and extensive operation against Afghan and foreign militants hiding/ residing in Pakistan especially in tribal areas. But the socio- politico-culture and the ideological dynamics served as a hurdle in pursuing new Pakistan’s Taliban policy. Pakistan after immediate negotiations with US after 9/11 supported the idea of installing “moderate Taliban”, in Afghanistan to counter non-Pashtun pro-India

40Dr Babar Shah, Chairman Regional Studies, was interviewed with the author on 3rd May 2018. 41Dr. Faiza Bashir Assistant Professor, Political Science Department, Islamia College University, Peshawar.interviewed with the author on 15th September, 2017.

125 alliance there. Consequently Pakistan had to face the black lash at home from extremist groups who were well organized and armed (Rashid, 1999: 413-14). Taliban in Arab, Central Asia and Sub-continent refers to students of Religious seminaries. But it changed later into a mind set. However, now Taliban refers to all those who are engaged in militancy/ terrorism. Unfolding preceding years (as mentioned above) new events of terrorism took place, safe sanctuaries of Taliban in Pakistan. Different brands of Taliban appeared. Pakistan had to deal with them, if they fought against all, they all would turn into their enemies and Pakistan had to face all of them. Pakistan was facing resource constraints, around one lakh troops were deployed on eastern border and huge number of military on Kashmir border. Pakistan military was also present on Pak-Afghan border and FATA. The name good and bad Taliban was coined to fight against those who are threat to Pakistan. Those who were not threat Pakistan decided not to fight against them. According to Dr Babar Shah, “It was a wise term to coin good and bad Taliban by the establishment of Pakistan and was in best interest at that time”. Military government of Pakistan was concerned about pro Taliban and anti US thoughts of society. They also expected severe reaction of hostility from the militant groups and Afghan Taliban and that could result into more chaos in Pakistan. Subsequently, Pakistan decided not to take action against all the Taliban whether Afghan or Pakistani and mostly actions were taken against the militant groups involved in terrorism inside Pakistan. Haqqani Network, Afghan Taliban residing in Pakistan including Quetta Shura42 was the ones against whom

42 Quetta Shura members are veterans of the Taliban regime that ruled Afghanistan in the late 1990’s. Majority of them are mullah or Islamic clerics who adhere to Deobandism, sunni Islamic sect of South Asia.

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Pakistan did not take action. This decision was taken as a strategic tool as well as because of the socio-cultural and psychological makeup of society. That was the reason Hafiz Gul Bahadur (he headed North Waziristan’s Wazir Taliban. As he maintained long lasting peace treaty with the government of Pakistan that’s why he was considered as a good Taliban) (Ahmad.A, 2013:82) in North Waziristan never joined TTP.43 Pakistan’s decision makers while designing Afghan policy post 9/11, prioritized having security and peace in Pakistani area bordering Afghanistan, guaranteeing Pashtun representation in Afghanistan’s government. Pakistan also wanted to secure its economic, political and military interest in Afghanistan’s new setup in comparison with India as well as wanted to ensure that Afghan soil should not be used against Pakistan especially Tribal belt and Balochistan province (as these areas are also facing insurgencies).Moreover, securing strategic nuclear assets from US attack was a priority.44At the same time, Pakistan was concerned about the Indian activities and policies in Afghanistan like economic and political support to Baluch insurgents (Khetran. M, 2017:123-124) on the other hand, India was highly concerned about Taliban gaining strength and holding power again in Afghanistan (Indian Defence Review, 15 May, 2017). Pakistan apart from making some political gains, securing military, political and economic objectives in Afghanistan from its new Afghan policy, also wanted to tackle possible Indo-US alliance (Zeihan, 2010). Pakistani policy makers were also considering negative impact like,

43Rahimullah Yusufzai is a Pakistani journalist, best known for having interviewed Osama bin Laden, and Afghan Taliban leader Mullah Omar. He is a war correspondent. Interview with the author on 15thMay, 2018. 44Dr Babar Shah, Chairman Regional Studies, University of Peshawar, interview with the author on 3rd May 2018.

127 destabilized Pakistan tribal areas, Pakistani Taliban linking themselves with Afghan Taliban (in order to utilize the situation of security vacuum), instead of repatriation of Afghan refugees in Pakistan it was expected to have more refugees from Afghanistan or Indo-Pak rivalry will increase through their proxies on Afghan soil. Hence, as stated by Dr Babar Shah, The best option Pakistan had that time was to join GWOT.45 In Pakistan not every section have supported General Musharaf’s decision in fighting GWOT which led towards anti US and anti Pakistan sentiments, sympathies of religious, political and common citizens towards jahadi’s( Khan. I, 2007:83). Pakistan was also in fear of losing pro militant groups. Similarly, non- representation of Pashtuns (discussed above) in Afghan government after Bonn Conference 2001, led towards making situation tough for Pakistan and achievement of its objective difficult instead (Sharan. T, 2011:1109- 1127). US, considering the difficulties faced by USSR during application of power by land forces in Afghanistan decided to just rely on air attacks. Resultantly, on October 7th, 2001, US along with coordination with Northern Alliance46 and allies launched Operation Enduring Freedom

45 ibid 46The Northern Alliance, also known as the United Islamic Front for Salvation of Afghanistan (UIFSA), was a coalition of militias seeking to topple the rule of the Taliban throughout Afghanistan. An organization operating under the same name was established in 1992 in opposition to the communist government of then President Najibullah. While victorious, this group disintegrated until September 1996, when Taliban forces captured the province of Kabul. The Northern Alliance became active once again in 1996, serving as a military front assembled by leaders of the Islamic State of Afghanistan. The organization was comprised of an ethnically and religiously disparate group of rebel movements fighting a defensive war against the Taliban, including primarily three non-Pashtun ethnic groups-Tajiks, Uzbeks and the

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(Lambeth. B, 2005:337-370). Heavy bombing over Taliban’s infrastructure started and within three days started showing results by the fall of North of Afghanistan to the Northern Alliance. Kabul was the next success of Northern Alliance (BBC, 7 Oct-9 Dec 2001). Taliban started moving back towards Kandahar, thousands of Taliban were ambushed into Kanduz. Many of the Taliban were perished, some surrendered to General Dostum, other melted into population or some escaped to the refugee camps and Madrassas in Baluchistan. While Al- Qaida’s members melted into the tribal Areas of Pakistan (Latif. A, Feb.9, 2009).According to M. Amjad Durrani, US completely only held Kabul47.With Pakistan’s assistance, US in a very brief period of time faced success in Afghanistan post 9/11 but later in 2002 when Taliban launched guerrilla war they started gaining strength again and became stronger in 2005. Iraq War and US engagement there led to strengthen Taliban much more in 2008-10.48 US refusal to deploy ground forces and depending on Northern Alliance there resulted into escape of militants from Afghanistan (Taylor & Francis Group, 2004:428). By the end of 2001, Mulla Omar shifted his central power from Kandahar to adjacent areas (Riedel.B, Jan 18, 2007). Though, they were harmed a lot, still their leadership structure remained intact and were reorganizing out of the survivors. Pakistan’s military regime was also being challenged by the local militant groups who fought along with Afghan Taliban’s against US and its allies, the reason being Pakistan’s participation in WOT

Hazaras.The group has had several notable leaders, the most prominent being Ahmad Shah Massoud. 47M. Amjad Durrani, Manager Cargo Sales in Afghanistan, P.I.A, from 2001-2002, interview with the author on 15th March 2018. 48Rahimullah Yusufzai is a Pakistani journalist, best known for having interviewed Osama bin Laden, and Afghan Taliban leader Mullah Omar. He is a war correspondent. Interview with the author on 15thMay, 2018.

129 alongside US. These groups were splinter groups of Al Qaida, Central Asian groups49 and Pakistan’s militant groups in FATA or their associates. Pakistan was blamed by Afghanistan’s President Hamid Karzai for providing safe sanctuary to militants and Taliban who are involved in insurgency on Afghan soil. On pointing towards Pakistan’s role in countering terrorism in Afghanistan President Hamid Karzai, not only highlighted the weakness in Pakistan’s Afghan policy but also placed the burden of his failures of bringing political stability in Afghanistan, on Pakistan (Grere, 2006). During military regime militants involved in cross border infiltration belonged to some of Pakistani Taliban, some to Afghan Taliban of Haqqani Network, Central Asian and Arab groups. By 2006 Gulbadein Hikmatyar started his activities in Afghanistan’s Kunar, Kapisa, Nangarhar, Laghman and Nuristan provinces. (Grere, 2006)(Rana and Sial, 2010:83). Taliban’s local groups and Al-Qaida’s network in tribal belt started turning against Pakistan due to its change in Afghan policy and siding with US against terrorism. Their targets were enforcement of Islamic law and establishment of Caliphate state in Pakistan. Pakistani army from 2003 launched its operations against Tribes assisting Taliban and AL-Qaida in its Northern frontier tribal belt. In the meantime, while a large anti Pakistan Taliban group emerged most particularly Tehrik-I- Taliban Pakistan (TTP)50 in FATA. The focus of Pakistan’s operations shifted to these groups (TTP and other 40 groups affiliated with it) by

49Central Asianallies :ISIL–Khorasan (ISIL), Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, East Turkistan Movement, Emirate of Caucasus, and elements of organized crime. 50Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan, alternatively referred to as the Taliban, is a terrorist group led by BaitullahMahsud, which is an umbrella organization of various militant groups based in the northwestern Federally Administered Tribal Areas along the Afghan border in Pakistan.

130 dividing them into good and bad Taliban’s groups after 2007. Moreover, pro-Pakistan Taliban groups like Gul Bahadur and Molivi Nazir groups were considered as good Taliban as they were not against the establishment of Pakistan and were just focusing on Afghanistan (Akbar, A .2013). Military operations were not the only remedy used by Pakistan’s establishment to counter domestic terrorism but they also signed several peace deals with Taliban in South and North of Waziristan51. These peace deals recognized the control of this Pakistani Taliban over certain area as well as gave them space for further operating and advances from these places (Rana, 2010). General Musharaf moved forward and planned major changes in Pakistan Afghan policy post 9/11 due to some unavoidable factors. Like, President Musharaf during his address to the nation prioritized national interests that he vowed to safeguard in his effort to take the nation into confidence; he spelled out Pakistan’s main concerns that had substantially contributed towards the policy formulation at this critical juncture of Pakistan’s history (USA Today, 2002:21). Four concerns were highlighted which included: Pakistan’s security concern, revival of economy, defense of strategic nuclear and missile assets and the Kashmir cause. Pashtuns are recognized with several names like, Pakhtun, Pathan or Afghans. Afghans also refers to the citizen of Afghanistan but it is an interchangeable name with Pashtun (Siddique.A, 2014: 12).The primary ancestor of Pashtuns was assumed to be Qais Abdul Rashid.In 17th Century Pashtuns were mentioned and were written about in Mughul Courts. According to existing classifications about Pashtuns, there are four main tribal groups they are divided in are: Sarbani (main tribes: Tareen, Sherani, Urmer, Durranis, Daudzai, Chamkanis,

51ShabanaNaureen, Assistant Professor , Political Science Department , Islamia College University. Interview with the author on 20thJanuary, 2018.

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Mohmands, Yousafzai, Tarkalani and Shinwaris), Bhittani (Bhittanis, Lodhis, Niazis, Babars, Marwats, Kungies, Gandapurs and Ghilzais), Ghughust (Mando Khel, Kakar, Musa Khel, Panri. Safi and Gandun Tribes under Ghurghust branch are found in Tribal Areas of KP Province of Pakistan and in Eastern Afghanistan) and Karlani (Khattaks, Afridis, Zadran, Mangal, Zazi, Muqbil, Bangash, Mehsud, Orakzai, Wardak, Khugiani, Wazirs and Turi) this tribe constitutes the largest tribal society.they reside on both sides of Durand line (ibid). Pashtuns mother tongue is an Indo-European Language Pashto. Moreover many small groups if speak any other language identified themselves as Pashtuns. Like an elite Afghan family known as Muhammadzai adopted Dari language around early 20th Century but claims to be staunch Pashtuns. Pashtuns are very strongly tied to tribal society comprised of several values and codes; they call it Pashtunwali like nang, badal, jirga, melmestya, tarboorwali etc (discussed in chapter 4). Several Pashtun Clerics residing on both sides of Durand line considers themselves as deobandis (Deobandis were originated in second half of 19th Century in British Sub-Continent). However, past few decades extremist Islamic Political ideologies and Global Jihadist ideology have started strengthening its roots. These ideologies were sustained by funding from regional and international players. Decades of funding in Billion Dollars in these areas and around four decades of war have changed the structure of these Pashtun areas. Likewise, alliances, leaders and classes emerged. Resultantly, Radical Islam became extremely strong in this region. Emergence of Taliban, their safe sanctuaries in these areas and the jihadist movement are the manifestation of this whole process (Siddique. A, 2014: 14-15). In mid 1990’s Pakistan recognized Taliban regime along with Saudi Arab and United Arab Emirates. All these states were on friends list

132 with US. Saudi Arab for funding Sunni Mujahideen to fight against Soviet army in Afghanistan in (1979-1989) and Pakistan for training US proxy’s to fight Soviet War. Post 9/11 Pakistan was accused of supporting Taliban groups and that Pakistan has ties with some of Taliban groups. Moreover, India blamed Pakistan for backing cross border terrorism in Kashmir and demanded to put Pakistan in list of Terrorist state which could have damaged Pakistan’s cause of Freedom in Kashmir badly (Kay.S, 2012:223). Pakistan after 9/11 attack on US had to take concrete steps to avoid international isolation after being declared as a terrorist state and had to safeguard Kashmir cause. The decision for allying with US in GWOT was taken to counter all these apprehensions.

It was by no means an easy decision. The government was well aware of the multi-dimensional risks, which a policy shift entailed. That was precisely why President Musharraf felt the need to consult all his military commanders before going public with the matter. The corps commanders’ meeting examined the issue in its entirety Pakistan’s future role in Afghanistan, the likely reaction of Taliban and the impacts of US-led military operation on the country’s Kashmir policy (The Herald, 2001: 22).Another factor was the Indian attempt to somehow jump on the “war against terrorism” bandwagon. While addressing on 18th September 2001 to the representatives of important think tanks, General Musharraf firmly stated that the severe economic situation Pakistan was facing and at the same time India’s plan and desire to brand Pakistan as sponsor of Terrorism, his government realized siding with the world will pull Pakistan out of this troublesome scenario.He pointed out to the repercussion a wrong decision could have brought, particularly referring to Indian moves to divert international wrath towards Pakistan. Its propaganda at both

133 government and media levels reflected its desire to get Pakistan declared a terrorist state India has been vainly trying to establish that the Kashmir freedom struggle is thriving on militancy exported by Afghanistan. Seen against its allegation that Pakistan too harbours religious militants’ camp, Indian game plan becomes clear: to establish a terrorist nexus between Pakistan and Afghanistan. So, Indian reference to Kashmir and offers of support was meant to incite action against Pakistan. If the Pakistan government did not choose to side with US-led coalition against terrorism, it would in turn, have provided India the opportunity to occupy the central position in the region in the context of US-led operation and with its inclusion in a military assault, it could be able to target Pakistan’s nuclear installation by “error”. Since India does not have borders with Afghanistan, any assault from its bases would have been invariably through Pakistani airspaces. The decision taken by Musharaf regime thus foiled this Indian design (Hassan Z, 2001).Moreover, the general consensus at the international level for adopting a tough and joint stance against terrorism had convinced Pakistan to go along with international community. The UN Secretary General, the Security Council and the most world leaders condemned the acts of terrorism, the Muslim leaders, including the OIC and the Arab League were equally firm in their condemnation of the loss of human lives in the united states and vowed to work together at the international, bilateral and national levels to eliminate the curse of terrorism (Rizvi. H, 2001). In the final analysis, the US pressure combined with the need to neutralize India’s effort by changing the gears of its Afghan policy and the call of the UN and friendly states for working together to combat the menace of global terrorism was enough to convince Pakistan that it should be offering what was eventually described by President

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Musharraf as “unstinted support” to the Americans. It can be said that after 9/11 national interest is in, and ideology out (Gary. J, 2001). Pakistan’s decision to join international community against terrorism reflected a down-to-earth realism and an appreciation of the changing dynamics of the global and regional contexts. The failure to do so would have isolated Pakistan in the international system, posing serious threats to Pakistan’s economic revival and security.

3.1.1 WITH US OR AGAINST US: US President George W. Bush in his address to the Congress stated, “Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists” (Newsweek, 2001). This statement reflected threatening and uncompromising attitude of US government over this matter. The statement of President th Bush declaring war on Al-Qaida on October 7 resulted in the launching of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), he stated in his statement that “as we strike military targets, we will drop food for the Afghan people”. This step taken by US government led to the killing of thousands of innocent people in Afghanistan. These people fell victim to the air and land strikes conducted by US forces and its allies. US wanted to show its magnanimity through its action in Afghanistan. Though, US intention of reconstruction and nation building in Afghanistan seemed doubtful. The only US intension visible was targeting culprits’ of 9/11 incidents in Afghanistan. This statement also threw light on US foreign policy showing US as a "lone superpower," and "indispensable nation".

3.1.2 INDIAN FACTOR IN THE POST 9/11 CHANGE OF PAKISTAN’S AFGHAN POLICY: Senior U.S. official on the visit of Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee, called India as the U.S.' "natural ally" resulted in pleasing Indian government. However, Indian officials were disappointed that

135 the matter of cross-border terrorism in Kashmir was not addressed. The Indian Prime Minister in the joint statement along with President Bush issued on 10th of November offered uninvited and unlimited cooperation to U.S. for any military operations in the war against terrorism in Afghanistan. They were ready to offer their land and resources to US in GWOT and wanted to minimize the importance and benefits they could have from of Pakistan’s geographic location. Prime Minister Vajpayee addressed to the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) on 10 November, "We in India know from our own bitter experience that terrorists develop global networks driven by religious extremism" (Koshy.N, 2001). Indian Prime Minister repeatedly kept reminding US of their support as he stated in U.S. Congress previously: "In our neighborhood in this twenty-first century, religious war has not been fashioned into; it has been pushed to be an instrument of state policy." India seemed to show that it is the state which claimed the mission statement on terrorism. Pakistan had the only real and prudent way to agree and accept US demand for providing all kinds of support and resources in GWOT. If Pakistan had not accepted US demands India would have benefited from the situation.

3.1.3 FRAGILE PAKISTAN’S ECONOMY:

Pakistan’s policy makers thought that agreeing to participate in GWOT can end economic problems faced by Pakistan. President General Musharaf publically announced that one of the most important aspects his government is dealing and managing is economy of Pakistan and its revival is his government’s top priority. He stated that: The economy is the key priority. Only with a viable economy will the security of Pakistan be guaranteed. Economic revival is the key to everything. Out of a nation of 150 million people, only 1 percent pays

136 income tax. Our debt burden is $38 billion, and we have got to prioritize reducing it. My program, simply put, is to concentrate on reducing our fiscal deficit, improving our trade balance, and broadening our tax base. We also have to privatize our assets, which are being mismanaged, and revive our moribund industries (Weaver. A. M, 2002:23). Pakistan initially was successful in removing sanctions it faced and also overcame international isolation. Pakistan again became US close ally. Resultantly, nuclear test related economic sanctions (explained in chapter 2) were removed on 22nd September and 27TH October in 2001 (Wagner. A, October 1, 2001). Pakistan got US Dollar 600 million as Economic Support Fund (ESF) after removal of these sanctions as well as US Dollar 624.5 million as assistance for developing purposes under ESF (Federal Ministry of Finance) (K.A.K, 2004 :14). 3.1.4 COUNTER SECURITY THREAT PERCEPTION: Pakistan longstanding Afghan Policy altered due to immense security threat perceptions, internal and external. Decision makers of Pakistan termed it as a survival of nation. Similarly, President Musharaf stated in his address to nation on 19th September 2001 that top priority while designing policy for Pakistan is its defense. Moreover, Pakistan’s nuclear assets are very precious for the survival of Pakistan. Pakistan’s rationale behind joining GWOT was also the threat to the security and safety of nuclear assets of Pakistan from US. Though some of the nuclear expert criticized Pakistan’s apprehensions and claimed them as undue. Likewise, eminent nuclear expert Naeem Salik stated as, “This was not a sensible argument to make since it created a perception of vulnerability of Pakistan's nuclear assets which has refused to go away and has allowed a persistent assault by the US media on the issue of vulnerability of Pakistani nukes to a takeover by Taliban/Al-Qaida types. The argument used by Musharraf was

137 probably aimed at exploiting the sensitivity of Pakistani people towards their nuclear assets to enlist their support for the policy to side with the US in GWOT and to ditch the Taliban. Apparently it was hoped that the Pakistani public would be willing to sacrifice anything in order to ensure the security of their crown jewels. In fact, this argument reflected his lack of wisdom and self confidence worthy of a nuclear weapons power. It seems that the deterrence value of nuclear weapons was not taken into account” (Fayyaz. S, 2010: 139). Pakistan was considering India and Israel nexus very seriously and considered it very alarming for its nuclear assets. As stated by the eminent officer Brig (rtd) Feroz Hassan Khan of Strategic Plans Division (SPD), “In 1986, Pakistani intelligence learned that India had conceived plans to strike at Pakistan‘s nuclear enrichment facility at Kahuta in an apparent attempt to emulate Israel‘s attack on the Iraqi nuclear plant at Osirak…Two years later, India planned a major operation code-named Brass- tacks…Once again, India contemplated executing plans to strike at Pakistan‘s nuclear installation. In 1990, the Kashmir crisis once again brought Pakistan and India close to war. By this time, the prospects of nuclear deployment were perceived to be real, prompting a mission by U.S. Deputy National Security Advisor Robert Gates to the region” (Khan. H. F, 2002:162). If history of Pakistan’s acquisition of nuclear capability is analyzed it can be noticed that US have always been against it. It was always a contention between US and Pakistan’s relations (Khan. H. F, 2006: 357-382).This gave a very solid ground to Pakistan’s policy makers to be considerate regarding security and safety of Pakistan’s nuclear assets. Meanwhile, western press was pointing towards Al-Qaida’s plan to obtain Weapon of Mass Destruction through Pakistan (The Guardian, 2002:11) (Financial Times, 2002:8) (Washigton Post, 2003)

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(Larssen. M. R, 2010:5-11). Furthermore, US forces post 9/11 have produced some evidences supporting their claim of Al-Qaida’s attainment of nuclear capability from Pakistan through people related to Pakistan’s Nuclear Program (Simpson. J and Littlewood. J, 2003:3). This situation was extremely critical for Pakistan. US as a consequence to this sensitive situation offered nuclear safety assistance post 9/11. As a result two kinds of thoughts arose in Pakistan. One thought was that, “The international community‘s assistance to Pakistan in bolstering security around its nuclear facilities would go a long way towards strengthening its safety and security apparatus and non-proliferation mechanisms. Since 2001, the United States and Pakistan reportedly have been cooperating with each other on nuclear (and biological) safety and security, including the provision of US support in the form of equipment and training” (Khan.Z:53). The other group criticized the US offer and were of the thought that, “Iranian officials disclosed that Pakistani‘s were among middlemen who the Iranian said had aided Iran‘s nuclear program. US intelligence officials also said they believed that Pakistan had traded nuclear technology to North Korea in exchange for missile technology. The US further said that Pakistan was the source for designs of centrifuges used by Libya‘s in its recently disclosed nuclear program” (China Daily, 2005) (Bruno.G, 2010). Dr Abdul Qadeer Khan’s name was exposed by US as a corrupt person who has the potential of assisting in providing nuclear capability to Al- Qaida (The News, 2004). Later, then President of Pakistan General Parvez Musharaf pardoned Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan. General Musharaf for justifying his decision stated that, “There will be no roll-back of Pakistan‘s nuclear and missile programs…The international community should take note of the

139 underworld and Pakistan cannot be singled out for being involved in the issue. This underworld has a network in European and Asian countries and a number of countries have relied on developing their programs on this underworld… As President of Pakistan I have decided to pardon Dr A. Q. Khan, who is our hero but has committed mistakes that I regret…It is incumbent on all Pakistanis to keep Pakistan foremost and ahead of all considerations when it comes to critical national interests” (Pakistan’s Times, 2004). General Musharaf claimed that any act committed by Dr. Abdul Qadeer, was his personal act and state of Pakistan has nothing to do with it, but credibility of Pakistan’s nuclear assets became questionable in front of international community. This situation was analyzed by an analyst Shireen Mizari, “For the future, the countries like Pakistan will be dragged into the Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) issue. For Pakistan, the issue is critical because this pretext could be a means of trying to target Pakistan‘s nuclear program that sits uneasily with the US. And since WMD remains one of the rationalizations for the US pre-emptive doctrine, the present framing of the WMD issue impacts and aggravates Pakistan‘s security concerns” (Mazari.S,2004:23). On the other hand, nuclear command and its control worked as a part and parcel of National Military Command Structure whose task was to guide on conventional military operations. Later, National Command Authority (NCA) was established under Strategic Plans Division (SPD) in 2000 as a secretariat of SPD (Associated Press, 2000). Apart from dealing with the developmental and operational issues related to nuclear competence SPD looks exports over and above clearance certification from ministry of Commerce. Similarly, tough and rigid code of conduct is guarantees to defend against any possible threat from external and internal non-state radical elements (Salik. N, 2009).

