The Asia-Pacific's Emerging Missile Defense and Military Space
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The Asia-Pacific’s Emerging Missile Defense and Military Space Competition Ian Easton December 1, 2010 Funded by a grant from the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center (NPEC) Introduction Competition is emerging over securing access to and control of the air and space mediums in the Asia-Pacific region. This competition is being driven in large part by the rapid Chinese development of asymmetric military capabilities and strategies that increasingly challenge the ability of regional missile defense and military space programs to keep pace. This situation has serious implications for the strategic landscape of the region and well beyond. Concerns that this paper hopes to highlight include the long term threat to strategic stability that China’s military developments pose to the region, and the accompanying potential for a major multi-faceted regional arms race driven by strategies and weapons systems that are of an inherently escalatory and de-stabilizing nature. The historic military modernization campaign being undertaken by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the Chinese development, testing and deployment of advanced anti-access, area-denial capabilities are eroding the confidence of other regional actors that they will have unimpeded access to and control of the air and space mediums in the event of a conflict. This is of crucial importance because the Asia-Pacific region is an aerospace theater by its very nature, and thus access to and control of the air and space dimensions of any future conflict will be critical to achieving political and military success on the land and the sea. The latest Quadrennial Defense Review, in an oblique reference to China, states: “Future adversaries will likely posses sophisticated capabilities designed to contest or deny command of the air, sea, space, and cyberspace domains.”1 Recognizing that a shifting balance of relative power and capabilities is underway, the 1 Quadrennial Defense Review Report, (Washington D.C.: Department of Defense, February 2010), p. 9, http://www.defense.gov/qdr/images/QDR_as_of_12Feb10_1000.pdf, accessed June 4, 2010. 1 U.S. and its allies and partners in the region are seeking to develop a variety of means to counter China’s fast evolving capabilities. However, current trends suggest that the U.S. and its allies will find it increasingly difficult to deter and defeat China in any future crisis or conflict. This is due, in no small part, to China’s unprecedented buildup of conventionally armed missiles. A key component of the evolving regional air and space competition is the proliferation of missile technology, most notably stemming from China’s on-going, large- scale production of conventionally-armed ballistic and cruise missiles. This is leading other regional actors to invest in missile defense, and in some limited instances, precise long-range strike capabilities of their own to counter and deter the perceived Chinese threat. In turn, China is developing its own increasingly effective air and missile defense network in the face of what it perceives of as missile threats on its periphery, and in doing so is challenging its potential rivals to develop ever better offensive and defensive means of deterrence. China is particularly sensitive to the U.S. development of an integrated Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) given such a system’s suspected ability to have long-term impacts upon China’s nuclear deterrent. China is also alarmed by U.S. moves to develop a regional theater ballistic missile defense network as a part of the BMDS, given the effects such a system could have upon China’s conventionally-armed ballistic and cruise missile centric strategies. However, authoritative Chinese sources suggest that due to the relative advantages missiles provide over missile defense systems in terms of strategic, tactical and economic effects, it is likely the PLA will continue to 2 invest heavily in such systems, while also bolstering its own missile defense capabilities. 2 Guan Shiyi, Zhu Kun and Song Fuzhi, “Some Issues of Guided Weapon Systems of Winged Missile” (Guanyu feihang daodan tixi de ji ge wenti), Tactical Missile Technology (zhanshu daodan jishu), May 2 Influential Chinese strategists argue that modern conventional aerospace capabilities transcend the nuclear threshold in that they are powerful enough to deter and defeat formidable enemies without having to resort to the threat of using nuclear weapons.3 The advent of relatively inexpensive, mass-produced, precise conventional ballistic and cruise missiles is indeed altering security equations as such weapons are indeed capable of creating strategic effects that were previously only limited to nuclear weapons. However, as will be discussed, their development could actually increase the threat of nuclear war in the coming years. Closely related to the subject of missile defense is the development and testing of anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons and the deepening