Defend, Deter, Or Disentangle

COLD WAR CREDIBILITY IN THE SHADOW OF VIETNAM: THE POLITICS AND DISCOURSE OF U.S. TROOP WITHDRAWALS FROM KOREA, 1969-1979 A dissertation submitted to Kent State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy by Leon J. Perkowski August 2015 © Copyright All rights reserved Except for previously published materials Dissertation written by Leon J. Perkowski B.S., Cornell University, 1993 M.S., Pennsylvania State University, 1995 Masters of Military Operational Art and Science, Air University, 2006 Ph.D., Kent State University, 2015 Approved by ________________________________________ Mary Ann Heiss, Associate Professor, History, Department of History, Doctoral Advisor ________________________________________ Clarence Wunderlin, Jr., Professor, History, Department of History ________________________________________ Kevin Adams, Associate Professor, History, Department of History ________________________________________ Steven W. Hook, Professor, Political Science, Department of Political Science ________________________________________ Andrew Barnes, Associate Professor, Political Science, Department of Political Science Accepted by ________________________________________ Kenneth Bindas, Professor, History, Chair, Department of History ________________________________________ James L. Blank, Dean, College of Arts and Sciences ii TABLE OF CONTENTS........................................................................iii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS…………………………...........................…….iv CHAPTERS I. Introduction………………………………...........….....................1 II. Credibility, Reputation, and the NSC-68 Mindset...................24 III. Nixon’s Decision to Reduce U.S. Troops in Korea.................56 IV. Military Resistance to Nixon’s Troop Withdrawal from South Korea: 1969-1971.....................................................111 V. U.S. Credibility and the South Korean Response to Troop Withdrawal.................................................................147 VI. Cold War Credibility and Carter’s Troop Withdrawal Failure in Korea....................................................................197 VII. Conclusion............................................................................264 BIBLIOGRAPHY….....……………………………….........................…275 The views expressed in this dissertation are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the United States Air Force, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. iii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS This has been an extremely demanding yet rewarding journey that would not have been possible or endurable without the support I received from so many people. First, I would like to thank my colleagues and students at Air Command and Staff College for encouraging me to follow my heart instead of my head, and take a leap away from the standard career path; I am forever changed by that decision. Second, I am grateful for the extensive financial and administrative support provided by the United States Air Force’s Civilian Institutions Program. I am also deeply appreciative of the help and support I received from my faculty, committee members, and colleagues. Dr. Steven Hook and Dr. Clarence Wunderlin have given generously of their time in serving on my committee, and Dr. Robert McMahon kindly offered guidance to a graduate student he didn’t know. I am also grateful for Dr. Kevin Adams’ thorough review of my draft and his insightful comments on how to improve it. Most importantly, I would like to thank my advisor, Dr. Mary Ann Heiss. First, she had faith that a meteorologist could become a historian. Her gentle guidance and willingness to let me forge into areas of interests that were not easy for either me or her were invaluable to my scholarly development. I am also grateful for her patient and thorough editing of every chapter I submitted, though any remaining errors are my own. iv Finally, I am eternally indebted to my wife, Katie, and my family and friends for supporting me through the doubts, the stress, and life challenges. It simply would not have been possible or worth it without them by my side, especially my patient, loving wife. And to my boys Lance and Ryan, who until now have lost innumerable weekend and evening hours with “daddy” because I was researching and writing, you always have had all of my heart and now you will have more of my time. v CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION No serious policy maker could allow himself to succumb to the fashionable debunking of “prestige” or “honor” or “credibility.” For a great power to abandon a small country to tyranny simply to obtain a respite from our own travail seemed to me—and still seems to me—profoundly immoral and destructive of our efforts to build a new and ultimately more peaceful pattern of international relations. Henry A. Kissinger, White House Years, 1979 Immediately following the formal surrender of the Japanese empire in September 1945, American forces hastily occupied the southern portion of the Korean peninsula as the Soviets took control in the North. Since that time, U.S. actions concerning the Korean peninsula have been entwined with prevailing views and discourse about the Cold War and national security strategy. The concept of “credibility”—the idea that the United States would dependably execute its threats to enemies and keep its promises to allies—was one of the most important of these prevailing Cold War views.1 Credibility’s significance was reflected, reinforced, and exemplified in the way many Americans explained the United States’ failure to deter the North Korean attack in 1950, how they justified the ensuing three-year war and subsequent continuous U.S. military presence in South Korea, and how they argued for the entry into and continuation of the Vietnam War.2 In the 1970s, the strains and aftermath of the Vietnam War prompted American foreign policy leaders to debate the future of U.S. ground forces in Korea. Unsurprisingly, the issue of American credibility lay at the heart of the debate. 1 Robert McMahon, “Credibility and World Power: Exploring the Psychological Dimension in Postwar American Diplomacy.” Diplomatic History, 15 (Fall 1991): 455. 2 Ibid., 455-57. See also, William W. Stueck, Jr., The Road to Confrontation: American Policy toward China and Korea, 1947-1950 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1981), 7. As William Stueck noted, “the Soviet- American conflict [in Korea] after 1945 had led State Department officials to connect the United States’ position below the thirty-eighth parallel to American credibility worldwide. And this fact suggests a measure of continuity to American policy before and after the North Korean attack that heretofore has been largely ignored.” 1 U.S. troop reductions in South Korea had been enacted or contemplated by U.S. presidents ever since the mid-1950s, but the U.S. presidents of the 1970s were the first ones to contemplate a complete withdrawal of all U.S. ground forces there. In 1970, President Richard M. Nixon enacted the largest reduction in the postwar U.S. deterrent forces in Korea by withdrawing one of the two U.S. Army divisions in South Korea (approximately 20,000 troops) as part of his “Nixon Doctrine,” an initiative that called on America’s Asian allies to bear a greater burden of their own self-defense.3 Although Nixon had considered an eventual complete withdrawal of U.S. ground forces, he and President Gerald R. Ford declined to make subsequent additional troop reductions during their remaining tenures as president despite the advocacy of Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird and numerous congressmen for additional cuts. Shortly after the 1976 election, however, President Jimmy Carter renewed efforts to withdraw all U.S. ground forces from Korea. Carter’s resolute but unsuccessful two-and-a-half-year attempt to withdraw all U.S. ground forces from Korea sparked a highly publicized civil-military rift and fueled one of many conservative criticisms of the Carter presidency that drew upon different understandings of the Cold War context. As various U.S. presidents contemplated reducing military forces in Korea, their military commanders and other foreign policy elites reminded them that the success of the United States’ deterrence of enemies and assurance of allies in the region hinged on U.S. credibility.4 The United States could expect to appear credible if it created the perception in other countries that it possessed: 1) the capability to carry out its threatened action with reasonable efficacy; 2) sufficient interest to take the threatened action if provoked; and 3) the resolve or fixity of 3 Hundreds of thousands of U.S. forces remained in Korea for over a year after the signing of the Armistice. In 1954- 55, Eisenhower reduced what was still essentially a wartime force of some 325,000 U.S. personnel into a standing deterrent force of about 71,000. In 1957-58, Eisenhower’s concern about the cost of global containment prompted him to apply his “New Look” strategy to Korea and reduce the existing deterrent force by more than 15,000 while offsetting their deterrent effect through the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons on the peninsula. As in examined in chapter 3, President Johnson also considered a reduction in U.S. forces in South Korea. 4 For a good explanation of the complexity and pitfalls of deterrence theory, see Robert Jervis, “Rational Deterrence: Theory and Evidence,” World Politics, 41: 2 (Jan 1989): 183-207. 2 purpose to endure the hardship of carrying out the threat.5

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