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Moreover, Pakistan have always been trying to meet requirements under international Nuclear Non-Proliferation regime, that are, United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNHCR) 15400 which was issued on 28th April 2004 ( Khan.Z, 2006: 2).

3.2 PAKISTAN’S AFGHAN POLICY DURING DEMOCRATIC ERA 2008-2014: Pakistan came under immense international pressure due to the increasing strength of Al Qaida and its alliances. It also led Pakistan allowing US to take charge of clandestine base in early 2008 for drone attacks in Pakistan. However, these attacks were completely condemned by the people of Pakistan and Pakistan’s government for keeping their agreements intact with militants in FATA slated publicly these attacks. The regime in Pakistan was handed over to Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) led coalition government in 2008. They declared that they will preferably counter terror but not only by force. Though complete support at all levels were provided to the military in countering terrorism. While Swat operation was conducted, military was fully supported by central and KP provincial government (House of Representative, March 21, 2007: 28). Moreover, in order to counter terrorism every aspect of Afghan policy was still headed and decided by the military as well as at domestic level military was leading all activities of eradicating terrorism52. Pakistan’s Afghan policy was still on the same lines of having different strategy for good and bad Taliban. Pakistan was not reacting harshly towards all Taliban as they wanted to intact their long term objective of

52 Brig, Mehmood Shah, Security and Defence Analyst,a retired Pakistani brigadier general who formerly headed security affairs in the tribal regions, interview with author on 4th May 2018.

141 maintain strategy against India (Kristen, Williams. Jesse, 2012:129). Secondly, engagement with Taliban at FATA and Punjab based Taliban at Home has kept Pakistan busy as a result they could not contribute much against Afghan Taliban in fighting WOT. Resultantly, faced international criticisms on the dual role Pakistan was playing in fighting WOT. Lashkar- e-Tayyaba (LeT)53, a Pakistan based group, in 2008 attacked eight spots in (Mumbai) India. After this incident India threatening posture to go along with its new Doctrine of Cold Start54. US paid no substantial attention to Indian aggressive posture towards Pakistan. In 2009, elections held in US and the Barak Obama took the charge as President of United States. He coined a new comprehensive strategy for Pakistan and Afghanistan portrayed as AfPak Strategy. This strategy stressed that, in addition to military, economic and political course as a necessary corollary to Counter insurgency( also mentioned as COIN) in Afghanistan, be acquainted with Pakistan on account of FATA being the safe haven for Al-Qaida and its allies factions as a war theater with Afghanistan. Pakistan objected over lumping together with Afghanistan. President Zardari stated in an interview with

53Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) literally Army of the Good, translated as Army of the Righteous, or Army of the Pure and alternatively spelled as Lashkar-e-Tayyiba, Lashkar-e-Toiba; Lashkar-e-Taiba; Lashkar-i-Tayyeba) is one of the largest and most active Islamic militant organizations in South Asia, operating mainly from Pakistan. It was founded in 1987 by Hafiz Saeed, Abdullah Azzam and Zafar Iqbal in Afghanistan, with funding from Osama bin Laden. Its headquarters are in Muridke, near Lahore in Punjab province of Pakistan, and the group operates several training camps in Pakistan-administered Kashmir. 54 Cold Start is a military Doctrine developed by Indian Armed Forces for use in a possible war with Pakistan. It is intended to allow India’s conventional forces to perform holding attacks in order to prevent a nuclear retaliation from Pakistan in case of conflict.

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Financial Times, 2009, that Pakistan and Afghanistan are two completely different countries and should not be considered same under the generic label of AfPak strategy of US. Pakistan insisted that India should also be included in this new US strategy. Pakistan’s decision makers became more concerned about Afghanistan in October 2011, when Indo- Afghan Strategic Partnership Agreement (SAP)55 was signed. In the mean while US operation in May 2011, during which Osama Bin Laden was killed in his compound in Abbotabad Pakistan. Increase of drone strike in 2008 and several violations of Pakistan’s border took place like in November 2011, NATO air force struck at a military check post causing death of 26 soldiers on Pakistan Afghan border (Rana & Safdar, Sial, 2013)(Christophe, J, 2016, 29). Problems between Afghan and Pakistan government kept increasing because of these incursions. Pakistani Taliban taking refuge in Afghanistan was also operating inside Pakistan from there, resulting in further deteriorating the trust between the two neighbours.

55Mr Karzai met Indian PM Manmohan Singh, who said violence in Afghanistan was undermining security in South Asia.He also said that India would "stand by Afghanistan" when foreign troops withdraw from the country in 2014. Mr Karzai's visit follows a series of attacks which have damaged ties between Kabul and India's rival, Pakistan. Objective of the SPA (Strategic Partnership Agreement) signed at Hyderabad House in New Delhi is to reinforce security cooperation b/w the two countries. India is to mentor the security forces as they gear up to deal with the drawdown of Foreign Forces in 2014. It also provides for cooperation in the areas of trade, culture, health, education, people-to-people contact and several other fields. SPA specifies trade and economic cooperation in a lot larger detail, addressing aspects ranging from supporting Afghanistan in developing trading routes to exploring for hydrocarbons and mineral ores the country is plentifully gifted with.

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Moreover, Pakistan’s policy makers realized that Talibanised Afghanistan is not in favour of stable Pakistan. Secondly, the increasing terror threat and attacks on Pakistan’s security forces, political leaders, and civilians have also supported this fact. Pakistan’s policy makers, bureaucrats and military elites had realized that unstable Pak-Afghan border and Talibanised Afghanistan can instigate internal extremism, fundamentalism and radicalism in the state resulting in further descent. Commander-in-Chief of the Army General Keyani in press conference on 1stFebruary, 2010 admitted that Pakistan wants stable Afghanistan and obtaining the objective of strategic depth from Afghanistan is only having friendly, stable and secured Afghanistan. In his speech on 14thAugust, 2012 he mentioned clearly about how disastrous these extremists and radicalisms could be for the stability and peace of Pakistan (Dawn, 2012). Sherry Rehman, Pakistan’s ambassador to America has also stated in July 2012, that the strategic depth policy of Pakistan in Afghanistan has changed (Dawn, 2012). Hina Khar, Pakistan’s Foreign minister while briefing on Pakistan Afghanistan relations on 24th July 2012.She also admitted that Pakistan in Afghanistan wants to have friendly relations with all the ethnic groups and for implementation of Pakistan’s Afghan policy there is no favorite group in Afghanistan. She also stated that Pakistan does not want to impose any type of Afghan government, Pakistan just want to deal with terrorism as Pakistan post 9/11 has lost, 40,000 lives in GWOT . During PPP’s government only Pakistan faced 352 suicide bomb and the economic loss that Pakistan faced is in tens of billions of Dollars, estimate between US Dollar 75 Billion to 100 billion (Council on Foreign Relations, 2012). The new government of PML (N) in 2013 was keen in defusing problems with its western neighbour Afghanistan. For that purpose

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Pakistan extended full support to reconciliation process led by Afghanistan. In February 2013, Maulana Fazalur Rehman56 was on a mission to convince Taliban leadership to resume talks with Pakistan’s authorities. A forum for discussing main concerns between the legislators of both the states a Parliamentary Afghanistan-Pakistan group was established in 2013. Moreover, grievances related to cross border militancy were particularly shared in that group. Furthermore, Prime Minister of Pakistan stressed on several forums that economic and political growth and development of Pakistan links with peace on its borders. In August 2013, President Karzai of Afghanistan was invited to Pakistan by the Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif. On his visit both the leaders discussed several issues and projects having bilateral interests of both the states. Pakistan’s desire of peaceful and developed Afghanistan was expressed on this occasion and several Taliban prisoners were released as a goodwill gesture by Pakistan (Kataman Afghanistan, 2007, Post-Taliban governance, 1-51). The objective of Pakistan Afghan policy of having friendly western neighbour remained static but the methods and tools utilized for the achievement of this aim have altered. Pakistan, views that Taliban could not take over the regime in Afghanistan now, the options which Pakistan would consider for implementation of their objectives would either be Taliban sharing power in Kabul through its representatives in government either to have an inclination towards non-Pashtun groups in Afghanistan (Carlos Setas, 2013:15).

56Maulana Fazlur Rehman is the leader of Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam Fazl (JUI-F), a Pakistani religious party whose vote base is largely the Pashtun population of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. JUI-F has maintained close links with the Taliban movement since it emerged in 1994.

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3.3 Support and co-operation provided by Pakistan to US in GWOT: Pakistan having vital geo-strategic location, religious and ethnic bonding with Taliban Regime in Afghanistan placed Pakistan in international limelight. Pakistan after consenting to side along US in GWOT it also agreed to provide support in concrete terms like from letting US and its allies using Pakistan’s territory to data gathering and from intelligence sharing to establishing surveillance centers inside Pakistan. This was an extremely important role Pakistan agreed to play and as a return earned a lot of appreciation from international communities. It was also stated that none of the state in this world has done enough as much as Pakistan has done for US (Defence week, 2004). Furthermore, to appreciate Pakistan’s support and co-ordination President Musharaf claimed that, “If Pakistan is not doing enough, the whole world is asleep; because I think we are doing the most. We are doing the maximum. I challenge any other country which is doing as much or thinking as much, executing as much as Pakistan” (Musharaf. P, 2005). Similarly, joining GWOT and providing its co-operation was done on the basis of National Interest of Pakistan and to free Pakistani society from religious extremism. But for attainment of its national interest Pakistan has paid a high price in all fields like Political, security and economic. Resultantly, the most effected state from the repercussions of GWOT was Pakistan (Fayyaz.S, 2010: 169). Pakistan responded positively to US demands (mentioned above) and allowed US to use its soil for curbing terrorism. Pakistan was looking towards its objectives, “Proactively pursue the end objective of elimination of terrorists and deny use of own territory as sanctuary for operations within Pakistan or across Pak – Afghan border through effective articulation of military, political and development measures…Our concept of

146 operations aimed to prevent outflow of terrorists / miscreants and unwanted elements from entering into Pakistan and keep own internal dynamics stable. Preclude reason for Coalition forces to enter into Pakistan territory on the pretext of hot pursuit operations…Concept of Deployment aimed to seal the border effectively to check the cross border movement. Dominate the internal environment through saturation of troops in the area” (ibid). It was considered initially that Pakistan has given unstinted permission to US for using land and air routes due to the information provided from national and international media. But later, on several forums Pakistan clarified that Pakistan has not agreed to US terms completely (Musharaf, 2005:204-205). In reality it negotiated over usage of air route and Pakistan also expressed its determinacy in not allowing any combatant operation to take place in Afghanistan from Pakistan’s land. Pakistan also clarified that it will always preserve its national interest first. Moreover, bases provided to US in Pakistan for operations in Afghanistan were also criticized by the public as, “The Jacobabad base located about 480 kilometers north of Karachi and southeast of Kandahar, was one of four Pakistani bases used by US and allied forces to support the 'Operation Enduring Freedom' campaign in Afghanistan…In early December 2001, Pakistan agreed to a US request for a long-term presence at Jacobabad, and permitted US Marines to renovate the base and build a concrete hangar for 50 large planes and air-conditioned barracks for troops…During that phase, all but a few Pakistani liaison officers were withdrawn from the base…Jacobabad was the scene of several protests by opponents of the US airstrikes on Afghanistan. The Jamaat-e-Islami, a staunch opponent of supporting the US in its 'war against terror' tried to march to the Jacobabad airfield on October 14, 2001, one person was killed and 24 people injured in clashes with police. By late October 2001,

147 roads to the city were blocked for days to prevent the entry of protestors. But on 23 October, around 200 JI activists appeared in the city, and at least 100 protesters were arrested. Subsequently, the protests subsided” (Newline, 2005)57. Instead of air route and bases for logistics Pakistan also extended intelligence cooperation with US. This cooperation resulted in archiving big successes like arrest of Al-Qaida’s Palestinian member Abu-Zubaidahin 2002 by Pakistani authorities. Later in same year US most wanted suspect Ramzi Binalshibh was also arrested. In 2003, Chief operational planner of 9/11 incident Khalid Sheikh Mohammad was also arrested in Rawalpindi, and all three of these terrorists were handed over to US (Aydinli. E, 2010: 30).Moreover, around 44 military operations were launched in 2004, based on US satellite information and a out 7000 troops were involved in these operations. During these operations Pakistani troops managed to capture about 650 militants (Khan. H. F, 2005:377). Pakistan’s promise of unstinted support was criticized by the West that the crackdown on militant groups from Pakistan is selective. Similarly, the most effective tool during exercise of joint strategy of tracing Al-Qaida and Taliban militants were interception and tracing of satellite telephone transmissions.US in this regard equipped and trained sensitive and responsive inside Pakistan some counter-terrorist organizations for monitoring internet traffic, curtail money laundering, online staffing and recruitment of possible Al-Qaeda agents etc. Moreover, in November 2001, for monitoring out going passengers on Karachi

57General Pervez Musharraf‘s inaugural address in the international Seminar on Global Terrorism: Genesis, Implications, Remedial and Countermeasures, organized jointly by the Institute of Regional Studies (Islamabad) and Hanns Seidel Foundation (Munich), 29 – 31 August 2005, Islamabad.

148 airport an FBI post was set up. Pakistan at Karachi airport, additionally, provided US and its allies complete operational facilities for peacekeeping operations in Afghanistan (Rafique. N, 2004). Pakistan’s role in GWOT and co-operating with US and its allies on its soil, its dedication in operations against militants was appreciated by the Congressional Research Report in 2003 (Kronstadr. A. K, 2004). Furthermore, some more detentions of militants like Mohammad Naeem Noor Khan and Ahmad Khalfan Ghailani (Al-Qaida’s operatives) by Pakistan inside its territory revealed their massive plans to bring destruction in US and UK (Harris.J. Burke, 2008). Besides, all these actions taken by Pakistan, further more initiations like banning Al-Rasheed Trust (mentioned above in this chapter), Al-Akhtar trust and AI-Rabeta Trust were also banned in order to freeze Al-Qaida’s bank accounts (Daily Times,2005). All such actions of freezing assets and bank accounts by the State Bank of Pakistan was done on the base of UNSC resolution No. 1267, 1333 and 1373 (Report of Pakistan Government, 2002). According to West Pakistan only grabs the terrorist group whose objectives did not match the objectives of Pakistan’s establishment’s perception of National Interest (Bruno.G & Bajoria.J, 2008). Later, during democratic government in Pakistan the elected Party was inclined towards US and wanted to curb terrorism but the government didn’t want to confront establishment in this regard. Pakistan on the other hand claims that it has lost thousands of soldiers in combating terrorism and any allegation of not being honest in its fight against terrorism is false (ibid).this scenario was described by then President General Pervez Musharaf as, “We have captured 689 and handed over 369 to the United States. We have earned bounties totaling millions of dollars. Those who habitually accuse us of ―not doing enough‖ should simply ask the CIA how much

149 prize money it has paid to the government of Pakistan “(Musharaf.P, 2005:237). Moreover, US and its allies, i-e, NATO and ISAF operating in Afghanistan were almost 80% dependent for their logistic support58 on Pakistan (Fayyaz. S, 2010: 174).These logistics from port in Karachi passed through Khyber Pass in Peshawar (KP) to Kabul in Afghanistan. Some supplies also reached Pakistan through Chaman border in Balochistan province of Pakistan (Washington Post, 2008). To keep these supplies of logistics secured Pakistan army entered into a battle with terrorists inside the country who have started attacking NATO supplies in 2008.the following statement indicates towards the sensitive and challenging position Pakistan Army got into, “Pakistan has conceded too many of the [Pakistani] Taliban's demands for peace, such as the release of fellow tribesmen. But if they demand something like the closure of NATO's supply lines from Pakistan, it is beyond Pakistan's orbit. The Americans sought Pakistan's cooperation [in the war on terror] in return they pledged billions of dollars in aid. But they wanted steady supply lines for NATO forces in Afghanistan…Pakistan has stretched itself to the limit for the sake of peace in the country, it has even struck deals with al- Qaeda for it to stop attacking Pakistan. But if they [al-Qaeda and militants] don't appreciate Pakistan's interests and compulsions, then...defeat is not an option” (Asia Times, 2008). Several incidents of attacks on NATO supplies were reported. Taliban used several tactics for disrupting NATO supplies from Pakistan, like late night rocket attacks on their terminals, blowing up bridges,

58Logistic support involves a wide range of services and responsibilities involving storage, transport, distribution, transport of personnel; acquisition, construction, maintenance, operation and disposition of facilities; acquisition or provision of services, and medical and health service support

150 targeting businesses related to transportation etc, any action taken by Pakistan was for security measure (PIPS, 2009). The insurgency from Afghanistan had diffused in to Pakistan and resulted in causing security threat from within the state as well as outside the state. 3.3 BENEFITS FROM WEST AND US AID TO PAKISTAN POST 9/11: Post 9/11 incident US required Pakistan’s support the most against the Al-Qaida network in Afghanistan. On 23rdSeptember, 2001 US administration after getting consent from the Government of Pakistan for cooperation in US GWOT, announced that all the sanctions imposed on Pakistan would be lifted. It was also announced that ample benefits and packages according to the participation of Pakistan in GWOT would be provided. Few benefits provided to Pakistan were: a) For the three years IMF program, US provided Two Billion Dollars to Pakistan (Siddiqui.A, 2015: 27). b) On September 23, 2001, the President issued Executive Order 13224 to block property and transactions with 27 organizations or individuals who commit, threaten to commit, or support terrorism. The Secretary of the Treasury added another 39 entities and individuals to the list on October 12, 2001, in part to include the 22 persons listed among the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Most Wanted. Some of the organizations listed are based in Pakistan and others may have ties to that country. Few weeks after Pakistan and the US have signed an agreement to reschedule the $ 379 million government-to-government debt of Pakistan (Dawn, February 17, 2003). This seems to indicate that President Bush exercised authority under USC 2364 to lift all restrictions under Section 508. For all practical purposes, Section 508 practically has ceased to exist (Kundi.A.M, 2005:9).

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c) US announced that it will provide ninety five million Dollars for different programs in Pakistan like, education, health, and childlabour (Siddiqui.A, 2015: 28). US hoped to keep increasing the money significantly with the passage of time. US also allocated three million Dollars for food assistance and seventy three million Dollars for border security. d) The program of World Bank and Asian Bank may extend their support up to US Dollars Two Billion. e) It was promised that US will reschedule foreign debt of Pakistan up to US Dollars Twelve Billion. European Union (EU) along with US reached to the agreement on easing restrictions on Pakistan’s Textile products (Wasif, 2001).EU increased Pakistan’s quota for exports from 10% to 15% on 1st of January 2002 and also reduced the tariff on several products.(Hilali,2005) f) US and its Western Allies were positive in rescheduling debts Pakistan had and to provide ample economic assistance as well. g) Apart from waiving part of Pakistan’s debt US administration also provided around US Dollar 600 million help for 2002-03. Out of this 600 US million Dollars , US Dollar 100 million was for education and 34 Million for hunger and poverty in remote areas and for military assistance US dollars 177 million were allocated (Sattar,2013: 263). h) Pakistan’s exports like Textile materials will be granted access in West. i) United Kingdom (UK) and Germany waived some parts of their loans and also showed inclination towards providing ostensible assistance to Pakistan.

152 j) Japan also provided aid of around 11.40 Million US Dollars to Pakistan till 2006 for better health care, enhancing road improvement, improving poor communities in NWFP (now KP), for improvement of lives and health of women and children etc (Asian Developing Bank, 2007:19). k) June 2003 while President Musharaf was visiting Camp David, US announced US Dollar three Billion package for security and economic assistance. This package will be distributed from 2004 till 2009. Moreover, Trade and Investment agreement (TIFA) was also signed. Furthermore, for the purchase of P3C Orion Aircraft US Dollars Nine fifty Millions and for arms purchase US Dollars 1.2 million packages were approved. (Rabbi,2012: 84-85) l) According US foreign Secretary in 2004, US were positive in developing and modernizing institutions of Pakistan to work with US and its Allies (Hussain. T, 2005:6). m) US foreign Secretary Collin Powell in Berlin in 2004 also declared Pakistan as the closest non-NATO ally. n) US also provided Dollar 5.174 Billion from the start of GWOT in 2001 till 2008 (Congressional Research Service,8 Dec 2014:17-18). a) funds drawn from the Operation and Maintenance, Defense- wide account Pakistan was also granted up to US Dollars 80- 100 millions from Coalition Support Fund (CSF) till August 2006.CSF also allows to reimburse US $ 1.5 Billion a year for operations conducted on Pakistan’s border areas, for the purpose of military and logistical support, for counter attacking operations (Congressional Research Service,8 Dec 2014:58).