regional militarization of space. Outer space has increasingly come to be seen as the ultimate strategic high-ground from which to wage modern warfare and as a result is being rapidly militarized by a number of actors in the Asia-Pacific region. Taking a sweeping view of the region, one sees China’s rapidly expanding military space and ASAT programs continuing to push towards a deepening militarization of space, and perhaps leading towards the weaponization of space; the United States, highly reliant on militarized space, researching, developing and testing a number of technologies which seek to ensure access to space in the event of a conflict; India and Russia, both having declared an interest in developing ASAT weapons and increasing their exploitation of military space; and Japan and Taiwan possessing the 2004, pgs. 1-10. Wu Kai, “2009 CASIC Builds Foundation For Development” (Hangtian kegong jituan gongsi 2009 zhulao fazhan genji), China Space News, January 5, 2010, http://www.china- spacenews.com/n435777/n435778/n435783/65278.html, accessed on May 18, 2010. Guan Shiyi, “New Developments in Flight Mechanics – Discussing and Detailing Research on Missile Attack and Defense” (Feixing lixue yanjiu de xin fazhan – feixingqi gongfang duikang yanjiu pingshu), China Science Electronic Journal: Technical Science, Vol. 39, No. 3, 2009, pp. 568-574. 3 Jiang Guocheng, “Building an Offensive and Defensive PLAAF: A Critical Review of Lt Gen Liu Yazhou’s The Centenary of the Air Force,” Air and Space Power Journal, Summer 2010, p. 87, http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj10/sum10/2010- 2%20Summer%20English%20ASPJ.pdf, accessed June 4, 2010. 3 technical and economic wherewithal to further evolve their budding military space programs should the calculus of their respective strategic outlooks change in the future. Thus the stage is set for what may prove to be one of the most important competitions of this century: the race to exploit the ultimate strategic high ground that space represents. In discussing this topic it may prove useful to note the important differences that exist between the militarization of space and the weaponization of space because without proper definition these terms can (and often do) lead to some confusion. There is indeed some room for reasonable disagreement. Some have argued that near-earth space has been militarized since the German V-2 ballistic missile flights of World War Two and the U.S. and Soviet development of ICBMs in the early stages of the cold war. Conversely, others point out that because ballistic missiles only transit the space medium the way ancient cannonballs transited the air medium, one can no more argue that ballistic missiles militarized space than one can argue that cannonballs represented the advent of aerial warfare.4 In any event, space was much more certainly militarized in the 1960s when both superpowers deployed satellite reconnaissance platforms into near-earth space. Since that time the number and variety of satellites performing military-related missions has drastically increased but, despite the early cold war development, testing and deployment of ASATs by the U.S., and the later deployment of operational ASATs by the former Soviet Union and contemporary China, space has not yet been weaponized because no nation is known to have crossed the threshold of placing space-to-space or space-to-earth 4 Barry D. Watts, The Military Use of Space: A Diagnostic Assessment (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2001), p. 98. 4 weapons in orbit for either a long-term or permanent basis.5 However, as will be discussed in this study, given the regional trend in the Asia-Pacific towards developing and fielding an increasing variety of ASAT weapons and missile defense systems with the potential for future space-based elements, the line between the militarization and the weaponization of space appears to becoming increasingly blurred. This monograph addresses the evolving missile defense and military space competition in the Asia-Pacific region being driven by China’s rapid development of ballistic and cruise missiles and ASAT weapons capabilities; explores the various state- level motivations and capabilities behind this multi-faceted competition; discusses the facilities and satellites most likely to be targeted in any future conflict; and looks at what the trends inherent in the situation portend for the strategic future of the competitors and the region as a whole. Ultimately, it will be argued that China’s missile-centric strategies and ASAT weapons buildup will have deleterious effects on regional stability in the coming years, and may lead to a major, multi-dimensional arms race in the region. REGIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE COMPETITION The United States The U.S. faces numerous emerging regional missile defense threats around the globe, including those stemming from volatile states such as North Korea and Iran. However, the U.S. views China’s ballistic and cruise missile build-up as its most challenging long-term threat, and accordingly is seeking ways in which to assure an 5 Ibid.