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b) Report of Congressional Research Services (CRS) in November 2008, received around US Dollars 12 Billion till the end of 2008. c) US endorsed an Enhanced Partnership for Pakistan Act (EPPA) also known as Kerry- Luggar-Berman Bill (KLB) in 2009 (Congressional Research Service,8 Dec 2014:7). This Bill promised assistance of US Dollar 1.5 Billion annually, for the next Five years in the fields of energy, water, education, health, agriculture, economic development and for implementation of Rule of Law. d) Pakistan in 2012 received US Dollar 2.1 billion in aid and graded third among aid recipients (Ahmad, 2015:14-23). e) Around two-third of the aid from 2002 to 2012, went to security sector which sums at US Dollar 15.8 billion (ibid). f) Foreign Military Financing (FMF) reached Pakistan around US Dollars 42.2 Million in 2014-2015. Most Payment Pakistan received was used by Pakistan in GWOT and most payment was done post payment, it was mostly re –imbursement, even re-imbursement money is still pending towards US59. 3.4 PAK-AFGHAN RELATIONS POST 9/11: Post 9/11Taliban Regime ended in Afghanistan. Pakistan’s military government in order to secure its security objectives in Afghanistan demanded for the formation of government in Afghanistan, which is not hostile to Pakistan’s interest there and representation from all the ethnic groups specially Pashtun majority should be ensured (Hussain. 2002, 71).As a result of Bonn Agreement on 5thDecember 2001, installation of interim government in Afghanistan took place. This

59 Brig, Mehmood Shah, Security and Defence Analyst, a retired Pakistani brigadier general who formerly headed security affairs in the tribal regions, interview with author on 4th May 2018.

154 government comprised of four important and major Afghan groups, i- e, Peshawar group, Northern Alliance, Cyprus group and Rome group (Ottaway, Lieven: 2002, 70). Taliban were not given any representation in interim government, even moderate Taliban were not given any political role, as pro West regime would consider all Taliban as radical (Yousafzai: 2002, 121-122). Hamid Karzai became President of Afghanistan on December 4th, 2001. Though Pakistan recognized Hamid Karzai’s government and extended assistance for development projects in Afghanistan since Pakistan wanted to have a friendly neighbour. However, Pak-Afghan relations witnessed a lot of mistrust and blame game during the period of 2001 till 2008. The issues for such deteriorated bilateral relations were border dispute developed by cross border infiltration, terrorism, Pakistan Tribal areas bordering Afghanistan and difference of outlook on the adoption of a strategy for the purpose of Countering Terrorism. For every act of Terrorism the government of Hamid Karzai used to blame Pakistan’s agencies, military and policies. Pakistan used to deny all the charges casted by Afghan government and blamed the corrupt and incompetent government of Kabul for not getting hold of their territory. Furthermore, Pakistan also blamed Afghanistan for spreading instability in Pakistan’s region bordering Afghanistan like FATA, KP and Baluchistan. This blame game between both the states weakens the process of confidence building between them. Moreover, inclination of Karzai’s government towards India also raised the suspicion and mistrust between their relations. Taliban took the advantage of the geographical landscape of the region and crossed the porous border Between Pakistan and Afghanistan for taking refugee from the US attacks in Afghanistan (Tajik, 2011:51). Their movement could not be controlled and stopped immediately as the state write was limited in FATA. Moreover, residents of these

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Tribal areas under their code of Pakhtunwali granted protection (Johnson, Mason, 2008: 59-60). Two main routes Chaman in South and Torkham in North are used for cross border movement between Pakistan and Afghanistan are guarded by Levis, Khasadars, and customs and FIA officials. besides these two routes in North there are almost one hundred and one illegal routes and in South around Two Hundred and Twenty Nine routes are being used by smugglers , nomads etc regularly since they are not monitored by both the states (ibid. 44). FATA soon became the main target area for providing safe havens to Al Qaida and Taliban. Despite Pakistan’s continuous denial Afghanistan kept blaming Pakistan for every act of terrorism and failure in Afghanistan. Karzai believed Taliban are not a threat to Afghanistan but its Pakistan who is causing instability in Afghanistan (Tang, 2006). He also blamed Pakistan for the instability in Afghanistan and claimed that Pakistan wants to enslave the inhabitants of Afghanistan. Karzai in his speech on 30th December 2006 warned Pakistan for supporting and nurturing Taliban in FATA (Gull, 2008:69). ON Feburary 2007 President Musharraf in a press conference claimed that the Terror attacks conducted in Afghanistan took place under the leadership of Gulbadin Hikmatyar, Jalaluddin Haqqani, Mullah Omer and Mullah Dadullah. He also declared that Pakistan’s agencies and military are not involved and responsible for any act of terrorism (Talib, 2008). On the other hand Pakistan was forced by Afghanistan and US to come hard on militants in FATA. Pakistan deployed almost 800000 security forces there, conducted several military operations in Tribal areas. Taliban as a revenge conducted around 63 suicidal attacks in Pakistan. Such attacks were a clear threat to Pakistan’s stability and security

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(Fayyaz, 2008). Pakistan and Afghanistan faced lack of coordination between their intelligence and law enforcing agencies, hence, resulting in low confidence building among them which failed them in countering terrorism and eliminating terrorist networks (Siddiqa, 2011:49-50).

3.4.1 BLAME GAME: Post 9/11 the fatal insurgency in Afghanistan resulted in rising suspicion of Kabul government towards Pakistan. The most insecure and unsound areas in Afghanistan were those areas which were bordering Baluchistan, KP and FATA of Pakistan. These areas of Afghanistan were claimed as extreme risk areas (Johnson, T, and 2007:109).These areas of Pakistan have the highest illiteracy and poverty rate. The increased insurgency in Afghanistan resulted in blaming Pakistan by Afghanistan for not playing its role efficiently against terrorism. Afghan Government kept blaming Pakistan for supporting Taliban and then these Taliban launch attacks in Afghanistan. Pakistan refused all the blames and charges; instead Pakistan blamed Afghanistan for spreading unrest and insecurity in Pakistan (Jones. S, 2008:32). Hamid Karzai kept condemning Pakistan for not doing enough against Taliban residing in its tribal belt. He also threatened Pakistan of tracking down Taliban into tribal belt of Pakistan and stated that the dilemma for Afghanistan is not Taliban its Pakistan, since Pakistan is supporting and harboring them (Tang. A, 2006).Similarly, Karzai on 13th December 2006 again delivered a statement blaming Pakistan for supporting Taliban and further stated that terrorist activities carried by these Taliban in Afghanistan are for scaring and pressuring Afghanistan(Gull. I, 2008:69).

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Military Ruler of Pakistan Prevez Musharraf while rejecting all the accusations by Afghanistan said on 2ndFeburary2007, in a news conference that all these Taliban are nurtured in Afghanistan. Moreover, he also claimed that Pakistan’s agencies and intelligence has no involvement in any type of insurgencies and terrorism in neighbouring states (Talib. F, 2008). Afghanistan kept accusing Pakistan and resultantly bitter relations developed between both the neighbouring states, further giving rise to the environment of mistrust between them. Hamid Karzai during an inauguration ceremony in Jalalabad, of Bacha Khan Complex expressed the way towards better relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan is only through reforms introduced by Pakistan in its Afghan Policy and stopping support of Taliban (The News. April 16, 2007).Afghanistan targeted Pakistan that Pakistan has banned the jihadi outfits but still no major achievement has been made and these Taliban are residing peacefully in Tribal belt of Pakistan (Qasim A, 2010:137). Pakistan, on the other hand blamed Afghanistan for letting its soil being used by India. President Musharraf blamed Afghanistan by stating that Indian objectives there in Afghanistan are only to offend Pakistan which is very clear and evident. He also raised the point of opening of Indian consulates in Kandahar and Jalalabad is only for creating problems for Pakistan (Rashid, A, 2008:229). Afghanistan kept accusing Pakistan for maintaining same strategy of backing insurgencies as it had during 1990’s. Though Pakistan kept denying from these accusations Afghan government firmly believed that Pakistan since Soviet war until now is supporting and backing such groups who creates insurgencies and unrest in Afghanistan (Mir. A, 2010:394-395).These Afghan suspicions became stronger after the revival of Taliban in Afghanistan. A UN report on the security of

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Afghanistan in September 2006 reveled that revival of Taliban especially in Southern Afghanistan is due to the weak, corrupt and incompetent Afghan institutions. Report also claimed that Afghan government, its army and police failed in securing Afghan land, guard its people, providing necessary services to them and counter insurgencies on their land despite the fact that billions of Dollars have been spent on them (UN Report,2006:3). Furthermore, the report stated that militants operating in Afghanistan were trained in Afghanistan. These Afghan militants were not motivated by ideology , its only their low social status, poverty and being deprive of basic needs that compelled them to involve themselves in such activities (ibid, 3). Afghan government failed in satisfying needs of its people and remained incompetent which compelled its citizens to find other means of earning. A survey conducted by an Asian Foundation in Afghanistan in 2004 and then in 2006 also disclosed that the people of Afghanistan are dissatisfied by its people (Jones, S, 2008: 12). Moreover, a state where Government writ is weak is very easily manipulated by various sections. Afghan weak administration could not managed violence and smugglers, drug dealers etc kept taking advantage of situation and served their interests well in Afghanistan. Interests of different sections converged, insurgents protected smugglers, drug convoys, traffickers and in return were benefited financially by them. All these sections of society could easily fulfill their interest as the government was incompetent to stop and get hold of them. In 2006 Hilmand province of Afghanistan proved to be the worst example of violence (ICGAR, 2006: 13). Government officials of Afghanistan seemed less interested in maintaining peace and stability in their country rather were more interested in getting their share and financial benefit out of huge poppy cultivation.

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Post 9/11 US intervention in Afghanistan and installation of interim Afghan government resulted in isolating Pashtuns from political process which further led to the insurgency and unrest there. Bonn agreement very clearly tilted the balance of power in Afghanistan towards Non-Pashtunsand compelled Pashtuns to find alternative means for expression of their discontent. This was also a very strong reason behind the revival of Taliban in Afghanistan despite of US, NATO and their allies’ heavy military operations. Therefore, they adopted the path of warlords, Taliban or anti government forces for finding the grounds to express their objection and frustration (Hashmi, A, 2007-07: 29-30). US presence and military operations conducted by foreign forces on Afghan soil further played a vital role in fueling unrest and insurgences. Furthermore, the way prisoners taken from Afghanistan were treated badly by international forces. These actions also declined the chances of Afghans trusting US forces and their allies and resulted in lack of cooperation and coordination for rooting out rogue elements(ibid: 45). Afghans in South and East were hesitant to cooperate with foreign forces and stand with them against Taliban as these were PASHTUN dominated areas and most of the Taliban belonged to their own tribe or clan. This also proved to be one of the very strong reasons for provoking insurgencies in Afghanistan (Stewart, R, 2009). Hence, these above mentioned reasons can easily prove that Afghanistan is easily invaded by foreign powers but gaining control and success there is not easy. History also proves that Afghanistan could never be controlled by foreign power for many reasons like it’s always been religious and conservative. Therefore, any effort made to transform, modernize Afghan society always failed. Hence, the attempt made by US to change Afghan society and move it

160 towards modernization couldn’t work and resulted in failing of US weak strategy (Marjan, S, 2008: 7). Afghan President Hamid Karzai established his Republican party named Hizb-e-Jamhuri Khwahan after Burhanudin Rabbani formed a new version of Northern Alliance named United National Front (UNF). Rationale behind formation of Republican Party was that Karzai felt threatened from UNF and wanted to oppose it. Such political insecurity became a much bigger issue then revival of Taliban, Al-Qaida and insurgency (Statesman, 2008). Furthermore, in such weak political scenario regional and neighbouring states also play their role in serving their interests. Likewise, role played by Iran, India, Pakistan, Russia and China to serve their interest in Afghanistancould not be ruled out. India wanted to grow its influence in Afghanistan to upset Pakistan easily. Pakistan was concerned about Indian involvement and consulates in Afghanistan. Russia and central Asian states had their own concerns and interests. Therefore, blaming Pakistan only is not the solution to the problems Afghanistan faced post 9/11. It has to tighten its administration and then tackle with all the elements causing disturbance in Afghanistan. Pakistan and Afghanistan considered that insurgency in their country originated from cross border movement of Taliban and other militant groups with the support of their respective governments. Blame game did fulfill the domestic policy of the governments but public opinion in both the countries is changing. They started believing that their government by externalizing the issues was hiding their own short comings.60President Musharraf to legitimize his rule, and gain international aid did exaggerate threat of terrorism from within and threat arising out of Afghanistan in the shape of its tilt towards India. While on the other hand, Karzai government to hide his short comings

161 of establishing writ of the government beyond Kabul, addressing the concerns of all ethnic groups in Afghanistan and failure to eradicate corruption and develop modern economy started blaming Pakistan to divert the attentions of masses from real problems. Regional based competition, strategic culture of Pakistan and Afghanistan of blaming each other and narrow outlook of the dominant elites who hypothesized threat perception of each other.

CONCLUSION: Pakistan post 9/11 brought changes in its Afghan Policy to meet security challenges, it was facing like nuclear security, Indian Factor, Kashmir issue, Afghanistan etc. Focusing on security of the state lead to associate survival of the state with its security. Pakistan allowed US forces to use its bases and land and air route to fight against militants in Afghanistan. His policy initially benefited Pakistan by taking Pakistan out from international isolation it was facing for supporting Taliban Regime in Afghanistan. Pakistan also got enough support to hold up its shaky economic condition. Moreover, Pakistan’s role was appreciated worldwide and Pakistan was declared as a non- NATO ally of US. But all these reliefs were for the time. Pakistan faced tough situation domestically and internationally as an outcome of its 9/11 Afghan policy. Pakistan gave assistance to US which helped them in defeating Taliban in a short span of time. But later, US engagement in Iraq War and relying on air strikes due to tough terrain of Afghanistan were enough grounds for Taliban to revive. Those Taliban who took refuge in Tribal areas of Pakistan, gradually started taking control of the area. Taliban settling in Pakistan created challenging situation for Pakistan’s security. Pakistan had to tackle the situation.

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Fighting with all the Taliban brands could bring disastrous results. Therefore, Pakistan decided to fight against those who are threat to the land and to enter in talks and deals with those who were not threat to the security of Pakistan. This led to division of Taliban in good and bad category. This division was a strategic decision but Pakistan internationally faced a lot of criticism. All the assistance provided to international coalition forces went in dark and only thing remained in was Pakistan distinguishing between good and bad Taliban. The decision makers for Pakistan’s post 9/11 Afghan policy were military generals. Had it been a democratic era the decision would have been taken in parliament by looking into the sentiments and inclination of people. Even then the government would have taken the same decision of allying with US but would have asked for a lot for Pakistan to face any bad consequences.

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Journals/Articles/internet sources: Ahmad, I. (April 25-May 1, 2008). ”Pakistan’s Foreign Policy under the New Regime”.WeeklyPulse,http://www.ishtiaqahmad.com/item_displ ay.aspx?listing_id=151&listing _type=1. Aamir Latif, A. ( Feb. 9, 2009). “Taliban Finds Fertile Recruiting Ground in Pakistan's Tribal Refugee Camps”. U.S. News, https://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2009/02/09/taliban - finds-fertile-recruiting-ground-in-pakistans-tribal-refugee- camps Abbas, Z. (October 2001).”Pakistan’s Great Gamble”. Herald. Asian Developing Bank. (September 2007). “ADB’s Japan Funds: Japan Fund for Poverty Reduction, Japan Special Fund, and Japan Scholarship Program Summary Report”.Operation Evaluation Department, Special Evaluation Study: Summary Report, Reference Number JFS:OTH 2007-20. Azzam, Abdullah (April 1988). “Al-Qa’idah al-Sulbah,” Al-Jihad, 41, The original text in Arabic was translated into English by Reuven Paz, Academic Director, International Policy Institute for Counter Terrorism, Israel. Ahmed, N. (January 2005). “Newsbeat: Bowing Out”. Newline Karachi. Ahmad, I. (25-May1,2008)” Pakistan’s Foreign Policy under the New Regime”. Weekly Pulse, April,17th feb 2017.http://www.ishtiaqahmad.com/item_display.aspx?listing_id =151&listing_type=1 Afghan Frontier. (Spring, 2008). ”, International Security”.32:4, 59-60. Aid To Pakistan by the Numbers,” available on http:llwww.cgdev.org Archives, U.S. Department of Defence, Office of Public Affairs, Washington D.C, June 14, 2002, https://2001-

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2009.state.gov/coalition/cr/fs/12753.htm , Retrieved on 9th April, 2018. Bruce Riedel, B.(Thursday, January 18, 2007). “Al-Qaeeda Five Years After the Fall of Kandahar”. Brookings, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/al-qaeda-five- years-after-the-fall-of-kandahar Borger, J. (20 August 2002). “Al-Qaida videos show poison gas tests”. The Guardian. Burke, J., Harris, P. and Bright, M. (8 Aug. 2004). “Suspect arrested in Pakistan may hold al-Qaeda‘s secrets‘”. The Observer.

Bukhari, F and Lamont, J.( Fall/Winter 2009). ” Transcript: Interview with Asif Ali Zardari”.Financial Times, 15 September, 2009, in Syed Farooq Hasnat, Pakistan’s Strategic Interests, Afghanistan and the fluctuating U.S. strategy, Journal of International Affairs, Vol.63, No.1, https://jia.sipa.columbia.edu/pakistans-strategic- interests-afghanistan-and-fluctuating-us-strategy . Accessed on 31st of March, 2017 Bunting, Madeleine. (February 3, 2003 ). "Beginning of the End: The U.S. Is Ignoring an Important Lesson from History--that an Empire Cannot Survive on Brute Force Alone," The Guardian. Bruno, G and Bajoria, J.( June 26, 2008). “U.S-Pakistan Military Cooperation”.Council on Foreign Relations, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/us-pakistan-military- cooperation .retrieved on 5th April, 2018 Clarke , R and Iqbal, K. (2009). “NATO Supply Lines in Central Asia: Expanding the Scope of Conflict?”.Islamabad: PIPS. Congressional Research Service, “Flooding in Pakistan: Overview and Issues for Congress”, November 18, 2010, https://books.google.com.pk/books

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China Daily, 19 January, 2004. Chapter vii: action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of Aggression, Charter of United Nations, http://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/chapter-vii Daily Times,March 17, 2005. Dawn, April 27, 2016, “Banned Organisation seeks unfreezing of accounts”, https://www.dawn.com/news/1254662 Epstein B. Susan. Kronstadt A.K. (June 7, 2011). “Pakistan:U.S. Foreign Assistance”.Congressional Research Service, 7-5700, R41856, www.crs.gov.

Eggers, J. (May 22, 2017). “U.S. Policy in Afghanistan: Changing Strategies, Preserving Gains”. Ashley J. Tellis, http://carnegieendowment.org/2017/05/22/u.s.- policy-in-afghanistan- changing-strategies-preserving-gains- pub-70027. EveryCRSReport. (July 15, 2002 – November 30, 2010). “ Nuclear, Biological, Chemical, and Missile Proliferation Sanctions: Selected Current Law. RL 31502, https://www.everycrsreport.com/reports/RL31502.html. Fazal, Rabbi. (2012).“War against Terrorism and its Repercussions for Pakistan.” Pakistan Journal for History and Culture Vol.XXXIII, No.2. Fayyaz, S. (20-21 Oct 2008).Regional Extremism and Militancy in South Asia (0ct, 2008), Paper presented at international seminar organized by Pakistan Institute of Regional Studies in collaboration with Konrad Adenauer Stiftung in Islamabad. Gellman , Barton. (23 March 2003). “Al-Qaeda near Biological, Chemical Arms Production”.WashingtonPost,,p:2.Availableat:

170 http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2006/06/09/AR 2006060900918.html General Pervez Musharraf interview quoted in Mary Ann Weaver, Pakistan: In the Shadow of Jihad and Afghanistan, New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2002. Hussain, R. (2002). “Pakistan’s Relations with Afghanistan: Continuity & Change “, StrategicStudies , No:4, Vol:XXII. Hassan, Zubair. (October 1, 2001). ”India’s opportunistic designs”. The Nation. Hussain, T. (August 2005). “U.S.-Pakistan Engagement:The War on Terrorism and Beyond”.Special Report 145, Washington DC 20036, www.usip.org.

Iqbal, Anwar. (Feburary 04, 2015).“Obama seeks $ 1 bn from Congress for aid to Pakistan,” Dawn. International Crisis Group, Asia Report, No.68, December, 2003, p.45. https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-asia/kashmir India Offers Three Air Basis for US Aircraft‖, People’s Daily, September 19, 2001. Journal of Politics and International Studies, Department of Political Science.Vol. 1, No. 1, January –June 2015. Jaffrelot, C. (etd). (April: 9-34, 2016).”Pakistan at the Cross Roads: Domestic, Dynamics and External Pressures”.Peace Studies, 5(1), Columbia University Press. Khan, Z. W and Rehman, U. J. (Session :2009-2013).US Drone Policy and Anti-American Sentiments in Pakistan (2001-2012)”. EduPedia Publications Pvt. Ltd, New Delhi. Koshy Ninan.( November 1, 2001).” The Natural Ally and the Tactical Ally”. Foreign Policy in Focus,issue: War & Peace, Asia & Pacific. https://fpif.org/the_natural_ally_and_the_tactical_ally/

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Kronstadt, A. K. (28 March, 2003). “Pakistan-U.S. Anti-Terrorism Cooperation”. CRS Report for Congress (Congressional Research Service) USA: Library of Congress. Kundi A. Mansoor. ( Winter 2005). “ Pakistan Post 9/11 Foreign Policy: Challenges and Responses”. Al-Siyasa-A Journal of Politics, Society & Culture, Issue VIII (Special Conference Issue). Rondeaux, C and Pincus, W. (November 19, 2008).“U.S. Seeks New Supply Routes into Afghanistan”.Washington Post. Government of Pakistan, (January 2002).Report of the Islamic Republic Of Pakistan to theUNSC Counter Terrorism Committee on Implementation of UNSC Resolution 1373. Khan, H. F. (2005). “The United States, Pakistan and the War on Terrorism: Enduring Allies or Uncertain Partners? Global Terrorism: Genesis, Implications, Remedial andCountermeasures”. Institute of Regional Studies, edit., Islamabad. General Pervez Musharraf‘s inaugural address in the international Seminar on Global Terrorism: Genesis, Implications, Remedial and Countermeasures, organized jointly by the Institute of Regional Studies (Islamabad) and Hanns Seidel Foundation (Munich), 29 – 31 August 2005, Islamabad. Gellman , B.(23 March2003). “Al-Qaeda near Biological, Chemical Arms Production”.WashingtonPost,,p:2.Availableat: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2006/06/ 09/AR2006060900918.html Khan, Z. (2006). “Strengthened Export Controls: Pakistan‘s Export Control Experience, Current and Future Challenges and Options Safeguards against IllicitTransfers: Pakistan‘s

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Institutional Response”. in International Conference Report,London: South Asian Strategic Stability Institute. Khan, Z. “Pakistan‘s Non-Proliferation Policy”, The Middle East Institute Viewpoints: The Islamization of Pakistan, 1979-2009. Kronstadt, A.K. (May 24, 2005). “Pakistan‘s Nuclear Proliferation Activities and the Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission: U.S. Policy Constraints and Options”.A Report for Congress (CRS) Order Code RL32745. Khan, H. F. (2006). “The United States, Pakistan and the War on Terrorism: Enduring Allies or Uncertain Partners?” Institute of Regional Studies, edit.,Global Terrorism: Genesis, Implications, Remedial and Countermeasures, Islamabad: IRS. Lambeth, S. B. (2005).” Air Power against Terror: America's Conduct of Operation Enduring Freedom”. Rand Corporation, http://www.jstor.org/publisher/rand?refreqid=excelsior%3A9436ac598 a18f3ef1033390cc8a7d07c Mowatt-Larssen, R. (2010).“Al Qaeda Weapons of Mass Destruction Threat: Hype or Reality?”U.S.A: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. Mir Sherbaz Khetran, S. M. (2017). “Indian Interference in Balochistan: Analysing theEvidence and Implications for Pakistan”. Islamabad: Institute of Strategic Students. Mc Geary, J. (October 22, 2001).” The World’s Toughest Job”. TIME. Ottaway, M and Lieven, A. (2002).” Rebuilding Afghanistan”. Journal of Current Affairs, No: 97. President General Pervez Musharraf Address to the Nation‖, 19 September, 2001. The News, 20 September, 2001. Pakistan Horizon, Journal Article Documents, Vol.55, No.1/2https://www.jstor.org/stable/41404013 President Musharraf (quoted in) ,Pakistan Times, 6 February 6, 2004.

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Ron Laurenzo, (February 2, 2004). “Abizaid: Pakistan Best Ally in War on Terror”. DefenseWeek. Rizvi, A, H (September 26, 2001).” Pakistan’s Foreign policy: The Dynamics of Change” . TheNation. Siddiqa, A. (Winter, 2011). “Pakistan’s Counter Terrorism Strategy: Separating Friends fromEnemies”. Op. cit. Shahzad, S. S. (30, January, 2008). “US homes in on militants in Pakistan”. Asia Times Online, 2008. Soharwordi, S. H. (April 2010).”Pakistan-US Policies on the War on Terror and theTaliban:Allies at Loggerheads”.Pakistan Horizon, Vol.63,No.2, Security Concernsin South and West Asia,Pakistan Institute of International Affairs. Rafique, N. (2004). “Pakistan – US relations since 9/11: Chronology of Events”. Islamabad: Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS). Sharan, T. (28 August 2011). ”The Dynamics of Elite Networks and Patron- Client relations in Afghanistan”. Europe-Asia Studies, Vol.63, No.6, Routledge-Taylor & Frances Group. Simonian, H and Huband, M. (6 November 2002). “Risk of al-Qaeda strike has reached new dimension”. Financial Times Simpson, J and Littlewood, J. (17 December 2003). “A Framework for Assessing UK Responses to CBRN Terrorism”.British International Studies Association 28th Annual Conference.UK: The University of Birmingham Tang, A. (2006). “Pakistan Accused of Supporting Taliban”.website: http://www.afghannewscenter.com/news/2006/dec Taylor & Francis Group. (2004). “The Europa World Year Book”. 45thEdition , Vol I, International Organisations Countries: Afghanistan-Jordan, Europa Publications.

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Tajik, H. S. (winter, 2011). “Analysis of Peace Agreements with Militants and Recommendations for Future”, Conflict and Peace Studies, 4:1, 51. Talib, F. “Taliban Up Rises to Put Pakistan in Pressure”, Retrieved September 15th 2017, from PIPS, website: http://san- pips.com/index.asp. Tenet, G. (2007). “At the Center of the Storm: My Years at the CIA”. New York: Harper Collins. Aid To Pakistan by the Numbers,” available on http:llwww.cgdev.org(The Frontier Post (Peshawar), October 18, 2001.) (International Crisis Group, Asia Report, No.68, December, 2003, p.45). (The News, February 14, 2002.p.2.). Thomas H. Johnson and M. Chris Mason.(Spring 2008). “No Sign until the Burst of Fire: Understanding the Pakistan-Afghanistan Frontier.” Quarterly Journal: International Security, vol. 32. no. 4. The News, The Nation, Dawn, 19 January , 2004. The Taliban are Forced out of Afghanistan, 7 October-9 December 2001, BBC, http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/events/the_taliban_are_forced_out_ of_afghanistan Verma, K. J.( 15 May 2017). “Taliban Gainng Strength in Afghanistan: Alarm Bells for Region”. Indian Defence Review, South Asia monitor,http://www.indiandefencereview.com/spotlights/taliban- gaining-strength-in-afghanistan-alarm-bells-for-region War on Terror: Perspectives.” Newsweek. 1 Oct. 200 Weaver, A. M. (2002), quoted General Pervez Musharraf interview in, “Pakistan: In the Shadow of Jihad and Afghanistan”. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.

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CHAPTER 4

PAKISTAN’S AFGHAN POLICY POST 9/11: CHALLENGES AND PROSPECTS

This chapter is divided into three parts: internal challenges, external challenges and prospects as a result of Pakistan’ post 9/11 Afghan policy. First part evaluates the internal challenges Pakistan faced post 9/11 Afghan policy over Pakistan’s internal security and peace such as, FATA (merged in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa on 31st May 2018), impact on Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, unstable democracy and growing. Second, part deals with external challenges impacting on Pakistan’s national security, economic and political challenges like, closeness of US with India and consequent impact on Pakistan’s security, Pak-Iran relations, Pak-US relations, Kashmir issue. Third part of this chapter deals with the prospects like, revival of Pak-US relations and Pakistan received a lot of international aid as a result of Pakistan’s Post 9/11 Afghan policy.

4.1 CHALLENGES: Pakistan played role of frontline state in US led GWOT, in post 9/11 Afghanistan against Al-Qaida and Taliban, however, it could not effectively stop emergence of uprisings and rebellions in its territory. Similarly, it also could not control entrance and escape of Taliban-led insurgents and Al-Qaida militants in South and North of Waziristan (Grare 2006, 6) porous character of Durand line is the major reason for that. Owing to these weaknesses, these militants’ organizations began reorganizing in FATA (now merged in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa), in 2004; however, intelligence agencies of Pakistan repeatedly ignored them and denied their presence in the region (Rashid 2012, 46-89). As

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Pakistan was having tension with India on its eastern border (Smith: 2002, 42) it could not pay required attention on what was happening on its western border. Hence, Al-Qaeda took advantage of this situation and began insurgency in Afghanistan. Further, to safeguard and justify their presence in FATA (now merged in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in 2018), foreign militants persuaded local tribes to form militant groups for waging Jihad against whoever stops them (Rana: 2009, 3). Similarly, intelligence officers of Pakistan met some foreign extremist leaders, such as Tahir of Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU, henceforth), heads of some local jihadi organizations like Jalauddin Haqqani (Rashid 2008, 269). The rationale behind meeting these heads was to pressurize Kabul for not letting use of its land by India against Pakistan (Smith: 2008). Pakistani Taliban, until 2004, focused more on recruiting forces (U.S. Department of State, Diplomacy in Action, South Asia Overview: 2003) for participating in war against US and its allies in Afghanistan as well as securing themselves from the security operations conducted by the state of Pakistan. They started earning strategic gains after they changed their tactics and started targeting security forces and officials. Similarly, other tactics like strategy of kidnapping government officials, demoralizing security forces by attacking them and later bargaining with the state for the release of their (militants) partners arrested by security forces. Around 1000 security personals had been kidnapped during 2007 and after bargaining Taliban were successful in releasing more than 500 militants. This tactic of kidnapping was the main reason which led to peace talks between State of Pakistan and Taliban. Trade and other economic activities in FATA got worsen

178 which resulted in developing war economy. People started renting their houses and services to militants. 61 Pakistan for avoiding further clash with all Taliban it made distinction between Taliban as good and bad Taliban. But this strategy bought terrorism on Pakistan’s soil and Pakistan could not save itself from the influence of Taliban-led militants (Paul: 2014, 62). Colin Powel, the then U.S. Secretary of State, paid a prompt visit to Islamabad in 2004 and notified Musharraf administration that USA would attack South Waziristan in case of Pakistan’s failure to attack Al-Qaeda militants, situated at South Waziristan. Following US threat, Musharaf administration, launched military operations in FATA. Subsequently, a peace deal was signed between Taliban and Musharraf’s administration, which led to extend and legitimize mullah- military nexus (Shehzad 2011). That deal included: to marginalize traditional Jirga system i-e, tribal council of elders and local religious clergy and replace them with Taliban to bring them into forefront as representatives of FATA, it was also agreed upon that militants would not attack any state property and personnel as well as militants would refrain from any action in Afghanistan. (Sattar, 2014) Conversely, the peace deal was proved of assistance to the armed militants and, thus, their terror compelled tribesmen and their elders not to refuse to provide support to Taliban. These tribal militants either killed numerous tribal leaders and innocent villagers or made them to run away from their home. On the other hand, the military leadership of Pakistan had faced hurdles in countering militancy in FATA and, thus, it led to additionally strengthen militants (Rashid 2000, 238-239).

61 Khadim Hussain , Managing Director at Bacha Khan Trust Education Foundation. He has been regularly writing on the issues of militancy, social development and religious extremism in FATA and Pakhtunkhwa. Interview with the author on 25th Feburary, 2017.

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As a result, these militants launched their self-styled system of Sharia until 2008 (Rashid 2008, 275). They also started FM radio station as propaganda tool and media organ, such as Al-Saha, collected funds and recruit men from each and every subsection of the tribe to expand their activities, established Sharia courts, banned sources of the government, forced tribal people girls to marry their daughters with to militants and destroyed numerous schools (Rashid 200,239-240). Some militant groups residing in agencies of Mohmand and Orakzai in FATA, Tank, Banu were making their finances by involving in criminal actions, such as, kidnapping for ransom, killings, taxes on trade and transportation etc (Rana 2009,9).These Non-State actors were aiming at destabilizing Pakistan. In FATA and Swat, they have not only murdered 400 Maliks but also civilians, religious leaders and personals of security forces were killed by them (Parveen, khalil, & Shah, 2014). The State of Pakistan wanted to control and calm the situation by initially conducting peaceful dialogues. Subsequently, a peace deal was signed between eminent tribesmen of Shakai and Musharraf administration, which could not control the activities of Taliban in FATA ( Rana & Gunaratna 2008, 71). Hence, calming down the hostilities of Pakistani Taliban, State of Pakistan decided to conduct massive operations to deal with the situation. Operation Sher- Dil in Bajaur on September 9, 2008. In April 26, 2009, operation named Operation Rah-e-Rast, in Swat valley. Safe hevens of militants in Orakzai Agency were dismantled by the air strikes. In Bara, the Operation Sirat-e-Mustakin (the path of the righteous) was conducted, as a lot of killings of minorities were done by the militants. On 2ndMay, 2011 Operation Koh-e-Sufaid was launched in Kurrum Agency (Parveen, khalil, & Shah, 2014, 239-252), and then Operation Zarb-e-Azab was started in June 24th, 2014, in North Waziristan. Operation Zarb- e -Azab though reduced the number and influence of

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Taliban in North Waziristan. These militants found safe shelter in Kunar (Afghanistan) mostly and went there. But victory against militancy cannot be claimed by the security forces as various military outfits are still presently working, such as, Uzbekistan Islamic Movement, Jamaat –ul- Ahrar, Lashkar-i-Khorasan, Jamat-ud-Dawa, Lashkar-i-Jhagvi etc (Mehmood & Azeem 2007). The retaliation of militants towards the operation Zarb-e-Azab was extremely heartless. They killed 135 students of an army run school based in Peshawar. Whole nation was grieved and international community mourned with Pakistan (Nahyan 2016, 51-52). This tragic day in December 2014 was declared as “a national tragedy day unleashed by savages”, by the Prime Minister of Pakistan (Dawn, 2014). Military courts were established as a response to militarism and within one year 2,763 militants were killed and around 90000 submitted (Shahid, 2015). Major concern faced by the State of Pakistan was the efficient settlement of Internally Displaced People (IDPS) after military operations conducted in FATA. These offensive military operations ended in creating major security and humanitarian problems. Consequently, 298,600 families displace from FATA according to the FATA Disaster Management Authority. Managing these IDP’S and then returning them safely back home was a challenge for civil and military administration of the state. But International agencies and State both could not fulfill this task (Shinwari 2010, 40). FATA, Research Center in 2013 stated researching on the major problems IDPs were facing and found out that most of the problems were related to children and women, like, health, hygiene, loss of identity, food problems and lack of shelter. US for targeting foreign and local militants in FATA started using Drones. Obama administration emphasized more on drone attacks with

181 introduction of signature strikes, than Bush’s administration. Obama , in 2013, implemented the rules for relying more on intelligence information in these drone attacks to avoid civilian casualties but lots of civilian lost their lives as it was declared by US that “proposed targets are imminent to threats to US” (Entous 2015). Though, many militants were killed in drone attacks but Al-Qaida kept on recruiting new militants from FATA (merged in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in 2018). From 2005 till April 2013, according to South Asian Terrorism Portal around 270 drone attacks were reported which resulted in killing 2496 people.62Moreover, in the wake of drawdown of US forces from Afghanistan, US would use drone strategy for attacking militant hiding in FATA (merged in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in 2018). Pakistan supported USA in catching several militants of Al-Qaida and numerous were also arrested from the major cities of Pakistan with the support of CIA (Hussain, 122-140). Militants, who were involved in attack on Parliament of India, escaped and found safe refuge at Azad Kashmir or FATA (Haque, 11). Militants kept finding refuge in tribal belt of Pakistan, For instance, Al-Jazeera TV exposed that leader of Al-Qaida, along with his vicegerent Ayman Alzawhiri, was seen roaming around the mountainous South Waziristan in 2003 (Rashid 2008, 270). 4.2 OPERATIONS CONDUCTED BY PAKISTAN’S MILITARY ON ITS SOIL: While Pakistan played vital role in achieving some major objectives of OEF like getting hold of major Al-Qaida members (discussed above) Pakistan faced a grave issue of militants using Pakistan’s soil as safe haven for conducting their terrorist activities in Afghanistan and also

62South Asian Terrorism Portal (SATP),Drone attack in Pakistan: 2005-2015

182 started operating against them in Pakistan. As stated by Brig Mehmood Shah, I told President Musharaf about the presence of Militants in Tribal belt. I was asked to prepare a list. A list of militants, their harbors, was prepared and handed over.63 4.2.1 OPERATION AL-MIZAN: This was the first major operation conducted by Pakistan’s army in FATA (merged in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in 2018). The Taliban and Al- Qaida militants after being attacked by US forces started finding safe havens in Tribal belt of Pakistan (discussed above). They got a lot of support and facilitation from the local militants. These militants in June 2002 attacked Pakistan’s security forces in South Waziristan in the area of Azam Warsak killing 12 security personals (Ahmad, 2014, p. 7). Operation Al-Mizan started against these militants in FATA but focusing particularly on South Waziristan. Moreover, basic infantry and Special Force units of the Army, and also the elite SSG (Special Service Group) were engaged in the operation ( Nabi. Adiya, 2016). The Pakistan’s objectives behind conducting this operation were:  Clear Pakistan’s soil from militants and jihadis weather local or international,  Clean Pakistan from the organizations and militant forces who wanted to or had threaten peace, security and sovereignty of Pakistan,  Get hold of the architect behind these militant groups to disturb the peace and security of Pakistan,  Foreign militants who were threatening government of Pakistan needed to be washed out from the territory of Pakistan,64

63 Brig, Mehmood Shah, Security and Defence Analyst,a retired Pakistani brigadier general who formerly headed security affairs in the tribal regions, interview with author on 4th May 2018.

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Furthermore, Al-Zawahiri’s fatwa against President Musharaf that he is assisting western forces on Pakistan’s soil was issued and the government of Pakistan wanted to stop the activities of these militants by deploying 80,000 troops in FATA (merged in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in 2018)(Jones & Fair, 2010, p. 46). The FATA area of Pakistan was not completely vacated from foreign militants, that’s why, it could be said that the objectives of operation Al-Mizan was not fulfilled (Roy .M, Khalid. I, 2016:241).

4.2.2 OPERATION KALOSHA MARCH (2004): Pakistan’s government officially asked South Waziristan’s political administration in mid 2003 to identify those locals who are harboring foreign militants there65. The administration in South Waziristan took certain actions like: conducting several shuras, consulting maliks and examining intelligence from local informants. Through these steps they were able to identify over 70 Ahmadzai Wazir tribesmen who were supporting foreign fighters (Roy.M, Khalid. I, 2016:242). Later in October, around 2500 soldiers were sent to Baghar a village in South Waziristan for capturing militants there. The Pakistan Army dispatched 2,500 soldiers to the village of Baghar in South Waziristan to capture militants (ibid). However, when on January 8, 2004 similar operation by the Pakistan army was conducted in South Waziristan they were trapped on their way back. Later at night the camp of Pakistan Army in Wana came under rocket attack from all the three sides by the militants. Operation Kalosha was started as the result of this militant attack (Tankel, 2015:31-36).

64 Author interview with Dr Faiza Bashir Associate Professor Islamia College University 65Author interview with Brig Mehmood Shah.

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The objective of this operation was to clear Wana from Foreignmilitants.Pakistani forces killed many local and foreign fighters they also destroyed an important Al- Qaida command and control center. The military of Pakistan raided a network of tunnels comprised of sophisticated several electronic equipments. However, places like Shah Alam, Tiarza, Bermal, Angoor Adda, Sarwekai, Laddha, and Wana were being targeted by the militants as a reaction of Pakistan’s military operation (Khan:34-36). Army for the operation purpose had to demolish few houses and used them as their barracks, this enraged some of the locals and they started blaming Pakistan army for their tactics (Mahsud. S, 2004: 66-67). 4.2.3 SHAKAI AGREEMENT (APRIL 2004) & SARAROGHA AGREEMENT (2005): The aftermath of Kalosha operation was a deal “Shakai Agreement” on 24th April 2004, between government of Pakistan with Ahmad Zai tribe led by Nek Mohammad. Government helped in assembling jirga of 50 members comprised of tribal elders with the assistance of leaders of JUI and Governor KP of Syed Iftikhar Hussain Shah. This agreement took place in Madrassa and was a verbal understanding. Pakistan’s government demanded for an unconditional submission of foreign militants and their local supporters and declared that it is mandatory for foreigners to register themselves with the government of Pakistan. Furthermore, no more attacks on government officials and security personals would be carried (Nawaz, 2009, p.18). Militants demanded that the army should lift the cordon; the houses demolished during operations should be reconstructed. Moreover, the militants and their supporters arrested during previous operations by Pakistan’s military should be released. Nek Mohammad Wazir and Haji Mohammad Sharif On March 27, decided the final deal with around 18 members of the jirga comprised of local ulema associated with the

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JUI and some elders from the Zalikhel tribe(at a Deobandi madrassa near Wana) (Dawn, 2004). In June 2004 Nek Mohammad died in a US drone attack and the agreement collapsed after his death66. On 7 February 2005, Pakistan army signed Sararogha agreement with Baitullah Mehsood (local militants’ leader) who was the successor of Nek Mohammed (International Crisis Group, 2006, p 17). The government of Pakistan granted amnesty to Baitullah and his associates under the six point agreement. The agreement has concluded by deciding that the militants will not only guarantee trustworthiness to the state of Pakistan. It was also but also consented to stop attacking Pakistan’s security forces. The government also agreed to remove throng from Baitullah Mehsood’s controlled areas and the compensation of raised or damaged homes must be paid to the militants. 4.2.4 OPERATION RAH-E-HAQ (2007, 2008 & 2009): This operation was conducted in three rounds in the tourist haven “Swat valley” of KP province of Pakistan. First round was in November 2007, second in mid 2008 and the last round January 2009. Militants responded back aggressively and started attacking security forces. The strategy during the last round of this operation was to shoot at sight any militant in Swat valley. This operation ended with the “Malakand agreement” between militants and Pakistan’s military (Tribune, June 15, 2014). 4.2.5 OPERATION ZALZALA (2008): This operation started from January 2008 till May. Military started this operation after the terrorists’ occupied Sararogha fort and clearing of South Waziristan (SW) from Mahsud Tribe (led by Baitullah and Abdullah Mehsud) was also the aim behind this operation (Jones &

66 Dr Faiza Bashir, Associate Professor in Political Science Department, University of Peshawar.

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Fair, 2010, p. 60). Operation Zalzala ended after military of Pakistan declared Fort Sararogh cleared from militants (IRIN News, 2011, May 30). 4.2.6 OPERATION SIRAT-E-MUSTAQEEM (JUNE 2008): Operation Sirat-e-Mustaqeem started in Khyber Agency after a serious conflict rose betweenBarelvi Ansar-ul-Islam and Deobandi Lashkar-e- Islami (Siddique.A, Jan 29, 2013). Though the agency was cleared from conducting any further terrorist activity but was not fully successful in dislocating militants (Adnan, 2012, 2-5).

4.2.7 OPERATION SHER –DIL (AUG 2008 & FEBURARY 2009): This operation was conducted in Bajaur and Swat. The aim of conducting operation Sher Dil in September 2008 was to curtail the militant groups responsible for challenging the writ of the state (Yousaf.M, 2014:75). Several aerial bombing along with heavy ammunition and a potential infantry troops were used while operation in the areas which became a major hub for the activities of militants against government officials and military and security officers of Pakistan. Those areas included: Loesam, Alizai, Nawagai and Khar (Roy.MI, Khalid.I, 2016:247-248). Extensive tunnel system was discovered during this operation and all the houses connected to this tunnel were demolished. The military got success in clearing several villages from militants during operation Sher Dil. In 2009, almost thousand Taliban were slaughtered during this operation. Many locals were displaced from their places and were sent to peaceful areas of KP (Dawn, 25 February, 2009). Faqir Muhammad was leading the militant leader there. Baitullah Mahsud was also assisting militants there in Bajur and Swat. As Bajur borders Afghanistan’s province Kunar that is why it was loaded with foreign

187 militants. To clear these areas from foreign militants, to secure border of Bajur and to find safe havens of militants in these areas were the main objective of this operation. Completion of operation Sher Dil led Pakistan military and Frontier Corps forces to Move towards Mohmand agency to conduct further operations (Ahmed, Naeem, 2014, p. 8-9). 4.2.8 OPERATION RAH-E-RAST (MAY 2009): The aim behind this operation was detain or kill Mahmood Khan and Muslim Khan along with other loyal commanders of Sufi Muhammd, Maulana Fazlullah and Baitullah Mahsud and to clear the valley of Swat from the militants (Dawn, May 31, 2009). Pakistan military was successful in retaking Mangora (largest city in the valley) and several towns which were previously in control of militants. 4.2.9 OPERATION RAH-E-NIJAT (2009 TILL 2010): Baitullah Mahsud kept operating from his secret hideout in South Waziristan. To clear South Waziristan from activities of TTP and of other militants along with their bases was the objective of this operation (Tipu Mehsud, Israr, 2014, pp. 5-7). During this operation land and air both strikes were used aginst the militants. Pakistan’s forces were able to move in Janata and Makin town after facing aggressive resistance (Ahmad, Naeem, 2014, pp. 8-9). 4.2.10 OPERATION KOH-E-SUFAID (JULY 2011): The militants of TTP captured the mainThal-Parachinar road, which connects Kurram agency with Peshawar. The agency comprised of large Shia Muslim population was captured by these Sunni militants (Nabi. A, Dec 28, 2016). This operation was launched against those TTP militants in Kurram agency on 4th of July 2011 (The News, 2013, July 2). The operation continued till June 2013 against TTP.

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4.2.11 OPERATION ZARB – E- AZAB: The militant groups like, TTP, Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LJ), Haqqani Network, Al-Qaeda and Jundallah (Rana.A, 2017: 32). The strategy used for this operation was Seek-Destroy-Clear- Hold67(Policy Perspective, 2015:93-107). The strategy meant to find the target first, once it’s found it should be destroyed, after destruction of that target the particular area should be cleared from any weapon, body or infrastructure and then get hold of that area or place. Operation Zarb-e-Azab ended by destroying the backbone of the terrorists by dismentaling their structure, disrupting their sleeper cells. Many terrorists were killed, many militant hide outs were destroyed and many were arrested during one and a half year of this operation (Zahid.F, July 10, 2015). However, Pakistan’s military faced huge losses also. 4.3 PAKISTAN’S PARTICIPATION IN WAR ON TERROR: IMPACT ON FATA (MERGED IN KHYBER PAKHTUNKHWA IN 2018): Pakistan’s participation in GWOT post 9/11 in Afghanistan impacted FATA political-administratively, socio-culturally and economically. Frontier Crime Regulations (FCR)68 deals with Law in FATA. It gives Political, Administrative and some sweeping judicial powers to

67Seek and Destroy component is from the Vietnam War, while clear and Hold component is from the Iraq War. 68 Frontier Crimes Regulations (FCR) comprises a special set of laws of Pakistan which are applicable to the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) (merged in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in 2018). of northwestern Pakistan. The law states that three basic rights are not applicable to the residents of FATA (merged in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in 2018). – appeal i-e, the right to request a change to a conviction in any court,,wakeel the right to legal representation i-e,and daleel i-e, the right to present reasoned evidence, respectively. The FCR has its origins in the Murderous

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Political Agent (P.A) appointed by the government in center of any agency. FCR gives inclusive power to the P.A of arresting any or all members of the tribe whose member has committed crime. Moreover, actions taken by P.A could not be challenged in any High Court, Supreme Court or any Court of Law. (Sabri: 1999, 202) P.A possessed an absolute authority in political and administrative sphere. The main instrument through which P.A controls his Political Agency and administration are Maliks69 of the Tribe. For attainment of loyalty and favour of these Maliks, they are paid and privileged by P.A. these privileges includes hospitals, jirga Halls, Schools, jobs in Khasadar force. Such government institutions granted to them were either used as guest house/ rooms or they used to sell them further (Focus on FATA: 2005, 4). Hence, Maliks serves as a bridge between P.A’s administration and tribes. They not only played role of the mouth piece of P.A, conveyed their messages and decisions to their people but also did spying for the P.A. Consequently, conducting such significant tasks for the political administration in agencies makes these Maliks influential and plays a very important role in local jirgas 70(Khan, 78). Under FCR, in tribal system all debatable issues raised between political administrations of the relative agency with tribesmen of that

Outrages Regulation (FOR) which was enacted by the British Empire to prosecute crimes in British India. The Murderous Outrages Act 1877 was specifically devised to counter the opposition of the Pashtuns to British rule, and their main objective was to protect the interests of the British Empire. The laws are currently applied by the Government of Pakistan to FATA residents. 69 Malik is the leader of the Tribe in FATA. Yet doesn’t possess absolute powers. Several factors for the attainment of the title of Malik are: experience, charismatic personality, inter-personal communication skills, wealth, family back ground and influence and approval of government . 70 A formal meeting called by the tribal elders for the settlement of disputes, with the power to impose penalty on both the disputed parties.

190 agency, are resolved by jirga system. These influential Maliks in actual practice just used to read out the verdict in jirgas and these verdicts were handed to Maliks by P.A. Post 9/11, Pakistan decided to side along US and its allies in War against militants of Al-Qaida and Taliban in Afghanistan. These militants after facing aggression in Afghanistan started moving across the border through porous border they share with Pakistan. FATA located on Durand line became best option for Taliban to convert it in their camp for further planning (Washington Post: 2007, 3). Tension mounted on Indo-Pak border around 2002 and Pakistan stopped deploying its army on western border, it also gave a good chance to Taliban for establishing allies with local tribes in FATA (merged in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in 2018). (Rashid: 2010, 148) Taliban wanted support and favour of locals in FATA; they started punishing/hanging criminals and dacoits. They threw the image of implementing true Islam. Taliban in FATA (merged in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in 2018) banned internet, television and setup their own Courts and administration. A recruitment office was setup in Wana (South Waziristan) (Zahid Hussain: 2010, 97). Since long FATA (merged in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in 2018) was deprived of their rights and privileges by the government that is the reason they found relieve in Taliban’s Amir Court. (Zahid Hussain: 2010, 97) Political Administration of P.A in FATA (merged in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in 2018) was replaced by Court of Taliban’s Amir. Amir’s Court had Shura which was comprised of Ulema who used to interpret Islamic Law in accordance with local traditions and customs. (The Fronteir Post: 2006) These courts soon gained confidence of tribal people by providing speedy justice to them. Taliban’s position strengthened in FATA (merged in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in 2018).

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Subsequently, Taliban to further strengthen their positions had to get rid of Maliks and Political Agents. Courts of Amir commenced jihad by claiming all Maliks and political Agents corrupt. They were then killed or kidnapped for ransom by Taliban. (Shah Sikandar, 205) Consequently, Amir became the chief of maintaining Law and Order in FATA (merged in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in 2018). Eventually, the power struggle was won by the Mulla from Maliks, resulting in ending the power system exercised by Maliks and Political Agents setup by British government (Shah Sikandar, 205).

4.3.1 IMPACT ON SOCIETY: FATA, due to lack of urbanization, illiteracy, absence of modern institutions and detachment from national mainstream remained more traditional and rigid in their practices. Pakhtunwali 71 is very religiously in FATA. Post 9/11 changes in the region also bought changes in Pakhtunwali and some new and abrupt trends were also inculcated in the tribal societies of FATA. (Economist: 2007) 4.3.1. A EXTREMISM: FATA was comprised of Pathans who were comparatively more peaceful then settled Pathans. Moreover, the crime rate in FATA was

71 Pathan community as a whole and FATA in particular is hosts to hundreds of customs and traditions. They take pride in their code of life. This code of life is known as Pakhtunwali. Pakhtunwali consists of some common habits and practices like , Melmastia(Hospitality), Nanawati(application of mercy/ status of forgiveness),Badal(revenge)the only way to avoid Badal is Nanawati, Naang (courage,generosity,grace), Ghairat (courage to protect one’s own rights or tribe’s prestige), Marrana ( bravery), Jirga (formal meeting called by Tribal elders for the settlement of disputes with the power to impose penalty on both the disputing parties), Athanr(special tribal dance), Badi (animosity), Badraga (if anyone happens to move through the tribal territory, his protection is the responsibility of that tribe through which he moves), Cheegha ( constituting a team of tribe ).

192 lesser then the developed areas. Regardless, of the fact that during Soviet war in Afghanistan, US flooded FATA with dollars and groups were indulged into jihad, they remained peaceful but religious extremism kept rising. (Ahmad: 1983) These jihadi groups fought for US objectives in Afghanistan, later after Soviet forces withdrew from Afghanistan; these groups became active for attainment of Strategic Depth a long term determinant of Pakistan Afghan policy, in Afghanistan. But, post 9/11 Pakistan joined GWOT of US against Al-Qaida, this strategy of Strategic Depth was not followed (Hilali: 2005, 249). Pakistan Post 9/11 incident decided to be a front line ally of US in GWOT, and agreed on sharing not only intelligence but also to provide logistic support for trekking and handing over Al-Qaida members and Taliban to them. This situation was alarming for Al-Qaida and Taliban and they started crossing long and porous Pak-Afghan border, making tribal belt of Pakistan as their new base. These jihadis were comprised of not only native Taliban but also foreign jihadis. (Christine.Nicholas:2006, 2) US pressure ,asking and expecting “Do more “ from Pakistan Army became intense and resulted in operation in FATA (merged in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in 2018) (discussed in above).These operations , drone attacks by US in FATA(merged in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in 2018) resulted in killing innocents there. Consequently, anti-US feelings and hatred for Pakistan’s Army started flourishing. In the mean while, Jihadi propaganda by militants through Radio in FATA (merged in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in 2018) commenced, which resulted in converting the minds of illiterate and innocent people to believe and strive for Badal (Spain: 1963, 64) against Pakistan Army. They challenged the Government’s writ and attacks over security forces and kidnapping of government servants started taking place. Hence,

193 extremism and violence became so intense that the area which was previously peaceful turned into war zone.

4.3.1. B ENMITY: Tribal men being illiterate used to be involved in inter tribal fueds and enmity. They used to be in fueds with their cousins (Tarboors). With the rising of Taliban’s influence in tribal area, those tribes who were weak in front of their Tarboor found chance of increasing their strength by joining Taliban. On contrary, it also complimented Taliban’s rise and strength in FATA (merged in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in 2018). These weak tribals got strength form Taliban and could easily take revenge from their Tarboor either by killing or kidnapping them. Destabilizing the economic strength and position of Tribes according to their wishes became easy for them. (Frontier Post: 2007) FATA (merged in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in 2018) is a mountainous area. Several tribes lives on mountains and at times enmity arises on the claim of ownership of the mountain. This enmity is based on Tribal’s intra-fueds “Wesh” means division on inheritance. (Spain: 1972, 89)Such ownership claims are decided by jirgas if not, they remained disputed. Amir of Taliban post 9/11 resolved or intensified these claims on the basis of their own interest. 4.3.1. C STATUS OF WOMEN: Under tribal practices women play no role in decision making, economic fields’ etc. tribal society has always been a male dominating society. In plain parts of FATA (merged in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in 2018) women observed strict “Purdah” means veil. (IPRI: 2008, 31) In contrary, those parts of FATA (merged in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in 2018) which are mountainous, women used to go to “Gudaar” a place consisting of natural water reservoirs to fetch water. They also used to go out for the purpose of collecting woods for lilting fire for cooking.

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Hence, there were hardly some restrictions over the movement of women in these mountainous areas. Though, women there kept conducting their duties in accordance to the wishes of male members of their family. Though, they used to move freely but no one could dare to intrude in the honor of women due to strict tribal practices and tribal codes which cannot even hesitate in granting death penalty if someone spoils the chastity of women. Some practices regarding women used to be observed like if anyone in family kill someone from another family, and then the jirga decide the punishment Qisa, Deyat or Swara for the family of the culprit will be granted by the family of the deceased. Swara, is when the assains family gives the hand of woman from their family to the family of deceased (Hussain: 1990, 30). This practice compels women to bear the punishment of the crime which she has never committed. FATA women in some parts of Tribal areas were also sold like a commodity. The amount paid for a woman is dependent upon how active she is in different household tasks, her beauty also compliments in her value. This practice is known as “Sar”, means head money or bride’s money. If a woman is a divorce she could still be sold but her price reduces. Polygamy is a normal practice in tribal society. After Pakistan’s participation in crushing militants with US in Afghanistan and then movement of Taliban in FATA and establishment of Amir’s court, these practices related to women altered abruptly. Amir of Taliban imposed strictness on purdah and movement of women. Previously, the head money for a woman ranged between PKR 1-2 lakhs, but Amir fixed this money at PKR 80,000 .He also claimed that this head money should be considered as a dowry which should be paid to her guardian instead of her. Engagements of infants by their families were declared null and void by Taliban Amir and he claimed that such practices were against the Islamic rights granted to

195 people. Under Taliban’s influence a choice to the divorced women is given of either leading her life at her Father’s or Brother’s place or she wants to re marry. If she opts for re-marrying then she should be married in her previous in-laws. Swara was also banned by Taliban. Women could only commit legal marriages and could not be used as a commodity under Taliban’s administration. As a punishment for crime only options given to the deceased family was Diyat, Qisas and forgiveness. Women though were kept within four walls of their house but were also granted some basic rights which they were deprived off earlier.

4.3.1. D ARMS CARRYING CUSTOM: FATA (merged in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in 2018) have never changed and developed in political, constitutional and legal sphere, reason being ruled under FCR Since it was installed in 1901. Moreover, state does not take responsibility of protection of fundamental rights of tribes and of its people. Consequently, people of FATA (merged in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in 2018) protect their rights themselves. This leads to carrying of arms and weapons with them when they move around. Hence, possession and carrying of arms has become a common practice there.(Shinwari:2008, 45)the arms tribal’s used to carry ranged from the simplest dagger to the most modern arm, i-e, kalashinikov popularly known as AK-47. Carrying these arms was also considered as a symbol of status. But, using these arms was not very common as the code of conduct of FATA brings strict repercussions then. Arms sophistication in FATA (merged in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in 2018) started post Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (ibid, 46) factories of arms and weapons were installed in most of the agencies. MiranShah, headquarter of North Waziristan Agency and Derra Adam Khel are quite famous for the production of arms and its dealing.

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Post 9/11, conventional arms like dagger and rifle were replaced by high quality explosives and suicide jackets. It was then used by the militants for target killing, public slaughtering and suicidal attacks.

4.3.1. E EDUCATION: Government of Pakistan never took educational system in FATA seriously. That is the reason that the improvement in educational system in FATA (merged in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in 2018) was very slow. There were thousands of primary, middle and high schools in FATA (merged in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in 2018). But, instead of using them for educational purposes they were either given by P.A as a bribe to Maliks of the particular agency or sell to them in order to gain their favour and cooperation. These Maliks used to become owner of the building famously known as Malik-i-Makan there (Rahmanullah: 2007) the literacy rate in FATA (merged in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in 2018) was 17% out of that female literacy rate was just 3% (ibid). Teaching staff in FATA (merged in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in 2018) was more obedient to Maliks because they had power to transfer them on their will. These schools were used as Hujras (place for guests). Many schools in FATA (merged in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in 2018) were ghosts’ schools. Though these schools used to get their funds for repairing, furniture and other educational purposes. Ghost schools kept withdrawing their salaries (Khan. A, 6 September 2013).since, female education system was not very popular and supportive there girls schools were not functioning. Secondly, female teachers appointed there were mostly not local, and living in FATA (merged in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in 2018) was not very easy and accessible for them. Post 9/11, Taliban after taking refuge in FATA (merged in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in 2018) from the aggression of US and its allies in Afghanistan targeted schools mostly. They specially focused more on

197 girl’s schools. Taliban declared female education unislamic. (Hussain Zahid: 2010, 97) Taliban blew many girls school.

Government servants appointed there in FATA (merged in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in 2018), were warned by Taliban for performing their duties. Ultimately, all educational activities and institutions were closed down by Taliban. Taliban’s basic focus was on religious based education focusing more on jihadi curriculum and literature.To fulfill their objective they established chains of Madrassas where religious teaching based on jihadi curriculum was taught. Moreover, training centers for jihad were established throughout FATA (merged in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in 2018) (Maleki: 2009).

4.3.1. F ECONOMIC LIFE: FATA (merged in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in 2018) has mountainous terrain. It has small pieces of land between mountain, crops like wheat, Maze, Rice, Sugarcane and fruits like orange, apple, peach and dates were produced there. Some dry fruits like nuts and chalghosas. The climate of FATA (merged in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in 2018) is suitable for agriculture but the terrain is not. Those small pieces of land s between the mountains were cultivated by farmers. They used to earn their bread and butter from farming. Other common means of earning livelihood apart from farming was small business, daily wagging as a worker or shop keeper. Post GWOT, 2001, FATA’s (merged in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in 2018) in secured scenario for life and property distracted economic activities. Taliban for raising funds for the purpose jihadi activities started imposing tax on the tribals, who were indulged in any kind of business or work.

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The economy of FATA (merged in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in 2018) turned into war economy people joining Taliban for any rank or activity/task were paid by Taliban. Those tribals who lend their houses to the members of Al-Qaida organization were paid heavy rents. Those tribals who were helping Taliban either local or foreigner was becoming rich (Frontier Post: 2007). Hence, those Tribals helping in providing safe sanctuary to Taliban or any other task for them became rich and powerful, and they used their power for killing any one. Post 9/11 smuggling routes for exploitation of Trade Transit agreement of Aghanistan72 were illegally either re-exported or sold in Pakistan.

Total Schools destroyed: Agency Region Boys Girls Total Bajaur 68 27 95

Mohmand 66 22 88

Khyber 31 27 58

Kurram 45 16 61

Orakzai 23 11 34

North Waziristan 23 9 32 South Waziristan 29 6 35

FR Peshawar 11 4 15

FR Kohat 17 15 32

72 Afghan Transit Trade Agreement, under which goods may be imported duty

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FR Tank 2 2 4

FR Lakki 2 2 4

Total 317 141 458

Source: FATA (merged in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in 2018) Research Centre Note: The schools destroyed include primary, middle, high and Secondary schools and a college. 4.4 IMPACT ON KYBER PAKHTUNKHWA (KP): 4.4.1 POLITICAL SITUATION: Disturbance in FATA (merged in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in 2018) post 9/11 bought insecurity and raised the issue of domestic security for Pakistan. Operations in FATA (merged in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in 2018) and Swat have kept the military of Pakistan over-stretched and also resulted in crating in security in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. It also disturbed the socio-political and economic structure of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. This involvement of Pakistan’s Army in FATA (merged in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in 2018) and US led GWOT in Afghanistan post 9/11 developed the feeling of hatred towards Pakistan’s army and President Musharaf, particularly in Pahtuns. Pakistan Institute of Peace Studies (PIPS) conducted a survey and according to that survey, around 18% of Madrassas in Pakistan are affiliated with sectarian groups and jihadis. About 81% of students in these Madrassas are against military operations in FATA and 78% are against Pakistan’s participation in GWOT. Similarly, 21% of students believe that the insurgency in FATA is the reaction to Pakistan participation in GWOT (Rana, 2009).

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The tribal elders considered the military intervention in FATA (merged in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in 2018) as a peril to their hold and rule there (Mazari, 2004). Pashtunsstarting taking GWOT as war against Islam thus led towards strengthening of local Taliban. Moreover, Mulla Umar ruled Taliban Regime in Afghanistan before 9/11, was educated in Pakistani religious Madrassa and he was also a Pashtun. He was considered as a ray of hope for Islamic caliphate by Pahtuns. These were the reasons that any attack on them and their associates were criticized in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Such disturbances resulted in low trade, low foreign investment, fear, uncertainty in country leading to distressing impact on society and economy (Mahmood, 2002). The policies of Musarraf regime and military actions against Taliban also worsen situation for Khyber Pakhtunkhwa government led by Mutahida Majlis-I-Amal (MMA). In January 2002, MMA was formed; it was comprised of 26 religious parties and small groups and together they decided to contest an election in October 2002. MMA opposed US led GWOT and also Pak-US partnership comprised of six major parties from Pak-Afghan Defense Council (ICG, Asia Report, 2003). MMA, also aimed at the exclusion of foreign powers and influence from decision making of external policies of Pakistan as well as they promised to provide all kinds of diplomatic support to the citizens of Afghanistan, Palestine, Chechnya and Kashmir (Khan, 2001). The election campaign was entirely focused by MMA on supporting and bringing justice to Muslim Ummah, on opposing Pakistan’s role in GWOT and against the internal and external policies of military regime of Pakistan. Consequently, MMA emerged as a third large party after gaining 53 general seats in National Assembly, comprising of 14 reserved seats for women, 10 minorities and 8 from FATA (merged in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in 2018). Similarly, clear majority was attained in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa by securing 48 general seats out of 99 and

201 securing 15 general seats out of 51 in Baluchistan province. Resultantly, in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa an independent government was formed by MMA and in Baluchistan MMA formed a government in coalition with Pakistan Muslim League (Election Commission of Pakistan, 2001). MMA claimed that their success is against liberal policies supported by some forces in the state and also against US interest (Naqvi, 2002). Moreover, MMA kept denouncing Pak-US alliance against terrorism in Afghanistan and FATA (merged in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in 2018). However, MMA could not sustain their success and secured 6 seats in National Assembly, 10 in Baluchistan, 14 in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and only 2 seats in Punjab (Election Commission of Pakistan, 2008). Failure of MMA was attributed to its inability to fulfill the promises it made. Continuous bombing and terror attacks in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, made the everyday life miserable as the infra structure of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa was damaged and local business was ruined. Moreover, Swat, Dir and Mingora, suffered the most loss in business, great loss in tourism due to grave law and order situation. Moreover, developmental projects like Reconstruction Opportunity Zone (ROZ), Gomal Zam Dam, Kurram Tangi Dam and Munda Dam could not be initiated due to serious security issues. Moreover, several terror attacks were conducted in Swat on educational institutes, approximately 188 girls schools’ and 97 boys’ were destroyed. This uncertain situation halted students from attending their schools (Shah, 2008). Hence, the economic situation in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa detoriated and the people in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa suffered mental, emotional, physical, economic and social loss. Terrorist acts and anti-Terrorist actions resulted in displacement of a large number of FATA (merged in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in 2018) and Swat inhabitants and taking refuge in different areas of Khyber

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Pakhtunkhwa, mainly, District Swabi, Mardan, Tank, Dera Ismail Khan and Nowshera. According to National Database Registration (NADRA) about 1.9 million IDPs were registered. Similarly, 428,000 IDPs were registered from South Waziristan in 2009. Moreover, 96% of these IDPs were registered in KPK (UNOCHA Report, 2009). In September 2009, about 1.6 million IDPs were repatriated to their homes and around 1.1 million remained as IDPs (IDMC, 2010). Consequently, the economy of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa was burdened and a lot of pressure was exerted over the available resources of the province. Repatriation of IDPs was also a challenging task for the government as the IDPs feared from going back to their homes due to the poor economic situation and terror from the militants there. 4.5 IMPACT ON PAKISTAN: 4.5.1 ECONOMIC COST: A country’s internal security is very important, Pakistan post 9/11 faced several internal security challenges not only as physical security but also to its citizens. Consequently, these security challenges have impacted on many domestic factors like, governance, terrorism, energy, water crises and economy. Pakistan’s economy suffered tremendously. Till 2008 Pakistan was granted US $ 11 billion under coalition support fund and further $ 7.5 Billion dollars were to be given to Pakistan in Kerry Lugar Bill in next 5 years. This grant was however; lower than the cost paid by Pakistan,i-e, $ 68 Billion due to terrorism and extremism.73(Dawn: 2011) This cost of economic assets were categorized in two groups, firstly, human loss as population of a state is its assets (Hoeflich, 2009)74, hurdles in economic projects and activities, damage to infrastructure. Secondly, worsening impact over

203 the production and domestic and foreign investment in Pakistan (Arshad Ali: 2009).75 Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) kept falling due to worse law and order situation in Pakistan. FDI dropped down straight by 67% in mid of 2012. A famous economist A. B. Shahid stated that the factors responsible for the fall of FDI are continuous militancy and poor management. (Express Tribune: 2012). 76 Similarly, tourism also got affected and its contribution in Pakistan’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) reduced enormously77. Such economic loss could not be countered as poor governance, corrupt and improper management, huge population, interest of political and security elites and religious fundamentals and growing militancy in the society had deep roots.78 4.5.2 GROWING EXTREMISM, SECTARIANISM AND INTOLERANCE IN SOCIETY: Extremism, a severe problem opening doors to social, economic, political, cultural, security and humanitarian catastrophe in Pakistan. Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 introduced extremism in the society. Incident of 9/11 further accelerated extremism in Pakistan. Social problems such as poverty, illiteracy, social injustice, inequality are internal factors and externally Pakistan’s participation in proxy’s war and then GWOT added fuel to growing extremism. Extremism, Pakistan was facing in its society was religious extremism, resulting in Pakistan’s tribal areas turning into safe havens for local and foreign terrorist, whose objectives were in contrast with the national interest of Pakistan. Resultantly, Pakistan’s Army conducted operations in its tribal areas. Consequently, people in tribal areas had to leave their

204 place and became Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), who not only faced financial problems but also physical and mental distress. Moreover, Numerous Drone attacks over tribal belt not only killing terrorist but also innocent locals. Liberal politician Benazir Bhutto was murdered. Religious Extremism gave rise to sectarianism, resulting into hitting opposite sects and religions in Pakistan. Several incidents like brutally killing passengers by taking them out from bus of Shia community (Hazaras), attacks on Christian’s community in Gojra and in Lahore on Qadyyanis took place due to the religious extremism in the society (Alamgir , 2011).79 This religious extremism has played chaos in society, resulting in killing almost 60 Hazaras80 every month in Quetta and about 50,000 Hazaras migrated from Balochistan (Express Tribune, 2012).81 This extremism and intolerance also targeted minorities, Ahmadis82 severly in 2010 (Express Tribune, 2012)83, then in Punjab burning Christain village. Moreover, hitting of a professor by his students in Punjab university , murder of Governer Punjab Salman Taseer, by his body guard Mumtaz Qadri,he was appreciated for his act by thousands of people , young lawyers and they all demanded release of Mumtaz Qadri. Reason being his opposition for blasphemy Law , later killing Shahbaz Bhatti minorities Minister on the same reason

80The Hazaras are an ethnic group native to the region of Hazarajat in central Afghanistan, speaking the Hazaragi variant of Dari, itself an eastern variety of Persian and one of the two official languages of Afghanistan.

82Ahmadis are considered non-Muslims by many mainstream Muslims since they consider Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, the founder of the movement, to be the promised Mahdi and Messiah awaited by the Muslims. The Ahmadis are active translators of the Qur'an and proselytizers for the faith.

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(Gall, 2011).84This intolerance is the result of the conspiracy theory taught through media, large number of intellectual, school texts etc. Resultantly, an intolerant and exclusivist society started emerging latent militant radicalism (Siddiqa, 2012).85 4.5.3 DEMOCRACY: Military’s hold over Pakistan’s internal politics after Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan became strengthened and its hold over foreign policy of Pakistan remained stronger as always. Pakistan’s establishment kept the objective of Strategic Depth in Afghanistan even after takeover of civilian government. In 1997, Nawaz Sharif’s government wanted to bring some reforms in political system and tried to strengthen democracy and the step taken for this purpose was appointment of General Musharaf as an Army Chief in 1998(Bennett: 2003.58)86Many factors like religious forces were not happy with these reforms and resulted in two attacks on Nawaz Sharif. But the Kargil incident further raised tension between military and civil administration. These tensions led to the fourth military coup in Pakistan in October 1999. General Musharaf kept religious forces intact but contrary with the Zia’s rule, Musharaf’s intentions were more of strategic and tactical 87(Bennett: 2003.101). Post 9/11, Musharaf decided to join GWOT against Taliban in Afghanistan. The policy makers of Pakistan decided to keep religious parties intact in order to retain military rule and to keep moderate and secular parties especially, PML-N &PPP away from threatening military rule. Many political leaders were disqualified on the basis of graduation though degrees of Madrassas were

206 considered as valid (ibid, 102).88Later, general elections in 2002 were manipulated by religious parties and Mutahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA). Military operations in Tribal areas exposed Intelligence officials and empowered religious parties backing Taliban in Kabul for fighting back against international coalition. Moreover, pressure from the civil society, confrontation with Judiciary, Lal Masjid operation, assassination of Benazir Bhutto added fuel to the worsening political situation and Musharaf era ended. February, 2008, democracy was restored, it did face challenges but it succeeded in completing its five years. During democratic era foreign policy was dealt with the establishment, they were dealing with the militants and militancy in FATA.

Though militancy had defused in some settled areas from FATA (now merged in Khyber PukhtunKhwa) in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa like Swat. Political government was facing tension with military establishment, corruption, energy crises, inflation, some political parties who were part of government coalition such as Mutahida Majlis I Amal (MQM) demanded concessions from the government or black mailed the government with the threat of withdrawing from the coalition (Kronstadt, 2011:33)89. Moreover, the democratic government stayed in conflict with judiciary which resulted in civil society and lawyers’ movement corruption committed by politicians. Resultantly, judiciary was restored and Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gaillani was removed from his position by the judiciary. Zardari’s government kept facing chaos by continuous insurgencies in Balochistan, Sectarian Massacre of Shia community particularly Hazaras, Memo Gate Scandal and then operation of US Marines in

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Abbotabbad , Pakistan which resulted in killing of Al-Qaida leader Osama Bin Laden (Waseem, Daily Dawn, 2011)90. Many religious factions and rightists kept pressurizing political government to stay away from GWOT.91 Despite of all such hurdles elected government was able to complete their constitutional term successfully.

4.6 EXTERNAL FACTORS: 4.6.1 INDO-US COLLABORATION POST 9/11: India’s response on 9/11, 2001 attack on US was very prompt. India offered its unconditional support to US and its allies as It expected to attain its objectives in Afghanistan (Washington Post, 2001 September 17).India was expecting that Pakistan would never be able to deliver US what favour they want from Pakistan in Afghanistan. Consequently, India decided to come hard on Pakistan (Pirzada, 2001:5)92. India never wanted Pakistan to collaborate with US in carrying its Regional policy. Indian high officials kept propagating themselves as a victim of terrorism and Pakistan as a terrorist state. Similarly, taking advantage of situation that US was serious against Terrorist organization; India kept condemning Kashmiri militancy this act of Indian policy resulted in US placing Jaish- I-Muhammad on US terrorist list.

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Indo-US relations flourished because US wanted to counter China in Asia.93 US policy in Asia is highly China centric. And India wanted to avail this chance in countering Pakistan. There was convergence in their interest in Asia. (Pakistan Vision Vol. 10 No. 2.134).94 Indo-US signed a huge weapon deal post 9/11, on 17th April, 2002. Under this deal 8 Raytheon Co. raders locating long range weapons, Radar system for detecting enemy’s long range missiles, morters rockets which was worth US $ 146 million(Dawn, 2002).95Israel’s Phalcon airborne worth US $ 1.2 billion was also approved by US to be sold to India on 22ndMay, 2003 (Hindustan Times, 2003). In March 2005, during her visit to India, Condoleezza Rice, the US Secretary of State delivered US President Bush’s views to Indian Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh about transforming relations between US and India and for moving towards full cooperation in civil and nuclear field. 96She also expressed that US wants India to be her Regional and international partner, and for this partnership they will be cooperating in many ways (Times of India, 2005).Later in 2005, US signed a 10 year Defense Pact on 28thJune, 2005. US wanted to achieve two goals out of this agreement and they were: 1) Helping India in further advancing US strategic objectives in Asia, 2) Helping India in becoming major world power and projecting presence of its military beyond its territory (Mahmood, 2005). The strategic partnership between India and US further led towards US lifting its export control for nuclear and military technology without

209 even signing Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT)97 (The Nation, 2005). Privileging India in regard of providing nuclear assistance like other member states of Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT)98 was considered as dangerous by Pakistan and some international analysts. Moreover, serious concerns were shown by the Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) and denounced US nuclear assistance to India by claiming that such technology can be illegally used by India. Tauqir Hussain, a former Pakistan’s diplomat as well as a researcher In Institute for Peace in US, Deputy Director of Center for NPT and Eward J Markey a Congressman from Massachusetts were among people who openly objected over illegal nuclear supply to India.The sanctions which were imposed by US in 1998 as a result of nuclear tests conducted by India were raised by US after September 2001, as a token of recognition for support in GWOT and a nuclear agreement signed on 18thJuly, 2005(137). 4.6.2 INDO-US CLOSENESS AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR PAKISTAN: India’s strategic empowerment was seen with the conscious eye by Pakistan. Pakistan knew that these measurements of enhancing arms and weapons are to threaten Pakistan. Pakistan wanted to maintain its relations with US and China both (Pakistan Vision Vol. 10 No. 2. 135). Indo- US Deals clearly showed clearly that US doesn’t want to keep India and Pakistan on equal footings in south Asia instead wants India

97The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty is a multilateral treaty that bans all nuclear explosions, for both civilian and military purposes, in all environments. The Treaty was negotiated at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva and adopted by the United Nations General Assembly. It opened for signature on 24 September 1996. 98The NPT is a landmark international treaty whose objective is to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and weapons technology, to promote cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and to further the goal of achieving nuclear disarmament and general and complete disarmament.

210 to be stronger in the region (Pakistan Vision Vol. 10 No. 2, 150). While, Pakistan as a non-NATO ally was also given enough support and appreciation but the sole super power considered India as a much stronger associate in the region. This decision of US to disturb the strategic balance in the region is upsetting for Pakistan, and Pakistan will be forced to attain similar nuclear system. Resultantly, it will affect Pakistan’s defense budget. Indo-US deals could also provide platform for Indian troops to show their presence in several US led multi-national operations, and UN recognition is not required for that (Mahmood:2005). Obama administration made sure additional military presence of US and Allies on the Eastern border of Afghanistan (borders Pakistan). Resultantly, drone attacks on tribal areas of Pakistan over the targets of Al-Qaida and Taliban. Indian involvement in Afghanistan is always considered a serious threat by Pakistan and Pakistan has serious reservations about it. India post 9/11 not only increased its influence in Afghanistan which it has lost during Taliban era but also started working on destabilizing Baluchistan (Pakistan’s province in South-West). India in this regard provided assistance to separatist in Baluchistan (The Indian Express 2009, July 31). India for attaining its objectives in Baluchistan made Billions of economic assistance in rebuilding Afghanistan as it would provide enough grounds to Indians for staying and planning on Afghan soil. Indian regional policy is based on Kautalya’s Philosophy,” “Neighbors are regarded as enemies and an enemy’s immediate neighbor as a friend” (Kautilya 1992). Indian involvement in Afghanistan would be favored and encouraged by Indo-US strategic partnership. Indo-US Defense Partnership signed between Rumsfeld and Mukhergee would give India an opportunity to join and conduct US military operation on Afghan soil (Wirsing 2007: 160). Moreover, US President Bush thanked Indian Government and

211 people on 2nd March 2006, for pledging US $ 565 Million for Reconstruction and 50 million for construction of new Afghan National Assembly. Furthermore, he also appreciated India for their support to the Afghan democratic government. Indian involvement in Afghanistan and encouragement from US became challenging for South Asia in general and Pakistan in particular. Later, Obama’s policies were stronger towards Afghanistan and inclined towards India. Obama believed to have stricked policies in Afghanistan for attainment of peace there (Mazhar& Goraya, 2010:322). He focused more on Pakistan’s tribal areas where he believed the terrorists were being harboured. These steps opened the doors of Indian involvement in Afghanistan who shares a long porous border with Pakistan. Pakistan is highly concerned about this development and considers it as a serious threat.

4.6.3 PAKISTAN’S POST 9/11 AFGHAN POLICY AND ITS IMPACT ON PAKISTAN’S KASHMIR POLICY: Incidence of 9/11 had a very strong impact on International and Regional politics. US was very determined to fight WOT in Afghanistan and seeked world support. Pakistan as a neighbouring state also had to take decision either to stand with US or to support Taliban in Afghanistan. India expected that Pakistan would not be able to fulfill US demands for cooperation. That is why Indian Premier only after three days of terror attack blamed Pakistan for supporting terrorism and demanded for banning the aid, assistance and support to Pakistan. India wanted International community to equally consider Terrorism the world is facing with the Freedom Movement of Kashmir (Pirzada, 2001). Since the inception of Pakistan and India they had dispute over the State of Jammu and Kashmir. Pakistan over the years compelled the

212 international community resolve Kashmir Issue for the Sake of peaceful South Asia. Kashmir became the nuclear flash point after the region transformed into nuclearisation. Moreover, US Secretary of State Collin Powell, admitted that the actual bone of contention between India and Pakistan is Kashmir Issue and it can only be resolved through peaceful ways (The Frontier Post (Peshawar), October 18, 2001.) There are almost twenty seven resolutions passed in Security Council on Kashmir from 1948 until 1971. These resolutions demanded pulling out of forces of both the nations from Kashmir and conducting fair and free elections. Pakistan has been supporting its Kashmir policy based on UN resolutions till the incident of 9/11 took place. Though India never appreciated participation of third party in resolving Kashmir Issue and justifies their stance on Simla Accord between Pakistan and India in 1972. Some noteworthy Security Council Resolutions (SCR) among them is: i) SCR no 47 on 21st April 1948. ii) SCR no 91 on 30th March 1951. iii) SCR no209 on 6th September 1965. iv) SCR no307 on 21st December 1971. Since, the 9/11 incident brought such situation that Pakistan not only altered Afghan policy but also Kashmir policy. The elements of support to freedom movement in Kashmir became a matter of grave concern to US and its Western Allies. Pakistan had to entertain Western concern or it had to face the wrath of US. Moreover, the nuclear capability of Pakistan was also questioned by the international community. India kept raising its voice against freedom movement in Kashmir and called it Terrorism, also became the concern of International community who considered it as a security threat from Pakistan. In Washington, President Musharraf declared that Pakistan’s

213 position against terrorism is decisive and that Pakistan rejects any type of terrorism anywhere in the world (The News, February 14, 2002.p.2.). moreover, President Musharaf in his address in UN General Assembly very clearly stated that Pakistan is against all types of terrorism but state terrorism which suppress the rights and liberation of people by foreign state or colonial power should not be justified (South Asia Terrorism Portal, Pakistan, accessed September 7, 2007) Musharaf post 9/11 have stated about Kashmir on different forums that Pakistan looks forward to the peaceful negotiations on Kashmir issue.21 Furthermore, addressing his nation Musharaff on 12th January, 2002 affirmed that terrorism from Pakistan’s soil will not be permitted he also banned two Kashmiri based groups i-e, Laskir-i-Taiba and Jaish –i-Muhammad. General Musharaf before 9/11 had a traditional Pakistani stance towards Kashmir and was in support of Jihad in Kashmir. Post 9/11, General Musharaf from his speech on 12th January 2002, declared clearly that Pakistan wants a peaceful solution to Kashmir issue and banned activities of some extremist organization that were operative from Pakistani soil. It was 18thDecember, 2003 when President Musharaf spoke about the flexibility Pakistan was ready to show on Kashmir Policy and expected the same from India. The flexibility was meant to find way somewhere between stated positions and UN resolution on Kashmir. This flexibility led to the positive response from India for having a dialogue (Chaudhry, 2005). Musharaf suggested four points as a solution of Kashmir other then the resolution proposed by UN. These four points consisted of, dividing Jammu and Kashmir into seven zones, these zones should be demilitarized, the status of these zones should be changed and lastly they should be managed and controlled by Pakistan and India both (Matiuddin, 2004). Though these resolutions were

214 rejected by the opposition outright. It was considered as a betrayal to the Kashmir cause. But Musharaf considered talks as the best option between both the nuclear powers. Secondly, Pakistan wanted India to accept Kashmir as a disputed territory.

4.6.4 PAK-IRAN RELATIONS POST 9/11: Pakistan and Iran both states reshaped their foreign policy preferences post 9/11. Pakistan, in post 9/11 international political scenario had to compromise over its long term policy of supporting Taliban. Moreover, for Iran, fall of Taliban regime was a positive development. However, for Iran post 9/11, GWOT brought another security dilemma and that was US presence in the region and later including Iran in the Axis of Evil by Bush administration also added fuel to Iran’s threat perception (Schroen, 2005). In December 2002 Iranian President visited Pakistan which was a great step towards improvement of their bilateral relations with Pakistan. Both the states assured through joint statement that they would work together for bringing peace in Afghanistan (Sulivan, 2008). Both the sates had concerns about regional security issues. Consequently, Hassan Rowhanni Iranian Sectary of National Security Council visited Pakistan and they agreed to counter security challenges together. Similarly, both the states reached to the consensus that in ythe political process of New Regime in Afghanistan all the ethnic groups in Afghanistan would be represented (Zaman, 2012). Subsequently, Pakistan’s Prime Minister Mir Zafar Ullah Jamali visited Iran in 2003 and agreed on working together for regional security, economic ties and Pak-Iran relations as whole. For the purpose of countering security issues Pakistan and Iran designed and set joint ministerial commission. Pakistan and Iran started interacting regularly on several levels from

215 the top administration of both the states till the intelligence sharing (Sumita, 2008). Iran in 2008 supplied crude oil to Pakistan, regardless of Pakistan was facing balance of payment issues. Moreover, Pakistan post 9/11 face severe electricity crisis, Iran supplied 1100MW electricity to Pakistan for meeting this shortage. Later both the states decided to further increase economic, trade and cultural links with eachother (Basit, 2009). In this regard Joint Trade (JTC)Committee on Commerce ministerial level was held between both the states in March 2009 in Tehran, it was further decided to expand of Preferential Trade Agreement (PTA), which is working between both the states from September 2001( for almost 647 items are granted concession from both the sides) (Tehsin, 2014). Furthermore, trade between both thestaes progressed post 9/11 and reached to almost US dollar 1 Billion per annum. However, Pakistan’s policy of providing assistance to US in GWOT in Afghanistan posed some hurdles between Pak-Iran relations, like, Pakistan again moved close to US( Khan:80,2007).and Pakistan was declared as a NON NATO ally (Prior to 2001, Pakistan’s support to Taliban regime in Afghanistan was not appreciated by US. On the other hand, US and Iran were having strained relations due to Iran’s Uranium Enrichment program (Malik: 36, 2008). Indo-Iran relations post 9/11 improved more. Both the states wanted an access to Central Asian market through Afghanistan and were committed to construct Afghanistan’s infrastructure accordingly. Consequently, developing rail and road structure through the routes not passing by Pakistan was their objective. For this purpose both Iran and India started facilitating Afghanistan to have its trade through Iranian Chabahar Port instead of Karachi’s port in Pakistan. Hence, Pakistan considered this relation

216 and cooperation between Iran and India as unfavorable for Pak-Iran relations (Hussain: 33-45, 2002). Iran’s desire to have a front hold in reaching CARS is only possible if Afghanistan has a non Pahtun government and Pakistan’s objective of strategic depth could only be achieved through friendly Pashtun Afghan government. Similarly, Iran’s policy towards Afghanistan is focused over the protection of Shia community in Afghanistan and wants to establish Tajik belt across North West of Afghanistan. However, Pakistan supports Sunni groups in Afghanistan. Iran post 9/11, moved closer to Karzai’s government in Afghanistan, and was struggling to support any party and group who could minimize US influence over Karzai’s government. Regardless of US antagonism towards Iran, Afghanistan and Iran kept strong ties with each other. Iran kept dominating the Western and Northern parts of Afghanistan and also kept its influence over Hazaras. Iran strongly supported the reconstruction and rebuilding of Afghanistan by the international community (Alam: 522-566, 2004). Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, U.S and India have had a strong impact on Pak-Iran relations. There are several bone of contentions between Pak- Iran relations like, warm indo-Iranian vis-à-vis Pak-Saudi relations, existence of anti-Iranian militants in Pakistan, both the states have divergence in their interests in Afghanistan, slow progress in Iran Pipeline project and other projects between Pakistan and Iran due to immense pressure from US and no direct air link between both the states resulting in minimum people to people contact and minimum bilateral trade (CGPS: 2014, 9).

4.6.5 PAK-US RELATIONS: Post 9/11 Pakistan under immense world pressure and in grave national interest decided to join GWOT conducted by US and its allies in

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Afghanistan. Pakistan before entering into GWOT clarified that a clear line should be demarcated between freedom fighters and terrorists while operating against them. Pakistan kept convincing US that relining only on military operations in Afghanistan as it will cause deaths of innocents as well resulting in developing anti- Americanism. Similarly, Pakistan also wanted US to strive for bringing Taliban at negotiation. Hence, it was clearly declared by President Musharaf that peace Jirga of Kabul should also be included in main stream Afghan political process as they are the natives of Afghanistan (Dawn:2007). However, US avoiding Tribal sensitivities wanted to conduct quick action to stop cross border terrorism. Some of these operations were successful hence, achieving immediate objectives but resulted in increasing support and sympathies of Tribal towards Taliban. This divergence in point of view of Pakistan and US remained a hurdle in their relations. Moreover, continuous acquisition by the Afghan leaders and members of ISAF on Pakistan for not doing enough to eradicate terrorism (Akhtar R, 2006:65) also created space between Pak-US relations. Pakistan on the Afghanistan beyond Kabul and also for being incompetent to control drug economy(Khan, 2006) Pakistan also had apprehensions about the US operational strategy that was the reason Pakistan didn’t handle tribal militant leaders directly even after several requests from US . (Kapila, 2007) Consequently, Pakistan was criticized by several US influential quarters for doing enough against Terrorism. US wanted Pakistan to destroy militants in FATA as militants after being attacked in Afghanistan found safe heavens in FATA (merged in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in 2018) and they are trained in FATA (merged in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in 2018) particularly in South and North Waziristan (The News, 2006). On the contrary, Pakistan’s perspective was different, for successful military operations in FATA; Pakistan was of the opinion that by first neutralizing those

218 who are raising arms in FATA. Secondly, US and its coalition forces should try and develop long lasting association with independent leaders of FATA (Dawn, 2007). Similarly, Pakistan also conveyed to US that without the support of Tribal leaders of FATA, it would be impossible for identifying and getting hold of Taliban there (Akhtar, 2006:60).Pakistan tried to sign several peace agreements, in order to distinguish between extremist Taliban and moderate Taliban but US kept pressurizing Pakistan to act against all of them and accused Pakistan that it is wasting time in signing peace agreements. Many blocks in Pakistan thought that US is not a true friend for casting accusations and not understanding Pakistan’s point of view. President Obama while visiting India didn’t visit Pakistan in 2010, which added more bitterness in Pak-US relations and showed US’s ‘pro-India’ policy clearly. Indian relations with US are always considered as threat to Pakistan. Afghanistan’s closeness with India is also considered as being supported by foreign powers (Kronstadt, 2012, p. 4).Indo- US nuclear deal and then US claiming India as a natural power was alarming for Pakistan (Ahmad, 2011, p. 223).However, Pakistan asked and expected such deals from US but US refused and justified their refusal by not considering Pakistan a responsible state to tackle such technology. United States is particularly concerned about the state of extremism in Pakistani society. The assassination of Governor of Punjab, Salman Taseer, due to his certain remarks on Blasphemy Law in Pakistan was provoking for US. His killing by his own guard on January 4th, 2011 and later mass appreciation of his killer was seen in United States as haunting event. The same year on March, 2nd Federal Minister for Minorities was killed. He was Christian and only non-Muslim minister in federal cabinet. This event was particularly seen as violation of minorities’ rights in Pakistan. These proved to be irritants in Pak-US

219 relations. United States urged Pakistan time and again to take care of continuous violation of rights in Pakistan (Kronstadt, 2012, p. 7). 4.5.6 ISSUES BETWEEN PAKISTAN AND US POST 9/11: 4. 5. 6. A ISSUE OF HAQQANI NETWORK: US believed that Pakistan is not serious in its commitment to eliminate terrorist setup and infrastructure from FATA. Moreover, they believed that Pakistan supports and assists Al-Qaida and Taliban in FATA. In this regard the presence of the elements of Haqqani network in Pakistan became a major bone of contention between US and Pakistan. US kept pressuring Pakistan to conduct military operations against Haqqani militants and network in FATA mainly in North Waziristan.Consequently, several times US urged Pakistan to” do more” in this regard. Hillary Clinton on October 20th, 2011(The Express Tribune, 2012) and Admiral Mike Mullen US Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff demanded from Pakistan for a more strategic action against Haqqani Network (The Express Tribune, 2011). Similarly, Leon Panetta in June 2012 also threatened Pakistan for stop supporting Haqqani Network and to take hard action against their sanctuaries in FATA (merged in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in 2018) (Reuters, 2012). US governmental documents were declassified, according to Congressional Research Service Report 2012; those documents indicated that if Taliban had no sanctuaries in FATA (merged in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in 2018), Taliban would have never revived in mid 2000’s in Afghanistan (Kronstadt, 2012:27). Pakistan’s perception is different from US in regard to launch military operation against Haqqani Network. Pakistan believed that those elements and groups of Taliban, who are not willing to attack Pakistan’s assets and military and has undergone some formal/informal agreement regarding this with State of Pakistan, would not be attacked.

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Pakistan justifies its stance on the ground that Pakistan already facing fragile situation regionally and internally does not want to open battles on all fronts (Siddiqa, 2011:151). This peace deal between establishment of Pakistan and observation Council (Shura e Murakeba) was first conceded by the Sirrajuddin Haqqani, Chief Operational Commander of Haqqani Network in February 2012 (Ahmad, 219-220). This deal would be followed strictly that is why all the mujahedeen, shelter providers and refugees were informed about it. Secondly, Pakistan was also considering the post GWOT scenario, when US would leave the region and Pakistan would be tackling the terrorism. Therefore, any direction and dictation from US was not entertained by Pakistan, if it is in contrary to the interests of Pakistan in the region. Thirdly, Pakistan justifies its links with Haqqani Network on the basis of strategic depth. Indian influence in Afghanistan and singing of strategic Partnership pact in 2011 between India and Afghanistan (Dawn, 2012).further enhanced Pakistan’s vulnerability. Pakistan looking at the post US withdrawal era did not want its strategic interests to be endangered specifically related to the political setup in Afghanistan. Therefore, Pakistan wanted to keep its links with friendly militant groups and wanted to secure its geo-strategic interests.

4.6.6. B INSURGENCIES’ IN KASHMIR AND AFGHANISTAN: US governments kept considering Al-Qaida and Taliban as a security threat while Pakistan considered them as tool for their strategic depth (IISS, 2012).. US kept blaming Pakistan post 9/11 era for not being honest in eliminating Islamic militancy which is vital for stable Afghanistan. Since, 2003 US military commanders complained against Islamic militants attacking coalition forces, which they believed have safe sanctuaries in Pakistan’s Tribal areas. US top official of State

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Department in 2006 stated in a senate panel that some local/tribal governments are in coalition with Al-Qaida and Taliban but US has no solid evidence to prove this (Kronstadt, 2009).

4.6.6. C DRONE ATTACKS: US believed that FATA (merged in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in 2018) region of Pakistan is providing safe sanctuaries to Al Qaida and Taliban militants and these militants carries out terrorist attacks on coalition forces. Foreign Secretary of US in 2012 in Turkey stated that US have a right to attack those forces and groups who have attacked US (Dawn, 2012). Moreover, in same year US President’s counter terrorism advisor John Brennen while speaking at Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington D.C, also justified US policy of Drone attacks on militants in FATA and claimed these US policies as self defense (ibid). Similarly, US also declared that since Pakistan is missing the capacity to counter these militants in its FATA region such drone attacks are necessary for US security (Dawn, 2008). Pakistan on the contrary was not happy with drone attacks in its FATA region and declared them as a challenge to the sovereignty of Pakistan. Therefore, Parliament of Pakistan in April 2012 demanded for immediate end to US drone attacks and declared them as an infiltration in Pakistan’s territory (Daily Times, 2012). Moreover, Prime Minister of Pakistan in also stated that it’s only Pakistan’s right to operate inside its territory (Dawn, 2008). Drone attacks by US in FATA (merged in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in 2018) resulted in killing of many innocent people. The total number of killings reported and showed is not even three percent of killings and casualties took place in FATA (Ahmad, 221). Moreover, U.N also declared these drone attacks by US as illegal and human rights violation (Dawn, 2012). However, US did not show any flexibility on

222 its drone policies which resulted in growing mistrust between Pakistan and US.

4.6.6. D ISSUE OF DR ABDUL QADIR KHAN: US and Pakistan came at odds with the issue of Dr Abdul Qadir Khan (AQ). Dr AQ, in 2004, admitted it publicly took the responsibility of illegal transfer of nuclear technology. Dr AQ Khan stated that his intensions were not bad while doing it and he also just wanted to make his country’s security fool proof (Khan, 2004). General Musharaf, then President of Pakistan announced that any news and confession should affect Pakistan’s nuclear program (Ahmad, 222). US kept pressing Pakistan on interrogating Dr AQ on the matter of Pakistan’s illegal transfer of technology to Iran. Moreover, US was interested in finding out that to what extent assistance and logistics for that assistance were provided by AQ Khan’s network to Iran (Daily Times, 2006). Moreover, Kerry-Luggar Bill also demanded for US excess to Dr AQ Khan (Ahmad, 222). Pakistan on the other hand rejected US claims and refused to interrogate Dr AQ directly. Pakistan believed that these investigations from Dr AQ are like disgracing national scientist (ibid). Similarly, it was declared by the Foreign Officer of Pakistan Khursheed Qassoori, that Pakistan is under a lot of pressure in handling the case of Dr AQ but Pakistan will not take dictation from any state only because it is a party to War on Terror (Daily Times, 2006) US concern related to this issue is that they claim that Pakistan’s nuclear technology, expertise and weapons are not in safe hands (Kronstadt, 2012:46).

4.6.6. E INDO-US DEALS: Pakistan has shown its concern over growing Indo-US nuclear cooperation. This new development in Indo-US relations increased

223 tension and trust deficit in Pak-US relations.US President Bush while signing a bill of transferring civilian nuclear technology into law with India in 2008 declared that both the states are natural partners. He also made it clear that US is determined to eradicate terrorism along with India as both the countries have been the target of terrorism (Dawn ,2008). Since, US considered Pakistan’s nuclear technology unreliable, therefore such nuclear deals and facilities are completely denied to Pakistan. Pakistan’s Prime Minister on July 30th, 2008 conveyed to Richard N. Haass, President of the Council on Foreign Relations that US should not discriminate between India and Pakistan while giving nuclear status (Washington post, 2011).. Pakistan was of the view that growing Indo-US alliance will disturb the security paradigm of Pakistan and balance of power in the region. Pakistan believed that this nexus of US and India would have negative impact on the region and will give rise to the arm race which would have long term implications. US were not ready to change its policy which developed divergence in the strategic interest of both the states in the region. 4.6.6. F RAYMOND DAVIS: Raymond Davis, appointed in U.S Consulate in Lahore on January 27th shot two men. According to him shooting them was an act of self defense as those men were intending to rob him on gun point (Kronstadt, 2011:2). Despite the pressure from US officials on Pakistan and declaring that diplomatic immunity protects him from prosecution, Pakistani courts barred the government from releasing him.US President Obama called Davis as US diplomat and justified his action on the basis of self defense (Washington Post, 2011). US kept calling Davis as US administrative and technical staff but failed to provide details of his respective duties. However, after few weeks of incident US government admitted that Davis was a former Special force combatant and a contractor of private security firm Black Water.

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Moreover, it was also disclosed by them that his task was to provide security to C.I.A team who are tracking militants in Pakistan. Davis was making himself familiar to the sensitive areas of Lahore on the very day he shot two men there (The Guardian, 2011). This incident created problems for the political leaders of Pakistan who privately recognize the requirements of international conventions and had to face public anger. Several statements given in this regard by the politicians like Yousaf Raza Gillani and Foreign Minister Shah Mehmood Qureshi, who justified their role in Davis case and claimed that they were pressured by US for doing so (New York Times, 2011). Several secret meetings held between Pakistan’s main security agency and C.I.A for resolving Davis’s issue (Kronstadt, 2011:3). Finally, after few months of negotiations, Pakistani officials pressurized Courts; Davis was freed after payment of US Dollars 2.3 million as blood money99 to the family of victims (ibid:4). 4.6.6. G OSAMA’S DEATH: Osama Bin Ladin, founder of Al-Qaida, was killed by a group of US Navy Seals in Abbotabad (KP) (Hersh, 2015:3-12), just a half kilometer from Pakistan Military Academy (PMA). Chief Counter Terrorism Advisor of President Obama, John Brennan expressed that Location of Osama’s residence enhanced the long term doubts about Pakistan providing assistance to militants (Washington Post, 2011). Obama administration came up with two conclusions after assassination of Osama in Pakistan, firstly, either, intelligence agencies of Pakistan were assisting and protecting fugitives. Secondly, either the civil-military establishment of Pakistan was so incompetent that they could not hunt for fugitives and top leaders of Al-Qaida. Moreover, Pakistan’s intelligence came under sever domestic criticism. This issue

99 Islamic concept allows murder dispute to be settled if the victim’s family forgive the accused and accept the financial compensation.

225 has fueled distrust in bilateral relations between US and Pakistan. Many serious questions were raised from US on the refuge of Osama (Kronstadt, 2011: 6). John Kerry, senator of Foreign Relations Committee stated while an interview that it is a very sensitive moment for US aid to Pakistan relations and that US needed full commitment from the leaders of Pakistan against terrorist groups (Washington Post, 2011). 4.7 Prospects Pakistan gained from its Post 9/11 Afghan Policy: Pakistan after deciding to side with US and West in GWOT had some prospects also but they were not long lasting. Like a sudden raise in aid from US in particular was witnessed. Pakistan after its nuclear testing in 1998 and imposition of Military rule was facing economic sanctions and blockage. Since, Pakistan was under sanctions at the time of 9/11 that was the reason that Pakistan was receiving the lowest level of aid. The opened doors of economic aid was for enhancing military and economic capabilities to fight GWOT but was also enough for Pakistan to get hold of its shaky economy. Pakistan after it decided to enter into war on terror immediately got US $ 500 million extension (Sattar, 2010). The level of aid, later kept on increasing from 2001 till 2011. Moreover, Pakistan also got waiver of US $ 2 billion loan (Cohen, 2007). Though US was demanding to “do more” from Pakistan in GWOT but was also providing adequate support for strengthening Pakistan in fighting GWOT and diminishing militants safe havens on Pakistan’s soil.

US focused on military and economic aid. There were three types of military aid received by Pakistan from US, they were,

i) Coalition Support Fund ii) Pakistan’s Counterinsurgency Capability Funds iii) Foreign Military Financing

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Economic aid Pakistan received in various sectors like health, Refugees, disaster in FATA etc. they were:

i) Economic Support Funds ii) International Disaster Assistance and Migration and Refugees Assistance iii) FATA development Plan iv) Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act, 2009 OR Kerry Lugar Bill v) Friends of Democratic Pakistan

The ‘Strategic interests’ were aligned after 9/11. When there was divergence, aid was reduced or declined. In Pak-US relations, US always had its regional interest on priority and Pakistan could never bargain its national interest with US precisely. Throughout every stage of engagement between both the states, Pakistan failed to push its long term interests. Pakistan and US both the states confined to phased and low level of cooperation marked by blame game from US. In Pakistan and US relationship aid had always played a weighty role but Pakistan considered the aid US extended to it for fighting GWOT post 9/11 did not match the level of economic loss Pakistan has experienced. Additionally, the role Pakistan played in GWOT was not recognized. Though for Pakistan aid was a huge attraction but the blame game from US has decreased the trust deficit between them.

Pakistan’s Afghan policy’s long term objective was to have good friendly relations with Afghan government. After 2001, fall of Taliban’s regime and establishment of Karzai government in Afghanistan, Pakistan extended its hand of friendly relations to Afghanistan egardless of the fact that the elements of Northern Alliance were holding prominent places and positions in that

227 government. further than US Pakistan also wanted to have friendly relations with its Western neighbour for having smooth economical linkages with Central Asian States (discussed in chapter 1) as well as for stability in Pakistan’s region bordering Afghanistan (Fazl-ur- Rahman:78). Pakistan by developing friendly relations with Karzai administration looked for curbing smuggling and opening doors for trade between both the neighbouring countries. Pakistan could furthermore see a lot of prospects in trade, agriculture, engineering, human resource development (Babar Shah, 2002). In this regard both the states agreed to enhance trade ties and anti-terror cooperation (The News, July 15 2004). But this friendly relations between both the states also ended soon and apprehensions and blame game dominated their trust on each other (explained above).

CONCLUSION: Pakistan’s post 9/11 Afghan Policy could not fulfill main objectives of Pakistan in Afghanistan such as: non-Pahtuns were empowered post Bonn Agreement 2001 in Kabul, Indian influence in Afghanistan increased in reconstruction and rebuilding of Afghanistan, even Karzai sent his army for training to India. All these actions from India were supported and encouraged by US. Pakistan always aimed at reaching to energy rich Central Asian market but could not attain this objective too as constant militancy and destabilization was a hurdle. Pakistan’s tribal belt bordering Afghanistan is rigid, conservative, politically disorganized, way too behind in development from rest of the state led it to radicalization soon. Resultantly, militancy from across the border defused and started strengthening its roots. Post 9/11,

228 this tribal belt known as FATA, not only became hub for Pashtun Taliban but also non-Pashtun Taliban. Pakistan policy makers thinking that policy of dividing Taliban as good and bad in Afghanistan will be in their favour but this policy option bought all the actors in Afghanistan against Pakistan. Consequently, Pakistan started facing isolation in the world; one more objective of Pakistan in joining GWOT remained unsuccessful. Moreover, Pakistan was also targeted and blamed for double game. Pakistan conducted military operations in FATA to counter the turbulent situation created by the militants. These operations were considered as a threat to the ethical and conventional tribal values. Moreover, the psychological state of the society got disturbed, education of the youth got effective, denial of security of life and property of people and huge displacement of people from FATA due to threat to their security from military action and militants’ reaction to it. Consequently, whole Pakistan faced security, social, political and economic deterioration. Pakistan remained unsuccessful in attaining its interest in Afghanistan by taking lead in GWOT and could not transform its status into strategic partner of the leading powers in Afghanistan. Pakistan not only faced loss in form of men (security personals, civilians, students) but also economically. Moreover political instability, clash in military and civilian setup, disharmony in different religious factions, extremism, radicalization in society. Afghanistan post 9/11 instead of rising confidence building and close relations with Pakistan since Pakistan was playing a lead role in GWOT. But Afghanistan kept blaming Pakistan for not being honest in its role. Moreover, Afghanistan never respected Pakistan’s reservations against India and kept growing its relations with India. Afghanistan

229 started the relation of rivalry with Pakistan during inception of Pakistan which led to Pakistan’s disturbed relations with Afghanistan.

Since US along with its allies decided to drawdown in Afghanistan by 2014 and leaving necessary forces in Afghanistan, gave rise to concern from regional players like China, Iran and Russia, in Afghanistan as they were concerned of Taliban again gaining power and taking over Kabul. This convergence in objective led all these players came on one table with US. US after drawdown of its forces from Afghanistan seemed interested in shifting of supply and trade route from Afghanistan to Northern Distribution Network (NDN) in order to reduce dependence on Pakistan. This strategic shifting is not only an attempt to push Pakistan more into international isolation but also Islamabad losing an important card for Afghanistan and US. Pakistan became victim of its own Afghan policy. Lost its internal peace and security, internationally started getting isolation and bringing its enemy on eastern border closer to US major player in Afghanistan. Pakistan should reconsider its Afghan policy. Pakistani policy makers should start considering about the objective of economic depth as it will enhance Afghanistan’s dependence more on Pakistan. Secondly, stable and peaceful Afghanistan should be the aim instead of Plaint regime in Afghanistan. Pakistan also needs to engage itself with regional and international players including India in Afghanistan. It will bring Pakistan to a strong footing in economic and strategic formation of Afghanistan. It will also contribute in breaking international isolation Pakistan is facing. Stable democracy and balance between civil and military leadership is required as unstable region brings a lot of threat perception for the

230 state. Pakistan having strong military countering these threats takes the lead in decision making resulting in a little space for democratic state to decide the policy and use diplomatic skills. Pakistan and Afghanistan realizing the sensitivity of security of the region should stop blame game between them. This is also the time where international community should realize and consider the contributions Pakistan did in GWOT and the price in shape of troubles faced by Pakistan nationally and internationally. Both the states should first treat the main cause and reasons behind the spread of terrorism instead of just blaming Pakistan and expecting more from it. International community should try to bring Pakistan out of this terrible phase either by fencing Pak-Afghan border, or accepting nuclear parity of Pakistan with India, or providing access to Central Asian and European Market or by waiving the entire loan Pakistan is loaded with. Such measures could help to maintain peace and security in the region. Pakistan’s role should be admitted by the international community and Afghanistan for the sacrifices it has made in GWOT. Moreover, Pakistan should be supported by the regional and international community in fencing Paki- Afghan border; Pakistan’s parity in terms of nuclear strength with India should be accepted and encourage Pakistan in maintain peace in the region. Furthermore, Pakistan’s exports and manufacturers should be provided an access in European market. They should come forward, admit Pakistan’s role, Fence the Pak afghan border, accept Pakistan nuclear parity with India, provide access to Pakistani manufacturers to European markets and write-off all the loans of this country. The US has to support Pakistan diplomatically and politically and with the latest weapons and technologies. Pakistan must be acknowledged as the most important ally in the GWOT rather than as a terrorist state. With limited

231 resources, political instability, natural calamities, Pakistan has already contributed enormously to the war. US should realize that sanctions are not the policy option towards Pakistan. However, US can put pressure on Pakistan to keep reforms on track and to persuade Pakistan to act responsible. This is how US can expect best results from its alliance with Pakistan. Similarly, secure and strong Pakistan can effectively help reducing tensions in the region and could play stronger role in peace building in Afghanistan. Both Afghanistan and Pakistan had to focus on increasing their relations because post US and NATO withdrawal both Pakistan and Afghanistan will have to deal with each other and face the common issues in the region effectively. Although the decades long dis-trustful relations cannot be developed overnight but a practical and comprehensive approach needs to be practiced by both the countries to tackle the main problems and issues in their stressed relationship. They should also aim at finding realistic and reasonable resolution which can address the concerns and make the most of their interests. Furthermore, positive attitude must be kept high to promote cooperation and to keep institutional linkages for further sustainable collaboration in all fields.

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CHAPTER FIVE DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION This chapter concludes the thesis with the main findings which highlights the subject matter and open doors for further researchers to fill the possible gaps. The integrated theoretical framework is based on Realism and Social Constructivism. It attempts to critically analyze the security threat perception of Pakistan with respect to Afghanistan. This thesis deals with principal question of how Pakistan took decision of declining support to long term policy of supporting Taliban and join GWOT post 9/11. Further it analyzes this decision taken by Pakistan, its internal and external implications on peace and security of Pakistan generally and FATA particularly. For understanding the answer first historical perspective of Pakistan’s Afghan policy and strategy is described and analyzed from the inception of Pakistan till 2001. It explains that it is national security that compelled the decision makers to use ideology as a tool. This national security of the state was stimulated by the ideology and religion (two nation theory) on which it was created. Pakistan was declared as Islamic Republic of Pakistan having religion as its basis. Its identity since its inception was based on Muslim worldview. Furthermore, Pakistan came into being with minimum or almost no resources having serious disputes with India on its Eastern border and Afghanistan on its Western border. This became the basis of its national security threat perception. Moreover, Kashmir issue rose which resulted in armed conflict in 1948, 1965 and 1971 between India and Pakistan. It contributed further in shaping Security Threat Perception of Pakistan. Pakistan needed a strong military and resources to compete Indian aggression. Non-alignment policy of India provided an opportunity to Pakistan to seek US assistance and joined

247 alliances like SEATO and CENTO to fulfill its security and economic needs. Threat from neighbouring more powerful India, seeking desirable resolution for Kashmir and the aim of strengthening its security and defense capabilities, designed Pakistan’s threat perceptions and policy. Pakistan’s decision making heavily depended on this security threat perception. Later in 1979 Soviet army invaded Afghanistan, perceiving Soviet presence in Afghanistan as a threat Pakistan agreed in playing a role of frontline state against Soviet army backed by US and Saudi Arabia. Since war erupted in Afghanistan, Pakistan wanted Soviets to vacate Afghanistan to further avoid the threat of Soviet army moving towards Warm waters and also to install friendly Pakistan government in Afghanistan. Pakistan always desired for pro- Pakistan government because the border Pakistan shares with Afghanistan is porous and cannot be monitored. The Social perception constructed by the people of Afghanistan was against the division of tribes (having same language, culture and religion) on both sides of Durand Line by British Raj. Hence, creation of Pakistan was not acceptable for the people of Afghanistan, unless the territories on which PASHTUN tribes lived in Pakistan were reunited with Afghanistan. Moreover, Pakistan shares long borders on its East with hostile India and on West with Soviet invaded Afghanistan feared a threat of being sandwich between them. These threat perceptions gave rise to the component of Pakistan friendly government in Afghanistan as a vital Foreign Policy objective. Pakistan during Soviet war in Afghanistan emerged as a US ally and frontline state against Soviet army. Pakistan’s Policy makers tried to counter any chances of installation of Indian friendly government in Afghanistan. Thus, Pakistan’s Afghan policy post Soviet invasion based on National Security and Threat Perception was to install Pakistan Friendly government in Afghanistan

248 and to send Soviet army back from Afghanistan and for attaining these objectives Pakistan along with US trained, equipped and financed ideologically motivated Islamic fighters from around the world to conduct jihad against Soviet forces. Resultantly giving rise to religious motivated non-state actors as a tool to achieve national security strategy. Pakistan’s Afghan Policy is also based on traditionalist Realist approach, according to which, national interest is supreme for a state. What Pakistan’s policy makers thought of was preserving the independence and sovereignty of state. Being born with sense of insecurity the need for enhancing security capability became the most important goal. This made developmental and economic challenges in much lesser priorities. Due to inception of Cold War globally Pakistan became allied with US for its defense and economic needs. These perspectives defined Pakistan’s national security susceptibility. After an extensive civil war in Afghanistan, Taliban emerged as a prominent military and political group. Pakistan looking at its national security considered Taliban as an appropriate tool against minimizing Indian influence and installing Pakistan friendly government in Afghanistan. Since, US objective in Afghanistan was achieved as Soviet army with drew post signing Geneva Accord in 1998, that was why US lost interest in Afghanistan and also it ended its financial and material support for jihadi groups in Afghanistan. Pakistan’s interests remained unchanged in Afghanistan since they share a long and porous border with each other. In the post 9/11 era, Policy makers in Pakistan looking at all the possibilities decided to compromise on the pro-Taliban policy in order to protect the Traditional National Security interests. In Afghanistan, Pakistan always looks forward to have a friendly government towards Pakistan who can protect Western border of Pakistan from any external

249 aggression, would also minimize Indian presence on Afghan soil. Furthermore, supporting Taliban meant fighting against US and its allies which could further deteriorate Pakistan’s sovereignty. Foreign policy of a state cannot remain static as it changes with new and changing regional and international scenario. To design policies it is best to adjust them in accordance with the environment. Changing dynamics of international and regional scenario led to the pronouncement of changed Pakistan’s policy, i-e, joining GWOT and allying with US and its allies. This decision was taken to adjust with the global changed political scenario. If Pakistan had not changed accordingly it would have faced international isolation, deteriorated economy and most probably Pakistan could have been declared as a terrorist state which could further harm Pakistan’s regional and international objectives. Furthermore, refusal of Pakistan for joining GWOT would have driven US further towards India. Resultantly, this would make India gain more influence on Afghan soil thus making Threat perception of Pakistan from India on Afghanistan a reality. Moreover, this scenario would put Pakistan’s nuclear plan under more pressure from the US and the West which is at the core of Pakistan’s security policy. This thesis finds out that the policy Pakistan adopted post 9/11 was off shoot of Pakistan’s national security threat perception which always stated Pakistan’s Afghan policy. Pakistan always wanted to secure its borders in order to maintain its sovereignty and enhance its security. Moreover, Pakistan had to protect itself from external and internal threats through participating in GWOT by assisting NATO and US forces in Afghanistan. Furthermore, regional security imperatives were also considered by Pakistan while deciding post 9/11 Afghan policy. After 9/11 India started to frame Pakistan as a terrorist state by highlighting its support to the freedom fighters in Kashmir. Therefore,

250 post 9/11 Pakistan wanted to counter Indian influence in the neighbouring Afghanistan by joining GWOT. Such Indian motives were challenging for Pakistan and Pakistan had to counter them through its policies. Consequently, Pakistan joining GWOT was a blow to Indian objective of labeling Pakistan as terrorist state and putting Pakistan into international isolation. US extended its GWOT in Afghanistan and it resulted in emergence of different groups as a strong militant groups ,like: Afghan Taliban (were fighting against US and their Allies and had a tendency to gain influence in Afghanistan and most of Afghanistan’s territory bordering Pakistan after US withdrawal from Afghanistan), Al-Qaida ( fought against both Afghan and Pakistan’s government and is comprised of mostly non-Pakistani and non-Afghani militants), Tehreek-E-Taliban Pakistan (declared war against state of Pakistan, its forces and government officials). Pakistan declared war against Al-Qaida and stayed on the same points with US and viewed Al-Qaida as a terrorist group and danger to the region but Pakistan kept different policy towards Afghan Taliban and viewed them as a strategic tool. Pakistan post 9/11 Afghan Policy as mentioned above was the result of external and internal threats. The strategy Pakistan adopted to deal with external threats was based on Traditional Realism (See chap 1) and policies to counter internal terrorism (See chap 4). As a realist approach Pakistan wanted US backed government to be dominated by PASHTUNS religious factions instead of Northern Alliance, the rationale behind this approach strengthening religious forces amongst Pashtuns and which would result in weakening Pashtun Nationalist forces. Thus heading towards resolution of Durand line Issue and minimizing the influence of India in Afghanistan. US unexpectedly didn’t pay attention to Pakistan’s demands. US and Allies structured US backed Afghan government dominated by Northern Alliance which

251 disappointed Pakistan. US inclination towards India increased after Northern Allies were given major representation in Afghan government. Thus, Indian involvement increased and resulted in Pakistan’s reluctance for an all out support to US against Al-Qaida and its supporters. Furthermore, Pakistan’s already shattered economy and economic sanctions it faced post 1998 (nuclear tests) and 1999 (military coup) needed support which was provided by US and allies after joining GWOT. Likewise, support and assistance program in agriculture, education, food, trade, health, promoting democracy, human rights, gender equality and most importantly equipment and training of military forces of Pakistan were granted. Moreover, debt rescheduling, loans, grants etc were designed by several European countries and international financial donors. Pakistan’s commitment to GWOT was extremely important for US and Pakistan was declared as a major non- NATO ally in July 2004. Pakistan’s decision of joining US led GWOT was based on realism and an approval of international and regional changing dynamics. This decision was realistic because if Pakistan would not have joined GWOT it would have to face the same fate as Taliban did. Moreover, Indian quick response and willingness to US for assisting in GWOT was also a concern for Pakistan. Pakistan could also have bracketed as a terrorist state, further harming Pakistan’s Kashmir cause. Pakistan based its decision to join US led GWOT on four fundamental parameters (discussed in chapter 3) are: Pakistan’s security, Kashmir Issue, revival of economy and guarding strategic nuclear weapons and missiles. On economic front, Pakistan already hosting millions of Afghan Refugees post Soviet-Afghan War faced again a huge influx of Afghan Refugees post 9/11. To get hold and strengthen its shaky economy, Pakistan expected that US Dollars would help.

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Pakistan’s post 9/11 Afghan Policy had serious repercussions for it, both domestically and internationally. A country wide campaign started inside the state, led by religious parties, against government’s decision of joining GWOT. Whole country faced a wave of anti US demonstrations and protests. Anti-US sentiments awakened causing threat to survival of military government of Pakistan. Sectarianism and extremism was raising high in the country which resultantly served as a ground in FATA region particularly for the home grown terrorism. FATA region of Pakistan faced a lot of disturbance; militants finding sanctuaries there, internal displacement of locals and military operations were rigorous political implication of Pakistan’s post 9/11 Afghan policy. Furthermore, domestically Pakistan also witnessed suicidal bombings, attacks on military forces and their sensitive areas, attacks on foreigners and major political leaders also. Pakistan’s military ruler General Pervez Musharaf also survived two assassination attacks on him. Internationally, Pakistan allied US because it wanted to secure its relations and status in international arena but the result was different altogether. US instead of Pakistan, was inclined more towards India, further ruining security situation and power balance in the region. Furthermore, Pakistan’s commitment and sacrifices were criticized by US and the world and they kept demanding for more assistance and collaboration in GWOT. Likewise, most of the economic aid which was given to Pakistan was reimbursement of what Pakistan has spent in GWOT. Pakistan ended up in more economic strain and burden unlike what Pakistani policy makers thought. This thesis finds out that the expected outcome from Pakistan’s Post 9/11 Afghan Policy could not be achieved. Main reason behind this disappointment was the thought of considering non-state actors as an asset for achieving Pakistan’s objective in Afghanistan (also mentioned

253 as an important foreign policy tool by Brig. Mehmood Shah in his interview to the author of this thesis). This view of utilizing non-state actors had to be installed after transforming state policies to avoid nurturing of militancy and intolerance inside the state. These Pakistan supported militant groups had to be controlled in more effective ways without effecting state’s Security and preventing territory of a state from external threats. Moreover, effective policy making would have countered terrorism inside the state as well as the money received would have been spending over the development of the country. Militancy in FATA (merged in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in 2018) and incidents like Lal Majid and attack on GHQ, Army Public School, Mehran Base etc showed that State’s policies lack the ability of controlling militants, Mullas and ideologically motivated factors inside the state. Pakistan Foreign Policy’s another objective was to contain India in Afghanistan by using the strategy of pressurizing landlocked Afghanistan through trade and not completely supporting Hamid Karzai’s government. However, this objective also failed and strategic partnership between India and Afghanistan bloomed. Pakistan also failed in converging its interest with those of US in Afghanistan and to convert Pak-US alliance in fighting against terrorism into strategic partnership. Pakistan’s internal political instability, natural calamity, military operations against terrorists inside the state, institutional clash, extremism in the society was major reasons for this policy failure. While, the external factors which hindered Pakistan achieving its goals were mainly the blame game played by Afghanistan, US and international community rather than acknowledging its role in GWOT and helping Pakistan counter Terrorism on its soil. So far, US, and its allies faced a lot of material and human loss in Afghanistan. As a result, US declared draw down in its military in Afghanistan by 2014

254 and decided to have minimal presence there. Regional states like Russia, China and Iran though were concerned about US bases and presence in the region but US draw downing its military from Afghanistan was considered as a comparatively immense concern as it was expected that with such weak government retaking of Afghanistan was very much possible for Taliban. This thesis also finds that comprehensive reaction towards terrorism at home was also weak. The operations against militant groups in Lal Masjid were also conducted years after Pakistan joining of GWOT. This shows that the response for internal security threats were very inadequate and not thought through. If these operations were conducted right in time and the root of terrorism was treated properly Pakistan would not have suffered from much internal and external turmoil, loss of innocent lives, international isolation and shaky economy. Additionally, if the politicians and representatives of tribes’ men were also taken into confidence in time that would also have been contributed in shedding less blood of Pakistan army and civilians. This study also finds out that the traditional concept about state security could not serve the security of Pakistani citizens, but the state kept following policy of traditional perception of state security even at the expanse of security of citizens. Similarly, the state of Pakistan decided to support GWOT and ally US and at the same time it kept an unsure approach towards militants and categorizing them. Pakistan kept targeting or supporting foreign and home-bred militants inside the state on the basis of their hostility towards Pakistan and also on the basis of their capability and willingness of serving Pakistan’s traditional national security interests. Hence, it is clear that ideological tools influence Pakistan’s Afghan Policy, which is reasonable and understandable within the sphere of realism.

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However, the external safety of the national security policy has depicted the crack between the traditional security interests of the state and internal security and safety of citizens. Pakistan after joining GWOT lost almost 30,000 citizens and soldiers proving that the national security approach did not provide security to citizens’ life and property. Similarly, lack of resources for welfare of citizens like their education, health and social life of citizens showed that no serious efforts were made to eradicate causes of terrorism inside the state. This study also finds out that the concept of external security threat and the domestic security threat should both be prioritized and considered while designing Pakistan Afghan Policy. This practice might result in achieving traditional national security interests along with protection of state’s citizens from any damage and violence resulting from terrorism. Whereas, Pakistan’s actions and decisions seems a Realist approach like, following realistic options in series with in view of balance of power that well furnishes out Pakistan’s interest. Meanwhile, there is also a role for Constructivism witnessed in Pakistan Afghan Policy while understanding the performance and actions taken by them. Militancy as a tool of Foreign Policy, functions as the Constructivist philosophy, it is repeatedly used to rationalize Pakistan’s Realist Afghan policies, proving its role as a dominant variable. It is frequently summoned by government of Pakistan to rationalize or to create a narrative for practical international relations Pakistan observes. Insecurity related to post-2014 scenario in Afghanistan and its implication on mutual relations restrained Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and FATA-based Pakistani businessmen, entrepreneurs and traders were hesitant from expanding their businesses and investing across the Durand line. However, if the transition goes smooth in Afghanistan, the prospective for the better economic ties between both the states

256 would only be possible if they improve their communications and trim down institutional barriers. Moreover, the reluctance of both the governments needs to resolve the seriously strained bilateral ties. For better state to state relationship both Pakistan and Afghanistan would have to take serious steps to review their foreign policy towards each other.

Pakistan a homeland for Muslims has an intention and inclination to empathize with Muslim causes and will raise Islamic principles to craft an ideological narrative, like: justifying and defending actions and decision of Muslim Ummah. The deduction of this study is that while addressing security in designing Pakistan Afghan policies security of citizens and the state both should be considered equally. Moreover, protection of state sovereignty, territorial integrity, education, political stability, social solidity should also be entertained. Hence, the role of state is to maintain and facilitate security in the traditional field but also nontraditional sphere. Pakistan should not only rely on military action as it is only one component for countering terrorism. Pakistan, must take political, social, economic, social and developmental measures along with the military action. The interest of state and citizens should be addressed together or the objectives of eradicating terrorism would not be possible. This study has analyzed Pakistan Afghan policy in the light of realist approach. Like the internal and external threats posed to Pakistan post 9/11 were studied, described and analyzed under the lens of realist approach. Social constructivism helped understand the mind set of people on both sides of Durand line. The culture, history and mindset of people and state plays vital role in designing policies and reacting

257 towards them. Furthermore, studying traditional national security clarifies that it extended the gap between state and citizen’s security. Recommendations and Suggestions: As sated at a very early stage of this thesis, Pakistan and Afghanistan have always had hostile approach towards each other and the root of this relationship lies in the history. Moreover, the porous character of border between both the states allows the mischievous factors to move and create problems on both sides of the border. Therefore, recognized border between both the states will not only benefit and secure these two states but also their neighbouring states would benefit from it. Such a settlement would clarify PASHTUNS on both the sides that they have to peacefully develop their part of land and after following specific legal procedure could carry trade across the border easily. This would help both the states attain their economic objectives. Afghanistan could peacefully conduct trade from Karachi port and Pakistan could have an access to Central Asian market. Furthermore, domestic ethnic disputes and national unity on both sides of the border would strengthen up. However, for attainment of such scenario both the states would have to guarantee peace and reversal of hostility towards each other. Pakistan and Afghanistan should have focused on trust building instead of blaming each other and spoiling relations between them. Durand line is practically a dividing line between Pakistan and Afghanistan. If Afghanistan has some issues regarding it Pakistan should not react towards it. Pakistan should not make it a major issue and keeping this matter aside should resolve other problems between them. Additionally, both the states should keep their good or bad relations with India away and try to develop relations on common grounds.Likewise, Islamic insurgency is one of the reasons both the states kept engaged in blame game and lack of trust towards each

258 other. To resolve this problem the suggestion given by General Pervez Musharaf in 2005 seems quite effective that the fencing of border could help (Aljazeera, 9 Sep 2005). But there are many critiques over this suggestion like; unless command and control of Taliban from both the sides is completely disrupted using resources and strategies for bringing peace among Pakistan and Afghanistan is very difficult. Such argument suggests that unless the root cause of terrorism is treated other measurements could be of no use. However, it could be said that fencing border can make the task of terrorists getting refugee from attacks and gathering their strength difficult. It can weaken the network which in turn can also lead to complete disappearing of militant networks. Political and Civil freedom in Pakistan’s territory bordering Afghanistan would contribute in bringing harmony and peace in the area. Most importantly, a program of disarmament and de-mobilization must be implemented strictly; it will gradually change the culture of arms carrying and badal (See Chap 4).These steps in turn will shrink the reasons and conditions led to provide safe heavens to the terrorists in these areas.

For bringing peace in the region and to counter terrorism, safe havens and sanctuaries of Taliban must be ended. All the funding, recruitment, training, equipment, instigators of militant forces in Afghanistan and in Pakistan’s FATA region must be checked and must be stopped. To attain this objective Afghanistan, US and NATO must be taken into confidence for their complimentary measures and cooperation with Pakistan. This could be done by active foreign policy designed by experts in international relations and foreign policy from foreign office, academia, ministry of Interior, Inter service intelligence (ISI). Such developed foreign policy moves could convince active players

259 like US, NATO and Afghanistan itself to help Pakistan in taking steps for abolishing insurgencies from Afghanistan in side Pakistan for maintaining peace in the region.

If political process was facilitated by US between Pakistan and Afghanistan that would also have solved some issues. Like U.S mediation and talks prevented nuclear conflict in 1999 and 2002 between India and Pakistan. Though tripartite commission was setup by US composed of some leading Afghan, US and Pakistani military officials in 2003, later NATO was also included in it, but it dealt with military coordination only (Rubin R.Barnett, Siddique. Abubakar, 1 October, 2006). This commission should be upgraded to deal with political issues; it may fill the gap of communication between both the states. Moreover, effective foreign policy making could also convince US to pressurize India and Afghanistan to refrain from covert actions from Afghan soil to destabilize Baluchistan and KP province of Pakistan. If India stops interfering in Pakistan from Afghanistan, Pakistan’s insecurity related to border region could be addressed which would result in less aggression on border. Similarly, it will also result in trust building between Pakistan and Afghanistan. In actual fact to counter the real cause behind terrorism international community should address the problem rather than pointing towards Pakistan and asking for doing more. Pakistan should be given credit for the role it played in GWOT and the loss it faced. They should help Pakistan and Afghanistan fence their border to further avoid dissemination of terrorism and terrorists across the border. Moreover, Pakistan should be accepted as a nuclear power on equal footings with India, and to support Pakistan politically, diplomatically and economically. Pakistan with limited resources and political instability

260 had already contributed a lot now it was the turn of international community to pay back. Furthermore, while making Afghan policy regional politics should also be considered as Indo-Pak rivalry and Afghanistan used as a stage to this rivalry. Afghanistan should be convinced that Indian investment in Afghanistan is for the betterment and development of Afghanistan but keeping good relations with Pakistan is critical as both the states are geographically so connected that disturbance in one state have negative impact on the other likewise prosperity in one state will make other prosper also. The restoration of bilateralism in its true essence will benefit both the states and the region. Post 9/11, Afghanistan and Pakistan held many talks to counter terrorism and stabilize the region but in vein. Both Afghanistan and Pakistan should understand that talks aren’t the only way to resolve issues. This study suggests that Afghanistan and Pakistan needs to have meaningful discussions and negotiations. Pragmatically, they should address each other’s concerns and then to find out common foundations and resolve their issues.

The security, economic and political dynamics of Pakistan cannot be understood without taking its history and the current regional complexities it shares with its neighbouring states into consideration. Pakistan’s main interest in having friendly Afghan government is to guarantee its own security. Former Prime Minister of Pakistan, Benazir Bhutto stated that Security issues are considered as an issue of survival for Pakistan (Hasnat F.Syed, 2011:130). Pakistan’s policy makers always considered traditional national security as the most important political strategy from any external threat and its only security which can lead and open doors for Pakistan’s economic and political growth. To achieve this goal of security Pakistan in its Afghan policy must

261 consider developing friendly ties with Afghanistan. Likewise friendly links between Afghan people should improve more.

Pakistan for achieving lasting and strong national and regional security, trustworthy and realistic strategic dialogue of Pakistan with Afghanistan, US and NATO is critical. The success of these dialogues may result in diplomatic agreement which can further form mutual partnership intend to build positive and secured future for the region.

Additionally to these dialogues corresponding between both the states which could lead to mutual acknowledgment must occur with both Iran and India. These dialogues may lead to formal/informal accords, treaties or agreements; and in those agreements Pakistan should spotlight on justifying Pakistan’s interests and policies in Afghanistan. Such actions could lead to portray Pakistan’s positive image in international and regional level. Moreover, these agreements should focus on eradication and elimination of militants who are responsible for destabilizing the region. Furthermore, Pakistan needs to stop all kinds of direct or hidden support to militants, and trustworthy ally in the region. Pakistan for this purpose should also abandon the safe heavens these militants have in Pakistan’s FATA region. Furthermore, for securing FATA, countering militancy inside the state and developing good relations with Afghanistan, Pakistan needs to stop supporting any proxy. Depending on proxies has proved to be more disastrous. Moreover, supporting Mullah Nazir, Gul Bahadur, Siraj Haqqani successful results cannot be expected, though they never directly attacked Pakistan forces but there is no guarantee that they will be different from TTP leaders (as even TTP leaders were initially friendly towards Pakistan government). Additionally, alliance between these militant groups constantly varies and shifts depend on their

262 interest and survival. These shifts in inclination of these groups and Pakistan’s policies managing them look chaotic. Moreover the nexus between militant groups like: TTP, Al-Qaeda and now Islamic State (IS) have to be contained to free the region from their tyranny. Through cutting down their finances, their intelligence sharing, their joint ventures could dismantle and defeat these groups. Moreover, delaying measures of dismantling these groups would result in expansion of these groups and their roots would become stronger in the region turning it into the worst place to live in. These countering militancy and militant groups would be achieved by implementing solid political reforms in FATA, which is promised several times to them by the government of Pakistan. Implementing such policies will enhance the chances of different political groups to take part in political process of FATA region hence, eliminating their rigid laws.

This study has discussed that Pakistan’s Post 9/11 Afghan policy failed policies in obtaining Pakistan’s objective in Afghanistan, securing safety and security of its civil society, citizens and maintain rule of Law inside the state. Pakistan wanted to clear its territory from militants and to eliminate any element linked to Al-Qaida network for that purpose several military operations were conducted in FATA region of Pakistan. For countering militancy and gaining confidence of international community Pakistan kept targeting militants in FATA region but those were limited actions against TTP. That is why Pakistan could not fulfill its objective despite the fact that a lot of army personals, innocent civilians had to sacrifice their lives. Pakistan took counter militancy measures, several military operations were conducted in FATA but terrorism could not be eliminated completely. Pakistan diplomatically could not convince International and Afghan government that it is dedicated in GWOT. Pakistan needs

263 to counter root cause of this militancy only military actions could not work. The ongoing political crisis and foreign policy making in Pakistan might have made the process of foreign policy making, particularly Afghan Policy more challenging. Hitherto, Nawaz Sharif’s government looking ahead of a narrow security centric approach and focusing more on economic and people to people contact (Idrees M. Anwar K, May 20, 2017) could fruitfully reorganize the relationship. Government of Pakistan, although have taken few steps as confidence building measures like enhancing economic ties between both the states and permitting Afghan Refugees to legally stay in Pakistan till end of 2015 but more effective steps needs to be taken for achieving desired objectives. This study creates room for further study aimed to depict the outline of a national security policy that is determined for the purpose of securing the life, property, liberty and decorum of citizens.

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REFERENCES Al Jazeera, (2005, 9 Sept.).“ Musharraf wants Afghan border fenced: Pakistan's president has proposed setting up a barbed-wire fence along the border with Afghanistan to help keep fighters from crossing the rugged area freely”. https://www.aljazeera.com/archive/2005/09/200849146144105 44.html Rubin,B.R., Abubakar Siddique. (2006, October 1).. “Resolving the Pakistan-Afghanistan Stalement”. Special Report, United States Institute of Peace, https://www.usip.org/publications/2006/10/resolving-pakistan- afghanistan-stalemate Hasnat, F.S. (2011). Global Security Watch—Pakistan.California: Praeger Idrees, M. & Anwar, K. (2017, May 20). Pakistan and Afghanistan after 9/11: A Case of the Failing Bilateralism: Review of Public Administration and Management.

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